Se-299 and 300 of IPC
Se-299 and 300 of IPC
Se-299 and 300 of IPC
Types of homicides
Example: - A is suffering from diabetes. B with the intention of hastening the death
of A gave him a lot of sweets. The intended victim ate the sweets, as a result of which,
his blood sugar level went high and eventually resulted in his death. Thus, B is
criminally liable.
Explanation 2
It describes a circumstance in which an injured person may have recovered
and avoided death if he had received early and appropriated medical treatment. In
such cases, the fact that the wounded person died as a result of his inability to obtain
adequate medical care cannot be used to absolve the person who caused the harm in
the first place of liability.
Example:- A is suffering from diabetes. B with the intention of hastening the death
of A gave him a lot of sweets. The intended victim ate the sweets, as a result of which,
his blood sugar level went high and eventually resulted in his death owing to the lack
of immediate medical care. Here, the fact of the lack of immediate medical care cannot
be considered to acquit B from liability.
Explanation 3
It refers to a somewhat different circumstance. It takes into account a child’s
death while still in the mother’s womb. It is not culpable homicide if the child dies
while still in the mother’s womb, according to the law. However, if any part of the
child emerges from the mother’s womb, even if it is not completely developed, and
the kid dies, it is considered a culpable homicide.
Example: - A is a pregnant woman who’s yet to deliver a baby in the hospital. Now,
the head of baby B comes out of the womb. If the baby dies, it amounts to culpable
homicide.
In Jabbar and Ors. vs. State (1965), Sarju, Jamna’s brother, was said to have
been hired as a labourer by Ishaq, the appellant, to transport limestone from Saraiya
hill. Ishaq was said to have slapped Sarju twice when he stated his willingness to carry
just five ‘dharas’ (seers) of lime instead of the seven that Ishaq demanded. The three
brothers, Jabbar, Ishaq, and Habib are said to have gone to their residence after that
and saw Sarju seated there while Smt. Pangoli was applying turmeric to the back of
his neck. Ishaq appellant is accused of striking two lathi strikes at Sarju as soon as the
appellants arrived on the scene, causing him to flee to his own nearby Kotha. After
that, it is reported that Jabbar appellant inquired about Jamna. As Smt. Pangoli was
unable to inform him, the appellant Jabbar is accused of pushing her, causing her to
fall on her stomach, and then kicking her on the side of her stomach. Smt. Pangoli,
who was pregnant at the time, became unwell as a result and gave birth prematurely
to a seven-month-old baby who died. The child’s hands, feet, and other body parts had
developed, according to the post mortem report. In other words, the baby had
developed sufficiently to be deemed an independent entity from the mother in the
eyes of the law. The court found Jabbar guilty of an offence under Section 304A of the
Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to one year of rigorous imprisonment, a fine of
Rs. 500, and three months of further rigorous imprisonment if he did not pay the fee.
Section 301 IPC : culpable homicide by causing the death of a person other than the
person whose death was intended
By Section 301, if a person commits culpable homicide by causing the death of
someone whose death, he neither intends nor knows to be likely to cause, the culpable
homicide committed by the offender is of the same description as if he had caused the
death of the person whose death he intended or knew to be likely to cause.
In Rajbir Singh vs. State Of U.P (2006), the appellant alleged that his brother’s
home was attacked with bricks by a neighbor. As a result of this, his father and the
accused had a verbal spat, but the problem was eventually resolved by the locals. The
next day, the accused and two relatives arrived with firearms. They approached the
complainant’s business, where his father was standing. The accused allegedly
persuaded or urged his relatives to murder him there. The accused began firing at the
complainant’s father, who was injured and fell to the ground. A girl went to that shop
to buy some items and was injured and fell down. On their route to the hospital, both
of the injured people died. In his defence, the accused claimed that the girl died by
mistake and that they had no intention of killing her. She was going through that area
when she was injured and died as a result. The Supreme Court overturned the High
Court’s decision and found the defendants guilty. He was accused under Section 301
of the IPC.
Murder
By Section 300, unless otherwise specified, culpable homicide is murder:
If the act that causes the death is done with the intent of causing death, or—
A fires a shot at Z, intending to kill him. As a result, Z dies. A commits murder.
If the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender
knows is likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
Knowing that B is suffering from an illness that makes a blow likely to kill him,
A hits him with the intention of injuring him. As a result of the strike, B dies. Although
the strike may not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the
death of a person in good health, A is guilty of murder. However, if A, unaware that B
is suffering from a disease, strikes him with a blow that would not, in the ordinary
course of nature, kill a person in good health, A is not guilty of murder if he did not
intend to cause death or bodily injury that would, in the ordinary course of nature,
kill a person in good health.
If it is done with the aim of inflicting physical damage on another person, and
the bodily injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the regular course of nature,
or—
In the regular course of nature, A purposefully causes Z a sword-cut or club-
wound sufficient to kill a man. As a result, Z dies. A is guilty of murder in this case,
despite the fact that he may not have planned to kill Z.
If the person conducting the act is aware that it is so risky that it must, in all
likelihood, result in death or physical harm that is likely to result in death and
conducts the act without any justification for risking death or injury as stated.
Without justification, A shoots a loaded cannon into a gathering of people, killing one
of them. A is guilty of murder, even though he did not have a planned plan to kill
somebody in particular.
Exceptions
Exception I : grave and sudden provocation
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender causes the death of the person who
delivered the provocation or any other person by mistake or accident while being
deprived of the ability of self-control by grave and immediate provocation.
Illustration
Under the impact of emotions aroused by Z’s provocation, A murders Y, Z’s
child, on purpose. In as much as the provocation was not offered by the child, and the
child’s death was not caused by accident or misfortune while doing an act prompted
by the provocation, this is murder.
The exception is subject to three exceptions of its own:
➢ The provocation should not have been sought voluntarily by the culprit as a
justification for killing or harming anybody.
➢ The provocation should not be caused by an act carried out in accordance with
the law or by a public official in the lawful exercise of his powers.
➢ The provocation is unrelated to any actions taken in the exercise of one’s right
to self-defence.
KM Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra
The defendant in KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1961), was a naval
officer. He had three children and was married. His wife admitted to him one day that
she had an affair with Prem Ahuja, the deceased. Enraged, the accused returned to his
ship, got a semi-automatic pistol and six rounds from the ship’s shop, proceeded to
the deceased’s flat, entered his bedroom, and shot him to death. Following that, the
accused turned himself in to the police. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the
accused’s actions were covered by Exception 1 of Section 300. The following
postulates pertaining to the grave and abrupt provocation were established by the
Supreme Court:
The test of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable man from
the same social group as the accused would be so outraged as to lose his self-control
in the position in which the accused was put.
In India, words and gestures may give grave and sudden provocation to an
accused, so bringing his act within the first exception to Section 300 of the IPC.
In determining whether the succeeding action produced significant and immediate
provocation for committing the crime, the mental context formed by the victim’s
earlier act may be taken into account.
The fatal strike should be definitely connected to the effect of passion
emanating from that provocation, not after the passion had cooled down due to the
passage of time or otherwise allowing for premeditation and calculation.
The accused may have temporarily lost control after his wife admitted to her
illegitimate relationship with the deceased, according to the Supreme Court. After
dropping his wife and children off at a movie theatre, he proceeded to the ship,
grabbed the handgun, conducted some official business, and then drove his car to the
deceased’s workplace and afterwards to his home. By that time, three hours had
passed, and he had had ample opportunity to restore his temper. As a result, the Court
decided that the requirements of Exception 1 to Section 300 were not applicable. The
defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison.
This was the last case decided by jury trial. This case was debated hugely
among the public. There was a major criticism about the case. Nanavati had
previously served as V. K. Krishna Menon’s Defence Associate while the latter was
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, and had gotten close to the Nehrus during
that period. Jawaharlal Nehru was Prime Minister of India at the time of Nanavati’s
trial and punishment, and his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, was Governor of Bombay
State. All of these benefits might not have helped Nanavati under other circumstances,
because a pardon could have been perceived by the press and public at other times
as a flagrant abuse of authority to aid a crony of a powerful political family. Public
opinion in the generally conservative country, on the other hand, was
overwhelmingly in favour of Nanavati, who was viewed as an upright navy
commander with middle-class ideals and a strong sense of honour. Nanavati had
served three years in prison, and it was thought that granting him clemency would
enrage the Sindhi community, to whom the Ahuja family belonged. Around this time,
the government received a pardon plea from Bhai Pratap, a Sindhi businessman who
had been convicted of abusing an import licence and had been a participant in the
Indian independence struggle. The government was inclined to pardon Bhai Pratap
because of his history as a freedom warrior and the minor nature of his transgression.
Finally, even Mamie Ahuja, the deceased’s sister, signed an application for Nanavati’s
pardon. In writing, she consented to his pardon. Bhai Pratap and Nanavati were
finally pardoned by Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the Governor of Maharashtra at the time.
This case is also an epitome of the influence of media trials.
In Shankar Diwal Wadu. vs. State Of Maharastra (2008), according to the
prosecution, the accused Shankar Wadu is the brother of Mahu Wadu, who was
assaulted by him and died as a result of the assault. The event occurred on October
22, 1996, in Kaimad Wadu Pada, Laluka Wada, Thane, where both the accused and
the victim, as well as other close relatives, lived. The accused sought to maintain
Kamlibai, the widow of his brother Vasant, as his mistress, according to the
prosecution evidence, but she refused. The appellant was violently dragging Kamlibai
to his residence on the day of the occurrence. His brother Mahu (the deceased) told
him at the time that he couldn’t force and pull Kamlibai to his residence. The accused
became outraged by such unsolicited advice and lifted a wooden plank (Pat) and
whacked Mahur on the head with it, as well as kicking and punching him. Mahu died
instantly. Yeshubai, a close relative of both the offender and the victim, filed a
complaint alleging his attack. The investigation was launched after receiving this
complaint, and the accused was detained. The prosecution called up to eight
witnesses to establish its accusation of murder against the accused, and the learned
trial judge, after weighing the evidence, found the accused guilty and sentenced him
to life in prison under section 302 / 506 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as a fine of
Rs.50,000.
Exception II : right of private defense
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of
the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by
law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of
defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than
is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration
Z tries to horsewhip A, but not in a way that causes him serious injury. A pulls
a handgun from his pocket. The attack against Z continues. A, believing in good faith
that there is no other way to avoid being horsewhipped, shoots Z to death. A has
merely committed culpable homicide, not murder.
Under some circumstances, the right of private defence even extends to the
infliction of death. This Section applies when a person’s right to private defence has
been violated. It should be noted that the fact that a person has exercised his right to
private defence beyond its limits does not completely exonerate him or her under this
exemption. It is only used as a mitigating element to lessen the crime from murder to
culpable homicide that does not constitute murder. Of course, before this exception
may be invoked, it must be established that the accused has the right to a private
defence under Sections 96-106 of the IPC. The question of whether the accused has
exceeded his right to private defence will arise only once the existence of the right has
been proved. If it seems that the accused does not have the right to a private defence
in the first instance, then this provision will not apply.
Nathan vs. State of Madras
The accused and his wife were in possession of some land that they had been
farming for some years in Nathan v. State of Madras (1972). They had fallen behind
on their lease payments to the landlady. The accused was forcibly evicted, and the
landlord attempted to harvest the crop. As a result, the accused killed the dead in the
exercise of his right to private property defence. The Supreme Court agreed with the
claim that the incident occurred when the accused was exercising his legal right to
private defence against the property. The right to private property defence was
restricted to the degree of causing any harm other than death under Section 104, IPC
because the deceased person was not armed with any lethal weapons and there could
not have been any fear of death or severe harm on the part of the accused and his
party. As a result, the accused’s right to private defence was violated, and the case
was classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 2 to
Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code because the act was done in good faith and
without the intent to cause death. The accused’s death sentence was commuted to a
term of life in prison.
Exception III : lawful act of a public servant
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, while acting as a public servant or
assisting a public servant acting for the benefit of public justice, exceeds the powers
granted to him by law and causes death by doing an act that he, in good faith, believes
to be lawful and necessary for the proper discharge of his duty as such public servant
and without malice toward the person who is killed.
The following are the essential elements of this exception:
➢ The offence must have been committed by a public servant or a person
assisting a public servant;
➢ The alleged act must have been committed by the public servant in the
discharge of his official duties;
➢ He must have exceeded the powers granted to him by law;
➢ The act must have been done in good faith; and
➢ The public servant should have thought that his actions were legal and
required for the proper fulfilment of his duties, and
➢ He should not have harboured any hatred toward the individual who died as a
result of his actions.
In Dakhi Singh vs. State (1955), a suspected thief was apprehended by a police
officer and was being transported to a railway station. The robber was able to flee the
speeding train. He was chased by the constable. He fired at him because he was unable
to arrest him. However, he hit the fireman and killed him in the process. The case was
found to be covered by this exception.
Exception IV : sudden conflict
Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed in the heat of emotion during a
sudden conflict and without the offenders taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel
or unusual manner.
The only requirements for this exception are that: the murder be committed without
premeditation;
• it is committed in a sudden fight;
• it is committed in the heat of passion;
• it is committed upon a sudden quarrel; and
• It is committed without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a
cruel or unusual manner.
In Manke Ram vs. State of Haryana (2003), the Supreme Court granted the
benefit of exception 4 to a police inspector who killed his subordinate in a bizarre
combination of circumstances. In his chamber, he asked the deceased to drink. While
they were drinking, the deceased’s nephew entered the room and summoned him for
supper. As the deceased rose to leave the room, the appellant became enraged and
began insulting him in obscene terms, which the deceased objected to. This enraged
the appellant even more. Between the two of them, a brawl erupted. The appellant
took out his service handgun and fired two bullets at the deceased, who was standing
close. These shots were lethal. The Supreme Court overturned the Punjab High
Court’s conviction under Section 302 of the Code, finding that the incident occurred
in the heat of passion and granting the petitioner the benefit of exception 4. It was
decided that, given the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant
did not take unfair advantage of the fight or conduct in an unusual or harsh manner.
Exception V : death with consent
Culpable homicide is not murdered if the dead individual is beyond the age of
eighteen years and suffers or risks death with his consent.
Illustration
A intentionally causes Z, a minor under the age of eighteen, to commit suicide
by instigation. Because Z’s young, he was unable to consent to his own death; as a
result, A had aided and abetted murder.
The following things must be proven:
• The death was induced with the deceased’s permission;
• The deceased was over the age of 18 at the time; and
• The consent provided was free and voluntary, and not based on fear or a
misunderstanding of facts.
In the case of Narendra vs. State of Rajasthan (2014), the deceased was a
married woman named Nathi who had left her house and was living with her parents.
There, she became close to the accused Narendra, and the two expressed their desire
to marry. Because they belonged to the same gotra, the villagers were opposed to
their desire to marry. Due to their dissatisfaction with the villagers’ rejection of their
love, both of them agreed to commit suicide. Other villagers saw the accused inflicting
harm on the corpse one day, but the victim had already died before they could save
her. Although the accused had stab wounds in his abdomen, he was prevented from
killing himself. The High Court found no evidence on the record that the deceased
gave his free and voluntary consent. Later, the case reached the Supreme Court,
where justices emphasised facts such as the fact that the deceased did not raise an
alarm, that the accused was injured, and that he did not have a weapon when he
entered the residence. Taking into account these facts, the Court found in favour of
the deceased, awarding him benefits under Exception 5.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CULPABLE HOMICIDE AND MURDER
The genus is culpable homicide, and the species is murder. All culpable homicides are
murders, but not all culpable homicides are murders. So the distinction is between
culpable homicide that amounts to murder and culpable homicide that does not
amount to murder. The sole distinction between culpable homicide and murder is the
degree of purpose and knowledge involved. The case would be classified as murder if
there was a high level of purpose and knowledge. The case would be classified as
responsible homicide if there was a lesser degree of purpose or knowledge. As a
result, establishing categorical demarcations between culpable homicide and murder
is challenging.
Intention
Clause (a) of Section 299 and clause (1) of Section 300 are the same. It is culpable
homicide under Section 299 if death is caused by an act done with the goal of causing
death (a). Unless one of the exceptions applies, it also amounts to murder under cl (1)
of Section 300.
Intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death
Both Section 299 clause (b) and Section 300 clauses 2 and 3 deal with the purpose to
inflict physical damage that is likely to result in death. In terms of Section 299(b), it
simply states that if death is caused by an act committed with the goal of causing
physical damage likely to cause death, it is considered a culpable homicide. While
clause (2) of Section 300 states that an act must be done with the goal of inflicting
bodily damage that is likely to result in death, it also states that the deliberate
causation of bodily injury must be accompanied by the knowledge that the bodily
injury is likely to result in death.
of Section 304, Pt II and brought under Section 302, as the offence would amount to
murder under Section 300(4).
In the case of Vishwanath vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959), the accused stabbed
the dead with a knife that penetrated his heart as the deceased was attempting to
carry away the accused’s wife and sister by force. The Supreme Court ruled that the
suit fell under Section 304, paragraph II.
Section 302: murder
Murder is punishable under Section 302. It specifies a penalty of death or life
imprisonment, as well as a monetary fine. If a court finds an offender guilty of murder
under Section 300, the court must sentence the criminal to death or life
imprisonment. No other lesser punishment can be imposed by the court.
In 1973, the Code of Criminal Procedure was updated again, making life
imprisonment the rule. The judge’s ability to impose a death sentence has been
limited by Section 354(3) of the new Code, which requires the court to establish
particular reasons for imposing a death sentence. When it comes to assigning a
penalty for murder, it has now made life imprisonment the rule and death sentence
the exception.
REDDY SAMPATH KUMAR VS. STATE
In Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State (2005), the Apex Court permitted the
accused, a doctor, who was engaged in many murders of his in-laws, to be sentenced
to life in jail. The court, however, barred him from collecting any remissions on
auspicious occasions in order to serve as a deterrent. Similarly, in Lehna case (2002),
the Supreme Court declared the death penalty imposed by the trial court and upheld
by the high court on the accused of murdering his mother, brother, and sister-in-law
to be unconstitutional and commuted it to life imprisonment, reasoning that the
multiple murders, while brutal, were not the result of diabolic and sinister planning.
CONCLUSION
Note:-
This study material is only for your reference, as per your own, you have to add
more cases and you have to refer any other text books. During preparation, I referred
numbers of books.