FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF LATIN AMERICAN

INTEGRATION (UNILA)
LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS,
SOCIETY AND POLITICS
MASTER’S DEGREE PROGRAM IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (PPGRI)

TWO TAILS OF NICARAGUA’S EXPERIENCE WITH GENDER INEQUALITY: THE

NEOLIBERAL POLITICS OF MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION ON THE
GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX REPORTS (2006 – 2019)

BRENDA MOREIRA MARQUES

MASTER’S DISSERTATION

2022

Foz do Iguaçu
2022
 FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF LATIN AMERICAN
INTEGRATION (UNILA)
LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS,
SOCIETY AND POLITICS
MASTER’S DEGREE PROGRAM IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (PPGRI)

THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICS OF MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION ON

GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX REPORTS: A SINGLE CASE STUDY ON THE
NICARAGUA’S GLOBAL PERFORMANCE FOR GENDER EQUALITY (2006 – 2019)

BRENDA MOREIRA MARQUES

Dissertation presented to the Master’s

program in International Relations (PPGRI)
at the Federal University of Latin American
Integration (UNILA), as a partial requirement
for elaborating the research thesis in
International Relations.

Research Advisor: Prof. PhD. Ana Carolina

Teixeira Delgado

O presente trabalho foi realizado com apoio da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de

Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES)

Foz do Iguaçu
2022
 BRENDA MOREIRA MARQUES

THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICS OF MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION ON GLOBAL

GENDER GAP INDEX REPORTS: A SINGLE CASE STUDY ON THE NICARAGUA’S
GLOBAL PERFORMANCE FOR GENDER EQUALITY (2006 – 2019)

The dissertation is proposed presented to the

Master’s program in International Relations
(PPGRI) at the Federal University of Latin
American Integration as a partial requirement for
elaborating the research thesis in International
Relations.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Research Advisor: Prof. PhD. Ana Carolina Teixeira Delgado

UNILA

Prof. PhD. Ramon Blanco de Freitas

UNILA

Prof. PhD. Paula Daniela Fernandez

UNILA

Prof. PhD Paula Drumond Rangel Campos

PUC-RIO

Foz do Iguaçu, _____ de ___________ de ______.

 ABSTRACT

The current work is focused on the politics behind the production and use of one of the
most relevant global ranking and indicators of gender in history: Global Gender Gap Index
(GGGI). GGGI is a multi-country indicator ranking with the most significant databases
focused on “gender disparities” globally. Also, the Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006
– 2019) grants Nicaragua a unique status: not only one of the best performers in gender
parity in the world but as the first country from the global south on track to achieve full
gender parity in the 21st century. According to the index, Nicaragua has eliminated 80% of
the inequalities between the sexes. It is a world leader in gender parity, with fast-speed
improvements over 13 years. Conversely, several sources question the positive status of
Nicaragua’s “gender paradise” promoted at GGI’s, since at domestic, there have been a
weakening of gender anti-violence laws, systematic persecution of women’s movements
and the emergence of “anti-gender and anti-democratic politics” in Ortega’s presidential
administration. As a result, this dissertation aims to provide a critical assessment of how
the political functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index help to foster an informal
regime of governance of gender in world politics, based on the case study of Nicaragua’s
global leadership in gender equality portrayed the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) in
contrast to the experiences of anti-gender politics and violence exercised at the local level,
from 2006 to 2019. Our theoretical framework draws on the nexus among Foucauldian-
inspired debates of power-knowledge, governance studies from global indicators’ literature
and gender studies on neoliberal framing and governmentality. Therefore, this dissertation
concludes that the GGI’s forms of measurement and quantification govern and normalizes
standards for the global governance of gender in countries through framings of neoliberal
governmentality and the governing functions of numbers. As such, Nicaragua’s national
identity in gender issues is created, altered, and rewarded as a world leader and top
performer, depoliticizing the meaning of gender equality by its newly reinforced connection
with governments, markets and national competitiveness. The patriarchal national project
of gender observed at the domestic level in Nicaragua is not recognized by the GGI’s
forms of measurement and analysis, given that the national gender project in Nicaragua is
aligned with practices of self-government that render the GGI’s forms of neoliberal
governmentality of gender operational. Granted, the GGI measures global disparities in
gender and ranks countries, but its form of measurement and interpretation not only masks
gender-based violence as something structural and therefore who acquires systemic
change, it is particularly unable to capture rates of gender inequality in non-eurocentered
contexts. Instead, it conflates different national projects of gender among countries, which
is problematic, as Nicaragua’s government makes use of the national branding of world
leader in gender equity established by the GGI to delegitimize alternate gendered
mobilizations for social change at the domestic level.

Key-words: Global Gender Gap Index, Nicaragua, Gender Politics

 RESUMO

O presente trabalho está focado nas dimensões políticas por trás da produção e uso de
um dos mais relevantes rankings e indicadores globais de disparidade de gênero da
história: Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). O GGGI é um ranking de subindicadores que
avalia, mensura e ranqueia a posição global de vários países sobre “disparidades de
gênero”. Além disso, os Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019) conferem à
Nicarágua um status único: não apenas a descrevem como tendo um dos melhores
desempenhos em paridade de gênero no mundo, mas como o primeiro país do sul global
e da América Latina e Caribe a caminho de alcançar a plena paridade de gênero no
mundo. Segundo o índice, a Nicarágua eliminou 80% das desigualdades entre os sexos.
É líder mundial em paridade de gênero, com melhorias rápidas ao longo de 13 anos. Por
outro lado, várias fontes questionam o status positivo do “paraíso de gênero” da
Nicarágua promovido nos GGI's, uma vez que no âmbito doméstico houve um
enfraquecimento das leis antiviolência de gênero, além de perseguição sistemática aos
movimentos de mulheres e o surgimento de projetos políticos anti-democráticos e hostis
às justiça social para mulheres na gestão presidencial de Ortega. Como resultado, esta
dissertação visa fornecer uma avaliação crítica sobre como as funções políticas
desempenhadas pelo Global Gender Gap Index ajudam a fomentar um regime informal de
governança de gênero na política mundial, com base no estudo de caso da liderança
global da Nicarágua em igualdade de gênero retratou o Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI)
em contraste com as experiências de política antigênero e violência exercidas em nível
local, de 2006 a 2019, com base em estudos da literatura de indicadores globais e
estudos de gênero sobre enquadramento neoliberal e governamentalidade. Portanto, esta
dissertação conclui que as formas de medição e quantificação do GGI governam e
normalizam padrões para a governança global de gênero nos países por meio de
enquadramentos da governamentalidade neoliberal e das funções políticas de governo
dos números do GGI. Como tal, a identidade nacional da Nicarágua em questões de
gênero é criada, alterada e recompensada como líder mundial e de alto desempenho,
despolitizando o significado da igualdade de gênero por sua conexão recém-reforçada
com governos, mercados e competitividade nacional. O projeto nacional patriarcal de
gênero observado em nível doméstico na Nicarágua não é reconhecido pelas formas de
medição e análise do GGI, uma vez que o projeto nacional de gênero na Nicarágua está
alinhado com práticas de autogoverno que tornam as formas de governamentalidade
neoliberal do GGI de gênero operacional. É certo que o GGI mede as disparidades
globais de gênero e classifica os países, mas sua forma de mensuração e interpretação
mascara a violência de gênero como algo estrutural e, portanto, omite que tal fenômeno
exige mudanças sistêmicas. No mais, o GGI é particularmente incapaz de capturar taxas
de desigualdade de gênero em países provenientes de contextos do Sul Global. Em vez
disso, mensura e iguala diferentes projetos nacionais de gênero entre os países, o que é
problemático, pois o governo da Nicarágua faz uso da marca nacional de líder mundial em
equidade de gênero estabelecida pelo GGI para deslegitimar mobilizações de gênero
alternativas em nível doméstico.

Palavra-chave: Índice de disparidade global de gênero; Nicarágua; Política de gênero

 LIST OF BOXES, FIGURES AND TABLES
Fig. 1 Economic and Participation Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:
Fig. 2 Educational Attainment Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:
Fig. 3 Health and Survival Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:
Fig. 4 Political Empowerment Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:
Fig. 5 Sources of data collection in the GGI:
Fig. 6 - Mapping of the overall GGI’S ranking across time (2006 – 2019)
Fig. 7 – The stage of global gender gap worldwide
Fig. 8 - Performance by region on the Global Gender Gap Index and sub-indexes:
Fig. 9 Visual culture about sandinist women in Nicaragua
Fig. 10. Nicaragua’s political propaganda: Cristiana, socialista, solidaria!
Fig. 11 Protests against the high rates of child-sexual abuse in Nicaragua
Fig. 12 Religious advertising against abortion rights in Nicaragua
Fig. 13 Amnesty International Campaign about Nicaragua’s full prohibition on reproductive
rights
Fig. 14 Cover of the Nicaraguan government-sponsored book: “El feminism y las guerras
de baixa intensidad” authored by the vice-president Murrillo (2008)
Fig. 15 Online activism reporting women’s arbitrary imprisonments in Nicaragua
Fig. 16. Women’s representation in Nicaraguan congress
Fig. 17. Nicaraguan public protests against Ortega’s government
Fig. 18 Nicaragua’s government view on the national model of equity and gender parity
Fig. 19. The model of “Women’s empowerment” in Nicaragua
Fig. 20 Nicaragua’s global position in education attainment
Fig. 21 Nicaragua’s global position in gender equality (2006 – 2010)
Fig. 22 Nicaragua’s evolution across time
Fig. 23 Key areas of national policy frameworks of gender
Fig. 24 Nicaragua’s levels of improvement in score compared to the global gender gap
index’s overall evaluations
Fig. 25 World Economic Forum’s Repository of Successful Practices for Gender Parity
Fig. 26. Nicaragua’s position in comparison to the scores of countries from the same
income group
Fig. 27 Nicaragua’s overall position in each subindex
Fig. 28 Nicaragua’s country profile
Fig. 29 Nicaragua’s ranking in Gender Gaps compared by country, world average and in
the G20 group
Fig. 30 Operationalization of objectification in the GGI
Fig. 31. Modelling Nicaragua’s graphic evolution to Yemen and Sweden
Fig. 32. Nicaragua’s position in health and survival
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GEI - Gender equity index

GEM – Gender Empowerment Measure
GGI - GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX
GII - GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX
GPI - GENDER PARITY SCORE INDEX
IPE – International Political Economy
IR – International Relations
MDGs - Millennium Development Goals
UN - UNITED NATIONS
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNSD - United Nations Statistics Division
WEW - WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………...……………………………………….12
1.1. “GENDER PARADISE WORLDWIDE VS ANTI-GENDER POLITICS AT DOMESTIC
LEVEL”: NICARAGUA AS A CASE STUDY FOR THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX’S
POLITICAL FUNCTIONS………………………………………………………………….…….20
1.2 METHODOLOGY………………………………………..………………….………………..27

2. FOSTERING DIALOGUES BETWEEN FOUCAULTIAN-INSPIRED CONCEPTS AND

FEMINIST APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INDICATORS IN
GOVERNANCE……………………………..……………………………………………………34
2.1 FOUCAULTIAN CONCEPTS AND FEMINIST STUDIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY:
AN OVERVIEW…………………………………………………………………………………...34
2.2. GLOBAL INDICATORS IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENDER: BASIC
DEFINITIONS…………………………………………………………………...………………...37
2.3. POWER-KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER AND DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICES……………………………………………………………………………………….40
2.3.1. ‘Governmentality’ applied to the feminist study of global indicators of gender……..48

3. NICARAGUA’S GLOBAL AND LOCAL “EXPERIENCES” IN GENDER EQUALITY

ACCORDING TO THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX AND BEYOND (2006 – 2019)....53
3.1 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM: HISTORY AND APPROXIMATION WITH “GENDERED
AGENDA” AT GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX………………………………………………..53
3.1.1. Contextualizing methodological aspects on measurements conducted by the global
gender gap index………………………………………………………………………………….55
3.1.2 Benchmarking and tracking gender gaps worldwide according to the global gender
gap index reports (2006 – 2019): global trends and rankings……………………………….60
3.2. “ANTI-GENDER COUNTRY” vs “MOST-GENDER EQUAL COUNTRY”:
NICARAGUA’S PERCEIVED LOCAL AND GLOBAL “EXPERIENCE” OF GENDER
EQUALITY…………………………………………………………………………………………64
3.2.1 An overview of Nicaragua’s history and gender politics across time…………...…….65
3.2.2 The “national gender project” pursued by Ortega’s administration in Nicaragua: from
his first mandate to the pre- covid 19 pandemic (2006 – 2019)……………………..………71
3.2.2.1 Women’s reproductive rights and health as a gender project in ortega’s
government……………………………………………………………………………………….75
3.2.2.2. Women’s political (dis)empowerment during ortega’s administration: war against
women’s movements and feminist diaspora…………………………………………………..79
3.2.2.2 Legislation for parity in women’s economic participation and protection against
gender-based violence in Ortega’s government…………………………..………………….86
3.3. NARRATING THE STORY OF NICARAGUA WITH GENDER EQUALITY
ACCORDING TO THE GGI: FROM MARGINAL COUNTRY TO GLOBAL LEADER…....92
3.3.2 Nicaragua “Rising to the global top 10”…………………………………………………97

4 “CONFLICTING NARRATIVES ABOUT GENDER EQUALITY IN NICARAGUA”:

ANALYZING THE GOVERNING FUNCTIONS OF THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX
AT PLAY AND BEYOND…………………………………………………………….………..112
4.1 THE GGI’S NORMALIZING FUNCTIONS TO WOMEN’S HEALTH AND SURVIVAL IN
NICARAGUA…………………………………………………………………………………….135
4.2 THE GGI POLITICAL FUNCTIONS EXERTED TOWARDS THE INTERPRETATION
OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT AND WOMEN-STATE RELATIONS IN
NICARAGUA………………………………………..…………………………………………..149
4.3. THE GGI’S POLITICAL FUNCTIONS ON ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION AND
OPPORTUNITIES BASED ON THE CASE OF NICARAGUA…………………………….159

5. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................170
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES
 Counting and classification can be powerful parts of
the process of creating knowledge. But they’re also tools of power in
themselves. […] An intersectional feminist approach to counting
insists that we examine and, if necessary, rethink the assumptions
and beliefs behind our classification infrastructure, as well as
consistently probe who is doing the counting and whose interests are
served. Counting and measuring do not always have to be tools of
oppression. We can also use them to hold power accountable, to
reclaim overlooked histories, and to build collectivity and solidarity
(D’IGNAZIO and KLEIN, 2020, p. 122-23).
 12

1. INTRODUCTION
This section is an introduction to the dissertation, whose main goal is to
discuss how the political functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index help to foster
an informal regime of governance of gender in world politics, based on the case study of
Nicaragua’s global leadership in gender equality portrayed the Global Gender Gap
Index (GGGI), in contrast to the experiences of anti-gender politics and violence
exercised at the local level, from 2006 to 2019. I begin this chapter by exploring
quantified knowledge as a social component of world affairs, followed by exposing the
main research gaps identified throughout our work, while at the same time, I present our
case study. Therefore, here I also provide context on the close relationship between
data production from global indicators of gender – namely the Global Gender Gap
Index, power and forms of government reflected by the evaluations of Nicaragua’s state
of gender affairs, connecting this broader context to the domestic affairs considered
“anti-gender politics” by scholars and feminist activists in the country. Ultimately, this
section includes a description of the purpose of the thesis, chapters, and methods from
a qualitative view. In other words, our data collection relies on a bibliography, document
research, observation, and qualitative codification. Documents from three different
sources were selected through the method of triangulation of data by levels, and
qualitative analysis is conducted through the theoretical dialogue of poststructural
feminist perspectives of political economy and Foucaultian-inspired interpretations of
global indicators as sites of knowledge-power.
The production and use of data are an undeniable asset to structuring
the social fabric of modern life, whose presence can be noticed across fields of
knowledge, news, governments, corporations, and communities. While the action of
quantifying, categorizing, measuring, and analyzing social reality through statistical and
non-statistical methodologies has been a practice employed over the centuries by
nation-states and other social actors, in the past, it was often linked to the governments’
demands in decision-making processes and political strategies to public agendas
(MELITA et al., 2018). Other than that, quantified knowledge is merged with social life in
numerous forms, including calculus, census, statistical models, performance indicators,
measurements, rankings, mappings, algorithms, and finances, to name a few. In this
spirit, we define quantification as the employment of numbers to describe and measure
social phenomena (INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
2008). In other words, quantification translates social experiences into numerical
 13

assessments, usually dependent on standardized forms, which implies turning social

phenomena into comparable units of analysis (MERRY, 2015).
In the domain of global affairs, for example, quantification and global
monitoring of social phenomena within countries’ performance is a widely used tool by
different kinds of international organizations and actors, namely states, research
institutes or statistical divisions inside international organizations and NGOs, which
makes the production of global indicators an instrumental technology to the realm of
international politics (MERRY, 2016). Some of the knowledge resultant from data
production and work shares links with issues of surveillance and technology, policing-
security practices, public policy debates and census, biased analysis, personal
engagements through social media and research scientific studies (D’IGNAZIO and
KLEIN, 2020). Because of this extensive use in modern life and its implications,
quantification receives attention as an object of study in social and applied sciences.
Since the 1970s, diverse debates on quantified knowledge have taken
place within social sciences, usually following at least one of three scopes of social
studies of quantification: (1) examination of a single (often-new) quantified
phenomenon; (2) comparison of quantification projects (often bound to a single field or
domain), and (3) the mapping and evaluation of impact over a specific case study of
quantification (BERMAN and HIRSCHMAN, 2017, p. 18). Among the main theoretical
developments, it is possible to recognize the pioneering work of the French school of
Desrosières, the American and German schools on studies of quantification in
philosophy and scientific epistemology, works of the field of critical accounting studies,
and social theory, Foucaultian approaches, new institutionalism, actor-network theory
and political economy, not to mention contributions from the sociology of science and
technology (MENNIKEN and ESPELAND, 2019).
In the case of International Relations’ agenda on quantified subjects
and quantification studies, there has been a combination of sociology of science and
technology, sociology of quantification and political economy with Foucauldian-oriented
discussions. Most works have explored quantified knowledge and quantified processes
as regulatory tools in transnational governance, exposing their impact on foreign policy
and political function as technologies of power acquired by international actors, such
as its capabilities of creating state-branding and agenda-setting in world affairs.
Second, most IR productions about quantified subjects refer to the subfields of soft
international law, global governance, international accountability and, in some
 14

instances, governmentality studies. Many investigate technologies of quantification

within agendas of international security and peace, liberal democracy, international
cooperation, economic development, international human rights, and good
governance. Broadly, works about technologies of quantification in global affairs share
a common understanding that international actors' use of global indicators displays a
new dimension of power in world politics (DAVID et al1, 2012; SIQUEIRA, 2017), where
they call for attention to the politics behind indexes over international security contexts,
including bias over categories of measurement and data collection. Following the same
line of thought, Merry (2015; 2011) books, “The quiet power of indicators: measuring
governance, corruption and the rule of law” and “The seductions of quantification:
Measuring human rights” demonstrate a poststructuralist commitment to the analysis
of global indicators from United Nations, NGO’s and private actors from the U.S.A, as
sources shaped by cultural assumptions of such producers.
Less common are works focused on other thematic issues to which
quantified technologies have been increasingly employed beyond mainstream areas
and contexts from the global north, including gender equality and gender-based
violence. One of the neglected debates is the unequal power differentials behind the
data production and interpretation worldwide (D’IGNAZIO AND KLEIN, 2020), especially
when discussing this phenomenon beyond the epistemic view from the cases portrayed
in the global north imbricated with the features of “human rights’ studies”. According to
Celis et al. (2013), the subfield of Gender and International Politics still lacks robust
analysis on how gender inequality is reproduced through institutions (understood here
as rules, norms, and practices) and policies and how institutions and policies are
gendered by nature. The authors describe a need for more research about “the role that
discourses and ideas about gender and sexuality play in constituting political actors and
structures in the global economy’ through the exposure to this research gap, we might
be able to “develop theoretical accounts of politics that better link structure, action, and
ideas” (CHAPPELL and WAYLEN, 2013, p. 16), which can help us understanding
international dynamics in more innovative ways. Following Celis et al. (2013)’s
considerations, we have shifted the traditional focus of the anglo-American field in IR
and Gender Studies over issues of “high politics”, and, with this dissertation, we intend
beyond state-centric, intergovernmental subjects as well as challenge eurocentered
debates of gender politics. For that, we have privileged the choice of a subject of study
1
See “Governance by Indicators: Global Power through classification and rankings” (2012).
 15

of a global indicator of gender, accompanied by a single case study on

underinvestigated experiences of international politics of gender. This dissertation
addresses the gap in gendered discussions on the politics of quantified knowledge in
world politics as an instrumental aspect of IR. At the same time, we argue that the field
of Women’s and Gender Studies could benefit from the interdisciplinary addressing of
global indicators of gender through a country’s case study.
Moreover, the recent development of feminist science studies on data
production and feminist debates about neoliberalism, disciplinary power and
depoliticization of “gender issues” in international and financial institutions demonstrate
two different branches of theorization in Women’s and Gender Studies yet to be
explored throughout together. In this dissertation, we consider that both theoretical lines
could be employed together as tools to analyze specific cases that intersect quantified
knowledge, neoliberalism and gender debates in International Relations. Since the
global indicator we investigate is associated with international discussions of gender
equality, we understand it as being more intensely subjected to gendered dimensions,
impacts and political framings in its language and employment. Because of that, it is
imperative to develop further research on this topic with a renewed body of literature
that delivers fruitful dialogue in three axes of debate. First, we make use of the
theoretical background of the social studies of quantification about the political and
cultural aspects embedded in quantified tools; for that, we take into account
Foucaultian-oriented approaches of International Relations about disciplinary power and
knowledge in world politics; and, finally, we use women’s and gender perspectives on
data production, gendered power and feminist perspectives on neoliberalised and
marketized global governance through governmentality of gender.
As for this dissertation, we investigate political functions played by the
quantification tools employed by international institutions and countries, many of which
may carry political implications and shape new types of relationships and standards of
behaviour in world affairs. Here, our attention lies on a quantified measurement
associated with the spectrum of international debates on gender equality, with multi-
country measurement and a robust interpretation database. Using national or multi-
country indicators to cover and rank dimensions of inclusion, diversity and inequality
can provide a complex picture of a country’s performance and reputation, thus
assisting international actors in recognizing challenges and crafting more effective
policies for equality (NG et al., 2021). To Ng et al. (2021)’s Handbook on Diversity and
 16

Inclusion Indices, a compendium of the most critical diversity and inclusion indices
related to gender issues, covers the following indicators: Gender Inequality Index (UN);
Gender Equity Index (Social Watch); Gender-Equality Index (European Institute for
Gender Equality); Women’s Economic Opportunity Index (Economist Intelligence Unit);
Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum); Gender Parity Score Report
(McKinsey); Gender Diversity Index (Women on Boards) and Gender Diversity Index.
Out of 8 indices of gender mapped above, only three of them produce
data across regions and within countries up until today: Gender Inequality Index (GII),
developed in 2010 to complement the Human Development Index (HDI) by United
Nations; Gender Parity Score Report (GPS), created in 2012 by Mckinsey & Company;
and Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI), developed in 2006 by the World Economic
Forum. Apart from Gender Inequality Index (GII), which is related to United Nations’
Human Development Index by calculating “the loss in potential human development
due to disparity between female and male achievements” (UNDP, 2021, sp), Gender
Parity Score (GPS) and Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) are the leading indicators
providing cross-countries measurements of gender. Even though both GPS and GGI’s
production uses a multi-country approach and comes from private actors, GGI’s
production seems much more stable and broader as a subject of study than the GPS.
First, the GGI have covered more countries’ performances and rankings than GPS.
While GGI began with 106 and nowadays evaluates over 140 countries with reports
annually, GPS had only three official reports with 95 assessed countries (2015; 2016;
2018) and several Gender Parity Score Reports for regional or continental analysis
(Asian, African, European) instead of reports with an intercontinental reach.
The GGI’s good reputation with public opinion, international media and
policymakers international stakeholders is much more pronounced than GII and GPS.
Its use can perceive as a source of information within international coverages 2,
including the “Top 10 most visited English-language online news websites in the world”3.
Numerous news publications’ commenting on Global Gender Gap Index Reports or
quoting its data were easily tracked during our research4. Besides that, the Global
Gender Gap Index Reports are used as a source in various international,

2
Reuters (2021); Al Jazeera (2021)
3 BBC; CNN; New York Times; Daily Mail UK; The Guardian; Fox News; Finance Yahoo; Washington
Post; CNBC and Express UK (PRESSGAZETTE, 2021, sp).
4 BBC (2021; 2019a; 2019b 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2016; 2015a; 2015b); CNN (2021; 2020a; 2020b;

2019a); New York Times (2021a; 2021b; 2021c); Washington Post (2021; 2019; 2017; 2013); NBC
(2019a; 2019b);
 17

intergovernmental, and policy documents5. So, we argue that GGI’s features: broad
multi-country covering, stable data production by annual reports, and more substantial
recognition by international actors assert it as a reasonable choice to develop debates
of gendered data production in IR, with its manifested politics in global processes.
Contrary to GPS, funded by Mckinsey & Company, GGI’s output reflects a much more
complex scenario of data production, as it is financed by the only international
organization for cooperation and governance between private-public sectors in the
world – World Economic Forum. Its members are the 1000th most profitable companies
globally and international policymakers, with a formal purpose for the development of
global corporate governance.
Far from being a random subject of study, scholars of Gender and
International Relations investigate the discursive aspects of global policy debates that
pose gender equality strategies as “beneficial” to international businesses, the global
economy and the increasing foreign aid investment. Many scholars study the ongoing
development of several international initiatives carried by the World Bank, European
Union, United Nations, multinationals6 and World Economic Forum as new branches of
debates for IR and Feminist Studies about corporate governance, neoliberalism and
gender framings (PRÜGL, 2015; PRÜGL and TRUE, 2015; TRUE, 2019; GRIFFIN,
2010). As a result, the role of the World Economic Forum as a specialized institution in
producing a cross-country ranking of gender gaps and parity demonstrates a vital
scenario of world affairs and gendered processes. Studying it opens the doors to
understanding that cross-country indicators can shape international debates, standards,
and international policies for gender equality (TANSKA et al., 2020; GRIFFIN, 2013;
TRUE, 2018), if not local at times.
According to Tanska et al. (2020), the publishing of the Global Gender
Gap Index Reports by the World Economic Forum has caused many political
implications for countries and their political images abroad. For one thing, in 2018, “the
US was shamed for ranking 49th in the world” in printed papers and news; “Japan was
shamed in the media for ranking the worst among G7 countries”; while at the same
time, “Forbes pursued with coverage of top-ranked countries, naming a few policies that
were deemed relevant for achieving high levels of gender equality […]”, not to mention
that “[…] in the European Union, the publication of rankings in gender wage equality […]

5
6
Nike, Mckinsey & Company, Goldman Sachs, Ernst and Young, Accenture, Deloitte, Coca Cola, among others.
 18

attracts coverage from the European Commission, national governments, and media
alike” (idem, p. 2). Besides, there is sufficient evidence on the primer use of the Global
Gender Gap Index Reports data to support the development of international cooperation
programs for gender equality and the adoption of policy agendas for gender equality.
The Global Gender Gap Index itself works as a corollary for the program Closing the
Gender Gap Accelerators, a public-private model of international cooperation
established to address gender gaps in countries evaluated by the GGI through national
plans of action, which now take place in nine countries representatives from three
regions, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Panama, Jordan, Kazakhstan and Egypt (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2021, sp).
International organizations have used GGI’s data in their reports, policymaking debates
and discourses: International Trade Union Confederation (2008); USAID (2021) at its
“Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment” program; International Monetary Fund’s
projects to tackle gender inequality as well as its gender budget policies (2019);
Santander (2021); International Labour Organization’s evaluations to narrow the gender
pay gap (2019) and the project’s in Pakistan (2011), Amnesty’s campaigns for gender
equality (2019); Islamic Development Bank in its “Country Gender Profile” (2018); UN’s
Women (2018) and OECD’s Report Promoting Gender Equality in Eurasia (2019).
The Global Gender Gap Index aims to promote global awareness of
gender challenges and opportunities worldwide. The global ranking was also developed
to be mobilized “as a basis for drawing effective strategies in the reduction of gender
inequality" (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2019, s/p). Since its first edition in 2006, the
Global Gender Gap Index has worked as a global indicator of gender that gathers one
of the largest databases exclusively focused on “gender disparities” across the globe,
certainly the largest one outside the United Nations and its counterparts. In addition to
its notable data gathering and unusual producer - World Economic Forum, this index
monitors, interprets and ranks the performance of countries in terms only of their gender
gaps supposedly despite their economic or socio-political position according to four
main areas or subindexes: Political Empowerment, Health and Survival, Opportunity
and Economic Empowerment and Educational Attainment, each of them providing a
separate analysis for a country’s behaviour in gender issues worldwide. According to
World Economic Forum (2020, p. 5), “the Global Gender Gap Index benchmarks the
evolution of gender-based gaps among four key dimensions […], tracks progress
towards closing these gaps over time”, which it allows the index to act as “[…] a tool for
 19

cross-country comparison and to prioritize the most effective policies needed to close
gender gaps”, considering that “it provides country rankings” at the global level, across
regions and income groups.
The Global Gender Gap Index Reports launches data rankings
annually, following the same data production and evaluation methodology. Its structure
can be divided into three thematic parts: (a) Key Findings, including the main trends
captured over the year on the countries’ progress towards gender parity, their average
progress across its four dimensions or subindexes, and the projection of future trends
for gender equality; (b) Measuring the global gender gap, which presents its
methodology, conceptual framework, results and analysis, progress over time,
performance by region and country and conclusions; and, lastly, (c) Country profiles,
which explore individual countries’ performance accessed by the Global Gender Gap
Index Data (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2017). On the average progress on gender
equality worldwide, the Index assesses the current distance to close the gaps to parity
levels of 68% globally. However, there were significant improvements in 89 of the 144
countries covered and analyzed, and projections on closing the global gender gap are
set to take place in 108 years across the 106 countries regularly monitored since 2006
(WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2018, p. 7).
At the current rates, the index states that the main challenge of closing
gaps around the globe, the region with the highest level of gender parity is Western
Europe (75.8%), followed by North America (72.5%) and Latin America (70.8%) in third
place. Beyond those, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa are pointed out as
having 70.7%, 68.3%, 66.3%, 65.8% and 60.2%, respectively (idem, p. 8). On the
subject of its ranking and countries accessed, the Global Gender Gap Index Reports
(2006 – 2019) find among its Top 10 best performers (“most gender-equal countries in
the world”) Nordic and European countries, including Iceland, Norway, Sweden and
Finland. Outside the global north and European countries’ ranking positions, the index
also features countries from other regions as case models: New Zealand, Philippines,
Latvia, South Africa, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Lesotho and Namibia.
In the trends reported on the data published about the Global South
from 2006 to 2019, the only non-European countries described as “best performers in
gender equality” (Top 10) for more than five years in a roll have been the Philippines –
from 2006 to 2019, Nicaragua, beginning as 62nd position in the overall ranking in 2006
 20

and later becoming part of the Top 10 from 2012 to 2019; and Rwanda, featuring on the
Index for the first time in 2014 to 2019 (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2019,
sp). Even though the GGI synopsis’ of the patterns of gender inequality at a global level
has consistently demonstrated the leadership of Nordic countries, European countries
and Philippines, Nicaragua and Rwanda, the three of them being the only low to lower-
middle-income countries with stable position of Top 10 performers over the years. The
2018 and 2019’s Reports showed an unprecedented projection: Iceland, the best
performer in the world; France and Nicaragua were said to be “on track to become the
first three countries to eliminate their gender gap, based on current rates of progress”,
with gender parity achieved by 2050. Thus, 2019’s report projection of full equality
granted Nicaragua a unique status as not only one of the best performers in gender
parity but as the first country from the global south on track to achieve full gender parity
in contemporary’s history. According to the index, Nicaragua has eliminated 80% of the
inequalities between the sexes. Nicaragua’s good trajectory positions the country as the
first and only country from Latin America and Caribbean groups to be featured as a
world leader in gender equality. This high-achieving status was central to our choice of
Nicaragua as a single case study about the politics behind this data production in the
International Politics of Gender.
1.1. “GENDER PARADISE WORLDWIDE VS ANTI-GENDER
POLITICS AT DOMESTIC LEVEL”: NICARAGUA AS A CASE STUDY FOR THE
GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX’S POLITICAL FUNCTIONS
Nicaragua's score went through fast-speed improvement over the 13
years of data and performance covered by the report. In 2006, the country carried an
initial score of 0.6566 out of 17, featuring the 62nd position worldwide. In contrast, in the
subindex “Economic Participation and Opportunity ranking”, the country was evaluated
with a score of 0.4626 out of 1, featuring in 101st global position among 115 countries
(WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2006, p. 9-10). At the subindex “Educational attainment
ranking”, Nicaragua was evaluated with a score of 0.9935, featuring in 40th worldwide
position; similarly, at the subindex “Health and Survival, it was ranked in 50th position,
with a score of 0.9785; and at the subindex “Political Empowerment”, Nicaragua
achieved the 25th global position through a score of 0.1918 out of 1 (idem, p. 11).
Nevertheless, in 2012 a significant evolution of its global performance was reported,
with a jump in its global position and performance. GGI has put Nicaragua as one of the
7
1 meaning full gender parity.
 21

“Top 10” countries’ to have closed its gender gap. From the year 2014 to the year 2019,
for example, the Index portrays Nicaragua in the "Top 5 best-placed countries" in the
sub-index of Health and Survival and Political Empowerment (WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM, 2006; 2012; 2014; 2019). More specifically, Global Gender Gap Index (2015,
p. 22; 2018; 2020) ascribes Nicaragua as the "highest ranked country in the world",
having achieved gender parity in at least two sub-indices of Education Attainment.
Health and Survival, with a promising performance in the Global Gender Gap's Political
Empowerment sub-index, since Nicaragua’s political system displays more women in
ministerial positions than men, is considered one of the best political placements in the
world (Top 5). Apart from its peers and best performers from the Global North, we see in
Nicaragua’s case a critical research opportunity to develop and apply debates on how
gender politics can take place in regions other than the global and epistemic centres of
International Relations. This change in empirical landscape improves regional
discussions in Latin and Central America and the understanding of global indicators of
gender’s self-imposed constraints, political influences and implications for the country’s
portrayal of performance and reputation in inequality issues at the international level.
Other than that, our choice of the single case of Nicaragua shows
commitment to the development of current research on single-countries studies’
performances in gender equality based on global indicators. Works such as Chen and
He (2020)8, Koeler (2011)9, Choe et al. (2016)10, Barns and Preston (2010) show the
potential of single and multi-case studies through different analyses of one or more
country’s performance in the Global Gender Gap Index, as sources to debate structural
implications of data production and gender equality, its limitations in several sectors and
its political framings. Current research contests the extent and capacity of GGI “to
provide an adequate understanding of women's labour market participation and
economic attainment” (BARNS and PRESTON, 2010, p. 1), as well as gender-based
violence and country’s world leadership (BENERÍA and PERMANYER, 2010). And even
though global indicators of gender are related to the measurement of either gender
equality, parity or inequality, for some feminist studies, such indices usually hide or
flatten “gender dynamics” or “gender regimes” at the global level. Significant values and
criteria may privilege correlations or inputs with the inequality references from the

8
About China’s comparative performance at the GGI across regions.
9
Lesoto’s global performance at the GGI as case for debating trends of gender, labour and migration.
10 “Gender gap matters in maternal mortality in low and lower-middle-income countries: A study of the

global Gender Gap Index”.

 22

Global North, not considering the gendered institutions and gendered political-economic
structures that influence or impact outputs from the Global South’s performance, as well
as its predictions and trends for inequality over the years (BOSE, 2015).
Also, we take Nicaragua’s case study as a point of departure to critically
analyze the Global Gender Gap Index's political function within a Global South's
reference. Women’s and Gender Studies scholars highlight Nicaragua as the “most
significant case of second-wave feminism” held in Central America and possibly outside
the global north (HEUMANN, 2014; KAMPWIRTH, 2006). This historical interpretation
alone shows Nicaragua's privileged position as a subject for debates on gender in Latin
and Central American politics. A branch of studies covers the roles of women’s
movements in Revolutionary Nicaragua and post-Sandinista revolution in
organizational, childcare and combat environments, which meant changing male-female
relations and expectations of behaviour (HEATON, 2017; CUPPLES, 2016; WEBBER,
2002; CAPPELLI, 2017). Besides the active participation of Nicaraguan women in the
Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front11, women were essential for the
country’s political unification under the FSLN government. During a post-revolution
setting, older women forged a maternal gateway. “Women’s disparate worry and grief”
was explored by FSLN’s government into a concrete political force; whereas for younger
women of age, female comrades' experiences of moral authority in the environment of
guerrilla warfare at the Sandinista Project facilitated support to the government
(HEATON, 2017, p. 4-5).
The country poses a unique geopolitical status in Latin and Central
America. Its revolutionary legacy from sandinism fostered a favourable environment for
Nicaraguan’s women entrance into public and political lives. As a result, the country
dealt with the emergence of new political agendas intensely “gendered”: the
development of women’s movements and feminist mobilizations during and after the
sandinist revolution and women’s movements' advocacy for social reforms. Kampwirth’s
(2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010, 2011) literature has captured a “gender record” of
the pink tide or leftist politics of gender in Latin America through the case of Nicaragua.
Central to her arguments are the following questions: “To what extent has the second-
wave feminist movement in Nicaragua been integrated into the pink tide? To what extent
do pink tide presidents govern in a feminist way?” (2011, p. 2). Kampwirth presents
Nicaragua as an understudied case from Gender and Latin American Studies. Hence, a

11 Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN).

 23

social analysis of Nicaragua’s gender state bears the potential to inform on the
ambivalences between “leftwing” governments’ actions on feminist agendas and
women’s movements.
In this sense, it should be noted that a gender account of Nicaragua’s
historical experience outlines three factors: “the end of the cold war, the limits of
neoliberalism and the emergence of new social movements – interact with country-
specific histories to explain outcomes”. More than that, the regional context of
Nicaragua gives us insight into how Ortega’s government may impact women’s and
minoritized groups while at the same time offering a case of study to uncover “the
divisions within the Nicaraguan left have complicated and even undermined Nicaraguan
democracy” (KAMPWIRTH, 2011, p. 2-3). Following the richness of Kampwirth’s
studies, Neumann (2014; 2016) also gives us a lot to consider in the current debates on
Gender Politics in Nicaragua. The author develops discussions about gender violence
laws and the gendered state in Nicaragua as a “pro-family” institution. Through this set
of literature, Neumann analyzes through the feminist lens the weakening of women’s
rights in the country (anti-gender politics), Nicaragua’s president's alliance with
conservative religious groups, and Ortega’s ambivalent relationship with women’s
concerns and social movements. The political environments described above about
Nicaragua demonstrate a much more complex scenario than GGI’s description and
evaluation of Nicaragua as one of the “most gender-equal countries” in the world during
Ortega’s government as Nicaragua’s president was democratically elected in 2007 and
continued in power under controversial circumstances. Despite what those interesting
trends reveal about Nicaragua as a case study of gender and Latin American Politics,
there is little attention to studies of Nicaragua’s political images as a “gender paradise”
in contrast to its emergent “anti-gender and anti-democratic politics” in Ortega’s
administration.
Also, it is worth mentioning that Nicaragua’s leadership position against
gender gaps has had an impact, at least in the political rhetoric of Ortega’s
administration in multilateral instances and at the domestic level. Ortega’s
administration has been using the rankings to assert specific agendas of gender and
reassure both a regional leadership and geopolitical position. In her speech,
Nicaragua’s vice-president, Rosario Murillo, comments:
Compañeros, compañeras, gran noticia también, vamos, estamos,
nos reportó nuestro embajador Ricardo Alvarado desde los países
 24

nórdicos, 5to lugar Nicaragua en equidad de género en el

mundo, quinto lugar. Dios nos bendice, Dios escucha, Dios nos
guía, Dios nos ilumina. Primero está Islandia, después Noruega,
después Finlandia, después Suecia,
después Nicaragua, nuestra Nicaragua de Luz, de Vida, de
Verdad, de Equidad. Nueva Zelanda, luego Irlanda,
luego España, luego Ruanda y luego Alemania. Son los
primeros 10 lugares y nosotros, este paisito pequeño, este
paisito lleno de coraje, este país inmenso en espíritu en el
quinto lugar por encima de tantos otros países poderosos,
potentes [...] Por ejemplo dice, los Estados Unidos 53, lugar 53.
Nosotros estamos en los cinco primeros lugares en el mundo, por
eso siempre decimos: no somos un país pobre, somos un país
empobrecido por la rapiña de las potencias y luego por los
vendepatrias que también quieren seguir rapiñando como
rapiñaron en los 16 años, seguir saqueando el país, seguir
arrebatando derechos al pueblo humilde, al pueblo trabajador. No
somos un país pobre sino empobrecido por los ánimos y los
apetitos insaciables del imperio y de los imperialistas o
serviles o sicarios de los imperialistas aquí localmente. Somos
un pueblo grande, rico en espíritu, esto lo prueba. Vamos adelante
con muchos éxitos de la justicia, porque eso es justicia, la
equidad de género es justicia!” (EL 19 DIGITAL, 2019).

Authors such as Piper (2018), An investigation into the reported closing

of the Nicaraguan gender gap and Herreta et al (2019), Gender Segregation and
Income Differences in Nicaragua, problematize methodological aspects, conceptual
definitions and narratives about Nicaragua’s world leadership in gender equality
according to the index. Because of that, I argue that Nicaragua’s case gives us insights
into the political functions of GGI’s behind the processes of data production both in
world politics and gender politics. Therefore, this dissertation aims to address the
following research question: Based on the case study of Nicaragua’s global leadership
in gender equality portrayed, the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI), in contrast to the
experiences of anti-gender politics and violence exercised at the local level: what are
the political functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index and how do the political
functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index help to foster an informal regime of
governance of gender equality in world politics?
Our primary research objective in the field of IR is two-fold: we aim to
foster innovative contributions to the understanding of “quantified knowledge” as a
social phenomenon in world affairs by further exploring theoretical linkages between the
body of knowledge in the field of IR, Foucauldian perspectives and the gender and
 25

feminist body of knowledge in Science Studies, concerning the political and gendered
dimensions present on the production and use of global indicators as data tools in
international dynamics; besides that, we aim to provide a critical assessment on how
the political functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index help to foster an informal
regime of governance of gender in world politics, based on the case study of
Nicaragua’s global leadership in gender equality portrayed the Global Gender Gap
Index (GGGI) in contrast to the experiences of anti-gender politics and violence
exercised at the local level, from 2006 to 2019. Our specific objectives are the following:
(a) to identify and analyze the representation of Nicaragua’s national and global
performance according to the “Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019)”, taking
into account how the four dimensions of the index are evaluated (Economic
Participation; Health and Survival; Political Empowerment and Education attainment);
(b) examine knowledge, gendered and governance-effects produced by the Global
Gender Gap Index with respect to Nicaragua’s case; (c) contrast Nicaragua’s world
leadership with contextual data from alternative sources (human rights’ reports and
academic literature about gender issues in the country) about the country’s politics of
gender, using the same range of time (2006 – 2019); and, finally, (d) inquiry about the
limitations in the social practices of data production (inputs) and measurement of
gender disparities (outputs) by the Global Gender Gap Index on Nicaragua’s
representation over the years, as in looking the gendered contexts that are privileged or
under-considered by this particular dataset and how their de-prioritizing connects with
broader discussions on the informal governance of gender in world politics.
As for the hypotheses, we understand that the Global Gender Gap
Index acts as a policy tool to shape informal governance of gender in world politics,
producing knowledge about gender equality worldwide and political evaluations. That
said, Nicaragua’s assessment by the index shows the articulate forms the global gender
gap index participates as a political device of neoliberal technology from an assembly of
power relations of normalization, disciplinarian, government and biopolitics. The index’s
political functions pose it as a technology of neoliberal governmentality of gender, which
is operationalized by social processes such as “gendered” subjectification,
objectification, de-politicization, and arena-shifting of its “measured objects”, Nicaragua
included. Moreover, the index produces measurements of Nicaragua’s performance
through neoliberalizing social macro readings or "gender neoliberalization" of the
specific scenarios it analyzes.
 26

The labelling of Nicaragua as a world leader in gender equality by the

index, as opposed to its problematic experience of anti-gender politics at the local level,
allows us to infer that the ranking creates ways of changing, rewarding and
disciplinarize subjective identities of international actors through notions of
competitiveness and competence in gender issues worldwide, especially in the
categories of the sub-index of Political Empowerment and Education. If we understand
that labels are constituted by social processes operationalized by the index with
material implications, from the perspective of data feminism and intersectionality, the
index’s shapes the informal governance of gender in world affairs by acting as a
technology of neoliberal governmentality of gender. The emphasis on war, peace, and
cooperation studies for hegemonic countries set the tone for long-lasting traditions in
the field. That said, the first motivation for our dissertation lies in our commitment to
transform the positivism and geographical privileging of the Global North as an
“epistemic centre” in its mainstream agenda. By focusing on the global gender gap
index through a case study of Nicaragua, IR’s mainstream agenda and geographical
emphasis are challenged. The culture of global indicators reflects specific regional
dynamics that are yet to be explored by research.
Conversely, such themes also call for a better representation of
women’s theorists from the global south in the field. After all, the under-representation of
women’s theorists from the global south undeniably restricts recognising gendered
challenges in peripheric regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean. By
correlating feminist IR debates and Foucaultian discussions on the political dimensions
of knowledge-producing on global gender issues in the 21st century, we establish an
innovative conversation between frameworks for international relations. From the
theoretical point of view, it is also considered as an essential contribution of this project
its purpose to dialogue the feminist and gender approaches with approaches of the
literature of the RI on the role of global indicators in governance studies since it
connects the object of study within a global economic agenda. This aspect bears
potential for renewing such discussions and revisiting possible limitations of the
concepts adopted by both pieces of literature, notably feminist studies of science and
feminist studies on international political economy about financial institutions, framings
of gender and the global indicators. The mutual dialogue between that literature
expands our understanding of how global indicators are integrated into projects of
government and governance of gender in world politics since it discusses its
 27

instrumentalization and the conditions in which such instruments shape international

standards and actors’ relationships.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present our research methodology. The primary
focus of this research is to examine, through a poststructural feminist political economy
and Foucaultian theoretical lens, Nicaragua’s performance in the Global Gender Gap
Index Reports, considering the index as a potential tool of knowledge and power in
world affairs, capable of informing new macro-realities and neoliberal readings of
gender disparities. Based on Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 5), we consider that an
overall plan to conduct research must take into account four components:
epistemological worldviews12; research approaches to a methodological strategy13;
research methods – including data collection, techniques, forms of analysis and
interpretation - and theoretical tools are chosen. On that note, this dissertation is
epistemologically oriented towards a transformative worldview. A transformative
epistemological worldview includes critical theorists, such as Marxists, feminists, and
postcolonial intellectuals (and others). The perspective holds that research inquiry is
intrinsically linked with politics, stating that a political research agenda of research is
needed to identify and confront social inequalities resulting from asymmetric power
relationships, placing new strategies to construct a pluralistic picture of social issues
(CRESWELL and CRESWELL, 2018, p. 9-10). Our epistemological and ontological
focus derives from a poststructural feminist theory.
According to Tickner (2006), four methodological perspectives are
linked to feminist research in the field of International Relations. Those are “a deep
concern with which research questions get asked and in less biased and more universal
than conventional research; the centrality of questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity
of the researcher; and a commitment to knowledge as emancipation” (idem). Her simple
affirmation that feminist research asks feminist questions has profound implications. It
argues that feminist research produces a specific type of knowledge and analysis

12
From Creswell and Creswell (2018), epistemological worldviews represent a broad set of assumptions
that guide academic inquiry and provide a broad orientation of a research and researcher’s position in a
study. Epistemological worldviews can be divided into four major groups (postpositivist, constructivist,
transformative and pragmatist).
13 According to Barragán (2006), a methodological strategy is a plan or preestablished path to accomplish

a research objective. As for this project, we began our methodological strategy by the acknowledgement
of the subject of study – the narrative of Nicaragua’s performance within the political dimensions and
limitations of the Global Gender Gap Index as a technology of govern – and the ontological and
epistemological aspects in which the subject is considered.
 28

oriented towards co-liberation and improving women’s lives in the face of oppressive
conditions, which is aligned with our research purpose. I consider those profoundly
pertinent to the investigation because this research makes feminist sense of the
International Politics that surround the global indicators’ production and use, with an
analysis committed to addressing gendered contexts and women’s struggles and
making itself helpful in envisioning feminist equitable issues in data production at the
international arena. Using the criteria of Tickner (2006) and D’Ignazio and Klein (2020),
a project can be considered feminist in different dimensions:
By its (critical) interactions against power: in content, in/on form, in/on
the process. While this may sound challenging to distinguish, each of
those criteria is clarified here: As will become clear, a project may be
feminist in content, in that it challenges power by choice of subject
matter; in form, in that it challenges power by shifting the aesthetic
and/or sensory registers of data communication; and/or in process, in
that it challenges power by building participatory, inclusive processes of
knowledge production. What unites this broad scope of data-based work
is a commitment to action and a desire to remake the world (idem, p.
18).
By considering the basic features of the research design presented in
Barragán (2006), Triviños (1987, p. 128-130), I claim that my dissertation relies on a
qualitative methodology. This interpretative and reflexive side becomes visible with our
attention to the information produced by the Global Gender Gap Index, based on the
view that those meanings used for quantification and measurement of countries’ levels
of gender parity are socially constructed. More centrally, a qualitative methodology
implies that our investigation is deeply guided by subjectivity and contextual flexibility
rather than numerical criteria and fixed variables. Finally, we also use qualitative
sources to gather different descriptions and inferences through abstractions and
induction. Nevertheless, we fathom the importance of exploring the narratives produced
by the Index with a qualitative facet since the indicator itself has been expressively
examined over quantitative considerations (see MASTRACCI, 2017; MONICA, 2012;
TOPUZ, 2021; TANSKA et al., 2020; CHEN and HE, 2020; KOLER, 2011; CHOE et al.,
2016; BARNS and PRESTON, 2010). Therefore, incorporating a qualitative dimension
in this research responds to the innovative spirit of exposing subjectivity and politics on
global indicators' power/knowledge dynamics. We choose to conduct our investigation
through the qualitative approach of Case Study Research. Case study research is a
 29

type of design in qualitative research in which the investigator aims to understand and
explain a case representative of a contemporary bounded system over time through
detailed, in-depth data collection (CRESWELL and POTH, 2018, 2018, p. 99). For Yin
(2002), the approach of case studies is preferable in the face of explicative types of
research that “deal with operational links that need to be tracked over time, rather than
being viewed as mere repetitions or incidences”. This condition also applies to our
investigation; after all, our goal is to examine the narrative of Nicaragua’s performance
in gender issues over time (2006 – 2019) according to the global gender gap index and
the alternative narratives provided by other sources. As an explicative case study with
qualitative features, our investigation follows its corresponding qualitative observation,
data collection, and examination techniques. Scholars like Barragán (2006, p. 109)
suggest that a qualitative investigation passes through four stages: data collection,
description, organization and analysis.
The first stage of our qualitative research – our data collection – was
pursued with a strategy known as “triangulation of data by levels”. As Mendicoa (2003,
p.122; p. 74 - 75) shows, triangulation is an excellent qualitative strategy that
aggregates to one investigation of different sources (thus points of view) of the works
and data to be collected later analyzed. While Mendicoa explains at least three possible
strategies of triangulations (of data, theory, methodology and researchers), we apply to
this investigation a triangulation of data by levels, so we can better assess not only the
data provided by the Global Gender Gap Index about Nicaragua but other sources as
well. Within the “triangulation of data”, we intend to collect information from three types
of sources, with a focus on a specific range of time, from 2006 to 2019, the period
where the Global Gender Gap Index, one of our subjects of investigation, measures
Nicaragua’s performance, a dimension we aim at examining. Hence, the three types of
sources through which we collected data for this investigation are the Global Gender
Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019); primary bibliography, consisting of reports from civil
society about human rights violations and gender-based issues in Nicaragua; and lastly,
secondary bibliography, consisting of academic works with analysis about gendered
issues in the country. At the Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019) level,
despite being defined as one source, the information gathered goes through quantitative
and qualitative forms of data collection, which are explained below.
At first, the quantitative data collected during this investigation includes
the different metrics provided by the index, such as the following: (a) numerical score
 30

that describes the overall country’s performance (0 – 1), its correspondent position in
the overall ranking of gender parity worldwide; secondly, we collected the numerical
score that describes the country’s performance on each subindex (0 – 1), as well as the
country’s position at each subindexes’ ranking. After collecting data through the strategy
of triangulation, we shift to the description and analysis phase. During it, we will conduct
observation and documental analysis in our qualitative methodology, offering attention
to organising our data collected through the " codification " process. Through this
process, we navigate our documents (raw data) by labelling terms and representative
words (“codes”) across the texts. This helps us summarize the files' main ideas or
interesting concepts and review the data through significant codification categories
(MENDICOA, 2003, p. 123). According to Creswell and Creswell (2018) and Creswell
and Poth (2018, p. 184), data management and analysis involve multiple steps: (a)
select and organize data files; (b) read through the texts, taking personal notes while
reading to form initial codes; (c) identifying and develop categories of codification
(expected codes; surprising codes; codes of conceptual interest); (d) apply codes and
describe the context of the case study; (e) use the categorical aggregation of codes to
define significant themes, processes or patterns; (f) relating categories to the analytical
literature; (g) produce contextual understandings and develop your interpretation and
theoretical interventions based on research findings and literature.
When it comes to selecting and organising data files, we first establish
three sources of data with a focus on a time range of 2006 to 2019: (1) Global Gender
Gap Index Reports; (2) Technical reports on gender equality and human rights violations
and gender issues in Nicaragua produced by organizations from civil society; (3)
bibliographical productions about gendered issues in Nicaragua. Furthermore, we have
defined specific codes for each of the three types of sources during documental
observation. To observe and examine the Global Gender Gap Index Reports, we focus
on the following “expected codes”: (a) Nicaragua's overall performance in the ranking;
(b) Nicaragua’s performance by subindex (Political Empowerment, Education
Attainment, Health and survival; Economic Participation and Opportunity). Whereas to
observe and examine the other two sources of documents (reports and academic work),
we use categories of codification to establish the type of gender issue explored in the
document, geographical context and social group to which the data refers. Although it
may seem simple, this codification is helpful to organize and systematize the first
reading of those texts and later define the most common type of gender-based issue
 31

and contexts present in the documents about Nicaragua.

In addition to the adoption of documental observation and documental
analysis, our research deploys a cross-disciplinary theoretical perspective to examine
the data collected and, consequently, the political and cultural dimensions of the
narratives within Nicaragua’s performance in gender disparities informed by the Global
Gender Gap Index Reports concerning other sources. Part of the theoretical
perspectives derives from Foucaultian and quantification studies in IR, aligned with the
framework knowledge/power, on the theoretical models that focus on global indicators
and rankings as tools of knowledge and governance in world affairs. For this reason, we
emphasize the use of three books: “The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring
Human Rights, Gender Violence and Sex Trafficking”, Sally Merry (2016); “Ranking the
world: grading states as a tool of global governance”, Cooley and Snyder (2015) (org);
“Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings”, Davis
et al. (2012) (Org). The following works of Elizabeth Prügl, Jacqui True and Juanita
Elias: “Neoliberalising Feminism” (2015); “Equality Means Business? Governing Gender
through Transnational Public-Private Partnerships” (2014); “The global governance of
gender” (2015); “Davos woman to the rescue of global capital” (2013).

1.2.1 Chapters’ description

The dissertation itself is structured into five chapters, as follows: (2)
Theoretical chapter: fostering dialogues between foucaultian-inspired concepts and
feminist approaches to the study of global indicators in governance; (3) Nicaragua’s
global and local “experiences” in gender equality according to the global gender gap
index and beyond (2006 – 2019); (4) ‘”Conflicting narratives about gender equality in
nicaragua”: analyzing the governing functions of the global gender gap index at play
and beyond”, and (5) Conclusion. In chapter one, we explore our theoretical framework,
attempting to build a conversation among Foucauldian literature on International
Relations and/or Global Indicators and a branch of literature of poststructural feminist
studies of political economy on neoliberalism, governance and financial institutions. The
chapter explores quantification as a social and political practice, where we present basic
definitions from the scholarship of global Indicators and rankings in world politics,
fundamental concepts of Foucaultian and gender studies applied to the understanding
of global indicators in IR, with emphasis on feminist studies on neoliberal framings of
gender, financial institutions and governmentality. Hence, the theoretical framework
 32

chapter explores how these two branches may provide a theoretical ground to better
analyze the politics of data production and evaluation at the GGI’s portrayal of
Nicaraguan performance in gender equality.
On the one hand, the third chapter introduces the Global Gender Gap
Index Reports main’ features, from its origin, methodology, monitoring, and global
tendencies where Nicaragua is situated and evaluated. On the other hand, the third
chapter also offers an overview of Nicaragua’s domestic affairs of anti-gender politics,
aiming to contrast local narratives with the ones of Nicaragua as a world leader in
gender equality provided by the Global Gender Gap Index Reports. During its
description of data collection about Nicaragua, the chapter aims to describe Nicaragua’s
global performance in gender equality according to the Global Gender Gap Index
Reports (2006 – 2019), focusing on its overall performance and ranking and its
individualized performance within the four dimensions measured by the GGI’s: Political
Empowerment; Educational Attainment; Health and Survival and Economic Participation
and Opportunity; whereas during its second part we explore the gender Politics in
Nicaragua beyond GGI’s reporting, briefly going from its revolutionary period, post and
contemporary politics of gender under Ortega’s government. In this chapter, I argue that
Ortega’s government instrumentalizes women’s rights and gendered affairs by
developing a national gender project marked by patriarchal policies. Furthermore, in our
4th chapter, we address our analysis of the neoliberal politics of measurement and
evaluation of GGI’s into Nicaragua’s profile, focusing on a Foucauldian and feminist
reading of this case of data production in world politics. We contrast the political
representation of Nicaragua as a world leader (against gender disparity), and the GGI’s
criteria of evaluation and classifications of excellence in gender equality with the political
narratives about Nicaragua fostered at the domestic level through movements of civil
society, NGOs, and human rights organizations. This chapter highlights how the political
functions within the framings of gender, forms of government of gender and evaluations
provided by the GGI about Nicaragua over the years represent forms of neoliberal
governmentality of gender in world affairs as its limitations as a global indicator. Finally,
in final chapter of conclusion, we revisit the discussion conducted throughout this
dissertation and provide an overview of the main reflections provoked during the
research analysis.
 33

.
 34

2. FOSTERING DIALOGUES BETWEEN FOUCAULTIAN-INSPIRED CONCEPTS

AND FEMINIST POLITICAL ECONOMY TO THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INDICATORS

In this chapter, I present the (double-)theoretical framework for this

dissertation: Foucaultian-inspired concepts and gender studies (aligned with lens from
the poststructural feminist political economy). I began by presenting the commonalities
between the two approaches for the field of international relations and the study of
global indicators. Second, from Foucaultian-inspired literature14, I focus on the concepts
of technologies of power15, normalization and neoliberal governmentality. Moreover, I
name the discursive processes considered pivotal to how global rankings can exert
governing and authoritative functions over international actors: objectification,
subjectification, depoliticization and legitimation. Third, I put those two perspectives into
dialogue with feminist poststructuralist discussions of governmentality and neo-
liberalization of gender in financial institutions. I justify this double-theoretical approach
by arguing that current Foucaultian-inspired perspectives on quantification studies alone
do not offer sufficient tools for theorizing gendered politics and gendered subjects
related to the portrayal of Nicaragua’s gender equality by the Global Gender Gap Index
Reports. Because the concepts of global indicators (and governance indicators),
technologies of power, normalization and governance as neoliberal governmentality are
pivotal to this study, definitions are in order at the outset.
2.1 FOUCAULTIAN CONCEPTS AND FEMINIST STUDIES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW
More than a transposition of the concept of gender to illuminate
International Politics, these are approaches that share a project of transformation and
social justice and an analytical structure based on three central premises: (i) the
recognition that the construction social is inherent to relationships, institutions, events
and international meanings; (ii) the recognition that such relationships and gender itself
vary across history, that is, they adapt to the power structures, economic systems,

14
Drawing on Foucauldian-inspired works in IR, our dissertation rescues some concepts of
Michael Foucault’s work on the power-knowledge complex and its adaptations to the study of
global indicators and rankings in international relations, as explored by the books of Merry
(2015), Davis et al. (2015) and Erkilla and Piirone (2013); as well as feminist literature of
International Relations about gender-relations and government of gender in financial institutions,
represented by the works of Prügl (2015); True (2015); True and Prügl (2013); Peterson and
Runyan (2012).
15
Sovereign, government, biopower and discipline.
 35

norms and political projects and (iii) thirdly, there is the recognition that there are other
ways of thinking about power in the IR discipline, not only from forces (capacities),
persuasion (soft power) or disciplinary forces but from the concept of the power of
gendered structures (Whitworth, 1994). Therefore, we understand that our dissertation
requires a Foucauldian toolbox to discuss the Global Gender Gap Index and Gender
and Feminist lens of International Relations and quantification studies.
Conversely, we adopt the Gender and Feminist Perspectives as our
theoretical alignment to explore gendered subjects in the area. However, what do we
mean by “Gender and Feminist Perspectives”? Through this term, we refer to the body
of literature that assumes gender, gendered relations, institutions and structures as
categories of analysis in international relations, as described above. Shortly we will
digress more on those specific approaches as we align with poststructural feminist
perspectives from the international political economy. Fortunately, it is undeniable that
Foucault significantly influenced feminist studies (DEVEAUX, 1994). So, there is a
broad literature on gender and feminist scholarship that extends the works of Michael
Foucault on themes such as power, sexuality and subjectivities in Social Sciences
(SAWICKI, 1991; MCNAY, 1992; MCLAREN, 2002; TAYLOR, 2018; KING, 2002;
MCLEOM and DURHEIM, 2002), which enable us to push forward a theoretical
dialogue during our dissertation. That said, three waves of Foucauldian-feminist
theorizations can be identified: “literature that appropriates Foucault's analysis of the
effects of power on bodies”; “analyses that take their cue from Foucault's later
development of interweaving power relations […] viewed as inherently contested”; and
finally, “postmodern feminist writings on sexual and gender identity informed by
Foucault's assertion […] to a modern regime of power and a proliferation of subjectifying
discourses on sexuality” (DEVEAUX, 1994, p. 223), so I argue that the feminist
approaches I will present in this chapter are aligned with analyzing the effects of gender
framings in regimes of neoliberal power concerning the global gender gap index.
Even though Foucaultian concepts can be theoretically helpful for
feminist research projects, some feminist theorists share reservations about Foucault's
account of power, labelling it as an inappropriate theory of power for women and
uncovering gendered power relations. For them, his theoretical assumptions leave no
space for agency, resistance and the práxis of liberatory goals of feminism as a social
movement (EPSTEIN, 1995; BODRIBB, 1992). In our case, we recognize that
Foucaultian insights can provide useful tools and draw common ground with feminist
 36

theories. For instance, both approaches share four fundamental convergences in their
theoretical constructions: “both identify the body as a site of power, both view power as
local, both emphasize discourse, and both criticize Western humanism privileging of the
masculine and its proclamation of universals” (MACLAREN, 2002, p. 2).
We can articulate two of the main differences from Foucaultian-
perspectives applied to IR and Feminist Studies as being related to the purpose of
knowledge production and the commitment to establishing normative strategies to
challenge gendered power in world politics. In this sense, Foucaultian perspectives rely
heavily on understanding knowledge production as being tied to disciplinary and
regulatory purposes. Even though it recognizes the resistance-facet in the knowledge-
power complex, those approaches advocate the capillarity of power undermines the
possibility of emancipatory and agency mechanisms beyond the micro-physics of those
relationships. In contrast, feminist approaches rely on assumptions that support or put
“knowledge-production” at service for transformative politics in and outside this sphere
towards ending structural and patriarchal oppression of gender, race, and ethnicity.
Because of that, our theoretical framework adds to the traditional terrain of Foucault as
a thinker in quantification studies; by reflecting upon Feminist-Foucauldian studies in
International Political Economy (EPI) about financial institutions, gender framings as
government and neoliberal subjectivities of gender.
Like foucaultian approaches, feminist epistemologists and philosophers
of science claim that dominant practices of knowledge production may create scientific
interpretations where women’s activities, experiences, interests and gendered power
relations are either invisible or taken for granted, unquestioned and considered value-
free. In other cases, traditional systems of knowledge may reproduce social (dominant)
understandings that reinforce inequalities and support the maintenance of gendered
hierarchies (ANDERSON, 2000). Faced with this interdisciplinary encounter between
Foucauldian and feminist studies, we discuss the political functions played by the Global
Gender Gap Index in fostering informal governance of gender as a signal to transform
what Wyer et al.’s (2014) call the absence of analytical dialogue between feminist
science theorists and feminist scholars in other disciplines, including International
Relations.
In many respects, feminist studies complement Foucauldian
considerations on quantification studies. Both approaches share a consensus about the
intrinsicality between knowledge-power and social life. At the same time, both are
 37

critical to modern sciences’ claims on universality, neutrality, and scientific authority.

Additionally, feminist science studies problematize the cartesian rationale of knowledge
in modern sciences, pointing out its rootedness in western white-male-standpoints,
experiences, and the exclusion of women’s productions (Minnich 2004; Flax 1987).
More than that, the white-male centrism of science and its symbolic violence may
reproduce the perpetuation of the binary sex and an unequal gender system, where the
privileging of hegemonic masculinities is considered an obstacle to the liberatory
potential of scientific research. According to this perspective, datasets are surrounded
by imagined objectivity, which means that data-driven systems hold the idea of offering
value-free information when they are marked by cultural assumptions, political interests,
and discriminatory practices.
2.2. GLOBAL INDICATORS IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
GENDER: BASIC DEFINITIONS
In International Relations, the rise of an indicator culture16 or audit
culture17 has widespread the use of quantitative measures as part of governance and
policymaking. Indicators and other forms of numerical knowledge are produced by
international organizations and used to measure, rank and rate countries on issues
such as their democracy levels, economic competitiveness, corruption and gender
equality (SHORE and WRIGHT, 2015). As a case in point, from the point of view of
western history, quantified knowledge had controversial roles in shaping modern politics
and establishing colonial dominance of European countries in many contexts of the
Global South; quantified knowledge and statistical data were instrumental for states to
support and better strategize the ways power could be exercised (BUTAH et al., 2018).
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the new political arenas
influenced by multilateralism, global governance and cooperation led to the
incorporation of indicators and other forms of quantified knowledge as a part of the
structure of international agencies of development and financial institutions, as new
international actors came to play into the domain of world affairs – such as
16
“It is part of the repertoire of institutional actors seeking to persuade publics and influence
governance decisions. “Indicator culture,” in this sense, includes a body of technocratic
expertise that places a high value on numerical data as a form of knowledge and as a basis for
decision making” (MERRY, 2015, p. 9).
17
“Audit culture is the process by which the principles and techniques of accountancy and
financial management are applied to the governance of people and organisations – and, more
importantly, the social and cultural consequences of that translation” (WRIGHT and SHORE,
2015, p. 24)
 38

Intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, financial institutions, audit companies, rankers,

and credit rating agencies (SHORE and WRIGHT, 2015). Their initial focus was
evaluating countries' compliance with international law and conventions (MERRY, 2011;
MERRY and WOOD, 2015). Hence, the movement of global demand for indicators to
understand local contexts has developed a global industry of global measurements,
aiming to address accountability and justify decisions in foreign policy and international
cooperation towards new governance and action political agendas. Because global
indicators work as examples of quantified knowledge whose presence has been
consistent in international affairs and whose centrality still needs to be further
understood with its political implications, we are faced with the following question: what
is the exact definition of a global indicator?
In this dissertation, I employ Davis's (2012) definition of global
indicators:

An indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to

represent the past or projected performance of different units. The data
are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a
complex social phenomenon. In this simplified and processed form, the
data are capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis
(such as countries or institutions or corporations) synchronically or over
time and evaluate their performance by reference to one or more
standards (idem, p. 4).

The type of quantified technology of Global Indicators can be

summarized by the Global Gender Gap Index, since the global ranking also combines
“multiple sources of data, even multiple kinds of data, converted into a single score or
rank”, with a higher demand for interpretative work (MERRY, 2015, p. 15). The
measurements produced by successful indicators often are associated with an aura of
objectivity, grounded on the trust of numbers, not to mention the controversial
assumption that statistical or quantified knowledge generates more accurate
assessments of a social context than qualitative data and analysis (MERRY, 2015).
Indeed, many treat indicators and statistical work as outside the realm of politics and the
exercise of power (DAVIS et al., 2012). By framing the work of numerical assessments
as political interpretations of its creators, it becomes possible to understand the political
functions of these technologies based on the different ways they interact and shape the
social world. The supposed “superior” accuracy, objectivity, and apolitical dimension of
 39

numerical assessments are questionable18.

Even though the development of measurement systems does not define
an end in itself, we argue that behind this performance-based culture lies different
political purposes chased by the producers of measurement systems, whose
productions may directly impact the social practices and contexts. Traditional studies
highlight the many managerial purposes of using performance-based systems, such as
promoting a specific reading of best practices within social phenomena, controlling
behaviour, discussing efficiency, and measuring an actor’s competence and
achievements (BEHN, 2003). In other words, measures are by nature artefacts with
reactive implications for how actors imagine and rationalize social life. As a composite of
numbers and units that hold together multiple cognitive meanings about the social
world, measures might transform how people think and act by creating new shared
understandings about subjects. This means that numbers for commensuration are the
root of disciplinary power (LAMONT and MOLNAR, 2002). By evoking numbers as
social practices, we consider its ability to define what behaviour is deemed appropriate
and how we should behave to fit institutions’ standards. According to Merry’s (2015)
work, political and cultural dimensions shape global indicators' functioning, making them
intrinsically political devices that reflect social practices. To uncover the “politics of
indicators”, she maintains that global indicators represent “the assumptions,
motivations, and concerns of those who carry them out” and the heavy interpretative
work that gives political meaning to the numerical assessments. In terms of
interpretative work on making global indicators, she describes the politics within
‘choosing approaches for measurement’, ‘construction of categories’, ‘selection of data
sources’, ‘labels used for the phenomenon measured’, ‘what things are counted and
how’. (p. 20-21).
Though indicators have been used throughout history, states' rating and
ranking is a relatively new phenomenon associated with governance practice in the
international context (Löwenheim, 2008, p. 256). In this dissertation, I define
governance in feminist terms as a “gendered system of rules, regulatory norms and
mechanisms” that international actors develop through the law, normative practices,
discourses and policies (WAY and RAI, 2008). In addition, based on the literature on

18For more, see: Melita et al (2018); Butah et al (2015); Merry and Wood (2015); Merry (2015); Erkkilä
and Piirone (2018); Shore and Wright (2015); Demortain (2019); Davis et al (2018).
 40

feminist political economy, I understand ‘gender’ ‘as a governing code that pervades
language and hence systemically shapes how we think, what we presume to ‘know’ and
value things, and how such knowledge claims are legitimated’. Because of its pervasive
meaning as a governing code of social life, in which masculine forms are privileged
(valorised) over feminine constructs (devalorised) within the global economy, gender
has practical implications for how groups within populations are treated and understood,
countries, and the creation of specific governance mechanisms (for example
international development policies) in international relations (PETERSON, 2008, p.
501). As shown in the following topic about feminist theories about governance and
governmentality, I contend that ‘all governance projects are intrinsically ideological, as
combined efforts in a sector-specific area involve actors pursuing political interests and
agendas with political contents’ (DAVIS et al, 2018). Moreover, as we aim to analyze a
regime of quantification focusing on gender issues worldwide, the properties of
governance of gender promoted by the global gender gap index should be understood
within its implicit and explicit ideological content. Therefore, the political role of indexes
produced by international and private actors such as the World Economic Forum, for
example, will be explored in understanding the political modes of global and local
governance over global topics – in this case, gender equality.
2.3. POWER-KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER AND
DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES
Having presented the basic definitions of global indicators, gender and
governance, I move further by exploring the notions of power relevant to this work. In
this dissertation, I employ Foucault’s power/knowledge lens as a point of departure in
discussions about the political functions of global indicators in world affairs. In
Foucault’s analytics of power, power is interwoven with all social relations, both at the
micro and macro-level, based on an assembly of force relations. Foucault’s concept of
power is relevant because it reminds us that “power relations are not outside but rather
"immanent in" other kinds (economic, knowledge, sexual) of relationships (1990a, 94)”
and certainly are not “an institution [or] a structure, nor an individual capacity” (LYNCH,
2011).
As we explore the political functions of the global gender gap index in
its controversial representation of Nicaragua over the years, the Foucauldian view of
power-knowledge give space for us to include the many gendered power relations in the
production of the global gender gap in the countries measured by the index. His idea of
 41

power is particularly relevant to this dissertation. One can argue that it enables the
recognition of gendered relationships or gendered portrayals in world politics as sources
to understand how power is exercised in myriad ways in social interactions in IR. When
discussing the microphysics of power, we uncover fundamental aspects of which
subjectivities are partly constituted through power relations. Those can represent
shared understandings based on larger strategies of social systems (LYNCH, 2011, p.
23-14). That said, we understand power as “a network of relations, constantly in
tension, in activity” (FOUCAULT, 1977, pp. 26-27), whose capillarity allows it to be
exercised across networks in social life rather than just at individuals (FOUCAULT,
1980, p. 98). His intake is interesting for this dissertation given its ability to theorize the
circulation of power beyond the States as the main subjects of it in IR. By considering
power in terms of networks of relations that ‘invest the body, sexuality, family, kinship,
knowledge, technology’ (FOUCAULT, p. 122), it becomes possible to analyze the
political functions of the Global Gender Gap Index in the network of relations this index
is structured around.
Foucault’s concepts clarify the political functions the Global Gender Gap
Index wielded when portraying Nicaragua’s case. From the Foucauldian perspectives,
the nexus between knowledge and power is pivotal to shaping relations in contemporary
society. Many of his books are considered historical genealogical examples of how
power, knowledge and discipline are linked through time. In Discipline and Punish, for
example, Foucault considers how ‘institutions and new forms of knowledge created new
forms of constraint and social control shift through changes in the object of discipline
and the goals of punishment’ (HEWETT, 2004, p. 17). For Foucault, different forms of
power rely on two factors: (a) techniques or methods of application and (b) some authority by
referring to scientific truths. Based on that, we understand that dominant and
knowledgeable claims about world politics are dictated and shaped by power politics
since new mechanisms of power become normalized by mechanisms of inclusion and
exclusion in our everyday lives.
On that note, in Foucault’s analysis of power-knowledge, we call
attention to his take on the ‘technological take-off in the productivity of power’ ever since
the end of the eighteenth century, arguing that new procedures that enable the
continuous circulation of power in the most basic levels of social life were developed
and should be throughout studied. The technologies that facilitate the exercise of power
are, then, a core concept of how this dissertation explores the political functions of the
 42

global gender gap index, which we intend to make visible through the analysis of the
case of its representation of Nicaragua. In Technologies of the self, Foucault (1978, p.
18) explores the historical connections between power and knowledge produced across
time, contending that the production and use of human knowledge have been
instrumentalized to transform the conduct of individuals. To that end, he defines four
main types of technologies: (1) technologies of production, (2) technologies of sign
systems, (3) technologies of power, and (4) technologies of the self in which ‘games of
truth’ are developed, understood as following:

As a context, we must understand that there are four major types of

these "technologies," each a matrix of practical reason: (I) technologies
of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate
things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs,
meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which
determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or
domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self,
which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls,
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or
immortality (FOUCAULT, 1978, p. 18).

Although all four types of technologies interact, Foucault sustains that

the last two are specific types of technologies oriented towards the domination of
individuals. For him, the point of contact between the technologies of power and the
technologies of the self is called ‘governmentality’, a concept I will discuss in a few
paragraphs (FOUCAULT, 1978, p. 19). The concept of ‘technology’ is essential to
power-knowledge discussions around the political functions of the global gender gap
index. For Foucault, what unites all technologies of power to something other than mere
discourses, it is potential to serve, just “like other technologies, a body of technical
knowledge and practices, a raft of techniques, which once developed and understood
can be applied to various situations”, profoundly political for the way they intervene in
social life (KELLY, 2009, p. 44 apud BLANCO, 2020, p. 54). To present its meaning, I
consider ‘technology of power’ in a sense developed by other authors than Foucault,
who nevertheless advanced the concept to the international affairs of contemporary
times. Nichola’s Rose understands technologies of power as “an assembly of forms of
knowledge with a variety of mechanical devices and an assortment of little techniques
 43

oriented to produce certain practical outcomes” (BLANCO, 2020, p. 54). Based on

Blanco (2020), we define at least four types of technologies of power: sovereign,
government, biopower and discipline. For Foucault, government or to govern acquires a
new meaning and refers to “the conduct of a conduct”, namely “the ways in which
myriad institutions and actors, including state ones, seek to direct the conduct of
individuals” following specific kinds of logics to produce practical outcomes (GORDON,
1991, pp. 2–3).
Specifically, according to Foucault (1982, p. 223-224), power in
contemporary forms of government can be exercised in the following ways:

To (a) the creation of differentiations, which allow governors to act upon

the actions of the governed (e.g., the normal, the pathological, etc.); (b)
the types of objectives pursued by those seeking to govern (e.g., to
create self-responsible citizens); (c) the means of bringing power
relations into being (e.g., threat, discourse, economics, etc.); (d) the
kinds of institutions used (e.g., legal structures, family, etc.); and (e) the
kinds of rationalities bringing power relations into play (e.g., scientific
knowledge, familial love, etc.) (idem).

To define modalities of power applied to larger groups, populations and

individuals, Foucault establishes the concept of disciplinary power and disciplinary
mechanisms. Disciplinary power targets bodies and aims to render individuals as
objects, docile, useful, and ultimately controllable. In Foucault’s interpretation, a
technology of power – biopolitics – was rendered operational partly due to the use of
statistical techniques at the national level in the form of demography. As the government
and disciplinary practices become directed at the control of populations (human-
species) rather than individuals as separate units based on demographic measures
such as birth rates, morbidity, and different biological disabilities, from the effects of the
environment, Foucault argued that ‘biopolitics would extract this knowledge and set the
field of intervention for its power’, defined as a technology of power whose goal and
subject is the control of life, with regulation not over individual bodies but over human
masses and global phenomena (FOUCAULT, 1999, p. 292, p. 302-303).
Through the production of specific individualities, disciplinary power
controls and orders those individuals’ subjectivities as a totality to create efficiency,
making use of techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement,
surveillance, and examination (HOFFMAN, 2011, p. 30). Nevertheless, less attention
has been given to governmental technologies used in contemporary politics. Baez
 44

addresses government technologies that take place within the ‘informational society’
based on the employment of statistics, database and accountability. In saying this, his
interpretation is committed to providing insights into the social, political and economic
structures arising from government technologies, which aligns with my broader
argument during this chapter. To Baez’s interdisciplinary approach, technologies of
government can be discerned based on the investigation of ‘texts’, defined as all
artefacts
The exercise of disciplinary power is connected to “normalizing
judgment”. In other words, those refer to the social practices of judging and pushing
“bad subjects” who do not perform according to the “standard norm”. Because of that,
the normalizing gaze of disciplinary power is supported by the formation of a realm of
disciplinary knowledge, which produces an epistemic foundation for examination
according to multiple processes of objectification, including but not limited to
measurements, gaps, and scores (FOUCAULT, 1979). Technologies of power can be
micro or macro-political and way too often are used for what Foucault (2007) calls the
“normalization process”. According to Blanco (2020), the normalization process aims to
intervene and transform abnormal elements into normal elements; this process is
intensely mediated by two double mechanisms: discipline and biopower, where the last
one represents a macropolitical form of power related to the management and control of
conditions that may affect populations and group’s lives.
In our perspective, Foucault’s concept of “normalization” is at the root of
how power operates in the data production of gender at the GGI. More than identifying
power structures, through the Foucaultian understanding of “normalization” and feminist
perspectives, we can access the broader articulation of political functions of the global
gender gap index in developing forms of governance of gender at the global level. In
practice, the Foucaultian toolbox advances the myriad ways power relations can be
identified and thus transformed in data production. Looking at the case of global
rankings of universities worldwide, Erkkila and Pirrone demonstrate how the process of
normalization can be rendered operational to the study of global rankings as social
phenomena in international affairs and public policy. In summary, the phenomena of
‘normalization’ become operational within global indicators and rankings based on four
discursive processes: objectification, depoliticization, subjectification and legitimation.
The authors argue that the evaluative aspect of global rankings
determines what is being measured and what is considered normal, average, excellent
 45

or expected. The deviant cases are often judged against the specific norm supported by
the theoretical background of the ranking, implicitly exposing policy-relevant
assumptions over alternative ones. In contrast, in subjectification processes
instrumentalized by global rankings, new identification processes (for the units
measured and ranked) are created for the social actors measured. By articulating two
mechanisms, evaluation and atomization, the units measured are assigned collective
identities within a specific “vocabulary of excellence” according to how they are
expected to act on a particular issue (ERKILLA and PIRRONE, 2018). For rankings to
work as both social practices, devices and policy instruments that govern actors and
individuals, they share an instrumental condition characterized through the ongoingness
of four processes applied upon social actors: objectification, (de)politicization,
subjectification and legitimation (ERKKILÄ and PIIRONE, 2018), figure below:
Fig. 4. Social processes within global indicators as policy instruments to govern
international actors:
Type of process Definition according to Erkkikä and Piirone (2018)
Objectification “Objectification is a process where ambiguous—often subjective—ideas and
concepts are turned into well-defined and collectively shared knowledge
products” (idem, p. 25).

(De)politicization A “movement towards closing a horizon”—as datasets may fix the

or arena shifting parameters of the phenomena, they seek to depict [...] issues in naturalizing
certain interpretations of reality at the expense of alternative visions
(PALONEN, 2007, p. 41 apud ERKKIKÄ and PIIRONE, 2018, p. 29).

Subjectification “Subjectification is a process where classifications, often obtained through

measurements, are linked to personal or collective identities. Subjectification
also comes to shape those identities according to prevailing political
imaginaries, leading currently to the atomization of subjects—states,
institutions and individuals—that are increasingly seen to compete in global
economy” (idem, p. 31).

Legitimation “Being recognized as an individual or organization possessing or having the

capability of producing such knowledge lends an element of authority to such
actors (Scholte 2005, 259). Authority based on scientific bases of legitimation
can, following Gieryn (1999, 1), be termed “epistemic authority” (idem, p. 34)

Source: Adapted from Erkilla and Piirone (2018, p. 25-34).

These four subjective effects of indicators and global rankings

(objectification, depoliticization, subjectification and legitimation) are fundamental in
producing new meanings to actors whose performance is measured. In other words,
rankings can work as apparatus to create governable subjectivities to global capitalism.
In this sense, it is possible to discern that through Erkilla and Pirronen’s four subjective
 46

processes - objectification, (de)politicization, subjectification and legitimation – global

rankings and indicators generate specific knowledge effects, working as policy
instruments in many settings of formal and informal governance at international
relations and public policy. Global indicators and rankings’ interpretative work promote
governance by acting as policy instruments with knowledge effects. As Cooley (2015)
explains: “rankings might reconfigure political relationships at both the transnational and
domestic levels”, and in some cases, they may “impact the recipient’s social status on
an issue, with their global hierarchical standing on a ranking against a peer state, rival
or regional grouping” being the cause for the state’s mobilization (idem, p. 6).

2.3.1. ‘Governmentality’ applied to the feminist study of global indicators

of gender
Foucault’s views on government and governmentality allow us to
explore the types and features of rationalities that lay behind hegemonic and social
affiliations of gender. As Mclaren (2002, p. 173) suggests, Foucault's understanding of
power in dialogue with feminist views can make sense of how categories of social
identity perform a dual function of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, through
processes such as “normalization” the category of “woman” can be both a source of
inclusion and the reification of exclusionary norms and identities to nondominant
members to the boundaries of this subjective construction. That said, details on the
functioning and shaping of technologies of power can be informed by the employment of
knowledge-devices - datasets of gender like the Global Gender Gap Index.
Foucault’s concept of governmentality refers to the political rationalities
or mentalities underneath the practice of governing, with many theoretical implications
for governmentality studies in International Relations. First, governmentality studies
offer tools for us to articulate the connections between practices of knowledge and
government practices at the global level. It shows the crystallization of power in the
exercise of government in the international sphere, as discursive frameworks shape and
give meaning to the conduct of behaviours (HOFFMAN and BLANCO, 2021, p. 36).
Hence, Foucault's debates on knowledge-power and governmentality create common
ground to understand the reciprocal constitution of power techniques and forms of
knowledge. The technologies of power are indissociable of the political rationalities that
produced them or in which they were produced (LEMKE, 2001). Considering those
cartographies of power, discipline and authority in quantified subjects, Foucaultian-
 47

scholarship in quantification studies has connected numerical knowledge to liberal and

neoliberal “governmentality” (DIAS-BONE and DIDIER, 2016; CAMARGO, 2016;
ROSE, 1999), investigating the trinomial relationship of government among the State,
population, and statistics (CAMARGO, 2021).
Moreover, Foucault’s inspired hypothesis on neoliberal governmentality
defines neoliberalism beyond laissez-faire, being specific rationality in which social life
is organized around the market up to a point where power technologies render
individual, and collective conducts the state of “subjects” by disciplining its subjectivities
(LORENZINI, 2018). Through governmentality studies, we can distinguish the existence
of neoliberal “governmentalitizing techniques” in world affairs (BAEZ, 2014), which
enlarges the theoretical potential of governmentality applied to quantified knowledge
(CAMARGO, 2021). In her view, poststructuralist scholarship of quantified knowledge is
facing new research challenges in developing insights into global indicators and
rankings. The role of indexes produced by private actors such as the World Economic
Forum, for example, is yet to be explored in understanding modes of global and local
governance in connection to governmentality studies.
To Desrosiéres (2011), governmentality in quantification studies shows
that indicators’ use on actors' behaviour becomes part of the political rationality of
neoliberalism. In this way, governmentality and the ideological project of neoliberalism in
world affairs become intertwined by the technologies of power and discipline employed
to govern and normalize social actors. Camargo’s argument plays a pivotal role in our
choice of theoretical approaches for our dissertation, joining a call to consider the
Global Gender Gap Index and its relationship with gendered subjects, gendered
language and its potential instrumentalization by the political project of neoliberal
governmentality.
However, what do we consider “govern based on numbers” in IR?
Basically, to the Foucauldian framework, govern “means essentially to structure the
area in which the possible actions and behaviours of the other can be performed”
(BLANCO, 2020, p. 33); so, we use the term “governance based on numbers” with a
Foucauldian sense to define the arrangement of “discourses, devices, practices and
infrastructures that facilitate the performance-oriented” behaviour of actors (HAMANN,
2020, p. 68). With the perspective of Erkkilä and Piirone (2018) on the governing
functions of numbers (and indicators) as well as the framework of Merry (2015), Davis
et al. (2015) and Cooley (2018), it becomes possible to ask questions about the so-
 48

called “knowledge and governance effects” of global indicators. More precisely, for the
usefulness of the indicators in global governance, we highlight that global indicators
represent technologies of governance and knowledge, hence the term “governance
indicators”. According to Andrew (2013, apud ROTBERG, 2018, p. 41), governance
indicators conjure measurement on “specific fields of engagement in which
governments perform on behalf of citizens”. For that, these very same governance
indicators produce political readings of states’ performance they aim to evaluate and the
social realities they intervene with quantification and measurement, not to mention they
may cause effects on governance and knowledge. For instance, global indicators (or
governance indicators), as Andrew 2013 calls are “technologies of power” in
governance, considering how they act as mechanisms imbricated within governance
projects.
Moreover, as we aim to analyze a regime of quantification focusing on
gender issues worldwide, the properties of the government of gender promoted by the
global gender gap index should be understood within its implicit and explicit ideological
content. There is unspoken yet central gendered content in global governance. Way and
Rai’s work defines governance as formed by a gendered system of rules, regulatory
norms and mechanisms that international actors translate through the law, discourses
and policies committed to the realignment of regimes of neoliberalism in the global
economy. To Kelley and Simmons (2015), the social functions of global indicators as
tools of knowledge and power “begin with their ability to frame issues” in numerous
ways, through forms of political communication, coining a language and vocabulary for
the issue measured, where the ultimate goal is to affect discourse, policy and legitimate
social practices.
The term governmentality of gender applies when the gender equality
agenda is connected in deep dimensions of the rationale of neoliberalism, to the point of
subordinating and co-constituting the advancement of the global capitalist economy so
that both financial organizations and their countries' members act, at different levels and
under other tensions, as “agents of neoliberal governmentality”, with an agenda of
gender politics that often regulates, disciplines, depoliticizes and co-opts gendered
notions and feminized subjectivities for different international actors (RUNYAN and
PETERSON, 2012). Therefore, a specific “frame” of gender equality must be considered
to analyze the framework underneath the visions of gender equality in the policy agenda
and political strategies. The specific political framing of gender inequality becomes a
 49

valuable aspect for understanding the politics within the measurements and
assessments of the Global Gender Gap Index. For that reason, we consider the implicit
or explicit interpretations of gender equality as a political frame within the Global Gender
Gap Index Reports, the different representations of gender issues offered by it and the
“policy solutions” through the theoretical lens of knowledge effects and governance
effects of global indicators in the countries “measured”.
As an instrumental feature of global rankings, objectification (as of
Erkkila and Pirrone) is an essential social process for the governing functions of
rankings because it can set specific parameters for abstract ideas – including gender
equality - claiming to address empirical realities. Its governing function as a technology
of knowledge provides a commensurability status to “units”, actors and phenomena that
are not the same, such as the particular ways to measure the “performance” of national
states in gender equality levels, for example. Elias’ (2013) work suggests that
neoliberal-compatible gender politics of the world economic forum explicitly connects a
country’s level of gender equality to its economic competitiveness in the global market
to achieve economic growth (ELIAS, 2013). When we consider that one governing
function of rankings lies in the fact that “rankings provide prescriptions for action”, with a
high descriptive and evaluative outcome in their measurement (Erkkilla and Pirrone), we
might come to conclusion that the global gender gap index hints to different processes
of governing of gender. After all, general processes of objectification recognized by the
literature imply authoritative or disciplinary power over “units” that are transformed into
“competitors” in gender rankings (idem).
The governance of “gender issues” through devices present both formal
and informal governance acquires a specific political outcome and sector-specific
agenda in the contemporary global economy (WAYLEN and RAI, 2008). Through the
government of gender, a feminist grammar assimilated the liberal and market economic
agendas of action to generate new manifestations of formal and informal governance
and, consequently, new ways of exercising and producing capitalist19 power on a global
scale (TRUE, 2015). It becomes evident that "gender equality is beginning to be coined
as the solution to several global governance issues, including sustainable economic

19 We understand capitalism as of having a neoliberal tendency, in which both capitalism and

globalization should be addressed as part of processes of a sociocultural and political-economic nature,
which operate from hierarchies of class, ethnicity/race, gender/sexuality - capable of locating this co-
constituted version of capitalism and racism on a global scale (PETERSON, 2018).
 50

development, financial stability" (idem, 2015, p. 3). The use of gendered notions in
market-based governance associated with neoliberal ideologies enables us to recognize
that “new types of power are being created to govern gender in the global political
economy” (PRÜGL, 2011 apud TRUE, 2015, p. 330). One example of this attempt to
harmonize policy agendas and generation of informal governance of gender is present
at the level of the World Economic Forum, one of the current major players in producing
and diffusing knowledge and policy models with activities of benchmarking, agenda-
setting and strategic projects of global ranking (idem).
More specifically, authors such as True (2015) and Prügl (2015) identify
the occurrence of an ideological neoliberalisation of feminist ideas into economic and
governance projects at the level of generating new rationalities and technologies of
neoliberal governmentality. Gender equality has become co-terminal to the project of
neoliberalism, where agents of governmentality are deployed to manage, discipline and
depoliticize populations (PETERSON and RUNYAN, 2012). In the anatomy of neoliberal
globalization, processes such as liberalization, deregulation, privatization, stabilization,
and specialization are constituent features that often result in precarious living
conditions for women and marginalized groups. We contend that the global gender gap
index might offer us information to discuss how depoliticisation processes have been
instrumentalized to govern gender at the global level. Depoliticization occurs where the
political horizon of the phenomena measured is set, and the governing function of global
rankings is on creating specific realities in terms of representation, formulation of
imaginaries and identities, a process followed by the exclusion of other specific realities
as politically relevant. In this process, it is common issues being viewed through the
economistic lens of governance, as many of those technologies are instruments for
politicizing issues accordingly to the demands of the global economy (PALONEN,
2007).
Prugl suggests that there are three mechanisms in which the “language
of feminism" has been "neoliberalized" and de-politicized by technologies of power in
financial institutions (PRÜGL, 2015). The three different facets of neo-liberalization of
feminism are (a) the co-option of feminism into neoliberal economic projects, (b) the
integration of feminism into neoliberal ideology, and (c) the interweaving of feminist
ideas in rationalities and technologies of neoliberal governmentality (PRÜGL, 2015, p.
619). The appropriation of feminist ideas through neoliberal rationalities in governance
projects of international institutions describes an ideology where the accountability for
 51

reform resides in the “objects” themselves. Within a neoliberalizing transnational project

of gender equality, the solution for gender inequality at the global level does not lie in
collective mobilization and transformation of structural sources of oppression (PRÜGL,
2015; TRUE, 2015). But instead, “through training in giving women access to resources;
and in the promotion of individual aspirations and corporate identities” (PRÜGL, 2015),
neoliberalism advances as a power project that produces individuals “who are
responsible for the norms of gender equality embedded in the market” (idem, p. 620).
Runyan and Peterson (2012) suggest that gender becomes yet another neoliberal
technique to “liberate” women for these actors in marketized relationships. No wonder
the gender governance agenda in financial institutions finds among its main arguments
and modus operandi the centrality of women's participation as a labor force in the world
economy. However, such agendas ignore other precarious contexts in the international
division of labor: reproductive work, domestic work, sex work, and immigrant and
informal work. Those ignored contexts are deeply racialized and reflect the reality of a
large parcel of the world’s population. For that reason, Runyan and Peterson interpret
that those agendas emphasize the placement of (white) women's participation in the
labor market from the global north. Leadership positions the center of its governance
project for gender equality.
Moreover, when global rankings treat actors as self-governing units
solely responsible for their behaviour (ERKILLÄ and PIIRONE, 2018), the process of
subjectification implies the production of new political and governable subjectivities by
rankings, dimensions deeply associated with the capitalist demands and imperatives of
a neoliberal regime of power, neo-liberalization and neoliberal governmentality
(WELSH, 2020). Subjectification individualizes separate but commensurable units
according to their comparative performance to produce and promote performance
management in capitalist terms by a legitimate producer of quantified knowledge – in
this case, the world economic forum. This apparent “blindness” or silence of the gender
governance agenda of international organizations is a symptomatic feature of the
neoliberal forms of governmentality of gender equality (RUNYAN and PETERSON,
2012) or “neo-liberalization of feminism” (PRÜGL, 2015). For both feminist
interpretations, the category "women" is treated in a monolithic way, whose insertion in
the labour market is explained in terms of the triad of feminist neoliberalization
technologies around the ideals of "individual freedom", "empowerment" and
"responsibility" of women for its subordinate condition. This reflection allows us to enter
 52

the perspective of Cornwall et al. (2008) on the appropriation of “Women's

Empowerment” in the neoliberal project of economic development, in which
development is “presented as the process that gives women a well-deserved chance to
improve their circumstances, making them able to benefit their families, communities
and nations” (idem, p. 3).
With the process of disciplinarization derived from the discourse of neo-
liberalization of the gender, "Empowerment" takes on the meaning of a category of
individual responsibility, which acts as a technology for legitimizing macroeconomic
policies and interests and the neoliberal project, instead of an emancipatory category
derived from feminist ideas and collective action. Furthermore, the governmentality of
"Women's Empowerment" constitutes a discursive function that allows the production of
feminized identities useful to the neoliberal project (Cornwall), as it is through the
"Women's Empowerment" policies, part of the global gender agenda of international
institutions and policy advising granted to countries, in which "women" are framed as an
abstract and isolated category of contribution to the world economy, acquire a utilitarian
meaning. In my literature review, I have identified four primary identities to which
‘gender in a feminist lens’ is reduced at the service of the neoliberal project. They are
the following a) Production of the ideal "Economic Woman" (PETERSON and RUNYAN,
2014); b) Production of "Good Woman" in the neoliberal framework (CORNWALL et al.,
2018); c) Production of feminized identities of entrepreneurship and financial-banking
leadership; d) Production of productive-citizen identities in a neoliberal economy
(PRÜGL, 2015). Far from being fixed and simplistic categories, they are forms of
governmentality that reflect the disciplining of women's citizen behaviours and
characteristics. Furthermore, the redefinition and disciplining of “gender” by governance
projects convert the social agenda into a new discursive dimension of exercising power
in the neoliberal order (Prugl), with a regulatory character pressed upon member
countries or governed countries. Complementarily, the association between achieving
gender equality through the identity transformation of the global market (from "women"
to "economic women" / "productive citizens" / "good woman" / "entrepreneurial woman")
is present in the agenda of financial institutions.
 53

3. NICARAGUA’S GLOBAL AND LOCAL “EXPERIENCES” IN GENDER EQUALITY

ACCORDING TO THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX REPORTS AND BEYOND
(2006 – 2019)
This section is divided into three parts. The first part explores a brief
introduction to the World Economic Forum behaviour as a relevant player in world
affairs; after all, it is the institution responsible for developing the index. Moreover, the
history and features of the World Economic Forum might reveal critical aspects of the
cultural and political contexts in which the index has been developed, offering valuable
contextualization on its methodological aspects and use of global indicators in
international institutions. This second section presents the index's main features,
concepts, and methodological aspects and how the interpretative work represents
global trends with the complexity of gender disparities measured. The third and last part
provides an overview of Nicaragua’s history and gender politics across time through the
GGI and beyond.

3.1 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM: HISTORY AND APPROXIMATION WITH

“GENDERED AGENDA” AT GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX
Before moving forward on the description of the Global Gender Gap
Index and its relation of measurement with Nicaragua’s disparities of gender, it is critical
to highlight the significance of the World Economic Forum as the international institution
behind the index’s methodology, and funding, production and reporting. The
organization was developed in 1971 in Switzerland, working as an international platform
for the corporate community in Europe to engage with international cooperation and
elaborate on strategic models of management and market development (WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, 2010). Since its first event held in Davos, the organization has
been invested in the concept of multistakeholder participation. Hence, “top managers of
corporations” were expected “to interact with all their stakeholders […]” (idem, p. 7),
including a range of actors including policymakers, enterprise owners, suppliers, civil
society and others to discuss corporate and public interests. Unlike other international
financial organizations, the World Economic Forum is an institution that promotes
corporate governance on global issues in defence of what the institution calls
"stakeholder capitalism".
According to the organization, stakeholder capitalism is an economic
project whose breadth makes it the solution to address the advances of globalization
 54

4.0 and the global challenges of the 21st century (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2019).
The model of “stakeholder capitalism” promoted by the World Economic Forum is
described through its three main areas of action: (1) promoting international awareness
and cooperation; (2) shaping mentalities and agendas; (3) leveraging collective action
from combined leadership among business, state and civil society leaders (idem).
Fougner (2008) assigns the World Economic Forum a vital role in agenda-setting and
benchmarking. Therefore, the impact of the World Economic Forum's activities on
promoting public-private international cooperation practices and formulating new
agendas and corporate interaction with state leaders is evident. The organization moves
more than USD 300 million annually with budgetary revenue only from its primary
initiatives. It creates spaces where alliances, programs, and the exchange of
information between committed international actors have forged corporate governance
and stakeholders in direct capital investments (idem). These features permeate the
institution's approach to the Global Gender Gap since the Index's Global Reports body
generates integrated narratives of performance, status creation, competitiveness, and
formulation of countries' gender identities.
To this end, the gender-related political agenda with the organization of
the World Economic Forum dates back to the beginning of the 21st century. GGI is
derived from the confluence of two scenarios: the Women Leaders Program initiative of
2001 and the Competitiveness Program, from which the first report on gender issues in
the FEM, Women’s Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap in 2005, would
give rise to GGI in the quantification methodology used from 2006 to today (WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, 2020b). To this organization, a nation's competitiveness is directly
associated with how "the female talent is educated and used" to promote its
development (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2014), so that gender issues are
addressed as "business, and national competitiveness matters" through four primary
forms of framing “gender equality” in its agenda-setting. According to Elias (2013), the
four framings of gender at the WEF are the following:
[…] linking of gender equality to competitiveness; the representation of
women as driving global economic recovery; the representation of
women and girls as a good investment; and a diversity management
frame that serves to legitimate rich Davos women as standard-bearers
for (all) women’s causes (idem, pp. 158-159).

Part of the literature signals that within international financial institutions

- such as the World Economic Forum – prevails a trend in consolidating the structure of
 55

global social governance arranged by the neoliberal discourse of globalization. In those

contexts, gender equality becomes "an essential part of the neoliberal rationale of
economic governance" (TRUE, 2014; PRÜGL and TRUE, 2015). Because of that,
states - in an attempt to attract foreign investments and an excellent international image
- seek to adapt to the adoption of several affirmative actions committed to regulating the
financial performance purchase. In this sense, the World Economic Forum is a financial
institution relevant to understanding how social issues are “capitalized” on its global
corporate governance agenda (PRÜGL, 2015; TRUE, 2015; ELIAS, 2013). Similar to
other financial and international organizations, this institution has adhered to the use of
global indicators in its studies, monitoring reports, methodological technologies that
have served to legitimize international agendas and initiatives in various fields, quoting
the area of search for gender equality through the social indicator of the Global Ranking
System on Gender Equality or Global Gender Gap.

3.1.1 Contextualizing methodological aspects on measurements

conducted by the global gender gap index
The proliferation of statistics and quantification as international
instruments of measurement and ranking can be traced back to the demand and supply
for managerial and governance projects. The global industry of auditing technologies,
such as the indicators and performance rankings, is at the heart of new relations
between countries, markets and transnational organizations towards what some authors
call the “new world order of audit” (SHORE and WRIGHT, 2015). Although the “culture
boom of global indicators” took place from the 1980s onwards (DAVIES et al., 2018),
when it comes to social issues of gender, those modern techniques of accountancy,
performance measurement, and auditing of gender occurred at a different pace and
relatively late in comparison to other areas. Many global indexes have been deployed to
track spatial, temporal, and performance variations of gender equality, gender-based
violence, and women’s empowerment worldwide.
Along these lines, it is not surprising that the genealogy of the three
global indicators produced in transnational contexts of governance gained traction at the
end of the 20th century: GDI and its reformed version GEM, MDGs and Global Gender
Gap Index (GGGI) (POWELL, 2006). At the transnational level, the development of the
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
of the UNDP agency of the United Nations in 1995 was considered critical to
 56

establishing a tradition of global monitoring. During the 2000s, much attention was paid
to the gender indicators derived from the Millennium Development Goals, produced by
the United Nations and the Global Gender Gap Index, developed by the World
Economic Forum. The GGI differs from other indicators (Gender Development Index,
Gender Empowerment Measure and Gender Inequality Index) in various aspects, from
its production source to its data range. This indicator is funded, produced, and launched
outside the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) scope. The Global Gender Gap or
index of the global ranking system on gender equality is defined as a framework to
examine the magnitude of gender disparities at the worldwide level by “providing a tool
for cross-country comparison and prioritize the most effective policies needed to close
gender gaps” (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2021, p. 5). Hence, the index seeks to
promote global awareness of the gendered challenges and opportunities created within
different countries, serving “as a basis for designing effective strategies to reduce
gender inequality" (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2019, s/p). Within the index, the
gender gaps are quantified through a dual mechanism: benchmarking across country
comparisons and launching country profiles to provide an overview of their gendered
environment (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2006, p. 3). The benchmarking process
aims to “identify existing strengths and weaknesses” among countries, forming guides
for policies from the nations best positioned at the index.
The index combines numerous socioeconomic, policy and cultural
variables; hence, it is centred on the premise that gender inequality is the interaction
and evaluation of those variables (UNCTAD, 2019). The index aims to measure
“whether the gap between women and men in the chosen variables has declined”. It
further evaluates it as decreasing the gender gap and increasing gender equality for a
country’s performance (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2007). To this end, three
elements are essential for the construction of the Global Gender Gap methodology: the
Index measures gaps in access to resources and opportunities; it captures gaps
through outputs; and finally, it ranks countries based on their proximity to achieving
gender equality and not women’s empowerment (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2018).
The Global Gender Gap Index works as a global ranking and a composite indicator
concerning its characteristics. As a composite indicator, the index implies a multi-
dimensional measurement of gender gaps and gender inequality by using an annual
overall score (0 – 1), where 1 translates a state of parity between sexes, through a
specific rationale for defining gender inequality.
 57

The evolution of gender-based gaps is calculated among four

dimensions or four sub-indexes (Economic participation and Opportunity, Educational
Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment), each sub-index is
assigned a weight of 0.25 out of 1, and all of them track progress towards closing the
gaps over time (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2021, p. 5). The four main dimensions
(sub-indexes) are measured from 14 indicators, calculated as "reasons" between men's
and women’s data positions. That gives rise to a process of assigning weights of each
dimension according to standard deviation; from this point on, the Global Gender Gap
assumes values between 0 (inequality) and 1 (equality) (MELO, 2010, p. 2). Each sub-
index builds its measurement of the gap between men and women in a given sector
from the compilation of the so-called "database", which uses a form of data collection
and interpretation that can be deconstructed into the categories in the worksheet above.
The sub-index of Economic Participation and Opportunity analyzes the gap between
men and women in participation, remuneration and advancement in access to economic
opportunities (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2006). Hence, this sub-index makes use
of four criteria: the participation gap, which considers the labour force participation
rates; the remuneration gap, which comprises a ratio of estimated female-to-male
earned income and the advancement gap, captured by the ratio of women to men
among leadership roles and the ratio of women to men among professional workers
(PEREZNIETO and MARCUS, 2015).

Fig. 1 Economic and Participation Subindex’ criteria and source of data

collection:
 58

Source: Zahidi et al. (2018, pp. 5–6 apud WORSDALE and WRIGHT, 2020).
The Education sub-index aims to capture the gap between men and
women in access to education at different levels, based on measurements of the ratios
disaggregated by sex for enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education and
female-to-male literacy rate (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2018).

Fig. 2 Educational Attainment Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:

Source: Zahidi et al. (2018, pp. 5–6 apud WORSDALE and WRIGHT, 2020).
The health and survival subindex seek to assess the differences
between women's and men's health, including two variables: the calculation of the sex
ratio at birth to capture the phenomenon of “missing women”; and the variable of
healthy life expectance of men and women.

Fig. 3 Health and Survival Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:

Source: Zahidi et al. (2018, pp. 5–6 apud WORSDALE and WRIGHT, 2020).
On the other hand, the subindex of political empowerment seeks to
measure the difference between men and women at the country's political decision-
making level (idem).
 59

Fig. 4 Political Empowerment Subindex’ criteria and source of data collection:

Source: Zahidi et al. (2018, pp. 5–6 apud WORSDALE and WRIGHT, 2020).
Fig. 5 Sources of data collection in the GGI:

Source: Adapted from World Economic Forum (2019, p. 45-46).

Another pattern observed through the GGI’s reports consists of its main
sources of data collection. For the subindex Economic Participation and Opportunity,
the data is said to be collected from modelled estimates provided by the International
Labor Organization (ILO) and the Executive Opinion Survey related to the members of
the World Economic Forum. Following a similar pattern, the subindex of Political
Empowerment uses data from one international organization – Inter-Parliamentary
Union and World Economic Forum’s calculations. On the other hand, for the
Educational Attainment and Health and Survival sub-indexes, most of its data collection
relies on Reports and sources from UN’s agencies. For the first, UNESCO – UIS
Education Statistics and Human Development Reports from UNDP are the primary
sources, while for Health and Survival some of the sources include the Department of
 60

Economic and Statistic and Social Affairs from the UN, World Health Organization and
Global Health Observatory database.

3.1.2 Benchmarking and tracking gender gaps worldwide according to the global gender
gap index reports (2006 – 2019): global trends and rankings

The Global Gender Gap Index has monitored and reported on gender
trends in 153 countries around the globe, suggesting that since its inception, no country
has been able to fully achieve gender parity, with 80% of gender parity being the
closest-ever achieved by the “Top 10 best performances of countries” (FORUM
ECONÔMICO MUNDIAL, 2019). Through its analysis, the index argues for the strong
correlation between a country’s gender gap and its economic performance and openly
encourages countries to improve their performances by setting new agendas for the
inclusion of female labour participation into action through public-private cooperation as
a critical strategy to close gender gaps across different dimensions. Most importantly,
“the report highlights the message to policy-makers that countries that want to remain
competitive and inclusive will need to make gender equality a critical part of their
nation’s human capital development” (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2020, p. 33).
Global Gender Gap Report (2020b) estimates that the global gender gap between
sexes accounts for an overall percentage of 31% nowadays. This means that 69% of
full parity was reached by the global average of countries evaluated. In terms of years,
the global gender gap will be "closed" in 99.5 years, with the area of Economic
Participation and Opportunity being one of the biggest bottlenecks in inequality between
sexes, as it evolves at a slower pace than other sectors measured, on an overall
forecast of reaching gender parity in approximately 257 years.
According to GGI’s evaluation, “all the top five countries have closed at
least 80% of their gaps”. About the experiences classified in the “Top 10 best
performances of countries” by the ranking of the index for 2019, the report assigns
Iceland the title of the best performer in gender equality in the world, with a score: of
0.877 out of 1, positioned in first place for the 11th edition in a row. Norway, then, ranks
second (score: 0.842 out of 1), followed by Finland in third place (score: 0.832 out of 1),
Sweden in fourth (score: 0.820 out of 1), Nicaragua in fifth (score: 0.804 out of 1), New
Zealand in sixth (score: 0.799 out of 1), Ireland in seventh (score: 0.798 of 1), Spain in
eighth (0.795 of 1), Rwanda in ninth (Score: 0.791) and Germany (0.787) (idem, p. 9).
 61

Fig. 6 - Mapping of the overall GGI’S ranking across time (2006 – 2019)

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Global Gender Gap Reports (2006 – 2019).

The report assigns Iceland the title of the world's best performer in
gender equality. Unsurprisingly, according to the figure above, Iceland has been
accompanied by Nordic countries in the “Top 10” since the GGI’s first report in 2019,
including Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. Also, there seems to be a
predominance of European Countries as best performers, such as Germany, Ireland,
and more occasionally, UK, Spain, Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. However, the
index also consistently features non-European performers countries which have taken
the spotlight: the Philippines, New Zealand, and Nicaragua after 2012, followed by
Rwanda in 2015. Those trends seem encouraging as an overall ranking features
countries from different regions. Still, the trends measured by sub-indexes are variable
within an individual country’s performance, showing the different and sectorial
challenges those countries may face in gender issues.
In the trends measured by the sub-indexes (economic participation and
opportunity; education; health and survival; and political empowerment), global gender
gaps vary and shape different scenarios. The minor gender gaps measured in the
performance of the regions are education, with a global average of 0.957 (0-1) and
health and survival, with an overall mean of 0.958 (0-1). According to this trend on
Education Attainment and Health and Survival sub-indexes, 96.1% and 97% of the
 62

global gender gap have already been closed. The advanced stage of Education
Attainment worldwide reveals that at least thirty-five countries have already achieved full
parity. Regarding the GGI’s ranking, twenty-six countries20 occupy the first position of
the best performer in Education Attainment. Among them are countries representative of
all regions, including our subject of study – Nicaragua. Nevertheless, eight countries did
not reach the average on closing their gender gaps at this index: Togo (77.8%); Angola
(75.9%); Mali (75.7%); Benin (73.3%); Yemen (71.7%); Guinea (68.0%); Congo,
Democratic Rep. (65.8%); Chad (58.9%) (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2020, p. 10-
12).
In addition, the wider gender gaps are present within the indexes of
Economic Participation and Opportunity (0.582) and Political Empowerment (0.241),
“where only 24.7% of the gap has been closed to date, and on Economic Participation
and Opportunity, where 58.8%” (idem, p. 10).
Fig. 7 – The stage of global gender gap worldwide

Source: Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2020, p. 10).

In the case of Political Empowerment, the index points out that Iceland
represents a successful case, where the presence of women across its political
apparatus is four times higher than the global average. Besides that, Iceland’s position
of 70% of Political Empowerment is followed by Norway, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and
Finland. Moreover, Iceland’s closed gaps contrast with 32 countries where women are
underrepresented across parliaments and ministries and Papua New Guinea and
Vanuatu, where women do not occupy political positions. In its analysis by region, the
Index predicts that Western Europe's global gender gaps will close in 54 years (2019
overall score: 0.767), 71.5 years for South Asia (2019 overall score: 0.661), 95 years for

20
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Honduras, Israel, Jamaica, Latvia, Lesotho , Luxembourg, Maldives,
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic.
 63

Sub-Saharan Africa (overall score in 2019: 0.680), 107 years for Eastern Europe and
Central Asia (overall score in 2019: 0.715), 140 years for the Middle East and North
Africa (overall score in 2019: 0.611), 151 years for North America (2019 score: 0.729),
163 years for the Pacific and part of Asia (2019 score: 0.685) (idem, p. 22).

Fig. 8 - Performance by region on the Global Gender Gap Index and sub-indexes:

Source: Global Gender Gap Report (2020b, p. 22).

Moreover, the report emphasizes the case of Latin America and the
Caribbean (general score in 2019: 0.721) as the second most promising trend on the
planet, with estimates of closing gender gaps in 59 years, as a result of the accelerated
speed of performance in some countries in the region” (FÓRUM ECONOMICO
MUNDIAL, 2020b, p. 6). It is inevitable not to consider the centrality of its top 5 best
performers: Nicaragua (0.804); Costa Rica (0.782); Colombia (0.758); Trinidad and
Tobago (0.756), and Mexico (0.754), as shown in the fig above. More than a continental
leader, GGI describes Nicaragua’s case’s importance in its leadership in gender parity,
as the country has closed 80.4% of its gender gaps and ranks 5th globally.
Much was said about the methodological stands on the index and its
projected trends for gender equality across the globe. Nevertheless, as we navigate
contextualizing GGI’s glimpses of countries’ global and national performances in gender
equality, we move closer to the most significant trends and scenarios evaluated by the
index concerning Nicaragua. In the earlier paragraphs, GGI’s reports have shown
Nicaragua's privileged position as one of the best performers globally, alongside
countries such as Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and New Zealand. However, the series of
reports published by WEF demonstrate that Nicaragua’s current leadership is a part of a
 64

much bigger trajectory within the ranking and its domestic socio-political contexts.

3.2. “ANTI-GENDER COUNTRY” vs “MOST-GENDER EQUAL COUNTRY”:

NICARAGUA’S PERCEIVED LOCAL AND GLOBAL “EXPERIENCE” OF GENDER
EQUALITY
In this topic, I intend to explore Nicaragua’s perceived local and global
experiences of gender equality. Those two experiences seem to clash when put in the
same context and inform rather opposite national gender projects in Nicaragua. At the
local level and based on the literature, Nicaragua is considered an “anti-gender
country”, with one of the harsher politics of gender in the world. Meanwhile, at the global
level, the Global Gender Gap Index provide us with an entirely different narrative of
gender equality, one that distinguishes Nicaragua as a world leader in gender equality,
whose performance has been measured and ranked during the whole period of
Ortega’s administration. During its first part, I provide an overview of Nicaragua’s history
and some of its most remarkable events in gender politics across time during the
Somoza Era, Sandinista Revolution and Postsandinista revolution, hoping to
contextualize historical trends of “gender politics” in the country that could help us
understand the Ortega’s government attitudes towards gender equality and women’s
rights nowadays.
To address Nicaragua’s local experience with gender equality, I access
the features of the “gender project” pursuit by Ortega’s administration in Nicaragua:
from his first mandate to the pre- covid 19 pandemic (2006 – 2019), given that this is the
same period covered by the Global Gender Gap Index. Those features include: (i)
women’s social and economic status, (ii) women’s reproductive rights, health, and
survival against gender-based violence, and (iii) women’s political empowerment.
Finally, to clarify where Nicaragua stands in its global performance, I discuss the
assessments of Nicaragua’s global leadership in gender equity as it has been presented
by the Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019), aiming to expose its most
significant achievements, shortcuts and political challenges identified by the index. The
main criteria for gender equality measured within countries by the GGI are related to
four domains of social life: (i) economic participation and opportunity between sexes; (ii)
health and survival; (iii) political empowerment and (iv) educational attainment.

3.2.1 An overview of Nicaragua’s history and gender politics across time

 65

To understand the contemporary politics of gender in Nicaragua in the

21st century, one must look back at some of the historical components that transformed
Nicaragua into a special case for analyzing gender inequality locally and measured at
the global level. In developing an accurate picture of Nicaragua’s gender politics, we
follow Ray and Korteweg’s (1999, p. 53) classical piece to emphasize the historical,
specific and local political forces21 as creators of the “political opportunity structure” for
the change of gender politics and women’s status and agency in a certain region.
Because of that, our focus here will be mainly on exposing the documented effects of
“national gender projects” in Nicaragua regarding the regulation of gender roles and
gender inequity, the arrival of controversial gender laws through conservative means
and the precarious status of Nicaraguan women and feminist NGOs who do not support
Ortega’s administration.
Thus, to understand Nicaragua’s gender politics practised by Ortega’s
government (2006 – nowadays), I call attention to the changes and broader legislative
reforms that regulate gender relations or, more specifically, target women’s rights under
his government (2006 – nowadays). Nevertheless, those legal reforms cannot be
understood as a “gender project” isolated from the political legacies of the Somocista
era, Sandinista Revolution and postsandinista period within women’s movements
(Neumann, 2014). Because the term ‘gender politics’ is somewhat vague, or rather less
useful for a comparative understanding of the collective gender politics pursuit by the
Nicaraguan state, I claim that the concept of gender projects22 (as of Connell, 2002) is
particularly helpful to define the “gender politics” of states in comparative-informed
studies, as shown by Ferree’s book (2012).
Gender politics in political institutions can be understood in terms of
collective gender projects (Conwell, 2002). Gender projects exist when social actors
demonstrate ‘conscious or unconscious commitment to particular organizations of
gender relations’ and become political when those gender projects act to ‘changing or
preserving a specific gender order or regime’, which means that states might carry

21
The authors classify changes in regime types (democratization, anti-colonial and nationalist
struggles, socialist, and religious/fundamentalist movements) and state crises as potential
preconditions to raise, radicalize and mobilize women’s interests in the political realm and public
sphere.
22
The concept ‘gender projects’ serves us to advance two questions in gender studies: “How has the
state influenced the emergence, growth, and decline of women’s advocacy? To what extent and why have
women’s movements sought both to challenge the state and to work within it?” (Basu).
 66

(specific) gender projects just as much as women’s social movements. One of how
states vary beyond regime-type is in their gender projects – which comprise their
commitment to gender politics oriented towards change or maintenance of gender
regimes. States – under their government's mandates - pursue varying national gender
projects through their policies, changes in legislation and the creation (or equipment) of
public institutions that sometimes regulate women’s agency, gender relations, and
gender identities up to the point of shaping women’s collective agency and activism
Like most Latin American countries, Nicaragua’s history is marked by
the effects of European (Iberian) colonialism and modern dependent capitalism, typical
of an externally oriented economy based on the trade of agricultural goods. With a
population primarily stratified in income and social class, few privileged groups have
benefited from the clash between its precarious economic model and the political
exploitation from groups of interest, whether domestic or international. Though it has a
small population, it has been the object of attention and direct intervention of hegemonic
countries, especially the U.S., due to its strategic position on interoceanic routes for
commerce (WALKER and WADE, 2017). Its history23 can be divided into the (a) colonial
period (1502 – 1583); (b) the initial Republican period (1821 – 1838), a period where
Nicaragua faced its partial independence to full independence; (c) the republican period
of armed confrontation between bourgeois groups (1953 – 1907), mainly conservative
versus liberals; (d) neocolonial period (under the U.S. occupation, 1907 – 1933); (e)
New republican period (1933 – 1936); (f) the Somoza era (1936 – 1979); (g)
revolutionary period (1979 – 1990); (h) the neoliberal years (1990-2006). Nevertheless,
in this dissertation, I will focus on the events from the Somoza era, sandinist revolution
and postsandinist period to expose the gendered dynamics relevant to understanding
contemporary Nicaragua.
By the 1920s, Nicaragua24 was ruled by an autocratic conservative
regime supported by the U.S. government, its marine military, and its military National
Guard. During this period, popular guerrillas led by revolutionaries such as Augusto

23
Even though Nicaragua became an independent nation from colonial rules during the 19th
century, the following century brought to the newly recognized country civil and domestic
conflicts in close association with the U.S. interventions in the region, in what came to be known
as the US-led “Banana Wars” in Central America (JOWETT, 2018, p. 4). Two characteristics of
the period are the military influence of the U.S. (from 1912 to 1925 and from 1926 to 1933),
under its first and second occupation on the ground and its alliance with land-owning oligarchies
pro-US governments.
24
The authoritarian regime faced the opposition of the Nicaraguan liberals and poorly equipped
Nicaraguan liberal guerrillas.
 67

César Sandino fought against the pro-American governments and U.S. forces. This
context was instrumental in Nicaragua’s history until nowadays because it described a
subservient period for Nicaragua politics, given that the two most affluent political
groups in the country - conservatives and liberals – accepted a peace treaty U.S.-
sponsored, which marked its pro-American brand across different governs during the
U.S. occupation (WALKER and WADE, 2017, p. 24 – 29). The conditions25 fostered
during this period led to the formation of the Somoza dictatorship and decades later
shaped a revolutionary tradition in Nicaragua – Sandinista Revolution - that would
overthrow the Somoza government26 in the 1979s. The Somoza era27 was widely
recognized for its corruption and brutality against the population at the hands of the men
from the National Guard, officially began in 1933 and went on until 1979 in Nicaragua
(RENZI and KRUIJT, 1997, p. 18 – 20). Despite the ongoing process of modernization
in the country, there was a limited number of opportunities for women in employment,
education, and civic activity. Nicaraguan women’s political and social status were
understood to be subordinate to Nicaraguan men, with gender roles for Nicaraguan
women defined around motherhood, domestic labour, and marriage. Before Somoza’s
regime, one could argue that no political projects in Nicaragua were committed to the
incorporation of women in the public space beyond their participation in traditional

25 During the Somoza Era, at the domestic level, Nicaragua’s population was subjected to
extreme social stratification, with 5% of the population controlling 43% of the national wealth,
poverty, violence in the hands of the armed men from the National Guard of Nicaragua,
economic and political corruption from the Somoza Family and no less brutal the effects of the
U.S. imperialism in the region. On that note, the local and structural problems faced by
Nicaraguans included rates of 51% of illiteracy within the population above seven years of age;
high levels of food and water insecurity, with only 51% of the population accessing potable
water in urban areas e less than 5% in rural regions; high rates of child mortality, with estimates
that 120 children of each 1000 would die before one year of age; and lastly, the land
concentration was extreme, given that 2% of companies owned 48% of the fertile lands in the
country (RENZI and KRUIJT, 1997, p. 18 – 20).

26
How did the Somoza dictatorship era diverge from other authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua?
In Walker and Wade’s interpretation, the Somoza era was a unique authoritarian regime in Latin
American Politics due to its extensive duration (42.5 years) and dynastic character (p. 33),
where the political power of the Somoza family was distributed over three members – who ought
to govern Nicaragua with iron hands over the years.
27 The founder, Anastasio Somoza García, was an educated man who entered politics into the Liberal
Party, but nevertheless was always in good terms with the U.S. military forces and, years later, had strong
ties with the formation of the National Gard. During the period where popular guerrillas fought against the
pro-American governments and U.S. forces, His influence into the National Gard
 68

gender roles (SAÉZ, 2007, p. 118). This condition would change to some extent during
Somoza’s regime and the Sandinista revolution. Though women’s position in
Nicaragua’s society was marginalized, women’s and the feminist Nicaraguan
movements were active and diverse. Since the 18th century, Nicaraguan women’s
movements have shared similar goals to those elsewhere, focusing on liberal ideals of
women’s suffrage and education rights. During the Somoza Era of dictatorship,
however, women’s liberal goals of suffrage and education rights would be co-opted by
the state, and feminist movements would be reduced to political outsiders and enemies
of the regime. Catholic urban middle-class women and conservative anti-feminist
women’s movements (later known as Somocista women’s movements) were
encouraged to be part of public life by expressing their political loyalty to the Somocista
state and liberal party so that women’s advocacy occurred in the public machinery,
where women’s access to employment took place based on state clientelism. The
Somocista gender project was conservative, religious, predominantly urban and, more
importantly, classed based.
In the 1970s, the combination results of imperialism, the economic
model of “modernization from above”, state violence and exploitation during the
Somocista dictatorship gave rise to “new” political actors within the Nicaragua society:
guerillas, unions, and women (HERNANDEZ, 2010, p. 161). However, FSLN was
founded in the 1960s with rural roots and ideological alignments under anti-imperialist
values, the growth of politico-military organizations such as guerrillas from decades
before strengthening the military strategies of FSLN during the revolutionary period.
During the revolution, the FLSN adopted a similar logic of political loyalty and
undermining feminism under a different slogan. Kampwirth points out that the ‘idealized
Sandinista woman was a mother’ and that young women were often seen as part of a
‘nursing guerilla’, the latter described as the intertwining of motherhood and
revolutionary war: ‘young woman with a rifle over her shoulder […] while holding an
infant’ (2014, p. 4). Instead, it urged women to be part of the guerrilla and the revolution
fight against the Somoza dictatorship. As a result, the Sandinista revolution created a
political opportunity for women’s agency from diverse classes and backgrounds to be
expanded into public and political life, even though they were to be recognized mainly
as “mothers, daughters and comrades” of the revolution.
Fig. 9 Visual culture about sandinist women in Nicaragua
 69

Source: Orlando Valenzuela’s Miliciana de Waswalito (1984) apud Feminity in Propaganda

(2011); Hispanicla (2017, sp).

In 1969, FSLN’s public discourses about women were keen on including

gender issues, specifically those related to motherhood and women’s political
participation in public life, as part of the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua, as can be
noticed in the following excerpt:

[…] Pay special attention to the mother and child, eliminate prostitution,
put an end to the system of servitude that women suffer, especially
abandoned mothers, establish equal 78 rights for children born out of
wedlock, establish child-care centers, mandate a two-month maternity
leave for working women, and raise women’s political, cultural, and
vocational levels through their participation in the revolutionary process”
(FSLN 1987, quoted in Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer 2008)

Differently from the gender project of the Somoza dictatorship that was
focused on urban and middle-class somocista women, the FLSN was able to expand
women’s agency from different classes and both rural and urban settings into the public
and political life of Nicaragua. As an example of that, it is the origin of the Women’s
Association for the National Problematic (AMPRONAC) in the 1970s as a development
of the National March of Mourning women in 1944 – known as a famous protest of
women against the repression and murder of undergraduate students by the Somoza
dictatorship. This organization was formed by women (middle-class women and from
other social strata) that ‘demanded better conditions of life and equality’ and would later
fight with the FSLN against the Somoza dictatorship (Zuniga and Viquez, p. 234). When
Sandinistas seized power in Nicaragua, the aftermath of the Nicaraguan revolution
produced significant transformations in gender relations, specifically for women.
Hellmund, for example, mentions that changes promoted by the FSLN could be named
politics of “gender” (p. 50), including transformations in gender and family relations,
 70

massive incorporation of Nicaraguan women into the primary and secondary education
and labour markets and more broadly, women acquisition of legal rights in family and
marriage law. According to Miskha (2019, p. 78), the FSLN promoted a party-specific
quota of 30% of women in its candidate's lists, which ‘set a precedent for women’s
representation and inclusion in the country. As for changes related to the achievement
of parity in family law, Zuniga and Víquez (2014, p. 234) contend that during the 1980s,
due to the strong pressure of Sandinista women, the FSLN approved the “Ley de
Alimentos” – a solid reference for legal enforcement of the obligations for fathers to pay
for pension alimenticia, including for children conceived outside civil marriage. In other
words, during the postrevolutionary period in Nicaragua, changes for gender parity in
family law, recognition of women’s participation in unions and facilitation of therapeutic
abortion was a period marked by a conflict of interests between feminists and the
Nicaraguan state: women’s movements remained at the margins. They were seen as
potential enemies of nationalist ideals. Their goals gained traction under transnational
feminist pressure and international law.
In issues about women’s sexual and reproductive rights, though, the
FLSN was explicitly against the decriminalization of abortion, one of the main goals of
the feminist women’s movements in the second wave in Nicaragua. Many leaders of the
FSLN – including Daniel Ortega and Bayado Arce - believed the “revolution needed to
replace the dead and that the revolutionary task of women was to give birth and give
birth” (Zpuniga and Viquéz, 2014, p. 237). Due to extensive transnational women’s
activism, legislation against gender-based violence was first promulgated in 1996 (Law
230). Despite that, the FSLN did not remain in power for long. Hellmund (2013, p. 90)
explains: ‘many limitations and failures of the revolution were related to the war and
counterrevolutionary campaign promoted by groups opposed to the regime and the US’.
From 1990s to 2006, Nicaragua faced three presidents - Violeta Barrios de Chamorro,
Arnoldo Alemán, and Enrique Bolaños – who ‘sought to reverse many of the changes of
the revolution including its gender policies, though policies that in broad terms can be
characterized as neoliberal’ (KAMPWIRTH, 2014, p. 9). There is a clear connection
between anti-feminist politics of gender and the coalitional power of religious actors: the
catholic church, evangelical churches, the state and the Ministries of the Family,
Education, and Health, as it will be shown in the following topics.

3.2.2 The “national gender project” pursued by Ortega’s administration

 71

in Nicaragua: from his first mandate to the pre- covid 19 pandemic (2006 – 2019)
To Nicaragua’s government, ever since 2007, ‘gender equality and
empowerment of women have been a fundamental axis in its policy of development and
fight against poverty based on a National Policy of Gender’. (NICARAGUA’S REPORT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2019, p. 8), in the form of laws, public policies and
campaigns to mitigate the global gender gap between women and men. In this sense,
according to the government, one of the pieces of evidence of this achievement in
matters of gender is in the global recognition of Nicaragua's global leadership by the
Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum and in the world ranking of
women’s political participation from the United Nations (idem, p. 10). Because of this
emphasis between the country’s achievements in gender equity and a national project
for women’s empowerment within Ortega’s administration, I will discuss the extent to
which the recognition of Nicaragua as a “gender paradise” makes sense at the domestic
level, while taking into consideration law reforms, campaigns, and political discourses
from 2006 to 2019. To that end, I will first give an overview of the political agenda and
main projects that distinguish Ortega’s administration from previous governments in
Nicaragua.
My description starts at the events from 2006 in Nicaragua. Daniel
Ortega won the elections in November 2006 and took power in early 2007. Though he is
an old figure in the Sandinista revolution, the nature of its government (as of 2007 until
nowadays) has differed in many ways from its previous Sandinista political mandate in
the country. At that time, the local and global forces related to Nicaragua were
intrinsically distinct from the first time he was president: coming from a period of
neoliberal politics, in 2006, most of the Nicaraguan population (61.9%) was living in
poverty (CEPAL, 2013, p. 7). Therefore, Ortega’s electoral platform seemed committed
to social welfare policy, and it was, at least in discourse, anti-neoliberal. His slogan
“Pueblo, Presidente!” spoke volumes about its intention to address politics for the
“people” – or more communitarian-based - as part of its government style. For us to
understand the extent of obstacles to the status of women’s health and survival in the
country, it is crucial to recognize that Ortega’s administration (2007 – nowadays) led a
“third historical turn” in health care policy: with a new declared ‘commitment to universal
health care’28. This new attitude of the FSLN’s party towards health care policy

28
In previous governments, specifically during the 1990s and early 2000s, Nicaragua faced an neoliberal health care
structuring aligned with policy solutions advised by the World Bank.
 72

translated to the removal of differentiated services and user fees in ‘all health ministry
clinics and hospitals’, addressing large campaigns to bring awareness about the free
character of health services in the country (Kowalchuk, 2018, p. 744). During its second
mandate, Nicaragua’s state-sponsored public health, education and development
strategies are marked by sociopolitical ideals of neoliberal agencies and, in practice,
describe a series of projects that address individual responsibility over one’s health and
the conditions of Nicaragua’s urban and rural environment (LA PRENSA
NICARAGUENSE, 2022). According to vice-president Murillo’s description, in the “Live
Clean, Live Healthy, Live Beautiful, Live Well […] each one of us, men and women,
undertake together a series of simple, easy, daily Actions, incorporating them into the
Realization of Shared and Complementary Responsibility for the Country that we
dream, the Country, Society, Community, Family, and Individual that we want to re-
create for the Good. For the Better.” (ROSARIO-MURILLO, 2013).
Though many law reforms and initiatives were launched to ‘mitigate
inequity and poverty’, as of 2015, for example, global reports of the United Nations point
out that half of all children and adolescents in Nicaragua were living in poverty, with one
of the highest rates of child labor and school drop out in the world (THE GUARDIAN,
2015). In matters of children’s health and survival, Nicaragua was also understood to
have one of the highest rates of child and adolescent abuse in the world, with girls and
women making up to 80% of the cases reported in the country (INTERNATIONAL
AMNESTY, 2014). To address most matters of food insecurity and poverty, some of the
social assistance-based programs promoted during Ortega’s term were the following:
Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger), Plan Techo (installation of zinc roofs that stand up to
tropical rains), Usura Cero (a micro-credit programme), Merienda Escolar (meals for
schoolchildren), Bono Productivo (credit granted for the most part for poor women in
rural areas), Bono Solidario (solidarity bonus for low-income workers), and Casas para
el Pueblo (Houses for the People) (TOISSAND, 2022).
Despite Ortega’s political platform pointing out policy solutions against
neoliberalism and more social welfare-oriented, part of its loans was based on bilateral
funding provided by Venezuela- in practice, its government maintained close relations
with the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral institutions
(INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK29, 2010, p. 2). The social programs, for

29
Since 2007, Nicaragua’s macroeconomic policy has been aligned with the International Monetary
 73

example, are said to be ‘fully compatible with the policies supported by the IMF and
World Bank’. Part of this might be related to the fact the IMF lent Nicaragua 120 million
dollars between 2007 and 2011 under several economic conditionalities 30. Moreover,
Ortega’s election alone did not represent ‘a general leftist turn among Nicaragua’s
electorate’ in comparison to other leftist leaders since the president was elected with
only 38% of the votes; instead, his victory is attributed to ‘a new electoral rule combined
with the schism of the right-wing anti-Sandinista block—the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
(ALN) […], and the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC)’. (CHAMORRO, 2009, p. 3). By
2006, Daniel Ortega’s novel “political pragmatism” (under the slogan El pueblo
president) is an attempt to promote a “refoundational” agenda for Nicaragua, one that
relies on gendered constructions and, more specifically, women’s rights. Unsurprisingly,
Ortega’s political campaign for its second mate has opted for a national slogan that
described Nicaragua as a country of “Family, Christianism, and Solidarity” (HEUMANN,
2011). In Rosario Murillo’s words, current vice-president of Nicaragua and Ortega’s wife:
“Seguimos cambiando Nicaragua, para que sea más cristiana, socialista y solidaria, lo
cual implica retomar nuestras raíces y las prácticas del cristianismo, socialismo,
solidaridad”. In this sense, the national slogan promoted by Ortega’s administration is
representative of ‘symbolic politics’ that will materialize shifts in public policy in matters
of gender. By committing to the idea of revolutionary Nicaragua oriented by the
ideological values of Catholicism and anti-feminism, Ortega’s political and discursive
turn towards pragmatism directly influenced the reduction of women’s rights.

Fund’s (IMF’s) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (now Extended Credit Facility, or ECF). The
country’s National Plan for Human Development (PNDH), presented in 2008, frames the government’s
vision to reduce inequality and poverty through an orthodox macroeconomic policy and an ambitious
program of social expenditure and public investment. The structural and financial targets required to
accomplish the country’s development agenda are set out in the Economic and Financial Program
(PEF) (IBD, 2010, p. 2).
Fig. 10. Nicaragua’s political propaganda: Cristiana, socialista, solidaria!

30
For more information see International Monetary Fund (2010, p. 2).
 74

Source: Voa News31 (2016, sp).

Thus, for us to understand state’s gender politics in terms of gender

projects and how states’ gender projects can influence the emergency, decline or
growth of women’s rights, I call attention to changes and broader reforms in legislation
that regulate gender relations or more specifically target women’s rights in the case of
Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega’s government (2006 – nowadays). Those legal reforms
and political actions cannot be understood as a “gender project” isolated from the
political legacies of the Somocista era, Sandinista Revolution and postsandinista period
within women’s movements (Neumann, 2014). To address and describe the current
gender project at play in Nicaragua Ortega’s administration, I follow Friedman’s (2009)
criteria to evaluate gender politics in Latin American countries in terms of (a) women’s
socioeconomic status, (b) feminist state-society relations, (c) women’s representation in
decision-making positions, (d) legislation on violence against women, (e) reproductive
and sexual rights.
Based on Neumann (2014), I argued in 2006, there was a shift in the
national gender project promoted by Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua that further constrained
women’s movements and rights by subordinating women’s conditions to the family and
the nation. In this topic, I will discuss the social context of Nicaragua’s population to
understand gender issues' developments over time. I define the “gender project” of
Orteguism based on its ideological discourse about women’s status, bodies, gender
relations and public policies that directly undermined women’s rights in the nationalist
project. More specifically, I will connect those discourses to how the government has
dealt with both women’s movements and women’s activists who are political opposition
and how Ortega has framed and reformed formal legislation on gender equality and
gender-based violence against women (reproductive and sexual) rights. Finally, I will
devote the last part of this chapter to addressing other social movements' goals and the

31
See: https://www.voanews.com/a/nicaragua-first-couple-leading-polls/3583230.html.
 75

human rights agenda.

3.2.2.1 Women’s reproductive rights and health as a gender project in

ortega’s government
According to the Observatory for Gender Equality in Latin America and
Caribe, when it comes to laws for the support of women’s reproductive rights and
health, Nicaragua has one of the most rigid legal frameworks against reproductive rights
in the region, alongside Chile, Honduras, El Salvador, and Dominican Republican and,
at the same time, one of the most conservative legislations at the global level: in
Nicaraguan abortion is prohibited in all cases, including medical emergencies, fetus
malformation, cases of rape and pedophilia (CEPAL, 2013). Far from a marginal issue,
reproductive rights in Nicaragua is a central subject when envisioning children,
adolescent and women’s health: after all, Nicaragua has one of the highest rates of
adolescent fertility in Latin America and the Caribbean, with one of every four births in
Nicaragua occurring to a teen girl, half unintended (Rojas et al. 2016:1), where rural
young girls are especially at risk. This situation has aggravated since the Nicaraguan
government paused collecting information about adolescent fertility rates in 2012. On
that same note, Nicaragua holds one of the world's highest rates of sexual violence
against girls and children. A report released in 2014 found that 82% of victims of sexual
abuse in the country were children: 3,065 aged 0-13 and 1,897 aged 14-17. (AL
JAZERA, 2014).
Fig. 11 Protests against the high rates of child-sexual abuse in Nicaragua

Source: Al Jazeera (2014, sp).

Therefore, the precarious relationship between the Nicaraguan state

within women’s reproductive rights and health cannot be re-traced without considering
the role of Ortega’s administration in conservative laws regarding women’s rights, and
 76

secondly, the instrumentalization of reproductive and the prohibition of abortion rights

acted as part of Nicaragua’s politics and the political campaign promoted by Daniel
Ortega and his political party to get him into power again. In 2006, a month before
Ortega’s election, therapeutical abortion –facilitated by the Nicaraguan state since 1870
- was criminalized, surprisingly ‘thanks to the votes of the party of the revolution, the
FSLN’ (KAMPWIRTH, 2014, p. 11). The bill was signed ‘in the presence of Catholic and
Evangelical church leaders’ and removed ‘an article from the country's penal code that
permitted abortion for therapeutic reasons’ (REPLOGUE, 2007, sa). Not only were
religious groups advocating against abortion and pro-family values, but the full
prohibition of abortion became ‘an electoral platform defended by two main candidates’
campaigns - Daniel Ortega y Eduardo Montealegre (AMNESTY USA, 2006, p. 12).
Fig. 12 Religious advertising against abortion rights in Nicaragua

Source: El Mundo (2006), Prensa Latina (2006).

Rosario Murillo, now vice-president of Nicaragua, wife of Daniel Ortega
and campaign leader at that time, said in a public statement of the FLSN party (2006)
the official position that the Nicaraguan state would adopt:
El Frente, la Unidad Nicaragua Triunfa dice: "No al aborto, sí a la vida!"
Nuestros candidatos, nuestros líderes, nuestros Alcaldes, nuestros
Diputados...nuestra Bancada va a emitir un pronunciamiento el día de
hoy. Somos enfáticos: "No al aborto, sí a la vida! Sí a las creencias
religiosas; sí a la fe; sí a la búsqueda de Dios, que es lo que nos
fortalece todos los días para reemprender el camino (MUJERES EM
REDE, 2006, sa).

Nicaragua's legislature voted to ‘eliminate […] therapeutic use of the

procedure for victims of rape or incest or to save the health and life of the mother’
(GETGEN, 2008, p. 58). Therefore, when an abortion ban outlawed women’s access to
 77

therapeutical abortion32 in Nicaragua, that meant at least three things: any woman who
was to experience pregnancy complications and risk medical conditions would not be
able to access health care services for therapeutical abortion without risking being
jailed; second, women’s rates of mortality and precarity in access to essential health
services would increase in the country, especially among the poorest groups; third,
health care professionals would be under watch, forbidden to conduct basic procedures
even in extreme cases, or, in case they attended women’s in danger and performed the
therapeutical abortion, they would be imprisoned and had its medical license revoked
for five years in the country. Despite the right to therapeutical abortion being first
outlawed in 2006, right before the election - in 2007, during Ortega’s government, the
therapeutical abortion ban was further expanded with harsher penalties for women, girls
who would seek medical care and any health care professionals that provide
obstetrician procedures based on law 641 – that reformed the Penal Code (NEUMANN,
2011). Numerous medical associations from Nicaragua33 were explicitly against the
legislation regarding the therapeutical abortion ban and harsher penalties for women,
girls and health practitioners; for them, the criminalization of all forms of abortion could
result in negative effects for women who seek treatment due to obstetric complications.
In 2008, the International Amnesty conducted an international investigation about
human rights abuse against women in matters of health survival and reproductive rights.
Delegations from the organization visited the country in 2008 and were denied meetings
with the Health Minister, Women’s national commission, National Assembly and Institute
for Nicaraguan women (INTERNATIONAL AMNESTY, 2009, p. 37). While interviewing
Nicaraguan health practitioners in 2008, a Nicaraguan gynaecologist shared the
following testimony about Ortega’s new Penal Code about abortion penalization and
incarceration for all who provide services and obstetric attention to patients under
medical risk:
Yo siento una frustración muy grande […] yo siento un atropello contra
uno mismo como persona y como profesional […]. Ahora, lo peor del
caso es que esto ha sido estimulado por un partido político en lo

32
For one to understand the implications of this bill, it is important to distinguish ‘elective abortion’ –
voluntary termination of pregnancy, from ‘therapeutical abortion’ – this second type of abortion, widely
accepted by the medical community as a public health concern, exemplifies the termination of pregnancy
when there are medical complications that endanger women’s health and survival.
33
La Sociedad Nicaragüense de Ginecología y Obstetricia; la Sociedad Nicaragüense de Medicina
General; La Facultad de Medicina de las universidades de León y de Managua; La Asociación de
Enfermeros/as de Nicaragua; Expertos en salud internacionales, incluida la Organización Panamericana
de la Salud.
 78

que yo he creído toda mi vida. No puedo entender por qué

consideran necesario imponer sus puntos de vista sobre una
emergencia obstétrica por sobre lo que yo considero el mejor
tratamiento como médica experimentada y profesional.

Similarly, another doctor shared her concerns not only about

incarceration but from the new legal problems of political repression brough by the law:
“[...] Estoy preocupada de que si hablo en contra de la ley, puedo ser acusada de
apología de delito. La verdad es que no sé hasta dónde podemos llegar en la lucha
contra esta ley, o qué nos pasará en el futuro”. Meanwhile, some health professionals
talk about the incoherence of the legal accusation of abortion: “Si alguien sufrió un
aborto espontáneo, otra persona puede acusarla de que fue un aborto inducido y no
hay forma real de demostrarlo”, others share concerns about the connections between
the health of girls who are survivors of sexual violence and access to health care and
obstetrician services: “¿Y de las niñas embarazadas producto de violación y que viven
en la pobreza? No tienen más opción [legal] que parir.”

Fig. 13. Amnesty International Campaign about Nicaragua’s full prohibition on

reproductive rights

Source: Amnesty International Campaign about Nicaragua (2008).

At the domestic level, there was strong advocacy of Nicaraguan

women’s movements and international feminist networks against the abortion ban and
its negative effects on girls and women. One of their highest achievements took place in
2010, when a transnational network of women’s movements in Nicaragua reported the
Nicaraguan state to the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights to protect the life
of a Nicaraguan woman from the country’s Penal Code: the CIHR granted precautionary
 79

measures for the Nicaragua State to allow a pregnant woman who had cancer to
receive proper medical treatment despite the treatment being risky for her pregnancy. At
that time, the citizen –Amalia - was pregnant and diagnosed with cancer. Due to her
fragile medical condition, she was advised to initiate sections of radiotherapy and
chemotherapy. Still, she was nevertheless denied the service in Nicaraguan hospitals
under the argument that the cancer treatment could cause her to have an abortion in
the country. Because of Nicaragua's legal position against therapeutical abortion,
hospitals and professionals refused to treat her for cancer only to prevent a potential
spontaneous abortion. The denial of medical assistance deteriorated her health and left
her vulnerable to the law enforcement of the Nicaraguan state (OAS, 2010).

3.2.2.2. Women’s political (dis)empowerment during Ortega’s

administration: war against women’s movements and feminist diaspora
In 2006, when thinking about the extent of women’s participation in
Nicaragua politics ‘Daniel Ortega promised that, if he were elected in 2006, half of his
cabinet ministers would be women’ (KAMPWIRTH, 2011, p. 18). Though numbers of
women’s formal participation in Nicaragua politics have significantly increased during
his three presidential mandates, ever since 2007, one could argue there is stronger
political repression of women’s activists, women’s movements and NGOs considered
opposed to the government than in previous periods. Contrary to the direction of his
promises, women’s integration in non-electoral forms of politics is far from ideal. Since
his first year as president, women’s movements for human rights, feminists and activists
would be framed as “imperialist enemies” of the Sandinista ideals and imprisoned years
later, as shown in the following paragraphs. The relationship between Ortega’s
government and female activists can be described as “hostility”. Ruptures between
Daniel Ortega as a public figure, women’s movements from the Sandinista party and
feminists’ activists date back to – at least – the 1990s: in 1998, Daniel Ortega’s
stepdaughter - Zoilámerica Murillo – accused him of rape and sexual abuse during her
childhood. Zoilámerica Murrillo received majoritarian support from feminists, women’s
movements in the country and political leaders elsewhere in Latin America. Ortega’s
political immunity and the Nicaraguan judicial system dismissed her accusation, leading
Zoilámerica Murrillo to report him in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
formally. Furthermore, there are at least three other accusations of child abuse against
the president (2006, 2007 and 2013) (EXPEDIENTE PÚBLICO, 2021, sa). Outside
 80

Nicaragua, Ortega’s image of a sexual perpetrator is widespread. Public protests from

women have taken place not only in the streets of Nicaragua but in environments of
foreign policy within the context of Paraguay, Honduras and El Salvador ministers of
women’s affairs:
Ortega's accusers are not limited to Nicaragua's small feminist
organizations. The minister of women's affairs in Paraguay's new left-
wing government, Gloria Rubin, whipped up a media storm in August by
calling Ortega a "rapist" and protesting his invitation to President
Fernando Lugo's inauguration — an event Ortega eventually skipped to
avoid the heat. A week later in Honduras, Selma Estrada, minister of the
National Institute of Women, resigned her government post in protest
over the official invitation of Ortega to Tegucigalpa. And in El Salvador,
feminist leaders are asking their government to declare Ortega persona
non grata before he's scheduled to attend a presidential summit there at
the end of the month.

More surprisingly, the Nicaraguan state has released an official position

about “feminism and feminist social movements in the country”: in 2008, for example,
the government of Nicaragua released a small book written by vice-president Rosario
Murillo titled “The connection between feminism and low-intensity wars”, where the vice-
president frames all Nicaraguan feminist movements and activists as “imperialist”
enemies from the Nicaragua revolutionary state, and argues that feminists should be
“defeated” during Ortega’s administration with “politics and faith”.
Fig. 14 Cover of the Nicaraguan government-sponsored book: “El feminism y las guerras de baixa
intensidad” authored by the vice-president Murrillo (2008)
 81

Source: Princeton’s Digital Archive of Latin American and Caribbean Ephemera (2008).

According to vice-president Rosario Murrillo’s description in the book,

“[…] feminism serves to the model of neo-colonization, with a key role as a strategy to
deteriorate revolutionary projects in Nicaragua”. Furthermore, she stresses: “[...] This
feminism is rendered to the boots of the empire. It is in the hands of women who do not
live as women, who do not know the feminine soul, individual or collective”. Finally, in
the vice-president’s evaluation: “Nicaragua wants work and peace, and because of that
we [*Ortega’s government] will answer to this cultural occupation with politics. We will
fight them with civilization, prayers, faith…” (PRADO, 2010, p. 63). By committing the
Nicaraguan public machinery of Ortega’s government to the fight against the “cultural
occupation of women’s and feminist movements”, Rosario Murrillo explicitly states
women’s political rights and feminist political agenda as targets of the national gender
project in the country to “save Nicaragua from imperialism”.
In 2008, the second year of Ortega’s mandate, the Nicaraguan
government (under the Ministry of the Interior) conducted legal proceedings against at
least human rights and women’s organizations of civil society: Communications
Research Center (CINCO), Grupo Venancia de Matagalpa, and the Autonomous
Women’s Movement (MAM), accused of “money laundering and subversion of the
“constitutional order”, later instigating violence against staff from the Nicaraguan Center
for Human Rights (CENIDH). The first two had their headquarters invaded for
investigation, judicial search, and raising legal accusations against female activists and
feminist NGOs. Furthermore, in November of that same year: ‘the Managua police, on
orders from Ortega, decided to block the passage of four hundred activists who
intended to march on the traditional date of November 25”, International Day for the
Elimination of Violence against Women. Instead, the vice-president organized its
procession in support of the FLSN government (RIBEIRO-GOMES, 2018, p. 24).
Though only in 2018 the Nicaraguan government would demonstrate its most
repressive state, declaring protests illegal in the country, in 2008, some of the first social
movements and activists attacked during Ortega’s administration were organizations for
women’s rights.
Fig. 15. Online activism reporting women’s arbitrary imprisonments in Nicaragua
 82

Source: Irn defensoras (2020).

Dora Maria Telles34 (2017 apud Ribeiro-Gomes, 2018), who is a former

Sandinista guerrilla commander and leader of the Renewal Sandinista Movement
comments that women’s movements, NGOs focused on women’s rights and feminist
organizations have been targets of censorship, physical threatening, and persecution by
the Nicaragua government:
Hasta 2007, el movimiento de mujeres y feminista disfrutaba de libertad de
organización y movilización, había experimentado un crecimiento sostenido
de organizaciones de mujeres en todo el país que se dedicaban a temas de
salud, violencia, empoderamiento de mujeres, justicia, producción y
economía, etcétera. Desde la instalación de Ortega en el poder en 2007, el
movimiento de mujeres ha sido perseguido, sus oficinas han sido
allanadas por la policía, y desde Cancillería se han realizado gestiones
para eliminar todo tipo de financiamiento y apoyo externo a los
movimientos de mojeres. Ocho líderes del movimiento fueron acusadas
penalmente y el proceso está aún abierto. Una radio de las mujeres de
Jalapa, en el norte del país, fue robada e incautada por agentes policiales
y del partido de Ortega, sin orden ni explicación alguna. Y así hay muchos
casos […] Los movimientos de mujeres, a pesar de la adversidad de este
régimen, continúan manteniendo su movilización [...] (emphasis mine).

In contrast to the political repression in Ortega’s government towards

women’s movements and female activists observed at the local level, in matters of law,
the National Assembly of Nicaragua passed and implemented laws for parity and
women’s political empowerment (Law 790) in the form of gender quotas of 50% (50
men, 50 women) during the year of 2012. But what are gender quotas, exactly? In this
case, it describes the legislation for parity on ballots from each party, in which each
party ought to have 50% male and 50% female candidates.
Percentage of Women in Nicaraguan Congress per Year

34In June of 2021, Dora Maria Telles was arbitrarily imprisoned accused of conspiracy by Ortega’s
government.
 83

Fig. 16. Women’s representation in Nicaraguan congress

Source: Inter Parliamentary Union (apud DIGMANN, 2015, p. 18)

Criminal investigations and arbitrary suspension of women’s
movements and human rights NGOs are just part of the political landscape in
Nicaragua, given the explosion of protests marked by extrajudicial executions and
repression that occurred in Nicaragua on 18th April 2018 and goes until current times.
For Klein et al (2022), Ortega’s government has committed a series of authoritarian
violations during his government, such as the ‘unconstitutional Ortega–Murillo’s
President–Vice President tandem, explicitly banned by the Constitution (Article 147) for
reasons of consanguinity or affinity’, ‘the elimination of the legal status of some parties’,
unequal access to the media, ‘with the President and close supporters owning seven
radio and three TV stations and the exclusion of 28 opposition legislators from their
seats’ (p. 58). On that note, the formal attempt to regulate and criminalize social
movements, protests and NGOs took place in 2018, as the National Assembly approved
the Law on Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Financing of the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction. After that, at least nine NGOs35 had their legal status
cancelled by the government in the year of 2018 (OAS, 2018, p. 1; CENTRO
NICARAGUENSE DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 2020), and 25 women’s and
indigenous movements had their legal status cancelled only in 2022 (FRANCE 24,
2022).
Though not gender-related, the public protests in Nicaragua began as a
response to Ortega’s reform in the social security law. They had further implications for
women’s activists and women’s political rights to protest in the country. Records of
assassinations and illegal arrest of protesters and activists against the Ortega’s

35
Centros de Información y Servicios de Asesoría y Salud (Cisas); Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Políticas
Públicas (Ieepp); Centro Nicaragüense de los Derechos Humanos (Cenidh); Hagamos Democracia; Ipade; Popol
Nah; Fundación del Río; Centro de Investigación de la Comunicación e Instituto de Liderazgo de las Segovias.
 84

administration were marked by the presence of the Nicaraguan army and pro-Orteguist
paramilitary groups, a context in which several students protesting against the
government at Polytechnic University in Managua were killed. During the uprising of the
2018 protests, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) from the
OAS released a report documenting the extent of repression, illegal, arbitrary arrests,
violence towards protesters and political harassment from the government against
the Matagalpa Women’s Collective (Colectivo de Mujeres de Matagalpa), the Venancia
Group (Grupo Venancia) and Radio Vos. The organization called on the state of
Nicaragua to cease the criminalization of protests in the country. Not only were
protesters and groups threatened, but the government attacked media organizations
quite possibly to control the press coverage of protests. As an example, International
Amnesty (2019) reported that in 2018 the Nicaraguan Telecommunications Institute
(Instituto Nicaragüense de Telecomunicaciones, Telecor), the 100% News Channel,
Channel 12, Channel 23 and Channel 51 were pulled off the air (p. 28).
Only in April 2018, 322 people were killed during the protests, and
hundreds were detained under accusations of terrorism against the state, with court
hearings held in private and concentrated in Managua (OAS PRESS RELEASE, 2018).
For many imprisoned in the El Chipote detention centre, the OHCHR has found
evidence that Nicaraguan men and women had suffered from sexual abuse, rape (“with
riffles”) by police guards and different forms of violence, not to mention threats of sexual
abuse against detained activists are described as a daily practice (HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, 2019).
Fig. 17. Nicaraguan public protests against Ortega’s government
 85

Source: New York Times (2018).

According to the UN Refugee agency, 62,000 citizens have fled
Nicaragua following the months of the state killings of public protesters and imprisoning
of activists. In OAS (2020) report, requests for Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica went
from 87 (May) to 3377 in June 2019. For the refugee-seeking who OAS interviewed, the
main reasons signalled to seek refuge in Costa Rica were to escape direct threats from
the government (20% for men, 11% for women), escape threats over social media
accounts (13% for men, 10% for women), financial debits (9% for men, 2% for women)
and state repression (6% for men, 2% for women). Moreover, Nicaraguan citizens make
up a refugee solicitant population considered above the global average in the context of
Costa Rica. As for the features of those groups, refugee solicitants are mainly (i)
students who participated in the demonstrations and protests, (ii) human rights
defenders and leaders of social and peasant movements (iii) people who supported
those who participated in the protests through the provision of food, shelters security
and medicines (iv) doctors; (v) journalists; and (vi) former soldiers and former police
officers who refused to participate in repressive acts ordered by the Nicaraguan
government.
Currently, aside from the Nicaraguan refugee community present in
Costa Rica, some authors report the occurrence of a Nicaraguan feminist diaspora in
Spain36, characterized by Nicaraguan women living under political asylum in Spain due
to the criminalization of women’s movements and due to their participation, as part of
feminist movements, in the protests of 2018. First of its kind, the Red Feminista por
Nicaragua (Feminist network for Nicaragua) is one of the first transnational networks of
activism for exiled female Nicaraguan leaders. Though there are reports of transnational
networks of political exiled such as the Red de Estudiantes Nicaragüenses Exiliados en
España and the platform SOS Nicaragua, the Red Feminista por Nicaragua was

36
5483 nicaragüenses have requested asylum to Spain only in 2019.
 86

created to denounce the political repression of the Nicaraguan state under Ortega’s
administration to European countries. Moreover, it criticises the violent practices of
Ortega’s government against feminist and women activists to advocate for the liberation
of women who are political prisoners in the country and violations of human rights.

3.2.2.3 Legislation for parity in women’s economic participation and

protection against gender-based violence in Ortega’s government
At the global level, like most countries in the western world, Nicaragua
has ratified most of the international legislation for women’s rights, including the
CEDAW – Convention about the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women (1995), considered an international landmark in the United Nations system of
gender governance. Nevertheless, according to a UN Women report (2014, p. 16), one
of the drawbacks in the country’s history with gender policies is the fact that Nicaragua
has refused to ratify the international legislation C.103, C. 183 and C. 156: the
international agreement on maternity protection and the international agreement on all
workers with family responsibilities.
Overall, the national legal-regulatory framework on equality for women
in Nicaragua is defined by (a) the Political constitution of Nicaragua (1987) and legal
reforms of 2014; (b) in 2008, Law nº 648 (Law for the Equality of rights and
opportunities), since it incorporates recommendations in the Action Program signed in
Vienna (1993) and Beijing World Conference (1995); (c) Law 717 about Equal access to
land ownership (2010); (d) in 2012, Law 779 - Integral law against gender-based
violence towards women; (e) Family Code summarized by the Law 870; (f) Law 896
against human trafficking (2015); (g) National Plan for Human Development (PNHD
2012 – 2016) (LOPEZ URBINA, 2018, p. 57). Furthermore, part of its National Project
for Human Development, the country has implemented three essential laws to address
food security for rural women: Law nº 693 for Food and Nutrition Sovereignty and
Security Law37 (2009), Law nº 757 for Dignified and Equitable Treatment of Indigenous
Peoples and Afro-descendants38 (2011), Law nº 717 for the Creation of the Fond for the
Purchase of Land with Gender Equity for Rural Women39 (2010).

37 Ley de Soberanía y Securidad Alimentaria y Nutricional (2009).

38 Ley de Trato Digno y Equitativo a Pueblos Indígenas y Afrodescendientes (2011).
39 Ley Creadora Del Fondo para Compra de Tierras com Equidad de Género para Mujeres Rurales
(2010).
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Fig. 18 Nicaragua’s government view on the national model of equity and gender parity

Source: Nicaragua’s government (Cartilla Muyer y derechos), 2019.

For my temporal investigation, rather than exploring previous legal
achievements in Nicaragua – including its constitution - I intend to focus on laws and
legal reforms about women’s economic and social rights conducted during Ortega’s
government (2007 – 2019) that were considered historical decisions in the country and
advanced the global level: the Law 648 and Law 779. Approved in 2008, Law nº 648
(Law for the Equality of rights and opportunities) was created ‘to promote equality and
equity in the enjoyment of human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
between women and men’. Moreover, Law 648 calls for ‘public policies aimed at
guaranteeing the effective exercise in real equality, in the application of the current legal
norm of women and men, to ensure the full development of women’, while signaling that
public mechanisms should be created by state powers (article 1, Law 648, 2008, p. 2).
On top of that, law 648 points out that Nicaragua is committed to an “enfoque de género
en las políticas públicas” (gender-sensitive approach to its public policies). In the legal
document, Nicaragua commits to gender-sensitive policies as a formal strategy to
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guarantee that ‘interests, needs, concerns and experiences of women and men are an
integral part in the formulation, execution, monitoring and evaluation of public policies to
achieve gender equality as elements of development, in all spheres’ (article 3, item I, p.
3).
In the economic realm, in article 13, Law 648 describes an outstanding
legal contribution to women’s economic rights when it expresses the commitment of the
Nicaraguan state to ‘adapt national statistics to account for the true participation of
women in their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product and the National Accounts’.
Moreover, the article explains that the state (or the National Institute of Information for
development) ‘must also quantify, through a Satellite Account, the contribution of
women to the country's economy, with the work they carry out at home’, in which
satellite account corresponds to ‘the account that quantifies the value of the activities
generated in the family sphere, mainly carried out by women, whose value at market
prices represents a certain percentage of the Gross Domestic Product’. This touches on
one of the biggest revindications of feminist economists and women’s movements about
the marginalization of women’s participation in the economic system by reproductive
work, including domestic and unpaid care work. Formal attempts to measure
reproductive labour produced by women and make it visible within the national
economies have been a long-awaited public policy elsewhere (Benería et al., 2018).
Yet, Nicaragua was a country pioneer in matters of public policies of gender with
feminist content when it prescribed the inclusion of unpaid reproductive labour
performed by women as part of the national economic product of the country. The law
reforms in Nicaragua for gender parity met women's everyday lives in the form of
different campaigns promoted by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Ministerio de La
Mujer).
According to the Nicaraguan Ministry of Women’s Affairs website,
Nicaragua adopts an economic model of “creativity and entrepreneurship” for
Nicaraguan women based on female economic empowerment. The Ministry of Women’s
Affairs defines economic empowerment for Nicaraguan women as the ‘capacity for
Nicaraguan women to generate their own achievements’, ‘evolve, manage and decide
about resources in the family and community’ and to ‘live with dignity, well-being and
prosperity’. More significantly, the Ministry suggests the main features that enable
Nicaraguan women to become economically empowered: proud entrepreneurship,
female leadership, self-responsibility for the economy, positive thinking, goal-orientation
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and dream achievement, confidence in personal capabilities, and control over the
distribution of resources, as shown the images below.
Fig. 19. The model of “Women’s empowerment” in Nicaragua

Source: Nicaraguan Ministry of Women’s Affairs (sp).

Moreover, the government justifies its position over women’s economic
empowerment in Nicaragua by commenting that ‘Nicaragua has one of the highest rates
of gender equity in the world’, comparable to first world countries because of Ortega’s
political commitment to gender equity’ (NICARAGUAN MINISTRY OF WOMEN’S
AFFAIRS, sp). In the vice-president’s words, some of the main practices of Nicaraguan
empowered women in the economy are described as follows:
Nicaragua is on the path of empowerment, you [*women] must continue
advancing until you manage to consolidate those practices of
empowered women, knowing and appropriating your rights, further
developing your abilities, skills and participating at all levels. PROUDLY
ENTREPRENEURIAL NICARAGUAN WOMAN... Because Nicaraguan
women are absolutely responsible, we are effective, we are
distinguished workers, we are entrepreneurs and we learn every day
from all the possibilities to grow in knowledge and grow in human quality
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that a new day offers us (ROSÁRIO-MURILLO, sd, our translation40)

The Nicaraguan government's focus on female entrepreneurship and

economic leadership represents a transformation in the country's business landscape.
Based on Pisani’s study (2018), as of 2016, Nicaragua has registered the highest
women’s entrepreneurship rates in the region and is above the average globally. In
urban areas, female-owned firms comprise 32.7% of all urban enterprises, while the
regional rates are 21.8% and at the global level, 14.5%. Moreover, the author claims
that 43.3% of Nicaraguan women are self-employed, a rate much higher than men
(28.3%) (INIDE, 2017). In 2012, Law 779 was unanimously approved by the National
Assembly of Nicaragua, dominated by an FSLN majority. To sum it up, the law
‘criminalizes violence towards women’ as a form to protect their human rights and
guarantee women’s well-being. According to its first article, Law 779 claimed the public
commitment of the Nicaraguan state to aid women and “promote changes in the
sociocultural and patriarchal patterns that underpin relations of power”41. Law 799 (The
Integral Law against Gender-based Violence in Nicaragua) expanded women’s legal
protection under new terms and methods: it has established a legal ground for the
responsibility of the state of Nicaragua to protect women against gender-based violence
based on the creation of public policies, campaigns and cultural education about
gender-based violence at the private and public environments. Moreover, the law has
typified different forms of gender-based violence as ‘any action or conduct, based on
gender, that causes death, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to

40
Original quote: “Estas en el camino del empoderamiento, debes continuar avanzando hasta lograr
consolidar esas prácticas de mujer empoderada, conociendo y apropiándote de tus derechos,
desarrollando más tus capacidades, habilidades y participando a todos los niveles. MUJER
NICARAGÜENSE ORGULLOSAMENTE EMPRENDEDORA... Porque la mujer nicaragüense es
absolutamente responsable, somos efectivas, somos insignes trabajadoras, somos emprendedoras y
aprendemos todos los días de todas las posibilidades de crecer en conocimiento y crecer en calidad
humana que nos ofrece un nuevo día”.
41 Article 1, Law 799 (2012): “The object of this law is to act against the violence exercised against women
with the purpose of protecting women’s human rights and guaranteeing them a life free of violence that
favors their development and wellbeing in accordance with the principles of equality and
nondiscrimination; and establish comprehensive protection measures to prevent, punish and eradicate
violence and provide assistance to women victims of violence, promoting changes in the sociocultural and
patriarchal patterns that underpin the relations of power.”
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women’ and acknowledged that gender-based violence could be physical,

psychological, sexual, institutional, labour-oriented, economic-patrimonial, misogynic
and femicide (BROWN, 2013, p. 15-16).
In September 2013, Ortega’s government reformed Law 799 (The
Integral Law against Gender-based Violence in Nicaragua) with juridical changes that
weakened women’s legal protection (Neumann, 2014). To Solís (2013), the reform of
Law 799 was the government’s response to “safeguard the family unit” in Nicaragua
based on the promotion of the practice of state mediation (family counselling) between
the aggressor and the victim instead of prosecution in cases of gender-based violence.
This practice was not new; in the perspective of women’s organizations, there was
evidence that 30% of femicides in Nicaragua had occurred despite state mediation
between the aggressor and victim. The executive supported the order for reform in law
799 and advised the creation of “Gabinetes de La Familia” to address forms of gender-
based violence. First, as a consequence of Ortega’s reform in Law 799, femicide could
only be recognized when “there is an intimate relationship between the aggressor and
victim", prioritising family counselling instead of accusations of violence. At the local
level, there was an explicit de-funding of women’s trained professionals and women’s
police stations (comísarias) to attend to victims of gender-based violence, which points
to the opposite direction of the Law discourse over the state obligation to protect women
against gender-based violence. In 2016 the Comísarias de la Mujer y niñez, which
consisted of a series of specialized social services for women, including services to
address gender-based violence, was officially discontinued by the government due to
lack of funding.
Though the political alliances summarized in the conservative gender
project pursuit between the state and religious fundamentalism is somewhat novel in
Nicaragua and part of a broader trend in the region, there is a strong continuity in how
the Nicaraguan state has dealt with women’s movements and rights as a political
gender project to subject women to ideals of the family with political loyalty to the state’s
ideology (Kampwirth, 2011; Neumann, 2014). Therefore, this chapter demonstrates that
there is a legacy of continuity in “gender projects” promoted across time during the
Somoza Era, Sandinista Revolution and Ortega’s government. However, local forces,
discourses and transnational forces are now different. Past gender projects were critical
in shaping and normalizing the current “gender project” of the Nicaraguan state under
Daniel Ortega’s administration (2006 – nowadays) in its leftist religious hostility towards
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women’s movements from diverse political affiliations, which undermine women’s

movements' collective agency unless they are loyal to state ideals (Basu, 2010, 278). I
conclude that the history of Nicaraguan women’s movements and their constrained
collective agency as of now during the administration of the leftist president (and former
Sandinista revolutionary) Daniel Ortega cannot be told nor further understood for
comparison without considering the variation and impact of gender projects pursuit by
the Nicaraguan state across time, so we can explore what has been missed from the
Nicaragua experience and what can be learned from elsewhere in Latin and Central
America contexts that share similar historical experiences but more progressive results
in gender-based violence legislation, women’s political citizenship and abortion rights.

3.3. NARRATING THE STORY OF NICARAGUA WITH GENDER

EQUALITY ACCORDING TO THE GGI: FROM MARGINAL COUNTRY TO GLOBAL
LEADER
As the Global Gender Gap Reports measure, analyze and rank
countries in matters of gender equality, with ‘equality and inequality benchmarks fixed
across time, allowing the reader to track individual country progress in relation to an
ideal standard of equality’ (GGI, 2013, p. 10), in this topic I will address how gender
equity Nicaragua is portrayed and accessed across time by the index and will
demonstrate the discourses adopted by the index to measure gender gaps not entirely
as a matter of human rights and equity, but one of efficiency for the global economy
(GGI, 2006; 2013, p. 19). During the 2006s, the first edition of the GGI, Nicaragua was
ranked 62nd out of 115 countries covered (90% of the world’s population back then),
with an overall score of 0.6566 (out of 1). In addition, Nicaragua was featured in 101st
place in the performance ranking of Economic Participation and Opportunity, one of the
worst world positions at the time; followed by an average global position of 40th and
50th places in the subindexes of Education Attainment and Health and Survival; and an
encouraging ranking of 25th at Political Empowerment ranking. But what do those
numbers mean for understanding gender dynamics in Nicaragua?
First, in 2006 Nicaragua is said to have low levels of gender parity in
Economic Participation and Opportunity, Health and Survival and Educational
attainment in the world. In other words, Nicaraguan men and women are present within
the economy at differential rates that point towards the formal marginalization of women
at that time. Regarding Nicaragua’s Economic Participation and Opportunity, the index
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portrayed Nicaragua as having one of the lowest levels of women’s labour force
participation worldwide and significant differences in wages for men and women who
performed similar work that year. From the interpretation from GGI’s (2006, p.5), huge
gaps of gender parity, specifically in economic levels are problematic because ‘not only
it undermines the quality of life of one half of the world’s population but also poses a
significant risk to the long-term growth and well-being of nations. In this sense, the index
signals that ‘countries that do not capitalize on the full potential of one half of their
human resources may compromise their competitive potential’, where ‘the advancement
of women is an important strategic issue with a potential impact on the growth of
nations’. Therefore, based on Nicaragua’s measured performance in 2006 and the
interpretation of the GGI, one can argue that the country’s long-term potential for growth
and global competitiveness in the capitalist economy is, if not threatened, but
undermined by the country’s low levels of women’s economic and opportunity
participation in comparison to men, so it is possible that engage for gender parity at the
level of Economic Participation, and Opportunity is a pressing issue to be addressed by
countries as ‘their national priorities’ and ‘priority area for reform’ (idem, p. 5).
Moreover, the correlation between productivity, economic growth and
women’s integration into formal labour is emphasized in GGI’s interpretation. For the
index, ‘the most important determinant of a country’s competitiveness is its human
talent—the skills, education and productivity of its workforce. And women account for
one-half of the potential talent base’ (World Economic Forum, 2007, p. 20), in which the
primary solution for leveraging a country’s competitiveness lies on ‘whether and how it
educates and utilises its female talent. To maximize its competitiveness and
development potential, each country should strive for gender equality—i.e., to give
women the same rights. The GGI does not explore women’s economic participation
beyond labor force levels in formal corporate environments and differential wage levels
for men and women. The high rates of unemployment, inadequate labour protection and
women's involvement in reproductive paid and unpaid labour, for example, remain at the
root of issues in women’s economic participation at the national level and are neglected
as part of that measurement (Benería et al, 2018).
Compared to the year before, in 2007 – the first year of Ortega’s
administration – the GGI portrayed that Nicaragua had an overall decrease in gender
parity in all four areas evaluated. The biggest losses were related to its global ranking of
gender parity (it had drastically dropped from 62nd to 90th, with a score of inequality of
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0.646 out of 1), Economic Participation and Opportunity (from 101th to 117th ranking);
Educational Attainment (from 40º to 51º), Health and Survival (from 50th to 60th),
though the country maintained a relatively stable position in its Political Empowerment
levels (from 25th to 28th overall position worldwide). Expected to work as a snapshot of
their country’s relative strengths and weaknesses of their country’s performance
compared to that of other nations’, the GGI’s evaluation of Nicaragua in 2007 suggests
that one of the relative strengths of the country at the global level, when it came to
gender equality, was Political Empowerment, or, in other words, the relatively equal
positions where men and women stand regarding the ‘political decision-making at the
highest levels’ (World Economic Forum, 2007, p. 4).
During 2008, Nicaragua climbs from 90º to the 71º global position in
gender parity (score of 0.675 out of 1) among the 130 countries measured by GGI. At
the subindex level, the country remains in the same marginal position for the national
levels of Economic and Opportunity (117th) and relatively similar for Health and Survival
(62nd position in the global ranking). Though the dataset average for Economic and
Opportunity levels is 0.587 of 1, Nicaragua earns a score of 0.461, which further
stresses the integration of women in the economy as a major problem of gender in the
country. Nevertheless, the most impressive outcome narrated by the GGI is that by
2008 Nicaragua supposedly reached a global leadership position in the subindex of
Education Attainment, ranking the first place worldwide (score one out 1, where one
means full equality or, in other words: 1.0 as a score measured ‘means the country
meets the ideal standards of equality, followed by a fair advancement in its subindex of
Political Empowerment (23rd place). In terms of its educational attainment levels, GGI
measures Nicaragua's world leadership based on the criteria of literacy rate, enrolment
in primary education, enrolment in secondary education, and enrolment in tertiary
education, all of which Nicaragua scores the maximum levels of equality worldwide
(GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2008, p. 125).
On that note, for 2009, GGI ranks in the 49th position in overall gender
equity at the global level (score of 7.00 out of 1.00), 65º position in Health and Survival
and 25th position in Political Empowerment. According to the index, Nicaragua (49)
makes one of the biggest leaps in the rankings […], as a ‘result of new data having
become available for the economic participation and opportunity subindex, which more
completely reflects the state of the economic gender gap in Nicaragua’. (GLOBAL
GENDER GAP INDEX, 2009, p. 21). Despite this justification, the index attributes
 95

Nicaragua the still unpromising ranked position of 104th in Economic Participation and
Opportunity measures of equality between sexes. Moreover, Nicaragua retains its global
leadership (1st place ranked) in matters of education attainment between sexes. To
explain it better, GGI states that the Index wants to reward or penalize countries
‘independent of the level of development’. So, in the case of the subindex of education,
the index ‘penalizes or rewards countries based on the size of the gap between
male and female enrolment rates, but not for the overall levels of education in the
country’ (p. 3-5), which might be an explanation for the reason why countries from
different contexts are understood to score the same levels of gender equality.
Fig. 20. Nicaragua’s global position in education attainment

Source: GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX (2009, p.15).

The GGI’s report of 2010 reveals that Nicaragua has reached 30º place
in gender equality worldwide (score of 0.712) among 134 countries. Second, in its
subindexes, Nicaragua ranked respectively: 94th in the economy (0.591 out of 1); 24th
in education (score one out of 1); 57th in Health and Survival (score of 0.976 out of 1)
and 19th in Political Empowerment (score 0.304 out of 1). As it is possible to notice in
the following images, based on the GGI’s interpretation, Education and Health are two
of the most gender-equal areas in Nicaragua at the domestic level (as of 2010) in
comparison to the country’s performance in the Economy and Politics.

Fig. 21 Nicaragua’s global position in gender equality (2006 – 2010)

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Source: GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX (2010, p. 234-235).

Though the index does not explore the Nicaraguan experience in
length, it does comment on the “best practices” of global world leaders in gender
equality, such as Iceland, which might hint at some of the impacts of public policies on
gender in the overall ranking, the GGI evaluates three types of politics (forms of family
care, parental leave, legislative reform to promote women’s participation in the board of
public and private companies) as central to the global leadership of that year
summarized by Iceland’s experience. Those comments about the “best practices” of
world leaders in gender equality are an interesting aspect of the GGI, given its “policy-
oriented” nature as a global ranking. It gives us the background to discuss in the next
chapter some of the criteria of gender policies considered as “ideal”, “exemplary”, and
“successful” as opposed to country’s politics that might be read as the “worst types of
practice”, “danger to achieving equality and to the country’s economic growth” and so
on:

[…] The extensive preschool and day-care system provided by

most municipalities, a legal right for parents to return to their jobs
after childbirth and a generous parental leave system are major
contributors to Iceland’s ranking. In March 2010 the Icelandic
parliament adopted a legislative reform to promote gender equality
on the boards of publicly owned companies and public limited
companies having at least 50 employees; these companies must have
at least 40% of both genders represented on their boards by September
 97

2013. Moreover, companies with 25 or more employees are required to

disclose the number of men and women employed as well as the
number of men and women in management positions (GLOBAL
GENDER GAP INDEX, 2010, p. 19-20).

By 2011, GGI evaluates Nicaragua as ranking in 27º place, with a score

of 0.725 out of 1 (full) gender equity at the global level. The index explains that
‘Nicaragua’s performance over the last six years puts it among the top climbers of the
114 countries that have been included in the Report since 2006 the GGI’. According to
the index, ‘Nicaragua’s increase is driven mainly by a narrowing wage gap’, which
signalizes an improvement of the country’s context of Economic Participation and
Opportunity between sexes. In this sense, within the subindex of Economic
Participation, Nicaragua is understood to rank the 79th position worldwide as opposed to
the 94th ranking from the year before. At 2011, it is as if all other social contexts
measured (health and survival, educational attainment, and political empowerment)
have been held constant in the country, for their changes are minimal: in health and
survival, the country climbs down one position (25 th worldwide), though it had
maintained the full score of parity in education (1 out 1); similar to that, Nicaragua’s
position in educational attainment went from 57th position to 58th, but it kept its score the
same in both years (0.976); as for the subindex of political empowerment, the country
has kept the same score from the year before (0.304), but it has climbed up two
positions (from 21st to 19th).
3.3.2 Nicaragua “Rising to the global top 10”
In the overall ranking of gender gaps in 2012, Nicaragua’s level of
gender equality was measured for the first time as part of the Top 10 countries’ world
leaders in gender equality, in the 9th position (score = 0.770 out 1) among the 135
countries measured and evaluated during that year. Interestingly, the GGI points out
that in 2012 the most accurate ‘top performers and world leaders’ models for gender
equity in the world can be noticed within the experiences of all Nordic countries, except
for Denmark (p. 19). The report justifies the relevance of Nordic countries – Iceland,
Finland, Norway and Sweden - as world models for gender equity based on the high
rates of women’s labour force participation, declining rates in salary gaps, tax
incentives, and the successful ‘top-down approach to promoting women’s leadership’ by
corporate companies, followed by a historically ‘strong record on the percentage of
women in ministerial level positions’, with Sweden presenting one of ‘the highest
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percentages of women in parliament in the world (44.7%)’ (p. 22).

Performing above the world average of 0.666 in 2012, Nicaragua
became the first country from Latin America and Caribe to ever ‘hold a place in the top
10 of the global rankings’, scoring at least 17.3% better than its first overall score of
gender equity measured in 2006 (GGI REPORT, 2012, p.38). Based on the GGI’s
evaluation, Nicaragua reached this position thanks to ‘changes in political
empowerment, particularly an increase in the percentage of women in parliament (from
21% to 40%) and an increase in the percentage of women holding ministerial positions
(38% to 46%)’ (p. 22), as opposed to the performance of the ‘lowest-ranking country
(Saudi Arabia) in political empowerment worldwide (p. 17). In that case, Nicaragua
drastically improved its performance in political empowerment by moving from 21st
position to the “top 5” at the global level, being measured as the 5 th best country in
political empowerment (0.4889 out of 1), with a similar score value as Sweden (4th
place, score of 0.4976) and above the sample average of countries (0.195). Aside from
this aspect, Nicaragua climbed to 55th place in Health and Survival, scoring the same
from 2007 to 2012 (0.976), above the sample average of countries (0.956). Even though
the country has maintained the same score of evaluation, for the sex ratio at birth
(female-male) Nicaragua ranks 1st in the world and 69th in healthy life expectance
between sexes. Nevertheless, around Economic participation and Opportunity, the
country climbed down a few places: from 79ª to 88º global position (0.615 out of 1),
slightly above the global sample average of countries (0.599). Furthermore, detailed
data interpreted by the index demonstrates that in matters of labor force participation,
Nicaragua ranks 98th, and for wage equality for similar work 118th global position below
the global standards for wage policy, despite being ranked in the first place (full parity)
in the measurements of parity for professional and technical workers in the country.
Fig. 22 Nicaragua’s evolution across time
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Source: Elaborated by the author based on Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019); WORLD
BANK DATASET (2021, sa).

To expand on the interpretations of the data collected by GGI, in 2012

the index highlights that ‘business leaders and policy-makers must therefore ensure
that, in addition to removing barriers to women’s entry to the workforce, they put in
place practices and policies that will provide equal opportunities for rising to positions of
leadership within companies’ (p. 29). Based on its research, the GGI found that national
policy frameworks play a central role in gender gaps in each country and at the global
level. Furthermore, the report stresses that gender mainstreaming across different
policy areas can be used to address the gaps found in each evaluation. While surveying
countries national policy frameworks, the index contend its focus on ‘parental leave,
 100

availability of childcare, type of taxation and workplace equality’ as the main important
themes that countries should vastly address (GGI, 2012, p. 58-59).
Fig. 22 Key areas of national policy frameworks of gender
Key areas of national Gendered, economic and developmental impacts according to the GGI
policy frameworks of
gender
Parental leave ‘Maternity, paternity and parental leave—or any other type of additional shared leave— are
closely associated with women’s economic participation in many parts of the world and are
thus an important element of policies aimed at a more efficient use of a country’s human
capital pool’
Childcare assistance ‘Childcare is an important factor in allowing women to reconcile professional and family
obligations because women tend to bear the majority of the caregiving responsibilities in the
majority of countries. For example, a well-established daycare system can be a long-term
investment that supports women in employment, thereby improving the efficiency of labour
markets’
Taxation system ‘Tax legislation may contain potentially discriminatory provisions that treat men and women
differently.3 For example, gender-biased taxation might alter the disposable income
available to men and women in a family and may thus have implications for the economic
and social decision-making at the household level’.
Equality and work ‘Legislative structures may help prevent gender-based discrimination in society and create
an ecosystem of support for women through, among other policies, obligatory and voluntary
quotas in public and private entities, targeted subsidies to female businesses and
supervisory bodies monitoring the implementation of national policies.
Source: World Economic Forum (2012, p. 58-59).

By 2013, the GGI recognizes that there are many paths to parity
that states, companies and stakeholders should consider. Policies around cash transfer
programmes, equal access to credit and financial services, parental leave, affordable
childcare facilities, innovative hiring process, redesigned career paths and meaningful
mentoring programmes represent some of the transformations that most countries
should address to change the landscape of gender equity at the global level (GGI, 2013,
p. 5). That said, Nicaragua is analyzed as one of the ‘top ten’ world leaders in the 10th
ranking (among 136 countries) in gender equity of the GGI, and it is characterized as
one of the three overall highest climbers of the 110 countries that have been included in
the Report since 2006’. Stronger than ever, its ranking of political empowerment is
maintained within the 5th global position (0.489 out of 1, the same score from 2012),
which suggests that Nicaragua has maintained some of the best practices in the world
in matters of political empowerment and political parity between sexes, given ‘the
Report identifies countries that are role models in dividing their resources equitably
between women and men, regardless of the overall resource level’ (p. 5).
Despite its improvement in the score of Economic Opportunity (from
0.615 to 0.622), the country climbed down to ten positions. It was ranked 91st,
comparatively low when we consider the highest and ideal performer in Economic
Opportunity – Norway, whose achievements point to the closing of 84% of its gender
 101

gap. Moreover, Nicaragua has ranked 109th in the sub-indicator of parity in Labor force
participation among 135 countries (p. 49). Still, it was considered a moderately better
performer than the lowest-ranked country in the world in Economic Opportunity – Syria,
with only 25% of its economic gap between sexes closed (GGI, 2013, p. 16). The score
in Economic Opportunity is particularly important as it is one of the main variables
strongly correlated to the global competitiveness of a country, one that weights the
global gender gap index as a whole. To test this hypothesis, in 2013, the GGI crossed
countries' overall global gender gap index with their measured and calculated overall
global competitiveness index (1 – 7 scale), both global indicators created by the World
Economic Forum. However, the report (2013) has concluded that while for some
countries, this predicted relationship holds, especially European countries, for countries
such as Nicaragua, high overall scores in the global gender gap index do not
necessarily can be translated into increased predictions of economic competitiveness
performance accessed by global competitiveness index, as shown in the graph below
(GGI, 2013, p. 32-35). Nevertheless, in the area of educational attainment and health
and survival, Nicaragua maintains the same score form previous years: for education, it
means the country has secured a score of full parity (1), nevertheless climbing down to
28th place worldwide; and for health and survival, Nicaragua was evaluated as scoring
the same ever since 2007 (0.976), despite moving from 58th to 55th in the ranking.
Fig. 23. Modelling the correlation between the global gender gap index scores and global
competitiveness index scores

Source: World Economic Forum (2013, p. 32).

In the quantification of the magnitude of gender equity at the global
level in 2014, the GGI Report claims that the benefits of gender equality can be
understood in terms of an economic case of competitiveness and fairness case for
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humanity’s collective progress (GGI, 2014, p. 5). In the economic case, related to the
country’s low levels of competitiveness is the underutilization of female talent in the
economy. More than that, the report calls for investment in girls’ education, highlighting
that healthy and more educated women are more likely to raise children that are equally
healthy and more educated than the average, which in turn leads to a positive cycle for
the population in that country (idem). Second, the report suggests that corporate
companies can also directly benefit from gender equality in two ways: women who are
corporate leaders outperform while working compared to companies that lack female
representation, and based on the consumer power within women.
As for Nicaragua, the index contends that the country has the highest
improvement to date (20%), with 79% of its national gender gap closed, which makes it
not only a global but a regional leader in the region of Latin American and Caribe, where
the average of gender gaps closed feature 70%. Nicaragua’s position is substantially
close to the highest ranked countries—Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark,
where the closing of gender gaps is recorded as at least 80% and distant from the worst
performer that year – Yemen. Furthermore, Nicaragua improved its labour force
participation in the region, whose strengths at the global level are a decisive score in the
Education Attainment subindex – it closed 99.96% of its gender gap, Health and
Survival, where the country closed 100% of its gender gap and Political Empowerment,
where the country ranks 4th among 142 countries. Between 2006 and 2014, the index
suggests that only 95% of the countries measured showed an improvement across
time. Still, the higher pace of this improvement – by 10% or more - is somewhat
restricted to Nicaragua, France and Ecuador due to their political indicators of gender,
while most countries have improved between 1-5%. In the table below, it is possible to
notice that Nicaragua is the only country represented in the quadrant of “countries
above the median score and improving” at higher levels of percentage of change and
overall score in 2006, despite its shortcomings in the economic participation gap, with
Nicaragua heading the bottom of the ranking (from 91st to 95th position, with a score of
0.635 out of 1).
Fig. 23 Nicaragua’s levels of improvement in score compared to the global gender gap index’s
overall evaluations
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Source: Global Gender Gap Index Report (2014).

While for countries, the GGI indicated key areas of work in legislation,
for corporate companies, the report highlights the role of business in promoting gender
parity at the national and global levels. The most successful practices for gender parity,
according to the GGI (2014, p. 45), are leadership and company commitment to lead
diversity efforts; the creation of accountability mechanisms to track gender imbalances
and create target setting; building awareness against gender-based discrimination in
management policies; the use of gendered work-life balance policies in corporate
settings; mentoring and training for women; and diversity training and engagement with
the value chain through gender parity-focused civil society and public sector initiatives’.

Fig. 24 World Economic Forum’s Repository of Successful Practices for Gender Parity
Leadership and ‘Visible leadership by the chief executive and top management on supporting women
company in management has proven to be one of the most important levers for progress in
commitment achieving gender diversity in a corporate context. This includes concrete and
symbolic actions by top management and, in many cases, the establishment of a
position or department to lead diversity efforts’ (p. 45).
Measurement and Achievable, relevant recruitment and retention targets at all levels, with an
target setting embedded accountability mechanism, are critical. Developing a disaggregated
database can help to evaluate the causes of gender imbalances and track progress.
Transparent salary bands to track and address male and female salary gaps are
additional useful tools to understand the status quo in organizations
Awareness and ‘The focus of many companies on building awareness indicates that the case for
accountability change still needs to be built to make progress. Accountably of the senior
management and transparency of career paths and opportunities have proven to be
effective practices. Ensuring that management policies, processes, systems and
tools do not harbour genderbiased discrimination and enhancing the understanding
of unconscious biases can also make inclusive leadership more tangible’
Work ‘Women are often the primary caregiver for both children and the elderly in most
environment and countries. Ensuring smooth on- and off-ramping; appropriate childcare options;
work- life balance developing guidelines on implementation of work-life balance policies and mentoring
for women going through a transition are important levers to ensure a sustained
career progression towards management’
Mentorship and ‘Companies have benefitted from programmes that promote guidelines on the value
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training of diversity as an underlying culture of the organization; impart knowledge on how to

manage a more diverse workforce; and how to attract, retain and promote female
talent. These training programmes, for both men and women, can be relevant for
shaping an environment within the broader employee base for women to
successfully lead’.
Responsibility ‘Many companies have leveraged the opportunity to exercise external influence
beyond the office along the value chain including diversity training for suppliers, distributors and
partners and training to support women-owned businesses in the organization’s
value chain. External influence can also be exercised by ensuring gender neutrality
in advertising, engaging girls and young women to display possible career paths and
developing partnerships with gender parity-focused civil society and public sector
initiatives’.
Source: GGI REPORT (2014, p. 45).

Though Nicaragua’s global performance was visibly improving from

2006 to 2014, in 2015, the country was ranked 12th among 145 countries. Therefore, it
was measured among the top 15 best performers worldwide. It went from 6th place, with
0.789 (2014) to 0.776 (2015). However, at the regional level, Nicaragua is viewed as the
best performer in Latin America and Caribe: ‘It has closed the gender gap fully on both
Educational Attainment and Health and Survival, and on ‘Political Empowerment it is the
highest-ranking country of the region and fourth in the world, with more than 50% of the
gender gap now closed’ (p. 21). Because Nicaragua is understood to be following a
progressive pattern to close the gaps in gender equality in the region, the country
remains a role model to the worst performers in the region: Belize (103th place),
Guatemala (106th place), Paraguay (107th place). Not only those three countries are
considered the worst performers in the region, but their performance is also indicative of
the opposite trend of Nicaragua’s development: they had regressed not only in the
overall ranking but in almost all indicators of gender, including Political Empowerment
(GGI REPORT, 2015, p. 22-23). In comparison to the scores of countries from the same
income group42, Nicaragua is also considered a leader: it has had a superior (maximum)
performance in all areas: overall index, economy, education, health and politics, as it is
possible to notice in the table below.

Fig. 25. Nicaragua’s position in comparison to the scores of countries from the same income
group

42
Countries from the same income group (LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME (US$ 1,046–4,125) as
Nicaragua: Philippines, Bolivia, Moldova, Kenya, Cape Verde, Lao PDR, Lesotho, El Salvador,
Ghana, Bangladesh, Guyana, Ukraine, Senegal, Kyrgyz Republic, Honduras, Georgia, Vietnam,
Sri Lanka, Cameroon*, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Swaziland, Armenia, Guatemala, India, Zambia,
Bhutan, Nigeria, Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen (GGI
REPORT 2015, p. 17).
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Source: GGI Report 2015 (p. 275).

In 2016, Nicaragua re-enters the ‘top 10’ in the global ranking among
142 countries covered, scoring 0.780 out of 1; at the same time, the country
strengthened its regional performance in Latin America and Caribe. In other words, the
country is understood to have closed 78% of its overall gender gap, estimated to be
relatively close to the best performer in the world – Iceland, a country that closed 87%
of its gender gap and is superior to the average of gender gaps closed worldwide (68%)
(Fig below). The main relative strengths of Nicaragua are Educational Attainment (score
1, suggesting the achievement of full parity) and Health and Survival (score 1,
suggesting the accomplishment of full parity), where the country ranked 1st at the global
level, having fully closed any gender gaps in both areas. Nicaragua’s achievements are
considered remarkable when compared to the underperformance of – at least 17
countries worldwide - that record gaps wider than 10% and 20% in educational
attainment (p. 19). Second, in Political Empowerment, Nicaragua has ranked 4th (score
of 0.506 out of 1). The main category where Nicaragua’s performance fell short was
within the subindex of Economic Participation and Opportunity, ranking 92nd (0.632 out
of 1), above the world average of 0.586.

Fig. 26 Nicaragua’s overall position in each subindex

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Source: Adapted from GGI Report (2016, p. 5; 17).

To track and advise on the development of countries, the GGI (2015) is
one of the first reports to comment on the effects of care work on the country’s levels of
global competitiveness. According to the report, there is a relationship between gender
gaps in paid work and gender gaps in unpaid work, with the first being an indicator of
the latter. Though unpaid work conducted by women varies, the index argues that the
deployment of women’s human capital should leverage into transforming the ‘care
infrastructure’ of countries through care policies. For the GGI, ‘stronger care-related
policies could enhance women’s economic participation and re-balance care roles in the
home’ between the sexes (p. 36). Specifically, the GGI connects care-related policies to
the cooperation provided by public-private partnerships based on (1) financial
arrangements, (2) working provisions for female workers that are mothers, (3) direct
care services.
In 2017, ‘Nicaragua (6) defends its place in the global top 10 and
remains the best-performing country in the region for the sixth year in a row’ (GGI, 2017,
p. 7). Ranked in 6th place (0.814 overall scores out of 1) among 144 countries,
Nicaragua is analyzed as having closed 81.4% of its gender gaps that year, an
important achievement in comparison to the global weighted average of 68% and the
average in Latin America and the Caribbean of 70%. Partly due to Nicaragua’s
performance, the region of Latin America and Caribe is understood to be one of the
fastest-improving regions in closing gender gaps at the global level since 2006. In
contrast to other countries in the region, Nicaragua is one of the 18 countries that had
improved their overall score instead of being one of the six countries that regressed in
performance. Though Bolivia is considered the second-best performer after Nicaragua
in the region, with an overall score of 0.758, the country has one of ‘the worst-
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performing country in the region on the Educational Attainment subindex’, ranked in

108th position (p. 20). Meanwhile, in terms of educational attainment, Nicaragua is
interpreted as achieving full parity with a maximum score estimated by the GGI (1.0 out
1.0).
Similarly, in the subindex of health and survival and Political
Empowerment, Nicaragua reaches the ‘top 5’ best positions worldwide: 1 st place in
health and survival, scoring 0.980; and 2 nd place in Political Empowerment, scoring
0.576 (p. 10). According to the GGI (2017), the main challenge in gender equality in the
country pertains to the area of Economic Opportunity, where the country ranks 54 th – an
improvement when compared to previous years – but a moderate performance of 0.702,
slightly higher than the world average of 0.585, nevertheless. Based on all the criteria
considered to measure the economic realm in Nicaragua, including labour force
participation, wage equality for similar work, estimated earned income, legislators,
senior officials and managers, rates of professional and technical workers, the area
where Nicaragua performs worst is the rates of labour force participation, in which the
country ranks 115th among 144 countries, with a score of 0.631 below the world average
of 0.667 (p. 258-9).
Fig. 27 Nicaragua’s country profile

Source: Global Gender Gap Report (2017, p. 257).

In 2018, the index further claimed the connections between the

systemic structure and global gender challenges. The index frames global challenges of
gender as being the ‘solution’ for the challenges posed by the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (4IR). According to the report, gender inequity can be noticed in terms of the
country’s deprivation of female talent in the global economy, as women make for half of
humanity, and the only way for humanity to ‘cope with increasingly fast technological
change and ensure broad-based progress for all’ would be to take advantage of
women’s skills and perspectives in economic sectors and technology-based areas, such
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as Artificial Intelligence. The report’s key findings suggest the following records in global
gender disparities: 77.1% for Political Empowerment; 41.9% for Economic Participation
and Opportunity gap; 4.4% and 4.6% for Educational Attainment and Health and
Survival (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2018, p. 7). Though no country has achieved
full gender equality, the index analyzes the top seven countries in the rankings as
having closed at least 80%. It establishes that those countries are projected to be the
first in the world to ever achieve gender equality in the near future.
In terms of Nicaragua’s performance, the index accessed Nicaragua as
the 5th best performer (score of 0.804 out of 1) among 149 countries, behind Iceland
(0.858), Norway (0.835), Sweden (0.822) and Finland (0.821). Not only had Nicaragua
been interpreted to have passed the world average in gender equity, but Nicaragua also
outperformed every country from the G20 Group - Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain,
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the U.S. and the EU, Latin American Region
and countries from the same income group (LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME (US$ 1,046–
4,125) to which the country is attributed to, including the Philippines, Bolivia, Moldova,
Kenya, Cape Verde, Lao PDR, Lesotho, El Salvador, Ghana, Bangladesh, Guyana,
Ukraine, Senegal, Kyrgyz Republic, Honduras, Georgia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka,
Cameroon*, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Swaziland, Armenia, Guatemala, India, Zambia,
Bhutan, Nigeria, Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, and the three worst world
performers in gender equity of 2018: Syria, Pakistan, Yemen. When it comes to its
performance in Economic Participation and Opportunity, Nicaragua ranks 69th (0.679).
Interestingly, in comparison to the other ‘most-gender equal countries’ in the world –
Nordic countries, Nicaragua outperforms most Nordic countries in three out of 4 areas
measured: in Health and Survival, for example, Nicaragua is ranked 1st with a score of
0.980, while Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland rank: 121st, 95th, 115th and 60th,
respectively. In Educational Attainment, Nicaragua surpasses three out of four ‘most-
gender equal countries’. It ranks 36th place (1.00) as opposed to the top 3: Iceland,
Norway and Sweden, ranking 39th, 41st, and 52nd, respectively. As for Political
Empowerment, Nicaragua ranks 2nd best with a score of 0.576, outperforming Norway,
Sweden and Finland, whose rankings are 3d, 7th and 6th, respectively, as shown in the
figure below:

Fig. 28 Nicaragua’s ranking in Gender Gaps compared by country, world average and in the G20
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group

Source: Adapted from Global Gender Gap Report (2018, p. 8-9, 19-20).

Regarding the year 2019, the most gender-equal countries in the world
reported are Iceland (1st, having closed 88.8% of its gender gap), Norway (2nd, 84.2%),
Finland (3rd, 83.2%), Sweden (4th, 82.0%) and Nicaragua (5th, 80.4%) (GLOBAL
GENDER GAP INDEX REPORT, 2020, p. 6), the latter showing a decrease of -0.005 in
comparison to the score of 2018. More than that, in 2019, Nicaragua is understood to
have the biggest overall increase in score among 173 countries: from 0.6566 to 0.804, a
rise of +0.147. The only other countries who had reached this milestone of overall
progress in gender equity in 2006’s edition were France (15th place, 0.781, increase of
+0.129), Albania (20th, 0.769, growth of +0.108), Mexico (25th place, 0.754, increase of
+0.108), Ethiopia (82nd place, 0.705, increase of +0.111) and Nepal (101th place, 0.680,
increase of +0.132) (idem, p. 9). Besides, Nicaragua attains gender parity in
Educational Attainment and Health and Survival, rises to the third place in the Political
Empowerment gender gap in the world (43.5% of gender gap yet to close), since
‘Nicaragua has more women in ministerial positions than men, and has been led by a
female head of state for almost seven years of the past 50’ (idem, p. 28). Nevertheless,
in the subindex of Economic Participation and Opportunity, Nicaragua demonstrates a
relatively poor performance (81st in the global ranking, 0.671 in parity), driven by its
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persistent low rates of labour force participation (53.9% of them are in the labour
market, versus 86% of men) and relatively large wage gaps (45% of this gap is yet to be
bridged) (p. 28). According to the GGI’s evaluation, some of the challenges associated
with the higher gaps in the area of Economy include the following:

The participation of women in the labour market is concentrated in part-

time jobs (51.4% of working women are employed part-time) and few
women rise to managerial positions (approximately 35% of these
positions are filled by women). These aspects show that, although
Nicaragua attains a strong performance overall, there are still some
important areas for improvement to better leverage female talent in the
labour market. In parallel, further investments in skills and education
should support better opportunities for all Nicaraguan citizens. For
instance, secondary enrolment rates remain low for both boys and girls
(52% and 44%, respectively), and greater efforts should be made to
increase human capital in the country (p. 28-29).

In the subindex of Economic Participation and Opportunity, it is possible

to notice that Nicaragua falls short in the global ranking of Labour force participation
rate %. Ranking in the 120th position worldwide (0.627), with a score below the world
average of 0.661, Nicaragua struggles to integrate women into formal employment.
Similarly, in wage equality rates, Nicaragua ranks in 112th place, with a score of 0.560
below the global average of 0.613 (p. 267). Based on the GGI projections for regions
struggling in the economic area, Nicaragua’s stakeholders – businesses and
governments ought to address economic challenges together in the form of public-
private partnerships to accelerate gender parity (impact-focused initiatives), so both
actors can generate ‘a new economic and social narrative for action and on coordinating
and speeding up the process of change’. On the one hand, companies need to focus on
leveraging gender diversity, and governments should act on policies for talent
development for all genders and diversification of leadership pools.
Finally, in an overall view, based on the data and interpretation shown
during the past paragraphs, the trajectory of Nicaragua with gender equity from 2006 to
2019 is unique in comparison to all 178 countries measured across the years. According
to the portrayal of Nicaragua in each edition, it was possible to notice the changes in the
narratives about the conditions of gender equity experienced by sexes in the country in
four areas: Educational attainment, Health and Survival, Political Empowerment and
Economic Participation and Opportunity. Nevertheless, the country’s improvement is
impressive, especially if compared to the other world leaders in gender equity, who –
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distinctly from Nicaragua- have always been evaluated as the best countries in matters
of gender equity. Opposed to its peers from the ‘top 5’ – namely Nordic countries,
Nicaragua was interpreted as the fastest-growing country in matters of equity. It went
from being interpreted as one of the worst countries for women to one that pursues the
lowest levels of gender disparities, advantaged scenarios for women in terms of health
and survival, educational attainment and a remarkable sign of ‘women’s political
participation in the country. Considering the criteria of data collection, measurement and
country analysis used by the GGI in each area, Nicaragua arrived in 2019 as one of the
most gender equal countries, with projected times for the country to achieve full gender
equity lower than the world average (257 years), despite its major challenges in the
subarea of Economic Participation and Opportunity. However, the case of Nicaragua’s
evolution over the years and world leadership in the fight against gender disparities also
raises important questions about the politics behind forms of quantitative measurement
and interpretation of the GGI, considering the political crisis of anti-gender nature lived
at the domestic level.
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4. “CONFLICTING NARRATIVES ABOUT GENDER EQUALITY IN NICARAGUA”:

ANALYZING THE GOVERNING FUNCTIONS OF THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP
INDEX AT PLAY AND BEYOND

In this chapter, I provide a critical assessment of how the political

functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index help to foster an informal regime of
governance of gender in world politics, based on the case study of Nicaragua’s global
leadership in gender equality portrayed the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) in
contrast to the experiences of anti-gender politics and violence exercised at the local
level, from 2006 to 2019. After all, the World Economic Forum's work on gender and
development with neoliberal-compatible discourses, as well as its experience with the
benchmarking of nation’s competitiveness and increase of female representation in the
annual meeting in Davos, suggest the forms ‘in which the corporate sector has come to
play an ever more significant role in the governance of gender and development issues’
(ELIAS, 2013, p. 152). To advance this discussion, I engage with Foucault’s
power/knowledge lens and feminist insights to explore the social meanings and
implications of the Global Gender Gap Index to international relations based on the
case of Nicaragua. As we build an argument about the political functions of the GGI in
fostering governance of gender based on the case of Nicaragua, I first recognize power
as ‘the ability of one entity to influence the action of another entity’ within displays of
force relations that are pervasive to life in society, so we can discuss the extent to which
the global gender gap index works not only as a global indicator of gender - that is, a
scientific product produced by an organization – but as a device intrinsically embedded
in a network of relations of power and knowledge in international affairs. To reflect on
the Global Gender Gap Index's political functions is to make sense of their data
(collection, sources, coding), analyze, limit, and, most importantly, it is to centre the
quantitative and qualitative work of this global indicator of gender in its relationship to
the exertion of power, management and discipline over social actors.
During the previous chapter, I presented an overview of the history and
work produced by the Global Gender Gap Index, exposing its projections at the global
level and in the case of Nicaragua. Once again, I call attention to the connection
between the global gender gap index and its responsible institution – the World
Economic Forum, because the data infrastructure created at the expense of the Global
Gender Gap Index is undoubtedly grounded in the political project of this institution. For
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example, the WEF's core mission is aligned with corporate governance practices to
advance stakeholder capitalism and build resilient communities of public-private
cooperation in the face of global economic challenges. This institutional framing of the
world economy and affairs speaks volumes to the argument that data produced by the
organization does not represent the neutral output. After all, for feminist perspectives of
science, the ‘extraction, production and interpretation’ of large datasets often answer to
the three S’s – science, surveillance and selling led by corporations, with life-altering
consequences for those contexts that are being measured and categorized (D’IGNAZIO
and KLEIN, 2020, p. 45).
Over 13 years (2006 – 2019), the Global Gender Gap Index and its
annual analyzes and ranks of countries have established itself with sufficient scientific
authority over the diagnosis and interpretation of gender issues at the global level. Little
to no other global indicator of gender continues to receive global attention in every
report published in the media and local news. What sets the Global Gender Gap Index
apart from other indicators of gender is, perhaps, its overall emphasis not only on
quantitively measuring countries' levels of gender inequality (instead of women’s
empowerment or development) but it is the comparative focus that places no weight in
countries’ levels of economic resources in the global economy, as well as its functioning
as a global ranking of gender rather than a mere indicator of demographic statistics.
Along with these starting points about the distinctiveness of the Global Gender Gap
Index as a global ranking of gender, I join a Foucauldian-inspired perspective about the
study and social role of quantitative forms of knowledge employed by political
institutions. Where authors such as Clough and Willse highlight ‘the consolidation of
apparatuses for organizing, assessing, and investing populations in terms of the
biopolitical (in)capacities of life and death’ as critical mechanisms of violence in
contemporary politics (2014, p. 4), this dissertation is concerned with a less visible, and
certainly more subtle case of assessing interpretations at the global level based on
countries’ efficiency capabilities of ‘performing gender equity’, with a special focus on
lessons provided by the case of Nicaragua.
Though we explored some of the reasons for the popularity of the
creation and use of global indicators in international institutions in the previous chapter
based on Merry (2015), it is worth mentioning that the Global Gender Gap Index fits with
the overall demand for large-scale data about social issues that can be standardly
measured, analyzed, and translated into supposedly ‘reliable’ non-political forms of
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knowledge: numbers (quantitative work). At first sight, the quantitative results embodied
by the Global Gender Gap Index Reports promise substantial knowledge about the
evolution of national gender disparities, with global projections of gender, rankings and
development of agenda-setting to tackle inequality and foster the country’s
competitiveness. It is noticeable how those technical and managerial purposes can
obscure the political and cultural assumptions that shape the Global Gender Gap Index
quantitative measurement and analysis. In the power-knowledge framework about
global indicators, Davis et al (2015) maintain the production of global indicators and
rankings comprises an inherently political process if we consider they are built based on
the authoritative power ‘to categorize, count, analyze, and promote a system of
knowledge that has effects’ in governance (p. 1). On that note, before diving into our
case study of Nicaragua, when describing the Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006
– 2019) as a system of knowledge in international relations, I consider the following
processes concerning this global indicator: infrastructure of data collection, production
and interpretation, conceptualization-framings of gender, forms of use and impact in the
global governance of gender. I agree with Roses (p. 18) that rendering the reality
thinkable through global indicators is to render it governable. Furthermore, I expand this
perspective by discussing the ways reality is rendered thinkable and governable by the
global gender gap index in gendered terms and for gendered purposes in international
affairs.
From a Foucaultian methodological reflection (FOUCAULT, 1979, p. 5),
I disentangle the political functions of government of the global gender gap index
starting from the governmental rationalities and praxis identified within this tool of
quantification and move from there to uncover the framings of the ‘universal’ categories
of government (state, political institutions, citizens, society and sovereign), so that we
can notice how these universals (state, institutions, citizens, society) of international
relations are modulated and transformed by conjunction with other praxis in history. In
other words, Foucault asks the following question: what can we do from the ‘universals’
(institutions, concepts, forms of understanding reality) by first describing and
understanding them based on the practices that structure them instead of taking
universals as given? The main universals I take into account, per the description of the
global gender gap index’s traits as a text, are gender equality and inequality, states,
economy and global competition and governance of gender.
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Following Baez’s Foucauldian analytics that consider technologies of

government in terms of texts, I interpret the global gender gap index reports as a ‘text’ –
an artefact that creates meanings through different means beyond written forms, in
which ‘things are invented so as to justify their governance’ (p. 2). The point of treating
the GGI reports and quantified measures as a text is not to downplay the non-linguistic
aspects of the indicator but to theorize the GGI’s measurement and interpretation of
Nicaragua as a complex linguistic text that also relies on a material infrastructure of data
collection, production and interpretation that generate forms of government and games
of truth. Arguably, not all forms of knowledge are necessarily tied to forms of
government or effective forms of political intervention. But, according to Baez, particular
forms of power use knowledge to incite action and change the conduct of actors in
governable terms. Therefore, the case of the Global Gender Gap Index is one of many
examples of devices whose text functions as forms of government based on different
technologies of power. As Merry points out in her evaluation of global indicators of
gender-based violence, I maintain that the Global Gender Gap Index uses numbers to
craft and conjure broader narratives about gender equality between sexes in each
country in relation to each other, with wider discursive and material consequences in
international affairs. First and foremost, the indicator addresses a language of feminist
social justice in its terms to define what is being measured as gender equality, how
gender equality can be understood and achieved, whose subjects are responsible, and
what set of actions social actors need to engage with to improve their behaviour and
maximize optimal positions in the global rankings.
To analyze the quantification of gender inequality and the numbers
behind each measurement in Nicaragua’s experience, one must consider what the
numbers of the GGI represent – for they represent not only the size and scope of an
issue such as gender inequality between sexes but in Merry’s words, but the
establishment of global standards of counting, data collecting, thinking, projecting the
issue of gender inequality and taking action for the sake of country’s status and
economy. Two things should be put in perspective: in the global gender gap index,
gender inequality – a nonobjective phenomenon – is turned into a measurable category.
Therefore it becomes the object of measurement and interpretation through arbitrary
processes of commensurability. As I evaluate, gender inequality – the main feature
measured and ranked in countries – including Nicaragua, ‘embody the assumptions
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about what should be counted, how to understand material reality’ (MERRY, 2015, p.
36).
Inside a Foucaultian toolbox, power includes rationalities, techniques
and practices to direct behaviour and action in a web of relations. Therefore, the global
gender gap index’s forms of engagement with quantitative measurement and
interpretation of Nicaragua through the years attend to major forms of discipline and
government at the structure of global governance of gender, as shall be explained
during this chapter. Based on Foucault’s (1997, p. 88) concept of power as government,
I call attention to the strategies, techniques and procedures employed by the global
gender gap index reports to guide and control states’ conduct in gender relations in
international affairs. Despite the Foucaultian consideration centered on ‘governmental
technologies have human life as their object’ (LEMKE, 2009, p. 51), in the case of the
global gender gap index, we have a governmental technology of gender that has state
life as their first object of intervention before arriving at human life in the individual and
populational level, the reason why I chose to focus on a single case study to investigate
such phenomena. Suppose quantification helps the government through numbers in
transnational governance processes (DEMORTAIN, 2019, p. 275), and the global
gender gap index emerges as one of the most stable and reliable quantitative tools for
gender inequality for cross-country comparison, ranking and agenda-setting (ELIAS,
2013). Furthermore, I take the case study of Nicaragua to move my discussion forward
toward the analysis of the political functions exerted by the GGI reports on the
governance of gender in international affairs, so we can untangle the specific processes
to which the numbers, interpretations and rankings provided by the GGI are most
expressive to what the literature calls ‘neoliberal governmentality of gender’ (Peterson
and Runyan, 2011; Prugl, 2015). I invoke such interpretation of the GGI’s political
functions as a form to expand Elias’s analysis about the World Economic Forum-
produced gender and development discourse, whose production of neoliberal-
compatible female subjectivities is aligned with the politics and practices of
neoliberalism (p. 152).
The case of Nicaragua is central to this analysis because it allows us to
dig deeper into how the GGI assesses countries individually and what implications of
this type of measurement are to gender issues that take place at the international and
domestic levels. I do not intend to argue that the GGI has direct (causal) implications for
Nicaragua’s domestic or foreign policy toward gender equality. However, I will discuss
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some commonalities shared by the index as a text in Foucauldian terms regarding the
national gender project of Nicaragua under Ortega’s administration. It is not my intention
to discuss the GGI as a tool of power that is enforcing a form of governance; I would
rather argue that the GGI is part or mutually constitutive of a web of power relations that
reveal a fragment of the political functions of statistical aggregates in the attempt of
governance over a social issue – in this case, gender equality. It is in this explicative
spirit that I look at the case of Nicaragua’s global leadership of gender – reported by the
GGI, considering its ambiguity, its novelty for a country from the Global South and its
potential to claim and use numbers as a repertoire of government and discipline in
broader areas of governance. To explain such engagement, I recur to Erkilla and
Pironne’s (2018) model, in which global indicators present governing functions based on
the successful execution of four processes in the context of global governance:
objectification, subjectification, depoliticization or arena shifting and legitimation.
In objectification, ‘ambiguous—often subjective—ideas and concepts
are turned into well-defined and collectively shared knowledge products’ (idem, p. 25).
The process of objectification at the global gender gap index displays a new language
of global social change. For one, we should consider the GGI’s novel approach towards
gender equity as if ‘gender equity’ itself is a material asset or resource to advance a
country’s status in the global economy rather than a structural trait of oppression and
disadvantage takes different forms in patriarchal societies. Specifically, the GGI
structures itself based on the correlation between countries’ gender gaps and national
competitiveness within the economy (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2020, p. 30),
arguing that for countries to remain competitive, they must create conditions for gender
equality by maximizing the engagement with the nation’s human capital development’
(p. 33). In the rationale provided by the GGI, countries’ long-term economic growth and
productivity can be accelerated and expanded if countries would invest in ‘gender
equality’ as a core aspect of national projects (‘priority area for reform’) (WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, 2007, p. 20). To that extent, the GGI stresses gender equality,
use of female talent and expanding men’s rights to women as the solution ‘to leverage a
country competitiveness and development’ (idem). As such, we ought to invoke critical
analysis on the use of the language of gender equality and women’s empowerment
through international institutions has shown the extent to which feminist language has
been ‘inserted’ into the international development industry, especially at the Millenium
Declaration and Millenium Development Goals. In such contexts, both terms – gender
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equality and women’s empowerment - ‘have been eviscerated of conceptual and

political promises (…) to demand rights and justice’ (CORNWALL and RIVAS, 2015, p.
1). On that note, I argue that a similar phenomenon occurs with the employment of
“feminist language” by the Global Gender Gap Index, as already demonstrated by Elias
(2013), in which the ‘WEF’s attempts to articulate a neoliberal-compatible gender and
development discourse is that women, rather than men, emerge as the archetypal
neoliberal subject—as those in society most capable of ensuring the right kind of
market-led economic development’ (ELIAS, 2013, p. 153).
Most western feminist traditions in theory and advocacy address gender
inequality as a structural subject to be tackled by and through collective action from
grassroots movements against patriarchal and gendered forms of power-making that
privilege masculine forms over feminine to subordinate women, though the theoretical
alignments and specific goals vary depending on one’s vision of feminism (BENERÍA et
al, 2018). In contrast to this perspective, the GGI’s framing of gender equality (and
inequality) at the countries’ levels deserves our consideration due to its incompatibility
with gender inequality in social justice languages and feminist theories. That said, this
dissertation highlights the GGI’s language of gender is a rhetoric and shift in meaning-
making of how nations should understand gender inequality using a historically ‘feminist’
language for social change and yet attaching new meanings to the relationship between
gender inequality, populations and country competitiveness in the global markets.
According to Lehman's (2019, p. 6) analysis of the Global Gender Gap Index, the
language used by the index silences issues of violence against women by turning
gender equality into something that can be solved through a ‘business case’, as it
follows:

The language (*in the GGI) includes investment in girls, women as

consumers and impacts on competitiveness. Claiming an objective
measure in using ratios while claiming the WEF drives change for
betterment is an example of symbolic violence under which impacts on
women are naturalized into the language of business objectives which
claim dominant and normalized conviction. Through a particular
business language, a mindset is molded and developed toward
privileging competitiveness, consumerism and profits. A movement is
lauded not for social justice aims per se but for “deliverables” to the
business community and economy. Measures are needed to prevent
loss articulated with gentle advocacy, as if natural (idem, p. 6).
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Drawing on Lehman’s (2019) critical reflection of accounting practices

conducted by the GGI, I maintain that the GGI has removed the feminist ideological
character of gender inequality and politicized the global issue in new areas of concern,
whose target was not necessarily people but countries’ behaviour. To count gender
inequality in terms of educational attainment, economic opportunity, political
empowerment and health and survival – restricting the quantification process to birth
and death rates, for example – ignores a large area of concern for gender inequity in
feminist terms and at the societal level. Defining, quantifying, and measuring gender
inequality around these four parameters enables the government of gender to conform
to the numbers present in criteria, scale and field of action. It is, in many ways, to model
and attempts to optimize countries’ behaviour in specific directions based on their
supposedly ranked ‘performance’ as reported by the numerical and governance
authority of the index from the World Economic Forum. In his power-knowledge
framework, Foucault explains that “there can be no possible exercise of power without a
certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this
association” (1986, p. 229), calling attention to the dissemination of regimes of truth to
render power operational.
Second, at the global gender gap index, the unit of analysis is nation-
states instead of populations or individuals, which also makes the unit of analysis – or
the national accounts that distinguish the conditions of one country from another, a set
of political and technical choices that demand decision making and subjective criteria
from the expertise team of the indicator. That said, the number 1 in the global gender
gap index – whose meaning is full gender equality – tells us the story of maximum
efficiency and ideal achievement to be set as global standards of a country’s levels of
gender equality. In contrast, the number 0 tells us about abnormal and suboptimal
countries’ experiences with gender equality, necessarily below the minimum standards
of gender equality and policies. In other words, the spectrum of numbers quantified as
countries’ performance in the GGI holds the political power to exercise public
international authority over gender matters to countries, leaders, and populations.
Narratives of success and failure of countries’ performance of gender equity by the
indicator illustrate how the social phenomena of gender equality can be rendered ‘real’,
‘governable’ and ‘disciplined’ around specific areas of action and numerical
quantification. Of course, each index and resulting outputs depend on an extensive data
collection and production infrastructure to feed information into the GGI. The key
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starting point is the infrastructure of data collection used to build the yearly evaluations
and rankings produced by the GGI. Interestingly, as shown in this dissertation (p. 55)
and World Economic Forum (2019, p. 45-46), in terms of sources, it is useful to recall
that global data that feeds the global gender gap index for Economic participation and
opportunity is derived from at least four sources: reports and modelled estimates from
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and its section of statistics, the World
Economic Forum – the organization that produces the indicator and Executive Opinion
Survey (EOS) answered by corporate leaders who share membership in the World
Economic Forum; The pieces of ‘raw information’ collected through those sources are
compiled, re-organized and presented as an objective description of country’s levels of
gender equality.
As Merry (2016) explains, indicators act as technologies of knowledge
embedded in governance frameworks and power relations. This intertwining can be
examined from what is considered relevant enough to be quantified and measured
within a research theme or agenda. Thus, the GGI displays its objectification of gender
equality and disparity around four basic categories (1) Economic Participation and
Opportunity; (2) Education; (3) Health and Survival and (4) Political Empowerment) and
14 indicators allow us to point out more precisely which elements are considered
politically important by the indicator's formulator - the World Economic Forum, as they
drive a production of knowledge that grants privilege to the above criteria, leaving aside,
for example, the measurement of issues or forms of disparity between the sexes with
regard, for example, to gender violence in its various contexts (domestic violence, in the
workplace, harassment and exploitation sexual intercourse, in contexts of displacement,
among others). By seeking to systematize and simplify the understanding of the global
gender disparity in national units, the GGI sanitizes the understanding of how
oppression makes women's experiences vulnerable around the globe, highlighting the
collection of data through databases of United Nations agencies, World Bank and
executive surveys of the World Economic Forum – which accounts for 1/3 of the data
collection for the sub-index Economic Participation and Opportunity, carried out with its
working groups in the business sector around the world.
Hence, what are the implications of cognitive restrictions in framing
gender equality, and how do they answer political questions of the governance of
gender? By dislodging gender inequality from its main components – gendered
violence, structural sexism and society – the index successfully reinscribes gender
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equality as a performance of capabilities in using the nation’s human capital. Had a

country used and invested in its human capital fully, the more gender equal that country
would be evaluated in its global performance. To illustrate such a description, the GGI
frames that ‘gender-based inequality prevents societies as a whole, women and men,
from reaching their full potential’ (2006, p. 3). Such description is compatible with a
narrative of women’s empowerment and gender equality that has emerged in the
contemporary business and development agenda (CORNWALL and RIVAS, 2015, p. 1).
In feminist thought and social work, Cornwall clarifies that empowerment entails the
transformation of power relations contingent upon someone’s positionality rather than
principles to foster women’s inclusion in a domain concerning their male peers: ‘it
concerns the relations of power in which people are located, within which they may
experience disempowerment or come to acquire the ‘ability to make strategic life
choices’, and it is contingent on a prior or future state’.
Furthermore, ‘it is not just about improving women’s capacities to cope
with situations in which they experience oppression or injustice’ (p. 10). Nevertheless,
when women’s empowerment is employed in conjunction with languages of gender
equality in the Global Gender Gap Index, one can notice the GGI uses a feminist
language in similar ways to the ones explored in previous developmental agendas, such
as the Millennium Development Goals, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Far from an isolated framing of gender, women’s empowerment is a powerful language
in the history of the international development industry and significant human rights
instruments. More than that, scholars contend that The Beijing Platform for Action
(1995) established a global call for women’s empowerment in political participation,
educational attainment, reproductive health and rights, employment and economic
resources, among others (MOGHADAM and SENFTOVA, 2005, p. 289). In all of those,
‘the intrinsic value of women’s empowerment (…)” is associated with “‘unleashing
potential’ and harnessing the power of billions of women workers and their
transformative economic effects as the producers and consumers who will drive growth”
(CORNWALL and RIVAS, 2015, p. 11).
In this sense, where Runyan and Peterson (2012, p. 126) sustain that
Gender Equality Indices are used for the global institutionalization of gender equality,
with the World Economic Forum and Global Gender Gap Index as examples of the
participation of corporate actors in the governance of gender equality, I join their
feminist foucaultian interpretation of such phenomena as forms of neoliberal
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governmentality based on the production of feminized, ‘good economic woman’ and

entrepreneurial subjectivities. More specifically, I attend to the notion of
‘neoliberalisation of feminism’ (PRUGL, 2015, p. 4) to analyze the ‘the interweaving of
feminist ideas into rationalities and technologies of neoliberal governmentality’. To that, I
consider neoliberalism in the foucautian sense, understanding its multidimensional
character as a cultural formation in the mixed form of a rationality and orthodoxy
economics in which marked-based forms of government occurs. For example, the GGI’s
edition in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis points out that the skills and talent of
the female human resource pool are one of the cornerstones of economic growth
available to countries and companies. Moreover, ‘as consumers, voters, employees and
employers, women will be integral to global economic recovery’ (GLOBAL GENDER
GAP INDEX, 2009, p. 05). In this sense, the rhetorical work of the GGI connects a
range of identities integral to women’s usefulness as resources in the global economy:
consumers, voters, employees and employers in the face of the financial crisis. Second,
we can notice a similar trend with the subjectification of identities but this time with
relation to ‘girls’ as ‘development investments’ with large returns to countries: ‘Girls’
education yields some of the highest returns of all development investments, yielding
both private and social benefits that accrue to individuals, families and society at large’
(GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2009, p. 47). Another demonstration is seen when the
GGI claims that ‘educated girls who become mothers are more likely to send their
children to school, passing on and multiplying benefits. This breaks the
intergenerational chain of poverty’ (idem). By connecting girlhood, motherhood and the
end of poverty, the GGI establishes new relationships in which girls are the bearers of
‘global solutions’ for countries’ growth (“girls’ education and its multiplier effects”),
similarly to Cornwall’s analysis on empowerment-gendered discourses promoted at the
World Bank and Development Goals Agenda for the United Nations. Thus, the World
Economic Forum, supported by the knowledge and scientific authority provided by the
GGI, acts as an agent of neoliberal governmentality and the latter, a technology of
power and knowledge. It governs gender equality (or, as I will expand on later based on
the case of Nicaragua: national gender projects) as a co-terminal goal with the country’s
levels of economic efficiency and the maintenance of capitalism, with both states and
populations as neoliberal subjects. About this interpretation, Runyan and Peterson
(2012, p. 131-132) explain:
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‘(…) Governmentality pertains not only to state and suprastate

bureaucratic apparatuses and policies but also to civil society institutions
that enable governing on the basis of rational, scientific, and statistical
calculations and produce human subjectivities that are amenable to
being “managed” or “regulated” and even participate in self-management
or self-regulation in conformance with rationalized approaches to
“problem-solving,” now associated with “good governance” (Woehl 2008:
65–66 apud RUNYAN AND PETERSON, 132).

However, how does the case of Nicaragua illustrate the objectification

performed by the global gender gap index reports? Concerned with the optimization of
countries’ performance in gender equity based on gender gaps across four areas, the
GGI certainly provides a map of the state of gender affairs in many countries, where ‘it
ranks countries according to their proximity to gender equality rather than to women’s
empowerment’ (GGI, 2006, p. 5). From 2006 to 2019, the period to which this
dissertation refers, one could illustrate ‘the map of the state of gender affairs in
Nicaragua’ by engaging with the data from the GGI reports into two distinct moments of
Nicaragua’s contemporary history: (1) when Nicaragua is portrayed as a country whose
performance situates ‘below the average standards of gender equality’ (2006 – 2011)
and (2) when the country is represented as a ‘world leader in gender equity’ above the
standards of gender equality abroad (2012 – 2019). In these two temporal intervals
(2006 – 2011, 2012-2019), it is possible to notice precisely how the objectification
process performed by the GGI re-creates boundaries of quantification and
representation used to reflect the social world of Nicaragua.
Fig. 29 Operationalization of objectification in the GGI

Source: Developed during this dissertation.

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In addition, this type of objectification affects not only how international

actors understand gender equality in the country but also it exercises power over how
the state of Nicaragua might define gender equality at the domestic level. Each
numerical evaluation describes a four-axed scenario of gender disparity in Nicaragua in
relation to ‘an ideal standard of gender equality’ (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2013,
p. 10). GGI attribute distinct descriptions of national and global identities to ‘gender
issues’ in Nicaragua based on the GGI’s authority in scientific measurements compared
to more than 100 countries. Interestingly, because international financial institutions –
including the World Economic Forum, responsible for the development of the GGI –
framings of gender equality as a matter of modern economic efficiency’ (RUNYAN AND
PETERSON, 2012, p. 132), which along with other mechanisms open interpretation to
the neoliberal governmentality that underpins gender equality promoted at the global
level, it becomes prevalent the fact that the major shortcomings of evaluations provided
by the GGI’s with respect to the Nicaragua – political empowerment, gender-based
violence and health and survival - are related to the social construct of gender equality
as a capability. In this spirit, ‘accountability for reform resides in the “objects”
themselves’ with ‘the promotion of individual aspirations and corporate identities”
(PRÜGL, 2015) under an ‘androcentric construction of states as not responsible for the
welfare of their citizenries’ (RUNYAN AND PETERSON, 2012, p. 133). Therefore, as
this dissertation will demonstrate in the following paragraphs, little space is left in the
measurements provided by the GGI to recognize the actual violence, forms of gender
inequality and gendered challenges in Nicaragua when it comes to analyze the country
in terms of political empowerment, health and survival and socioeconomic status
beyond neoliberal rationalities assumed by the GGI to govern states as their main
objects. Moreover, I argue that the main political functions performed by the GGI can be
further traced by considering the instrumentalization of neoliberal rationalities of gender
as well as its controversial effects when we look at what has been missed in its
evaluation of Nicaragua’s levels of gender equality under a feminist analysis. Hence,
one of the political effects noticed in the GGI’s framings of gender equality in Nicaragua
is its potential to maintain the status quo of gender-based violence at the structural level
by fostering heteronormative rearrangements of gendered constructs under marketized
notions while failing to address gender equality as a systemic structure and women’s
emancipation as a critical and collective project of political transformation.
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In the time frame (2006- 2011), when Nicaragua is portrayed as a

country whose performance situates ‘below the average standards of gender equality’
(2006 – 2011), one should consider not only the objectification of gender equality into a
measurable phenomenon but also the impacts of such objectification to Nicaragua’s
state-branding in gender equality. For one, as we analyze the GGI’s narrative about
Nicaragua across the years based on the bar graph below, it becomes clear that there
are drastic changes in Nicaragua’s conditions, given the country’s levels of gender
disparity went from 62nd place in the 2006’s global ranking, below gender equity global
standards to the 27th position in 2011. Based on the analysis of the GGI, one can imply
that Nicaragua’s place in the global ranking and its poor performance in economic
participation posed a significant risk for Nicaragua’s development in the global
economy, suggesting a definite poor use of its female talent. This type of rhetoric works
as a universal global policy script of gender. For instance, the global gender gap index
report (2012, p. 58-59) highlights ‘Key areas of national policy frameworks of gender’
that are central to mitigate gender inequality at the global level and adopted by
countries that are world leaders in gender equality: parental leave, childcare assistance,
taxation system and equality and work. Moreover, it attributes ‘under-performing’
subjective identities to states, as if they were cohesive units of human behaviour instead
of political institutions and calls for action in policymaking. The political imaginary of
gender equity is altered with respect to gender and countries. Though gender equality is
treated as structural subject, in the sense that countries are compared to each other, the
content of gender equality is treated as an individual trait within the countries' domestic
structure that such countries are responsible for. The relationships between countries
created by the GGI are relative to competition, performance and ‘naming-and-shaming’
discoursive techniques. Undeniably, the GGI first report stresses the role of country
comparisons, as the following:

The country comparisons are meant to serve a dual purpose: as a

benchmark to identify existing strengths and weaknesses; and as a
useful guide for policy, based on learning from the experiences of those
countries that have had greater success in promoting the equality of
women and men. The index quantifies the gender gap within the four
critical categories— economic-, educational-, political and health- based
criteria—thus highlighting the priority areas for reform (2006, p. 3).

To exemplify this characteristic, in Nicaragua, the GGI demonstrate the

‘weakest points’ in Nicaragua's social structure of gender equality, namely economy and
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political empowerment (2006 – 2011), in which the government and international

stakeholders must take action to change it and outperform its peers. By understanding
and measuring each country within the same criteria and not accounting for the
structural and historical differences between countries, the GGI publicized shared
identities that would not be existent without the process of quantification and
objectification of gender equity. In 2006, Nicaragua ranked 62nd and performed poorly in
the subindex of Economy. However, the relational effects of the ranking allow us to
compare Nicaragua as a country that could have better conduct in gender equity if the
country mirrored the actions of the best performer in the world: Sweden. At the same
that the GGI subtly demonstrate the best performers, it is also implying the message
that such countries had somehow managed their gender disparities better than the
“worst performers” as self-responsible actors.
On that note, the case of Nicaragua enables us to expand on the
second governing function of global indicators present within the GGI. Second to the
objectification of gender equity, Erkkila and Piirone (2018) argue that subjectification is a
governing function often performed by global indicators in good governance, democracy
levels, country’s economic competitiveness and global higher education. In this
definition, subjectification takes place when ‘classifications, often obtained through
measurements, are linked to personal or collective identities’. When a global indicator
performs subjectification, it shapes new identities within political imaginaries, ‘leading
currently to the atomization of subjects—states, institutions and individuals—that are
increasingly seen to compete in global economy’ (idem, p. 31). As an illustration of the
subjectification performed by the GGI, each country will be numerically represented with
different profiles in gender disparity: in the image below, Nicaragua’s narrative of gender
disparity (2006, 2007) shows observed weaknesses (Economy and Political
Empowerment) and strengths shown by measures (Health and Survival, Educational
Attainment). Those suggest different directions for social actors and policymaking: areas
with higher scores reinforce those successful practices are taking place; while areas
considered ‘weaknesses’ of countries (low scores) indicate domains that should be
prioritized to improve Nicaragua’s efficiency in gender equity at the global level so the
country can be a world leader just as ‘best cases’ (Nordic countries). In the GGI’s words
(2006, p. 15): as strong performers in the GGI, ‘they (*Nordic countries) provide a useful
benchmark for comparison purposes and in some ways offer a model for the rest of the
world’.
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Though 2006 – 2011, Nicaragua is below global standards of gender

equity and certainly far from the conduct of the ‘world leader in gender equity’ –
Sweden, Nicaragua is nevertheless above the supposedly ‘world loser in gender equity’
in the global ranking, to use the same precarious language – Yemen. Interestingly, the
GGI enable comparison with the overall score of Nicaragua and with respect to each
area evaluated an aspect that complexifies the results of subjectification into identity-
formation of international actors. During the 2007’s edition of the GGI, for example,
Nicaragua reaches one of its lowest scores during its 13 years of trajectory: 90th position
in the overall global ranking of the gender gap. Furthermore, its precarious position
suggests that Nicaragua is a country for global concern with gender equity and in the
economic domain, as its score deteriorated in all areas concerning the previous year's
performance. Moreover, due to the comparative and benchmarking nature of the GGI,
one can inevitably contrast Nicaragua with other self-fulling and responsible agents in
the realm of gender disparity (states). When we position Sweden and Yemen’s profiles
close to Nicaragua (2006, 2007), it becomes possible to contend the areas in which
Nicaragua assembles and diverges from Sweden (world leader) and Yemen (world
loser), forging new cognitive meanings and data references for international actors.
Because Nicaragua and other countries’ measurements provide a competitive
performance-based scenario of gender disparity, states are treated as atomistic entities
whose behaviour can be ‘separate’ if not isolated from the web of relations. This
atomization that accompanies the subjectification of countries measured by the GGI
creates a political imaginary in which countries should strive for improvements and
whose relationships in international affairs are ones of competition through the system
of ‘rewarding and shaming’ each performance in the global ranking. The recurring
references of ‘model subjects’ such as Nordic countries – especially Sweden during
these two first years – create a dichotomy towards subjects whose performances are
further from the ideal standards of gender equity proposed by the GGI through
objectification. For example, from 2006-2007, in the evaluations and projections below
among Nicaragua (62nd and 90th place, 2006-2007), Yemen (115th and 128th place, as
more countries were added to the GGI’s evaluation in the following year) and Sweden
(1st place in world ranking both in 2006 and 2007), we might interpret that Nicaragua’s
description of the social reality of gender disparity is suboptimal but more alike the best
performer – Sweden in the areas of Educational Attainment and Health and Survival,
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which creates space for the making of its global status in gender equity in the domains
of Educational Attainment and Health Status that will be more prevalent after 2011.
In contrast, when Nicaragua’s overall performance (2006-2007) is
compared to the optimal performance of Sweden, it becomes visible that the hugest
gender gap in Nicaragua is related to Political Empowerment, even more than the gap
in Economic Opportunity. Though this might be seen as a discursive framing of
Nicaragua’s potential priorities areas for social change, I argue that there are policy
implications for Nicaragua that challenge a traditional view of power relations in
international affairs; after all, it is not as if the GGI is governing nation-states in a top-
down directional approach of power, or if, at the opposite side, governed states are
simply influencing the knowledge produced by GGI. Instead, the GGI is one
manifestation of broader gendered dynamics that are taking place within countries
simultaneously as the GGI’s evaluations. The numbers represented through the bar
graphs build a simplified overview of Nicaragua as a country that should not pursue the
same steps taken by penalized countries with poor performance, such as Yemen. The
creation of otherness (‘worst’, ‘poor performance’, ‘abnormal’) is then relational to the
identity-making of Nicaragua during 2006-2007. Because the global gender gap index
scores also provide a time projection for the country’s achievement of gender equity, the
statistics predictions are future-making. The report presents conditions and predicts
future outcomes for Nicaragua, and interestingly, those future outcomes of economic
growth and competitiveness in Nicaragua had associated the country with a negative
image and disadvantaged scenario for women in the long haul. As an example of the
subjectification process of identity-making and state-branding, when Nicaragua is in the
‘top 10’ best performers in gender equality in the world, other international actors make
use of this knowledge: The news website Sunday Times (2013), for instance, is one of
the media outlets that report that ‘Women in Cuba, Nicaragua and Lesotho are more
likely to be treated as equal to men than those in Britain, according to an influential
report on gender gaps’. In this type of interpretation, there is an implicit world
competition between countries as gender equality becomes a trait that represents ‘fast
progress’ for countries’ identities. Hence, the source automatically connects
performance results from different countries to assume that based on the Global
Gender Gap Index’s evaluation Nicaragua is more women-friendly than supposedly
developed countries such as Britain by arguing that ‘Britain lags behind (…) in the race
to gender equality’. Another organization, Instituto de Nutrición de Centro América y
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Panamá, reports that ‘Nicaragua remains the most advanced country in the region with
respect to gender equality (…), ranking 10th in the world index and 5th place in political
participation’43 (INCAP, 2014) based on the evaluation provided by the GGI.
Furthermore, another media source points out that ‘Nicaragua is the world’s unlikely
champion in gender equality’44 (QUARTZ, 2015). According to this interpretation from
the GGI, gender equality is objectified not only as a capability, but it becomes a matter
of competition in which there are countries subjectified as ‘champions’, ‘winners’, and
‘losers’ in the annual race to mitigate gender inequality at the global level. Rosario-
Murillo, Nicaragua’s vice-president is quick to comment that Nicaragua’s world
leadership: ‘We were there when we came to the government. (From there) to the fifth
place in 2018, we continue to maintain gender parity, that is, gender equality in
ministerial positions and (Nicaragua) has one of the highest proportions in the world of
women in parliament’ (TELESUR, 2018, sp).

Fig. 30. Modelling Nicaragua’s graphic evolution in scores of gender parity in comparison to
Yemen and Sweden

Source: developed during this dissertation based on data collected from GGI (2006-2007).

All things considered, it is worth understanding that the supposedly

weaknesses in gender disparity in Nicaragua (2006 – 2011) are specific dimensions of
Economic Participation and Opportunity and Political Empowerment. After 2007 the GGI

43
See Incap (2014):
https://www.sica.int/busqueda/Noticias.aspx?IDItem=84377&IDCat=3&IdEnt=29&Idm=1&IdmStyle=1.
44
See Quartz (2015): https://qz.com/556722/nicaragua-the-worlds-unlikely-champion-of-gender-equality/.
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reports a significant improvement in Nicaragua’s score. Based on the bar graphs of

Nicaragua’s scores over the years (2007 – 2011), in 2008, the country’s growth was
driven by an improvement in Political Empowerment and a 1st world place in educational
attainment. The subjectification of Nicaragua’s precarious national and global identity in
matters of gender is further supported by its below-the-world average scoring in
Economic Participation - 0.461. While leader in education attainment, with promising
conduct in political empowerment, it is certainly an outlier case in the economic domain,
where the world average score was 0.587 (GGI, 2008, p. 125). As a response to
suboptimal performances in countries such as Nicaragua over the years, the GGI
models and signals ‘best practices’ of world leaders in gender equality to be followed by
their underperforming peers over the years. From this perspective, ‘Best practices’ is a
loose term for global policy scripts of gender promoted at the GGI – drawing from the
case of Iceland, for example, ‘best world practices’ include family care, parental leave,
and legislative reform to promote women’s integration into the formal labour market and
leadership corporate positions (GGI, 2010, p. 10-20).
In the Economic Participation and Opportunity sub-index, it is also
possible to question the economic orthodoxy present in this criterion's measurement
and quantification process in the GGI through a critique of the methodological
production field of feminist economics. In their proposal of gender analysis in the
international economy, Benería et al (2018) draw our attention to some of the
fundamental objectives of an economic approach with gender analysis, such as
“generating explanations about the causes, nature and role that gender inequalities fulfil
in the economy while seeking to modify the subordinate position of women in society”
(idem, p. 106), while at the same time making the process of recognizing the sexual
division of labour and accounting for work central, including its informal, voluntary and
unpaid reproductive work dimension performed by women in the economy. In their
critique of statistical practices and accounting around traditional work, Benería et al
(2018, p. 291) demonstrate that there is a persistent disconnect between official
statistics on rates of women's economic activity in relation to what was observed during
in-loco visits in the countries, with underestimation of the participation rates of women in
informal work and its centrality to reproductive work. Thus, in the political and theoretical
project Accountings for Women’s Work, bases are offered for us to problematize the
case of accounting for work disaggregated by sex of the Economic Participation and
Opportunity subindex of the GGI. After all, the sub-index makes an important part of
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women's economic activity invisible within the care economy and its links with the
market economy, which, on the one hand, neglects the possibility of analyzing more
broadly the scenario of work and economic activity of women in the world and on the
other hand, the possibility of thinking about policies for reconciling paid and unpaid work
performed by women. This is because much of the literature highlights the intrinsic
relationship between gender inequality and the naturalization and precariousness of
women's unpaid reproductive work, an issue ignored by the GGI's social theory
premise, which conceives gender as a fixed and binary category and disparity of gender
through an orthodox logic or gender analysis of neoclassical legacy with prioritization of
data disaggregated by sex. To expand on that, research has shown the prevalent nature
of heteronormativity in the international development industry (discourses, policies and
programs) with its overall focus on normative family models and the status quo of
gender structures and relations, which often exclude queer communities in detriment of
governing constructs of heteronormative intimacies (LIND, 2010, p. 2-3).
That said, I will now contextualize improvements and constraints to
gender equality in Nicaragua beyond what is shown by the Global Gender Gap Index in
this same time frame (2006 – 2011) in an attempt to analyze and discuss its political
functions and limitations. I provide an alternate narrative of gender equality in Nicaragua
based on local and international data (Human rights reports from organizations from
civil society and international agencies and government archives) as part of the method
of data triangulation within this dissertation. As the past paragraphs had shown, through
the years 2006 – 2008, GGI’s evaluation of Nicaragua’s conduct in gender parity was
not promising. Again, I argue that the negative characterization of Nicaragua’s national
identity with social issues of gender fostered by such scores and rankings (62nd place,
90th place, and 71st place, respectively) is consistent with a general view propagated by
the GGI’s first editions that countries from the global south – specifically from Latin
America and Caribe – are in the worst position of gender developments in comparison
to those of the global north, partly due to the inaction of the Nicaraguan government,
considering that the GGI relies on an argument of self-sufficiency and self-government
of gender within countries, in which states are treated as individual actors self-
responsible for their gender affairs. As of 2013, though, the global gender gap index
reports Nicaragua as one of the fastest improving countries in gender parity in the world
with the ‘highest improvement to date (20%)’, compared to exemplary leaders such as
Nordic countries. In 2014, the third year Nicaragua entered the ‘top 10’, the GGI
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describes Nicaragua’s position (6th best country in gender parity in the world) and
contends that Nicaragua is the “best performer in the region and the only country from
Latin America and the Caribbean to make it into the top 10, having achieved this for the
third consecutive year, (…) having closed 79% of the gender gap” (GLOBAL GENDER
GAP INDEX, 2014, p. 22).
Furthermore, as we recall that one of the main political functions
performed by the GGI is governing functions under neoliberal governmentality, we
should not ignore the fact that Nicaragua’s public authorities have used the GGI’s
reports on Nicaragua’s world leadership in gender equality in its political platforms,
which suggests an overt form of positive interaction and assimilation of the index’s
framings of gender equality about its measured objects. Ultimately, Nicaragua’s vice-
president, Rosario Murillo, uses Nicaragua’s world leadership to celebrate and compare
the country’s levels of development as “superior” in relation to western peers. Not only
the vice-president celebrates the results reported by the GGI on Nicaragua’s
performance, but she also uses a similar language of gender-based justice to the one
adopted by the GGI and United Nations Development Agendas:

‘Compañeros, compañeras, gran noticia también, vamos, estamos, nos

reportó nuestro embajador Ricardo Alvarado desde los países nórdicos,
5to lugar Nicaragua en equidad de género en el mundo, quinto
lugar. Dios nos bendice, Dios escucha, Dios nos guía, Dios nos ilumina.
Primero está Islandia, después Noruega, después Finlandia,
después Suecia, después Nicaragua, nuestra Nicaragua de Luz, de
Vida, de Verdad, de Equidad. Nueva Zelanda, luego Irlanda,
luego España, luego Ruanda y luego Alemania. Son los primeros
10 lugares y nosotros, este paisito pequeño, este paisito lleno de
coraje, este país inmenso en espíritu en el quinto lugar por encima
de tantos otros países poderosos, potentes [...] Por ejemplo dice,
los Estados Unidos 53, lugar 53. Nosotros estamos en los cinco
primeros lugares en el mundo, por eso siempre decimos: no somos un
país pobre, somos un país empobrecido por la rapiña de las
potencias y luego por los vendepatrias que también quieren seguir
rapiñando como rapiñaron en los 16 años, seguir saqueando el país,
seguir arrebatando derechos al pueblo humilde, al pueblo trabajador. No
somos un país pobre sino empobrecido por los ánimos y los
apetitos insaciables del imperio y de los imperialistas o serviles o
sicarios de los imperialistas aquí localmente. Somos un pueblo
grande, rico en espíritu, esto lo prueba. Vamos adelante con muchos
éxitos de la justicia, porque eso es justicia, la equidad de género es
justicia!” (EL 19 DIGITAL, 2019).
 133

Besides the narrative created by the GGI’s reports, it is undeniable that

historical key events provide another angle – and to some extent, entirely other
narratives – about gender affairs in the country. For didactic reasons, I will expose the
connections between such historical events with new narratives about gender equality
in the country based on similar ‘criteria’ employed by the GGI, only within a different
order and qualitative engagement: health and survival economic opportunity, political
empowerment and educational attainment. My argument here is that Ortega’s
administration had developed a national gender project in Nicaragua (2006 – 2019), one
that is compatible with the Global Gender Gap Index reports’ content and, lastly, one
that demonstrates some of the governing and normalizing functions of the GGI at play
throughout the years. I now will contextualize key historical events to gender equality in
Nicaragua under Ortega’s government based on a qualitative approach of data
triangulation and feminist literature on Nicaragua and gender politics. To avoid how
broad (and sometimes vague) the notion of ‘gender politics’ can be for one to identify
‘key historical events to gender equality’, I must clarify that the alternative narrative with
‘key historical events’ to gender equality in Nicaragua is based on the concept of
‘national gender project’ (CONWELL, 2002; FERREE, 2013). Gender projects refer to
the nature of gender politics pursued within political institutions, such as states: when
nation-states – or, in this case Nicaragua under Ortega’s administration – actively
attempt to maintain or transform the status quo of gender relations and women’s rights.
I define the content from the national gender project of Nicaragua based on legal
reforms and laws passed during Ortega’s administrations (2007 – 2019), reports from
international human rights and women’s organizations from civil society, and lastly
discourses from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and vice-president Rosario Murillo.
For each area measured at the GGI in the case of Nicaragua, I consider
alternative domestic events as part of my qualitative analysis. The key events,
discourses and outcomes explored provide not only an alternative narrative of gender
disparities in the country, one that largely contrasts with the evaluations provided by the
GGI, but also allows us to recognize the political functions performed by the GGI in the
government of gender - or rather, national projects of gender, as I shall explore later. In
matters of health and survival, I consider as main events for my analysis: (a) gendered
discourses within policies and speeches from Ortega’s administration as well as
adverse outcomes of policies that target women’s health; (b) the outlawing of all forms
of abortion, with the penal code reform based on law 641 and its implications to
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women’s health in the country; (c) the investigation on the violation women’s rights in
matters of health and health care conducted by the International Amnesty; (d) when the
state of Nicaragua was reported by women’s movements to the Interamerican
Commission of Human Rights, being later subjected to preventive measures. In the axis
of political empowerment evaluated by the GGI, I contrast it in the case of Nicaragua by
exploring an alternative perspective on Political Empowerment and feminist-state
relations through the following elements: (a) gendered discourses that target women’s
political empowerment during Ortega’s administration; (b) Ortega’s actions of repression
and political discourses against activists and women’s movements; (c) law reforms for
gender parity. Furthermore, I discuss gender-based violence in Nicaragua based on law
reforms, such as (a) the launching of the Integral Law 779 against gender-based
violence towards women (2012), (b) the reform of Law 779 to ‘safeguard the family unit’
in Nicaragua (2013); (c) the creation of ‘Gabinetes de la Familia (state institutions for
family counselling and state mediation in cases of gender-based violence); (d) the
discontinuation of the social program ‘Comísarias de la Mujer y niñez’ (2016); finally, in
the account of gender disparities in the economic domain, I bring attention to the
discursive and material implications from national campaigns, discourses and laws.
For this dissertation’s data collection, literature review and analysis, I
have found evidence that the national political project within Ortega’s administration is
gendered in four specific areas: women’s health, reproductive rights and survival;
women’s political participation and interests in state-civil society relations and women’s
economic participation. I consider Ortega’s national project a gendered project for
Nicaragua, because it carries discoursive and material implications for the form and
content of gender relations, women’s lives, and the degrees of gender inequality.
Moreover, I contend the GGI cannot capture the particularity of the national gender
project of Nicaragua in the context of gender equality. Rather, the GGI provides an
inaccurate assessment of Nicaragua as a world leader in gender equity, a label
incompatible with the state of gender affairs at the domestic level. Considering that
Nicaragua’s Report to the United Nations (2019, p. 8) has stated ‘gender equality and
empowerment’ as a fundamental axis in the National Policy of Gender in the country,
one should not ignore the institutional engagement of the government with gender
issues, gender relations and women’s interests is part of a broader national political
project rather than an organic movement pursued in Ortega’s administration.
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4.1 THE GGI’S NORMALIZING FUNCTIONS TO WOMEN’S HEALTH

AND SURVIVAL IN NICARAGUA
When gender equality in Nicaragua is understood at the domestic level
through qualitative data rather than the quantitative measurement of the GGI, one can
argue the path towards Ortega’s consolidation of power and its administration in
Nicaragua (2006 – 2019) is illustrative of how nations and national projects can be
gendered with significant (negative) effects to women’s lives, in fair contrast with the
narratives on the low levels of gender disparities in health and survival reported by the
GGI, in which Nicaragua is considered a world leader in the matter. To problematize
such measurement and interpretation provided by the GGI over Nicaragua is to
contextualize this narrative with domestic events that are certainly neglected within the
GGI’s forms of evaluation. In this topic, I bring attention to some of the main events that
have negatively affected women’s lives in Nicaragua in terms of health and survival,
including but not limited to (a) the outlawing of all forms of abortion, with the penal code
reform based on law 641 and its implications to women’s health in the country; (b) the
investigation on the violation women’s rights in matters of health and health care
conducted by the International Amnesty; (c) when the state of Nicaragua was reported
by women’s movements to the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights, being later
subjected to precautionary measures and (e) gendered discourses in Rosario-Murrillo
and Ortega’s administration as well as negative outcomes of policies that target
women’s health.
By comparing domestic matters, it becomes possible to consider the
broader political functions executed by the GGI’s forms of measurement and rationales.
Historically, the symbolization of Nicaraguan women’s roles in the Sandinista project
has been present within the nationalist imaginary. Yuval-Davis (1997), for instance, asks
the double-side question: “what women can do for nations and what nations can do for
them” the contemporary history of Nicaragua demonstrates the differential ways
national projects can be gendered in Latin America. In this sense, “Mothers, daughters
and comrades” of the revolution were one of the collective identities in which women’s
roles were portrayed throughout the years concerning the public and political life in the
country (KAMPWIRTH, 2012), with an emphasis on the association between
motherhood and war. To illustrate this ideological positioning of female identity, Zpniga
and Viquez (2014, p. 237) report the current president Daniel Ortega was of the
patriarchal opinion that “the revolutionary task of Nicaraguan women was to give birth
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and give birth” to replace the human losses from the Sandinista revolution. Motherhood
in Nicaragua had a two-fold role in its revolutionary nationalist project: women were
fighters and child-bearers and were central to the reproduction of the political memory of
mourning and suffering the war against the Somoza dictatorship, which could be
perceived in women’s articulations such as the National Marching of Mouning Women
(1944), or even the creation of Women’s Association for the National Problematic
(AMPRONAC) in the 1970s.
Based on Walby’s (2000, p. 523) notion that nations and national
projects can be gendered, I maintain that Nicaragua’s national project has been
imperative in articulating gender differences at the domestic level. The first report
released by the GGI (2006) is separated by the historical outlawing of women’s
reproductive rights in Nicaragua within one month. After all, the full prohibition of
therapeutical abortion was the agenda of the electoral platform in the country of Daniel
Ortega’s presidential campaign, signed and supported by the FLSN party. According to
Kampwirth’s (2011) study into leftwing gender politics in contemporary Nicaragua,
Daniel Ortega’s government fostered what she calls ‘anti-gender politics’ that combines
a leftwing face with a neoliberal, nationalist and religious ideology. One cannot help but
notice how ‘the gendered components of Ortega’s 2006 electoral strategy (…) have
weakened feminists and made life more precarious for many women’ (idem, 2016, p.
31). Because reproductive rights are so central to feminist history, organizing and
progressive agendas for gender equality, the full prohibition of abortion became a
historical turn of gender politics and debates in the country, and certainly, it did not
represent the only gendered struggle that would be a turning point for the nature of
gender policies during Ortega’s government. As such, one should consider the limitation
of reproductive freedom as part of a broader political project that fosters and model
particular gender relations between sexes (KAMPWIRTH, 2016, p. 34), a project
necessarily supported by the political allyship between religious groups (roman catholic
and protestants) and the FLSN party. That said, the national project of Nicaragua drew
heavily on the domestic gender regime fostered by ideals aligned within catholic and
protestant religious groups of power in the country.
Ever since 2007, the autonomy of Nicaraguan women’s bodies has
become a dispute terrain and object by the political coalition between the state, Ministry
of Family and religious powers as opposed to the positions of local women’s
movements, feminists, and marginalized communities. In essence, the limitation of
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women’s reproductive freedom and prohibition of health care to abortion in cases where
the women’s life is threatened reinforces women’s subordinate roles as mothers and
daughters for the sake of the Christian nuclear family, whose fertility is vital to the
strengthening of Nicaragua society. In 2007, when the therapeutical abortion ban was
expanded with penalties for women and health care practitioners (Law 641) under
Ortega’s administration, one can notice the safeguarding of the family unit for nationalist
purposes and livelihood of Nicaragua, with women subordinate to the country’s
interests, with strong anti-imperialist rhetoric against feminism and with pro-family
values. That being the case, it is worth emphasizing Rosario Murillo (2006, sa) public
speech about the prohibition of women’s reproductive rights: “El frente, la Unidad
Nicaragua Triunfa dice: “No al aborto, sí a la vida!” (…) Somos enfáticos: Si a las
creencias religiosas; sí a la fe; sí a la búsqueda de Dios”. In her speech, the outlawing
of women’s access to therapeutical abortion is equated with further support for Christian
religious beliefs and pro-family values. Nicaragua’s conservative legislation that has
prompted the banning of women’s reproductive rights with harsher penalties for women
and health care professionals, the country becomes one of the places with the most
rigid legislation about women’s health in the world (CEPAL, 2013), combined with
highest rates of adolescent fertility and child abuse (AL JAZERA, 2014). It is rightfully
investigated by organizations such as International Amnesty to report human rights
violations of women’s reproductive rights and health. For instance, the full abortion ban
implemented during Ortega’s administration stated a 14-year prison sentence for
medical staff who help with procedures that could potentially endanger the fetus (THE
LANCET, 2009, p. 677).
Hence, in this first period (2006 – 2008), Nicaragua’s precarious
position on the Global Gender Gap Index (62nd place, 90th place, and 71st place,
respectively) is somewhat representative of the ambivalent state of domestic affairs of
gender in the country. However, for matters of gender disparities in health and survival,
Nicaragua’s global position measured by the subindex (50th place) fails to acknowledge
any deterioration of the conditions in women’s health and survival over the years and
instead, it rewards the country’s supposed “health improvement” in differences between
sexes over the years, up to the point where Nicaragua becomes a global leader in the
domain of health levels between sexes. As evidence of such rewards, authors from the
GGI point out that ‘rich countries have more education and health opportunities for all
members of society and measures of education levels thus mainly reflect this well-
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known fact (…) Global Gender Gap Index, however, rewards countries for smaller gaps
in access to these resources, regardless of the overall level of resources’ (Hausmann et
al., 2010, p. 3). Because of this, I argue the subindex of Health created and measured
by the GGI performs the governing function of objectification over the governable
subjects – including Nicaragua - as it establishes a subjective and specific definition of
how gender disparities in health should be measured and understood among countries:
acceptable levels of life health expectance and sex ratio at birth (WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM, 2007, p. 7). The World Health Organization calculates the first, and it provides
‘an estimate of the number of years that women and men can expect to live in good
health, by taking into account the years lost to violence, disease, malnutrition or other
relevant factors’. In contrast, the second captures the phenomenon of “missing women”
(idem) with data provided by the World Health Organization. Moreover, eleven
subcategories are considered to account for the two benchmarks in health and survival:
(1) Health Mortality of children under age 5, all causes, age-standardized deaths per
100,000 (female, male); (2) Mortality due to non-communicable diseases, age-
standardized deaths per 100,000 (female, male); (3) Mortality due to infectious and
parasitic diseases, age-standardized deaths per 100,000 (female, male); (4) Mortality
due to accidental injuries, age-standardized deaths per 100,000 (female, male); (5)
Mortality due to intentional injuries and self-harm, age-standardized deaths per 100,000
(female, male); (6) Maternal mortality in childbirth (per 100,000 live births); (7) Existence
of legislation on domestic violence; (8) Prevalence of gender violence in lifetime; (9)
Law permits abortion to preserve a woman’s physical health; (10) Births attended by
skilled health personnel (%) and (11) Antenatal care coverage, at least four visits (%)
(GGGR 2018, 51-52).
To Repo (1996, p. 110), the discussion of demographic and population
conditions touches upon mechanisms that deploy the apparatus of gender as an
example of the biopolitics of power, which makes biopolitics necessarily gendered. In
other words, ‘gender became woven into the rationalities of population governance and
was central to new attempts to regulate population through behaviour modification’
(113). Foucault argues that populations are regulated through statistical categorization
and quantification to manage their productive potential for the economy (2007a, 104-
105). Surprisingly, the same rhetoric highlighted above by Foucault through statistical
knowledge in biopolitics and biopower can be found in the GGI’s discourses about the
role of women as a population in a country’s competitiveness, economic growth and
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economic growth and development. In 2006, the GGI report's first page warned that
‘countries that do not capitalize on the full potential of one-half of their human resources
(*women) may compromise their competitive potential’ (p. 5). In matters of health and
survival, the GGI 2009 report states that ‘Girls are still missing out on primary and
secondary education in far greater numbers than boys, thus depriving entire families,
communities and economies of the proven and positive multiplier effects generated by
girls’ education and instead aggravating poverty, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and maternal
and infant mortality’ (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX REPORT, 2009, p. 5). Hence,
according to the GGI, gender disparity to entitled to state and market intervention
because countries with low levels of gender parity are not taking advantage of women
(and women’s and girl skills reservoir) as a capital resource for the nation’s growth.
Therefore, the GGI calls up countries and businesses to promote the ‘necessary flow of
this talent in the future’ at the global level, establishing further connections between
health and survival and the economy. In this sense, health and survival are portrayed a
capability to a country’s long-term competitiveness in the global market. Moreover,
health and survival levels should be further improved upon ideals of efficiency, following
what the GGI defines as proper ‘health and survival’ levels between sexes. The
government of gender disparities in terms of health and survival becomes particularly
visible in the case of Nicaragua, as the country proceeds to “adjust” its global position in
the GGI by attending to what is expected from statistical measures of female healthy life
expectance over male and sex ratio at birth (female over male).
The boundary-making of health disparities between sexes proposed by
the GGI is set up as ‘norm’. It normalizes the way that gendered disparities in health are
to be considered in global discussions and the global governance of gender issues. No
space is left to discuss the impact of social determinants of health on women in their
material conditions in the contexts of countries such as Nicaragua, where the deliberate
lack of access to health care services in case of medical complications that require
interruption of pregnancy to safeguard a women’s life is a public policy with forms of
punishment supported by the state (2007 – nowadays). One of the main issues with the
measurements in the health and survival domains is that the GGI operates under a
binary logic that considers gender disparity as a given. For instance, the GGI’s subindex
of health and survival does not consider experiences of gender disparity in health
because elements that make women’s health are neglected, such as maternal health
care and medical and reproductive rights. It is not just a matter of access to health care
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in the same services compared to men, as cisgender men do not experience any
struggles with pregnancy, motherhood, lactation, and so on. Hence, it is also a matter of
accessing health care services that broadly impact women or bodies that are socially
understood as biologically reproductive and still neglected medical care.
As an example of such limitation from the GGI to capture disparities of
gender in health issues, at the time, The Lancet (2009, p. 677) and international
Amnesty reports that the abortion ban in Nicaragua has led to an increase in maternal
deaths in the country, Nicaragua becomes one of the top climbers (“performers”),
reaching up to 27th place in the overall ranking and 25th position in health and survival
worldwide according to the global gender gap index reports. In the words of Leonel
Arguello, a Nicaraguan doctor interviewed during the investigation conducted by
International Amnesty; there were “(…) several cases where women with cancer and
kidney problems died because they could not get treatment. If they could have had
therapeutic abortions, they would still be alive”. Second to this circumstance, there were
reports that young victims of sexual violence (10 and 14 years) were forced to “give
birth to their brothers” (idem). Meanwhile, it was in 2010 that Nicaraguan feminist
networks reported the Nicaraguan state to the Interamerican Commission of Human
Rights to protect the life of a Nicaraguan woman from the country’s penal code against
medical abortion (“Case Amalia vs Nicaragua”) (OAS, sa). Due to the criminalization of
abortion in Nicaragua in all cases, Amalia was denied treatment for cancer on the
grounds that chemotherapy could endanger the fetus (THE GUARDIAN, 2010), which
led to IACHR requesting the state to take precautionary measures to ensure she had
proper access to health care treatment as shown below:

On February 26, 2010, the IACHR granted precautionary measures for a

person who the IACHR will identify as Amelia in Nicaragua. The request
seeking precautionary measures alleges that Amelia, the mother of a 10-
year-old girl, is not receiving the necessary medical attention to treat the
cancer she had because of her pregnancy. The request alleges that the
doctors had recommended urgently initiating chemotherapy or
radiotherapy treatment. Still, the hospital informed Amelia’s mother and
representatives that the treatment would not be given, due to the high
risk that it could provoke an abortion. The Inter-American Commission
asked the State of Nicaragua to adopt the measures necessary to
ensure that the beneficiary has access to the medical treatment she
needs to treat her metastasic cancer; to adopt the measures in
agreement with the beneficiary and her representatives; and to
keep her identity and that of her family under seal. Within the
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deadline set to receive an answer, the State of Nicaragua informed

the IACHR that the requested treatment has been initiated (OAS,
2010, sa)

Because the GGI aims to foster a global script for policymaking on

gender issues, it is undeniable its limitations in capturing health disparities between
sexes within countries negatively impact the field of action for international actors, as it
sets global standards within its measures that countries and other international actors
should look for to manage their behaviour and optimize their “performance” in health
disparities between sexes: acceptable levels of life health expectance and sex ratio at
birth. No wonder Foucault’s approach to power had considered the role of statistics in
what the author has named “biopower” and “biopolitics”. As a technology of power,
biopolitics is, if not explicitly present, embodied within the structure of the GGI due to
the GGI’s complementary relation committed to governing states’ behaviour in gender
matters in health and survival. In Foucault's words, biopower addresses as its main
object the multiplicity of humans (human species) as a global mass, or population,
susceptible to collective biological threats and phenomena such as living, dying,
sickness. More importantly, among mechanisms associated with biopower are analytical
predictions, statistical measurements, global measurements that aim to regulate and
intervene over phenomena that impact global masses rather than individual bodies
(FOUCAULT, 2005, p. 292-293). In this case, the biopower contained within the GGI
creates a norm of behavior that targets states, one that relies on the control over rates
of life health expectance and sex ratio at birth between sexes within a country.
Furthermore, one should consider the fact that both statistical measurements are not
isolated from broader governance systems in global health. As the GGI points out, the
World Health Organization provides the calculated gap between women and men’s
healthy life expectancy (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2007, p. 5). The latter – World
Health Organization’s conceptualization of health – ‘a state of complete physical,
mental, and social well-being, is created and lived by people within the setting of their
everyday lives — where they learn, work, play, and love’ (1986) have been subject of
inquiry of Foucaultian researchers. Therefore, I argue that healthy life expectancy can
be used as a surveillance mechanism of gender disparities in health and survival, as it
is one of the only measures used as a benchmark from the GGI to analyze the status of
a country’s population health status by sex, given that it benefits the development of a
standardized approach to data collection, statistical measurement and global ranking to
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foster decision-making and inform governance efforts for gender equality in matters of
health and survival depending on the country’s placement in the global ranking.
To regulate the state of gender disparities in health and survival at the
level of the population within countries, the GGI considers not only the optimal state of
life health expectance and sex ratio at birth (which is by registering no difference
between sexes) that should be acquired by a country, but it also punishes countries that
feature below the global average in health and survival measurements, so as to use it to
predict the exact number of years that will take for a region to achieve gender parity. In
the case of Nicaragua, we notice a double-fold implication of the GGI’s biopolitical
function over gender disparity in health and survival in states: from 2006 to 2013; the
GGI interprets Nicaragua’s performance in health and survival with a – less than ideal -
range of scores that go from 50th to 62nd global position among countries. However, in
2014, GGI portrayed Nicaragua as a world leader against gender disparity in matters of
health and survival. For six years in a roll, the country achieved the first position in the
global ranking of health and survival and is represented as an exemplary case of health
and survival rates. In 2013, for example, Nicaragua was presented as the 6th world
leader overall and ranked 1st in health and survival (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX,
2014, p. 8). It is positively compared to the world leaders countries against gender
inequity such as Iceland (1st overall, ranked 128th in health in survival); Finland (2nd
overall, ranked 52nd in health and survival); Norway (3d overall, 98th in health and
survival); Sweden (4th overall, ranked 100 in health and survival) and Denmark (5 th
overall, ranked 65th health and survival). As it is possible to notice, according to the
Global Gender Gap Index (2013 – 2014), Nicaragua demonstrates a privileged position
in gendered matters of Health and Survival, ranking 1 st place in the world with a score of
0.9796 in 2014. Though this is only one of the axes explored in the GGI, it is clear that
such “above the average” performance fosters the political imaginary for the country,
which positions Nicaragua with more substantial resources (or capabilities) than its
peers in the world ranking. Such interpretation reinforces a new form of subjectivity that
was not considered previously in global public opinion on gender equality, making it
particularly powerful in knowledge legitimacy over the years. The message sent by the
Global Gender Gap Index Reports is aligned with an evaluation of Nicaragua, which
included an already optimized performance above the norm of minimum global
standards of health and survival established by the GGI.
Fig. 31. Nicaragua’s position in health and survival
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Source: Global Gender Gap Index (2014).

Not only had Nicaragua been considered to have achieved the ‘norm’,
but it has also surpassed the levels predicted by the GGI, which led to Nicaragua being
portrayed as one of the ‘top climbers’ in the global competition for the development in
gender equality at the national level. This slow but permanent change of national
identity promoted the GGI’s biopolitical functions, which should be contextualised with
the legislation changes for women’s health during Ortega’s government. As women’s
reproductive rights and survival are not the objects of regulation and control promoted
by the GGI’s criteria for health and survival in countries, the deterioration of women’s
health and survival as a product of the changes in Ortega’s government – namely the
outlawing of abortion in all cases and penalty for women and health care practitioners –
become somewhat compatible with the objectification of health and survival performed
by the GGI. In turn, one can argue that where the GGI’s forms of measurement and
interpretation over Nicaragua are concerned, Nicaragua’s government can
instrumentalize the positive data and national identity framings of Nicaragua to
delegitimize women’s advocacy for reproductive rights and health care concerns at the
local level. This type of instrumentalization occurs because Ortega’s administration's
national gender project concerns gender relations, women’s bodies and traditional roles
in preserving motherhood and fertility as strong components of the country’s nationalist
discourse. In 2011, when Daniel Ortega was reelected under the slogan “Christianity,
socialism and solidarity” with strong advocacy towards conservative policies to constrain
women’s access to reproductive rights and proper health care services, Muller (2020)
called attention to the position of the FSLN government is vis-à-vis sexual and
reproductive rights of women in 2011. In her long-term study of the decision-making
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process around teenage motherhood and early childbearing in Nicaragua, she

illustrates Ortega’s official position based on ‘(…) a case of a 12-year-old who was
pregnant as a result of being raped became public, and obliged to have the child as a
consequence of the criminalization of abortion’. During this episode that took place in
2011, ‘Daniel Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo (since 2017 Vice-President of Nicaragua),
commented the birth of this child as “a miracle, a sign from God”13 while Ortega said
his government was “the enemy of Herodes” (idem, p. 12-13).
Those types of discourses were not isolated events. In 2016, Rosario-
Murillo45 commented on motherhood and mothers of Nicaragua as having a central role
in the country’s evolution as safe-keepers to Nicaragua’s culture and heroic character.
In a similar discourse at the Supreme Justice Court in Nicaragua, Cerda (2015)
highlights that “Ortega’s government has given a special role to the family, to the mother
and to women, considering the political affairs in Nicaragua, the constitutional reform
and in the Family, Code has made it clear that family is the central unit in the country”,
moreover: “the judicial system highlights the double-role performed by women as
mothers and workers”, but it states that it is the family unit that plays a central role in the
advancement of Nicaragua, as Nicaragua’s mother's roles are to be understood
(PRESS NOTES, 2015, sp). At the local level, such emphasis on the role of maternity
and motherhood as an axis of Ortega’s national gender project for Nicaragua can be
noticed by strengthening Motherhood Houses (Casas Maternas). Motherhood Houses
represent a groundbreaking initiative in providing health care and essential services to

45
‘Queridas Madres de Nuestra Nicaragua, todas las Culturas del Planeta celebran la Vida, y
honran a las Madres como Fuente de esa Energía Sagrada que en nuestros Cuerpos de Mujer
se asienta y toma forma (...) El Protagonismo de las Madres, incluyendo muchas llamadas
Madres “solteras” o solas, en un País, una Sociedad y una Cultura como la nuestra, es tanto
Material, de Luchas Valientes, para mejorar la Vida de sus Familias, como Cultural y Espiritual.
És un Rol profundamente Evolutivo, de Guardianas y Portadoras de una Cultura Valiosa; Rol de
Madres, Forjadoras de Espíritu, muchas veces ignorado, desestimado, e invisibilizado, por un
Mundo cada vez más superficial, frívolo, materialista, y simplista. En estos Tiempos únicos de
nuestro Proceso Histórico, l@s nicaragüenses queremos Ir Siempre Más Allá, en
Reconocimiento y Respeto genuino de todo lo que nos hace Mejores. Saludamos y rendimos
Homenaje a las Madres nicaragüenses, Madres que frecuentemente también son Padres,
porque todas, en cualquier circunstancia, asumimos integralmente Hogares y Familias, con Fé,
y Valentía admirables. Las Madres y Jefas de Familia, en Nicaragua, somos Protagonistas
sustantivas de estos Nuevos Días, con los que Dios ha bendecido a esta Patria de todas. (...)
Nuestro Presidente, nuestro Comandante Daniel ratifica su Compromiso invariable de Victorias,
en las Luchas contra la Pobreza, y con Amor se dirige a las Madres, que representamos
Carácter nicaragüense Heroico, Entereza, Determinación y Convicción de Seguir Unidas’
(ROSARIO-MURILLO in EL DIGITAL 19, sp, 2016).
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pregnant women from rural areas to secure safe childbirth for women, with more than
88 houses in full operation as of 2011. According to JICA (2012, our translation46):
Casas Maternas are community-level boarding and meal services
for pregnant women in rural areas who have difficult access to safe
delivery services. These services are intended to improve the
maternal and infant mortality rate [32]. The maternity homes
operate with medical institutions to enable safe deliveries, and
have contact with provincial hospitals, which can provide support
from doctors and nurses when necessary. They are also managed
in coordination with volunteers, posts, health centres and a
network of communities (p. 47).

Therefore, the GGI is ‘an annual overview to policy-makers about the

extent to which resources and opportunities in their countries are being equally
distributed among men and women, to allow them to track progress over time and to
catalyse action to close the gender gap’ (p. 5), which it means that from the years the
GGI’s portrays Nicaragua as a first place-ranked world leader of gender parity in health
and survival (2013 – 2019), the GGI needless states that resources and health-care
opportunities in Nicaragua are being equally distributed between sexes, which it is
simply not accurate. The non-recognition of health and survival struggles from the
suppression of women’s reproductive rights and access to healthcare treatments in
Nicaragua (as of 2007 – 2019) by the GGI has depoliticized debates on gender
disparities in health-care issues at the local level. More than that, the GGI’s
subjectification fosters a positive national branding of Nicaragua when it highlights its
global leadership in gender parity for health and survival and its extensive comparison
with countries considered “model examples in gender equity” at the global level, namely
Nordic countries. What does it mean to be positioned in a parallel evaluation with
countries such as Finland, Sweden and Norway, whose national gender projects are
distinct from the health care system and legislation for reproductive rights in Nicaragua?

46 ‘Las Casa Maternas son servicios de hospedaje con comidas al nivel comunitario para
mujeres embarazadas de zonas rurales quien tienen acceso difícil a servicios para parto
seguro. Estos servicios tienen como motivo la mejora de la tasa de mortalidad maternal e
infantil [32]. Las casas maternas operan con instituciones médicas para posibilitar partos
seguros, y tienen contacto con los hospitales provinciales, los cuales pueden dar soporte de
médicos y enfermeros cuando sea necesario. Además son administradas en coordinación con
voluntarios, puestos, centros de salud y red de comunidades” (JICA, 2012, p. 47)
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Moreover, what does it mean for Nicaragua to be not only a world leader in health and
survival but a regional leader in the group of states belonging to Latin America and
Caribe and lower-middle income?
Though the biopower that comes from the knowledge structure from
the GGI builds specific boundaries around gender disparities in matters of health and
survival for countries, we can notice that in Nicaragua, the biopower takes place within
its forms during Ortega’s administration. For instance, the full prohibition of abortion and
punishment to those that seek medical treatment that might endanger the fetus
represents, in feminist perspectives, the full exercise of biopower over biologically born
females – in this case, as a population. Both forms of biopower – one that is a
mechanism for the GGI’s knowledge system, regulating and rewarding actors that act
accordingly such ideal standards and other than the regulated actor performs - address
the human life at the population level are ultimately gendered. In this sense, ‘as biology
and life have become political objects of power, biopolitics ensures the visibility of
bodies for regulation and discipline’ (FOUCAULT, 1978, p. 139). Hence, in the GGI, the
collective female body (women-as-species) and sex are objectified for political
investments from states to maintain the minimum (statistical) standards in what the GGI
considers “gender equality” in population measures. For example, the Nicaraguan
women’s bodies are heavily regulated by state investments – or rather de-investments –
in recording fertility rates considered abnormal by global human rights standards.
Coincidence or not, it is in 2012 that Nicaragua stops its data collection on adolescent
rates of fertility – by then considered one of the highest rates in the world and it
aggregates its measurements into ‘women’s fertility’. As much of the scholarship of
gender gaps in health and survival relies on quantitative measures such as the GGI and
its counterpart for data collection – the World Health Organization, one should not
overlook that a qualitative account of how women in Nicaragua experience the “gender
gap” in health and survival might enhance and expose context-specific challenges. In
Nicaragua, evidence shows not only reduced freedom of choice for girls and children,
but no health care support is available in risky cases of teenage pregnancy in
Nicaragua, with the human rights of Nicaraguan girls at stake (MULLER, 2020, p. 9).
As the subindex refers to ‘health and survival’, we cannot avoid
discussing health and survival and gender inequality in its relationship to gender-based
violence. Empirical research in this area has argued that gender-based violence is a
multi-faceted public health problem as it worsens women’s well-being and harms their
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access to basic human rights (NAKRAY, 2013, p. 2-6). In the international policy arena,
gender-based violence is already addressed as a public health issue. As Heise et al
(1994) notes, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women suggested that
‘any act of gender-based violence that results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual
or mental harm or suffering to women including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life’ (UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1993). Among the main negative costs of gender-
based violence, we could cite impacts on physical, mental and reproductive health; inter
and intra-generational impact; loss of self-stem; higher levels of alcohol and drug abuse;
adverse impacts on interpersonal relationships and social exclusion (NAKRAY, 2013, p.
7-8). Though gender-based violence is never discussed in length by the GGI, it certainly
is a key aspect to be addressed if one intends to provide a ‘map of global action’ for
countries to mitigate gender inequality. In her critical analysis of the accountability of
violence by the Global Gender Gap Index in health and survival, Lehman (2019, p. 7)
argues that the summary results and analysis from the Global Gender Gap Index fail to
mention gender-based violence while at the same time the reports highlight an overall
improvement in health and survival at the global level. More importantly, the Global
Gender Gap Reports ‘privilege women as consumers, as investments in technology, as
cultivators of economic prosperity, while ignoring and silencing the pervasive violence
toward them’ (idem, p. 9). With respect to addressing levels of gender-based violence
as a ‘national framework for policy making’, the case of Nicaragua touches upon several
questions and limitations from the GGI. In 2012, the approval of Law 799 – Integral Law
against Gender-based Violence towards Women by the National Assembly marked a
historical advancement for the recognition that the state of Nicaragua is responsible for
women’s legal protection in the context of patriarchal violence. According to the Article
1, Law 799 (2012):

‘The object of this law is to act against the violence exercised against
women with the purpose of protecting women’s human rights and
guaranteeing them a life free of the violence that favours their
development and wellbeing in accordance with the principles of equality
and nondiscrimination; and establish comprehensive protection
measures to prevent, punish and eradicate violence and provide
assistance to women victims of violence, promoting changes in the
sociocultural and patriarchal patterns that underpin the relations of
power’ (sp).
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By the time Nicaragua is portrayed as a world leader against gender

disparities overall and in health and survival matters (2013 – 2019), almost two years
later than its approval for Law 799, law 799 suffered a strong backlash from
conservative sectors in Nicaragua and was reformed to change many of its elements
and to include state mediation for women who suffer gender-based and domestic
violence (SOLÍS, 2013), ‘Gabinetes de la familia’ (family counselling and state
mediation in cases of gender-based violence) was created to mediate gender-based
violence cases between victims and aggressor. Such a mechanism was usually
instrumentalized to settle domestic cases of gender-based violence in the country. To
Neumann (2014, p. 69-90), the conservative reforms on the Ley 779 demonstrate
Ortega’s longstanding tensions with the country’s feminist movement, his “pro-family”
alliance with conservative religious groups’ – such as catholic and evangelical churches
- and ultimately the deterioration of women’s rights under the personalization of state
patriarchal authority during his government. The term patriarchal authority is not used
loosely here; after all, there was an organized legal backlash in the country to push
against the ‘feminist content and language’ of the law. For instance, in an opinion piece
published in La Prensa (2013), Nicaraguan Lawyers argued that “[Ley 779] is a product
of an assault of radical international feminism that encourages women to abandon their
husbands in other to later legalize aberrant same-sex unions or homosexual marriage”.
In this sense, the case of Nicaragua’s leadership by the Global Gender
Gap Index suggests that the privileging of women as consumers, investments and
workers also play a large role in neglecting the measurement of key factors that have
aggravated gender-based violence in Nicaragua, as this chapter shows. It becomes
problematic that the GGI not only underrecognizes the role of gender-based violence in
its health and survival measurements of Nicaragua, but it also portrays the country as a
‘world example’ in health and survival. In Wade’s (2019) interpretation, the relationship
between the evaluations provided by the GGI and Nicaragua should be considered
carefully, given that behind the results provided by the ranking, there is a larger picture
of gender-based violence and inequality in the country. In questions such as health and
survival, she argues that ‘life expectancy and sex ratios may tell us something about
gender parity on those indicators, but they do little to illuminate the genuine health and
survival issues faced by Nicaraguan women’, as Nicaragua has high rates of gender-
based violence. Moreover, as legislation on gender-based violence in Nicaragua has
become more conservative over the years (2012 – 2014) through the reform of Law
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799, the GGI maintain its endorsement of Nicaragua's world leadership in gender
disparity. As the GGI explains, the index aims to measure the levels of access to
resources in a certain domain between sexes, which means that in matters of gender-
based violence, there has to be a consideration of how legislation plays an important
role in diminishing and harming women’s rights in cases of gender-based violence.
Hence, the governing, subjectification and arenashiftining functions performed by the
GGI carry discoursive and practical implications in the case of Nicaragua, as the index
acts up as a technology of knowledge with scientific authority that could potentially
delegitimize women’s movements' claims against the reform on Law 799. At the
international level, the positive image of Nicaragua as a world leader in gender equity
and health and survival created by the index could, in turn, pacify the global public
opinion and international pressure against conservative mechanisms adopted under
Ortega’s administration. For instance, the scholar Wade47 contends that ‘the World
Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap rankings create a false impression of progress
in many countries, including Nicaragua. This gap between ranking and reality obscures
women's real struggles in countries like Nicaragua’ (EL PAÍS, 2020, sp). Here, it is
possible to infer that the domain of governing and governance exerted by the GGI of
national gender projects for countries targets gender-based violence as a minor or
secondary element. In this sense, one can observe through the measurement in the
case of Nicaragua that there is an active arenashiftning of gender-based violence as a
global standard for countries, one that enables Nicaragua to be ranked a world leader
alongside countries with different levels of impunity on gender-based violence.

4.2 THE GGI POLITICAL FUNCTIONS EXERTED TOWARDS THE

INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT AND WOMEN-
STATE RELATIONS IN NICARAGUA

In the previous topic, I discussed the politics of gender disparities in

terms of women’s health and survival status in Nicaragua as opposed to the evaluations
provided by the GGI. Now, we must recall that the GGI interprets political empowerment
through the compilation of measures of the gap between men and women in political
decision-making at the highest levels in a country (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX,
2006, p. 7), including the ratio of women to men in minister-level positions, the ratio of

47
See Wade (2020) in https://agendapublica.elpais.com/noticia/13744/nicaragua-gender-gap-rankings-and-reality.
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women to men in parliamentary positions and the ratio of women to men in terms of
years in executive office (prime minister or president) in the last 50 years. To advance
the analysis of the political functions performed by the GGI in fostering the government
of ‘national gender projects’ based on the case of Nicaragua, we first should engage
with the timeline of changes evaluated by the GGI in the country. Similar to GGI’s
measurements of Nicaragua’s level of gender disparities in health and survival, when it
comes to political empowerment, the GGI’s evaluation of Nicaragua’s performance over
the years can be easily divided into two periods: 2006 – 2011, a period in which
Nicaragua ranks from the promising range of 19th position to 28th among more than 100
countries evaluated, and 2012 – 2019, a period in which Nicaragua is represented as a
world leader both in the overall ranking of gender disparities and at the political
empowerment subindex. In this sense, I will explore some of the key events at the local
level, such as (a) gendered discourses that target women’s political empowerment
during Ortega’s administration; (b) Ortega’s actions of repression and political
discourses against activists and women’s movements; (c) law reforms for gender parity.
So, we can also contextualize Nicaragua’s evaluation and evolution in the ranking of
political empowerment with its domestic aspects. After all, research has shown that
some of the major changes and trends accessed by the Global Gender Gap Index
about Nicaragua (2006 – 2017), especially in this subindex, is positively associated with
political events at the domestic level, where supportive social and political environments
are said to play important roles in empowering women in the country, driving
Nicaragua’s scores to increased records at the global level (NGUYEN et al, 2020, p. 1-
2, 6).
To that, I argue that the Global Gender Gap Index misrepresents the
context of political empowerment in Nicaragua, by associating the country with an
image of world leadership in gender equality in the political arena. In turn, based on
discourses, data collection and previous literature (KAMPWIRTH, 2011; HEUMANN,
2014; EXPEDIENTE PUBLICO, 2021; among others), I maintain that under Ortega’s
administration there has been a shift and constraining of women’s civil, political and
human rights in the political arena, particularly with respect to the discoursive
criminalization of women’s movements, NGO’s and activists, and actual episodes of
political violence and repression against women that led to imprisonment, and the
development of a feminist diaspora of Nicaraguan women who are considered political
refugees. Not only those worrisome developments cannot be captured by the GGI’s
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evaluation, but the GGI’s positive representation of Nicaragua is also instrumentalized

by Ortega’s government to delegitimize women’s political mobilizations and actions to
the public opinion in both the domestic and international arena. In this sense, the GGI’s
political functions led to depoliticization, arena-shifting and the creation of shared-norms
about how political empowerment to gender equality should be pursued by states, thus
acting up as a technology of knowledge that relies on fostering specific female
subjectivities of neoliberal leadership and representation. Problematic as it is, the
framework promoted by the GGI implicitly rewards countries with formal female
representation in policy without further inquiry into the content of representation while
neglecting other forms in which women exercise political participation. In the extreme
case of Nicaragua, where political repression and persecution of feminist and women’s
movements represent a long-term issue, the GGI’s become yet another tool – this time
a technology of knowledge with international authority – that can undermine women’s
political rights regardless of the political violence suffered at the domestic level.
As such, when considering that ‘political empowerment’ is an element
measured by the GGI, it is imperative that we also discuss the meaning of the
expression ‘political empowerment’ explored by the index. As Alexander et al (2016, p.
432) note, theoretically driven definitions of women’s global political empowerment are
limited and often derived from the broader concept of “women’s empowerment”. Despite
this, the author advocates that women’s global political empowerment can be defined as
‘the enhancement of assets, capabilities, and achievements of women to gain equality
to men in influencing and exercising political authority worldwide’ (p. 433). In the case of
the GGI, there is a palpable difference between what is considered gender equality vs
women’s empowerment during the measurement and interpretation of a country’s
performance, as quite possibly the use of ‘women’s empowerment’ as the major
paramount of GGI’s measurements could fuel notions and incite contexts where women
might be outperforming men (“winning” the “battle of the sexes”) (GGI, 2014, p. 4).
Because of that, the GGI’s extensive focus is restricted to gender equality as its main
benchmark, leaving space to the concept of empowerment to be considered only in the
axis of ‘political empowerment’ in country. Recalling the politics of the interpretative work
on making global indicators described by Merry (2015, p. 20-21), we should explore the
politics present with the GGI in several angles: ‘choosing approaches for measurement’,
‘construction of categories’, ‘selection of data sources’, ‘labels used for the phenomenon
measured’, ‘what things are counted and how’. (p. 20-21).
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Feminist scholars committed to analyzing gender politics in Latin and

Central America suggest the use of qualitative criteria to understand the gendered role
of the electoral leftwing in contemporary dynamics of gender disparities. During this
topic, I will follow the analytical (qualitative) model explored in Friedman (2009) about
the nature of gender politics in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile. According to Kampwirth (2011),
Friedman’s model can be applied to the case of anti-gender politics in contemporary
Nicaragua during Ortega’s government. To that, I consider gender politics in Nicaragua
based on the state of feminist state-society relations and women’s representation in
decision-making positions at the domestic level in the country and contrast it with
narratives provided by the GGI. I do so because the GGI provides quantitative
evaluations based on gender disparities in political empowerment in Nicaragua, pointing
out the latter as a world leader. As it was said in the previous chapter and a few
paragraphs earlier, feminist literature reports an intrinsic relationship among the varying
types of regimes, political forces and national gender projects, whose combination might
mobilize and affect women’s agency and interests in the public sphere in the form of
political opportunity structures or, in some other cases, political structures that could
constrain ever further women’s collective action (RAY and KORTEWEG, 1999, p. 53).
That said, it becomes imperative that I engage with the state of gender politics in
Nicaragua as to compare local dynamics with what is exposed by the GGI, so we can
discuss the GGI political functions towards the analysis, ranking and measurements of
women’s political empowerment summarized by the case of Nicaragua.
During its first measurement, the GGI reported that women from 115
countries had only 15% of the political empowerment available to men, with the regions
of Asia, subSaharan Africa and the Middle East occupying the last places in global
performances of gender gaps in political empowerment (GGI, 2006, p. 12), meanwhile,
ever since the first edition of the GGI, Nordic countries such as Iceland, Sweden,
Finland and Norway are represented as world leaders in gender equity with ‘a long
tradition of political empowerment of women’ (p. 15). Still, in 2007, for example,
Nicaragua was already positively portrayed in the ‘top 30’ of gender parity in the axis of
political empowerment by the GGI, ranking 28th place with a score of 0.1813 above the
world average of 0.142 (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2007, p. 11), due to the period
of government of its former president Violeta de Chamorro (1990 – 1997). Violeta de
Chamorro was the first female president in the region of Latin America, with Mireya
Moscoso in Panama (1999-2004) being the second. Namely, the GGI stresses that
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Nicaragua’s position is driven by its above the average number of years with a female
head of state (12th global position). In the other areas of political empowerment –
women in parliament and women in ministerial positions, Nicaragua secured 52 and 51st
positions at the global level among 128 countries evaluated (idem, p. 117-118).
Therefore, based on the criteria used by the GGI to measure political empowerment, we
notice an overall focus on women’s descriptive (and quantitative) representation in
formal political institutions, such as women’s presence in legislature-parliaments and
adoption of gender quotas. To that, I maintain that the GGI acts up as a technology of
knowledge and power directed at the governing of what should be understood and
measured as “women’s political empowerment” in the global arena, largely neglecting a
transformative framing of political empowerment such as citizenship and women’s
political behaviour.
The careful wording choice within the index, for example, reveals some
of its rhetoric alignment with the phenomenon analyzed: after all, instead of measuring
women’s political participation, the subarea of the index claims to measure ‘women’s
political empowerment’, which points out that the GGI is measuring more of trends of
gendered participation in politics fostered by governments than simply women’s levels
of engagement in the political system. Evidence of this interpretation is noticed in the
Global Gender Gap Index Report (2007, p. 18). According to the report’s portrayal of the
word empowerment in its framework, there is a correlation between gender equality and
the level of development of a country, ‘consistent with the theory that empowering
women translates into more efficient use of an economy’s human resources, and thus
affects the overall productivity and economic performance of countries’. For instance,
whether the government and state exert active roles in fostering women’s political
representation (aka “empowering women” in politics) through gendered policies and
quotas becomes two of the main objects of consideration throughout the qualitative
aspect derived from the index. To illustrate this argument, we notice that the Global
Gender Gap Report (2012, p. 58-59) highlights ‘Key areas of national policy frameworks
of gender’ that are central to mitigating gender inequality at the global level, including
parental leave, childcare assistance, taxation system and equality and work. In the
latter, the index suggests that countries should develop legislative structures to support
women and though ‘(…) among other policies, obligatory and voluntary quotas in public
and private entities’. This becomes particularly meaningful as we understand that one of
the biggest achievements and transformations during Ortega’s government is related to
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the implementation of gender-parity quotas, as shall be commented on later. Though we

cannot trace back any causal relationship to the index’s global script of gender towards
the adoption of obligatory and voluntary quotas to ensure gender equality in public and
private sectors and Nicaragua’s expansion towards the political inclusion of women in
legislative areas, we can certainly argue that Nicaragua’s adoption of quotas has played
a key role with improving the way Nicaragua was evaluated by the GGI.
In the snapshot provided by the GGI on Nicaragua’s gender disparities
in political empowerment, from 2012 and on, there is a steady improvement in
Nicaragua’s performance, as the country climbed from 5th place in 2012 and 2013 to 4th
place in 2014 – 2016, reaching 2nd place worldwide in 2017-2018, and 3d place in 2019.
In 2012, Nicaragua entered the ‘top 10’ global performers in gender equality according
to the GGI in the 5th position – just below Nordic countries – world leaders in gender
equality, and above the score from the sample average of countries measured (0.195).
That said, Nicaragua becomes the first country from central and Latin America to ‘ever
hold a place in the top 10 of the global rankings (p. 38), scoring at least 17.3% better
than its first overall measurement in 2006’, the index analyzes that Nicaragua achieved
such privileged position thanks to ‘changes in political empowerment, particularly an
increase in the percentage of women in parliament (from 21% to 40%) and an increase
in the percentage of women holding ministerial positions (38% to 46%)’ (GGI, 2012, p.
22). Moreover, in 2014, the GGI reported that among the countries with a fast pace of
change towards gender equality over the years, climbing significant positions are
Ecuador, France and Nicaragua, ‘all three primarily driven by changes in political
indicators (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2014, p. 31).
As a critique to the forms of measurement and evaluation of political
empowerment promoted by the GGI, I bring attention to the fact that limited studies
have been conducted to explore the real effectiveness of gender quotas to promote
women’s political engagement, knowledge and interest in a country. Moreover, it is
necessary to consider not only women’s formal participation in politics but women’s
styles of government, political engagement outside decision-making and citizenship
behaviour (O’BRIEN and PISCOPO, 2019, p. 59-60), in which ‘political engagement can
include both conventional activities, namely turning out to vote, following politics in the
news, discussing politics with friends, or contacting one’s representative, and
unconventional activities, such as participating in protests, demonstrations, or civil
disobedience’, those other contexts are neglected by the GGI and increasingly
 155

important when we analyze the outrageous extent of gender inequality in the political
arena in Nicaragua.
Women’s participation in Nicaragua politics as well as its engagement
with movements from civil society to contest the state are influenced by the gendered
political legacies from the Somocista Era, Sandinist revolution and postsandinist period
(NEUMANN, 2014). For instance, Kampwirth (2011, p. 10-11) contends that Nicaragua
bears the most significant second wave feminist movement in Central America and one
of the biggest in the context of Latin America. Moreover, it is a fact that after the
revolution the movement has maintained autonomy in relation to political parties, the
Nicaraguan state and public institutions. In particular, the autonomy of Nicaragua
feminist movements from the Nicaraguan government remained strong despite Daniel
Ortega’s electoral plead to increase women’s participation in politics with ‘half of his
cabinet would be filled with women’ (DANIEL ORTEGA, 2006). What’s more, research
has shown an increased antagonism between feminist and women’s political activism
and Daniel Ortega’s administration over the years (HEUMANN, 2014, p. 290). There are
‘interrelated processes of (self)censorship and self(silencing) through which women
were disciplined into the “revolutionary discourse” (…) that affected the relationship
between Sandinista movement and feminists’ (idem, p. 292), with contradictory effects
to women’s rights and the stigmatization of feminism (and supposedly feminist agenda)
in Nicaragua. Part of this “revolutionary discourse” that disciplined and tied women’s
bodies to motherhood and nationalist ideals was discussed in the previous topic about
women’s health and survival in Nicaragua. Nonetheless, I argue that it is through an
analysis of negative discourses on women’s political participation in Nicaragua that such
context becomes palpable, specially when looked in comparison to what is reported by
the Global Gender Gap Index in matters of political empowerment in the country. To
illustrate the political functions played by the GGI in matters of political empowerment in
the case of Nicaragua, I engage with Kampwirth’s description of politics of gender in
Nicaragua where she emphasizes the presence of an antifeminist movement that
counts on the support of powerful political institutions: the Catholic Church, a number of
evangelical churches, and the state, especially the Ministries of the Family, Education,
and Health as my main model of qualitative analysis (KAMPWIRTH, 2011, p. 10-11).
However, I mostly engage with discourses and controversial events that could be
descriptive of the nature of women’s political action in Nicaragua in relation to matters
conducted in Ortega’s administration.
 156

As commented in the previous chapter, the antagonism between

feminist women’s political activism and Daniel Ortega as a leader over the years is far
from unidirectional. Tensions date to the late 1990’s, when Daniel Ortega was accused
of childhood sexual abuse by his stepdaughter Zoilamérica Narváez (HEUMANN, 2014,
p. 305). Despite the case being reported to the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights, to the disappoint of many women’s movements, and Ortega remained protected
by legal immunity. In this case, the autonomous feminist movement in Nicaragua,
especially the Women’s Network Against Violence (Red de Mujeres Contra la Violencia)
were supportive of Zoilámerica (KAMPWIRTH, 2011, p. 11). However, it was in 2007,
due to the outlawing of women’s reproductive rights in Nicaragua, that political tensions
between the government and women’s movements rose again. To explore the
ambivalence of the tensions of gender politics in Nicaragua in contrast to the GGI’s
evaluation of Nicaragua as a world leader driven by its changes in political
empowerment (2012 – 2019), one should consider two simultaneous events: (i) In the
context of Ortega’s political platform, Nicaragua became one of the few countries in the
region where chief executives appointed cabinets following the principle of formal
gender parity (half female and half male) (HTUN and PISCOPO, 2010, p. 3), an element
that played the biggest role in fostering Nicaragua’s global leadership in gender equality
in matters of political empowerment by the Global Gender Gap Index (per GGI’s
statement, 2014); (ii) the discourses and actions of political repression and
imprisonment of female activists and feminist leaders performed during Ortega’s
government have actively undermined women’s political mobilization, civil and human
rights during the same period evaluated by the index.
With respect to gender politics, one of the most controversial political
pamphlets from Ortega’s government has been its government propaganda called “The
connection between feminism and low intensity wars” (PRINCENTON’S DIGITAL
ARCHIVE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN EPHEMERA, 2008, sp). According
to this book, the now vice-president declares its hostility towards feminist and women’s
movements in Nicaragua by arguing that ‘(Nicaraguan) feminism serves to the model of
neocolonization, with a key role as a strategy to deteriorate revolutionary projects in
Nicaragua (…) this feminism is in the hands of women who do not live as women, who
do not know the feminine soul’ and, due to this “cultural threat”, the vice-president
emphasize that Ortega’s government intends to block the cultural occupation of feminist
movements with its public policies, notions of civilization, prayers and faith (PRADO,
 157

2010, p. 63). Following this publication, Ortega’s government initiated arbitrary legal
proceedings against human rights, female activists and women’s organizations from
civil society, including the Autonomous Women’s Movement (MAM) accused of
“subverting the constitutional order” (2008), as shown in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
the government – represented by Managua’s police – blocked the passage of four
hundred activists that were having demonstrations to bring awareness to issues of
gender-based violence in the country. We can see the antigender politics at play in
Nicaragua’s government with relation to women’s activism: Dona Maria Telles (2017
apud RIBEIRO-GOMES48, 2018), former Sandinista guerrilla commander, feminist
activist and leader of Renewal Sandinist Movement, stresses that under Ortega’s
government in 2007, 'the women's movement has been persecuted, its offices have
been raided by the police, and the Foreign Ministry has taken steps to eliminate all
kinds of financing and external support', with at least 'eight criminally charged feminist
leaders'.
Far from being punctual events of ‘antifeminism and antigender politics’
in Nicaragua, such events describe a common scenario of political repression and
hostility against feminist women in the country. This scenario becomes even more
aggravating as we put it in the context of the historical Protests and political crisis of
2018 in Nicaragua. Even though the public protests in Nicaragua were a response to
Ortega’s reform in the social security law, those protests carried deadly implications for
women’s activism and political behaviour, as pro-orteguist paramilitary groups,
Managua Police and the Nicaraguan Army exerted political harassment, with numerous
episodes of violence against protesters. In April 2018, hundreds were arbitrarily
detained under accusations of terrorism against the state, and 322 people were killed
(HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2019). As for the imprisoned protesters held in Managua,
the OHCHR found evidence that Nicaraguan women and men suffered sexual abuse
and rape by police guards (OAS PRESS RELEASE, 2018, sp). Moreover, the UN
refugee Agency (2019) reported that around 62,000 citizens fled Nicaragua after the
killings of protesters and popular protests that were initiated in 2018. One of the results
of the 2018 protests were, among other things, the strengthening of a transnational
activist network of female leaders who are exiled, denouncing political repression in
Nicaragua - Feminist Network for Nicaragua (Red Feminista por Nicaragua).
48
See Ribeiro-Gomes (2018) in https://www.redalyc.org/journal/745/74556945002/html/.
 158

Again, in the case of political empowerment, we can argue that the

GGI’s functions as technology of knowledge has serious implications to how Nicaragua
is perceived worldwide, as the country’s results often erase – if not recognize the
political crisis of anti-gender politics that occurs at the local level. In Nicaragua’s report
to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations49, the country uses the GGI’s
evaluation to leverage its commitment to the restoration of women’s rights and political
empowerment:

‘Although we do not accept recommendations 117.14 to 117.7 (*from the

Human Rights Council of the United Nations), we would nonetheless like
to elaborate on some aspects of the amendments to Act No. 779 and
action to combat violence against women, which is a matter of great
concern for the Government of Reconciliation and National Unity. Since
2007, Nicaragua has promoted the restoration of women’s rights,
as part of the National Human Development Plan and a policy to combat
violence, on the basis of a model of shared responsibility. Nicaragua is
one of the most advanced countries in terms of women’s
participation and empowerment. According to the 2013 World
Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, it ranked tenth in the
world for gender equality. In America as a whole, the average
proportion of women parliamentarians is 22.6 per cent, while in
Nicaragua it is 40.2 per cent and 50 per cent of ministers are
women’ (UNITED NATIONS, 2014, p. 5).

In 2017, for example, the report contends that ‘on the Political
Empowerment subindex, only Iceland has closed more than 70% of its gender gap.
While no other country has closed more than 60% of its gender gap, four countries—
Nicaragua, Rwanda, Norway and Finland—have crossed the 50% threshold’ (GLOBAL
GENDER GAP INDEX, 2017, p. 9). Furthermore, at the institutional level, Rosario-
Murillo, Nicaragua’s vice-president, is quick to comment on Nicaragua’s world
leadership: ‘We were there when we came to the government. (From there) to the fifth
place in 2018, we continue to maintain gender parity, that is, gender equality in
ministerial positions and (Nicaragua) has one of the highest proportions in the world of
women in parliament’ (TELESUR, 2018, sp). Moreover, in the same year of the Protests
and political crisis of 2018, the vice-president highlights that the GGI’s evaluation of
Nicaragua as a world leader in gender equality and political empowerment is evidence
of how Ortega’s government is ‘working together for justice, (…) working together to

49
See Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review* Nicaragua (2014, p. 5),
General Assembly in https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014-
10/a_hrc_27_16_add.1_e.pdf.
 159

implement a state policy of reconciliation and peace, (…) women and men, families’
(idem, sp). Another evidence can be found on the report provided by the Nicaragua’s
government50 to the IOT (2019-2020) about the gender pay gap and occupational
segregation between sexes in decision-making and political arenas, in which the
government cites its global position in gender equality to describe and legitimize
Nicaragua’s government commitment to gender equality. Those examples demonstrate
important interactions between the knowledge produced by the GGI about Nicaragua
and the country itself. At the same time they can be used as evidence that political
functions performed by the GGI entail objectification, depoliticization, subjectification
and legitimation of the world economic forum and GGI as authorities on the subject of
gender equality. The four discoursive processes above (as of Erkkilla, 2018) render the
phenomena of ‘normalization’ of the agenda for gender equality operational within
global indicators and rankings.

4.3. THE GGI’S POLITICAL FUNCTIONS ON ECONOMIC

PARTICIPATION AND OPPORTUNITIES BASED ON THE CASE OF NICARAGUA

50
‘In its supplementary report, the Government emphasizes the fact that at the global level
Nicaragua continues to occupy fifth place in the Global Gender Gap Index in 2020,
achieving a 80.4 per cent reduction in inequality between men and women. Women
occupy more than 50 per cent of decision-making posts in the legislative, executive and judicial
authorities, in the Government cabinet, local governments, and in senior management in
decentralized autonomous entities. With regard to the judiciary, the Government recalls that, in
response to a growth in demand for judiciary services, in 2015 the overall number of judiciary
staff increased by 60 per cent compared with 2008. The Government indicates that it has
increased the number of women judges in the Supreme Court of Justice by 37 per cent and the
number of women judges in the Appeal Courts by 47 per cent. Moreover, two of the four
chambers are presided over by women judges of the Supreme Court, and one woman judge is
the president of the highest body of the judiciary. Four of the eight Appeal Courts are presided
over by women judges. A total of 64 per cent of posts in the judiciary are held by women, and in
the administrative service 285 out of 465 senior management posts, 1,045 out of 1,797
executive posts and 1,281 out of 2,771 operational posts are occupied by women. The
Government therefore affirms that there is no salary gap between men and women of the same
rank and that any differences are owing to hierarchical position. In other words, the judges of
the Supreme Court of Justice have the highest salary, followed by the judges of the Court of
Appeals. Lastly, the Government recalls that the Judiciary Commission on Gender (established
in 2003 to improve access to justice for women and to promote diligent and efficient judicial
action which respects and protects women’s rights) is the body that implements gender
mainstreaming’ (IOT, 2021, sp).
 160

Finally, in this topic, I expand on GGI’s political functions to foster

governance of gender in world politics in one of its main domains: Economic and
Opportunity. Though I did explore its political functions in the first part of this chapter, I
now intend to advance understanding of the normalizing functions in the subarea of
Economic and Opportunity by connecting it to Nicaragua’s evaluations and domestic
affairs perceived outside the realm of the index. Ultimately, it is in the economic realm
that the neoliberal rationality of gender promoted by the GGI’s political functions of
government is broadly transmitted to states, as explored throughout this chapter. In
other words, this interpretation follows along with a poststructural feminist perspective of
international political economy, as it entails considering the ways in which ‘gender
equality’-discourses promoted by international actors and agendas of governments
become aligned with dominant paradigms of economic development in market-based
governance (TRUE, 2015, p. 329-330; PRUGL, 2015; RUNYAN AND PETERSON,
2012). In addition, in the case of Nicaragua, the discourses and actions from the
‘national project of gender’ in economic matters pursued by Ortega’s government are
more aligned with the rationalities fostered by the GGI. Furthermore, in this topic, I
emphasize that commonalities found between the rationalities behind the GGI’s forms of
measurements in the case of Nicaragua and the ‘national project of gender’ in the
country are two axes of a larger power dynamics. This dissertation suggests that the
focus of the GGI is not simply to govern ‘gender’ but rather ‘national projects of gender’
for countries, businesses and ultimately populations, which makes it an even more
compelling case for the study of gender politics, neoliberalism and forms of public-
private governance. The GGI functions as a technology of knowledge structured around
neoliberal governmentalities that shape understandings of health and survival, political
empowerment, educational attainment and economic and opportunity. In addition, the
index namely depolicize feminist languages of social change for international actors,
fosters and normalizes numerous feminized subjectivities of entrepreneurship, state-
performance and individual competition, largely connecting economic growth and
female empowerment as a solution to untap the global economy while at the same time
it fosters national policy frameworks rather than simply governing ‘gender’. National
projects of gender, for instance, entail an active role for political institutions to maintain
or change gender relations, gendered status for women and minorities and gendered
roles.
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In this sense, it is worth recalling that Economic Participation and

Opportunity is a subindex and at the same time one of the most important aspects from
the GGI’s forms of evaluation, ranking and interpretation on countries’ experiences with
gaps and gender inequality. The index uses as a benchmark Ratio: female labour force
participation over male value; wage equality between women and men for similar; ratio:
female estimated earned income over male; ratio: female legislators, senior officials and
managers over male value; and ratio: female professional and technical workers over
male value. In all of its editions (2006 – 2019) analyzed throughout this dissertation, the
Global Gender Gap Report emphasize much of the relationship between country’s
economic growth and competitiveness as contingent to women’s participation in labour
markets and countries’ and businesses commitments to gender equality. The
organization notes that ‘the report will serve as a call to action to governments to
accelerate gender equality through bolder policy-making, to businesses to prioritize
gender equality as a critical economic and moral imperative and to all of us to become
deeply conscious of the choices we make every day that impact gender equality
globally’ (2017, p. v). After all, the reports point out that ‘competitiveness on a national
and a business level will be decided more than ever before by the innovative capacity of
a country or a company. In this new context, integrating women into the talent pool
becomes a must’ (idem). That in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap
Index, True (2015, p. 330) contends that there is a liberal instrumentalization of gender
equality see women (and women’s participation in labour markets) as a ‘resource to be
governed’ to enhance national growth and the functioning of the global economy. As an
example of such dynamic, the Global Gender Gap Report51 (2010, p. 30-31)
demonstrates the link between gender equality and productivity, growth and
development can be seen through the capitalization of women in the form of
investments in (a) girls’ education; (b) women’s labour force participation; (c) women as
consumers; (d) women and their spending decisions; (e) and women and leadership.
Not surprisingly, in several reports, the GGI justifies that women should be integrated
into the economy and gender equality pursued by countries and corporate actors,
‘because women account for one-half of a country’s potential talent base, and a nation’s
competitiveness in the long term depends significantly on whether and how it educates
and utilizes its women’ (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2012, sp apud TRUE, 2015, p.

51
See Global Gender Gap Index Report (2010, p. 30):
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2010.pdf
 162

331). Interestingly, as the GGI employs this language on the role of women in the global
economy, it becomes possible to notice that the responsibility for country’s economic
development partly falls on women’s shoulders, the report clarifies the power of women
as workers and as consumers (2007, p. 20), with direct implications to the global
economic recovery in face of the 2008 financial crisis.
The GGI’s (2007, p. 20) makes the case by arguing that ‘to maximize
competitiveness and development potential, each country should strive for gender
equality’. Thus, the index actively calls governments and business in fostering gender
equalutt in economic participation. Governments would be responsible for ‘creating the
right policy framework for improving women’s education and economic participation’ and
companies responsible to ‘create ecosystems where the best talent, both male and
female, can flourish’ (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2011, p. 5). More specifically, the
subindex of economic participation and opportunity establishes ideal standards of
gender equality that include the maximization on female labour force participation, wage
equality, earned income and female leadership in public and private positions.
Therefore, those are the areas that countries and corporate actors should focus on with
their national frameworks of gender equality. Most, if not all, the key areas of national
policy frameworks of gender suggested as ‘best practices’ by the GGI – parental leave,
childcare assistance, taxation system and legislative structures to mitigate
discrimination in public and private entities - somehow strengthen the inclusion and
better accommodation of women as labor force. As the GGI points out, ‘a well-
established daycare system can be a long-term investment that supports women in
employment, thereby improving the efficiency of labor markets’ (GLOBAL GENDER
GAP INDEX, 2012, P. 58-59). At this point, my dissertation interprets that the Global
Gender Gap Index’s rationale behind its evaluations on Nicaragua and other countries
reflects not the simply co-optation of feminist ideas but what Prugl (2014, p. 4) calls the
neoliberalisation of feminism altogether, specially when we consider the GGI’s
discoursive approach towards gender equality on the Economic Participation and
Opportunity subindex. Here, neoliberalism is defined ‘not only as an economic
orthodoxy, but also as a cultural formation, a rationality in the Foucaultian sense “linked
less to economic dogmas or class projects than to specific mechanisms of government’
(FERGUNSON, 2010, p. 171 apud PRUGL, 2016). I argue that the Global Gender Gap
Index through the case of Nicaragua demonstrates a new facet of neoliberalism with
‘the interweaving of feminist ideas into rationalities and technologies of neoliberal
 163

governmentality’ (PRUGL, 2015, p. 4-5). In this scenario, gender equality should be

promoted because it fosters economic efficiency, world competition and the
maintenance of global economy. This ultimate goal is to be achieved by self-responsible
actors – states and corporate stakeholders – with the adoption of national frameworks
of policy and the absorption of neoliberal rationalities that place in women’s
empowerment and labor inclusion as two of the main arenas for intervention,
standardization and international monitoring. Moreover, as Prugl (2014, p. 7) proposes,
the neoliberalisation of feminism entails a discourse that ‘generates individuals as
entrepreneurs of the self and favours the creation of external environments that lead
individuals to self-monitor so that they conduct themselves in ways that respond to
market principles’. Moreover, the GGI’s discourses reveals forms of neoliberal
governmentality that are little discussed by the feminist literature, including the
instrumentalization of the ‘care infrastructure of countries’ through ‘care-related policies’
not exactly to enhance human rights and the expansion of social support through the
valorization of care labor and care economy. Instead, the index comments that countries
should invest in care infrastructure of countries to expand women’s economic
participation to leverage national competitiveness (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX,
2015, p. 36). The depoliticization of feminist understandings of the care-economy
followed by the subjectification of ‘care-related policies’ under a neoliberal rationality to
serve the productivity of markets, and it emphasizes the extent to which the
neoliberalisation of feminism occurs in the GGI. In the case of Nicaragua, we will notice
the particular ways to which governments respond to those forms of government
promoted at the GGI and, to some extent, embrace the major discourses of neoliberal
governmentality in its national gender project for gender equality at the domestic level,
especially in the programs and frameworks developed at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs
to improve women’s economic status under the label of ‘women’s empowerment and
gender equality’.
Over time, Nicaragua’s position in the subindex of Economic
Participation and Opportunity has been one of the biggest challenges faced by the
country. In contrasting with other evaluations, we can notice that economic participation
and opportunity diverges from (a) the overall ranking, where Nicaragua retained a range
of 90th to 27th global ranking position (2006 – 2011), entering in the ‘top 10 best
performers’ from 2012 – 2019, with 5th world ranking being its most promising position in
the GGI; (b) political empowerment subindex, in which the country also was evaluated
 164

in two moments: 2006 – 2011, ranking a range from 28th to 19th, 2012 – 2019, ranking a
range from 5th to 2nd best performer in the world; (c) health and survival subindex, where
Nicaragua is ranked in a range of 65th to 50th (2006 – 2013) and 1st place in the world
(2014 – 2019); and educational attainment, where there is an uneven trajectory in the
GGI’s evaluation about the country. That said, how do the Economic Participation and
Opportunity subindex’s evaluations about Nicaragua diverge from the previous
categories? First, different from the other subindexes evaluations, over time Nicaragua’s
global position in Economic Participation and Opportunity is, in many years, below the
global average and outside the ‘top 50’ world leaders in this domain. More specifically,
from 2006 – 2019, Nicaragua ranks 101st, 117th, 117th, 104th, 94th, 79th, 88th, 91st, 95th,
100th, 92nd, 54th, 69th, and 81st place in the world. In 2011, when Nicaragua climbs up
almost 20 positions in world ranking in economic participation and opportunity (ranking
from the almost hundredth position to 79th), GGI interprets that ‘Nicaragua’s increase is
driven mainly by a narrowing wage gap’, and it indicates that ‘Nicaragua’s performance
over the last six years puts it among the top climbers of the 114 countries that have
been included in the Report since 2006’ (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2011, p. 24).
The highest achievement in Nicaragua’s performance through the subindex of the
economic domain was recorded in the year of 2017, where the GGI evaluates
Nicaragua in the 54th place and states that ‘Nicaragua (6) defends its place in the global
top 10 and remains the best-performing country in the (Latin American and Caribbean)
region for the sixth year in a row’ (GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX, 2017, p. 20). With
respect to its overall leadership and yet less than ideal score in economic participation
and opportunity, we notice that Nicaragua’s score is very different – particularly large –
in comparison to how other countries on the ‘top 5 global performers’ rank overall and in
the economic domain: the world leader Iceland reaches 1st place overall and 14th
position in economic opportunity; Norway, 2nd place overall, ranks 8th place; Finland,
third place in the world, ranks 16th in economic participation and opportunity (idem, p.
10).
Despite the evaluations from the economic subindex not being ideal for
Nicaragua in the global ranking, at the domestic level, to Nicaragua’s government52,

52
‘El Estado de Nicaragua, desde el Gobierno de Reconciliación y Unidad Nacional (GRUN), en
armonía con su vocación de respeto a los derechos humanos, a la paz y la solidaridad, a través
del Modelo Cristiano, Socialista y Solidario; ha venido priorizando la incorporación de la
Equidad e Igualdad de Género en instrumentos normativos y jurídicos que orientan la ejecución
 165

gender equity, economic empowerment and gender equality are sone of the main axis
in its domestic and national strategies. However, their national framework towards
gender equality is one inspired from Ortega’s government Nicaraguan model of
Christianism, socialism and solidarity: its framework aims to promote the restitution of
rights, empowerment, women’s and family leadership in different spaces of participation
in the country (CEPAL, 2019, p. 5). As an official archive from the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs53 (2020, p. 2-3) explains, ever since 2007 Nicaragua has adopted a model of
equity and complementarity with the main goal of promoting economic, social, cultural
and political empowerment of women and their family through public policy, projects and
programs associated with human development According to Nicaragua’s government54,
Nicaragua’s world leadership position evaluated by the GGI – as 5th place in world
gender equality - is evidence from the government management, political efforts and
commitment to strengthen women’s rights in the country.
As we analyze that the GGI encourages countries to align their national
frameworks of gender policy with the frameworks considered priority areas by the index
to improve their performances and achieve gender equality, True (2015, p. 331) argues
that world leaders by the Global Gender Gap Index’s evaluations – countries such as
Sweden – become in fact ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in the arena of gender equality. As the
GGI analyzes, world leaders – top performers – in the index are to be understood as
role models on gender equality at the global level: ‘the Index points to potential role
models by revealing those countries that—within their region or their income group—are
leaders in having divided resources more equitably between women and men than
other countries have’ (p. 32). Hence, I contend that Nicaragua’s case of world
leadership can also be seen as an example of countries with a strong ‘policy

de Estrategias y Programas Sociales, Económicos, Culturales y Políticos para la restitución de

los Derechos, Empoderamiento y Liderazgo de las Mujeres y sus familias en los diferentes
espacios’ (CEPAL REPORT, p. 5). See in
https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/nicaragua_em_2019.pdf.
53
See Cartila Mujer y derechos:
https://www.minim.gob.ni/storage/documents/Bn7RijqbMMg14okn2I0ueAAMBdzfxn4ZWrOztan2.pdf.
54
‘La gestión del Gobierno en la restitución y fortalecimiento de Derechos de las Mujeres ha
permitido que organismos internacionales destaquen a Nicaragua como un país con avances
extraordinarios y consistentes en la reducción de las desigualdades de género; el Informe sobre
la Brecha Global de Género del Foro Económico Mundial (FEM), publicado el 17 de diciembre
2018, ubica a Nicaragua en el ‘top’ 5 a nivel mundial de los países con mayor Equidad de
Género de América Latina, avanzando 85 puestos en relación a la posición 90 que ocupaba en
el año 2007; Nicaragua forma parte de un selecto grupo de 10 países a nivel mundial que han
cerrado la brecha de género en más de un 80%’ (CEPAL REPORT, p. 5). See in
https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/nicaragua_em_2019.pdf
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entrepreneurship’ in gender equality. The harmonization between Ortega’s frameworks

with the discourses of women’s empowerment and gender equality as a global policy
script for economic growth becomes more prominent as we explore the discourses
adopted during Ortega’s administration (2006 – 2019). As such, this dissertation shows
that in theory Nicaragua bears a robust national legal-regulatory framework on gender
equality55, including the Law 648 for Equality of Rights and Opportunities (2008); Law
717 about Equal Access to Land Ownership and creation of the fond for the purchase of
Land with gender equity for rural women (2010); National Plan for Human Development
(2012 – 2016). That said, I bring attention to the discourse in which the Law 648 is
based and national campaigns for women’s empowerment in Nicaragua, given the
proximity between the language and framework adopted by the GGI and those two legal
frameworks of public policy. The Law 648 addresses national principles for equity and
equality of rights and opportunities in Nicaragua between women and men 56 (LAW 648,
article 1, 2008). The law is structured57 under a ‘gender approach’ (gender

55
Political constitution of Nicaragua (1987) and legal reforms of 2014; (b) in 2008, the Law nº
648 (Law for the Equality of rights and opportunities), since it incorporates recommendations in
the Action Program signed in Vienna (1993) and Beijing World Conference (1995); (c) Law 717
about Equal access to land ownership (2010); (d) in 2012, Law 779 - Integral law against
gender-based violence towards women; (e) Family Code summarized by the Law 870; (f) Law
896 against human trafficking (2015); (g) National Plan for Human Development (PNHD 2012 –
2016) (LOPEZ URBINA, 2018, p. 57). Furthermore, part of its National Project for Human
Development, the country has implemented three essential laws to address food security for
rural women: Law nº 693 for Food and Nutrition Sovereignty and Security Law55 (2009), Law nº
757 for Dignified and Equitable Treatment of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-descendants55
(2011), Law nº 717 for the Creation of the Fond for the Purchase of Land with Gender Equity for
Rural Women55 (2010).

56
Artículo 1 ‘Es objeto de la presente Ley promover la igualdad y equidad en el goce de los
derechos humanos, civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales entre mujeres y
hombres; establecer los principios generales que fundamenten políticas públicas dirigidas a
garantizar el ejercicio efectivo en la igualdad’ (2008). See
https://oig.cepal.org/sites/default/files/2008_ley648_nic.pdf.

57
‘In order to comply with this Law, the following general public policy guidelines are
established: 1) The incorporation of the gender approach is guaranteed to ensure the
participation of women and men in public policies by the Powers of the State, its administrative
bodies at the national level, the Governments of the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast,
municipalities and the institutions of constitutional creation as a comprehensive strategy to
guarantee equality and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. 2) Public policies, actions,
programs and projects to achieve equal opportunities and treatment between women and men
will be designed and executed within the framework of sustainable human development and
 167

mainstreaming) and executed under the framework of sustainable human development

with citizen participation for the strengthening of democracy. In the economic area, the law
establishes similar guidelines58 - with the exception of counting women’s productivity
and contribution to Nicaragua’s economy59 - for the development of public policies in
Nicaragua as the ones promoted by the Global Gender Gap Index: increase women’s
labor participation in the form of employment policies; guaranteed equal pay; promote
the protection of women’s working rights. Moreover, based on this law, Nicaragua
developed its own statistical mechanism to control and measure the women’s access
and participation in labor markets: ‘7) the national registry of employment status and
wages should be periodic and disaggregated by sex’ (ARTICLE 7, LAW 648, 2008).
Though this legislation does not extend in length towards its definition of women’s
economic empowerment, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Women’s Affairs along with the
Instituto de La Mujer are the main public institutions responsible for integrating the
guidelines from the Law 648 into the everyday lives of Nicaraguan women in the form of
campaigns and projects. For instance, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs clarifies that
Nicaragua relies on an ‘economic model of creativity and entrepreneurship’ based on

with citizen participation for the strengthening of democracy and fight against poverty’ (LAW
648, article 6, 2008).

58
‘The following guidelines must be applied in employment policies, plans, programs and
projects for job placement: 1) Include in employment policies the provisions contained in this
Law in order to achieve real equality in the exercise of labor rights between women and men,
access to work, labor relations and the conditions generated by them. 2) Women and men must
receive equal pay for equal work, in accordance with their work experience, academic
preparation, level of responsibility of the position, as well as enjoy the labor rights and social
benefits that correspond to them. 3) The requirements and criteria for the selection of personnel
that are established must contemplate equal access and opportunities between women and
men, without discrimination. The requirement of a pregnancy test to apply for a job is strictly
prohibited. 7) The national registry of employment status and wages should be periodic and
disaggregated by sex. 8) Guarantee the protection of the labor rights of working women, in
accordance with current labor laws and international instruments ratified by the Republic of
Nicaragua on labor matters’ (LAW 648, ARTICLE 7, 2008)’.
59
Art. 13 The Powers of the State, their administrative bodies at the national level, the
Governments of the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast, the municipalities and the
institutions of constitutional creation, must adapt the national statistics in order to account for the
true participation of the women in their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product and to the
National Accounts. They must also quantify through a Satellite Account the contribution of
women to the country's economy, with the work they do at home. Satellite Account is
understood as the one that quantifies the value of the activities generated in the family sphere,
mainly carried out by women, whose value at market prices represents a certain percentage of
the Gross Domestic Product (LAW 648, 2008).
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female economic empowerment: in this model, women are prioritized to become

economically empowered in the development of ‘proud entrepreneurship’, female
leadership, self-responsibility for the national economy, positive thinking, confidence in
personal capabilities, goal-orientation and control over the distribution of resources.
That said, we can infer that Nicaragua’s national policy framework of gender equality
and principles of women’s economic empowerment does represent an example of
neoliberalisation of feminism with empowerment-discourses similar to the ones present
within the Global Gender Gap Index, one that supports ‘a particular machinery of
governing women in global markets’ (PRUGL, 2015, p. 14). Unsurprisingly, the
Nicaraguan Ministry of Women’s Affairs comments that ‘Nicaragua has one of the
highest rates of gender equity in the world – comparable to first world countries,
because of Ortega’s political commitment to gender equity’.The vice-president Rosario-
Murillo (2019) expands on the subject of women’s empowerment by explaining the
following:

Nicaragua is on the path of empowerment, you [*women] must continue

advancing until you manage to consolidate those practices of
empowered women, knowing and appropriating your rights, further
developing your abilities, skills and participating at all levels. PROUDLY
ENTREPRENEURIAL NICARAGUAN WOMAN... Because Nicaraguan
women are absolutely responsible, we are effective, we are
distinguished workers, we are entrepreneurs and we learn every day
from all the possibilities to grow in knowledge and grow in human quality
that a new day offers us (ROSÁRIO-MURILLO, sd, our translation60)

Again, women’s empowerment and gender equality strategies with

neoliberal logics co-terminal with capitalist goals represent discourses through which
governing functions are exerted over subjects: feminized identities are developed
through neoliberal logics, such as of women as workers, entrepreneurs and self-
responsible empowered leaders. In the case of what we observe in Nicaragua’s national
framework of gender, we see a different – yet similar – degree of neoliberal

60
Original quote: “Estas en el camino del empoderamiento, debes continuar avanzando hasta lograr
consolidar esas prácticas de mujer empoderada, conociendo y apropiándote de tus derechos,
desarrollando más tus capacidades, habilidades y participando a todos los niveles. MUJER
NICARAGÜENSE ORGULLOSAMENTE EMPRENDEDORA... Porque la mujer nicaragüense es
absolutamente responsable, somos efectivas, somos insignes trabajadoras, somos emprendedoras y
aprendemos todos los días de todas las posibilidades de crecer en conocimiento y crecer en calidad
humana que nos ofrece un nuevo día”.
 169

governmentality when compared to the neoliberal governmentality of gender national

projects fostered by the Global Gender Gap Index. Where the Global Gender Gap Index
refers to women’s neoliberal subjectivities (‘the good woman’; ‘womeneconomics’) by
referring to the power of women (and sometimes girls) as workers, consumers, voters,
leaders and ‘untapped resources’ to foster financial recovery and economic growth,
Nicaragua’s governments national framework of gender equality explored in this
dissertation refers to women’s neoliberal subjectivities in similar terms: women are also
targeted as ‘solutions to economic growth’, but they are also associated with the
survival of the conservative portrayal of Nicaragua’s revolutionary legacy as a
reproductive force (of motherhood and family unit) in the country, often subjected to the
standards and ideals of ‘Christianism, socialism and nuclear heteropatriarchal family’.
Second, where Nicaraguan women are considered important as voters, consumers and
leaders, Ortega’s political commitment to gender equality scrutinizes feminism (and
women’s mobilizations) while instrumentalizes and modifies feminist notions and
language for social change. Third, based on definitions from the Nicaraguan Ministry of
Women’s Affairs and Nicaragua’s vice-president discourse on nicaraguan female
empowerment: ‘women’s economic empowerment’ seem to be the cornerstone of the
national project of gender fostered by Ortega’s government with self-responsable
entrepreneurship and ‘good woman citizenship’ as key elements for women to achieve
gender equality themselves rather than through collective struggle of social activism. To
that, authors such as Pisani (2018) report that Nicaragua has registered the highest
women’s entrepreneurship rates in the region, above the average at the global level.
The case of Nicaragua’s approach to women’s empowerment and gender equality
shows a form of neoliberal governmentality of gender that targets mainly Nicaraguan
population, including women to whom the national framework is being developed. It
works well as an example of how self-government forms of conduct can be further
transmitted from a range of international actors where technologies of knowledge –
such as the Global Gender Gap Index – are concerned.
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5. CONCLUSION
This conclusion is an attempt to provide an overview of this dissertation,
its goals, theoretical background, methodological choices, analytical results and overall
contributions to the field of IR. From the methodological point of view, our
methodological strategy was based on Barragán (2006), followed by a feminist research
design (TICKNER, 2006; D’IGNAZIO AND KLEIN, 2020) with qualitative methodology.
This dissertation was carried as an explicative case study using qualitative methods and
techniques, including triangulation of data, documental observation and documental
data analysis. In naming this dissertation a feminist project, I presumedly called for an
engagement between feminist theory and discussions about power in the data
production of global indicators of gender, in hopes that some of the ideas exposed in
this research could travel beyond Brazil and point to other pathways in research
practices and international institutions as data producers on gendered segments. In this
dissertation’s research design, I spoke indirectly to Ferree’s (2012) influential book on
the importance of exposing varieties of feminism, forms of gendered states and gender
projects in countries other than the United States, coming from a methodological place
that Cynthia Enloe (2014) calls ‘feminist curiosity’ in international affairs. To claim this
dissertation as a feminist investment, however, as Tickner (2006) contends requires an
acknowledgement on my positionality as an author. It is clear that my affiliations here –
Brazilian amazônida, white and cisgender woman who studied at the Federal University
of Latin American Integration – played an important role in my articulation of this
subject, including the feminist questions this dissertation allowed me to ask.
Among the questions raised through my feminist curiosity were to what
extent global data production and evaluation on gender issues led by institutions in the
Global North is representative of gender disparities and gender-based violence that
takes place in countries in the Global South, such as Nicaragua; and how such
incongruence present within the case of Nicaragua’s representation is illustrative of
power relations and neoliberal narratives about gender inequality engrained in aspects
of governance and governing functions in the Global Gender Gap Index Reports. As
many international institutions and actors search for formulas and ways to “fix” gender
inequality with little regard for the social structures, discourses and forms of behavior
that render gender inequality material in people’s lives, and – what’s worst – doing that
for the sake of economic efficiency and world competition rather than from a place of
shared humanness and desire for structural change, it becomes a pressing issue to
 171

change the terms of discussion, so we can analyze what can kind of social process and
change – if any - has been fostered throughout data collection and evaluation.
With that in mind, this dissertation aimed to provide a critical
assessment on how the political functions played by the Global Gender Gap Index help
to foster an informal regime of governance of gender in world politics, based on the
case study of Nicaragua’s global leadership in gender equality portrayed the Global
Gender Gap Index (GGGI) in contrast to the experiences of anti-gender politics and
violence exercised at the local level, from 2006 to 2019. Our specific objectives were
the following: (a) to identify and analyze the representation of Nicaragua’s national and
global performance according to the “Global Gender Gap Index Reports (2006 – 2019)”,
taking into account how the four dimensions of the index are evaluated (Economic
Participation; Health and Survival; Political Empowerment and Education attainment);
(b) examine knowledge, gendered and governance-effects produced by the Global
Gender Gap Index with respect to Nicaragua’s case; (c) contrast Nicaragua’s world
leadership with contextual data from alternative sources (human rights’ reports and
academic literature about gender issues in the country) about the country’s politics of
gender, using the same range of time (2006 – 2019); and, finally, (d) inquiry about the
limitations in the social practices of data production (inputs) and measurement of
gender disparities (outputs) by the Global Gender Gap Index on Nicaragua’s
representation over the years, as in looking the gendered contexts that are privileged or
under-considered by this particular dataset and how their de-prioritizing connects with
broader discussions on the informal governance of gender in world politics.
At first, based on what has been discussed within the specialized
literature, I hypothesized that the Global Gender Gap Index acted as a policy device to
shape informal governance of gender in world politics, producing knowledge about
gender equality worldwide and political evaluations. That said, I expected Nicaragua’s
assessment by the index to show the articulate forms the global gender gap index
participates as a political device of neoliberal technology from an assembly of power
relations of normalization, disciplinarian, government and biopolitics. Furthermore, the
index’s political functions posed it as a technology of neoliberal governmentality of
gender, which is operationalized by social processes such as “gendered”
subjectification, objectification, de-politicization, and arena-shifting of its “measured
objects”, Nicaragua included. At the same time, I analyzed that the index produced
measurements of Nicaragua’s performance through neoliberalizing social macro
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readings or "gender neoliberalization" of the specific scenarios it analyzes. The labelling

of Nicaragua as a world leader in gender equality by the index, as opposed to its
problematic experience of anti-gender politics at the local level, allows us to infer that
the ranking creates ways of changing, rewarding and disciplinarize subjective identities
of international actors through notions of competitiveness and competence in gender
issues worldwide, especially in the categories of the sub-index of Political
Empowerment and Education. If we understand that labels are constituted by social
processes operationalized by the index with material implications, from the perspective
of data feminism and intersectionality, my hypothesis concluded that the index’s shaped
the informal governance of gender in world affairs by acting as a technology of
neoliberal governmentality of gender in Nicaragua.
To confirm and further explore this hypothesis, I relied on many
chapters: after the introduction, the second chapter of this dissertation was a theoretical
one. Thus, in this second chapter, I presented the basic definitions of global indicators
for world politics; more specifically, it focuses on the Foucauldian views on knowledge
and power and Foucaultian-inspired literature about global indicators and postructural
lens of feminist political economy about gender, governance and governmentality
studies. These two conceptual parts complement themselves and present an excellent
site for further interdisciplinary dialogue between International Relations (IR) and
Gender Studies. Both analytical approaches allow us to consider the cultural
dimensions that shape the production of political narratives in the Nicaraguan context by
the Global Gender Gap Index Reports. They also provide ground for a feminist account
of the index’s production by the World Economic Forum. Theoretically, I argued that
current Foucaultian-inspired perspectives on quantification studies alone do not offer
sufficient tools for theorising gendered politics and subjects related to portraying
Nicaragua’s gender equality by the Global Gender Gap Index Reports. Partly, I claimed
that this research carries an epistemological and critical commitment to address both
objects through the expertise of Women’s and Gender Studies as a form to produce
knowledge to address transformative politics. One of the reasons why I argue that
gender studies add to our analysis of the representation of Nicaragua’s performance of
gender by the GGI is purposefully neglecting gender issues and women’s and gender
studies literature in analysing world politics on its gendered subjects, such as a global
indicator of gender, means ignoring the understanding of a portion of the gendered
dynamics mobilized or shaped at the international domain. As feminist and gender
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studies are ultimately committed to understanding, describing, and theorising women’s

and gendered oppression and subordination, those approaches are inherently political
because they aim to liberate women and other gendered-oppressed populations to their
conditions subordination from structures of inequality. In turn, this is what makes those
approaches unique and critical to our dissertation. In this dissertation, the disclosure of
the basic features of global governance towards understanding it as informal
governance of gender and the recognition of the social practices of gendered
assimilation in governance structures, including the process of “neoliberalization of
feminism” to produce “governmentality of gender”.
After that, I exposed the rise of governance indicators in world affairs
based on a foucaultian-inspired analytics of knowledge-power. This notion of power and
ideology interviewed with governance is essential to this investigation. It allows us to
widen how regimes of quantification can interact, influence or reflect the ideological and
power aspects on the structures and actors they measure and provide knowledge. To
explore such thing, I engaged with Erkkila and Pirrone’s (2018) theoretical model about
the governing functions of global indicators in higher education and global policy. Even
though those authors do not discuss gender nor global indicators of gender, I found their
theoretical model useful for my analysis, as it proposed four social processes that would
describe the governing functions at play in discourses produced by global indicators:
subjectification, objectification, arena-shiftning and legitimation. Moreover, doing justice
to the postructural feminist political economy discussions carried out by True (2015),
Cornwall et al. (2008), True (2015), Peterson and Runyan (2014) and Roberts (2014), I
presented feminist perspectives about the interactions of gender equality, neoliberalism
and international institutions. In the association of the triad "gender" (intricate panorama
of the neoliberal economic framework), "woman" (object/social subject - generally from
the Global South - disciplined as an economic citizen by the governmentalized identity)
and "empowerment" (as a field of action governmentalized by financial institutions
around marketed ideas), I explained the concepts of neoliberalisation of feminism and
neoliberal governmentality of gender.
The discussions from this dissertation disclose important points in the
development of scholarship between multiple fields: International Relations and
perspectives about science and knowledge production (see MERRY, 2015; ERKKILA
and PIRRONE, 2018; DAVIS et al, 2015), Gender Studies in feminist political economy
(IPE) (ELIAS and ROBERTS, 2018) and, to some extent, some of the findings raised
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new questions about the nature of gender relations in Latin and Central America,
including how little feminist scholarship and IR scholarship discuss the effects of
informal governance of gender to social actors from the Global South, as well social
change that takes place in those contexts. This dissertation suggests that theoretical
assessments of gender equality and the production of global indicators of gender in
international affairs have been too focused in highlight and reward ‘role model
experiences’ in the Global North (Nordic countries). In other words, experiences of
Nordic countries - European role models (policy entrepreneurs) - engaged with trends in
‘feminist foreign policy’ become what any other country concerned with gender equality
should strive to be. While the GGI points out to this new trend of countries seen as
policy entrepreneurs in gender equality, it also raises questions about the mismatch
produced by the neoliberalised forms of feminism to countries in the Global South. In
Nicaragua, we see an environment of extreme suppression and regulation of women’s
movements, reproductive rights and health (control over feminized bodies and
motherhood as the the Christian family), and women’s economic self-sufficiency
regardless of their well-being, all three central to the maintenance of
The results from my investigation on how the political functions played
by the Global Gender Gap Index help to foster an informal regime of governance of
gender in world politics, based on the case study of Nicaragua’s global leadership in
gender equality portrayed the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) in contrast to the
experiences of anti-gender politics and violence exercised at the local level painted a
somewhat different picture from our hypothesis exposed above. This research has
confirmed that in many ways the GGI political functions are to govern the conduct of the
conduct of states (and not simply individuals nor populations) on ‘gender issues’, where
this global indicator of gender acts up as a device part of a technology of power
(LEMKE) and knowledge in world affairs (MERRY, 2015). On that note, we demonstrate
that the Global Gender Gap evaluates levels of a country’s measured ‘gender equality’
between sexes rather than empowerment or development based on four parameters:
economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, Health and survival and
Political empowerment, where 0 represents full inequality and 1 represents full equality.
In this sense, those four criteria are the main boundaries around the issue of gender
inequality at the global level. The measurements of the global gender gap index, in a
way, carefully built the notion of gender equality around four boundaries of social reality
in countries: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, Health and
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survival and Political empowerment. The domain of what constitutes gender equality as
a capability for a country is restricted by these four traits, making up what Foucault’s
work calls ‘normalization’. In the normalization process at play within the GGI, we notice
that the GGI disseminates a global standard view on ‘gender disparities’, where the
discourses on the case of Nicaragua’s world leadership portray ‘gender equality’ a
capability of a country rather than a social justice goal to be pursued by a collective
movement.
Nevertheless, in this dissertation we have learned that through the
governing functions of the GGI ‘gender equality’ becomes a strategy to govern states
(TRUE, 2015) through discursive strategies of depoliticization, objectification,
subjectification, arena shifting and legitimation (ERKKILA and PIRRONE, 2018) on the
authority of the GGI as a technology of knowledge. More than that, we ended up with
the conclusion that the GGI performs distinct but complementary political functions that
target ‘national gender projects’ (CONWELL, 2002) of countries rather than simply
‘gender’ as a construct. In the GGI’s political rationale, states become global leaders –
best performers and certainly above the average – when they employ national gender
projects aligned with the neoliberal rationale proposed and legitimated by the GGI. As
such, the GGI’s forms of measurement and quantification governs and normalizes
standards for the global governance of gender (through neoliberal national gender
projects) in countries through framings of neoliberal governmentality and the governing
functions of GGI’s numbers. From this initial assessment on the Global Gender Gap
Index’ role in fostering an informal global governance of gender in world affairs
regarding the evaluation of Nicaragua’s ranking and status in global gender disparities,
we can draw many conclusions: First, Nicaragua’s national identity in gender issues is
created, altered, and rewarded as a world leader and top performer by the GGI’s
governing functions, depoliticizing the meaning of gender equality by its newly
reinforced connection with governments, markets and national competitiveness.
To illustrate that, my data collection and data analysis show that the
GGI gives rise to two different political narratives about gender affairs in Nicaragua
across time: (1) at first, Nicaragua is portrayed as a country whose performance
situates ‘below the average standards of gender equality’ (2006 – 2011), therefore
passive of self-optimization to achieve the ‘norm’ in four areas of gender affairs
established by the GGI and (2) second, with sufficient institutional change, Nicaragua is
represented as a ‘world leader in gender equity’ above the standards of gender equality
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abroad (2012 – 2019), outperforming most countries in the world ranking and being
showcased as a ‘role model’ in the region of Latin America, as well as presenting similar
traits of world-leadership in gender equality (‘top 10 most gender equal country’) along
with nordic states, with fast-paced predictions to achieve gender equality in the world
race to become a gender-equal country. In these two temporal intervals (2006 – 2011,
2012-2019), it is possible to notice precisely how the objectification, subjectification and
arenashifting processes occur at the GGI’s forms of evaluation, as the GGI’s is
successful in recreating boundaries of quantification and representation used to reflect
the social world of Nicaragua to the public opinion at the global level.
Beyond that, it possible to notice that Nicaragua’s representation and
evaluation over the years through the GGI expands on the biopolitical functions
performed by the GGI as well as its negative effects to enhance and properly represent
Nicaragua’s gender gaps in women’s health and survival. In contrast to many outlets
where Nicaragua is represented as having one of the most conservative legislations
against women’s reproductive rights and health care access, as well as a historic of
state repression against women’s political behaviour, feminist and women’s movements
that has give rise to the creation of a network of Nicaraguan feminist diaspora in Costa
Rica and Spain, the GGI’s recognize Nicaragua as a steady world-leader in gender
equality regarding matters of health, women’s survival and women’s political
empowerment in the country. During this dissertation’s data collection, literature review
and qualitative analysis, I have found evidence that the there is a national political
project of gender (Conwell, 2002) within Ortega’s administration at play in Nicaragua
that help us understand the limitations of the GGI’s evaluations as well as the neoliberal
logics shared by the GGI’s governing functions and Nicaragua’s own representation of
its domestic affairs to pass along the government of its citizens. Such national project of
power is gendered in four specific areas: women’s health, reproductive rights and
survival (NEUMANN, 2014; 2011); women’s political participation and interests in state-
civil society relations (KAMPWIRTH, 2011; 2016) and women’s economic participation.
The method of data triangulation by levels allowed me to gather sufficient data to
develop an alternative narrative of gender disparities in Nicaragua, one that is largely
distinct from the positive evaluations provided by the GGI about Nicaragua as a world
leader in gender equity.
The alternative narrative built through my data collection has served to
uncover the political functions of the GGI’s forms of evaluation concerning Nicaragua’s
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national project of gender. For instance, I contrasted Nicaragua’s evaluations from the
GGI with alternative narrative based on the following key events in Nicaragua’s gender
politics: (a) gendered discourses within policies and speeches from Ortega’s
administration as well as adverse outcomes of policies that target women’s health; (b)
the outlawing of all forms of abortion, with the penal code reform based on law 641 and
its implications to women’s health in the country; (c) the investigation on the violation
women’s rights in matters of health and health care conducted by the International
Amnesty; (d) when the state of Nicaragua was reported by women’s movements to the
Interamerican Commission of Human Rights, being later subjected to preventive
measures. As for the political empowerment evaluated by the GGI, I contrast it in the
case of Nicaragua by exploring an alternative perspective on Political Empowerment
and feminist-state relations through the following elements: (a) gendered discourses
that target women’s political empowerment during Ortega’s administration; (b) Ortega’s
actions of repression and political discourses against activists and women’s
movements; (c) law reforms for gender parity. Furthermore, I discuss gender-based
violence in Nicaragua based on law reforms, such as (a) the launching of the Integral
Law 779 against gender-based violence towards women (2012), (b) the reform of Law
779 to ‘safeguard the family unit’ in Nicaragua (2013); (c) the creation of ‘Gabinetes de
la Familia (state institutions for family counselling and state mediation in cases of
gender-based violence); (d) the discontinuation of the social program ‘Comísarias de la
Mujer y niñez’ (2016); finally, in the account of gender disparities in the economic
domain, I bring attention to the discursive and material implications from national
campaigns about “women’s empowerment”, discourses from the vice-president Rosario-
Murillo and laws to enhance gender parity in the economic sector.
As established throughout our data analysis, in both the GGI’s and the
national gender project of Nicaragua, it is possible to identify the neo-liberalization of
feminism (PRUGL, 2015) through the constitution of new rationalities about women at
the global level (as ‘economic solutions’, ‘assets’, ‘weapons’ and ‘resources’ for the
world economy) and Nicaraguan women (as ‘proud entrepreneurial and empowered
women’ and ‘mothers and comrades’ essential to Nicaragua’s economy, Nicaraguan
nuclear and Christian family model and Orteguist nationalist project). In both processes
of neoliberalisation of feminism – the GGI’s and Nicaragua’s national gender project,
gender politics assumes a character of individual and productive accountability, in which
the solution to inequality comes to be described by the capacity building, providing
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resources to women and encouraging entrepreneurial identities, resulting in a

marketized version of gender equality and women’s empowerment. The patriarchal
national project of gender observed at the domestic level in Nicaragua is not recognized
in its anti-gender politics content by the GGI’s forms of measurement and analysis,
given that the national gender project in Nicaragua is aligned with practices of neoliberal
self-government and female empowerment that render the GGI’s forms of neoliberal
governmentality of national gender projects operational. Granted, the GGI measures
global disparities in gender and ranks countries, but its form of measurement and
interpretation not only masks gender-based violence as something structural and
therefore who requires systemic change, it is particularly unable to capture rates of
gender inequality in non-eurocentered contexts such as Nicaragua. Instead, it conflates
different national projects of gender among countries, which is problematic, as
Nicaragua’s government makes use of the national branding of world leader in gender
equity established by the GGI to delegitimize alternate gendered mobilizations with
feminist and human rights content at the domestic level.
As shown in this dissertation, even though the conservative ‘national
gender project’ fostered during Ortega’s government carries many legacies of hostility
(against feminism and women’s activists who do not identify with the political projects of
the country) from the Somoza Era, Sandinist Revolution and Postrevolutionary
Nicaragua, it is a fact that Ortega’s government national gender project is structured
around neoliberal logics of gender issues that way too often do not benefit women nor
safeguard women’s human rights. Evidence of that is shown in this dissertation, as
grassroot organizations, protesters, NGOs, international agencies and public authorities
demonstrate strong opposition to the ‘national gender project’ and its forms of violence
against Nicaraguan women at play in Ortega’s government. During Ortega’s
government, historical turns against ‘feminist gender politics’ and women’s rights, as
well as the proposal of a new model of empowerment for women’s roles in Nicaragua
society demonstrate the many events that engender women’s well-being in comparison
to their male peers that cannot be fully grasped by the GGI’s evaluations of countries’
gender gaps. Therefore, I argue that our analysis towards social processes that
describe the governing functions of the GGI help us better understand the informal
regime of governance fostered by the index is one that relies not on the governance of
gender, but at the governance of ‘national projects of gender’, which it makes it hard to
take into account the localized version of patriarchal authority present within the
 179

Ortega’s government in gender issues. Where the GGI was developed to provide an
universal and comparative account of gender gaps between countries, the case of
Nicaragua illustrates that the absence of measurements of gender-based violence
throughout each subcriteria (health and survival, educational attainment, women’s
political empowerment and economic opportunity) largely benefits the evaluation of
countries with conservative national projects of gender with patriarchal authority whose
nature makes use of neoliberalised versions of feminism.
In particular, this dissertation advances the scholarship on gender,
neoliberalism and international relations. Most studies have analyzed the intersections
of gender, neoliberalism and international relations through either institutional analysis,
or case-studies located within the Global North. Sydney Calkin and Sara Wallin (2018),
for example, discuss the implications on the absorption of feminist language and gender
mainstreaming as a governance strategy in financial institutions such as the World Bank
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), while True
(2015) explores the notion of global governance of gender through the role transnational
elites, gendered discourses and neoliberalisms. Elias (2013), on the other hand,
considers the work of the World Economic Forum more broadly and Prügl (2015)
analyzes the neoliberalisation of feminism at the implementation of international projects
and campaigns from private companies. What sets this dissertation apart in this
scholarship is, therefore, its ability to engage with discussions of gender, neoliberalism
and IR by connecting three different puzzles: the production of knowledge (Global
Gender Gap Index), its social and political processes regarding gender issues in global
governance and its implications for Nicaragua as an understudied “role model” of
national gender project from the Global South.
Finally, my critique at the Global Gender Gap Index Reports’ politics of
measurement and informal governance of national gender projects summarized through
the case of Nicaragua is located in a broader transnational movement in
interdisciplinary scholarship called data feminism. More than that, my dissertation is
also situated within a broader call to bring the qualitative perspectives into quantitative
objects (“datasets”). Quantitative data and quantitative forms of measurement can be
intrinsically embodied, social and subjective, which is why quantitative data also
deserves our careful examination as a social practice with broader implications and
roles in world affairs. According to this perspective, we should expand IR’s scholarship
towards new forms of analyzing meaning and power relations within global and
 180

statistical subjects than simply adjusting global indexes’ criteria. Without doubt, more
research needs to be done on the prevailing narratives within global indicators, global
statistical measurements and global rankings of any sort, so we can learn new ways in
which data and evaluations can benefit goals of social justice and praxis.
 181

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