SPR 2002

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THE OBJECTIVE FORCE ROLE: SECURING THE FUTURE

This is an exciting time to serve as Chief of Infantry, events brought home clearly the need to proceed with-
and I particularly welcome the opportunity to represent out further delay in arming and training an Army that
the interests of our Branch at a time when we are pre- can anticipate and neutralize adversaries with similar
paring to realize the full benefits of the Army Trans- aspirations, as well as responding to threats of a more
formation. Building upon the readiness, morale, and conventional nature. We had already selected an azi-
professionalism of the Legacy Force, we have com- muth for an orderly transition from Legacy Forces to an
mitted assets toward Interim organizations with poten- Interim structure that would prevail over near term
tial for significantly enhanced mobility, lethality, threats, and finally yield an Objective Force to meet the
sustainability and survivability, and are gaining a challenges of adversaries whose capabilities are as yet
clearer picture of what we will demand of the Objective unmeasured. Unfortunately, predictions of violence on
Force once it becomes reality. transnational and national levels have already come
The changes that we see unfolding—in doctrine, in true, and circumstances demand that we waste no time
weapons and the target acquisition systems that com- in transitioning to an Army capable of executing even
plement them, and in the training that will develop and more diverse and demanding missions. We must
maintain the professional competencies of the Infan- shorten our time line to build our future force.
try—are all part of a commitment that we share. To be During the next year, this Objective Force will start
sure, our soldiers and our loyal, productive civilian to take shape as our Combat, Materiel, and Training
work force are already committed to the defense of our Developers wrestle with putting form to our future In-
nation, but we must also accept the commitment to fantry. The exact shape will not come into sharpest
fully support this evolutionary process upon which so focus for several years, but we know now what this
much depends. force must do. I want to share my thoughts on the need
Although the threats facing our nation have changed for the Objective Force, what some of its key capabili-
significantly in just the past decade, our role as Infan- ties must be, and what our role as Infantrymen will be.
trymen in protecting our nation, her people, and our We have amply demonstrated our technological lead
institutions is fundamentally the same as it has been for to those who would challenge us, and the lesson has not
more than two and a quarter centuries. The values that gone unheeded. Aware of their vulnerability to U.S.
sustained the spirit and resolve of our forbears at Val- detection and subsequent precision strikes, adversaries
ley Forge are no less relevant today, as we confront will avoid massing their forces in linear offensive and
adversaries who operate unrestricted by national defensive echelons. Instead, they will attempt to em-
boundaries and impelled by motives not easily under- ploy selective strikes, conduct rapid maneuver from
stood in the context of a free and open society. areas of sanctuary, engage in terrorism, incite civil and
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demon- political unrest, and initiate other asymmetric actions
strated sharply the scope, commitment, and asymmetric aimed at destabilizing allies and attacking U.S. interests
nature of the threat against the United States. These worldwide. From this posture, the enemy will also at-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 1


tempt to marshal attacks against selected targets in the Lethality. We will dominate the close, personal
hope of creating a perception of U.S. vulnerability, in- fight with overwhelming fires. When necessary, we
flicting casualties, and exerting some degree of influ- will bring in the full force of our indirect and joint fires
ence on world opinion and the way our national resolve to destroy any potential enemy force.
is perceived. Survivability. Soldiers and systems will be surviv-
An adversary may well plan and time his actions to able against a full threat array. We will take full ad-
increase uncertainty and expand their opportunities to vantage of stealth and materiel technologies to make
surprise us. Conventional lines of communication may sure that we lighten the soldier’s load and reduce his
be difficult to secure, jeopardizing sustainment opera- risk.
tions. Asymmetric tactics will focus on degrading our Sustainability. We have to be able to strike quickly
advantages in engagement standoff. An adversary will and stay for the long haul. We will lead the assault and
also attempt to maintain continuous pressure on our stay for the mop-up.
forces and those of our allies in an effort to reduce op- What can we expect as infantrymen preparing to
portunities for reorganization and maneuver. But we serve in this Objective Force? First and foremost, it
are not without experience in such operations: In virtu- will not change the enduring infantry mission of domi-
ally every action since our Revolutionary War, we have nating the close, personal fight; rather, it will harness
either encountered—or ourselves executed—partisan technology to give us enhanced situational awareness,
operations, and we have also amassed a considerable lethality, mobility, and survivability to help us do our
data base on other armies’ successes and failures in job quicker and better. Technology will not give us a
similar operations. silver bullet or a platform that avoids combat, but it
This assessment of current and future military op- will give us more tools in our combat toolbox. Serving
erations provides our framework for defining require- in the Infantry of the future, we will need to possess
ments for the Objective Force and allows us to develop and demonstrate the Infantry “warrior ethos” we’ve
a force that is based on both threat and capabilities. always required to close with and destroy the enemy.
Infantry forces must retain a quality of adaptive domi- The battle does not end until one warrior dominates
nance—we will win regardless of situation or enemy another warrior.
actions by retaining the agility and initiative to put our With these new tools and systems, we will operate
adversary on the defensive and keep him there. confidently and efficiently in urban terrain and deny
Regardless of the structure of our Infantry forces, we the enemy his sanctuaries. Our sensors will find them
must have the capability to see the enemy first, fix his and infantrymen will destroy them. We will not only
position, and destroy him in depth and in detail. This own the night; we will own the battlefield under all
will present a technological challenge as well as a meteorological conditions, and obscurants will be our
training challenge as we train our soldiers to realize the allies. Our Objective Force will be able to convert low
full potential of the digital tools offered by our nation’s visibility into a force multiplier that no adversary can
technological and industrial base. match. We can expect to lead and serve in units that
With this in mind, here are some key characteristics are more agile, more versatile, and more lethal. New
we know our Objective Force Infantry must possess to platforms will give us revolutionary freedom of ma-
ensure victory in future conflicts. neuver to get us quickly and securely into our close
Responsiveness and Deployability. We must get fight. We also must work harder to ensure that we and
there quickly and minimize the reception and staging our soldiers know how to use the new tools of our
support requirements. We can no longer afford the trade. We must master both the art and science of war,
luxury of a slow and predictable force build-up such as and we must be smart enough to know the difference.
we enjoyed prior to the Gulf War. The Objective Force that we are building will allow
Agility. Our future infantry forces will continue to our Army to execute the orders of our National Com-
be able to dominate any tactical situation. As infantry mand Authority. It will provide our nation a dominant
leaders and soldiers, we will need the mental agility to force, capable of operating equally effectively across
respond to any “come as you are” contingency, and this the entire spectrum of conflict, and with the ability to
is a learned skill, one that can be taught, enhanced, and defeat any threat in any environment and under any
sustained. conditions. The architects of this Objective Force
Mobility. We will not be constrained by rugged know that the soldier is the centerpiece of this struc-
mountains, desert sands, or watery rice paddies. Our ture. The Infantry’s unique capability to close with and
transport systems will allow us to reliably get our sol- destroy the enemy will continue to be just as critically
diers to the right place at the right time. important as it has been since the birth of our nation.
Versatility. Soldiers and leaders will be able to As Infantrymen, the same qualities and spirit that have
fight and win in the full spectrum of conflict. Our units made us successful throughout our country’s past will
will dominate all battlespace from low level, stabiliza- continue to lead us to success on tomorrow’s battle-
tion actions to the intensity of a major theater of war. fields.

2 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


IN PRAISE OF THE M79 nade trigger, causing a grenade to im- puter; and an M9 pistol. Each weapon
pact nearby. Fortunately, it had trav- would be much lighter and less complex
Most Infantry readers probably don’t eled less than the arming distance and and easier to handle under almost any
remember the M79 grenade launcher— did not detonate.) conditions, particularly in confined
the predecessor to the M203. One man As an infantry platoon leader I ini- spaces such as urban areas. Each would
in each fire team carried this handy, tially carried a rifle, just as the book be easier and cheaper to build and
lightweight weapon, which was de- suggested. Part way through my tour, I maintain. The savings could be used to
signed to take out machinegun positions was struck by the idea of carrying an expand the ammunition selection for the
and enemy soldiers in bunkers and M79 and a pistol instead. I could carry 20mm. A shot round and a slug round
rooms. It resembled a small shotgun, it in one hand, with the other hand free would allow the 20mm to take the place
was easy to use, and could be carried in to operate the radio—an important duty of the combat shotgun (XM1014).
one hand, yet could be brought up to a while in contact. A shot round in the Smoke and illumination rounds could
firing position without changing grip. chamber could provide a quick burst of be used the same way I used them in
Since the M79 was a single shot, a self-protection if needed, and I wouldn’t Vietnam. Less-than-lethal rounds could
grenadier carried a .45 caliber pistol as even have to change my grip or take be developed as well.
well. careful aim. Another advantage was Imagine the flexibility offered by
When I reported to the 82nd Airborne that I could use smoke rounds to mark arming each two-man buddy team in the
Division at Fort Bragg in 1970, each enemy positions for armed helicopters squad with one M4 and a 20mm. New
infantry platoon had six M79s. Arriv- instead of smoke grenades to mark my tactics and techniques would arise to
ing in Vietnam in 1971, I found that the own position. I could also use smoke or take advantage of this effective combi-
M79 had been replaced by the M203. high-explosive rounds to mark targets nation. And for once, we’d really be
This gave me a chance to compare the for my machineguns. I quickly lightening the infantryman’s load, at
merits of the two. scrounged an M79 (there were plenty least in comparison to the M203/M16
The key advantage of the M203/M16 still around) and carried it for the rest of combination or the OICW. So, let’s
combination was that you could fire the my tour. Luckily, I did not have to put explore this alternative (it’s the same
grenade and then function as a rifleman my ideas to a real acid test, because technology, after all) and test the con-
without having to take time to reload. things had calmed down after the Easter cepts, head to head, before a final deci-
(None of the soldiers wanted to engage Offensive in 1972. sion is made.
the enemy with their .45s.) The platoon Well, all that’s very nice, I can hear
got six more rifles without having any you thinking, but it isn’t relevant to BG JOHN R. SCALES
more men. infantry now or in the future. Per- Clemmons, North Carolina
There were several important disad- haps—but consider the objective indi-
vantages to the M203 as well. First, the vidual combat weapon (OICW). This
combination was heavy. Carrying two weapon of the future is a 20mm grenade THE HUMAN ANIMAL
weapons in one with both calibers of launcher and a 5.56mm rifle in an over CHANGES “NOT MUCH”
ammunition was tough. Second, unless and under configuration; if it is not a
specially trained and experienced with son of the M203/M16, it is a close rela- Reading Lieutenant Colonel Albert
the weapon, the M203 gunner tended to tive. It offers a lot of benefits: long Garland’s review of our book, Dear
fire his loaded grenade, then function range, integral rangefinding, air burst, Harry . . .Truman’s Mailroom, 1945-
solely as a rifleman. The weapon with- etc. It also is heavy, unwieldy, and 1953: The Truman Administration
out quadrant sights was less accurate complex. Would the infantryman be Through Correspondence with “Every-
than the M79 and, when the quadrant better served by a different combina- day Americans” (May-August 2000,
sights were used on the weapon, they tion? page 51), I am struck by how different
tended to catch on things and break. Consider the benefits offered by things can look—even for like-minded
Finally, in the confusion of the moment, fielding three personal weapons in the individuals—when they view a com-
gunners sometimes pulled the wrong squad: an improved M4 with integral mon problem from radically different
trigger. (Once, an M203 gunner to my sights and rangefinder from the OICW; vantage points.
left rear aimed with his rifle sights at a a 20mm grenade launcher with the Our access to the president’s personal
target beyond me and pulled the gre- rangefinder, sights, and ballistic com- papers and senior Administration offi-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 3


INFANTRY LETTERS
cials leads us to conclude that the presi- service man of my acquaintance,” wrote World War. They were happy to have
dent did indeed view his actions during that piece as he reflected on mankind’s the fighting stop and to quit worrying
the drastic reductions of the armed apparent inability to learn from experi- about their sons and daughters in the
services as a sort of rear guard in the ence: armed services.
face of a continual and significant de- Sept. 26, 1918, a few minutes before Then the reaction set in. Selfishness,
cline in military funding. Though Tru- 4 A.M. a service man of my acquain- greed, jealousy raised their ugly heads.
man narrowly won the 1948 election, he tance was standing before a battery of No wartime incentive to keep them
was painfully aware of the grim budget- French 75[mm]s at a little town called down, labor began to grab all it could
ary realities imposed by an unfriendly Neuville to the right of the Argonne get by fair means or foul. Farmers be-
Congress. While one can rightfully Forest. A barrage was to be fired by all gan black-marketing food, industry
criticize some of his decisions, it must the guns of the Allied front from Bel- hoarded inventories and the same old
be remembered that he had very little gium to the Swiss border. pacifists began to talk disarmament. . . .
maneuver room. And through it all, At 4 A.M. that barrage started, at 5 The human animal and his emotion
young professional officers such as Al A.M. the infantry in front of my ac- change not much from age to age.
Garland had to deal with their own set quaintance’s battery went over. At 8
of grim realities at the unit level. A.M. the artillery, including the 75 bat- D. M. GIANGRECO
Diary entries by Truman and his tery referred to, moved forward. That U.S. Army Command and General
boyhood chum Charley Ross, then forward movement did not stop until Staff College
serving as press secretary, offer some Nov. 11, 1918. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
insights into Truman’s thinking. It is My acquaintance came home, was
also worthwhile to remember that the banqueted and treated as returned sol- KATHRYN MOORE
time between the end of World War II diers are usually treated by the home Lee’s Summit, Missouri
and the Korean War was quite brief; far people immediately after the tension of
shorter in span, for example, than that war is relieved. The home people
between the 1st Armored Division’s [soon] forgot the war. . . . They began to LONG DISTANCE MARCHING
crossing of the Sava River and today. talk about disarmament. They did dis-
When the diary entries were made in arm themselves, to the point of help- I was very interested in the World
late 1946, Truman was in the midst of lessness. They became fat and rich, War II article on “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell
presiding over a demobilization that special privilege ran the country—ran it and his walk out of Burma (Infantry,
speedily culled seven million men and to a fall. In 1932 a great leader came May-August 2000).
women from the armed services. Re- forward and rescued the country from There is a clear lesson to be learned
turning veterans came home to find that chaos and restored the confidence of from this account: The most necessary
jobs and places to live were scarce. At the people in their government and their exercise is long-distance marching. In
one point, nearly 100,000 veterans were institutions. my view, they ought to scrap the current
looking for work in Chicago alone. Then another European war came PT test (pushups, situps, run) for a four-
Rationing was still in force, and infla- along. We tried as before to keep out of mile march with a standard uniform and
tion was skyrocketing. As more than it. The great leader warned the country weapon.
one million workers walked off their of the possibility. He was vilified, This would have two immediate re-
jobs, labor unions, free of their wartime smeared, misrepresented, but kept his sults:
promises not to strike, were demand- courage. As was inevitable, we were First, it would do away with the per-
ing—and receiving—large “catch up” forced into the war. The country ception of “gender norming.” True or
pay hikes. As if all this was not awoke—late, but it awoke and created not, the charge remains because of the
enough, the new president had to deal the greatest war production program in different standards for men and women.
with a rising tide of pacifism and had history. . . . All soldiers should have to complete the
recently fired his commerce secretary Unfortunately, the great leader who march in the same passing time. If my
for criticizing the administration’s had taken the nation through the peace memory serves me correctly, a forced-
emerging Cold War policy toward an time and war time emergencies passed march pace is historically four miles in
increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. to his great reward just one month be- 50 minutes. If a soldier can’t do that,
In September 1946, Ross wrote: fore the German surrender. What a pity he or she does not belong in any serv-
“The President showed me today a little for this to happen after twelve long ice!
piece he wrote yesterday, September years of the hardest kind of work, three The second effect of this reform
26, the anniversary of the Argonne Of- and a half of them in the most terrible of would be to give loyal commanders
fensive of 1918. It was a very simple all wars. more flexibility to implement their own
and vivid piece of writing. The point is My acquaintance who commanded PT programs. Right now, most units do
that we are now going through the same the 75 battery on September 26, 1918, the same thing every day—pushups,
experiences that followed the last war.” took over. The same elation filled the situps, and run—because that’s what’s
Truman, referring to himself as “a home people as filled them after the first on the PT test. This new PT test re-

4 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


quires no special training or facilities; M240B does not lend itself to any ap- nade rounds. If the 20mm OICW and
just ramp up the marching one month preciable reductions in weight or length, 25mm OCSW (objective combat squad
out from the test. which rules out an M240 SAW. The weapon) enter service, their bursting
Finally, while we’re at it, let’s do best that has been achieved to date is munitions will be adopted by NATO.
away with the photo for the promotion the 19-pound M60E3 (which is still Where the U.S. leads, NATO will fol-
boards—and the weight control pro- used by the Navy SEALs, along with low.
gram! If you can pass the PT test, who the M14 rifle).
cares what you look like? Were it not for two factors, it would STANLEY C. CRIST
Good walking! make more sense to reissue the vener- Lancaster, California
able M14 to riflemen and use the
WILLIAM M. SHAW M60E3 as a squad automatic weapon.
MAJ, U.S. Army, Retired However, there are almost certainly too FIRST INFANTRY
Roswell, New Mexico few M14s still available, and it is not DIVISION REUNION
likely that the Army would acquire any
M60 variant, having only recently The Society of the First Infantry Di-
WHERE THE U.S. LEADS. . . . fielded the M240B. vision (Big Red One) will hold its 84th
The only practical, off-the-shelf annual reunion from 14-18 August 2002
In his letter in Infantry (September- 7.62mm weapons are the Heckler & in New Orleans, Louisiana.
December 2000, page 6), Ward Wright Koch G3 for riflemen and either the The Society of the First Infantry Di-
proposed that infantry units be armed HK21 or the G8 for the SAW role. vision is composed of soldiers who
with the ArmaLite AR-10 rifle. Since Being belt-fed, the HK21 light ma- served in World War I, World War II,
this weapon fires the 7.62x51mm car- chinegun would have better continuity Vietnam, Desert Storm, the Balkans,
tridge, riflemen equipped with it would of fire than the nearly identical G8, but during the Cold War and in peacetime.
have urban combat capability superior the latter can feed from either a 50- For information, please contact:
to that of the 5.56mm M16A2, while round drum or standard G3 rifle maga- Society of the First Infantry Division
using NATO-standard ammunition. zines. 1933 Morris Road
This idea does have considerable The G3 and G8/HK21 offer a vari- Blue Bell, PA 19422.
appeal, because the AR-10 and M16A2 able interim solution to the need for
have the same configurations and some greater effectiveness in urban warfare, Phone: 1(888) 324-4733
degree of parts interchangeability. One but would nevertheless still be ham- FAX: 1 (215) 661-1934
aspect that could be a problem, how- pered by the weight and bulk of both E-mail: Soc1ID@aol.com.
ever, is that the AR-10 uses an M14 weapons and ammunition. For the long
magazine that has been altered in such a term, I still think the 6mm Optimum EDWARD J. BURKE
way that it might not be “G.I.-proof.” concept is so superior that it should be Executive Director
A more serious drawback to this pro- developed regardless of the eventual
posal lies in the lack of a suitable squad fate of the OICW (objective individual
automatic weapon (SAW). An auto- combat weapon) project. [See “Is 6mm 45th INFANTRY DIVISION
matic rifle version of the AR-10 would the Optimum Caliber? A Common ASSOCIATION REUNION
have the same flaws as the M14A1— Cartridge for Rifle and Machinegun,”
inadequate controllability in full-auto Infantry, September-December 1999, The 45th Infantry Division Associa-
mode, and insufficient continuity of fire page 6.] tion (Thunderbirds) will hold their an-
from the small-capacity, 20-round To those who say we can’t “force” nual reunion 29-31 August 2002. Con-
magazine. another cartridge upon NATO, I must tact me at (210) 681-9134.
It does not seem possible to build a say, “Nonsense.” We adopted the
belt-fed, 7.62mm SAW of the same 7.62x51mm cartridge, and NATO ac- RAUL TREVINO
weight as the M249, but with the requi- cepted it. We adopted the 5.56x45mm, San Antonio, Texas
site durability, reliability, and controlla- and so did NATO. Same for low-
bility. The design of the 27-pound velocity and high-velocity 40mm gre-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 5


THE MILITARY EYE PROTECTION daytime and nighttime lenses have been being evaluated at Fort Campbell,
System (MEPS) will soon replace an eliminated. Kentucky. Fielding is expected to begin
assortment of protective eyewear. Natick is looking at blocking broad in 2005.
Since the mid-1990s, the Army and bands of laser while minimizing the
the Marine Corps have used a combina- effect on color vision. This color vision
tion of ballistic/laser protective specta- is critical to the soldier’s ability to read PRECISION AERIAL DELIVERY (PAD)
cles (BLPSs), special protective eye- maps and use such devices as image prototype equipment, data processing,
wear, cylindrical system (SPECS), and intensifiers. Also being considered are and system procedures were tested last
sun, wind, and dust goggles (SWDGs) better light transmission and, ultimately, summer at the U.S. Army Yuma Prov-
to shield troops from eye injury. tunable laser protection that adjusts to ing Ground, aboard an Air Force C-
With the new protective gear, the the hazard. 130E. The system provides onboard,
number of lenses is cut in half, and the Other improvements are in fit, com- real-time modeling of load release, fall
level of protection is increased. Troops fort, and logistical efficiency. The trajectory, and aircraft dynamics to im-
will have one system in sleek goggles or BLPS was designed to accommodate prove the accuracy of high-altitude air-
spectacles, with interchangeable lenses wearers of prescription eyeglasses. drops.
for both. They were all in one size and difficult Two container delivery system loads
The new protection system carries to fit the entire user population. SPECS (2,225 pounds and 1,485 pounds)—
over the lightweight but tough polycar- come in two sizes for more precise fit, each with standard 26-foot parachute
bonate used in these earlier spectacles but they can be worn only by soldiers canopies—were deployed from 10,000
and goggles that passed tests for ballis- with normal vision. Military-issued feet above ground level on two separate
tic resistance. The new spectacles add eyeglasses fit inside the SWDG, but passes. The impact points were within
peripheral coverage that was limited often with just enough room. 98 and 130 meters of the intended point.
with the SPECS. Like SPECS and The new system can be worn by any- This is considered good performance,
BLPS, they also meet the American one and comes in two spectacle sizes especially for an initial test.
National Standards Institute require- for an improved fit while retaining a The model that was tested used high-
ments for occupational eye and face single size for the goggles. A prescrip- resolution atmospheric forecast fields
protection. tion lens carrier snaps into the goggles and real-time atmospheric wind profile
BLPS, SPECS, and SWDG use four and spectacle frames if needed. data received in-flight from a GPS-
lenses designed for each item: clear, Clear, sunglass, and laser lenses, all based free-falling wind probe released
sunglass, three-line laser protective, and with ballistic protection, are inter- from the drop aircraft. This enabled the
two-line laser protective. When lasers changeable between the large spectacles PAD team to update and refine the
are not a hazard, soldiers can use the and goggles for simpler supply and Computed Aerial Release Point in real-
clear lens to protect against ballistic and storage. Spectacles or goggles, along time while aboard the aircraft.
ultraviolet rays day or night. Or they with two extra lenses, are stored and The system is the result of a four-year
can use a darkened sunglass lens with carried in a rigid foam case with a green development effort of the PAD Team.
added glare protection during the day. cloth cover. Yuma Proving Ground will conduct
When lasers are a danger, soldiers The goggles are easy to tighten, or to additional tests and proof-of-concept
currently switch to a green lens that loosen so they can fall to the chest—a aerial demonstrations of the prototype
blocks two wavelengths for use in dim feature important to a gunner looking system in August and September 2002
light, or a dark lens that shields three through a vehicle’s internal sights. The at altitudes up to 18,000 feet above
wavelengths for use in daylight. Spe- currently used goggles have a simple mean sea level.
cial coloring and coatings absorb the elastic strap and are stowed on the hel-
laser to minimize or eliminate injuries. met, where they interfere with the
For durability, the new system uses proper use of the sighting system in a THE HIGH EXPANSION RATIO shelter
two types of laser reflective materials fighting vehicle or tank. for long-term deployments has been
sandwiched between two layers of Goggles are undergoing user evalua- developed from a new technology in
polycarbonate. It also covers a wider tion at the Marine Corps Air Ground rigid-wall manufacturing. Wood beams
band of near-infrared wavelength en- Combat Center in California; and both assembled on the ground to support
ergy than the current systems. Separate goggle and spectacle prototypes are plywood floors, and sheets of plywood

6 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


for walls and doors, have turned ordi- packaging for cold weather locations ture significant military operations are
nary modular tents into almost- and tan wrapping for special operators, likely to involve the Infantry as part of a
permanent housing. the products are nearly identical. Still, combined arms team in urban areas.
This shelter is largely composed of the features of the products serve differ- This manual provides brigade and
13 modules that are stored and carried ent needs. battalion commanders and staffs, com-
in a container measuring 8 feet by 8 feet Freeze-dried food can be eaten as it pany commanders, small-unit leaders,
by 20 feet. Each folded 500-pound is, or rehydrated with hot or cold water. and individual Infantrymen with de-
module is stored vertically and slides It is resistant to storage damage, and tailed discussions of doctrinal principles
out of the container at four inches thick. with vacuum packing the entrees have a as well as tactics and techniques for
Panels connected by hinges unfold on shelf life as long as 20 years. The new conducting full-spectrum urban opera-
each side to form walls and then a MCW/LRP meets or exceeds the mili- tions.
peaked roof. Modules are connected tary’s shelf life standards of three years The new version updates and expands
with gasketed aluminum closeouts to at 80 degrees F. or six months at 100 the information provided in the previous
seal the roof and walls from the out- degrees F. The process also makes the manual and adds discussions on the
doors. food lighter and easier to carry. following subjects:
Adjustable steel jacks at each end and The new MCW/LRP weighs one pound, • Stability and support operations.
in the middle of the module support the compared to the Meals, Ready-to-Eat • Sniper and countersniper tech-
shelter and lift it off the ground for a (MRE’s) one and one-half pounds, and niques.
smooth floor in uneven terrain. The it is compatible with MRE production. • Employment of Army aviation.
modules provide an expansion ratio of It is designed so a soldier can have a • Operations under limited visibility.
12:1 to make a shelter 19 feet wide by good meal without carrying extra • Precision room clearing.
up to 96 feet long. Space can be ad- weight and bulk. He gets eight ounces • Considerations for coalition opera-
justed, however, by adding or removing of entrée with the MRE, but a rehy- tions.
modules. drated LRP provides 16 ounces of food. • Hazards of toxic industrial materi-
Comfort, stability, and noise level in Special Forces like that, because they als.
windy conditions are a big improvement feel full at least once a day. • Subterranean operations.
over tents, and a hinged door makes it This is important because one packet • Weapons effects against urban
easy for soldiers to enter and exit. Be- of the new LRP contains 1,540 calories targets.
sides the panels—which take up the and is intended to give the special op- • Techniques for marking buildings
most space—all necessary beams, jacks, erator his food each day for up to 10 and rooms.
and lights fit inside the container. days. A study in 1992 concluded that An added appendix provides a dis-
A goal of the program is for four sol- the extra calories provided by an LRP cussion of the numerous lessons learned
diers to be able to set up the entire ration over a 1,200-calorie MRE can from modern urban operations, not just
shelter in three and one-half hours. No make a critical difference in physical by U.S. forces but by the Israelis, the
material handling equipment, such as performance and immune function. French, the Russians, and UN forces.
forklifts, is required—only stepladders Future changes to the MCW/LRP Although it is primarily focused on
and simple tools. may include switching to a single pale- the traditional Infantry, Armor, Artil-
green color for easier procurement, lery, and Engineer combat team, this
standard use of a peel-open seal for the manual may also be used as a reference
THE U.S. ARMY SOLDIER SYSTEMS entrée, and replacement of the peanut for other leaders of combat, combat
Center (Natick) has merged two special- brittle bar and granola bar with products support, and combat service support
purpose combat rations into a single that have a longer shelf life. units who will participate in combined
product, called the Meal, Cold arms urban operations.
Weather/Food Packet, Long Range Pa- The new manual will soon be avail-
trol (MCW/LRP). NEW URBAN OPERATIONS DOCTRINE able on the Reimer Digital Library. The
The new item streamlines production has been published by the Infantry document search form can then be
and offers greater operational flexibility School. Under the Army’s new field found at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/
than the Ration, Cold Weather, used by manual numbering system, this manual atdl.html.
soldiers in frigid climates and the Food is now known as FM 3-06.11, Com- Readers who need to download a
Packet, Long Range Patrol (LRP), con- bined Arms Operations in Urban Ter- copy immediately can log onto the
sumed by Special Operations Forces, rain. It replaces FM 90-10-1, Military internet and go to the Infantry School’s
which shared the same primary compo- Operations on Urbanized Terrain, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site. The
nents. dated May 1993 with Change 1. web address is <ftp://moutftp: out99tfp
The meal/packet expanded the variety Worldwide urban growth and popu- @ftp.benning.army.mil/>>. Open the
to 12 menus from the Ration, Cold lation shifts from rural to urban have folder titled Doctrine, and then the
Weather’s six menus and the LRP’s significantly affected Army operations, folder titled FM 3-06.11.
eight menus. Aside from all-white both combat and non-combat. All fu-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 7


Urban Operations Update
JOHN J. BASTONE

In October 1996 the Defense Science Command (TRADOC). The doctrinal FM 3-06 (90-10), Urban Operations
Board concluded that the most likely update methodology consists of three (Final Draft), provides the Army with
battlefield of the future would be an efforts on parallel axes: operational doctrine for conducting
urban area. The board also made some • Link Field Manual (FM) 3-06 (90- UOs. (The current FM 90-10, Military
recommendations, essentially stating 10) to FM 3-0(100-5) and Joint Pub (JP) Operations on Urbanized Terrain,
that the armed forces of the United 3-06; provides all inclusive urban op- written in 1979, focuses on high-
States needed to improve their capabili- erational doctrine. intensity urban combat against a War-
ties for conducting urban operations • Link FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1) and saw Pact threat in Western Europe.)
(UOs). Understanding this need, U.S. 7/71 Series FM updates to FM 3-06 (90- FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1), Combined Arms
Army Infantry School established the 10); provides UO combined arms doc- Operations in Urban Terrain, formerly
Combined Arms MOUT Task Force trine at brigade level and below. An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in
(CAMTF) in June 1999, with the char- • Link TRADOC proponent efforts Built-Up Areas, and the 7/71 Series FM
ter of updating UO doctrine, developing to update respective proponent manuals updates provide tactical level combined
an overall training strategy, and identi- to the above field manuals; provides arms UO doctrine. Finally, proponent
fying training requirements. This arti- branch specific UO doctrine. efforts across TRADOC provide
cle provides a short synopsis of what In short, published and emerging branch-specific doctrine for conducting
the task force has accomplished to date. doctrine is sound and applies to current of urban operations.
forces as well as Transformation forces. Figure 1 depicts the horizontal and
Doctrine The capstone Army doctrinal man- vertical integration of the doctrinal up-
The following is an overview of the ual—FM 3-0 (100-5), Operations, pro- date methodology, along with the key
UO doctrinal update effort throughout vides the doctrinal framework for the doctrinal concepts found in the manu-
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Army. The keystone doctrinal manual, als.

DOCTRINE STATUS
Horizontal and Vertical Synchronization
FM No. TITLE STATUS
Doctrinal Framework
Chg 1, App J, Urban Ops, The
7-30 Posted on Digital Library.
FM 3-0 (100-5) Full Spectrum Ops Infantry Brigade
Decisive, Shaping, Chg 1, App G, Urban Ops, The
Sustaining Ops 7-20 Posted on Digital Library.
Infantry Battalion
Chg 1, App L, Urban Ops, The
7-10 Posted on Digital Library.
Infantry Rifle Company
FM 3-06 (90-10) Assess, Shape,
Chg 1, Ch 6, Urban Ops, The
Dominate, Transition 7-8 Posted on Digital Library.
Infantry Rifle Platoon & Squad
Chg 1, Ch 9, Urban Ops, The
7-92 Infantry Recon Platoon & Posted on Digital Library.
FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1) Offense, Defense, Squad
Stability, and Support
7/71 Series Updates 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Pending posting on Digi-
Tactics & Techniques
12 (90-10-1) Urban Terrain tal Library.
Figure 1 Figure 2

8 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Figure 2 shows the CAMTF’s doc-
trinal update effort. Note that UO doc-
trinal updates for FMs 7-30, 20, 10, 8
and FM 7-92 are posted on the General
Dennis Reimer Digital Library. Up-
dates to FMs 7-7J and 71-1 are to be
incorporated into the revision of both
manuals. FM 3-06.11 is in the process
of being posted on the digital library.

Training
Equally important was the effort to
give the Army an overall UO training
strategy. The training doctrine was
outlined in Training Circular (TC) 90-1,
Training for Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain. The TC described
how to use the MOUT Assault Course
and the Collective Training Facility
(CTF). One of the inherent problems
under this system was that no opera- Figure 3
tional and maintenance funds were pro-
vided for the upkeep of the facilities,
nor was any provision made for live
fire. Installations and units often fabri-
cated shoot houses and used hand-held
video cameras to collect data for after-
action reviews (AARs). Additionally,
targets were often fabricated, and there
was no standard targetry that could be
used for either long- or short-range pre-
cision engagements.
The CAMTF’s primary effort has
been to revise the live UO training
strategy. That strategy—which will be
found in the revised TC 90-1, Training
for Urban Operations—consists of the
Urban Assault Course, the Shoot House,
the Breach Facility, and the Combined
Arms Collective Training Facility
(CACTF). The overall cost of each
facility includes estimated operation
and maintenance as well. The revised Figure 4
TC 90-1 has been approved, and posting gunnery station. The assault course toon live-fire training. It will have full
on the digital library is now pending. supports the training strategy as out- audio/video instrumentation, portable
Urban Assault Course. The assault lined in TC 90-1. The facility is de- after-action reviews (AARs), and three-
course (Figure 3) is a five-station facil- signed for recommended training before dimensional precision targetry pack-
ity designed to train individuals, squads, using the shoot house or the collective ages. This facility supports the training
and platoons. It includes a two-story training facility. (Recommended fre- strategy as outlined in TC 90-1. (Rec-
offense/defense building, a grenadier quency of use: Quarterly for the active ommended frequency of use: Semi-
gunnery station, an underground trainer, components, and during pre- and post- annually for the active components and
and two training lanes for tasks and mobilization for the reserve compo- during pre- and post-mobilization for
techniques for individual through pla- nents.) reserve components.)
toon level. This facility will include an Live Fire Shoot House. The shoot Breach Facility. The breach facility
instrumented three-dimensional target house (Figure 4) is a single-story de- (Figure 5) includes wall, door, and win-
package and a conventional live-fire signed for individual, squad, and build- dow breach locations. It has no instru-
pop-up target package at the grenadier ing with multiple points of entry, pla- mentation and contains only structural

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 9


PROFESSIONAL FORUM
cepts that will guide the UO training:
Units at platoon level and below will
train at home station using the assault
course, the shoot house, and the breach
facility to achieve squad and platoon
level UO proficiency. Infantry and
other branches in both the active and
reserve components can also use these
facilities.
Companies and battalions will con-
duct live training at home station, while
brigades will conduct live training at the
combat training centers (CTCs). The
combined arms training facility will
permit collective combined arms UO
training.
Figure 5 The CAMTF’s efforts during the past
two years have been unique in the sense
that simultaneous doctrine and training
revisions for the Army have been com-
pleted throughout the major commands
in both the active and reserve compo-
nents. Installations will see the con-
struction of these facilities as early as
Fiscal Year 2003, and construction will
continue through FY 2009.
Facilities have been designed to ac-
commodate full spectrum operations for
both Legacy Forces and Transformation
Forces. The interim brigade combat
teams (IBCTs) have priority of utiliza-
tion in using the training facilities.
The Combined Arms MOUT Task
Force will continue to perform its duties
as the Army’s primary point of contact
for UO training in FY 2002. The em-
phasis will be on lending its expertise to
installations and units during the im-
plementation of the UO training strat-
egy.
Figure 6
For further information contact John
Bastone, Project Manager, CAMTF,
targetry. The facility supports the capture instrumentation, three-dime- (706) 545-5827, DSN: 835-5827,
training strategy as outlined in TC 90-1. signal precision targetry, and an AAR bastonej@benning.army.mil; or Jeff
It provides training for individuals, facility, and is designed to accommo- Arneson, Training Strategy Implemen-
teams, and squads in breaching tech- date expansion. tation, CAMTF, (706) 545-0134, DSN:
niques and procedures. It trains the The facility supports the training 835-0134, e-mail, arnesonja@benning.
technical tasks of mechanical, ballistic, strategy as outlined in TC 90-1. It pro- army.mil.
thermal, and explosive breaching. (The vides combined arms collective training
active components would use it semi- for platoon and company situational
annually and the reserve components training exercises and battalion task John J. Bastone is a retired infantryman with
during pre- and post-mobilization.) force field training exercises. (Recom- more than 22 years of active duty experience
in mechanized and airborne infantry units and
Combined Arms Collective Train- mended training frequency: Semi- Special Forces. He is currently the Project
ing Facility. This facility (Figure 6) is annually for active components and Manager of the Combined Arms MOUT Task
a complex of 20 to 26 buildings cover- during post-mobilization for reserve Force, United States Army Infantry School.
ing an urbanized area of 2.25 square components.)
kilometers. It will contain audio/video The following are the training con-

10 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Interim Brigade Combat Team
Indirect Distributive Fires Concept
LIEUTENANT GERARD M. ACOSTA
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS CHRISTOPHER MENTON

The expectation that the Interim Bri- Occupation: behind number 2 gun. Number 4 gun is
gade Combat Team (IBCT) will fight in • The terrain must provide 360- placed 150 meters to the left and on line
a non-linear environment has forced degree mask and overhead clearance. with number 2 gun.
units to develop new tactics, techniques, • The mortars are placed in a modi- • The mortars are laid on the primary
and procedures (TTPs) to incorporate fied “Lazy W” configuration to increase DOF with referred deflections of 2800
indirect fires to deliver rounds in a 360- the platoon’s depth and limit overhead and 0700 mils. Both deflections have
degree zone. Traditionally, most infan- fire. aiming stakes placed at 50 and 100 me-
try units have trained and fought in a • Once the DOF to the priority target ters. The two sets of poles are posi-
linear environment where—in offensive is determined, the number 2 gun is tioned to prevent inadvertent sight
operations—the mortar platoon has placed as the anchor (Figure 1). Num- blockage.
been located at a one-half to two-thirds ber 1 gun is placed at a general direc-
distance behind friendly troops provid- tion of four o’clock and 70 meters be- FDC Procedures:
ing a single direction of fire (DOF) for- hind number 2 gun. Number 3 gun is • It should be noted that depending
ward of friendly lines. placed at a general direction of seven upon the array of the tubes, it is possible
With the introduction of non-linear o’clock and 70 meters to the left and to fire above the heads of the gun teams
operations, a larger battalion area of (Figure 2), which is not permitted
responsibility (AOR), and the pos- during training exercises because
sible requirement to execute si- of safety concerns. The M16
multaneous missions, the 5th Bat- plotting board allows the FDC to
talion, 20th Infantry, has adopted determine which guns will fire
the 360-degree distributive fires during the mission. The plotting
concept to employ its mortar assets board is set up with the base gun
in a responsive, accurate, and safe representing the pivot point. The
manner. other three guns are plotted as
This concept is predicated on positioned on the ground. Any
situation dependent tactics, in value can be assigned to the in-
which the mortar platoon estab- termediate quadrants on the board.
lishes a firing point in the center of • The 360-degree fire adjust-
Figure 1
the battalion AOR so it can provide ments are conducted in accordance with
indirect fires in any direction. This Field Manual 23-91, Mortar Gunnery.
technique for employing indirect mortar During fire for effect (FFE), the FDC
fires allows the IBCT infantry compa- determines the firing element, the
nies and platoons to operate in a non- sheaf’s width and attitude, and the
linear environment with maximum bursting diameter.
freedom of maneuver and with constant 4 2 • The sheaf’s width is determined by
and responsive mortar support. In order multiplying the number of guns in the
to provide 360-degree support, new FFE by the bursting diameter of the
mortar TTPs were developed for occu- weapon system. The sheaf’s attitude is
pying a firing position and for fire di- 3 1 determined by finding the perpendicular
rection control (FDC) procedures. The azimuth to the direction of fire. The
following are excerpts from the battal- DOF is indexed on the plotting board
ion’s mortar platoon’s standing operat- outlining the perpendicular azimuth.
ing procedures (SOPs): Figure 2 • FFE is computed by entering the

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 11


PROFESSIONAL FORUM
tactical firing control (TFC) ducting numerous dry fire exer-
switch on the M23 mortar ballis- cises. After practicing the con-
tic computer. The sheaf is cept in multiple FTXs, the pla-
changed from PARALLEL to toon conducted several LFXs
SPECIAL. The adjusting point is using short-range training rounds
changed from FLANK to CENTER. (SRTRs) to implement the theory
This special sheaf arrangement and establish safety guidelines.
(Figure 3) allows the rounds to The SRTR exercises were an effi-
impact perpendicular to the cient way to improve the sheaf
gun-target line. Without the spe- and practice maneuvering the
cial sheaf (Figure 4) targets to the Figure 3 mortar tubes at multiple DOFs.
DOF flanks would be engaged The FDC conducted a weeklong
with a sheaf parallel to the gun– battalion mortar certification
target line. conference with the company
• The FDC uses two firing mortar sections to discuss and
batteries in its set-up data to com- brainstorm firing techniques to
pute the call for fire. The mortar improve the sheaf and fire mis-
battery is entered in the computer sion time lapses. Finally, we
twice, with a referred deflection integrated all of the developed
of 0700 and 2800. The DOF de- TTPs into several LFXs.
termines which battery to employ The battalion mortar platoon
in the call for fire. and company mortar sections
• The initial fire command is recently conducted a 360-degree
tailored to explain which referred LFX. The mortars established a
deflection to use in the fire mis- firing point in the middle of the
sion and designated Safety T. Fort Lewis impact area. Nu-
Figure 4
The following is an example of merous forward observer (FO)
the firing command: teams were positioned in obser-
Section Sergeant (SS): “Section, of the challenges lie in the ability to vation points surrounding the impact
refer to your 0700 poles and red find a suitable firing point location that area. The FO teams called for fires that
Safety T data.” provides 360-degree mask, overhead forced the mortar guns to use both re-
Squad leader (SL): “Refer to 0700 clearance, cover, and concealment. The ferred deflections.
poles and red Safety T data.” need to fire 360 degrees may also limit The 360-degree indirect fire concept
SS: “Section, deflection 1234, eleva- the use of camouflage nets. provides responsive and accurate fires
tion 5678, at my command.” The mortars have implemented nu- in any direction to any unit in a non-
SL: “Deflection 1234, elevation merous SOPs to increase their surviv- linear environment. The FDC and gun
5678, at your command.” ability. Manning the mortar tubes to crews must continually practice the
SS: “Section, hang it.” provide responsive fires and to provide 360-degree TTPs and platoon SOPs to
SS: “Section, fire.” internal security for the mortar platoon ensure that the fire missions are con-
The FDC and mortar gun crews continues to be a challenge. The mor- ducted precisely and safely. Leaders
modified standard methods of monitor- tars have conducted numerous break- must be innovative during training
ing Safety Ts, registration data, and fire contact live fire exercises to practice the events to practice the theory and inte-
commands to the gun line. If there is task of completing a fire mission while grate security measures to increase sur-
not a contiguous 360-degree firing fan, engaged with an enemy element. To vivability. By constantly reviewing and
each engagement area may have its own maintain proficiency in defending itself improving training and techniques,
registration data, and must have its own from ground attacks, the platoon inte- mortar crews are ensuring that they can
Safety T. This data is color coded and grates both blank and live fire break- deliver timely accurate indirect fires the
placed on the mortar system. Once the contact drills into all mortar LFXs. The first time, every time.
FDC receives the fire mission, the FDC mortars rely on constant reconnaissance
refers the gun squad leaders to the color to locate and occupy new firing posi-
code reflecting the respective Safety T tions to avoid counter-battery fire. Lieutenant Gerard M. Acosta and Sergeant
for the fire mission. The platoon conducted a series of First Class Christopher Menton, when this
article was written, were assigned to the 5th
The 360-degree distributive fires training events to develop and refine the Battalion, 20th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 2d Infan-
concept offers both advantages and 360-degree concept. The platoon first try Division (IBCT) at Fort Lewis
challenges. Its primary strength is the developed the “Lazy W” formations,
mortar platoon’s ability to provide fires fire commands, and determined the re-
in any direction to any element. Some ferred deflection sight settings by con-

12 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Fighting Position, or Deathtrap?
ARTHUR A. DURANTE

All infantrymen must know how to constructed positions have collapsed Field Manuals (FMs) 5-103, Surviv-
construct solid, functional fighting po- and killed or injured the soldiers they ability, and 5-34, Engineer Field Data,
sitions. An improperly constructed po- were intended to protect. Positions contain detailed designs that ensure the
sition such as the one shown here is collapse in peacetime as well. At each structural integrity of the position and
actually dangerous for the soldier to of the combat training centers, soldiers the safety of the occupants. The Infan-
occupy. It will not provide the protec- in improperly designed, poorly sup- try School has published Graphic Train-
tion from fire that he needs, and it may ported, and badly constructed fighting ing Aid (GTA) 7-6-1, Fighting Position
even collapse onto him at any moment. positions have been injured when the Construction Infantry Leader Reference
Such unsafe structures should be torn overhead cover came crashing down or Card, which contains multiple illustra-
down and re-built properly; otherwise a the sides collapsed in on them, smoth- tions and detailed leader checklists.
position designed to protect may well ering them even as their comrades (These references are available at
present an even greater danger. struggled to dig them out. http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdl.html.)
Throughout history, the Infantry has It is the unit leaders’ responsibility to Unless the soldiers constructing a
been called upon to seize key terrain prevent this from happening. Each of position and the leaders supervising the
and then dig in solidly to hold it. In- them, from squad leader through bat- construction actually follow the design,
fantrymen, assisted by their brothers-in- talion commander, must learn the stan- the resulting position will neither pro-
arms the combat Engineers, build the dards for proper construction of a tect the soldiers inside, nor survive en-
field fortifications and fighting posi- fighting position, and must supervise emy fire. Contrast the photo of the
tions that are key to surviving the en- and inspect the soldiers under him as poorly constructed position shown here
emy’s fire and repelling his assaults. they build their positions. The funda- with the well designed, solidly built,
Well-constructed bunkers, trenches, mental design of well-constructed functional fighting positions depicted in
and fighting positions protect infantry- fighting and survivability positions is FM 5-103, shown in Figures 1 and 2.
men and allow them to fight and survive not new. U.S. Army Engineers have In the drawings, you immediately
in the deadly environment of modern validated several basic designs that will notice the sturdy timbers, solidly sup-
combat. survive direct and indirect fire from ported on broad, level footings that hold
On every battlefield, from the muddy most enemy weapons, and that will up the heavy load of overhead cover.
trenches of World War I to the sandy protect the men inside while they return You do not see the unstable columns of
desert of the Persian Gulf, improperly fire. rotting sandbags found in the photo-
graph. The proper support of overhead
cover is a vital aspect of a safe fighting
position or observation post.
According to FM 5-103, sandy soil
can weigh as much as 100 pounds per
cubic foot. The 10' x 4' roof in the
photograph, if covered with 18 inches
of soil, could weigh 6,000 pounds.
That’s three tons! Unless the roof is
waterproofed, that weight could double
as the soil soaks up water during rains.
That’s nearly six tons balancing pre-
cariously over the head of the soldier
manning that position.
A properly designed and built posi-
tion provides 360-degree protection,
instead of just shielding its occupants
from the front. The position in the
photograph clearly does not do that. It

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 13


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Figure 1 Figure 2

also lacks sufficient overhead cover, apart, simply cannot carry the load. bat arms or not, must know this. Su-
and the stringers appear to be too few Another key factor is the strength and pervising the construction of fighting
and too far apart. The center column, location of the support base on which positions is one of the fundamental
along with the 4"x4" post at the right of the stringers rest. If the base is too tasks of a noncommissioned officer. It
the photograph, appears to have been weak, or too close to the edge, the sides has to be done to standard, because the
added after the position was built, of the position will slump inward, pos- lives of soldiers and the success of the
probably because the roof was sagging. sibly suffocating the occupants before mission depend on it. Learn how to
It is too short and has been propped up they can be dug out. inspect a fighting position. If you do,
on two sandbags, a totally inadequate Do not be intimidated by all of this you will never have to dig the lifeless
footing. This column also would inter- talk of construction standards, footings, body of a soldier out of one that col-
fere with the soldier if he tried to en- timbers, stringers, and spacing. It is not lapsed on him.
gage targets from the oversized open- technical information that can be under-
ings. stood only by an engineer. This is sim-
The selection, number, and placement ple soldier-skill stuff, and infantrymen Arthur A. Durante, Jr., is Deputy Chief of
Doctrine, Combined Arms and Tactics Di-
of the stringers supporting overhead have been building good, solid positions rectorate, U.S. Army Infantry School.
cover is critical to the safety of a posi- since before World War I.
tion. Weak stringers, placed too far Every soldier and every leader, com-

M41 TOW
Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CRAIG G. LANGHAUSER

The M41 TOW improved target ac- providing better antiarmor capabilities naissance, surveillance, and target ac-
quisition system (ITAS) is a block up- to antitank units, also has capabilities quisition (RSTA), rear area protection,
grade to the M220 ground/high- that make it an integral part of the com- and urban operations capabilities.
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle bined arms team. Even when organized The TOW ITAS consists of three new
(HMMWV)-mounted TOW 2 missile in heavy–light task forces, where the line replaceable units: the target acqui-
system. The TOW ITAS is currently preponderance of antiarmor capabilities sition subsystem (TAS), the fire control
being fielded to airborne, air assault, traditionally has resided in the heavy subsystem, and the battery power
and light infantry forces throughout the elements, TOW ITAS-equipped anti- source; a modified TOW 2 traversing
active and reserve components of the tank units can not only destroy threat unit; the existing TOW launch tube and
U.S. Army. The ITAS, in addition to targets but also provide superior recon- tripod; and a TOW HMMWV modifi-

14 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


cation kit. The TAS integrates into a U.S. Army inventory. The second gen- gade task force to win the counterre-
single housing the direct view optics, a eration FLIR NVS with 24-power digi- connaissance battle without firing a
second-generation forward looking in- tal zoom provides more than twice the single missile.
frared (FLIR) night vision sight (NVS), detection, recognition, and identifica- The HMMWV provides excellent
missile trackers, and a laser range tion ranges of the TOW 2 in moderate mobility throughout “rear areas.” Dur-
finder. TAS electronics provide auto- weather conditions. The TOW ITAS ing an NTC rotation, a HMMWV that
matic boresighting for these compo- offers even greater advantages in was back in the BSA for vehicle main-
nents, eliminating both tactical collima- harsher weather conditions. During a tenance destroyed a lone attacking BMP
tion and 180-day verification require- recent National Training Center (NTC) less than four minutes after a soldier
ments. rotation, 82d Airborne Division soldiers noticed the HMMWV and climbed up
The fire control subsystem, which is could see movement beyond 10 kilo- on it and powered up the system.
the system’s brain, contains the soft- meters, distinguish between tracked and Urban terrain is not traditionally a
ware that controls the missile flight, the wheeled vehicles at eight kilometers, good environment in which to employ
aided target tracker, passive ranging, and identify vehicle types and dis- an antiarmor system. The fire control
and NVS zoom. The tracker enables mounts at five kilometers. The brigade software, though, enables the gunner to
the gunner to lock onto the thermal im- combat team (BCT) commander used fire a TOW 2B missile and guide it line-
age of a target by properly sizing “track this capability to determine the disposi- of-sight to the target. The gunner can
gates” on the target. The tracker will tion and intent of the opposing force literally fly the missile into a window or
cause the missile to fly to the center of (OPFOR). In thick vegetation, such as door to attack a target within a building.
mass within the track gates during the that at the Joint Readiness Training Development will soon start on the
brief period of target obscuration after Center (JRTC), soldiers have been able TOW bunker buster missile, which will
missile launch. These track gates can to acquire targets, and again determine make at least a 24-inch diameter hole in
be used to determine the approximate the OPFOR’s intent. In both cases, the a double reinforced eight-inch concrete
range to a target on the basis of standard units equipped with the TOW ITAS wall, and provide a breach point for
target form sizes. The fire control sys- gathered the priority intelligence re- dismounted infantry to enter a building.
tem also contains the embedded training quirements to set the tone of the battle When it comes to putting a missile on
circuitry for sustainment training, and to come. target, the TOW ITAS offers a vastly
advanced built-in test/built-in test The battery power source will power improved probability of hit over that of
equipment (BIT/BITE), which provides the TOW ITAS for ten hours of dis- the ground TOW. The first TOW ITAS
fault detection and isolation for both mounted operations or ten hours of si- units have achieved more than a 90 per-
operator and direct-support mainte- lent watch beyond the capability of the cent hit rate after firing more than 300
nance. HMMWV battery. Coupled with the missiles. All targets were farther away
The battery power source gives TOW extremely silent NVS cooler, the TOW than 1800 meters, with most of them
ITAS a ten-hour dismount capability, a ITAS truly has a silent watch capability between 2500 and 3750 meters, both
power conditioner for on-vehicle power, that makes it impossible to detect with moving and stationary. Many gunners
and an AC/DC battery charger. The the unaided ear. had just completed advanced individual
modified traversing unit has an eleva- Upon target acquisition, soldiers can training and had not attended new
tion brake to reduce launch transients, use the ranging capabilities of the TOW equipment training with their unit or
and improved “pistol grip” hand- ITAS to determine target locations be- received TOW ITAS training at Fort
grips/controls that provide improved yond the direct-fire weapons’ range of Benning. Some of these soldiers trained
ergonomics. Controls on the left hand- any infantry or armor battalion, and less than three hours at the range before
grip are for sight select, menu control, relay them to the fire support element launching their first missiles. The TOW
field of view and brightness, contrast, for engagement with indirect fire sup- ITAS’s embedded training and im-
and focus. The right handgrip switches port. This is essential to winning the proved ergonomics facilitated the rapid
control track gate initiation, activating, counterreconnaissance battle. During training.
adjusting, and locking the track gates on the first TOW ITAS-equipped JRTC A single platoon from an airborne
a target, ranging the target, and firing rotation, soldiers mounted an AN/PAQ- D Company attached to a balanced,
the missile. The TOW ITAS fires all 4A/C infrared aiming light on the TOW heavy brigade task force at the NTC
existing TOW missile versions and its ITAS. Once the OPFOR came within was credited with destroying 20 vehi-
digital architecture gives it the growth range of the M2HB .50 caliber ma- cles of an attacking motorized rifle
capability to accept future missiles such chinegun and the Mk 19 grenade regiment. Needless to say, the brigade
as the TOW fire-and-forget, the TOW launcher, the gunners used the TAS- defeated the regiment.
bunker buster, common missile, and mounted PAQ-4s to designate targets A central design tenet of the TOW
compact kinetic energy missile. for their platoon mates to engage. The ITAS was to reduce required mainte-
After the long-range advanced scout gunners were also able to designate nance actions and increase system reli-
surveillance system (LRAS3), the TOW targets for the OH-58D Kiowa Warri- ability and availability. This is accom-
ITAS is the best RSTA device in the ors. The TOW ITAS enabled the bri- plished through the reduction of the

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 15


PROFESSIONAL FORUM
number of components from 18 to six, BPS. The Li Ion BPS uses the state-of- pany will find itself assigned many key
compared to the TOW 2, and a modular the-art technology of the electric vehicle roles to support IBCT operations.
design that requires no special tools. battery and will reduce BPS weight, The TOW ITAS provides the Army’s
The BIT/BITE fault isolates to a spe- provide longer silent watch, faster re- light and medium forces many of the
cific component and eliminates the need charge times, and a greater useful life. same capabilities currently being
for organizational test equipment. The By the end of 2002, the CCMS Project fielded on the M2A3 in the heavy
built-in automatic boresight eliminates Office also plans to demonstrate the counterattack corps at Fort Hood,
the 180-day verification test require- versatility of the TOW ITAS by firing a Texas. Threats, simulated or real,
ment. The only scheduled maintenance Javelin missile. should beware of the immense capabili-
action is to replace the BPS batteries at A modified version of the TOW ties TOW ITAS equipped units have to
the end of their useful life. ITAS will be used on the antitank detect, recognize, and identify potential
The TRADOC System Manager, guided missile (ATGM) variant of the targets and the multitude of ground and
Close Combat Missile Systems, and the interim combat vehicle (ICV) for the air systems that can be summoned to
Close Combat Missile Systems (CCMS) interim brigade combat team (IBCT). respond.
Project Office, are continually working Modifications will be made to mount
to improve the TOW ITAS. Funded TOW ITAS components in a turret, Lieutenant Colonel Craig G. Langhauser is
improvements include: a vehicle com- remote the video into the vehicle, and the Product Manager, Advanced TOW Acqui-
mander’s display for viewing the TAS accommodate a dual-tube launcher. sition Systems, which includes the M41 ITAS
and the Improved Bradley Acquisition Sub-
thermal image, a TAS mount for either This system will provide the medium system (IBAS) on the M2A3 Bradley. He is a
the AN/PAQ-4A/C infrared aiming force with all the capabilities the TOW 1982 graduate of the United States Military
light or AN/PEQ-2A target pointer/ ITAS-equipped light infantry now has. Academy and holds a master’s degree from
the University of Maryland, University Col-
illuminator, an improved FCS that will The TOW ITAS and the LRAS3 are the lege.
enable the incorporation of enhanced only second generation FLIR systems in
target tracking, and a lithium (Li) Ion the IBCT; as a result, the ATGM com-

Get Volcano Mines Into the Fight


COLONEL THOMAS K. LITTLEFIELD, JR.

According to Field Manual (FM) 20- can get authority for four-hour duration The future maneuver concerns can be
32, obstacle emplacement authority is mines. The problem comes when we mitigated with the use of lanes. Lanes
the jurisdiction that a unit commander request 48-hour or 15-day duration can be left in the Volcano minefield,
has to emplace tactical obstacles. In a mines. I have occasionally received 48- and they can be closed with Modular
theater of operations, theater command- hour permission, but never 15-day per- Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS). They
ers have the authority to emplace obsta- mission. At the same time, I have had can also be opened with the self-
cles. In most cases they delegate this permission to use conventional hand- destruct feature of the MOPMS.
authority to corps commanders who emplaced mines that cannot have a self- As we move to the future we must get
further delegate it to division com- destruct capability. These are armed used to replacing conventional hand-
manders. Division commanders then and deadly until removed or destroyed. emplaced mines with scatterable mines.
have obstacle emplacement authority in Why is permission to use a temporary We need to do this for three primary
their area of operations, unless that mine denied while permission to use a reasons—reduced logistical require-
authority is withheld or restricted by a permanent mine is routinely granted? ments, faster emplacement times, and
higher commander. Commanders sub- The normal reasons that I have been smaller manpower requirements.
ordinate to corps and division do not given for denial are concerns about frat- From a logistical viewpoint, a Vol-
have the authority to emplace obstacles ricide and constraining future maneu- cano antitank mine weighs about four
unless the higher commander delegates ver. Both of these concerns can be pounds, as opposed to the conventional
it for a current operation. mitigated. Before any land Volcano M-15’s 30 pounds. This is more than
During my time as a combat engineer System can be used to emplace a mine- an 85 percent reduction in weight for
commander and staff member, I have field, fratricide prevention fences must countermobility logistical requirements.
had difficulty getting authority for using be erected, just like those used for con- Two soldiers with one vehicle can em-
our organic Volcano systems. Often we ventional hand-emplaced minefields. place a 1,000-meter minefield in about

16 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


10 minutes, while it takes an engineer RECOMMENDATIONS ventional mines. Don’t restrict com-
platoon 10 hours to emplace a surface- manders from bringing all their combat
Use specific obstacle restrictions for spe-
laid conventional minefield of the same cific reasons; do not use blanket restrictions
multiplier systems into the fight. Let
length. simply because “that’s the way we’ve always them know what their Volcano assets
This is extremely significant when done it” or “that’s the way we did it at NTC.” are and allow them to use them.
you consider the reduction of the num- Allow people on the ground to determine Use specific and not blanket restric-
ber of sappers in combat engineer com- the best way to fight their ground, especially if tions. A commander would never as-
panies. When I was a company com- they are assigned a defend in sector mission. sign a defend-in-sector mission to a
mander, my company had nine ten-man Use Volcano to make up for reduced sap- subordinate commander while with-
sapper squads. As a brigade com- per manpower, to provide faster obstacle holding the use of organic weapons.
mander, my companies had six eight- emplacement, and to reduce the obstacle They need to do the same for Volcano.
logistics.
man squads. The last version of future If they don’t, this valuable tool will
divisional engineer companies that I Develop unit rapid mine teams and drills never be used to its potential. It will
using Volcano.
saw had four eight-man squads. In not make up for the lack of sapper
combat engineer companies, the 90 Mitigate fratricide concerns with protective manpower, and it will not reduce the
sappers have been reduced to 32. This fences. logistical requirement for tactical ob-
greatly reduces the ability to hand- Mitigate future maneuver concerns with stacles.
emplace mines in a time-constrained lanes and closure with MOPMS. Appropriate use of the Volcano sys-
situation. We have to depend upon tem won’t get better until maneuver
scatterable mines emplaced by the Vol- We have an army that is based on commanders demand it, plan it, and do
cano system. decentralized mission command, but it. Don’t stand for being any more lim-
We need to use Volcano as routinely routinely restricts the use of Volcano. ited than you would be with your main
as we would use conventional mines. The same commanders who impose weapons systems.
We need to let people know it’s all right these restrictions don’t think twice
to use them in the 15-day mode if the about delegating conventional mine Colonel Thomas K. Littlefield, Jr., is a 1975
situation dictates. I have found that the emplacement authority to the battalion graduate of the United States Military Acad-
emy. He has served in various combat engi-
brigade commanders I supported didn’t level. neer units, commanded a battalion in the
routinely plan 15-day Volcano mine- My message to commanders is: 101st Airborne Division, and commanded a
fields, because they couldn’t count on Don’t unnecessarily restrict subordinate brigade in the 2d Infantry Division in South
Korea. He is currently an instructor in the
getting the required authority. Instead commanders by routinely withholding Department of Military Strategy, Planning and
their fall-back was to depend upon con- authority for Volcano. Withhold the Operations, at the Army War College.
ventional mines. authority only as you would for con-

Effectively Using Interpreters


MAJOR PAUL J. SCHMITT

As this country’s land-fighting com- how to employ interpreters. quential steps, as you will see, influence
ponent, the Army has needed and em- Small-unit commanders and leaders each other.
ployed interpreters in every engagement in an engagement area are often the Selection can come from two
throughout its history. And because of ones most in need of interpreters, but sources—military and local-hire civil-
increased force projection requirements, also often the ones who have the least ian. Military interpreters can be spe-
the need for skilled linguists is growing. idea of how to use them properly. This cially trained, uniformed servicemen, or
On the strategic level, the Army has article will examine issues involving contracted American citizens. A mili-
made great strides in developing pro- interpreters and address questions perti- tary, uniformed interpreter with a secu-
grams for military interpreters, foreign nent to you, the small-unit leader. rity clearance is the most desirable, but
area officers, and the Korean augmen- For maximum effectiveness, leaders the demand on military interpreters
tees to the U.S. Army, just to name a should consider carefully the selection, makes them scarce. In fact, you are not
few. But the Army must also improve preparation, and use of the interpreter in likely to encounter one under normal
the tactical education of its leaders on each individual circumstance. The se- circumstances. As a result, local-hire

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 17


PROFESSIONAL FORUM
interpreters are the most commonly seem, most don’t take this first step. remain in control of the situation and
used source. Make sure your interpreter understands the conversation. You can do this best
Locally hired civilian interpreters that he is to translate exactly what you with physical positioning. Many who
have their own characteristics. They say, and that he must suppress any per- use an interpreter, perhaps through
can be useful in explaining the sur- sonal feelings he may have. Be aware faulty logic, place the interpreter be-
rounding environment, situation, and that many interpreters sign contracts tween the communicating parties, or off
personalities, or may have access to with a contract agency; both of you to the side. This places too much em-
important information that is not avail- should be aware of and abide by its phasis on the interpreter and often leads
able to an imported military interpreter. conditions. Explain clearly your stan- to your counterpart talking directly to
Be aware, however, that interpreters dards for his appearance. Much like your interpreter, having sidebar conver-
will inevitably talk with others in their counseling, strictly enforcing standards sations, or even worse, questioning the
spare time, about what they have seen of conduct and expectations will make interpreter, while excluding you.
and done, or worse, are debriefed by it easier for your interpreter to work To use your interpreter correctly,
hostile counterintelligence agents when within your guidelines. Preparation of position him behind one of your shoul-
they go home. If local-hire interpreters the interpreter follows self-preparation. ders, so he is partially or entirely ob-
are allowed in your camp’s perimeter, For starters, you must learn every- scured. You then simply talk directly to
they should be kept in a partitioned area thing you can about the culture in which the person you are addressing and wait
to limit their access to and view of your you will be operating, and your inter- for the interpreter’s translation. Addi-
operations. Additionally, due to their preter can help you with this. You tionally, don’t talk to your interpreter
increased status, wages, or perception as should also take it upon yourself to using such phrases as “Tell him that …”
collaborators, interpreters may face learn basic phrases and words and how or “Ask him if. . . .” Simply talk di-
hostility or jealousy from the locals. to count in his language in order to rectly to your intended audience and
You may not have much voice in the avoid misunderstandings. Be careful request that the interpreter say exactly
initial selection process, but you should how you use idioms, and try not to in- what you have said. This way the inter-
be aware of the advantages and limita- clude allusions deeply rooted in Ameri- preter conveys your words only and
tions of both types of interpreters. can culture that will get lost in the otherwise remains in the background.
If you are given the opportunity to translation. For example, I once wit- Be aware of your interpreter’s needs.
choose from a pool of talented inter- nessed a battalion commander attempt- If possible, interpreters should be given
preters, there are several factors that ing during small talk to explain the finer time to rest periodically. They may be
should govern your choice. Although points of a Road Runner cartoon seg- poorly adjusted to continuous military
the education and language ability of ment. Meanwhile, his listeners had no operations and could become physically
the interpreter should be your primary idea what a coyote was, nor did they exhausted from wearing body armor
consideration, you should take into ac- really care. Other soldiers have used and carrying equipment. More impor-
count other criteria, such as age, ethnic- expressions like “pig in a poke,” leaving tant, continuous interpreting is mentally
ity, sex, personal compatibility or char- the interpreter frustrated and confused. exhausting. Additionally, depending on
acter, and security clearance. Avoid acronyms and military specific the ability of your interpreter, speak a
Learn early whatever you can about jargon at all cost, unless your interpreter sentence or two, and then pause to al-
the cultural and social norms of the area has a good grasp of them and can con- low for translation. Be aware that, as a
in which you are deployed so as to vey their meanings. As part of your practical matter, conversations will take
avoid problems later. There may be interpreter’s preparation, you may have at least twice as long, since both parties
occasions when a woman, an extremely to educate him on basic organizational have to wait for their words to pass
young person, or an interpreter of a or tactical terminology or the rank through the interpreter.
certain ethnicity could be counterpro- structure—ask yourself how many In short, interpreters play an impor-
ductive or distracting to your message American civilians know the difference tant and sometimes mission-essential
or its tone. In Bosnia, for example, between a corporal and a captain or a role. With attention to the selection,
bringing a Bosnian Croat interpreter to platoon and a battalion. preparation, and employment of inter-
talk with Bosnian Serbs about land In general, it is best to be aware that preters, leaders can develop them into a
claims between the two groups could many cultures are not as business- force multiplier that lets the commander
create perceptions of partiality before oriented as we are. In many cultures, or staff officer communicate clearly and
you even begin negotiations. our “get down to business” approach is unmistakeably.
After selecting your interpreter and misinterpreted as extreme rudeness. In
before any negotiations, clearly explain their culture, real business is accom-
your requirements and expectations. plished only after an appropriate period Major Paul J. Schmitt, when he submitted
this article, was assigned to the Department
You must be certain that the interpreter of small talk, hors d’oveurs, toasting, or of Foreign Languages at the United States
understands that he works exclusively tea. They will expect you to participate, Military Academy.
for you and assists you in accomplish- or at least be aware of their traditions.
ing the mission. As obvious as it may While working with your interpreter,

18 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Russian
40mm Grenades and Launchers
ADAM GEIBEL

Experiences from the second This feature is also useful for engaging After the First Chechen War (1994-
Chechen War set the tone for future personnel in open trenches. 1996), the Russian command found that
ordnance. The Pribor Research and The ammunition comes packed in its Naval Infantry units had paid little
Production Center announced in May 40-round boxes (known as “zincs”), and attention in training the marines to fire
2001 that it had developed a 40mm the market price of a VOG-25 frag- the GP-25 and considered it a major
“cumulative” round for GP-25 and GP- mentation round was about U.S. $30, failure of the command echelon. (In
30 under-barrel grenade launchers ca- while the training grenade was only 1997, the training emphasis was
pable of piercing 60 to 70mm of armor. $15. changed to rectify that problem as well
In addition to illuminating and training The illuminating round explodes at a as a list of other shortcomings).
rounds, the Russian Military News height of about 100 meters and illumi- Under-barrel grenade launchers—
Agency quoted Pribor chief engineer nates the area for 10 seconds, but the M203, GP-25 and GP-30 being the most
Vladimir Eggert as saying that the third illumination radius was not mentioned. popular—are considered effective
new round would be thermobaric. The VOG rounds have no fixed car- weapons in many armies, but their rate
The effectiveness of a thermobaric tridge case, but have a propellant charge of fire leaves something to be desired.
40mm grenade round will be an inter- with percussion primer at their base. After each shot, they have to be re-
esting problem in packaging. The 4.7kg This cuts down reloading time, because loaded and are limited to 4 or 5 rounds
Bulgarian 93mm RPG-7 thermobaric there is no casing to be ejected. per minute.
warhead creates a blast wave equivalent The Russian answer to the M-203 The Russians recognized this need
to that produced by the detonation of was the BG-15/GP-25 under-barrel gre- for a greater rate of fire from their
2kg of TNT. A regular RPG-7 round nade launcher “Kostyor” (Fire). Devel- squad grenade launchers, particularly
weighs only 2.5kg, and a VOG-25 oped by Valery Telesh in 1972, mass when confronted with ambushes initi-
round has only 48 grams of high explo- production started in 1980. Nine P-25s ated by command-detonated mines.
sive. are issued to each 47-man mechanized Inspired by the 40mm South African
Pribor produces the .25kg VOG-25 infantry platoon, and each grenadier MGL-6, Tula’s Instrument Design Bu-
fragmentation grenade and the .278kg usually has a basic load of 10 rounds. reau State Unitary Enterprise offers a
VOG-25P jumping fragmentation gre-
nade. The impact fuse on these gre-
nades is sensitive enough to work on
snow, bog, and water surfaces.
However, a VOG-25P “bounces” to
explode at the height of 0.5 to 1.5 me-
ters (also reported as 1.5 to 2 meters).
On striking the ground, the impact fuse
fires a small charge of smokeless pow-
Figure 1. GP-25 under-barrel 40mm grenade launcher.
der, blowing the main body of the gre-
nade back into the air. As it does so, a
short-delay fuse is ignited and after the
grenade has risen about 1.5 meters, the
high-explosive charge is detonated.
The “airburst” enhances its effec-
tiveness, since half of the fragments of a
regular HE grenade exploding on the
ground bury themselves in the soil.
Sketches from The New World of Russian Small
Arms & Ammo, by Charlie Cutshaw; used with
permission of Paladin Press. Figure 2. AKS-74U with GP-25 grenade launcher.

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 19


PROFESSIONAL FORUM
But they felt that the most important
advantage of the RG-6 over the MGL-6
was that for the same weight, the Rus-
sian weapon was made entirely of steel
and did not malfunction if it was
dropped.
Two RG-6 grenade launchers were
used by the Russian army during the
first incursion into Chechnya in 1994.
Since then, small numbers of the
weapon have worked their way into
Figure 3. AK-74M with GP-25. service, and the RG-6 is being heavily
promoted for export sales, but with the
designation of 6G-30.
Some fans claimed that this grenade
launcher could have reversed the out-
come of the March and April 2000 am-
bushes of the Moscow and Perm
OMON columns in Grozny.
In early May 2000, a Russian TV
program reconstructed the Grozny am-
bushes. They had set up six wooden
targets representing Chechen fighters
carefully concealed behind ruins or in-
side buildings, making them all inacces-
sible to the flat trajectory fire of the
small arms carried by OMON troops.
Figure 4. GP-30 under-barrel grenade launcher.
One soldier hit all the targets in 10 sec-
six-shot 40mm hand-held grenade It also features a self-cocking trigger onds with six shots from the grenade
launcher that fills the intermediate posi- mechanism and a sliding stock (combat launcher. Two of the targets received
tion between tripod-mounted automatic length .78 meter, travel length .57 me- direct hits from above, while the rest
grenade launchers and under-barrel ter). The maximum effective range is were sprayed by numerous fragments.
launchers. Originally known as the 6G- 400 meters, while the GP-30 has a
30, it is now advertised as the RG-6. sighting range of 380 meters. Adam Geibel, a National Guard captain, is
With a practical rate of fire of 15−18 The Russians noted that South Af- S-2 of the 5th Squadron, 117th Cavalry, New
rounds a minute, the RG-6 far outper- rica’s MGL-6 had a slower rate of fire, Jersey Army National Guard. He previously
led a tank platoon in he 3d Battalion, 102d
forms its single-shot cousins. The because the fired casings had to be Armor. He is a graduate of Drexel University
5.7kg RG-6 resembles a revolver, with manually extracted, and claimed that and was commissioned through the New
the cylinder (or cassette) rotated by a their VOP-25 grenade was three times Jersey Military Academy OCS in 1990.
spring. as effective as the South African one.

Using Tactical Decision Games


To Study Tactics
SUBMITTED BY CAPTAIN FRANK W. BREWSTER II

The use of tactical decision games use 500 years before the birth of Christ. To be sure, experience is one of the
(TDGs) to train leaders is not new; the Today the TDG has assumed new im- most valuable aspects of teaching, but it
technique can be traced back at least to portance in allowing leaders to develop is also often costly in terms of lives and
the Chinese general and military theo- and sharpen their tactical skills without materiel. The tactical and military his-
rist Sun Tzu, who was advocating their an extensive commitment of resources. tory instruction, readings, and digital

20 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


data bases available to most officers and devotees of the art for decades, and are many ways to approach a problem, we
noncommissioned officers today pro- now being used to complement small- are not limiting the student to one pass-
vide an opportunity to capitalize on the group instruction at the Infantry School. or-fail school solution. Discussions of
successes, and failures, of earlier warri- The tactical decision game shown this and other possible solutions can be
ors, and prepare our future leaders to here—TDG 1-01—is the first of a series found at the Combined Arms and Tac-
derive the maximum benefit from par- that will be run in Infantry Magazine. tics Directorate web site at http:// www.
ticipation in TDGs. In the United A solution to each TDG will be found benning.army.mil/CATD/TDGs/index.htm.
States, wargames have been widely toward the back of the magazine.
enjoyed by both military and civilian Recognizing, however, that there are

TDG #1-01
LIGHT INFANTRY ATTACK OF A RIDGELINE

Situation— company to lead this attack. You are to seize the high ground
You are the commander of A/2-87 IN (L) consisting of three vicinity Hill 122 to secure a foothold in order to facilitate the
rifle platoons, an AT section, a mortar section, and a headquarters battalion’s seizure of the rest of the ridgeline and pass the brigade
element. You are Javelin/240B equipped, and are 100% on per- main attack.
sonnel and equipment. You are the lead element in the battalion’s movement and
For the past two weeks, your battalion has faced strong attacks have priority of fires for FA. The DS artillery battalion (105mm)
from a regimental sized enemy light infantry element that man- completed a 15-minute suppression mission on the objective in
aged to cross the Pecos River (northwest of Hill 122 off sketch). preparation for your assault. Anticipating a fierce fight based
Since this was the last significant barrier between U.S. forces and upon B Company’s experiences yesterday, you transition into
the enemy, our division commander committed our brigade to bounding overwatch as you cross Schiller’s Bridge over the Bull-
block the penetration. Our battalion, as a supporting effort, is to frog River. Your lead platoon makes it nearly to the marker atop
seize a ridgeline that overlooks the river to facilitate the brigade Hill 122 when it comes under automatic weapons fire from the
(–) attack on the enemy’s bridgehead. Hill 122 marks the start of south.
this ridgeline. The battalion commander’s intent is to destroy all The battalion commander calls for a Sitrep and informs you
crew-served and AT weapons, control key hilltops on the ridge, that C Company started taking mortar fire east of Schiller’s
and pass the brigade (–) unhindered along Axis White (which Bridge.
runs to the NW through CPs 2, 3, & 5—CP 5 is to the northwest
off of the sketch). REQUIREMENT—
Your battalion has twice failed to seize the ridgeline in earlier Take 12 minutes to develop the orders you would pass to your
attempts the past two days. Since the other companies were a bit subordinates. Include guidance for supporting arms and a sketch
weakened from their assaults, the commander has chosen your of your plan. Then provide a brief explanation.

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 21


Combat has always affected civilians in areas of opera- tions—to disrupt the military operations of their foes, peace
tion, from front lines to rear areas. Controlling civilians on enforcers, and relief agencies. A moderate to heavy flow of
the battlefield can be a major problem for infantry units, be- civilians can wreak havoc on operations if commanders are
cause they are often the first to face the issue of unplanned unprepared; even a small trickle can be disruptive at key
population movements. And sometimes they face it alone. times and places. Mass waves of noncombatants into the
Infantry leaders must know what to do and how to do it. I battle space—including front lines, forward logistics bases,
offer here some general guidance and proven processes and and rearward staging areas in cities and other terrain—can
procedures for controlling civilians at brigade level and be- stop a low-tech war for any high-tech superpower that is not
low, in war and in military operations other than war. prepared by doctrine, training, and planning to anticipate and
Total war will greatly disrupt the lives of civilians, but quickly handle them the right way.
even small-scale combat may affect local populations. The It is at the division level that a staff typically plans, as-
nature, frequency, intensity, and duration of the effects vary signs, and coordinates the tactical control and care of civil-
with the interaction of complex factors. It is not simply the ians (see Appendix B, Dislocated Civilian Planning, Field
point on the spectrum of conflict that matters, and—unlike in Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs, 2000), but it is the infan-
some Army and joint force command and staff training exer- try units at and below brigade that must routinely do most of
cises at corps and echelons above corps—panicked civilians the work early in an operation. This is as true along front
rarely wait for the post-hostilities phase of an operation. lines as it is in the brigade support area. As the logistics
Similarly, an infantry unit that lands, occupies, or advances footprint hardens and deepens, the division support com-
in the center of a sector may encounter no civilians on the mand’s size, supplies, and services tend to attract displaced
battlefield, while sister units on its flanks could find them- civilians, but this rarely relieves infantry platoons and squads
selves blocked by them. This was true in World War II, Ko- of their burden; indeed, some infantry units may be part of a
rea, Vietnam, and to a lesser degree, in Desert Storm and in special task force designated to control civilians in key areas.
Afghanistan. We have seen it recently in Europe, Asia, and Moreover, infantry units on the move rarely have the luxury
Africa, but no region, ally, coalition partner, or U.S. military of fully relying on military police (MP), civil affairs (CA), or
service is immune. The accidental and deliberate effects of the host nation, to control civilians. These assets are often
future conflicts may be worse, however, in unstable states in too thin or too late. Therefore, infantry officers and non-
the developing world where people are moving to over- commissioned officers must be trained to select and apply
crowded cities through unprecedented migration within and the best tactics, techniques, and procedures to control civil-
between states. Intelligence agencies, think tanks, and other ians, legally and effectively, across the spectrum of military
sources predict increasing discontent and instability through- operations. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, is very useful.
out the developing world in the years ahead, with greatest Recent newsletters and other publications on peace opera-
potential for combat and peace operations in and around tions by the Center for Army Lessons Learned are helpful,
large cities and other built up areas. but more help is needed. FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics,
One of the more purposeful strategies now employed by Techniques, and Procedures, may help, but it is not sched-
state and non-state belligerents is the use of massed civil- uled to be published until August 2002.
ians—indirectly by information or directly by combat opera- In the meantime, this paper describes measures that were

22 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


successfully applied in battle center MEASURES TO CONTROL CIVILIANS
training program (BCTP) and Joint CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS SPECIAL PERSONNEL RESOURCE
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) exer- MEASURE OF MEASURE REQUIREMENTS INTENSITY
cises (82d Airborne Division, 1990-2000), Blocking Medium – High Conducive Terrain Low – Medium
Clearing Low – Medium Dedicated Vehicle(s) Low – Medium
as well as Desert Storm in Iraq (3d Bri-
Collecting Low – High Special Training High – Very High
gade, 82d Airborne Division, 1991), Re-
store Hope in Somalia (elements of Joint Task Force Soma- innocent civilians at the roadblock may be vulnerable in case of
lia, 1993-94, including advice and assistance to our coalition a terrorist attack. In deliberate blocking, the force uses well-
partners), combat planning (the planned invasion of Haiti, placed barriers to keep civilians and their vehicles at a distance.
1994), and Uphold Democracy (elements of the 10th Moun- Loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, such non-lethal
tain Division, 1994-95) in Haiti. weapons as pepper spray, mass dispersion devices, and other
First and foremost, leaders should prevent or minimize the equipment and techniques discussed in FM 19-15 are also used
dislocation of civilians unless there is a contrary policy or op- to keep crowds at bay. This enhances the safety and security of
erational objective, such as evacuating civilians because a all.
chemical attack is feared, or because the host nation’s policy is Clearing. Clearing by mounted troops sweeps DCs from
to move them to the rear for safety and the United States has roads—such as main and alternate supply routes and the trains
decided to help. (U.S. forces may be in hostile territory or oth- areas—to get them out or keep them from impeding move-
erwise lack an “invitation.” In such cases, there is no host na- ment, interfering with operations, or concealing a terrorist
tion to rely on.) threat—25 to 50 feet from a roadway may be enough for dis-
Preventing or minimizing the dislocation of civilians in mounted civilians, but civilian vehicles should be kept at least
hostile or contested territory is more problematic for U.S. 50 meters away from troops. The first priority is to cause the
forces. When temporarily or permanently displaced civilians DCs to move in the general direction or to the exact location
(DCs) appear in the area, it is best to bypass or ignore them if you want them to go. A larger challenge is to make them con-
doing so makes the execution of immediate operations easier tinue to comply with instructions when the clearing team is not
without compromising follow-on operations. Mechanized right behind them.
units on the move will want to try this approach first—unless, Clearing is likely to be ineffective if it is not well planned
for example, the trains are to be established near the civilians. and integrated with other control techniques. Therefore, clear-
Light infantry has a tougher time bypassing or ignoring masses ing is usually a part of a larger DC control plan designed to
of civilians, if only because they can walk or drive as fast as or push DCs in specified directions away from military units,
faster than the troops, but it should be done if possible. A gen- routes, and operations. Clearing is an economy-of-force op-
eral exception to the standard policy of bypassing and ignoring eration, because a clearing team is small compared to a block-
DCs arises when there is a need to process them for intelli- ing or collecting team.
gence information, noncombatant evacuation operation Some of the planning considerations for clearing are:
(NEO) eligibility, and so forth. • The ability to continually sweep or chase DCs.
If actual control is a must, there are three basic ap- • Teaming with MPs, host nation forces, and PSYOPs
proaches—blocking, clearing, and collecting—and each has its personnel, whenever possible, to enhance each others’ mis-
pros and cons. In tactical operations below division level, sions.
leaders are likely to use all three techniques. • The ability to respond in greater force when initial efforts
Blocking. Blocking uses roadblocks, which may be sup- are ineffective.
ported by checkpoints (see FM 3-19.4, [MP], Military Police There are two main drawbacks to clearing:
Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy • Control is fleeting, and sweeps must be repeated as long
Prisoner of War Operations) to prevent DCs from flowing onto as the road or area is being used by friendly forces and civilians
key roads or areas and otherwise interfering with operations. are close enough to be a problem.
The first priority, always, is to block the DCs. The second pri- • Mounted civilians present a continuing security concern
ority, usually a much harder task, is to persuade them to quit for friendly forces, such as terrorism by car bomb, because they
the area and return to their homes or a temporary holding area. can quickly breach any safe distance that is created.
Planning considerations include the following: All clearing is hasty by nature, but deliberate planning may
• Availability of host nation assets to support operations. ensure that loudspeakers with prerecorded messages and mass
• The likely timing, direction, rate, and flow of DCs, so as dispersal devices are available for use on the recalcitrant.
to position blocking forces where and when they will be most Collecting. Collecting results in hands-on control of 100
needed. or more DCs at a time at a displaced civilian collection point
• Terrain that channels the DCs. (DCCP) (Figure 2) or other holding area to keep them from
• The ability to reinforce a roadblock under pressure. interfering with operations, or to foster their care and proc-
• The flexibility to disengage on order. essing. FM 41-10 says that collecting “is the primary control
Blocking may be hasty or deliberate. In hasty blocking, the measure for gaining initial control over DCs.” But collecting
blockers do not search civilians or their means of transport. is not always efficient or otherwise appropriate for infantry.
But the blocking force, friendly troops passing by, and any It takes considerable forethought, training, and manpower to

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 23


THREE MAIN MESSAGES
STANDARD ROADBLOCK RECORDING:
1. This is a roadblock.
2. For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.
3. Return to your homes.

STANDARD CLEARING RECORDING:


1. Stay off the road. OR Get out of this area.
2. If you do not comply you will be arrested.
3. Return to your homes.

STANDARD CIV RECORDING:


1. This is a civilian collection point.
2. You will not be harmed.
3. Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and
parked. Some belongings may be taken from you temporarily for
everyone’s safety.
4. Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after
you have been searched.
5. If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If Figure 1
any of your belongings for which you have a receipt are not returned to
you, you will be compensated for them. is a short term holding area—a few hours to three or four
days. A displaced civilian assembly area, which is typically
TEN MAGIC WORDS to the rear of DCCPs, may host DCs for a week or longer.
1. Go 6. Stand Although an assembly area may evolve into a DC camp,
2. Stop 7. Sit
3. Hands up 8. Yes typically, such a camp is very carefully planned as a mid- to
4. Right 9. No long-term facility at corps or echelons above corps, and ci-
5. Left 10. Water vilian assembly areas feed people into it.
Infantry units are often designated to operate or support
collect DCs and entice them to stay at a collection point with- the operation of a DCAA. In some cases, the job falls upon
out the disincentive of hot combat down the road. Civilians are them by flow of action. Infantry leaders at brigade and be-
there voluntarily unless host nation forces are available to de- low can help prepare for this job by standardizing and com-
tain them. Continuing to hold them, thus preventing opera- bining plans and tasks for dealing with non-combatants. In
tional interference until the time of disposition, is a particu- the attack, the quadrant method (Figure 1) is one way to
larly challenging task. designate hasty sites for controlling noncombatants and other
Disposition includes their release from or closure of the groups. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may
DCCP because units or operations have moved on, and be designated for a likely group or purpose—such as North-
moving them to a displaced civilian assembly area west for a hasty DCCP, Northeast for a hasty enemy prisoner
(DCAA)—a logistical step up from a DCCP. There is no of war (EPW) and/or a detainee (DET) site, Southeast for a
book on how to persuade people to stay at a DCAA, but hasty casualty collection point (CCP), and Southwest as a
good psychological operations and civil-military support can multi-purpose quadrant for maintenance, supplies, and other
help. Some helpful means include mass media broadcasts, purposes, keeping the groups 50 to 100 meters from the
loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, signs (with cultur- roads. This keeps the groups sufficiently separated. It im-
ally correct graphics), and leaflets. proves the safety and security of each group, minimizes
Shown in the accompanying box are, main messages for manpower requirements, and reduces the potential for ter-
use in tactically controlling civilians. These messages can be rorism by keeping people a reasonable distance from passing
prerecorded for loudspeakers, if possible, but they should troops. Prior training and rudimentary supplies, including
also be printed in English and the predominant language of water cans or bottles and large quantities of chemical lights,
the AO on 3x5 cards that can be used to “point and talk” by facilitate the day and night operation of a hasty DCAA.
number. A well-prepared DCAA will display the same Once a hasty DCCP becomes operational, transformation
words in the same order on a large sign. Also shown are ten into a deliberate DCAA may begin, as appropriate. There are
magic words or phrases that every soldier should be able to five key tasks at a deliberate DCCP:
say in the dominant language. “Put down your weapon” and • Local security.
other phrases are also important, of course, but “hands up” is • Physical security within the area, to include vehicle search
a simpler way to express surrender and control, and related and DC search.
concepts. • DC processing and property control.
Division usually selects or approves the routes for the • Services.
movement of DCs, approves collection points identified by • Resolution or disposition, such as the move-out phase.
brigades, tying them into tentative civilian assembly areas, The ability to accomplish all five of these tasks in the loca-
and plans for personnel and logistics to support DCs at op- tion of a hasty DCCP may be problematic and require the con-
erational sites beyond the capabilities of brigades. A DCCA trolled movement of the facility. This requires controlled

24 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


movement of civilians—a task to be
avoided, if possible—because effective
movement requires more manpower
than staying put, and the noise and
lights of the DCs location may com-
promise security, and there may be
danger areas to cross. Accordingly,
the officer or NCO in charge of the
DCCP may need to undertake the five
tasks selectively. Even if an infantry
unit is able to hand off a hasty DCCP
to a support unit just a few hours after
it becomes operational, knowledge of
the layout and operation of a deliberate
DCCP is valuable.

Operation of a DCCP

Local Security.
• Locate the DCCP so that DCs
will not suffer any greater exposure to
the effects of combat than they would Figure 2. . Sample DC Overlay (From FM 41-10)
without the DCCP.
• Establish local security to protect
the persons operating the DCCP, the
occupants, and friendly troops adjacent
to it or passing by.
• Post guards at the entrance and
exit of the DCCP. Give them special
orders, as required.
Physical security and operations
within the DCCP:
Step 1, Dismount point/vehicle
search. Ensure that all private autos,
public conveyances, and the like (in-
cluding livestock and carts) are parked
outside or on the fringes of the facility
in the vehicle search area until they
have been searched; require all pas-
sengers to dismount.
• Direct passengers to the DC
search area.
• Make sure the driver remains
with the vehicle until it is searched. If
you have an undercarriage observation Figure 3
device, use it. When the search is over,
the driver and the searchers together
move the vehicle or livestock cart to the vehicle hold area in Card, sentence 3, to point-to-communicate, as necessary. Treat
accordance with the model DCCP layout (Figure 3). Many livestock as vehicles. Treat pets as livestock—if this does not
vehicles will contain household goods, suitcases, and other create more problems than it avoids. If available, affix a Field
items. Search them for bombs and weapons if the vehicle Property Control Card to the vehicle or animal by using the
holding area is within 50 meters of the people holding area. back of the card to denote the driver/owner as best you can.
Although searching for contraband is not standard procedure, it Give a copy to the driver. Point to sentence 3 on the Explana-
may be mandatory under the OPORD or special orders given to tion Card, as necessary. (Brigades may develop a simple
you. Inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will Field Property Control Card that contains lines for the DCCP
be secure, but placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to number, the date, the seized item number, the seized item
retrieve any of the items from the vehicle. Use an Explanation description, and a signature lock for the DCCP OIC or

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 25


ORAL REHYDRATION THERAPY (ORT), tained, have a trained male searcher do the search, using the
WHAT EVERY SOLDIER SHOULD KNOW back of the hand technique, if its use is not contrary to orders
and if special security concerns require a search.
Death from dehydration (extreme loss of fluids), espe-
cially of infants, the elderly and the sick or injured, is a con- • Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an over-watcher
stant threat in war and military operations other than war. (armed). They must be trained in these skills and know how to
People tend to experience extreme loss of fluids from diar- work together.
rhea, bleeding, and hot weather. You must be aware of this Step 3, DC processing, to include DC screen and property
threat and always prepared to respond to it effectively, espe-
control. This part of operating a deliberate DCCP may be de-
cially when operating a displaced civilian collection point, to
help carry out the legal and moral responsibilities of the ferred for a while, but a full waiver is not advisable, as a gen-
commander. eral practice. DC processing consists of two stages. All per-
sons go through stage one. Stage two may be deferred or de-
Be especially aware of: layed, reserved for certain people, or skipped entirely.
- Infants (who are burned or bleeding; whose skin has lost
its elasticity; who do not urinate or have dark colored urine • Stage 1 processing. This is the quick screen to identify
as opposed to clear urine). EPWs and others (civilian internees and detainees) who must
- Nursing mothers be segregated immediately from everyone else. You may be
- Very thin people, with sallow eyes able to do this without a translator. Beware of irregulars and
- Persons who are heavily bandaged infiltrators trying to pass as civilians. Upon discovery, all
- Persons on litters
EPWs, civilian internees, and detainees are placed in the short-
World Health Organization ORT formula: term detainee holding area. Normally, you may detain anyone
- 1 quart water who is causing a problem at the DCCP. Although civilian in-
- 3.5 grams of sodium chloride (table salt) ternees and detainees should be further segregated from EPWs,
- 2.5 grams of sodium bicarbonate (Arm & Hammer)
you will rarely have the time or the resources to do this.
- 1.5 grams of potassium chloride (Lite Salt)
- 20 grams of sugar. Consistent with orders, take control of all items that may
cause harm to your team, to any friendly forces passing the
U.S. military field expedients for ORT: DCCP, or to the occupants of the DCCP—or items that non-
- MRE salt pack = 4 grams of table salt combatants are not to have according to U.S. or host nation
- MRE beverage base pack = 32 grams of sugar
- MRE cocoa pack = 1.4 grams of potassium policy.
• Stage 2 processing. This stage is to help categorize DCs
Water and salt alone are okay in a pinch. In extreme more specifically (for example, “Is anyone a U.S. citizen?”), to
cases, do not “load up” the patient with fluids, especially if reunite families within the DCCP, to identify persons of influ-
the water is cold; this may cause vomiting and the loss of
ence, and to obtain information (from equipment, weapons,
even more fluid. Give small amounts of room temperature
water frequently. papers, and discussions) that may have intelligence value. Do
Babies will want to suck (not drink) the formula. Use ice this when you have the time and resources, but do not put a
chips or a wet, porous rag. high priority on it. A translator is almost always required.
A dehydrated person’s blood pressure is low. Get the Step 4 (Services) Services at a DCCP may range from im-
patient into the shade, with feet up, if possible.
mediate care (attention to life-threatening conditions) to ancil-
Pedia-Lite is a brand name ready-mix ORT formula for
infants. lary care (including food), depending on need and resources.
Only water and immediate medical care are mandatory, to the
NCOIC.) In a pinch, however, any handwritten receipt that extent they are emergency services provided consistent with
is clear, complete, and concise will do. Army forms, such as the legal and moral obligations of the commander. Do not pro-
DA Form 3161 (Request for Issue or Turn-In), may also be vide service to a DC until after he/she has undergone the quick
used. screen stage of processing, except for emergency care needed
• A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search area. to prevent loss of life (death imminent).
Step 2, DC search. Search DCs and their belongings for • First, treat life-threatening emergencies, such as giving
items that are prohibited. first aid for traumatic injuries and oral rehydration therapy
• Vary your search methods. Use a quick pat-down for (ORT) for dehydrated infants.
some people, and do a more invasive search of others. If you • Second, provide water as a preventive measure if you
have a hand-held metal detector, use it to expedite the searches. have a supply adequate for this purpose.
Tag any property taken under your control and give a copy to • Third, allow occupants to relieve themselves. Provide
the owner. Use a Field Property Control Card. Use an Expla- one latrine for men and one for women, and basic equipment
nation Card, as necessary. (such as shovels and latrine screen expedients) to permit and
• Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If encourage the occupants themselves to prepare rudimentary
possible, use females to search females, infants, and children. sanitation facilities (slit trenches). Supervise.
If a female searcher is not at the DCCP but is close enough to • Fourth, give out food only to occupants who have been at
get there in a reasonable time, defer these searches until she the DCCP 24 hours or more. Food handed out more gener-
arrives; set the people aside until then so that they are not a ously can become a “pull factor.” Also be aware that certain
potential danger to others. If a female searcher cannot be ob- MRE items may be forbidden or inappropriate by religion or

26 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


culture and/or too rich for malnourished people and cause im- erty over to other forces or agencies, usually the follow-on
mediate sickness. (Yellow-packaged international humanitar- forces assuming responsibility for the DCCP. For simplicity,
ian rations are safe.) you will usually want to make this an all-or-nothing proposi-
• Fifth, provide other services consistent with the com- tion; that is, either transfer all controlled property to follow-on
mander’s legal, moral, and mission-specific obligations and forces, or retain all of it. (Transfer of property is preferred if
requirements. your intention all along has been to return the property to the
Step 5, Disposition or Resolution. Once a DCCP is opera- DCs when they left the DCCP; that is, if the property was con-
tional, there are four possible outcomes for the operators: trolled solely or mainly to ensure security within the facility.)
• Retain control of the DCCP, recognizing that moral obli- Transferring control. To transfer control of this property,
gations to the civilians there will increase with time. you must do the following:
• Close down the DCCP by releasing the DCs from it, if • Fill out a property control register, listing all the items
warranted by the tactical situation and other factors. controlled.
• Arrange for the movement of the DCs to another holding • Have an official of the follow-on forces sign for the items
area, such as a civilian assembly area, or... and a copy of the register itself by using DA Form 3161 (Re-
• Hand off DCCP operations to other operators (such as a quest for Issue or Turn-In).
support unit or the host nation)—this is the most likely out- Retaining control. If you take the property with you (as
come for infantry units on the move. you must do if no one will sign for it and you do not want to
Handing off a DCCP. As your unit moves out of an area, return it), you may have to give an official receipt (such as DA
you must be prepared to hand off any DCCP in operation to the Form 3161) and explain to the owners the U.S. Army’s inten-
follow-on forces. Ideally, these forces will include trained CA tion to return the property at a later time and their rights for
operators, but they may not. In either case, you must be pre- compensation if it is not returned. This reiteration of rights
pared to give the follow-on forces a full briefing on your op- (sentence 5 of the Explanation Card) is intended to reassure the
eration of the DCCP. owners and may be needed to ensure a smooth hand-off.
Briefing. Cover the following: In light of the fact that the primary mission of U.S. forces
• EPWs. will be the conduct of combat and security operations, it is
• U.S. allied and coalition soldiers. obvious that credible, trusted host nation forces be used to the
• Civilians who are interned or detained. greatest extent possible in controlling and safeguarding their
• Civilians who are U.S. citizens and/or contractors. civilians displaced by the currents of war.
• Civilians who may be useful as centers of influence. This paper has provided general guidance and specific in-
• The tactical situation and intelligence (or unprocessed formation for controlling civilians on the battlefield. Although
information) as they concern real or potential threats to the some of the information may seem too detailed for infantry
DCCP. leaders, small unit leaders are discovering that practice of the
• Medical emergencies. basics, not simply awareness, is a modern military necessity.
• Controlled property, any special, additional information If we accept and prepare for the eventuality of dealing with
peculiar to the DCCP. The officer or NCO in charge of the population movements in the area of operations, we can better
facility must give the briefing personally and keep notes for his train our soldiers to deal effectively with one of the greatest
own records—the date-time group of the hand off, the challenges that can confront a combat leader.
name/rank/position of the person to whom the hand off was
made, and a summary of the information provided. Colonel Kenneth H. Pritchard is an operations research analyst,
Policy and Strategy Division, U.S. Special Operations Command, spe-
Controlled property. Depending on the category of prop- cializing in civil-military issues. He has served in a variety of command
erty, you may do one of the following: and staff positions in the active Army, the Maryland Army National
• Retain control of it. Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, including commander, 45th Civil
Affairs Battalion (Airborne), which supports the 3d Brigade, 82d Air-
• Return it to the person(s) from whom it was taken. borne Division worldwide.
• Do a combination of the previous two, or hand the prop-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 27


Although well trained and focused on our mission in that my unit faced, and take a bit of the discovery out of
Kosovo, the Task Force leaders knew immediately upon peace enforcement operations.
passing through the Kachonic Valley that the mission would One of the most challenging duties of the command was
be difficult; that our soldiers would tire under the physical to translate this mission and the responsibility shared by the
and mental stress; and that staying focused would be the interim local government and international organizations.
challenge of our lives. Each soldier had to understand that the key to the municipal-
Our preparedness to face this challenge would be a com- ity’s success hinged on the abilities of the United Nations
bination of institutional knowledge, unit lessons learned. and Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Civil Police,
countless days and hours spent at home station and the Com- local Civil Administration, and the United States Kosovo
bat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. In es- Force (USKFOR). These were the four pillars upon which
sence, we and our predecessors would be writing the book on peace and prosperity had to be built. Ineffective leadership
how to conduct support and stability operations in the peace or lack of purpose, the lack of cooperation and shortsighted
enforcement environment. private agendas of these organizations would precipitate mis-
The challenge would be to learn quickly the cultural, his- sion failure and seriously reduce the chances of survival for a
torical, economic, and political mores of a populace that ex- multiethnic region. Understanding the missions of these
isted in something less than a country. That task would be organizations became necessary because success in my sec-
further compounded by the fact that this sub-country was tor mandated the synchronization of their efforts. We asked
occupied by two distinct groups of people who despised one a lot of our soldiers. It was not enough just to know the
another, and would in most cases prefer that the other group day’s required security tasks, patrol routes, and checkpoint
leave, “dead or alive.” We took solace in the fact that our duties. The leaders had to have at least a working knowl-
mission began in the winter and the lull in fighting would edge of how each pillar might complement or assist in any
give us a chance to get our feet wet and prepare for the decision that was made.
spring offensive, if there was to be one. Unfortunately for I quickly learned that the tactics we applied at the CMTC,
us, this assumption was based on the “Bosnia Model,” and and other high-intensity lessons learned, were applicable and
the hate and contempt in Kosovo went much deeper and could be translated so that each soldier understood how to
would prove to be a year-round challenge. reference them in regard to peacekeeping. I found that doc-
My mission was to secure the town of Gnjilane in order to trinal terminology such as mutual support, dead space, dis-
ensure freedom of movement for the ethnic populace. How persion, and redundancy applied at all levels of the mission.
such a simple mission could have demanded so much of my We applied five essential elements in Kosovo that I be-
soldiers and me, only we will ever know. Maybe it was the lieve contributed to the success of the task force and the
fact that Gnjilane was populated with approximately 70,000 company team:
Albanians, 2,000 Serbians, and 500 Roma; all ethnic groups • Identifying the security requirements.
that have one reason or another to hate each other, but even • The use of check points and dismounted patrols.
worse, the resolve to exterminate each other. So dedicating • Interaction with local leaders.
150 soldiers to the protection of these 2,500 ethnic minorities • Detailed graphical control measures.
may have been a bridge too far, but for the professionalism • Decentralized execution.
of the soldiers and officers of 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry. When we first arrived in Gnjilane, the task seemed
This article is not meant to highlight the differences be- daunting. What was my mission as it pertained to the overall
tween the Serbian and Albanian populace of Kosovo, al- task force and brigade missions? How was my 150-man
though in some instances it will be necessary. The article is company going to secure this town of more than 70,000 peo-
meant to denote a few lessons learned, examine challenges ple? Could we make a difference? I realized that I would

28 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


have to focus on my own efforts and those of my soldiers as assessment of the known requirements. Platoons learned
well. It was my job to define the company mission and en- such things as ethnic minority movement patterns, known
sure that everyone in the unit understood it. Any deviation trouble-makers, and past shooting or grenade incidents.
from the mission would require swift and decisive action, or Each platoon then created target folders that contained the
we would lose momentum in our chosen task. The company pictures of the homes and people along with demographic
team mission—secure the town of Gnjilane in order to en- information such as school-aged children, problems, and
sure the freedom of movement of the ethnic populace (Serb skills. Documenting Serb and Roma homes, businesses and
and Roma)—was born out of the necessity to tailor the mis- gathering places on a map and the demographically specific
sion so soldiers would understand what they had to do. target folders created a visual reference for all soldiers and
Our primary task before we could secure the ethnic mi- gave the soldiers of each platoon the confidence they needed
norities, which we found numbered a manageable 2,500, was to man their sector.
to find out where each and every minority in the town lived. Simply knowing the location and gathering places of the
Company B was made up of four line platoons (three organic ethnic minorities was not enough. We had to find a way to
and an engineer platoon from Company A, 82d Engineers). maximize our newfound knowledge. Three key elements
Each platoon had a sector to comb daily. Their tasks were to were characteristic of a platoon’s sector: checkpoints, dis-
pinpoint all ethnic minorities in sector, identify current and mounted patrols, and a coordinated communications plan.
past problems, and document location on a map for future Platoons, in turn, developed their battle rhythm from the
planning. This first step at gaining a working knowledge of number of centrally planned checkpoints and patrols. A
our sector paid dividends for us throughout the entire mis- carefully monitored battle rhythm was essential to success.
sion. Not only did we locate the ethnic minorities in town, Too many sector missions could create problems for the
but we also developed a rapport with the populace by dem- platoon, while too few could create sector issues.
onstrating that we were concerned with existing and past Checkpoints were placed throughout sector in those areas
security problems. that either had the higher ethnic population density or were
After pinpointing the ethnic populace tasks—such as cre- more prone to violence. The soldiers at these checkpoints
ating boundaries, identifying a main effort, and locating served as a static presence where the ethnic community
command posts—became less guesswork and more educated could report problems and concerns, and they became very

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 29


knowledgeable. They could easily recognize who belonged but that was more the exception than the rule. Formulating a
and who did not. Movement patterns and informal leaders of battle rhythm became the method by which a soldier or
the community also became readily apparent as the people leader could determine sleep plan, maintenance, and physical
came and went. The populace soon recognized that violence training time. If a platoon had three checkpoints, it required
and crime decreased wherever these checkpoints were, and it six soldiers, a roving patrol with a minimum of four or five
is no exaggeration when I say that every minority wanted soldiers, and a command post with two or three soldiers
one. quickly became a 14-man sector mission (shift). Each pla-
We applied certain doctrinal applications to the check- toon could man two full sector missions and a consolidated
points: Each had to be mutually supporting; there was a after-curfew mission. Curfew was at 2200, and was gener-
minimum requirement of two soldiers at each; there had to ally adhered to, except for eight to ten violators per evening.
be one man in and one man out; and each had to have com- Although manning the checkpoints and conducting the
munications. Platoons manned three to five checkpoints 250 roving patrols provided the company with a focused mission,
to 300 meters apart. The number of checkpoints a platoon security could not be attained without communication with
could man was based on the criteria listed above (minority those being secured (Serb and Roma) and the populace from
population density and history of violent incidents). The whom they were being secured (Albanian). The task force
soldier inside the checkpoint was in charge of communica- developed a coordinated communications plan that included
tion, and the soldier outside was responsible for community key leader meetings (mayors and community representa-
interaction and presence (weapon at the ready). These re- tives), church meetings, and bi-partisan think-tank meetings.
quirements created the appearance of mass and, when placed These meetings engaged the community and eventually
in key locations and choke points, provided us with a tool to evolved into town hall meetings that gave the people access
control an area that otherwise may have been too large for a to decision makers.
company to cover. The task force commander and S-3 had a very aggressive
While the checkpoints served as the stationary element, meeting schedule that complemented the task force area of
each platoon was also required to have a roving patrol at all operations. For example, in Gnjilane I held a weekly church
times, which served as the platoon’s maneuver element. meeting at the Serb Church, which included representatives
These two elements worked together to respond to problems from UNMIK, UNHCR, OSCE, the Serb Church Council,
and sector issues throughout their areas of responsibility. and Roma community leadership. In this meeting every Fri-
The patrols concentrated on tying in the checkpoints, but day, I could reinforce Task Force themes on sector problems
also served as visible presence along “ethnic fault lines”— that may have been discussed in the Serb Mayor’s meeting
areas where ethnic minorities believed violent crime was led by the S-3, or the Four Pillars meeting attended by the
most likely and, in a lot of cases, rightly so. They generally task force commander.
bordered ethnic neighborhoods. (Although no ethnic Along with the Serb Church meeting and Roma commu-
neighborhood was purely Serb or Roma, Albanians within nity meeting, I had a one-on-one meeting with the appointed
these neighborhoods had a better track record for interaction Albanian mayor as well as a meeting with a local political
with the minorities.) party leader. In these meetings I reinforced security priori-
Each platoon’s roving patrol was tied into its checkpoints ties, addressed Task Force and KFOR concerns, dispelled
at all times. The patrols—four or five soldiers with basic rumors, and provided the community with access to the deci-
load of ammunition and communication with both the sions that were being made in their stead. I also learned
checkpoints and the command post—were invaluable. They where I needed to improve my security efforts and concen-
gathered information by reading the latest posters (a popular trate my patrols. Although many of the requests were 911
form of information sharing), talking to the populace, and calls for personal security, genuine needs could also be de-
gauging movement patterns. They were the maneuver ele- termined from these meetings. The Serb Church served as
ment for the checkpoints, responding to situations that would the center of gravity for the remaining 2,000 or so Serbs who
take checkpoint personnel away from their posts. The pa- remained in town; therefore, they were able to present an
trols also served as an immediate reaction force for the com- actual weekly synopsis of problems for the community. I
pany in those cases where one platoon could not handle a was able to gauge my company’s success for the week from
situation. the number of complaints I received regarding the Serb
One of the key essential tasks that a platoon leader and community at these meetings.
platoon sergeant had to learn was the management of a battle In my meetings with the Albanians, my theme turned to
rhythm. Once I identified the number of checkpoints that inclusion. After listening to the stories of torment and abuse
each platoon would man, based upon the above criteria, it at the hands of the pre-war Serbs, we made a bit of headway
was essential that the platoon determine how they would with the Albanian leaders. After months of meeting with
meet the minimum manning requirements. Because of the these organizations individually, the Task Force was finally
number of soldiers each platoon had, these minimum re- successful in getting a key Albanian leader to attend a Serb
quirements often became the maximum requirements as town hall meeting. This joint gathering made the months of
well. Every now and then a platoon leader could determine meetings worth the effort. It left us with the hope that future
that he needed an extra soldier on a shift to cover anomalies, meetings would be possible and that reconciliation was only

30 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


a matter of time. edge through casual and directed conversations and a simple
Although I believe the key to the company’s success was awareness of where the community lived. Many minorities
mainly encompassed in the tasks of identifying the security believed that time would heal the wounds between the Alba-
requirements, conducting checkpoints and roving patrols, nian and minority populace—KFOR is the mechanism that
and interacting with community leaders—key subtasks that the populace used to gain this much-needed time. Minorities
the company performed extremely well also contributed to also remained in the community because of KFOR’s will-
our success. One of those tasks was the management of de- ingness to man 24-hour and periodic checkpoints. These
tailed graphical control measures. The task force that pre- checkpoints were the only dependable KFOR operations in
ceded us there passed to our task force a system of check- sector that were dedicated to increasing the freedom of
points and area management that we used and improved movement of the Serb and Roma population. Most of the
upon. It included a numbered checkpoint system that minority population remained in those places where KFOR
worked in conjunction with an area that had the name of a manned a checkpoint. KFOR’s willingness to man these
state in the United States whose geographic situation corre- static positions helped the community gain the time needed
sponded with general area in Gnjilane. This system was un- to heal the festering wounds of hatred and contempt.
derstood by all and helped the company master terrain that Much more than a dedicated security force is needed to
was foreign and, if not hostile, downright unfriendly at solve the problems in Gnjilane and, on a larger scale,
times. Kosovo. As I have stated, many organizations and groups
The control measures assisted in reporting, response to are trying in their own ways to help. Synchronizing the ef-
sector emergencies, and soldier confidence. The newest pri- forts of the groups to increase the freedom of movement, and
vate could get on the net and report a problem and vector the the inclusion of ethnic minorities, must remain a priority of
quick reaction force to the area that required attention. Eve- the collective peacekeeping mission. Although at some cost,
ryone could converse about “the problem across the street a multi-ethnic environment may be salvaged in Kosovo.
from the mosque in the bar district vicinity I6 (checkpoint 6 Key ingredients to this equation include continued presence
in area Indiana),” and know exactly were the problem oc- along the “ethnic fault lines” to increase freedom of move-
curred. I was very proud of the mastery of terrain and situ- ment, minority participation in local and regional govern-
ational awareness that these control measures brought the ment, and the synchronization of effort between UNMIK, the
company and recommend a similar system for anyone in- Civil Police, the Civil Administration, and KFOR.
volved in long-term peacekeeping security operations. Both success and failure are summarized in the formula
Decentralized execution is the method in which I took the for Gnjilane’s short-term and long-term future. Although
most risk. Although I personally patrolled from 14 to 16 failure is easily attainable, success is an elusive concept that
hours a day, including meetings—and my first sergeant con- can be achieved only through the slow erosion of hate and
ducted a “midnight run” for four to six hours per evening— violence. Since success cannot be quantified, participants in
platoons still conducted missions with very little supervision. the operation will have to evaluate their labors within the
Except for directed checkpoints and patrols, platoons exe- collective peace structure over time.
cuted missions in accordance with their battle rhythms. My To the soldiers I found at checkpoints at 0200 with weap-
dismounted patrol and the first sergeant’s mounted patrol ons at the ready (one man in and one man out in the rain), to
checked standards and reinforced the Task Force mission. the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants chasing down
Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants were often patrol lead- phantom leads to meet the commander’s intent, to the section
ers on different sector missions. The success of the company leader who conducted mounted patrol at night in night vision
was in the hands of junior NCOs on checkpoints, soldiers on devices for eight hours, and to my first sergeant who never
dismounted patrols, and section leaders at command posts. let me or the company fail: “Yours was the hard task.”
The soldiers’ interaction with the community was also an
important stabilizing factor with the Serbs and Roma who Captain Lee A. Flemming commanded Company B, 2d Battalion, 2d
infantry, in Kosovo with Task Force 2-2, and is currently the plans
did remain in town. The interaction addressed security—the officer for 1st Brigade, 75th Division (TS). He is a 1991 ROTC
most essential concern of these people. It also helped KFOR graduate of the University of Houston.
identify the “ethnic fault lines” by increasing sector knowl-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 31


Merging Technology and Training
The 82d Airborne Division’s Master Gunner Program
MAJOR MALCOLM B. FROST
CAPTAIN JOHN C. JACKSON
MASTER SERGEANT MICHAEL A. VALDEZ

The 82d Airborne Division recently the challenges involved in integrating sergeant at division, one sergeant first
undertook a bold initiative to improve each device with the weapon. class in each of the infantry brigades,
marksmanship skills and the lethality of nine staff sergeants in the infantry bat-
the individual paratrooper. Modeled Where We’ve Been talions, and one staff sergeant in the
after the mechanized infantry master To initiate the program, the leaders engineer battalion. Additionally, each
gunner program, this program is de- first had to define its parameters. The infantry and engineer company was
signed to provide a foundation of NCO possible weapon systems included the charged with providing one staff ser-
subject matter experts who are charged M4, M249, M240B, Mk 19, M2, TOW, geant to serve as master gunner as an
with improving marksmanship through Javelin, and 81mm and 60mm mortars. additional duty.
training, new equipment integration, These systems were divided into three Identifying the right personnel to
and small arms systems maintenance. groups on the basis of priority and a serve as the 14 primary master gunners
Since marksmanship performance has realistic workload for the master gun- was considered critical to the success of
remained high in the 82d, the purpose ners: the program. NCO expertise would be
of this program is not to revive a lost Phase I weapons are the M4, M249, the program’s touchstone, and short-
skill. On the contrary, the influx of M240B, and Javelin—the initial focus term sacrifices would have to be made
night vision devices (NVDs), optics, of the master gunner program. to achieve long-term success. This im-
and lasers has given light forces an un- Phase II weapons are the Mk 19, M2, portant duty therefore fell onto the divi-
precedented opportunity to own the and TOW. sion’s command sergeants major, who
night in a small arms clash. Yet to date Phase III weapons are the 81mm and hand-selected NCOs to fill the master
the potential of this increased capability 60mm mortars. gunner positions. Each battalion and
has not been fully realized. The divi- At the same time, the leaders had to brigade master gunner was interviewed
sion’s master gunner program is simply make decisions about personnel. What by his unit CSM and appointed with the
recognition that if we are to capitalize is the appropriate master gunner rank at principal duty title of master gunner.
on this technology and increase lethality each unit level? Should they be given Upon selection, each was stabilized in
at night, we must have a core of experts special duty (SD) status so they can his position for one year.
trained on current capabilities, weapon fully concentrate on master gunner du-
configurations, and the unique technical ties without distractions? Which units Where We Are
aspects that each device brings to our need master gunners? Once the initial pool of master gunner
weapons. Master gunners must also be Leaders soon decided that the pro- candidates had been selected, coordina-
intimately involved in the fielding of gram would begin with 14 master gun- tion was quickly made with 2d Battal-
new equipment and be responsible for ners serving in SD status. One master ion, 29th Infantry Regiment, at Fort

32 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Benning, Georgia, to provide a founda-
tion of institutional training on the key PROCEDURES FOR USING THE LASER BORELIGHT
topics ranging from weapon configura- TO ZERO OPTICS AND LASER AIMING DEVICES
tion to marksmanship. As the propo-
1. Read the associated manual for the laser borelight.
nent for all small arms systems, 2d 2. Use the 10-meter zero lanyard provided in the laser borelight kit as fielded.
Battalion provided the expertise neces- 3. Zero the laser borelight to each weapon before zeroing any of the advanced optics or
sary to conduct this training and help laser aiming devices
4. Use a heavy ruck sack or aiming box to stabilize the weapon while using the borelight
the 82d with this initiative. to zero optics and laser aiming devices. (NOTE: A hand-held weapon will not allow the
On the surface this may seem a small borelight to properly zero advanced optics or laser aiming devices.)
point, but during the first phase of the 5. Use the proper offset zero targets for each optic or laser aiming device from the Small
Arms Integration Booklet (SAIB) when zeroing weapons with the laser borelight.
five-week long training, NCOs from the NOTE: The SAIB can be found in the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
82d and the 29th exchanged ideas and Digital Library at:
tested various methods of mounting, http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/st/saib/saib.htm.
boresighting, and firing the M4, M249,
and M240B weapon systems. Every ducted dry-fire exercises, and practice detailed after-action reports from the
aspect of the training incorporated de- and record fires with the M4 in various commander of 2d Battalion, 29th In-
vices from the nightfighting arsenal. configurations during the day and at fantry.
During this training, both teams of night. The most important lesson learned—
NCOs learned a great deal, shared The second week of training was and the common thread that led to in-
knowledge, and dispelled myths about dedicated to the M249 squad automatic creased marksmanship performance for
training with night-vision equipment. weapon and M240B machinegun. In all small arms weapons (M4, M203,
During the second phase of the training addition to reiterating the marksman- M249, M240B)—was the proper use of
with the 29th, the master gunners con- ship fundamentals for machinegun fir- the laser borelight. The borelight
centrated on the Javelin gunnery and ing, the lectures introduced the M145 proved to be fundamental in enabling
training devices, and earned the 2C ad- machinegun optic during the day and the NCOs to use all of the nightfighting
ditional skill identifier (ASI). Addi- incorporated the lasers at night. Some equipment effectively, along with
tionally, they were able to gain insight of the fundamentals of rifle and ma- NVDs and advanced optics. Proper use
and provide input on new developments chinegun marksmanship were adjusted of the borelight as detailed in the ac-
and upcoming fieldings from the Infan- for firing with night vision devices companying chart ensured that all optics
try School’s Directorate of Combat De- (NVDs) and lasers. In addition, the and laser aiming devices were effec-
velopments. instructors provided feedback on how to tively zeroed to each weapon.
The first week of training began with run fixed-fire ranges more efficiently. Remarkable results were achieved
the M4 modular weapon system with In the third week of training, the during the first two weeks of small arms
integrated rail adapter system (RAS). master gunner transitioned to the Jave- training. Upon completion of their
The master gunners received extensive lin Training Device Course, and the training with the 29th Infantry, every
classroom instruction on boresighting NCOs were introduced to the Javelin 82d Division master gunner had made
procedures for every device integrated system and training devices. The basic appreciable gains in live-fire qualifica-
into the RAS. This instruction included skills trainer (BST)—a computer simu- tion standards. As an example, the fol-
the characteristics and technical aspects lated device—was used to train the lowing results were achieved at night
of own-the-night equipment, the various NCOs to train soldiers on Javelin firing with 40 to 45 percent illumination: M4
target offsets for each aiming laser, procedures and target acquisition, se- with AN/PAQ-4C—29 of 40 soldiers
safety considerations of equipment, lection, and engagement. They also tested were able to qualify; M249 with
mounting procedures, and preventive trained with the field tactical trainer AN/PAQ-4C—7 of 11 qualified. Addi-
maintenance. (FTT), which uses MILES to simulate tionally, the average for M68 CCOs
Upon completion of classroom in- firing Javelin at a vehicle at ranges up during the day was 35 of 40 hits.
struction, and before firing a round to 2,000 meters. To complete the training on Phase I
down range, each master gunner had to During the completion of each train- weapons, the master gunners received
display expertise and pass hands-on ing event, significant issues from the additional technical training at Fort
tests in the operation and boresighting small arms and Javelin training were Bragg on maintenance procedures,
of the laser borelight, AN/PAQ-4C and brought up, and any necessary adjust- fielding, and rigging (for airborne op-
AN/PEQ2A aiming lasers, AN/PAS-13 ments were incorporated into the proc- erations) of small arms and OTN
thermal weapon site, and M68 close ess. Upon completion of the training, equipment. This training was one week
combat optic. Once this segment was the NCOs were given copies of all the long, covered the technical aspects of
completed, training moved to the training materials and lesson plans that the Phase I weapon systems and their
ranges. The master gunners boresighted were used. This included the results of components, and provided the master
lasers and zeroed the back-up iron site training, statistics, research material, gunners with an understanding of the
and the close combat optic. They con- fielding plans, technical manuals, and process involved in the fielding, testing,

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 33


TRAINING NOTES
and maintenance of new weapons and letter is intended to ensure that master division plans to run quarterly company
OTN equipment. gunners remain proficient, act as a col- master gunner courses to sustain the
Day-to-day, master gunners will con- lective body to support large-scale training base and increase the number
tinue to observe ranges and provide marksmanship events, get ahead of the of master gunners within companies and
training assistance to units and soldiers lag in technical expertise on the fielding battalions across the division.
on marksmanship issues and compile of OTN equipment, and proliferate the In addition to bringing some of their
marksmanship training data. This will program over time by teaching and expertise to company level, the master
help identify marksmanship training sustaining a core of master gunners at gunners will serve crucial roles in
deficiencies and unit trends that can be company level. leader and unit training. The division’s
shared with the division as a whole As this is an NCO-driven program, master gunners will be the proponents
through the network of master gunners. the division CSM continues to be inte- for all small arms and night fighting
They will communicate information to gral to the program’s success. He is equipment related issues in the unit. As
commanders on upcoming changes in behind the program on several fronts. the train-the-trainers for small arms and
small arms technology and will present First, he has worked with the Total OTN equipment boresighting, zeroing,
and solve issues on behalf of their units Army Personnel Command (PER- and firing, they will be a tremendous
and the division. They will also iden- SCOM) to give one-year minimum sta- asset for small unit leaders in the plan-
tify maintenance trends and systemic bilization to the initial pool of master ning, setup, and conduct of fixed-fire
problems with small arms and OTN gunners from battalion to division lev- ranges. They will participate, advise,
equipment. The master gunners will els. Next, he will be the final approval and provide oversight for the execution
work closely with the G7 (Force- authority for the use of the master gun- of machinegun weeks and marksman-
Modernization) personnel and provide ners. Specifically, he will oversee the ship densities. By supervising unit ar-
valuable insight from the user perspec- master gunners to ensure that their fo- morers and helping coordinate for re-
tive during new equipment fielding cus remains on marksmanship and night placement parts, maintenance, and turn-
meetings. While the first priority of the vision equipment, and that units do not in procedures of all small arms and
master gunner program is to train the overstep their bounds and use master OTN equipment, they will play a key
initial pool of NCOs, they are already gunners for other duties. Finally, he role during their unit’s Operational
working issues and aggressively dis- will chair the division master gunner Readiness Survey inspection before the
seminating information in an effort to conferences, where decisions on con- unit assumes responsibility for Division
improve marksmanship and meet the figuration, programs, supported events, Readiness Force 1 missions. The mas-
challenges of technological evolution in and equipment fielding will be made in ter gunners will also work closely with
the entire division. a forum that includes the division’s trainers and maintainers to keep units
CSMs, master gunners, and G4 and G7 abreast of systemic trends in mainte-
Where We’re Going Force Modernization personnel. nance deficiencies and apply lessons
The next step for the 82d is to de- In order to effectively disseminate the learned at the user level.
velop a framework that will ensure the knowledge developed at Fort Benning, Several initiatives are also being de-
continuity of the master gunner pro- the master gunners ran the division’s veloped that will enable the division to
gram. This requires a campaign strat- first three-week Company Master Gun- keep up with the pace of change, ex-
egy that balances the collective issues ner Course in March-April 2001. This change ideas, and share knowledge.
necessary to ensure long-term survival course was similar to the training re- These are included in a master gunner
of the program with the immediate ceived from the 29th. The first week Website (https://airborne.bragg.army.
needs at the small unit and individual concentrated on configuration, zero, mil/82mastergunner/), a master gunner
level. equipment operation, practice and rec- Newsletter, and a master gunner Bi-
As with any new program, command ord fire for the M4. Also critical to the weekly Update.
emphasis is vital. Without it, the pro- first week of training was training on The master gunner Website will pro-
gram would wither away in short order. the proper operation of NVDs, which is vide information on configuration,
In the 82d, the commanding general, too often overlooked. To see targets maintenance, new equipment fielding,
assistant division commander for op- clearly at night, each soldier must un- division marksmanship standards, and
erations, and division CSM are firmly derstand how to focus the devices, ad- force modernization issues. Included
rooted in their support of the master just the diopter, and gain brightness will be photographs of fully configured
gunner program. To illustrate this in control. The second week focused on weapons and detailed photos with in-
more tangible terms, the division is de- the M249 and M240B, and the third structions on each piece of equipment
veloping a master gunner policy letter week, on the Javelin. This first course that must be mounted on each weapon.
that will address the scope of the pro- primarily centered on training the in- It will also provide links to Army web-
gram, master gunner duties and respon- fantry and engineer line company mas- sites that are critical to the program, and
sibilities, division events that will be ter gunners. In the short-term, it has points of contact, including the divi-
supported, and clear guidelines for the helped push expertise down to the sol- sion’s master gunners and support per-
use of this valuable asset. The policy diers in line units. In the long term, the sonnel from the Directorate of Combat

34 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Developments—Project Managers (PM) one-kill takes a higher level of training program—an institutional course to
Small Arms and Night Vision at Fort in an environment based upon night train the trainers, an MOS identifier,
Benning—2d Battalion, 29th Infantry, fighting equipment. To achieve success positions in the MTOE, and recognition
and Picatinny and Rock Island Arse- in this environment, order must replace from the Infantry community, higher
nals. the confusion that the complexities of Army headquarters, and the Army that
The website will also provide links to technology bring to the forefront. This the true experts and best our NCO
the master gunner Weekly Updates and means we must have expert trainers in Corps has to offer must serve in these
monthly Newsletter. The Weekly Up- our warfighting units. For years, light crucial light, air assault, and airborne
date will provide short-term snap-shots infantry has needed a program that ad- infantry master gunner positions.
of working issues—training, mainte- dresses this problem. The Infantry
Major Malcolm B. Frost is a 1988 graduate
nance, recent force modernization is- needs an institutional foundation that of the U.S. Military Academy and has a
sues, a running eight-week calendar, can embrace this problem and put solu- Master's degree from Webster University. He
and a “What’s New” section. The tions into the hands of the primary served his first tour in the 4th Infantry Division
and has commanded companies in 3d Bat-
monthly master gunner Newsletter will trainers—the NCO Corps. talion, 325th ABCT (Italy) and the 3d U.S.
take a broader approach to these same The 82d’s Division master gunner Infantry (The Old Guard). He also served as
areas. It will tell the story of where the program, along with the critical exper- aide to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and is
now S-3 for 3d Battalion, 504th Infantry, in
program has been in recent months and tise of the 29th Infantry, is an initial the 82d Airborne Division.
where the mid- to long-term focus will step toward grasping and solving the
be in training, maintenance, and field- issues light forces face as they attempt Captain John C. Jackson is a 1993 gradu-
ate of the U.S. Military Academy. He has
ing. It will also sum up the issues and to merge training with technology. served as a platoon leader with 2d Battalion,
decisions reached at the division master What we need now is for the institu- 502d Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, and
gunner conferences and any fundamen- tional base to grab hold of this program the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. He
has also served as platoon trainer for the
tal shifts in the program’s azimuth. and exploit it. This is significant be- Infantry Officer Basic Course and is currently
Every weapon carried by a light or cause it is not just the light infantrymen commanding Company C, 2d Battalion, 29th
airborne infantryman is no longer just a who will be using these devices. Every Infantry.
weapon or weapon system. Each go-to- infantry unit and many non-infantry Master Sergeant Michael A. Valdez was a
war weapon in the inventory is now an combat arms units will eventually re- scout squad leader in the 2d Battalion, 327th
ever-changing element of systems that ceive them. As we move into the fu- Infantry, 101st Airborne Division; a squad
leader in the 5th Battalion, 502d Infantry,
includes the soldier. The individual ture, this training must be integrated Berlin Brigade; and the V Corps Readiness
soldier must be trained on the com- into the NCO Education System NCO in Germany. In the 82d, he has served
plexities of configuring, boresighting, (NCOES) so that every NCO has the as a rifle platoon sergeant, battalion opera-
tions sergeant, and battalion intelligence
zeroing, firing, and maintaining these basic skills necessary to train soldiers at sergeant in the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry,
systems. “Basic” marksmanship is a the squad and platoon level. and is currently the 82d Division master gun-
misnomer. Putting accurate, well- A good start point is a mirror of the ner.
aimed fire down range for one-shot, mechanized infantry master gunner

Master Marksmen
In the Light Infantry
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS KENNETH WOLFE

Infantrymen today continue to strug- requirement, it will continue to be unre- I recommend that all light infantry
gle with marksmanship, especially un- alistic, less cost effective, and in many battalions designate a Master Marks-
der combat conditions. Trends at the cases unsafe. Consider the precious man, and make him responsible for es-
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) training hours and dollars spent on tablishing and directing a comprehen-
continue to document that soldiers do leadership development and unit train- sive marksmanship program within the
not engage targets effectively. Until ing. All of that time and money is unit. The Army’s mechanized infantry
unit leaders make marksmanship a wasted if soldiers cannot effectively and armor units as well as the Marine
command focus instead of a biannual engage targets. Corps have such programs in place.

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 35


TRAINING NOTES
The results have been superbly trained would establish the battalion training another avenue to explore. Mobile
individual marksman and gun crews. plan for all Standards in Training training teams (MTTs) could easily be
The Master Gunner programs work. Commission (STRAC) qualification and laid on from the Special Forces com-
With the support of his commander, a small arms training. Such duties would munity or the Army Marksmanship Unit
battalion Master Marksman would im- encompass scheduling, preparing, and for more advanced shooting at minimal
prove marksmanship proficiency in the running the ranges. The Master cost to any unit.
light infantry battalions. A Master Marksman would attend preliminary Every issue of Infantry Magazine
Marksman would be the battalion com- marksman instruction, qualifications, offers training tips and notes. Several
mander’s subject matter expert on all zero ranges, and known-distance civilian handguns magazines offer dif-
weapons organic to the battalion. That ranges. He could offer instruction on ferent insights on weapons training that
alone would provide a single point of the fundamental elements of marksman- would be beneficial to a battalion Mas-
contact for improving the unit’s corpo- ship, shadowbox, dime-washer drills, ter Marksman. An extensive library of
rate knowledge of its organic weapons Weaponeers, dry firing exercises, and field and technical manuals will be
and their sighting systems. That is no other subjects. maintained in order to complete the
small task, considering that the inven- As the battalion became more profi- plan, particularly with crew-served
tory includes night vision devices cient at these tasks, the Master Marks- weapons. Additionally, the Center for
(NVDs), laser and optic, 9mm, M4, man could transition into more ad- Army Lessons Learned (CALL) news-
M203, M249, M240B, M24, M2 .50 vanced techniques of fire, close quarters letter would also be helpful.
caliber machinegun, and Mk 19 grenade marksmanship (CQM), close quarters A battalion Master Marksman would
launcher. But it is through training that battle, reflexive and quick fire, as well and should use his expertise everyday.
the Master Marksman would really as the four positions for firing on a Most units operate on three cycles:
come into play as a combat multiplier. known distance range—sitting, kneel- Field training (combined arms live fire
He would plan the battalion’s consoli- ing, off-hand prone, and rapid fire. Flat exercises, range training); deployment
dated weapons training in each training 25-meter ranges would be used to teach readiness force and combat training
cycle and prior to the assumption of any controlled pairs, automatic fires, turning center deployments; and support (post
Readiness Force mission, or deploy- and running techniques—all a part of details, schools, and leave).
ment for war or operations other than his duties. As the soldiers and leaders In the field, the battalion Master
war. became skilled in marksmanship, the Marksman would observe units during
The assistant S-3 NCO would be a battalion Master Marksman would take live-fire exercises (LFXs), make rec-
good candidate for this job. The light marksmanship to the next level, which ommendations to commanders, and
infantry battalion military table of or- might include engaging targets in attend after-action reviews. The bat-
ganization and equipment (MTOE) al- rooms, hallways, and stairwells. These talion Master Marksman would focus
ready allows for two sergeants first make up a unique phase of CQM. on improving the hit-to-miss ratio dur-
class in the battalion S-3 shop, and one Point-man and quick-reaction drills for ing LFXs and the proper deployment of
of them should be able to fill this role. patrolling should be incorporated and crew-served weapons.
As senior NCOs, these sergeants are emphasized. Ranges for crew-served In range training, the battalion Master
experienced with all weapon systems weapons should meet more than the Marksman would oversee the battal-
within the battalion. Being in the S-3 requirements of zero and qualification, ion’s consolidated weapons training.
shop is ideal. They are also placed and should also include targets with As the battalion commander’s subject
where they can draw on the knowledge depth, linear, oblique, and enfilade en- matter expert, he would ensure that
represented in the Department of the gagements. Traversing and elevation ranges are being run to standard. He
Army school system as well as local manipulation and the understanding of would reinforce the proper execution of
small-arms schools. The Master the traversing bar on a tripod would all all tactics, techniques, and procedures
Marksman would have direct contact be within his sphere of responsibilities. (TTPs), in accordance with the battalion
with the S-3—the most important The battalion Master Marksman should commander’s intent. The battalion
training officer in the battalion. He establish qualifying standards in each of Master Marksman would use feedback
would interact daily with the battalion these tasks so that live-fire exercises from OICs and NCOICs to improve
training area and ammunition NCO to would become more meaningful. weapons training.
procure ranges and Class V. Moreover, Where does the battalion Master The support cycle would be the most
the Master Marksman would become an Marksman gain the knowledge to ac- important one for the battalion Master
integral part of the battalion’s training complish all these requirements? He Marksman. Using company and pla-
and support meetings along with the should already have these skills due to toon marksmanship training plans, he
battalion and company XOs. his rank and experience. Sniper School would consolidate those programs and
The duties and responsibilities of a would be a tremendous asset for the add his own ideas. That would make
battalion Master Marksman would pure fundamentals of marksmanship. him the battalion’s coach, teacher, and
closely resemble those of a mechanized M249 and M240B courses from the mentor on all aspects of marksmanship.
infantry or armor Master Gunner. He 29th Infantry at Fort Benning would be He would train the units’ trainers and

36 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


set the battalion up for future success. ized, the distance and reaction times of When it is added up, nearly 30,000
In addition, the battalion Master our engagements will decrease. Our rounds will be expended. If only half of
Marksman could help make the marks- marksmanship training should reflect these rounds hit targets, are we truly
manship training safer, more realistic, this as well. In the city or the jungle, a getting the best use out of our training
and more cost effective in several ways. light infantryman’s fight starts at his dollars? In the beginning, a battalion
First of all, a constant focus on the use muzzle. He may be prone, kneeling, or Master Marksman program may use up
of weapons would make marksmanship standing, all in a matter of seconds. more ammunition, but over time a
training safer. Soldiers who have Realistic marksmanship training en- command focus on marksmanship
weapons in their hands all the time tend compasses those scenarios. The battal- training will save training dollars.
to be more comfortable with them. ion Master Marksman would enforce During the Gulf War, for example, ef-
Soldiers with a solid understanding of reality, insisting that units train for fective marksmanship in the mecha-
the functions and capabilities of their combat marksmanship—training as they nized divisions was attributed to a
weapons are more confident with them. fight. Master Gunner Program.
Fully versed in the limitations and ca- A light infantryman must qualify Looking at it from another angle,
pabilities of his weapon system, a sol- twice a year, which requires 160 rounds consider all of the training, leader de-
dier is more prepared to execute safer of 5.56mm. At 22 cents a round, this velopment, and material costs involved
more realistic LFXs. Coupled with a amounts to $35.20 per man per year. If in putting a soldier out on the line. We
regular shooting regime, a superbly a soldier hits the target only 100 times, owe every one of our soldiers a fighting
confident and safe marksman will that is a loss of $13.20 in training funds. chance to survive in combat. If he can’t
emerge. Multiplied by the 600-man strength of a hit what he’s aiming at, we as leaders
Engaging the enemy in combat will light infantry battalion, the loss comes have failed.
not be done from behind two sandbags, to $7,920.00. Taking this analogy even
Sergeant First Class Kenneth E. Wolfe is
nor will it be from a culvert buried in further, let’s look at the company LFX, an Infantry platoon observer-controller at the
ground overlooking a perfectly mani- including breaching the wire to clear a Joint Readiness Training Center. He previ-
cured range. This is not realistic, and trench and bunkers: Each rifleman ously served 11 years in the 75th Ranger
Regiment and more than two years in the
our training should reflect the threat. starts with 210 rounds, M249 gunner 101st Airborne Division.
As more of the world becomes urban- with 600, and M240B gunner with 900.

Medical Evacuation and Training


During Ranger School
CAPTAIN MARC CLOUTIER

It’s Day 9 of the 10-day field train- medical evacuation (MED-EVAC) heli- MEDEVAC Systems Rehearsals.
ing exercise (FTX) conducted at the copter for the student. Within 20 min- Systems rehearsals are conducted on the
6th Ranger Training Battalion (RTB), utes the student is extracted from the fourth day of each Ranger Class—11
the final exercise of Ranger School. swamp and is at the Eglin Air Force times over the course of a year. The
For the past eight days the Ranger Base emergency room for treatment. first system to be tested is a jungle
students have averaged only two hours Today, the 6th Ranger Training Bat- penetrator (JP) hoist of a 200-pound
of sleep per day. A platoon of 40 talion, responsible for the Florida Phase dummy off a safety boat on the Yellow
Ranger students walks through the of Ranger School, is expertly supported River. Before any student conducts
swamps along the Yellow River on the by aircrews from the XVIII Airborne waterborne training, this rehearsal is
Florida Panhandle. The illumination Corps. The battalion trains MEDEVAC conducted to verify that aircrews, flight
is zero and the nearest road is an un- systems and scenarios at least 15 times medics, boat operators, Ranger medics,
improved trail two kilometers away, a year. This training is broken into four and tactical operations center (TOC)
with the Boiling Creek to their back. different categories: MEDEVAC systems personnel can safely extract a casualty
Suddenly a water moccasin bites one rehearsals, quarterly MEDEVAC training, from the swamps.
of the Ranger students. Without hesi- annual interagency mass casualty Following the hoist rehearsal, one RI
tation the Ranger Instructors (RIs) (MASCAL) exercise, and student MED- walking team, consisting of four in-
assess the situation and request a EVAC operations.. structors, initiates part two of this sys-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 37


TRAINING NOTES
tems rehearsal. Each cycle, a new FTX that cause all elements of the local strobe light by night. As the aircraft
day is tested. It may be an airborne safety network to be activated and approaches, it will indicate by FM radio
operation, a waterborne accident, or any trained. if the smoke or strobe is visible. When
number of simulated injuries in remote The annual MASCAL exercise gives the aircraft is within 200 meters of the
areas of the Eglin training area. This several separate agencies an opportunity casualty, the white strobe must be
rehearsal tests MEDEVAC procedures at to conduct MEDEVAC training. In addi- turned off so it does not create a haz-
all levels. An evaluator records signifi- tion to Ranger assets, joint MASCAL ardous situation for pilots flying with
cant events, a medical evaluator records exercises involve local emergency night vision goggles (NVGs). If the
actions taken by the RIs to treat the medical services from two counties, the pilots are having a difficult time identi-
casualty, and the battalion S-3 evaluates local fire department, five local hospi- fying the signals, FM communications
the primary instructor (PI) team on ac- tals, the news media, and Eglin AFB’s with a clock direction and distance are
tions taken upon notification of a Disaster Control Group. used to direct the helicopter to the loca-
MEDEVAC. As in all Army training, an Student MEDEVAC Operations. tion.
after-action review (AAR) follows the Ranger School is designed to train small The near signal used by day is a VS-
event, involving commanders, air and large combat arms unit leaders and, 17 panel, which marks where the hoist
crews, walking teams, medics, and more importantly, give them the tools or helicopter should land. The near
evaluators so that lessons learned can be and ideas to take back to their parent signal at night is a swinging red chemi-
captured and new procedures devel- units and use in training their own sol- cal light tied to the end of a two-foot
oped, if necessary. One of the most diers. section of 550 cord. If this signal is
difficult types of evacuation, and the In addition to ambushes, raids, and swung vigorously overhead, the pilots
most common in a swamp environment, waterborne operations, 6th RTB sends can readily identify it at night. When
is the JP hoist—an event we always try the Ranger graduate back to his unit the aircraft is overhead, FM communi-
to incorporate into the systems rehears- capable of incorporating MEDEVAC cation from the ground to the aircraft
als. training as an integral part of battle- must cease. At this point the aircraft is
Quarterly MEDEVAC Training. focused training. Each of three Ranger relying on instructions from his crew
Quarterly MEDEVAC training allows training companies routinely conducts chief and is busy trying to maintain
company commanders to train multiple MEDEVAC training scenarios during the control of the aircraft in a hover. The
walking teams in the procedures for ten-day FTX. The treatment and added radio communication only aggra-
treating and evacuating a casualty. It evacuation of simulated casualties oc- vates an already challenging situation
also gives air crews invaluable and re- curs without notice to the student chain for the pilot. Also at this point, any
alistic training. Quarterly MEDEVAC of command, and often requires white light being used to treat a casualty
training focuses primarily on the use of evacuation by use of the jungle pene- on the ground must be extinguished as
the JP hoist or SKEDCO litter hoist trator. Ranger instructors assist stu- this creates another dangerous situation
from the swamps. Instructors and crews dents in the proper procedures for a JP for pilots flying under NVGs. (If light
train both day and night scenarios in- extraction, as the procedure itself is is critical, a red or blue lens filtered
volving a casualty requiring immediate difficult and potentially hazardous. light can be used.)
extraction. This training realistically During numerous training events, Finally, during a hoist mission, sig-
replicates hazards that might occur AARs have brought to light many pro- nals must be used to relay when a casu-
during upcoming cycles. Hypothermia cedures that save time and prevent con- alty is ready to be raised. Only one
treatment and evacuation is the focus fusion. One challenge encountered person should give the signals. During
before winter cycles, and heat stroke during MEDEVAC training in the swamps the day, a simple thumbs up overhead is
and snakebites are most common before and dense vegetation is signaling tech- all that is required. At night, the same
spring and summer cycles, but there are niques. Both the ground personnel and red chemlite on two feet of 550 cord
always added injuries or surprises to the aircrews must understand each oth- again lets the crew chief know that the
prevent complacency on the instructors’ ers’ signals. Our far recognition signal casualty is prepared for the hoist. Since
evaluation and treatment of the casu- both day and night is FM communica- the flight medic will first be lowered to
alty. tions and a red star cluster (red pen gun the ground to continue treatment of the
Annual Interagency MASCAL Exer- flare if the star cluster is not available or casualty, he becomes the primary sig-
cise. Once per year, the 6th RTB hosts is a dud). nalman for the hoist. The flight medic
an interagency MASCAL that involves all When the pilots or our TOC indicate also has FM communications with the
agencies in the Eglin community, in- that the aircraft is one minute out, the aircraft. We also have the aircrew acti-
cluding local hospitals, law enforce- walking team members fire their star vate a red chemlite and attach it to the
ment, and fire and rescue personnel. cluster. Smoke, our intermediate signal, jungle penetrator during training. This
The MASCAL scenario is developed to is thrown immediately after the star enables the aircrew and the personnel
be the worst case the 6th RTB would cluster is fired because it takes time to on the ground to see the hoist as it is
have to encounter and overcome. The billow and crest the canopy of trees. lowered to help maintain situational
scenario is driven by unforeseen factors We use red smoke by day and a white awareness.

38 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Although the JP is the primary means tions. The cable can easily become Instructors are now more proficient in
of extraction from the swamp, cross entangled with the ground team and MEDEVAC operations, which has trans-
training on the SKEDCO litter is essen- cause serious injury. Signals should be lated into better MEDEVAC training for
tial for cases involving a back or neck made by only one signalman; more than the Ranger students as well. It has also
injury. During 6th RTB’s most recent one creates too much confusion and can provided the Florida Phase of Ranger
training, the flight medic was pre- be dangerous. Rigging a patient for a School with a stronger safety net in the
positioned at the extraction location on SKEDCO hoist while under the rotor event we do encounter injuries that
the ground where he was able to con- wash is detrimental to both ground per- threaten life, limb, or eyesight. By
duct training on the actual terrain where sonnel and air crew. Once the neces- dedicating effort and enthusiasm to our
a hoist mission is most likely to become sary equipment is lowered, signal the MEDEVAC training, we have devel-
necessary. aircraft off into an orbit, and have the oped—and continually revalidate—
We learned several lessons from this flight medic call the aircraft back over- techniques that ensure better, safer, and
training: head once he is ready to extract. Safety more realistic training for the Ranger
First, a SKEDCO should not be used goggles and a kevlar helmet help pro- students and cadre of the 6th Ranger
when extracting a casualty from the tect the ground crew and the patient Training Brigade.
swamp if a JP will suffice. The dense from dead-fall blown down by the rotor
vegetation of the swamps made it very wash. Captain Marc Cloutier, when he wrote this
difficult to find an area large enough to Through constant training and evalu- article, was S-3 Air of the 6th Ranger Training
Battalion, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
use the SKEDCO. Cable awareness is ation, MEDEVAC training has paid big
paramount, especially in night opera- dividends for our soldiers. Our Ranger

Integrating Medical Training


Into Company Warfighting Training
CAPTAIN LAWRENCE O. BASHA

When an infantry officer takes com- and Vietnam—a major, comprehensive These are not easily quantifiable bene-
mand of a company, he wants to make it study of wound effects—found that 80 fits, but they are important and a good
the best fighting force possible. Many percent of combat deaths occurred in commander will work to improve them.
of us know how to develop the maneu- the first hour after injury. Of these
ver aspects of training, but we may not casualties, 50 percent bled to death, half Ranger CLS Training:
be sure how to improve other areas that of whom could have survived if the A Case Study
support the company’s ability to fight. bleeding had been stopped. Saving The results of a good CLS program
One essential support skill is the lives is the fundamental reward from a are impressive. Recently, I observed a
ability of trained combat life savers good medical training program. platoon raid conducted by 3d Battalion,
(CLSs) to perform medical tasks. The Improving life-saving skills yields 75th Ranger Regiment. A fire team was
training and evaluation of medical per- other benefits as well. An individual providing security in an intermediate
sonnel is the responsibility of the bat- soldier gains confidence when he can support-by-fire position. A medical
talion medical officer. The company perform the actions that he knows will observer-controller (OC) came up from
commander, in turn, can use the medics save lives, and when he has truly mas- behind and assessed a casualty on the
to train and evaluate his infantry per- tered a skill he can use anywhere and fire team—a Ranger was given a shoul-
sonnel. This article provides sugges- any time. Units gain confidence going der wound. The OC put a laminated
tions on how the company commander into battle, knowing that they will be index card specifying the injury on a
can improve soldiers’ CLS skills. cared for by the soldiers around them. 550-cord loop around the Ranger’s
Any good infantry commander knows Soldiers will fight harder when they neck. The combat life saver with the
the value of correct and timely first aid know there is good, competent care and CLS bag went to his aid. He prepared
on the battlefield. The Bellamy Analy- an evacuation program to take the the injured Ranger and applied the
sis of casualties in World War II, Korea, wounded back to a dedicated care giver. proper bandages. Without looking up,

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 39


TRAINING NOTES
he asked the medical OC, “Has the the next casualty. The Rangers then achieve qualification, the commander
bleeding stopped?” The OC told him evacuate the casualty to the next higher should closely monitor training to keep
that it had, and the Ranger CLS contin- level of care (platoon to company, com- this number to a minimum, below 10
ued to stabilize the bandages and pre- pany to battalion). percent if possible. Sending personnel
pare the Ranger for evacuation. “Is the Following the exercise, a medical- to other courses on the installation may
patient conscious?” asked the Ranger. specific AAR is conducted, and the also reduce the number of unqualified
The OC told him yes, but the soldier comments are plugged into the training soldiers. This may be an inconvenience
could not assist him, nor could he walk. management cycle. Through this to some, but it will clearly demonstrate
This said, the Ranger began to prepare training sequence, the battalion has im- command emphasis. The object is to
this casualty for movement. The medi- proved the individual Rangers’ medical see that all personnel are CLS certified.
cal OC moved on to assess another ability and increased the unit’s combat Since each course can be run for about
casualty. The CLS then moved the first effectiveness and survivability. one-third of the company, sessions can
casualty to the platoon casualty collec- Command Emphasis. For the in- be scheduled around prime training
tion point (CCP) and helped evacuate fantry company commander, improving times.
him to the battalion aid station (BAS). the company’s medical treatment is not The CLS course itself should focus
To the casual observer, this may difficult. Command emphasis on the on trauma. The instructors should em-
seem like a very high-speed process, but training program is essential, and this phasize the type of trauma the company
when examined, it is the result of four can be achieved in numerous ways. would see in combat, such as gunshot
basic training principles: Commanders can schedule time on wounds. Explaining what the CLS can
• The 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger the training calendar for the initial and expect in a real-life situation will focus
Regiment, uses dedicated medical OCs refresher training. They can make sure the soldiers on the course. Subjects to
to evaluate and influence the medical personnel attend the classes and empha- be emphasized should include trauma
training during blank fire exercises size 100 percent attendance. Units care, tactical field care, and casualty
(BFXs) and live fire exercises (LFXs). evacuation. Since this course will be
These OCs assess specific casualties on The inclusion of casualty geared for one company, instructors can
the force. play during an LFX or a BFX cover company SOPs and teach every-
• The OC evaluates the care given to one the proper techniques and proce-
puts individual training into
the casualties. dures for CLS treatment, evacuation
• All the Rangers go through CLS perspective and enhances the procedures, and the CCP setup.
training when they arrive at the unit. overall mission training. Sustainment Training. Following
• The Rangers have regular medical the initial training, the company can
and CLS refresher training. should develop CLS training kits con- have medical classes en masse or for a
It is because of command emphasis taining the bandages and other items sub-element (platoon, squad, fire team,
and continual training that the 3d Bat- required for training. Resources for or two or three individuals). The
talion, 75th Ranger Regiment’s CLS training may include new or improvised classes can be conducted in a formal
training program sets the standard and supplies (such as cravats made out of classroom setting or in the field. They
is hence worthy of emulation. fabric). These can be stored in used should combine instruction and practi-
The inclusion of casualty play during ammunition boxes or containers from cal application. The smaller the number
an LFX or a BFX puts individual train- the Defense Reutilization and Market- of soldiers trained at one time, the
ing into perspective and enhances the ing Office, thus saving unit funds. The greater the value of the training, and the
overall mission training. A typical commander should ensure that appro- less time the soldiers waste waiting for
training evaluation consists of a medical priate medical supplies are available for evaluation.
OC who is equipped to assess casualties training missions and make it a policy Since many of our leaders and sol-
and is responsible for providing medical that he be notified when items are diers have never been in combat and do
coverage for the range. He carries missing and cannot be replaced. Fi- not know first-hand what to expect, the
casualty tags (similar to the MILES nally, the commander can require that commander can have a former combat
casualty cards) on 550-cord loops so casualty play be integrated into all ma- veteran give a talk to the unit about
that when a casualty is designated, the neuver exercises, no matter what size what types of injuries he has seen in
injury and the patient’s condition are element is being trained. battle. The 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger
easily visible to caregivers. The casu- Initial Training. The commander Regiment, has had good results with
alty wears this around his neck and does can schedule annual CLS training to be this type of briefing. It adds emphasis
not have to hold it or dig it out of a conducted three or four times a quarter, to the medical training and gives the
pocket when a new caregiver comes to so the entire company can be trained men a better idea of what to expect. It
him. one quarter at a time. Personnel who also gives the medical personnel and the
When the OC assesses an injury, he cannot attend one session should be 11-series CLS ideas for setting up the
observes the treatment until he feels able to get into another. Although some training for the upcoming medical re-
satisfied with it and then moves on to of the company’s soldiers may not fresher training.

40 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


Trauma Lanes. Trauma lanes are CLS Equipment Bags. One of the will eliminate irrelevant and distracting
simply a means of hands-on evaluation pre-combat inspections (PCIs) should training. Ensuring that casualties are
for the CLS, allowing him to practice be to check and restock the CLS bags. marked by an easily identifiable infor-
and be evaluated on his skills. These This inspection should be supervised by mation card will eliminate any confu-
lanes can be as simple or as complex as the company senior medic or a repre- sion about the injury, and keep a soldier
the trainer desires. The most basic sentative from the BAS. This gives the from forgetting that he has an injury and
trauma lane consists of one evaluator, CLS the responsibility for maintaining getting up to go back to the fight. The
one casualty, and one CLS trainee in a “his” equipment. Having the senior medical briefback on the evaluation
static location with minimal medical medical personnel supervise the PCI process and the AAR will provide a
resources. This can be expanded as far increases the interoperability of the better working relationship with the
as the trainer’s imagination and re- chain of medical care and treatment. It medical support personnel and allow the
sources will allow. An important aspect gives the senior medical personnel an- commander to ensure that training is
of the training is an evaluator who can other opportunity to mentor and train conducted in accordance with his intent.
both teach and evaluate the CLS. To- the CLS. This increases the unit’s Post-exercise Assessment. The
gether, the platoon medic and the bat- medical capability and confidence. medical training continues after the
talion aid station (BAS) personnel can Medical Rehearsals. Another im- exercise has ended. The Medical AAR
determine the focus of the trauma lane portant step is to have medical rehears- should be sequenced to follow the unit
(blunt trauma, evacuation, broken als on ranges before training. These AAR and cover the standard AAR for-
bones). rehearsals should incorporate the ex- mat. This will lead to improvements in
The duration of training can also be pected type of injuries, the anticipated individual skills and the company’s
varied. Individual CLS can treat single level of care, and the evacuation proce- medical SOPs and give the CLSs feed-
or multiple injuries. Additionally, the dures. A BFX will be different from an back in the environment where they will
duration of tasks may be increased by LFX or a static fire range. The re- be expected to perform. No commander
having the CLS conduct a sequence of hearsal should incorporate as many would think of conducting an exercise
treatments. Since this training and CLSs and dedicated medical personnel without having a unit AAR afterward.
evaluation is a one-on-one process, as possible. Once again, this gives sol- The infantry commander should give
training in smaller elements reduces the diers a sense of ownership and makes feedback to the medical personnel about
time soldiers wait for instruction and them more eager to participate. their integration with the unit, including
practical application. An iteration will Casualty Play. A key to improving comments—to sustain and improve
usually take about as long as most com- medical training is the integration of performance—about the exercise casu-
plex EIB or NBC station tasks. casualty play in BFX and LFX training. alty play, the OCs’ conduct, and the
The location of the trauma lane can This gives soldiers the closest idea of evaluation process. This feedback will
also be adjusted. The basic trauma lane what they can expect during combat and help the BAS personnel improve their
can be conducted in a day room or the the opportunity to use their CLS train- own systems for supporting the unit in
company area. Obviously, the trauma ing in the proper sequence when they combat.
lane would be more complex and diffi- have finished their primary infantry These are some tried and true meth-
cult in a training area or on a range (for tasks. The company should designate a ods for improving the infantry com-
example, by conducting the basic member of the BAS as a medical OC. pany’s ability to provide aid on the bat-
trauma lane on a qualification or static This requires that the commander make tlefield. Improving the company’s CLS
range). The platoon or company medic full use of the BAS personnel. The program will result in the most impor-
who covers the range can act as the commander should outline and super- tant reward for the commander: saving
evaluator. If a medical emergency vise the medical personnel’s preparation soldiers’ lives. In addition, helping
arises, the medic can react without de- for training and evaluation. Their individual soldiers and their units gain
lay. preparation should include the use of confidence and skills in life-saving will
As with all skills, some soldiers de- moulage kits for casualties (OPFOR have benefits that extend far beyond
velop better competencies more quickly during blank fire), a detailed list of inju- just putting the bandages in the right
than others. These soldiers should be ries they plan to assess on the soldiers, places.
identified and given the responsibility the standard by which they will evaluate
of being the CLS for the fire team or the care and evaluation process, the
squad. All soldiers should undergo proper means of identifying casualties, Captain Lawrence O. Basha served in the
CLS training, but the more adept ones and the specifics for the AAR. 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, at Fort
should be designated primary CLS for The medical personnel will be re- Benning, and as a senior engineer sergeant
in a Special Forces detachment. He is a
the unit. Once these soldiers have had sponsible for the preparation and 1988 graduate of the University of New Mex-
some experience as primary CLSs, they evaluation for the exercise, but the ico and was commissioned through the Offi-
should be rotated out so that another commander must supervise the process cer Candidate School in 1995.
soldier can benefit from the responsi- to tailor it to his goals for the company.
bility of the position. Checking the types of injuries planned

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 41


TRAINING NOTES

Sharpening the Warfighter’s Edge


Through Peace Support Operations
LIEUTENANT RICHARD L. SCHWARTZ
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS RICHARD A. MORIN

Few would disagree that a six-month ior leaders the tools to make peace sup- doesn’t our ability to intercept such
deployment to Kosovo with the mission port operations a testing ground for the quarry depend on the same night-
of bringing peace and stability to a techniques and attributes required at the driving skills and use of terrain that
troubled region would bond soldiers in collective, leader, and soldiers levels to must mask us in force-on-force en-
a way that no duration of training center succeed in the high-intensity fight. gagements? Once again, the insight
exercises can approach. In nearly six months of continuous into the limitations and particular re-
Even fewer would argue against the mounted and dismounted patrols to in- sponse of these assets to temperature,
notion that an undivided focus on a real- terdict the movement of weapons, mate- altitude, precipitation, and illumination
world mission allows us to develop riel, and personnel belonging to ethnic variables becomes institutional knowl-
more cohesive soldier teams. Until guerrilla factions, the learning curve for edge after continual exposure.
recently, however, there has been on- collective tasks has been steepest in There is no excuse for failing to de-
going debate on the damage combat night operations. The daily movement velop precision squads and platoons
skill proficiency suffers during a pro- of squad size elements in limited visi- collectively for use in an urban envi-
longed emphasis on peace support. bility over rugged mountain terrain has ronment. The opportunity rests at every
Since elements of what is now the 2d been vital in bolstering the claim that abandoned doorstep. A reliance on
Battalion, 6th Infantry, deployed to we own the night. Knowledge of the thorough searches and the mutually
Bosnia more than six years ago (and limitations and proper employment of supporting movement of elements in
again in 1998), senior leaders have been night vision goggles, close combat op- confined spaces is much the same in the
steadily developing ways to combat this tics, and infrared aiming lights is appre- peace support role. Though we may
erosion of skills. The same battalion’s ciated to a far greater degree in the first- assume a more civil approach in our
recent deployment as part of the U.S. hand knowledge that our armed oppo- official cordon and search missions, the
Kosovo Force was programmed to in- nents are blindly stumbling along first priority of safety and security en-
clude modified gunnery tables for both nearby. The repetitive execution of sures that we continually rehearse and
Bradley fighting vehicle and dis- react-to-contact drills and non-verbal practice techniques for survivability in a
mounted infantry live fire exercises, as fire control techniques on patrol is ef- fight. More common, though, is the
well as numerous day and night weapon fective without firing a single shot or hasty occupation and search of aban-
proficiency ranges and train-the-trainer adversely affecting the mission. The doned structures in the towns that have
events. The resources themselves are platoon and squad leaders’ nightly use become part of regular patrol routes, in
being improved, and the training man- of these exercises develops the certainty much the same manner as the react-to-
agement of individual soldier and mis- of action that is then capped by periodic contact drills in wooded terrain. Local
sion essential tasks has been a priority live-fire ranges, while expending less civilians benefit from the stability our
at both platoon and company level, with time and fewer resources than at home presence provides at the same time we
no reduction in steady-state operations. station. hone our execution in the most realistic
Still, with all the improvements to Crew drills and effective scanning of environments. That experience was
training resources and the addition of techniques for the BFV integrated sight ultimately showcased in a live-fire ex-
exercises devoted solely to maintaining unit are actually made more important ercise on an improvised MOUT com-
proficiency in high-intensity conflict, by the absence of a threat force that is a plex to a degree that would be hard to
the greatest returns have come from the mainstay of conventional maneuver replicate from a home station train-up.
emphasis on using every day to give training. When objects of interest are Perhaps more valuable is the abun-
teams, squads, and platoons the ability tractors on the remote trails of a valley dance of junior leader training. After
to fight. Instead of viewing the devel- floor or horse-drawn carriages cresting all, the single greatest advantage of our
opment as an obstacle to combat readi- a ridgeline, the gunner’s eye becomes army over others on the battlefield is the
ness, commanders are now giving jun- all the more discerning. After all, initiative and ability of the professional

42 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


noncommissioned officer. This is daily find themselves directing aircraft onto tional interest than by the need to ac-
a squad leader’s and team leader’s mis- potential targets, working with scout commodate the Army’s training goals.
sion. The emphasis on deliberate plan- elements to interpret suspicious traffic, Since these deployments are unavoid-
ning and troop-leading procedures for and debriefing staff sections in a man- able, small units must make maximum
operations at the most vital level guar- ner and frequency that would initially use of the training opportunities they
antees that much of the insight and ex- be a painful yet necessary process in offer. It is a commitment by the chain
perience they gain here can be recalled combined arms operations. of command and a concern not just to
when time constraints and pressures are Lastly, in peace support operations separate high intensity conflict goals,
greater on a conventional battlefield. there is the unique value of soldier but to approach peacekeeping as a
The responsibility for everything—from training that does not come from the bridge that leads to sharper warfighting
the orders process to thorough pre- tasks we execute as part of a training skills.
combat inspections—rests squarely on a matrix. The essence of the individual While the debate goes on around us,
new generation of sergeants, with senior infantryman’s responsibility here is also small-unit leaders must employ the
NCOs there to mentor and provide his single greatest benefit in preparation creativity and techniques to make sure
after-action reviews. A solid founda- for the battlefield—the demand for a the deployment places maintaining
tion in these processes through repeti- disciplined, confident professional who readiness on an equal footing with op-
tive use in this environment is the es- is flexible in response and effective in erational success.
sential element that can then be applied the use of minimal force. Soldiers here
successfully to any given mission. display the confidence and aggressive- Lieutenant Richard L. Schwartz was a rifle
platoon leader in the 1st Armored Division on
At the company level, we must con- ness, even when confronted, that can peacekeeping duty in Kosovo, and is now
tinue to hone our techniques for the come only from knowing that they have assigned to the 2d Battalion, 6th Infantry, 1st
timely and effective reporting of situa- the necessary skills to succeed in any Armored Division, in Germany. He is a 1999
ROTC graduate of the University of Notre
tions that develop in our area of respon- given situation. They see their leaders Dame.
sibility. The need for concise, accurate, adapting to challenging demands and
and current spot reports gives a realistic know that the respect this unit is ac- Sergeant First Class Richard A. Morin was
view to information flow between lead- corded here is won on the merits of a rifle platoon sergeant in the 1st Armored
Division on peacekeeping duty in Kosovo.
ers. Couple that almost daily with the each individual every day. He previously served as a mechanized rifle
subsequent requests and coordination Commitment to operations other than company master gunner, drill sergeant, and
with other assets, and a synergy is cre- war—especially in troubled areas such Bradley fighting vehicle instructor. He also
served in the 1st Cavalry Division during
ated that would be essential to the mod- as the Balkans—is likely to move for- Operation Desert Storm.
ern battlefield. Squads and platoons ward at a speed governed more by na-

Scouts
Their Selection, Training, and Operations
MAJOR MICHAEL T. WILLIAMS

Ever since the first adversaries took the selection, training, and operations of operations vary from one rotation to the
to the battlefield to settle their differ- the scouts. As the Israelites did when next. Some units deploy their scouts
ences, opponents have sought tactical they ended their 40 years of wandering forward, while others do not. Gener-
advantage over each other. Tactics seek in the Sinai, commanders continue to ally, the commander’s preference and
to exploit those advantages, and they dispatch scouts to gather information the abilities of the scout element deter-
vary from era to era, war to war, and about their prospective enemies. mine the employment. When time is
battle to battle. Reconnaissance—see- Joshua, as a wise commander, recog- plentiful, scouts typically receive de-
ing and understanding the enemy—is a nized that intelligence drives operations, tailed guidance and instructions for the
fundamental issue that drives that evo- and today’s leaders should be no less upcoming mission during intermediate
lution. perceptive. staging base operations, but even then,
Here we will revisit the age-old use At the Joint Readiness Training they rarely get a detailed reconnaissance
of the tactical reconnaissance element— Center (JRTC), tactical reconnaissance order. Still, they go forward with an

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 43


TRAINING NOTES
adequate mission load to gain intelli- ten, scouts are given this mission as an important, a commander who doesn’t
gence for the maneuver commander. In afterthought, tacked on to the end of the see the battlefield.
all too many cases, this is their only planning process to answer the belated Given the first two factors, scout
opportunity to perform as the com- question, “What do we do with the leaders at platoon and squad level tend
mander’s eyes on the battlefield. scouts?” The commander who is not to focus on avoiding detection. Force
As the operational pace intensifies thinking reconnaissance is not thinking, protection is a priority, of course, but
and compresses planning time, other he is reacting. the scout mission of reconnaissance and
challenges capture the commander’s While many of these reasons gener- surveillance remains the most important
attention. The battle is joined. Logis- ally stem from command and staff goal. If the scouts are merely out there
tics threatens to become a ball and chain planning factors, others come from the trying to move around and cover too
to operational flexibility. Personnel selection and training of the scouts many NAIs, they are needlessly putting
losses challenge unit effectiveness. In themselves. Although most scouts are themselves at risk.
all the turmoil, the unit may become in excellent physical condition, they are Even if the scouts are given a well-
reactive, surrendering tactical initiative not always tactically and technically planned and resourced mission, they
to the opposing force. A key indicator proficient in reconnaissance and sur- may not be trained to get out there,
of this confusion is when the scout pla- veillance. gather, and report all the commander’s
toon is overlooked in the planning and OCs often notice that scouts who are critical information accurately and
execution of follow-on missions. deployed forward of the battalion spend promptly. A good scout is more than a
Observer-controllers (OCs) at the more time looking for and moving to remote video; he is a forward deployed
JRTC have learned to look at the scouts their NAIs than performing reconnais- military analyst. He recognizes the
to see how well or how poorly a unit is sance and surveillance on these areas. indicators that an enemy is preparing to
doing. Here are several things OCs attack, defend, or withdraw, and he can
consider and reasons they are important. Scouts are routinely assigned relay that information to the com-
Scouts continue to watch named more NAIs than they can ob- mander, who can best use it to make a
areas of interest (NAIs) that no critical tactical decision.
longer help the commander in his
serve effectively, and no priori- Besides following the logic of train-
decision-making process. The prob- ties have been assigned to them. ing scouts, giving them a good mission,
lem may simply be their poor commu- Scouts can either cover a few and teaching them what to look for,
nication skills. On the other hand, it NAIs effectively or cover a their training must teach them how to
may be that the scouts have not received get this information back to the com-
a change of mission that would have
lot of NAIs ineffectively. mander. The very nature of the scouts’
allowed them to shift to newer NAIs. Several factors influence this trend. mission suggests that they need special
Both of these factors suggest that the First, scouts are routinely assigned more communications gear and training on
battalion, overwhelmed by events, has NAIs than they can observe effectively, how to use it. OCs at JRTC report that
lost touch with its scouts. The scouts and no priorities have been assigned to this vital link is often overlooked.
are not being used to gather intelligence them. Scouts can either cover a few Let us pause here. We can talk on
on the enemy’s strength and weak- NAIs effectively or cover a lot of NAIs and on about the scouts’ shortcomings
nesses. The battalion has gone reactive. ineffectively. and why certain things happen at the
The scouts are not properly posi- Even though part of this problem lies JRTC, but one of the recurring trends is
tioned on the battlefield, and their with the staff and planning process, the the lack of proper training.
location takes them out of the battle. scouts themselves must recognize and A well-trained scout can analyze ter-
The scouts’ ability to be out front is react to their own capabilities and limi- rain, tell where the enemy is likely to
limited by the battalion’s ability to tations. This recognition comes with be, and know how the friendly forces
transport them. The time required for experience based on training, with little can exploit that information. All too
them to react hinders their ability to or no guidance on priorities, along with often, however, scouts are not well-
affect the outcome of the battle. Again, inadequate training, the scouts do not versed in identifying these indicators,
the battalion has lost sight of its single have the time or the manpower to con- much less in analyzing their meaning.
most important reconnaissance asset— duct the mission successfully. In the We need to examine the selection
its eyes on the battlefield. A battalion absence of guidance, scouts must ask process and the training of a scout pla-
that is not seeking out the enemy is al- for it. toon soldier, as follows:
lowing the enemy to seek it out. This initial factor flows into the sec- In the typical infantry battalion, a
The scouts are used to defend the ond—the same lack of guidance to the vacancy appears in a position in the
tactical operations center (TOC) or scout platoon leader cripples his ability scout platoon in the course of normal
the battalion trains. Both of these are to plan a detailed mission. Addition- attrition. The scout platoon leader and
vital assets that need protection, but ally, a lack of planning time results in the headquarters company commander,
other elements in the unit are better inadequate orders, no rehearsals, and raise the need for replacements with the
suited for defending them. All too of- poor tactical reconnaissance—and most operations officer and the battalion

44 INFANTRY SPRING 2002


commander. The scout platoon leader driven scout training program. Once training exercise on all the above skills
proposes a selection process, and the the soldiers’ initial orientation is com- to determine whether they will qualify
commander is free to make changes. plete, they are catapulted into situ- and graduate. In most cases, 50 to 90
The commander then issues his guid- ational and field training exercises that percent of the members of the team
ance for the selection of the new mem- test and evaluate their newfound craft. have graduated from the LRSLC. That
bers and the course of their training. At the end of a 30- to 60-day grace pe- means that the “seasoned professionals”
Once the process is approved, the riod, they at least receive the title of inside the LRS detachments not only
operations officer and the scout platoon “scouts.” But they may or may not know what right looks like, they know
leader prepare the tasking for the com- know what they’re doing. how to do it. The institutional knowl-
pany commanders. This step is vital to Their brethren in the reconnaissance edge within the unit sustains itself and
the success of the selection. The task- community, the long range surveillance at the same time expands from external
ing includes the number of prospective (LRS) elements, offer an interesting training.
candidates per company, what the se- contrast to the infantry scouts. These The LRSLC training system is now
lection process entails, and the training soldiers undergo the same selection open to infantry scouts, and we must
schedule. Although soldiers are often process and rigorous training—with two revamp our training to take advantage
encouraged to volunteer, the company major exceptions: of it. Until now, units have selected the
commander is the approving authority The first is that all the trainers of the most physically fit and brightest young
when choosing qualified candidates. new recruits are graduates of the Long men in the battalion, have placed them
During the selection phase, the pro- Range Surveillance Leaders Course in the scout platoon, but have not
spective candidates are put through rig- (LRSLC). This course was designed equipped them with the training they
orous physical and mental challenges. with the reconnaissance leader in mind, need to succeed on the battlefield.
These challenges include an Army based in the heart of the Ranger com- These young soldiers will give it their
Physical Fitness Test, an Army Swim best and work very hard to accomplish
Test, a foot march of 12 to 15 miles, The LRSLC training system the mission. Commanders must train
day and night land navigation, physical is now open to infantry scouts, their men for success. Leaders should
training of various sorts used to test look closely into the training and devel-
upper and lower body strength, running and we must revamp our train- opment of our scouts. The LRSLC
events ranging from four to ten miles, ing to take advantage of it. cadre is determined to provide quality
memorization games that test soldiers’ training, not only to the LRS commu-
ability to assimilate and recall informa- munity with its own company structure nity, but to the entire reconnaissance
tion and basic infantry skills. After the and program of instruction. Each stu- family. For more details on the course,
selection process, there is no doubt that dent attends the 33-day course and un- leaders should visit the Fort Benning
these soldiers are physically fit and ca- dergoes a vigorous physical, mental, web site or contact their division’s LRS
pable of handling the physical demands and academic challenge. The LRSLC detachment or Corps’ LRS company. I
of being scouts. That’s a good start. begins with an Army Physical Fitness am sure they will be happy to share
Next, the newly selected members Test, Army Swim Test, and day and whatever manuals and training they can.
must be trained as scouts. This means night long-range land navigation test. In conclusion, the need for reconnais-
they have to be transformed from fight- Students then swiftly move into the sance never ends. Satisfying that need
ers into observers—the eyes and ears of academic portion of the course. They means understanding what reconnais-
the battalion. This training entails are taught and tested on vehicle recog- sance can provide and incorporating it
teaching the potential scout the art of nition, both of the former Soviet Union into the planning process. The com-
closing in on the enemy undetected and and American; communications with mander who strikes out with inadequate
observing his every visible and audible HF and FM radios including propaga- reconnaissance may join the rolls of
move. Upon completion, the soldiers tion and antenna theory; and intelli- Custer and the 7th Cavalry at the Little
join their respective teams where they gence preparation of the battlefield. Big Horn or the ranks of the 106th In-
will get most of their scout training The students are then taught and graded fantry Division at St. Vith. The com-
from veterans in the platoon, including on their ability to receive and properly mander who wins the reconnaissance
a few who have attended sniper school. write a detailed reconnaissance or sur- fight wins the battle!
Therein lies a potential pitfall. These veillance order. Additionally, they
“seasoned” professionals have learned learn the planning and construction of Major Michael T. Williams served as a scout
and tactical operations center observer-
through much trial and error. On-the- hide sites and mission support sites, controller at the JRTC, and is now Chief of
job training is valuable and can offer conduct tracking and countertracking in the JRTC, Center for Army Lessons Learned
many lessons if it is used properly. But the field, and basic survivability, in- (CALL). He previously served in the 504th
infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, and
it is extremely important that the train- cluding standards of escape and eva- the Division Long Range Observer Controller
ers and the trainees experience and see sion. for the JRTC. He is a 1990 ROTC graduate
what works. Unfortunately, this does To complete the course, the students of South Carolina State College.
not routinely occur in an internally are graded in a situational and field

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 45


TRAINING NOTES

“Go Find the Enemy!”


Use of Available Time During Movement to Contact
MAJOR SCOTT W. HEINTZELMAN

The purpose of a movement-to- Area denial—preventing the enemy initiative to the enemy. That means
contact is to gain or reestablish contact from operating unhindered in an area, rotational units lose freedom of action
with the enemy. However, rotational such as cordons, blocking positions, and consequently can only react to the
units at the Joint Readiness Training traffic control points, ambushes, secu- enemy’s initiative. Units should spend
Center (JRTC) tend to spend most of rity patrols. more than half of the available time on
their time during this phase conducting Force protection—protecting key finding the enemy. That is the purpose
force protection tasks. facilities such as the brigade tactical of a movement to contact. It will allow
They remain stationary far too long, operations center, Q-36 radar, Sentinel rotational units to maintain the initiative
thus relinquishing the initiative to the air defense radar, forward arming and and set the tempo of battle.
enemy and allowing him to set the refueling point, and the reverse osmosis Unfortunately, data collected at the
terms of battle. Naturally, the enemy water purification unit. Additionally, JRTC shows that units spend most of
attacks only when those terms are fa- time spent in patrol bases, as well as their time conducting force protection
vorable, and the vast majority of direct conducting resupply operations and tasks. A study of six rotations (three
fire contacts end in his favor. casualty evacuation. light infantry, two air assault infantry,
Units must understand that the op- Information collection—observing and one airborne infantry) revealed that
erative word in movement to contact is named areas of interest, reconnaissance units spend an average of eight percent
movement. Stationary units are targets. patrols, questioning civilians. of their time conducting destruction of
But there are measures unit leaders can OCs routinely coach units to spend the enemy, 27 percent conducting area
take to avoid that trap as they prepare most of their available time actively denial, 60 percent conducting force
for future JRTC rotations. protection, and five percent collecting
Because rotational units face a dis- A study of six rotations information.
persed enemy, most choose the search- revealed that units spend Additionally, units spend a signifi-
and-attack technique to locate the en- an average of eight percent cant portion of the force protection time
emy during the movement-to-contact in patrol bases, not guarding key facili-
phase. Field Manual (FM) 7-20, The of their time conducting de- ties. Thus, units spend more time pro-
Infantry Battalion, states that the pur- struction of the enemy and tecting themselves than they do search-
pose of a search and attack is focused 60 percent conducting ing for and attacking the enemy.
on four primary areas: Destruction of force protection. Stationary units allow the enemy to
the enemy, area denial, force protec- gain the initiative, deciding when and
tion, and information collection. searching for the enemy. This gives where to make contact and under what
When rotational units begin the priority to the areas where the enemy terms. The enemy initiates an attack
movement-to-contact phase, OCs track can be fixed and destroyed, area denial, only when all the conditions are favor-
the way each maneuver platoon uses its and information collection. Protecting able; in these six rotations, the enemy
time in each of these areas. Using FM key facilities is a legitimate task, as is initiated contact nearly 70 percent of the
7-20 as a guide, senior analysts have the requirement to conduct patrol-base time. As a result, the rotational units
further defined the areas in greater de- activities so soldiers can sleep, eat, and were seldom prepared to use combined
tail: We then use this information to clean their weapons. In addition, plan- arms—indirect fires, attack aviation,
facilitate discussion in after-action re- ning and preparing for upcoming op- armor/mechanized infantry, and close
views (AARs). erations frequently takes place during air support—in response. Rotational
Destruction of the enemy—killing patrol base activities, but these activities units—using direct fire plus one other
or capturing the enemy. Actively support only the mission of movement system as the standard for combined
searching for enemy forces or being in to contact. Spending most of the avail- arms—employed combined arms in
physical contact with them. able time in patrol bases surrenders the only 23 percent of the contacts. This

46 INFANTRY Spring 2002


lack of combined arms also allowed the companies simply wait in patrol bases needs, reporting is still important.
escape of almost 75 percent of the en- for the next mission. Retaining the ini- Companies must submit daily logistical
emy encountered. Furthermore, units tiative requires thinking ahead and status reports, with special emphasis on
maneuvered against the enemy only 21 planning past the initial operation. any supplies not included on the daily
percent of the time, another principal To solve the logistics problem, units requirements list. If the S-4 is not re-
factor in allowing the enemy to escape. need to establish a battle rhythm where ceiving timely reports, for whatever
Lastly, since most of the contacts at the the staff is able to deliver the next day’s reason—such as lack of FM communi-
JRTC are infantry-against-infantry mission to the companies approximately cations—he must go get them in person.
fights, the enemy causes four friendly 24 hours before execution. This keeps The support platoon leader might col-
casualties for every one he sustains. units from waiting for missions, and lect the reports during the daily logisti-
When units remain stationary, the en- thus becoming lucrative targets for the cal package deliveries. In addition, the
emy gains a tremendous advantage. enemy. It also allows the company battalion executive officer should track
There are two primary reasons that commanders to complete their current the daily submission of reports as well
units remain stationary so much of the operations and still have time to plan for as the status of supplies for each com-
time: The first is that logistics often the next day. pany. His oversight of the logistics
drive maneuver. The average rifle A useful technique is to establish a system should enable any company to
company spends much of each day daily rhythm for the battalion com- continue operations.
waiting for supplies, especially water. mander’s delivery of a fragmentary Rotational units at the JRTC need to
In the summer, water is often critical to order for the next day’s operations dur- spend more time searching for the en-
continued operations. Unit logisticians ing battlefield circulation. emy and less time in patrol bases. Fail-
fail to anticipate the resupply needs of Anticipation and reporting are the ure to do this gives the enemy a tre-
rifle companies, and the companies sel- two fixes for the supply problem. The mendous advantage. To maintain the
dom send logistical status reports to the battalion S-4 should be able to antici- initiative, units must anticipate and re-
logisticians. Units run out of supplies pate what the average rifle company port logistical requirements and plan for
and must cease operations while waiting needs each day. By establishing a list operations in advance.
for emergency resupply. In addition, of standard daily requirements (water, In short, the units that go find the
units often wait far too long for casualty rations, batteries, ammunition), the bat- enemy first will succeed.
evacuation. talion S-4 can at least ensure that each
Major Scott W. Heintzelman is a senior
The other reason units spend so much company gets enough supplies to con- battalion analyst at the Joint Readiness
time in patrol bases is that they are tinue to operate, whether they have re- Training Center, where he previously served
waiting for missions from battalion. quested those supplies or not. Addi- as a platoon, company, and assistant opera-
tions observer-controller. He served as a
After the initial insertion, most battalion tionally, a daily battle rhythm of logisti- platoon leader, company executive officer,
staffs fail to plan 24 hours ahead. In- cal resupply, such as one resupply de- and battalion and brigade staff officer in the
stead, they wait for the enemy to act, livery every morning or evening, would 7th Infantry Division, and as a rifle company
commander and battalion and brigade staff
and then react to these events, sending allow company commanders to include officer in the 25th Infantry Division. He is a
rifle companies all over the battlefield this daily resupply when planning their 1989 graduate of Indiana University of Penn-
without much planning or preparation. operations. sylvania, and holds a master’s degree from
Louisiana State University.
If there are no current enemy events, Even with accurate anticipation of

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 47


EXPERT INFANTRYMAN Captains being considered for promo- cally designed to eliminate accountability
BADGE CHANGES tion have been able to look at their records problems with photos, such as lost, incor-
online since 1 February 2002, and staff rect, or damaged hard-copy prints.
As the Infantry changes, so must the sergeants being considered by the June This initiative supports both Personnel
EIB program. The Army’s Transforma- board could look at their records online as Transformation and the Army’s Knowl-
tion program, the Infantry MOS consoli- of 1 March 2002. edge Management Strategy. At the same
dations, and emerging technologies have In its first three months, OMPF Online time, this system supports the Army’s
led the Infantry School to make some has already proved to be a cost-saving routing and transfer of business and cus-
changes in the EIB test program. initiative for the Army Enlisted Records tomer support applications to Army
The goals of the new test are to main- and Evaluation Center (EREC). About 10 Knowledge Online (AKO), the Army
tain the traditions, support unit mission percent of the 20,000 sergeants first class Portal. The goal is to use AKO as the
essential task lists, use training resources who reviewed their records online chose one-stop information site for the Army.
wisely, and test the modern Infantry sol- not to request their microfiche records. Until DAPMIS is fully implemented
dier’s high-tech skills. Since it costs about $1.40 to produce a this summer, there will be a transition
The Infantry Center asked infantry microfiche, this was a saving of $2,800. period during which hard-copy photos
units world-wide how the EIB program By fiscal year 2003, EREC’s goal is to will still be printed. During a three-to-six-
could be improved, and incorporated the eliminate the need for soldiers to request month transition period, soldiers will be
unit feedback into the new program. microfiche, which will save the Army a given hard-copy photos to mail to PER-
The major changes are in the 12-mile significant amount of money each year. SCOM.
road march, land navigation, PT test, and The goal is for the entire Army to be . Some personnel initially will be able to
day and night qualification on individual able to view military records online by do both—view photos online and receive
weapons, which are now prerequisites for June. New software for the complimen- photos to mail in for their files. The rule
taking the EIB test. The revised program tary feature “Field-to-File” will enable a of thumb is that a soldier who is given
is now eight days—five training days and soldier to send official military personnel photos should turn them in.
three testing days. documents—such as awards and Non- This system eliminates trips back to the
Soldiers will test on 63 different tasks commissioned Officer Evaluation Reports studio to review printed photos. In addi-
at 22 sites. Some new tasks include the (NCOERs)—directly from a battalion or tion, soldiers will no longer be responsible
Javelin antiarmor system and the ASIP brigade S-1 to his own OMPF at PERS- for taking approved photos to their nearest
radio. Arm-and-hand signals will include COM. services battalion for mailing to PERS-
both dismounted and mounted signals. There are now 19 digital senders COM on their behalf.
EIB candidates must demonstrate profi- throughout the Army. These are difficult A soldier’s photo is automatically for-
ciency with the AN/PSN-11 (the precise to manage and maintain, however, and warded to the centralized data base used
lightweight GPS receiver) under day and EREC wants to enable the soldiers to send by Army selection boards, branch-
night conditions. in their documents from their own com- assignment officers, soldiers, and com-
Young soldiers respect a soldier wear- puters. manders.
ing the EIB as a man of accomplishment The soldier is given three days in which
and skill. The new test ensures that the to approve the stored photo through his
Expert Infantryman Badge will continue BIG IMPROVEMENTS IN AKO account on the Army Portal,
to represent the highest standards of pro- OFFICIAL PHOTO PROCESS www.us.army.mil. The photos are part of
fessionalism. the AKO’s password-protected section for
Official military photographs can now Official Military Personnel Files.
be sent digitally. And it may be just in DAPMIS began in late 1999, using bar-
OMPF ONLINE time for thousands of NCOs otherwise coding of hard-copy photos to help keep
SAVES MONEY eligible for promotion, but lacking photos track of photos. In the next phase, the
in their files. Army designed and validated the concept
Official Military Personnel files The Department of the Army Photo- of a digitized photo-processing system.
(OMPF) Online began in November 2001 graph Management Information System The third phase implements the system
for sergeants first class being considered (DAPMIS) receives digitized, official DA worldwide.
for promotion, and is expanding to in- photos directly from the Army’s world-
clude more of the force. wide photo labs. The system is specifi-

48 INFANTRY Spring 2002


MacArthur and the American Century: amines American policy during the Korean tingency planning as to MacArthur’s alleged
A Reader. Edited by William M. Leary. War in light of new documentary evidence, military genius. Particularly galling to the
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, and concludes that the relationship between author is MacArthur’s efforts to run his war,
2001. 522 Pages. $40.00, Softbound. MacArthur and Truman was far more com- except for photo-opportunity flying visits,
MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Un- plex than originally viewed. Given recently from 700 miles away in Japan.
doing of an American Hero. By Stanley declassified documents concerning the Weintraub is equally critical of MacAr-
Weintraub. Simon & Schuster, 2001. 385 Truman Administration’s position on thur’s principal subordinates, the “unsteady”
Pages, Softbound. Audio tape (ISBN: 0- bombing across the Yalu, the attitude of the Walton Walker, commanding Eighth Army,
7435-0535-2), $25.00. Reviewed by Colo- Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and the “incompetent and abrasive” Ned
nel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army, Retired. toward atomic war in the Pacific, and the Almond, commanding X Corps, as well as
No American general in the 20th century Eisenhower Administration’s uneasiness the senior Army leadership at the Joint
has generated more controversy than Gen- about the armistice, Bernstein demands ad- Chiefs of Staff level. Both Chairman Omar
eral of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur. In ditional scholarly research into the conduct Bradley and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton
a military career spanning five decades, of the Korean War. Discussion concerning Collins seem weak and unwilling to confront
MacArthur was the preeminent combat gen- the use of the atomic bomb, for example, is MacArthur, who had been Army chief of
eral of World War I, the resourceful com- clearly revealed in Joint Chiefs of Staff staff when Bradley and Collins were junior
mander of the Southwest Pacific theater in documents as early as November 1950. officers. Only Lieutenant General Matthew
World War II, and the enigmatic Supreme Bernstein also states that despite Truman’s Ridgway receives high marks from Wein-
Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan claim that he despised MacArthur long be- traub for his success in restoring Eighth
at the outset of the Korean War. Following fore the spring of 1951, he hesitated to re- Army’s fighting spirit after the disaster on
his abrupt dismissal from command by move him from command; he was deterred the Yalu and its subsequent retreat south of
President Harry S Truman, MacArthur re- chiefly by his fears of provoking a political the 38th Parallel.
turned to the United States amid a tumult battle at home that would further aid the What Weintraub does do well is his
reminiscent of that of a Roman emperor two Republican Party in attacking the admini- analysis of MacArthur’s removal from
millennia ago. Two recent books explore stration’s unclear China policy. command. Giving little heed to restrictions
the contentious general who was both re- In contrast to Leary’s balanced assess- imposed a hemisphere away, and deliber-
viled and deified by millions of his fellow ment of MacArthur, Stanley Weintraub joins ately setting himself on a collision course
soldiers and countrymen. an increasing number of historians who with the Truman Administration, MacArthur
In MacArthur and the American Century, paint a highly unflattering portrait of his courted dismissal by “intimating to sympa-
editor William M. Leary has compiled a controversial subject. In an attempt to re- thetic listeners that a limited war fought to
comprehensive anthology of essays that member the Korean War’s first eleven sustain a semblance of the status quo failed
address virtually every phase of MacAr- months, which he dubs “MacArthur’s war,” to justify the sacrifices” already made in the
thur’s remarkable career, with World War I Weintraub begins his study of the war with field. Such talk about ideological war was
being the notable exception. Contributors MacArthur’s triumphant return to the United treachery in Truman’s eyes and left the
include renowned historians: Stephen E. States following his abrupt dismissal from President no recourse but to relieve the in-
Ambrose, D. Clayton James, and Russell command by Truman, then back-pedals to subordinate MacArthur.
Weigley, as well as the general himself, the events foreshadowing North Korea’s In the final analysis, both Leary and
whose essays and speeches provide contem- premeditated attack on its southern neighbor Weintraub have provided readers with an in-
porary insight into the man and his times. on 25 June 1950. The MacArthur who depth look at America’s most controversial
To his credit, Leary also includes a separate emerges from these pages is an egotistical general. In some sense, the real MacArthur
section that not only places MacArthur’s field commander, unwilling to consult with remains wrapped in mystery. Borrowing
illustrious career in perspective, but also the Pentagon; an indecisive general reluctant Lord Clarendon’s description of Oliver
takes his numerous biographers to task for to confront bad news; and an imperial sho- Cromwell in his own consideration of Na-
presenting MacArthur in an overly subjec- gun, completely out of touch with the com- poleon Bonaparte, David Chandler ponders
tive light, virtually ignoring the general’s bat readiness of the troops entrusted to his whether “the ‘Man of Destiny’ was a good
frequent lapses into egotism and insubordi- command. or evil man—or both—a ‘great bad man’.”
nation. Still, one cannot read this anthology Like Michael Schaller’s Douglas Perhaps. But Napoleon indelibly marked
without reaching the conclusion that Doug- MacArthur: The Far Eastern General, History. The same can be said of Douglas
las MacArthur imprinted his personality, for Weintraub leaves no stone unturned in his MacArthur.
better or worse, on both the U.S. Army and attempt to discredit MacArthur. “More
the American century. glorious than the Cote-de-Chatillon in 1918
One essay merits special scrutiny. Barton or Leyte in 1944 was Inchon,” which Wein- Combat Operations: Stemming the
F. Bernstein of Stanford University reex- traub credits as much to luck and prior con- Tide: May 1965 to October 1966. By John

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 49


BOOK REVIEWS
M. Carland. U.S. Army Center of Mili- believed that they had a successful formula than fiction. To help us understand all the
tary History, 2000. 410 Pages. $43.00. that needed only greater tempo and mass. players in this drama, Kilzer provides a
Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse Whether Westmoreland was ultimately compendium of 28 spies, networks, and
College. proved wrong or whether the events of 1968 abbreviations at the opening of his book.
The United States Army Center of Mili- substantiated his belief is beyond the scope This is a needed feature as it is difficult to
tary History produces excellent work, and of this particular volume. Carland does follow the narrative without a listing of the
this eighth volume in the Vietnam series is address the question of whether search and players who were part of this intelligence
another outstanding contribution. The vol- destroy or pacification should have taken effort. At first, one cannot tell these players
ume focuses on the first 18 months of action primacy when adequate manpower did not without a program.
as the United States changed its mission exist to seriously attempt both. In the early The Red Army sometimes knew move-
from advisory to combat operations. period, the limited and inconsistent Ameri- ment orders to German units in the field
Chronologically, it is the first of four Viet- can efforts on the pacification front were not within hours of their release to German
nam battle histories. particularly successful. The issue and the commanders. Stalin’s paranoia at times
By March 1965, Communist forces were problem would continue to grow throughout prevented him from trusting these reports,
posed for a military victory. Only a major the war. and Kilzer offers the often repeated example
U.S. commitment could prevent it. General An extensive literature exists on the deci- of Stalin’s mistrust of his subordinates that
William Westmoreland sent in American sion process to undertake the combat role in justified his purges: The fact that there was
infantry units to engage the enemy and blunt 1965. Among the best recent studies are the no evidence of a conspiracy against him was
their offensive until enough troops could works of Brian VanDeMark, H.R. McMas- absolute proof that there was a plot to de-
arrive to effect a more positive military ter, and Frederick Logeval. But for the war pose him. Indeed, Stalin doesn’t come off
situation in the country. The initial response on the ground during this crucial period, much better than Hitler in terms of his in-
to the emergency was successful. As the Stemming the Tide is an essential source. ability to differentiate valid information
U.S. attempted to take the war to the enemy, Well researched, clearly written, and sup- from misinformation or propaganda. The
search and destroy missions became the ported with exceptional pictures and combat Wehrmacht’s initial successes on the Rus-
means. U.S. forces prevented the commu- maps, this is an extremely valuable resource. sian front, as both authors point out, was due
nists from massing for a major assault, de- in no small part to Stalin’s liquidation (read:
molished supply caches and base camps, mass execution) of many top officers in the
disrupted infiltration into the South, and Hitler’s Traitor. Martin Bormann and Soviet army during the late 1930s. Without
thwarted attempts to seize harvests. Despite the Defeat of the Reich. By Louis Kilzer. experienced leaders and competent staff
the escalating growth of American troops Presidio Press, 2000. 307 Pages. $29.95. officers in the field to lead and guide Rus-
during the period, however, the U.S. re- Inside Hitler’s High Command. By sian soldiers, the Red Army was a fruit ripe
mained essentially on the defensive Geoffrey P. Megargee. University Press to be plucked by German forces.
throughout 1966. Much of the American of Kansas, 2000. 327 Pages. Reviewed by While scholars have speculated on a
commitment was devoted to providing secu- Colonel Christopher Timmers, U.S. Army, highly placed traitor within Hitler’s inner
rity to protect the building of an American Retired. circle, Kilzer is the first to come out and
infrastructure to conduct larger warfare. As one might expect, Adolf Hitler is the identify him. His case is as compelling as it
And the enemy maintained the ability to central character in both of these excellent is complete. Megargee, on the other hand,
control the pace and intensity of combat. To studies. Louis Kilzer painstakingly estab- also breaks new ground in a way that may
a large extent, the communists decided when lishes a convincing case that Martin Bor- dismay fans of the vaunted German General
to engage the Americans and to what degree. mann, the Fuehrer’s top advisor and confi- Staff. For his contention is that Hitler’s
The multi-dimensional nature of the war, dant, was actually a spy working in the generals, far from being detached intellec-
as both a large unit conflict and a counterin- service of Russian intelligence. Geoffrey tual soldiers who only followed the Fuehrer
surgency effort, demanded a complex strat- Megargee advances the not implausible out of loyalty—or in some cases fear—were
egy and the elusiveness of the enemy called theory that the German general staff was of themselves frequently complicit in the
traditional war-making doctrines into ques- the collection of military intellectuals most schemes launched by the Wehrmacht that
tion. The helicopter literally changed the of us have commonly accepted. In fact, frequently ended in failure (Stalingrad
nature of ground warfare, but it had negative after reading these two works, one is almost comes to mind). The generals might have
as well as positive impacts. moved to remark, sarcastically, that it was a been hesitant in various campaigns, but had
The conflict in 1965 and 1966 was miracle (and a tribute to the German fighting an undying faith in their soldiers, not en-
Westmoreland’s war. President Johnson man) that the Reich lasted as long as it did, tirely misplaced; this faith clouded their
allowed his commander full authority to especially after Stalingrad. judgments, especially in regard to the fight-
develop strategy and battlefield tactics, al- Hitler’s casual regard for intelligence ing ability and sheer tenacity of the Russian
beit under strict geographical constraints and security made him and his staff almost blind soldier. A contempt of one’s enemies can
with limited American manpower. In the to the machinations of a mole, “Werther” often be the precursor to defeat.
elusive quest for a means of determining was his code name, and ultimately brought Both books are highly readable and, in
success, attrition became the goal of military the Reich to grief on the battlefield. Kilzer’s publishing terms, are “page turners.” Buy
operations. Although a “strategy in disre- tale of network spies operating from Swit- both, read both, and be enlightened.
pute” since World War I, Westmoreland zerland, Germany, and the USSR, and
argued that there was no alternative and that feeding Russian intelligence critically im-
despite the horrible costs, it would prove portant details of German high command With Alex at War: From the Irrawaddy
successful. At least through 1966, Westmo- plans and intentions (often disregarded by to the Po, 1941-1945. By Rupert Clarke.
reland and the rest of the command structure Stalin) is proof that fact is often stranger Leo Cooper, 2000. 242 Pages. $30.00).

50 INFANTRY Spring 2002


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. regimental duty. After the success of Alex- There is a story behind this book, of course,
Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired. ander’s Po offensive and the capture of a but that is best told somewhere else. Suffice
“‘General Alex’ or ‘The Chief,’ as we all million German prisoners, Alexander, as to say, George Marshall wrote in the first
knew him,” wrote Rupert Clarke about narrated by Clarke, accepted the first uncon- edition’s Introduction: “This book treats of
British Army General Sir Harold Alexander, ditional surrender signed by the Germans on the tactics of small units as illustrated by
“was a man in a million.” To be sure, Field 29 April 1945. examples drawn from the World War. It
Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, as he later This enthralling, easy-to-read book is checks the ideas from peacetime instruction
became known, was one of the outstanding lavishly illustrated, with more than 70 pho- against the experience of battle.” (Infantry
British military commanders of the 20th tographs of Alexander spread throughout the Magazine’s book, Infantry in Vietnam, 1967,
century. Professional, optimistic, and self- text. There are five excellent appendices, followed the same general design used by its
confident, “Alex” played a significant role including the delightful “Alex: Family predecessor.) I still believe today’s infan-
in virtually every theater where British Man,” which includes copies of letters Al- trymen could learn from the WWI dough-
troops fought during the Second World War. exander wrote to his family and illustrated boys.
Clarke served as aide-de-camp and per- with drawings and cartoons. I was quite pleased with Triplet’s mem-
sonal assistant to Alexander from April 1941 Clarke’s memoirs open a unique window, oir. He served as an enlisted man (platoon
to early 1945, and recorded in this book his hitherto closed, on Alexander’s generalship, sergeant) in WWI, attended West Point after
interesting and insightful observations of and more importantly, on Alexander the the war, graduating with the class of 1924
and experiences with Alexander. In a short man. The image that emerges is of a man and going into the Infantry. He had at least
preface, the author chronicles the early life with great inner strength, character, integ- three tours at Benning before the outbreak of
of Alexander from his birth in 1891 until rity, and concern for the welfare of his sol- WWII, but eventually commanded an armor
1941. He was commissioned in the British diers, and a superb fighting soldier. combat command in Europe during the
Army in 1911 and during World War I closing months of the war. He retired in
commanded in frontline action at every 1954 and died in 1994.
echelon from platoon to brigade. Alexander A Youth in the Meuse-Argonne: A His memoir was readied for publication
emerged from the crucible of combat with Memoir, 1918-1919. By William S. Trip- by Robert H. Ferrell, a professor emeritus of
an enhanced reputation for courage, sound let. Edited by Robert H. Ferrell. Univer- history at Indiana University in Blooming-
leadership, and imperturbability. sity of Missouri Press, 2000. 326 Pages. ton. Ferrell discovered the memoir, which
When Clarke reported for duty with him Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. was in xeroxed form, while searching
in April 1941, Alexander had already com- Garland, U.S. Army, Retired. through the Army Military Institute’s ar-
manded a division in France (and the rear- Veterans of World War II and particularly chives at the Army War College.
guard at Dunkirk) and subsequently a corps, those who fought in northwest Europe in He became interested in having Triplet’s
and was serving as General Officer Com- 1944 and 1945 have been publishing their manuscript published, because he believed
manding Southern Command. Alexander’s memoirs in seemingly ever-increasing num- its “literary quality was remarkable.” Trip-
mission was to prepare defenses to thwart a bers. I have a feeling that many of those let’s surviving family members (two
possible German invasion of England. Two veterans took their cue from Stephen Am- daughters) gladly gave their permission.
months after the Japanese attack in Decem- brose’s many writings on the war in Europe. Ferrell decided to publish the manuscript in
ber 1941, Alexander became Commander- In recent months I have read at least a two parts, one covering Triplet’s WWI ca-
in-Chief, Burma. It was virtually impossible half-dozen such memoirs. And with one reer, the other his WWII experiences. (The
to halt the Japanese onslaught and save exception, they were published by infantry- second part was published in 2001 by a dif-
Burma. Only by conducting a difficult re- men. The main theme of all of them seemed ferent university press.)
treat—the longest retreat in the history of to me to be a reiteration of that old adage: In the book under review, I found it his-
the British Army—was Alexander able to “War may be hell, but infantry combat is torically sound, well written, and indicative
save his force. worse.” Much gore, shrapnel decapitations, of a sure hand at the other end of the pen. It
Although the defeats of Dunkirk and and “88s”, which, to those individuals at is as much an account of an Army National
Burma would have ruined the career of an least, was the only artillery piece the Ger- Guard division (the 35th), called to active
ordinary general, Alexander became Com- mans had. duty and struggling to find itself during a
mander-in-Chief, Middle East, shortly after And so I was pleasantly surprised to re- chaotic mobilization period, as it is about
returning to England in July 1942. Fighting ceive this book for review. True, it was Triplet. Leaders were hard to come by and
against Rommel, Alexander accomplished written by a combat infantryman, and true, the author, despite his youth, (17 when he
his mission of clearing North Africa of en- the author stresses the difficulties of infantry enlisted, falsifying his age). He soon found
emy forces by May 1943. Alexander then combat. But it is not about World War II; it himself the platoon sergeant of the 2d Pla-
commanded the 15th Army Group during is about World War I. Memoirs from that toon, Company D, 140th Infantry Regiment,
the invasion of Sicily, then became com- war, which has gone on our list of “forgotten with which he remained until wounded. He
mander-in-chief of the polyglot Allied ar- wars,” are seldom seen today even though returned to the company before the Armi-
mies in Italy during the difficult advance up there has been a slight resurgence of interest stice, and remained with it until it returned
the well-defended peninsula. The apex of in “the war to end all wars.” to the States in 1919.
Alexander’s military career was the capture I have always thought our Army’s lack of Triplet learned much about the U.S. sol-
of Rome on 4 June 1944, for which he re- interest in WWI, and particularly at The dier, the men he led, his weapons, and above
ceived his field marshal’s baton. On 12 Infantry School, was strange. For it was the all else, leadership qualities, sometimes the
December 1944, Alexander was appointed School, after all, that published Infantry in hard way. He had an uneasy relationship
Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, and Battle in May 1934 and revised it for a sec- with his company officers but worked his
the following month Clarke returned to ond edition published in September 1938. way through these times. For me, person-

SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 51


BOOK REVIEWS
ally, I was happy not to have to read page treatment the prisoners received on their Pages, photos, illustrations. $12.95, Softbound.
after page of blood, guts, and tears—and 88s. return to the United States. The Air Force Americans Behind the Barbed Wire: World
War Two Inside a German Prison Camp. By J.
I put the book down, impressed with the centralized the decision-making process and Frank Diggs. Vandamere Press (P.O. Box
similarities between my WWII company’s handled all cases administratively. The 5243, Arlington, VA 22205), 2000. 176 Pages,
experiences and those endured by Triplet’s Army, on the other hand, left the court mar- $24.95.
unit. He had one problem we were happy tial decision to the three-star commanders of Strike and Hold: A Memoir of the 82nd Air-
borne in World War II. By T. Moffatt Burriss.
not to have faced—poison gas. He worried the armies in the United States. This re- Brassey’s, 2000. 218 Pages. $24.95.
Hitler would turn loose everything he had sulted in significantly different treatment for The Korean War. By Peter Lowe. St. Mar-
left in order to do as much damage as he the accused soldiers. Many soldiers were tin’s Press, 2000. 147 Pages. $15.95, Soft-
could to the Allied armies on both fronts. discharged before any disciplinary action bound.
The book contains a good introductory was possible and, incredibly, the 21 turn- The Korean War. Volume 1. By the Korean
Institute of Military History. University of
note and an equally good bibliographical coats who eventually returned to the United Nebraska Press, 2000. 941 Pages, photos,
essay. It has footnotes, although these are States escaped prosecution on a technicality. maps. $29.95, Softbound.
few in number and used sparingly and ef- The Navy conducted a single court of in- The Korean War. Volume 2. By the Korean
fectively, and a useful index. quiry to examine the conduct of one Marine Institute of Military History. University of
Nebraska Press, 2001. 821 Pages, photos,
This memoir should go a long way to- Corps aviator. maps, charts. $39.95, Softbound.
ward rekindling our interest in WWI and in This book presents an excellent account Land of Tears: In Vietnam 1967-1968.
one of our Army’s all-time major combat of the behavior of U.S. soldiers under ex- Harry C. Graham. Burd Street Press, 2001.
engagements. tremely trying conditions and of their subse- 109 Pages. $7.95, Softbound.
quent treatment by their own government. On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships,
and Epic Battles of the American Navy. By
Lech based his research on more than John Lehman. The Free Press, 2001. 436
Broken Soldiers. By Raymond B. Lech. 60,000 pages of official documents pro- Pages. $35.00.
University of Illinois Press, 2000. 330 duced mainly by the Army and the Navy. German Boy: A Child in War. By Wolfgang
Pages. $27.95. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Because of what the author characterizes as W.E. Samuel. Broadway Books, 2001. 445
Pages. $15.95, Softbound.
F. Davino, U.S. Army. a lack of cooperation from the Air Force, he An Uncertain Trumpet: The Evolution of
The conduct of American prisoners of was not able to examine the conduct of air- U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941. By
war in Korea left much to be desired. men in the same detail as the other services. Kenneth Finlayson. Greenwood Press, 2001.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Korean Additionally, he specifically chose not to 208 Pages. $62.50.
War, the United States adopted the Code of conduct any interviews to supplement the A Command Post at War: First Army Head-
quarters in Europe, 1943-1945. By David W.
Conduct to make it clear exactly what was official record. It would have been inter- Hogan, Jr. Center of Military History, 2001.
expected of servicemen captured by the esting to find out what happened to these ex- 360 Pages. $40.00, Softbound.
enemy in some future conflict. This was prisoners later in life. Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army
necessary because, unlike previous enemies, For readers who are interested in the Ko- in World War I. By John S.D. Eisenhower.
The Free Press, 2001. 252 Pages. $26.00.
the Chinese and the North Koreans contin- rean War and its aftermath, Broken Soldiers Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in
ued their war effort in the prison camps. is an excellent book. It also can provide Somalia and Haiti. By Col. Lawrence E.
Not satisfied with simply mistreating some valuable insights to other readers on Casper (U.S. Army-Ret.) Lynne Rienner, 2001.
American prisoners, this new type of enemy how the Chinese and North Koreans chose 277 Pages. $35.00, Hardcover.
relentlessly sought to indoctrinate them on to treat American prisoners. Desert War: The North African Campaign,
1940-1943. By Alan Moorehead. Originally
the benefits of the Communist system while published in U.S. as March to Tunis, by Harper
simultaneously encouraging them to commit & Row, 1965. Penguin, 2001. 653 Pages.
numerous disloyal acts and undermine the $19.00, Softbound.
U.S. war effort. RECENT AND RECOMMENDED Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalin-
Keystone: The American Occupation of grad. By William Craig. Originally published
Broken Soldiers examines this disturbing Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations. Foreign by Readers Digest Press, 1973. Penguin, 2001.
episode of American military history in Relations and the Presidency Series. By $14.00, Softbound.
great detail. Using the transcripts from the Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. 287 Pages. $34.95. Long Day’s Journey Into War: Pearl Harbor
courts martial of the 14 soldiers tried for An Attack on Duffer’s Downtown. By Rus- and a World At War—December 7. 1941. By
collaboration and other crimes, Raymond sell W. Glenn. Rand Corporation, 2001. A Stanley Weintraub. First published in 1991.
booklet on the challenges of urban combat. 38 The Lyons Press, 2001. 736 Pages. $19.95,
Lech covers the comprehensive program of Pages. Free for military personnel; $12.00 for Softbound.
mistreatment these men received from their others. To order, call 1-877-584-8642; FAX: The Navy Times Book of Submarines: A
captors as well as the way their own gov- 310-451-7002; or e-mail: order@rand.org. Political, Social, and Mililtary History. By
ernment dealt with them when they returned Hidden Heroism: Black Soldiers in Amer- Brayton Harris. Berkley, 2001. 405 Pages.
ica’s Wars, from Colonial Times to Today. By $15.00, Softbound.
from captivity. Robert B. Edgerton. Westview Press, 2001. Burnside’s Bridge: Antietam. Battleground
It is not a pleasant story. Tortured men- 296 Pages. $25.00. America Series. By John Cannan. Leo Coo-
tally and physically by sadistic enemies, Through Ordinary Eyes: The Civil War Cor- per, 2001. 155 Pages. $16.95, Softbound.
hundreds of American servicemen collabo- respondence of Rufus Robbins, Private, 7th Flags of Our Fathers. By James Bradley
rated with the enemy and mistreated their Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers. Edited by with Ron Powers. Bantam, 2001. 384 Pages.
Ella Jane Bruen and Brian M. Fitzgibbons. $12.95, Softbound.
fellow prisoners. Discipline broke down in Praeger, 2000. 248 Pages. $39.95. Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the National
the camps as many leaders failed to exercise Leadership for NCOs. By J.D. Pendry, Security Agency From the Cold War Through
their authority. Even more puzzling is that Command Sergeant Major, USA Retired. the Dawn of a New Century. By James
21 Americans chose to refuse repatriation Presidio, 2000. 256 Pages. $17.95, Softbound. Bamford. Doubleday, 2001. 721 Pages. $26.95
The Infantry Soldier’s Handbook: The Clas- War and Our World. By John Keegan.
and remain with their Chinese captors. sic World War I Training Manual. By Major Vintage Books, 2001. Originally published
Lech also details the seemingly arbitrary William H. Waldron. Lyons Press, 2001. 256 1998. 102 Pages. $10.00, Softbound.

52 INFANTRY Spring 2002


A

SOLUTION
Tactical Decision
Game #1-01
Assumptions:
Hill is rocky and devoid of vegetation.
We will get both 105 & 81mm priorities of
fire.
Must get a sizeable element west of the
hilltop to close the range so I can get effects
on the enemy and pass the remaining ele-
ments in the battalion/brigade.

FRAGO follows:
Enemy contact with 2 machineguns south
of CP2. Enemy crew served weapon sighted
west of CP1. Dug-in enemy, estimated at
platoon strength, vicinity north of CP3. C Co
receiving indirect at the rear of the battalion Rationale:
formation. In order to give 1st platoon time to seek better cover and start massing
Company mission—no change. fires on the machineguns, it was necessary to place some immediate fires
My intent—Retain control of Hill 122, de- on the two crew-served weapons to the south with my own co mortars. I
stroy the crew-served weapons, suppress moved 2nd platoon into SBF 2 in order to set the conditions for my main
OBJ CAT, and pass the battalion (–) along effort’s movement west. Accurate small arms fires on the enemy will be
AXIS WHITE. difficult, due to the distance, but the crew-served weapons can still fire
Mortars—Immediate suppression south of effectively. Furthermore, I’ll engage one or more bunkers with Javelin in
CP2, 2 crew-served weapons in the open. order to allow my main effort to close the distance without being under fire
1st Plt—Suppress enemy machineguns from the dug-in enemy. The 2nd platoon would have the time to work the
south of CP2 in order to prevent direct fires FA and BN mortars onto CAT, and any other crew-served positions to the
on 3rd platoon. 60mm priority of fire. 81mm north as well. This is necessary to set the conditions for 3rd platoon’s
priority of fire once 3rd in SBF 3. move west along AXIS DOG.
2nd Plt—Move to the spur northeast of I saw it decisive to get an element on the western side of the hilltop to
CP 2 and occupy SBF 2. Suppress enemy place effective fires on CAT so that the battalion could still maneuver.
between CPs 3 and 1 in order to facilitate Simply seizing the hill top on 122 is not enough to accomplish the purpose
movement of 3rd platoon along AXIS DOG. the battalion commander assigned me. I can foresee a need for Class V
105 & 81mm priorities of fire. O/O, guide B resupply and anticipate enemy indirect fires on my positions (especially
Co along AXIS WHITE. 2nd) given how long it will take to pass the brigade, let alone the remain-
3rd Plt (ME)—O/O, move west past the der of the battalion.
crest of Hill 122 and establish SBF 3. Fix the Although time is critical, I would call the battalion commander and rec-
enemy on OBJ CAT in order to pass the ommend to him that once I get 3rd platoon set in SBF, I could pass the
battalion (–) along AXIS WHITE. 105mm next company in line (assuming it was B Co) to destroy the enemy on
priorities of fire once in SBF 3. CAT. The other concern I had was the two enemy machineguns to the
south. I’m sure I could destroy the crews for them, but it is likely that they
Fires: are supported by infantry. If I encountered more enemy to the south, I
FA—Disrupt dug-in enemy on OBJ CAT so would not have had 3rd platoon move west of the crest of the hill, but to
that they can’t place effective direct fires on orient more to the south to pass the battalion. The other option I consid-
3rd platoon. ered was pulling a squad from 2nd to form a company reserve, since the
Mortar (81mm)—Obscure 3rd platoon’s range from SBT 2 to OBJ CAT would reduce the effectiveness of small
movement to SBF 3 from the enemy on CAT. arms fire. My first planning priority would be reinforcing 1st in the south,
Mortar (60mm)—Destroy crew-served and my second would be reinforcing 3rd in SBF 3.
weapons south of CP 2. Even with the presence of the enemy, I still saw myself as terrain ori-
AT—From SBF 2, destroy crew-served ented, given the commander’s guidance. I tried to focus on the necessity
weapons position/bunkers to facilitate 3rd of getting to vantage points where I could, as a minimum, suppress the
platoon’s movement to SBF 3. enemy to permit the battalion to pass. Naturally, these orders would need
XO—Move with 2nd. to be amended after things started to develop. They were intended to get
1SG—Establish the company CCP vicinity us through the initial contact and get arrayed to start massing the effects
2nd platoon’s current location. of our combat power to achieve our purpose.
(Based on an actual vignette from: Army Historical Series, Combat Actions in Korea,
Russell A. Gugeler, CMH Publication 30-2, Chapter 2. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/30-2/30-2_2.htm)
SPRING 2002 INFANTRY 53

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