Moot Respondent Final - HB

Aditi Shah vs. State of Mahanagar and Ors.
LAWTRYST CODE: LT15
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDUS
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. XXX OF 2019
UNDER ARTICLE 132 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS
IN THE MATTER OF
ADITI SHAH ...APPELLANT
vs.
STATE OF MAHANAGAR & Ors. ...RESPONDENTS
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDUS
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... 01
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... 02
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................ 04
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................................................................... 05
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 06
SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENTS .............................................................................. 11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ..................................................................................... 15
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ...........................................................................................24

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Full Form

Anr. Another
Art. Article
ATIS Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
CALEA Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
CAR Civil Aviation Requirements
DGCA Directorate General of Civil Aviation
DSDO Defense Study and Development Organization
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
Hon’ble Honourable
HRLG Human Rights Liberation Group
ITA Indian Telegraph Act
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
No. Number
NPNT No Permission – No Takeoff
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
Ors. Others
PDPB The Personal Data Protection Bill
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Pvt Private
RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
SC Supreme Court
TFAS Task Force for Aerial Surveillance
UAOP Unmanned Aerial Operator Permit
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System
UIN Unique Identification number
vs. Versus
Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATIONS REFERRED
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

2. THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) ACT, 2000
3. THE INDIAN TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885
4. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
5. THE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION BILL, 2018
6. AIRCRAFT RULES 1939
CASES REFERRED
Sr. No. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of
1 MANU/SC/1044/2017
India (UOI) and Ors.
2 Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148
3 R. Rajagopal vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 632
People's Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) vs. AIR 1997 SC 568
4
Union Of India And Another (1996) 1 SCC 301
JODHPUR S.B. Civil Writ
5 Basanta Jain vs. Dilip Kataria
No. 12501/2018
6 District Registrar And Collector, Hyderabad And 1 SCC 496
Another vs. Canara Bank And Others 2005
7 Malak Singh And Others vs. State Of P&H And 1 SCC 420
Others 1981
8 Mr.Aseem Takyar vs. National Highways CIC/SS/A/2012/000145
Authority Of India
9 N. Ramkumar vs. Kamaraj College of Engineering (MD)No.9563 of 2011
And Technology
Rituraj Mishra vs. Govt. Of U.P Thru. Its Chief P.I.L. CIVIL No. - 6907 of
10
Secy. Civil Sectt. Lko. & Ors 2017

BOOKS REFERRED
1. H.W. E. Wade, Administrative Law (10th ed. 2009).

2. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional law of India (4th ed. 2008).
3. Janusz Symonides, Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges (1st ed. 1998).
4. Jayant Chaudary, Handbook of Human Rights (1st ed. 2012).
5. M.P. Singh, VS.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India (11th ed. 2008).
6. M. Hidyatullah, Constitutional Law of India (1st ed. 1984).
7. M.VS. Pylee, Constitutions of the World (4th ed. 2012).
8. R. Satya Narayana, Natural Justice: Expanding Horizons (1st ed. 2008).
9. VS.B. Malleswari, Human Rights: A Global Agenda (1st ed. 2007).
10. VS.B. Malleswari, Human Rights: International Perspectives (1st ed. 2007).
11. VS.R. Krishna Iyer, The Dialectics & Dynamics of Human Rights in India (1st ed.
1999).
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
1. United Nations Human Rights Instruments

2. Council of Europe Treaties on Human Rights & the Protection of Personal Data
3. European Court of Human Rights Case Law on Privacy, Data Protection & the Impact
of New Technologies
WEBSITES REFERRED
1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com

2. Lexis Nexis Academica, http://www.lexisnexis.com/academica
3. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal
4. SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in
5. Oxford Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com.
6. https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/india
7. https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-in-india/

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE APPELLANT HAS FILED AN APPEAL AGAINST THE IMPUNGED

ORDER OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 132 READ WITH
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS FOR THE VIOLATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENUMERATED IN PART III OF THE
CONSTITUTION. THE RESPONDENT MAINTAINS THAT NO VIOLATION OF
RIGHTS HAS TAKEN PLACE. THEREFORE, THIS HON’BLE COURT NEED
NOT ENTRATAIN ITS JURISDICTION IN THIS WRIT PETITION.
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS THAT IN THE EVENT THIS

HON’BLE COURT DECIDES TO PASS AN ORDER IN FAVOUR OF THE
APPLICANTS/PETITIONERS, IT WILL LEAD TO GROSS MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE AND WOULD HAMPER THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHORITY OF
VARIOUS INVESTIGATING AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE SAID MATTER,
AND WOULD MAKE THE EXECUTIVE MACHINERY TOOTHLESS IN
FIGHTING AND/OR TRACKING CRIME OR MAINTAINING LAW AND
ORDER; WHERE THE ONLY PEOPLE PRIVY TO THE TECHNOLOGY
WOULD BE THOSE DOING SO WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION. IT IS
REQUESTED UPON THIS HON’BLE COURT TO MAINTAIN THE PROCESSES
AND RIGHTS WHICH ARE ALREADY WORKING EFFICIENTLY IN ORDER
TO GET PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE LEGALLY AND WITHIN THE AMBIT
OF LAW AND LET TECHNOLOGY ALSO BE MADE ALLOWED AND
ALLOWED TO BE USED BY THE EXECUTIVE.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Whether the existing laws of the Government of Indus are adequate to regulate
the drone usage in the country? If yes, what remedies are available? If no, what
can be done about it?
II. Whether the implementation of the Task Force for Aerial Surveillance (TFAS)
will violate the fundamental rights to privacy of Citizens?
III. Whether the Aditi Shah is entitled for compensation due to negligence, if any, of
the Police Department?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Aditi Shah
vs.
State of Mahanagar & Ors.
1. The Appellant ‘Aditi Shah’, an Indian National is an employee of TCA International.
2. Respondent No. 1 is the State of Mahanagar which also includes the Central Government
for constituting the Task Force and the State Police Departments for executing the pilot
run of the drone surveillance.
3. Respondent No. 2 is a newspaper named News Today. The present response is not on
behalf of, or as counsel for this Respondent.
4. Launch of TFAS: On 01.10.2019, the Central Government announced the launch of a
program called Task Force for Aerial Surveillance (TFAS). The aim of this task force was
to empower certain State Police Departments with Aerial Surveillance Mechanisms. The
drones could be used to analyse huge crowds gathered in large numbers for public events
where in any trouble could be spotted and neutralized.
5. The advantages stated of using the drones were as follows:
a. To have a bird’s eye view of the scene.
b. It would be beneficial in those States where there is a shortage of official
manpower.
6. Pilot run decision: On 02.11.2019, the Bureau of Police Research and Development in
the State of Mahanagar gave the Parla City Police Department 15 drones which were to
be used by them for six (6) months as a pilot study. The data collected would then be used

to decide the success rate of TFAS programme in fulfilling its objectives as stated in the
above point.
7. On 24.12.2019, two events took place near JUZU beach. One was a public event that is a
political gathering which took place at an open ground near JUZU beach. With this
information in hand, the Parla City Police Department decided to use drone surveillance
for the event.
8. On the same day, the Appellant attended a 4-day private event organized by her
colleagues of TCA International consisting of 11 members in all, near JUZU beach which
was from 24.12.2019 to 27.12.2019. The Appellant and her colleagues had rented out a
vacation home - a private property lining the beach of one Ramnish Suri. The property
had a pool in the backyard and the Appellant and her colleagues decided to have a pool
party on 24.12.2019. There were three drones flying in the area for surveillance of the
public event.
9. The petitioner and her colleagues were dressed according to the theme of a pool party, all
the members of the private party were enjoying the swimming pool, relishing the food
and consuming drinks. They could hear the noise of the loudspeakers from the ground of
the political party, but mostly ignored it to enjoy their own musical world and friendly
banter. They also spotted the drones in the sky but did not give much thought to it.
10. The data being collected by the drones was being downloaded on the spot by the technical
analysts (two-member team) of TFAS. They had three drones in the air: viz. Alpha, Beta,
& Gama. One of the team members realized that there was a malfunction in Beta. On
examination he realized that the drone’s frequency was compromised and the intruder
now had access to the data of the drone. Precautionary measures to prevent the breach
failed and the drone was brought down and deactivated. Monitoring of the public event
continued with the other two active drones.

11. The next day on 25.12.2019, three newspapers covered this political event; The INDUS
times, News Today, and The Gerald paper. News Today covered the political event on
page-2. News Today was able to provide aerial shots of the event. Taking advantage of
the aerial shots, News Today published one more article on page-12 of the same
newspaper. It was titled “HERE IS WHAT THE YOUTH OF INDUS WANT TODAY”.
The article had pictures (aerial shots) of the above-mentioned pool party that had been
conducted in Ramnish Suri’s house.
12. Alleged infringement of Privacy: Aditi Shah (the Appellant) and Divya Sharma, one of
her colleagues, belonged to conservative families who for the first time were given
permission to attend the party by their parents. Their families did not take the news well
and were embarrassed and felt humiliated about the same. Heated phone calls were made
to the respective girls by their family members and they were finally asked to cut their
trip short and return home which was on the outskirts of the state of Mahanagar.
13. Filing of complaints: On 29.12.2019, fathers of both the abovesaid women visited the
Parla City Police Station to file their complaints. On reaching there they informed the
officer in – charge, Srikanth Shukla regarding the pictures that appeared in the newspaper
of a private party. While looking into the matter the officer in-charge realized that these
photographs could not have been taken at ground level and were shot from above the
ground.
14. Internal investigation: The officer in-charge immediately realized that the photographs
were taken on the same day that their own drones were in the air. Upon internal inquiry, it
was revealed that one of their drones (Beta) had captured identical shots of the party
which were stored on the device memory. The technical analyst informed him of the
interference faced before the drone was brought down from the air.

15. Investigation with Newspaper and internal matters: The officer in-charge,
immediately constituted a team of two officers and one cybercrime specialist officer to
look into the matter with the newspaper. Meanwhile Appellant’s father through his
contacts in the department unofficially found out about this technical issue with the
drones. The Appellant’s father was told to wait as an official inquiry was being conducted
as per the department protocol before anything else could be stated formally therefore
neither affirming nor denying the facts.
16. On 29.01.2020, the Appellant filed a petition before the High Court to seek the following
reliefs:
a. That the Task Force for Aerial Surveillance (TFAS) pilot violated the fundamental
right to privacy of citizens and therefore should be aborted,
b. That the Police department has been negligent with the use of drones and
c. The Police Department was liable to compensate the Appellant.
17. Time Lines of Events that occurred:
1st of October 2019, (01.10.2019):

● Launch of TFAS - Task Force for Aerial Surveillance. Drones provided for
surveillance.
2nd of November 2019, (02.11.2019):

● Pilot run decision to be carried out by the Parla City Police Department. Decision
taken by the Bureau of Police Research and Development in the State of Mahanagar.
24th of December 2019, (24.12.2019):

● 2 events took place near JUZU beach – one political gathering and second a private
pool party on one Ramesh Suri’s property lining the JUZU beach.
● Interference in Beta drone, one of the three drones monitoring the public event. Drone
deactivated by technical team immediately.
25th December 2019, (25.12.2019)

● News Today reported the private pool party pictures on page 12 of its newspaper.

29th December 2019, (29.12.2019)

● Both fathers of the Appellant and one Divya Sharma, filed their complaint with
respect to the newspaper article.
● Team sent to News Today office for further investigation.
● The Appellant’s father, unofficially learnt about the drone interference.
29th January 2020, (29.01.2020)

● Aditi Shah, the present Appellant filed a petition before the High Court.
18. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the TFAS is a Government
policy of a surveillance program which was initiated in national interest. On the issue
of negligence, the court refrained from passing an order. However, the High Court
granted a leave to appeal and immediately the present appeal was filed before this
Hon’ble Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Yes, the Respondent humbly submits that the existing laws of the Government of
Indus are more than adequate to regulate drone usage in the country.
The country’s first Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) for drones were published
on 27.08.2018 and went into effect from 01.12.2018.
Remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) and unmanned aircraft (drones) are governed by the
Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) issued by the Directorate General of Civil
Aviation (DGCA) from time to time.
The relevant regulations that deal with RPAs and unmanned aircraft are
(i) CAR section 3 - Air Transport Series - X Part 1 Issue I dated 29 August 2018;
(ii) AIP Supplement 164 of 2018 issued by the Airports Authority of India dated
30 November 2019 and
(iii) The DGCA RPAS Guidance Manual issued on 03.06.2019 by the DGCA.
The DGCA is the regulatory body charged with enforcing the above-
mentioned rules.
Other rules already governing privacy, including digital data of personal nature:
• The Indian Penal Code (1860)

• The Indian Constitution: Article 19, Article 21 and Article 300A
• The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 (“the PDPB”): Contemplates the
establishment and incorporation of a Data Protection Authority by the Central
Government.
The above rules are further elaborated in the Arguments Advanced section.

will violate the fundamental right to privacy of Citizens?
No, the implementation of the Task Force for Aerial Surveillance (TFAS) will not
violate the fundamental right to privacy of Citizens. It is within the ambit of
surveillance for the State, the same has been explicitly permitted. Even the
Constitution allows for “reasonable restrictions” to the right to privacy.
As per various judgements of the Supreme Court, it is clear and evident that
protecting national security and preventing crime are evidently within the ambit
of “reasonable restrictions” to the right to privacy.
• The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is another government department that
plays a role in surveillance. The MHA is responsible for the internal security of
the country and the various central security agencies that report to and operate
under it. Further, as per the rules promulgated under the Information Technology
Act 2000 as well as the Telegraph Act, the Secretary of the Ministry of Home
Affairs is the "competent authority" to issue interception orders under
this legislation in the normal course.
• As per Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules and Rules under section 69 of the
Information Technology Act 2000, service providers are required to maintain the
secrecy and confidentiality of the intercepted information.
• A number of statutes penalize unlawful surveillance. For example, Section 24
of the Indian Telegraph Act states that the penalty for unlawful interception is a
fine of up to 500 rupees and imprisonment of up to one year.
• The Rules under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 provide
that service providers or their employees who intentionally and without
authorisation attempt to intercept, authorise, or assist any person to intercept
information in transmission at any place within Indus will be punished according
to the relevant provisions.

In case of unauthorised interception by security agencies, no specific penalty is
provided for, but there is a “catch-all” penalty under the IT Act (section 45) that states
that any person who contravenes any provisions of the IT Act or the Rules or
Regulations under the IT Act would be liable to pay a fine not exceeding 25,000
Rupees.
In view of the above, it is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the
implementation of the Task Force for Aerial Surveillance (TFAS) will not violate the
fundamental right to privacy of Citizens.

No, Aditi Shah is not entitled to any compensation due to negligence.
1. Lack of Mens Rea: In the present case of the drone “Beta” being compromised
by interfering signals, the drone operator showed no malice in intention to
collecting the data of the Appellant. Hence there was no Mens rea. This, in itself is
a complete defense.
2. Reasonable care, caution and precaution: As soon as it was perceived that the
drone in question faced interference and was not fully commissionable, the drone
operator promptly deactivated the drone to stop any unintended damage. This is
the extent of care, caution and precaution that the drone operator could reasonably
take.
3. Volenti non Fit Injuria: Moreover, the Appellant was at the swimming pool
when the footage was captured. The swimming pool was not indoors. The same
site was hence visible to others.
4. In continuance, by the doctrine of Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio, since:
a. The appellant had hidden from her family, the fact that she was in a
cosmopolitan group of 11 men and women staying in a house. If the same
was common knowledge, there would have been no offence.
b. The fact that as soon as her family found out about the salient features of
the event that were not disclosed to them (which included activities like
choice of attire, enjoying drinks, etc) they immediately made her cut short
her trip. If the event was culturally and socially acceptable by the
Appellant’s family, they would neither ask her to cut short her trip, nor
lodge a complaint claiming social embarrassment.
5. Salus Populi Suprema Lex: The commissioning of drone surveillance was done
to promulgate safety and security of the masses and to take pre-emptive measures
against possible crime. Here, if technology is not used to curb possible crime, the
benefit of the individual would conflict with the benefit of the population whose
security is of prime importance for law enforcement.
In view of the above, is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court not compensate the
Appellant on the above grounds and not entertain the present petition.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Yes. The Respondent humbly submits that existing laws of the Government of Indus
are more than adequate to regulate drone usage in the country.
1. The country’s first Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) for drones on August
27, 2018 went into effect from 01.12.2018.
2. Remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) and unmanned aircraft (drones) are governed by
the Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) issued by the Directorate General of Civil
Aviation (DGCA) from time to time.
3. The relevant regulations that deal with RPAs and unmanned aircraft are already
included as:
(i) CAR section 3 - Air Transport Series - X Part 1 Issue I dated 29.08.2018;
(ii) AIP Supplement 164 of 2018 issued by the Airports Authority of India dated
30.11.2019 and
(iii) The DGCA RPAS Guidance Manual issued on 03.062019 by the DGCA.
The DGCA is the regulatory body charged with enforcing the above-
mentioned rules.
4. Other rules already governing privacy, including digital data of personal
nature:
a. The Indian Penal Code (1860) - Section 378: This is applicable and is to be
used to prevent theft of data. Since the offences of theft and misappropriation
technically apply only to movable property under the Indian Penal Code, but the
term “movable property” has been defined to include corporeal property of every
description except land or property that is permanently attached to the earth.
b. The Indian Constitution: Article 21 of the Constitution protects an individual’s
right to life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court of India, in a nine-judge

bench decision in August 2017, (in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union
of India and Ors.) held that citizens enjoy a fundamental right to privacy that is
intrinsic to life and liberty. Article 300A of the Constitution also guarantees the
right not to be deprived of one’s property except by authority of law, so if the data
in question is regarded as property, this provision may be relied upon. It must be
noted, however, that rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be used against the
State or State-owned enterprises, which is very much the case in the state of
Mahanagar. In addition to the above, invasion or breach of privacy could lead to
an action in tort.
c. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 (“the PDPB”): contemplates the
establishment and incorporation of a Data Protection Authority by the Central
Government. As envisaged in Section 50 of the PDPB, said Authority will
comprise of six full-time members appointed for a five-year term by the Central
Government. Appointments will be made on recommendation by a selection
committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary, the Chief Justice of India or a
Supreme Court Justice nominated by the Chief Justice, and “one expert of repute”
nominated by the Cabinet Secretary and Chief Justice. Section 60 of the PDPB
details the powers and functions of the Authority, which include a wide range of
functions related to monitoring data transfers and fiduciaries involved in such
transfers, enforcement of the law and of its own codes of practice, which it will be
empowered to write, taking action in response to data breaches, creating a rating
for fiduciaries in the form of a “data trust score”, advising Parliament and Central
and State governments, etc.
Once the PDPB is implemented, the same shall encompass all regulations in
addition to those already in effect. Any effort to create any more regulation or
legislation to this effect would be redundant.
5. A number of statutes penalize unlawful surveillance. For example,

a. Section 24 of the Indian Telegraph Act states that the penalty
for unlawful interception is a fine of up to 500 rupees and imprisonment of
up to one year.
b. The Rules under section 69 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 provide that service providers or their employees who intentionally

and without authorisation attempt to intercept, authorise, or assist any

person to intercept information in transmission at any place within India
will be punished according to the relevant provisions.
6. In case of unauthorised interception by security agencies, no specific penalty is
provided for but there is a “catch-all” penalty under the IT Act (section 45)
that states that any person who contravenes any provisions of the IT Act or the
Rules or Regulations under the IT Act would be liable to pay a fine not exceeding
25,000 rupees.
7. In the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1996) the
Supreme Court has already extended the right to privacy to communications. In
doing so, the Court laid down guidelines that form the backbone for the checks
and balances in interception provisions in India.
It is the submission of the Respondents that there are already more than
adequate laws in Indus to regulate drone usage and any additional endeavours
would be a gross misuse of this Hon’ble court’s time and resources.
It is evident that various other agencies involved in the matters related to the
behaviour of drones are working within the ambit of the law. In the interest of not
having duplication in legislation and multiplicity in cases, the Respondent pleads to
consider this PIL premature, with no further action from the court and to dispose off
this PIL, as per the process, judiciously and expeditiously, within their scope and
powers, and the same shall be immediately disposed off by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.

will violate the fundamental rights to privacy of Citizens?
No. The Respondent humbly submits that the implementation of the Task Force for
Aerial Surveillance (TFAS) will not violate any fundamental rights to privacy of
Citizens.
1. The same has been explicitly permitted within the ambit of surveillance for the
State. Even the Constitution allows for “reasonable restriction” to the right to
privacy.
2. Justice DY Chandrachud’s opinion, co-signed by Chief Justice of India JS
Khehar, Justice RK Agrawal and Justice S Abdul Nazeer, in the case of
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of Indus and Ors. reminds us of
the test used for all restrictions on Article 21, under which privacy is being read:
“the requirement of a need, in terms of a legitimate state aim”
“the means which are adopted by the legislature are proportional to the object
and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law”
The conclusions of Justice Chandrachud’s opinion give a few examples of what

these might be. “The legitimate aims of the state would include for instance
protecting national security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging
innovation and the spread of knowledge, and preventing the dissipation of social
welfare benefits,”
Hence, it is clear and evident that protecting national security and preventing
crime are evidently within the ambit of “reasonable exceptions” to the right
to privacy as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
3. In extension: Agencies such as law enforcement agencies, intelligence and

securities government agencies, military, internet service providers,
telecommunications service providers, corporations and the public. For instance,
many of the companies sell CCTV cameras and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
to law enforcement agencies and the Indian military, biometric systems to the
Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), and possibly phone and
Internet monitoring tools to intelligence agencies allow for data interception.
Lawful interception technical regulations and standards adhered to by these

companies include those proposed by Alliance for Telecommunications Industry

Solutions (ATIS), European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), and standards
such as ISO 9001: 2008, ISO 27001: 2005, STQC Certification, INCITS 379 and
BS 7799
4. In Govind vs. State of M.P. (1975). The Supreme Court confirmed that the right
to privacy is a fundamental right. It derived the right to privacy from both the right
to life and personal liberty as well as freedom of speech and movement. The right
to privacy was said to encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home,
the family marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. However, the
right to privacy is subject to “compelling state interest”.
5. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is another government department that
plays a role in surveillance. The MHA is responsible for the internal security of
the country and the various central security agencies that report to and operate
under it. Further, as per the rules promulgated under the IT Act as well as the
Telegraph Act, the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs is the "competent
authority" to issue interception orders under this legislation in the normal course.
6. As per Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules and Rules under section 69 of the
Information Technology Act, service providers are required to maintain the
secrecy and confidentiality of the intercepted information. The implementation of
the TFAS will not give the State any more rights to invade privacy than it already
has.
7. In the case of Mr.Aseem Takyar vs. National Highways Authority Of India,
even if the authority has a particular footage during the course of his day to day
duty, the same is held confidential and not disclosed to any entity in the public
domain. In this case, the toll authority, having CCTV footage, vide his letter dated
27.07.2012 furnished pointwise reply/information to the Appellant and
categorically declined the disclosure of information in respect of footage of each
CCTV Cameras citing privacy issues. This goes on to further show that even if the
camera DOES capture the footage and it is in the possession of the authorities,
they are already duty-bound to keep it private and confidential.
8. In the case of Basanta Jain vs. Dilip Kataria, it was held that violation of the
right to privacy only occurred because the intent of installing the CCTV cameras

was solely to infringe upon the rights of the Plaintiff and it was intentionally
pointing continuously at the property of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the
implementation of the TFAS will not violate this right, but, on the contrary, it
will safeguard this right to privacy in case the deed is done with intent to
breach someone’s privacy.
9. In the case of Rituraj Mishra vs Govt. Of U.P. Thru. Its Chief Secy., the High
Court of Allahabad held that the job of the court is to find out as to whether the
activity which is proposed to be taken has behind it a genuine motive in order to
protect its citizens or not.
In case this petition is not dismissed, it might open the flood-gates to a plethora of
similar cases that have already been dismissed by the lower courts to be appealed.
Since all safeguards are already covered within the law, hence, it is humbly submitted
to this Hon’ble Court that the implementation of the Task Force for Aerial
Surveillance (TFAS) will not violate any fundamental rights to privacy of Citizens.

No. The Respondent humbly submits that the Appellant is not entitled to any
compensation due to negligence. This humble submission is substantiated by the
following arguments:
1. Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 clearly states that reasonable
restrictions can be imposed on the right to privacy in the interest of the sovereignty
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence.
2. Lack of Mens Rea: In the given case of the drone Beta being compromised by
interfering signals, the drone operator showed no malice in intention to collecting
the data of the Appellant. Hence there is no Mens rea. This, in itself is a complete
defense.
3. Reasonable care, caution and precaution: As soon as it was perceived that the
drone in question malfunctioned and was not fully commissionable, the drone
operator promptly deactivated the drone to stop any further damage. This is the
extent of reasonable care, caution and precaution that the drone operator could
reasonable take. It is safe to suggest that the essence of negligence needs a
violation of the duty to care by not exercising reasonable care, caution and
precaution, which has been more than exercised in this case.
4. Volenti non Fit Injuria: Moreover, the Appellant was at the swimming pool when
the footage was captured. The swimming pool was not indoors. The same site was
hence visible to others, including, but not limited to passers-by, people present in
the vicinity, people in balconies of adjacent houses, etc. The fact that the Appellant
was voluntarily present in the area outside the confines of the indoor area of the
house, it implies that she consented to be seen as present at the given property in
the attire of her choice.
5. The Supreme Court, in R. Rajagopal vs. Union of India has clarified that the
protection available under the right to privacy may not be available to a
person who voluntarily introduces him or herself into controversy.

a. By being in a publicly visible area outside the perimeter of the house, while
dressed in a way they did not wish to be seen by the public, while having the
intent of concealing their whereabouts or attire or food and drink habits or
behaviour from their own family, the Appellant has herself created the basis of
the situation that made her visible at the location, thereby voluntarily thrusting
herself into controversy.
b. Even if it was determined by the Supreme Court that the right to privacy is a
part of the right to personal liberty guaranteed under the constitution; the
counsel for the Respondent is NOT denying that right. However, in the same
judgement, the Supreme Court ALSO goes on to say that nobody can publish
anything unless he or she consents or voluntarily thrusts himself into
controversy. It has been amply proven without reasonable doubt that the
Appellant had voluntarily thrust herself into said controversy and hence
protection under the right to privacy is not applicable here.
6. In continuance, since the above point establishes the doctrine of Ex Turpi Causa
Non Oritur Actio, since the appellant had hidden from her family, the fact that she
was in a cosmopolitan group of 11 men and women staying in a house where there
may be consumption of drinks, etc. If the same was common knowledge, there would
have been no offence. Hence no action is warranted.
7. The fact that as soon as her family found out about the salient features of the event
that were not disclosed to them (which included activities like choice of attire,
enjoying drinks, etc) they immediately made her cut short her trip. If the event was
culturally and socially acceptable by the Appellant’s family, they would neither ask
her to cut short her trip, nor lodge a complaint claiming social embarrassment.
8. Salus Populi Suprema Lex: The commissioning of drone surveillance was done to
promulgate safety and security of the masses and to take pre-emptive measures
against possible crime. Here, if technology is not used to curb possible crime, the
benefit of the individual would conflict with the benefit of the population whose
security is of prime importance for law enforcement.
9. District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad and another vs. Canara Bank and
another (2004). The Supreme Court also held that the right to privacy deals with
persons and not places and that an intrusion into privacy may be by (1) legislative
provisions, (2) administrative/executive orders and (3) judicial orders.

There was exercise of rights to executive orders and therefore it does not amount to
any case of violation of privacy, thereby does not warrant any compensation to the
Appellant.
10. In case of N.Ramkumar vs Kamaraj College Of Engineering also, the court
contended that the guilt of the students was established only when they themselves
pre-meditated and perpetrated the act of stealing the security cameras. The main intent
of the students was the basis for the conviction. It highlighted that in case it was
proven that the said act was done innocently and/or for learning purposes, there would
have been no case against them.
In the present case, the drone operators did not have any intent to either share the
footage or part away with, or steal the drone, since it belonged to their own
organization. They neither intended to share the footage nor give any temporary
possession of the drone to a third party. In fact, they immediately disabled the drone
as soon as they noticed interference. This was a most bona fide act warranting no
consequence.
11. Case of Govind vs. State of M.P., the Hon’ble Supreme court held that the right to
privacy can be restricted if there is an important countervailing interest which is
superior to it. In the same case, The Hon’ble Supreme Court also reiterates that the
right to privacy can be restricted if there is a compelling state interest to be
served.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble
Court be pleased to:
1. Dismiss the writ petition.
2. In the alternative declare and adjudge:
a. That the Respondents have not violated the fundamental right of the Appellant.
b. That the Respondents have performed any and all actions in the discharge of their duty
which is either under executive acts or acts of State.
c. That the case be dismissed for lack of any Mens Rea.
3. Orders as to costs
4. And to pass any such order as it may deem fit in the light of justice, equity and good
conscience.
For This Act of Kindness, the Respondent Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Place- Capital of Indus
Date- 04th March, 2020
S/d-
(Counsel for the Respondents)

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Aditi Shah vs. State of Mahanagar and Ors.

LAWTRYST CODE: LT15

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDUS

W.P. (CIVIL) NO. XXX OF 2019

UNDER ARTICLE 132 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS

ADITI SHAH ...APPELLANT

STATE OF MAHANAGAR & Ors. ...RESPONDENTS

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... 01

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... 02

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................ 04

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................................................................... 05

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 06

SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENTS .............................................................................. 11

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ..................................................................................... 15

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ...........................................................................................24

Abbreviation Full Form

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 1

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

Sr. No. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 2

1. H.W. E. Wade, Administrative Law (10th ed. 2009).

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

1. United Nations Human Rights Instruments

1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 3

THE APPELLANT HAS FILED AN APPEAL AGAINST THE IMPUNGED

IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS THAT IN THE EVENT THIS

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 4

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 5

State of Mahanagar & Ors.

1. The Appellant ‘Aditi Shah’, an Indian National is an employee of TCA International.

run of the drone surveillance.

behalf of, or as counsel for this Respondent.

4. Launch of TFAS: On 01.10.2019, the Central Government announced the launch of a

where in any trouble could be spotted and neutralized.

5. The advantages stated of using the drones were as follows:

a. To have a bird’s eye view of the scene.

b. It would be beneficial in those States where there is a shortage of official

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 6

for the event.

continued with the other two active drones.

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 7

conducted in Ramnish Suri’s house.

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 8

neither affirming nor denying the facts.

right to privacy of citizens and therefore should be aborted,

c. The Police Department was liable to compensate the Appellant.

17. Time Lines of Events that occurred:

1st of October 2019, (01.10.2019):

2nd of November 2019, (02.11.2019):

24th of December 2019, (24.12.2019):

25th December 2019, (25.12.2019)

Memorandum for the Respondents Page | 9

29th December 2019, (29.12.2019)