SPR 2002
SPR 2002
SPR 2002
This is an exciting time to serve as Chief of Infantry, events brought home clearly the need to proceed with-
and I particularly welcome the opportunity to represent out further delay in arming and training an Army that
the interests of our Branch at a time when we are pre- can anticipate and neutralize adversaries with similar
paring to realize the full benefits of the Army Trans- aspirations, as well as responding to threats of a more
formation. Building upon the readiness, morale, and conventional nature. We had already selected an azi-
professionalism of the Legacy Force, we have com- muth for an orderly transition from Legacy Forces to an
mitted assets toward Interim organizations with poten- Interim structure that would prevail over near term
tial for significantly enhanced mobility, lethality, threats, and finally yield an Objective Force to meet the
sustainability and survivability, and are gaining a challenges of adversaries whose capabilities are as yet
clearer picture of what we will demand of the Objective unmeasured. Unfortunately, predictions of violence on
Force once it becomes reality. transnational and national levels have already come
The changes that we see unfolding—in doctrine, in true, and circumstances demand that we waste no time
weapons and the target acquisition systems that com- in transitioning to an Army capable of executing even
plement them, and in the training that will develop and more diverse and demanding missions. We must
maintain the professional competencies of the Infan- shorten our time line to build our future force.
try—are all part of a commitment that we share. To be During the next year, this Objective Force will start
sure, our soldiers and our loyal, productive civilian to take shape as our Combat, Materiel, and Training
work force are already committed to the defense of our Developers wrestle with putting form to our future In-
nation, but we must also accept the commitment to fantry. The exact shape will not come into sharpest
fully support this evolutionary process upon which so focus for several years, but we know now what this
much depends. force must do. I want to share my thoughts on the need
Although the threats facing our nation have changed for the Objective Force, what some of its key capabili-
significantly in just the past decade, our role as Infan- ties must be, and what our role as Infantrymen will be.
trymen in protecting our nation, her people, and our We have amply demonstrated our technological lead
institutions is fundamentally the same as it has been for to those who would challenge us, and the lesson has not
more than two and a quarter centuries. The values that gone unheeded. Aware of their vulnerability to U.S.
sustained the spirit and resolve of our forbears at Val- detection and subsequent precision strikes, adversaries
ley Forge are no less relevant today, as we confront will avoid massing their forces in linear offensive and
adversaries who operate unrestricted by national defensive echelons. Instead, they will attempt to em-
boundaries and impelled by motives not easily under- ploy selective strikes, conduct rapid maneuver from
stood in the context of a free and open society. areas of sanctuary, engage in terrorism, incite civil and
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demon- political unrest, and initiate other asymmetric actions
strated sharply the scope, commitment, and asymmetric aimed at destabilizing allies and attacking U.S. interests
nature of the threat against the United States. These worldwide. From this posture, the enemy will also at-
In October 1996 the Defense Science Command (TRADOC). The doctrinal FM 3-06 (90-10), Urban Operations
Board concluded that the most likely update methodology consists of three (Final Draft), provides the Army with
battlefield of the future would be an efforts on parallel axes: operational doctrine for conducting
urban area. The board also made some • Link Field Manual (FM) 3-06 (90- UOs. (The current FM 90-10, Military
recommendations, essentially stating 10) to FM 3-0(100-5) and Joint Pub (JP) Operations on Urbanized Terrain,
that the armed forces of the United 3-06; provides all inclusive urban op- written in 1979, focuses on high-
States needed to improve their capabili- erational doctrine. intensity urban combat against a War-
ties for conducting urban operations • Link FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1) and saw Pact threat in Western Europe.)
(UOs). Understanding this need, U.S. 7/71 Series FM updates to FM 3-06 (90- FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1), Combined Arms
Army Infantry School established the 10); provides UO combined arms doc- Operations in Urban Terrain, formerly
Combined Arms MOUT Task Force trine at brigade level and below. An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in
(CAMTF) in June 1999, with the char- • Link TRADOC proponent efforts Built-Up Areas, and the 7/71 Series FM
ter of updating UO doctrine, developing to update respective proponent manuals updates provide tactical level combined
an overall training strategy, and identi- to the above field manuals; provides arms UO doctrine. Finally, proponent
fying training requirements. This arti- branch specific UO doctrine. efforts across TRADOC provide
cle provides a short synopsis of what In short, published and emerging branch-specific doctrine for conducting
the task force has accomplished to date. doctrine is sound and applies to current of urban operations.
forces as well as Transformation forces. Figure 1 depicts the horizontal and
Doctrine The capstone Army doctrinal man- vertical integration of the doctrinal up-
The following is an overview of the ual—FM 3-0 (100-5), Operations, pro- date methodology, along with the key
UO doctrinal update effort throughout vides the doctrinal framework for the doctrinal concepts found in the manu-
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Army. The keystone doctrinal manual, als.
DOCTRINE STATUS
Horizontal and Vertical Synchronization
FM No. TITLE STATUS
Doctrinal Framework
Chg 1, App J, Urban Ops, The
7-30 Posted on Digital Library.
FM 3-0 (100-5) Full Spectrum Ops Infantry Brigade
Decisive, Shaping, Chg 1, App G, Urban Ops, The
Sustaining Ops 7-20 Posted on Digital Library.
Infantry Battalion
Chg 1, App L, Urban Ops, The
7-10 Posted on Digital Library.
Infantry Rifle Company
FM 3-06 (90-10) Assess, Shape,
Chg 1, Ch 6, Urban Ops, The
Dominate, Transition 7-8 Posted on Digital Library.
Infantry Rifle Platoon & Squad
Chg 1, Ch 9, Urban Ops, The
7-92 Infantry Recon Platoon & Posted on Digital Library.
FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1) Offense, Defense, Squad
Stability, and Support
7/71 Series Updates 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Pending posting on Digi-
Tactics & Techniques
12 (90-10-1) Urban Terrain tal Library.
Figure 1 Figure 2
Training
Equally important was the effort to
give the Army an overall UO training
strategy. The training doctrine was
outlined in Training Circular (TC) 90-1,
Training for Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain. The TC described
how to use the MOUT Assault Course
and the Collective Training Facility
(CTF). One of the inherent problems
under this system was that no opera- Figure 3
tional and maintenance funds were pro-
vided for the upkeep of the facilities,
nor was any provision made for live
fire. Installations and units often fabri-
cated shoot houses and used hand-held
video cameras to collect data for after-
action reviews (AARs). Additionally,
targets were often fabricated, and there
was no standard targetry that could be
used for either long- or short-range pre-
cision engagements.
The CAMTF’s primary effort has
been to revise the live UO training
strategy. That strategy—which will be
found in the revised TC 90-1, Training
for Urban Operations—consists of the
Urban Assault Course, the Shoot House,
the Breach Facility, and the Combined
Arms Collective Training Facility
(CACTF). The overall cost of each
facility includes estimated operation
and maintenance as well. The revised Figure 4
TC 90-1 has been approved, and posting gunnery station. The assault course toon live-fire training. It will have full
on the digital library is now pending. supports the training strategy as out- audio/video instrumentation, portable
Urban Assault Course. The assault lined in TC 90-1. The facility is de- after-action reviews (AARs), and three-
course (Figure 3) is a five-station facil- signed for recommended training before dimensional precision targetry pack-
ity designed to train individuals, squads, using the shoot house or the collective ages. This facility supports the training
and platoons. It includes a two-story training facility. (Recommended fre- strategy as outlined in TC 90-1. (Rec-
offense/defense building, a grenadier quency of use: Quarterly for the active ommended frequency of use: Semi-
gunnery station, an underground trainer, components, and during pre- and post- annually for the active components and
and two training lanes for tasks and mobilization for the reserve compo- during pre- and post-mobilization for
techniques for individual through pla- nents.) reserve components.)
toon level. This facility will include an Live Fire Shoot House. The shoot Breach Facility. The breach facility
instrumented three-dimensional target house (Figure 4) is a single-story de- (Figure 5) includes wall, door, and win-
package and a conventional live-fire signed for individual, squad, and build- dow breach locations. It has no instru-
pop-up target package at the grenadier ing with multiple points of entry, pla- mentation and contains only structural
The expectation that the Interim Bri- Occupation: behind number 2 gun. Number 4 gun is
gade Combat Team (IBCT) will fight in • The terrain must provide 360- placed 150 meters to the left and on line
a non-linear environment has forced degree mask and overhead clearance. with number 2 gun.
units to develop new tactics, techniques, • The mortars are placed in a modi- • The mortars are laid on the primary
and procedures (TTPs) to incorporate fied “Lazy W” configuration to increase DOF with referred deflections of 2800
indirect fires to deliver rounds in a 360- the platoon’s depth and limit overhead and 0700 mils. Both deflections have
degree zone. Traditionally, most infan- fire. aiming stakes placed at 50 and 100 me-
try units have trained and fought in a • Once the DOF to the priority target ters. The two sets of poles are posi-
linear environment where—in offensive is determined, the number 2 gun is tioned to prevent inadvertent sight
operations—the mortar platoon has placed as the anchor (Figure 1). Num- blockage.
been located at a one-half to two-thirds ber 1 gun is placed at a general direc-
distance behind friendly troops provid- tion of four o’clock and 70 meters be- FDC Procedures:
ing a single direction of fire (DOF) for- hind number 2 gun. Number 3 gun is • It should be noted that depending
ward of friendly lines. placed at a general direction of seven upon the array of the tubes, it is possible
With the introduction of non-linear o’clock and 70 meters to the left and to fire above the heads of the gun teams
operations, a larger battalion area of (Figure 2), which is not permitted
responsibility (AOR), and the pos- during training exercises because
sible requirement to execute si- of safety concerns. The M16
multaneous missions, the 5th Bat- plotting board allows the FDC to
talion, 20th Infantry, has adopted determine which guns will fire
the 360-degree distributive fires during the mission. The plotting
concept to employ its mortar assets board is set up with the base gun
in a responsive, accurate, and safe representing the pivot point. The
manner. other three guns are plotted as
This concept is predicated on positioned on the ground. Any
situation dependent tactics, in value can be assigned to the in-
which the mortar platoon estab- termediate quadrants on the board.
lishes a firing point in the center of • The 360-degree fire adjust-
Figure 1
the battalion AOR so it can provide ments are conducted in accordance with
indirect fires in any direction. This Field Manual 23-91, Mortar Gunnery.
technique for employing indirect mortar During fire for effect (FFE), the FDC
fires allows the IBCT infantry compa- determines the firing element, the
nies and platoons to operate in a non- sheaf’s width and attitude, and the
linear environment with maximum bursting diameter.
freedom of maneuver and with constant 4 2 • The sheaf’s width is determined by
and responsive mortar support. In order multiplying the number of guns in the
to provide 360-degree support, new FFE by the bursting diameter of the
mortar TTPs were developed for occu- weapon system. The sheaf’s attitude is
pying a firing position and for fire di- 3 1 determined by finding the perpendicular
rection control (FDC) procedures. The azimuth to the direction of fire. The
following are excerpts from the battal- DOF is indexed on the plotting board
ion’s mortar platoon’s standing operat- outlining the perpendicular azimuth.
ing procedures (SOPs): Figure 2 • FFE is computed by entering the
All infantrymen must know how to constructed positions have collapsed Field Manuals (FMs) 5-103, Surviv-
construct solid, functional fighting po- and killed or injured the soldiers they ability, and 5-34, Engineer Field Data,
sitions. An improperly constructed po- were intended to protect. Positions contain detailed designs that ensure the
sition such as the one shown here is collapse in peacetime as well. At each structural integrity of the position and
actually dangerous for the soldier to of the combat training centers, soldiers the safety of the occupants. The Infan-
occupy. It will not provide the protec- in improperly designed, poorly sup- try School has published Graphic Train-
tion from fire that he needs, and it may ported, and badly constructed fighting ing Aid (GTA) 7-6-1, Fighting Position
even collapse onto him at any moment. positions have been injured when the Construction Infantry Leader Reference
Such unsafe structures should be torn overhead cover came crashing down or Card, which contains multiple illustra-
down and re-built properly; otherwise a the sides collapsed in on them, smoth- tions and detailed leader checklists.
position designed to protect may well ering them even as their comrades (These references are available at
present an even greater danger. struggled to dig them out. http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdl.html.)
Throughout history, the Infantry has It is the unit leaders’ responsibility to Unless the soldiers constructing a
been called upon to seize key terrain prevent this from happening. Each of position and the leaders supervising the
and then dig in solidly to hold it. In- them, from squad leader through bat- construction actually follow the design,
fantrymen, assisted by their brothers-in- talion commander, must learn the stan- the resulting position will neither pro-
arms the combat Engineers, build the dards for proper construction of a tect the soldiers inside, nor survive en-
field fortifications and fighting posi- fighting position, and must supervise emy fire. Contrast the photo of the
tions that are key to surviving the en- and inspect the soldiers under him as poorly constructed position shown here
emy’s fire and repelling his assaults. they build their positions. The funda- with the well designed, solidly built,
Well-constructed bunkers, trenches, mental design of well-constructed functional fighting positions depicted in
and fighting positions protect infantry- fighting and survivability positions is FM 5-103, shown in Figures 1 and 2.
men and allow them to fight and survive not new. U.S. Army Engineers have In the drawings, you immediately
in the deadly environment of modern validated several basic designs that will notice the sturdy timbers, solidly sup-
combat. survive direct and indirect fire from ported on broad, level footings that hold
On every battlefield, from the muddy most enemy weapons, and that will up the heavy load of overhead cover.
trenches of World War I to the sandy protect the men inside while they return You do not see the unstable columns of
desert of the Persian Gulf, improperly fire. rotting sandbags found in the photo-
graph. The proper support of overhead
cover is a vital aspect of a safe fighting
position or observation post.
According to FM 5-103, sandy soil
can weigh as much as 100 pounds per
cubic foot. The 10' x 4' roof in the
photograph, if covered with 18 inches
of soil, could weigh 6,000 pounds.
That’s three tons! Unless the roof is
waterproofed, that weight could double
as the soil soaks up water during rains.
That’s nearly six tons balancing pre-
cariously over the head of the soldier
manning that position.
A properly designed and built posi-
tion provides 360-degree protection,
instead of just shielding its occupants
from the front. The position in the
photograph clearly does not do that. It
Figure 1 Figure 2
also lacks sufficient overhead cover, apart, simply cannot carry the load. bat arms or not, must know this. Su-
and the stringers appear to be too few Another key factor is the strength and pervising the construction of fighting
and too far apart. The center column, location of the support base on which positions is one of the fundamental
along with the 4"x4" post at the right of the stringers rest. If the base is too tasks of a noncommissioned officer. It
the photograph, appears to have been weak, or too close to the edge, the sides has to be done to standard, because the
added after the position was built, of the position will slump inward, pos- lives of soldiers and the success of the
probably because the roof was sagging. sibly suffocating the occupants before mission depend on it. Learn how to
It is too short and has been propped up they can be dug out. inspect a fighting position. If you do,
on two sandbags, a totally inadequate Do not be intimidated by all of this you will never have to dig the lifeless
footing. This column also would inter- talk of construction standards, footings, body of a soldier out of one that col-
fere with the soldier if he tried to en- timbers, stringers, and spacing. It is not lapsed on him.
gage targets from the oversized open- technical information that can be under-
ings. stood only by an engineer. This is sim-
The selection, number, and placement ple soldier-skill stuff, and infantrymen Arthur A. Durante, Jr., is Deputy Chief of
Doctrine, Combined Arms and Tactics Di-
of the stringers supporting overhead have been building good, solid positions rectorate, U.S. Army Infantry School.
cover is critical to the safety of a posi- since before World War I.
tion. Weak stringers, placed too far Every soldier and every leader, com-
M41 TOW
Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CRAIG G. LANGHAUSER
The M41 TOW improved target ac- providing better antiarmor capabilities naissance, surveillance, and target ac-
quisition system (ITAS) is a block up- to antitank units, also has capabilities quisition (RSTA), rear area protection,
grade to the M220 ground/high- that make it an integral part of the com- and urban operations capabilities.
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle bined arms team. Even when organized The TOW ITAS consists of three new
(HMMWV)-mounted TOW 2 missile in heavy–light task forces, where the line replaceable units: the target acqui-
system. The TOW ITAS is currently preponderance of antiarmor capabilities sition subsystem (TAS), the fire control
being fielded to airborne, air assault, traditionally has resided in the heavy subsystem, and the battery power
and light infantry forces throughout the elements, TOW ITAS-equipped anti- source; a modified TOW 2 traversing
active and reserve components of the tank units can not only destroy threat unit; the existing TOW launch tube and
U.S. Army. The ITAS, in addition to targets but also provide superior recon- tripod; and a TOW HMMWV modifi-
According to Field Manual (FM) 20- can get authority for four-hour duration The future maneuver concerns can be
32, obstacle emplacement authority is mines. The problem comes when we mitigated with the use of lanes. Lanes
the jurisdiction that a unit commander request 48-hour or 15-day duration can be left in the Volcano minefield,
has to emplace tactical obstacles. In a mines. I have occasionally received 48- and they can be closed with Modular
theater of operations, theater command- hour permission, but never 15-day per- Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS). They
ers have the authority to emplace obsta- mission. At the same time, I have had can also be opened with the self-
cles. In most cases they delegate this permission to use conventional hand- destruct feature of the MOPMS.
authority to corps commanders who emplaced mines that cannot have a self- As we move to the future we must get
further delegate it to division com- destruct capability. These are armed used to replacing conventional hand-
manders. Division commanders then and deadly until removed or destroyed. emplaced mines with scatterable mines.
have obstacle emplacement authority in Why is permission to use a temporary We need to do this for three primary
their area of operations, unless that mine denied while permission to use a reasons—reduced logistical require-
authority is withheld or restricted by a permanent mine is routinely granted? ments, faster emplacement times, and
higher commander. Commanders sub- The normal reasons that I have been smaller manpower requirements.
ordinate to corps and division do not given for denial are concerns about frat- From a logistical viewpoint, a Vol-
have the authority to emplace obstacles ricide and constraining future maneu- cano antitank mine weighs about four
unless the higher commander delegates ver. Both of these concerns can be pounds, as opposed to the conventional
it for a current operation. mitigated. Before any land Volcano M-15’s 30 pounds. This is more than
During my time as a combat engineer System can be used to emplace a mine- an 85 percent reduction in weight for
commander and staff member, I have field, fratricide prevention fences must countermobility logistical requirements.
had difficulty getting authority for using be erected, just like those used for con- Two soldiers with one vehicle can em-
our organic Volcano systems. Often we ventional hand-emplaced minefields. place a 1,000-meter minefield in about
As this country’s land-fighting com- how to employ interpreters. quential steps, as you will see, influence
ponent, the Army has needed and em- Small-unit commanders and leaders each other.
ployed interpreters in every engagement in an engagement area are often the Selection can come from two
throughout its history. And because of ones most in need of interpreters, but sources—military and local-hire civil-
increased force projection requirements, also often the ones who have the least ian. Military interpreters can be spe-
the need for skilled linguists is growing. idea of how to use them properly. This cially trained, uniformed servicemen, or
On the strategic level, the Army has article will examine issues involving contracted American citizens. A mili-
made great strides in developing pro- interpreters and address questions perti- tary, uniformed interpreter with a secu-
grams for military interpreters, foreign nent to you, the small-unit leader. rity clearance is the most desirable, but
area officers, and the Korean augmen- For maximum effectiveness, leaders the demand on military interpreters
tees to the U.S. Army, just to name a should consider carefully the selection, makes them scarce. In fact, you are not
few. But the Army must also improve preparation, and use of the interpreter in likely to encounter one under normal
the tactical education of its leaders on each individual circumstance. The se- circumstances. As a result, local-hire
Experiences from the second This feature is also useful for engaging After the First Chechen War (1994-
Chechen War set the tone for future personnel in open trenches. 1996), the Russian command found that
ordnance. The Pribor Research and The ammunition comes packed in its Naval Infantry units had paid little
Production Center announced in May 40-round boxes (known as “zincs”), and attention in training the marines to fire
2001 that it had developed a 40mm the market price of a VOG-25 frag- the GP-25 and considered it a major
“cumulative” round for GP-25 and GP- mentation round was about U.S. $30, failure of the command echelon. (In
30 under-barrel grenade launchers ca- while the training grenade was only 1997, the training emphasis was
pable of piercing 60 to 70mm of armor. $15. changed to rectify that problem as well
In addition to illuminating and training The illuminating round explodes at a as a list of other shortcomings).
rounds, the Russian Military News height of about 100 meters and illumi- Under-barrel grenade launchers—
Agency quoted Pribor chief engineer nates the area for 10 seconds, but the M203, GP-25 and GP-30 being the most
Vladimir Eggert as saying that the third illumination radius was not mentioned. popular—are considered effective
new round would be thermobaric. The VOG rounds have no fixed car- weapons in many armies, but their rate
The effectiveness of a thermobaric tridge case, but have a propellant charge of fire leaves something to be desired.
40mm grenade round will be an inter- with percussion primer at their base. After each shot, they have to be re-
esting problem in packaging. The 4.7kg This cuts down reloading time, because loaded and are limited to 4 or 5 rounds
Bulgarian 93mm RPG-7 thermobaric there is no casing to be ejected. per minute.
warhead creates a blast wave equivalent The Russian answer to the M-203 The Russians recognized this need
to that produced by the detonation of was the BG-15/GP-25 under-barrel gre- for a greater rate of fire from their
2kg of TNT. A regular RPG-7 round nade launcher “Kostyor” (Fire). Devel- squad grenade launchers, particularly
weighs only 2.5kg, and a VOG-25 oped by Valery Telesh in 1972, mass when confronted with ambushes initi-
round has only 48 grams of high explo- production started in 1980. Nine P-25s ated by command-detonated mines.
sive. are issued to each 47-man mechanized Inspired by the 40mm South African
Pribor produces the .25kg VOG-25 infantry platoon, and each grenadier MGL-6, Tula’s Instrument Design Bu-
fragmentation grenade and the .278kg usually has a basic load of 10 rounds. reau State Unitary Enterprise offers a
VOG-25P jumping fragmentation gre-
nade. The impact fuse on these gre-
nades is sensitive enough to work on
snow, bog, and water surfaces.
However, a VOG-25P “bounces” to
explode at the height of 0.5 to 1.5 me-
ters (also reported as 1.5 to 2 meters).
On striking the ground, the impact fuse
fires a small charge of smokeless pow-
Figure 1. GP-25 under-barrel 40mm grenade launcher.
der, blowing the main body of the gre-
nade back into the air. As it does so, a
short-delay fuse is ignited and after the
grenade has risen about 1.5 meters, the
high-explosive charge is detonated.
The “airburst” enhances its effec-
tiveness, since half of the fragments of a
regular HE grenade exploding on the
ground bury themselves in the soil.
Sketches from The New World of Russian Small
Arms & Ammo, by Charlie Cutshaw; used with
permission of Paladin Press. Figure 2. AKS-74U with GP-25 grenade launcher.
The use of tactical decision games use 500 years before the birth of Christ. To be sure, experience is one of the
(TDGs) to train leaders is not new; the Today the TDG has assumed new im- most valuable aspects of teaching, but it
technique can be traced back at least to portance in allowing leaders to develop is also often costly in terms of lives and
the Chinese general and military theo- and sharpen their tactical skills without materiel. The tactical and military his-
rist Sun Tzu, who was advocating their an extensive commitment of resources. tory instruction, readings, and digital
TDG #1-01
LIGHT INFANTRY ATTACK OF A RIDGELINE
Situation— company to lead this attack. You are to seize the high ground
You are the commander of A/2-87 IN (L) consisting of three vicinity Hill 122 to secure a foothold in order to facilitate the
rifle platoons, an AT section, a mortar section, and a headquarters battalion’s seizure of the rest of the ridgeline and pass the brigade
element. You are Javelin/240B equipped, and are 100% on per- main attack.
sonnel and equipment. You are the lead element in the battalion’s movement and
For the past two weeks, your battalion has faced strong attacks have priority of fires for FA. The DS artillery battalion (105mm)
from a regimental sized enemy light infantry element that man- completed a 15-minute suppression mission on the objective in
aged to cross the Pecos River (northwest of Hill 122 off sketch). preparation for your assault. Anticipating a fierce fight based
Since this was the last significant barrier between U.S. forces and upon B Company’s experiences yesterday, you transition into
the enemy, our division commander committed our brigade to bounding overwatch as you cross Schiller’s Bridge over the Bull-
block the penetration. Our battalion, as a supporting effort, is to frog River. Your lead platoon makes it nearly to the marker atop
seize a ridgeline that overlooks the river to facilitate the brigade Hill 122 when it comes under automatic weapons fire from the
(–) attack on the enemy’s bridgehead. Hill 122 marks the start of south.
this ridgeline. The battalion commander’s intent is to destroy all The battalion commander calls for a Sitrep and informs you
crew-served and AT weapons, control key hilltops on the ridge, that C Company started taking mortar fire east of Schiller’s
and pass the brigade (–) unhindered along Axis White (which Bridge.
runs to the NW through CPs 2, 3, & 5—CP 5 is to the northwest
off of the sketch). REQUIREMENT—
Your battalion has twice failed to seize the ridgeline in earlier Take 12 minutes to develop the orders you would pass to your
attempts the past two days. Since the other companies were a bit subordinates. Include guidance for supporting arms and a sketch
weakened from their assaults, the commander has chosen your of your plan. Then provide a brief explanation.
Operation of a DCCP
Local Security.
• Locate the DCCP so that DCs
will not suffer any greater exposure to
the effects of combat than they would Figure 2. . Sample DC Overlay (From FM 41-10)
without the DCCP.
• Establish local security to protect
the persons operating the DCCP, the
occupants, and friendly troops adjacent
to it or passing by.
• Post guards at the entrance and
exit of the DCCP. Give them special
orders, as required.
Physical security and operations
within the DCCP:
Step 1, Dismount point/vehicle
search. Ensure that all private autos,
public conveyances, and the like (in-
cluding livestock and carts) are parked
outside or on the fringes of the facility
in the vehicle search area until they
have been searched; require all pas-
sengers to dismount.
• Direct passengers to the DC
search area.
• Make sure the driver remains
with the vehicle until it is searched. If
you have an undercarriage observation Figure 3
device, use it. When the search is over,
the driver and the searchers together
move the vehicle or livestock cart to the vehicle hold area in Card, sentence 3, to point-to-communicate, as necessary. Treat
accordance with the model DCCP layout (Figure 3). Many livestock as vehicles. Treat pets as livestock—if this does not
vehicles will contain household goods, suitcases, and other create more problems than it avoids. If available, affix a Field
items. Search them for bombs and weapons if the vehicle Property Control Card to the vehicle or animal by using the
holding area is within 50 meters of the people holding area. back of the card to denote the driver/owner as best you can.
Although searching for contraband is not standard procedure, it Give a copy to the driver. Point to sentence 3 on the Explana-
may be mandatory under the OPORD or special orders given to tion Card, as necessary. (Brigades may develop a simple
you. Inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will Field Property Control Card that contains lines for the DCCP
be secure, but placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to number, the date, the seized item number, the seized item
retrieve any of the items from the vehicle. Use an Explanation description, and a signature lock for the DCCP OIC or
The 82d Airborne Division recently the challenges involved in integrating sergeant at division, one sergeant first
undertook a bold initiative to improve each device with the weapon. class in each of the infantry brigades,
marksmanship skills and the lethality of nine staff sergeants in the infantry bat-
the individual paratrooper. Modeled Where We’ve Been talions, and one staff sergeant in the
after the mechanized infantry master To initiate the program, the leaders engineer battalion. Additionally, each
gunner program, this program is de- first had to define its parameters. The infantry and engineer company was
signed to provide a foundation of NCO possible weapon systems included the charged with providing one staff ser-
subject matter experts who are charged M4, M249, M240B, Mk 19, M2, TOW, geant to serve as master gunner as an
with improving marksmanship through Javelin, and 81mm and 60mm mortars. additional duty.
training, new equipment integration, These systems were divided into three Identifying the right personnel to
and small arms systems maintenance. groups on the basis of priority and a serve as the 14 primary master gunners
Since marksmanship performance has realistic workload for the master gun- was considered critical to the success of
remained high in the 82d, the purpose ners: the program. NCO expertise would be
of this program is not to revive a lost Phase I weapons are the M4, M249, the program’s touchstone, and short-
skill. On the contrary, the influx of M240B, and Javelin—the initial focus term sacrifices would have to be made
night vision devices (NVDs), optics, of the master gunner program. to achieve long-term success. This im-
and lasers has given light forces an un- Phase II weapons are the Mk 19, M2, portant duty therefore fell onto the divi-
precedented opportunity to own the and TOW. sion’s command sergeants major, who
night in a small arms clash. Yet to date Phase III weapons are the 81mm and hand-selected NCOs to fill the master
the potential of this increased capability 60mm mortars. gunner positions. Each battalion and
has not been fully realized. The divi- At the same time, the leaders had to brigade master gunner was interviewed
sion’s master gunner program is simply make decisions about personnel. What by his unit CSM and appointed with the
recognition that if we are to capitalize is the appropriate master gunner rank at principal duty title of master gunner.
on this technology and increase lethality each unit level? Should they be given Upon selection, each was stabilized in
at night, we must have a core of experts special duty (SD) status so they can his position for one year.
trained on current capabilities, weapon fully concentrate on master gunner du-
configurations, and the unique technical ties without distractions? Which units Where We Are
aspects that each device brings to our need master gunners? Once the initial pool of master gunner
weapons. Master gunners must also be Leaders soon decided that the pro- candidates had been selected, coordina-
intimately involved in the fielding of gram would begin with 14 master gun- tion was quickly made with 2d Battal-
new equipment and be responsible for ners serving in SD status. One master ion, 29th Infantry Regiment, at Fort
Master Marksmen
In the Light Infantry
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS KENNETH WOLFE
Infantrymen today continue to strug- requirement, it will continue to be unre- I recommend that all light infantry
gle with marksmanship, especially un- alistic, less cost effective, and in many battalions designate a Master Marks-
der combat conditions. Trends at the cases unsafe. Consider the precious man, and make him responsible for es-
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) training hours and dollars spent on tablishing and directing a comprehen-
continue to document that soldiers do leadership development and unit train- sive marksmanship program within the
not engage targets effectively. Until ing. All of that time and money is unit. The Army’s mechanized infantry
unit leaders make marksmanship a wasted if soldiers cannot effectively and armor units as well as the Marine
command focus instead of a biannual engage targets. Corps have such programs in place.
It’s Day 9 of the 10-day field train- medical evacuation (MED-EVAC) heli- MEDEVAC Systems Rehearsals.
ing exercise (FTX) conducted at the copter for the student. Within 20 min- Systems rehearsals are conducted on the
6th Ranger Training Battalion (RTB), utes the student is extracted from the fourth day of each Ranger Class—11
the final exercise of Ranger School. swamp and is at the Eglin Air Force times over the course of a year. The
For the past eight days the Ranger Base emergency room for treatment. first system to be tested is a jungle
students have averaged only two hours Today, the 6th Ranger Training Bat- penetrator (JP) hoist of a 200-pound
of sleep per day. A platoon of 40 talion, responsible for the Florida Phase dummy off a safety boat on the Yellow
Ranger students walks through the of Ranger School, is expertly supported River. Before any student conducts
swamps along the Yellow River on the by aircrews from the XVIII Airborne waterborne training, this rehearsal is
Florida Panhandle. The illumination Corps. The battalion trains MEDEVAC conducted to verify that aircrews, flight
is zero and the nearest road is an un- systems and scenarios at least 15 times medics, boat operators, Ranger medics,
improved trail two kilometers away, a year. This training is broken into four and tactical operations center (TOC)
with the Boiling Creek to their back. different categories: MEDEVAC systems personnel can safely extract a casualty
Suddenly a water moccasin bites one rehearsals, quarterly MEDEVAC training, from the swamps.
of the Ranger students. Without hesi- annual interagency mass casualty Following the hoist rehearsal, one RI
tation the Ranger Instructors (RIs) (MASCAL) exercise, and student MED- walking team, consisting of four in-
assess the situation and request a EVAC operations.. structors, initiates part two of this sys-
When an infantry officer takes com- and Vietnam—a major, comprehensive These are not easily quantifiable bene-
mand of a company, he wants to make it study of wound effects—found that 80 fits, but they are important and a good
the best fighting force possible. Many percent of combat deaths occurred in commander will work to improve them.
of us know how to develop the maneu- the first hour after injury. Of these
ver aspects of training, but we may not casualties, 50 percent bled to death, half Ranger CLS Training:
be sure how to improve other areas that of whom could have survived if the A Case Study
support the company’s ability to fight. bleeding had been stopped. Saving The results of a good CLS program
One essential support skill is the lives is the fundamental reward from a are impressive. Recently, I observed a
ability of trained combat life savers good medical training program. platoon raid conducted by 3d Battalion,
(CLSs) to perform medical tasks. The Improving life-saving skills yields 75th Ranger Regiment. A fire team was
training and evaluation of medical per- other benefits as well. An individual providing security in an intermediate
sonnel is the responsibility of the bat- soldier gains confidence when he can support-by-fire position. A medical
talion medical officer. The company perform the actions that he knows will observer-controller (OC) came up from
commander, in turn, can use the medics save lives, and when he has truly mas- behind and assessed a casualty on the
to train and evaluate his infantry per- tered a skill he can use anywhere and fire team—a Ranger was given a shoul-
sonnel. This article provides sugges- any time. Units gain confidence going der wound. The OC put a laminated
tions on how the company commander into battle, knowing that they will be index card specifying the injury on a
can improve soldiers’ CLS skills. cared for by the soldiers around them. 550-cord loop around the Ranger’s
Any good infantry commander knows Soldiers will fight harder when they neck. The combat life saver with the
the value of correct and timely first aid know there is good, competent care and CLS bag went to his aid. He prepared
on the battlefield. The Bellamy Analy- an evacuation program to take the the injured Ranger and applied the
sis of casualties in World War II, Korea, wounded back to a dedicated care giver. proper bandages. Without looking up,
Few would disagree that a six-month ior leaders the tools to make peace sup- doesn’t our ability to intercept such
deployment to Kosovo with the mission port operations a testing ground for the quarry depend on the same night-
of bringing peace and stability to a techniques and attributes required at the driving skills and use of terrain that
troubled region would bond soldiers in collective, leader, and soldiers levels to must mask us in force-on-force en-
a way that no duration of training center succeed in the high-intensity fight. gagements? Once again, the insight
exercises can approach. In nearly six months of continuous into the limitations and particular re-
Even fewer would argue against the mounted and dismounted patrols to in- sponse of these assets to temperature,
notion that an undivided focus on a real- terdict the movement of weapons, mate- altitude, precipitation, and illumination
world mission allows us to develop riel, and personnel belonging to ethnic variables becomes institutional knowl-
more cohesive soldier teams. Until guerrilla factions, the learning curve for edge after continual exposure.
recently, however, there has been on- collective tasks has been steepest in There is no excuse for failing to de-
going debate on the damage combat night operations. The daily movement velop precision squads and platoons
skill proficiency suffers during a pro- of squad size elements in limited visi- collectively for use in an urban envi-
longed emphasis on peace support. bility over rugged mountain terrain has ronment. The opportunity rests at every
Since elements of what is now the 2d been vital in bolstering the claim that abandoned doorstep. A reliance on
Battalion, 6th Infantry, deployed to we own the night. Knowledge of the thorough searches and the mutually
Bosnia more than six years ago (and limitations and proper employment of supporting movement of elements in
again in 1998), senior leaders have been night vision goggles, close combat op- confined spaces is much the same in the
steadily developing ways to combat this tics, and infrared aiming lights is appre- peace support role. Though we may
erosion of skills. The same battalion’s ciated to a far greater degree in the first- assume a more civil approach in our
recent deployment as part of the U.S. hand knowledge that our armed oppo- official cordon and search missions, the
Kosovo Force was programmed to in- nents are blindly stumbling along first priority of safety and security en-
clude modified gunnery tables for both nearby. The repetitive execution of sures that we continually rehearse and
Bradley fighting vehicle and dis- react-to-contact drills and non-verbal practice techniques for survivability in a
mounted infantry live fire exercises, as fire control techniques on patrol is ef- fight. More common, though, is the
well as numerous day and night weapon fective without firing a single shot or hasty occupation and search of aban-
proficiency ranges and train-the-trainer adversely affecting the mission. The doned structures in the towns that have
events. The resources themselves are platoon and squad leaders’ nightly use become part of regular patrol routes, in
being improved, and the training man- of these exercises develops the certainty much the same manner as the react-to-
agement of individual soldier and mis- of action that is then capped by periodic contact drills in wooded terrain. Local
sion essential tasks has been a priority live-fire ranges, while expending less civilians benefit from the stability our
at both platoon and company level, with time and fewer resources than at home presence provides at the same time we
no reduction in steady-state operations. station. hone our execution in the most realistic
Still, with all the improvements to Crew drills and effective scanning of environments. That experience was
training resources and the addition of techniques for the BFV integrated sight ultimately showcased in a live-fire ex-
exercises devoted solely to maintaining unit are actually made more important ercise on an improvised MOUT com-
proficiency in high-intensity conflict, by the absence of a threat force that is a plex to a degree that would be hard to
the greatest returns have come from the mainstay of conventional maneuver replicate from a home station train-up.
emphasis on using every day to give training. When objects of interest are Perhaps more valuable is the abun-
teams, squads, and platoons the ability tractors on the remote trails of a valley dance of junior leader training. After
to fight. Instead of viewing the devel- floor or horse-drawn carriages cresting all, the single greatest advantage of our
opment as an obstacle to combat readi- a ridgeline, the gunner’s eye becomes army over others on the battlefield is the
ness, commanders are now giving jun- all the more discerning. After all, initiative and ability of the professional
Scouts
Their Selection, Training, and Operations
MAJOR MICHAEL T. WILLIAMS
Ever since the first adversaries took the selection, training, and operations of operations vary from one rotation to the
to the battlefield to settle their differ- the scouts. As the Israelites did when next. Some units deploy their scouts
ences, opponents have sought tactical they ended their 40 years of wandering forward, while others do not. Gener-
advantage over each other. Tactics seek in the Sinai, commanders continue to ally, the commander’s preference and
to exploit those advantages, and they dispatch scouts to gather information the abilities of the scout element deter-
vary from era to era, war to war, and about their prospective enemies. mine the employment. When time is
battle to battle. Reconnaissance—see- Joshua, as a wise commander, recog- plentiful, scouts typically receive de-
ing and understanding the enemy—is a nized that intelligence drives operations, tailed guidance and instructions for the
fundamental issue that drives that evo- and today’s leaders should be no less upcoming mission during intermediate
lution. perceptive. staging base operations, but even then,
Here we will revisit the age-old use At the Joint Readiness Training they rarely get a detailed reconnaissance
of the tactical reconnaissance element— Center (JRTC), tactical reconnaissance order. Still, they go forward with an
The purpose of a movement-to- Area denial—preventing the enemy initiative to the enemy. That means
contact is to gain or reestablish contact from operating unhindered in an area, rotational units lose freedom of action
with the enemy. However, rotational such as cordons, blocking positions, and consequently can only react to the
units at the Joint Readiness Training traffic control points, ambushes, secu- enemy’s initiative. Units should spend
Center (JRTC) tend to spend most of rity patrols. more than half of the available time on
their time during this phase conducting Force protection—protecting key finding the enemy. That is the purpose
force protection tasks. facilities such as the brigade tactical of a movement to contact. It will allow
They remain stationary far too long, operations center, Q-36 radar, Sentinel rotational units to maintain the initiative
thus relinquishing the initiative to the air defense radar, forward arming and and set the tempo of battle.
enemy and allowing him to set the refueling point, and the reverse osmosis Unfortunately, data collected at the
terms of battle. Naturally, the enemy water purification unit. Additionally, JRTC shows that units spend most of
attacks only when those terms are fa- time spent in patrol bases, as well as their time conducting force protection
vorable, and the vast majority of direct conducting resupply operations and tasks. A study of six rotations (three
fire contacts end in his favor. casualty evacuation. light infantry, two air assault infantry,
Units must understand that the op- Information collection—observing and one airborne infantry) revealed that
erative word in movement to contact is named areas of interest, reconnaissance units spend an average of eight percent
movement. Stationary units are targets. patrols, questioning civilians. of their time conducting destruction of
But there are measures unit leaders can OCs routinely coach units to spend the enemy, 27 percent conducting area
take to avoid that trap as they prepare most of their available time actively denial, 60 percent conducting force
for future JRTC rotations. protection, and five percent collecting
Because rotational units face a dis- A study of six rotations information.
persed enemy, most choose the search- revealed that units spend Additionally, units spend a signifi-
and-attack technique to locate the en- an average of eight percent cant portion of the force protection time
emy during the movement-to-contact in patrol bases, not guarding key facili-
phase. Field Manual (FM) 7-20, The of their time conducting de- ties. Thus, units spend more time pro-
Infantry Battalion, states that the pur- struction of the enemy and tecting themselves than they do search-
pose of a search and attack is focused 60 percent conducting ing for and attacking the enemy.
on four primary areas: Destruction of force protection. Stationary units allow the enemy to
the enemy, area denial, force protec- gain the initiative, deciding when and
tion, and information collection. searching for the enemy. This gives where to make contact and under what
When rotational units begin the priority to the areas where the enemy terms. The enemy initiates an attack
movement-to-contact phase, OCs track can be fixed and destroyed, area denial, only when all the conditions are favor-
the way each maneuver platoon uses its and information collection. Protecting able; in these six rotations, the enemy
time in each of these areas. Using FM key facilities is a legitimate task, as is initiated contact nearly 70 percent of the
7-20 as a guide, senior analysts have the requirement to conduct patrol-base time. As a result, the rotational units
further defined the areas in greater de- activities so soldiers can sleep, eat, and were seldom prepared to use combined
tail: We then use this information to clean their weapons. In addition, plan- arms—indirect fires, attack aviation,
facilitate discussion in after-action re- ning and preparing for upcoming op- armor/mechanized infantry, and close
views (AARs). erations frequently takes place during air support—in response. Rotational
Destruction of the enemy—killing patrol base activities, but these activities units—using direct fire plus one other
or capturing the enemy. Actively support only the mission of movement system as the standard for combined
searching for enemy forces or being in to contact. Spending most of the avail- arms—employed combined arms in
physical contact with them. able time in patrol bases surrenders the only 23 percent of the contacts. This
SOLUTION
Tactical Decision
Game #1-01
Assumptions:
Hill is rocky and devoid of vegetation.
We will get both 105 & 81mm priorities of
fire.
Must get a sizeable element west of the
hilltop to close the range so I can get effects
on the enemy and pass the remaining ele-
ments in the battalion/brigade.
FRAGO follows:
Enemy contact with 2 machineguns south
of CP2. Enemy crew served weapon sighted
west of CP1. Dug-in enemy, estimated at
platoon strength, vicinity north of CP3. C Co
receiving indirect at the rear of the battalion Rationale:
formation. In order to give 1st platoon time to seek better cover and start massing
Company mission—no change. fires on the machineguns, it was necessary to place some immediate fires
My intent—Retain control of Hill 122, de- on the two crew-served weapons to the south with my own co mortars. I
stroy the crew-served weapons, suppress moved 2nd platoon into SBF 2 in order to set the conditions for my main
OBJ CAT, and pass the battalion (–) along effort’s movement west. Accurate small arms fires on the enemy will be
AXIS WHITE. difficult, due to the distance, but the crew-served weapons can still fire
Mortars—Immediate suppression south of effectively. Furthermore, I’ll engage one or more bunkers with Javelin in
CP2, 2 crew-served weapons in the open. order to allow my main effort to close the distance without being under fire
1st Plt—Suppress enemy machineguns from the dug-in enemy. The 2nd platoon would have the time to work the
south of CP2 in order to prevent direct fires FA and BN mortars onto CAT, and any other crew-served positions to the
on 3rd platoon. 60mm priority of fire. 81mm north as well. This is necessary to set the conditions for 3rd platoon’s
priority of fire once 3rd in SBF 3. move west along AXIS DOG.
2nd Plt—Move to the spur northeast of I saw it decisive to get an element on the western side of the hilltop to
CP 2 and occupy SBF 2. Suppress enemy place effective fires on CAT so that the battalion could still maneuver.
between CPs 3 and 1 in order to facilitate Simply seizing the hill top on 122 is not enough to accomplish the purpose
movement of 3rd platoon along AXIS DOG. the battalion commander assigned me. I can foresee a need for Class V
105 & 81mm priorities of fire. O/O, guide B resupply and anticipate enemy indirect fires on my positions (especially
Co along AXIS WHITE. 2nd) given how long it will take to pass the brigade, let alone the remain-
3rd Plt (ME)—O/O, move west past the der of the battalion.
crest of Hill 122 and establish SBF 3. Fix the Although time is critical, I would call the battalion commander and rec-
enemy on OBJ CAT in order to pass the ommend to him that once I get 3rd platoon set in SBF, I could pass the
battalion (–) along AXIS WHITE. 105mm next company in line (assuming it was B Co) to destroy the enemy on
priorities of fire once in SBF 3. CAT. The other concern I had was the two enemy machineguns to the
south. I’m sure I could destroy the crews for them, but it is likely that they
Fires: are supported by infantry. If I encountered more enemy to the south, I
FA—Disrupt dug-in enemy on OBJ CAT so would not have had 3rd platoon move west of the crest of the hill, but to
that they can’t place effective direct fires on orient more to the south to pass the battalion. The other option I consid-
3rd platoon. ered was pulling a squad from 2nd to form a company reserve, since the
Mortar (81mm)—Obscure 3rd platoon’s range from SBT 2 to OBJ CAT would reduce the effectiveness of small
movement to SBF 3 from the enemy on CAT. arms fire. My first planning priority would be reinforcing 1st in the south,
Mortar (60mm)—Destroy crew-served and my second would be reinforcing 3rd in SBF 3.
weapons south of CP 2. Even with the presence of the enemy, I still saw myself as terrain ori-
AT—From SBF 2, destroy crew-served ented, given the commander’s guidance. I tried to focus on the necessity
weapons position/bunkers to facilitate 3rd of getting to vantage points where I could, as a minimum, suppress the
platoon’s movement to SBF 3. enemy to permit the battalion to pass. Naturally, these orders would need
XO—Move with 2nd. to be amended after things started to develop. They were intended to get
1SG—Establish the company CCP vicinity us through the initial contact and get arrayed to start massing the effects
2nd platoon’s current location. of our combat power to achieve our purpose.
(Based on an actual vignette from: Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea,
Russell A. Gugeler, CMH Publication 30-2, Chapter 2. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/30-2/30-2_2.htm)
SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 53