HEIRS OF DURANO V UY

G.R. No.
136456 October 24, 2000

HEIRS OF RAMON DURANO, SR., RAMON DURANO III, AND ELIZABETH
HOTCHKISS DURANO, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANGELES SEPULVEDA UY AND EMIGDIO BING SING UY, et
al., respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS:
In 1970, petitioners informed respondents that the land which they are tilling and
residing in had been purchased by Durano & Co., Inc. (DCI) from Cebu Portland
Cement Co. (CEPOC). They were threatened by DCI to vacate and proceeded to
bulldoze the lands occupied by them, destroying their plantings and improvements.
Later, DCI sold the lands to Ramon Durano III, who procured the registration of said
lands. Aggrieved, the respondents filed complaints against petitioners over so-called
“invasion” of their alleged properties. Petitioners accused respondents of officiating a
‘hate campaign’. Respondents followed this by another complaint addressed to the
President of the Philippines, saying petitioners are "oppressors", "landgrabbers" and
"usurpers" of their alleged rights. This prompted an investigation by the DOJ and the
Philippine Constabulary but led to the conclusion that respondents’ complaint was
untenable. Respondents demanded the return of their properties and made
counterclaims.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint and the RTC granted it without prejudice to
respondents’ right to proceed with their counterclaims. RTC ruled in respondents’ favor,
with respect to counterclaims, but only a few properties were returned to respondents
because these were not part of the land that was purchased by DCI from CEPOC.
Respondents alleged that they inherited these properties from their parents, who in turn
inherited them from their own parents. Some said they bought it from former occupants.
They and their predecessors were responsible for the plantings and improvements on
the property. They sought for the properties to be tax-declared in their names, and they
continually paid the taxes. Respondents maintained that they were unaware of anyone
claiming adverse possession or ownership of these lands until the bulldozing operations
in 1970.
The CA affirmed and modified the RTC Decision. The CA ordered the return of the
property to all the respondents-claimants, saying that the registration of Ramon III was
attended by fraud. CEPOC had no registered title over the disputed property and that
the Deed of Absolute Sale between CEPOC and DCI was not notarized and thus,
unregistrable.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners’ claim to ownership and title is tenable.
Whether the respondents are the owner the lands through acquisitive prescription
Whether the CA was correct in returning the properties to respondents.
Whether petitioners could justifiably invoke the doctrine of separate corporate
personality to evade liability for damages.
HELD:
No. Petitioners’ claim to ownership and title is untenable.
Petitioners failed to substantiate a valid and legitimate acquisition of the property—
considering that (1) the certificates reveal the lack of registered title of CEPOC to the
properties, (2) the alleged titles of CEPOC were not produced in evidence, and (3) the
Deed of Sale between CEPOC and DCI was unregistrable, being unnotarized.
The Court held that the petitioners’ evidence on their claim of ownership is weak. For
instance, the non-production of the alleged reconstituted titles of CEPOC despite
demand, gives rise to a presumption (unrebutted by petitioners) that such evidence, if
produced, would be adverse to petitioners. Also, the un-registrability of the deed of sale
is a serious defect that should affect the validity of the certificates of title. Notarization of
the deed of sale is essential to its registrability, and the action of the Register of Deeds
in allowing the registration of the unacknowledged Deed of Sale was unauthorized and
did not render validity to the registration of the document.
In this case, respondents were in open possession and occupancy of the properties
when DCI supposedly purchased the same from CEPOC, but petitioners made no
attempt to investigate the nature of respondents’ possession before they ordered
demolition in August 1970, which makes them buyers in bad faith.
Furthermore, the purchase between DCI and Ramon III cannot be in good faith. Ramon
III acquired the property with full knowledge of the respondents’ occupancy. There
appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to Ramon III, as the
bulldozing operations by DCI were still underway when the Deed of Sale to Ramon III
was executed. There is not even an indication that DCI attempted to transfer registration
of the property in its name before it conveyed the same to Ramon III.
Thus, petitioners could not justifiably invoke the defense of indefeasibility of title to
defeat respondents’ claim of ownership by prescription. The rule on indefeasibility of title
does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy at law.
Yes. The respondents are the owners of the properties. The lands were acquired
by respondents through acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners’ acquisition of the property was erroneous, while respondents have shown
prior and actual possession in the concept of owner. The records indicate that
respondents’ possession has ripened into ownership by acquisitive prescription.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription, in the case of immovable property, requires
possession of the thing in good faith and with just title, for a period of ten years. A
possessor is deemed to be "in good faith" when he is not aware of any flaw in his title or
mode of acquisition of the property. On the other hand, there is "just title" when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes for
acquiring ownership recognized by law, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right. The claimant by prescription may compute the ten-year period by
tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor-in-interest.
In this case, the properties were conveyed by purchase or inheritance, and in each case
the respondents were in actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the
properties. They exercised rights of ownership over the lands, including the regular
payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and improvements. They were unaware
of anyone claiming to be the owner of these lands other than themselves until the
notices of demolition in 1970 --- and at the time each of them had already completed the
ten-year prescriptive period either by their own possession or by obtaining from the
possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Thus, such possession had been converted to ownership by ordinary prescription.
Yes. The CA is correct. Respondents’ action for reconveyance is proper and will
prosper.
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the
CA to be builders in bad faith. Respondents’ action for reconveyance will prosper, it
being clear that the property, wrongfully registered in the name of petitioner Ramon III,
has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad
faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in
order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built,
planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and
the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages
from the builder, planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to
appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2)
to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay
the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages under Article
451.
The Court sustained the return of the properties to respondents and the payment of
indemnity as being in accord with the reliefs under the Civil Code.
The right of the owner of the land to recover damages from a builder in bad faith is
clearly provided for in Article 451 of the Civil Code. Although said Article 451 does not
elaborate on the basis for damages, the Court perceives that it should reasonably
correspond with the value of the properties lost or destroyed because of the occupation
in bad faith, as well as the fruits (natural, industrial or civil) from those properties that the
owner of the land reasonably expected to obtain. The Court sustained the view of the
lower courts that the disparity between respondents’ affidavits and their tax declarations
on the amount of damages claimed should not preclude or defeat respondents’ right to
damages, which is guaranteed by Article 451.
No. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of separate corporate personality to
evade liability for damages.
The CA applied the well-recognized principle of "piercing the corporate veil", i.e., the law
will regard the act of the corporation as the act of its individual stockholders when it is
shown that the corporation was used merely as an alter ego by those persons in the
commission of fraud or other illegal acts.
The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction is as follows:
1. Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of
its own;
2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate
the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust acts in
contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights; and
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents "piercing the corporate veil". In
applying the "instrumentality" or "alter ego" doctrine, the courts are concerned with
reality and not form, with how the corporation operated and the individual defendant’s
relationship to that operation.
The Court sees no reason to reverse the finding of the CA. The facts show that shortly
after the purported sale by CEPOC to DCI, the latter sold the property to petitioner
Ramon III, who immediately procured the registration of the property in his name.
Obviously, DCI was used by petitioners merely as an instrumentality to appropriate the
disputed property for themselves.

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G.R. No.

136456 October 24, 2000

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