DAVID WOLFSDORF

The Irony of Socrates

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We are not exalted by the destruction of the great, we tinction between verbal irony and eirôneia is the
are reconciled to its destruction by the fact that truth is absence, in the former case, of intended deception.
victorious, and we are exulted by its victory. Verbal irony succeeds when the intended audience
Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony grasps that the speaker is highlighting the literal
falsity of the utterance, whereas if the audience
To specify the particular approach of this paper were to grasp the speaker’s sincere belief, eirôneia
toward the subject of Socratic irony, it is necessary would fail. Furthermore, the intent of the verbal
to begin with some terminological distinctions. ironist is benign, whereas the eirôn is malevolent.2
The Greek noun ‘eirôneia’ is standardly under- Situational irony entails a certain incongruity
stood as deception or dissembling, but in its earli- between what a person says, believes, or does and
est recorded usage, namely, among Aristophanes’ how, unbeknownst to that person, things actually
comedies and Plato’s early dialogues, the latter of are. Oedipus vows to discover Laius’s murderer,
which will be the focus of this paper, ‘eirôneia’ unaware that Laius was his father and that he him-
and its cognates have a more precise sense. In dis- self is guilty of patricide. Whatever the precise
cussing cunning intelligence among the Greeks, nature of the incongruity involved in situational
Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant cite the irony, verbal and situational irony loosely share a
following description of the fox from Oppian’s conceptual core of incongruity, often tending to-
treatise On Hunting. When he sees a flock of wild ward polar opposition between two elements, such
birds, the fox crouches low to the ground and pre- as a semblance of things and reality.
tends to be asleep so that when his unsuspecting Dramatic irony is further distinguishable as a
prey approach him, he can effectively spring upon type of situational irony; it is simply when situa-
them.1 The fox’s hunting tactics well illustrate the tional irony occurs in a drama. The incongruity is
concept of eirôneia in its earliest usage; eirôneia is between what a dramatic character says, believes,
the use of deception to profit at the expense of an- or does and what, unbeknownst to that character,
other by presenting oneself as benign in an effort the dramatic reality is. The example in the preced-
to disarm the intended victim. ing paragraph is specifically of dramatic irony.
In the phrase “Socratic irony,” which, as here, is Given these distinctions, the question of
principally used with reference to Plato’s charac- whether Socrates is ironic is ambiguous. It could be
ter Socrates, ‘irony’ is also commonly understood interpreted to inquire whether Socrates exhibits
to mean dissembling or disingenuousness. This us- eirôneia or verbal or situational irony. More pre-
age is clearly informed by the conventional under- cisely, since there is reason to assume that Socrates
standing of ‘eirôneia,’ but ‘irony’ does not mean is not a strictly trans-textually identical character
deception. There are two basic kinds of irony, ver- among Plato’s dialogues, the question should be
bal and situational. Verbal irony occurs when a whether in any particular instance Socrates is be-
speaker deliberately highlights the literal falsity of ing verbally or situationally ironic or eirôn.
his or her utterance, typically for the sake of hu- As far as we know, the ancient tradition was
mor. For example, a tennis player mocks a lousy principally concerned with Socratic eirôneia and
shot with “brilliant!” Consequently, a crucial dis- other ancestral relatives of verbal irony. It is only

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65:2 Spring 2007

176 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

in the modern period, specifically since the late observable. Where before irony had been thought of as
eighteenth century, that Socratic irony in the sense being practiced only locally or occasionally . . . it now be-
of dramatic or situational irony has emerged as a came possible to generalize it and see all the world as an
topic of interest alongside, and often of greater ironic stage and all mankind as merely players . . . And
significance than, Socratic verbal irony. where before irony had been thought of as a finite act or
In Cicero, Socratic ironia is for the first time es- at most an adopted manner (as with Socrates), it could
teemed, and the distinction is made between its use now be thought of as a permanent and self-conscious
as an isolated trope and its operation as a perva- commitment: the ideal ironist would be always an iro-
sive discursive habit.3 But N. Knox claims that until nist, alert even to the irony of being always an ironist;
modernity, the concept underwent no substantial

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irony, in short, could be seen as obligatory, dynamic, and
further development: “In the fifteen centuries be- dialectical.9
tween Quintilian’s death and the first appearance
of irony in English little that was new happened to At present among Anglo-American scholars, this
the word. The rhetorical definition of it as saying fundamental distinction between approaches to
one thing and meaning the contrary . . . was passed Socratic irony is conspicuous in the treatments of,
on from one rhetorician to another.”4 When the for example, Gregory Vlastos, whose immediate
Latin word did surface into English as ‘yronye’ concern is verbal irony, and Alexander Nehamas,
in 1502, it was and remained among Anglophones whose interest is the irony of Socrates’ situation
until the early eighteenth century an “esoteric and and his attitude toward it.10
technical” concept.5 This article focuses on Socratic verbal irony
Only late in the eighteenth and at the begin- among Plato’s early dialogues.11 There are sev-
ning of the nineteenth century did irony undergo eral reasons for this focus. First, Plato’s Socrates in
the “radical transformation” that has yielded the early dialogues (hereafter, Socrates) is rarely
the range and depth of literary, psychological, portrayed as an eirôn.12 Second, the topic of So-
and philosophical meanings now associated with cratic situational and specifically dramatic irony
the concept. Crucial to this development, D. C. is secondary to that of Socratic verbal irony. One
Muecke observes, is the conceptualization of irony cannot effectively speak to the subject of Socratic
not “in terms of someone being [verbally] iron- dramatic irony if one has not adequately treated
ical, but of someone being the victim of irony the question of Socrates’ attitude toward his ut-
. . . Once the notion of irony was attached to the terances. This suggests—and this is the principal
naı̈ve or uncomprehending victim of Verbal Irony reason for the focus on Socratic verbal irony—that
. . . one could then think of someone as being the subject of Socratic verbal irony is fundamen-
the ironic, that is, unsuspecting victim of circum- tal to the interpretation of Plato’s early dialogues.
stances or events.”6 In the hands of German Ro- Socrates is the main and favored character in these
mantics, in particular, local situational irony was texts. If an interpreter is persistently unable to de-
subsequently generalized, universalized, and ele- termine Socrates’ attitude toward his utterances,
vated to “metaphysical dignity.”7 So, for instance, the project of interpreting the texts is hamstrung.
central to Friedrich Schlegel’s metaphysical irony Consider the comments of Iakovos Vasiliou: “So-
is humanity’s finitude and so necessarily inad- cratic irony is potentially fertile ground for exeget-
equate “striving to comprehend an infinite and ical abuse. It can seem to offer an interpreter the
hence incomprehensible reality.”8 chance to dismiss any claim [that] conflicts with
Muecke summarizes the modern development his account . . . merely by crying ‘irony.’ If abused
of irony as follows. in this way, Socratic irony can quickly become a
convenient receptacle for everything inimical to
Where before irony had been thought of as essentially an interpretation.”13
intentional and instrumental, someone realizing a pur- It is desirable to determine sound criteria for as-
pose by using language ironically . . . it now became pos- sessing whether, in a given instance, Socrates is be-
sible to think of irony as something that could instead ing verbally ironic. The thesis of this paper is that
be unintentional, something observable and hence rep- Socrates is rarely verbally ironic; in other words,
resentable in art, something that happened or that one Plato, for the most part, characterizes Socrates as
became or could be made aware of . . . from now on irony sincere. The argument for this thesis will turn on
is double-natured, sometimes instrumental, sometimes a single passage (Euthyphro 2c–3e) that appears
Wolfsdorf The Irony of Socrates 177

to be a clear case of verbal irony. In arguing that general. Nehamas refers to the “incredibly heavy-
Socrates is not verbally ironic in this passage, a handed irony with which Socrates treats [Euthy-
number of fundamental interpretive questions will phro] throughout the dialogue,” and he claims that
be broached. The most fundamental of these ques- “Socrates’ irony is so extreme that it soon ceases
tions concerns the extent to which Plato portrays to be humorous.”15
Socrates in a realistic manner. Generally, it will be In view of the definition given, if Socrates’ re-
argued that there are limits to the realism of the marks are verbally ironic, then he is intending to
early dialogues. Specifically, it will be argued that highlight their falsity for humorous effect. Accord-
Socrates is sincere in the Euthyphro passage and ingly, it is to be expected that Euthyphro would
that this sincerity is unrealistic. laugh at or comment on the absurdity of Socrates’

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So much for an introduction—let us now begin praise of Meletus. Here is Euthyphro’s response:
the argument. The definition of verbal irony given “I hope it may be so, Socrates, but I fear the oppo-
above provides a clear criterion for determining site may result, for it seems to me that he begins
whether a speaker is being verbally ironic. Since by injuring the state at its very heart when he un-
the ironist, unlike the eirôn, does not intend to dertakes to harm you. Now, tell me, what does he
deceive, but to highlight the falsity of the literal say you do that corrupts the youth?”16
meaning of his or her utterance and typically for Euthyphro responds as though Socrates has
the sake of humor, the reaction of the interlocutor spoken in earnest. Moreover, Socrates does not
should give some indication of whether the utter- correct Euthyphro’s interpretation of his remarks;
ance is verbally ironic (hereafter, referred to sim- he proceeds to answer Euthyphro’s question.
ply as “ironic”). Granted, attempted irony may fail Thus, Euthyphro’s response and Socrates’ re-
because a speaker is too subtle or an interlocutor sponse to Euthyphro’s response indicate that
too obtuse, but even if that occurs, the speaker’s re- Socrates’ initial remarks are not verbally ironic.
sponse to the audience’s response should correct This argument is unlikely to receive warm wel-
misunderstanding—save in the exceptional case come. It will be vigorously objected that one of
where the ironist allows the point to die. the dialogue’s basic features is Euthyphro’s ob-
Armed with this criterion, I turn to a passage tuseness; therefore, it is natural that Euthyphro
that is widely regarded as exemplifying the trope. fails to appreciate Socrates’ irony. Again, Ne-
As such, the passage offers a powerful test case. hamas claims that “Plato’s Euthyphro . . . is un-
The passage occurs at the beginning of Euthyphro usually stupid” and “remains totally impervious
where Socrates is recounting to Euthyphro the na- to [Socrates’ irony].”17 Consequently, the reaction
ture of his suit and prosecutor. may come that to interpret Socrates’ remarks as
earnest is as dim-witted as Euthyphro himself and
What sort [of case is Meletus prosecuting]? No mean as Meletus for prosecuting Socrates in the first
one, it seems to me, for the fact that, young as he is, he place.
has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small Since a clear criterion for verbal irony has been
credit upon him. For he says he knows how the youth given and the passage has been shown to fail to
are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He satisfy it, it is necessary to consider why read-
must be a wise man, who, seeing my lack of wisdom and ers so readily attribute verbal irony to Socrates
that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the state, as a in a case such as this. One reason is supplied
boy runs to its mother, to accuse me. And he seems to by a recent scholarly discussion of so-called con-
me to be the only one of the politicians who begins in the ditional irony. Conditional irony is said to oc-
right way, for the right way is to take care of the young cur when the speaker asserts a proposition to
men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a which he or she is sincerely committed, but that
good husbandman will naturally take care of the young is explicitly or implicitly embedded as the conse-
plants, as he says. Then, after this, when he has turned quent in a conditional, the antecedent to which
his attention to the older men, he will bring countless the speaker does not sincerely believe. Vasiliou
most precious blessings upon the state—at least that is suggests that Socrates’ remarks in Euthyphro con-
the natural outcome of the beginning he has made.14 tain the following example of conditional irony.
Socrates claims that “(1) Meletus charges Socrates
Consider a representative response to this pas- with a charge that is not ignoble, for it is no base
sage and to Socrates’ treatment of Euthyphro in thing for a young man to have knowledge of such
178 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

a subject.”18 But the irony here depends on the On my interpretation, Socrates’ sincerity would
assumption that Meletus possesses knowledge of be intertextually inconsistent. In other words, to
excellence (aretê) so that: interpret Socrates’ praise of Meletus as earnest
would yield inconsistency with other of Socrates’
experiences and utterances in other dialogues. For
in (1) the implied conditional is: if Meletus has knowl-
example, in Gorgias, Socrates emphasizes that if
edge of [excellence], it is surely no base thing and the
he is ever brought to court on a capital charge,
charge he has raised against Socrates is not ignoble.
“it will be some villain who brings me there, for
Socrates literally means this, but we know that Socrates
no honest man would prosecute a person who had
does not believe the antecedent. Given this, however,
done no wrong.”22 Furthermore, Socrates’ praise

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Meletus’ false pretence to knowledge and his charge
of Meletus occurs at the end of his life, which
against Socrates based on that pretence are base and
has been devoted to examining excellence with
ignoble.19
his contemporaries. In all the ethical investigations
that Plato portrays in the early dialogues, Socrates’
But let us press Vasiliou. How do “we know” that interlocutors are revealed to be ignorant of ex-
Socrates does not believe Meletus has knowledge cellence, and in Apology, Socrates emphasizes his
of excellence? Vasiliou writes: “we know from fellow citizens’ ignorance of their ignorance. Re-
[Socrates’] treatment of Meletus in the Apology gardless of whether Socrates has so interrogated
(esp. 24b–28b), as well as from the other dialogues, Meletus himself, such experience with so many
that Socrates does not believe that Meletus truly others should provide strong grounds upon which
fits [(1)].”20 to assume that Meletus does not have knowledge
Consider the matter now from the perspective of excellence.
interior to the texts’ fictional worlds. Regardless Precise support for this view comes from the be-
of when Plato composed Euthyphro and Apology, ginning of Meno, where Socrates claims: “I have
Socrates’ chance meeting with Euthyphro at the never come upon anyone who, in my opinion,
Basileic Stoa precedes Socrates’ trial. Accordingly, knew [what excellence is].”23 The dramatic date
Socrates’ discussion with Meletus at Apology 24b– of Meno surely precedes that of Euthyphro. And
28b provides no evidence that Socrates knows that so—the argument may run—it is unbelievable that
Meletus lacks knowledge of excellence. Further- in Euthyphro Socrates would sincerely assume
more, in Euthyphro, Socrates explicitly relates that that Meletus possesses such knowledge.
he hardly knows Meletus: “I don’t know the man My response to this objection will proceed in
very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be two steps. First, I want to dwell on Socrates’ spe-
a young and unknown person. I believe, however, cific claim in Meno. Subsequently, I will address
that his name is ‘Meletus’ and that he is of the the topic of inconsistency among Socrates’ utter-
deme Pitthus—if you recall any Meletus of Pit- ances as a general hermeneutic problem.
thus with long hair, a short beard, and a hooked First, observe that Socrates’ remark in Meno
nose.”21 Socrates gives the impression that he has happens to be inconsistent with a passage at the be-
seen Meletus, but had little if any contact with the ginning of the investigation of courage in Laches.
man. How, then, could Socrates know that Meletus
lacks knowledge of excellence? I emphasize that [So.] Then it is necessary that we begin by knowing what
Plato, certainly, believes that Meletus lacks knowl- excellence is, for, surely, if we had no idea at all what
edge of excellence and so that Socrates’ praise of excellence is, we could not possibly consult with anyone
Meletus is dramatically ironic. But dramatic irony regarding how he might best acquire it. [La.] I certainly
is beside the point—except, we might add, inso- think not, Socrates. [So.] Then we agree, Laches, that we
far as the reader is confusing Socrates’ assumed know what it is. [La.] We do. [So.] And what we know
verbal irony with Plato’s genuine dramatic irony. we can, I suppose, describe. [La.] Of course. [So.] Then,
Granted, from the fictional perspective interior my good man, let’s not at once examine the whole of
to the texts, Socrates cannot know that Meletus excellence, for that may be too much work. Rather, let’s
lacks knowledge of excellence insofar as Socrates first look at a part of it to see if we have sufficient knowl-
has never met Meletus. However, let us now con- edge of that. And, most likely, this will make our inquiry
sider a second objection to my claim that Socrates easier . . . So, then, which part of excellence should we
is not verbally ironic in the Euthyphro passage. choose? Or isn’t it clear that it is the part that is believed
Wolfsdorf The Irony of Socrates 179

(dokei) to pertain to the study of fighting in arms? And, Scholars tend to treat Socrates’ intertextual and
I believe, this is thought by many (dokei tois pollois) to intra-textual inconsistencies as though they were
be courage.24 merely apparent. There are various ways in which
this is done; but the variety may be conceived as
This passage is remarkable in a number of re- ranging between two poles. At one end, appar-
spects. It is the only passage in the early dialogues ent inconsistency is resolved by appeal to so-called
where Socrates presumes to know what excellence irony and various forms of disingenuousness, from
is. Also, Socrates explicitly bases his conception of polite concession to ad hominem argumentation to
courage and the relation between courage and ex- jesting to pedagogical savvy. Let us call this style
cellence on conventional views. of interpretation and its accompanying conceptu-

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Penner, who maintains that Socrates regards alization of Socrates as characteristically insincere
excellence as a unity, appeals here to Socrates’ the complex view. At the other end of the spec-
disingenuousness, a trait frequently conflated with trum, Socrates’ claims are accepted as sincere, and
irony: “Since the primary way in which Socrates their apparent inconsistency is resolved by appeal
identifies the parts of [excellence] he wants to nar- to developmentalism or to deeper, subtler unify-
row the inquiry down to, is as the part that has ing principles. Let us call this style of interpretation
to do with fighting in heavy armor, he must be literalist.
wickedly trying to lure Laches into giving the ac- Interpretations of Socrates’ epistemological
count of courage he knows Laches is itching to commitments provide a good and, as we will see
give anyway.”25 Likewise, Irwin, who maintains toward the end of this paper, topically relevant ex-
that Socrates is committed to the unity of excel- ample of this range of responses. According to the
lence, claims that the “assumption that bravery complex view, Socrates’ denials of knowledge are
is a proper part of [excellence is] introduced to insincere. As such, they tend to be interpreted as
make the inquiry easier, because bravery [seems] serving some pedagogical function. According to
to be the [part of excellence] most closely con- the literalist view, Socrates’ disavowals of knowl-
nected with training in armed combat.”26 In short, edge are accepted as genuine, yet it is observed
Penner and Irwin appeal to Socratic “irony” in that Socrates also occasionally sincerely avows
order to explain away a Socratic claim, which, if knowledge. The inconsistency is resolved by ap-
accepted as sincere, would jeopardize their thesis peal to explanations such as that Socrates uses
that Socrates (and therefore Plato) is committed words for knowledge in two different senses or
to the unity of excellence. that Socrates avows knowledge of certain proposi-
In contrast, Brickhouse and Smith use the tions, but disavows knowledge of how such propo-
Laches passage in their argument that Socrates is sitions are true, or that Socrates disavows exper-
committed to the disunity of excellence. Thus, they tise, but avows nonexpert knowledge.
criticize Penner’s appeal to “irony”: “One dubious However, the very conceptualization of
consequence of [Penner’s position] is that Socrates Socrates’ apparent or genuine inconsistencies as
feels free to exempt himself from the requirement an interpretive problem itself rests on a deeper
he so often places on his interlocutors, that when assumption about the nature of intertextual
developing an argument about a moral matter that interpretation. A remark Socrates makes in one
they always ‘say what they believe.’”27 text that is inconsistent with a remark Socrates
This scholarly dispute suggests that the attempt makes in another text need not be conceived as a
locally to resolve problematic passages such as hermeneutic problem unless it is already assumed
that in Laches is unlikely to succeed. Likewise, that intertextual interpretation involving the
the appeal to the Meno passage as evidence that assembly and distillation of all of Socrates’ utter-
in the Euthyphro passage Socrates is condition- ances is itself a legitimate, indeed, the legitimate
ally ironic is also problematic. Satisfactory treat- interpretive procedure. But on what grounds can
ment of these local problems is going to require that assumption be justified?
plumbing deeper, more general assumptions that Typically, the kind of justification given is post
govern the interpretation of the dialogues. The hoc; the interpreter’s success in demonstrating a
general problem is that to a considerable extent consistent set of Socratic philosophical principles
Socrates’ statements among as well as within indi- is taken to confirm what begins as a method-
vidual early dialogues are inconsistent.28 ological presupposition. In the case of many
180 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

philosophical texts, that kind of approach may be knowledge, but concludes with the novel view that
well warranted. However, in the particular case of knowledge is not equivalent to that kind of divine
Plato’s early dialogues, good reasons can be mar- inspiration. Apology begins with Socrates’ articu-
shaled against this sort of intertextual interpreta- lation of the common perceptions of himself and
tion. his guilt and ends with his confirmation of his in-
Even granting the possibility of revisions and nocence and beneficence. In general, the inves-
overlapping or relatively simultaneous compo- tigations in the definitional dialogues begin with
sition, Plato must have written the dialogues conventional conceptions of the definienda and
in some chronological order. Accordingly, some advance toward novel Socratic-Platonic concep-
dialogue—or, if one insists, some small set of tions.32 Note also that a-structure may function as

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dialogues—was composed first. Consequently, a broad feature, organizing whole discussions, as
Plato’s first dialogue could not have been inter- well as in a more limited way.
preted intertextually and could not have been in- The fact that a-structure and a common doxas-
tended to be interpreted intertextually. What if tic base are basic features of the early dialogues
Euthyphro were the first Platonic dialogue? In strongly encourages the view that Plato conceived
fact, in the traditional organization of the corpus the reading of each of the early dialogues indi-
transmitted since Diogenes Laertius, Euthyphro vidually in the sense proposed. Consequently—to
is the first dialogue. How, then, would a reader be return to the Euthyphro passage—it is difficult to
situated to recognize the verbal irony in Socrates’ see how a reader could be expected to appreciate
remarks when Euthyphro himself does not? verbal irony in Socrates’ remarks to Euthyphro
This suggestion is weak. The corpus of Thra- about Meletus. Moreover, appeal to the operation
syllus, which Diogenes adopts, probably does not of a-structure can be made to support the view that
reflect Plato’s intended order. There are more con- Socrates is being sincere in his praise of Meletus.
crete and compelling reasons against the sort of in- Euthyphro begins by suggesting an analogy be-
tertextual interpretation of the dialogues in ques- tween Meletus and Euthyphro as individuals who
tion, the most important of which is that each are allegedly knowledgeable about affairs of im-
text shares what I have elsewhere described as portance to the state. In contrast, Socrates initially
a common doxastic base.29 By “common doxas- appears to be relatively ignorant and their intel-
tic base” I mean a common intellectual point of lectual inferior. However, in the course of the in-
departure. The point of departure for the discus- vestigation, Euthyphro and, by analogy and im-
sion in every early dialogue is conventional opin- plication, Meletus are gradually revealed to be
ion. For example, no discussion introduces a con- ignorant and ignorant of their ignorance, while
cept or proposition whose comprehension within Socrates’ humility emerges as well founded and
the framework of the discussion requires prerequi- enlightened. In short, the function of a-structure
site understanding that must be gained from some explains why Socrates so confidently claims that
other early dialogue. This is precisely unlike the Meletus is praiseworthy and that Euthyphro has
case of a textbook, the comprehension of whose expertise in theological matters.
successive chapters depends on comprehension of Granted this, the appeal to the operation of a-
preceding chapters. In the early dialogues, where structure does not adequately explain why, from
a novel concept is introduced early in a discus- a realistic historical and psychological perspec-
sion, such as Form (eidos) in Meno and Euthyphro, tive, Socrates so confidently claims that Meletus
Socrates endeavors to clarify the concept. is praiseworthy and that Euthyphro has expertise
Related to the early dialogues’ doxastic base in theological matters. With this point we come to a
is the prevalence of a certain organizational fea- further question pertaining to the sort of intertex-
ture among the texts, which, again, I have dis- tual interpretation under scrutiny and to the inter-
cussed elsewhere and that I call “a-structure.”30 pretation of the early dialogues still more broadly.
A-structure serves a linear pedagogical function: Given that the dialogues were intended to be read
to lead the intended audience from a conventional individually in the sense proposed, what signifi-
conception of the topic treated in the text to a cance does this have for our conceptualization of
novel, unconventional Socratic-Platonic concep- the character Socrates? Specifically, what grounds
tion of that topic.31 For example, Ion begins with remain to support the view that Plato conceptu-
the assumption that Ion, an inspired rhapsode, has alized and composed the character Socrates as
Wolfsdorf The Irony of Socrates 181

having a strict trans-textual identity among the objectives principally were philosophical, and re-
early dialogues? Furthermore—and the follow- alism, to the extent that it is employed, is done so
ing question remains alive even if strict trans- in the service of philosophical objectives. Conse-
textual identity is denied to Socrates—to what ex- quently, however psychologically fascinating cer-
tent did Plato intend to portray Socrates in any tain modern scholars find the character Socrates,
given dialogue as historically and psychologically it should be appreciated that Plato was not princi-
realistic? pally concerned to portray a psychologically fasci-
Let me reiterate here the relevance of the ques- nating individual. Likewise, however much certain
tion to the Euthyphro passage. An objection to modern scholars seek to infer about the identity
my view that Socrates is sincere in praising Mele- of the historical Socrates from Plato’s characters

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tus is that Socrates, then, emerges as historically named ‘Socrates,’ it should be appreciated that
and psychologically implausible, in other words, Plato’s principal objective was not to portray the
unreal. Consequently, let us examine the parame- historical Socrates as he actually was, nor to rep-
ters of realism in the early dialogues. resent the precise details of episodes in Socrates’
Realism, the prevailing dramatic mode of the life.
early dialogues, is achieved through three com- Indeed, as is often the case in literature, realism
plicit dimensions: the discursive style in which the in character portrayal serves or, more strongly, is
characters engage, the portrayal of the psycholog- compromised to serve other dramaturgical objec-
ical profiles of the dramatic characters through tives. This subject has received little treatment in
their speech and nonverbal action, and the his- Greek literary scholarship. I emphasize that we
toricity of the settings and characters. To this may are not here dealing with the topic of the repre-
be added the following two salient features of sentation of personhood or individuality in Greek
these texts: the language of prose versus poetry literature, a subject that has received a good deal
and the unities of time and place. The events por- of attention. Rather, our interest is in the fact that
trayed in the early dialogues largely occur in real although Plato generally tends to portray his char-
time, and the discussions are set in a single loca- acters in a relatively realistic manner, such realism
tion.33 Note that the latter is true even in the case may be compromised in the service of other dra-
of dialogues such as Protagoras, for Socrates re- maturgical objectives.
counts to the anonymous aristocrat the events that Of course, all literature, even the most realistic,
transpired at his and then Callias’s house. Like- is selective in the aspects of the fictional world it
wise, in Republic I, Socrates narrates from a sin- portrays. One could spend pages detailing all that
gle unspecified location his and Glaucon’s meeting occurs when a person turns his or her head. It is
with Polemarchus and company somewhere be- a matter of relative degree of detail. More impor-
tween Athens and Piraeus and their subsequent tantly, it is a matter of the manner of handling the
visit at Cephalus’s house. details selected. In developing and clarifying the
In comparison with almost all earlier Greek lit- point, it will be helpful to refer to Michael Silk’s
erature, the realism of Plato’s dialogues is extraor- discussion of character portrayal in Aristophanes,
dinary. On the other hand, Plato’s intentions were specifically through his attention to inconsisten-
ultimately not to represent historical events that cies in style of speech.
actually occurred, nor, to the extent that Plato em-
ployed history instrumentally, to represent events For stylistic idiom to be compatible with realism, it must
with precise and accurate historical details. Fur- involve a range of expression that is consistently related
thermore, Plato’s intentions were ultimately not to a vernacular language, a language of experience, a
to portray the uniqueness of subjective experi- language of life. Either the idiom is felt to amount to
ences, the historically conditioned individuality a “selection of the language really spoken by men,”
of personal psychologies, or, more generally, the as Wordsworth called it; or alternatively it involves a
actual character of human psychology, including broadly consistent stylization, like (for instance) the styl-
Socrates’. Plato surely was concerned to portray ization of Greek tragic language, which does not consti-
human psychology, as he conceived it, insofar as tute anything like a language of life, but is, neverthe-
this was instrumental to the achievement of partic- less, fixed and conventionalized at a set, comprehensible
ular ethical-pedagogical objectives. But—and this distance from some hypothetical and more naturalis-
is the fundamental point—Plato’s dramaturgical tic idiom, which would pass for a language of life à
182 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

la Wordsworth . . . In Aristophanes, the inconsistency involves, as Silk describes it, a relatively internally
within a given speaker’s range of idiom points the op- consistent departure from reality.
posite way. The style in which his people are made to Plato’s early dialogues and, specifically, Plato’s
express themselves is incompatible with any kind of re- characterization of Socrates in large measure are
alism; and more fundamentally, as this consideration of realistic in the sense of representational; however,
style serves to suggest, the people of Aristophanes per they also involve some admixture of imagism. It
se are not strictly containable within any realist under- will be helpful to consider some striking unrealis-
standing of human character at all.34 tic and specifically imagistic moments in the por-
trayal of Socrates. Note that the following two are
In describing realism in characterization, Silk complicated by the fact that they turn on a lit-

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emphasizes internal consistency, however stylized, erary distinction introduced by Gérard Genette
unnaturalistic, and unrepresentative of the lan- between narrated time and narrative time.36 Nar-
guage of life a character’s manner of discourse. rative time is the chronological sequence of the
Silk calls the dramaturgical deployment of discon- fictional events; narrated time is the sequence in
tinuous stylistic idiom and, by extension, character which fictional events, however chronologically
imagistic, in contrast to realistic. ordered, are ordered in the literary work. Clearly,
the two sequences may be inconsistent; for in-
Words used in images—that is, words used tropically, and stance, when a narrative begins at the end of events
especially words used metaphorically—disrupt the ter- and proceeds to recount how things came to pass.
minological continuity of their context. Like words used The first movement of Protagoras consists of
literally, they evoke some reality. Unlike words used lit- Socrates encountering an anonymous aristocrat in
erally, they evoke their reality through discontinuity . . . an unidentified location in Athens. The aristocrat
Aristophanes’ characters, similarly, have their realist el- questions Socrates about his relationship with Al-
ements, or moments, or sequences, disrupted by [imag- cibiades. Socrates responds that at Callias’s house
istic] elements, or moments, or sequences.35 from which he has just come, he ignored Alcibi-
ades and was far more impressed by the wisdom
Perhaps we might replace the word ‘imagistic’ of Protagoras. Socrates proceeds to recount the
by ‘poetic’ or ‘tropical’ insofar as such discontinu- earlier events of the day when Hippocrates awoke
ities are hallmarks of literary and especially po- him at home and then urged him to go to Callias’s
etic composition in general and because, as Silk house to meet with Protagoras. This constitutes
observes, they operate not only in tropical con- the second movement of the dialogue. The events
structions at the level of the phrase or clause, but, and discussion at Callias’s constitute the third and
as in Aristophanes, analogously in characteriza- main movement of the dialogue. In narrated time,
tion more generally. In fact, it can be seen that Socrates’ discussion with the anonymous aristo-
such discontinuity often operates at the level of crat precedes the third movement, but in narrative
the entire drama or story. Consider a play such time it occurs after the third movement, in which
as Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot or, to take Protagoras’s claims to wisdom are undermined.
more commonplace examples from ancient litera- Therefore, when Socrates meets the anonymous
ture, the fables attributed to Aesop or the sort of aristocrat in the first movement of the dialogue
parables we find in the New Testament. In these and praises Protagoras’s wisdom, Socrates has al-
cases, the drama, story, or episode is in its entirety ready undermined Protagoras’s claim to wisdom.
to be understood as metaphorical. A similar inconsistency occurs in Euthydemus.
Whatever we choose to name this discontinuous According to the chronological order of fictional
mode of literary or linguistic form, it is also con- events, the first movement of the dialogue in which
venient to retain more commonsensical notions Socrates is talking with Crito is temporally pos-
of non- or anti-realism that we associate with un- terior to Socrates’ discussion with Euthydemus
natural idiom, as most saliently in versification, and Dionysodorus, which, according to the nar-
distortion, and deformation of character, as often rated order, follows the first movement. In the
found in comedy, as well as the impossible events first movement, Socrates praises the brothers’ wis-
and elements of, say, fantasy and science fiction. dom. The final movement of the dialogue returns
In short, this general literary mode, which we may to Socrates’ conversation with Crito. The first
call nonrepresentationalism, and unlike imagism, and final movements are temporally contiguous;
Wolfsdorf The Irony of Socrates 183

no event has intervened except the story of the reference through much of his discussion with Hip-
meeting with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus that pias in Hippias Major. It is perhaps especially note-
Socrates recounts and that constitutes the main worthy that all these characterologically unrealis-
body of the dialogue. However, in concluding his tic and imagistic moments, passages, or aspects of
discussion with Crito, Socrates suggests that, as the texts have a comic dimension. Indeed, I ven-
in all fields, there are also pseudo-practitioners of ture that imagism may be particularly suited to
philosophy who must be avoided. Socrates does comedy insofar as it is one species of a common
not explicitly cite the brothers as examples, but and general comic maneuver, the amusing distor-
this clearly is Plato’s point. tion or, more radically, subversion of reality.
In these passages from Euthydemus and Pro- With this, we come to one further objection that

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tagoras, Socrates is psychologically inconsistent or is likely to be made to my thesis that, given Euthy-
implausible. On the other hand, both examples phro’s response and Socrates’ response to Euthy-
are explicable as serving a dramaturgical function phro’s response, Socrates’ remarks are in earnest.
in accordance with a-structure. Both texts begin The objection is that Socrates is being verbally
with Socrates praising the wisdom of individuals ironic, but that this irony is not intended for Euthy-
who will become his principal interlocutors. Thus, phro, who indeed is a dullard. Rather, the target
the reader begins with the conventional notion audience of Socrates’ verbal irony is the intended
that these celebrated individuals will demonstrate reader of the dialogue. It is the reader who appre-
their intellectual capabilities. Naturally, these ex- ciates Socrates’ sense of humor at the expense of
pectations are subverted as the ensuing discus- and, in fact, compounded by Euthyphro’s obtuse-
sion reveals that they cannot satisfactorily answer ness.
Socrates’ questions. This sort of consideration is particularly appro-
This pervasive feature of the early dialogues priate in the context of a discussion of the lim-
does not depend on the complication of inconsis- its of realism in character portrayal. For Socrates
tency between narrative and narrated time. Gen- to be verbally ironic and for this irony to be di-
erally speaking, when Socrates begins a discus- rected over the head of his fictional interlocu-
sion with an alleged expert or authority figure, he tor and at the flesh-and-blood intended reader,
praises that individual and, as in the Euthyphro Socrates would have to be portrayed as conscious
passage, there is no indication in these instances of himself as within a fiction and of the reader as
that Socrates is being verbally ironic. The tradi- privy to this fiction. Moreover, this is precisely the
tional tendency, of course, is to interpret Socrates’ sort of nonrealism in which literature may indulge,
praise as disingenuous, but, again, I submit that a salient example of this kind being the aside in
in such instances, Socrates is used, in accordance drama.
with the function of a-structure, to introduce a However, while this is the kind of dramaturgi-
conventional conception that the ensuing dialogue cal move that can occur, as a matter of fact there
proceeds to undermine. According to this inter- is no compelling evidence that it does occur in Eu-
pretation, Socrates sometimes does emerge as a thyphro. Generally speaking, there is not a sin-
remarkably naı̈ve individual, indeed, as an unre- gle instance in the early dialogues where Plato
alistically naı̈ve individual relative to his hypothet- makes Socrates say or do something that indi-
ical fictional history and to the discursive sophisti- cates Socrates’ awareness of himself as within a
cation he demonstrates in the ensuing discussions. fiction and of the reader as existing in a world be-
Likewise, Socrates’ praise of Meletus is remark- yond the fiction. Moreover, while there is some
ably naı̈ve. However, I submit that this is one strat- precedent for a related dramaturgical technique
egy within Plato’s multifarious dramaturgical arse- within Greek literature, namely, the parabasis in
nal, an arsenal not beholden to realist injunctions. Aristophanic comedy, that device operates in a
Other notable examples of imagistic treatment most conspicuous fashion. Were Plato to have
of Socrates’ character in the early dialogues in- adapted and applied such a device to the early
clude Socrates’ interpretation of Simonides’ ode dialogues, it would presumably bear more striking
in Protagoras, Socrates’ argument in response to resemblance to the original. Consequently, there
Polemarchus’s definition of justice in Republic I would be no doubt whether it was occurring. In
to the effect that the just man is a thief, and, per- short, I submit that the claim that Socrates’ irony
haps most remarkably, Socrates’ disguised self- is directed at the intended reader is another case
184 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

of the misidentification of Plato’s genuinely dra- Protagoras refrains from speechifying. Shortly af-
matic, situational irony as Socratic verbal irony.37 terward, Alcibiades remarks that Socrates was not
In sum, if Socrates is, in any instance, being ver- seriously claiming to have a weak memory.41 Thus,
bally ironic, given that the intended audience of his Socrates is tactfully self-depreciating to avoid up-
irony is his interlocutor and not Plato’s intended setting Protagoras for failing to adhere to the dis-
reader, the response of his interlocutor should, for cursive mode of succinct question and answer. In
the most part, confirm that verbal irony is occur- short, to a large extent, when Socrates does not
ring. Accordingly, as a matter of fact, Socrates sel- mean what he says or does not say what he be-
dom is verbally ironic. Instances occur here and lieves, Plato has dramaturgical means by which the
there, as do instances of sarcasm, both of which interlocutors or Socrates himself are made to ac-

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are to be expected in some measure among a set of knowledge this.
dramatic dialogues that employ natural language. The general literalizing interpretation of
But verbal irony is not a dominant trait of Socrates. Socrates’ utterances that I am advocating yields
Consequently, since we introduced the problem a character who sometimes is less psychologically
of Socratic verbal irony as a potential hermeneu- complex and unified than is often conceived, while
tic problem, we can conclude that in fact Socratic at the same time more dramaturgically complex
verbal irony does not present a problem for the as well as psychologically unrealistic, specifically
interpretation of Socrates’ utterances. imagistic and discontinuous. If this is correct, then
Generally speaking, it should be emphasized we present-day interpreters of Plato’s early di-
that in those instances where Plato thought alogues find ourselves in an awkward position.
it important to register Socrates’ psychological Rather deep and unconscious realist assumptions
states, but not transparently through Socrates’ inform seemingly natural readings of the texts and
directly corresponding utterances, he employed yet, perhaps especially in view of intertextual in-
other means to do so. For example, in Charmides consistencies that are the inevitable consequence
when Charmides proposes a definition of sound- of those realist assumptions studiously applied, we
mindedness and Critias denies that he is its source, have found reason to question those very assump-
Socrates at that moment grants that the identity tions.
of its author is unimportant. However, shortly Misinterpretation of Socratic irony is, then, to
afterward, he notes—in the narrative, but not be fully explained by tracing scholarship back
aloud to the interlocutors—that he had thought through the much broader context of the history
Critias was responsible for the definition.38 Later of realism as well as its cousin historicism. At the
in Charmides when Socrates has shown that the other end of Western literary history, the ideas ad-
knowledge of knowledge and all other knowledges vanced here invite more thorough consideration
and lack of knowledge is unlikely even to exist and of the conventions of characterization in the genre
Critias cannot bring himself to admit his confusion of sokratikoi logoi (Socratic discussions) specifi-
and ignorance, Socrates narrates, but does not say cally. If more examples of this relatively widely
to the interlocutors, that he conceded the possibil- practiced literary form had survived, our precon-
ity of its existence “to advance the discussion.”39 ceptions in reading Plato’s Socrates would surely
In other words, Socrates reveals that he acted tact- be altered. Although relatively little does survive,
fully in order not to humiliate Critias. In Lysis, among Xenophon’s work and the pseudo-Platonic
once Socrates has humbled Lysis through an ad dialogues there is enough to say considerably more
hominem argument whose conclusion is that Ly- than what has been said.
sis’ parents will not love Lysis to the extent that In closing, let us turn to consider from a more
he lacks knowledge, Socrates casts a look at Hip- limited perspective how misunderstanding of So-
pothales to indicate that this is how one should cratic irony arose. The topics of Socratic ver-
treat one’s beloved.40 Thus, Socrates confirms his bal irony and situational irony share a concep-
intentions in the argument with Lysis without actu- tual ground, Socrates’ attitude toward knowledge,
ally vocalizing them to the interlocutors. Still fur- specifically, Socrates’ tendency to disavow knowl-
ther, in Protagoras, following Protagoras’s account edge. On the one occasion where an interlocu-
of the relativity of goodness, Socrates claims that tor speaks of Socrates’ “customary” eirôneia, it is
his memory is poor and, therefore, that he is un- because that interlocutor, Thrasymachus, thinks
able to hold a conversation with Protagoras unless that Socrates is concealing beliefs and shielding
Wolfsdorf The Irony of Socrates 185

himself from the sort of scrutiny to which he ventional relative to Socrates’ interlocutors and
allegedly subjects others.42 Why Thrasymachus Plato’s contemporaries. In short, misinterpreta-
should suspect this is not hard to understand. tion of Socrates as an eirôn and subsequently as
Socrates is portrayed as spending most of his verbally ironic begins with Socrates’ own inter-
time engaged in philosophical discussions, and in locutors’ misunderstanding of Platonic epistemol-
doing so he displays remarkable facility in argu- ogy among the early dialogues.43
mentation, particularly in criticizing conventional Interpretation of Plato’s early dialogues is
beliefs. It is reasonable to suppose that such an haunted by the specter of Socrates, specifically
individual would have achieved a sophisticated by the deeply embedded idea that beyond or at
grasp of the topics with which he is so preoccu- least within the texts there is a strange and re-

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pied, indeed a far more sophisticated grasp than markable individual driving the philosophical en-
those with whom he holds these discussions. In terprise. Whether this individual is identified with
this light, it is reasonable for Thrasymachus to the historical Socrates, with Plato’s conception of
challenge Socrates to articulate his views and for the historical Socrates, or, finally, with Plato’s con-
Thrasymachus to suspect that Socrates’ resistance struction of a literary figure, in all cases it is as-
bespeaks a sort of insincerity. sumed that this figure is a unity and so a unified
I suspect that such a perception of Socrates, source. In contrast, I emphasize that the charac-
especially Socrates’ ease in criticizing his inter- ter Socrates is not only a literary construction—
locutors’ beliefs, is responsible for the tendency to whatever its debt or causal relation to the histori-
regard his disavowals of knowledge as disingenu- cal Socrates—but that in accordance with certain
ous, but this is an impressionistic conception. More dramaturgical objectives, Plato takes liberties in
careful examination of Socrates’ avowals and dis- his treatment of this character that transgress real-
avowals of knowledge throughout the early dia- ism. Socrates’ unrealistically naı̈ve, sincere praise
logues yields a different conclusion. Among the of Meletus at the beginning of Euthyphro is one
early dialogues, Socrates does not consistently dis- such instance. In the face of such passages, the
avow all knowledge. Socrates is not a Cartesian quick appeal to Socratic “irony” prevents inter-
skeptic preoccupied with the grounds of ordinary preters from appreciating the strange complex-
knowledge claims. Moreover, while Socrates does ity of Plato’s dramaturgy and the various uses to
disavow eschatological and theological knowledge which he put his favored character.
on a few occasions, such disavowals are relatively
marginal to his interests and investigations. It is DAVID WOLFSDORF
Socrates’ frequent disavowals of ethical knowl- Department of Philosophy
edge that distinguish him from his interlocutors Temple University
and that must have distinguished the historical Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122
Socrates from his contemporaries—if, that is, the
historical Socrates did disavow ethical knowledge. internet: david.wolfsdorf@temple.edu
Xenophon, for instance, does not portray Socrates 1. Marcel Detienne and Jean-PierreVernant, Cunning
as characteristically disavowing ethical knowl- Intelligence and Greek Culture and Society (Humanities
edge. Furthermore, it is not that Plato portrays Press, 1978), p. 35; Oppian, II., 107–118.
Socrates as a noncognitivist; Socrates clearly be- 2. ‘Eirôn’ is the adjective from ‘eirôneia.’
3. Norman Knox, “Irony,” in The Dictionary of the His-
lieves ethical propositions are truth-functional— tory of Ideas, vol. 2 (New York: Scribner’s, 1973), p. 628;
he is an ethical realist. It is just that Socrates is em- Norman Knox, The Word “Irony” and its Context 1500–
phatic about the difficulty for humans of achieving 1755 (Duke University Press, 1961), p. 5. See also D. C.
ethical knowledge. Muecke, Irony and the Ironic (London: Methuen, 1982), p.
16; G. Sedgewick, Of Irony Especially in Drama (Univer-
To the extent that Socrates’ sensitivity to
sity of Toronto Press, 1935). Note that Quintilian, Institutio,
the difficulty of attaining ethical knowledge was IX.ii., 44–53, distinguishes three categories of irony: an iso-
extraordinary—and it was—it is not difficult to lated trope, a character of an entire speech, and a quality of
see why those insensitive to the problem would a man’s life.
have presumed that he must secretly harbor such 4. N. Knox, The Word “Irony” and its Context, p. 6. For
a more recent and exhaustive study, see Dilwyn Knox, Iro-
knowledge. In addition, the Platonic epistemol- nia Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony (Leiden: E.
ogy of the early dialogues entails requirements J. Brill, 1989), which demonstrates the diversity of Italian
for ethical knowledge that are wholly uncon- Renaissance conceptions and treatments of Socratic irony
186 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

in particular. Here, D. Knox writes that while conceptions 12. The view that Socrates is generally portrayed as a
of ironia persisted “[d]uring the Latin Middle Ages . . . the seeker of truth and as cooperatively engaged in investiga-
fortunes of ironia socratica declined. Indeed, the notion ap- tions of ethical claims with his interlocutors is defended in
pears to have been almost entirely unknown to medieval au- David Wolfsdorf, “Socrates’ Pursuit of Definitions,” Phrone-
thors, even though they were well enough acquainted with sis 48 (2003): 271–312.
ironia as a figure or trope, including ironia similar in kind 13. I. Vasiliou, “Conditional Irony in the Socratic Dia-
to that which classical and Renaissance authors often as- logues,” Classical Quarterly 35 (1998): 456–472, see p. 456.
sociated with Socrates, and also with many aspects, whether Note that Vasiliou is here interpreting ‘irony’ to mean de-
apocryphal or otherwise, of Socrates’ life and teaching” (Iro- ception or disingenuousness. This sort of abuse pervades the
nia Medieval, pp. 97–98). history of modern Platonic scholarship. D. Knox discusses
5. The first occurrence of ‘yronye’ is in Thordynary of some examples from the Renaissance in Ironia Medieval and

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Crysten men. The phrase “esoteric and technical” comes Renaissance Ideas on Irony, pp. 102–109.
from Knox, The Word “Irony” and its Context, p. 7. See 14. Euthphro, 2c2–3a5. The translation follows H. N.
Muecke, Irony and the Ironic, pp. 16–18. Fowler, Plato I (Harvard University Press, 1914).
6. Muecke, Irony and the Ironic, p. 20. 15. Nehamas, The Art of Living, p. 37.
7. On the German Romantics, see N. Knox, “Irony,” pp. 16. Euthphro, 3a6–9.
629–630. Compare Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living 17. Nehamas, The Art of Living, pp. 37–38.
(University of California Press, 1998), p. 94: “The real au- 18. I have inserted the numeral to facilitate exegesis.
thority of Plato as the true source for the historical Socrates is 19. Vasiliou, “Conditional Irony in the Socratic Dia-
the product of Romanticism, and I am convinced that the im- logues,” pp. 468–469 (emphasis added). The word ‘aretê’ is
portance of irony both to Plato and to the Romantics played often translated as ‘virtue’; but ‘excellence’ is better because
a crucial role in that transformation.” For a thorough treat- it does not require that ‘aretê’ be a psychological condition.
ment of the rise of the Socratic problem in the eighteenth 20. Vasiliou, “Conditional Irony in the Socratic Dia-
century, see M. Montuori, De Socrate Iuste Damnato (Am- logues,” p. 468.
sterdam: Grieben, 1981), pp. 9–29, and Socrates Physiology 21. Euthphro, 2b7–11.
of a Myth (Grieben, 1981). See N. Knox, “Irony,” p. 628. 22. Gorgias, 521d1–3.
“The nineteenth century provided many terms for this gen- 23. Meno, 71c3–4.
eralization of ironies of events: Ironie des Schicksals, ironie 24. Laches, 190b7–d5 (emphasis added).
du malheur, du monde, de l’histoire, du sort, de la nature, de 25. T. Penner, “What Laches and Nicias Miss—and
nos destinées, de l’existence, irony of fate, of circumstances, Whether Socrates Thinks Courage Is Merely a Part of
of time and of life” (“Irony,” p. 629). Virtue,” Ancient Philosophy 12 (1992): 1–27, quote found
8. N. Knox, “Irony,” pp. 628–632. on p. 16 (emphasis added).
9. Muecke, Irony and the Ironic, p. 19. 26. T. Irwin, “Socratic Puzzles,” Oxford Studies in An-
10. Nehamas, The Art of Living, chs. 1–3; see also Ne- cient Philosophy 10 (1995): 241–266, see p. 243.
hamas’s review of Gregory Vlastos, Socrates Ironist and 27. T. Brickhouse and N. Smith, “Socrates and the Unity
Moral Philosopher (Cornell University Press, 1991), “Voices of the Virtue,” Journal of Ethics 1 (1997): 311–324, see p.
of Silence: On Gregory Vlastos’ Socrates,” Arion 2 (1992): 318, n.20.
157–186. This is not to say that Vlastos is disinterested in 28. Examples here are legion. For a discussion of the
Socrates as an ironic figure; Socrates’ strangeness (atopia) problem with examples, see David Wolfsdorf, “Interpreting
is fundamental to Vlastos’s broad perspective. Conversely, Plato’s Early Dialogues,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philos-
Nehamas certainly regards Socrates as verbally ironic, but ophy 27 (2004): 15–40.
that is not the focus of his discussion. This ambiguity surfaces 29. Wolfsdorf, “Interpreting Plato’s Early Dialogues.”
in J. Gordon, “Against Vlastos on Complex Irony,” Classi- 30. Wolfsdorf, “Interpreting Plato’s Early Dialogues.”
cal Quarterly 46 (1996): 131–137, who writes: “One of the 31. Note that a-structure operates regardless of whether
main weaknesses of Vlastos’ definition is that it views irony the discussion ultimately concludes in aporia.
as limited to language proper, i.e., ‘things said’, as opposed 32. Note that this is so even though the early definitional
to, for example, how something is said or in what context. dialogues invariably conclude their investigations in apo-
Most of the time, what we perceive as ironic, on Socrates’ ria. The progress of the early definitional dialogues is dis-
part, is so in the context of complex drama . . . I would like cussed in Wolfsdorf, “Socrates’ Pursuit of Definitions,” and
to redefine a kind of irony which encompasses all off these by Dunamis in “Laches,” Phoenix 59 (2005): 324–347, espe-
things and so incorporates elements of the dramatic context cially pp. 340–347.
as essential to Socratic irony” (“Against Vlastos on Complex 33. Apology is slightly exceptional since there are time
Irony,” pp. 131–132). lapses between the conclusion of Socrates’ defense, his sug-
11. In “early dialogues” I include: Apology, Charmides, gestion of a fine, and his concluding comments.
Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, 34. M. Silk, “The People of Aristophanes,” in Individu-
Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Meno, Protagoras, and ality and Characterization in Greek Literature, ed. C. Pelling
Republic I. Note that it is debatable whether Hippias Ma- (Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 150–173, see p. 154.
jor is spurious as well as whether Republic I was composed 35. Silk, “The People of Aristophanes,” p. 159.
independently of and significantly prior to the rest of Re- 36. G. Genette, Narrative Discourse (Cornell University
public. Although I refer to Republic I and Hippias Major in Press, 1980).
my discussion, my argument would not be seriously jeopar- 37. Another problem for the objection has to do with the
dized if Hippias Major were spurious or if Republic I were background conditions of the culture or, more accurately,
composed during Plato’s middle period. subculture in which the intended reader of Euthyphro is
Wolfsdorf The Irony of Socrates 187

embedded. The objector must assume that the intended 38. Charmides, 161c, 162c.
reader’s situation would enable him or her to appreciate 39. Charmides, 168c–d.
Socrates’ statement as verbally ironic. But what evidence is 40. Lysis, 210e.
there that the intended reader would be situated in such a 41. Protagoras, 335b–c, 336c–d.
subculture? If, indeed, the function of the early dialogues is 42. Republic, I 337a4.
to win adherents to philosophy, then presumably the reader 43. These epistemological topics are more fully discussed
would not already be sympathetic to Socrates’ mission. Thus, in David Wolfsdorf, “Socrates’ Avowals of Knowledge,”
it also falls to the objector to show that the subculture Phronesis 49 (2004): 74–142, and “The Socratic Fallacy and
in which the intended reader would have been embedded the Epistemological Priority of Definitional Knowledge,”
would have enabled him or her to appreciate Socrates’ ut- Apeiron 37 (2004): 35–67.
terance as verbally ironic.

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