Consumer ADR in Europe (Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr)

Consumer ADR in Europe
This is the first systematic comparative study into how consumer ADR systems (usually
ombudsmen and médiateurs) work, the differing national architectures within which they
operate and how they can be improved. It describes ADR schemes in Belgium, France,
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom as well as emerging pan-EU dispute resolution schemes. Use of the techniques of
mediation, conciliation and adjudication are noted. It also covers EU measures on consumer
ADR, and 2011 proposals for legislation on ADR and ODR. Data on volumes, cost and
duration of ADR schemes are compared, both between different systems and with courts.
The authors’ findings underpin EU and national developments, and outline options for
future policy. Findings and proposals are included for the functions, scope, performance,
essential requirements, architecture and operation of ADR systems. The relationships
between ADR, courts and regulators are discussed, and need for reforms are noted. This is a
ground-breaking work that will have a major impact on European legal systems.
Hodges Consumer ADR in Europe.indb 1 4/19/12 9:19 AM

Civil Justice Systems
Series General Editor, Chris Hodges, Director, CMS Programme, CSLS, University of
Oxford
This series covers new theoretical and empirical research on the mechanisms for
resolution of civil disputes, including courts, tribunals, arbitration, compensation schemes,
ombudsmen, codes of practice, complaint mechanisms, mediation, and various forms of
Alternative Dispute Resolution. It examines frameworks for dispute resolution that comprise
combinations of the above mechanisms, and the parameters and conditions for selecting
certain types of techniques and procedures rather than others. It also evaluates individual
techniques, against parameters such as cost, duration, accessibility, and delivery of desired
outcomes, and illuminates how legal rights and obligations are operated in practice.
Also in this series:

The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation
A Comparative Perspective
Edited by
Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer and Magdalena Tulibacka

Consumer ADR in Europe
Christopher J S Hodges
MA (Oxon), PhD (Lond), FSALS

Head of the CMS Research Programme on Civil Justice Systems,
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,
University of Oxford
Erasmus Professor of the Fundamentals of Private Law,
Erasmus University
Life member, Wolfson College, Oxford
Solicitor
Iris Benöhr
M Res and PhD (European University Institute, Fiesole)

Licence en Droit (University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland)
Post-Doctoral Researcher, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford
Admitted to the Brussels Bar (2009–2011)
Attorney admitted to the Bar (Supreme Court Zurich)
Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda
MA (USQ Australia), PhD (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

Post-Doctoral Researcher, Center for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford
OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON

2012

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© Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012
Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda have asserted their right under the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
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In Memoriam
Malcolm Carlisle OBE
(1947 – 2011)

SUMMARY Contents
Detailed Contents ix
List of Tables and Figures xv
Contributors xix
Interviewees xxi
Abbreviations xxv
Introduction xxix
Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr, Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda
Consumer ADR at EU Level

1. Alternative Dispute Resolution Iris Benöhr 1
for Consumers in the EU
Consumer ADR in Selected Member States

2. Belgium Stefaan Voet 25
3. France Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr, Naomi 37
Creutzfeldt-Banda
4. Germany Iris Benöhr, Christopher Hodges, Naomi 73
Creutzfeldt-Banda
5. Lithuania Christopher Hodges 117
6. The Netherlands Franziska Weber, Christopher Hodges 129
7. Poland Magdalena Tulibacka 167
8. Slovenia Aleš Galič and Christopher Hodges 197
9. Spain Iris Benöhr, Franziska Weber 209
10. Sweden Franziska Weber, Christopher Hodges, 229
11. The United Kingdom Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Christopher 253
Hodges, Iris Benöhr
12. Best Practice in Customer Care Christopher Hodges 339
in the UK
13. Cross-border Consumer ADR Christopher Hodges, Naomi Creutzfeldt- 355
Banda, Iris Benöhr
Findings
14. Empirical Findings Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda 367
15. Findings and Conclusions Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr, Naomi 389
Creutzfeldt-Banda

viii Consumer ADR at EU level
Appendices
1. Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable 455

to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes
(98/257/EC)
2. Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of- 463
court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes
(2001/310/EC)
3. European Code of Conduct for Mediators 471
4. French Charter of Consumer Mediation 475

Detailed Contents
Summary Contents vii

List of Tables and Figures xv
Contributors xix
Interviewees xxi
Abbreviations xxv
Introduction xxix
Consumer ADR xxix
The Different Meanings of ADR xxix
The World of CADR xxx
Policy Decisions xxxi
The Research Question and Approach xxxii
Plan of the Book xxxiii
Methodology xxxiv
Consumer ADR at EU level
1. Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU 1

Introduction 1
Access to Justice and ADR at the International and Regional Level 2
Historic overview of key ADR Related Actions in the EU 3
Competences of the EU in Civil Justice and Consumer ADR 5
Specific EU Measures Regarding ADR 7
EU Cross-border Networks 13
EU-Wide Complaints Reporting 18
The European Commission’s Proposals on Consumer Adr and Odr 20
Conclusions 23
Consumer ADR in Selected Member States
2. Belgium 25
The New FPS Economy and its Mediation Task 25
Creation of Belmed 26
Information 27
Online Application 29
CADR Agencies 34
3. France 37
Overview 37

x List of Chapters and Headings
The Institutional Landscape for Consumer Issues 38

Consumer Claims and Mediation within the Court System 39
Consumer Complaints Boards 41
Types of Médiateur 43
Banking 46
Insurance 51
Energy 56
Transport 62
Electronic Communications 65
Internet 68
Doctors 69
Evaluation 70
4. Germany 73
The National Context 73
Privatised Enforcement of Consumer Law 82
Overview of Consumer ADR Bodies 87
Chambers of Commerce 89
The Insurance Ombudsman 90
Doctors 94
Transport 96
Online Travel 99
Financial Services 100
Telecoms 108
Lawyers 112
The Failed ‘Ombudsman.de’ Scheme 113
Energy 114
Conclusions 115
5. Lithuania 117
Overview 117
Courts 117
Public Sector Ombudsman 121
Integrated Regulatory and ADR System 121
Conclusion 128
6. The Netherlands 129

Summary 129
National Culture of Negotiated Settlement 130
The Geschillencommissie Structure 135
ANVR: Travel Sector 149
Thuiswinkel: Web Traders 152
Financial Services: KiFid 153
Discussion 159
Overall 164

List of Chapters and Headings xi
7. Poland 167
Introduction 167
Forms of ADR in Poland 168
ADR Bodies 178
Summary and Assessment of Lingering Problems 194
Evaluation 196
8. Slovenia 197
Mediation in Business Sectors 197
General Consumer Arrangements 199
Courts and ADR 201
Small Claims Procedure in Regular Courts 204
Evaluation 206
9. Spain 209
Introduction 209
The Legal Framework and Consumer Claims within the Court System 209
Overview of the ADR System in Spain 212
ADR in Specific Sectors 219
Conclusions 227
10. Sweden 229

Introduction 229
The Policy of Prioritising Consumer Advice 229
Private Sector ADR 231
The National Board for Consumer Disputes 239
Courts 246
The Consumer Agency 248
Group Claims 249
Cross-border Claims 250
Evaluation 251
11. The United Kingdom 253

Introduction 253
Courts and Mediation 254
The Wide Culture of ADR 257
Models of Consumer ADR 258
ADR within Consumer Regulation 261
Private Sector ADR Bodies 266
Financial Services 272
Finance & Leasing Association 282
Pensions 284
The Legal Ombudsman 289
Telecoms 291
Energy 307
General Consumer Trading Sectors: Resolution of Disputes under Codes of Business 312
Practice

xii List of Chapters and Headings
Motor Codes 320

Travel Disputes: The ABTA Code and Schemes 328
Estate Agents 334
Evaluation 338
12. Best Practice in Customer Care in the UK 339

Introduction 339
Boots 341
British Telecom 348
Procter & Gamble 350
13. Cross-border Consumer ADR 355

European Car Rental Conciliation Service 355
SELDIA: The European Direct Selling Association 356
European Energy Ombudsman Group 358
ODR 358
ODR for Domain Names 360
EU ODR 364
UNCITRAL 365
Findings
14. Empirical Findings 367

Incidence of Claims 368
By Country 369
By Sector 377
Thresholds and Limits 379
Case Fee for Consumers 380
Levels of Loss and Detriment 381
The Cost of Major CADR Schemes 382
WIPO 384
Cost per Inquiry 384
Duration 385
EU Consumer Complaint Data 386
15. Findings and Conclusions 389

Findings of the State of CADR in the EU 389
The Unique Concept of CADR 389
The Extent of CADR 389
Coverage 390
Knowledge of CADR 391
The National Context of CADR schemes 392
The Historical Development of CADR Models and Techniques 394
Market Regulation, Reducing Cost and Maintaining Business Reputation as 395
Drivers for CADR
CADR in the Context of DR 398
Models of CADR 400
Ombudsmen 401

List of Chapters and Headings xiii
CADR with Business Codes of Practice 402

Modes and Techniques of Dispute Resolution in CADR Systems 403
The Sequencing of Dispute Resolution Pathways 405
The First Stage; Direct Contact with Traders 407
Advice, Information and Dispute Resolution 408
CADR and Collective Redress 409
Variations in Effect: Persuasive or Binding? 411
Conceptual issues with CADR 412
The Basis of CADR Decisions: Law and Fairness 412
Should CADR or Courts Decide the Law? 415
Binding and Non-binding Decisions 416
Compliance 417
Due Process Issues for CADR 418
The Purpose and Nature of CADR 420
ADR as an Essential Aspect of Regulation and Behaviour Control 422
Capturing and Using Market Information 423
What Criteria Should Apply to CADR? 425
Proposed Essential Requirements and KPIs 426
Architectural Issues 429
Centralised and Sectoral Schemes 429
Maximising Usage: Unified Architecture, Visibility, Consistency and Trust 430
Filling Gaps to Extend Coverage 433
Best Operating Procedures 437
Confidence and Trust 437
Accessibility 437
Language 438
Access Cost 439
Efficiency 439
Independence and Impartiality 440
Transparency 445
Factors Affecting Cost, Efficiency and Incidence 446
Conclusions 448
A Model for a National Consumer ADR Architecture 449
Appendices
1. Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable 455

to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes
(98/257/EC)
2. Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of- 463
court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes
(2001/310/EC)
3. European Code of Conduct for Mediators 471
4. French Charter of Consumer Mediation 475

List of Tables and Figures
Chapter Page
3 France
Figure 3.1 List of French mediation organisations 43
Table 3.1 Inquiries and mediations 2010 50
Table 3.2 Inquiries and mediation requests by subject area 2010 50
Table 3.3 Types of issues raised with ASF 2007-2010 51
Figure 3.2 Mediation Charter of the FFSA 53
Figure 3.3 Code of Good Conduct for the insurance societies that are members of 54
the FFSA or GEMA
Figure 3.4 Overview of insurance mediation applications 55
Table 3.4 Percentage of médiateur’s recommendations followed by companies in 2010 58
Table 3.5 Complaints received by the EDF médiateur 2006-2010 60
Table 3.6 Responses by consumers 60
Table 3.7 Processes and main reasons for complaints 61
Table 3.8 Website contacts to FNAUT in 2010 62
Table 3.9 Response times for the SNCF médiateur 63
Table 3.10 Types of infringements 64
Table 3.11 Sources of referrals since 2006 65
Table 3.12 Number of applications received and opinions given 2005-2010 68
Table 3.13 Type of complaints in 2010 68
Table 3.14 Complaint figures 2010 70
French Charter of Consumer Mediation 475

4 Germany
Table 4.1 Complaints data 2006-2010 93
Table 4.2 Complaints to Insurance Ombudsman 2006-2010 93
Table 4.3 Subject matter of complaints, by percentages 93
Table 4.4 Percentages of outcomes of complaints 94
Table 4.5 Decisions in matters concerning doctor liability 2008 96
Table 4.6 Amount of court cases avoided: Evaluation June 2007 96
Table 4.7 Categories of complaints 100
Figure 4.1 Details that should be included in a complaint to BaFin 102
Table 4.8 Complaint areas 2006-2010 108
Table 4.9 Overview of number and outcome of complaints received annually 2006-2010 108
Table 4.10 Fees charged by BnetzA 110
Table 4.11 Claims statistics of BnetzA 111
Table 4.12 Areas of complaints and inquiries 2010 111

xvi List of Tables and Figures
5 Lithuania
Table 5.1 Court stamp duty charges in civil disputes 118
Table 5.2 Litigation rates in Lithuania 120
Table 5.3 Complaint data for communications 125
Table 5.4 Air Transport Passenger Complaints handled by the Lithuanian Civil 127
Aviation Administration
Table 5.5 Complaints upheld and dismissed 127
6 The Netherlands
Table 6.1 The 50 Sectoral Complaints Commissions 136
Figure 6.1 Total company costs for Geschillencommissie cases in 2007 139
Table 6.2 General statistics 146
Table 6.3 Cases against ANVR members 151
Table 6.4 Cases received by KiFid 155
Table 6.5 Outcome of Financial Services Ombudsman cases in 2010 155
Table 6.6 Cases received by the Financial Services Geschillencommissie in 2010 156
Table 6.7 Outcome of Geschillencommissie cases in 2010 156
Table 6.8 Outcome of Financial Services Geschillencommissie cases in 2010 156
Table 6.9 Financial Services Appeal Committee, 2009 and 2010 156
7 Poland
Table 7.1 Cases referred to mediation 2006-2009 172
Table 7.2 Claims data from Tribunals in Szczecin 1991-2009 182
Table 7.3 Fees for the Arbitration Tribunal of the Polish Banks Association 188
Table 7.4 Fees for the Arbitration Tribunal of the Financial Supervision Commission 189
Table 7.5 Fees for the Arbitration Tribunal of the Insurance Ombudsman 192
8 Slovenia
Table 8.1 Statistics for ECC Slovenia in 2010 200
Table 8.2 Statistics for civil litigation cases in all country courts in Slovenia 206
9 Spain
Figure 9.1 The mediation process managed by OCU 218
Table 9.1 Processed complaints by type of resolution 224
10 Sweden
Table 10.1 Types of patient insurance claims: average 1997-2001 235
Figure 10.1 Contacts received by Telecom Advisers 2007-2011 237
Figure 10.2 Contacts received by Telecom Advisers 2005-2011 238
Table 10.2 ARN’s departments 240
Table 10.3 Cases received by ARN 2008-2011 245
Table 10.4 Total number of cross-border cases handled by ARN 2006-2010 245
Table 10.5 Type of decision in cross-border disputes 2008-2010 246
Table 10.6 Compliance rates 2008-2010 246

List of Tables and Figures xvii
The United Kingdom

Table 11.1 Summary typology of Consumer ADR Schemes in UK 259
Table 11.2 Major sectors, regulatory authorities and consumer ADR providers 259
Figure 11.1 Level of satisfaction with how a complaint was handled 266
Table 11.3 Allocation of Ombudsman Service costs between service sectors 272
Table 11.4 FOS budget figures 280
Table 11.5 Complaints types 2007-2010 281
Table 11.6 Total number of complaints to Ofcom 2007/8 to 2009/10 291
Table 11.7 Number of complaints closed under the Broadcasting code 293
Figure 11.2 Awareness of official dispute resolution bodies 297
Table 11.8 Ofcom’s key criteria for an ADR scheme 298
Figure 11.3 The outcome of consumer complaints 299
Figure 11.4 The Ofcom Approved Code of Practice for Complaints Handling 300
Table 11.9 Contacts received by OS:C 2007/08-2010/11 304
Figure 11.5 CISAS enquiries and valid applications 2005-2010 304
Table 11.10 Number of complaints 2009-2010 304
Table 11.11 Reasons for OS:C accepting a complaint 2009-2010 305
Table 11.12 OS:C Complaint Data 2009-10 and 2010-11 305
Table 11.13 Ranges of awards made by OS:C 2009-10 and 2010-11 305
Table 11.14 Nature of complaints to OS:C and CISAS 306
Table 11.15 Performance against OS:C Key Performance Indicators 306
Table 11.16 Energy Ombudsman complaints 2008/09 to 2010/2011 310
Table 11.17 Reasons for accepting a complaint 2010-2011 311
Table 11.18 Reasons for the complaint 2010-2011 311
Figure 11.6 Overview of the core CCAS criteria 313
Table 11.19 Cost to the consumer and fees for businesses of accessing ADR for 317
the OFT approved codes
Table 11.20 Code sponsor complaint information 319
Table 11.21 Code membership statistics 2010 322
Table 11.22 Complaint statistics 326
Table 11.23 Code subscription costs 327
Figure 11.7 ABTA complaint statistics 2000/01-2008/09 333
Table 11.24 Subject matter of complaints to OS:P in 2010-2011 336
Figure 11.8 Summary of OFT’s criteria for approval of the schemes 337
12 Customer Care
Figure 12.1 The complaint journey process 347
Figure 12.2 Boots Retail Issue management process 348
13 Cross Border
Table 13.1 Total number of WIPO cases 1999-2011 363
Table 13.2 Outcomes of WIPO cases 1999-2011 363
14 Empirical Findings
Figure 14.1 Total number of contacts per sector divided into proportions of 369
redirected contacts and those categorized as complaints

xviii List of Tables and Figures
Table 14.1 Details of complaints by scheme 370

Figure 14.2 Total number of contacts per sector divided into proportions of 370
Table 14.2 Details of complaints per scheme 371
Table 14.3 Total number of contacts (if available) by sector showing accepted and 372
resolved cases
Figure 14.3 De Geschillencommissie number of contacts per year showing the 372
proportions of initiated and processed claims
Figure 14.4 ECC NET Slovenia proportion of complaints and request for information 373
Figure 14.5 Spanish arbitration system for consumer disputes Sistema Arbitral de 373
Consumo proportion of complaints and redirected contacts
Table 14.4 Details of categorized complaints 374
Figure 14.6 Total number of contacts per sector divided into proportion of 374
Figure 14.7 ARN proportion of complaints dealt with and those dismissed 375
Table 14.5 Details of categorized complaints 376
Figure 14.8 Total number of contacts per sector showing proportions of 376
redirected/inquiries and complaints
Table 14.6 Total number of contacts telecoms by country 378
Figure 14.9 Total contacts in 2010 378
Figure 14.10 Total contacts in 2010 378
Table 14.7 Total number of contacts financial services by country 379
Figure 14.11 Total number of contacts without FOS 379
Table 14.8 Overview of cost to consumer by country and scheme 381
Table 14.9 Allocation of Ombudsman Service costs between service sectors 384
Table 14.10 Average duration per case in months by country and scheme 385
15 Conclusions
Figure 15.1 Integrated use of techniques by CADR providers 406
Figure 15.2 More sophisticated model for escalated use of techniques 406
Figure 15.3 Escalation model with an outsourced function of binding decision-making 407
Figure 15.4 The Netherlands Model 430

Contributors
Aleš Galič is an associate professor at the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana, his main interests
in teaching and research are Civil Procedure, International and European Civil Procedure,
Arbitration Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution. He has participated in numerous
expert groups for drafting legislation in Slovenia and also in Montenegro.
Magdalena Tulibacka is an independent researcher whose published research work covers

Polish law and civil procedure, Central and East European product liability law, European
Union law, Europeanization of law, and EU civil justice. She is Associate Research Fellow of
the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies’ Programme in European and Comparative Civil Justice.
Dr Tulibacka taught European Union law, comparative law, and product liability law at the
University of Westminster and the University of Oxford. She spoke at numerous academic
and legal practitioners’ conferences on European law and civil procedure. She cooperated
with BEUC on designing training courses in EU consumer law for personnel of European
consumer organisations and civil servants. She co-edited and contributed chapters to other
books published by the European and Comparative Civil Justice Systems Programme: Costs
and Funding of Litigation: Comparative Review (Hart, 2010), and The Globalization of Class
Actions (The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2009).
Stefaan Voet is a research and teaching assistant at the Institute for Procedural Law at Ghent
University, and an attorney at the bar of Bruges. In 2011, he obtained his PhD in Law on
complex litigation in Belgium. He was a visiting scholar at the Law Center of the University
of Houston, and SMU Dedman School of Law in Dallas. He frequently speaks at national
and international conferences, and regularly publishes in the field of civil procedure.
Franziska Weber is a final year PhD student at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. With-
in the European Doctorate of Law and Economics program she carries out research on con-
sumer law enforcement in various European countries. She completed her LL.M. ‘Master
European Law School’ at the University of Maastricht cum laude in 2008 and registered with
the Madrid Bar Association as a Spanish lawyer in 2011.

INterviewees
Netherlands
Professor Willem van Boom of Erasmus University
Paulien van der Grinten and Neils Frenk of the Ministry of Justice
Dr Alex Brenninkmeier, the National Ombudsman
Herman Schilperoort of Raad voor Rechtsbijstand (the Legal Aid Authority)
Dries Cuijpers and Bob Boelema of the Netherlands Consumer Authority
Bregje Krainen of Consumentenbond
Hubert van Breemen of VNO-NCW
Peter Moerkens and Koos Nijgh of De Geschillencommissie Stichtung
Peter Beatson
Professor T Jongbloed, of Utrecht University
AC Oosterholt of KiFiD
AC Monster, Financial Services Ombudsman
Prisca Ancion-Kors and Fabian Bloem of the Dutch Advertising Council
Léon Mölenberg of Thuiswinkel
Gerard de Vries Lentsch of ANVR
Leonard Böhmer of CMS Dirks Star Busman
Germany
Dr Jens Wagner, Dr Tim Reher, of CMS Hasche Sigle
Professor Reinhard Zimmermann, Dr Felix Steffek, Liane Schmiedel of the Max Planck
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
Petra Sandvoss of HandelsKammer Hamburg
Dr Daniela Strauss, Birgitt Maasch-Wiesel Bundesnetzagentur
Professor Günter Hirsch Insurance Ombudsman
Edgar Isermann, Christof Berlin of söp
Dr Georg Starke of BMELV
Dr Heiko Willems, Dr Ulrike Suchsland-Maser of BDI
Natasha Sassenrath-Alberti Domenik Wendt of GDV
Professor Jürgen Basedow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private
Law
RA Katrin Upmeier of Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V.
Jana Brockfeld Federation of German Consumer Organisations
Bernadette Zawal-Pfeil of Kundenbeschwerdestelle beim Bundesverband der Deutschen
Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken - BVR
Herr J Neu of Schlichtungsstelle für Arzthaftpflichtfragen der norddeutschen Ärztekammern
Prof Schmid of Reiseschiedsstelle

xxii Interviewees
Denmark
Ole Hasselgaard and Dr Ketilbjørn Hertz of the Ministry of Justice
Jens Olsen of the Ombudsman
Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe, the Consumer Ombudsman and Tina Emilie Pedersen
Peter Jacobsen of Patientforsikringen
Jan Erik Svensson of Gorrissen Federspiel
France
Xavier Beaud, Service de la médiation Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF)
Mr Constans, Médiateur du ministère de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi
Francis Frizon, Médiateur auprès de la Fédération française des sociétés d’assurances
Madame Letzeler, Fédération française des sociétés d’assurances
Cédric Musso, UFC-Que Choisir
Nicolas Godfroy, UFC-Que Choisir
Bernard Cieutat, Médiateur de SNCF
Leila Schwartzenbart, Déléguée générale, AMCE
Patricia Foucher, Service juridique et économique, Institut National de la Consommation
Michel Astruc, Médiateur GDF-SUEZ
Stéphane Mialot, Directeur des services energy Médiateur
Bernard Dreyfus, of Défenseur des Droits
Elyane Zarine, présidente, Commission de la Médiation de la Consommation (CMC)
Joëlle Simon, MEDEF
Loïc Armand, L’Oréal
Lithuania
Dr Rimantas Simaitis, Associate Professor, Vilnius University
Raidla Lejins & Norcous
Renata Juzikienė, Director, Law Systems Department, Ministry of Justice
Feliksas Petrauskas, General Director of the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority
Aida Gasiūnaitė, Head of the International and EU Affairs Coordination Division, State
Consumer Rights Protection Authority
Aivė Čeponienė, Head of Division, State Consumer Rights Protection Authority
Virginija Žegunytė, Head of Air Transport Division, Civil Aviation Administration
Lina Rainienė, Acting Deputy Director, Communications Regulatory Authority
Eugenijus Žvalionis, Director of Communications Department, Communications
Regulatory Authority
Saulius Linkevičius, Director, European Customers Centre
Slovenia
Jana Huč Uršič, Director of ECC Slovenia
Professor Dr Ernest Petrič, President of the Constitutional Court
Andrej Friedl and Marko Djinović, Chamber of Commerce of Slovenia
Natasha Stanič

Interviewees xxiii
Spain
José Domingo Gómez Castallo, General Director, Autocontrol
Alejandro Perales, President of AUC (Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación)
Rocío Algeciras, Member of the Legal Service, FACUA-Consumers in Action
Emilio Lizarraga Bonelli, Secretary of the Ethical Commission, ICOMEM (Medical
Association Madrid)
Enric Brazis Caubet, ENDESA, Energy Ombudsman, Office Manager
Professor Fernando Esteban de la Rosa, Universidad de Granada.
Alicia Menéndez González, Director of the Arbitration Department at the Spanish National
Institute on Consumer Affairs and Secretary of the National Arbitration Board
Begoña Outomuro Pérez, Área de Consultas y Reclamaciones Dirección General de Seguros
y Fondos de Pensiones, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
David Ortega from OCU (Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios;
Cristina Menéndez de Luarca, Servicio de Reclamaciones, Banco de España
Ignacio Pérez Pérez, Jefe de Servicios de Juntas Arbitrales
Sweden
Professor Ulf Bernitz, Stockholm University
Gunnar Larsson, Swedish Consumer Agency
Jolanda Girzl, Konsument Europa/ECC Sweden
Torsten Palm, Allmänna reklamationsnämnden
Anna Lefevre Skjöldebrand, SwedishMedtech
Tomas Tetzel and Marie-Louise Ulfward, Swedish Bankers’ Association
Marie Lüning, SEB
Anna Montelius, Swedish Post and Telecom Agency
Mattias Grafström, The Swedish Telecom Advisers
Staafan Löfgren, Insurance Sweden
Carl Espersson and Agneta Karlbom, The Swedish Patient Insurance Association
Peter Rigling and Elisabeth Ekwall, Road Traffic Injuries Commission
Peder Hammarskiold, Hammarskiold & Co
Henrik Bellander, Uppsala University
Philip Rämsell, Stockholm University
UK
T Hardy and F Thomas of CMS Cameron McKenna LLP
Heidi Munn, Stella d’Italia, Duncan Lawson, John Madill of BIS
Monica Arino, Marc Caines, Ian Blair, Claudio Pollack, Jeff Loan, Alan Pridmore of OFCOM
Donna Davis, Kate Damania of OFT
Clive Gordon, Jamie Kerr, Matthew Horne, Nick Walker and Marie Bogdan of FSA
David Baker, Paul Bentall, Laura Layfield, Maria White and Adrian Dally of the FOS
Joanne Milligan of Consumer Focus
Deborah Prince and Chris Warner of Which?
Tony King, Pensions Ombudsman
Megan Charles of the Finance and Leasing Association
Gregory Hunt of CEDR Disputes Group
Alan Connarty and Veena Kanda, both formerly of IDRS

xxiv Interviewees
Lewis Shand Smith of The Ombudsman Service

Charles Fachiri, Daryl Nurthen and Simon Bunce of ABTA
Christine Francis of Cosmos Travel
Seftton Samuels and Melanie Wiseman of SMMT
Tristan Holland of Motor Codes Limited
Madeleine Campbell-Barker and David Moran of RMIF
Ian Larkins of Daimler Chrysler UK
Keith Richards of Raleo Ltd
Michael Todd of the Advertising Standards Authority
Heather Simmons of the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority
Adrian Booth and Graham Hardy of Boots plc
Lesley Atkinson, Claire Dodgeon and Andrew McCarthy of Procter & Gamble
Chris Holland and Tim Liddell of BT
Craig Berry of RBS
Jonathan Peddie of Barclays
Robert Lane CBE, Ben Holland, Chris Watson, Simon Morris, Mark Grant, Mark Atkinson,
Susan Barty, Guy Pendell and David Marks of CMS Cameron McKenna
International
Brigitte Acoca, OECD
Peter Avery, Head, Consumer Policy Unit, OECD
Richard Knubben, Leaseurope
Mauritz Bruggink, Executive Director, Seldia – the European Direct Selling Association
Erik Wilbers, WIPO
European Commission
Rossella Delfino, European Commission
Maria-Cristina Russo, European Commission
Sebastian Bohr, European Commission
Eleni Tampaki, European Commission
Nicole Scourti, European Commission
Tamás András Molnár, Head of Unit, European Commission
David Mair, European Commission
Marilena Di Stasi, European Commission

Abbreviations
ABTA The Travel Association (formerly Association of British Travel Agents)

ADNRC Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (cross-border)
ADR alternative dispute resolution
AFM Autoriteit Financiële Markten - Financial Markets Authority (Netherlands)
AMCE L’Association de Médiation des Communications Electroniques - the
Electronic Communications Mediation Association (France)
AMF l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers - Financial Markets Authority (France)
ANVR Algemene Nederlandse Vereniging van Reisondernemingen - Dutch
Association of Travel Agents and Tour Operators (Netherlands)
ANWB Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond – Royal Dutch Tourist Board
(Netherlands)
APN Board for Personal Injury Liability Insurance (Sweden)
ARN Allmänna reklamationsnämnden - National Board for Consumer
Disputes (Sweden)
ASF l’Association des Sociétés Financières, ASF (Financial Companies
Association (France)
AUC Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación – Consumer Association for
Communication (Spain)
BaFin Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (Germany)
BAFM Bundes-Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Familien Mediation - Federal Association
for Family Mediation (Germany)
BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - German Civil Code (Germany)
BMELV Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz
- Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection
(Germany)
BnetzA Bundesnetzagentur - Federal Network Agency (Germany)
BVL Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit - Federal
Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (Germany)
C2B consumer-to-business (dispute)
CAC Czech Arbitration Court (cross-border)
CCAS Consumer Code Approval Scheme (OFT UK)
CEDR Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution
CISAS Communications and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme
CMC Commission de la médiation de la consommation - Commission of
Consumer Mediation (France)
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores - National Stock Exchange
Commission (Spain)

xxvi Abbreviations
Commission
European Commission
CRLC Commissions de Règlement des Litiges de Consommation - Consumer
Complaints Boards (France)
DIS Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit - German Institution of
Arbitration (Germany)
DR dispute resolution
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECODIR Electronic Consumer Dispute Resolution (cross-border)
ECRCS European Car Rental Conciliation Service (cross-border)
ECT European Community Treaty
EEC-NET European Consumer Centre Network (EU)
EEJ-NET Extra-Judicial Network (EU)
EGZPO Einführungsgesetz zur Zivilprozeßordnung - Code of Civil Procedure
(Germany)
EUCFR EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
FBF Fédération Bancaire Française - French Banking Federation (France)
FFSA Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances - French Federation of
Insurance Companies (France)
FI Finansinspektionen - Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Sweden)
FIDIC International Federation of Consulting Engineers
FIN-NET Financial Services Complaints Network
FLA Finance & Leasing Association (UK)
FNAUT Fédération Nationale des Associations d’Usagers des Transports – National
Federation of Associations of Transport Users (France)
FNR The Board for Legal Protection Issues (Sweden)
FOS Financial Ombudsman Service (UK)
FPSs Federal Public Services (Belgium)
FSA Financial Services Authority (UK)
GC Geschillencommissie - ADR Board (Netherlands)
GDV Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft - German
Insurance Association (Germany)
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (cross-border)
ICT Information and communications technology (cross-border)
IDRS IDRS Limited (UK)
INC Instituto Nacional del Consumo - National Consumer Institute (Spain)
IPF Insurance and Pension Funds (Spain)
KiFiD Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening - Financial Services
Complaints Institute Foundation (Netherlands)
KFB Swedish Consumers Insurance Bureau
KO Konsumentombudsman, Swedisch Consumer Ombudsman (Sweden)
LEC Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil - code of civil procedure (Spain)
LEI Legal expenses insurance (Netherlands)
MCL Motor Codes Limited (UK)
MEDEF Mouvement des Entreprises de France - principal business association
(France)

Abbreviations xxvii
MKB Brancheorganisatie voor het midden- en kleinbedrijf - Employers

Association for SMEs (Netherlands)
NAF National Arbitration Forum (cross-border)
NMa Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit - Dutch Competition Authority
NMI Nederlands Mediation Instituut (Netherlands)
OCU Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios - Organization of Consumers
and Users (Spain)
ODR online dispute resolution
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFCOM Office of Communications (UK)
OFGEM Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (UK)
OFT Office of Fair Trading (UK)
OFWAT Water Services Regulatory Authority (UK)
OKN The Attorney Cost Board (Sweden)
OLC Office for Legal Complaints (UK)
ONIAM L’Office National d’Indemnisation des Accidents Médicaux – The National
Compensation Body for Medical Accidents (France)
OPAS Occupational Pensions Advisory Service (UK)
ORR Office of Rail Regulation (UK)
OS Ombudsman Services (UK)
OTELO Office of the Telecoms Ombudsman (now OS:C)
PFN Board for Insurance of Persons (Sweden)
POL The Insurance Appeal procedure concerning an attorney’s suitability
(Sweden)
PPI Payment Protection Insurance (UK)
PPSs Federal Public Planning Services (Belgium)
PRS Premium rate services (UK)
S § - section (Germany)
SELDIA Direct Selling Association (cross-border)
SER Sociaal-Economische Raad - Social and Economic Council (Netherlands)
SGC Stichting Geschillencommissie - Consumer Complaint Commissions
(Netherlands)
SGR Stichting Garantiefonds Reisgelden - Travel Refund Guarantee Fund
(Netherlands)
SMMT Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders
Söp Schlichtungsstelle für den öffentlichen Personenverkehr e.V - Conciliation
Body for Public Transport of Passengers (Germany)
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TPAS Pension Advisory Service (UK)
TPO The Property Ombudsman (UK)
TPR Pensions Regulator (UK)
UDRP Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (cross-border)
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
VBI Verband Beratender Ingenieure - Association of Consulting Engineers
(Germany)
VEH Vereniging Eigen Huis - sectoral consumer associations (Netherlands)

VNO-NCW Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen-Nederlands Christelijk
Werkgeversverbond - Confederation of Netherlands Industry and
Employers (Netherlands)
VZBV Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V - Federation of German
Consumer Organisations
WBZ Wettbewerbszentrale - Centre for Protection against Unfair Competition
(Germany)
WCAM Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade - Act on the Collective
Settlement of Mass Claims (Netherlands)
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization (cross-border)

INTRoduction
Consumer ADR
This book examines the recent phenomenon of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
for disputes between consumers and businesses in the context of a European-wide debate
on methods of dispute resolution. By ADR we mean any ‘alternative dispute resolution’
mechanism, that is, any mechanism that is ‘alternative’ to the traditional model of civil
proceedings issued in the courts. However, this book is about the specific area of consumer
ADR, which is distinct from other manifestations of ADR. Many are familiar in Europe
with ADR in the form of mediation, frequently in the context of resolving disputes that are,
or would otherwise be, proceeding in court. However, consumer ADR occupies a different
context, and one that is currently far less well known, at least to many lawyers and judges,
and many consumers. Indeed, the world of consumer ADR is so distinct that we propose to
coin a new acronym for it in this book: CADR.
The Different Meanings of ADR
There is nothing new about ADR: the Chinese were using it to resolve disputes three
thousand years ago1 and it has existed in North America for some decades.2 ADR has a
number of different meanings in different contexts. The traditional way to examine ADR is
as a range of possible techniques. The following list was published in 2010:3
a. In-house complaints procedures: many ADR schemes stipulate that individuals
must have exhausted the company’s in-house complaints procedures before using the
ADR mechanism.
b. Mediation: mediation is conducted confidentially and consists of an independent
third party actively assisting the parties in working towards a negotiated agreement
of a dispute.
1
S Roberts and M Palmer, Dispute Processes. ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-Making (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2
M Shapiro, Courts. A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981).
3
Mapping UK consumer redress. A summary guide to dispute resolution systems (Office of Fair Trading, May
2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/general_policy/OFT1267.pdf.

xxx Introduction
c. Conciliation: this is a process similar to mediation but in which the neutral third
party takes a more active role in putting forward terms of settlement or an opinion
on the case.
d. Arbitration: in arbitration an independent third party considers both sides in a
dispute, and makes a decision that resolves the dispute. In most cases the arbitrator’s
decision is legally binding on both sides.
e. Adjudication: like arbitration, adjudication involves an independent third party
considering the claims of both sides and making a decision. This usually produces a
decision that is binding on the company but not on the consumer.
f. Ombudsman schemes: ombudsmen are independent, impartial intermediaries who
consider complaints. The particular mechanisms of ombudsman schemes vary but
they often combine neutral fact-finding, mediation and adjudication in various tiers.
g. Legal mechanisms: formal legal action is usually the last resort employed by
consumers to obtain redress. Consumers can, however, take legal action without
going through other mechanisms if they wish.
Different combinations of the above techniques can often be found to exist in practice. For
example, a combination of different techniques can be used sequentially, so as to encourage
parties to deal with disputes in simple and cheap ways first, through direct negotiation,
before escalating unresolved disputes into other techniques involving third parties. Hence,
some business sectors have tiers of approaches, starting with direct negotiation, ending
with the courts, and in between involving one or more other techniques.
The World of CADR
All of the above techniques share the meaning that they are dispute resolution procedures
that are outside of, but closely linked to, the court process, and take place within its shadow.
In this meaning, ADR is a technique, such as mediation that is used in conjunction with
a claim that is being brought, or potentially brought, in the court system. Such mediation
might precede the issue of court proceedings, or occur after proceedings have commenced
so as to try to reach resolution of the proceedings through negotiated or other means as an
alternative to final adjudication by the judge. This ADR process (direct negotiation assisted
by mediation, or early neutral evaluation of the merits of a claim) might or might not result
in resolution of the dispute by agreement between the parties. If no agreement is reached,
the ADR process may, nevertheless, have been valuable in clarifying the issues in dispute
and the strength of the arguments of the parties involved.
In the wider sense, however, CADR might not be associated with court proceedings at all.
All that is required is that a dispute exists, and any technique, or combination of techniques,
may be used in order to resolve it, whether this involves a court at some stage or some other
technique. In the context of consumer-to-business (C2B) disputes, dispute resolution takes
place within a different architectural structure that is entirely separate from courts. It may
be that the dispute could end up being taken to the court process, but this rarely happens.
The important point is that CADR structures have emerged that operate wholly separately
from courts, and process many disputes with no reference to courts.

Introduction xxxi
This book is concerned with CADR in this wider, non-court sense. We seek to uncover
the new universe of CADR systems, to find out how they operate, to evaluate them, and
determine how they might be extended and improved.
The starting point is that many sectoral ADR systems exist in EU Member States, and the
national architectures differ significantly. CADR schemes have emerged piece-meal over
the past forty years, and in many Member States within only the last decade. But they are
now a major phenomenon. CADR systems need to be examined in relation to both courts
and regulators in order to see whether their functions are in competition or synergistic.
This book seeks to analyse some of the major existing national models. The facts and
analysis presented here are far from complete, and no claim is made that this work is
comprehensive. The diversity of CADR systems that currently exist is considerable, and
may surprise many readers. CADR has expanded significantly in recent years, and is clearly
still expanding: a state of stability has not yet been reached, so it is premature to propose
final conclusions or standard models. But the current analysis should provide a useful
starting point.
Policy Decisions
CADR is important and topical at EU level. On 29 November 2011, the European

Commission adopted two legislative proposals on CADR (one being on the related area
of online dispute resolution, ODR). Many people may be unclear exactly what CADR is,
and frequently confuse it with court-related mediation, especially since they may only be
familiar with the EU Mediation Directive, adopted in 2009 for implementation in 2011.
The European Commission has sponsored three studies on CADR in preparing for its
2011 proposals, which provide a highly important map of CADR across the 27 Member
States. Professor Stuyck’s study of the position within the Member States4 reveals that there
is a huge variation in national mechanisms for collective redress. It has been noted that
‘redress’ is itself a wide concept, and can encompass mechanisms that operate both within
and outside traditional court-based litigation, such as arbitration, small claims procedures,
mediation and other ‘alternative dispute resolution’ techniques, public oversight of
restoration and compensation (such as ombudsmen, public enforcement activities, partie
civile piggy-back claims, recovery of the proceeds of crime) and self-regulatory or voluntary
mechanisms (such as no fault schemes, codes of conduct and other informal mechanisms).5
We pay tribute to the excellent work done in those studies by Professor Stuyck and his
Leuven team and to Dr Alleweldt and his Civic Consulting team.6 It is always a challenge
to obtain such a vast amount of data on a new subject from 27 Member States, and to
present the information and the picture coherently, particularly within the methodological,
time and budgetary constraints that arise in connection with any such Commission or
4
J Stuyck, E Terryn, V Colaert, T Van Dyck, N Peretz, N Hoekx and P Tereszkiewicz, Study on alternative means
of consumer redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings (Catholic University of Leuven, 17
January 2007), published April 2007, para 384, the Comparative Report and the 28 National Reports are available
at ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports_studies/index_en.htm.
5
See European Commission, Green Paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008) 794 final, 27 November
2008, available at ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/greenpaper_en.pdf.
6
Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, (Brussels, Civic Consulting, 2009).

xxxii Introduction
governmental study. Nevertheless, a number of questions remained after reading those

studies—and it is an unfortunate fact that not many people do in fact read such long and
detailed studies.
Hence, we set out to try to illuminate further the world of CADR in Europe, and how it
actually works. We wished to have this book available at the time that European Member
States and the European Parliament would be considering the Commission’s CADR
proposals, so as to inform their deliberations. Whatever the outcome of those deliberations,
however, it is clear that national and individual CADR systems will continue to spread and
evolve. Hence, this book should intend to inform discussions about how that might best
happen.
It is important to understand that this book is not about the various mechanisms that
might be used to seek or deliver consumer redress. CADR systems are, of course, primarily
intended to deliver consumer redress, but they are not the only possible pathway. Various
other public or private systems, whether individually or in combination with themselves
and/or with CADR systems, may also deliver consumer redress. CADR systems are certainly
emerging as one of the most important and promising possible pathways for consumer
redress, and this book seeks to illuminate them. But a comprehensive picture of all the
possible pathways, and an evaluation of them, must await another occasion.
The Research Questions and Approach
This book is primarily concerned with the following issues:

– What is the current state of CADR in Europe? What systems currently exist? How do
they work? How extensively are they used? How much do they cost, how long do they
take, and so on? These are micro-level empirical issues.
– How might European governments and those providing or wishing to use CADR best
extend and improve their CADR systems? What are the best national or international
architectures for CADR? This involves examining CADR systems at their macro levels,
and comparing different architectures.
– How can individual CADR systems be improved? This is a micro level issue, with
a comparative perspective. This involves examining a number of current CADR
systems, preferably those that differ significantly, together with any formal criteria that
are applied to them, so as to be able to answer the question: What is, or should be,
current best practice for CADR systems?
Accordingly, in order to answer the above questions, we designed a research project with the
following main elements. It is necessary to examine a number of differing CADR systems,
so as to identify the current phenomenon of CADR, and to have a sufficient range of models
from which to draw comparative conclusions. It transpires that there are many different
models of ADR and CADR. It would not be practical for us to have undertaken research
into the position in all 27 Member States, given firstly that we wanted to go to a certain level
of detail and depth and, secondly, that we wanted to finish this project so that this book
could be available soon after the publication of the Commission’s proposals. Accordingly,
we have selected ten Member States, which we believe give a sufficiently wide spectrum of
the current European phenomenon of CADR. The States selected are: Belgium (albeit not in

Introduction xxxiii
the same format as other chapters, but to highlight the important development of Belmed),
France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom.
We are well aware that this list omits Member States that have interesting CADR schemes.
We are grateful for discussions with experts from, for example, Denmark, Italy and Portugal.
Regrettably, constraints of time and space have not permitted us to include those and other
countries in this book. However, we continue to research ADR and dispute resolution
systems, and hope to include those and other countries in our future work. CADR is clearly
a developing phenomenon, and current EU-level debates will only encourage further swift
development.
Since the goal is to examine both national architectures of CADR systems and the modes
of operation of leading CADR models, this project has not attempted to give a complete
picture of CADR in every Member State. It would simply not be feasible to examine every
single CADR scheme that exists in even the ten Member States that we selected. Therefore,
we may have inadvertently omitted some important schemes, but we believe that the picture
that we have painted is, nevertheless, sufficiently robust and accurate for the purposes of this
project. At the least, our work will have illuminated a number of leading CADR systems.
For reasons of limiting the scale of this project, so that it could be accomplished within
around eighteen months, we have limited the focus to CADR models as defined in the
Commission’s proposals, namely contractual disputes between consumers and businesses
(what are known as B2C issues: business-to-consumer). This omits a number of other
important ADR models, notably those for personal injury claims. There are notable
examples of personal injury compensation schemes, especially in Nordic States and France,
but consideration of these will have to await another occasion.
Although, for the same reason, consideration of court-annexed mediation and similar
models are outside the scope of this analysis, it is, nevertheless, necessary to say something
about such matters for some jurisdictions. This is because both the historical development
and current operation of CADR models are often strongly influenced by both the pre-existing
court systems and regulatory systems of a state that cover private and public enforcement
of consumer law. Hence, we aim to give a brief indication of why national CADR systems
have developed the way they have, highlighting influences from civil procedure, regulatory
and cultural systems.
CADR systems are often found clustered in particular industry sectors. This may
have occurred because of market conditions in particular sectors, or specifically because
legislators have encouraged or required CADR systems to be introduced within them. There
is little consistency across different Member States of those business sectors that do, or do
not, have CADR systems. However, we have tried to focus on the position in the Member
States covered here of national models for financial services, telecoms, energy, and general
consumer trading, so that comparisons can be made across countries.
Plan of the Book
The first chapter examines the development and current status of CADR at EU level. This
is followed by ten chapters that describe the architecture of CADR systems in ten selected
Member States, and illustrate the current modes of operation of important schemes. The

xxxiv Introduction
state of best practice in relation to the important topic of companies’ in-house customer
care functions is then illustrated with selected examples from the United Kingdom (chapter
12). Chapter 13 then examines some examples of cross-border dispute resolution schemes,
both at EU and global levels.
We then draw together the findings of the preceding chapters on national CADR systems,
so as to examine the policy issues that arise, based on a comparative empirical analysis of
the information from the status of CADR systems in the ten Member States. Some of the
most important statistics collected during this study are presented in chapter 14. We finally
set out our findings and conclusions in chapter 15. It reviews the following main points: the
factual findings on the state of CADR in Europe; the conceptual issues that arise; the issues
that arise for the architecture of national systems; and best practice for CADR schemes.
Based on the information collected, we return to consider the three central questions posed,
namely:
– What is the current state of CADR in Europe?
– How might the architecture of CADR systems be improved?
– How might individual CADR systems be improved?
We conclude by setting out a suggested model for how CADR schemes should be designed,
both in relation to general coordinated architecture and general mode of operation.
It must be repeated that it has only been possible, for reasons of time and space, to
include ten Member States in this study. There may be useful information from other States.
In addition, many—but not all—of the CADR systems and techniques are relatively new
and as yet undeveloped. For both these reasons, sufficient experience and data on which to
found a mature evaluation of CADR and its models may not yet be available. Accordingly,
the findings are preliminary. There is undoubtedly scope for further research. Nevertheless,
it will be seen that a wealth of material has been assembled in this book.
Methodology
The information and findings presented here are some of the fruits of the ongoing CMS
Research Programme on Civil Justice Systems at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at
the University of Oxford.7 This research has also been carried out in collaboration with
colleagues at the Behavioural Approaches to Contract and Tort (BACT) Programme at the
Law Faculty of Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Consideration of the various options for dispute resolution prior to 2008 had led us to
various conclusions: that far more dispute resolution options exist than are widely known;
that there has been no systematic overview of all the options, no evaluation of them, or
coherent plan for how they might be used or prioritised within a contemporary civil justice
system; that some ADR pathways might be extremely useful for certain types of disputes;
and that previous policy assumptions (notably that courts and lawyers are not only the
principal dispute resolution option but also always the preferable one), need to be robustly
tested. In short, it is time for a comprehensive review of the options for dispute resolution,
7
For details of the Programme and its various constituent projects see http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/european_
civil_justice_systems.php.

Introduction xxxv
without pre-conceived notions. This work on CADR therefore fits into a far wider ongoing
research agenda.
In 2009, Dr Magdalena Tulibacka, in conjunction with the United Kingdom’s consumer
association Which?, carried out an internet-based survey of how many ADR pathways
could readily be identified in the United Kingdom, and found some 130 mechanisms.8 Since
January 2010, we have undertaken more detailed research into CADR in the ten Member
States noted above. The first stage was to draw up a list of questions to be asked about
individual schemes, such as: what are the rules, what is the governance, how transparent is
the scheme, how much does it cost (both to participants and overall), how long do disputes
take to be processed, what outcomes occur, and so on.
The second stage was to answer as many of those questions as possible from materials
on the websites or elsewhere. The third stage was to interview CADR providers, users,
and representatives of government, consumers and business, to check the facts but more
importantly to gain an understanding of the history and context of CADR at both micro
and macro levels. It is, of course, that third stage that has taken most time.
We are very grateful to colleagues who have collaborated in the research and writing of
various chapters. Franziska Weber of Erasmus University has worked on the Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden. Dr Magdalena Tulibacka has looked at Poland. Dr Stefaan Voet of Ghent
University has looked at Belgium. Professor Aleš Galič has produced a chapter on Slovenia
in record time.
We have undertaken around 100 interviews. We are most grateful to many who have
made themselves available for interview, frequently at short notice, whose names are listed
at the end of this chapter (and we apologise if we have inadvertently omitted anyone from
that list). Many have also provided considerable assistance with insights and arrangements.
We are also grateful to Professor Lisa Webley and Dr Angus Nurse, who contributed
respectively draft chapters on mediation in family law in England and Wales and the UK
Local Government Ombudsman, and for kindly agreeing to hold those pieces over to a
future publication.
Special thanks are due to our colleagues Dr Rebecca Money-Kyrle, Andres Gonzalez-
Watty for assistance with research and references, and Katie Orme for cool and wonderfully
efficient administration. Various friends have kindly commented on drafts of national
chapters, notably Professor Ulf Bernitz, Zbynek Loebl, Patricia Foucher and Dr Felix Steffek.
We are also grateful to the funders of the CMS Research Programme on Civil Justice
Systems: the international law firm CMS and the European Justice Forum. They have
been exemplary in providing research funds with no strings attached, and have allowed
us complete freedom to select what we wanted to research, how we wanted to do it, and
what we have said about our findings. Such enlightened support is all too rare, and greatly
appreciated.
Finally, we warmly thank all at Hart Publishing who have provided wonderful professional
support at great speed.
Oxford, February 2012
8
An updated list is at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/AlternativeDisputeResolution.php.

1
Alternative Dispute Resolution for
Consumers in the European Union
Iris Benöhr
Introduction
In an enlarged European market, consumers move increasingly across the European

Union and engage in online transactions. This has led to a higher number of cross-border
purchases and complaints, requiring new means of dispute resolution. Alternative Dispute
Resolution (hereafter ADR) is regarded as an important element in the attempt to provide
simple and efficient redress at EU level.1
This chapter refers to consumer ADR mechanisms which are designed as an alternative
to resolving a conflict in a court. They cover out-of-court schemes that lead to the settling
of a dispute through the intervention of a third party, such as an arbitrator, mediator or an
ombudsman. This third party can propose or impose a solution, or merely bring the parties
together to assist them in finding a solution.2
ADR schemes aim at facilitating speedy and low cost solutions that are more time
efficient and flexible than ordinary procedures before the court.3 They have been growing
in popularity in Europe and in the Member States4 and are particularly useful for consumer
related disputes involving small monetary claims.5
The European Commission has been active in promoting the development of ADR.
Two Recommendations have established quality criteria in the EU that each ADR scheme
should offer to its users.6 In addition, a Directive on Mediation in Civil and Commercial
Matters aims to ensure a sound relationship between the mediation process and judicial
1
See OECD, Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress (Paris, OECD, 2007).
2
See the ADR definition applied in the European Commission’s Consultation Paper ‘On the Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution as a Means to Resolve Disputes Related to Commercial Transactions and Practices in the
European Union,’ 2011, para 6.
3
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/index_en.htm.
4
M Tulibacka and C Hodges, English Justice System – Beyond the Courts: Mapping out the Non-judicial Civil
Justice Mechanisms (Research Report of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford, 2009), at http://www.csls.
ox.ac.uk/european_civil_justice_systems.php. At international level, see also United Nations Commission on
International Trade law Model Law on ADR.
5
HW Micklitz, N Reich, P Rott, Understanding EU Consumer Law (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2009) 341.
6
Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes OJ 115, 17/04/1998, 31 – 34; Commission Recommendation (EC)
2001/310 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer ADR, OJ
L 109, p 56.

2 Consumer ADR at EU Level
proceedings by establishing common EU rules on key aspects of civil procedure.7 A number

of networks were also created to facilitate finding extra-judicial solutions to cross-border
consumer disputes.8
At the Member State level, a large number of ADR mechanisms exist, which comply with
the European Commission’s Recommendations.9 Many of these schemes focus on sectors
presenting a high number of disputes, such as the telecommunications sector.
While ADR systems have developed considerably during the last decade, a number of
shortcomings prevail in the current framework. The European Commission published an
ADR consultation paper in 2011, highlighting that the existing ADR procedures do not
cover all fields of consumer sectors and are often inconvenient for cross-border cases.10
This chapter describes the emergence of ADR as part of the access to justice movement
in Europe. It then analyzes the competences of the EU in ADR, and describes specific
measures and key ECJ cases within this field. Finally, it outlines the recent proposals by the
European Commission on Consumer ADR.
Access to Justice and Adr at the International

and Regional Level
The importance of ADR procedures was highlighted by the global access to justice movement
in the late 1970s. One of the leading scholars in this field, Mauro Cappelletti, helped to
broaden the concept of access to justice beyond courts, including alternative dispute resolution
as a significant part of civil procedure.11 In a seminal work in 1978, Cappelletti and Garth
enumerated three phases (or waves) of legal innovations fostering access to justice:12
1. the reform of institutions for delivering legal services to the poor;
2. the strengthening of the representation of diffuse interests, such as those of
consumers and environmentalists;
3. a shift in focus to a broader conception of access to justice.
The last point may also include dispute-processing and less formal alternatives to courts.
According to Cappelletti, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are essential to make
access to justice available to a wider group of citizens.13 He describes ADR as a means
that can provide high quality dispute resolution solutions. In particular, it provides the
opportunity to find an amicable solution between the parties, which ‘has the potential to
preserve the relationship (…), rather than a final break of the relationship.’
7
Directive 2008/52/EC of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.
8
For example, the European Consumer Centres Network and FIN-NET.
9
At least 750 national ADR schemes, according to the 2009 DG SANCO, Study on the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the European Union (Berlin, Civil Consulting 2009) at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/
adr_study.pdf.
10
European Commission’s Consultation Paper ‘On the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Means to
Resolve Disputes Related to Commercial Transactions and Practices in the European Union,’ 2011.
11
Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide
Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993), 3 The Modern Law Review 56, 287 ff.
12
Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant G Garth, ‘Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to
Make Rights Effective’ (1978), 27 Buffalo Law Review 181.
13
Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes’ (1993).

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the EU 3
Subsequently, access to justice has played an increasingly central role in Europe and
has been recognised as a human right. The right to access to justice and to a fair trial are
guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore,
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU provides for the ‘right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial’ (Article 47 EUCFR).14
ADR has also gradually been promoted at the international and regional policy level.15 The
Council of Europe adopted a number of recommendations to promote ADR and mediation:
• Recommendation on alternatives to litigation between administrative authorities and
private parties (2001);16
• Recommendation on mediation in civil matters (2002).17
The second Recommendation is particularly important for consumer-related disputes. It
provides a definition of mediation and describes the scope, organisation and procedure
of mediation that member states should apply. Furthermore, it also advises states among
others to provide training to mediators and to inform the public about mediation options.
More recently, at the international level, the UN Commission for International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) is in the process of developing procedural rules for online dispute resolution
(ODR), to resolve dispute arising from e-commerce.18 ODR is often defined as a form of
ADR which takes advantage of the speed and convenience of the Internet.19 It is an effective
redress tool for consumers, as it can resolve high volume and low value cross-border cases
cheaply.
Finally, finding specific ADR mechanisms for consumers has increasingly been debated
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 2006
the OECD adopted a report on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in the Global
Marketplace.20 This report provides an overview of OECD member countries’ mechanisms
for consumer dispute resolution and evaluates the different existing approaches. In particular,
it highlighted the importance to foster cross-border dispute resolution mechanisms and
find suitable funding solution for ADR.21
Historic Overview of Key Adr Related Actions in the Eu
In the EU, the number of ADR schemes has increased considerably since the global access
to justice movement. ADR mechanisms are used to resolve disputes between citizens and
14
See a detailed report on fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/report-access-to-justice_EN.pdf.
15
There is also a growing trend by private entities to adopt cross-border ADR mechanisms, eg the European
Car Rental Conciliation Service adopted in 2010, helps customers with unresolved complaints concerning cross
border vehicle rentals within Europe: www.leaseurope.org/index.php?page=consumer-redress-service.
16
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on alternatives to litigation between administrative
authorities and private parties, Rec (2001) 9, 5 September 2001.
17
See wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=306401&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=F
DC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864.
18
See www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working_groups/3Online_Dispute_Resolution.html.
19
See more on ODR in Pablo Cortes, ‘Developing Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the EU: A
Proposal for the Regulation of Accredited Providers’ (2010), International Journal of Law and Information
Technology.
20
OECD, Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in the Global Market Place (Paris, OECD, 2006): www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/26/61/36456184.pdf.
21
ibid, 58.

administrations,22 in working relationships, in commercial relations, consumer disputes

and family matters.
The importance of ADR for consumer protection has been debated for some time. In
1998 the Commission published a communication on ‘out-of-court settlement of consumer
disputes.’23
Furthermore, in the European Council on Justice that took place in Tampere in October
1999, EU leaders drew attention to how much importance they placed on the role of ADR
in cross-border disputes.24 In March 2000, at the Lisbon Summit on employment and the
information society, EU leaders asked the European Commission and the EU Council of
Ministers to reflect upon ways of applying ADR methods to resolve conflicts in the area of
e-commerce with the aim of promoting consumer confidence.25
In April 2002 the Commission launched a Green Paper on ADR so as to initiate a
debate on a certain number of legal issues that were raised with regard to ADR in civil and
commercial law.26 As a result of the Green Paper the EU adopted a voluntary European
Code of Conduct for Mediators launched in July 200427 and a Mediation Directive in 2008.28
The aim was to promote the application of mediation as a cheap and fast alternative to court
procedures in commercial cross-border disputes.
Furthermore, on 13 June 2007 the EU adopted a Regulation establishing a European
Small Claims Procedure.29 Although the small claim procedure is not an ADR mechanism
as such, it provides an alternative to the usual court procedures. It aims to improve access
to justice by simplifying cross-border small claims litigation in civil and commercial
matters, and by reducing costs.30 ‘Small claims’ are defined as cases concerning sums under
EUR 2,000, excluding interest and expenses.31 This regulation also reduces the length of
procedures, as it eliminates the intermediate step of requiring the recognition of the case and
its enforcement in another state. It is of particular importance for consumers, as they often
refrain from taking actions because of low damages claims and high court-costs. However,
22
For example, the European Ombudsman was established by the Maastricht Treaty to investigate
maladministration complaints in the EU institutions; more at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/home.faces.
23
See ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/commu/index_en.htm.
24
See also a 1999 follow-up paper on a Consumer Policy Action Plan of 1998, where the Commission
mentioned prioritising consumer access to justice ADR of consumer disputes, requiring the establishment of out-
of-court settlement bodies, Report on the communication from the Commission on the Consumer Policy Action Plan
1999–2001 (COM(98)0696-C4-0035/99).
25
The EU also established a European Judicial Network, see Council Decision of 28 May 2001 establishing a
European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 174/25.
26
Commission (EC) ‘Green Paper on alternative dispute resolution in civil and commercial law’, COM (2002)
196, final, 19 April 2002, para 10. In the green paper the importance of ADR as a means of achieving social
harmony was highlighted, by which the parties do not engage in a process of confrontation but rather in a process
of rapprochement, thereby themselves achieving a consensual solution that maintains their commercial or other
relations.
27
See europa.eu.int/comm.justice_home/ejn/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.pdf.
28
Directive (EC) 2008/52 concerning certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [2008] OJ
L136/3.
29
Regulation (EC) 861/2007 establishing a European small claims procedure, [2007] OJ L199/1.
30
ibid.
31
G Haibach, ‘The Commission Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a European Small Claims Procedures:
an Analysis’ (2005) European Review of Private Law, 593–601; E Hondius, ‘Towards a European Small Claims
Procedure’ in L Thévenoz & N Reich (eds), Liber Amicorum Bernd Stauder, Consumer Law (Geneva, Schulthess,
2006), 131 ff; J Baldwin, ‘Is there a limit to the expansion of small claims?’ in MDA Freeman (ed), Current Legal
Problems, vol 56, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 313–343; CJ Whelan (ed), Small claims courts – A
comparative study, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990), 253 ff.

a study in 2007 has shown that the cost, length or complexities of these procedures are still
too high to allow effective access to justice.32
In 2010 the EU launched a ‘European e-Justice portal’33 to facilitate access to justice
contributing to the creation of a single area of justice. This portal provides information to
citizens, business and practitioners on legislation and case law in all Member States promoting
understanding of different legal systems. Among information on legal aid and courts, it also
provides a useful general overview on mediation systems in the Member States.34
At the Member State level various important national reforms of civil procedure during
the past decade have also encouraged the development of ADR schemes.35 They have
established different out-of-court models varying extensively across the EU.36 While some
ADR schemes are supported by public initiatives, such as the consumer complaints boards
in Scandinavian countries, others rely rather on self-regulation, as in Germany. The legal
effect of the decisions adopted by ADR schemes also differ considerably, as some are merely
voluntary recommendations whereas others are only binding for the professional.37
The EU recently commissioned several studies on the effectiveness of ADR mechanisms
in the EU and in the Member States.38 These studies showed that, while ADR has been
efficient in special sectors various shortcomings prevail, such as a lack of information about
available schemes, wide diversity and a lack of general coverage. Therefore, the European
Commission proposed two new legislative measures in 2011 to strengthen the efficiency of
ADR and ODR throughout the EU.39 These are described at the end of this chapter.
Competences of the Eu in Civil Justice Matters

and Consumer ADR
The growing interest of the EU in ADR mechanisms raises the question of its competences
to adopt measures in this field. The following section will analyse the Treaty provisions that
deal with civil justice and ADR.
Originally, the EU did not enjoy express power in the area of ADR and therefore applied
soft law instruments to determine minimum-quality criteria of ADR schemes.40
32
The University of Leuven conducted a study in 2007 on alternative means of consumer redress. It consists
of a comparative report and 28 national reports (hereafter ‘Leuven Study’), p 10: also available at: ec.europa.eu/
consumers/redress/reports_studies/index_en.htm (accessed in July 2009).
33
See the webpage at e-justice.europa.eu/home.do?action=home&plang=en.
34
See e-justice.europa.eu/content_mediation-62-en.do.
35
E Blankenburg, ‘The Infrastructure for Avoiding Civil Litigation: Comparing Culture of Legal Behaviour in The
Netherlands and West Germany’ (1994) 28 Law & Society Review 4, 789–808. E Blankenburg, ‘Civil Litigation Rates as
Indicators for Legal Cultures’, in D Nelken (ed) Comparing Legal Cultures, (Sudbury, Dartmouth Publishing Co, 1997), 41.
36
AAS Zuckerman, Civil Justice in Crisis, Comparative Perspectives of Civil Procedures (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1999) 3 ff; C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding of Civil
Litigation: A Comparative Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).
37
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/index_en.htm.
38
DG SANCO. Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU (Berlin, Civic Consulting 2009
and Leuven Study).
39
Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes
(Directive on consumer ADR)’, COM (2011) 793/2, final, 29 November 2011 and Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for
a Regulation on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR)’, COM (2011)
794/2, final, 29 November 2011.
40
For example, Commission Recommendation (EC) 98/257 on the principles applicable to the bodies
responsible for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes [1998] OJ L 115, 31; see also N Reich, ‘More

Extension of the competence of the European Community into the area of civil justice
systems began in 1999, when the objective of establishing ‘an area of freedom, security and
justice’ was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam.41 The Commission has since sought to
simplify the legal context within the EU to improve access to justice.42 There has also been a
slow trend towards a stronger harmonisation of legislation in the EU.43
Within litigation systems, developments have taken place in the context of a European
Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (EJ-NET),44 and a Community framework
of activities to facilitate the implementation of judicial cooperation in civil matters.45 There
has also been emphasis on ADR, since this can avoid or shorten legal processes, and save
money.
Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the EU has a wider competence to adopt civil justice
measures. Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
broadened the competences of the EU in the field of civil justice and could serve as a general
basis for cross-border ADR measures.46
The pre-Lisbon Treaty Article 65 EC stated that improving measures which have cross-
border implications could be taken ‘in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the
internal market’.47
The new Article 81 (2) TFEU on civil procedure now provides the possibility for the
EU to adopt civil justice measures without requiring a market-making objective.48 This
provision would allow legislation on, inter alia:
(...)
(e) effective access to justice;
(g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement;(…).
Thus, the EU can adopt ADR measures on the basis of this Article. This competence is
nonetheless generally restricted to cross-border matters, so that purely Member States
procedures may remain unaffected.49
Clarity after Claro?, Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts as an ADR (alternative dispute resolution)
mechanism for effective and speedy conflict resolution, or as ‘deni de justice’?’ 3 European Review of Contract Law
1, 41–61.
41
See more in Eva Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2008).
42
Giuseppe Gargani, Explanatory Statement: Report on the Prospects for Approximating Civil Procedural Law in
the European Union (Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, 30 January 2004).
43
C Hodges, ‘Europeanisation of Civil Justice: Trends and Issues’ (2006) 1 Civil Justice Quarterly, 96–123, see
also the European Parliament ‘Resolution on the prospects for approximating civil procedural law in the European
Union’ COM(2002) 654 + COM(2002) 746 – C5-0201/2003 – 2003/2087(INI), 30 January 2004.
44
Council Decision (EC) 2001/470 establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters,
[2004] OJ L 174/25.
45
Council Regulation (EC) 743/2002 establishing a Community framework of activities to facilitate the
implementation of judicial cooperation in civil matters, [2002] OJ L 115/1.
46
E Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law, A Policy Area Uncovered, Studies in European Law (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2008), 184; C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal
Systems (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008), 95.
47
Art 65 ECT stated: ‘Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border
implications, to be taken (...) in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, shall
include: (...) (c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the
compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.’
48
M Tulibacka, ‘Europeanization of Civil Procedures: In Search of a Coherent Approach’ (2009) 46 Common
Market Law Review, 1527–1565.
49
D Fairgrieve and G Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates’ (2009), 58 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 406 ff.

However, the EU could adopt broader measures by relying in addition on sector specific
provisions, such as Article 169 TFEU regarding consumer protection.
According to Article 169 (1) TFEU, the EU aims to promote the interests of consumers
and ensures a high level of consumer protection. The Union shall in particular: ‘contribute to
protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their
right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.’
In order to attain these objectives the EU can adopt two types of measures (Article 169(2)):
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 TFEU in the context of the completion of the
internal market;
(b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Member States.
The harmonisation measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 TFEU must have as their
objective the establishment and functioning of the internal market. This requirement does
however not apply to measures adopted according to Article 169 (2) (b).
Although the European Commission has the choice between the different legal provisions
described above, most EU measures regarding consumer law have been adopted on the
basis of Article 114 TFEU. The new 2011 Commission’s proposal on consumer ADR is also
based on this Article. It remains to be seen if this proposed, far-reaching measure complies
with the requirement of Article 114 TFEU to foster market functioning. Article 169 (2)
(b) might have been a more appropriate basis for the Draft Directive as it allows the EU
to adopt measures that support and supplement ADR consumer schemes in the Member
States, without requiring a market-building rationale.
Specific EU Measures Regarding ADR
Recommendations to Promote the Quality of Consumer ADR
Since 1998 the Commission has adopted two Recommendations to promote consumer
ADR. They establish a number of minimum guarantees, such as independence and
effectiveness, which ADR schemes should respect.
Recommendation 98/257/EC on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible
for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes was adopted in 1998.50 It applies to
consumer ADR schemes which, no matter what they are called, either propose or impose a
solution to resolve a dispute.
This Recommendation sets seven minimum guarantees in ADR proceedings:51
1. independence,
2. transparency,
3. adversarial principle,
4. effectiveness,
5. legality,
50
Commission Recommendation (EC) 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for the
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, [1998] OJ L 115.
51
See Arts I–VII of the Commission Recommendation (EC) 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the
bodies responsible for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, [1998] OJ L 115.

6. liberty, and
7. representation.
Recommendation 2001/310/EC,52 adopted in 2001, applies to ADR schemes which involve
a more consensual resolution of disputes. It targets out-of-court mechanisms where third
party bodies responsible for consumer dispute resolution procedures: ‘no matter what they
are called, attempt to resolve a dispute by bringing the parties together to convince them
to find a solution by common consent.’53 However, the recommendation does not cover
customer complaints services or such mechanisms provided by or on behalf of a business.54
Part II of the Recommendation sets four minimum guarantees that such ADR schemes
should respect:55
1. impartiality,
2. transparency,
3. effectiveness,
4. fairness.
Both Recommendations have positively influenced consumer ADR schemes in the Member
States, which have often adopted the minimum quality guarantees in their procedures. The
Commission has developed a database with more than 500 ADR schemes which, according to
Member States, meet the Commission’s quality criteria, complying with the Recommendations.56
Voluntary Code of Conduct and Mediation Directive
A Code of Conduct for Mediators was promoted by the European Commission and
developed in conjunction with a large group of practitioners and mediation experts. This
code was adopted by mediation experts in 2004 and sets out a number of principles to
which individual mediators in civil and commercial matters can voluntarily decide to
commit.57 Mediation organizations can also adhere to the Code and promote the respect of
its principles through information, training or monitoring of mediators.58
Under the Code of Conduct, mediation is defined as: ‘any process where two or more
parties agree to the appointment of a third-party – hereinafter “the mediator” – to help the
parties to solve a dispute by reaching an agreement without adjudication and regardless of
how that process may be called or commonly referred to in each Member State.’59
Adherence to the Code is without prejudice to national legislation or rules regulating
individual professions.60 The Organisations that apply the Code’s mediation principles can
52
Commission Recommendation (EC) 2001/310 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the
consensual resolution of consumer ADR, OJ L 109, p 56.
53
Part I (1) of the Commission Recommendation (EC) 2001/310 on the principles for out-of-court bodies
involved in the consensual resolution of consumer ADR, OJ L 109.
54
Part I (2) of the Commission Recommendation (EC) 2001/310 on the principles for out-of-court bodies
involved in the consensual resolution of consumer ADR, OJ L 109.
55
See Part II (A–D) of the Commission Recommendation (EC) 2001/310 on the principles for out-of-court
bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer ADR, [2001] OJ L 109.
56
This database can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/schemes_en.htm.
57
European Code of Conduct for Mediators promoted by the Commission and adopted by mediation experts
in October 2004: see ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.pdf.
58
ibid.
59
ibid.
60
ibid.

notify the Commission in order to be added to a ‘European Code of Conduct for Mediators’
list.61
More recently, the EU also adopted a Directive in 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in
civil and commercial matters, based on Article 61c and Article 67 (5) ECT.62
According to Article 1, the Directive aims to:
(…) promote the amicable settlement of disputes by encouraging the use of mediation and by
ensuring a balanced relationship between mediation and judicial proceedings.
The Directive harmonises national rules concerning mediation and some elements of
national civil procedures in a relatively limited manner, and is confined to cross-border
mediation only. However, Member States can also extend the application of the provisions
implementing the Directive onto purely national mediation procedures.63
A cross-border dispute is defined in Article 2 as:
(…) one in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State
other than that of any other party on the date on which:
(a) the parties agree to use mediation after the dispute has arisen;
(b) mediation is ordered by a court;
(c) an obligation to use mediation arises under national law; or
(d) for the purposes of Article 5 an invitation is made to the parties.
The Directive promotes mediation as a viable alternative to court litigation to facilitate access
to justice. It places an obligation on the Member States to provide the general public with
information on how to contact mediators and organisations offering mediation services
(Article 9). Furthermore, it aims at providing a harmonised approach to mediation – by
requiring appropriate training for mediators and providing common definitions for both
mediators and mediation.
According to Article 3 (b):
Mediator means any third person who is asked to conduct mediation in an effective, impartial and
competent way, regardless of the denomination or profession of that third person in the Member
State concerned and of the way in which the third person has been appointed or requested to
conduct the mediation.
The Directive refers to mediation as a voluntary process, but it does not prejudice national
law provisions which provide for sanctions or incentives related to participation in
mediation (Article 3 (a)). It also applies to cases where parties are referred to mediation by
a judge and where mediation is prescribed by law (Article 3(a)).
Importantly, the Directive clarifies at Article 3 (a) (2) that it includes mediation conducted
by a judge who is not responsible for any judicial proceedings concerning the dispute in
question. However, it excludes attempts made by the court or the judge to settle a dispute in
the course of judicial proceedings concerning the dispute in question.
At Article 4 the Directive requires Member States to strengthen the quality of mediation
through control mechanisms and the promotion of training. In particular a high level of
effective, impartial and competent mediation should be ensured at Member State level.
The Directive also states that courts before which cross-border disputes are brought may
refer the parties to mediation schemes.
61
The list is published at ibid.
62
Directive (EC) 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008], OJ L 136/3.
63
See ibid, Art 2 for the definition of a cross border dispute.

In addition, the Directive regulates the following aspects of mediation:

• enforcement of agreements resulting from mediation (Member States must in general
ensure that agreements are enforced) (Article 6);
• the appropriate courts and authorities to make requests to must be communicated to
the Commission which then makes the information available to the general public
(Article 10);
• confidentiality of mediation (Article 7);
• and prescription and limitation periods (Member States must ensure that parties who
refer their dispute to mediation are not prevented from later bringing the case to a
court or using arbitration because of prescription or limitation periods) (Article 8).
The Directive had to be transposed by each Member State by 21 May 2011,64 apart from
Denmark, which opted out.65 The mediation Directive makes cross-border dispute
resolution in civil and commercial matters more effective. It establishes a coherent EU
framework ensuring a balanced relationship between mediation and judicial proceedings.66
The Directive also provides an incentive for Member States to go beyond the requirements
in the Directive promoting mediation in a purely national context.
ADR in Sectoral EU Legislation
A number of sectoral EU directives in specific sectors encourage or require Member States

to establish adequate and effective out-of court dispute resolution procedures.
Measures that encourage Member States to establish ADR schemes are the:
• Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive67
• Timeshare Directive68
• E-commerce Directive69
• Postal Services Directive70
• Insurance Mediation Directive71
• Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)72
64
For a comparative study on mediation regulation and implementation of the Mediation Directive
see Felix Steffek, ‘Mediation in Europa und der Welt – Rechtvergleichende Forschung zur Umsetzung der
Mediationsrichtlinie’ (2009), 1 Zeitschrift für Konflikt-Management, 1–22; Felix Steffek, ‘Rechtsvergleichende
Erfahrungen für die Regelung der Mediation’ (2010), 74 The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International
Private Law, 841 ff.
65
Press release from 2010 by the EU on the Mediation Directive: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/10/1060&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
66
For the impact of the Directive on Germany, see Jan-Bertram Hillig and Martin Huhn, ‘Impact of the
EU Mediation Directive on the German Construction Sector’ (2010), 162 Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute
Resolution in Engineering and Construction 2.
67
Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services, 9.10.2002, Art 14.
68
Directive 2008/122/EC of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of
timeshare, longterm holiday product, resale and exchange contracts (Art 14(2)), OJ L 33, 3.2.2009, Art 14.
69
Directive (EC) 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), [2000] OJ L 178/1.
70
Directive (EC) 2008/6 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal
market of Community postal services, [2008] OJ L 52, 3.
71
Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation (Art 11(1)), OJ L 9, 15.1.2003, Art 11.
72
Directive (EC) 2004/39 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and
93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, [2004] OJ L 145/1, 33.

In turn, EU legislative frameworks that require that adequate and effective ADR schemes
are put in place are:
• The telecom sector73
• The energy sector74
• The Consumer Credit Directive75
• The Payment Services Directive76
For example, the EU Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC,77 contains an ADR
requirement at Article 24 entitled ‘out- of-court resolution’, which states:
1. Member States shall ensure that adequate and effective out-of-court dispute resolution
procedures for the settlement of consumer disputes concerning credit agreements are put in place,
using existing bodies where appropriate.
Article 24 (2) then continues:

Member States shall encourage those bodies to cooperate in order to also resolve cross-border
disputes concerning credit agreements.
Finally, the EU Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal markets contains a

detailed provision on the settlement of disputes.78 The Services Directive requires providers
that are part of an ADR scheme to provide consumers with information on this scheme.
Article 27 (1) states that: ‘(…) Member States shall take the general measures necessary
to ensure that providers respond to the complaints (…) in the shortest possible time and
make their best efforts to find a satisfactory solution (…)’.
According to paragraph 4 providers that are subject to a code of conduct, or are members
of a trade association or professional body offering recourse to an ADR means, have to
inform their customers thereof.
These Directives show that there is an increasing trend in EU law to include provisions
regarding alternative redress mechanisms in consumer-related measures. While the older
consumer Directives rarely mentioned out-of-court dispute resolution, in the new Directive
Member States are often encouraged to promote such schemes.
The European Court of Justice Case Law on Judicial Consumer Protection
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become more active in determining the judicial
protection of consumers with regard to ADR related matters.
73
Directive (EC) 2009/136 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to
electronic communications networks and services.
74
Directive (EC) 2009/72 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing
Directive 2003/54/EC, [2009] OJ L211/55; and Directive (EC) 2009/73 concerning common rules for the internal
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, [2009] OJ L211/94, p 55, 94.
75
Directive (EC) 2008/48 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC,
[2008] OJ L 133/66, 66.
76
Directive (EC) 2007/64 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/
EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, [2007] OJ L319/1, 32.
77
Directive (EC) 2008/48 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC,
[2008] OJ L 133/66.
78
Directive (EC) 2006/123 on services in the internet market, [2006] OJ L376.

In a recent case Alassini79 the ECJ had to decide whether Italian mandatory mediation
rules are contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection.80 This case concerned a
2003 national law that implemented the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC (USD)
in Italy by introducing, among others, mediation rules.81 In a preliminary ruling the ECJ
had to determine whether an attempt to achieve out-of-court settlement can be made a
mandatory condition in Italy for the admissibility before the courts of actions in disputes
between providers and end-users under the USD.
In its assessment the ECJ examined the principle of effective judicial protection from a
human rights perspective, which is included in Article 6 and 13 of the ECHR and confirmed
by Article 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. It held that according to
settled case-law these rights are not absolute but can be restricted by measures of general
interest provided they are proportionate. 82
In this particular case, the Court considered that the Italian law imposing a duty on the
parties to attempt to find an amicable dispute resolution solution constituted a legitimate
objective in the general interest which was not disproportionate. Therefore, the Court
decided that the law complied with the principle of effective judicial protection and was not
precluded by EU law.
In a number of cases the ECJ also had to decide on the conflict between consumer
protection included in the Directive 93/13 on unfair terms and contractual arbitration
clauses.
In Claro v Centro Movil, a company included the use of an arbitration tribunal, raising
issues of fairness.83 The ECJ ruled that the national court was required to assess whether a
contractual arbitration clause was void even when the consumer has not raised the issue of
unfairness in the arbitration proceedings but only in the action for annulment.84
A more recent judgment, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira,85
concerned the enforcement of an arbitration award. In this case an unfair arbitration clause
had been included in a mobile phone contract of a Spanish telecommunication company.
The Court held that a national court:
hearing an action for enforcement of an arbitration award which has become final and was made in
the absence of the consumer is required, where it has available to it the legal and factual elements
necessary for that task, to assess of its own motion whether an arbitration clause in a contract
concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, in so far as, under national rules
of procedure, it can carry out such an assessment in similar actions of a domestic nature.86
The ECJ went further than in Claro v Centro Móvil by stating that Article 6 of the Directive
on unfair terms forms part of the rules of public policy.87
As a result of these cases the national courts have to become active under certain
conditions and act of their own motion to verify the potential unfairness of standard terms
79
Alassini (C-317/08, C-317/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08) March 18, 2010.
80
See also J Davies and E Szyszczak, ‘ADR: Effective Protection of Consumer Rights?’ (2010) 35 EL Rev October
2010-11-19.
81
Legislative Decree No 259 of August 1, 2003 relating to the Electronic Communications Code GURI No 214
of September 15, 2003, 3.
82
Alassini (C-317/08, C-317/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08) March 18, 2010 at [63].
83
C-168/05 Claro v Centro Movil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421.
84
The consumer often lacks legal knowledge and has limited power to change contractual arbitration clauses.
85
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira. – ECR 2009, p I-9579.
86
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira. – ECR 2009, p I-9579, para 59.
87
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira. – ECR 2009, p I-9579, para 52.

or to annul an arbitration award if it is based on an unfair contract clause.88 This might well
influence EU Member States’ practice to undertake stricter assessment of arbitral clauses in
consumers’ contracts.89
EU Cross-border Networks
In the last decade the EU has launched a number of networks in order to facilitate cross-
border dispute resolution. These networks deal either with general cross-border consumer
matters (such as the European Consumer Centres Network), or with specific fields (such as
FIN-NET) that facilitate dispute resolution in cross-border cases between consumers and
financial services providers.
The European Consumer Centres Network
In 2001, an Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-NET) was launched by the EU90 and a consumer
claim form promulgated to facilitate consumers’ access to ADR providers.91 This EEJ-Net
consisted of national ‘clearing houses’ that assisted consumers to settle possible cross-
border disputes with companies by guiding them towards alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.92
The task of the network was to:
• inform consumers of the possibilities of recourse to alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms;
• facilitate cross-border complaints, particularly by helping the complainants to
overcome linguistic difficulties by providing practical assistance such as translating
complaint forms;
• facilitate the lodging of complaints using the appropriate standard ADR form;
• follow-up resolution of complaints and action taken involving ADR within the
network.93
In January 2005, this network was merged with the European Consumer Centres
‘Euroguichets’, which provided information and assistance on cross-border issues and
became the ‘European Consumer Centres Network’ (ECC-Net).
The ECC-Net was established to assist consumers in the resolution of cross-border
complaints and disputes.94 It consists of a single European consumer centre in every
Member State and in Iceland and Norway that function as contact points for consumers.
88
Karin Sein, Protection of Consumers against Unfair Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice, Juridica International XVIII/2011.
89
B U Graf, A E Appleton, ECJ Case C 40/08 Asturcom – EU Unfair Terms Law Confirmed as a Mattter of
Public Policy, ASA Bulletin, vol 28, No 2, 2010, 417.
90
Council Resolution (EC) 2000/C on a Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial
settlement of consumer disputes, OJ C 155/1.
91
See www.eejnet.org/filing_complaint; ec.europa.eu/consumers/publications/factsheet-ECC-Net_en.pdf.
92
See europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32043_en.htm.
93
See europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32043_en.htm.
94
See ec.europa.eu/consumers/publications/factsheet-ECC-Net_en.pdf.

The network is funded by both the European Commission and national governments and
handles over sixty thousand cases every year.95
From an organizational point of view the host organization of the individual Consumer
Centres must be a public or non-profit-making body selected by the Member State and
approved by the European Commission.96 For instance, in the UK the Consumer Center is
hosted by the Trading Standards Institute and is co-funded by the European Commission
and the UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.97
The objective of the ECC-Network is to ensure consumer confidence when purchasing
cross-border.98
Its main tasks are:
• to inform consumers and to give them advice about their rights when shopping cross-
border;
• to give advice and support to any consumer with a complaint related to a cross-border
purchase;
• to provide easy access to ADR-bodies in situations where it has not been possible to
solve a cross-border consumer complaint amicably and to assist in this process;
• to raise the awareness of the out-of-court resolution schemes among consumers and
businesses and sharing best practices at national and EU level;
• to cooperate with other EU-networks which provide essential information on EU,
national legislation and case-law, such as SOLVIT and FIN-NET.99
Case-handling procedures and key statistics

In the event that consumers cannot resolve a cross-border dispute they can contact the
Consumer Centre in their country of residence for help.
This Consumer Centre, together with the Centre in the country where the dispute
occurred, can support a consumer who has a complaint by contacting the affected business.
Furthermore, they act as intermediaries between the consumer and the relevant ADR system.
In particular, the Consumer Centers have the following role:
1. to determine the appropriate out-of-court scheme;
2. to provide the consumer with detailed information about the relevant ADR bodies.
3. to inform the consumer of the advantages and disadvantages of ADR;100
4. to help consumers monitor their dispute, where necessary;
5. to provide access to translation services when required.101
In theory, the procedure consists of the following steps. The Consumer Centre is contacted
by the consumer located in the same country. As a result, this Centre assists the consumer
95
For example for the period 2007–2008 the Commission provided € 8.5 million of funding to the ECCs, see
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/annual_report_ecc_2007.pdf.
96
Cross-border Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Europe – Practical Reflections on the Need and Availability
(ECC-Net, 2009).
97
The UK centre opened in August 2007 taking enquiries from consumers and handling cross border cases
referred from other Member States. The centre is fully operational and staged an official launch on 14 November
to raise awareness with consumers and stakeholders. www.ukecc.net/default.asp.
98
ECC-Net, Cross-border Dispute Resolution (2009).
99
ibid, 10–11.
100
For instance the Centre will explain the advantages of ADR compared to other methods of redress, such as
any time limits or cost issues.
101
ECC-Net, Cross-border Dispute Resolution 2009, 11.

with an eventual translation and then transfers the case to the Consumer Centre where
the business is located (hereafter the ‘Business ECC’). The latter forwards the case to the
appropriate ADR scheme, which then contacts the trader and tries to solve the case. After
the dispute resolution procedure it informs the Business ECC of the outcome, which
then informs the Consumer Centre where the consumer is located, which in turn lets the
consumer know.102
In practice however, the procedure is often different from that described above because
in a large number of cases appropriate ADR schemes are missing. In such cases, Business
ECCs usually try to solve the cases directly without seeking the help of an ADR body.103
From 2006–2009, most complaints tackled by ECCs concerned products and services,
and contract terms. The main sector concerned by far was air transport, and a large number
of complaints also concerned on-line transactions (55%).104
The total number of complaints handled by ECCs has been between 50,000 and 60,000
annually. In 2008 and 2009 the volume of information requests and complaints split into
around 25,000–30,000 information requests and 30,000–35,000 complaints.
The ECC-Net has provided consumers with valuable assistance in the resolution of
cross-border disputes. This has been particularly useful in sectors where cross-border
purchasing is common and will probably increase in the future, such as air transport and
e-commerce. The mixture of Centre services providing both advice regarding rights and
helping more concretely to settle the dispute is helpful, as consumers often do not know
the relevant legal framework. However, the lack in coverage of ADR schemes in Member
States has rendered effective dispute resolution difficult. As explained above in the
Member States appropriate ADR schemes are often absent, so the ECC-Net tries to resolve
the dispute directly with the traders.105 These shortcomings might however be overcome
if the new EU ADR Draft Directive was adopted, as it requires that ADR schemes will be
available for all consumer disputes.
FIN-NET
For the financial services sector the Commission has set up a specific dispute resolution
network of national ADR bodies, called FIN-NET (Financial Services Complaints Network).
This network was established in 2001 and deals with ADR cross-border disputes between
consumers and financial services providers, covering the European Union, Norway, Iceland
and Liechtenstein.106
The objective of FIN-NET is to provide consumers with easier access to ADR schemes
in cross-border cases through the cooperation and assistance of national ADR bodies.107
In particular, the network aims to:
• provide consumers with easy and informed access to out-of-court redress in cross-
border disputes;
102
ibid.
103
ibid, 10–11.
104
In 2011 FIN-NET had 55 Members, see the ECC Network website at: ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/key_
facts_figues_en.htm.
105
ECC-Net Cross-border Dispute Reolution 2009, 10–11.
106
See ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/finnet/index_en.htm.
107
DG Internal Market and Services, Evaluation of FIN-NET (2009, Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services).

• ensure efficient exchange of information between European out-of-court complaint

schemes;
• improve the quality of ADR schemes and ensure that they operate under a common
set of principles;
• raise consumer confidence in financial services from other Member States.108
If a consumer has a complaint against a financial service provider from another country, the
FIN-NET member in the consumers’ country will help to identify the relevant complaint
scheme in the financial services provider’s country. Furthermore, it will provide information
about the scheme and its complaint procedure.109
If the consumer then decides to file a complaint, the FIN-NET member will transfer it
to the relevant scheme in the service provider’s country or suggest to the consumer to file a
complaint directly with the cross-border scheme.
A Memorandum of Understanding links FIN-NET Members, including a declaration
of intent on cross-border co-operation between the parties. Amongst other things the
Memorandum describes the procedure of cooperation and conditions of exchange of
information in handling cross-border complaints. As the Memorandum is of a voluntary
nature it does not create any legal rights or obligations.110
In order to be admitted as a member of FIN-NET a scheme must provide out-of-court
settlement of disputes between consumers and service providers in financial services. In
addition, it has to comply with the principles set out in Commission Recommendation
98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-
of-court settlement of consumer disputes.111 This means that a Member State authority
has to certify to the Commission that it complies with all the seven principles of the
Recommendation (ie independence, transparency, adversarial procedure, effectiveness,
legality, liberty and representation). Details of organizations that have registered with FIN-
NET can be found on its webpage.112
Key data and evaluation

The data from FIN-NET’s activity reports113 reveal a strong increase in the number of
complaints handled from the initial annual total of 335 in 2001. In 2009, FIN-NET handled
1,542 cross-border cases, out of which 884 were in the banking sector, 244 in the insurance
sector, 410 in the investment services sector, and four that cannot be attributed to one sector.114
An important characteristic of FIN-NET’s activity is the very uneven distribution among its
member ADRs. For example, according to data from 2009, only five ADRs deal with over
85% of the total number of complaints handled. The other 20 have between five and twenty
cases each and the remaining ADRs having no more than a few cases annually.115
108
ibid.
109
See ibid. The information provided by the FIN-NET member includes contact details, coverage, organisation,
in which languages the scheme operates, whether there are any charges to be paid by the consumer, whether the
decision of the scheme is binding and typical times for handling complaints.
110
See ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-net/members_en.htm.
111
Commission (EC) 98/257 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement
of consumer disputes, [1998] OJ L 115/31.
112
www.fin-net.eu.
113
ibid.
114
ibid.
115
DG Internal Market and Services, Evaluation of FIN-NET (2009), 27.

The most active ADR scheme is by far the UK Financial Ombudsman Service that
covers all types of financial services and in 2008 handled 842 cases – up from 444 in 2007
– representing 58% of the total 1,405 complaints reported. The Irish Financial Services
Ombudsman Bureau is also quite active with 76 cases handled in 2008 – mainly insurance
– and 186 in 2007. The high activity of the two ADRs is seen partly to be a reflection of the
relatively increased cross-border trade of specific types of services between Ireland and the
UK, but also, according to the ADRs representatives, the common language and the similar
legal framework of the two countries makes it easier for consumers to file a complaint.116
An evaluation report from 2009 commissioned by DG Internal Market and Service
showed that FIN-NET can work well in specific cases. However, the report also revealed
significant gaps in the coverage of the network. For instance, some EU Member States had
no ADR schemes for particular financial services sectors,117 and a number of schemes were
not members of FIN-NET.118 Importantly, they were sometimes not members because they
did not comply with the ADR principles set out in the Commission Recommendation
98/257/EC of 1998.119
In conclusion, the number of complaints has risen gradually so that FIN-NET provides
useful assistance to cross-border consumer complaints. However, the evaluation report also
indicates that the availability and quality of these schemes for consumers across the EU
Member States differ considerably. The new EU proposals 2011 on consumer ADR described
in the last section of this chapter might provide a solution to both of these problems.
SOLVIT
SOLVIT is an ‘on-line problem solving network’ which aims at solving conflicts out-of-court
caused by the misapplication of Internal Market law by public authorities.120 Established in
July 2002, SOLVIT has a Centre in every EU Member State as well as in Norway, Iceland
and Liechtenstein. These Centres cooperate to provide alternative dispute resolution
for cross-border complaints from citizens and businesses. They are not responsible for
disputes between consumers and businesses.121 Consumers may however file cross-border
complaints regarding the violation of EU consumer and market law by public authorities.122
In practice this rarely occurs, as for instance in 2010 the largest number of cases regarded
social security issues, residence rights and professional qualifications.123
The SOLVIT Centres are part of the national authority and try to find a solution free
of charge usually within ten weeks. They are coordinated by the European Commission,
which supports them with database facilities and helps to speed up the procedure. The
Commission also refers relevant cases to the Centres.124
116
ibid.
117
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
118
Spain, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Romania, Slovakia.
119
Internal Market and Services, Evaluation of FIN-NET (2009), 19–20.
120
See ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm.
121
ECC-Net or FIN-NET are responsible for cross-border disputes between businesses and consumers
depending on the type of cross-border case. For general citizens complaints about EU institutions the European
Ombudsman is responsible: ombudsman.europa.eu.
122
See ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/index_en.htm.
123
See SOLVIT Annual Report 2010 available at:ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/docs/solvit_2010_report_en.pdf.
124
See ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm.

The procedure works as follows: a case is submitted to the local SOLVIT Centre, which
checks that the formal requirements are met. The case is then entered into an on-line
database and forwarded to the SOLVIT Centre in the Member State where the problem
occurred. The latter confirms the acceptance of the case within a week, provided it is well
founded and the misapplication of the internal market law can be resolved effectively. If the
solution of a dispute requires the abrogation of a national rule a legal action might be more
appropriate. Nevertheless, SOLVIT may instead convince a Member State to waive the rule
that does not comply with EU law until it is annulled.125
The final suggested solution by SOLVIT does not need to be accepted by the claimants
and cannot be challenged through SOLVIT.126 However, if the claimants are not satisfied
with the outcome they can file a legal action to the national court or bring a complaint
before the European Commission.
In conclusion, SOLVIT is a useful network to solve cross-border claims of citizens and
businesses against national authorities informally and expediently. This is also suggested by
the high rate of solved cases.127 In these cases a misapplication or wrong implementation of
EU law has been redressed and the problem solved for the claimant or the Networks found
that there was no violation of EU law.128
EU-Wide Complaints Reporting
The EU also took initiatives to promote publication of comparable consumer complaints

information, including ADR data. This effort formed part of the EU Consumer Policy
Strategy 2007–2013 which strives to empower EU consumers.129
In May 2010, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation introducing an
EU-wide method for classifying and reporting consumer complaints. This initiative aims
to harmonize the different complaint classifications in Europe and provide a Union-wide
database of consumer complaints.130 This complaints method can be applied on a voluntary
basis by complaint bodies.131
Such a harmonized consumer complaint reporting method is particularly important to
assess the effectiveness of the numerous out-of-court schemes in the EU. As they are of
a more informal nature than court procedures, comprehensive data is not always made
publicly available. As a result, evaluation and overview is sometimes difficult, even at
national level. Thus, comparable form and regular publication of complaints can improve
the transparency of ADR schemes and provide a better understanding of problematic cases
in a sector. At the same time data has to be published in a way that does not violate the
confidentiality requirements in ADR schemes.
The Commission’s recommendation proposes a standardised way of collecting and
reporting consumer complaints, using a common set of criteria. For instance, it proposes to
125
See ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm#why.
126
See ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm#why.
127
For instance, in 2010 SOLVIT had 90 % success rate of the 1363 solved cases for which it was competent.
128
SOLVIT Annual Report 2010.
129
See ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/facts_en.htm.
130
See the recommendation at ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/complaints_en.htm. See ec.europa.eu/
consumers/strategy/complaints_en.htm.
131
ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/complaints_en.htm.

distinguish complaints depending on product category (eg an airline ticket, electricity, or a

bank account) and type of complaint (eg quality, price, safety, delivery).
According to paragraph 3 (a) of the Recommendation complaint handling bodies should
collect and register at least the following information:
(i) country of the consumer;
(ii) country of the trader;
(iii) name of the complaint handling body;
(iv) reason for contact by the consumer, distinguishing between complaints and enquiries;
(v) date of receiving the complaint or enquiry;
(vi) selling method (...)
Furthermore, according to paragraph 4 (b) of the recommendation complaint handling

bodies are encouraged to collect and register the following additional data:
(i) advertising method;
(ii) means of payment;
(iii) name of the trader;
(iv) value of the transaction;
(v) value of the loss incurred by the consumer;(...).
Organisations that deal with consumer complaints (ie authorities, consumer organisations
or ombudsmen) can opt in to the system and to sending their data to the Commission. The
Commission would then make the aggregate data public through the ‘Consumer Markets
Scoreboard.’
The Scoreboard evaluates key indicators to identify malfunctioning in EU consumer
markets, including consumer satisfaction and complaints.132 For example, the 5th Consumer
Scoreboard (2011) included an analysis of ADR data in the EU.133 The Scoreboard showed
that whereas not many Europeans make use of ADR mechanisms or courts for settling
their disputes, they seem to favour ADR. In particular, 48% of consumers agreed that it
is easy to resolve disputes through ADR mechanisms compared to only 33% for courts.
The countries which have the highest percentage of consumers who find it easy to resolve
disputes through alternative mechanisms are Ireland, United Kingdom and Cyprus. 56% of
retailers are aware of the existence of ADR. Nevertheless, the use of ADR is quite limited
considering that only 10% of retailers have used this type of dispute resolution mechanism.
Denmark and Ireland are the countries where ADR mechanisms are the most popular
among retailers.134
The EU-wide complaints reporting classification provides evidence of market failures
affecting consumers. This will assist the EU and Member State to determine targeted policy
responses to overcome shortcomings, for instance by introducing legislative measures on
consumer ADR.
132
The Consumer Scoreboard was developed in 2008 by the Commission in conjunction with the Member
States see: ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/facts_en.htm.
133
5th Consumer Scoreboard, 2011, 42–44.
134
ibid.

The European Commission’s Proposals on Consumer Adr

and Odr
On 29 November 2011 the Commission issued two legislative proposals on the resolution of
consumer-related disputes out-of-court: a draft Directive on ADR135 and a draft Regulation
on ODR.136 The Commission’s objective is ‘to improve the functioning of the retail internal
market and more particularly to enhance redress for consumers.’
Both proposals are based on Article 114 TFEU that requires a market-building rationale.
The Commission mentioned in a communication on these proposals137 that ‘the diversity
and uneven geographical and sectoral availability of ADR entities prevent consumers and
businesses from fully exploiting their potential’. It assumes that the new ADR legislation for
consumers can boost economic growth, by ensuring equal access to justice to consumers in
all EU regions.
These ADR and ODR proposals have been developed as a result of a number of studies138
that showed gaps in coverage of out-of-court schemes and insufficient awareness about
these tools and their availability. The new proposals aim to overcome these challenges,
while adapting the existing regulation to new contexts, characterized among other things
by an increase in the use of the Internet.139
In a detailed impact assessment the Commission compared a number of policy options
and concluded that only a combination of two instruments on ADR and ODR can ensure
out-of-court dispute resolution. In particular, a Framework Directive was considered
the most appropriate way to ensure full ADR coverage in all Member States, to inform
consumers about ADR and to ensure quality principles.
The Proposed Directive on Consumer ADR
The Commission proposed a specific Directive on consumer ADR to ensure the quality and
availability of such schemes for contractual disputes. According to Article 1, the objective
of the Directive is : ‘(…) to contribute to the functioning of the internal market and to the
achievement of a high level of consumer protection by ensuring that disputes between
consumers and traders can be submitted to entities offering impartial, transparent, effective
and fair alternative dispute resolution procedures.’
The proposal applies to procedures for the out-of-court resolution of consumer-related
disputes. It regulates contractual disputes arising from the sale of goods or the provision of
services by a trader established in the Union, to a consumer resident in the Union (Article 2).
Hence, the draft Directive would cover both domestic and cross-border disputes whilst not
135
Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR)’, COM (2011)
793/2, final, 29 November 2011.
136
Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Regulation on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation
on consumer ODR)’, COM (2011) 794/2, final, 29 November 2011.
137
Commission (EC) ‘Communication by the European Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution for
consumer disputes in the Single Market’, COM (2011) 791, final, 29 November 2011.
138
See Study on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union of 16 October 2009 and the
Leuven Study on alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings
(Leuven study).
139
consumer disputes in the Single Market’, COM (2011) 791, final, 29 November 2011, p 2.

applying to in-house dispute resolution services operated by traders, to direct negotiation,

or judicial attempts at settlement.
This Draft Directive tackles in particular three key shortcomings,140 which impede the
effectiveness of consumer ADR:
(a) Gaps in the coverage of ADR entities at both sector-specific and geographical level;
(b) Lack of awareness and insufficient information preventing consumers and businesses from
using ADR entities; and
(c) Variable quality of ADR: a significant number of ADR entities are not in line with the core
principles laid down by the two Commission Recommendations.141
Consequently, the four main elements of the legislative proposal are:
1. Ensuring that ADR procedures exist for all consumer disputes
Member States under the proposed Directive have to ensure that disputes can be submitted
to an ADR scheme for all consumer disputes. In addition, ADR schemes should provide the
possibility to file a case online and exchange information via electronic means (Article 5 Draft
Directive). 142
2. Information on ADR and cooperation

According to the Draft Directive Article 10, traders must inform consumers about
the relevant ADR schemes and whether or not they commit to use ADR in relation to
complaints lodged against them. Member States have to ensure that consumers can
obtain help regarding their cross-border complaints – an obligation that Member States
can delegate to their ECC-Net offices (Article 11 Draft Directive). Moreover, the proposal
encourages cooperation between ADR entities and national authorities entrusted with the
enforcement of consumer protection legislation.
3. Quality of ADR entities

ADR schemes should respect the quality principles provided by the two Commission
Recommendations. The Draft Directive also includes a number of quality requirements
that an ADR scheme has to comply with: expertise, impartiality, transparency, effectiveness
and fairness (Articles 6–9). In addition, the proposal states that disputes should be resolved
within 90 days, and that ADR procedures should be free of charge or of moderate costs to
consumers.
4. Monitoring
In each Member State, a competent authority will be in charge of monitoring the work of
ADR entities established on its territory.
The Directive would enter into force in national law 18 months after adoption.
140
See Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union of 16 October 2009, http://
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf, pp 56–63; 112–115; 120–121.
141
consumer disputes in the Single Market’, COM (2011) 791, final, 29 November 2011, 6.
142
Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC
(Directive on consumer ADR)’, COM (2011) 793/2, final, 29 November 2011, 4.

The ODR Regulation
The Draft Regulation on Consumer ODR, which aims at fostering the EU internal market,
has a special focus on e-commerce. Recent data143 showed that current ADR schemes for
e-commerce are incomplete and only half of the existing schemes offer the possibility of
submitting consumer complaints online while very few provide the option to deal with the
entire process online.144 Thus, a key element of the Draft Regulation addresses precisely
this point, by proposing the establishment of a European online dispute resolution platform
(‘ODR platform’).
ODR platform
The platform will consist of an interactive website offering a single point of entry to
consumers and traders who seek to resolve disputes out-of-court. In the current proposal,
this platform would apply to disputes arising from cross-border e-commerce transactions
and would be free of charge. It could be accessible in all EU official languages. ADR schemes
established in Member States, notified to the Commission in accordance with the ‘Directive
on consumer ADR’ would be automatically registered electronically with the ODR platform.
Consumers and traders will be able to submit their complaints through an electronic
form on the platform’s website. The platform will then check if a complaint can be processed
and will seek the agreement of the parties to transmit it to the competent ADR scheme. The
chosen ADR scheme will in turn try to resolve the dispute, in accordance with its own rules
of procedure, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the complaint. It will notify the
platform of relevant information regarding the development of the dispute.
Moreover, the draft regulation proposes to establish a network of online dispute resolution
facilitators (‘ODR facilitators’ network’). Such a network will have one contact point in each
Member State, and will provide support to the resolution of disputes submitted via the
platform.
Information about the ODR platform

Another important element of the proposal is that it requires EU traders engaged in cross-
border e-commerce to inform consumers about the ODR platform. This information shall
be made easily, directly, prominently and permanently accessible on the traders’ websites,
and will be provided again when the consumer submits a complaint to the trader.
Monitoring
The compliance by ADR schemes with the obligations set out in this Regulation will
be monitored by the competent authorities to be established in the Member States, in
accordance with the Directive on consumer ADR.
In conclusion, both legislative proposals are an ambitious and welcoming initiative to
strengthen consumer ADR in the European Union. The mixture of ODR regulation and
143
The 2010 report of the European Consumer Centre’s Network indicates that more than half of complaints
(56.3%) received by the ECC-Net were linked to e-commerce transactions. However, out of the 35.000 cross border
complaints received by ECC network in 2010, 91% could not be referred to an ADR scheme in another Member
State as no suitable ADR scheme existed (ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/2010_annual_report_ecc_en.pdf).
144
Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on online
dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR)’, COM (2011) 794/2, final.

ADR framework Directive is a promising move towards a comprehensive solution for

consumers to access out-of-court schemes. However, it remains to be seen how these
proposals will be funded. As all Member States have to provide full coverage of consumer
ADR, the establishment of such a system may turn out to be expensive.
Conclusions
This chapter discussed recent trends, at the international and European level, in the
design and adoption of ADR schemes for consumers. Out-of-court redress mechanisms
are increasingly recognized as an important element to strengthen access to justice.
Consequently, a growing number of organizations adopted recommendations regarding
ADR (eg, the Council of Europe) or are in the process of developing specific ODR
procedures (eg, the UNCITRAL).
In the last decade, the EU has also become gradually more active in the regulation of
consumer ADR. While this has been initially done through soft law recommendations,
the latest trend is towards adopting binding measures for ADR. Initially, the Commission
adopted non-binding Recommendations that influenced ADR schemes positively in the
Member States to respect quality standards in their organization and procedures. Then, the
mediation Directive (2008) harmonised national rules concerning cross-border mediation
in a relatively limited, but binding manner. Finally, the most recent ADR and ODR legislative
proposals include wide ranging measures obliging the Member States to ensure that ADR
schemes are available for all consumer disputes and respect certain quality principles. At
the same time, the proposal builds on existing ADR schemes, leaving Member States free to
decide how to transpose the obligation.
This active approach by the Commission is supported by the broader competence that
the EU received to legislate in cross-border civil justice matters, since the Lisbon Treaty.
The new proposal is however not based on the civil justice provision, which is confined
to cross-border issues, but on Article 114 TFEU, because the proposal goes beyond cross-
border measures.
The new legislative proposals on consumer ADR and ODR are very welcome initiatives
that can help to overcome problems of lack of information and lack of coverage which afflict
current schemes. In particular, the ODR Regulation will facilitate processing consumer
complaints in e-commerce matters.

2
Belgium
Stefaan Voet
The New Fps Economy and its Mediation Task
After the 1999 elections, the Belgian federal government made the modernization of public
administration one of its main priorities. A major reform of the various administrations,
aimed at restoring citizens’ confidence in the public institutions, was announced. This
program is known as the Copernicus reform.1 The core of it was that the citizen is not there
for the administration, but that the administration and its civil servants must be at the
service for the citizen. The latter, and not the administration, is at the centre.
One of the aims of the Copernicus reform was to restructure the federal administrations.2
The ministries were replaced by Federal Public Services (FPSs) and Federal Public Planning
Services (PPSs).3 The tasks entrusted to the former are the same as those given to the
former ministries. The latter handle ad hoc matters associated with socially-based issues
that require coordination between several FPSs, such as the policy on equal opportunity or
sustainable development.
In 2002, and in this context, the Ministry of Economic Affaires was reformed to the FPS
Economy, SMEs,4 Self-Employed and Energy.5 Its task is to create the conditions required
for the competitive, sustainable and balanced operation of the goods and services market
in Belgium. To achieve this aim, the FPS plays an active and effective part in controlling the
overall standards framework of the country’s economic and monetary union.
The Copernicus reform was extended to the Directorate-Generals of the Ministry. From
then on, the Directorate-General responsible for enforcement was called the Directorate-
General Enforcement and Mediation. In particular, the ‘mediation part’ was added. The
reason for this is unclear. The content of the mediation task was totally left open, so the
Directorate-General was given a free and broad discretion to interpret it.
1
Copernicus proposed that the sun, and not the earth, is the centre of the solar system (the heliocentric
system), and that the earth and other planets turn around the sun. See on the Belgian Copernicus reform: G Joris,
C De Visscher & C Montuelle, ‘Federal public administration reform in Belgium: new public management under
deconstruction’, www.congresafsp2009.fr/sectionsthematiques/st45/st45jorisdevisschermontuelle.pdf.
2
Other aspects of the reform were the abolition of the ministerial cabinets (and the replacement by three
new bodies: the strategic council, the management committee and the strategic cell), the reinforcement of the
autonomy of the directorates of the FPSs and a new appointment procedure for managers.
3
An overview can be found on www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/federal_authorities/federal_
and_planning_public_services/.
4
Small, and Medium Enterprises.
5
http://economie.fgov.be/en/.

26 Consumer ADR in Selected Member States
From the beginning, one thing was clear: besides ethical objections, the Directorate-
General did not have the financial resources and infrastructure to intervene or mediate in
individual (consumer) cases. In the beginning of the new century, markets were liberalized
(eg the energy and telecommunication market). This gave cause for a lot of consumer
complaints. The first thing the Directorate-General did, under the mediation umbrella, was
sectorial mediation. They invited the market players (business and consumer associations)
and tried to solve complaints on a sectorial basis.
Because the Directorate-General is convinced of the fact that creating a favourable
environment for consumer A(O)DR leads to a better functioning of the goods and services
market,6 it decided, still under the mediation umbrella, to promote A(O)DR. This led to the
Belmed project.
Creation of Belmed
Belmed was created in three phases. First of all, a feasibility study was ordered on the
introduction of an online mediation tool. The study was carried out in 2005–2006 by the
Research Center on IT & Law of the University of Namur and the Brussels Management
School.7 The research explored the legal, economical and technical (IT) possibilities of
online mediation. One of the conclusions was to establish a private – public partnership to
create an ODR tool.
In a second phase, and on the basis of this study, a stakeholder consultation was organized
with business associations, consumer associations, ombuds services, etc. The enthusiasm
was great, except for the financial aspect. None of the stakeholders wanted to support the
project financially.
In a third and final phase, a European tender was launched at the end of 2009 to develop
the software. Eight companies were interested, including IBM. In January 2010, the tender
was assigned to IRIS Solutions & Experts, an IT company from Louvain-la-Neuve.
Belmed, which is an abbreviation for Belgian Mediation,8 was presented in April 2011. It
is a digital portal (platform) on ADR and ODR, which it wants to promote and make more
accessible. Belmed consists of two pillars: on the one hand offering information on ADR,
and on the other hand providing ODR for consumers and enterprises.
Belmed only applies to consumer disputes (non-commercial disputes are excluded) and
disputes between a consumer residing in one of the 27 EU member states, and an enterprise
that is registered in the Belgian Register for Companies, or vice versa (disputes between
consumers and disputes between enterprises are excluded).
The website of Belmed is www.belmed.fgov.be, and is available in Dutch, French, German
and English:
6
At the launch of Belmed, the Belgian Economy Minister underlined that Belmed is a facilitating instrument
for economic life, and not a control instrument.
7
C Lazaro, J Gérard & Y Poullet (CRID) & I Choquet & A Ejzyn (ICHEC), ‘Etude relative au marché et à la
faisabilité quant à la mise en oeuvre d’un système alternatif de résolution en ligne des litiges (SPF Economie)’, April
2006, 270 p. (the study can be consulted (in French) on www.crid.be/pdf/public/5593.pdf).
8
The name ‘Belmed’ is protected in the Benelux, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Belgium 27
Information
On the one hand, the information part contains a guide on how to settle a dispute in an
amicable way.9 It not only explains what a formal notice,10 a consumer dispute,11 a third
9
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/what/guide/.
10
‘It is an official letter inviting the person it is addressed to (the debtor) to carry out within a fixed deadline an
obligation that is his responsibility (solving a problem, paying a sum, respecting a contractual obligation, etc). This
should preferably be sent by recorded delivery with an acknowledgement receipt, which makes it possible to prove
that the formal notice has reached the person it was addressed to.’

party,12 and alternative dispute resolution13 are, but also offers concrete examples of eg a
formal notice:
Place and date
Name and address of the sender
Name and address of the addressee
Dear Sir or Madam,
Re: purchase of …… (description) – invoice/order form reference – … (date)
I have bought the above-mentioned … from you on … (date).
The contract (or order form) mentions a precise deadline (or date) for the delivery: ....... This
deadline (or date) is now over.
As I still have not heard from you, I enjoin and ask you to take all the necessary measures to
proceed to the delivery during the next … days.
Yours faithfully,
Signature
Other examples of letters can be found under ‘Tips’:14 eg a general purpose registered letter,
a registered letter dealing with a product breaking down, and a registered letter to terminate
a contract.
On the other hand, the information part offers a convenient outline of all existing
ADR tools in Belgium.15 It gives an overview of all Belgian arbitration,16 conciliation,17
mediation,18 and ombudsmen agencies.19 All this information is also offered per sector20
(consumer goods, general consumer services, financial services, postal services and
electronic communications, transport services, leisure services, energy and water, health,
education, and cross-border disputes) and subsector.21 The information outline of each
11
‘It is a problem that appears during a commercial transaction between a consumer and a tradesman. This is
the type of disputes that Belmed handles, with the exception of disputes between private individuals or between
consumers. Scams, fraud or disputes dealing with fiscal or social law are not concerned either.’
12
‘The ‘third party’ is a person or authority entitled to lead an alternative dispute resolution process. Depending
on his degree of involvement in the search for a solution, the third party leads: a mediation procedure, (…),
a conciliation procedure, (…), an arbitration procedure, (…) a mediation procedure, (…). To carry out this
mission, the ‘third party’ must respect several rules: independence (he has no interest in the parties’ problem),
impartiality and neutrality, confidentiality (he cannot reveal the content of the exchanges between the parties), and
transparency (the parties are informed of the evolution of the process). Belmed collaborates with authorities that
respect these rules and are notified to the European Commission or to the mediators approved by the FPS Justice.’
13
‘Alternative’ means that the search for a solution takes places out of court (one also talks about ‘extrajudicial’
resolution). Compared to a court action, this method has many advantages: it is fast; it is inexpensive (some
authorities do not charge anything, and the fees for the intervention of an approved mediator are usually divided
in equal parts); it is confidential (while court debates are public), and it maintains a good relationship between the
parties (in case of agreement, there are two winners instead of a winner and a loser).’
14
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/tips/.
15
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/what/alternative_settlement_options.
Another (more limited) overview can be found on the website of the European Judicial Network in civil and
commercial matters (http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_bel_en.htm).
16
Real Estate Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation Board, Mediation and Arbitration Office, Arbitration
Commission for Consumers and Textile Carers, Furniture Disputes Commission, and Travel Disputes Commission.
17
Real Estate Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation Board, Justices of the Peace, Second-hand Vehicle
Reconciliation Commission, Travel Dispute Commission, and Construction Reconciliation Commission.
18
Real Estate Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation Board, Mediation and Arbitration Office, Federal
mediation service ‘Patient Rights’, Mediation Service Banks – Credits – Investments, and an approved mediator
19
Ombudsman Service for the Postal Sector, Insurance Ombudsman, The Mediator for rail passengers,
Ombudsman Service for Energy, and Telecom Mediation Service.
20
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/what/help/.
21
eg the sector ‘consumer goods’ contains the following subsectors: food, clothing and footwear, furnishing,
household appliances, audio and video equipment, new cars, second-hand cars, etc. The sector ‘transport services’

Belgium 29
agency is similar. At a single glance, all relevant information can be consulted: the address,
the website, for which problems the agency is competent, the prerequisites for access, how
the process works, a complaint form, the rules, and the costs.22
The information part finally contains some frequently asked questions,23 an overview of
relevant (Belgian and European) legislation and some tips.
All the aforementioned information is explained in a plain and accessible language,
thereby avoiding legalese.
Online Application
On the other hand, and this is the second pillar, Belmed offers the possibility of making an
online application for arbitration, conciliation, or mediation. The idea is to create one digital
portal, or access point, for the consumer and tradesman. After an application is made, the
Belmed system will automatically send it to the competent agency. So, the consumer or
tradesman do not have to find out, in advance, which agency is competent for their dispute.
If a consumer or tradesman wants to make an application, he/she has to click on the ‘make
a request for mediation’ link on the introductory webpage24 (see the screenshot supra).
The consumer or tradesman who visits the Belmed platform for the first time, will be
faced with two ‘accessibility criteria’. On the one hand, an application can only be made
when one has already contacted the other party to report the problem and try to solve it.
If not, the applicant will be referred to the aforementioned guide in the information part,
which contains an example of a formal notice. On the other hand, an application can only
be made if there is no court proceeding pending. If so, the applicant will receive (albeit
limited) information on how to mediate during a court proceeding.25
contains the following subsectors: railways, tramways, busses, subways, airlines, taxi, water transport, and rental
services. The sector ‘financial services’ contains the following subsectors: payment accounts, credit/loans, payment
services, investments, and insurances.
22
One example: the ‘Furniture Disputes Commission’:
– Address: Kasteelstraat 1A B10, 1700 Dilbeek; Phone: +32 2 478 47 58; Fax: +32 2 478 37 66; e-mail:
clmeubles@gcmeubelen.be; website: http://www.navem.be (available only in French or in Dutch)
– Prerequisites for access: the store must be a member of Navem and the standard contract must have been
used (in French or in Dutch); you must have tried to solve the dispute directly with the company, to no avail;
the damage must have taken place a month ago minimum.
– How does it work? See brochure (in French or in Dutch).
– Form. Form to download (in French or in Dutch), print and fill in or to be asked from the Commission +
enclose a copy of any useful document.
– Rules. Rules defining the procedure to follow (in French or in Dutch).
– Fees. 100 euro as a guarantee if you are a member of Test-Achats, Navem or Arcopar. 150 euro if you are not
a member of Test-Achats, Navem or Arcopar. If the intervention of an expert is needed, a deposit will have
to be made. The losing party will have to pay for the expertise costs.
23
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/questions/. The questions are: ‘amicable
dispute resolution, what does it mean?’, ‘if I do not have a computer, how can I contact Belmed?’ (see infra), ‘how
long does a mediation procedure via Belmed take?’, ‘can I try mediation if I am already involved in a trial?’, ‘what is
an approved mediator?’, ‘what is to authenticate a document?’, ‘what to do if the mediation attempt fails?’.
24
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/.
25
The applicant will see the text of Art 1730, §1 of the Belgian Judicial Code: ‘any party can propose to the other
parties, independently of any judicial or arbitral procedure, before, during or after a judicial procedure, to resort
to the mediation process.’

If the applicant has contacted the other party to no avail, and there is no court proceeding
pending, he/she can log in and register.
There are two ways to register.26 First of all, every Belgian resident can use his or her
electronic ID card or token with the federal authentication portal to register. Secondly, every
Belgian resident and every European consumer can create a personal Belmed account. All
European consumers can use the system. For the moment, they can only do so when they
have a dispute with a company that is registered in the Belgian Register for Companies (eg
a German consumer who lives in Berlin and bought a second hand vehicle in Antwerp, or
an Englishman who lives in Brussels and has a dispute with a real estate agency in Bruges).
Every private individual, or enterprise, can create a personal Belmed account. The
applicant has to fill out the following information: email, password, name, first name,
street, n°, zip code, city, country, phone, language (Dutch, French, German, or English),
and gender. The applicant also has to agree with the terms of use.27
26
https://belmed.economie.fgov.be/belmed/faces/login/login_form.jsf?belmed-user-language=EN.
27
‘1. Belmed offers a place where consumers and traders can talk freely – with the help of a mediator – to try
and solve a commercial dispute amicably. 2. Each party can end this dialogue whenever they wish. 3. If mediation
does not work, one or both parties concerned can try another type of amicable resolution (for instance, arbitration
or conciliation with a justice of the peace), or can bring the dispute to a court of justice. 4. Belmed users promise
not to use this space to denounce or criticize any person, company or institution. If such a negative behaviour
or any exterior disruption renders dialogue impossible, the mediator will inform the Belmed manager and will,
if necessary, suspend or even cancel the mediation procedure. 5. The Belmed platform is entirely secure and
confidential, which implies only Belmed users and the mediator have access to it. Belmed also observes the loi du 8
décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la vie privée et à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel
(privacy act). This means that the Belmed manager as well as the mediator in charge of a mediation request
promise not to divulge any data of a personal nature or pertaining to the dispute in question. Anyone can ask – in
writing – a correction of his personal data from the person in charge of the processing: (…). 6. When a mediation
request is made via the appropriate form, the applicant automatically receives an acknowledgement receipt that
gives a reference number to the request. Within two working days, Belmed will indicate which amicable resolution
options are possible. If there is a mediator in the specific sector, and if this mediator works with Belmed, the
request will be automatically sent to him. He will then contact the applicant and the other party in the dispute
and inform them on the process. 7. Since the Belmed platform is secure, users can only access it after registration
and authentication – preferably with the electronic identity card or eID, or, failing that, a personal code (federal
token for more information or to request a token, use the following link: https://www.belgium.be/usermgmt/

Belgium 31
When the consumer or tradesman has registered, he/she receives a confirmation email with
a link to validate the registration.
The Belmed account consists of different parts: making a new request, an overview of all
(current and previous) applications (‘my cases’), an email inbox (‘my inbox’), a link to the
account (where the applicant can edit his or her personal information) (‘my account’), and
a help link.
A new request can be made in three capacities: as a private individual consumer, as an
intermediary for a private individual consumer (eg a son making an application for his 80-
year old grandmother who has a problem with her electricity supplier, or a father making
an application for his 15-year old son who has a problem with his new cell phone), and as
an intermediary for a company (eg a lawyer or accountant).
eGovUserMgmtwebapp/public/RegistrationIntro.do) or a personal password. This access enables each party to

talk to the mediator, to send him documents by e-mail, to correct/update personal data or to follow up the dispute
online. 8. The Belmed space is available 24/7 (subject to technical or maintenance constraints). Any message
sent to the mediator (secure space) will receive an answer as soon as possible, during office hours. 9. Before any
mediation request, the applicant has to give his explicit consent to Belmed’s terms of use. 10. As it does not play
any part in the mediation process, the FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy cannot be held responsible
for any direct or indirect harm resulting from the use of the Belmed space (08/11/2011).’

The structure of the online request is based on Commission Recommendation 2010/304/

EU of 12 May 2010 on the use of a harmonised methodology for classifying and reporting
consumer complaints and enquiries.28
Preliminarily, the applicant will be confronted, for the second time, with the two
‘accessibility criteria’: ‘have you contacted the tradesman/consumer concerned to report
your problem?’ and ‘did you take the matter to court?’. Then the applicant has to provide
information about the provider, or supplier (there is a tool to search for the business
number), or, if the application is done by a tradesman, information about the consumer
who eg didn’t pay an invoice. The request information itself is vital (see next screenshot),
because the system will use this to send the application to the competent agency.
The applicant has to fill out:
– the sector (and subsector) where the problem has occurred: consumer goods,
education, energy and water, financial services, general consumer services, health,
leisure services, postal services and electronic communications, or other;
– the sales method: distance or face to face;
– the type of problem: contracts and sales, delivery of goods/provision of services,
invoicing/billing and debt collection, price/tariff, privacy and data protection,
provider change/switching, quality of goods and services, redress, safety (covers both
goods (including food) and services), unfair commercial practices, warranty/statutory
guarantee and commercial guarantees, or other issues;
– the value of the claim (‘financial loss estimation’): between 500 and 1,800 euros, from
0 to 500 euros and over 1,800 euros.
Finally, there is an unlimited empty field (‘description’) where the applicant can provide
additional information. It is also possible to add scanned documents (eg an invoice,
pictures, a letter etc), that can also be send by regular mail.
28
Official Journal L 136 of 2 June 2010.

Belgium 33
When the applicant clicks on ‘send’, the application will be sent, through the Belmed
system, to the competent agency. From that moment on, this agency will deal with the
case: they will contact the applicant, examine the admissibility of the application,29 contact
the opponent, explain the arbitration/conciliation/mediation process, etc). This entire
process goes online.
Belmed only serves as an administrator, a ‘serving-hatch’. The FPS doesn’t see the
identity of the applicant, nor does it read the application, nor does it interferes in the ADR
process. This makes sense, because the FPS is the control agency of some of the arbitration/
conciliation/mediation agencies that are using Belmed.
The FPS only collects statistical data (how many times the system is used, how many people
clicked on the guide, how many people made an application for mediation with respect to a
travel dispute, etc).30 This data is vital for two reasons. One, if a lot of applications are made
in a sector where there currently is no ADR agency (in which case the applicant receives
general information on how to start an informal conciliation procedure with the Justice of
the Peace), this is an objective policy argument for the FPS to persuade the sector to create
such an agency.31 Two, a lot of similar applications (eg with respect to a specific deficient
product) can indicate a collective problem, which can be a trigger for a governmental (or
other) body to act and seek collective redress.
At the end of 2011, six CADR agencies have signed a protocol to work with the Belmed
system:
– Ombudsman Service for Energy;
– Mediation Service Banks – Credits – Investments;
– Second-hand Vehicle Reconciliation Commission;
– Travel Dispute Commission;
29
If the agency is not competent (because the applicant has chosen the wrong sector), this will be communicated
to the applicant, who will have to make a new application. In other words: the ‘incompetent agency’ will not send
the application directly to the ‘competent agency’.
30
This statistical data will be published.
31
This already seems to be the case with respect to consumer goods.

– European Consumer Centre;

– Furniture Disputes Commission.
In the near future, the Real Estate Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation Board, and the
Belgian Direct Marketing Association will join the Belmed system.
All Belmed partners must comply with the minimum guarantees of the two EU
Recommendations of 1998 and 2001 to promote consumer ADR: Commission
Recommendation 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes32 (independence, transparency,
adversarial principle, effectiveness, legality, liberty, and representation) and Commission
Recommendation 2001/310/EC of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies
involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes33 (impartiality, transparency,
effectiveness, and fairness).
In the long run, the FPS wants to have agreements with all CADR agencies. If two or
more agencies are competent in one sector, the consumer will be able to choose based on
specific parameters (eg cost and speed). In other words, competition between the agencies
will be tolerated.
Attention is also paid to consumers who do not have computer access.34 A collaboration
is established with non-profit organizations that help poor and socially excluded people,
and with Public Computer Spaces (eg libraries and schools). In those Public Computer
Spaces, and with the help of those organizations, consumers who don’t have a computer, or
don’t have computer skills, also can make an application.
Finally, the Belmed site contains some success stories in the energy, financial services,
second-hand cars and travel sector.35
CADR Agencies
The five Belgian ADR agencies that currently have signed the Belmed protocol, cover a wide
range of consumer disputes.
For any problem arising between a consumer and a supplier within the framework of
the electricity and natural gas market, the consumer can apply to the (public) Ombudsman
Service for Energy.36 There are two prerequisites: the consumer must have tried to solve
the dispute directly with the company, to no avail; and the dispute cannot be more than
32
Official Journal L 115 of 17 April 1998. See also appendices of this book.
33
Official Journal L 109 of 19 April 2001. See also appendices of this book.
34
One of the frequently asked questions is ‘If I do not have a computer, how can I contact ‘Belmed’?’. The answer
is: ‘you can go to a public computer room (PCR) where someone will help you browse the Belmed website. Info:
PPS Social Integration, anti-Poverty Policy, Social Economy and Federal Urban Policy : tel. : +32 2 508 85 85 or
+32 2 508 85 86.’ For the visually impaired, it is always possible to enlarge the screen.
35
http://economie.fgov.be/en/disputes/consumer_disputes/Belmed/success_stories. One example in the
second-hand cars sector: ‘Description of the dispute. A merchant from the region of Mons sold a BMW 318 from
2003 to a private individual residing in the province of Walloon Brabant. The sale took place in March 2011. Two
months later, the engine started to stop at random due to a failure of the crankshaft and of the flow meter. At first,
the seller refused to take action. Result : conciliation agreement. After many letters, the seller has accepted to cover
parts of the repair costs as a gesture of reconciliation, which the customer accepted and which solved the problem.
The customer has since then resold the vehicle.’
36
www.mediateurenergie.be.

Belgium 35
one year old. The Ombudsman will try to reach an amicable solution with the company in
question. If this doesn’t work, he will give a non-binding recommendation. If the request is
considered admissible, the collection process carried out by the electricity or gas company
will be suspended from the moment the request was made with the mediation service and
until this service gives a recommendation or until the dispute is settled amicably. In case of
failure, the parties can still try arbitration or take the matter to a court. The service of the
ombudsman is for free.
For any problem related to a bank service, a credit, an investment, assets management,
stocks, etc., one can apply to the (private) Mediation Service Banks – Credits – Investments.37
There are some prerequisites. First of all, the applicant must have tried to solve the dispute
directly with the company, to no avail. Secondly, the financial institution must be a member
of the Belgian Banker’s Association, the Professional Union of Credit Providers, the Belgian
Association of Stock Exchange Members, or the Belgian Asset Managers Association.
Thirdly, disputes concerning a trade decision (rate or credit refusal) or overindebtedness,
are excluded. And fourthly, the applicant must act as a private individual. A legal person
(company) can only appeal to the service if it concerns a cross-border payment of €12,500
maximum within the European Union. The mediator, helped by a consumer representative,
will try to solve the problem and will propose a non-binding recommendation (unless
the problem concerns a basis banking service, such as the opening of an account with
withdrawal and payment possibilities, in which case the decision will be binding). In case
of failure, the parties can still take the matter to a court. No fees have to be paid. Legal
persons calling on the Mediation Service for a dispute dealing with a cross-border payment
have to pay €50.
For any problem relating to the purchase of a second-hand vehicle, the consumer
can go to the (private) Second-hand Vehicle Reconciliation Commission.38 There are two
prerequisites: the trader must be a member of Federauto and the standard contract must
have been used, and the applicant must have tried to solve the dispute directly with the
company, to no avail. A conciliation expert will first try to solve the problem with the
parties. If he can find an agreement, he will write down an agreement report to be signed
by the parties. If this doesn’t work, he will send a notice (binding for the parties but only
with respect to the technical aspect of the case) to the Commission, which will then gather
a college made up of representatives for car drivers (Touring and VTB-VAB) as well as for
the professional sector (Federauto) to make a unanimous decision. In case of disagreement,
a lawyer (third party) intervenes to take a stand as an arbiter. A fee of €50 has to be paid. If
the expert’s mission must be extended or expanded, the parties must pay €100 plus €0.30
per Km (expert’s travel allowance) each. For other possible charges, an estimate will be sent
to the parties for approval.
The (private) Travel Dispute Commission handles disputes opposing a traveler and a tour
operator and/or a travel agency.39 The Travel Dispute Commission is qualified to handle
disputes by way of conciliation or arbitration. It is not competent if the complaint concerns
physical damage, the non-inclusion of a travel insurance or of an assistance insurance, etc.
There are four prerequisites. First of all, the tour operator and/or travel agency must be
registered with the Belgian Register for Companies. Secondly, the general terms included in
the tour operator’s brochure and/or on the travel agent (or travel agency)’s order form must
37
www.ombfin.be.
38
www.federauto.be.
39
www.clv-gr.be.

correspond to the general terms of the Travel Dispute Commission. Thirdly, the applicant
must have tried to solve the problem amicably with the tour operator and/or travel agent.
And fourthly, the application must be made within specific time limits. After the parties
have signed a conciliation agreement, a conciliator will be chosen. He will actively guide the
parties to find a solution but will not impose any. In case of failure, the parties can still take
the matter to a court. A fee of €50 has to be paid. In case of arbitration, a college made up of
professional and consumer representatives will analyze the case, and make a definitive and
binding decision. A 10 per cent guarantee of the sum the applicant claims as compensation
(with a minimum of €100) has to be paid.
The (private) Furniture Disputes Commission deals with disputes concerning furniture.40
There are three prerequisites: the store must be a member of Navem (the National Federation
of Furniture Traders) and a standard contract must have been used; the applicant must have
tried to solve the dispute directly with the company, to no avail; and the damages must
have taken place no more than a month ago. If the applicant is a member of Test-Achats
(Belgium’s largest consumer organization), or Navem, a guarantee of €100 has to be paid. If
the applicant is not a member, a fee of €150 has to be paid. If the intervention of an expert
is needed, a deposit will have to be made.
40
www.navem.be.

3
France
Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda
Overview
Consumer ADR in France has distinct national characteristics. The existence of médiateurs
is well established in a number of situations, as are many of the general principles. But the
system is also in a state of transition.
The first point to make is linguistic. There are many médiateurs in France, and much
discussion about médiation. The term ‘ombudsman’ is less known, but as will appear below,
the French médiateurs function in almost identical fashion to what would be called an
ombudsman in other Member States. This chapter uses the French words, and assumes that
they have the same meaning as ‘ombudsman’.
France has a tradition of mediation in disputes between citizens and public services.
This is to a significant extent an expression of the Constitutional principle of solidarity
between citizens and the State. There is a strong system of local conciliation through a
court-annexed justice conciliator, who is highly accessible to those involved in litigation. A
national network of consumer dispute settlement committees (CRLCs) is authorised to be
created in each of the 96 Départements, but only three Départements currently fund a local
CRLC.
Médiateurs began to appear within some larger companies in France around the early
1990s. They constitute what in other countries would be considered to be the top of the
internal customer complaint department, but they have adopted an additional aura of
independence from the company, whilst remaining part of it. Examples were AXA France
(1993), GDF SUEZ (previously ‘Gaz de France’, 1999), BNP Paribas, 2002 (in the wake of
the adoption of the so-called loi Murcef, passed in 2001). Sectoral médiateurs also appeared,
notably in the postal sector (1992),1 insurance (FFSA, 1993), financial services (ASF, 1995),
direct selling (FVD as regards their Commission paritaire de médiation de la vente directe,
1995), and electronic communications.2
The appearance of médiateurs lay in the objectives of major businesses, partly to be
able to maintain better and closer relations with their customers (which risked fracture
if customers became unhappy with products and services, even if they were of acceptable
quality), partly to avoid the costs, publicity and divisiveness of court proceedings, and
partly as a response to the national debate on whether to introduce class actions to resolve
mass consumer issues.
1
Involving a protocol signed by national consumers organisations.
2
see www.mediateur-telecom.fr/home: 2003.

The current state of evolution on mediation in France has been summarised by the
Médiateur national de l’énergie, who is the only statutory médiateur in relation to consumer-
to-business issues:
French mediation is seeking its identity: mediation, namely an amicable way of settling disputes,
is becoming increasingly popular in France, but consumer associations, enterprises, and public
bodies have widely diverging views on its working principles. The national energy médiateur is
championing the importance of independence and transparency.3
The position of médiation has crystalised in 2011 with the adoption of a national Charter for
consumer disputes, which sets out important principles. It holds that mediation should not
be binding on either party, and not involve binding recommendations. It should, however,
be free to consumers.
Implementation of the EU Mediation Directive in 2011 introduced a definition of
mediation in French law, and some criteria of what constitutes a ‘good’ médiateur, namely
that the médiateur must accomplish his mission with impartiality, competence and
diligence.4 It is debatable whether the omission of a requirement for independence is
significant, given the number of in-house médiateurs in French companies.
The Institutional Landscape for Consumer Issues
Consumer affairs are overseen by the Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment.
Consumer policy is implemented by the Directorate-General for Competition, Consumer
Affairs and Fraud Repression (DGCCRF),5 which works together with a number of
independent administrative authorities6 and specialist agencies.7 There are seventeen
consumer associations, mainly with sectoral focus: the leading national associations
are Union Fédérale des Consommateurs (UFC – Que Choisir)8 and Confédération de la
Consommation, du Logement et du Cadre de Vie (CLCV). All of the consumer associations
try to assist with consumer complaints. The principal business association is Le Mouvement
des Entreprises de France (MEDEF).9 Formal discussion between consumers, businesses,
the public services and the authorities responsible for consumer issues take place at the
3
National Energy Ombudsman, Activity Report (2010), www.energie-mediateur.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/
RapportMNE_2010_UK.pdf.
4
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025179010&fastPos=1&fastReqId=1554304
886&categorieLien=id&oldAction=rechTexte. The amendment to the civil procedure code is: Livre V: La résolution
amiable des différends, in which Arts 1542 and 1543 add an ADR procedure between parties in litigation with their
lawyers.
5
For its tasks and powers see www.dgccrf.bercy.gouv.fr. When appropriate, DGCCRF works with other
authorities, in particular the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Health,
Youth and Sports, and the Ministry of Sustainable Development.
6
Such as the Competition Authority, the Financial Markets Watchdog (AMF), the Electronic Communications
and Postal Services Watchdog (ARCEP), the Insurance and Mutual Societies Watchdog (ACAM), the National IT
and Freedoms Watchdog (CNIL), and the Energy Watchdog (CRE).
7
Notably the French Food Safety Agency (AFSSA) and the French Agency for the Safety of Health Products
(AFSSAPS).
8
See www.quechoisir.org; Que Choisir. The Institut national de la consommation (INC; see www.conso.net)
publishes a monthly magazine 60 Millions de Consommateurs.
9
www.medef.fr MEDEF established a Commission on mediation, and published a Guide to Mediation in May
2009.

France 39
National Consumer Council (CNC),10 chaired by the Consumer Affairs Minister. As

alternatives to the courts, the DGCCRF sponsored the establishment of consumer dispute
settlement committees (CRLCs).
Consumer Claims and Mediation within the Court System
Since its reformation after the 1789 Revolution, the French justice system has been based on
fundamental principles that include access to justice for all, independence and neutrality of
the courts.11 The principle of free access to justice finds expression in the rule that litigants
do not pay the costs of provision of courts and judges, and the fees (dépenses) that are
payable12 are comparatively low.13 However, the loser pays rule applies to approved dépenses,
on a tariff basis, and some part of any lawyer’s fees incurred: the amounts recovered are
usually modest.14
France has two separate but parallel systems of courts: the administrative courts and the
ordinary courts.15 Each system has a pyramid structure, with a single court at the top and
various courts at the base. Litigants displeased with a court decision on one level can seek a
review before a court on the next level of the hierarchy. In each order, a single court of last
instance ensures that the lower courts apply the law in the same way.
The public authorities play an important role in French national life. The administrative
courts settle disputes between private persons and public authorities.16 For instance, for a
claim for damages for breach of contract to which a public authority is a party the case must
be brought to an administrative court. There are 42 local courts (tribunaux administratifs)
and eight courts of appeal (cours administratives d’appel), which are subject to the appellate
or cassation jurisdiction of the Conseil d’Etat.17
The ordinary courts (‘judicial’ courts) settle disputes in a wide range of areas, including
civil, commercial and consumer issues.18 For civil and commercial matters, the ordinary
courts are organized on local and regional levels.19 If both parties are professionals, the
competent court is typically the Commercial Court. When one party is not a professional,
the competent courts are the Tribunals of First Instance (Tribunal d’instance or Tribunal
de grande instance, depending on the amount of the claim. The Tribunal d’instance is
appropriate for claims under or equal to €10,000 and the Tribunal de grande instance for
claims exceeding €10,000. The local magistrate (Juge de proximité), a non-professional
10
www.minefi.gouv.fr/conseilnationalconsommation.
11
French Ministry (2007), ambafrance-us.org/IMG/pdf/Justice_ag.pdf.
12
Code of Civil Procedure, Art 695.
13
Y Desdevises and A-L Villedieu, ‘France’ in C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and
Funding of Civil Litigation. A Comparative Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).
14
ibid.
15
E Hayaux du Tilly, European Civil Justice, second edition, volume 2 (France, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 141.
16
French Ministry (2007), ambafrance-us.org/IMG/pdf/Justice_ag.pdf.
17
E Hayaux du Tilly, France, European Civil Justice (2nd edn, vol 2, 2004, Sweet & Maxwell) 141. French
Ministry of Justice 2007, ambafrance-us.org/IMG/pdf/Justice_ag.pdf. See www.conseil-etat.fr/media/document/
plaquette_ja_english.pdf.
18
Hayaux du Tilly, European Civil Justice (2004), 141. Civil procedure in France has mainly been governed by
the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile (NCPC) since 1975. L Cadiet, Code de procédure civil (Paris, LexisNexis,
2012).
19
Hayaux du Tilly (n 15), 147.

magistrate, introduced in October 2003 to deal with minor disputes, is appropriate for
sums not exceeding €4000.20 There are some special rules: for example trial about consumer
credit are dealt with specifically by the Tribunal d’instance, which is also in charge of rental
contracts. In January 2013, juridictions de proximité will be abolished, so consumer affairs
will be treated by a Tribunal d’instance, and juges de proximité will be attached to the
Tribunal de grande instance.21
The procedure before the Tribunal d’instance and before the Juridiction de proximité is
oral and there is no need for the assistance of, or representation by, a lawyer. Plaintiffs can
simply introduce their claims by filing a form at the court registry (déclaration au greffe),22
which is then responsible for communicating the claim to the defendant. Consequently, the
parties do not have to bear high costs, apart from those necessary for every trial.
Mediation can be used for cases in court, as regulated by sections 131–1 of the Code
of Civil procedure. The judge will appoint a médiateur who is qualified, impartial and
independent. The mediation process must not exceed three months, and confidentiality is
guaranteed. The médiateur’s remuneration is set by the judge, and is payable by the parties,
who must make an initial payment at the start, except in the case of an impecunious party.
Specific solutions have been introduced to facilitate dispute resolution for small claims
procedures and consumer access to justice.23 Firstly, a ‘small claims’ procedure was
introduced in March 1988: the declaration au greffe and procedure of injunction de faire.
Theses procedures were studied in Dijon and the Creusot, and found to be useful for
consumers since they do not have to pay the bailiff in order to obtain a summons.
Secondly, Act 2002-1138 of 9 September 200224 was adopted to make justice more
accessible to citizens and capable of dealing efficiently with small claims and minor offences.
According to Article L. 331-2 modified by Act 2005-47, a network of local courts can rule
on disputes by individuals, provided that they are unrelated to their profession and for a
value not exceeding €4,000.25
Thirdly, parties can also use a legal conciliator (conciliateur de justice), who is appointed
by a court of appeal judge to facilitate settlement of disputes out of court, in particular those
involving a consumer and a trader and rental contract matters. If conciliation is successful,
even partially, a statement of agreement signed by the professional and the consumer
and the conciliator will be drawn up. If the agreement is approved by the judge, it has the
authority of a ruling.26
Fourthly, a magistrate of first instance will also make a prior attempt at conciliation to
help both the consumer and professional who wish to avoid court proceedings to come
to an agreement.27 The procedure is free of charge (except that since October 2011 there
20
www2.economie.gouv.fr/directions_services/dgccrf/documentation/publications/depliants/litiges_anglais.pdf.
21
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024960344&fastPos=14&fastReqId=706671
112&categorieLien=id&oldAction=rechTexte.
22
The declaration au greffe is only for sums not exceeding €4000.
23
C Montfort, France—National Report’ in J Stuck et al, An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of
Consumer Redress other than Redress Through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings. Final Report (Leuven, Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, 2006) (the Leuven Study). ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.
24
Loi n° 2002-1138 du 9 septembre 2002 d’orientation et de programmation pour la justice, available at http://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000775140.
25
Code de l’organisation judiciaire, Art L. 331–2 modified by Act n° 2005-47 du 26 janvier 2005 – Art 3 JORF
27 relative aux compétences du tribunal d’instance, de la juridiction de proximité et du tribunal de grande instance
(1).
26
Direction générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (2006) www2.
economie.gouv.fr/directions_services/dgccrf/documentation/publications/depliants/litiges_anglais.pdf.
27
ibid.

France 41
is a revenue stamp costing €35, introduced to finance the public legal aid service), but
may only be used for disputes not exceeding €10,000 or disputes expressly attributed to
the magistrates’ court.28 If an agreement is reached, a report is drawn up by the judge that
has the force of an order that can be executed by a bailiff. Otherwise, the parties may take
legal proceedings, some of which are free of charge.29 In practice, however, the judge often
convinces the parties to go to the legal conciliator (conciliateur de justice).
Fifthly, according to Articles 127 – 131 of the Code of Civil Procedure the parties can choose
to conciliate before the judge or any third person of their choice during legal proceedings.30
Finally, Article L 331-1 of the Code de la Consommation includes a special procedure
for cases regarding consumers’ over-indebtedness that seems to work effectively.31 It applies
as a first step of the procedure an ADR conciliation scheme that, if it is not complied
with, leads to a judicial scheme. To begin with, the debtor must make a request before a
specialised conciliation commission (Commission de surendettement des particuliers).32 The
commission can then suggest to the creditors to suspend or stop the judicial actions against
the debtor to conciliate an agreement between the parties by the proposal of a plan.33 If the
commission’s recommendations are not followed by the creditors, the commission can issue
non-compulsory awards.34 After this, a single judge can start a hearing if the parties do not
comply with these awards.35
Consumer Complaint Boards
A network of Consumer Complaints Boards (Commissions de Règlement des Litiges de

Consommation: CRLC)36 is approved across the country to facilitate consumer complaints
arising from the sale of goods or the provision of services by businesses to natural persons
for their private use. However, because of a lack of finance, only three départements currently
have CRLCs.
The CRLC aims to resolve complaints arising from the sale of goods or the provision of ser-
vices by businesses to natural persons for their private use within two months of a complaint
being filed. The service is free, flexible and easily accessible. The CRLC looks at complaints not
falling explicitly within the remit of any other specialised conciliation body. A CRLC may be
established within each consumer committee at département level,37 and consists of:
• The office of chairman of a CRLC that may be assumed by any person whose expertise
in the legal and/or economic field and experience qualifies them for such a function. No
functions may be assumed by any person acting on behalf of an organisation for the pro-
tection of consumers’ interests or anyone active in the business, crafts or industrial sector.
28
ibid.
29
ibid.
30
See also the Leuven Study, An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer Redress (2006).
31
See the Leuven Study (n 23).
32
ibid.
33
Code de la Consommation, Art L 331–6.
34
See the Leuven Study (n 23).
35
ibid.
36
Pursuant to the Decree of 20 December 1994; see www.conso.net.
37
France is organised into 96 Départements, plus 5 overseas Départements.

• In each département, the chairman is appointed by the ‘prefect’ (préfet) for a renewable
term of two years, subject to prior approval by the two assessors on the board.
The competent CRLC is that located in the département where the consumer is resident.
The positions of regular and deputy assessors on a CRLC may be occupied by any persons
whose experience and expertise in the fields of economics and/or consumer law qualifies
them for such a function. The préfet of the département is to appoint two regular assessors
and between two and six deputy assessors—with an equal number representing consumers
and businesses respectively—for a period of three years.
Process
Complaints are submitted to the chairman of the CRLC. The secretariat registers these and
notifies the parties which rapporteur is in charge of the case. For each complaint received,
the chairman appoints a rapporteur, whose task is to try to bring about an amicable
settlement between the parties within a period of two months. Before a rapporteur is
appointed, the chairman must ensure that the consumer was able to contact the customer
complaints department of the company concerned. The rapporteur deals with the case,
acting under the authority of the chairman. The chairman may, subject to the agreement of
the two regular assessors, relieve a rapporteur of his duties if there are serious and justifiable
reasons for such a step.
The rapporteur investigates the case and draws up a brief report on each case being
handled, stating the nature of the complaint, the names of the parties, their arguments and
proposals for a negotiated settlement of the dispute. In the course of his investigation, the
rapporteur may, subject to the prior approval of the chairman, use a simplified procedure.
Where necessary, the chairman requests the assessors’ opinion on the proposal for
a settlement drawn up by the rapporteur. If the rapporteur uses this procedure and a
proposed settlement is submitted to the parties for their signature, they must be informed
that the CRLC has given its prior approval. The parties must also be informed that use
of the simplified procedure will enable the CRLC to draw up a conciliation report if the
rapporteur merely sends on the agreement signed by them. If the simplified procedure is
not used, the rapporteur submits his report to the CRLC’s secretariat and asks for it to be
put on the agenda of a future meeting of the CRLC.
Meetings of the board are called by the chairman. The secretariat informs the parties at
least two weeks before the date scheduled for the meeting that their case is to be heard by
the board. The letter of notification sent to the parties must indicate the date, place and time
of the meeting, and must invite them to attend in person if possible. The parties are also
informed that they may, if they wish, nominate a person of their choice to assist them at the
meeting, or appoint a duly authorised representative.
The secretariat must also provide the parties with a list of accredited consumer
associations and inform them that they may use the services of these organisations if they
consider that this would be useful.
The number of cases handled by the boards, and their outcomes, are not published. Only
one board, the MCE of Rennes (Département 35), publishes an annual report, which says
its mediations are successful in 80 per cent of cases.38
38
Annual Report, (Commissions de Règlement des Litiges de Consommation, 2010), available at www.mce-info.
org/upload/documentation/fichier/332fichier1.pdf.

France 43
Types of Médiateur
Médiateurs in France fall into the following general categories:

• Public sector ombudsmen, principally Le Défenseur des Droits,39 which was created
in 2011 as a merger of four previous bodies.40 Public sector dispute resolution is not
considered further here. Other examples, who deal with administrative rather than
consumer disputes, are Le Médiateur du Ministère de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de
l’Emploi (Médiateur of the Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment)41
and Médiation de la ville de Paris.
• Médiateurs who are embedded within companies. These often exist in leading
companies, and examples are: Médiation d’Electricité de France, Médiateur de Gaz
de France, Médiateur du Groupe La Poste, Médiateur de la SNCF (Médiateur of the
French railway company), Médiateur de la RATP (Médiateur of the Paris public
transport company), Médiateur des aéroports de Paris (Médiateur of the Paris airport
company).
• Médiateurs covering particular sectors. These are relatively recent in origin. Leading
examples are: Médiateurdunet.fr (abolished since 2010), Commission Paritaire de
la Vente Directe (Joint Committee for Direct Selling), Médiateur de la Téléphonie
(Médiateur for Telecommunications), Médiateur de la Fédération Française des Sociétés
d’Assurances (FFSA – French Federation of Insurance Companies), Médiateur du
voyage et du tourisme (travel and tourism), and others in the water distribution and
franchise sectors.42 Only two are created by statute: MINEFI (Ministry of Economy,
Finance and Industry43) and Energy.
Many different types of mediation exist, and particular approaches are promoted by bodies
such as the National Association of Mediators (ANM). The extent to which mediation
has spread in France over the past fifteen years can be seen from the list of organisations
involved in mediation shown in Figure 3.1 with their dates of creation.
Figure 3.1: List of French mediation organisations
Institut National d’Aide aux Victimes et de Médiation (INAVEM),44 1986

Centre National de la Médiation (CNM),45 1988
Association Nationale des Médiateurs (ANM),46 1997
Association des Médiateurs Européens (AME),47 1999
Conseil National Consultatif de la Médiation Familiale (CNCMF),48 2001
Fédération Nationale des Centres de Médiation (FNCM),49 2001
39
defenseurdesdroits.fr.
40
The Médiateur de la République, created in 1973, the Defenseur des enfants, the High Authority against
Discriminations and for Equality (HALDE), and the Deontology of the Security National Commission (CNDS).
41
www.minefi.gouv.fr.
42
For an overwiew see www.conso.net/page/bases.5_vos_droits.4_dossiers_juridiques.1_les_mediateurs.
43
www.economie.gouv.fr/index.php.
44
www.inavem.org.
45
Association founded by Jean-François Six, editor of the Cahiers de la Médiation, and chaired by him since then.
46
mediateurs.asso.fr.
47
www.mediateurseuropeens.org. Formerly, Ombudsman Association of the Bar of Paris
48
www.unaf.fr/spip.php?article151. This was dissolved in 2005.
49
cnb.avocat.fr/Mediation.

Union Nationale des Médiateurs Chambre Syndicale de la Médiation (UnaM-CSM),50 2001

Fédération Nationale de la Médiation Familiale (FENAMEF),51 2002
Groupement Européen des Magistrats pour la Médiation (section français) (GEMME),52 2005
Chambre Nationale des Praticiens de la Médiation (CNPM),53 2006
Institut Français de la Médiation,54 2007
Union Professionnelle Indépendante des Médiateurs (UPIM), 2007
Chambre Professionnelle de la Médiation et de la Négociation (CPMN),55 2007
Office National des Médiateurs (ODM), 2008
Office National de la Médiation,56 2008
France Médiation,57 2008
Institut Français de Certification des Médiateurs (IFCM),58 2008
Agence Européenne d’Arbitrage, de Conciliation, d’Expertise et de Médiation (AEACEM), 2009
A key development was the creation in 2002 of the Club des médiateurs59 to bring together
mediators’ organizations (companies, government, communities) that share the same
values in mediation. The Club was originally ‘Club of the Public Services Ombudsmen’. It
developed a charter60 in 2004, setting out the basis of values shared by its members and their
shared vision of institutional mediation.
Working groups of the CNC deliberated in 2003–2004 and 2006–2007 on mediation and
ADR, with the main objective of defining criteria for good mediation practice.61 After the
2004 discussions, various public sector ombudsmen registered with the ECC-Net. Debates
about ADR continued against the background of two factors: one was the negotiation at
EU level of the Mediation Directive, passed in 2008 for implementation by 2011, and the
other was a national debate about collective redress, in which political statements were
made that unless business supported and underpinned effective consumer ADR structures,
a law would be passed that introduced a generic class action. In response, MEDEF created
a Consumer Committee in 2009, whose remit included to ‘ensure that consumers’ trust
and the satisfaction of consumers’ requirements again become central issues of the debates
concerning the place of enterprises in society, in particular through the development of
mediation in order to resolve consumer-related disputes’.
In 2010, the Club reorganised under the Mediators Association Act 1901 to strengthen its
promotion and development of institutional mediation in France, welcoming new members.
The Club now comprises government, institutions and companies.62 In 2010 it established
50
www.unam-csm.com/index0.html. This was replaced by FCNM at the end of 2007.
51
www.mediation-familiale.org.
52
www.gemme.eu/fr.
53
www.cnpm-mediation.org. Association of a dozen mediators of the Loire Département.
54
www.institut-français-mediation.com
55
www.cpmn.info/wp. Substituted by UNAM-CSM, National Union of Mediators—Union Chamber of
Mediation.
56
www.formation-de-mediateur.fr.
57
www.francemediation.fr.
58
www.institut-francais-mediation.fr. The Association declared its closure at the end of 2008, and it occurred
in June 2009.
59
Le Club des Médiateurs de Services Public www.clubdesmediateurs.fr. In 2011 the President, was Emmanuel
Constans, Ombudsman of the Ministry of Economy and Budget, and Vice-President was Jocelyne Canetti,
Ombudsman of EDF. Not all ombudsmen have been invited to join.
60
www.clubdesmediateurs.fr/la-charte.
61
ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/docs/FR_web_country_profile.pdf.
62
The members as at January 2012 are AMF, Caisse des Consignations, EDF, the French Federation of Insurance,
France 2, France3, France Television, GDF-Suez, La Poste, the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry,
Ministry of Education, the Ombudsman, Mutuelle Sociale Agricole, RATP, SNCF, Ville de Paris.

France 45
a training module for employees of mediation services of its members, to understand the
cultural and legal aspects of the activity of mediation, to master the basic principles that
govern it, to identify the key steps its history, to identify the different types of mediation,
and to understand the steps and methodology of investigation of a case.63
The Commission de la Médiation de la consommation (Commission of Consumer Mediation
(CMC) was established on October 20, 2010,64 to be ‘responsible for issuing opinions and
proposing measures of all kinds to assess, improve and disseminate best practices of mediation
for non-court settlement in consumption’. It will audit the use of mediation devices and set
ethical rules. It was charged with developing a charter of good mediation practice, which was
published in 2011 (a translation can be found at the end of the chapter).65
The charter was influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, strong reliance on the
principle that mediation should be free of charge to the consumer was influenced by the
fact that access to the court is relatively cheap in France, and that it was wished to attract
consumers into an ADR pathway. Secondly, the approach was influenced by the existence
of many in-house company médiateurs and relatively few sectoral ones, in contrast to some
other countries. Thirdly, the principle of access to the courts was upheld in the rule that
mediation should be voluntary—for both consumer and company. It is rare to find in
France a situation in which companies agree in advance to accept the recommendations of
médiateurs. These considerations can be illustrated by the cultural approach to mediation
included in statements by business bodies:
Mediation is both an approach to social problems and a resolution method.66
[Médiateurs] share a vision of citizens service, customers and users that emphasizes listening,
dialogue and resolution through amicable settlement of disputes. They are widely known to
their institutions and their public due to their transparency, the values that
underpin their work,
their role of being preventative guarantees impartiality and efficacy attached to their status and
procedures they respect.67
It is important to recall that mediation is a dispute settlement mode that relies on the parties’
resolve and that cannot exist in the absence of such resolve.68
As recalled in paragraph (13) of the Recitals of Directive No 2008/52/EC of 21 May 2008

on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters: mediation ‘should be a
voluntary process in the sense that the parties are themselves in charge of the process and
may organise it as they wish and terminate it at any time’.69 An enterprise’s decision to rely
on mediation forms part of an approach for the continuous improvement of the complaint
treatment process.
Mediation must be used after all remedies internal to the enterprise (‘consumer unit’ or
‘client unit’) have been exhausted. Most issues between sellers/suppliers and consumers are
63
There is an associated website dedicated to the promotion of institutional mediation: www.
clubdesmediateurs.fr.
64
Under the Act of 1 July 2010 on reform of consumer credit. The CMC is chaired by Elyane Zarin, President
of OR.GE.CO (General Organization of Consumers); the appointment of a senior consumer figure was seen as a
strong political signal.
65
www.mediation-conso.fr/doc/French_Charter_of_consumer_mediation.pdf.
66
GDF SUEZ Mediator’s report 2010, 15, available at: www.gdfsuez.com/fr/accueil/mediateur/le-mediateur-
de-gdf-suez.
67
ibid, 14.
68
MEDEF’s response to the DG SANCO consultation concerning alternative dispute resolution means (MEDEF,
2011), 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_responses/b_MEDEF_en.pdf.
69
ibid.

settled at this stage. The large majority of disputes between consumers and sellers/suppliers
originate from difficulties related to contracts, and not any unlawful conduct. A consumer
survey in 201170 found that where consumers had had disputes with traders in the past
year, the most related to telephony (24 per cent), general consumer trading (22 per cent)
and information (12 per cent), with many other sectors at lower levels, including transport
(5 per cent), banking and insurance (each 3 per cent) and energy (2 per cent). Almost all
complaints made had been directed to the consumer service of the supplier (56 per cent) or
the seller (38 per cent). Seventy-six per cent of consumers surveyed said they had previously
heard of mediation, although only 50 per cent said they knew how to find a médiateur.
Banking
Legal Requirement for Banking Médiateurs
Banking mediation emerged in France in the late twentieth century in order to improve the
relationship between banks and their clients. In 2001 a law dealing with urgent economic
and financial measures (Loi portant mesures urgentes à caractère économique—Loi
MURCEF),71 established the basis for a mediation scheme for disputes rising between banks
and consumers. It was intended to coordinate the several mediation offices that existed
formerly in this area. Since the MURCEF law, banks must provide a mediation scheme and
inform their customers about this alternative redress mechanism.72 The médiateur’s range
of tasks and how a case should be submitted to the médiateur are defined by the individual
banks.73 The médiateurs are selected on the basis of their expertise and impartiality and the
procedure is free of charge.74
The médiateur has a relatively short period (approximately two months) to issue his
recommendation.75 However, if the disagreement persists at the end of mediation, the client
or the banking institution remain free to initiate a legal proceeding.76
The means of contacting the médiateur and his contact details appear on the account
statements sent to the customers, as well as on the account agreements. The recourse to a
banking médiateur is voluntary and cannot exclude the possibility of a judicial proceeding.
The banks have the choice of establishing an in-house mediation service or using the
mediation service provided by specific financial services organisations. In general, the
larger banks have integrated their own mediation services.
70
By Crédoc, a research centre for the study and observation of living conditions; www.credoc.fr.
71
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000020874250&idSectionTA=LEGISCTA0000
20874252&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072026&dateTexte=20120209) and www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.
do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000021979552&idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000021979561&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006
072026&dateTexte=20120209. For the annual report see www.banque-france.fr/la-banque-de-france/missions/
protection-du-consommateur/infobanque-votre-banque-et-vous/mediation-bancaire.html.
72
Monetary and Financial Code, Art L 312-1–3, now Art L. 315-1. In order to encourage good mediation,
a comité de la médiation bancaire was created by Murcef Law: this is why the Commission de la médiation de la
consommation does not deal with bank matters.
73
Note by the European Consumer Centre France, Mediation and consumption: How does it work.
74
Monetary and Financial Code, Art L 312-1-3.
75
ibid.
76
ibid.

France 47
For banks that do not have their own mediator specialized organizations have made a
mediation service available to them and their customers:
• l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers, AMF (Financial Markets Authority);77
• l’Association des Sociétés Financières, ASF (Financial Companies Association); and
• la Fédération Bancaire Française, FBF (French Banking Federation).
The AMF is a public institution, whereas the two latter organisations are private professional
associations offering mediation services. The médiateurs of the ASF and the AMF are
described in detail below.
The Ombudsman of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers
The Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) is an independent public agency with legal
personality and financial autonomy, responsible for regulating and overseeing financial
markets in France and protecting investors.78 It was established by the French Financial
Security Act of 1 August 2003 and was formed from the merger of various financial services
commissions to improve the efficiency of France’s financial regulatory system and to give it
greater visibility.79 Its remit is to:
• safeguard investments in financial instruments and in all other savings and investment
issues
• ensure that investors receive information
• maintain orderly financial markets
The AMF also supports financial market regulation at the EU and international level and
has four kinds of responsibilities: regulation, authorisation, supervision and enforcement.
The AMF is empowered to conduct inspections and investigations and its Enforcement
Committee may impose penalties or sanctions to punish breaches of the AMF General
Regulation or professional obligations.
The AMF has jurisdiction over:
• Corporate Finance activities and disclosures: The AMF regulates corporate finance
activities and disclosures by listed companies.
• Collective investment products: The AMF authorises the creation of open-end and
closed-end funds. It verifies the information set out in the simplified prospectuses that
must be provided to customers before they invest in any product.
• Market and infrastructure: The AMF sets the principles of organisation and operation
applicable to market operators and approves the rulebooks of clearing houses.
• Services Providers: The AMF sets conduct of business rules and other requirements
applicable to professionals authorised to provide investment services.
77
www.amf-france.com.
78
www.amf-france.org/affiche.asp?id=7294.
79
Commission des opérations de bourse (COB), Conseil des marchés financiers (CMF) and Conseil de discipline de
la gestion financière (CDGF); www.amf-france.org/affiche_page.asp?urldoc=lesmissionsamf.htm&lang=en&Id_
Tab=0.

The AMF’s Ombudsman Service

The AMF houses an ombudsman scheme that provides assistance to non-professional
investors (consumers and non-profit associations). It aims to promote understanding of
financial markets, and handles complaints about financial information, order execution,
transfers of securities accounts and asset managements. As part of the AMF, the ombudsman
has its own budget, to enable him to carry out mediation in a neutral and impartial manner.
The ombudsman cannot receive orders concerning the individual cases handled under its
responsibility.
The Ombudsman’s office has a two-fold remit: answering investors’ queries and arranging
out-of-court settlement. In its first function, the Ombudsman’s Office deals mainly with
queries from private investors, citizens’ associations companies on a wide range of financial
services issues. These include stock market mechanisms, disclosure requirements for
publicly traded companies, rules and regulations for portfolio management, transmission
and reception of trade orders, and custody.80 Investors can call the ombudsman services
through a telephone helpline.81
In the second function, the Ombudsman’s Office can help parties that are in dispute to
reach an out-of-court settlement and avoid legal action. It does not act as lawyer for either
party or as a judge. A charter governs this procedure, which is free of charge, confidential
and elective (requiring the consent of both parties).82
The dispute resolution function has a statutory basis. Pursuant to Article L. 621-19 of the
French Monetary and Financial Code:
The Authority shall be authorised to receive claims relating to matters within its jurisdiction from
any interested party and to deal with them appropriately. When necessary, it shall propose out-of-
court settlements of the disputes brought to its attention, via conciliation or mediation.
Submitting a dispute to the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) to find an out-of-court settlement
shall entail suspension of the statute of limitations for civil and administrative proceedings. The
statute shall apply again once the AMF declares the mediation finished. The AMF shall cooperate
with foreign authorities for out-of-court settlement of crossborder disputes.
The Authority may propose amendments to laws and regulations dealing with disclosures to
holders of financial instruments and the public, markets in financial instruments and the status of
investment services providers.
The Ombudsman may be contacted by any person or legal entity involved in a dispute of an
individual nature falling within AMF jurisdiction described above. The Ombudsman inter-
venes in disputes relating to investor information, order execution (lead-time, order content),
portfolio management and custody. The Ombudsman’s Office does not have jurisdiction in
the field of taxation, life insurance or banking (interest charges, loans, overdrafts, etc). It also
does not advise on individual investment opportunities and cannot intervene if an AMF audit
or enquiry is underway or if legal proceedings have already been initiated.83
Before seeking assistance from the Ombudsman’s Office, the investor must have contacted
the financial intermediary or the company in which they are a shareholder. A claim may only
be brought to the attention of the Ombudsman when a prior action has been taken against
the investment services provider or issuer, and the complaint has remained unanswered or
80
www.amf-france.org/affiche_page.asp?urldoc=mediateur.htm&lang=en&Id_Tab=0.
81
ibid, Phone number +33 (0)1 5345-6464.
82
ibid.
83
ibid.

France 49
has been rejected either totally or partially. It is also a condition that no legal action or AMF
investigation is in progress regarding the same facts.
The procedure
The AMF mediation procedure is free of charge. The Ombudsman may only undertake the
mediation procedure with the consent of both parties. In principle, mediation lasts three
months from the time when all useful evidence has been supplied to the Ombudsman by
the parties.
The mediation procedure is an adversarial procedure. It is carried out in writing, but
the Ombudsman may decide to hear the parties separately or together. Enquiries are sent
through the post or filed using the three online forms (for enquiries, mediation requests
and reports). Each party presents its position in the dispute and produces legible copies of
supporting documents in their possession (eg account agreements, discretionary mandates,
subscription forms, trade confirmations, account statements, management reports, letters,
emails, screen shots, etc). Both parties are heard and a written record is kept of the
procedure. The Ombudsman can ask the parties to meet and will seek to find a solution
acceptable to both parties. The parties will then indicate whether they agree to it. If they
do, the Ombudsman will see that it is put into effect. The parties can modify the solution or
decide at any time to terminate the procedure.84 The Ombudsman and the parties are bound
by the strictest obligations of confidentiality.
The mediation procedure ends either by an out-of-court settlement, or by the statement
of a persistent disagreement, the withdrawal of one of the parties, or by the start of legal
action relating to the dispute. Whatever the outcome of the procedure, the Ombudsman
informs the parties, in writing, of the end of his intervention.
Both parties retain the right to bring the dispute in front of the courts at any time. The
submission of the dispute to the courts brings the intervention of the Ombudsman to an end.
The AMF cooperates with foreign stockmarket regulators in the resolution of cross-
border disputes85 and the ombudsman is member of the EU FIN-NET.
Statistics
According to AMF’s Annual Report (2010), of the 1,397 queries received in 2010, 1,001
were inquiries (72 per cent) and 396 were mediation requests (28 per cent),86 having fallen
from 2009 (2,029, 1,249 and 735 respectively). Of these contacts, 686 (or 49 per cent) were
made using online forms, showing a rising use of this method for submitting queries (35
per cent in 2009).87
The telephone helpline fielded 829 calls in 2010. Most queries were submitted by retail
investors (individuals acting alone: 90 per cent), with 7 per cent from authorities and 3 per
cent collectively from lawyers, associations and internet service providers. Further data is
given the Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
Requests from other authorities or administrations rose from 5 per cent to 7 per cent,
while requests from other sources remained constant.
84
ibid.
85
ibid.
86
Annual Report of the AMF (2010).
87
ibid, 4.

Table 3.1: Inquiries and mediations 201088
Number of inquiries handled 1,041

Percentage of inquiries closed within one month of receipt 86%
Number of mediation requests 520
Percentage of cases closed within 6 months 74%
Percentage of cases considered on their merits in which agreements were reached 40%
Table 3.2: Inquiries and mediation requests by subject area, 201089
Inquiries and mediation Mediation requests only

requests
Issuers, corporate finance, general market 46% –
matters, financial instruments
Collective investment schemes, 29% 59%
discretionary management
Order reception and transmission 14% 13%
Direct marketing, advice on asset 6% –
management and financial investment
Miscellaneous – 15%
Account management – custody – 13%
The Médiateur of the ASF
The French Association of Specialised Finance Companies (ASF)90 established a mediation

scheme in 1995, to which members of the ASF may voluntarily subscribe.91 The ASF
mediator provides out-of-court dispute resolution solutions for consumers and their
brokers or financial service providers in the following areas:
• financial conventions concluded by individuals for their personal needs;
• the management of a deposit account for individuals;
• information precedent to the housing loan contract.
The mediation service is free of charge for consumers,92 and is financed by the financial
services providers that have subscribed to the scheme. According to Article 2 of ASF’s
mediation regulation the médiateur has the right to receive adequate funding by ASF, which
is fully covered by the membership fees of the association. No specific standing fees or per
case fees are published.
The médiateur must be independent. Pursuant to Article 2 of the mediation regulation
the médiateur is chosen according to his skills and impartiality by the Board of the ASF
and representatives of consumer organizations. He is appointed for a period of two years
and is bound by confidentiality.93 The ASF provides the médiateur with sufficient financial
resources to work effectively and independently (Article 2 (2)).
88
ibid, 5.
89
ibid, 8.
90
ASF is the professional organisation that represents institutions specialised in finance (consumer credit, house
financing, leasing, factoring, guarantees and investment services). It was created under the regulatory framework
of the banking act of 24 January 1984.
91
www.asf-france.com/mediation.
92
www.asf-france.com/Accueil/ASF-English-presentation.pdf.
93
ibid.

France 51
A case may be submitted to the mediator only if the consumer first tried to contact the
trader unsuccessfully. The mediator can then propose recommendations in order to try to
resolve the dispute between the financial service provider and its costumer.
The mediator of the ASF organizes an annual meeting with financial institutions in order
to discuss possible failures encountered in certain mediation cases. In the annual report
the mediator then proposes specific measure in order to improve customer services and
information.94 The ASF ombudsman is a member of the EU FIN-NET.
In 2010 the médiateur received 1,656 cases, of which he admitted 1,076 cases (83 per cent)
that were finalized by the end of the year. Of these, 84 concerned the provision of information
or the analysis of specific laws or contracts without the resolution of a dispute. The médiateur
decided 617 of the cases in favour of the debtor (62 per cent), and 375 (38 per cent) against
the claimants. Of those not admitted, 123 (7.5 per cent) did not relate to ASF and 156 (9.5 per
cent) related to another médiateur.95 The breakdown of types of case are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Types of issues raised with ASF 2007–2010 (Annual Report ASF (2010))
2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2010

number
Entries FICP 13 10 10 13 158
Debt restructuring 11 16 13 157
Prepayments 9 9 8 12 139
Insurance problems 17 13 12 10 123
Litigation cases 6 7 5 7 81
Plans of over-indebtedness (establishment, 2 4 6 6 74
management)
Accounts (objections or requests for explanation) 10 8 6 6 71
Workings of a revolving credit 3 3 3 4 49
Claims against solidarity among co-borrowers 3 2 2 3 38
Fraudulent use of cards 4 3 3 2 30
Established or operating levy 2 2 2 2 30
Litigation costs (delivery, operation) 3 2 2 2 29
Challenges to taking out loans 3 3 3 2 26
Requests for documents 3 2 2 2 24
Adjustable-rate real estate 6 11 4 1 13
Implementation of the loan 1 1 1 13
Miscellaneous 13 9 13 14 159
Total numbers of issues 744 1,123 1,402 100% 1,214
Insurance
In France, several médiateurs exist to deal with insurance complaints without being notified
to the European Commission.96 The médiateur of the French Federation of Insurance
Companies is the only notified scheme and will be described below.
94
www.asf-france.com/mediation.
95
See the Annual Report of the ASF Médiateur for the year 2010, www.asf-france.com/mediation/Pages/Page-
mediateur.aspx.
96
The médiateur du GEMA (www.gema.fr), médiateur de la Chambre Syndicale des Courtiers d’Assurances
(CSCA) (www.csca.fr), médiateur du CTIP (www.ctip.asso.fr), médiateur de la Fédérale Mutualiste (www.
mutualite.fr); for more information regarding these schemes see: www.acam-france.fr/mediateurs.

The Médiateur of the French Federation of Insurance Companies
The médiateur of the French Federation of Insurance Companies (Fédération Française des
Sociétés d’Assurance) (FFSA) is able to rule on disputes involving members that have signed
its Mediation Charter (see Figure 3.2). The FFSA is the leading trade organisation in the
insurance sector and represents 90 per cent of the insurance market.97 The mediation scheme
of the FFSA was established by members in 1993 and is private and voluntary. The Charter is
intended to provide a framework whereby policyholders and third parties can benefit from
mediation for the settlement of their disputes, without resorting to litigation.98 Under the
Charter, the insurer and the insured can seek advice from the in-house médiateur or refer
the matter to the FFSA-appointed médiateur. Six companies have established their own in-
house médiateur.
While mediation is particularly useful for dispute resolution between consumers and
insurers arbitration has traditionally remained the most frequently used mechanism to
resolve disputes between insurers and reinsurers or between reinsurers. An insurance and
reinsurance arbitration centre (Centre Français d’Arbitrage de Réassurance et d’Assurance)
(CEFAREA) was established in 1995 to facilitate arbitration. Rules on the conduct and
arbitration procedure were adopted, a list of arbitrators established and model arbitration
clauses proposed.99
The FFSA médiateur is appointed unanimously by a board comprising the Chairman of
the National Consumer Institute of Consumption (Institut National de la Consommation),
the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the National Insurance Council (Commission
Consultative du Conseil National des Assurances) and the Chairman of the FFSA. Its term of
office is two years (renewable). Mr Francis Frizon is the current FFSA Mediator.
Legal framework regarding insurance mediation in France

French law transposing EU Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation (Insurance
Mediation Directive) treats any person conducting an insurance mediation activity in
exchange for remuneration as an insurance or reinsurance intermediary.100 Insurance
mediation is defined as an activity that consists of introducing, proposing or facilitating the
conclusion of insurance contracts.101
Furthermore, insurers must specify in information documents made available to
prospective policy-holders the conditions in accordance with which complaints shall
be processed.102 These documents should also inform the policy-holder about dispute
resolution mechanisms within the company and provide contact details of a mediator.
The médiateur of the FFSA is a member of the cross-border European network FIN-NET.
97
www.ffsa.fr.
98
A first mediation mechanism was put in place for insurance company members in 1989 by the French
Insurance Mutual Undertakings Group (Groupement des Entreprises Mutuelles d’Assurances) (GEMA). GEMA is
the trade organisation of insurance mutuals and their subsidiaries. Apart from its representative role of 50 entities,
it also carries out studies on the evolution of insurance.
99
In 2008 CEFAREA became member of the Paris Centre for Mediation and Arbitration (Centre de Médiation
et d’Arbitrage de Paris) (CMAP).
100
Insurance Code, Art L. 511-1.
101
ibid.
102
ibid, Art L. 112-2, inserted by Law No 94–5 of 4 January 1994.

France 53
Procedure
The mediation service is free of charge and there are no limits on the amount of the
complaint to the médiateur. A request for mediation can only be accepted after all the
internal, contractual or other means of redress made available by the insurance company
in question have been exhausted. No time limit applies. The FFSA médiateur should deliver
his opinion within three months. In practice, the average time taken to handle a complaint
varies according to the individual files. If mediation does not give rise to an agreement, the
médiateur issues a non-binding written opinion and the parties remain free to bring the
matter before the courts.
Article 8 of the Mediation Charter provides that the médiateur should take into account
elements of law and equity. However, the same Article states that the médiateur aims at
achieving an amicable solution that cannot correspond to a judicial approach.
Figure 3.2: Mediation Charter of the FFSA
1 A FFSA mediator shall be appointed unanimously by a board made up of the Chairman

of the Institut national de la consommation [National Consumer Institution], the
Chairman of the Comité consultatif du secteur financier [Consultative Committee for the
Financial Sector] and the Chairman of the Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance.
The period of his appointment shall be three (3) years and shall be renewable.
2 The FFSA mediator shall carry out his task completely independently.
3 The mediator shall receive all of the assistance, funds and powers necessary to carry out
his task. Companies shall have a maximum period of six (6) weeks to respond to requests
for information or documents issued by the FFSA mediator.
4 The task of the FFSA mediator shall be to investigate disputes in the insurance sector
between an insured or a third party and an insurance company. Only disputes involving
private individuals shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the FFSA mediator.
5 A matter may be submitted to the FFSA mediator by the insured, by a third party, or
with the consent of such parties, by the insurance company, after the internal dispute
resolution procedures of such company have been exhausted. In such a case, the
limitation period shall be interrupted. No matter may be submitted to the FFSA mediator
if litigation has been instigated or is underway.
6 After having investigated the matter with the assistance of the parties, the FFSA
mediator shall issue a motivated advice within three (3) months. The advice shall not be
binding on the parties. The decision on whether or not to implement the advice of the
mediator must be taken by the directors of the company and notified to the FFSA mediator.
7 The FFSA mediator shall inform the insured or the third party that they continue to be
entitled to instigate proceedings before the Courts.
8 It shall be stipulated in any advice issued by the FFSA mediator that it has been prepared
taking into account elements of law and equity but also with the aim of achieving an
amicable solution which cannot correspond to a judicial approach.
9 An insurance company may appoint a specific mediator as long as such person is an
independent party, with whom the company may not have or have had any employment
connection. Such company mediator shall then be substituted for the FFSA mediator; his
intervention shall comply with the same formal conditions and time periods as the FFSA
mediator, as defined in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 above. The company mediator

shall co-ordinate with the FFSA mediator and shall ensure with him the harmonisation of
the opinions handed down and shall keep him informed of his activities.
10 The FFSA mediator shall publish an annual report which shall provide an account
of his activities and of the activities of the company mediators who shall for such
purpose submit to him a report on their interventions.Within the Association Française
de l’Assurance, the FFSA and GEMA have collaborated on rules of good conduct for
companies active in the personal insurance sector. This collaboration has led to the
adoption of a Code of Good Conduct. The Code may be consulted in its entirety on the
website of the Association Française de l’Assurance.
Figure 3.3: Code of Good Conduct for the insurance societies who are members of
the FFSA or GEMA
Within the Association Française de l’Assurance, the FFSA and GEMA have collaborated
on rules of good conduct for companies active in the personal insurance sector. This
collaboration has led to the adoption of a Code of Good Conduct. The Code may be
consulted in its entirety on the website of the Association Française de l’Assurance.
UNDERTAKING IN RELATION TO THE PUTTING IN PLACE OF MEDIATION

MECHANISMS
Approved by the General Meeting of the FFSA on 15 December 2009 and by the Executive
Committee of GEMA on 11 June 2009, this undertaking was confirmed by the General
Meeting of the FFSA on 21 June 2011 and by the Executive Committee of GEMA on 12 May
2011.
Mediation mechanisms were put in place for insurance company members, in 1989 at
GEMA and in 1993 at the FFSA.
It should be noted that Law No 94-5 of 4 January 1994 inserted into the Insurance
Code an Article L112-2, which requires insurers to specify in information documents
made available to prospective policy-holders the conditions in accordance with which
complaints shall be processed, and the fact that there exists within the company a body
entrusted with such task which is obliged, should a dispute not be settled, to provide the
complainant with the contact details of the mediator.
This undertaking seeks to set out the minimum rules applicable to mediation.
The insurance companies which are members of the FFSA or GEMA must put in place a
mediation mechanism available to all of their policy-holders which satisfies the following
requirements at least:
– the mediators must be independent of the insurance companies for whom they
intervene andmust perform their tasks entirely independently;
– the insurance companies must endeavour to respond promptly to requests for
information and documents issued by mediators in the context of the requests
submitted to such mediators;
– any insured holding insurance cover in a personal capacity shall be entitled to have free
access to the mediator with jurisdiction, depending on his or her insurance company.
This right shall however only vest after the policy-holder has exhausted all complaint
procedures within the company;

France 55
– the instigation of a mediation procedure by the policy-holder or with his or her consent
shall lead to the automatic suspension of any prescription periods which may have
commenced until the mediator issues an opinion. At the end of the mediation, the
policy-holder shall retain all of his or her rights to instigate any judicial proceedings.
Statistics
According to the Annual Report of the FFSA (2010): in 2010, 5,316 requests for mediation
were made for companies affiliated to the FFSA, and 333 to the GEMA médiateur, making
a total for all insurance companies in France of 5,649. The number of applications was
relatively constant between 1995–2000 at around 500 cases per year, then rose to around
1,300 for 2001–2005, and has risen considerable since 2006, as shown in Figure 3.4. Of
the FFSA cases in 2010, as many as 45.9 per cent of applications were rejected: 33 per cent
(1,759) were referred to in-house procedures, 6.6 per cent were outside the médiateur’s
jurisdiction, and 6.3 per cent were returned for insufficient information. That year, 77 per
cent of applications originated from individuals, 10 per cent from other médiateurs, and
2.7 per cent from a consumer organisation. Of the FFSA claims, 47 per cent related to
property and liability insurance, 53 per cent to insurance of the person (23.8 per cent under
individual policies and 29.2 per cent collective policies).
Figure 3.4: Overview of insurance mediation applications103 1995–2010
In 2010, the FFSA médiateur handled many cases involving small sums, often around €100
and as low as €15.104
103
Annual Report of the FFSA 2010, 36.
104
ibid, 41.

In 2010, formal recommendations were issued in 391 cases by the FFSA médiateur and
274 by the GEMA médiateur. Of the former 391, 54.7 per cent were in favour of companies,
26.9 per cent were favourable to applicants, and 18.4 per cent partly favoured applicants.
The FFSA médiateur reported that his recommendations were not acted on by the parties in
whole or in part in 2.5 per cent of cases in 2010.
Furthermore, the médiateur reported that companies were required to respond to his
requests for information or documents within six weeks, and that almost 90 per cent of his
opinions were delivered within three months.
Energy
The Médiateur national de l’énergie
The national energy médiateur105 is the only médiateur in France established by statute apart
from the médiateur of the French Ministères de l’Economie et du Budget (Minéfi).106 The
office is regulated by the law of 7th December 2006 on the energy market.107 The médiateur
national came into existence as part of an initiative to open up the energy market, proposed
by the CNC in 2005 and implemented by DGCCRF, which recommended that a sectoral
ombudsman should be created alongside the sectoral regulator. The new scheme was
originally intended to operate from July 2007, and the new and innovative public office
of médiateur national was created by December 2006 under the law on the energy market,
but the appointment was delayed by elections in 2008, and the post was only filled in
December 2008. Before the 2006 law, two companies, EDF and GDF-SUEZ, which together
supply 95 per cent of the French energy market, each had their own in-house médiateurs,
outlined below, whose existence was not affected by the introduction of the médiateur
national. Companies are required to answer the médiateur national’s questions within a
fixed timeframe (2 months), but may also retain their in-house médiateurs, and this may
cause confusion.
The model for médiateur national was inspired by considerations of administrative
justice and courts, so established strict rules on structures and procedures. The existence
of fixed legal rules that govern the médiateur’s function have the advantage of giving clear
legitimacy and a statutory framework but the disadvantage of impeding what might be
regarded as a proper mediation function, as well as evolution in scope and processes. The
law has been criticised as being too complex. For example, it requires the médiateur to write
a formal and motivated recommendation to every complaint, but no precedents existed
for this. The médiateur can only deal with 30 per cent of complaints received, and rules on
admissibility had to be set up to filter the complaints. The médiateur finds that the rules can
impede attempts to improve productivity.
105
www.energie-mediateur.fr.
106
Décret n°2002-612 du 26 avril 2002 instituant un médiateur du ministère de l’économie, des finances et de
l’industrie.
107
A further law reorganising the electricity market was published in the Official Gazette on December 7, 2010
and came into force in early 2011, known as the NOME Act. See Energy code, Art L. 122–1, available at www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=8F39C51D8791D78E5BAF40346397D755.tpdjo16v_3?idSectionTA=
LEGISCTA000023985676&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000023983208&dateTexte=20120209.

France 57
The 2011 budget of the médiateur nationale was € 6.6 million,108 which was partly financed
out of a tax called CSPE that mainly funds social tariffs, renewable energy subsidies and
equalization of regulated prices in islands.
Procedure
The médiateur national is an independent administrative authority responsible, under
the 2006 law, for examining consumer complaints, recommending solutions to disputes
relating to the performance of contracts for the supply of electricity or natural gas, and
taking part in campaigns to inform consumers about their rights.109 After examining the
case the médiateur prepares a written recommendation supported by detailed arguments,
which are designed to enable the dispute to be settled within two months of the case being
brought before him.
The only admissible applications are those that have been subject to a prior written
complaint to an electricity or natural gas supplier, who has two months in which to propose
a solution to the consumer. If the consumer has not received a satisfactory reply from his
supplier by the end of that period, or if the latter has not replied, the consumer can appeal
to the médiateur within a maximum of two months.
All claims submitted to the national energy médiateur are examined case by case. All
claims are subject to in-depth technical and legal investigations. The médiateur has 40 staff,
ten case handlers, who are legally trained, and two team managers. Examination is based
on consultation and cooperation between the parties. While a case is being examined the
médiateur can hear the parties or ask them to produce comments within a set time. With
the parties’ agreement he can also hear consenting third parties.
After examining the case, the médiateur prepares a written recommendation for a
solution to the dispute within two months of the case being brought before him, which
is communicated in writing to each of the parties, who are free to follow the médiateur’s
opinion or not. However, suppliers must inform the médiateur within two months of the
follow-up made to his recommendation.
The drafting of the recommendations is subject to four key principles:
• Simplicity: the recommendations must be understandable by anybody without any
special legal or technical knowledge;
• Fairness: the recommendations take account of every situation and restore the balance
between the parties;
• Exemplarity: the recommendations can highlight opportunities for improvement by
suppliers and network operators to avoid similar disputes arising in future;
• Pro-activeness: if necessary the examination of case files leads to an in-depth
investigation of current rules and procedures and operator practices.
108
Journal officiel de la République française – N° 20 du 25 Janvier 2011. For the 2012 budget see www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025242218&fastPos=1&fastReqId=1831877087&categorieLien=i
d&oldAction=rechTexte.
109
Campaigns to inform consumers about their rights and available complaint procedures, located on
the ‘Energy info’ information unit, are financed jointly by the médiateur national and the Energy Regulation
Commission (CRE). The unit includes a call centre open from Monday to Friday between 08:30 a.m. and 6:00
p.m. (0800 112 212, a free number since January 2012) together with a web site: www.energie-info.fr. An example
of a campaign with INC, a TV consumer programme, in 2011 is at www.conso.net/video/visionneuse_conso.
php?videoDocIdy=23153.

Any recourse to the médiateur suspends the time allowed for applications through the
courts.110 When the médiateur has made his recommendations the time allowed for legal
recourse continues from the point when the appeal was made, as if the mediation had not
taken place.
The médiateur is required to report on his work to Parliament, and has chosen to publish
on his website his most important recommendations, in view of his duty to look at wider
market issues/trends and not just individual complaints. Individual recommendations
publish the amounts awarded but not the name of the company, whereas, annual reports
publish aggregated data that includes the names of companies, number of cases per
company, answering delays, and follow up of the recommendations. On rare occasions,
the ombudsman does publish the name of a company that does not comply with a
recommendation, if any other option had been unsuccessful.
The médiateur seeks to identify wider problems in the relationship, such as incorrect tariffs
or unfair terms, and this information is picked up by consumer associations and other com-
mentators. The energy sector has complicated contracts, between consumer-supplier, suppli-
er- distributor, and consumer–distributor. There is little judicial case law on energy law issues,
so the médiateur tries to give clarity through his recommendations, working closely with the
energy public authorities (they are in the same building) and responding to consultations.111
An attempt was made to improve the quality and readability of contracts. A December 2010
report on billing by companies summarizes all the knowledge and recommendations of the
médiateur, and similar guidelines are planned on other issues.
Statistics112
In 2010, 17,467 complaints were received (986 were online, 6,890 were by letter and 9,591
by phone). Sixty-eight per cent of the complaints within the competence of the médiateur
were settled or were subject to a recommendation. That year, 802 recommendations were
issued, of which 67 were published. The average award was €373, and average processing
time of complaints was 183 days.
The referrals received by the médiateur in 2010 related to the following suppliers: 43 per
cent GDF SUEZ, 38 per cent EDF, 12 per cent DIRECT ENERGY, 4 per cent POWEO, 3 per
cent other. The admissibility of received referrals was 58 per cent potentially admissible, 35
per cent admissible and 7 per cent not admissible. The outcome of recommendations by the
médiateur in 2010 is in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Percentage of médiateur’s recommendations followed by companies in 2010
Others GDF/SUEZ Direct energy EDF POWEO ERDF GrDF TOUS
No information on 3 6 9 3 4 4
the follow-up
Recommendations 8 10 12 22 41 51 20
not followed
110
Civil Code, Art 2038.
111
The médiateur and the energy regulator are in the same building. Nevertheless, they do not always agree:
an example of recent difference in opinion concerns smart metering. The médiateur does not always feel that
companies listen to his recommendations, and has as a result become more assertive.
112
Annual report (2010) www.energie-mediateur.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/RA_MNE_2010V2.pdf.

France 59
Recommendations 12 16 1 16 6 16 16 14
followed in part
Recommendations 88 73 83 63 69 43 29 62
followed
The Mediation at EDF (Electricité de France)

The EDF Group has had a médiateur since around 1999,113 who acts as a last resort in the
business, when all other avenues have been exhausted and were unsuccessful. The médiateur
is the independent reviewer of appeals to the President of EDF arising out of any dispute
over a contractual relationship with an affiliate of EDF (client, network user, supplier, or
partner). The médiateur of the EDF Group leads the institutional relationship between the
EDF Group and the consumer,114 including bi-annual meetings with consumer associations,
and annual meetings between the representatives and leaders of the Group.
During 2010, individuals within the Group’s National Consumer Service have been
identified on a regional basis to liaise with delegates of the médiateur, and regular exchanges
between the two parties have been instituted, based on written principles of collaboration,
which are being duplicated at regional entities of the Regional Services User Network
(ERDF). This also strengthens relations between the Commerce Department, consumer
associations and ERDF.
Process
Complaints must first be made to the relevant local contact between consumer and the
Group. If they are not resolved, the consumer may complain to regional and national levels,
and finally to the Group médiateur. Upon receipt of a complete complaint file, the médiateur
sends an acknowledgment within 48 hours. He then analyses and investigates the case. If
necessary, he contacts those involved in the dispute. He seeks an equitable solution, which
is then presented in writing as a report, within two months, to all parties.
The médiateur states that he approaches solutions in accordance with a rigorous ethical
approach, based on the following principles:
• Independence and impartiality: analysing the situation without favouring the interests
of either party;
• Respect people: any criterion of personal opinion or position must be taken into
account in the analysis of the case;
• Equity: applying the rule or practice that interferes the least with human situations;
• Adversarial: ensuring that each party communicates its views to the other;
• Listen: taking into account the particular circumstances of each party;
• Balanced listening: being available and attentive to the parties;
• Privacy: the ombudsman is bound to confidentiality regarding the names of parties,
the information and evidence obtained during the investigation of the dispute;
• Transparency: the activity of the médiateur is presented in an annual report available
to all.
113
fr.edf.com/mediateur-du-groupe-edf/la-mediation-a-edf-48650.html.
114
The current ombudsman, Jocelyne Canetti, who was appointed by the President of EDF in September 2009
for a period of three years, is also Vice-President of the Commission of Consumer Mediation, and has a high
profile in promoting mediation nationally.

Statistics
In 2010, the EDF médiateur received 4,476 contacts, of which 3,808 were redirected
elsewhere, for example back down the internal customer complaint structure, and 669
(17.5 per cent) were accepted.115 As shown in Table 3.5, this situation has followed a similar
pattern in recent years, although the volume of direct contacts has continued to increase.
Table 3.5: Complaints received by the EDF médiateur 2006–2010
Redirected files Admissible files Total

2006 1202 215 1417
2007 1392 197 1571
2008 2116 316 2432
2009 2469 545 3014
2010 3808 668 4476
The number of admissible files has been rising, and in 2010 the EDF médiateur closed 634
of the outstanding 758 caseload.116 The average amount in dispute in 2010 was €1,120: 50
per cent of cases involved over €1,000, and 23 per cent over €2,000. The médiateur achieved
his goal of dealing with more than 80 per cent of the cases in two months. The average
processing time was 52 days, and 45 per cent of cases were processed within 50 days. In
2010, the médiateur upheld applicants’ complaints completely or partially in 61 per cent of
cases. 16 per cent of cases in 2010 involved the médiateur reviewing cases where consumers
wrote in again after receiving his initial recommendation. Responses by consumers were
reported as shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Responses by consumers
Request further explanation 21%

Thank the médiateur 6%
Provides new evidence and requests a further recommendation 5%
Contests the recommendation 46%
Reject the recommendation/ confirmation of prior response 23%
given by the company at national level
GDF SUEZ
GDF SUEZ mediation was established in March 1999, in partnership with consumer
groups, after the creation of GDF SUEZ in 2008.117 The médiateur of GDF SUEZ118 resolves
ongoing problems with any person or organization regarding the Group’s activities, whether
or not a client, through amicable settlement of disputes. The médiateur’s mission is to help
to improve relationships with customers, through his recommendations and through the
115
Rapport du Mediateur EDF 2010 available at: http://fr.edf.com/fichiers/fckeditor/Commun/Edf_en_france/
documents/rapport_mediateur_2010_vf.pdf.
116
ibid.
117
A merger between Gas de France and Suez.
118
www.gdfsuez.com/fr/accueil/mediateur/le-mediateur-de-gdf-suez. The Mediator of GDF SUEZ is currently
the spokesman of the EEOG.

France 61
development of mediation, and he has promoted methods of dispute resolution throughout

the group’s services and subsidiaries.
Procedure
Before approaching the médiateur, the consumer must have used the dispute resolution
services of GDF SUEZ members and not be satisfied with the outcome. The applications
must be sent in writing, either via letter or online form.
The médiateur will let the applicant know how the request will be handled. The complaint
usually comes directly from a consumer, customer GDF SUEZ or its subsidiaries in France
and Europe. The médiateur can also be addressed by a consumer association chosen by an
individual. Similarly, a professional organization or a consular chamber can intervene on
behalf of a professional or business. Within 48 hours the applicant receives information on
treatment modalities of the application, and the next steps that are needed to resolve the
problem exposed.
Statistics
In 2010, the médiateur received 6,351 complaints, of which 6,246 cases were reassigned to
resolution teams operating within the Group for mediation with the client. The remaining
105 cases, which were more complex disputes, were dealt with by the médiateur as a last
resort before court proceedings. The médiateur reported that:
• 90 per cent of clients had a response within 48 hours that indicated what processing
method would be used;
• 66 per cent had a response from the service concerned within fifteen days;
• the cases of mediation as a last resort were closed within two months, with a success
rate of 95 per cent, except for (an unknown number of) complex cases.
The reasons for complaints were stated as shown in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Processes and main reasons for complaints
Process First reason Second reason Third reason

Energy billing 88% Bill disputes Cancellation of contract Payments of bills
Faults and changes Billing, usage, payment Payment terms,
of meter, estimates, reviews, direct debits, dispute over direct
contract changes readings debit
Gas distribution 4% Disputes regarding costs Unjustified Operations at the
of services disconnection of energy customer’s home
supply
Sales offers and 3% Dissatisfaction with Dispute regarding the Quality of information
tariffs plan taken out price of natural gas
Contact with 4% Request for Personalized follow-up Other
GDF SUEZ compensation
Quality and 0% Quality of the service Diagnosis quality Other
safety of interior Dual fuel
equipment

Transport
FNAUT
The Fédération Nationale des Associations d’Usagers des Transports (FNAUT)119 is a consumer
association whose activities include120 advice and representation to passengers121 on legal
claims involving violation of the rules of consumer protection. FNAUT acts as a filter in
checking the validity of claims, as well as representative of travellers in pursuing them. It
often brings claims to the mediation services of the SNCF and the RATP (see below), in order
to resolve disputes out of court after solutions were not found through companies’ customer
services.122 FNAUT also acts as a watchdog in monitoring the mediators’ publications, so
as to raise issues that companies should address. FNAUT charges fees for its services: for
normal complaints, the fee is €16 for members and €34 for non-members,123 and for airline
issues €42 for members and €60 for non-members.124 It requires that travellers contact the
travel company first, and allows a month for them to respond. The 2010 website hits as at 1
December 2010 were as shown in Table 3.8.125
Table 3.8: Website contacts to FNAUT in 2010
Air travel 2,025

RATP travel 1,841
Passenger SNCF 9,106
Referral to local court 3,946
Plane flight cancellation 5,249
Plane – overbooking 4,401
Plane – death or injury 1,976
Plane – loss, damage or delay of baggage 11,795
Plane – civil liability of travel agencies 6,135
Plane – delay 4,492
SNCF – personal injury 8,656
SNCF – aggression 3,156
SNCF – delay of a train 70,564
SNCF – theft, loss or damage to luggage 14,775
119
www.fnaut.asso.fr. FNAUT is a member of various European groupings of passengers and environment
protection.
120
The FNAUT was formed with two objectives: to facilitate the movement of all, especially non-motorized,
and to promote transport policy for people and goods consistent with sustainable development. It publishes
a monthly newsletter with updates about transport policy: www.fnaut.asso.fr/images/docs/publications/
chartesncf.pdf.
121
Pedestrians, cyclists, disabled, families of victims of road accidents, users of urban public transport, rail and
road, river and urban transit corridors that face the nuisance of traffic, citizens concerned with global environment
and regional planning.
122
As with a number of other associations, the FNAUT signed agreements with SNCF and RATP allowing them
to use their Mediateurs to resolve disputes between users and operators. The FNAUT takes care of all the steps to
the Ombudsman and the transport service concerned. A request, supported by a consumer association will carry
more weight.
123
Membership of FNAUT (€ 18) + fees (€ 16); for those living in Ile de France, the fee is € 30 (membership of
AUT Ile de France € 14 + fees € 16).
124
Membership of FNAUT (€ 18) + fees (€ 42); for those living in Ile de France, the fee is € 56 (membership of
AUT Ile de France € 14 + fees € 42).
125
fnaut.asso.fr/index.php/voyagez-malin.html.

France 63
The Médiateur de SNCF
Since 1994, the institution of the médiateur de SNCF126 allows travellers to seek a second
opinion regarding their complaints. The médiateur is established as an independent person
within the company, appointed by the President of SNCF, to examine issues with fairness
and impartiality, according to a protocol signed with consumer protection associations.
The médiateur aims to respond to letters within 2 months. This is a considerable admin-
istrative challenge, as the médiateur answers every letter in person. On average it takes 2–4
months to deal with a claim. The médiateur has 4 people working with him and several interns
that assist at the claim entry level. Additionally there are 2 people running the online system.
A change was instituted in 2009 to enable the médiateur to be contacted directly.127
Information about this change was distributed widely to travellers, both by SNCF, including
posters in stations, and the media. The result was a sharp increase in claims submitted to
the médiateur: 746 in 2008, 2,485 in 2009, and 3,731 in 2010. This increase was due solely to
claims brought directly by individuals: none in 2008, 2,066 in 2009, and 3,408 (92 per cent
of the total) in 2010. Over the same period, the number of cases referred by associations
declined.
The 2009 increase in caseload resulted in an increase in the length of time within which
the médiateur was able to deal with cases, but this was addressed in 2010, as shown in Table
3.9, and has been maintained in 2011. In 2011 the target time to respond was within 50 days.
Table 3.9: Response times for the SNCF médiateur
2009 2010 First 5 months of 2011

Less than 2 months 36% 53% 56%
2 to 4 months 34% 44% 44%
Over 4 months 34% 3% 0%
Average response time 81 days 59 days 57 days
In 2010, 20 per cent of applications received were not within the médiateur’s competence.
They were cases that either had not first been sent raised with after-sales services (12 per
cent of cases), or fell outside the jurisdiction of the médiateur, since they related to matters
such as accidental injury, identity theft, SNCF activities as a travel agent, business subject
to a proceedings (8 per cent of cases). The médiateur gave his opinion in the two-thirds of
claims brought before him. In 14 per cent of cases accepted in 2009 and 2010, the customer
had obtained satisfaction with after-sales services before the Médiateur deliberated on the
issue. The Protocol on Mediation provides that customers can make a complaint if they
have not received a response from the service after a month.
The majority (70 percent) of claims submitted to the médiateur in 2010 were classified
as ‘commercial issues’, and cover a wide range of matters. Requests for refunds of tickets,
involving unused tickets or tickets lost or stolen, and not resulting from the commitment
time guaranteed (EHG) represent 30 per cent of commercial claims. Complaints about
consequences of delays and their impact on the rest of a trip account for 24 per cent of
126
Société National des Chemins de Fer (French Railways). The current ombudsman is Bernard Cieutat, a former
magistrate of the Court of Auditors.
127
Annual report (2010), www.clubdesmediateurs.fr/sites/clubdesmediateurs.fr/files/upload/document/pdf/
Mediation_der.pdf.

commercial disputes. Complaints about the website sncf.com have recently remained
constant at 11 per cent.
The number of complaints to the médiateur about the Railway Police is stable and
represented 30 per cent of referrals in 2010. Of those, 96 per cent related to tariff violations,
4 per cent to crimes of behaviour (such as improper use of the alarm signal, violating the
ban on smoking): see Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Types of infringements
No ticket 55%
Unjustified reduction 21%
Ticket does not consist 7%
Reservation is not valid 4%
Other infringements (long travel, upgrades, alarm signal, etc.) 13%
The opinion of the médiateur is not likely to be challenged, unless the client or the company
provides new evidence, in which case the médiateur may review his opinion. In 2010, 257
people wanted to reject an opinion, and the médiateur upheld the client’s request in 10 per
cent of reviewed cases. A claimant who is not satisfied with the médiateur’s view retains the
ability to bring a claim in court.
The médiateur has no defined budget: he requests funding from the President of SNCF,
who then grants funds. The online scheme had a budget of €120,000 in 2011.
The Médiateur de RATP
The RATP Group, which includes the Paris Métro and also extensive bus, RER, and
tramway transport, carries 12 million people daily. It has an in-house médiateur, who
accepts complaints after the consumer has first made a complaint to customer services.128
The office was created in 1990 under an agreement made by the Directorate General with
consumer associations, and extended in 2006.129 If the consumer is disputing a reported
offence, the complaint must be made within two months of that offence. Customers can
complain themselves or through a consumer group.
The médiateur first assesses the admissibility of the complaint, and sends a letter in
acknowledgement of acceptance or explaining the reasons for rejection. He may send the
file to the relevant RATP service department himself if the customer has not first done this.
The main reasons why cases are deemed inadmissible are that the complaint is made too
early because customer service has not yet been contacted; the complaint is made too late,
ie outside the two-month period following the offence; or the complaint falls outside the
remit of the médiateur.
The médiateur then investigates the case based on the information provided, to examine,
firstly, the grounds of the request and the relevance of the arguments and, secondly,
the lawfulness and legitimacy of the company’s position. He will ask the relevant RATP
departments for any additional information he feels he needs to decide the case. The
médiateur has 45 days to respond to a complaint. In particularly difficult cases, this time
128
www.ratp.fr/fr/ratp/c_5032/saisir-le-mediateur.
129
La médiation à la RATP, available at www.ratp.fr/fr/ratp/r_6176/la-mediation-a-la-ratp.

France 65
period may be extended to four months. Many complaints relate to fines imposed on
travellers, in which cases the médiateur informs them that the fine recovery procedure is
suspended while the médiateur investigates the case, and it will not be referred to the police
court to start proceedings.
Once the investigation is complete, the médiateur informs the complainant of the
outcome of the complaint by letter, explaining the reasons for his decision. A copy is also
sent to the RATP department responsible for its implementation. He has power to decide
that no further action will be taken on an infringement or fine, or that the fine remains
partly or wholly valid. A decision by the médiateur cannot be appealed, but a customer can
pursue a complaint in the courts.
The médiateur’s annual report is published, therefore providing the same information
to both customers and RATP. The report also informs RATP management of some of the
questions that have been raised by customers and publishes the answers that have been
given to them. It therefore serves as an additional tool for dialogue between customers and
the company.
Statistics
The médiateur received 294 referrals in 2010.130 The number of complaints increased
annually from inception in 2006 until 2009, with a 7 per cent fall in 2010, as shown in Table
3.11. The number of inadmissible cases has doubled in the previous two years.
Table 3.11: Sources of referrals since 2006
Year Other Médiateur de la Republique Specific Signatory associations

2006 23 17 94 39
2007 – 24 174 28
2008 8 16 233 14
2009 18 19 268 12
2010 11 21 255 7
Electronic Communications
Alternative methods for dispute resolution are mandated under EU directives, as discussed
at chapter 1. The EU requirements were implemented by DGCCRF (Directorate General
for Consumer Affairs, Competition and Repression of Fraud) and ARCEP (Regulatory
Authority for Electronic Communications and Post). The electronic communications
sector serves more than 106 million customers in France. Companies have customer service
departments for questions and complaints. Dialogue between companies and consumer
associations has helped to advance methods of handling complaints.
The Médiateur des Communications Electroniques131 was created in 2003 as an industry
initiative to consider disputes in the sector of fixed telephony, mobile telephony and internet.
It is available for clients of the operators that have signed the charter of mediation and are
130
Mediation Officer Report (2010), www.ratp.fr/fr/ratp/c_5032/saisir-le-mediateur.
131
www.mediateur-telecom.fr.

members of the Association Médiation des Communciations Electroniques (AMCE: the

Electronic Communications Mediation Association), which was established in July 2002 as
an association under the Act of 1 July 1901 in order to provide administrative support to
the médiateur. The members of AMCE comprise most of the French telecom operators and
Internet Service Providers.132
The AMCE aims to be a free, fair and fast alternative dispute resolution service for small
business and residential customers in France who have unresolved complaints about their
telephone or internet service. The médiateur is impartial and neutral towards the industry,
government and consumer organizations. The médiateur is appointed for a term of three
years that is renewable once. He is chosen after consultation with the DGCCRF and
consumer bodies on the basis that his skills, authority and independence are recognized. His
mandate is irrevocable. Since March 2008 consumers can appeal to the médiateur online.
AMCE’s current budget is €1.3 million, for 12 employees, (a mediator, 1 managing
director, 8 legal counsel, and 2 assistants). Its fifteen members represent 98 per cent of the
French telecom sector serving the general public (consumers), not the business sector: only
a few small operators are not members. Every month AMCE charges its members an agreed
fee for each case it has received involving that operator.
The system of mediation in the electronic communications sector is based on five
fundamental principles:
Freedom
• The use of the médiateur of electronic communications is optional.
• The consumer is participating voluntarily in the mediation process and can terminate
it at any time.
• The consumer can contact the médiateur directly or through representation of a
consumer association, or a lawyer.
• The mediation is not binding on the consumer.
Free
• Contacting the médiateur is free and done by ordinary mail.
• All costs of processing the application as well as the involvement of phone operators
and internet are the responsibility of the médiateur’s independent experts.
Efficiency
• There is only one médiateur for the electronic communications sector (fixed and
mobile telephony, Internet, television).
• The médiateur agrees to give his opinion within three months.
• A mediation charter, which defines the principles of the mediation is widely shared by
operators to their customers.
• The médiateur is under an obligation of confidentiality, allowing parties to speak freely.
In return, the opinions of the médiateur are confidential and cannot be used in court,
unless agreed to by both parties.
Independence
• The médiateur is chosen, after consultation with the DGCCRF (Directorate General
for Consumer Affairs, Competition and Repression of Fraud) and consumer groups,
from candidates whose competence and authority are widely recognized.
132
The current members are: Bouygues Telecom, France Télécom, Orange, Ten by Orange, SFR, Universal
Mobile, Carrefour Mobile, Simplicime, Télé2 mobile, Numéricable, Free, Alice, NRJ Mobile.

France 67
• The médiateur is appointed for a term of three years.

• The médiateur investigates cases independently.
Transparency
• The Charter sets out the principles of mediation that are shared with clients.
• The médiateur’s areas of responsibility are clearly indicated in the responses of
consumer services operators, once the referral is made.
• Each year, the médiateur writes a report that assesses how he completed his mission
and expresses his recommendations.
Procedure
A consumer who has a complaint about their telephone service, mobile or Internet Service
Provider, or television, and who has tried to solve it with the service provider directly
without success, can lodge a claim with the médiateur provided the service provider is a
member of AMCE, and the consumer has not taken legal action. A claim must be lodged in
writing (by post or website: in order to keep costs low, AMCE does not provide a telephone
service). The application is free to the consumer. AMCE’s case handler will first check
that the complaint falls within its remit (admissability: this takes about 2 minutes on the
website, by responding to simple questions like ‘Who is your operator? What answer did
they provide?’). Within 48 hours, the médiateur will inform the complainant what action to
take. If the case proceeds, the complainant completes a written form giving the necessary
information and attaching relevant documents. The form must be completed within 15 days.
The médiateur is obliged to keep all information confidential: all documents submitted are
destroyed after analysis. The médiateur’s opinion is confidential: parties cannot produce it
in a court proceeding, unless expressly agreed between them. Both parties retain the right
to bring the dispute before the competent courts.
The médiateur then asks the operator to provide the documents in its possession and
to state its position. The médiateur investigates the case independently, and may call on
independent experts as he wishes. The médiateur bases his opinion on law and equity. It is
communicated in writing to each party within three months. Each party is free to accept or
reject the médiateur’s opinion, and should present its position to the other party and to the
mediator within one month.
Statistics133
The number of complaints received between 2005 and 2010, and associated outcomes, is
shown in Table 3.12: there were 18,672 cases received in 2010, of which 3,554 were valid
applications: 1,374 were received through the website and 2,180 were sent by post. Thus,
15,110 were redirected.
133
Annual report (2010) www.mediateur-telecom.fr/ressources/media/files/Rapport_Mediateur_2010.pdf; the
charter is at www.mediateur-telecom.fr/charte.html.

Table 3.12: Number of applications received and opinions given 2005–2010
Year Received cases Opinion given

2005 2,508 579
2006 3,723 680
2007 7,466 1,787
2008 20,076134 3,173
2009 17,252 3,302
2010 18,672 3,554
In 2010, the percentage of requests upheld was 87 per cent (3,104 satisfied queries). The
total number of complaints resolved on the basis of a proposal from the operator increased
in 2010 by 7 per cent. This represents 1,001 cases resolved satisfactory. Cases that result in
compromise increased by 23 per cent (1,611 cases), reflecting the goal of mediation to find
an acceptable solution for both sides. The total number of opinions that were not followed
was 13.
The duration of the process has shortened: in 2010 the average decreased to 69 days from
75 in 2009. The increased pursuit of mediated solutions resulted in processing time ranging
from 8 days to 2 ½ months. The mediator has set a goal of continuing to reduce processing
time down to no more than 2 months.
The type of complaints received in 2010 is shown in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13: Type of complaints in 2010
Number Percentage
Technical problems 893 25.0
Billing 869 24.5
Contract 976 27.5
Cancellation 814 23.0
Internet
Le Forum des droites sur l’internet135 (Forum of Internet Rights, FDI) was created in
December 2000 under the 1901 Law on Associations on the initiative of the Prime Minister
to reflect on questions of law and society related to the Internet, and to inform the public
and foster dialogue between government, companies and users on such issues. In 2010, the
Forum included nearly 70 members, public bodies, associations and private companies. In
2003 it launched a website information service DroitDuNet.fr, for which the most popular
issues were protection of children (violent or pornographic content) (53 per cent), payment
security (36 per cent) and computer security (viruses, hacking) (30 per cent).
Since 2004 it has also offered a mediation service for disputes related to the Internet.
The service was piloted for a year before opening to the public, and showed a significant
success rate: 75 per cent of the cases were settled out of court and 90 per cent of agreements
134
This peak is a result of the extension of jurisdiction and the opening of an online referral line.
135
www.foruminternet.org.

France 69
were met. A review in 2006 found that the mediation service had logged more than 5,400
applications, of which 3,200 were dealt with, with a resolution rate of 89 per cent for cases
closed. 97 per cent of cases related to electronic commerce, of which non-receipt of goods
and hidden defects made up the bulk. There was a satisfaction rate of over 73 per cent.
However, on December 7, 2010, the Association announced its dissolution, after the State
did not renew its grant for 2011.136
Since 2006, a partnership between FDI and the AFNIC, deal with the extra-judicial
settlement of disputes over domain names brought by individuals.
Doctors
L’ ordre des médecins, the French Order of Physicians, was established by Government
edict in 1945, to uphold medical ethics, and to be a self-regulatory and representative
organisation.137 It is financed by doctors, and has a network of councils in each département.
Its functions include a mediation and conciliation role between physicians and patients and
between physicians themselves.
Disciplinary chambers of first instance138 have disciplinary powers (appeals can be made
to the disciplinary section of the National Council, and ultimately to the Conseil d’Etat).
They comprise nine regular members, and an equal number of substitutes, elected by the
departmental councils for nine years, of whom a third are renewed every three years. Also
present in an advisory capacity are a legal expert, the local Director of Public Health (DAS),
a Professor of Medicine, a medical officer from the national health care insurance system
(Securité sociale), and a representative of salaried doctors.
Cases can be submitted by the departmental councils, the minister, the departmental
director of health, the prefect, the public prosecutor, doctors associations, or an individual
doctor. Receipt of a complaint leads to investigation of medical records and review of cases
by a panel that comprises a permanent doctor, a part-time doctor, nurses, five contractor
doctors who are active in a hospital or clinic, an emergency physician, a general practitioner,
and a surgeon along with ten other delegates, such as teachers, a radiation oncologist, or a
judge. Possible sanctions are warning, censure, temporary or permanent suspension from a
public medical post, temporary suspension or erasure from the Register.
On 7 September 2010 a partnership agreement was signed between the Médiateur de
la République (now Le Défenseur des Droits)139 and the National Council of the College
of Physicians (CNOM),140 concerning the reciprocal exchange of information to identify
corrective and preventive actions that are best suited to improving quality and safety of
care. The two institutions work closely on the treatment of individual claims, in addition to
reviewing proposals for improvement of safety of care and quality of relations with users of
the health system. The Défenseur now contacts the CNOM in any claim relating to ethics,
ethics and professional practice. Statistics for 2010 are at Table 3.14.
136
www.foruminternet.org/institution/espace-presse/communiques-de-presse/le-forum-des-droits-sur-l-
internet-est-dissout-3118.html.
137
www.conseil-national.medecin.fr.
138
They also hear disputes over healthcare insurance claims.
139
See above p 43. Le Défenseur des Droits is Jean-Paul Delevoye.
140
www.conseil-national.medecin.fr/system/files/mediature.pdf.

Table 3.14: Complaint figures 2010141
Contacts to the call centre 11,880

Letters received during treatment 1,400
Web forms processed 282
Requests for a medical or surgical adverse events 39%
Requests reports of abuse or violence 20%
In 2010 almost 18 per cent of the requests came from professionals who were unable to
resolve a dialogue with a patient, or felt professional isolation after undergoing a medical
accident, or threatened in their work. Recognising these reasons for complaints, the
défenseur raised the issue with the Department of Health, and created the Pôle santé et
sécurité des soins (The Healthcare Division and Safety of Care) in 2009.142 This introduced
an assistance unit to support professionals involved in the management of post-traumatic
stress, confronted with complex and sensitive situations, and associated with a collapse in
dialogue with stakeholders with no prospect of solutions.
Complaints for compensation arising out of medical accidents are dealt with under the
national medical compensation scheme operated by the Office National d’Indemnisation
des Accidents Médicaux (ONIAM),143 created by the Act of 4 March 2002. Details of that
interesting and successful scheme are outside the scope of this book, but the procedure
involves investigation by local Commissions régionale de conciliation et d’indemnisation des
accidents medicaux (CRCI), which seek first to mediate a negotiated agreement between
the victim and the insurer of the health professional.144 If agreement is not reached, and the
Commission reaches the conclusion that a healthcare provider was at fault, the provider or
his insurer is informed and is expected to make an offer of compensation to the victim,145
failing which ONIAM will itself make a payment and reclaim the money from insurers.
ONIAM received 732 claims in 2010.146
Evaluation
Consumer ADR is an important subject in France, and there have recently been serious
efforts to establish a consistent approach based on high standards of practice through
the adoption of the general Charter. The spread of médiation has occurred on a sectoral
basis, and is expected soon to be introduced in more sectors, although this leads to an
organisationally disparate approach, as with the UK and Germany. The possibility that a
unified national system might exist, through the CRLCs, has been undermined because of
a lack of funding from départements. Business sectors are, therefore, establishing sectoral
141
Annual report 2010 available at: www.mediateur-republique.fr/fic_bdd/pdf_fr_fichier/1295941775_Bilan_
P3S.pdf.
142
Le Journal du Mediateur de la Republique, Fevrier 2009, No 44. www.mediateur-republique.fr
143
www.oniam.fr/oniam/presentation-oniam. Created under Code de la santé publique: see www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072665&dateTexte=20111107.
144
See G Helleringer, ‘Symposium on Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global Perspective: Part I:
Medical Malpractice and Compensation in France, Part II: Compensation based on National Solidarity’ (2011) 86
Chi-Kent L Rev 3, 1125.
145
Code la Santé Publique Art L 1142-14.
146
Annual report ONIAM (2010), at www.oniam.fr/IMG/rapportsoniam/rapport2010.pdf.

France 71
consumer ADR systems. As with Germany and the UK, the sectoral approach can lead to a
lack of consistency and clarity in how consumer ADR operates.
Some confusion arises from use of the name ‘médiateur’ for both in-house company
ombudsmen (where there are several leading and powerful figures) and external sectoral
ombudsmen (where some are being established by trade associations but only two are so
far established by law). This situation exists in some other countries, but the confusion
is more acute in France, where the dominance of in-house médiateurs appears to have
confused consumers and not encouraged an ideally high level of consumer confidence
in the independence of such médiateurs, or of médiateurs in general. The position is not
assisted by stories that some in-house customer complaint mechanisms involve several
stages, which mean that customers may give up before reaching the end of what may be
a long and complex process, and become disillusioned in the system, preferring to seek a
court solution. There is, therefore, confusion over whether the function of médiateurs in
general are sufficiently independent.

4
Germany
Iris Benöhr, Christopher Hodges and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda
The National Context
ADR in Germany is, from a comparative perspective, a prime example of the maxim that
context is paramount. The concept of ‘ADR’ is frequently referred to in Germany, but has a
particular meaning, essentially encompassing mediation associated with court proceedings,
or arbitration. There are some limited examples of ADR that do not occur in the context
of alignment to court proceedings, such as ombudsman procedures, but they are currently
limited in scope and in usage. In this respect, the German ADR landscape resembles that of
the United Kingdom as it was around 1995. However, there is no reason why the German
ADR scene should not develop extra-court procedures that are highlighted in some other
jurisdictions elsewhere in this book.
There are two essential features of the German dispute resolution system, which need
to be understood both in order to describe it as it exists today and in order to explain its
historical development. These features are the nature of the civil procedure system and the
fact that lawyers have largely maintained a monopoly on giving legal advice.
Taken together, the features identified above produce a relatively high volume of
litigation per head of population in Germany compared with many other jurisdictions.1 In
consequence, there is widespread use of, and familiarity with, the litigation system. Simply
put, the court system works, and produces reliable results reasonably quickly and cheaply
(especially when the wide availability of insurance is taken into account). Accordingly,
there has historically been little social or cost pressure for alternatives to the courts to be
developed. Lawyers, whose costs are comparatively low for litigation, have been able to
maintain a monopoly on legal advice and representation in court, and therefore have kept
the role of gatekeepers on disputes. Lawyers have directed disputes into the court system,
thereby maintaining their monopoly and income stream. The costs of litigation have not
been allowed to become so high and disproportionate as in some other jurisdictions, such
as England, and therefore pressure by lawyers or parties to look for alternatives to courts
has been kept in check.
Looking merely at the statistics on ADR in EU states, it appears that there are numerically
more ADR bodies in Germany than in any other Member State.2 Yet the statistics are
misleading, since there is a comparability issue. As at February 2010, 203 German ADR
1
E Blankenburg, ‘Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures’, in D Nelken (ed), Comparing Legal
Cultures (Colorado, Dartmouth Publishing, 1997); Justizbericht in Zivilsachen (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2007).
2
See ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/ecc_germany_en.htm, and ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_
of_court/commu/acce_just04_en_ccb_en.pdf.

schemes were registered with the European Commission—which was more than any other
Member State.3 The Civic Study in 2009 identified 223 ADR bodies in Germany.4 However,
the overwhelming majority of bodies are focussed on mediation of cases, either cases that
are proceeding in court or that would be brought in court if the mediation does not succeed.
They are not particularly focused on consumer claims.
The number of bodies that deal with consumer ADR issues by providing a completely
non-court pathway is far more limited than appears from the overall statistics. Further, such
bodies are relatively recent and have relatively low usage, although there is considerable
scope for growth.
The Court System
The courts occupy a position in dispute resolution in Germany that is not only central
but also highly dominant. For many years, that situation prevented, or made unnecessary,
the development of alternative pathways. The courts have several clear advantages when
compared with those of many other jurisdictions:5 they are cheap, quick, efficient, and have
costs that are predictable (both in relation to claimants’ costs for court and lawyers fees, and
potential liability under the loser pays rule). As a result of the predictability of costs, legal
expenses insurance has developed, and is widely held for individual claimants, with third
party funding for meritorious claims being available relatively cheaply from insurers on a
case-by-case basis.
Maintaining the rule of law is a central principle enshrined in the German constitution
(Rechtsstaatsprinzip), and requires not only that there should be free access to the courts,
but also that litigation costs should be both predictable and reasonable.6 The general rule is
that the loser pays the costs.7 The amounts reimbursable for both the court fees,8 and fees of
opponents’ lawyers’9 and experts are specified in tariffs, and are comparatively low amounts.
The amounts in the tariff vary depending on (a) the sum in dispute and (b) the stage that a
case reaches. The arrangements discourage plaintiffs from inflating the amount of a claim.
They also encourage settlement, since the lawyer receives a higher fee (Einigungsgebühr) for
the middle stage of the procedure if settlement is achieved than he would if the case had
continued. This result is, again, intended to encourage settlement. Scale fees for lawyers
and courts are maintained at modest levels partly because lawyers do less work than they
would under a common law system, and partly as a result of a policy of cross-subsidisation
(Quersubventionierung) between more and less remunerative cases.10
3
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/ecc_germany_en.htm.
4
See ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf.
5
See A Stadler & W Hau, ‘The Law of Civil Procedure’ in M Reimann, J Zekoll & W Ebke (eds.), Introduction
to German Law, 2nd ed (The Hague, 2005).
6
A cognate principle is reflected in the ‘principle of equality’ in Art 3 of the German Constitution, which
means that every person is equal before the law.
7
German Civil Procedure Code, (Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO)), s 91.
8
By the German Court Fees Act, (Gerichtkostengesetz (GKG)). Certain other statutory provisions govern
payment of court fees in certain cases (eg guardianship and probate cases). Undisputed debt claims may use an
abbreviated procedure (Mahnverfahren), in which the costs are half of those that apply in the Amtsgericht or
Landgericht courts.
9
By the German Lawyers’ Fees Act, the Gesetz über die Vergütung der Rechtsanwältinnen und Rechtsanwälte
(RVG).
10
However, a 2006 study revealed that 38% of participants believed that cross-subsidisation was ‘not workable’:
C Hommerich and M Kilian, Vergütungsvereinbarungen deutscher Rechtsanwälte (Soldan Institute, 2006), 22,
figure 1.

Germany 75
The predictability of costs to assert (and defend) a claim in the courts facilitated the
development many decades ago of legal expenses insurance (LEI). LEI is widely held by
individuals in Germany, and was held by 43 per cent of German households in 2006.11 The
predictability and comparatively low cost of litigation in Germany results in the German system
producing a considerably higher level of smaller claims than most other European states.12
However, a study comparing different types of litigation in the Netherlands with the German
Land North Rhine-Westphalia found that low value consumer disputes were processed in both
countries by ‘pre-court institutions’, ie ADR bodies, rather than through litigation, although
there were more alternatives and more pre-court conflict institutions in the Netherlands than
in Germany, with the Dutch managing to filter better in the first instance.13
Legal aid is available in court proceedings (Prozesskostenhilfe),14 subject to an applicant
proving to the court qualification under means and merits tests. Legal advice and assistance
(Beratungshilfe) may be provided separately by a Land or a local Bar.
The average duration of cases that involve less than €5,000 is 4.7 months in the
Amtsgericht, and if appealed a total of 16.7 months; and of cases over €5,000 8.1 months in
the Landgericht and if appealed in the Oberlandesgericht a total of 24.6 months.15 In both
cases, any further appeals to the Supreme Court take on average a further two years.16
Small claims procedures are available across most of Germany, enacted by the various
State legislatures (Landesgesetzgebung), which usually involve claims of less than €600, and
endeavour to resolve such claims primarily by way of extra-judicial mediation. The small
claims procedure is not widely used in practice, and does not operate so as to prevent a
claimant from taking its case straight to court.17 The European Small Claims Procedure18
has also been available since 2009 in respect of cross-border claims of €2,000 or less.
The courts in Germany are bound by the Code of Civil Procedure to ‘promote at every stage
of the legal procedure a consensual settlement’. They are encouraged by scholarly writings to
adopt a ‘peace-making function’ and in practice are pressured by heavy case loads to engage in
settlement activities and avoid writing judgments.19 Continental procedure permits the judge
discretion to shift back and forth between his role as conciliator and his role as adjudicator.20
11
C Hommerich, M Kilian and R Dreske, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Anwaltschaft 2007/2008 (Soldan Institut für
Anwaltmanagement, 2008), Tables 7.2. and 7.2.2. See also AAS Zuckerman, ‘Lord Woolf ’s Access to Justice: Plus çà
change…’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 773, 791–795; M Kilian, ‘Alternatives to Public Provision: the Role of Legal
Expenses Insurance in Broadening Access to Justice: The German Experience’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 31,
also in R Moorehead and P Pleasance, After Universalism: Re-engineering Access to Justice (Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
12
C Hommerich, M Kilian and R Dreske, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Anwaltschaft 2007/2008 (Soldan Institut
für Anwaltmanagement, 2008). E Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands compared to
Neighbouring Germany’ (1998) 46 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1, vol 46.
13
Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture’, 1–26.
14
Civil Procedure Code, ss 114–127a.
15
StatistischesBundesamtRechtspflege 2010 available at: http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/
destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/Fachveroeffentlichungen/Rechtspflege/GerichtePersonal/Zivilgeric
hte2100210107004,property=file.pdf.
16
K J Hopt and F Steffek (eds), Mediation – Rechtstatsachen, Rechtsvergleich, Regelungen (Tübingen Mohr
Siebeck, 2008), 81.
17
If a claim for less than €600 is brought by way of court proceedings, the court has a broad discretion as to the
conduct of the case: German Civil Procedure Code, section 495a. Such cases are conducted in an informal manner
if the parties are unrepresented.
18
Regulation (EC) 861/2007, establishing a European Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ L 199/1. The
procedure has been implemented in the German Civil Procedure Code, section 1097ff.
19
KF Röhl, ‘The Judge as Mediator’, Dispute Processing Research Program, Working Paper 1983–89, University
of Wisconsin-Madison Law School; see S Roberts and M Palmer, Dispute Processes. ADR and the Primary Forms
of Decision-Making (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
20
E Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands compared to Neighbouring Germany’, in The
American Journal of Comparative Law, (1998) vol 46, 1 at 17.

Settlement is regarded as being better than a court decision, since it brings the dispute to an
end and is the appropriate social goal (Rechtsfrieden, literally: legal peace).
Various aspects of the system are directed at resolving cases through direct negotiation,
thereby saving money and reinstating social relations. If a party institutes proceedings and
the opponent immediately concedes liability, the claimant will be required to pay the costs.
This rule is aimed at encouraging settlement through direct negotiation. There is no limit
on the number of pre-action exchanges between the parties.
The Influence of Lawyers
For many decades, lawyers held a monopoly on legal advice, protected by law.21 Blankenburg
drew attention to the huge impact that that monopoly had in restricting the development
of sources of legal information and advice by trade union, consumer, insurance and general
civil society sources, and in particular on the development of ADR as opposed to court
forms of dispute resolution.22 The restriction has only recently begun to be liberalised, and
German law now distinguishes between legal advice out-of-court and representation before
the courts. Only in 2007 did the Legal Service Act (Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz) allow ‘non-
lawyers’ to provide free legal advice out-of-court, thereby enabling charities, consumer
organisations and other associations to provide legal advice in the field of their expertise.
No legal representation of the parties is needed before the local courts (Amtsgericht),
which are competent for claims up to €5,000.23 However, before the German district courts
and before all courts of higher instances, parties are obliged to be represented by a lawyer.24
Socio-Legal Culture
National character and culture can be seen in influencing attitudes to the courts and ADR.
Given a ‘national sense of internalized social order’ and doing what people ‘say they will
do according to the recognized rules and nothing more’,25 the use of clear rules enforced
by courts contrasts with the culture of negotiation in Holland. Public pressure to observe
rules can be very powerful. Business practice rarely uses codes: there is a strong culture of
compliance based on social norms. Landmark cases have considerable impact, and attract
widely reported headlines in the media, and public attention.
It is relevant that the German language has a number of words for different concepts:
Schiedsgericht (arbitration), Mediation (mediation), Schlichtung (conciliation), Ombudsman
(ombudsman).
21
See the German Legal Services Act (Rechtsberatungsgesetz (RBerG)), RGBl. I S. 1478 (BGBl. III 303–12) that
was annulled in 2008. The objective of this law was to ensure a high quality of legal advice for the clients; see M
Henssler and LS Terry, ‘Lawyers Without Frontiers—a View From Germany’, Dickinson Journal of International
Law, Vol. 19:2, 2001, 304.
22
E Blankenburg, ‘Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures’ in D Nelken, Comparing Legal
Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997); E Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to
Neighbouring Germany’ (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 1–41.
23
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (German Courts Constitution Act) § 23 Nr. 1, 71 Abs. 1 GVG.
24
s78 ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure Rules).
25
B Tomalin, The Essential Guide to Customs & Culture. Germany, (UK, Kuperard, 2011).

Germany 77
Encouragement of ADR before Court Proceedings
Mediation in the German Introductory Law of the Code of Civil Procedure

German Law does not place a general duty on the contending parties to attempt to resolve
their dispute extra-judicially before bringing their matter to court. However, pursuant to
Section 15a(1) of the Act Introducing the Code of Civil Procedure (EGZPO),26 a federal
state can require by law that an action shall only be brought before a court once an attempt
to achieve consensus has been made at a recognised conciliation office. This may apply, inter
alia, to:
• financial disputes coming under the jurisdiction of a local court (Amtsgericht), where
the amount of the claim in dispute does not exceed 750 euros,
• certain disputes relating to the law concerning neighbours, and
• disputes relating to defamation claims, where the derogatory remarks were not made
via the press or broadcasting media.
Where a federal state makes the above provisions, an action of one of the above types
brought without an attempt to reach a consensus would be dismissed as being inadmissible.
Not all the federal states have so far availed themselves of the possibility to demand an
extra-judicial attempt to achieve consensus. However, conciliation procedures are not
necessary in the following cases:27
• Petitions to modify a judgment, supplementary actions for security deposits, actions
relating to the recognition of judgments from abroad, cross-actions and actions which
have to be filed within a statutory or judicial period of time,
• Motions for a new trial,
• Claims under deed or bill-enforcement proceedings,
• Litigious procedure, where a claim is being asserted under summary proceedings for
the recovery of a debt, and
• Actions pertaining to enforcement measures.
Furthermore, conciliation procedures are not allowed if the parties do not live or have
their registered office or branch in the same Land. The federal states can apply state laws
to restrict the scope of application of section 15a(1) EGZPO and to extend the reasons for
exclusion in section 15a(2) EGZPO.
For judicial proceedings at first instance, the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) provides
for consensual discussions to precede the (contentious) court hearing in order to achieve
an amicable settlement of the dispute.28 This principle does not apply when discussions to
26
This Act (Einführungsgesetz zur Zivilprozeßordnung: EGZPO) was adopted on 1 January 1999 and section 15a
EGZPO (1) provides: ‘The states can introduce the mandatory use of mediation schemes before a complaint can
be admitted by the courts, if the case concerns:
1) financial disputes before the Magistrates Court up to a litigation value of € 750,
2) certain neighbourhood disputes,
3) defamation disputes where the alleged defamation has not occurred through the media,
4) disputes over claims under section 3 of the General Equal Treatment Act.’
Certain exceptions were specified in s 15 a (2) EGZPO. A discussion of the Bavarian mediation law is provided
by K Funken, ‘Comparative Dispute Management: Court-connected Mediation in Japan and Germany’
(2002) 3 German Law Journal, see the German Law Journal webpage at: http://www.germanlawjournal.
com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=130.
27
EGZPO, s 15a(2).
28
ZPO, s 278(2).

achieve a consensus have no prospect of success because an attempt to reach consensus had
already been made at an extrajudicial conciliation office, eg under a federal state law pursuant
to section 15a EGZPO, or it is obvious for other reasons that consensual discussions are
hopeless. Instead of requiring consensual discussions according to section 278(2) ZPO, in
suitable cases a court can also suggest that the parties resolve their dispute extrajudicially.29
Within the framework of mandatory conciliation proceedings (cf section 15a EGZPO),
the failure of an attempt to reach a consensus is a precondition for the admissibility of an
action. It is thus possible to bring the matter before a court if no solution to the dispute has
been reached. If consensus proceedings pursuant to section 278(5) of the Code on Civil
Procedure (ZPO) are unsuccessful, the proceedings are converted into contentious ones
as a result. If there has been an attempt at extra-judicial dispute settlement before a private
sector conciliation body in response to a customer complaint, the participants can bring the
case before the court if they have not accepted the conciliation offer..30
During an attempt to settle a dispute extra-judicially, the statute of limitations is
suspended with reference to the claims of the parties to the dispute.31 This has the effect of
not pressurising the parties into bringing their extra-judicial negotiations to a close before
the period of limitation runs out.
Arbitration
One alternative to courts, arbitration, has long been used in Germany, in appropriate
cases. The traditional circumstances in which arbitration is preferred are well-known
and straightforward. The Arbitration Rules of the German Institute for Arbitration
(Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit: DIS) date from 1998,32 and it introduced
Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes, effective from 15 September 2009.33
Arbitration has advantages in comparison with courts when parties need confidentiality
(such as to preserve commercial secrets,34 or even the fact that a dispute exists), or when
an arbitrator can apply particular expertise that a normal judge does not posses (such as
for complex construction, technical or maritime disputes), or in international contracts so
as to overcome arguments over choice of jurisdiction and submission to unknown foreign
legal systems. However, the costs in arbitration can be unpredictable and/or higher than
in courts. Therefore, many straightforward commercial contracts for the sale of goods or
services do not contain arbitration clauses, because the courts will usually be cheaper and
otherwise comparable in expertise and duration.
A good example of the use of arbitration comes from the building and engineering sector.
The German Association of Consulting Engineers (Verband Beratender Ingenieure: VBI)35
29
ZPO, s 278(5) sentence 2.
30

A conciliation offer is defined in the rules of procedure for conciliation boards, s 5(3)
(Schlichtungsstellenverfahrensordnung).
31
For consensus and arbitration proceedings before state-run or recognised consensus boards, this is a direct
consequence of s 204(1) No 4 of the German Civil Code (BGB). For other forms of alternative dispute resolution,
it is a consequence of s 203 sentence 1 BGB.
32
www.dis-arb.de/scho/schiedsordnung98-e.html. The law was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration – 1985, see www.unicitral.org.
33
www.dis-arb.de/download/DIS_SRColD_%202009_Download.pdf
34
Arbitration clauses are common in the constitutions of family-owned corporations, so as to keep disputes
away from public scrutiny.
35
See www.vbi.de/english/about-vbi.html. The association has around 3,000 member firms employing more
than 45,000 consultants and engineers.

Germany 79
facilitates dispute adjudication as an ADR method for the settlement of disputes, especially
for complex, large-scale and international construction projects. FIDIC, the International
Federation of Consulting Engineers, introduced dispute adjudication as a dispute resolution
process in its standard contractual terms since the mid-1990s. Dispute adjudication has
been part of all standard sample contracts since 1999. Around 50,000 FIDIC contracts are
awarded every year. The purpose of dispute adjudication is the prompt, cost-effective and
conclusive resolution of disputes, while staff, equipment and building materials are still on
the building site.
VBI has undertaken the task of training and examining German-speaking dispute
adjudicators in accordance with FIDIC standards. It keeps records of German-speaking
dispute adjudicators and acts as a nominating body for enquiries from parties wishing to
involve a dispute adjudicator.
The parties to a contract agree to choose a board of up to three adjudicators (engineers
or others) who then supervise the development and completion of the construction on
site. By setting tight deadlines within which the dispute adjudication boards must make
their decisions the procedure is accelerated. As a rule, the deadline is 84 days. Within this
period, the parties have the opportunity to present the facts of the matter and to exchange
their points of view. Following an oral hearing, the dispute adjudication board makes its
decision. The decision is binding, but can be reviewed by the Court of Arbitration. The
possibility to start a judiciary process in front of traditional courts also remains open.
As a result of good results in the engineering sector, the German Association for
Construction Law, supported by the German Construction Industry Federation (HDB),
commenced in January 2010 a new dispute resolution procedure for the building sector as a
whole (Streitlösungsordnung für das Bauwesen), promoting dispute adjudication, arbitration
and mediation.
The Mediation Phenomenon
In looking at ADR in Germany, the phenomenon of mediation will be apparent, and has
been widely discussed. However, it is important to note that what has almost invariably
been referred to is mediation associated with court-based claims, and discussion has only
recently included mechanisms that stand entirely apart from courts as an integral dispute
resolution procedure.
The adage about ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ is highly pertinent here: the usual
situation is that parties may ‘mediate in the shadow of the courts’, whereas in some other
Member States ADR pathways exist within their own firmament and are not as connected
to the courts as mediation is in Germany.
In order to promote use of amicable dispute resolution, of which mediation is one example,
and diminish the workload for the courts, a Federal law came into effect on 1 January 1999
that permitted the German states (Länder) to introduce compulsory mediation regarding
specific civil disputes.36 In those states that have implemented this law, a claimant must,
on commencing a court claim, provide the certificate issued by the mediation board that
proves the unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation by the parties.
36
See Section 15a EGZPO (1) of the the Introductory Law of the Code of Civil Procedure (Einführungsgesetz
zur Zivilprozeßordnung) (EGZPO), described on pp 77–78 of this chapter.

A number of organisations providing mediation services and training for mediators has
arisen since the 1990s, notably Bundesverband Mediation (BM: The Federal Association
of Mediation, created 1992),37 Bundesverband Mediation in Wirtschaft und Arbeitswelt
(BMWA: Federal Association of Mediation in Business and Workplace, created in 1996),38
Centrale für Mediation39 (CfM: the Centre for Mediation, created 1998), and Bundes-
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Familien-Mediation40 (BAFM: Federal Association for Family
Mediation, created 1992). The German mediation associations BAFM, BM and BMWA, the
Swiss Confederation for mediation SDM-FSM and the Austrian Association for Mediation
ÖBM have mutually recognized training regulations and guidelines. In 2008, a number
of major businesses founded the Round Table Mediation und Konfliktmanagement der
deutschen Wirtschaft (Round Table Mediation and Conflict Management),41 to support the
development of mediation in business disputes, with academic support from the European
University Viadrina at Frankfurt (Oder). Their work has focused on developing principles
on conflicts.42
The EU Mediation Directive43 aroused considerable debate within Germany, leading
up to its implementation in May 2011.44 The Mediation Directive is viewed as the most
significant development in civil procedure in Germany for many years. It is revolutionary
in its impact. The existing procedure in the civil procedure code is based on a model of
conflict between the parties, which is resolved by the judge, whereas mediation involves
compromise by the parties themselves. The Directive not only introduces this change in
culture but institutionalises it on a permanent basis.
The state of mediation in Germany remains patchy across the country, vividly described
as ‘a sea with islands’.45 The sea is the all-pervasive court system, in which various
islands of mediation have emerged comparatively recently, and are of differing size and
disposition. Mediation has occurred where someone has fostered it, for example a local
Land government or court President. In Lower Saxony, for example, some Court Presidents
support mediation, some judges have been trained as mediators, and there are high usage
and success rates as regards mediation within courts. In contrast in Baden-Württemberg,
the government was for a long time not attracted to mediation, hence there was no boost
to judicial careers to support it, and usage is still limited, although a few model projects
have recently appeared. Germany is in a transitional period on the use of mediation. It is
currently unclear whether or not the Mediation Directive will give the situation a boost.
The choice of mediator is a private matter for the parties. Competition has, therefore,
developed between different suppliers, and a large number have emerged. Mediator
37
www.bmev.de.
38
www.bmwa.de/about.php?myOID=&myUID=.
39
www.centrale-fuer-mediation.de.
40
www.bafm-mediation.de.
41
www.rtmkm.de.
42
The motivation for companies is simply commercial: the costs of conflict resolution form part of the costs of a
conflict, so firms have become more attuned to monitoring costs and have sought to reduce the transactional costs.
43
Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of
mediation in civil and commercial matters, available at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2
008:136:0003:0008:EN:PDF.
44
See F Steffek, ‘Rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen für die Regelung der Mediation’ (2010) RabelsZ Bd. 74,
841–881; KJ Hopt, and F Steffek, Mediation – Rechtstatsachen, Rechtsvergleich, Regelungen – Gutachten im Auftrag
des Bundesministeriums der Justiz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Tübingen 2008); H Eidenmüller and M Prause,
‘Die europäische Mediationsrichtlinie – Perspektiven für eine gesetzliche Regelung der Mediation in Deutschland’
(2008) NJW, 2737–2743.
45
Dr F Steffek in a meeting with the authors in May 2011.

Germany 81
associations tend to organise themselves according to particular subject-matter, such as

those who specialise in family law or commercial law.
An important issue in relation to future development of mediation is how the insurance
sector will react. Who will pay for a mediation? Will insurers fund mediation? Insurers
are now increasingly including the cost of mediation in their policies, and varying their
requirements on quality of mediators. Two issues remain central to implementation of the
Mediation Directive.46 Insurers have asked for quality criteria to be included in the law.
The extent to which mediation develops will depend on comparative costs issues as
between mediation and the courts system. Will the costs of a failed mediation be counted as
costs, and recoverable costs, of the procedure? One of the situations in which mediation has
been shown to be most successful is where a judge (who is not the judge who is in charge of
the file) acts as mediator, and this situation currently triggers no additional court or lawyers
costs to be paid. Accordingly, a key question is how large the market might be for mediation
outside the courts, since the costs of not just the mediator but also the parties’ lawyers will
need to be funded. Insurers or parties who pay must perceive there to be a favourable cost-
benefit balance if mediation is going to be preferred to the courts. It is also unclear whether
court-provided mediation will save money for the courts: if it does not, then court costs can
be expected to rise, either in general or through a specific charge for mediation. Current
gaps in the mediation landscape could take a long time to fill.
There is no clearly accepted policy on what the state should provide in relation to dispute
resolution, or in what form.
The German civil procedure rules inherently provide less pre-action information to
be exchanged between parties than do the English rules. The English mediation model
is supported precisely because of such pre- and early-action exchange of information. In
Germany, a claim starts when a claimant sends a document to the court that is a statement
of the facts and main evidence on which the party relies. A defendant then produces
his statement of facts and the evidence that supports his case. Each party’s statement is,
therefore, inherently one-sided. The judge can only get an overview of what the case is
about by carefully considering the statements of both sides at the first hearing, so as to
form a comprehensive independent picture of the merits and which issues are agreed or are
in contention. The stance of each party remains throughout one of asserting the facts and
interpretation of law that he wants to put forward.
The draft Mediation Law will require people to state if they have tried mediation. The
implication of this is that the lawyers on both sides will have to gain an understanding of
the facts, real nature of the case and the legal position that is wider than has traditionally
been the case, so as to assess the relative merits of each party’s case. Not only is that a
fundamentally new approach, it is an approach that is not catered for within the ongoing
civil procedure rules, and it may also give rise to extra work that is not provided for under
the costs tariff, which will have to be funded somehow. In contrast, when England and
Wales made a similar revolutionary shift to introduce ADR,47 both the philosophy and
46
The government made early progress in considering how to implement the Directive, and commissioned a
comparative study from the Max Planck Institute in 2007. Drafts of a law were presented and widely discussed.
However, progress was interrupted by Federal elections, which resulted in a change of Justice Minister from an
SDP to a Liberal politician, and the need for fresh ministerial briefings and obtaining full Cabinet approval, which
was delayed by other pressing issues.
47
Civil Procedure Rules (1999); Lord Woolf ‘Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the
Civil Justice System in England and Wales’, HMSO (Final Report).

rules of civil procedure underwent significant reform so as to align the operation of court
procedure with the practicalities of negotiated settlements.
Privatised Enforcement of Consumer Law
The Limited Role of Public Authorities
The resolution of disputes involving consumers and businesses in Germany needs to be

seen also in the context of the constitutional structure and the environment for enforcing
consumer law.
Since Germany is a federal country, the Federal Government generally enacts legislation
governing consumer protection within the scope of its constitutional competences. The
16 federal states, the Länder, are responsible for the enforcement of laws. Hence, there is
no central supervisory authority for consumer protection in Germany, and neither federal
nor state bodies are particularly active in enforcement of consumer law, save in relation to
enforcing the safety and health protection of consumers, eg with regard to foodstuffs.
The Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV) is
responsible for consumer policy, consumer protection and general matters regarding
consumer information.48 The Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety
(BVL),49 an independent higher federal authority within the BMELV, is responsible for
cross-border violations of consumer rights, operating under the EU Consumer Protection
Cooperation Regulation50 and the German EC Act that implements it.
Enforcement of consumer law is privatised51 in two ways.52 Firstly, in the field of
economic consumer protection, consumers concerned are themselves generally responsible
for asserting private claims under civil law, eg if purchased products show material defects,
they must take court action if necessary and there is no public enforcement authority
that takes care of this for them. Secondly, private organisations are particularly active in
enforcing unfair competition law (especially misleading advertising) and unfair consumer
trading laws. Two types of private organizations are involved, one funded by business (the
Wettbewerbszentrale: WBZ)53 and others that are consumer organizations that are largely
state-funded (the Verbraucherzentralen). Although individual consumers may pursue their
own claims, these two types of bodies are the widely preferred mechanisms for enforcing
both individual and collective issues.
48
See www.bmelv.de/EN/ConsumerProtection/consumer-protection_node.html.
49
www.bvl.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage_node.html.
50
Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of
consumer protection [2004] OJ L364/1.
51
A structure that relies strongly on enforcing consumer law through private actors in the courts leads to a
steady stream of cases in the Federal Supreme Court about contract and tort, including consumer protection law.
This is not so in the UK, where such cases do not now reach the Supreme Court and they appear to have dried
up, as they now seem to have diverted into other ADR systems. The authors are grateful to Professor Reinhard
Zimmermann for this observation.
52
See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/ecc_germany_en.htm, andhttp://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
redress/out_of_court/commu/acce_just04_en_ccb_en.pdf.
53
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb e.V. (Wettbewerbszentrale: WBZ); Centre for
Protection against Unfair Competition, see www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/institution/profil/auftrag.

Germany 83
This system deals only with prevention, and not with redress. Seeking damages is a
matter for the individuals affected to pursue personally. Both the WBZ and the consumer
associations have the right to take action under the ‘skimming off ’ law,54 but the former does
so rarely, typically only in hard core cases such as involving fraud. Unscrupulous traders can
disappear quickly, in which case the private bodies try to involve prosecutors, who are far
more effectively armed to take action against rogues.
Private Enforcement of Unfair Commercial Practices
Under the Act against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb:
UWG),55 an advertisement or any kind of unfair commercial practice (ie misleading practices,
unfair business terms, distance selling contracts, guarantees, e-commerce), independent of
the media or business sector, can only be queried by civil action and are therefore dealt with
before the civil courts. In addition to legislation, some codes exist covering questions of taste
and decency. Specific types of advertising, such as concerning alcohol and cars, discrimination
and the role of women in advertising, are dealt with by the German Advertising Council
(Deutscher Werberat). However, most commercial practices are regulated by law, such as
misleading statements, sales promotions, prize competitions, unfair marketing practices,
medical and food advertising, price labelling and shop opening hours.
The UWG grants those whose rights have been infringed the right to apply to a court in
civil proceedings for an injunction against others’ unfair competition.56 Such rights are also
exercisable by the WBZ57 and, since 1965,58 by consumer associations. The system has been
operating effectively, swiftly and cheaply for 100 years. The enforcement system is free to
consumers: losers pay under the court costs rules. The establishment costs of the consumer
associations are paid by the state, and those of the WBZ are paid for by businesses.
The Wettbewerbszentrale
The WBZ is a self-regulatory body of German business founded in 1912. It comprises all
chambers of commerce, most trade and craft corporations, about 750 other industrial or
commercial associations and approximately 1,300 companies. It deals with over 15,000
complaints a year at its head office in Bad Homburg and five regional branch offices (Berlin,
Dortmund, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart). Its total annual budget is not published.
Infringement cases are handled by a team of in-house lawyers. Where court proceedings
are instituted, cases are outsourced to a member of a panel of external law firms. The annual
54
See the skimming-off procedure (Gewinnabschöpfung) according to s10 of the German Act Against Unfair
Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb: UWG). This Act allows consumer or competition
associations since 2004 to skim off unlawful gains. However, due to the complexity of the procedure, it has
shown little practical effect. See information provided by the VZBV at: www.vzbv.de/cps/rde/xbcr/vzbv/
rechtsdurchsetzung_broschuere_vzbv_2011.pdf.
55
Originally introduced in 1909.
56
UWG, s 8.
57
See UWG, para 8.3 and the German Law on injunctions (Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UklaG)). See also, s 33
of the German Act Against Restraints on Competition (Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB), para
33 regarding cartel damages.
58
In order to implement Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation, in the
Verbraucherschutzdurchsetzungsgesetz (the Law on Consumer Protection Enforcement).

budget for such external work is €750,000, although the court-specified level of costs is
recovered in those cases that are won.
An important function of the WBZ is to provide information and advice to its members
concerning advertising and marketing practices in the planning stage (copy advice), so as
to prevent infringements from occurring. This ex ante function is effective and widely used
by companies. Members of staff also give talks and seminars on current matters of interest
concerning general and specific topics in competition law. The WBZ publishes a monthly
journal, Der Wettbewerb: Aus der Praxis – Für die Praxis, which is addressed to its members
and the public, to inform them of significant changes, developments and judgments in the
area of unfair competition law. Furthermore, the WBZ publishes an analysis of the most
important court decisions and essays concerning competition law on a monthly basis (Urteils-
und Literaturauswertung). It also publishes an annual report, which gives an overview on
developments in different branches of trade and industry (ie tourism, telecommunication,
e-commerce, financial sector, health sector, energy sector) and outlines the most important
cases dealt with by the WBZ. Press releases are issued regularly on selected current cases as
well as on developments in legislation and jurisdiction. Information collected from court
decisions around the country is widely relied on by other courts as well as by traders and
others. Such decisions create an extensive legal framework for market activity, and legal
commentaries.
Consumer Associations (Verbraucherzentralen)
Consumer organisations in Germany do not require any approval by the state, and operate
at national and Länder levels. There are two large consumer organizations that operate
throughout Germany and receive funding from the federal budget, the Federation of
German Consumer Organisations (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.: VZBV)59 and
Stiftung Warentest, the premier consumer testing organisation. Forty-two other consumer
organisations or consumer-policy oriented associations operate and are members of
VZBV. Other consumers organisations also exist, such as the German Consumer Initiative
(Verbraucherinitiative e.V.).
The VZBV60 is a non-governmental, independent organisation that represents the
political, economic and social interests of consumers, vis-à-vis policy-makers and the private
sector.61 The federation was established in 2000 as a result of the merger of three consumer-
interest organisations62 and has approximately 100 staff members working in the Berlin
offices.63 Registered as a non-profit association, it acts as an umbrella organization for the
16 consumer advice centres in the federal states and for 26 other consumer-policy oriented
associations. These consumer bodies form an integrated system of advice, information,
law enforcement and representation of political interests promoting consumer interests
which has more than eight million individual members.64 Consumers receive advice from
a network of 190 advice centres dealing with around four million individual contacts with
59
www.vzbv.de/go.
60
www.vzbv.de/go.
61
www.verbraucherzentrale.de/en/wir.php.
62
The AgV, the VSV and the Stiftung Verbraucherinstitut.
63
www.vzbv.de/go/wir/wir_ueber_uns/index.html.
64
www.vzbv.de/go, See the note on Germany on the EU Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
index_en.htm.

Germany 85
consumers per year. All advice centres have recourse to a database of ‘advisory stances’ (ie
model answers for typical problems). The formulation of advisory stances is coordinated
by the federal association and is subject to a uniform quality management. The individual
advisory activities are stored in a central computer database. This constitutes the basis for,
on the one hand, being able to systematically take action against recurring violations and,
on the other hand, for obtaining a precise empirical picture of existing consumer problems.
The €8.7 million annual budget of VZBV is 90 per cent funded from annual institutional
grants provided by the federal government,65 together with contributions from public
authorities, businesses, economic operators and civil society at national, European and
international level.66 At the federal state level, the consumer advice centres receive both
institutional and project financing. The centres also contribute to this funding with
consultation fees and the sale of consumer advice guides.
VZBV deals with a wide range of consumer topics such as sustainable consumption,
financial services, health care and food law. Its tasks include enforcement through lawsuits,
the development of standards and providing professional training for the staff of member
organisations. VZBV is particularly active on three levels:
• consumer-policy lobbying and advising politicians and policy-makers to achieve rules
that guarantee a transparent market;
• legal implementation, by highlighting irregularities and enforcing consumer rights in
courts;
• promoting consumer advice services.67
Stiftung Warentest, a foundation established in 1964 under private law, is charged with the
task of informing the public about the quality and environmental friendliness of goods and
services on the basis of tests. Furthermore, the foundation is to provide general information
about optimal private housekeeping and health- and eco-conscious behaviour. Around 88
per cent of the annual earnings of Stiftung Warentest or approximately €50 million come
from the sale of its publications, eg the magazines test and FinanzTest. In addition, the
foundation receives an annual grant from the federal budget as compensation for the
fact that it waives income from advertisements in its publications in order to maintain its
independence from suppliers.
Procedure
Consumer complaints that involve breaches of consumer law may be made to the WBZ or
any consumer association. Those bodies are empowered to bring injunction proceedings to
end the infringement, but do not have power to seek damages. Complaints are received from
any source, including competitors, consumers, trade associations and public authorities
such as the police, trade and health authorities. Business organisations and authorities
provide 80 per cent of complaints to the WBZ, and the WBZ considers that a competitor is
the best type of complainant, since it will have far greater technical and timely knowledge
than most consumers or other outsiders.
65
The Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV).
66
The Federal Ministry funds also individual projects run by different consumer organizations, such as the
German Nutrition Society and the Information Service for Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture.
67
www.verbraucherzentrale.de/en/wir.php.

In practice, enforcement cases are frequently resolved at an early stage. The body will
usually first write to the trader asking him to sign an undertaking (Abmahnung) to amend
or discontinue the advertising or commercial practice.68 This declaration contains a penalty
clause, so breach of which will give rise to a fine.69 Legal action is threatened in the case of
non-compliance. The threat of an injunction to protect the collective interests of consumers
can be sufficiently powerful to result in swift settlement, although some cases are taken to
the courts for wider market reasons, including setting a precedent.
In urgent cases, the body can seek a preliminary court injunction prohibiting the
unfair commercial practice. Cases that involve unfair competition law usually satisfy the
requirement for urgency. Therefore, many such cases are dealt with this way. The court will
normally issue the preliminary injunction within a day by immediate order. In the case
of contravention, the court can charge the opponent with an administrative fee of up to
€250,000.
In non-urgent cases, before taking court action, the WBZ will—in appropriate cases—try
to reach an amicable agreement, which may involve the complaint being brought before the
Board of Conciliation of the regional Chamber of Commerce.70 Court proceedings may be
instituted in the Landgericht, and are subject to the normal loser pays rules. A claimant has
to prove all details and facts in his claim, but the burden of proof rests on the defendant to
produce the evidence that his advertising complies with the law, so firms usually can either
produce such evidence or not, and that result determines the outcome of a challenge. If a case
proceeds to the trial stage, the judge will often be faced with complex technical evidence.
The consumers associations and the WBZ liaise regularly, and sometimes institute cases
against the same infringers. The WBZ’s approach is to respond to individual complaints by
instituting individual cases, finding solutions, and stopping unfair advertising. Consumer
associations can, in addition, sometimes raise issues that have more political aspects, and seek
media coverage aimed at highlighting issues. The WBZ considers that the Federal competition
authority (Bundeskartellamt) is better equipped to obtain facts and market information in
relation to competition law issues: the private bodies do not have power to inspect companies,
and civil procedure law contains no general right to discovery of documents.
Statistics
The procedure is usually fast. On average, advertisements or unfair commercial practices

are often withdrawn or amended within 1 to 2 weeks from receiving a complaint. If a
preliminary injunction procedure is commenced before a civil court, a settlement can be
achieved within a day by immediate order.
The WBZ receives around 14,000 complaints a year.71 Of those, only around 50 per cent
are well founded. Warning letters are sent out in roughly 6,000 to 7,000 cases a year, 80–90
per cent of which result in amicable settlement by the recipient. Around 600–700 cases are
started in court every year.
68
The WZB is authorised by s 13 Unterlassungsklagengesetz (Law on injunctions, implementing Directive 98/27
EG on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests) to request information from postal and telephone
authorities and companies on a customer’s personal data. Thus, the WZB has the power to disclose the identity of
the owner of a German P.O. Box or telecommunication service.
69
See http://www.vzbv.de/cps/rde/xbcr/vzbv/rechtsdurchsetzung_broschuere_vzbv_2011.pdf, 7.
70
http://www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/home.
71
WBZ Annual Report 2010 available at: www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/media/getlivedoc.aspx?id=31254; In
the mid-2000s when eBay was widely used, the number was considerably higher.

Germany 87
In 2010 the WBZ started to record the source of complaints. Of the overall 14000
contacts, 2500 are consumer complaints; all others are from businesses, official, legal or
political authorities or associations.
Example of selected areas that are complained about to the WBZ in 2010:
Sector Amount of cases

Health sector (Doctors, Chemists, Health insurance, pharma industry, optitians... 1368
Bidding platforms (ebay, my-hammer, ..) 1203
Trade 1044
stationary trade 950
Tourism / tavel 787
Car sector 764
Online trade 667
Driving schools 479
Security 480
Expert opinoins 362
Media / publishers 342
Finance (banks, insurance, insurance broker, financial services) 229
Telecoms 198
Lottery / gaming / mashines 170
Architects / engineers 161
Energy 153
Cross-border Cases
The Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit (BVL)72 is the ‘single
liaison office’ in Germany for the European cooperation in consumer protection and is the
competent authority for cross-border enforcement of a large number of consumer rights.73
The BVL can delegate foreign cases received to the WBZ or consumer associations.
In 2009, the WBZ received around 120 complaints from German competitors and
consumers concerning marketing practices of companies abroad (mainly Austria,
Switzerland and Great Britain). Enforcement abroad is based on the Brussels Regulation,
and has been found to be difficult in practice.
Overview of Consumer Adr Bodies
A wide range of models of consumer ADR are found in Germany. The overall picture is
confusing, and hides a number of important gaps. One source of confusion arises from the
fact that the existing bodies can be categorised in different ways. If the bodies are categorised
by source of funding, or whether they are public or private bodies, the following appears:
• ADR within public authorities, such as the Bundesbank, or Bundesnetzagentur;
• Private legal entity with state funding, such as Schlichtungsstelle Mobilität, now
superceded;
72
www.bvl.bund.de/EN/091_ConsumerProtection/01_Tasks/02_EuropeanConsumerProtectionCooperation/
wvs_EuropeanConsumerProtectionCooperation_node.html
73
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) and the EC Consumer
Protection Enforcement Act.

• Privately funded ADR schemes, whether arbitration boards or ombudsman, such as

Reiseschiedsstelle, Versicherungsombudsman, Schlichtungsstelle für den Öffentlichen
Personenverkehr and the Schlichtungsstellen für Arzthaftpflichtfragen.
In contrast, if the bodies are categorised by type of technique, they are based on either
conciliation or arbitration. Thus the Federal government states:
There are in the Federal Republic of Germany many conciliation boards which deal with the
amicable resolution of consumer-related conflicts before they reach the courts. The conciliation
boards are mostly organised by professional bodies (associations and confederations) and therefore
define their competence according to their line of business. Thus, conciliation boards exist in the
field of vehicle repair, cleaning of textiles and other trades (building trade, radio and television
engineers etc.) …74
Further, within the private sector, arbitration tribunals and conciliation boards are part of
the services offered by the chambers of industry and commerce in nearly all larger cities,
as well as their chamber of handicrafts (Handwerkskammer). Some conciliation boards are
run by sectoral trade bodies, such as the motor trade in relation to vehicle repairs and
motor dealers for defects in second-hand vehicles, and by the liberal professions, such as
the medical councils and architects’ associations, organised in nearly every federal state.
The professional associations of lawyers, patent agents, tax consultants and chartered
accountants are bound to mediate, if called upon, in disputes between their members and
their members’ clients.
The Civic Consulting Report found:75
The number and diversity of ADR schemes in Germany is very high. There are many schemes
that are mostly organised by professional bodies (the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the
General Medical Councils) and the guilds of different crafts (vehicle repair, shoemakers, cleaning
of textiles and other traders) aimed at using expert knowledge in a particular sector when a case
arises. These schemes exist in larger cities as part of the services offered by their chamber of industry
and commerce as well as by their chamber of handicrafts (Handwerkskammern). There are also
ADR schemes run by the motor trade, by the motor dealers, by the liberal professions (medical
councils architects’ associations and associations of lawyers, patent agents, tax consultants and
chartered accountants) that operate at local level.
ADR services are then offered by the ombudsmen, especially for disputes between providers
of financial services and consumers: the Ombudsman for Private Health Insurance,
the Ombudsman for Insurances, the Ombudsman for Disputes with Banking Houses,
the Ombudsman of Building and Loan Associations and the Ombudsman for Disputes
involving Online Trade. In addition, the Schlichtungsstelle Mobilität and Reiseschiedsstelle
provide ADR services in transport and travel sector respectively.
The number of ombudsmen is currently small but growing. The first and most successful
is the Insurance Ombudsman, whose model has been copied for Transport.
But the overall position on ADR within Germany is one of confusion of models and
pathways. Some sectors have far more ADR opportunities than others. Different options
exist within different sectors, such as for financial services and banks. The profile of
different ADR schemes varies enormously, and so does the extent to which they are used:
From http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_ger_en.htm#102.
74
DG SANCO, Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union (Berlin, Civil Consulting
75
2009), at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf.

Germany 89
some are prominent and others hardly known at all. There are also differences in relation
to the powers of the various bodies, especially over whether outcomes are binding or not.
Recommendations made by conciliation boards are not as a rule binding on the parties.
However, the board’s award sometimes places one-sided obligations on the business
undertaking.
Thus, making generalisations about the state of ADR bodies in Germany is difficult,
given their diversity. It would not be helpful to give details of the operation of every body.
The position will be illustrated by summarising certain types and sectors.
Chambers of Commerce
Every major city has a chamber of commerce (Handelskammer), which almost always has a
long-established arbitration court (Schiedsgericht), and more recently a mediation facility.
The objective is to provide a forum for resolution of disputes that is more appropriate than
courts, for example by providing expertise for various commercial sectors. They handle
both B2B and B2C disputes, including allegations of infringing the unfair competition law
UWG.
The Hamburg arbitration court, which with Munich is the largest chamber in Germany,76
has 2,500 arbitrations per year, over half of which end in settlement. There are various
specialist courts. The main court of arbitration has 5 to 10 cases per year, in more than
50 per cent of which one or both parties are international, and who choose Hamburg as a
neutral place for the dispute. Arbitration cases valued under €25,000 are handled by a single
arbitrator, whereas higher value cases have three arbitrators, although parties sometimes
decide to accept one arbitrator to keep the cost down. There is no formal requirement for
arbitrators, but most are legally qualified. The arbitration court that deals with grains and
coffee has three arbitrators from within the professional membership plus a legal adviser.
That court is too costly for consumers as the minimum fee is €1,000.
The Hamburg chamber of commerce has a mediation centre, which was one of the first
to be established in Germany, and was intended to provide high quality mediation. (The
main user in this centre is Airbus, which has operations in France and at Hamburg.) The
general mediation centre has 20–25 cases per year. The chamber of commerce provides a
forum to inform and facilitate mediation. Its website lists recommended mediators, which
the public can contact free of charge. The chamber of commerce charges a fee to contact a
mediator. The chamber of commerce also has conciliation centres. All the centres have their
own rules.
The Hamburg chamber of commerce processes about 800 consumer cases a year against
traders. The consumers contact the chamber by phone and then follow a formal process
under the chamber’s mediation rules. There is a high drop out rate after the initial phone
conversation and after the request for a written explanation of the problem. The chamber
does not charge a fee to the consumer. If the parties agree to appoint a mediator, they must
agree a fee with the mediator, which is usually €150 to €350 per hour or €1,200 to €2,800 a
day, plus VAT.
76
The Hamburg chamber of commerce has 150,000 member businesses and around 250 staff.

The Insurance Ombudsman
The most established Ombudsman scheme in Germany is the Insurance Ombudsman,

which was created on 1 October 2001 on the initiative of the German Insurance Association
(Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft: GDV).77 The objective was to
promote out-of-court dispute resolution between insurance companies and consumers
and to enhance consumer protection.78 ADR was thought to be of particular importance to
facilitating redress in the insurance sector in Germany, which has a notably large number
of contracts between consumers and insurance companies: there are more than 400 million
insurance contracts, more than 90 million of which involve capital savings, financing of
residential property and securing financial assistance in old age. Thus, insurance has been
described as a ‘service of general interest’.79
The founders were concerned to overcome ‘structural asymmetry’ between consumers and
insurance companies.80 Insurance contracts are often complex and difficult to understand
for consumers, and providers have more legal expertise and financial resources to enforce
their rights. The Ombudsman procedure was specifically intended to demonstrate the
commitment of insurance providers to taking consumer issues seriously, and hence support
confidence in the sector. The Ombudsman system helps to counterbalance imbalances and
assists contracting parties to settle their disputes on an equal footing if a problem arises.81
Insurers have an obligation to inform customers of the Ombudsman procedure in every
contract and in any relevant discussion.82
The 2004 Insurance Intermediaries Directive83 provided that an ADR body should exist
for disputes, and the German Ministry of Justice awarded this competence to the Insurance
Ombudsman.84
The Role and Independence of the Ombudsman
The Insurance Ombudsman is an independent private institution that provides alternative

dispute resolution and forms part of FIN-NET. By this means, the funding and function of
the Ombudsman is independent of the trade association. Approximately 95 per cent of pri-
vate insurance companies are members of the Insurance Ombudsman Association (Versicher-
ungsombudsman e.V.). The Ombudsman is funded by an annual contribution of the compa-
nies that are member of the Insurance Ombudsman Association and by case fees. The annual
contribution by the companies varies depending on their gross premium income. Individual
claims attract a case fee of €100 payable by companies, which is adjusted at the end of a claim.
77
J Basedow, ‘Small Claims Enforcement in a High Cost Country: The German Insurance Ombudsman’ in P
Wahlgren (ed), What is Scandinavian Law? Social Private Law (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, 2007), 54.
78
www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/Navigationsbaum/WirUeberUns/AufgabenUndZweck/index.html.
79
G Hirsch, The German Insurance Ombudsman, speech paper, 2011, 2.
80
ibid.
81
ibid.
82
Solvency II Framework Directive (Directive 2009/138/EC), Art 185; Art 1 No 19 of the German Regulation
on Information Obligations for Insurance Contracts (VVG-InfoV).
83
Directive (EC) 2002/92 on insurance mediation [2002] OJ L9/3.
84
The Federal Ministry of Justice has recognized the Insurance Ombudsman as an arbitration board within
the meaning of the EU Mediation Directive. See s 214 of the German Insurance Contract Act (VVG). For more

Germany 91
The dispute resolution service of the Ombudsman is free of charge to consumers. They
retain the option either to file a claim with a state court or with the Insurance Ombudsman.
The decision by the Ombudsman is legally binding for the insurance companies, while the
recommendations are voluntary for consumers.85 Even after the decision by the Insurance
Ombudsman, the consumer can still lodge a claim with the ordinary court.86
Maintaining the independence of the insurance ombudsman is regarded as very
important. The neutrality of the Ombudsman is ensured by his independent status. The
Ombudsman is not an employee of the association and dismissal is only possible for obvious
gross misconduct of his obligations. He is independent in his decision-making and is not
subject to any instructions from other bodies. He has, however, to observe the law in his
decision-making,87 and in making recommendations in achieving voluntary settlements.
In order to be elected to the office of Ombudsman, the candidate has to show particular
expertise in insurance matters and needs to be impartial. This means that he cannot take up
assignments in the insurance sector that are incompatible with his function.88 Furthermore,
representatives of both the insurance companies and consumers have to agree with the
election of the Ombudsman. The appointment decision is taken by the Advisory Council of
the Ombudsman Association, where insurers and consumer organisations are represented
equally. In addition, there are members from the supervisory authority, academia and the
parliamentary groups of the political parties represented in the German Parliament.89 The
Ombudsman is elected for a period of five years and reports to the Membership Assembly
and Advisory Council once a year.90 The current Insurance Ombudsman is Professor Dr
Günter Hirsch. He has a staff of 45, including eighteen lawyers and fourteen insurance
salespeople.
Powers and Procedures
The Ombudsman procedure differs from state court procedures because it is more flexible
and is limited to simple issues that can be decided expeditiously. The application can be
made orally, in writing or in other forms, and the respondent usually has to reply within
a month.91 Before lodging a complaint the consumer must have contacted the insurer
providing it with a deadline of at least 6 weeks for a reply.
The Ombudsman can accept complaints that are brought by a consumer against an
insurer if the latter is a member of the Ombudsman Association. The procedural rules
refer to the definition of a consumer that is used in EU law and included in section 13 of
the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB). As a result, a natural person who
concludes an insurance contract for a purpose that is outside his or her trade, business or
profession, may lodge a complaint.92 However, the Ombudsman is not competent, inter
information see the Article published by the German Ombudsman: Günter Hirsch, ‘The German insurance
Ombudsman’ (2011) ZVersWiss 100, 566.
85
s 11 para 1 code of procedure.
86
s 11 para 1 code of procedure. See Basedow, Small Claims Enforcement in a High Cost Country (2007), 54.
87
www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/Navigationsbaum/WirUeberUns/StellungUndKompetenz/index.html.
88
Basedow (n 77), 55.
89
See note by the Insurance Ombudsman, p 7.
90
www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/Navigationsbaum/WirUeberUns/AufgabenUndZweck/index.html.
91
Basedow (n 77), 56.
92
See Insurance Ombudsman note, 8.

alia, in cases regarding healthcare insurance or if a case is already pending in a court or

arbitration tribunal.93
The Ombudsman can refuse a complaint if it would use too much of his resources.
Importantly, the Ombudsman is obliged to dismiss a case if it deals with a question of ‘legal
principles’ that needs to be decided by the court.94 The Insurance Ombudsman investigates
the facts of the cases ex officio.95
He can take a legally binding decision up to a sum of €10,000. Above that threshold he
may pronounce non-binding recommendations in disputes about claims of up to €100,000.96
The procedure is designed to be more informal than that of courts, and the Ombudsman
assists consumers in making complaints. Lawyers are not required and are normally not
used by the parties. The Ombudsman regards a particularly important aspect of his function
as helping the parties to find a mutual understanding and solution to their problem.
Accordingly, he usually adopts a conciliation function as a first step, prior to his decision-
making function, and the former is often successful. If the Ombudsman thinks that he is
likely to decide against an enterprise, he indicates this to the company so as to give it an
opportunity to settle the case itself, thereby assisting it to re-establish its relationship with
its customer. He considers that he has a particular opportunity to create flexible ‘win-win’
solutions for the parties that can decease tension between them, in contrast to the ‘win-lose’
decisions that are the outcome of court decisions. If the Ombudsman decides in favour of
the insurer, he pays particular attention to providing the consumer with an explanation of
his decision.
The Ombudsman applies the law, although he considers that there is a margin of
interpretation of the legal rules, and where the facts are not clear. Since under the rules the
insurance providers are prohibited from taking disputes to court, the Ombudsman considers
that he should refrain from making a decision against an enterprise if a fundamental legal
question is involved, since that should be decided by a court, although this situation arises
only rarely.
Respondents may request at any stage of the proceedings that the Ombudsman withdraws
from the case if they can show that it concerns a test case of fundamental importance.97 This
is however only possible provided that the respondents commit themselves, to reimburse
the complainant the legal costs before the court of first instance, even if the respondent wins
the case.
Where cases arise that involve important decisions, companies have the option of asking
the Ombudsman to resolve them or of starting the test case procedure in court. If the
Ombudsman handles the procedure, the enterprise will be liable for all the costs at first
instance (the consumer not being liable). The Ombudsman is obliged to deal with mass
issues as a test case, without discretion, and all similar cases are stayed pending the decision
of the test case. The current Ombudsman considers that it would be an improvement to give
the Ombudsman the power to declare a case to be a test case.
93
s 2 para 3 code of procedure.
94
s 8 para 2 of the code of procedure. See J Basedow (n 77), 58.
95
J Basedow (n 77), 58.
96
See section 2 of the Insurance Ombudsman procedural rules. Prior to November 2010 the limit was €80,000.
97
Rule 8.4.

Germany 93
Statistics98
The number of complaints that the Insurance Ombudsman receives has increased
considerably since the office began, and in 2010 stands at over 18,000 complaints a year.
In 2010 about 12,720 complaints were admitted and 5,034 were not admitted. The claim
success rate is around 38 per cent. Over 90 per cent of claims involve less than €10,000.
The majority of cases are decided within three months. The Ombudsman procedures
have become more efficient with time and are shorter than the usual court procedures.
Table 4.1: Complaints data 2006–2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Complaints made 18,451 17,592 18,837 18,145 18,357
Complaints concluded 17,038 16,889 18,801 18,261 18,609
The claims figures for 2006–2010 are at Table 4.1. Both the total number of complaints
(around 18,000) and the percentage of admissible complaints (69 per cent) have been
at consistent levels. The subject matter of complaints is indicated in Table 4.3. Of the
12,720 admissible complaints in 2010, 12,565 related to insurance companies and 155
to intermediaries. Complaints were received by letter (61 per cent), email (18 percent),
telephone (11 per cent) and fax (9 per cent). Of the inadmissible complaints, 33 per cent
related to facts prior to the period of jurisdiction, and 29 per cent had no connection with
an intermediary. The success rate of admissible intermediary complaints was 22 per cent.
Table 4.2: Complaints to the Insurance Ombudsman 2006–2010
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Total complaints 18,357 18,145 18,837 17,592 18,451
Admissible 12,720 12,371 13,375 11,583 12,768
Not admissible 5,034 5,045 4,740 5,302 5,043
No follow up 603 729 722 707 640
Table 4.3: Subject matter of complaints, by percentages
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Life/pension 38.5 39.3 40.7 41.4 55.4
Legal insurance 15.2 13.9 13.1 12.1 10.1
Car insurance 7.1 5.6 6.4 5.9 4.9
Accident 4.1 3.6 3.6 2.6 1.7
Building 7.4 8.9 8.8 9.2 6.5
Home contents 7.0 6.9 5.0 5.6 4.1
Private insurance 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.7 3.7
Disability for work 3.2 2.9 2.7 3.0 2.6
Other 7.7 9.0 9.2 8.6 6.5
98
Annual report Insurance Ombudsman (2010). www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/Ressourcen/PDF/
Jahresbericht-2010.pdf.

Table 4.4: Percentages of outcomes of complaints
Finalised by Accepted by Settlement Withdrawn Total

the Ombudsman broker
Justiciable 75.3 7.4 2.5 6.2 91.4
Not justiciable 3.1 0.6 0.0 4.9 8.6
Total 78.4 8.0 2.5 11.1 100.0
Eighty-six per cent of complaints were for under €5,000, although a small number reached
the ceiling, which was €100,000 by late 2011. Admissible complaints took an average of 4.4
months to complete.
In 2010, the Insurance Ombudsman cost €3.2 million and had an income of €3.6 m
which means a profit of €0.04 m.99
Evaluation
The Insurance Ombudsman has increasingly been recognized by both public bodies100 and
private actors as an effective dispute resolution provider. This ADR model was copied by
the transport sector Ombudsman (see below) and has been considered by scholars to be
successful and may inspire wider areas of consumer dispute resolution.101 Insurers have
applied this dispute resolution mechanism as a marketing advantage. The costs are lower
than court proceedings and involve less potential for adverse publicity. Consumers, in
turn, have an additional option to file a complaint without the financial risks that a court
procedure would entail.
Doctors
Claims for medical negligence against physicians in Germany are handled by twelve
specialist conciliation schemes, which are organized on a regional basis in the Länder,
although some schemes cover more than a single Land. The largest scheme is in North
Germany and is called Schlichtungsstelle für Arzthaftpflichtfragen der norddeutschen
Ärztekammern102 (conciliation scheme for medical liability disputes). It was established
in 1976 and has handled a steadily increasing number of claims, totalling around 85,000
claims between 1976 and 2010, currently around 4,000 cases a year. The conciliation
schemes were created as a response to a perception that valid claims in the courts were not
succeeding, since medical experts appointed were reluctant to criticise their colleagues, and
patient confidence was falling. The Federal medical association (Ärztekammer) wished to
create a separate, more satisfactory and quicker dispute resolution service. However, the
different regional conciliation schemes operate under different rules, established by the
99
ibid.
100
Several states provide that court claims can only be filed after an out of court mediation institution has tried
to solve the dispute.
101
J Basedow (n 77), 61.
102
http://norddeutsche-schlichtungsstelle.de.

Germany 95
local medical chamber, and the result is confusing and makes comparisons challenging.
However, it should be kept in mind that lawyers and other professionals are organised
regionally as well. Some attempts have now been made to work towards a single national
standard, bearing in mind that lawyers now operate across Land borders and bring claims
in different Länder, under different procedures and rules, and subject to different relations
with the local medical chamber.
The north German scheme in Hanover is organisationally independent of the nine
medical chambers that it covers.103 The chambers finance the scheme but they have no
influence on the scheme. The chambers have the right to change the procedures but not to
be involved in individual cases. The scheme only has the obligation to report back to the
chambers on financial matters. The North German scheme costs €4.1 million per year. The
advantage of being independent is that patient and doctor can be sure that their dispute will
not be ‘known’ by the medical chambers: no ‘name and shame’ policy operates.
Mediation as a technique has been found to be unsuited to medical claims, since its aim
is to bring the parties together and restore trust, whereas patients are generally unwilling
to approach a medical problem in this way.104 In addition, there is asymmetry of expertise
between doctors and patients that hinders reaching consensus. However, in recent years
the general aims of the scheme to improve the relationship between doctor and patient,
and so keep the number of court cases low, have expended to encompass preventing future
mistakes in treatment and improving patient safety.
The north German scheme has 55 doctors from all medical specialities with expert
knowledge to draw upon. Every case is looked at by a lawyer and a doctor, who are in
constant exchange with each other. The doctors have regular seminars to improve their
expertise in medico-legal issues, and employees and independent experts are trained
frequently. About 3,000 independent experts are consulted by the Hanover scheme per year
throughout Germany (in contrast to courts, which only use local experts). The Hanover
scheme’s quality system has been approved since 2007 by the national standards body,105
and is subject to regular inspections, which have proved high motivation for employees.
The scheme is free of charge for patients and doctors. The settlement process is aimed to
be fair, transparent, free of barriers, with minimal formalities and fast. The scheme obtains
the medical records, makes an assessment of the case, obtains comments from parties about
the identity of the external expert to be consulted and the list of questions to be asked, and
subsequently on the expert report, and reaches an internal decision on legal liability. The
decision of the settlement is not legally binding. Any party can terminate the investigation
process at any time. The time limits for the independent processes are usually two weeks
to one month, but the parties can call and ask for an extension. The timing at court is
very strict, if a document is submitted late then the case gets dismissed, the north German
scheme is more lenient with timing. The average duration per case is 14 months.
The doctor’s insurance company (Haftpflichtversicherung) is an equal player in the
process, and takes the decision (without involving the doctor) whether to pay or not.
The involvement of the insurance company in this process has been found to save a lot
103
The following information was supplied by Johann Neu and Christine Wohlers of Schlichtungsstelle für
Arzthaftpflichtfragen der norddeutschen Ärztekammern.
104
See B K Hattemer, Mediation bei Störungen des Arzt-Patient-Verhältnisses (Springer, 2011). The book
provides a detailed analysis of the possibilities and limitations of mediation in a variety of problems in the doctor-
patient relationship.
105
Under DIN EN ISO 9001:2008 TUV, www.tuevsued.de/management_systeme/qualitaet/iso_90012000.

of time and money (although this is not the same for all the dispute resolution schemes
in Germany). The insurers pay a fixed rate for the service and pay for the external expert
report. This makes it possible to pay the external independent evaluators the same rates as
they receive from a court. The settlement decision has no impact on the doctor’s insurance
premium as it is seen as a good will decision of the insurers to be a part of this process.
The process will only go ahead if all parties agree. The consent can be withdrawn at any
time by the parties.
The north German scheme finalizes a case with a decision that comments on the claims
made in the process from a legal basis. This means that they decide if the claims are made
rightfully or not. The damage is differentiated; if the conclusion is that a medical mistake
caused the damage, with this documentation the patient can claim directly from the doctor’s
insurance, which is involved in the proceedings, without any further paperwork or time
spent. Other schemes do not try to prove this information; they merely prove that a medical
problem has occurred.
Statistics
Table 4.5: Decisions in matters concerning doctor liability 2008: 4,840
Landgerichte in North Germany, first instance 46% 2,230 decisions

North German out-of-court settlement Hanover 54% 2,610 decisions
Table 4.6: Amount of court cases avoided; Evaluation June 2007: 800 decisions from the
year 2002
800 cases decided at out-of-court settlement Hanover

court follow-up Court avoided
73: 9% 727: 91%
Since 2000, anonymised data from cases has been entered into a Medical Error Reporting
System (MERS), which the federal Ärztekammer decided in 2006 to operate throughout
Germany.
Transport
Various regional Conciliation Boards106 or Ombudsstellen107 have been created in some

Länder, which usually make non-binding recommendations for complaints involving
bus, subway, tram and railway services. A publicly financed national pilot scheme for long
distance travel, the Schlichtungsstelle Mobilität,108 was discontinued in 2009. In its place,
106
An example is Schlichtungsstelle Nahverkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Conciliation Board for
Local Public Transport in North Rhine-Westphalia).
107
Such as Ombudsstelle Nahverkehr Bayern (Ombudspoint for Local Public Transport Bavaria) and a similar
one in Baden-Württemberg.
108
www.schlichtungsstelle-mobilitaet.org. See case study at Civic Consulting 2009, pp 455–460.

Germany 97
the private transportation companies founded The Conciliation Body for Public Transport
CBPT (Schlichtungsstelle für den öffentlichen Personenverkehr (söp)).109,110
Söp is an independent and neutral organization and offers its service throughout
Germany to customers of train, bus, flight and ship companies that are members of its
conciliation scheme. This process is free of charge for the consumer; the cost of the scheme
is met by the transport companies. Söp evaluates the complaint and makes a settlement
suggestion to resolve the dispute acceptable for both sides and outside of court. Söp can deal
with cases of a value up to € 30,000: a normal claim is between €10 and €200. For example,
a consumer can get help with a complaint about:
• Delays and missed connections,
• Cancellations,
• Damaged or lost luggage,
• Faulty information,
• Tickets and reservations,
• Bad service.
It is common for travellers to use more than one form of transport (eg train to plane), and
investigating a complaint can take up a lot of time, involving a long chain of transport
providers and contracted partners. The söp scheme aims to focus its expertise and contacts
on dealing with that part of the chain that relates to the claim, thereby avoiding the need
for a consumer to confront various different conciliation boards. Söp covers 99 per cent
of long-distance rail travel and 95 per cent of regional travel. Söp is seeking to expand
membership and offers a ‘get to know’ programme explaining the benefits of the service.
The same approach is also applied to cross-border travel. Söp does only handle complaints
against transport companies, ie, it does not cover conflicts related to the services of third
online booking platforms, and refers such cases to the Reiseschiedsstelle. While the focus is
currently on railway transport, söp aspires to become a ADR scheme covering all modes of
transportation. It has the capacity to handle complaints in German, English and French. The
main current challenge and coverage gap stems from the reluctance of airline companies to
participate in ADR procedures. The German federal government is considering legislation
to require airlines to subject themselves to ADR.
The Process
The customer must first contact the company concerned. Beside legal statutes of limitation,
there are no time limits in which the consumer has to have complained to the company or
approached söp. The consumer lodges his complaint in writing. Söp’s approach is voluntary,
so it first ensures that the travel company is a member of its scheme: this is the case if the
company is a member of the trade association Trägerverein der Schlichtungsstelle für den
öffentlichen Personenverkehr e.V.. After receipt of all the necessary documents, söp contacts
the transport company to ask them for a statement. It does not hear witnesses, and makes
its decision on the basis of the documents.
Söp produces a report with a recommendation for a consensual settlement on the basis of
applying the law to the facts, as would occur in court. All the conciliators at söp are lawyers.
109
Information below includes comments from Director Edgar Isermann and Christof Berlin of söp.
110
www.soep-online.de/die-schlichtung.html. söp was listed as satisfying Recommendation 98/257/EC in June
2010.

The recommendation only becomes binding if both the traveler and the transport company
agree to it, with any possible modifications. Each side can decide to take their case to court
at any time of the process.
Söp aims to resolve the dispute by win-win solutions: It finds that there are many situations
where the law has no good solution. For example, if a train breaks down during daytime
and the passenger decides to take a taxi to his final destination, the rail company arguably
has no obligation to pay for the taxi. The law does not cover this situation, so söp can make
a suggestion to the company to resolve the dispute (such as involving vouchers or shared
taxi cost) and the company has two weeks to reply. Söp can support a creative outcome
and make good-will suggestions to the company. It seeks to reinforce the companies’
motto ‘more than satisfaction’ for travellers. The main task of söp is to ensure out-of-court
settlement of individual disputes between travellers and the transport companies helps to
strengthen customer satisfaction with the travel companies. Both parties can take the case
to court at any time and thereby end the settlement process.
The process usually is handled within 3 months. Söp has a 90 per cent success rate in
settling rail disputes. It has a steady media presence, with over 3,000 mentions per year, and
conveys its ability to solve disputes amicably. Söp is capable of processing mass problems,
including an individual perspective and always tries to give the individual an answer to his
particular problem. Successive complaints from the same person are rare.
Costs and Funding
The settlement process is funded by the transport companies. For the traveller as a
complainant the conciliation is free. They carry only their own costs, for example for
postage and copies, or the involvement of lawyers.
Every member company pays an annual fee (€1,000 for a single company but groups of
companies like Deutsche Bahn pay €5,000 max) as well as a case fee (€25 for unjustified
claims and €150, €200, €300, €400, €600 or €800 per case, depending on the time and
expenditure involved). Although the scheme is privately founded and funded, its advisory
council includes public authorities, which command about one-third of the votes, the other
two-thirds representing associations that deal with consumer and travellers’ rights and
transportation companies.
During the first two years of work since December 2009, söp received around 6,800
individual cases, of which 4,500 related to rail disputes and 2,300 to air travel. Most of the
rail disputes could be settled, whereas the majority of the flight cases is still pending, due to
the lack of co-operation by many airlines. Complaints fall into the following types:
Rail
Customer rights 48%

Bahn card [rail discount card] 18%
Additional travel cost in retrospect 16%
Refunds 9%
Other 9%

Germany 99
Air
Delays 47%
Cancellations 31%
Luggage 8%
Tickets 5%
Being stranded 5%
Other 4%
Online Travel
In 2004 some of the larger companies that offer online travel founded the Verband Internet
Reisevertrieb (VIR)111 (association of online travel sales). One of the association’s goals is to
ensure that consumers have confidence in booking travel services on the Internet. In order
to build such confidence, the association launched its travel arbitration scheme in March
2005, which aims at finding an amicable settlement to disagreement between online travel
agents and their clients. This facility is the first of its kind in the travel industry and was one
of the first in Germany to receive official EU certification.112
VIR provides customers (including those outside Germany), who have booked a trip
online through a member of the scheme, with independent intermediaries (‘arbitrators’)113
that can be invoked whenever the parties themselves do not manage to resolve the dispute.
The arbitrator will then consider the complaint objectively and make a proposal on how a
dispute can be resolved amicably, to the satisfaction of both parties. Companies that join the
scheme are required to agree to try and solve any complaints with the customer before the
scheme is approached. A complaint can be submitted in writing, as email, by online form, or
phone. The complaint is dealt with according to the guidelines in the Verfahrensordnung,114
based on the idea of voluntary participation and active support of the process by the parties.
All the facts and circumstances of each individual case are evaluated with all submitted
documents. Cases are handled in the German language, but can be dealt with in English.
The Reiseschiedsstelle deals with online flight bookings only, an area that the söp does not
cover, and the two bodies co-operate and refer cases to each other.
Arbitrators are required to be experienced lawyers with the qualification to hold a
judicial office, and to have relevant work experience in the area of travel and aviation law:
experience of the industry is deemed to be important, although the arbitrator must be
neutral and independent of the parties. The arbitrator receives no salary from the scheme
or parties, but a fee from the parties in any case of arbitration, regardless of whether the
settlement recommendation is accepted or not. Arbitration is free to customers because
the association and its affiliated companies meet the cost of the scheme and the process.
Members pay an annual fee, which includes one free arbitration per month. Parties are not
represented by a lawyer. Passengers must, however, pay only the costs of any lawyer from
111
Members are Avigo, ebookers, Expedia, Holiday Autos, Opodo, Lastminute und Travel24: see www.
reiseschiedsstelle.de.
112
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/ecc_germany_en.htm.
113
The leading arbitrator is Professor Schmid.
114
For more detail see: www.reiseschiedsstelle.de.

whom they choose to obtain advice and their own expenses (such as telephone, postage and
copying costs.)
The process lasts four weeks115 from receipt of the complaint to the submission of
a settlement recommendation. The scheme deals with 200 cases per year, and numbers
are rising. In the first 12 months of operation, the Reiseschiedsstelle received 86 phone
enquiries, in 30 of which the scheme had no jurisdiction because either the journey was not
booked online or not booked through a VIR-member, or because it is quite clear that there
was no fault by the travel intermediary. Of the remaining 56 cases accepted for arbitration,
two proposals (3.5 per cent) were not accepted by the consumer, and one case had not
concluded. In 96.5 per cent of those accepted cases, settlement was successfully reached.
Under 2 per cent of cases end at court. The complaints for 2010 were categorized as shown
in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Categories of complaints
Complaints about Cases

Bookings116 10
Lack of information117 19
Travel problems118 15
Problems with air travel contracts119 12
VIR and its member companies see a number of benefits with the scheme: complaints are
dealt with faster than the courts, much more cheaply, involving less complicated procedures
and on an individual level. The debate is not conducted in public, so the companies’
operational practices are not made public, which limits damage to the image of companies
and the entire travel industry. The ombudsman, Professor Schmid, has noted a significant
decline in the number of cases since the start of the scheme, which he attributes to companies
learning from his decisions and changing their behavior.
Financial Services
A large number of financial services providers have voluntarily agreed to settle disputes
with the help of private conciliators or ombudsmen. However, the ADR providers are
fragmented since they have arisen within the confines of the main historical sectors, notably
private banks, co-operative banks and building societies (savings and loan).120 In addition, a
115
In the first 12 months of the Reiseschiedsstelle, a settlement process took an average of 15.9 days.
116
Typical cases: booked by accident, booked something else than intended (eg without rental car); double
booking after a termination of the booking process; viewed the booking request as the confirmation; or booking
by under-aged persons.
117
Typical cases: no, wrong or misleading information, flight booking without information for the traveller, not
received information regarding changes.
118
Typical travel shortcomings like hotel overbooking, non-compliance with contractual obligations, double
room instead of family room, wrong hotel.
119
Typical cases: no on-board meal although it was booked, damage to baggage, long waiting for connecting
flights, stressful transfer, etc.
120
BaFin provides information about the procedures and contact points at www.bafin.de/cln_109/nn_723250/
DE/Verbraucher/BeschwerdenAnsprechpartner/OmbudsBeschwerde/ombudsbeschwerde__node.html?__
nnn=true.

Germany 101
complaints facility exists within the regulator, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(BaFin), and an arbitration board of the German Bundesbank (Schlichtungsstelle bei der
Deutschen Bundesbank).
The first step in all of these complaint procedures usually requires the consumer to
contact the company in order to try to solve the issue directly with the company before
taking the matters further. If no solution is found, the consumer can lodge a complaint with
a wide range of ADR schemes that are specialized in financial services or with the courts.
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and its Mediation

Board
BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) is the supervisory authority of
financial services providers, insurance undertakings and securities. It was established in
May 2002121 and is an independent public law institution that is subject to oversight by the
Federal Ministry of Finance. BaFin is funded by fees and contributions from the institutions
and undertakings that it supervises.
BaFin is a purely administrative authority and does not have an arbitration function. It
cannot give binding rulings on individual disputes, because questions of law are a matter for
the courts alone. It cannot provide expert opinions on general questions of law.122
BaFin can decide if a company is behaving in a legally correct manner and whether or not
supervisory measures have to be taken against the company.123 Complaints by individuals
provide BaFin with an important source of information for its supervisory work and
help to detect breaches, such as insider trading or price manipulation.124 BaFin specifies
the format for complaints: see Figure 4.1. Where complaints are well founded, BaFin
contacts the institution concerned and follows it up. It deals with about 20,000 complaints
regarding insurance undertakings and 5,000 complaints about banks and financial services
institutions every year. If a complaint relates to insurance or banking, the complainant
can use the online complaints form.125 Importantly, the complaint has no bearing upon
the expiry of legal or contractual deadlines (eg payment or registration dates or statutory
limitation periods).
BaFin usually proceeds as follows:
• It evaluates whether the information and documentation provide basis on which to
reach a final decision on a case.
• If not, it requests a statement from the company concerned.
• The company reports back to BaFin, explaining the reasons for its decision.
• If the outcome of the investigation is that the company’s decision is not in breach of its
statutory responsibilities it will let the complainant know.
• In the contrary case, it will pursue the matter further with the company.126
121
www.bafin.de/cln_179/nn_720486/EN/BaFin/bafin__node.html?__nnn=true.
122
BaFin can only assess a complaint if the company concerned is subject to its supervision, ibid.
123
ibid.
124
BaFin may then launch an investigation, and reports the case to the public prosecutor’s office if the suspicion
is substantiated. See ibid.
125
ibid.
126
ibid.

BaFin is not responsible for compensation complaints regarding securities transactions (eg
shares purchased or sold). These kinds of complaints have to be addressed to the courts.
However, BaFin can be contacted when:
• an individual feels badly advised with regard to the purchase of securities (eg equities,
warrants) and have lost money as a result, or if an offer appears to be suspect. BaFin
might then investigate a potential breach of the Securities Trading Act.
• unsolicited calls are made regarding investments.
Figure 4.1: Details that should be included in a complaint to BaFin
• Name and address.

• The name and address of the company concerned.
• If the complaint relates to an insurance policy, the type of policy, the policy number and, if
applicable, the claim number.
• If the complaint relates to a credit or financial services institution, the type of product should be
mentioned (safe custody account, current account, savings plan, etc.), the account or customer
number, and the name of the account holder if it is someone else.
• If the complaint relates to the purchase of securities, the Security Identification Number (WKN
or the new ISIN).127
• The problem has to be described as precisely as possible and enclose copies of any supporting
documentation (eg contract, statements of account, insurance certificate, correspondence).
On 1 July 2011, BaFin established a mediation board for consumer disputes relating to
provisions of the Investment Act (Investmentgesetz (InvG)).128 The objective of the board is
to provide consumers with an easily accessible, efficient and relatively fast means of dispute
resolution that is free of charge.129 On 28 June 2011 BaFin adopted a Regulation on the
Mediation Board according to section 143c (3) of the Investment Act.130
The BaFin Mediation Board is a back-up mediation body, because it only applies to media-
tion cases against companies which either are not members of the Bundesverband Investment
and Asset Management e.V. (BVI) or have not joined the Ombudsman scheme of the BVI.131 The
BVI established a specialized ombudsman scheme for disputes regarding investment matters. 132
BaFin has appointed two mediators to its Mediation Board. The procedures take place
before a single mediator. In order to be selected as a mediator, an employee of BaFin needs to
be qualified to exercise the office of a judge, possess at least three years of legal professional
experience, and should not supervise the companies subject to the Investment Act.133
The BaFin and several other associations, such as the Federation of German Consumer
Organization (VZBV) and the Central Credit Committee (ZKA) take part in the selection
procedure of the Mediation Board.
127
128
This ADR procedure constitutes a procedure before a conciliation body within the meaning of section 15
(3) sentence 1 off the Introductory Act of the German Code of Civil Procedure, see also BaFin Quarterly, Q3/11,
pp 9 and 12.
129
BaFin Quarterly, Q3/11, 9.
130
(Investmentschlichtungsstellenverordnung –InvSchlichtV) BGB. I, 1299.
131
www.ombudsstelle-investmentfonds.de/index.php/ombudsstelle/liste-der-teilnehmenden-gesellschaften.
132
See more at www.ombudsstelle-investmentfonds.de/index.php/ombudsstelle/liste-der-teilnehmenden-gesel
lschaften.
133
BaFin Quarterly, Q3/11, 10.

Germany 103
The mediator is independent and not bound by instructions in his or her decision
making. The BaFin mediation procedure takes into account the principles of procedure
established in the Recommendation of the European Commission.134
The application for a mediation procedure must be submitted to the Mediation Board in
writing. Applications are inadmissible if the case is already pending with a court or another
alternative redress body.135 The mediator aims at reaching an agreement between the parties
providing an independent evaluation of the legal situation considering also aspects of equity
and good faith. The procedure ends with a written proposal by the mediator. If the parties
accept the proposal recourse to the courts is normally excluded.136
For the consumer the procedure is free of charge, whereas for the respondent a fee of
EUR 200 applies.
The Arbitration Board at the Deutsche Bundesbank
The Arbitration Board at the German Central Bank137 provides alternative dispute resolution
in relation to payment services138 and the distance marketing of financial services.139 It was
established in August 1999 in Frankfurt am Main by the German Central Bank and aims at
improving access to justice for consumers.
For consumers the procedure is free of charge, whereas for the banks every case costs
€200. While the parties do not need legal representation, they can be represented by a third
party of their choice if they so wish. The banks have to inform their costumers about the
Arbitration Board of the Central Bank.
The establishment and responsibilities of the Arbitration Board are set out in section 14
(1) of the German Prohibitory Injunctions Act (Unterlassungsklagengesetz).140
In particular, the Arbitration Board is responsible for complaints in connection with:
• Payment services;141
• Consumer credit;142
• The distance marketing of financial services,143 with the exception of insurance services.
The Arbitration Board consists of the arbitrators and a support office, which is the contact
point for complaints and provides administrative support to the arbitrators.144 The arbitrators
are qualified judges who act independently and impartially.145 The current three arbitrators
are all Directors of the Bundesbank, and serve part time on the Arbitration Board.
134
German law Section 143c (5) sentence 2 of the InvG and Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998
on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disutes (98/257/EC).
135
BaFin Quarterly, Q3/11, 10–11.
136
BaFin Quarterly, Q3/11, 10–12.
137
That is the English title used by this body, although it is debatable whether ‘conciliation’ is a better translation
than ‘arbitration’.
138
BGB s 675c to 676c.
139
www.bundesbank.de/schlichtungsstelle/schlichtungsstelle.php.
140
German Bundesbank, The Arbitration Board at the German Central Bank, leaflet, Frankfurt am Main, 2011, 2.
141
ss 675c to 676c of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and Council Regulation (EC) 924/2009
on cross-border payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 [2009] OJ L266/1.
142
ss 491 to 509 of the German Civil Code.
143
ss 312b to 312d of the German Civil Code.
144
German Bundesbank, The Arbitration Board at the German Central Bank, leaflet (Frankfurt am Main,
German Bundesbank, 2011), 2.
145
ibid.

Any customer may file a complaint directly with the Arbitration Board in connection
with payment services, distance marketing of financial services and consumer credits. A
large number of complaints are resolved by the support office at an early stage by providing
consumers with further information. Cases are also often directly transferred to the private
ombudsman schemes of the different banking associations.
Complaints against companies which are members of any of the associations below and
which participate in the arbitration proceedings provided by these associations should in
fact be addressed directly to the associations concerned:146
• Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands;
• Bundesverband deutscher Banken;
• Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken;
• Sparkassenverband Baden-Württemberg;
• Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband;
• Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband.
A complaint is inadmissible if:
• the matter of complaint is already pending before a court, has been brought before a
court in the past or is brought before a court by the complainant during the arbitration
proceedings;
• the dispute has been settled out of court;
• an application for legal aid has been rejected because the action intended to be brought
offers no prospect of success;
• the matter is already the subject of an arbitration proposal or the arbitration proceedings
of an arbitration body pursuant to section 14 (1) of the German Prohibitory Injunctions
Act or of any other conciliation body which deals with the settlement of disputes;
• the claim had already become statute-barred when the customer complaint was lodged
and the respondent pleads the defence of limitation.147
A complaint must be submitted to the Arbitration Board in writing with a brief description
of the facts and problems together with the necessary documentation (eg correspondence,
invoices from the enterprise, account statements etc). The procedure takes on average three
to four months and is divided into a preliminary proceeding and arbitration proceeding.
Preliminary proceedings
If the support office receives a complaint, it confirms receipt of the statement and examines
the documents submitted. Admissible complaints are passed on to the company concerned
with a request to comment within one month.148
The support office forwards the company’s comments to the complainant, who then has
the opportunity to submit a written opinion within a month. If the complainant does not
respond, the complaint is considered to be resolved and the proceedings are closed.149
146
ibid, 4.
147
ibid, 5.
148
ibid, 7.
149
ibid, 7.

Germany 105
Arbitration proceedings
If the customer complaint is not resolved, the matter is passed on to the responsible arbitrator,
who makes his decision on the basis of the documents submitted in the proceedings.150 He
can ask the parties involved to provide additional comments or information, but cannot
take evidence unless it can be supported through the presentation of documents. A hearing
is not conducted.151
The arbitrator presents a written arbitration proposal, which is voluntary for the parties.
Neither the proceedings nor the arbitrator’s decision affect the party’s right to bring the
matter before the courts.152
The parties involved can announce whether they accept the arbitrator’s decision within
six weeks of receiving it. Once this deadline has expired, the support office informs the
parties of the outcome.153 If an agreement is not reached, an ‘attestation of an unsuccessful
conciliation attempt pursuant to section 15a (3) sentence 3 of the Act concerning the
Introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure’154 is issued.
All customer complaints are treated as strictly confidential and are therefore not
published. The Arbitration Board meets the requirements of the Recommendations of the
EU regarding ADR and is a member of FIN-NET.155
Data
In 2009, 93 consumers contacted the Arbitration Board with inquiries about information
about the calculation of costs regarding cross-border transfer payments and online
payments. During this period 174 written complaints were submitted to the board. 91
of the complaints could not be addressed by the Arbitration Board because of a lack of
competence. Nine of the complaints were referred to private Ombudsman schemes.156 74 of
the complaints were admissible and processed by the Arbitration Board. A large majority of
these cases (54 complaints) were solved by providing the parties with detailed explanations
about the legal framework.
The Ombudsman and Conciliation Services

Many banks and the majority of insurers in Germany have voluntarily agreed to settle
possible disputes with the help of private conciliators and ombudsmen. The ombudsmen
are appointed for a specific period and may not be dismissed prematurely simply because
they have adjudged a case to the company’s disadvantage.157
These ADR units have been established within the industry associations of the respective
companies, and are usually independent and impartial.
150
ibid, 8.
151
ibid.
152
ibid.
153
ibid.
154
s 15a Abs.3 Satz 3 des Gesetzes betreffend der Einführung der Zivilprozessordnung.
155
the European network of complaints schemes for financial services launched by the European Commission.
156
German Bundesbank, Annual Report for the Arbitration Board of the German Bundesbank, for the whole year
2009, 7–8.
157

Major financial services associations that provide ADR services are:

• Cooperative banks: Kundenbeschwerdestelle beim Bundesverband der Deutschen
Volksbanken (BVR) (Federation of the German Credit Unions and Agricultural Banks,
Customer Complaints Office);
• Public-sector banks: Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands e.V. (VÖB)
Kundenbeschwerdestelle (Association of German Public Sector Banks, Customer
Complaints Office);
• Private Banks and Mortgage banks: Kundenbeschwerdestelle beim Bundesverband
deutscher Banken e.V. (Association of German Banks, Customer Complaints Office);
• Private building and loan associations: Ombudsfrau der privaten Bausparkassen e.V.
and Verband der privaten Bausparkassen, Kundenbeschwerdestelle (Federation of
the Private Building Societies, Customer Complaints Office), and several regional
conciliation bodies, for which the central contact point is Deutscher Sparkassen-
und Giroverband (DSGV), Kundenbeschwerden (German Savings Bank Association,
Customer complaints);
• Land building and loan associations: Schlichtungsstelle der Landesbausparkassen
(Conciliation body of the Land building societies);
• Disputes concerning credit transfers or misuse of credit cards, if no other arbitration
unit is responsible: Schlichtungsstelle der Deutschen Bundesbank.
In some cases, the decisions makers are highly qualified legal professionals, eg former
federal judges. The procedural rules to be applied are similar between the respective
ombudsmen.
The procedure is free of charge for the complainants. However, they will have to bear all
costs they have incurred (postage, copies, telephone charges etc.) and possible legal advice
fees for an attorney.
If a consumer would like an ADR body to assess a case, the first step is to ask the company
in question whether it operates within the ADR system and, if so, which body is responsible
for the case.
The Ombudsman Scheme of the Private Commercial Banks
The Ombudsman Scheme of the Private Commercial Banks is an out-of court conciliation
procedure that was established in 1992 by the Private Commercial Banks in Germany.158
The Ombudsman Scheme is a key part of the private commercial bank’s consumer policy
scheme, which includes four parts: consumer education, information, contract transparency
and out-of-court dispute resolution facilities.159 The establishment of this scheme reflected a
new approach of the banks in order to build trust in their services and has been promoted by
the EU. Consumers’ complaints were also viewed as a tool of assessment of their services.160
This scheme applies mainly to consumers, but also to companies and self-employed persons
in the event of disputes relating to credit transfers or misuse of a payment card. Details of
the procedure and the admissibility requirements are set out in the ‘Rules of procedures
158
Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken, The Comprehensive Consumer Policy Scheme of the German Private
Commercial Banks (Berlin 2007), 44.
159
Obudsman Der Privaten Banken Tätigkeitsbericht 2009, 104.
160
Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken, The Comprehensive Consumer Policy Scheme of the German Private
Commercial Banks (Berlin 2007), 44.

Germany 107
for the settlement of customer complains in the German banking sector’ approved by the
Federal Ministry of Justice.161
The Ombudsman is an independent and impartial person that can provide a binding
decision on cases up to a €5000 specific amount. Above this amount; the rulings are not
binding on the private commercial banks that are affiliated to the scheme. However, even in
the latter case banks often comply with the recommendation of the Ombudsman.
The procedure is free of charge for consumers and provides them with a quick dispute
resolution without any risks. The consumers can refuse a decision or recommendation issued
by the ombudsman service if they are not satisfied with the outcome. In this case, they can
subsequently approach a court of law. The customer’s legal interest cannot be prejudiced by
expiry of the statutory limitation period during the Ombudsman proceedings.162
A Customer Complaints Office was set up at the Association of German Banks to act as
an interface between bank clients and the Ombudsman Scheme.163 Costumers of a private
commercial bank can contact this office in writing and have to describe the problem,
the history of the case and the desired outcome, adding any relevant documents. A large
number of cases are already solved through information and negotiation before they reach
the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman Scheme of the Private Commercial Banks has been recognized by
banks and costumers as an effective dispute resolution solution. Many banks have as a
consequence introduced their own in-house complaint settlement schemes in order to
solve a problem informally. Furthermore, a large number of banking associations have
been inspired by the Ombudsman Scheme of the Private Commercial Banks and have set
up their own Ombudsman system. For example the Association of German Public Sector
Banks has an Ombudsman since May 2001. An important difference is however that their
decisions are only voluntary for the banks.
Also at the government level the Ombudsman has been recognized as an ADR scheme.
For instance, for disputes between retail or corporate customers and private commercial
banks relating to credit transfer law, distant financial services and misuse of payment cards
the Ombudsman replaces the ADR body set up at the Deutsche Bundesbank under the
German Prohibitory Injunction Act.164
Furthermore, if the regional law uses the possibility under section 15 of the Act introducing
the Code of Civil Procedure, a complainant must apply an ADR body before taking a legal
action, provided that the amount of dispute does not exceed €750. This obligation can be
met by the costumer by contacting the private commercial banks’ Ombudsman, which is
considered equivalent to a government dispute settlement body.165
The Ombudsman is part of FIN-NET that helps complainants in cross-border cases.
The failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 triggered a rise in the number of complaints,
which continued throughout 2009. 166 In 2009, the number of complaints received totalled
over 6,500, which was an increase of around 35 per cent compared with 2008.
161
ibid.
162
ibid, 45.
163
Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken, The Comprehensive Consumer Policy Scheme of the German
Private Commercial Banks, Berlin 2007, 45.
164
The Federal Ministry has given the Ombudsman Scheme the public dispute-settlement mandate for these
areas, see Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken, The Comprehensive Consumer Policy Scheme of the German
Private Commercial Banks, Berlin 2007, 47.
165
Bundesverband der deutschen Banken (Berlin 2007) 48.
166
Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken (Berlin 2010), 106–112.

Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show a five year comparison of the trend in complaints, broken down
into individual lines of business.167
Table 4.8: Complaint areas 2006–2010168
Area 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Securities business 725 19.3% 796 22.0% 1,867 38.6% 3,104 47.7% 3,186 49.1%
Lending business 1,006 26.8% 898 24.9% 1,000 20.7% 1,072 16.5% 1,038 16.0%
Payments business 1,234 32.9% 1,172 32.5% 1,252 25.9% 1,516 23.3% 1,462 22.5%
Basic account 431 11.5% 386 10.7% 354 7.3% 358 5.5% 396 6.1%
Savings business 300 8.0% 272 7.5% 254 5.3% 348 5.3% 351 5.4%
Guarantees/third party
19 0.5% 18 0.2% 11 0.2% 12 0.2% 13 0.5%
security
Miscellaneous 38 1.0% 68 1.9% 99 2.0% 104 1.5% 48 0.7%
Total 3,753 100% 3,610 100% 4,837 100% 6,514 100% 6,494 100%
Source: Association of German Banks, 30 June 2011
Table 4.9: Overview of number and outcome of complaints received annually 2006–2010169
Area 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Total number of complaints 3,753 3,610 4,837 6,514 6,494
Complaints not followed up by customer 607 617 744 1,030 1,234
Inadmissible/unsuitable complaints 598 385 743 1,184 1,036
Admissible complaints 2,548 2,608 3,350 4,300 4,224
Complaints resolved in favour of customer 1,423 1,403 1,824 2,260 1,716

(also partly)
Compromise proposed by ombudsman 51 68 89 229 178
Complaints resolved in favour of bank 1,074 1,137 1,437 1,811 1,048
Source: Association of German Banks, 30 June 2011

1) Admissible complaints under the Rules of Procedure which the ombudsman nevertheless declines to re-
solve as further evidence-taking would be necessary.
2) Of the 4,224 admissible complaints, 1,282 are still being processed.
Telecoms
Bundesnetzagentur (BnetzA) is the federal agency that regulates electricity, gas,

telecommunications, post and railway network services.170 Since 1999 it has operated a
statutory settlement procedure that aims to find solutions for disputes between consumers
167
Bundesverband der Deutschen Banken, (Berlin 2011).
168
ibid.
169
ibid.
170
Information kindly supplied by Dr Daniela Strauss and Birgitt Maasch-Wiesel of Bundesnetzagentur.

Germany 109
and providers in the telecoms sector. One of the main objectives is to operate quickly,
since court cases can take one to two years. The scheme was notified by the European
Commission in October 2010,171 after undergoing a complex assessment procedure by the
Ministry of Justice and the European consumer centre in Kehl, to ensure it complies with
the EU ADR standards.
The legal basis for consumer protection is set out in the Telekommunikationsgesetz
(TKG) (telecommunications law), section 47a which deals with settlement. The consumer
can start the settlement process with the BnetzA if the telecoms provider has not met one
of the specified laws.172 BnetzA listens to both parties, following public settlement rules
(SchliO2008).173 The process ends if the parties decide not to go ahead or if the BnetzA
decides that no settlement can be reached. The scheme does not award compensation: it
tries to solve the problem.
Consumers usually submit their complaints in writing, and can do so online, but oral
complaints are accepted. Parties and conciliators are expected to maintain the privacy
of parties, so that business secrets do not become publicly available. The arbitrators are
bound to secrecy. The rules state that all parties have to be treated equally, and all written
documents are to be presented to both parties. It is possible to be represented by a lawyer
or by a representative of a consumer association: this happens in about 10 per cent of cases.
The settlement body meets once a week and comprises three officials within the BnetzA,
one acting as rapporteur. There has never been a complaint about possible prejudice in
recruiting the settlement board from within the regulator.
The settlement body checks the claim (this takes about 1–2 weeks), which is then sent to
the telecom provider, which has 4 weeks to respond. There is no collection of evidence by
the scheme, but the body can request further details from the parties. The consumer then
has 3 weeks to respond to the company’s statement, after which the company has a further
3 weeks to respond. The service submits a proposal to the parties, giving a brief explanation
in plain language, which is not legally binding and which the parties have three weeks to
accept, although the period can be extended. If the proposal is accepted, it constitutes an
amicable agreement, and is contractually enforceable. If there is no agreement, the parties
can take the dispute to the civil court, after which it is not possible to go back to the scheme.
Telecom providers have an obligation to tell their customers about the BnetzA settlement
scheme. No details are made public about individual cases, but the BnetzA as regulator
maintains an internal case database, which assists in identifying trends on which it may
need to act.
171
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/ecc_germany_en.print.htm.
172
ss 43a, 43 to 46 /2 and §84 of Council Directive (EC) 2007/717 about roaming in public mobile phone nets
in the Union and the amendment of the Directive 2002/21/EC [2007] OJ L171, 32. The investigations catalogue
includes: inclusion of the interests of persons with disabilities, use of properties, fault repair, standards-based
technical service, network access, right to itemised billing, prepaid services, connection charge, content of bills,
part payment, billing objections, liability to pay in the case of incorrectly established charges, disconnection,
continuing obligations for short code services, entry in public directories, publication requirements, number
misuse, right to information on additional services.
173
www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BNetzA/Verbraucherservice/Telekommu
nikation/Schlichtungsstelle/Schlichtungsordnung2008ID17039pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

Cost
The process is at a cost to both parties according to section 145 TKG, which is a tariff
based on the amount in dispute. Where the dispute resolution service submits a proposal
for resolution, it shall rule on the costs as appears fair, having regard to the findings of fact
and the matter in dispute. Each party shall bear the costs it has incurred from participating
in the proceedings. The fee is a minimum of € 25 and increases in line with the value of the
matter in dispute. The fees charged are shown in table 4.10:
Table 4.10: Fees charged by BnetzA
Value of matter in dispute up to … euro Fee … euro

300 25
600 35
900 45
1200 55
1500 65
2000 73
2500 81
3000 89
3500 97
4000 105
4500 113
5000 121
6000 136
7000 151
8000 166
9000 181
10.000 196
13.000 219
16.000 242
19.000 265
22.000 288
25.000 311
In 2010174 the number of complaints reaching the consumer service at the BnetzA has risen
21% compared to 2009. Most of the 69.886 complaints were received by telephone. However
a trend can be seen that more consumers contact the BnetzA by email. Details of the sectors
complained about are in tables 4.11 and 4.12.
Table 4.11: Claims statistics of BnetzA
Telecommunication 2010
Overall claims applications 703
Cases resolved; of which 9% withdrawn cases, of the 679
remaining cases 46% were rejected as not complying with
TKG
174
BnetzA anuual report (2010), www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BNetzA/Presse/
Berichte/2011/Jahresbericht2010pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

Germany 111
Number of cases that were re-directed (additional to the 703) 174

Finalized and admissible cases
Success rate [settlement reached] 66%
Discontinued cases by complainant 5%
Cases discontinued by company 29%
Post
Overall claims applications 10
Successfully completed 3
Unresolved as no settlement reached 3
Rejected case 1

Table 4.12: Areas of complaints and inquiries 2010 [total 69,886 complaints]:
Complained about Amount

Telekom 54,880
Electricity 10,400
Gas 2,401
Post 2,161
Trains 44
Telecom
Complaint 2010 2009

Contracts 14,505 13,429
Number misuse 10,964 6,955
TK bill 10,408 6,721
Change of provider 7,448 5,524
Number queries 4,049 3,262
General services 1,697 1,605
Other 5,809 8,268

Electricity
Complaint 2010 2009

Bills 2,083 1,963
Contracts 1,736 1,397
Renewable energy 1,670 1,006
Delay in change of provider 1,428 926
Change of provider 918 585
Electricity prices / tariffs 550 458
Meters 365 263
Other 1,623 1,204

Gas

Complaint 2010 2009
Bill 587 181
Delay in provider change 516 1.053
Contract 411 236
Change of provider 259 237
Gas prices / tariffs 126 150
Insolvency of gas provider 58 2
Other 444 377


Post
Complaint 2010 2009

Delivery and receipt 1,188 1,13
Service 239 142
Accessibility of postal services 66 197
Cross-boarder deliveries 17 18
Other 651 440
Lawyers
The arbitration board of the legal profession (Schlichtungsstelle der Rechtsanwaltschaft)

was established on 1 January 2011 to settle disputes between clients and their lawyers,
free of charge. The arbitration board is governed by the provisions of section 191f of the
Federal Lawyers’ Act and the Statute of the Body of the legal profession.175 The independent
mediator must not be a lawyer, and is Dr Renate Jaeger, a former judge of the European
Court of Human Rights. The advisory board of arbitration has nine members who support
the mediator.
The arbitrator can only make a settlement proposal, not a legaly binding decision, which
the parties can accept or reject. If the process is unsuccessful, the parties retain the right to
apply to the courts. The procedure can be used when there is a dispute about a suspected
error in advice, in conflicts over fees, and for claims for damages, but in every case not
above a limit of €15,000. It is a requirement for mediation that both parties are ready for
dialogue and the referral criteria for arbitration are met. The arbitrator can decline to handle
individual cases, for example where evidence is not available to clarify the facts, or if it is
clear that the process has no chance of success.
The procedure176 specifies that a request for mediation to the dispute resolution service has
to be a short written description of the facts and accompanied by the required documentation,
which is to include a description of the facts and all relevant correspondence and interviews
in chronological order. The procedure is not available if court proceedings are ongoing or
have been concluded or settled. The complainant is asked to describe what he or she wants
to achieve by the request for mediation, such as repayment of fees or compensation.
Each party bears its own costs and expenses, unless they agree otherwise: no loser pays
rule applies. Use of the conciliation board process is free of charge.177 The board is funded
by the legal profession in Germany, each lawyer paying €3 per year. The scheme was set up
in 2010, there have been 886 complaints, of which 263 were resolved. A backlog built up
since Dr Jaeger could only start her work at the beginning of 2011. It is too early to quote
the average duration of the process.
175
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung und Satzung der Schlichtungsstelle der Rechtsanwaltschaft.
176
www.schlichtungsstelle-der-rechtsanwaltschaft.de/sites/default/files/merkblatt_zum_schlichtungsantrag.pdf.
177
Satzung der Schlichtungsstelle, para 8.

Germany 113
The Failed ‘Ombudsman.de’ Scheme
Ombudsman.de178 began as a pilot project in 2004, and was funded for 17 months largely
from public sources.179 After that, until 30 June 2011, it was funded by the Verbraucher
Initiative e.V., a Germany-wide consumer association, located in Berlin,180 and then closed
down when they could not afford to finance it any longer. Ombudsman.de was a neutral
and independent dispute resolution provider, which aimed to resolve disputes arising from
online shopping transactions between consumers and retailers. The service was intended
to support start-up online companies. It was provided free of charge to both parties. It did
not offer legal advice.
Every contracting party to an online shopping transaction was able to make use of
ombudsman.de. The prerequisites were that the buyer must be a consumer residing in
Germany and the retailer was a commercial seller, who had his place of business in the
European Union. Both parties had to agree to use this procedure.
The consumer first had to register online.181 In complaints about a provider of an online
shop, the process was an online adaptation of the European Commission’s international
consumer complaints form. Ombudsman.de then checked that the case falls into its
responsibility, namely that the dispute was between a consumer and an online-trader. If
so, an electronic file was created and the consumer informed by email of the password
that allowed access at any time to his or her individual, secure case file. As soon as the
information was complete, ombudsman.de contacted the provider and tried to solve the
dispute by suggesting an agreement between the parties.
If no agreement was reached, ombudsman.de offered the parties an arbitration process,
in which ombudsman.de made either a settlement proposal (Vergleichsvorschlag) or an
arbitral award (Schiedsspruch). If the parties did not accept the decision, then ombudsman.
de informed the parties that its involvement is terminated. The consumer was able during
the process to send comments and documents to ombudsman.de via email, with a reference
to the specific case.
Contracted lawyers acted as ombudsmen through a special case number online. The
ombudsman aimed to contact the trader within 48 hours of the initial complaint documents
being completed, and to resolve the issue within 2 weeks. However, it was found that it took
much longer to resolve the cases than anticipated. The reason was that most complaints
related to new start-up online shops that required a lot of attention and suggestions as to
how to comply with the German law and how to change their approach.
Without the scheme being advertised, it attracted about 100 cases per month,182 of which
traders were found to have been at fault in about three-quarters of cases, and consumers in
about one-quarter.
At the closure of the scheme, the organizers drew various conclusions.183 Firstly, the
level of workload had been almost unmanageable. Secondly, the scheme did not impose
178
www.ombudsman.de/ombudsmann.php/cat/1/title/Home.
179
Funding was the EU 50%, Bund Germany 30% and Verbraucher Initiative 20%.
180
Elsenstraße 106, 12435 Berlin /Bundesvorsitzender: Dieter Schaper (V.i.S.d.P.), www.verbraucher.org.
181
At www.ombudsman.de.
182
There was a large percentage of ‘Abo-Fallen’ subscription traps.
183
Interview with Georg Abel, Bundesgeschäftsführer (Federal Director) of Verbraucher Initiative eV on 6
October 2011.

sanctions on traders, since the object was to help them rather than make money. But if
they had done so, it would have been possible to have some means of affecting traders’
behaviour. Thirdly, the adverse emotional aspect of informing a consumer that they are
wrong was not something they liked to hear. Fourthly, the closure of the scheme was seen
as a big reversal for consumer politics in Germany. They felt that an ombudsman system
that was based on many local ones, as existed in some of the Länder,184 would not be
preferable to a single national scheme, as ombudsman.de had been, but the government
would have to fund it.
Energy
A conciliation body for energy, Schlichtungsstelle Energie,185 was established in October 2011
as a scheme recognized by the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection for the extra-judicial settlement of disputes
between energy companies and consumers. It is sponsored jointly by energy associations186
and the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. The conciliation board is intended to be
independent, neutral, non-bureaucratic, and free to the consumer. An energy company
complained against pays a case-fee as set in a cost regulation.187 The Ombudsman is Dr
Dieter Wolst, a former federal court judge.
Under the Energy Act,188 utility companies, meter operators and metering services are
obliged to deal with complaints from consumers, in relation to concluding a contract or
for quality of services provided by the company, within four weeks. If the complaint is not
rectified, the company must explain why in writing or electronically. Complaints can be
made about the following matters:
• connection to the supply network,
• usage of the connection,
• energy supply,
• measurement of energy.
If a satisfactory agreement is not reached, the conciliation board is the next step, and the
conciliation body can only be accessed if the customer can prove that the claim made
previously against the energy company was unsuccessfully asserted.189 The process then
begins through filling out an online claim form190 or sending an email or fax. The energy
companies are obliged by law to take part in the concilliation process. Once the Ombudsman
184
For example those in Hessen and Baden-Württemberg, see www.online-schlichter.de/de/index.php.
185
http://www.schlichtungsstelle-energie.de/index.php?id=2.
186
Verbände der Energiewirtschaft .
187
http://www.schlichtungsstelle-energie.de/fileadmin/Download/Kostenordnung_Schlichtungsstelle_19.09.
2011-Gruendung-.pdf.
188
Since 4 August 2011, Energy Act (EnWG) s 111a and b regulates the right of consumers to approach the
arbitraiton board after unsuccessfully dealing with the energy company. The legal relationship between consumers
and utilities arises primarily from the contract with the utility contract. Also relevant are the Energy Management
Act (Energy Act EnWG), the basic electricity supply regulation (StromGVV), the gas basic service regulation
(GasGVV), the low voltage connection Regulation (NAV), the low pressure connection Regulation (NDAV) and
the Civil Code (BGB).
189
Energy Act (EnWG), s 111a and b.
190
https://secure.e-consult-ag.de/e.consult.6489/webakte/beschwerde_extern.asp.

Germany 115
has decided the admissibility of the claim according to the rules of procedure,191 the energy
company has two weeks to respond to the complaint. The Ombudsman then determines
the facts on the basis of the law and issues a non-binding recommendation. Both sides then
have four weeks to let the Ombudsman know if they will follow the recommendations or
not. The entire complaint process should be finished within three months.
Conclusions
The appearance of private sector alternative dispute resolution schemes for consumer
disputes in Germany is comparatively recent. Major reasons why consumer ADR has not
emerged as quickly as in some neighbouring states are, first, that the enforcement system
for consumer law places a great deal of emphasis on prevention and speedy cessation of
infringements backed by the threat of injunctions in the courts, and the fact that the court
procedures in Germany for seeking damages are comparatively swift and efficient, and
the predictable and low costs regimes have lead to widespread legal expenses insurance.
Hence, there has been less need to develop new pathways for ADR for consumer disputes
in Germany compared with other countries.
However, some sectors, led by insurers, have started to introduce ombudsmen systems,
in order to resolve disputes even more swiftly and cheaply than through the courts, and
in order to maintain the client relationship and avoid unnecessary adverse publicity. The
Insurance Ombudsman model has been notably successful, and has been copied in the
transport and other sectors.
Complaint procedures also exist within various regulatory bodies, but have not been
particularly widely used.
The current situation is that consumer ADR is at a relatively early state, but is developing
into a confused state of diversity in the types and coverage of ADR bodies. There is
considerable variation in the caseload attracted by individual bodies, and some are simply
not known about. This diversity in models can confuse consumers, who need a simple ADR
structure that is easily comprehensible.
Most ADR schemes in Germany have a regional geographical coverage, while 12 schemes
report a national geographical coverage.192 The sectoral gaps most frequently mentioned by
stakeholder organisations are games of chance, scams and pyramid schemes, food services/
products, transport, and package travel/tourism. The existence of guilds was an important
factor for the development of sector specific ADR schemes.
The European Commission statistics that indicate that there are many consumer ADR
bodies in Germany are seriously misleading, since the bodies that have been notified are
largely a raft of new bodies that have been created to offer general mediation services,
spurred by the high profile that has been given to implementation of the EU Mediation
Directive in Germany. A wide debate about the introduction into German civil procedure
of a mediation procedure has obscured the reality that mediation-alongside-court-claims is
a different animal from consumer ADR.
191
http://www.schlichtungsstelle-energie.de/fileadmin/Download/Verfahrensordnung.pdf.
192
DG SANCO, Study on the use of ADR (2009).

5
Lithuania
Christopher Hodges
Overview
Lithuania has a national heritage from Soviet times of a centralised state bureaucracy.
Citizens and businesses still tend to look to the State to provide solutions, but they do
not necessarily trust State institutions, including judges. The adoption of Parliamentary
democracy and of EU market legislation is still recent, and although many EU rules have
been enacted, the institutions that operate them are both new and, paradoxically, based
on a Soviet heritage. This can clearly be seen in relation to the enforcement of consumer
protection law.
Although Lithuania has a court system that functions effectively, costs little and attracts
a significant volume of cases compared with a population of 3.2 million, it is still too slow
(and more expensive) compared with the consumer ADR system. The ADR system is
attractive to consumers since it is free. The consumer complaint system is institutionalised
in the consumer protection legislation, and integrated within the state enforcement bodies.
This arrangement enables the Authorities an opportunity to use complaint data in their
market surveillance, and as a basis to respond quickly to developing trends. However, not
all Authorities have yet developed the ability to take full advantage of the opportunities, and
usage of the ADR system is probably hindered by the fact that decisions are not binding on
traders.
Consumer representation in Lithuania is diffused by the existence of several consumer
organizations, including the National Consumer Confederation (founded in 2003 as an
umbrella association),1 the Lithuanian Consumer Institute (established in 2000),2 the
Lithuanian Consumer Union,3 and the Consumer Rights Protection Centre.4
Courts
For civil proceedings, Lithuania has a first tier level of around 54 District Courts, a second
tier of five Regional Courts, with appeals to a Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court,
1
vartotojai.eu; vartotojuteises.lt/apie_lnvf/lnvf_ataskaitos/lithuanian_national_consumer_federation.
2
www.vartotojai.lt/en.
3
www.lvks.lt.
4
mereckas@centras.lt.

being a court of cassation.5 Procedure is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure of the
Republic of Lithuania. A party has to pay court charges (‘stamp duty’), court expenses
related to examination of the case, and the fees of any lawyer hired. The amount of stamp
duty is prescribed,6 and the current sums are shown in Table 5.1.7
Table 5.1: Court stamp duty charges in civil disputes8
Nature of dispute Court fees

Property disputes not exceeding ca. LTL 100,000 3 per cent of the amount of the claim, but not
less than ca. LTL 50
Property disputes over ca. LTL 100,000 but not ca. LTL 3,000 plus 2 per cent of the amount of
exceeding ca. LTL 300,000 the claim exceeding ca. LTL 100,000
Property disputes over ca. LTL 300,000 ca. LTL 7,000 plus 1 per cent of the amount of
the claim exceeding ca. LTL 300,000 . The total
amount of court fees cannot constitute more
than ca. LTL 30,000
In any other disputes, ie non property disputes ca. LTL 100
Application for a court order ¼ of the amount payable for the lawsuit, but not
Application for documentary proceedings ½ of the amount payable for the lawsuit, but not
Non-contentious proceedings ca. LTL 100
Application for review of default judgment ca. LTL 50
Appeal against judgments and cassation appeals Same as payable for primary lawsuit
Application for renewal of court proceedings ca. LTL 100
A person may be partially or entirely exempted from the obligation to pay court charges,
where the court reviews the applicant’s personal circumstances,9 or, inter alia, where the
claim is for damages caused by personal injuries or death, or property or non-property
damages caused by criminal offence.10
A person may also be exempt from paying court charges if they are granted legal aid.
Primary legal aid covers consultations and general pre-litigation advice, usually provided by
municipal officers, although it also can be provided by lawyers or non-profit organisations.
Secondary legal aid, which can be provided only by lawyers,11 covers drafting of legal
instruments, defence and representation in the court proceedings. Applicants must qualify
under requirements on levels of assets and income, for which there are two levels: those
eligible are refunded 100 per cent or 50 per cent of the secondary legal aid costs, depending
on whether they qualify at the first or second level respectively.12 Qualification for
5
This section is based on information from Dr Rimantas Simaitis, including his Report on Costs and Funding
in Lithuania (on file with the author). There is also a system of Administrative Courts, not considered here.
6
Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure, Art 80.
7
R Simaitis, Bylinejimosi islaidos civiliniame procese [Litigation costs in civil procedure] (Vilnius, Justia, 2007)
92–106. According to the results of a survey, performed in 2005–2006, stamp duty covers only up to 8–9 per cent
of the true costs of operation of the courts in Lithuania.
8
As at 21 December 2010, 1 Lithuanian Litas = 0.29 Euro [1:0.289622]. See: www.lb.lt/exchange/default.
asp?lang=e.
9
Code of Civil Procedure, Art 83(3).
10
11
Law on Legal Aid, Art 17.
12
Secondary legal aid is administered by specialised regional non-profit organisations, established by the
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Bar is responsible for supervision of the qualification of
lawyers that provide secondary legal aid.

Lithuania 119
secondary legal aid excuses a person from liability to pay the stamp duty in civil litigation.
Grant of legal aid does not exempt a party from liability for and court expenses related to
examination of the case, and the fees of any lawyer: those may be reimbursed, at least in
part, by an opponent if the case is won, discussed below.
The court expenses that a party will be required to pay cover the costs of any expert
appointed by the court,13 translator, bailiff, or expenses related to process,14 enforcement
of a judgment.15 A party will also have to pay the expenses of any witness to attend court.
Lawyers’ fees are subject to agreement between client and lawyer,16 and only regulated
in relation to legal aid.17 Lawyers’ fees are usually capped, either for the whole assignment
(eg representation of the client in a particular dispute), or for a particular service (eg
preparation of a lawsuit). However, an hourly fee rate remains very common. The ability to
agree a contingency fee in civil cases was introduced in 1999.18 The amount of an advocate’s
fee that depends on the outcome of the case must not contradict the principles governing
the practice of advocates: case law has established that 50 percent of the amount awarded is
considered to conflict with such principles.
When the court adopts final judgment in a case it is obliged to allocate the parties’ liability
to reimburse litigation expenses incurred by the court and parties,19 which include the costs
of witnesses, experts, court procedure costs described above.20 The general rule is that the
party in whose favour judgment was made is to be indemnified by the other party, though
the latter is not required to pay the stamp duty into the state budget. Where a claim is partly
satisfied, the litigation expenses have to be awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to the part
of the claims satisfied by the court, and to the defendant in proportion to the part of the
claims that were refused by the court. Reimbursement of a lawyer’s fees are subject to a tariff
of maximum amounts21 approved by the Minister of Justice together with the Chairman of
the Council of the Bar, but subject to consideration by the court of the complexity of the
case and time spent on the matter.22
There is a small claims procedure for claims up to LTL 5,000 (about € 1450), under which
the normal costs rules are applied.23
Litigation is frequently used to resolve disputes in Lithuania. In 2010, 201,585 new civil
court cases were initiated:24 data is shown in Table 5.2. It appears that only around 10 per
13
Code of Civil Procedure, Art 212. Sums to be paid for experts and method of calculation are set out in
Resolution No 344 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 6 December 2002. Under Art 90 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, a party who files a request to appoint an expert is obliged to pay in advance a deposit to cover
the litigation expenses, in an amount established by the court. If both parties require an expertise, they are obliged
to pay the deposit in equal parts. If the court on its own initiative calls expertise, the expenses shall be paid from
the state budget.
14
15
16
Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, Art 50.
17
Particular fees are set forth in the Resolution No 69 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 22
January 2001.
18
Law on the Bar, Art 50.
19
20
21
set out in the Order No 1R‑85 of the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania of 2 April 2004. Under
para 8 of that Order, the maximum remuneration of expenses incurred by the party for legal assistance is capped
either in relation to the whole amount or in relation to a maximum hourly rate.
22
23
24
National Courts Administration, Annual Report on Activities of Lithuanian Courts in 2010, (2011, National
Courts Administration,Vilnius) available at www.teismai.lt.

cent of cases are settled before judgment. More than 90 per cent of all civil disputes are
usually determined within 6 months, but complex cases can take longer than a year.25
Appeal costs are similar to the costs of first instance, and appeals or cassation usually take 6
months. The percentage of cases appealed in 2010 was around 6.43 per cent.
Table 5.2: Litigation rates in Lithuania.26
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cases 118121 127992 127992 152132 148019 145705 156330 185878 236556 201585
commenced
Cases solved 117428 125372 125372 149646 148750 145286 153436 180071 229221 205423
Pending cases No data No data 9314 17523 17121 17320 18331 21365 35333 31056
Peaceful No data No data No data No data 801 2441 2650 3467 4601 5246
settlements
The Rules of Court Mediation govern court mediation, but this technique is only used
in a small number of cases, and where the parties agree. The Council of Judges approved
the use of mediation in civil cases in all Lithuanian courts in January 2007. Mediation is
conducted in the court by special mediators, who are judges or assistant judges, or persons
with the necessary qualification under the Code of Conduct of European Mediators. If the
mediation ends with a settlement agreement, the agreement is confirmed by the court and
has the power of a court decision.
Arbitration is available but restricted to resolving business-to-business disputes.27 In 2009
the Vilnius Court of Commercial Arbitration received 18 domestic and 21 international
cases, almost all large commercial disputes involving significant sums of money, although
15 per cent were shareholder cases.28
There is a debate about the introduction of a class action procedure. Currently, part 45
of Article 49 of the Civil Procedure Code foresees the possibility of seeking to protect the
public interest through a group claim, but no group action procedure is provided for. A
Concept Paper was presented in 2009 by a working group of the Ministry of Justice. A draft
law that would introduce a Class Action procedure was published in January 2012.
In summary, the cost that a consumer would have to pay to bring a low value claim
against a trader would be roughly around €163–610 (stamp duty of LTL 50 (ca. €15), court
expenses for postal services around LTL10-50 (ca. €3–15) and lawyers’ fee of around LTL
500-2000 (ca. €145–580). These figures reflect litigation in one court instance, and would
need to be multiplied if the case is appealed. They also exclude calculation of the potential
liability for adverse party litigation costs, under the ‘loser pays’ rule.
25
National Courts Administration, Annual Report on Activities of Lithuanian Courts in 2008, (2009, National
Courts Administration,Vilnius) available at www.teismai.lt.
26
ibid.
27
Under the Law on Commercial Arbitration, Art 11, disputes arising from sale agreements (as well as disputes
arising from constitutional claims, the employment relationship, family law, administrative legal relations, disputes
connected with competition, patents, trademarks and service marks, and bankruptcy) may not be submitted to
arbitration.
28
See www.arbitrazas.lt/VCCA_statistics_web1.pdf.

Lithuania 121
Public Sector Ombudsman
The Seimas Ombudsmen29 investigate citizens’ complaints concerning the abuse of office
and bureaucracy of officers of state, government and administration institutions, local
government institutions, military institutions and institution ranking as such. The activities
of the President of the Republic, members of the Seimas, the Prime Minister, the Government
(as a collegial institution), the State Controller and judges of the Constitutional Court and
other courts, municipal councils (as collegial institutions), also the legality and validity of
procedural decisions of the prosecutors, investigators and officers conducting the inquiry
are outside the Seimas Ombudsman’s powers of investigation. The Seimas Ombudsmen
does not investigate complaints arising from the labour legal relations, complaints that
are subject to court investigation, or complaints about the legality and validity of court
decisions, judgments and rulings.
Integrated Regulatory and ADR System
Consumer protection policy in Lithuania and its institutional framework is relatively recent.30
The first Law on Consumer Protection was enacted in 1994, amended in 2001 (establishing
a National Consumer Rights Protection Board), and again in 2007,31 implementing the
EU unfair consumer practices legislation and a 2003 National Strategy for Consumer
Rights Protection and Lithuanian National Consumer Education Programme. One of the
key purposes of that Strategy was to ‘aim for establishment of an alternative out-of-court
settlement of disputes mechanism in all the areas of Consumer Protection’.
The Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania32 not establishes only
substantive rules on consumer protection but also an institutional system for the protection
of consumer rights.33 In particular, it establishes the State Consumer Rights Protection
Authority34 as a public body, reporting to the Ministry of Justice. The State Consumer Rights
Protection Authority is given functions that include ensuring the protection of consumer
rights; coordination of the activities of various consumer rights protection institutions;
controlling standard terms and conditions of contracts; applying sanctions for breach of
consumer law; and provision of consumer ADR.35
This Authority has about 65 staff, including 33 lawyers, divided into two internal
Commissions: one deals with fines and sanctions, and the other with consumer ADR. It
has a number of enforcement powers but does not supervise the market. Thus, a breach of
the Unfair Commercial Practices legislation could be raised with a trader by the Authority:
if the trader did not change its practice, the Authority could institute a court enforcement
procedure, acting in the public interest (and in effect in a collective capacity). Such an
29
See www.lrski.lt/index.php?l=EN.
30
See www.ecc.lt.
31
Law on prohibition of unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, available at: www3.lrs.lt/pls/
inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=315866.
32
See www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=362796.
33
Law on Consumer Protection, Art 1.1.
34
See vvtat.lt.
35
Law on Consumer Protection, Art 12.

action is classed as a civil action, rather than a criminal procedure. The remedy would be a
declaration or injunction, but not compensation. The Authority has power to impose a fine,
within statutory maxima and minima set by law for infringements of different provisions,
such as advertising, food safety, product safety, unfair commercial practices. Alternatively,
an individual consumer could pursue a private enforcement action, and the Authority
would provide an expert opinion to the court in the case.
The State Consumer Rights Protection Authority is responsible for coordinating the
activities of a number of other sectoral Authorities in relation to consumer protection
issues, including:
• Food and Veterinary Authority36
• State Non-Food Products Inspectorate under the Ministry of Economy37
• National tourism department under the Ministry of Economy38
• Civil Aviation Administration39
• State Public Health Service under the Ministry of Health40
• State Energy Inspectorate under the Ministry of Energy41
The Law on Consumer Protection sets out a specific and detailed regime for resolving
consumer complaints out of court,42 which applies in addition to the right to pursue a claim
in court.43 A consumer who presumes that his rights have been infringed by a seller or service
supplier must first contact such seller or supplier and make a specific request, to which the
trader must, within ten working days, provide a reasoned written reply, substantiated with
documents.44 If the trader fails to satisfy the consumer’s request and it relates to unsafe or
inadequate quality of goods or services, the latter may then complain to the relevant Service,
Inspectorate or Health Service, which must consider and respond to the complaint in a
specified manner.45 A consumer also has a right to file a complaint with the State Consumer
Rights Protection Authority or one of the following specialist authorities:46
1. the Communications Regulatory Authority,47 which handles disputes in electronic
communication services, post and courier services;48
2. the Insurance Supervisory Commission,49 which handles disputes on insurance;50
3. the State Energy Inspectorate of the Ministry of Energy,51 which handles complaints
about consumer protection issues provided in the Law on Energy;52
36
See www.vet.lt.
37
See ww.vnmpi.lt.
38
See www.tourism.lt/en.
39
See www.caa.lt.
40
See www.vvspt.lt/en.
41
See www.vei.lt/index.php?id=522.
42
Law on Consumer Protection, ch 6.
43
See further, V Mizaras, ‘Lithuania – National Report’ in J Stuyck et al, Study on alternative means of consumer
redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings (Catholic University of Leuven, 2007), at http://
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.
44
45
46
Law on Consumer Protection, Arts 22 and 23.
47
See rrt.lt/en/home.html.
48
Law on Electronic Communications, Art 4; Law on Post, Art 3.
49
See www.dpk.lt/en/.
50
Law on Insurance of 18 September 2003, Arts 2 and 192 to 207.
51
See www.vei.lt/index.php?id=522 .
52
Law on Energy (Arts 18 and 26 para 2). The State Energy Inspectorate is required to operate a preliminary
procedure for administration of complaints without judicial proceedings, considers complaints regarding

Lithuania 123
4. the National Commission for Prices and Energy,53 which deals with consumer
complaints in the areas provided in the Law on Energy;54
5. any other bodies established for consumer protection purposes by law.
Prior to January 2012, separate ADR schemes for disputes in the financial service sector
existed for banking (within the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority’s ADR
scheme), insurance (the Insurance Supervisory Commission, noted above), and securities
(under the Lithuanian Securities Commission). As of that date, supervision of financial
markets, including the responsibility for provision of ADR in the above three schemes) was
transferred to the Bank of Lithuania.
The State Consumer Rights Protection Authority therefore operates as a single residual
ADR facility, supplementing the similar systems of the specialist sectoral Authorities. It is
currently the only ADR institution in Lithuania that is notified to the European Commission.
It receives around 12,000 complaints a year, and around 2,300 requests for ADR. The ADR
procedure is a conciliation procedure, operated like a small court procedure, and is free
of charge to consumers: the consumer ADR system is funded by the State, but parties
themselves bear any costs incurred. Examples of how two sectoral Authorities handle
complaints are given below.
Procedure
The same procedure is specified in the Law on Consumer Protection for all consumer
ADR complaints to any of the designated Authorities. It is described as settling disputes ‘in
compliance with the adversarial principle and principles of case expedition and transparency’
and requiring an Authority to ‘disclose the essence of the dispute, examine the available
evidence and take measures for conciliating the parties’.55 The Authorities do not act as
representatives of consumers’ interests, but as independent decision-makers. The procedure
shall be free of charge to consumers,56 in order to ‘give consumers greater confidence in the
independence of the ADR provider and the impartiality of the decision taken.’57
An application must be in writing, attaching copies of relevant documents and specifying
certain particulars, including the names and addresses of the consumer and trader, the
rights alleged to have been infringed, the consumer’s requests, information on a prior
complaint to the trader, and whether any other complaint or legal claim has been made.58
A consumer association may represent consumers. The Authority must determine whether
the complaint is admissible, and then send the documents to the trader, requesting ‘within
10 days … written exhaustive explanations and the documents substantiating them’.59 It
may call on experts from other relevant agencies before making a decision in the form of
a settlement proposal to the trader. The Authority will normally make a decision using a
damage in relation to energy facilities, equipment and accounting devices, violations in operation, energy quality
requirements, energy accounting and payment for the energy consumed, accidents, interruption, suspension or
restriction of energy supply and so on.
53
See www.regula.lt/en/about-us/.
54
Law on Energy, Art 17.
55
Law on Consumer Protection, Art 25.3 and 25.4.
56
Law on Consumer Protection, Art 25.9.
57
Response to EU ADR Consultation, Ministry of Justice of Lithuania, 2011.
58
59

written procedure, but has discretion to adopt an oral procedure when necessary.60 Oral
hearings are open to the public.
The Authority’s decisions are not binding. If the trader and the consumer accept
a decision, it becomes a binding contract between the parties. If the Authority receives
notification that a trader has not implemented a decision within the time specified for this,
the Authority may publicise this fact on its website.61
Statistics
Cases take on average 37 working days to complete: far quicker than court procedures. In
the period from January 2010 through September 2011, the Authority investigated 2,290
disputes through the ADR procedure. Figures for 2010 alone have not been available. Of
these:
• 45 per cent (1020) were settled by the parties before the Authority adopted a decision.
• 7.7 per cent (163) were terminated under one of the reasons provided for in the Law,
such as involving no breach of the law, or as being an invalid complaint.
• 48 per cent (1107) involved adoption of a decision by the Authority. Of these,
consumers were wholly successful in 72 per cent (797) and partially successful in 16
per cent (180), and traders were successful in 16 per cent (180).
In that period, traders complied with the Authority’s decisions in 33 per cent of cases: the
66 per cent of non-compliance included a number of cases caused by bankruptcy of traders.
The main sectors in which complaints were received were:
• Consumer goods and services 44% 1017
• Food products, tourism and recreational services 28% 641
• Unfair commercial practice, advertising and construction 15% 347
• Financial services 9% 206
• Energy and utilities 1.5% 34
• Others (sale of mortgages, legal services etc) 2% 45
Communications
The Communications Regulatory Authority is required to ensure that safe and affordable
electronic communications and postal services are available to every consumer.62 It has
a shared competence with the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority, and the two
agencies collaborate when required: the latter is responsible for the unfair consumer
protection legislation. They redirect consumer complaints between them.63 As a result
of the specific competence of each agency, it is possible to end up with two decisions in
relation to a single complaint.
The Communications Regulatory Authority has been able to receive complaints online
since 2007, and this has become popular with consumers, who upload relevant documents.
60
61
62
Law on Electronic Communications.
63
The ADR provisions are at Law on Electronic Communications, Art 36.

Lithuania 125
This facility enables complaints to be processed speedily. It has never received a complaint
from a consumer association.
The Communications Regulatory Authority uses the data that it receives to identify
any market problems, whether with companies complained about or other companies or
the market generally. It raises issues in regular meetings with companies, and publicises
information on their activities (such as where rules on portability are not respected).
Companies do not like such adverse publicity, and the Authority finds that they usually
respond quickly when issues are raised. That attitude may be affected by the fact that most
are multinationals, and have a responsive behaviour pattern. The Lithuanian Authority
raises and cross-border issues (but not individual ADR complaints) with its correspondent
National Enforcement Bodies in other Member States (lost post arises regularly). It finds
that it does not need to resort to the ECC network.
The costs of the Authority are in effect paid by the market, through supervisory operating
fees levied on operators. Thus, it is slightly misleading to say that the State funds the ADR
system for this sector.
Statistics are published in annual reports, summarised at Table 5.3. In 2010,64 there
were 590 complaints,65 and the number is increasing. Of these, 70 related to the quality of
service, 181 to billing, and 106 to other issues (eg tariffs, conditions of agreements, number
portability). Service providers settled 158 during the complaint process (in other words,
the supplier conceded), and the Authority issued 32 decisions in favour of consumers and
23 in favour of service providers. The deadline for dealing with complaints is one month,
but some take longer as it sometimes takes time for a party to provide all the relevant
information: the average time is currently two months.
Table 5.3: Complaint data for communications
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Total 238 281 362 448 1513 590
Regarding quality 46 42 56 74 54 70
Regarding billing 146 178 221 229 318 181
Other issues 46 61 85 145 1141 106
The Authority believes that a potentially far larger number of consumer complaints are settled
voluntarily, and are not raised with the Authority, because of the nature of the regulatory
system. In this sector, there is little problem over compliance by traders with the decisions
of the Authority. This is because the Authority is enabled under the primary legislation to
establish secondary legislation, the Rules for the Provision of Electronic Commerce Services.
The Authority amends these Rules as necessary, after consultation with the market through
regular meetings, so as to clarify conduct on any issues that arise. Hence, if a systemic
problem is identified through complaints directed at any single provider, it can be solved for
the future in relation to all providers and their customers, by means of a Rule change. The
Authority has not, therefore, heard of any non-compliance with its recommendations in
individual complaints, whether from consumers or from subsequent court cases instituted
by either side. Decision on complaints have the status of executive documents, which can be
64
Rysiu Reguliavimo Tarnyba, Annual Report 2010, (2011, Communications Regulatory Authority of Lithuania,
Vilnius), available at www.rrt.lt/en/reviews-and-reports/rrt-annual-repots.html.
65
In 2009, there were 1,513 complaints, caused because one communications service provider changed the
conditions of the agreement with most of its subscribers.

enforced by a National Regulatory Authority under EU legislation, so are in effect binding.

Although the Authority has formal enforcement powers, these are hardly ever used, since
issues are resolved through regular discussion with providers, which take place against the
background that that Authority has ultimate power to amend the Rules, after consultation.
The most effective potential sanction is that the General Activity Conditions that apply
to providers’ licences to operate include the right for the Authority to impose not only
economic sanctions but also impose temporary suspensions of activities. In practice, the
Authority finds that it is enough to ‘name and shame’ companies, thereby keeping the more
powerful sanctions as a rarely used but effective threat. It has found that companies have
become more sensitive to their reputations as the market has developed.
The Authority maintains internal separation between divisions responsible for ADR and
regulation. The legal function assists both. It views the ADR system as an essential regulatory
tool, enabling it to respond quickly and consistently to market issues. If consumers were to
raise complaints in court, the Authority would lose having access to the information and
have greater difficulty in aggregating it to identify trends.
Civil Aviation Administration
The Civil Aviation Administration handles enforcement and complaints as a National

Enforcement Body (NEB) under EU legislation,66 and also handles other air passenger
complaints, such as carriers’ liability for lost or damaged luggage under the Montreal
Convention 1999 or Regulation 889/2006. As an enforcement body, the Civil Aviation
Administration’s primary objectives are security and safety. Accordingly, its enforcement
emphasis is on prevention (providing information to passengers and providers) rather than
on sanctions, although sanctions are sometimes imposed. The Code of Administrative
Violations of Lithuania prescribes financial penalties for breach if the regulations, although
the sanctions are limited to between 1000 LTL and 3000 LTL, so very low.
Most consumer contacts to the Authority are requests for information, rather than
complaints.
Recent complaints statistics do not include contacts arising out of two bankruptcies:
Star1 Airlines (which led to 760 requests for assistance) and flyLAL – Lithuanian Airlines
(LAL). The Civil Aviation Administration usually asks consumers to talk to carriers first,
but this can sometimes be difficult, in which case it will contact airlines itself.
Complaint statistics are not published, but are included in reports to the European
Commission and the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority. Cross-border complaints
are forwarded to NEBs in other Member States. The main types of complaints in recent
years are shown at Table 5.4. Delayed boarding is the most frequent issue. The number
of complaints upheld or dismissed in 2011 and 2011 is at Table 5.5. The Civil Aviation
Administration does not have information on the outcomes of complaints.
66
Under Regulations 261/2004, 2111/2005 (Chapter III), 1107/2006 and 1008/2002 (Chapter IV).

Lithuania 127
Table 5.4: Air Transport Passenger Complaints handled by the Lithuanian Civil Aviation
Administration
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Total number of complaints 35 89 67 102 62 84 63
Regulation 261/2004 21 62 41 59 40 64 50
1. Delay 10 9 26 15 20 23 23
2. Cancellation of flight 5 46 13 31 17 36 21
3. Denied boarding 6 7 2 13 3 5 6
Delayed, damages or lost baggage 4 10 11 17 5 3 3
(under Montreal Convention)
1. Damaged baggage 1 2 1 5 1 1 0
2. Delayed baggage 1 1 3 5 3 2 1
3. Lost baggage 2 7 4 7 1 0 0
Regulation 1008/2008 (prices)67 – – – – – 11 5
Regulation 1107/2006 (reduced – – – – – 0 0
mobility)68
Other complaints 10 17 15 26 17 6 5
Table 5.5: Complaints upheld and dismissed
2010 2011
Complaints upheld 71 37
Complaints not upheld 13 26
Cross-border Complaints
The ECC-Lithuania office was established in 2005 and has been very active in promotional
activities. It has a facebook page, makes regular radio and television appearances (twice a
week), uses skype, and has close links with the media and magazines. Eighty per cent of the
contacts that it receives are requests for information, and only 20 per cent are complaints.
The two most populated areas are e.commerce and air passenger rights. At the end of 2011
it was handling 143 outgoing complaints, mainly over traders in Latvia, Germany and the
United Kingdom. Some e.commerce issues relate to non- or partial delivery, but some
are criminal scams (such as buying cars online) and can only be referred to the police. In
2011, 34 cases were resolved in the consumer’s favour, and 20 were not resolved: the reason
for non-resolution is often the non-binding nature of any non-court ADR process. ADR
decisions in Latvia are binding, and so the consumer Authority there has greater ability to
resolve issues. The EU small claims procedure is sometimes the only option, but it is rarely
used by consumers.
67
Complaints about prices involve agencies as well as carriers.
68
Complaints about reduced mobility often involve airport operators rather than carriers.

Conclusion
Lithuania has a unified consumer out-of-court complaints resolution system, which is

free of charge to consumers. The ADR system is integrated into the regulatory authorities.
Complaints may be made to sectoral regulatory Authorities, or to the State Consumer
Rights Protection Authority. The State Consumer Rights Protection Authority has a high
national profile. However, it considers that there is a lack of consumer information and
awareness about ADR.69 It is concerned that the major flaw in the current system is that
decisions are not binding on traders, so compliance rates are lower than they should be. The
procedure is adversarial in nature, similar in concept to a judicial procedure.
The architecture of the system, like Sweden, provides full coverage for disputes in any
consumer trading sector. Various sectors are covered by specialist arrangements, and the
sectors are collated by the ‘residual’ function of the State Consumer Rights Protection
Authority.
Whilst statistics about consumer disputes will inherently be available to the regulatory
enforcement authorities, there is not yet full public transparency of data on disputes, sectors
and traders. It is, therefore, difficult to evaluate whether the authorities themselves are
functioning well as either ADR or enforcement bodies.
69
‘In Lithuania there are no long established ADR traditions and consumers do not have much knowledge of,
or confidence in, ADR bodies.’ Response to EU ADR Consultation, State Consumer Rights Protection Authority
of Lithuania, 2011.

6
The Netherlands
Franziska Weber and Christopher Hodges
Summary
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Netherlands is based on a well-established structure

and operation of Consumer Complaint Commissions1 (Geschillencommissies). The
Commissions operate within a wider structure that contains three elements:
1. Agreement of the Terms and Conditions that will apply within a trade sector. These
are negotiated between the relevant trade association and the national consumer
association (Consumentenbond) and sometimes in cooperation with sectoral consumer
associations like Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond ANWB and Vereniging Eigen
Huis (VEH).
2. Disputes in many sectors are referred to an ADR process overseen by an independent
Foundation of Complaint Commissions (Stichting Geschillencommissies voor
Consumentenzaken), which creates and operates sectoral arbitration Commissions.
The process includes direct negotiation between customer and trader, conciliation/
mediation, and finally arbitration. The process is notably simple, cheap, effective and
widely supported. It has the advantage that it is a national framework, so can maintain
both high visibility for consumers and traders, combining sectoral variations within a
general model, and a high quality of independence and process delivery.
3. The outputs of the Commissions’ decisions are used by traders and their trade
associations for self-regulatory purposes in improving their operations. Summaries of
important decisions are made publicly available, so as to act as precedents.
The financial services sector has a separate structure, with its own Ombudsman who
operates as a first tier, its own Commission as second tier, plus an appeal Commission as
third tier.
The first part of this chapter notes the strong national culture of settlement and ADR in
the Netherlands, from which the various sectoral Geschillencommissies grew and flourished.
Then, the structure and operation of the Geschillencommissies are examined and illustrated
in more detail by the examples of the travel and web-trading sectors respectively. Finally,
the slightly different financial sector arrangements are discussed and general conclusions
are made.
1
The word commissie is sometimes translated as commission, committee or board: the first option has been
chosen here.

National Culture of Negotiated Settlement
The culture of the Netherlands is strikingly consistent in relation to dispute resolution as

between public and private sectors, in adopting a uniformly conflict-avoiding approach to
disputes.2 The Netherlands has a distinct and firmly established culture of resolving disputes
out of court as a primary mechanism and as an alternative to the courts.3 The Dutch have
a reputation for tolerance, concern for justice,4 pragmatism and respect for human rights.
National characteristics are hospitality, friendliness, tolerance, fair-mindedness, and an
ability to trade and hence negotiate.5 The development of a culture of achieving pragmatic
consensual solutions through settling disputes through direct and facilitated negotiation
within less adversarial and confrontational settings and frameworks is consistent with
that national culture.6 Public support for the justice system in the Netherlands has long
been extremely high,7 and remains so, although it appears that there is now a considerable
level of discontent with legal institutions, especially in relation to a perceived lack of
punitiveness and responsiveness of the justice system on the criminal side.8
This national approach is central to the ADR bodies discussed in this chapter. But those
ADR systems can be seen in clearer perspective by also considering three other examples,
namely the integration of ADR in the normal litigation system, the approach of the National
Ombudsman in overseeing disputes involving public sector bodies, and the unique court
procedure for settling mass litigation.
Principles of the Civil Court System

A primary principle of Dutch legal doctrine is that although people should have access to
justice, litigation should only be available as an ultimum remedium after all other options
have been exhausted.9 That policy underpins the principle that litigation should not be free,10
so litigation costs serve as an incentive to parties only to use litigation after other routes,
especially ADR.11 The concept of fairness (billijkheid) also underpins the loser pays rule.12
2
See G Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across
nations 2nd ed (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 2011).
3
See ML Tuil, ‘The Netherlands’, in C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka, The Costs and Funding of Civil
Litigation. A Comparative Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).
4
Leading illustrations of this international reputation can be seen from the location in The Hague of the United
Nations International Criminal Court and Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.
5
See S Buckland, Netherlands. The Essential Guide to Customs N Culture (London, Kuperard, 2008).
6
See E Blankenburg, ‘Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures’ in D Nelken, Comparing Legal
Cultures (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997); E Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared
to Neighbouring Germany’ (1998) 46 (1) American Journal of Comparative Law 1; F Bruinsma, ‘Judges and
Lawyers in the Netherlands—an Overview from 1970 till 2000’ in W Felstiner (ed), Reorganisation and Resistance:
Legal Professions Confront a Changing World (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005); F Van Waarden, ‘The Societal and
Historical Embededness of Dutch Corporatism’ in F Van Waarden and G Lembruch (eds), Renegotiating the
Welfare State (London, Routledge, 2003).
7
JL Gibson and GA Caldeira, ‘The Legal Cultures of Europe’ (1996) 30 Law & Society Review 55 characterised
the Netherlands as one of the most law-abiding countries in Europe. See also E Blankenburg and F Bruinsma,
Dutch Legal Culture (Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994), 76.
8
M Hertogh, ‘The Curious Case of Dutch Legal Culture. A Reassessment of Survey Evidence’ (2010) 5 Journal
of Comparative Law 2.
9
HJ Snijders, CJM Klaassen and GJ Meijer, Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht (Deventer, Kluwer, 2007), 56.
10
ibid, no 28.
11
Tuil, ‘The Netherlands’ (2010).

The Netherlands 131
Mark Tuil has summarized the ways in which the above principles are implemented into
rules of professional conduct for lawyers, the rules on civil procedure, and on legal aid:13
… the rules of conduct for lawyers stipulate that a lawyer should realise that a settlement is often
preferable to a litigated outcome.14 This rule places a duty on lawyers to try to effect a settlement.
If a case is still brought before the court, the court will, after the parties have stated their case in
their initial briefs, order the parties and their representatives to appear for a meeting (comparitie
or mondelinge behandeling). Such a meeting has multiple purposes. Among those purposes is the
exploration of the possibility of a settlement.15 The judge may facilitate the settlement by giving
a preliminary view of the case.16 Parties are also encouraged to settle their disputes by way of
mediation. For this purpose, the Netherlands have a system of court-annexed mediation. The first
2.5 hours of mediation are provided free of charge.17 Any subsequent hours are billed to the parties,
who have to decide how to divide these costs. A mediator will cost approximately €150 per hour.18
Mediation is also covered by legal aid. Settlement is further facilitated by the possibility of the
provisional examination of witnesses or a provisional report by an expert.19 These measures aim
to reduce uncertainty, thereby facilitating a settlement. In some (rare) instances the law obligates
parties to negotiate before they are allowed to start their suit.20
The government has pursued a specific policy of enhancing ADR to the extent that it and
the courts are complementary. The Ministry of Justice sponsored an investigation into the
prospects for mediation in court proceedings as long ago as 1996 (Platform ADR). After
successful pilot mediation schemes in five courts, reporting in 2003, every court has a
mediation facility.21 The Netherlands has a single national umbrella mediation organization,
the Nederlands Mediation Instituut (NMI), which was established in 1993 primarily to
promote mediation, and has strong links with the Ministry of Justice.
Class Settlements: The WCAM
A notable manifestation of the general approach towards ADR and legal claims is the
adoption by the Dutch of a unique and innovative approach towards mass litigation,
which is entirely aimed at achieving fair and speedy negotiated settlements, rather than
encouraging collective litigation.22 After complex and lengthy product liability litigation (of
12
WL Haardt, De veroordeling in de kosten van het burgerlijk geding (‘s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhof, 1945),
and EM Wesseling-van Gent, ‘Proceskostenveroordeling’ in NVv Procesrecht (ed) De kosten van de procedure
(Deventer, Kluwer, 1993), 2–3.
13
Tuil (n 3), 405.
14
Rules of conduct for lawyers 1990 (‘Gedragsregels 1990’) Rule 3, at www.advocatenorde.nl.
15
For procedures that start with a summons this objective can be found in Art 87 (Wetboek van Burgerlijke
Rechtsvordering) (RV) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. For procedures that start with a request an explicit rule is
absent, however this does not mean to say that the judge is not allowed to try to affect a settlement.
16
HR 24 September 1999, NJ 1999 (Bleij/Stegeman).
17
Policy Resolution ‘Stimuleringsbijdrage conflictbemiddeling’ Stcr 2009, 63.
18
According to the website of the Dutch Judiciary www.rechtspraak.nl.
19
Arts 186 f and 202 f Rv. See Snijders, Klaassen and Meijer Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, 247.
20
The division of co-owned property (Art 3:185 BurgerlijkWetboek (BW) – Dutch Civil Code); see ML Tuil,
Verdelingsbeslagen (Den Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2009) 191–93, in collective actions (Art 3:305a BW) and
in separation cases concerning children (Art 815 Rv).
21
J Singer, The EU Mediation Atlas: Practice and Regulation (Centre for Effective Dispute resolution, CMS and
Lexis/Nexis, 2005).
22
See WH van Boom, ‘Collective Mass Claims in the Netherlands’, in M Casper et al (eds), Auf dem Weg zu
einer Europäischen Sammelklage? (Munich, Sellier, 2009), 171–92; T Arons and WH van Boom, ‘Beyond Tulips
and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from The Netherlands’ (2010) 6 European Business Law

individual cases, in the absence of a collective procedure) over cervical cancer in children of
mothers who took diethylstilboestrol (DES) during pregnancy, a settlement was negotiated.
However, the pharmaceutical company wished to achieve closure involving the settlement
being binding on as many individual claims as possible. The Act on the Collective Settlement
of Mass Claims (Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade: WCAM) was passed in 2005 in
order to achieve this. Under this procedure, parties to a dispute (whether or not they have
commenced litigation claims) can jointly apply to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal for a
declaration that the terms of a negotiated settlement are fair and binding on all potential
parties in the defined class of claimants unless they individually opt out of the settlement.
The WCAM procedure has been criticized by some as omitting a ‘front end’ mechanism of a
procedure to certify a class, or otherwise initiate mass litigation. Instead, it only has a ‘back
end’ procedure of certifying a fair settlement as binding, for those who do not opt out. But
that is precisely the point: the cultural and policy objective is to encourage negotiation and
settlement, rather than litigation. The WCAM procedure has already proved its worth by
attracting a series of large disputes.23
The National Ombudsman
The office of the National Ombudsman was created in 1982 and since 1999 is guaranteed in the
Dutch Constitution.24 The Ombudsman investigates complaints brought to him by members
of the public and can also launch investigations on his own initiative. The Ombudsman has
a staff of around 140 and total expenditure in 2010 of €14.6 million. The Ombudsman is a
‘fall-back’ provision, only available after the citizen has complained first to the administrative
authority itself, including through any appeal procedure, and the matter has not been settled.
The Ombudsman has extensive investigatory powers. Administrative authorities and
witnesses are required by law to cooperate with his investigations. The written reports that
are produced set out the facts and the reasons for his decision and recommendations. His
decisions and recommendations are not legally enforceable, but almost always observed
and implemented. Recommendations may relate to resolving an individual case or may be
designed to prevent complaints arising in future. The National Ombudsman is required by
law to accompany each of his decisions by a statement of the standard of proper conduct
that has been breached. Over the years, this has resulted in the development of a list of
around 25 standards of proper conduct. They include not just matters such as promptness,
adequate information gathering and provision, and proportionality, but also respect for
fundamental rights like the right to physical integrity.
The National Ombudsman may adopt a number of approaches in handling complaints,
including intervention, mediation, and investigation. He considers that reflection and
feedback to public authorities are integral aspects of his work. Feedback is given not just
about lessons learned from how individual cases have been handled, but more importantly
Review, 857; F Weber and WH van Boom, ‘Dutch Treat: the Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act’
(WCAM 2005), (2011) 1 Contratto e impresa / Europa, 69.
23
H van Lith, ‘The Dutch Collective Settlements Act and Private International Law’ (WODC, Ministerie van
Justitie, 2010). Following the recent failure of a bank, DSB, its administrator wants to use WCAM as a quicker
solution for reaching negotiated solutions than complex bankruptcy procedures. Amendments are being
considered to the bankruptcy law in order to facilitate this.
24
Ch 4, Art 78a.

The Netherlands 133
about the overall systems and whole approach of the public administration towards the
public. The current Ombudsman, Professor Brenninkmeijer, has produced a notable series
of reflections on the lessons from his work,25 and wrote in 2010:26
The National Ombudsman does not see the right of complaint and the consequent handling of
complaints as ends in themselves. While it is clearly important that individuals, businesses and
institutions should be able to express their dissatisfaction with the actions of administrative
authorities and that their complaints should be taken seriously, it is better still to prevent such
complaints. For that reason, the National Ombudsman needs to exert a more structural influence
on the way administrative authorities deal with the public. Proper treatment is not just a question
of being ‘pleasant’ and ‘courteous’: it lies at the very root of the legitimacy of government action
and public compliance. Proper treatment is the concrete expression of procedural fairness. For the
people involved, the feeling that government action has been fair is often essential. 27
Out of that attitude has arisen a campaign to encourage public servants to treat citizens
with respect: ‘should seek direct personal contact with people presenting complaints and
problems, take them seriously, treat them with respect, and deal with them as equals.’ 28
Policy on Consumer ADR
The main policy considerations that are pursued in the Netherlands in relation to business-
to-consumer (B2C) ADR are to provide fast, easy and cheap procedures.29 A consumer
is encouraged to use an ADR body where one exists and the trader belongs to it, instead
of the courts. This policy has stimulated traders to join what has become an established
framework of ADR bodies. Hence, the function of ADR bodies has become comparable
to the courts, and the two tracks are viewed as equally valid options for resolving disputes.
In practice, the ADR pathway has grown to the extent that it has eclipsed the courts for
consumer-to-business claims in most of the sectors where the ADR route exists.
The state’s sponsorship of ADR is manifested by the role of the Social and Economic
Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER) in sponsoring and facilitating the crucial
initial stage of formal negotiations between consumer and business representatives
to agree standard terms and conditions of trade, which act as the pre-condition to
establishment of an ADR system in each sector. The SER, which operates on a public law
basis, has its own secretariat, undertakes market studies, and provides an independent
chairman (such as a law professor) to chair the negotiations on terms and conditions.
Huls has described this approach as the ‘standard bearer of the Dutch polder model (ie
consociational politics).30,31
25
See the Annual Reports, and AFM Brenninkmeijer, Apologies in public administration (National Ombudsman
of the Netherlands, 2010).
26
AFM Brenninkmeijer, Compliance with recommendations (National Ombudsman of the Netherlands,
2010), available at www.nationaleombudsman.nl/sites/default/files/2011_gb_artikel_compliance_with_recomme
ndations.pdf.
27
TR Tyler, Why Do People Obey the Law? Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Compliance (New Haven,
Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1990).
28
AFM Brenninkmeijer, Compliance with recommendations.
29
See A Klapwijk and M ter Voert, Evaluatie De Geschillencommissie 2009, available at www.wodc.nl/images/
ob278_volledige_tekst_tcm44-237673.pdf.
30
A Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice (London,
Routledge, 2008).
31
N Huls, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy: A Third Way between Autonomy and Paternalism in Private Law’ (2010) 3
Erasmus Law Review 1, 7, 19.

The government has also encouraged ADR through the Coordination Group on Self-
Regulation (CER), which provides information on developments. In the earlier stages of
establishment of the ADR system, a decade or so ago, government subsidies were available
for those Geschillencommissies that were recognized. Currently, the government funds the
central administration of the SGC.
Two legal forms of ADR exist in the Netherlands, arbitration (a binding decision)
and a binding advice. Arbitration is regulated in detail in similar fashion to many other
jurisdictions: the rules are contained in Articles 1020–1076 BW. The Geschillencommissie
procedure discussed below is based on the ‘binding advice technique, which was inserted
into the Civil Code (Articles 7:900–906 BW) in 1993. The ‘binding advice is a settlement
agreement in which a third party rules on a dispute between parties, in relation to which
the parties have agreed beforehand on this form of dispute resolution, for example under
a specific agreement or by means of the general terms and conditions declared as being
applicable to an agreement concluded previously.32 The parties are, however, not bound by a
patently unreasonable decision.33 Such unreasonableness may pertain to the substance of the
decision, or the way in which it was reached. A binding advice may not be directly enforced,
but must be first subject to a ruling on compliance obtained from a court.
The Role of the Consumer Authority
Before examining the private sector dispute resolution arrangements in detail, their
significance within the Dutch legal and enforcement framework should be seen against the
background of the structure of public enforcement of consumer law. There was no structure
for public enforcement of consumer law before the creation of the Consumer Authority
(Consumentenautoriteit) in 2007.34 There were two reasons to create such an Authority:
firstly, the need for a national authority to exist so as to form part of the EU network of
national authorities required by Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation
in the single market, and secondly, to address issues of non-compliance with regulations in
consumer markets, and a lack of knowledge of consumers’ rights.35 When the Consumer
Authority was created, it was surprised how many cases were brought to it, which it felt
revealed an unmet need.
The Consumer Authority has both public and private law enforcement powers for
collective breaches:36 public law enforcement powers as to clear-cut provisions and private
32
See Response to the European Commission’s Consultation on ADR by the Netherlands Ministry of Justice,
2011, available at ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_responses/the_netherlands-ministry_of_justice_
en.pdf.
33
Art 7:904 BW.
34
The Authority falls under the supervision of the Minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation,
although it has been granted direct oversight and enforcement powers, thereby providing from independent
decision-making.It was announced in March 2011 that the Consumer Authority, the Telecoms Authority and
the Competition Authority (NMa) would merge. The Consumer Authority has 42 staff as at 2011, whereas the
Competition Authority has 600 staff, including an Economic Bureau.
35
S Ammerlaan and D Janssen, ‘The Dutch Consumer Authority: an introduction’ in WH van Boom and
MBM Loos (eds), Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law – Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group
Action and Public Authority Intervention (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing 2007); MA Heldeweg, ‘Supervisory
governance. The case of the Dutch Consumer Authority (2006) 2 Utrecht Law Review 1, 67.
36
Notably the legislation on unfair commercial practices, services, misleading advertising, E-commerce,
consumer purchases, general contract terms, distance selling, timesharing, package travel (all of which is EU-
based legislation) and national legislation on doorstep selling and price visibility.

The Netherlands 135
law enforcement powers (via a civil judge) as to provisions that leave room for some
discretion. Enforcement of private law is a matter for the private sector, and hence the
Consumer Authority does not have power to enforce private law contracts, such as Terms
and Conditions, which may promise more than the law requires, and it is not empowered
to deal with individual complaints. The Authority does take note of information from all
sources on what is happening in the market, so it notes any individual complaints that are
brought to its attention. Its resources are slim, with 42 staff as at 2011, but both resource
and function are affected by the existence of the extensive private sector arrangements for
negotiation Terms and Conditions and resolving complaints, discussed below.
Overall, it can be said that, in the Dutch legal system, consumer protection and
enforcement are based on a dual system of civil law and public law. The traditional approach
that civil resolution of issues is prioritized has only recently been complemented by public
law enforcement. The civil ‘pillar’ moves from individual action through ADR bodies
(Geschillencommissies) and consumer associations to collective interests, which are resolved
through self-regulation by branch associations.
In relation to public enforcement by the Consumer Authority, 85% of cases are solved
by informal means, such as talking or letters.37 In 2010, the Authority took 5 sanctions
decisions, 2 decisions on administrative appeals, 2 other decisions on appeal, 10 judgments
on request procedures, and 8 orders combined with incremental penalty payments. Between
2007 and 2010 it closed 310 investigations.
The Consumer Authority is the designated Single Liaison Office for the Netherlands
under the CPC network of national authorities. 75% of its cases are national, and 25% are
cross-border. But that statistic does not say anything about the importance of particular
cases. The Netherlands receives more cross-border cases than any other Member State with
the CPC Network (21 new requests for assistance in 2010). It is also number one in dealing
with cases quickly: as at end 2010, only 4% of requests were still open. Requests received
under the CPC system are individual cases, and can take time to deal with.
The Consumer Authority considers that the ECC-NET system would be improved if it
made possible complaints and action about systemic problems. It considers the basis of the
network to be good, and there to be effective cooperation between national authorities. The
problem with the system lies in its legislative approach: putting the rules into legislation
leads to an unnecessarily bureaucratic and legalistic system, and too many discussions
about the precise interpretation of terms used. There are many differences between national
systems over enforcement powers (criminal or other), enforcement approaches or policies,
and the architecture of enforcement bodies. Power is sometimes given to different bodies,
such as over airline tickets.
The Geschillencommissie Structure
The ADR model is standardized nationally for almost all sectors apart from financial services,
and operated by a national body, the Foundation for Consumer Complaint Commissions
(Stichting Geschillencommissie (SGC)). The Dutch government has financially supported
the SGC (see below), and the expansion of the number of Commissions in the 2000s. In
37
Interview, 23 March 2011.

some sectors, such as electricity, gas, water and taxi, traders are obliged by law to enter
into an ADR scheme, although no specific scheme is specified. Notaries will shortly also be
required to join an ADR scheme.
The SGC was established in 1970, in order to create and oversee the first Board, and
Boards have been created to resolve disputes in different sectors at a steady pace ever since.
As at 2011 there are fifty sectoral consumer Commissions, which are listed at Table 6.1, and
five business disputes Commissions. The range of sectors covered by Commissions is now
very wide, and includes financial services, telecoms, energy and air transport. Legislation
in 2012 will provide for a new sectoral Commission on medical claims. The SGC already
has two sectoral Commissions for medical disputes, one for Hospitals and one for Nursing,
Normal Care and Home Care. A Commission was established on sports and exercise in
January 2012.38 The arrangements are illustrated below in relation to two sectors: those for
travel and web trading.
Table 6.1: The 50 Sectoral Complaints Commissions
1. Air-conditioning 26. Leisure

2. Aviation 27. Moving firms
3. Building refinement 28. Newly-built private housing
4. Bicycles 29. Nursing, Normal care and Home care
5. Car rentals 30. Opticians
6. Community aerial systems 31. Paintwork, Glazing and Plasterwork
7. Crèches 32. Parquet floorings
8. Dry-cleaning and laundry services 33. Pets and domestic animals
9. Driving schools 34. Post
10. Electrical goods 35. Private health care clinics
11. Electronic communication services 36. Private education institutes
12. Energy and Water 37. Public Transport
13. Energy label 38. Rebuilding
14. (Real-) estate-agency 39. Roofing
15. Funeral services 40. Selling door-to-door
16. Gardening 41. Stores for construction supplies/materials
17. Glass, porcelain and earthenware 42. Sun screens
18. Grooming industry 43. Taxi transport
19. Handy men and floor companies 44. Telecommunications
20. Health Care (eg hospitals) 45. Textiles and shoes
21. Home furnishing 46. Travel
22. Home shopping 47. Vehicles
23. Information service providers 48. Water sports
24. Installation technicians 49. Care, maintenance and home care39
25. Legal profession 50. Jewellery and clocks40
At the end of 2011, two consumer complaints boards stopped: aviation and funeral
services as there was no level playing field established. As of April 2012, the complaints
boards for the fitness industry and paving companies begin. In July a second complaints
board for webshops will open. It is also anticipated to establish a complaints board for
notarys and pharmacists in 2012.
38
Annual report 2011 of ´De Geschillencommissie´, 7.
39
Verpleging, Verzorging and Thuiszorg, operating since 1 January 2011.
40
Sieraden and Uurwerken, operating since 1 April 2011.

The Netherlands 137
Agreeing Sectoral Terms and Conditions
The usual first step is for trade associations and the consumer association(s) to negotiate
and agree the terms and conditions that will apply to members of the trade association in
the sector. The Consumentenbond is always involved, together with any relevant sectoral
consumer association, such as exist for daycare, car drivers, homeowners, bikers, and
patients.
The negotiations are undertaken under the auspices of the SER, which makes its
facilities available for both sides, thereby providing a neutral environment and also the
formal patronage and encouragement of the state for the parties to reach agreement. A law
professor with relevant expertise or other legal expert usually chairs the negotiations. Such
terms and conditions are based on all applicable law, and never fall below the standards set
in the law, but often fill in gaps or more detail that are not covered by legal requirements,
thereby sometimes establishing higher standards.41
Trade association members who agree terms and conditions under the system are
not permitted, under the terms of their trade association membership, to use terms and
conditions that are not approved. At the start of 2011 there were 62 sets of agreed terms
and conditions. Not all sectors have terms and conditions: healthcare is such an example
but they are being introduced there, and awareness is growing of their usefulness in the
medical sector.
The process of renegotiation is continuous: all the terms and conditions are revised every
three to five years. When entering a renegotiation, the Consumentenbond looks at signals
from its members and from the Consumer Authority, any other feedback, the published
case law from Geschillencommissie decisions, and may also undertake site visits. It can insert
various provisions aimed at affecting behaviour. For example, if it finds that bills are higher
than people expect, a term can be inserted that traders should inform customers of the size
of a bill in advance of entering into a contract.
Trade associations consider that the ability of their trader members to operate with terms
and conditions approved by the Consumentenbond, associated with membership of the
Geschillencommissie system, contributes significantly to consumer confidence.42
Various codes of business practice or conduct are produced by some trade associations,
which usually cover advertising issues. They are unilateral statements, and not negotiated
with anyone else, such as consumer associations. There is no national scheme for Codes. The
codes are not enforceable under private law, and could not form the basis of a compensation
claim, which would have to be pursued through the courts, assuming a Geschillencommissie
route was not available. Codes can form the basis of negotiations on Terms and Conditions
between a branch association and consumer association, such as over quality standards.
The Advertising Code Commission (RCC) gives non-binding opinions on whether
advertisements comply with the advertising law. Consumentenbond sometimes comments
on such matters.
41
An example is the Thuiswinkel (web traders) conditions, which increased the 7 day withdrawal period
required by law to 14 days, in advance of this being required under the forthcoming EU Consumer Rights Directive.
Thuiswinkel considers that 90% of its terms and conditions merely paraphrase the rules set out in the law.
42
Interviews with H van Breemen, L Mölenberg and G de Vries Lentsch.

Establishing a Sectoral Commission
The normal situation is for a trade association that has agreed, or intends to agree, general
contract terms and conditions for a sector to approach the SGC to establish a Commission.
It is not necessary to have terms and conditions as a precondition for the establishment of
a sectoral Commission. The existence of the Foundation and the Commission system has
operated as an incentive for the creation of terms and conditions in sectors: the output of
Commissions’ decisions can be used to form the basis of new terms and conditions, as a
form of codification. If it decides to do so, the Foundation will draw up a contract with the
trade association concerned, which contains details of the Commission jurisdiction and
financial support by the association for the SGC to cover the Commission’s principal costs.
The SGC then sets up the Commission and runs it, in accordance with its normal format,
subject to any sector-specific requirements.
The Ministry of Safety and Justice subsidizes the annual costs for the infrastructure with
around €750,000, to which some special payments can be added. Business pays for the
handling of the cases (caseload) of the system. This means that the annual costs for business
depend on the number of cases handled. Over the years, the ministry subsidizes between
15–20% of business between 80–85% of the costs. The total annual costs fluctuate between
€ 5.5 and 6.5 million, depending on the caseload and 50 trade organizations participating.
Other ministries subsidize some of the sectoral Commissions. But the main source of
funding comes from annual payments made under the contracts with the various trade
associations. This totaled € 3.7 million in 2009.43
The trade association pays to the SGC the annual costs for handling the caseload, part
of which is paid on account and then subject to adjustment at the end of the year when the
total usage of the relevant Commission is known. The year-end adjustment can cause some
challenges for those sectors where the claim rate fluctuates significantly between that which
was budgeted and which materializes, and which involves either a rebate or an extra bill
to be funded.44 (Individual traders do not pay case fees to the SGC directly with each case,
so the associations have to fund the bill and either have a reserve or a means of collecting
quickly from members.) The amount of the total sum varies from sector to sector,45 and
depends on factors such as bargaining power, the volume of cases and so on. The financial
structure provides an incentive for each branch association to reduce the number of claims
in its sector. It is up to each trade association how to distribute the cost amongst its members:
roughly half of them raise a general levy amongst their members,46 and also roughly half
impose a cost on individual companies who lose a case. The latter solution can clearly have
some effect as a penalty and deterrent to multiple defendants and an incentive to improve
their operations.
43
Between 2005 and 2007 the business sector contribution was about €2.2 million, which decreased immediately
after the formation of KiFiD in 2008.
44
The ANVR finds that the sum initially budgeted can vary against the final account by 50% or 60%.
45
In 2010, Thuiswinkel’s total bill was €30,000, with an average cost of €750 per procedure.
46
Thuiswinkel’s members pay an annual membership fee to the association, based on the member’s turnover,
which includes the cost of the Geschillencommissie. The range of annual contributions varies between €150 and
€28,000, contributing to Thuiswinkel’s annual turnover of €4.5 million. In order to become a full member of
Thuiswinkel, a firm needs to show 2 years’ market history and financial figures. Aspirant members can join
until they can show two years’ figures, and pay a certification fee of €350 annual contribution of €400. There is
a contractual right to charge members separately for the cost of the Geschillencommissie but this has never so
far been invoked. The association is, in 2011, considering charging a member for the cost of a case where the
association considers that the member should have settled it.

The Netherlands 139
Companies that register individually with the SGC, usually because they are not members
of a trade association that is registered, pay a fee on registration, subsequent annual fees, and
a fee per case. A 2007 survey found that the range of overall costs contributed by individual
companies varied from under €100 to over €20,000, as shown in Figure 6.1.47
Figure 6.1: Total company costs for Geschillencommissie cases in 2007.
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Less than € 100 t/m € 500 t/m € 1.000 t/ € 2.000 t/ € 5.000 t/ € 10.000 t/ € 20.000
€ 100 € 499 € 999 m € 1.999 m € 4.999 m € 9.999 m € 19.999 and more
Source: ondernemersenquête.
The Structure of the Foundation and of Dispute Resolution Commissions
The fact that the operation of Commissions comes under an independent oversight body
is intended to guarantee that every Commission operates to appropriate standards and
impartiality. Every Commission meets the principles that are specified in the Ministry
of Justice’s Recognition Regulation,48 which are consistent with the EU’s related 1998
Recommendation.49 The network has its own brand, which is well-recognised. Some
separate private sector boards exist, but may not meet the same standards, and the boards
that are in the official Commission network are widely recognised and preferred. The
system has the confidence of consumers and business. The acceptance of every complaint
that is made through the SGC avoids cherry-picking.
A pre-condition to bringing a claim to a Commission is that the trader is registered with
the SGC. A trader can register in one of two ways: it can either be a member of the sector
organization or it can register independently with the SGC. The possibility of registration by
individual traders is designed to raise business standards and provide consumer guarantees,
47
See Klapwijk and ter Voert, Evaluatie De Geschillencommissie (2009), 92. The total sum thus includes costs for
travelling, telephone calls, collection of information, contact with lawyers, consumers, and the Geschillencommissie.
48
Stscrt. 1996, 248.
49
Commission Recommendation (EC) 98/257 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for the
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, [1998] OJ L 115.

since it attracts firms in sectors for which there may be no trade association. Firms therefore
apply so as to benefit from the commercial advantage of belonging to a trusted organization.
In accordance with normal arbitration practice, both parties must consent to initiate
the procedure. Consumers are left free to choose between going to court and going to
the Commission. A standard contract term requiring a consumer to submit a case to a
Geschillencommissie and thus prohibiting him from bringing the case in an ordinary court
is deemed to be unfair.50 If they choose to go to the Commission, however, in principle they
waive their right to a civil procedure. The business’ consent is given through its membership
of a national organization or its registration with the SGC.51 A trader may seek to initiate
a claim, but if it is to be accepted by a Commission, the consumer must also consent. The
government plans to impose a higher personal contribution for citizens who receive legal
aid if they decide to start proceedings in court instead of with the Geschillencommissie.52
The contract between a trade association and the SGC contains a number of key clauses.
First, the trade association guarantees that its members will use the general contract Terms
and Conditions that have been bilaterally agreed with the consumers’ representatives.
Secondly, it guarantees that its members consent to consumers taking their complaints to
the Commission and that they waive their right to take disputes to a civil court. Thirdly,
the association undertakes that if one of its members fails to comply with a Commission
decision, it will itself pay the claim.53 This financial guarantee usually has a ceiling per case
of €10,000; for higher amounts, the branch organization will support the consumer in court
proceedings, thereby avoiding execution problems for the consumer if the trader is unwilling
to pay. Recovery of such costs from the member is a matter between the trade association and
the member. Some guarantees used to be unlimited, but the €10,000 ceiling was introduced
after the National Bank decided that any firm offering arrangements over that sum per case
would be considered to be subject to the onerous regulatory requirements for insurance.
Most claims concern disputes involving contracts, for which compensation is the remedy
sought most often. The Commission procedure is not available if a case is already pending
in court.54 This has been true for disputes that involve death, physical injury or illness, but
a more nuanced approach has developed and this restriction does not apply to the Boards
for Ophthalmic Matters, Hospitals and Nursing, Normal Care and Home Care, and will not
apply for the new Boards for medical health care.
The Foundation establishes a list for each sector of individual people who are approved to
hear disputes relating to that sector. Each list has three groups: chairmen, who are selected
by the Foundation and have expertise in adjudication, usually being a judge or law professor;
and individuals nominated respectively by Consumentenbond and the business sector, all of
whom are required to act in their own personal capacity as experts in the particular field,
and not as representatives of any organization or interest. They are all approved by the
Council of the SGC, and are responsible to the SGC not to their employers or nominating
organizations. As at 2011 the total pool of arbitrators comprises 300 individuals. There were
an additional 120 technical experts.
50
Art 6:236 (n) BW; see MBM Loos and WH van Boom, Handhaving van het consumentenrecht – Preadviezen
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht 2009, (Deventer, Kluwer, 2010), 90.
51
J Stuyck, E Terryn, T van Dyck and V Colaert, Evaluation Report of the Compendium on Consumer Law, 2006,
see national report on the Netherlands, compiled by E Hondius (2006).
52
See Loos and van Boom, Handhaving van het consumentenrecht (2010), 46 referring to Bijl. Handelingen II
2008/09, 31 753, nr 1, p 16.
53
ANVR has a financial guarantee to cover claims against companies that become insolvent, and Thuiswinkel
is working towards introducing this, but it is expensive.
54
Hondius, Netherlands National Report (2006).

The Netherlands 141
The key quality required for decision-makers is expertise, whether judicial, technical, or
knowledge of the perspective of one or other side in the dispute. This tripartite structure
for composition of Commissions is intended to guarantee that all views are represented on
the panel, that the penal has appropriate expertise in adjudication and technical issues, and
also to guarantee independence and impartiality.55 The external activities of the members
are regulated as to avoid inconsistencies.56 The SGC asks the trade association when a new
arrangement is established what types of disputes can be expected, and chooses arbitrators
with appropriate expertise.
Panels of three arbitrators (containing one from each group) chosen at random by the
Foundation are booked in advance for hearing days. They will deal with such cases as are
ready and next in line for hearing. The panel members are paid a small honorarium, but
such posts are attractive to members since they gain good experience. Judges are keen to
work closely with the experts on the panels.
The Complaints Boards are supported by independent experts, who are also all approved
by the Council of SGC. Where necessary, these experts carry out investigations in order to
inform the Board regarding specific technical aspects of a complaint. Examples of Boards
for which experts regularly report are those for Automobiles, Installation Technicians and
Home Furnishing. Both parties receive a copy of the report of the technical investigation,
so they can comment on it in a fully transparent procedure. In a cross-border complaint,
the SGC uses its network of national trade associations to contact national associations
in the other European state to organize an investigation on the location of the complaint.
Similarly, the SGC uses the national European Consumer Centre to support the consumer
in arranging any translation that may be necessary.
The Sequenced Approach to Processing Claims
The first stage is always that the consumer is required to contact the trader to try to solve
matters between them. The SGC maintains information on its website for each sector which
is designed to provide useful information, including Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
and an index of important previous decisions plus a search engine, so all sides can see
standards and decisions that have been previously established.
If direct negotiation is required but fails, the consumer (or the trader) may initiate the
complaint to the relevant Commission. A number of trade associations offer the consumer
the option of attempting conciliation before cases proceed to the Commission, and the
SGC is planning to integrate such activity further into its dispute resolution process. Online
mediation is one option being considered, through which the details of every complaint
that arises would be entered into the SGC’s computer system by, or be available to, the trade
association for conciliation purposes.
The procedure is designed to be an efficient logistical process that reaches fair decisions
swiftly, as early in the process as possible, and at minimal cost. It operates as a ‘quality circle’.
It is not intended to be a judicial process. It is administered centrally by the SGC and is
fully electronic, ISO certified to an INK quality model. All aspects are designed to facilitate
settlement. Although paper complaints are received, almost all are now fully electronic.
55
See FAQ on the website of the Geschillencommissie, www.degeschillencommissie.nl/over-ons/veelgestelde-
vragen.
56
See Klapwijk and ter Voert (n 29), 59.

The consumer completes a standard form, uploads any supporting evidence (which can
be done by sending documents to the SGC) and identifies a possible solution. The form
must be signed/approved, to signify agreement to the arbitration process being binding. On
submission, the complainant is given a unique username and password, and can monitor
the progress of the claim online. The SGC reviews submitted forms to ensure that they are
complete and the relevant Commission can handle the problem. The digital process drives the
workflow through set stages of defence, expert report and hearing.57 An accepted claim is sent
to the supplier by email, again with a user name and password, which has four weeks to submit
a response online. The notification to the supplier reminds him of the opportunity to settle,
and a significant number contact the consumer during that period and reach settlement.
In many sectors an expert’s report is required, such as floor paneling or reconditioned
engines.58 Others, such as disputes on billing by utilities, can be decided on paper evidence.
Where required, the SGC will instruct an expert from its panel of 120 to make a field visit
and file the report. Some of the experts are trained mediators, and their discussion of a case
with the consumer and trader can lead to agreement at that stage.59
Although rates vary between sectors, the process facilitates settlement in about 50 cases
filed. If necessary, a date for a hearing is then fixed. The hearing is informal, takes around
30 minutes, and is generally open to the public. Both the consumer and the trader are free
to attend or not as they wish. If a party is present, he or she may explain their position. The
parties can bring witnesses and experts.60 The Commission can gather information at its
own motion, by hearing witnesses and experts, or by initiating an investigation conducted
by the commission or an expert. The Commission notifies the parties of its decision in
writing.
Legal representation is possible but not necessary. Some consider that the fact that parties
do not have to be represented by a lawyer could be to the detriment of weaker consumers.61
However, the Commissions aim to operate impartially.62
Decisions generally turn on applying the sectoral terms and conditions and the general
law. The terms and conditions are regularly updated. As with all arbitration procedures,
Commissions can decide issues of law where they arise.
Initiating a procedure at the Geschillencommissie and obtaining binding advice preludes
access to court except for limited appeal options. In general, there is no appeal from
Commission decisions. Minor issues like spelling mistakes can be corrected in awards up
to 14 days after a decision has been given. Either party may apply to the court within two
months for nullification of a Commission decision, but the grounds are limited: the court
can annul the decision if the Commission violated fundamental principles of procedural law,
such as the right to be heard,63 or if the decision is unacceptably unfair and unreasonable.64
Nullification decisions are rare, such as when the knock-on effect of a single Commission
57
This ‘workflow system’ was introduced in this form on 1 January 2010: see Annual report 2010 of De
Geschillencommissie, 9.
58
Some associations have in-house experts who can assist in resolving complaints at an early stage: the cars
association has four.
59
Three Commissions in particular (Wonen, Parket en Klussen, and Vloerenbedrijven) have experts that have
mediation skills to enable a settlement between the parties.
60
Hondius, (n 51), 5.
61
ibid.
62
WH van Boom and T Jongbloed, personal communications. Professor Jongbloed is a chairman in the travel
commission.
63
Hondius, (n 51), 5.
64
Art 7:904 BW. AS Rueb, Compendium van het Burgerlijk Procesrecht (Deventer, Kluwer, 2009) 328.

The Netherlands 143
decision on other cases is considerable, for example in liability of utility companies for
damage caused by power cuts. The rules provide that parties can ask that a member of a
panel is replaced when there is doubt about his or her impartiality.65 Such claims have been
brought in the courts of first instance, and lawyers are usually instructed in such cases.66
Between January 2005 and July 2008 13 cases have come before the courts, of which the
‘binding advice’ was nullified in 5 cases.67
Fees
The party who initiates a complaint has to pay a modest registration fee. The rationale for
this is not to be a financing instrument but to ensure that the complainant takes the case
seriously. The fee generally ranges between €25 and €125, depending on the sector. An
exception is the Commission on Garantiewoningen (newly-built private housing) where the
fee is €320.68 The registration fee includes the services of the arbitrators and any expert visit
and report. The overall costs for the consumer usually amount to less than €100, and only
in one out of 20 cases does the consumer pay more than €500.69
The losing party reimburses the registration fee if the claimant wins the case, unless the
final decision is similar to a settlement offer made by the defendant at an earlier stage and
not accepted by the consumer.70 Any further costs incurred by a party, such as lawyers’ or
experts’ fees or travelling, telephone calls, photocopies, are not claimable or shifted, so the
general principle is of no cost shifting.71 In very exceptional cases, the losing party can be
required to reimburse other costs.
Statistics on Use
The published statistics for 2010 on the number of claims for each sectoral Commission,
and outcomes, are shown in Table 6.2 (pp 146–147),72 which show the following:
• 7,826 claims were initiated (continuing a steady falling trend: 10,483 in 2009, 11,043 in
2008, 11,280 in 2007). The SGC considers that the diminishing trend in cases is caused
by its various efforts aimed at encouraging earlier settlement, and increased efficiency
due to digitalization, which was introduced in 2008, and its associated earlier exclusion
of non-admissible claims.
• 60% of claims were submitted in a digital form, compared to 50% in 2009 and 39% in
2008.73
65
See FAQ on the website of the Geschillencommissie, www.degeschillencommissie.nl/over-ons/veelgestelde-
vragen.
66
67
The judgments were accessed at www.rechtspraak.nl.
68
FAQ on the website of the Geschillencommissie, www.degeschillencommissie.nl/over-ons/veelgestelde-
vragen.
69
These costs entail those for travelling, phone calls, copies, printing and collection of information, see Klapwijk
and ter Voert (n 19), 12.
70
Hondius (n 51), 5.
71
E Hondius, (2010), ‘The innovative nature of consumer law’, prepared for the ius commune conference in
Leuven on 25/26 November 2010, 5.
72
Due to the introduction of the workflow system in 2010 (see above) there is no full comparability of the 2010
numbers to those of the previous years. See annual report 2010 of De Geschillencommissie, 22.
73
Annual report 2009 of De Geschillencommissie, 7.

• 5,799 cases were processed (6,316 in 2009, 6,525 in 2008, 6,112 in 2007).
• 3,046 ‘binding advices’ were given (3,117 in 2009, 3,417 in 2008 and 3,504 in 2007).
• In 2,167 cases, the consumer and the trader settled during the procedure (2,806 in
2009, 2,741 in 2008, 2,650 in 2007).
• In 289 cases, an expert’s involvement led to a settlement (393 in 2009, 358 in 2008, 364
in 2007).
• The average claim value and value awarded varies from sector to sector, with being a
few hundred Euros (€206 awarded for taxi transport) or a few thousand (the largest
average award being €5,980 for housing guarantees).
Duration
The average duration of Geschillencommissie cases in 2010 was 4.4 months (4.7 months in
2009).74 By comparison, although an uncontested small claim might be processed within
one week, the duration of small claims cases in court averaged 15 weeks in 2009 (19 weeks
in 2008) and averaged 61 weeks for ordinary court proceedings (in both 2008 and 2009).75
Enforceability and Self-regulatory Consequences
As a rule, suppliers comply with awards, because they have knowingly committed
themselves to the process. But if a trader is unwilling to comply, there are underlying
business guarantees by each trade association. The aim is to avoid execution problems for
the consumer, as an extra quality aspect of the ADR process of dispute settlement. Such
a guarantee entails that a trade association takes over the obligation that the Complaint
Board imposes on one of its members, and will pay the award, whenever the member in
question does not voluntary comply with the obligation, or submit the binding decision for
review to an ordinary court within two months after it was delivered.76 A firm that is not
a member of a trade association provides a similar compliance guarantee arrangement by
means of a bank guarantee for each individual dispute, or deposits an amount set by the
SGC to serve as a compliance guarantee.
A more important inconvenience is that not all trades and industries are well organized
and that enterprises therefore do not take part in the complaints tribunal system.77 The
entry into the market of foreign traders who are probably less prone to seek membership
of traditional Dutch trade organisations may also be such an element.78 Non-registration
of a trader with the Geschillencommissie was given as the reason for rejection of a case in 8
per cent of the cases in 200879 but only 2 per cent of cases in 2009, and 3 per cent in 2010.80
74
75
See Rechtspraak Annual Report 2009, 63, table 9a and which can be accessed at www.rechtspraak.nl/
Gerechten/RvdR/Publicaties/Jaardocumenten.htm. Note that these numbers include all types of cases, including
commercial as well as consumer law cases.
76
In a rare case in 2011, Thuiswinkel paid a consumer and sued its member under to recover the amount under
a contractual obligation in its membership agreement. The association also expelled the member.
77
See also M Y Schaub, ‘Handhaving van consumentenrecht’, in E Engelhardt, Y Giesen, and CEA Mahé (eds),
Handhaven van en door het Privaatrecht, (Den Haag, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2009) 156 ff.
78
Hondius (n 51), 1.
79
See Klapwijk and ter Voert (n 29), 11. Their evaluation ended with the year 2008.
80
Annual report 2009 of De Geschillencommissie, 24; Annual report 2010 of De Geschillencommissie, 22.

The Netherlands 145
The SGC copies all awards electronically to the relevant trade association. Many trade
associations then use the information for self-regulatory purposes. This enables to use this
information in subsequent general contract term negotiations, exert pressure on traders or
politics and to use it for marketing purposes. The importance of case-law of the Commission
on travel has increased considerably over the years.81 It is common practice among traders
to send each other the judgments to assess their probabilities of winning and losing a case.
The SGC makes a selection of unanimously decided important cases available on its
website, together with a search engine, to act as public guidance on decisions. There have
been some calls by consumers and academics that all Commissions’ decisions should be
published, so as to provide full transparency of business practice as well as of the operation
of the Commissions, since the selection of decisions is made by the SGC.82 The SGC resists
such calls on the basis that many decisions are identical and would give no added value.
The Consumer Authority can take enforcement action, or exert pressure. An example
was a penalty against the branch for kitchen sellers for not applying their terms and
conditions when they said they would, for example where they said they would not ask for
a fee exceeding 25% of the value of the goods.83 There is a cooperation protocol between
the SGC and ConsuWijzer, a central information point for consumers that also observes
consumer problems, administered by the Consumer Authority.84
Access: The Public Profile of Boards
The extent to which the existence and work of an individual Commission is well known
varies from sector to sector. The Commissions in the utilities and travel sector are well-
known. Others can wither. It is not generally known that anyone who takes a taxi he can
file a claim with a Commission. Not all taxis are members of the association that subscribes
to their sector Commission, and not all those that are members publicise that fact. There is
also the cost-benefit issue that applies to any dispute, namely whether it is worth paying €25
for a dispute over a €20 fare.
If the ADR arrangement is mentioned in the general contract terms, such as occurs in the
travel sector, it becomes visible and very popular. In the travel sector, about 90 per cent of
package travel contracts are concluded on the basis of the standard Terms and Conditions
for the sector, and disputes are consequently solved through the sector Commission.
The Geschillencommissie initiated a campaign in 2009 to increase the popularity of the
boards, particularly targeting sector organisations and traders. They prepared a toolkit
for traders to show to consumers that they are members of the ADR Commission.85 A
documentary about the procedure at the Commission was broadcast on television in
summer 2010 and on radio.86
The system provides an umbrella that professionalises all the individual sectoral schemes,
and harmonises the approach of all the trade associations involved. Various motives have
81
Interview with T Jongbloed, 26 January 2011.
82
In the travel sector all decisions of the Geschillencommissie are made available to ANVR.
83
See Besluit in zaak 426/Keukenkampioen B.V., 19th November 2009 and Besluit in zaak 427/Keukenconcurrent
B.V., 19th November 2009, to be accessed at the homepage of the Geschillencommissie: Besluit in zaak 427/
Keukenconcurrent B.V. www.consumentenautoriteit.nl/besluiten/sanctiebesluiten
84
forms.consumentenautoriteit.nl/sites/default/files/redactie/Samenwerkingsprotocol%20ConsuWijzer%20
SGC%20SGB.pdf.
85
See catalogus.degeschillencommissie.nl.
86

Table 6.2: General statistics

Complaints handled in 2010
Arbitration committee
claims including those

brought forward from
Competence of Board
Trader not registered
Overflow problems
complaints in 2009
complaints in 2010
Total number of
Number of new
Number of new
Outside of the
Inadmissible
Still pending
in 2010
Others
2009
Legal profession 177 68 163 231 2 1 18 25 105
Building refurbishment 30 13 46 59 8 0 1 2 27
Air conditioning 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Car rental 9 5 8 13 0 0 1 1 7
Building materials 29 9 14 23 4 0 1 1 6
Community aerial systems 95 16 26 42 5 0 5 4 4
Roofing 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 1 1
Selling door-to-door 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
DIY companies 23 7 29 36 1 0 0 1 18
Electrical Goods 139 56 100 156 14 0 5 7 51
Electronic communication services 953 157 357 514 16 9 48 30 161
Energy and Water 2493 1284 1334 2618 7 8 162 240 797
Energy label (NEW in 2010) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing Guarantee (NEW in 2010) 0 0 211 211 4 2 12 2 105
Pets and domestic animals 2 0 7 7 1 0 0 2 2
Glass, porcelain and earthenware 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Gardening 39 27 44 71 4 0 2 2 26
Information service providers 15 5 231 236 2 217 6 2 7
Installation technicians 174 87 126 213 8 2 13 15 78
Crèches 70 14 33 47 1 0 5 5 13
Handy men and floor companies 88 37 87 124 11 1 6 6 50
Aviation 64 44 839 883 5 10 33 65 639
(Real-) estate- agency 232 93 160 253 5 1 15 17 76
Public transport 155 49 79 128 1 1 17 8 37
Opticians 33 14 21 35 0 0 1 1 8
Parquet floorings 59 27 48 75 18 0 2 2 21
Private education institutes 22 12 24 36 0 0 6 2 12
Post 247 56 78 134 0 5 2 12 34
Leisure 268 66 73 139 4 0 13 7 42
Travel 1000 313 772 1085 23 22 54 56 370
Driving schools 11 8 11 19 1 0 1 2 5
Paintwork, Glazing and Plasterwork 30 17 20 37 6 1 2 1 10
Taxi transport 99 23 34 57 3 0 5 4 18
Telecommunications 1499 279 1005 1284 20 87 109 98 421
Textiles and shoes 28 12 20 32 4 0 2 2 12
Dry-cleaning and laundry services 135 42 67 109 13 0 12 18 43
Home shopping 147 53 126 179 14 1 7 6 64
Bicycles 32 20 20 40 2 0 1 3 18
Personal Care (NEW in 2010) 5 2 5 7 2 0 0 0 3
Funeral services 0 0 15 15 0 0 1 3 11
Renovations (NEW in 2010) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Moving firms 26 5 12 17 1 2 1 1 6
Vehicles 569 296 424 720 21 3 21 36 231
Water sports 42 23 30 53 2 0 3 2 18
Newly-built private housing 1379 557 1073 1630 46 3 96 83 421
Private health care clinics 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Sunscreens 12 6 11 17 3 0 0 2 5
Health care (eg hospitals) 44 24 37 61 10 1 3 10 16
Total 10483 3826 7826 11652
Total 11652 292 378 692 787 4001

The Netherlands 147
Awards and Settlements
Arbitration committee
Awards in claims made
Awards in claims made
Average compensation
Total settlements and
Total settlements and
Average claim value

judgments 2009
With expert
Settlements
judgments
awarded
in 2009
in 2010
8 0 2 72 82 80 4844 2337 Legal profession
3 0 1 18 22 19 2735 2385 Building refurbishment

0 0 0 0 0 2 - - Air conditioning
0 0 0 4 4 3 486 280 Car rental
4 0 1 7 12 15 5913 ? Building materials
19 0 0 5 24 67 200 ? Community aerial systems
1 0 0 0 1 0 - - Roofing
0 0 0 0 0 1 ? ? Selling door-to-door
5 4 3 7 19 18 2433 4527 DIY companies
18 0 6 61 85 50 964 292 Electrical Goods
192 0 4 58 254 704 528 471 Electronic communication services
743 0 127 661 1531 913 973 370 Energy and Water
0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Energy label (NEW in 2010)
43 23 2 20 88 0 16085 5980 Housing Guarantee (NEW in 2010)
0 0 0 2 2 2 425 425 Pets and domestic animals
0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Glass, porcelain and earthenware
5 0 3 32 40 30 5718 2850 Gardening
2 0 0 0 2 0 - - Information service providers
15 0 18 82 115 101 2530 1680 Installation technicians
11 0 0 12 23 55 1608 ? Crèches
5 4 6 41 56 55 3171 2374 Handy men and floor companies
83 0 20 48 151 4 1125 915 Aviation
10 0 9 129 148 189 3026 1329 (Real-) estate- agency
16 0 1 48 65 78 285 120 Public transport
2 0 3 23 28 28 960 571 Opticians
0 2 0 30 32 40 5130 1865 Parquet floorings
7 0 0 9 16 8 1282 780 Private education institutes
10 0 6 71 87 145 556 ? Post
10 0 10 63 83 146 1808 739 Leisure
169 0 8 391 568 882 3562 952 Travel
1 0 0 9 10 5 653 583 Driving schools
1 0 5 16 22 14 4272 1873 Paintwork, Glazing and Plasterwork
13 0 0 14 27 46 219 206 Taxi transport
392 0 9 157 558 986 813 ? Telecommunications
1 0 1 11 13 15 892 530 Textiles and shoes
0 0 1 23 24 67 325 309 Dry-cleaning and laundry services
30 0 5 57 92 81 580 420 Home shopping
0 0 1 16 17 11 3824 681 Bicycles
1 0 0 1 2 1 - - Personal Care (NEW in 2010)
0 0 0 0 0 0 ? ? Funeral services
0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Renovations (NEW in 2010)
1 0 0 5 6 17 1084 ? Moving firms
57 0 7 351 415 374 3285 2269 Vehicles
3 0 0 25 28 30 5027 1062 Water sports
285 256 35 440 1016 1004 3038 2172 Newly-built private housing
0 0 0 0 0 1 ? - Private health care clinics
0 0 1 7 8 4 1837 ? Sunscreens
1 0 2 20 23 25 2515 1065 Health care (eg hospitals)
2167 289 297 3046 5799 6316 Total
2167 289 3046 Total

been asserted for traders to join the scheme. It is primarily regarded as a commercial market
tool for traders to set up and then abide by general contract terms in which they authorize
the ADR body to settle the disputes. Not to be a member in this sector organization puts a
trader in a bad light. Predictably, in those sectors where the level of organisation is low, the
self-regulatory system of SER negotiations and the resulting Commission is less satisfactory.
Examples in the past were computer shops and child daycare.
Future Developments
Several possible developments are being implemented or proposed that further entrench
ADR within the Dutch approach to settlement of disputes.
Firstly, a new Personal Injury Act enables the medical Commission to refer an issue to the
court for a decision on law if it will help achieve an amicable settlement. The court’s function
is essentially to decide a preliminary issue, perhaps on assumed facts. This technique is
already widely used. It is difficult to appeal the court’s decision. If no settlement occurs
and the case ends up back in court, the earlier judgment will stand as preliminary findings
unless new factors affect its validity. The advantage is that the subsequent proceedings avoid
restarting the whole case afresh.
Secondly, a Bill is being considered in relation to disputes over the price for use of items that
are protected under intellectual property law (such as the fee paid by restaurants for playing
copyright music, in which there can be disputes about over-pricing). A Geschillencommissie
will be set up to deal with such disputes, which has the usual advantage of industry expertise
in such matters. If either party starts such a dispute in court, the court will be obliged to ask
the advice of the Commission on any issue within the Geschillencommissie’s jurisdiction.
The court’s jurisdiction is not ousted, since such disputes often involve other legal issues.
But this is a striking example of an emerging new relationship between courts and ADR
Commissions.87
Thirdly, the government plans to impose a higher own contribution by citizens who
are awarded legal aid if a Geschillencommissie exists but the citizen decides to start court
proceedings instead.
Commissions and Collective Redress
The SGC’s computerized system and the sectoral Commissions habitually process mass
problems. The system can handle test cases more effectively and swiftly than civil courts.
One approach is for a series of cases to be allocated for hearing on the same day, thereby
providing consistency of adjudication.88 Mass claims have been experienced in leisure
disputes, where the Commission has selected say two individual cases out of 50, determined
those as test cases, and then applied the results to the other similar cases. The approach has
been developed into a procedure under which individual parties will be notified that their
cases are the ‘on hold’ pending decision by the Complaint Board of a representative selection
of similar individual cases. The parties will be notified of the outcome of the representative
87
It is interesting to note that such an approach may have worked well as a procedure for handling the long-
running disputes over unauthorized bank charges in UK that ran between the mid-2000s and 2010.
88

The Netherlands 149
cases, and invited to settled their cases between them, but if they cannot the Board will
decide them. This approach has been particularly used for complaints against airlines, such
as over delayed flights. The approach keeps administration expenses down for the majority
of cases that are ‘on hold’, and avoids the need to process large volumes.
There is no possibility for a consumer association to bring a claim, whether in court
or in a Commission. The Consumentenbond considers such an option to be undesirable,
since it nominates one of the three members of each Board, and has representatives on
the executive board of SGC.89 It can, however, support consumers with advice on how to
bring a claim successfully, and it can publish the result if it appears to be a case that many
consumers struggle with on their website.
There may be some problems where traders faced with very large liabilities might
force issues into court to avoid having to deal with every case individually. For example,
the airlines have recently tried to get cases on delay into court, since they argue that the
Geschillencommissie will be biased if they set a precedent in one case and apply it in all
others, since they are supposed to look at every individual case on its facts. In contrast,
Consumentenbond considers that these issues should be separated. The consumer view
is that a Geschillencommissie is designed for easy cases involving quick solutions and not
much evidence or expertise, with judges who are not so senior; decisions are generally fair,
but issues of legal precedent should be dealt with in courts.
Cross-border Capacity
The SGC has an arrangement with the Dutch European Consumer Centre to handle cross-
border cases, and this includes a translation facility. Thus, incoming claims can use the
Geschillencommissie system, apart from airline claims. Consumentenbond considers that the
ECC-NET seems to be working satisfactorily.
ANVR: Travel Sector
In 2010 membership of the trade association Algemene Nederlandse Vereniging van

Reisondernemingen (ANVR) 1426 travel agencies, 126 flight agencies and 220 tour
operators.90 Around 90 per cent of all package tours booked in the Netherlands annually
are made through ANVR members, covering around 6.5 million people.91 The members of
ANVR can be identified from its website.92
In 2010 772 Geschillencommissie complaints were made and 391 cases decided.93 Figures
are not available for complaints that are solved at earlier stages. Based on historical trends,
around 95 per cent of the claims will be dealt with: 35 per cent settled between the parties
before a formal decision, and 60 per cent decided by Geschillencommissie decision, of
89
Interview with B Krijnen, 3 December 2010.
90
Annual report ANVR 2010, 3.
91
The terms and conditions, last revised in 2005, are at www.anwb.nl/binaries/pdf/vakantie/service-advies/
anvr-reisvoorwaarden-12472.pdf.
92
See loket.degeschillencommissie.nl/Web/Site/default.aspx?m=commissie&code=rei.
93
Annual report ANVR 2010.

which around half are in favour of consumers and half in favour of the business. After the
Geschillencommisie decision, perhaps 10–20 cases have been taken to court during the past
10 years.
Under the terms and conditions, a consumer must complain about a package tour during
the trip or within one month of returning, and produce all the evidence.94 A high number
of complaints are successfully settled at that stage, in the light of a 3 month time limit for
starting a claim in the Geschillencommissie Reizen.95
The cost to a consumer of instituting a Geschillencommissie cases depends on the costs
of the trip: the costs is €50 for travel costs up to € 500; €75 for travel costs from € 500 to €
1,500; and €100 if the trip cost exceeded €1,500.96
In 2009, procedures in this particular Geschillencommissie took on average 3.8 months In
2009 the largest category of claims related to the quality of accommodation (39 per cent),
and the average travel costs were €3,527: in 2010 the largest category was transportation
(38 per cent), and the average travel costs were €3,562. The consumer was present in 81
per cent of the 2010 hearings and operators were present in 75% of the cases. Consumers
were represented in 13 per cent of cases (almost always by in-house lawyers provided by
legal expenses insurers) and traders were represented in only 3 per cent of cases. The cost
of any representation has to be borne by the party who obtains it. The average amount of
compensation awarded was €952.
ANVR was formed from an amalgamation of three sectoral associations, dealing with
tour operators, travel agents and business travel. The tour operators attracted more claims
than the other sectors, and used to weight their contributions to the SGC more towards
the overhead element with lower costs per case, subject to a penalty element of a higher
contribution by a member if its claim level exceeded a set threshold. After amalgamation, the
travel agents objected to paying the same level of general contribution towards the system,
and argued that the tour operators should pay the larger share, so members currently pay
a small level of annual contribution and a higher case fee on a ‘user pays’ principle. The
association has had to raise the case fee considerably in recent years, and staff would prefer
to revert to the threshold-penalty approach.
Members who win a Geschillencommissie case pay €150 to ANVR and €500 if they lose.
The sum used to be the same irrespective of outcome, but the differential incentivises
settlement. The €150 rule will be abolished in 2012 as a result of pressure from the members.
It occasionally gives financial support to a member over an important case involving
a genuine issue of principle. ANVR is considered by some consumers to be a consumer
association, but consumers who contact it over complaints are directed first to the member.
Members may ask ANVR for advice, but it does not usually intervene in trying to settle
disputes. ANVR is looking at extending the mediation function to an early stage of the
complaints process.
Members are screened when they join the association but not subsequently–ANVR sees
little demand for this in current conditions. The association would intervene with a member
if it identifies that something is wrong. It accepts that there is a variation in behaviour
94
See for exceptions Art 12 ANVR standard contract terms. For non-ANVR travel agencies this period might
be shorter. The requirement to contact the travel agent during or soon after the problem is intended to overcome
difficulties of proof that arise if where allegations are made some time after an event and cannot be checked.
95
Interview with Prof. T Jongbloed, 26 January 2011. The 3 month deadline can be extended where the trader
does not respond to the initial complaint within one month. That provision was created to react to traders who
only responded shortly before the 3 month claim initiation deadline.
96
Each fee will be increased by € 25 in 2012.

The Netherlands 151
amongst members, and it considers that a degree of variation has to be accepted. The issue
is to define what is or is not acceptable in prevailing market circumstances. ANVR can fine
members and has kicked some out. It does take active steps to monitor what non-member
companies are doing.
ANVR’s guarantee (nakomingsgarantieregeling) comes into effect if a trader does not
comply with the Board decision within 2 months.97 It has had no problems with the
guarantee system. It is very rare that members would refuse to pay a Geschillencommissie
award. Sometimes a member objects as a matter of principle, but ANVR would kick out
non-compliers.
There has been a clear decline over the years in the number of Geschillencommissie
cases against members, as shown in Table 6.3. ANVR argues that the quality of members’
performance has increased, but it accepts that other possible reasons are (as SGC argues)
that decisions are now published, and that traders may be more inclined to settle.
Table 6.3: Cases against ANVR members
Year Number
2000 3,400
2005 2,876
2006 2,378
2007 1,980
2008 1,585
2009 1,299
2010 772
2011 anticipated 1,000
ANVR has confidence in the Geschillencommissie system, which it considers to operate well
and impartially. It is viewed as being more competent, faster and cheaper than a judge. No
complaints have been heard within the sector that any industry-nominated members of
the Geschillencommissie have been biased in any respect: individuals are experienced and
senior industry personnel but sit purely in a personal capacity without any representative
function. Experts are almost never required for travel cases.
Traders that are members of the ANVR are also connected to two funds, the catastrophe
fund Calamiteitenfonds and the Stichting Garantiefonds Reisgelden (SGR), an insolvency
fund for travel agencies.98 The latter fund is designed to compensate consumers if their
travel agency goes bankrupt before or during their journey. The consumer will also be
compensated where he cannot go on the holiday at all and, if the journey has to be interrupted,
the costs of repatriation and other losses are covered. The SGR fund is also available for
general compensation payments if the consumer has already acquired a ‘binding advice’
from the GC before the company became insolvent. The fund was built up from consumers’
contributions since 1999, but the SGR guarantee is now free for consumers, since the fund
has sufficient capital. Traders finance its administration. The catastrophe fund is financed
by a fee of €2.50 per booking.
97
Art 17, lid 5, ANVR standard contract terms.
98
See www.sgr.nl/index.asp; www.anwb.nl/vakantie/zoek-en-boek/service-en-advies,/ANVR--SGR--Calamite
itenfonds.html.

Thuiswinkel: Web Traders
The association of web traders, Thuiswinkel, originated as an association for postal order
traders, and took over web traders around 2000 from Consumentenbond. Membership
has grown from 35 firms to 1,200. Its members comprise 30 per cent of web-shops in the
Netherlands, and 80 per cent (€5.5 billion turnover) of the national e-commerce market,
which has an annual turnover of €9 billion. Its members are both large and small, 80 per
cent of which have annual turnover of less than €5 million.99
The strategic goal of the association was to address an initial lack of consumer confidence
in trading on the web, and this has been achieved. A strong single market new exists.
Initially, a wide range of terms and conditions were in use, many of which contained illegal
provisions. Thuiswinkel has cleaned up practice in relation to matters such as guarantees,
pre-payment systems, and exclusions of liability. Members are obliged to use Thuiswinkel’s
terms and conditions. Thuiswinkel requires members to be audited by an independent
body (ECT Recht) both before admission to membership and annually. It checks members’
websites, and currently looks at issues such as methods of payment and delivery costs.
Members are entitled to use Thuiswinkel’s logo, which is believed to be widely understood
as a mark of quality by the public.
Members operate within a wide range of market sectors, and may belong to other trade
associations that are organized by type of product, in addition to Thuiswinkel, which is
based on a method of distance selling. Members may, therefore, be subject to more than
one set of terms and conditions, and more than one Geschillencommissie. It accepts other
approved terms and conditions without checking them. Thuiswinkel agrees arrangements
with other trade associations. For example, it is agreed between Thuiswinkel and ANVR
that travel claims sold on the web that relate to the method of selling should be directed
to the Thuiswinkel Geschillencommissie, and claims that relate to product service to
Geschillencommissie Reizenh. If the Thuiswinkel member is not a member of ANVR,
Thuiswinkel has agreed with the Consumentenbond that the consumer can rely on ANVR’s
terms and conditions and use of that Geschillencommissie (at Thuiswinkel’s expense) but
without ANVR’s guarantee. Consumers have a choice of relying on whichever set of terms
and conditions, or Geschillencommissie, they wish, and no defensive point will be taken as
between different terms and conditions. Thuiswinkel sees few conflicts in practice. The SGC
will try to direct consumers towards the most appropriate sectoral Geschillencommissie, and
the trade associations see no problems over this. Consumers have been known to compare
the costs of using different Geschillencommissies, and to forum shop accordingly.
Thuiswinkel considers that consumer law has evolved to a stage in which the rules are
clear and comprehensive, so traders have little scope or excuse for breaking the rules.
Accordingly, its approach to compliance and enforcement is ‘soft’. It is easier to ‘police’ the
internet shopping sector than some others, since on-line advertisements are transparent so
easy to check if traders are complying. Thuiswinkel undertakes a yearly audit on compliance,
and has a lot of quality standards. If members are not complying, they are given a warning
and 2 months to comply. It finds that non-compliance usually results from traders not
knowing, or overlooking, what the rules are, and that they can almost always be influenced
to comply when they are told what the rules are. Thuiswinkel can usually influence the
99
The picture is affected by the fact that some large players operate from other States, such as Amazon from
Germany.

The Netherlands 153
behaviour of its members by pointing to the classic ‘big stick’ enforcement powers that can
be exercised by the Consumer Authority.100 It quotes a recent fine of €100,000 imposed on
a trader by the Consumer Authority for an infringement. That example, even though rare–
and precisely because of its rarity–has significant deterrent effect on the majority of traders.
Thuiswinkel sometimes has to persuade traders to settle and pay up, sometimes because
smaller ones are unfamiliar with the law. It does not consider that imposing a fine on its
members is a relevant sanction in the current circumstances. Instead, its policy is to rely
on the sanction of canceling a firm’s membership where it has been shown to have broken
the law in a serious fashion. It accepts that things do go wrong, especially where some
large members sell as many as 5 million product lines. Common issues include delivery,
late delivery, or non-conformity of goods. Thuiswinkel believes that consumers accept that
things can sometimes go wrong, and that traders are human and can make mistakes, but
in such cases consumers want things to be dealt with. Hence, great reliance is placed on
addressing problems effectively and quickly.
Against that background, the association is proud of the fact that the number
of Geschillencommissie cases is very low: 57 judgments in 2010 and 44 in 2009. Of
these, consumers and traders each win roughly 50 per cent. Thuiswinkel views most
Geschillencommissie decisions as unsurprising. Members must have a clear complaint
system, which must be used as the first line of response, and which resolves the vast majority
of issues. The total number of complaints against members in 2010 was around 2,200.101
Thuiswinkel receives some complaints itself, which it directs to traders, but asks a consumer
to inform it if the complaint is not dealt with satisfactorily. The association tries to mediate
where appropriate, especially by advising members on the legal situation.
Thuiswinkel believes that the quality of the Geschillencommissie is high, not less than
that offered by the courts and probably better because of the inherent expertise. It sees
little evidence that consumers are pressured to ‘under-settle’ complaints. Where it exerts
pressure on members, it would typically say ‘Make the consumer an offer he cannot refuse.
Even if you’re right, it’s costing you money to argue’. Settlements can be booked against tax.
Given the low value of most claims, the management cost of handling them far outweighs
the intrinsic value of a claim, and Thuiswinkel believes that this commercial reality tends to
result in fair offers and settlements so as to achieve speedy resolution.
Financial Services: KiFiD
The financial services sector has a slightly different structure of dispute resolution to that
described above. It has three stages, all administered by the Financial Services Complaints
Institute Foundation (Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening: KiFiD). A claim can be
pursued in court at any stage, unless the claimant has agreed to binding arbitration. As
a pre-condition, a claim must first have been raised with the relevant financial services
provider.
100
A fine can be imposed of up to €74,000 for breach of consumer rights under administrative powers, and of
up to €450,000 per case under the fair trading (EU unfair commercial practices) laws.
101
In March 2011, it received 359 complaints direct, 183 of which were about members and which were solved
by members directly, and the rest about non-members.

On reaching KiFiD, the first stage is an Ombudsman process.102 Cases are managed by
a team of case officers,103 although every decision is made by the Ombudsman personally.
The Ombudsman is subject to an obligation to seek a settlement between the parties, and
therefore resolves many disputes by conciliating between the customers and the business:
some customers are persuaded to drop poor claims and some businesses are persuaded
to settle strong claims. If the parties do not agree, the Ombudsman produces a written
recommendation. This is not binding on either party, but the compliance by business is
effectively 100 per cent. The outcome can be binding if the parties have so agreed in writing
beforehand or do so afterwards.104
If the consumer does not accept the Ombudsman’s decision, the second stage (as an
alternative to a court case) is a Commission (Geschillencommissie), for which the procedure
is the same as other Geschillencommissies discussed above. The claim has to be made within
3 months and a claim value of €100 euro is required, with some exceptions. The Rules make
it optional for business organizations to accept a decision as binding, but all banks and most
intermediaries have agreed to accept all decisions up to €5 million. The consumer also has
a choice of whether to accept the result as binding, but if this is accepting this in advance
surrenders the right to claim in court. The chairman of the Geschillencommissie decides,
depending on the kind of claim, whether it will be dealt with by him (or a vice-chairman or
a member that fulfills the requirements to be chairman) individually or by a panel (which
may consist of 3 or 5 members).105
The third stage is an Arbitration Appeal Board, which is available for cases of major
significance, meaning a case value of at least €25,000. Exceptions are possible if the
importance of the claim justifies this. The appeal must be initiated by the consumer or the
trader within 6 weeks of the decision of the Geschillencommissie.
KiFiD was established in April 2007 as a merger between the pre-existing sectoral disputes
schemes on insurance (which had an ombudsman, whose decisions were not binding and not
published), the banks (which used to be in the Geschillencommissie system) and securities
(which also had a binding arbitration board for consumer claims, established under the
Securities Act 1983). The Financial Services Act 2007, which introduced a new supervisory
structure,106 introduced an obligation for all businesses in the sector to join an ADR system
for consumer complaints.107 Rather than use the Geschillencommissie, the banks decided to
set up their own separate umbrella organization to oversee their ADR system, which would
be a twin of the Stichting Geschillencommissie.108 Two large Geschillencommissie boards
(Bankzaken and Hypothecaire Financieringen) therefore transferred across from SGC to
KiFiD. The arrangements were further streamlined within KiFiD in 2009–2010 by merging
the specialities of ADR in banking, insurance and financial services, so as to provide an
integrated approach.
102
It is a precondition for a case to be considered by the Ombudsman that the internal handling procedure of
the trader has first been accessed: see KiFiD rules, Art 13.
103
The Ombudsman has around 20 staff.
104
KiFiD rules, Art 25.3.
105
KiFiD rules, Art 35.
106
Prudential supervision came under the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.: DNB), and
market behaviour came under the Financial Markets Authority (Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten: AFM).
Both the AFM and the Consumer Authority deal with the law on unfair trade practices.
107
It is interesting to note that the courts and the Geschillencommissie structures are the responsibility of the
Ministry of Justice, whereas responsibility for financial services is a matter for the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
and this may historically explain the separate development ADR in that sector.
108

The Netherlands 155
Approval from the Ministry is required by KiFiD under the Financial Services Act,
which is subject to it being run in good order and undertaking to comply with the EU
1998 Recommendation.109 KiFiD is run by a Board of directors, which in 2011 is shedding
its business and ministerial members in order to enhance the appearance of independence
from any outside influences.110 The current Ombudsman is a judge with 25 years’ previous
judicial experience, and the Chairmen of the Arbitration Committee and the Appeal Board
are both leading professors of financial law.
The number of cases in recent years in shown in Tables 6.4–6.9. 111 The total number
of cases received in the past three years has fluctuated between roughly six and eight
thousand, and is susceptible to variations in claim levels for particular types of claims (such
as life insurance or liability insurance). A significant number of complaints received do
not fall within the Ombudsman’s criteria, the largest category of those being complaints
that have not first been referred to the relevant company. The Ombudsman stage results in
resolution of roughly ninety or ninety-five per cent of initial complaints, with a few hundred
proceeding to the Geschillencommissie, and twenty or so going to the Appeal Committee.
Table 6.4: Cases received by KiFiD
2010 % 2009 2008

Banking 1586 23 1662 1217
Securities 662 30 1027 602
Mortgages 992 10 1151 770
Life insurance 1465 22 2175 2295
Liability insurance 2014 15 1803 1527
Total 6719 100 7818 6411
Table 6.5: Outcome of Financial Services Ombudsman cases in 2010
Liability
Banking Securities Mortgages Life insurance insurance Total %
Handled 1794 930 1104 1639 1971 7438
Not accepted 799 236 459 623 966 3083

No internal claims handling 372 99 227 303 493 1494
No claim 113 21 72 95 120 421
Unclear claim 79 17 37 62 116 311
No consumer 66 21 23 11 98 219
> 3 months 34 33 27 26 31 151
Bank not registered at
59 8 35 19 11 132
KiFiD
Request for information 21 13 13 54 26 127
Others 55 24 25 53 71 228
Accepted 995 694 645 1016 1005 4355

Ill-founded 404 441 212 310 341 1708 39
Result 258 92 157 321 337 1165 27
Direct 269 92 231 248 254 1094 25
Recommendation 28 54 25 119 4 230 5
‘Cessation’; dismissed 36 15 20 18 69 158 4
109
See ch 1.
110
See letter of the Minister of Finance to the Chairman of the Second Chamber, 30th June 2011 ‘Publiekrechtelijke
status Ombudsman Kifid’.
111
KiFiD annual reports, eg available at www.kifid.nl/fileupload/Jaarverslag_2010.pdf.

Table 6.6: Cases received by the Financial Services Geschillencommissie in 2010
2010 2009 2008

Banking 128 64 73
Securities 158 116 70
Mortgages 101 67 49
Life insurance 107 101 80
Liability insurance 115 95 75
Total 609 443 347
Table 6.7: Outcome of Geschillencommissie cases in 2010
Judgments 249 52%

Declined 168
Partially awarded 47
Awarded 26
Not admissible 3
No competence 3
Interim judgment 1
Hearing ‘applicable’ 1
Procedural irregularity112 135 28%
Settled after case filed 79 17%
Withdrawn 13 3%
Total 476
Table 6.8: Outcome of Financial Services Geschillencommissie cases in 2010
Numbers %
Banking 100 21
Securities 96 20
Mortgages 84 21
Life insurance 100 20
Liability insurance 96 18
Total 476 100
Table 6.9: Financial Services Appeal Committee, 2009 and 2010
Cases received by the Appeal Committee 2010 2009

19 9
Cases 27
Withdrawn 5
Not admissible 7
Admissible 15
Outcomes per sector %

Banking 3 20
Securities 3 20
Mortgages 1 33
Life insurance 5 20
Liability insurance 3 7
Total 15 100

The Netherlands 157
Kifid’s budget has tripled in recent years to round about €9 million accompanying a large
rise in claims.113 The procedure before the Ombudsman is free of charge for the consumer,
but a fee of €50 is payable for accessing the Geschillencommissie.114 For traders, the minimum
yearly contribution of banks and insurers is €170.115 For all other members, the lowest
contribution is €163. The registration fee amounts to €25.
The Ombudsman and arbitrators make decisions by applying the law. They do not apply
any terms and conditions or codes. Hence, an important difference between KiFiD and
the SGC system is that terms and conditions are not negotiated in the financial services
sector between consumers and business associations, and that requirement is not a trigger
for access to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman treats every claim as if it were a normal
civil claim, and ultimately reaches an adjudication in the same way as he would if he were
sitting in court (save that the effect of his decision is not binding). Decisions are made on
the basis of the law, which is usually contract law and sometimes financial services law, but
can sometimes be influenced by regulations made by the AFM. Industry guidelines that
may exist will be irrelevant in this context, and indeed, the Ombudsman can decide that
industry guidelines are contrary to the law. The Ombudsman’s Rules specify that decisions
must be ‘fair and reasonable’116 but that standard is has always been interpreted as being
the same as that provided for by law. The Dutch courts decided in the 1960s that the Rule
of Reason could contradict a contract, for example for reasons of good faith, and that was
later codified.117
Financial services businesses can produce their own codes of practice: one exists for
the insurance sector. Disputes under that code are dealt with by a body established by the
insurance trade association, the Tuchtraad. (Other similar bodies, collectively known as
Tuchtrecht, exist for disputes involving medical personnel and notaries.) The Tuchtraad
consists of at least 5 members and its task is to ensure that when dealing with consumers
the affiliated traders maintain the good name, reputation of and trust in the sector.118 If
such a case is brought to the Ombudsman or the Geschillencommissie, it is transferred to
the Tuchtraad. In recent years, the Tuchtraad Assurantiën dealt with 1–4 cases per year.119
The Ombudsman publishes his decisions that are of wider interest, rather than every
decision. This is justified on the basis that decisions are non-binding, many cases result in a
conclusion that the Ombudsman cannot help the consumer, and a concern not to diminish
the impact of the relatively few decisions that have impact. Decision of the Ombudsman
and the Arbitration Board have been seen to affect the behaviour of banks, regulators and
trade associations.
112
eg fees not paid.
113
Annual report KiFiD 2010, pp. 6, 23. KiFiD is still in the process of setting up (weerstandsvermogen)
1,250,000 euros within the First 5 years of its existence. Twice in 2010 €250,000 were transferred to this reserve (p.
24). The budget for 2011 is to be €8,701,000 (p. 25).
114
FAQ KiFiD, www.kifid.nl/consumenten/veelgestelde-vragen. If the Ombudsman himself transfers the
case to the Geschillencommissie the consumer is free from the fee, see Art 26.2 KiFiD rules, for instance due to
procedural complexity. If the Ombudsman has declared the claim ‘kennelijk ongegrond’ (clearly inadmissible)
according to Art 31.2 KiFiD rules the fee is €100.
115
See cost rules: www.kifid.nl/fileupload/Kostenreglement_2011.pdf.
116
‘fair en billijk’.
117
Art 4:2 BW.
118
See Reglement Tuchtraad Financiele Dienstverlening (assurantiën).
119
See www.verzekeraars.nl/Over%20het%20Verbond/Zelfregulering%20en%20Klachtenprocedures/Regle
ment%20en%20uitspraken%20Tuchtraad.aspx.

Consumentenbond have criticized the Ombudsman stage on a number of grounds. One

point is that it is an obligatory first stage, and that consumers cannot access the arbitrator
so as to get a binding result. Comsumentenbond consider that its use should be a matter of
choice, with the option of skipping to a binding solution. The other concerns are that there
is only a single Ombudsman rather than a panel, and that both the Ombudsman and the
arbitrator are within the same organization. These arrangements have been criticised as not
ensuring the independence of the arbitrator and the system. Some view the KiFiD system
as being set up by banks for their protection.
In response, KiFiD obtained advice from a distinguished judge, Mr van Delden, that
the first stage should be voluntary. A key consideration is to maintain the effectiveness of
the Ombudsman in handling a sizeable volume of complaints: the annual input of around
4,000 cases is considerably larger than that of any Geschillencommissie, and considerations
of efficiency and effectiveness arise. KiFiD argues that if all of the claims that it handles
went straight to an arbitration committee, the process would be notably slower and more
expensive. On the single/triple arbitrator issue, KiFiD believes that requiring an arbitrator
panel of three results in two of the members putting forward partisan views and the decision
is really made by the single independent chair, so maintaining three members merely adds
unnecessary cost and unnecessary window-dressing to give an illusion of balance.
The financial services sector periodically gives rise to mass claims. KiFiD is required to
process all claims that it receives, and its experience is that similar claims can build up over
time, sometimes creating a ‘sleeping mass’ that erupts into a major managerial challenge.
The two notably examples have been the Legio Lease/Dexia securities case (which erupted
before the Ombudsman route existed)120 and the Woekerpolis case (where the Ombudsman’s
role in facilitating a solution was criticized by those who were unhappy with his proposed
solution).121 Negotiation has played a part in both of those cases: most of the Legio Lease
claims were included in a settlement approved under WCAM. Such cases frequently have
wider implications than resolution of individual the disputes to which they give rise, such
as issues involving commercial practice and supervisory systems, and sometimes need to
be resolved through channels other than those designed for resolution of small disputes.
KiFiD’s rules provide that if a claim is one of many with a total aggregate of €100,000, the
trader can stop the procedure and go to court. The idea behind this is that if there are large
implications, large businesses currently prefer a forum in which the wider implications can
be authoritatively and exhaustively considered, rather than precedents being set fortuitously
by a small number of individual claims that happen to arise at an early stage. There is a
feeling that a decision by a senior court is currently a better option than the Ombudsman/
arbitration procedures or decisions by lower courts for achieving such an outcome, but that
that is not necessarily the best solution.
KiFiD handles all cross-border claims, incoming or outgoing, through the FIN-NET
system. It regards FIN-NET as a useful forum for sharing techniques amongst national
financial services ADR schemes.
120
This involved some 400,000 consumers who bought shares with borrowed money, which became loss-
making after share process dropped in 2000 and interest tax deductions for consumer credit were halted. After a
lengthy period of public anger and litigation in which Dexia Bank sought to enforce its securities, and a negotiated
solution was hammered out by a senior respected public figure, Wim Duisenberg, illuminated by the then existing
decisions from courts and the Arbitration Board, the settlement was approved under WCAM. Some individuals
opted out and pursued individual solutions (often those advised by intermediaries who sought their cuts).
121
This involved allegations of extortionate life insurance policies, investment funds, and funds combined with
mortgages, which were sold with fees amounting to 30 or 40%. After the 2008 financial crash, the final funds were
far less than anticipated.

The Netherlands 159
Discussion
Views of Stakeholders
The business community is happy with the Geschillencommissie mechanism: it is a ‘good

working machine’ and has solved many cases, keeping them out of court and the press.122
Businesses fund the system for two reasons: to settle consumer disputes quickly and more
cheaply than courts; and to get the feedback that is useful for self-regulatory purposes.
Systems do differ somewhat between different sectors, but the umbrella is the same, and has
the advantages of reliable quality and a single system that everyone can know about. The
Geschillencommissie system is voluntary for business, but is widely supported since it offers
so many advantages. However, as Government subsidies for the system are decreasing,
traders realize that the system is becoming expensive for them. For example, the fees that
traders have to pay in the travel sector even where they win a case will be abolished in 2012
because of resistance.
From the consumer perspective, Consumentenbond regards the system of negotiating
terms and conditions as well balanced. The consumer associations have significant power,
led by the involvement of the Consumentenbond in all sectoral negotiations. Their position
is backed by the power of the media and string enforcement powers available to the
Consumer Authority, which together act on the commercial desire of many traders to
maintain high reputations within competitive markets. A significant historical factor in the
evolution of the system of negotiation of terms and conditions was the introduction in 1992
of a mechanism for the Consumentenbond to apply to the court for collective injunctive
redress.123 This powerful weapon was a major factor in bringing business associations to
the table, in order to avoid disruptive, uncertain and costly litigation, and associated loss of
reputation. Since then, the systems of ex ante negotiation and associated dispute resolution
mechanism have grown and strengthened. The overall quality of terms and conditions has
improved and is continually evolving. The system has spread outwards from a few sectors
to cover almost the whole range of consumer-facing commercial activity.
On the other hand, the collective injunctive power is expensive for Consumentenbond to
use, given the court rules on costs. With the creation in 2007 of the Consumer Authority,
the regulatory ability to take action in the common interest, where it is required, has been
open to that public agency. Enforcement action by the Authority would be both cheaper
and more effective than by the consumer association.
Consumentenbond therefore has a significant regulatory role. However, this is only
effective against firms that are members of the Geschillencommissie system. The ‘bad guys’
are rarely in that system, so public enforcement is needed by the Authority. The gap between
the ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ is widening. Accordingly, Consumentenbond is advising its
members to be aware of the advantages of trading with members of the Geschillencommissie
system.
Interview with Hubert van Breemen of VNO-NCW IMKBh on 24 February 2011.

122
123
Art 3:305a BW. Whereas injunctive actions could previously name individual traders, the new legislation
enabled all members of a particular branch to be sued at once.

Evaluating the ADR System
The official policy on encouraging informal dispute resolution in the Netherlands has
produced a thriving ADR system alongside the courts.124 Each of those two pathways has
equal status in resolving disputes. The same criteria of independence, trust, fairness and so
on are considered to apply to each pathway.
The Geschillencommissie procedure has fewer rules than arbitration. It ends with ‘binding
advice’ that is closer in form to contract than a binding court judgment, but compliance is
rarely a problem, given the trade association guarantee arrangements. A Report by Professor
Snijders concluded that there was no need to change the Geschillencommissie system, since it
works.125 Snijders noted that binding arbitration would be theoretically preferable in sectors
where association guarantees do not exist or there are other compliance problems. However,
he said that such an approach might create confusion in the minds of consumers and others.
Arbitration already takes place at the SGC, namely Geschillencommissie Garantiewoningen
and Geschillencommissie Luchtvaart. Further, the Geschillencommissie Advocatuur uses
arbitration in all but consumer claims.126 A problem with the Commission system, but also
for enforcement through courts, arises with jurisdiction over foreign traders or any trader
that is not registered with the ADR body.127
The ADR system offers a number of strong advantages. Firstly, the model is standard
across a wide range of business sectors. That consistency promotes visibility of the ADR
mechanisms for consumers and businesses. The system is now comprehensive across trade
and professional sectors, apart from one major gap, which is doctors. There is a Bill under
which doctors and alternative healers will be obliged to join an ADR system, without
identifying which system, but it must be one founded jointly by traders and a consumer
association. Secondly, the national template operates with independent oversight that builds
high quality and trust in the dispute resolution system. The range of Geschillencommissie is
now so wide that, given the high level of trust, consumers tend to expect that a committee
will exists for almost every type of dispute that might arise. That consumer expectation in
turn places pressure on business sectors to establish a commission for their sector, and to
abide by the associated standards of conduct and terms and conditions.
Thirdly, the network is cheap to use. As at December 2010, only 55 staff handle at the
SGC the central administration for all 50 of its consumer Commissions and five business
Commissions. The ADR Commission procedure is designed to be less costly to access for
consumers than the ordinary courts. The Commissions are now focusing on promoting
mediation and online solutions, so as to reduce costs further.128 The low cost and accessibility
are thought to encourage some consumers to ‘try their luck’ in bringing a claim, rather than
risking money and time in the courts.
Fourthly, the model is not static, but able to evolve and innovate. As the number of
sectors covered has steadily risen over 40 years, the unified GSC structure has not imposed
complete uniformity for each sector, but been able to accommodate some variations in
124
See PMM van der Grinten, ‘The Netherlands: Policy Observations’ in C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M
Tulibacka, The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation. A Comparative Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).
125
HJ Snijders, Arbitrage en/of bindend advies bij de SGC, Een onderzoek in opdracht van de Coördinatiegroep
Zelfreguleringsoverleg van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, CZ/401, 2010; available at www.ser.nl/nl/publicaties/
overige/2010-2019/2010/20101015.aspx.
126
Snijders, Arbitrage en/of bindend advies bij de SGC (2010), 7.
127
Hondius, (n 51), 1.
128

The Netherlands 161
procedure or use of experts depending on the requirements of individual types of disputes

that arise in sectors.
Fifthly, the ADR arrangements operate as an integral part of a larger system designed
to deliver acceptable business practices, through the negotiation of terms and conditions,
and post-dispute feedback and self-regulatory controls. The model integrates the different
elements of direct negotiation, regulation, ADR and courts into focusing on maintaining
standards and providing redress. It encourages public trust in traders and sectors, and
assists consumer choice by pointing towards selecting trustworthy traders, who have signed
up to observe both approved terms and conditions and the Board procedure and decisions.
The system requires a competitive market. Its effectiveness may be reduced or threatened
if there is too small a number of large players, which make the branch organisation too
dependent on the income and views of that oligopoly, or where there is a large number of
small players, who do not rely on reputation to the same extent as in a more competitive
market and who do not seethed the costs of joining the organization and system outweigh
the benefits.
Consideration is being given to the establishment of a general Geschillencommissie
whose jurisdiction would be for traders who are not members of a trade association but
who could join on a voluntary basis. Extending the possibilities of business-to-business
Geschillencommisie is also being considered.
A different approach would be arbitration, so that the decisions would be instantly
enforceable at law: some bodies are asking for this, since enforcement can be a problem is
some sectors, such as cars, garages, car rental, motor bikes, bicycles, and aeroplanes.
Some Problem Areas
Problems can arise in individual sectors, that relate to the nature of the market or attitude
of traders, rather than with the Geschillencommissie system as such.
The telecom sector has a poor reputation. It is not organized as an integral sector. Its
terms and conditions and Geschillencommissie are based on the normal telephone situation,
rather than on mobile telephony. There have been difficulties recently in the SMS texting
sector, where the members no longer advertise at all on television. The kitchen organization
is reported to have found it difficult to kick out large members, since it relies on their
income. There are a number not complying in the child daycare sector.
The airlines are reluctant to embrace the terms and conditions system. The
Geschillencommissie in the airlines sector is based on arbitration, and it deals only with
some aspects of their activities, such as denied boarding, which arises under EU-based
legislation. The attitude may be based on the historical origin of the Dutch airlines as being
state-owned and therefore somewhat resistant to external influences. Airline companies
were reluctant to create a sectoral Committee until they were forced to do this as a result
of combined pressure from the Minister and the implications of the Denied Boarding
Directive.129 ANVR members have many actions against airlines over commercial or agency
issues.
129
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation
or long delay of flights, OJ L 046, 1–8.

Access to Justice: Courts or ADR?
The consumer has a choice between the Geschillencommissie procedure and the special
civil court procedure (kantongerechtsprocedure). Before 1 July 2011, the subdistrict judge
dealt with all cases of a value below € 5,000 and disputes concerning rent and labour
contracts (irrespective of the amount).130 The limit was recently increased to € 25,000 and
the judge is now competent in all cases of consumer credit (ie loans up to € 40,000) and
all consumer contracts.131 Both of those procedures usually produce fast results, but the
Geschillencommissie procedure is cheaper for the cases that it covers. A significant advantage
of the Geschillencommissies, and a reason for their creation, was in order to provide cheaper
and effective solutions than courts, and they certainly provide attractive alternatives.
Judgments in the kantongerechtsprocedure in 2010 totaled 661,600 (650,550 in 2009,
561,900 in 2008)132 and 118,420 in the ordinary civil procedure (111,740 in 2009, 102,010
in 2008).133 However, since consumer law cases are not registered individually within the
figures at civil courts, they are impossible to identify within those total figures. As noted
above, in 2010 7,826 claims were initiated in the Geschillencommissie system and 6,719 in
the financial services system. Hence, general trends are that small claims cases are rising
and Geschillencommissie claims (excluding the financial services sector, which fluctuates)
are falling.
The Geschillencommissie costs are clearly attractive when compared with the courts.134 As
noted above, the Geschillencommissie costs vary depending on the sector, ranging from €25
to €125 and only rarely over €500. The fee for court cases with no clear monetary value, or
where an amount of less than €12,500 is claimed, is €255 for natural persons and €560 for
legal entities.135 The fee for cases where more than €12,500 and less than €100,000 is claimed
is €580 for natural persons and €1,165 for legal entities. Cases where more than €100,000
is claimed have a fee of €1,395 for natural persons and €3,490 for legal entities. In addition,
there is the cost of bailiffs for service (€72.25), any experts required (€81.23 plus taxes),
and lawyers’ fees (usually on hourly rates). Parties litigating before a District Court must
be represented by an attorney. If a case is lost, there is the risk of liability for opponents’
costs in court claims, in a Geschillencommissie the risk is limited to reimbursement of the
registration fee, but there is no loser pays rule with the small claims procedure (a winning
consumer would regard that as a disadvantage).136
130
Hondius (n 51), 1ff.
131
Evaluatiewet modernisering rechterlijke organisatie, Stb. 2011, 255, Act, of 19th May 2011, www.eerstekamer.
nl/behandeling/20110531/publicatie_wet/f=/viqs9moy17pd.pdf.
132
Annual report Rechtspraak 2010, 54. Statistics from the Central Bureau for Statistics differ: for the small
claims procedure 452,400 in 2008 and 519,800 for 2009, and for ordinary civil procedures 31,100 in 2008 and
35,500 in 2009. see statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70229ned&D1=a&D2=a&
HD=090416-1648&HDR=G1&STB=T.
133
See Rechtspraak 2009, 61. Neither are the results from Raad voor de Rechtspraak, Rapport commissie
Eenvoudige procedure voor eenvoudige zaken – advies d.d. 23 april 2007 more revealing according to Loos and van
Boom (n 50), 27.
134
Tuil (n 3).
135
New court fees legislation has been proposed in the Netherlands (Wet griffierechten burgerlijke zaken, Stb.
2010, 715), which is intended to increase the court fees in civil matters and also in administrative matters (Wijziging
van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht en de Wet griffierechten burgerlijke zaken in verband met de invoering van
kostendekkende griffierechten and Wijziging van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht en de Wet griffierechten burgerlijke
zaken in verband met de invoering van kostendekkende griffierechten). As at January 2012, the proposals had not
been introduced in Parliament.
136
See Loos and van Boom (n 50), 81.

The Netherlands 163
Given the level of irrecoverable costs if the case is won, plus the risk of cost liability if it is
lost, there will be a net loss below a certain threshold of claim, and an unattractive recovery-
to-cost ratio immediately above that threshold. Some commentators have assumed that
a rational consumer would refrain from seeking individual redress through the ADR
institutions only if the claim is below €100–200 (depending on the applicable admission
fee).137 In 2009, only 9 per cent of the Geschillencommissies dealt with claims of less than
€250, there was no claim involving a value of more than €10,000, and the largest segment of
claims (24 per cent) were for €1,001 – 2,000.138
The legal aid provisions apply to any case with value over € 500.139 The costs calculations
are, of course, affected for those who are eligible for legal aid, which is relatively widely
available in the Netherlands.140 Under current rules a claimant who qualifies financially
will only get legal aid for a court claim. It is proposed that there should be legal aid for a
Geschillencommissie claim, but that the claimant would get less support for bringing a case
in court, thereby prioritizing the ADR system.
The costs relationships are, however, set to change as a result of various reforms. Firstly,
the government is considering whether the court fee should be set at a level that would
recover the real cost, so as to relieve the state from having to subsidise it (kostendekkende
griffierechten): that would mean that court fees would rise four-fold.141 There is also a
proposal that a trader who loses would have to pay more costs in defending a court claim
where it has not joined a Geschillencommissie.
The potential advantage that a court judgment is directly enforceable, whereas a
Geschillencommisie award is not, has been overcome by the latter being backed by the
guarantee of the trade association.
It is important also to consider two structural features that have considerable impact
on the choice between the available pathways: firstly, that many decisions on processing
disputes in the Netherlands are made by insurers rather than consumers and, secondly, the
national situation on who may offer legal advice.
Insurers hold considerable power in deciding choice of claims pathways in the
Netherlands. Legal expenses insurance (LEI) covers around 47.8 per cent of households.142
It is usually the LEI insurers that decide whether a case is sent to court or a Commission.
Insured individuals would contact their insurer as first point of call for advice, and insurers
in the Netherlands have large in-house legal departments who give advice on claims
and any legal aspects that arise. Insurers strongly prefer Commissions because they are
cheaper than courts: there is no court fee and no external lawyer’s fee, but only a modest
Commission filing fee, which is recoverable. Further, around 50% of individuals who attend
137
MBM Loos, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European
Union – country report The Netherlands’ (CIVIC Consulting, 2008), available at ec.europa.eu/consumers/
redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.
138
Klapwijk and ter Voert (n 29), 43; data from Geschillencommissie on years 2005 – 2008. Note that the
financial value is known in 55 % of the cases.
139
See Normbedragen Wet op de rechtsbijstand (Wrb) per 1 juli 2011. (‘Rechtsbijstand op basis van een toevoeging
(= gesubsidieerde rechtsbijstand) wordt, als zijnde van onvoldoende belang, niet verleend indien het op geld
waardeerbare belang blijft beneden een bedrag van €|500,-.’) www.st-ab.nl/normwrb.htm Certain maximum income
limits are valid as well.
140
See Tuil (n 3), 406.
141
See Annual report Rechtspraak 2010, 6.
142
ibid, 407. The Dutch Association of Insures (Verbond van Verzekeraars) reports that in 2008 at least 2,212,000
households held a BTE policy. Verzekerd van cijfers 2009 (Verbond van verzekeraars, The Hague, 2009) 94. In
addition 1,444,000 BTE policies had been sold that cover motor vehicle related claims.

Commission hearings are accompanied by a lawyer, but it is an in-house lawyer from the
insurance company, who has built up considerable experience as repeat players. According
to the 2008 evaluation of the Geschillencommissie 20% of consumers and small businesses
received some kind of legal assistance.143
Broadly, consumers use the Geschillencommissies for consumer claims, especially where
they involve lower amounts, and businesses use the courts or arbitration for their (more
expensive) cases, although many businesses sell their claims, to be collected by factoring
agencies. Dutch arbitration law does not deal with the recovery of fees or costs. In the
absence of agreement on costs between the parties, the arbitrators may decide, and will
often adopt a loser pays approach, limited to an amount that they consider reasonable.144
It appears that the ADR system provides a forum that enables cases to be brought that
would otherwise not be brought in court in view of the expense and inconvenience of
the latter.145 While at first sight it might be assumed that the ADR bodies take cases from
courts, it rather appears that many of the cases dealt with by ADR bodies would not have
been brought to the ordinary court.146 Whether more cases are brought in court than in
Commissions seems to depend on the sector, and is related to claim value.147 Consumer
cases concerning housing and car contracts are mainly dealt with in the ordinary courts
because of their high case value.148 Research by Verstappen, van Boom, Loos and Rinkers
concluded that Geschillencommissie disputes were not so much about terms and conditions
as other issues.149
The total number of claims in both the courts and the Geschillencommissie structure
appears to be low compared with other jurisdictions. In 2008, the courts of first instance
had 522,400 cases that started with a summons (the traditional way of starting a case
concerning a normal monetary dispute).150
Overall
The Geschillencommissie system is an outstanding success, and one of the leading European
examples of ADR. The system operates within a distinct national cultures of collaboration
and achieving pragmatic solutions. The question for other states is whether such a culture
is a pre-requisite for a successful ADR system. If not, and such a culture is independently
desirable, would it be a product of a successful ADR system?
143
144
M van Hooijdonk and P Eijsvoogel, Litigation in the Netherlands. Civil procedure, Arbitration and
Administrative Litigation (The Hague, Wolters Kluwer, 2009), para 3.5.
145
E Hondius, ‘Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection – a Dutch perspective’, in F Cafaggi,
H-W Micklitz, New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – The interplay between public and private enforcement
(Antwerp, Oxford, Portland, Intersentia, 2009), 239.
146
ibid, 235–239.
147
148
See Loos and van Boom (n 50), 26.
149
JMP Verstappen, WH van Boom, MBM Loos and JGJ Rinkes, Onderzoek naar de rol van algemene
voorwaarden in de praktijk van de geschillencommissies SGC, (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2007), available at
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2007/07/25/onderzoek-naar-de-rol-van-algemene-
voorwaarden-in-de-praktijk-van-de-geschillencommissies-sgc.html.
150
Based on the figures reported on the website of the Dutch Central Statistic Bureau (Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek) under ‘Kerncijfers’ on their websitewww.cbs.nl. These figures include small claims.

The Netherlands 165
In any event, a key lesson for other states is how the Netherlands has expanded the use
of ADR across so many sectors—it is within sight of providing comprehensive coverage.
This has been achieved by having a single basic approach, that is centrally organized, and so
provides standardization and control over the performance requirements of independence,
quality, low cost and so on, but also permits sectoral variations where necessary. Compliance
with the performance requirements is obviously essential for consumer confidence. But it
is the visibility of the system as a whole, as produced by its unification, that has enabled
the wide proliferation of sectoral Committees, enlisting consumer demand and business
support.
Is the particular approach towards negotiating terms and conditions a pre-requisite for a
successful ADR system? This would not seem to be the case, since other states have effective
ADR systems without this feature. The negotiation stage operates as a gateway to the
Committees in the Netherlands, whereas no such gateway exists in most other states. The
central question here is whether ex ante or ex post techniques are preferable for enforcing
consumer law, which is beyond the scope of the current enquiry. The Dutch system might
result in wide compliance by businesses, since they are involved in the negotiation of their
sector’s terms and conditions up front, and this should bring both higher understanding
and compliance. If so, such a system might cleverly result in what may be a low number of
infringements compared to other states’ enforcement systems that adopt ex post enforcement
techniques. That hypothesis will need to be tested further.

7
Poland
Magdalena Tulibacka
Introduction
ADR has seen an unprecedented development in Poland within the past 20 years. This
phenomenon is by no means unique in this region of Europe. It can be observed in other
post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Slovenia and Hungary,1 which
after 1989 returned to market economy, democracy and rule of law. Their markets are
maturing, surrounded by newly reformed laws, regulations, and administrative structures.
Their justice systems, both court-administered justice as well as alternative methods of
resolving disputes, were overhauled. However, in spite of a true explosion of new forms
of alternative dispute resolution and new bodies offering ADR services, ADR in Central
and Eastern Europe continues to suffer from quite significant problems. Some of these
problems result from the relative novelty of these developments and the on-going process
of transformation. Most, however, are quite similar to the problems faced by ADR in other
parts of Europe.
This chapter explores ADR mechanisms in Poland and evaluates the problems that
remain. It focuses on consumer disputes, and thus ADR bodies dealing solely with
commercial ADR, especially commercial arbitration, are not covered. Further, the chapter
does not cover criminal and family law ADR. It is solely concerned with civil justice.
The time is indeed ripe for reviewing what Poland has achieved in the area of ADR.
By joining the European Union in 2004,2 Poland also joined its efforts to strengthen civil
justice.3 ADR is seen as a valuable mechanism of accessing justice and therefore it is widely
encouraged by EU policymakers. Poland, together with other Member States is actively
participating in the process of assessment, revision, and greater popularization of ADR
1
The website of the European Commission provides data concerning ADR schemes in all Member States,
including Central and Eastern European states: ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm. This page
includes a map with information on ADR bodies notified to the Commission, as well as the ‘fiches’ on national
ADR systems – short notes describing ADR systems in each Member State. It is clear from these documents
that the Polish ADR system is the most significant of all the CEE states – both in terms of number of bodies and
number of cases considered.
2
Together with the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia,
Poland signed the Accession Treaty with the European Union in 2003. The Treaty was published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities of 23 September 2003, L 236, Vol. 46.
3
The EU involvement in civil justice, and in particular civil procedure, is reviewed by: E Storskrubb (2008)
‘Civil Procedure and EU Law. A Policy Area Uncovered’ (Oxford: OUP); and M Tulibacka (2009) ‘Europeanization
of Civil Procedure: in Search of a Coherent Approach’, 46 CMLR 1527–1565. See the following websites for further
information on EU activities in the area: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm (DG SANCO),
and http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/dispute/policies_civil_dispute_en.htm (DG FSJ).

mechanisms coordinated by the EU. This is particularly visible in the area of consumer
protection. The European Commission’s DG SANCO established a database of ADR bodies
in EU countries, and four Polish mechanisms have been registered on the database so far.4
In early 2011, SANCO published the Consultation Document ‘On the use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution as a means to resolve disputes related to commercial transactions and
practices in the European Union’.5 The Document highlights the dynamic developments in
the area, both by the EU and by the Member States, as well as weaknesses and problems.
The findings are largely based on the ‘Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the European Union’ of October 2009.6 The Study found 750 ADR schemes across the EU
Member States, of which 24 in Poland.7
The key problems identified by the Study were: lack of awareness among consumers and
businesses of the existence of ADR schemes, gaps in geographical and sectoral coverage,
refusal of businesses to follow non-binding decisions of ADR schemes, or even refusal to
altogether engage in proceedings before such schemes. As this chapter will demonstrate,
ADR in Poland undeniably suffers from these shortcomings. To some extent they limit
its popularity, use, and effectiveness. Thus, Polish ADR is not yet ready to fully embrace
the key advantages and aims of ADR: greater access to justice, shifts in the structure and
functioning of law and justice, and also improved behavioural standards within society.8
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, the main types of ADR which have developed in
Poland are set out; second, the ADR bodies and institutions are analysed in detail. Throughout
these two parts, emphasis is placed on a number of issues: the internal (also statutory)
framework of the ADR methods and bodies, their procedures, costs, and participants, their
use and popularity using available statistical information, and any problems which have
been detected in practice and in academic writings. The chapter concludes with a short
restatement of these problems and some elaboration on their implications.
Forms of Adr in Poland
Within the past 20 years, Polish ADR mechanisms gained policy and judicial recognition,
as well as statutory footing. Mediation and arbitration are now firmly established in the
Code of Civil Procedure,9 and the parties to prospective or on-going litigation as well
4
See fn 1. These bodies are: the Trade Inspection, the Banking Ombudsman, the Arbitration Tribunal of the
Financial Supervision Commission, and the Insurance Ombudsman, all examined below.
5
DG SANCO Consultation Paper On the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a means to resolve disputes
related to commercial transactions and practices in the European Union (Brussels, DG SANCO, 2011). Text of
the Consultation Document is available online: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/
docs/adr_consultation_paper_18012011_en.pdf.
6
DG SANCO Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union (Berlin, Civic
Consulting, 2009).
7
The Study does not look at the identified mechanisms in detail. With regard to Poland there is also one crucial
problem: the Study considers each of the district Consumer Arbitration Tribunals as separate mechanisms. This
chapter sees them as branches of the same mechanism. At present, it does not seem justified to make a distinction
between them – they are subject to the same legislation, have the same organizational structures and follow the
same procedures. As a result, the number of ADR bodies examined here is smaller than 24 identified in the Study.
8
C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework for
Collective Redress in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008).
9
The Code of Civil Procedure of 17 November 1964, published in Dziennik Ustaw No 43, item 296, later
amended. A version updated in 2008 is available on the following website: http://lex.pl/serwis/kodeksy/
akty/64.43.296.htm.

Poland 169
as the court are bound to at least consider the use of mediation. Arbitration is used in
disputes between businesses as well as in consumer disputes. Ombudsmen, both of a public
and private nature, also started appearing, starting with the Civic Rights Ombudsman
established by the Act of 15 July 1987.10 Initiatives to establish new ADR bodies come from
public, business and civic initiatives.
Civil law systems such as Poland are good ground for ADR. The position of judges in the
mechanics of court proceedings – typical for such largely inquisitorial systems – enables
them to effectively entice litigants to engage in alternative dispute resolution, in particular
in mediation. The Polish Code of Civil Procedure reiterates this position in the judicial duty
to always aim at concluding litigation with an amicable solution. There are also negative
costs consequences which can in certain circumstances be imposed on parties who refuse
to engage in mediation.11
Further, a specific legal-cultural shift that is favourable to growth of ADR can be seen
in Poland. Civil justice and indeed civil relations between businesses and individuals are
undergoing a specific process of ‘privatisation’.12 The sense of personal empowerment
fostered by the new legal and procedural mechanisms gives rise to new ways of approaching
law and justice, especially that it is contrasted with the prevalence of public control of the
previous socialist period. ADR is undoubtedly an embodiment of this privatisation. It
is seen by prominent scholars and members of the judiciary to be a method of resolving
disputes that guarantees greater autonomy and flexibility to the parties, and at the same
time it is easier for them to access than the formal judicial process.13
Mediation
Mediation is a relatively new concept in Polish procedural law. It was first introduced
into criminal procedure: the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1997 and 2000
to introduce mediation in criminal and juvenile proceedings. Following this, mediation
appeared in public administrative procedure, in 2004. The Code of Civil Procedure was
amended in 2005 to include a number of provisions about mediation and its use before and
during litigation.14 The new rules concerning civil mediation followed the Recommendation
of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers concerning measures to prevent and
reduce the excessive workload in the courts.15 Mediation was designed to be an attractive
alternative to litigation: this was achieved by making it a simple, cheaper option.
10
Amended since. Published in Dziennik Ustaw of 2001, No 14, item 147.
11
Mentioned below in the part of the chapter concerning mediation [I guess that this foot note will have to be
re-maked when the chapters are numbered].
12
R Morek Mediacja w Sprawach Cywilnych’ (Mediation in Civil Cases) (Warszawa, Oficyna Wydawnicza
Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości, 2009), 3.
13
T Ereciński Kodeks Postępowania Cywilnego. Komentarz. Część Pierwsza. Postępowanie rozpoznawcze (Civil
Procedure Code. Commentary. Part One. Trial), (Warszawa, 2006), 407.
14
The amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure of 28 July 2005 (Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) No 172,
item 1438. Mediation is regulated by Part II (‘First Instance Proceedings’), Chapter 1 (Mediation and Arbitration),
sub-chapter 1 (‘Mediation’) of the Code. For further information on the history and present position of mediation
in Poland see: R Morek, Mediacja w przepisach o postępowaniu cywilnym, karnym, w sprawach nieletnich oraz
przed sądami administracyjnymi (Mediation in civil, criminal, juvenile and administrative procedure), (Edukacja
Prawnicza, 2006), No 11, I–II.
15
Recommendation (CE) R (86) 12 concerning measures to prevent and reduce the excessive workload in the
courts [1986].

Civil mediation in Poland takes place outside litigation or during litigation. It can be
initiated by parties or by court. In the first case parties can agree on an ad hoc basis to
mediate a dispute, or mediation can result from a pre-existing mediation agreement.
Mediation agreements can take form of independent arrangements, or are part of a larger
contract regulating relations between parties. These agreements or clauses can also specify
various escalating mechanisms for resolving disputes: starting from negotiations, through
mediation and finally arbitration.16 Article 183.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that all the agreements must specify the subject of mediation (a dispute or a relationship
from which it can arise) and appoint a mediator or at least specify the method of his
appointment. The agreements need not be in writing.
The second type of mediation takes place during litigation, where the court recommends
such course of action for the parties. The court can initiate mediation in such manner
until the end of the first day of court proceedings, following which the power to initiate
it shifts exclusively onto the parties.17 If the court does initiate mediation, each party
has one week to object, and this will prevent mediation from taking place. Whilst such
mediation is not compulsory for litigants, there are negative costs consequences for parties
who unjustifiably refuse to engage in mediation to which they previously consented.18 This
regulatory approach to mediation led to a dispute among scholars. Some claim that it limits
the parties’ autonomy (referred to as ‘freedom of disposition’) during litigation.19 Others,
however, point out that parties have no obligation to agree to mediation in the first place –
thus their freedom of disposition is preserved.20 There is no doubt, however, that there are
incentives to mediate and to settle the case enshrined in the Code of Civil Procedure: for
instance if a settlement is reached following mediation, the court repays the claimant 50%
of the amount of court fee paid when lodging the case.21
Costs of mediation are usually not very significant, but the parties are obliged to pay the
mediator’s fee.22 Even legally aided parties are obliged to pay the mediator, unless the latter
agrees to forego his remuneration.23 Normally the parties agree the remuneration, but in
court-suggested mediation the Regulation of the Minister of Justice24 applies. According to
16
Morek Mediacja w Sprawach Cywilnych (Mediation in Civil Cases) (2009), 7, points out that such multi-step
dispute resolution clauses are increasingly popular in dealings between commercial partners.
17
18
These apply both to situations where the court initiates mediation or when it is done by the parties. The new
costs rules were introduced by the same Act (of 28 July 2005) amending the Code of Civil Procedure. The loser
pays rule is prevalent in Polish Civil Procedure, but Art 103.2 of the Code introduces and exception from this rule.
Court can order a party to pay all costs irrespective of the result of the case if the party behaved improperly (this
includes refusing to engage in mediation to which consent was previously given).
19
Z Miczek, Mediacja w sprawach cywilnych (mediation in civil cases) No 6 (Przegląd Prawa Sądowego, 2006),
12, and R Zegadło, ‘Mediacja w toku postępowania cywilnego – uwagi na tle projektu Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej
Prawa Cywilnego’ (mediation during civil procedure – analysis in the light of the draft of the Civil Law Codification
Commission), in ‘Rozprawy Prawnicze. Księga Pamiątkowa Profesora Maksymiliana Pazdana’ (Legal treatises. In
memory of Professor Maksymilian Pazdan), (Zakamycze 2005), 1536.
20
K Weitz, ‘Mediacja w sprawach gospodarczych’ (mediation in business disputes), in T Wiśniewski, G Bieniek,
E Marszałkowska-Krześ, P Pogonowski, K Weitz (eds) Postępowanie sądowe w sprawach gospodarczych (litigation
in business disputes), Volume 7 (Warszawa, 2007), 234.
21
22
As stipulated in a mediation agreement between the parties or in the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of
30 November 2005 on the rates of remuneration and disbursements of mediators in civil proceedings (published
in Dziennik Ustaw No 239, item 2018). The Regulation only applies to mediation initiated by court.
23
Legal aid in Poland consists in waiver of court fees and appointment of a lawyer ex officio. See M Tulibacka,
‘Poland’, in C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka (eds.) The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation. A Comparative
Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), 453–466, and 457–459.
24
ibid. Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 30 November 2005 on the rates of remuneration and disbursements
of mediators in civil proceedings.

Poland 171
the Regulation, mediator’s remuneration amounts to 1% of the value of the case (if the case
concerns pecuniary rights), but not less than 30 PLN and not more than 1000 PLN,25 or if
the value of the case cannot be determined or if the case concerns non-pecuniary rights:
60 PLN for the first meeting in the mediation process, and 25 PLN for each subsequent
meeting. These amounts are very low indeed, and they have recently been the subject of an
official letter by the Civic Rights Ombudsman to the Minister of Justice. The Ombudsman
suggested that one of the reasons for lack of popularity of mediation in Poland are the low
amounts paid to mediators. They, according to the Ombudsman, do not attract sufficient
quality and quantity of mediation services available to parties willing to mediate.26
Outside litigation, the costs of mediation vary. Mediation centres and organisations offer
their services at relatively reasonable prices. For instance, Centrum Mediacji Partners Polska
requires 200 PLN for mediation conducted by 1 – 2 mediators, and an additional 200 PLN
for recording the settlement.27 In cases concerning pecuniary claims, the costs are somewhat
higher: 300 PLN for the first mediation session, and 200 PLN for each subsequent session.
Business mediation is more costly: in cases worth less than 40,000 PLN the fee is 1000 PLN;
in cases worth between 40,000 and 400,000 – it is 1000 PLN + 3 per cent of the amount
above 40,000 PLN and in cases worth more than 400,000 – it is 13,000 PLN + 1 per cent
of the amount above 400,000 PLN.28 There are also cost-free mediation centres: such as
the Centre for Resolving Disputes at the University of Warsaw Law and Administration
School.29
Mediators are appointed by the parties, or by the court with the consent of the parties. They
are appointed from lists of mediators kept by courts,30 or parties can use mediators of one of
the mediation centres and organisations. Several mediation centres and organisations have
been established: including Centrum Mediacji Partners Polska mentioned above, Krajowe
Centrum Mediacji, and Polskie Stowarzyszenie Mediacji. Some other non-governmental
organisations also offer mediation services or advice, including the abovementioned Centre
for Resolving Disputes at the University of Warsaw Law and Administration School.
Mediation should normally last no more than one month, unless both parties agree that
it ought to take longer. If a settlement is reached during mediation, the court approves it
unless it is contrary to law or to the principles of community life,31 if it is aimed at evading
the law, if it is unclear or inconsistent.32 The settlement is binding on the parties, and after
court approval it has a legal force of an execution title.
Mediation is becoming more and more popular, in particular in commercial disputes,
employment disputes, neighbourhood and community disputes, and consumer disputes.
The Polish Ministry of Justice noted that in comparison to 2009, in 2010 mediations
increased by 36 per cent in civil cases, 65 per cent in commercial cases, and 42 per cent in
25
At the time of writing this chapter, the conversion rate for the Polish currency (PLN) against the Euro is as
follows: 1 PLN = 0.25 Euro.
26
Gazeta Prawna, 1 June 2011, prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/519308,rpo_mediatorzy_zarabiaja_za_malo.
html.
27
www.mediacja.org/info.php/koszty,c8cf12b5386f31b3f9737c9b1ce8f929.html.
28
www.mediacja.org/info.php/koszty,,e73457406003aae891d4b6f64c43bcfd.html.
29
www.mediacje.wpia.uw.edu.pl/text.php?cat=70.
30
The lists of mediators are kept in district courts, and it is the head judge of the district court who decides on
including or excluding someone from the list of mediators.
31
The ‘principles of community life’ are a general clause with significant prominence in the Polish Civil Code.
Their further explanation can be found in: M Tulibacka, Product Liability Law in Transition. A Central European
Perspective, (London, Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 29, 61, 199.
32
Code of Civil Procedure, Art 183.14 para 3.

family cases.33 According to the statistical data collected by the Ministry, numbers of cases
referred to mediation by district courts34 have grown steadily as shown in Table 7.1.35
Table 7.1: Cases referred to mediation 2006–2009
Year Cases referred to mediation by Court Cases where mediation led to settlement
2006 1053 546
2007 1021 707
2008 1061 760
2009 1349 914
These numbers are not very impressive, considering the number of civil cases brought each
year before district courts. For instance, only in the first half of 2010, 143,300 cases were
brought.36 District courts consider cases of higher value and complexity than regional
courts, as well as appeals from regional courts, but clearly there is scope for much wider use
of mediation. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that in regional courts the numbers
are much smaller – normally not reaching half the number of mediations in district courts.
This is even more striking when one considers the much higher number of cases brought to
regional courts: 3.5 million cases only in the first half of 2010.37 This may partly be caused
by the types of cases that are normally considered by regional courts: over 50 per cent of
cases concerning estates registers, and over 25 per cent of cases dealing with injunctions. Of
course, it is difficult to ultimately make an assessment of the use of mediation in Poland even
based on these numbers. They do not include mediations conducted out of court. However,
the widely accepted view is that mediation is not as popular as it should be.
The mediation centres mentioned above continue to promote its value on their websites,
and through local events and campaigns. These activities are encouraged and reinforced
by a very active role of the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry aims at increasing popularity
of mediation by addressing a number of problems pinpointed by legal practitioners and
scholars. They continue to bemoan relative lack of use of mediation in Polish civil, criminal
and administrative justice. A major problem appears to be insufficient emphasis on mediation
by judges, who after all do not have an express duty to inform the parties of the possibility
to engage in mediation or to encourage them to mediate. As a consequence, parties often
do not consider mediation as a viable and attractive alternative to litigation. One of the
reasons for this lack of judicial encouragement is lack of communication between judges
and mediators, and unfortunately also lack of trust of the judiciary in qualifications and
expertise of mediators. In order to create new communication channels between judiciary
and those involved in mediation, the Ministry appointed special ‘mediation coordinators’ in
July 2010. At present there are 91 of them: judges, legal practitioners, professional mediators.
Their role is to liaise between mediators and mediation organisations, non-governmental
bodies, judges, and the Ministry of Justice: to improve mutual trust and understanding.
33
Data from the website of the Ministry – note on meeting between the Minister of Justice and mediation
coordinators on 3 March 2011: http://ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje/news,3057,masz-prawo-do-mediacji--spotkanie-
ministra.html..
34
The structure of the Polish judicial system in civil cases is as follows: regional courts, district courts, appellate
courts, and the Supreme Court.
35
Data available on the website of the Ministry: http://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/statystyki/statystyki-2010.
The data is for civil cases only.
36
ibid.
37
ibid.

Poland 173
The coordinators have also been entrusted the role of drafting the code of good practice for
mediators.38
Other problems with mediation have been highlighted in literature: such as an insufficient
number of mediators who are specialists in a specific field.39 There are postulates to regulate
qualifications and requirements of mediators in a more comprehensive manner. Further,
some ‘white spots’, where mediators are scarce and thus the availability of mediation as a
viable mechanism is very limited, were identified in certain regions of Poland.40
Arbitration
Arbitration is an increasingly popular alternative to litigation in Poland. It has a relatively

long history, reflected in a number of Supreme Court judgements concerning the operation
of this mechanism as well as the legal force of settlements reached through arbitration.41
Within the past 20 years it has become an exceptionally popular mechanism for settling
disputes, especially among businesses. Its relative simplicity, confidentiality, and the
potential for greater expertise of arbitrators (when compared to district or even appeal
court judges) are seen as the particular advantages over litigation. The cost of arbitration
may however be high, perhaps even higher than the cost of litigation in a comparable case.
As an exception to this, Consumer Arbitration Tribunals are free of charge for consumers,
and the Consumer Arbitration Tribunal operated by the Chairman of the Electronic
Communications Office (UKE)42 has a 100 PLN charge to lodge the case.
The new provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure introduced in 200543 regulate
arbitration is some detail. In contrast to mediation, arbitration is to take place of litigation.
The jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal to consider a particular legal dispute is contingent
upon an agreement between the two parties (in Poland this agreement is referred to as ‘a
clause for an arbitration tribunal’—zapis na sąd polubowny—a more descriptive manner of
referring to an arbitration clause). The existence of such an agreement does not prevent one
of the parties from bringing a case to an ordinary court, albeit the other party may object to
the jurisdiction of the ordinary court in the case. Following this objection, the court refuses
to consider the case, even if the arbitration is to take place outside Poland.44
Normally the parties appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators. The Code of Civil Procedure
stipulates that current members of the judicial profession cannot be arbitrators. The
proceedings before an arbitrator or arbitration tribunal may involve a hearing if one of
the parties requests it, or if the agreement between the parties included a clause to this
effect. Otherwise the arbitrator or arbitration tribunal may conduct the proceedings based
on documents only.
38
Information from the website of the Ministry of Justice – note on the meeting with the coordinators on 3
March 2011, ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje/news,3057,masz-prawo-do-mediacji--spotkanie-ministra.html.
39
Morek, (n 12), 8.
40
Meeting of the Minister of Justice with mediation coordinators, 3 March 2011, http://ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje/
news,3057,masz-prawo-do-mediacji--spotkanie-ministra.html.
41
B Dalka, Sądownictwo polubowne w PR (Arbitration in the Polish Peoples’ Republic), (Warsaw, 1987), 16. A
list of the Supreme Court judgments concerning arbitration, with short explanations in Polish, can be found on the
following website: http://www.arbiter.org.pl/240,Orzecznictwo-SN.html. The judgments mentioned there stretch
over a period of more than 40 years.
42
Analysed below.
43
Act of 28 July 2005 added Part Five on arbitration courts (Arts 1154–1217, replacing Part Three (Arts 695–
715)) to the Code of Civil Procedure.
44

The award of the arbitration tribunal (including settlement concluded by the parties
approved by the arbitration tribunal) can be referred for review and annulment to an
ordinary court.45 This is not an appeal procedure, but rather a complaint procedure. The
court will reject the award or settlement in the following circumstances:
1. If the arbitration tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to consider the case;
2. If the award/settlement is contrary to the fundamental principles of the Polish legal
system;
3. If there was no arbitration clause, or if such clause is void, ineffective, or lost legal force
according to the law governing it;46
4. If one of the parties was not informed of the fact that an arbitrator was appointed,
of the fact that the proceedings before an arbitration tribunal commenced, or in any
other way was prevented from presenting her case before the tribunal;
5. If the award, or part of it, goes beyond the scope specified in the arbitration clause (in
the former case, the court only rejects the part of the award concerning issues which
were not covered by the clause), unless the party who participated in the proceedings
before the tribunal knew of this fact and did not object to it during the proceedings;
6. If legal requirements, or requirements resulting from the arbitration clause, concerning
the members of the arbitration tribunal or the proceedings before the tribunal were
not followed;
7. If the award/settlement was a result of a crime, or if its basis was a forged or altered
document;
8. If the same case between the same parties was previously decided in a court judgement.47
The complaint may be brought by a party within 3 months from the day when the party
received a copy of the decision, or from the day when the party has learnt of the reasons
for complaint if the reasons are those contained in points 7 and 8 (not later, however, than
5 years since the party received a copy of the decision).48 In a recent decision, the Supreme
Court held that the presence of either one of these conditions is sufficient for nullifying an
award. It followed that in most cases the court before which the complaint was brought is
constrained by the conditions specified by the complainant. However, two conditions (1
and 2) the court can consider of its own initiative.49
There are many arbitration tribunals operating in Poland. The Consumer Arbitration
Tribunals functioning within the remit of the Trade Inspection, and the Consumer
Arbitration Tribunal of the Chairman of the Electronic Communications Office were already
mentioned, and are analysed below. There are arbitration bodies linked with professional
associations such as lawyers, doctors, and architects. These are not analysed in this chapter.
Other notable examples are: the Arbitration Court of the National Economic Chamber
in Warsaw,50 the Arbitration Tribunal of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers
(Lewiatan), the Arbitration Tribunal of the Regional Economic Council in Katowice, the
International Arbitration Tribunal in Wroclaw, the Arbitration Tribunal of the Cotton
45
Code of Civil Procedure, Arts 1205–1211.
46
Art 184 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies that the court will reject the clause which is illegal, contrary
to the principles of community life, or aims to evade the law.
47
ibid, Art 1206.
48
ibid, Art 1208.
49
Supreme Court, decision of 9 September 2010, I CSK 535/09.
50
This is the largest organization of this kind in Poland, considering between 300 and 500 cases per year.

Poland 175
Chamber in Gdynia, and many others. These bodies deal with commercial arbitration, and
thus are not examined in detail here.
There is no doubt that arbitration is a popular ADR mechanism in business disputes.
However, in disputes involving consumers it suffers from similar problems to mediation.
Although known among many consumers and offered by an ever-growing number of
bodies, it is not yet as popular as it could be. In common with mediation, problems relate
to lack of awareness of the existence of bodies offering arbitration, as well as lack of general
awareness and trust in this ADR mechanism and arbitration bodies. The key issue, as will
be seen from the analysis below, appears to be the fact that businesses often do not agree to
submit to this method of resolving disputes. Jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals is normally
dependent on their consent, and they are not willing to offer it. There are numerous reasons
for this attitude, which no doubt include the shape of the Polish justice system in general
with its slow and often costly court procedure.51 Such a court system does not offer sufficient
incentives to opt for ADR, especially for those traders whose intention is to discourage
the consumer from pursuing the claim.52 There are also doubts as to independence and
objectivity of the bodies conducting arbitration (in particular—the Banking Ombudsman,
Trade Inspection, or Arbitration Tribunal of the Financial Supervision Commission
analysed below). Considering that their decision would be final for the trader or other
professional in question, with the sole remedy of lodging a complaint with a court explored
above, this does not always appear an attractive option. This, on the other hand, does not
instil confidence in the existing ADR mechanisms in Polish consumers.
Ombudsmen, Evolution of their ADR Functions, and Growth of Civic Society
Ombudsmen have a relatively short history in Poland, but their role in public life, in
government administration and constitutional and human rights affairs has already
become very significant. The first type of Ombudsmen who appeared are those who do
not offer ADR services, although they often have some indirect or informal involvement
in ADR proceedings. These are public bodies: Civic Rights Ombudsman, Childrens’ Rights
Ombudsman, Patients’ Rights Ombudsman, and the Regional Consumer Ombudsmen.
They are briefly described below.
The Civic Rights Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) – was established by the
Act of 1987, and is the most renown and respected of all Ombudsmen today. His powers
cover a wide range of constitutional, civic and social issues: including civil, criminal and
administrative justice. The Ombudsman takes action if human or civic rights are being
infringed by a public institution obliged to respect them by the Constitution or another
legal provision. In common with the Children’s Rights Ombudsman and the Patients’ Rights
Ombudsman created during 1990’s, it is a constitutionally independent public body and
performs public functions regulated by statute. As mentioned above, these Ombudsmen do
not play traditional ADR functions, and thus are not analysed in detail in this chapter. They
51
These problems in the Polish civil justice system were explored in M Tulibacka, ‘The Ethos of the Woolf
Reforms in the Transformations of the Post-socialist Civil Procedure: Case Study of Poland’, in D Dwyer (ed),
The Civil Procedure Rules. Ten Years On (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 395–416. On costs and delays see in particular pp
408–413.
52
This situation is gradually improving: with reforms to civil procedure, the introduction of a small claims
procedure in 2000 and a class action procedure in 2009 (explored in more detail below – in the part of the chapter
concerning Ombudsmen and civic society).

investigate complaints, make recommendations and may take part in civil or administrative
litigation in support of a particular person or organisation. However, they also increasingly
take on complaints from individuals and attempt informal mediation or other ways of
resolving the issue. Their public esteem is growing, and thus the success of such efforts is
also improving.
The most notable among those new public Ombudsmen are Regional Consumer
Ombudsmen. They are local officials whose tasks are regulated by statute.53 Their role
involves taking consumer complaints and referring them to traders. During negotiations
or mediations, they make recommendations and suggestions concerning resolving of the
dispute in question (albeit with no powers to make binding decisions). When a Regional
Consumer Ombudsman refers a complaint to a trader, the latter must respond to the
Ombudsman’s questions. They can also represent consumers in court proceedings (bring
litigation as well as take part in litigation already proceeding) or in mediation or arbitration
proceedings before other bodies. Recently, they were entrusted by an additional, potentially
even more significant, power: one of bringing class actions in the name of a group of at least
10 people in cases involving consumer protection, product liability, and tort liability.54
The Regional Consumer Ombudsmen have established themselves as valuable consumer
advice, representation and assistance institutions. They do not have the power to conduct
formal ADR proceedings, albeit their involvement in ADR—through direct contact and
negotiations with traders in informal or formal proceedings is quite significant. The
power to take the consumer’s case to court, or before an ADR body if negotiations fail,
can be a powerful lever in those negotiations. Just how powerful it can be is illustrated
by the effectiveness of the Danish Consumer Ombudsman.55 Unfortunately, the Regional
Consumer Ombudsmen in Poland are not always able to capitalise on the potential of this
power. Some are more active than others. There are many reasons for this situation, an
important one being that the threat of court proceedings, which in Poland are still wrought
with complexity, costs and delays, is not always a serious one. However, this situation is
gradually improving—primarily because court proceedings are undergoing reforms.
Further, the small claims procedure which has existed in Poland since 2000 is an easier to
access, cheaper and less complex option.56 Its existence is more and more widely known
and the procedure is becoming popular among consumers. The new power to bring class
actions introduced by the Class Action Act of 17 December 2009 will also strengthen the
position of Regional Consumer Ombudsmen. In fact, one such class action has already
been brought by an Ombudsman.57
Another reason why Consumer Ombudsmen’s power to bring cases before courts may
not be perceived as a realistic option could be their limited resources and in some cases
53
Act of 16 February 2007 on the protection of competition and consumers, Art 42.2, published in Dziennik
Ustaw of 2007, No 50, item 331.
54
Art 4.2 of the Act on Class Actions of 17 December 2009, published in Dziennik Ustaw of 2010, no 7; item
44 p 1 (in force since 1 July 2010).
55
www.consumerombudsman.dk.
56
Small claims procedure is regulated in Arts 505.1–505.14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amended by
the Act of 24 May 2000, published in Dziennik Ustaw No 48, item 554. It is available only in cases resulting
from contracts, where the amount in dispute is no more than 10,000 PLN, or legal and commercial warranties
for products worth no more than 10,000 PLN, as well as residential dwelling lease contracts (with no financial
threshold). The procedure is easier to lodge (the claimant fills in an official form available online or in courts),
cheaper (court fees are between 100 and 300 PLN depending on the amount in dispute), and less complex as
regards evidence and trial.
57
The action is against BRE bank and concerns mortgages and the calculation of variable interest rate.

Poland 177
also lack of knowledge, expertise and experience which such an initiative would no doubt
require. Occasionally, the expertise and knowledge of the Ombudsmen are questioned
by consumer organisations and the public bodies that cooperate with them, as well as by
consumers themselves.58 The particular source of criticism is the fact that the Ombudsmen
do not have to be lawyers. Indeed, they can be economists or have a degree in any other
discipline.59 They are required to have at least five years’ professional experience, but there
is no requirement that this experience is related to consumer protection or ADR. They are
nominated by the local authorities, and every now and then there are doubts as to their
suitability for the position.60
Another type of Ombudsmen which appeared in Poland, the most crucial as regards the
topic of this chapter, are public (Insurance Ombudsman) or private (created by industry,
such as Banking Ombudsman) bodies established specifically for the purpose of settling
disputes between consumers and representatives of particular types of industry. The
proceedings before them and their involvement in ADR vary, and are analysed below. For
the most part, those Ombudsmen offer mediation or arbitration, and sometimes both these
methods alternatively, depending on the circumstances.
ADR services offered by Ombudsmen are increasingly popular. Some precise statistical
data is provided in the parts of this chapter devoted to the specific Ombudsmen. It is
clear that an Ombudsman as an independent third party, possessing the knowledge and
expertise required in the respective area can be an effective ADR mechanism, especially
when equipped with a large dose of social trust. Unfortunately, here is where weaknesses of
some Ombudsmen are most clearly exhibited. The problems with knowledge and expertise
of Regional Consumer Ombudsmen were mentioned above. The Banking Ombudsman’s
independence from the industry it represents is not always trusted.61 The popularity and
use of Ombudsmen would no doubt improve if those concerns were addressed. There
is no doubt that the potential of an Ombudsman as an institution is very significant in
Poland, and needs to be capitalised on. What is more, Polish consumers increasingly expect
Ombudsmen to have wide powers to consider disputes and be able to in some way enforce
their decisions. A good example is a new Ombudsman for the Recipients of Fuel and
Energy, analysed below. This recently established body operates within the organisational
structure of the Office for Energy Regulation. It does not yet possess the powers to formally
follow up on complaints or to resolve disputes. The 2010 Report of the Head of the Office
for Energy Regulation mentions the increasing number of consumer complaints, with
specific requests concerning dispute settlement.62 The disappointment of the complainants
on being informed of the Ombudsman’s limited role has been noted, especially in telephone
conversations. There are plans to broaden the Ombudsman’s powers in the future.63
An important phenomenon is also the growth of civic society in Poland—the topic that
should not be overlooked in the context of alternative mechanisms for accessing justice. A
growing number of civic society associations and groups (often set up with no public fund-
ing) with whom the Civic Rights Ombudsman and other Ombudsmen cooperate indicates
58
I have heard these not very favourable opinions about the preparedness and expertise of the Ombudsmen
from the Polish branch of the European Consumer Centres and some representatives of the Consumer Federation.
59
Act on the protection of competition and consumers, Art 40.2.
60
Personal interviews with employees of the Polish European Consumer Centre.
61
Please refer to the part of this chapter devoted to the Banking Ombudsman.
62
Urzad Regulacji Energetyki, Annual Report 2010. The Report can be found on the website of the Office: www.
ure.gov.pl/ftp/Biuletyny_URE/2011/2010_03_01-biuletyn_nr1(2).pdf.
63
ibid, 184–185.

that in this relatively new democracy the level of social and civic awareness has increased.
The list of such associations can be found on the Civic Rights Ombudsman’s website, and
it includes such bodies as: the Association of Civic Advice Bureaux, the Foundation for the
Development of Local Democracy, Public Affairs Institute, Foundation for Mutual Assistance
‘Barka’, Association for the Promotion of Civic Attitudes, Campaign Against Homophobia,
etc.64 These associations, often in conjunction or with the assistance of an Ombudsman, offer
help, including legal assistance in the areas of their concern. Further, the number of consumer
associations and organisations dealing with specific aspects of consumer protection is grow-
ing as well. They offer a wide range of services to consumers: including advice, information,
and other types of assistance. To mention only a few, they are: Federacja Konsumentów, Sto-
warzyszenie Konsumentów Polskich, and the network of Citizens’ Advice Offices created in
1996 following the example of the UK’s Citizens’ Advice Bureaux. According to Article 61
of the Code of Civil Procedure, non-profit consumer organisations and other public interest
organisations can bring litigation in the name of a consumer or take part in on-going litiga-
tion to support the consumer’s case. This power can be extended to most ADR proceedings as
well. In common with the Regional Consumer Ombudsmen, those organisations have a po-
tentially significant negotiating tool, albeit with very similar challenges. The problems faced
by consumer associations are specifically related to lack of adequate funds and legal support to
bring litigation, especially in complex cases.65 There is unfortunately no reliable statistical data
concerning the number of cases that were indeed brought by such organisations, or in which
they participated. The Consumers Federation (which is the oldest and the largest consumer
organisation in Poland) recorded 2514 cases in which it took part in 2004.66
Although it is difficult to assess the impact of those civic organisations precisely, they
certainly contribute to the greater awareness of legal remedies, including the availability of
ADR mechanisms.
ADR Bodies
A growing number of bodies—also those established by businesses—offer ADR services. As

mentioned above, four of these schemes: the Trade Inspection, the Insurance Ombudsman,
the Banking Ombudsman, and the Arbitration Tribunal of the Financial Supervision
Commission have been officially notified to the European Commission and can be found
on the official EU ADR database maintained by the European Commission.67
The Trade Inspection and its ADR Services
The Trade Inspection is a public regulatory body with statutory duties in the area of trade
and consumer protection. Its powers and organisational structure are set out in the Act
64
www.brpo.gov.pl/index.php?md=4448&s=1.
65
I have heard this view from many representatives of Polish (and indeed other Central and Eastern European)
consumer organisations.
66
Data from the website of the Federation: www.ure.gov.pl/ftp/Biuletyny_URE/2011/2010_03_01-biuletyn_
nr1(2).pdf.
67
The database is available on the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/
adrdb_en.htm.

Poland 179
of 15 December 2000 on Trade Inspection.68 The Head of the Office for the Protection of
Competition and Consumers69 is also the Head of the Trade Inspection. There are regional
heads in each district in Poland (16 districts).
The Inspection is primarily intended to control safety and quality of products and
services, and its powers are designed accordingly. In addition to those, it also organises the
activity of the Consumer Arbitration Tribunals described below, and engages in mediation
in consumer cases.70 According to Article 36 of the Act on Trade Inspection, a district
head of the Inspection has the power to conduct mediation proceedings. Mediations are
carried out resulting from a consumer’s request, or can be initiated by a district head of
the Inspection. The authority of the Inspection does not extend upon such areas as health,
education, banking, insurance, telecommunications, energy and fuels.
Very often the Inspection becomes involved in disputes between consumers and
businesses when the former contact it for advice. The number of such advice requests
is growing, and so is the number of mediations. An employee of the Inspection dealing
with consumer protection in the Śląsk district also noted that a growing number of
such mediations are resolved in favour of consumers.71 In this region, during 2010, 562
mediation requests were brought by consumers, of which 369 resulted in mediations. 260 of
these mediations were resolved favourably for consumers. The national average, regarding
the percentage of such favourable results, is 66.4%.72 Mediations are free of charge for the
parties, and often concern very small amounts of money.73 However, if during mediation an
opinion of an expert is sought, the consumer should cover the expert’s fee unless the parties
agree otherwise.74
The success rate for consumers in mediations led by the Inspection and the growing
number of mediations may be related to the fact that the Inspection has the power to issue
administrative decisions against traders,75 and there are criminal charges prescribed for the
traders who do not follow the decisions.76 Unfortunately there is no data concerning how
many unsuccessful mediations were followed by such administrative steps.
Consumer Arbitration Tribunals
The Tribunals consider disputes between consumers and businesses resulting from
contracts of sale of goods or provision of services. They were established in 1991, and
68
Dziennik Ustaw of 2001, No 4, item 25. Amendments published in Dziennik Ustaw of 2009, No 151, item
1219, and Dziennik Ustaw of 2010, No 182, item 1228.
69
The Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers is a government body with wide powers in
the area of competition and consumer affairs. Its powers derive from the Act on counteracting monopolistic
practices of 24 February 1990, amended in 1996 to change the name of the office to the Office for the Protection
of Competition and Consumers. At present the powers of the Office are contained in the Act on the Protection of
Competition and Consumers of 15 December 2000.
70
Act on Trade Inspection describes the powers and responsibilities of Trade Inspection, Art 3.
71
K Wolwiak – data from interview on the website of the Polish mediation internet portal: www.mediacja.com/
index.php/Nie-kupuj-kota-w-worku-akcja-inspekcji-handlowej.html.
72
Data from the Polish mediation portal: www.mediacja.com/index.php/Spor-o-buty-zalagodzi-mediator.
html. The note refers to the Inspection in Lublin, where the percentage of mediations concluded favourably for
consumers is 88% (the highest in Poland).
73
The note quoted above mentions an example of a pair of shoes worth 13 PLN (around €4) being the subject
of one such mediation in Gorzów.
74
The district heads keep lists of such experts.
75
Act on Trade Inspection, Art 18.
76
Act on Trade Inspection, Arts 38 and 39.

initially the procedures and structures differed among various regions they were based in.
In 2001 the procedures were unified and since then lodging the case with the Tribunals is
free of charge.77 The Tribunals are located in the offices of the Trade Inspection.78 Although
the Trade Inspection offers them administrative and organisational support, the Tribunals
maintain their independence in adjudication. Each Tribunal consists of a president and
permanent arbitrators. The president is appointed from the list of permanent arbitrators
(only those with a law degree) by the district head of the Trade Inspection, after consultation
with consumer and business organisations. The arbitrators are appointed in equal numbers
by consumer organisations and by business organisations. At least one-third of them must
have a law degree.
At present, there are 16 permanent Tribunals and 15 Tribunal offices in Poland.79 The
Tribunals consider cases brought by consumers, businesses, consumer organisations, and
Regional Consumer Ombudsmen. The value of the case cannot exceed 10.000 PLN, unless
it is brought before the Tribunal in Warsaw, which does not have monetary limits.80 Both
parties must agree for the case to be heard by the Tribunal. The Tribunals do not hear
cases which are within the jurisdiction of other ADR mechanisms: energy sector is under
the jurisdiction of the Head of the Office for Energy Regulation, the financial sector—the
Banking Ombudsman, the Insurance Ombudsman and the Arbitration Tribunal of the
Financial Supervision Commission, and the postal and telecommunications services—the
Arbitration Tribunal of the Head of the Office of Electronic Communications. The Tribunals
also do not hear cases concerning health and social services.
As mentioned above, it is free of charge to lodge a case with the Tribunal, although each
of the parties bears the costs of an expert opinion or any other procedural activity, if it was
requested by them.81 The party lodging the case sends a claim document (available online)82
with the applicable information and evidence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after accepting
the case, sends a copy of the claim to the defendant. The latter has 7 days for giving consent
for the case to be heard by the Tribunal. The defendant’s silence cannot be interpreted as
consent. If the consent was given, the president of the Tribunal sets the date for a hearing,
which cannot be later than 1 month after the defendant’s response was received. The parties
are also requested to appoint one arbitrator each (one from the group of arbitrators appointed
by consumer organisations, and one from those appointed by business organisations). The
panel is presided over by the super-arbitrator appointed by the president of the Tribunal.
Depending on the position of the parties and whether a settlement is reached, cases can
take from between 14 days to 2 months on average to complete.
77
Following Regulation of the Ministry of Justice of 25 September 2001 on Organization of Permanent
Consumer Arbitration Tribunals, published in Dziennik Ustaw of 2001, No 113, item 1214.
78
Art 37 of the Act of 15 December 2000 on Trade Inspection and the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of
25 September 2001 on establishment of the rules of organisation and operation of permanent consumer arbitration
tribunals. Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2001, No 4, item 25. The Minister’s Regulation on the establishment
of the rules of organisation and operation of permanent consumer arbitration tribunals (Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of
Laws) No 113, poz 1214) can be viewed (in Polish) on the website of the Consumers’ Federation: www.federacja-
konsumentow.org.pl/pagePrint.php?page=37. Before these legislative provisions were introduced, the tribunals
were operating on the basis of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
79
The 16 permanent offices are placed in each district (in the main city of the district), and the 15 offices are in
other cities in larger districts.
80
Website of the Warsaw Tribunal: spsk.wiih.org.pl/index.php?id=1.
81
The experts are selected from the lists kept by regional heads of the Trade Inspection.
82
It is available on the website of the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers: www.uokik.gov.
pl/stale_polubowne_sady_konsumenckie__informacje.php.

Poland 181
The arbitration proceedings before the Tribunal are open to the public. Indeed, some
Tribunals actively encourage members of the public to attend hearings. During the trial,
both parties have an opportunity to present their views, and experts’ opinions are presented.
The fundamental aim is to encourage the parties to settle. If no settlement is reached, the
Tribunal makes an award. Both the settlements and the awards are binding on the trader,
but the consumer can still bring the case to an ordinary court. For traders, these settlements
and decisions have the same force as any other arbitral awards: Tribunals’ decisions may be
reviewed and annulled by an ordinary civil court following the complaint procedure analysed
above, in the part of the chapter concerning arbitration.83 This is not an appeal procedure.
The proceedings before the Consumer Tribunals are cheaper, quicker, and much more
informal than in the ordinary civil courts. They have been commended by the Consumers’
Federation for their efficiency and greater suitability for consumer disputes. However, their
jurisdiction is conditional upon both parties’ consent. The Consumers’ Federation pointed
out that traders only too often do not agree for the case to be considered by the Tribunal,
in hope that the consumers will not bring the matter before an ordinary court.84 In a recent
review of one of the Tribunals (Szczecin), it transpired that 25% of consumers’ claims met
with such a refusal during the first half of 2010.85 This is an improvement on the national
average of between 33 per cent and 39 per cent observed before 2008.86 Indeed, in 2010, in
1,065 out of 2,684 cases traders refused to participate.87
The speed of the proceedings before the Tribunals is undoubtedly their advantage over
normal court proceedings. The average case processing time in Szczecin, in the first half
of 2009, was 37 days. The costs of the proceedings tend to be lower than the costs of a
comparable case in court. Unfortunately there is no data that would allow one to make
meaningful comparisons concerning this issue: mainly because the types of low value cases
that reach the Tribunals rarely reach ordinary courts. As mentioned above, lodging the
case is free of charge, and the only costs involved are the costs of expert opinions and other
activities requested by the parties. Parties can also choose to be represented by lawyers,
although this will of course bring further costs. The loser pays principle, which is a leading
principle in the Polish civil proceedings,88 also applies to the Tribunals, albeit it has been
modified. First of all, if the consumer loses the case the Tribunal may decide that the costs of
the other party are to be paid by the Trade Inspection. This is done if the financial position
of the consumer indicates that he would be unable to cover these costs. Further, the costs of
legal representation are never covered by the loser pays principle and must be paid by each
party respectively.
83
The complaint procedure was prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for arbitration (Arts 1205–1211).
84
www.federacja-konsumentow.org.pl/pagePrint.php?page=41.
85
R Wasilewski‚ ‘Spory Konsumenckie a Stałe Polubowne Sądy Konsumenckie’‚ 17.01.2011, http://
karieraprawnika.pl/index.php/spory-konsumenckie-a-stale-polubowne-sady-konsumenckie-spsk/menu-id-259.
html#_ftnref8.
86
J Brol, ‘Bariery na drodze alternatywnego rozwiązywania sporów w sprawach cywilnych. Sądownictwo
polubowne (arbitrażowe)’ (Barriers to alternative dispute resolution in civil cases. Arbitration) in E Holewińska-
Łapińska, Prawo w działaniu 6. Sprawy cywilne (Law in Action 6. Civil cases), (Warsaw, Oficyna Naukowa, 2008),
74; and E Bagińska, ‘Alternative resolution of consumer disputes in Poland’, in M Habdas and A Wudarski (eds.),
Festschrift für Stanisława Kalus. Ius est ars boni et aequi, (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2010), 55.
87
Speech by M Krasnodębska–Tomkiel (Head of the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers),
Warsaw, 15 March 2011, available at www.uokik.gov.pl/aktualnosci.php?news_id=2502.
88
See M Tulibacka, ‘Poland’ in C Hodges, S Vogenauer, M Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding of Civil
Litigation. A Comparative Perspective, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), 465–466.

Overall, it should be said that the use of the Tribunals is growing, with the number of
cases brought yearly reaching nearly 3000.89 In 2009, the number of cases was 2,666, and in
2010 it was 2,684.90 The numbers for Szczecin are at Table 7.2.91
Table 7.2: Claims data for Tribunals in Szczecin 1991–2009
1991 – 1994 59 claims

1995 84 claims
2007 130 claims
2008 134 claims
2009 172 claims
The success rate for consumers before the Tribunals is not necessarily high. Again, in
Szczecin, in the first half of 2010, there were 121 claims brought, of which 71 were rejected
as either baseless or not within the Tribunal’s remit. Further 26 claims were decided against
the consumer, in 19 a settlement was reached, and in only 6 the consumers won the case.92
Wasilewski, who researched the cases in detail, points out to a number of interesting
phenomena. Over 50 per cent of cases concerned shoes and in most of them consumers’
claims were rejected or they lost the case. Further, it appears that in cases involving low
value items (such as shoes) consumers tend to lose. Wasilewski suggests that in many of
those cases consumers are simply trying to get rid of items they no longer require. In high
value cases, consumers tend to win more often. In my own readings of the decisions of
the Warsaw Tribunal I noted that claims are considered very carefully in the light of facts
and law, albeit there appear to be significant filters on unsubstantiated claims. Cases where
consumers’ requests were unreasonable, where the evidence was weak, where one of the
legal requirements (such as causal link in a case of contractual liability for damage) was not
met, the Tribunal proceeded to decide in favour of a trader. However, the Tribunal also did
not hesitate to use any res ipsa loquitur or other types of presumptions available according
to the applicable law in order to assist the consumers.
The Head of the Office for Energy Regulation and the Ombudsman for Fuel
and Energy Recipients
The Head of the Office for Energy Regulation has wide-ranging powers in the area of fuels
and energy. These powers include settling disputes between fuel and energy suppliers and
prospective recipients concerning fuel and energy contracts. In cases where contracts
have not yet been concluded, and the parties find it impossible to come to an agreement
regarding connection to a commercial network, sales, and other arrangement relating to
fuels or energy, the dispute can be referred to the Head of the Office. Also cases of unjustified
refusal to supply or refusal to connect to a commercial energy network can be considered
89
ibid. Brol (2008) ‘Bariery na drodze alternatywnego rozwiązywania sporów w sprawach cywilnych.
Sądownictwo polubowne (arbitrażowe)’, and Bagińska (2010) ‘Alternative resolution of consumer disputes in
Poland’.
90
ibid speech by M Krasnodębska–Tomkiel (fn 87).
91
Source: R Wasilewski, ‘Spory Konsumenckie a Stałe Polubowne Sądy Konsumenckie’, 17.01.2011, http://
karieraprawnika.pl/index.php/spory-konsumenckie-a-stale-polubowne-sady-konsumenckie-spsk/menu-id-259.
html#_ftnref8.
92
ibid.

Poland 183
by the Head of the Office.93 Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the Head of the Office does
not cover contracts already concluded. These ought to be referred to an ordinary court or
another ADR body.
Overall, ADR powers of the Head of the Office are quite limited. They are rather informal
powers of negotiation and mediation, with the possibility of issuing an administrative
decision if negotiations fail. Such negotiations and mediations are in fact mainly conducted
by local departments of the Office for Energy Regulation. They follow complaints from
recipients of gas and energy. The 2010 Report of the Office notes that sometimes energy or
gas companies continue the conduct that was the subject of the complaint in spite of the
negotiations.94
The Office also offers the services of the Ombudsman for Recipients of Fuels and
Energy. Since 2010 the Ombudsman’s office in fact consists of three ombudsmen. The
ever-increasing number of cases necessitated this organisational change. The number of
complaints referred to the Ombudsman has grown from 108 in 2002 to 3,264 in 2010.95
The Ombudsman operates in the name of the Head of the Office in order to protect the
interests of the recipients of fuels and energy. His powers, however, are quite limited. The
Ombudsman offers advice and assistance with complaints from the recipients against
energy companies, and can present these complaints to the companies, but is unable to
formally conduct mediation and arbitration or make formal decisions. As mentioned above
in the part of this chapter exploring the institution of Ombudsman, the 2010 Report of
the Office noted that consumers expect the Ombudsman to have powers at least similar to
those of Regional Consumer Ombudsmen (in representing consumers before courts and
ADR bodies). Frustration of complainants with the limited help the Ombudsman can offer
was emphasised and the suggestion was made that the powers ought to be extended. It is to
be seen whether the suggestion will be acted upon.
The Office of Electronic Communications and its ADR Services
The Office of Electronic Communications is a government body responsible for postal,

telecommunications, spectrum and electromagnetic compatibility sectors. It has wide
regulatory powers within these sectors, including setting up schemes to resolve disputes,
and consumer protection.
Consumer Arbitration Tribunal of the Office of Electronic Communications

The Tribunal considers pecuniary consumer claims resulting from contracts for
telecommunications and postal services.96 It operates on the basis of legislation dating
from 2004.97 The most common examples of cases involve wrongful billing, problems with
internet services, and lost letters or packages. The rules of the Tribunal require that the
consumer first exhaust the internal complaint route directly with the service provider.
93
These powers of the Head of the Office are regulated in Art 8.1 of the Energy Law of 10 April 1997, published
in Dziennik Ustaw of 2006, No 89, item 625, later amended. The latest version of the Law is at www.ure.gov.pl/
portal/pl/25/17/Ustawa_z_dnia_10_kwietnia_1997_r__Prawo_energetyczne.html.
94
The 2010 Report is available at www.ure.gov.pl/ftp/Biuletyny_URE/2011/2010_03_01-biuletyn_nr1(2).pdf.
95
The 2010 Report, at p 181.
96
Complaints of business clients of telecommunications and postal services companies are not within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

These complaints are to be addressed within 30 days. After unsatisfactory completion of

the complaint procedure, the case can be referred to the Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to consider a case is conditional upon both parties consenting to arbitration. The
cost of lodging the case is 100 PLN (around 25 Euro), plus there may be additional costs if
a party requests additional procedural activities or an arbitrator who is not a local resident.
Cases are considered in session either in Warsaw, or in one of the regional departments
of the Office. The arbitration panel consists of 3 persons: a super-arbitrator appointed by
the Head of the Office, one arbitrator chosen by the consumer (from the list of arbitrators
selected by consumer organizations), and one arbitrator chosen by the service provider
(from the list of arbitrators selected by service providers). The decision of the panel is legally
binding upon both parties and cannot be appealed against. However, as specified above, in
common with other types of arbitration decisions, a complaint can be made to an ordinary
civil court to void the decision.
The number of cases brought before the Tribunal continues to increase. In 2008, there were
156 cases brought, of which 23 concerned postal services and the rest – telecommunication
services.98 In 2009, there were 182 cases, of which 18 concerned postal services.99 In 2010,
206 cases were brought.100 The effectiveness of this ADR body appears, however, still
inadequate. In 2008 no session of the arbitration panel took place, in 2009 only two sessions
took place, and in 2010 this number grew to six. It is indeed disappointing in the light of a
much larger number of cases initially brought before the Tribunal the cases are not followed
through. The Reports of the Tribunal indicate that some are settled before an official session
of the arbitration panel. But they also point out that consent of one of the parties upon
which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contingent is very often refused or withdrawn.101
Mediation by the Head of the Office of Electronic Telecommunications

The Head of the Office of Electronic Telecommunications is also empowered to conduct
mediation between recipients of telecommunications or postal services and their providers.
Only consumer recipients can request mediation as regards telecommunications services,
while no such limitation exists for postal services. Similarly with the arbitration process
above, there is a requirement that the internal complaint route was exhausted before
mediation is commenced. Mediation is conducted in writing and is free of charge.
In the area of telecommunications, the Head of the Office reported over 10,000
mediations between the years 2006 and 2010.102 In contrast, postal services triggered over
200 mediations between 2006 and 2010.103 The Head of the Office suggested that the ability
of the service provider not to consent to mediation, or at any later point to withdraw such
consent, is a deterrent for consumers. This is especially clear in the area of postal services.
97
Act of 16 July 2004 The Act on Telecommunications Law, published in Dziennik Ustaw of 2004, No 171, item
1800.
98
The 2008 Report of the Office, at www.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/16/60/16607/Sprawozdanie_UKE_2008.pdf, p 129.
99
The 2009 Report of the Office, at www.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/28/64/28648/Sprawozdanie_UKE_2009.pdf, p 192.
100
The 2010 Report, at www.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/41/18/41183/Sprawozdanie__UKE_2010.pdf.
101
ibid, 193.
102
Information from the Summary of the Activities of the Head of the Office of Telecommunications and Postal
Services in the area of telecommunication services for the 2006 – 2011 term: www.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/40/81/40813/
Podsumowanie_kadencji_telekomunuikacja_2006_2011.pdf, 24. The 2010 Report mentions 2600 mediations
conducted in 2010 www.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/41/18/41183/Sprawozdanie__UKE_2010.pdf.
103
Information from the Summary of the Activities of the Head of the Office of Telecommunications and
Postal Services in the area of postal services for the 2006–2011 term, 12: www.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/40/86/40862/
Podsumowanie_kadencji_poczta_2006_2011.pdf, .

Poland 185
Thus, the proposal of new Postal Law includes mandatory mediation for postal service
providers in their disputes with consumers. But upon further enquiry about the reasons
for such a significant discrepancy in the numbers of mediations in telecommunications
and postal services, another explanation is certainly the nature of the services. Whereas
telecommunication services (mobile and stationary phones, internet services) are normally
provided on a long-term basis and tend to be more costly, postal services are much more
often one-offs and tend to be cheaper. One may assume that in disputes involving postal
services the consumer would be less likely to persist in attempting to resolve a dispute or
obtaining remedy (such as a refund or a price reduction).
To summarise the ADR services offered by the Office of Electronic Communications,
while growing in popularity, they are not as effective as one would hope. There are a
number of problems with these services: the main one being voluntary jurisdiction of the
Arbitration Tribunal, which means that for the time being the majority of cases are not
followed through because the service provider does not give consent. Bagińska also points
out that in the light of small value of average claims in this area, the payment of 100 PLN
could be seen as a deterrent to consumers.104 This may explain a much greater popularity
of mediation, which is free, over arbitration. She also suggests that the fact that consumer
organisations or consumer ombudsmen cannot bring claims in the name of consumers is
regrettable.105 Mediation conducted by the Head of the Office appears to be getting more
positive outcomes, although it may be assumed that cases which are indeed mediated are
not as difficult and contentious as those reaching arbitration.
National Banking Ombudsman106
The Ombudsman was established by the Polish Banks Association in 2002107 to consider
disputes between banks and their customers (only consumers: physical persons who
conclude a banking agreement with a bank outside the scope of their business activity). The
Ombudsman is member of FIN-NET: the financial dispute resolution network of national
out-of-court complaint schemes in the European Economic Area (the European Union
Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). Members of FIN-NET are bodies
responsible for handling disputes between consumers and financial services providers:
banks, insurance companies, and investment firms. The network has been established for
the purpose of settling cross-border claims concerning financial services.
The disputes which are within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman pertain to activities
of banks, and the maximum value of the claim cannot exceed 8,000 PLN (over €2,000).108
The rules on the operation and the proceedings before the Ombudsman were established in
2001 and amended in April 2006, and are available online on the Polish Banks Association’s
104
ibid. Bagińska (2010), 61.
105
ibid, 61.
106
The Banking Ombudsman is a term used on the website of FIN-NET (the Ombudsman is a member of FIN-
NET: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-net/index_en.htm). However, the literal translation of the Polish
name of the body is ‘Consumer Banking Arbitration’.
107
Following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the Polish Banks’ Association in May 2001. See
K Marczyńska, Dochodzenie roszczeń przez konsumenta w praktyce orzeczniczej Arbitra Bankowego, (Pursuing
consumer claims in the practice of the Banking Arbitrator), CBKE E-biuletyn 2/2008, (Warzawa, Centrum Banań
Problemów Prawnych i Ekonomicznych Komunikacji Elektronicznej, 2008), 3.
108
This amount does not include interest and additional costs sought by the claimant, apart from the principal
sum.

website.109 They limit their applicability to banks which are members of the Association,
albeit other banks may also consent to a complaint against them being considered by the
Ombudsman.110 The Ombudsman is appointed by the Board of the Banking Association
for 4 years. He is based in Warsaw, and is supported by the Banking Ombudsman
Office. In spite of the fact that arbitration is a term officially referred to in the name of
the Ombudsman, the proceedings cannot be classified as arbitration. The rules of the
Ombudsman expressly exclude the application of the Code of Civil Procedure’s arbitration
provisions.111 The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, the nature of the proceedings, as well as
the legal force of the Ombudsman’s decisions, distinguish it from other arbitration bodies.
First and foremost, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is not contingent upon the existence of
an arbitration clause between the parties – members of the Association must engage in the
procedure.
The proceedings before the Ombudsman are commenced when the consumer sends a
written complaint to the Office of Ombudsman. The case will not proceed if the consumer
has not exhausted an internal complaint procedure with the bank. Thus, the consumer must
attach to his complaint a statement that such an internal procedure was completed, or that
the bank failed to respond to the complaint within 30 days. The case will also not proceed if
it was already considered, or is being considered by a court or an arbitration tribunal, or if
it is within the jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal.
The fee for lodging the complaint, payable by the consumer, is 20 PLN if the value of
the case is lower than 50 PLN, and 50 PLN in higher value cases. This fee is returned to
the consumer at the end of the proceedings: in full if the decision of the Ombudsman was
favourable to the consumer, and in half if the consumer and the bank settled the case.
The Ombudsman encourages the parties to settle the case, but if they are not willing
to settle, the Ombudsman takes a decision (often the decision follows a hearing where
representatives of the consumer and the bank are present). The decision is final for the
bank, which must execute it within 14 days. The consumer, however, is not bound by the
decision and may still bring the case to court. Here is where another crucial difference
with arbitration lies. Arbitral awards are binding and, apart from a complaint concerning
formal infringements, they cannot be appealed. Until 2008, 5 consumers dissatisfied with
the Ombudsman’s decisions brought their cases to ordinary courts.112
During 2011, 1,066 cases were brought before the Ombudsman, and 1,131 decisions were
made, of which 518 rejected the case.113 In 2010, 1165 cases were brought.114 This was quite
a significant decrease in comparison with the data for 2009 (1,413).115 The 2010 Report
notes that 1,117 decisions were made, in 556 of which the case was rejected.116 The 2009
Report summarises that 1,284 decisions were made during this time (in comparison to
109
An English translation of the rules can also be found on the website: www.zbp.pl/site.php?s=MDAwODY5.
110
According to the website of the Association (www.zbp.pl/site.php?s=MTMxNjU0NDk=), 64 banks are
members (website accessed on 6th December 2010). They include Polish banks as well as international banks
operating in Poland (such as HSBC, Deutsche Bank, and BNP Paribas).
111
These provisions were analysed above. Para3 of the rules provides that the proceedings before the
Ombudsman are not arbitration proceedings covered by the Code.
112
Marczyńska, ‘Dochodzenie roszczeń’ (2008), 4.
113
2011 Report: http://www.zbp.pl/photo/NJ747/sprawozdanie%20%20BAK_2011%20FINAL.pdf.
114
Reported on 2 February 2011 by the Banking Ombudsman Katarzyna Marczyńska for Gazeta Bankowa:
wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100969,9041897,Do_Arbitra_Bankowego_wplynelo_1165_skarg_na_banki.html.
115
The 2009 Report is available on the following website: www.zbp.pl/photo/konf24-02-2010/INFORMACJA%20
BAK%202009%20-%20final.pdf.
116
2010 Report: www.zbp.pl/photo/!Struktura/Arbiter%20Bankowy/Dokumenty/Informacja_BAK%202010.pdf.

Poland 187
809 in the previous year, and 707 in 2007), of which 703 consisted in denying to consider
or in rejecting the case. It is unclear why so many cases are indeed being rejected by the
Ombudsman. In 2011, 151 cases were decided in favour of the consumer, and 422 in favour
of the bank. This is a significant increase as regards decisions unfavourable for consumers
in comparison with 2009, when 245 cases were decided in favour of a consumer, and 339
cases – in favour of a bank. Katarzyna Marczyńska, the current Banking Ombudsman,
notes that within the period of 2002–2006, the percentage of cases won by consumers has
been increasing (from 30 to 47 per cent), 117 although at present it seems to be decreasing
again. During this period, 3,954 cases were brought. The average value of a claim was 3400
PLN, and the average processing time was 40 days.118
The 2002–2006 Report emphasises another very important role of the Ombudsman: one
of receiving informal complaints about banks and performing a supervisory function. The
report notes that such informal complaints from consumers run in thousands each year,
and they are often settled swiftly, albeit not always favourably for the complainants. It is
noteworthy that such a privately established mechanism is perceived as having a supervisory
function.
Katarzyna Marczyńska noted certain positive changes in the banks’ conduct towards
consumers (better practices, speedier satisfaction of complaints, more effective and efficient
procedures for credit decisions, and a generally more conciliatory attitude to consumer
complaints and disputes).119 She attributed these changes, as well as the overall decrease
in the number of certain types of complaints, to the activity of the Ombudsman. She also
emphasised the importance of the Code of Good Practice, which was established by the Polish
Banks Association in 2006. Consumers increasingly bring claims before the Ombudsman
concerning breaches of the Code. The latest decrease in the number of complaints has been
attributed by her to the adoption of 2009 Good Practices Recommendation ‘Bankassurance’
No 1 (in force since 1 November 2009) concerning insurance accompanying various
banking products, which the banks have been adhering to since April 2009.120 Two further
recommendations are currently being prepared: concerning mortgage protection insurance,
and savings and investments insurance.
This positive view of the activity of the Ombudsman is not, however, shared by all.
Indeed, a government institution concerned with finance: the Financial Supervision
Commission (Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego), sees its position as somewhat problematic.
The Commission has been in charge of supervising financial institutions since 2006, and the
Act of Supervision of the Financial Market required it to establish an Arbitration Tribunal.
The Tribunal is analysed below in this chapter. As far as banking activities are concerned,
the Tribunal is a competing ADR body to the Banking Ombudsman. It appears that the
Commission is dissatisfied with both these bodies and plans to propose establishment of a
body similar to the UK’s Financial Services Ombudsman, with mandatory jurisdiction and
independent of the banks. Indeed, the problem that the Banking Ombudsman pointed out
by the Commission is that questions of the Ombudsman’s independence and impartiality
may appear.
117
Marczyńska (n 108), 5–6.
118
ibid.
119
120

Arbitration Tribunal of the Polish Banks Association
The Tribunal was established by the Association in 1992. Since then, it considered over 100
cases. It is not, in contrast with the Banking Ombudsman, a body focused on consumer dis-
putes. Rather, it considers any case referred to it (within any area of law, apart from alimony
matters) by the parties. The requirement is of course, as in any other type of arbitration body,
the existence of an arbitration clause. The Tribunal’s seat is in Warsaw, and its president and
vice-presidents are nominated by the Association. The Tribunal holds a list of arbitrators (over
30 at the moment) who are specialists in the area of banking, finance and taxation. The arbi-
trators are obliged to follow the Rules of Ethics of the Polish Banks Association.121 The Rules
concern the qualifications, independence and impartiality, and confidentiality. Their breach
may result in removal from the list of arbitrators. The parties can appoint an arbitrator or ar-
bitrators from the list, or can choose a different person. Depending on the agreement between
the parties, the proceedings before the Tribunal can include an appeal procedure.122
The costs of the proceedings can be quite significant, and depend on the complexity of
the case, the number of and the seniority of arbitrators, and whether an appeal is brought
against the decision in the first instance. The base costs are specified in the tariff document,
and consist of: registration fee, base fee, reimbursement of expenses. Registration fee (which
is non-refundable) amounts to 2.000 PLN. The base fee (which is reduced if only one
arbitrator considers the case, and increased if five arbitrators consider the case) depends on
the amount in dispute (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Fees for the Arbitration Tribunal of the Polish Banks Association
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE (in PLN) BASE FEE (in PLN)

Less than 10.000 2,000
10.000 – 50.000 2,000 + 7% of the amount over 10,000
50.000 – 100.000 4,800 + 5% of the amount over 50,000
100.000 – 1.000.000 7,300 + 4% of the amount over 100,000
1.000.000 – 10.000.000 43,400 + 0.8% of the amount over 1,000,000
Over 10.000.000 115,300 + 0.5% of the amount over 10,000,000
Arbitration Tribunal of the Financial Supervision Commission
The Financial Supervision Commission (Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego) has been in

charge of supervising financial institutions123 since 2006, and the Act of Supervision of
the Financial Market124 required it to establish the Arbitration Tribunal. The Tribunal has
been in operation since 31 March 2008. It considers disputes between all participants in
the financial markets, and in particular between financial institutions and their customers.
Similarly with the Banking Ombudsman, the Tribunal is member of the FIN-NET
network.125 It has also been registered with the Commission’s ADR database.126
121
The Rules of Ethics, established on 31 March 2010, are available on the following website: www.zbp.pl/
photo/!Struktura/Sad%20Polubowny/zasady%20etyki%20arbitra_310310.pdf.
122
The new Rules of the Tribunal, applicable since 22 April 2010, are available on the website of the Association:
www.zbp.pl/photo/!Struktura/Sad%20Polubowny/Regulamin_SP_220410.pdf.
123
These are banks, insurance companies, investment companies, brokers and investment funds.
124
Act of 21 July 2006, published in Dziennik Ustaw No 157, item 1119, later amended.
125
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-net/index_en.htm.

Poland 189
The cases considered by the Tribunal must have a minimum value of 500 PLN, although
disputes concerning non-pecuniary rights may also be considered. Further, disputes worth
less than 500 PLN can be accepted by the Tribunal if the claimant is a consumer.127
The Tribunal offers two types of proceedings: mediation and arbitration. Both the
mediators and the arbitrators who are involved in the Tribunal’s proceedings follow the
‘Principles of Ethics of Mediators and Arbitrators of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Financial
Supervision Commission’.128 These require them to be impartial and independent, honest,
efficient, acting with best care and skill and according to the rules of law. Mediators are
nominated by the Head of the Tribunal. Arbitrators are appointed by the General Assembly
of Arbitrators of the Tribunal (they can at the same time be employees of the Financial
Supervision Commission).
Mediation
Mediation is conducted between two consenting parties by a mediator chosen by them
from the list kept by the Tribunal. The parties can withdraw their consent at any stage.
Mediators are academics or professionals working in the area of finance. If the parties
cannot agree on the appointment of a mediator, the Head of the Tribunal appoints one. The
costs of mediation are 250 PLN for each of the parties. 70% of this amount is returned to
the parties if they settle the case. There could be additional costs if the parties request an
expert opinion or any other additional procedural step – in such cases they need to bear the
costs of these. Mediation before the Tribunal is usually concluded during the first session.
The settlement is binding upon both parties, and if it is confirmed by a court it has the legal
force equal to a court decision.
Arbitration
Arbitration before the Tribunal is always preceded by mediation. It is also contingent
on consent by both parties. If the value of the case is lower than 50,000 PLN, the parties
appoint one arbitrator; if it is higher – each party appoints one arbitrator, and they choose
a super-arbitrator. In especially complex cases the Head of the Tribunal can decide that a
panel of five arbitrators should take part in the arbitration.
The costs of arbitration are: for cases where the recipient of financial products or services
is the claimant, 250 PLN; and for other cases the amount depends on the value of the case
and is established as shown in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Fees for the Arbitration Tribunal of the Financial Supervision Commission
Cases worth less than 25,000 PLN 3.5% of the value (at least 250 PLN)
Cases worth less than 250,000 PLN 875 PLN + 3% of the amount exceeding 25,000 PLN
Cases worth more than 250,000 PLN 7,625 PLN + 2.5% of the amount exceeding 250,000 PLN
(not more than 100,000PLN)
126
This is an EU-wide database, updated regularly and published on the DG SANCO’s website. The Polish ADR
bodies are at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/ecc_poland_en.htm.
127
See the Rules of the Tribunal at www.knf.gov.pl/Images/Regulamin%20Sadu%20Polubownego_tcm75-
9718.pdf.
128
Available at www.knf.gov.pl/Images/Zasady_etyki_arbitrow_i_mediatorow_Sadu_Polubownego_przy%20
KNF_tcm75-7304.pdf.

Similarly with mediation, other costs may be involved: such as costs of expert opinions. The
arbitration can be done in writing or can involve a session with the parties and arbitrators
present. The arbitrators’ decisions are binding on both parties and cannot be appealed. Only
a complaint prescribed in Articles 1205–1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure (mentioned
above in the part analysing arbitration) is possible.
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is voluntary, and so far the uptake has not been notable. The
numbers shown in the Report for the period between 1 April 2009 and 31 March 2010 are
indeed unimpressive.129 During this period, 133 claims were brought. 68 of them requested
arbitration, and 65 mediation. The claims were brought mainly by recipients of financial
products and services (consumers and businesses). However, in only 7 cases the defendant
institution consented to mediation or arbitration requested by the other party. In additional 9
cases the Tribunal was informed that the parties settled the case. Between 1 April 2010 and 31
March 2011 the numbers were even smaller: 93 claims brought (30 concerning arbitration and
63 mediation), and in only 3 the defendant institutions consented. In additional 6 settlements
were reached, and a small number of cases were withdrawn (4).130 The Tribunal is a relatively
new institution, and it is still too early for assessing this mechanism. It is, however, instructive
that Łukasz Szymański, a representative of the Financial Supervision Commission, spoke of
ineffectiveness of such mechanisms being a consequence of their voluntary jurisdiction.131
Szymański was negative about the prospects of the Tribunal, but he was equally unimpressed
with the activity of the Banking Ombudsman who, albeit possessing mandatory jurisdiction,
according to him does not necessarily guarantee independent consideration of consumer
claims. He proposed establishment of a body similar to the UK’s Financial Ombudsman
Service. The proposal is being considered by the Office for the Protection of Competition
and Consumers. The Ombudsman would be financed largely by the banking industry, and
its jurisdiction would be mandatory for banks in cases worth less than 10,000 PLN. Both
consumers and banks would be able to appeal its decisions in a court.132
The Tribunal is currently undergoing reforms, which are mostly aimed at improving its
efficiency and its reputation among recipients and those who offer financial services. There
is to be a requirement that the arbitration proceedings before the Tribunal ought not take
more than 3 months. New requirements concerning arbitrators: their qualifications and
conduct while processing cases will be introduced.133
Arbitration Tribunal of the Insurance Ombudsman
The Insurance Ombudsman134 was established in 1995 by the amendment of the Insurance
Law of 1990.135 At present, its powers and organisation are governed by the Act of 22 May
129
The Report for the period of 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 is available at www.knf.gov.pl/Images/
sprawozdanie_SP_2009_tcm75-23145.pdf.
130
Report for the period of 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011, at www.knf.gov.pl/Images/sprawozdanie_SP_2010_
tcm75-26447.pdf.
131
Statement at a Conference concerning ADR in the area of finance, March 2011. Quoted on the banking
industry website: banki.onet.pl/2259776,wiadomosci.html.
132
http://banki.onet.pl/2259776,wiadomosci.html.
133
The Report (1 April 2010 – 31 March 2011), at www.knf.gov.pl/Images/sprawozdanie_SP_2010_tcm75-
26447.pdf.
134
The Polish title, Rzecznik Ubezpieczonych, means literally: Ombudsman for the Insured. This chapter adopts
the shorter: Insurance Ombudsman.
135
The amended Act was published in Dziennik Ustaw of 1996, No 11, item 62.

Poland 191
2003.136 The Ombudsman is required to submit an annual report of its activities to the
Prime Minister.137 Its functions are primarily of a supervisory nature, and within the scope
of these functions the Ombudsman receives complaints from the insured, the insurers, the
insurance brokers, and members of pension schemes. The Ombudsman may also bring
representative claims before ordinary courts in the name of consumers in cases concerning
unfair commercial practices.138
Since 2004, the Ombudsman has also been in charge of establishing and running the
Arbitration Tribunal. The Tribunal operates on the basis of the Rules of Procedure of 5 April
2004. It considers disputes between:
• the insured and the insurers,
• the recipients of payments from the Insurance Guarantee Fund and the Fund,
• the recipients of payments from the Polish Office of Traffic Insurance and the Office,
• the members of pension funds or their families and these funds,
• the members of employees’ pension funds or their families and these funds,
• the insured or the insurers and insurance agents or brokers.
Normally, only monetary claims of at least 1,000 PLN can be brought. In exceptional
circumstances, smaller claims can be accepted if one of the parties requests it and the other
party consents. Further, cases that do not qualify for arbitration may with the consent of the
parties be considered in mediation, which is also conducted by the Tribunal. Both arbitration
and mediation are conducted by arbitrators who are appointed by the Ombudsman. At
present, there are 26 arbitrators. The Rules require that at least half of them have a law degree.
They also need to have professional knowledge and experience in the area of commercial
and social insurance. Trade organisations, the Office for the Protection of Competition and
Consumers, consumer associations, and academics can suggest candidates. Candidates
cannot be employees of the office of the Insurance Ombudsman, insurance companies or
pension funds.
The arbitration and mediation proceedings before the Tribunal are analysed below.
Arbitration
The claimant brings the case before the Tribunal using a written form which is available
online.139 After confirming its jurisdiction to consider the case, the Tribunal also confirms
whether the other party consents to the case being considered in arbitration. Such consent
could have been given before the case was brought (arbitration agreement or arbitration
clause between the parties). The claimant must pay the registration fee of 15 PLN only if
the consent was not given in advance. Interestingly, in such cases the registration fee will
not be reimbursed if the other party refuses consent. The amount of 15 PLN is relatively
insignificant, and thus it does not appear to be a deterrent to bringing claims.140 If the
consent is obtained and the case is set to proceed, the claimant is requested to nominate an
136
The Act on Insurance and Pension Funds Supervision and on Insurance Ombudsman was published in
Dziennik Ustaw of 2003, No 124, item 1153.
137
The Reports are published on the Ombudsman’s website: www.rzu.gov.pl/publikacje/sprawozdania.
138
The Act of 23 August 2007 on unfair commercial practices amended the Act of 22 May 2003 on Insurance
and Pension Funds Supervision and on Insurance Ombudsman and gave the Ombudsman the power to bring
action concerning unfair commercial practices before court in the name of consumers, and to take part in such
litigation already brought.
139
The form is published at www.rzu.gov.pl/files/184__55__Wniosek.pdf.
140
Bagińska (2010), at p 57, is of the same opinion.

arbitrator and to pay the arbitration fee. The panel of three arbitrators is used more often
(each party nominates one arbitrator from the list on the Ombudsman’s website, and the
super-arbitrator is nominated by joint consent). However, in cases worth less than 5,000
PLN (unless they are complex or there is another good reason) one arbitrator (nominated
by joint consent of the parties) is sufficient. The arbitration fee is either a percentage of the
amount in dispute or a lump sum. The rates are published on the website of the Ombudsman
(Table 7.5).141
Table 7.5: Fees for the Arbitration Tribunal of the Insurance Ombudsman
Case value Arbitration fee

1,000 – 5,000 PLN 5% (not less than 100 PLN)
5,001 – 10,000 PLN 4.5% (not less than 350 PLN)
10,001 – 20,000 PLN 450 PLN for 10,000 PLN + 4% of the rest
20,001 – 50,000 PLN 800 PLN for 20,000 PLN + 3.5% of the rest
50,001 – 100,000 PLN 1,750 PLN for 50,000 PLN + 3% of the rest
More than 100,000 PLN 3,000 PLN for 100,000 PLN + 2.5% of the rest
More than 300,000 PLN Established ad hoc
In cases where the value cannot be determined, there is a fee of minimum 100 PLN if one
arbitrator is involved and minimum 350 PLN if three arbitrators are involved. In addition to
the arbitration fee, the claimant or the party who suggested additional procedural activities
(such as expert evidence or medical examination) must pay their cost.
Normal costs rules apply in arbitration conducted by the Tribunal.142 The usual loser pays
principle is used, and the costs are normally awarded to the winner in the decision finalising
the proceedings. In exceptional circumstances, partial or no costs can be awarded. If the
parties reached settlement, costs are divided between them.
Settlements or arbitration awards are binding on both parties.
Mediation
As an alternative to arbitration, especially in cases that are worth less than 1,000 PLN
and thus do not normally fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the parties can agree to
mediation. It is conducted by an mediator appointed by the parties from the Ombudsman’s
list of the Tribunal’s mediators. The party brining the case must pay the same registration
fee as is due in the case of arbitration. The mediation fee payable constitutes 75 per cent of
the arbitration fee explained above and it is normally paid by both parties in equal amounts.
Mediation is usually conducted on the basis of written documents, and it ought to be
concluded during the first seating. If it takes longer, the case can be referred to arbitration.
Settlements reached before the mediator and approved by him have the same legal force as
the arbitral awards given by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal certainly has the potential to become an effective alternative to court
proceedings. Its services are relatively inexpensive, and the proceedings are less complex
141
www.rzu.gov.pl/sad-polubowny/Taryfa_oplat_Sadu_Polubownego_przy_Rzeczniku_Ubezpieczonych
__182.
142
For these rules see elaboration on costs assessment and allocation in M Tulibacka, ‘Poland’ in C Hodges, S
Vogenauer, M Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation. A Comparative Perspective, (Oxford and
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp 405–406.

Poland 193
and lengthy. However, so far its record has been quite poor. Since its creation until October
2010, 253 cases were brought before the Tribunal. The majority concerned traffic insurance
(this tendency corresponds with complaints brought to the Insurance Ombudsman).143 Only
in 14 cases the other party (insurance company) agreed to arbitration. The percentage of
cases that are indeed pursued before the Tribunal is so low indeed that some authors refer to
the ‘boycott’ of this body by the insurers.144 The key arguments put forward by the insurers
concern independence and impartiality of the Tribunal and the independence and expertise
of the arbitrators. Because the Tribunal is linked, operationally and financially, to the
Ombudsman whose main task is to protect those on the receiving end of the insurance and
pension products, insurers question whether it is sufficiently prepared to also understand the
needs of the insurance industry.145 There are also doubts whether the arbitrators, appointed
by the Ombudsman, are capable of independently and impartially considering the position of
both parties, and whether their expertise in the area of insurance and pensions is adequate.146
Interestingly, however, in spite of the possibility for the industry associations to nominate
candidates, the industry has not so far participated in nominating any arbitrators.147 Perhaps
dialogue between the Ombudsman and the insurance industry was neglected initially—
thus the lack of trust. Those concerns are recognised by the Ombudsman’s office, and the
Ombudsman took some steps towards constructive dialogue and cooperation with insurers.
Meetings with some major players in the industry took place in 2008, although not all of
the insurers attended. The Ombudsman was attempting to convince the insurers that their
participation in arbitration and mediation by the Tribunal enhances their reputation among
the insured. The participants considered the possibility of creating mandatory jurisdiction
for the Tribunal in certain types of cases. These ideas have not led to any results so far, albeit
one hopes that they signify important changes in the area and the dialogue will continue.
In the light of these problems, the Ombudsman continues to promote the activities of
the Tribunal among businesses and consumers. On the consumer side, there is still some
work to be done as regards accessibility of the Tribunal. The costs of the proceedings can
constitute an obstacle to bringing a case, especially that the loser pays rule may increase the
costs exposure even further.
Polish Centre for Mediation
The Centre has been established in 2000 as a continuation of a Group on Introducing

Mediation in Poland. It is a non-governmental, not-for-profit organisation the members
of which are volunteers (at present there are 1000 members—mostly mediators, but also
organisations supporting mediation). Its focus is on enabling those people who are interested
in using mediation in civil, family, labour, commercial and criminal cases, to contact
mediators, as well as on training mediators and popularising mediation. The Centre drew up
the Code of Conduct for Mediators in 2001.148 Its members who are mediators must respect
143
E Kiziewicz, ‘Sąd Polubowny przy Rzeczniku Ubezpieczonych’ (Arbitration Tribunal of the Ombudsman of
the Insured), Monitor Ubezpieczeniowy (2010).
144
Bagińska (2010), 58.
145
Kiziewicz, ‘Sąd Polubowny przy Rzeczniku Ubezpieczonych’ (2010).
146
ibid.
147
ibid.
148
The Code is available on the website of the Centre: http://mediator.org.pl/images/dokumenty/kodeks%20
2006.pdf.

the Code. The Centre operates through 46 local offices. So far, the Centre has conducted
over 9000 mediations across Poland.149 The explanatory note to the Code of Conduct for
Mediators mentioned that in 70 per cent of cases the parties managed to reach a settlement.
Mediation Centre ‘Partners Polska’

The Centre is affiliated and supported by the Foundation ‘Partners Polska’. The Foundation
supports organisations working in the area of democratic transformations in Poland.
Similarly with the Polish Centre for Mediation, this Centre also offers mediation in various
areas: including consumer, neighbourhood, labour and family disputes.150 The costs of
mediation offered by the Centre have been mentioned above: in the part of the chapter
describing mediation in general.151
Summary and Assessment of Lingering Problems
The popularity of ADR mechanisms is growing in Poland. In a recent survey of lawyers by

IPSOS, 68 per cent were of the opinion that ADR was faster than ordinary judicial proceedings,
and over 50 per cent—that it was more effective.152 The most common forms of ADR are
arbitration and mediation. While arbitration has been used for some time, mediation is a new
mechanism. The use of arbitration increased significantly, especially in business cases but
also in consumer disputes in many areas. Various arbitration bodies dealing with business
disputes are reporting growth in case numbers.153 Also Consumer Arbitration Tribunals
are used more often. As far as mediation is concerned, Poland does not have significant
experience but its use and the awareness of it among legal professionals, judges, as well as
consumers, has improved markedly.154
While the legal and organizational infrastructure creates favourable conditions for the
use of ADR in Poland, many problems still remain. Is ADR in Poland efficient and effective?
Does it constitute a viable alternative to court-administered justice? Does it enhance a
culture of law abidance and the rule of law? The answers to these questions are not easy
to give. They involve issues that go beyond the scope of this chapter. Poland’s position
is very complex. Some of the reasons for this situation are systemic, and are inherently
linked to the shape of the Polish justice system. Others are concerned with the lingering
149
See website of the Centre, above.
150
See the website of the Centre for more details: www.mediacja.org/info.php/o,nas,acf7f74b41b8537ff6acb85
fbe5de1ce.html.
151
200 PLN for mediation conducted by 1 to 2 mediators, and an additional 200 PLN for recording the
settlement. In cases concerning pecuniary claims, the costs are higher: 300 PLN for the first mediation session,
and 200 PLN for each subsequent session. Business mediation is more costly. The website of the Centre sets out the
costs in detail: www.mediacja.org/info.php/koszty,acf7f74b41b8537ff6acb85fbe5de1ce.html.
152
Data published in Gazeta Prawna on 29 June 2010: prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/432491,arbitraz_i_
mediacja_staja_sie_coraz_bardziej_popularne.html.
153
The Arbitration Tribunal of the National Commercial Chamber reported that only in the first 9
months of 2010 360 cases were brought (this is 100 more than in the entire 2008): prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/
artykuly/461751,przedsiebiorcy_czesciej_korzystaja_z_arbitrazu.html.
154
Interview with Dr R Morek of the Dispute Settlement Centre by the Law Faculty of the University of Warsaw,
in Gazeta Prawna of 29 June 2010, prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/432491,arbitraz_i_mediacja_staja_sie_coraz_
bardziej_popularne.html.

Poland 195
state of transition from socialism and some cultural factors peculiar to Poland. There are
issues concerning the increasing but still relatively weak position of regulators. There is the
improving and yet overloaded civil justice system. There is the interestingly complex legal
culture that, on the one hand, does not entail trust in judges and authority and, on the other
hand, does not often see the possibility of obtaining justice outside the courts. The author of
this chapter wrote about these factors elsewhere.155
What is most instructive in the context of this chapter are the problems common to EU
states, and even to jurisdictions beyond the EU. Poland has had some useful experiences
in this area, and it is important to point them out here, following from the analysis of ADR
mechanisms conducted throughout this chapter.
The problems identified across Europe by the ‘Study on the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the European Union’ of October 2009:156 lack of awareness of ADR mechanism,
gaps in coverage, and refusal to engage in ADR procedure or to recognise decisions of ADR
bodies, are no doubt prevalent in Poland. Many of those weaknesses are a result of the
still to some extent proceeding transformation from socialism to democracy and market
economy and are gradually disappearing. However, the Polish ADR experience so far has
already demonstrated how such problems may be effectively targeted.
A growing number of civic society associations, and in particular consumer associations,
working together with government actors (such as the Ministry of Justice), are able to
increase awareness and indeed the reputation of ADR bodies. Coherent and well thought
through regulatory requirements concerning quality of ADR, encouraging or even leading
of dialogue between various actors involved in ADR, and comprehensive advertising
campaigns, all done by the Ministry, have been shown to achieve this aim. The awakening of
civic awareness and the belief in benefits of ADR can also contribute to closing in the gaps
in coverage—another problem identified throughout Europe. Poland can indeed serve as an
example of how such gaps can be identified and limited in a relatively short period of time:
new mechanisms in the areas of finance, banking, telecommunications and media appeared
recently and are already quite active. Some were the result of a regulatory intervention,
others: business initiatives. There still remain some gaps, the most pressing of which seem
to be the areas of health and social services.
As far as the latter problem: one of failure to agree to engage in ADR is concerned, here
also one may draw useful suggestions from the Polish experiences. It is crucial that both
sides of disputes trust the knowledge, expertise and independence of the ADR body. A
number of ADR bodies in Poland, specifically the Banking Ombudsman, the Regional
Consumer Ombudsmen and the Arbitration Tribunal of the Insurance Ombudsman,
struggle with the lack of trust. Their attempts to improve the situation by emphasising
quality of adjudication and their independence, also through dialogue with the parties
concerned, appear to have already achieved some level of success. Further, it is also clear
that ADR bodies which are capable of escalating the dispute or at least escalating the
position of the parties through bringing cases to courts or making administrative decisions
are more effective in compelling the parties to get involved in ADR. They are also much
more effective in achieving settlements between the parties. The Regional Consumer
Ombudsmen, albeit they have yet to fully capitalise on their powers to bring cases to court,
are a good example of how this combination of powers can be utilised. The most effective
155
See Tulibacka, ‘The Ethos of the Woolf Reforms in the Transformations of Post-Socialist Civil Procedures:
Case Study of Poland’ (2009), 395–413.
156
DG SANCO Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (2009).

manner in which such blunt refusals to engage in ADR can be tackled, however, seems to
be mandatory jurisdiction of the ADR bodies – at least as far as businesses are concerned.
While this solution may often appear radical, especially in relation to ADR which is still
largely associated with voluntary activities, its effects are clear: especially in the operation
of the Banking Ombudsman.
Poland, similarly with the rest of Europe, has great potential as regards creation of an
efficient civil justice system including effective alternatives to court-administered justice.
Such a system, however, requires a comprehensive approach involving the regulatory
environment, the court system, ADR bodies, and civic society.
Evaluation
The architecture of consumer ADR in Poland is developing and not yet clear. In brief, there
is scope for clarifying the national architecture and techniques.
The most notable aspect of the system, which is distinctive to post-socialist countries,
is the role of public regulatory authorities in ADR. Thus, the regional offices of the Trade
Inspection have power to conduct mediation, and the regional Consumer Arbitration
Tribunals are located within the Trade Inspection’s structure. This structure provides
inherently complete coverage of all types of consumer disputes with all traders, and a clear
national network that is accessible locally.
A second feature is that sectoral ADR bodies have developed for some major sectors,
notably banking, insurance, energy and electronic communications: that feature is not
surprising given the size of the Polish market.
However, the third feature introduces some confusion for consumers and businesses in
accessing ADR. This is that there is no consistency between the modes of operation of
different ADR systems: some use arbitration models only, some mediation, and some both.
The position is somewhat confused by the fact that it is not clear whether schemes may be
intended for resolution of business-to-business or consumer-to-business disputes, or both.
Although some sectoral bodies can be called Ombudsmen (in energy and banking sectors)
they operate differently: the Energy Ombudsman can only provide advice (and not mediate
or arbitrate) whereas the Banking Ombudsman can mediate and arbitrate. Many of the
ADR bodies use arbitration involving panels of three arbitrators, so they offer balanced
decision-making functions, but do not adopt the more streamlined single-ombudsman
models found in some other Member States. It is interesting that enforcement officials, like
those of the Trade Inspection and the Head of the Office of Electronic Communications,
have power to mediate in consumer disputes.

8
Slovenia
Aleš Galič and Christopher Hodges
Slovenia became a Republic on 25 June 1991. It is a small country in EU terms, with two
million inhabitants, covering 20,256 square kilometres. Mediation options exist in some
sectors, such as for banks and insurance. Implementation of EU legislation has introduced
the idea of ADR into sectors such as telecommunications and payment services, but so far
arrangements are limited. Experiments in introducing ADR into the court system date back
to the late 1990s and there have been recent new approaches but results are uncertain, and
cases take up to two years if not settled earlier, and involve cost and a loser pays risk.
Mediation in Business Sectors
The primary business organizations are the Chamber of Commerce, the Employers
organisation, the Chamber of Enterprise (which covers smaller businesses and trades),
the banks association and the insurers association. Some sectors established mediation
schemes in the early 2000s. A mediation scheme for banks (Poravnalni svet: The conciliation
council) has existed for some time in Slovenia, established by the sectoral trade organisation
(Association of Slovenian Banks: Združenje bank Slovenije).1 Up to 2012, if no consensual
settlement was reached by mediation, a reasoned decision could be issued that is not binding
for both parties. Extracts of these decisions are published on the website. The rules have been
amended in 2012 and now no longer provide that the Conciliation Council is authorized to
issue a non-binding decision where no consensual resolution of a dispute is reached. There
is no experience yet with the new rules. Proceedings are predominantly written and no oral
hearing takes place. The practical importance of the scheme is limited, as demonstrated by
the fact that in 2011 26 cases were submitted to the Conciliation Council. In 2 of these cases,
a settlement was reached, in 13 cases it was established that the complaint of the consumer
is ill-founded, and in 10 cases the complaint was found to be at least partially well-founded.
The Law on payment services and systems2 (which transposed, inter alia the EU
Directive 2007/64/EC of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market)
also provides for the obligation of the providers to adopt out-of-court mechanisms for
resolution of consumer disputes (Article 218). The provision aims at fulfilling the obligation
from Article 80 of the Payment Services Directive and is framed in similar fashion. Thus,
1
www.zbs-giz.si/zdruzenje-bank.asp?StructureId=371 (In Slovenian language only).
2
Official gazette, No 58/2009.

it does not establish an ADR scheme but rather only requires the providers to do so—
either individually or in cooperation with other providers. Providers may therefore jointly
establish an ADR scheme.
In the insurance sector, the trade association (The Slovenian Insurance Association:
Slovensko zavarovalno združenje) established a mediation scheme (The Mediation Centre
attached to the Slovenian Insurance Association) in 2003.3 The procedure is voluntary for
the consumer (the scheme is open to all parties to insurance contracts, not only consumers)
and free of charge. The scheme is voluntary for insurance companies as well, whereby the
members of the trade association have declared that they will be bound ‘whenever possible’
to participate in an out-of-court dispute resolution procedure if the other party to the
dispute initiates the mediation proceeding. In practice, however, the number of cases where
insurance companies give consent for mediation in this scheme has drastically decreased
in recent years. Although the Scheme is run by the sectoral trade association, insurance
companies are much more willing to consent to the court-annexed mediation (see below).
Since the number of cases where insurance companies give consent to the mediation in the
established scheme is in reality very low, it is questionable whether the scheme effectively
fulfills the obligation imposed by the Insurance Act.4 The Act determines that insurance
companies must establish an ADR mechanism for consumer disputes.5 Furthermore it is
questionable whether mediation that is merely a settlement facilitation procedure can be at
all in line with the statutory requirement. The latter foresees that there should exist an ADR
body that decides the dispute.6 The wording that the ADR body should ‘decide’ the dispute
would imply that a procedure should result in a reasoned (although possibly non-binding)
decision.
The Law on electronic communications,7 which transposed the EU Universal Services
Directive, provides for the establishment of the Agency for postal and electronic
telecommunications of the Republic of Slovenia, which is an independent regulatory body.
The Agency can conduct administrative proceedings and issue administrative decisions
(decrees), which are subject to judicial review in an Administrative court. The law also
provides that the Agency can conduct conciliation proceedings, aimed at reaching a
consensual settlement between parties in dispute.8 Proceedings must be in accordance
with the principles of impartiality, equality, equity and confidentiality.9 The mechanism
is open to all parties, not only for consumer disputes. It is entirely unclear from the text
of the law what the relation is between this procedure and matters in which the Agency
conducts administrative proceedings.10 It seems that the Agency can conduct conciliation
proceedings in all disputes between parties, concerning rights deriving from that law, thus
including disputes for which otherwise a regular civil court of law would have jurisdiction.11
The law provides that where such a conciliation does not result in a consensual settlement,
the Agency has jurisdiction to decide a dispute with a decision,12 unless one of the parties
3
www.zav-zdruzenje.si/resevanje_sporov.asp.
4
Zakon o zavarovalništvu, Official Gazette No. 99/2010 (Consolidated version).
5
ibid, Art 333.a, para 1
6
ibid, Art 333.a(2), para 2.
7
Official Gazette 13/2007, consolidated version.
8
ibid, Art 63.
9
ibid, Art 63, para 3.
10
ibid, Art 119.
11
ibid, Art 129.
12
ibid.

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has already brought the case to the regular court. The system is rather unclear and there
is no experience in practice yet. However, one can have very serious doubts, whether
parties will ‘play with open cards’ in a conciliation procedure when they are aware that
the ‘conciliator’ is the regulatory body, which—if conciliation fails—may decide the matter
with the authority of an administrative decision. The fact that the regulatory body has a
wide range of administrative and repressive powers does not make a possible comparison
with the MED-ARB13 technique well founded. The system as a whole leaves an impression
that the legislator just wanted to adopt a purely formal transposition of the obligation from
Article 34 of the Universal Services Directive, without paying much attention to whether
the ADR system provided for would be at all effective in practice.
General Consumer Arrangements
A Consumer Protection Office existed for some years within the Ministry of the Economy
but was abolished in September 2011 when the new Consumer Protection Act came into
force, and its functions are taken over by the Ministry. This change was partly to save money
and partly because it was felt that the Office had not been sufficiently effective. There has
been debate over whether there should be an independent Consumer Agency, and whether
the Consumer and Competition protection functions should be combined.
Consumers who experience problems with goods or services can contact their sellers.
There is no mechanism under which trade associations might assist in responding to
complaints and there are no ombudsmen for consumer-to-business disputes. The general
view is that contacting the Consumer Protection Office has been ineffective.
The Consumers Association has a 20 year history and around 6,000 members. The
Consumers Association hosts the ECC-Net office for Slovenia, which has four full-time
staff, including a lawyer and a case handler. ECC Slovenia is funded in equal parts by the
European Union and by the Slovenian Ministry of the Economy.
Consumers do contact the Consumers Association (such contacts are a major source of
new members for the Association) and do contact EEC Slovenia, although its jurisdiction
is only for cross-border claims: the two organisations cross-refer cases regularly, facilitated
by being in the same building. The annual membership fee of the Consumers Association
is €40, which buys free legal advice, a monthly magazine, and a mediation facility. In
comparison, advice from a lawyer costs €100 per hour.
Statistics for EEC Slovenia in 2010 are in Table 8.1.
13
A procedure when ‘third party neutral’ starts to participate in the dispute as a mediator, but if mediation
fails, the same person continues to act as an arbitrator— thus with full authority to decide the case in a binding
matter.

Table 8.1: Statistics for EEC Slovenia in 2010
2010 2009
Cases received 837 754
– Requests for information 573 524
– Consumer complaints 264 230
Countries most frequently dealt with
– Germany 43% ?
– Great Britain 15% ?
– Italy 9% ?
– Spain 9% ?
Types of cases
– online shopping 63% ?
– in-store shopping 26% ?
– air passenger rights 15% ?
– other 13% ?
Cases successfully resolved 42% ?
The Consumer Protection Office presented a draft Alternative Resolution of Consumer

Disputes Act as long ago as 2008. After some public debate, work on this draft law came
to a temporary halt in the Ministry of Economy, seemingly for lack of sources in the state
budget for financing the establishment of the proposed public ADR scheme. However, the
draft law received critical responses from the business sector (which fears that the proposed
scheme would result in further financial burdens for the economy) as well as from consumer
organisations (which find it too ‘trader friendly’). The fate of this draft therefore remains
uncertain.
The draft act, provides for the establishment of a special public body for resolution of
consumer disputes (Razsodišče za potrošniške spore: The Consumer Disputes Tribunal) and
provides for a certain combination of a non-binding evaluation and a voluntary binding
arbitration. It is foreseen that the Tribunal would, upon the request of the consumer,
conduct two main types of procedures, depending on whether the trader had accepted its
binding jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Tribunal can resolve a dispute with a binding
decision (with effects of res iudicata and enforceability). Otherwise it can only render a
non-binding, however written and reasoned decision (recommendation). Concerning non-
binding recommendations, it is expected that they would offer guidance to both parties as
an authority of argument but, if not respected, the claimant still needs to pursue the case
in court or (where the evaluation is not favourable to the claimant) is not prevented from
pursuing the case in court.
The Tribunal can also conduct mediation proceedings and in general, assist parties to
reach settlements, provided that certain guarantees are fulfilled. A consumer cannot enter
a jurisdiction agreement (which would exclude access to court) before the materialization
of a dispute. This restriction is imposed because, at the time when the consumer enters
into a contractual relationship, he or she usually does not pay due attention to stipulations
concerning dispute settlement included in pre-formulated or general contract terms. Due
consideration is given to principles of independence, effectiveness, representation and the
adversarial principle (right to be heard) in relation to the course of proceedings and the
organization of the Tribunal and its membership.
Certain types of consumer disputes are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as
they are not suitable for an accelerated and simplified dispute resolution scheme, due to the

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complexity of the subject matter or high value of dispute. Emphasis is given to the request
that, prior to seeking redress in an out of court scheme, the consumer should exhaust
internal complaints mechanisms of the trader, and, on the other side, the trader is obliged
to give appropriate response to the consumer’s complaint and attempt to reach an amicable
solution.
Decisions or extracts from decisions are to be made public, both in order to assure public
scrutiny of the Tribunal’s activities and public awareness of consumer rights as well as to
put an additional pressure upon a trader voluntarily to fulfil the decision of the Tribunal. A
system is established involving a limited right to have a decision of the Tribunal reviewed
by a regular court of law where the Tribunal’s decisions are binding, similar to procedures
for setting aside arbitration awards.
The procedure of the Tribunal is framed in such a manner that it should enable lay parties
to effectively participate without legal representation, there is a fee of €20 for procedures
(reimbursable in case of at least partially successful complaint) and the system also strives
to keep other costs of the proceedings low. Legal representation is possible, but not
reimbursable. The proposed scheme is open for individual disputes only and not for the
protection of collective interests.
The ECC Slovenia office has found it a challenge to promote ADR. It organised a
conference on ADR in 2008, where the aforementioned draft act was critically assessed. The
EEC office believes that if an effective national consumer ADR system could be created, this
would assist both consumers and business, not only resolving disputes that go unresolved at
present (the courts being too slow or expensive) but also raising business standards to levels
that would be internationally competitive. Since Slovenian consumers experience levels of
service provided by traders in other EU states, they increasingly expect higher standards
from domestic suppliers, including better levels of responsiveness than can be provided.
The experience of the Protector of Human Rights, and also the courts, shows that if an
independent dispute resolution body has no effective power, business (or government) will
not pay attention to its pronouncements, and consumers will not seek to use it. The EEC-
Slovenia office, for example, can undertake extensive publicity through media appearances
and organising meetings, and seek to affect public opinion in general and in relation to
specific traders, but coercive powers can only be exercised where cases are referred to the
courts or a governmental Inspectorate.
Courts and ADR
Pilot-programmes on voluntary mediation were initiated by certain Slovenian courts as

long ago as the late-1990s, and proved to be quite successful.14 Following this experience,
the Civil Procedure Act was amended in 2002 in order, for the first time, to take account
of court-annexed and other mediation schemes.15 It provided that the court is empowered
to stay civil proceedings for up to three months if parties voluntarily agree to try an ADR
procedure, whether out of court or court-annexed. In order to reach an in-court settlement,
14
A Galič, ‘Alternative dispute resolution in Slovenia’, 6 ADR Bulletin 4, Art 3, available at: epublications.bond.
edu.au/adr/vol6/iss4/3.
15
A Galič, ‘Slovenia’ Civil Procedure – Suppl. 49 (Wolters Kluwer, 2008).

but also to examine whether an ADR approach might be appropriate, the court can call a
settlement conference (poravnalni narok) as a special stage in the civil procedure, following
follows receipt of a reply to an action and prior to the trial.16 A settlement conference is
conducted by the judge who remains responsible for the procedure at the first instance court,
who, in accordance with case management principles, tries to bring about a consensual
resolution of the dispute with the parties.
The court may omit the settlement conference if:
1. the parties have already (unsuccessfully) carried out a procedure of out-of-court ADR (eg,
mediation, early neutral evaluation). Mere unsuccessful negotiations between the parties without
participation by a third party-neutral do not meet this requirement. The court may omit the calling
of a settlement conference also,
2. if, giving consideration to the assertions contained in the action and the reply to the action and
to the nature of the dispute, it decides that there is no possibility for a settlement (the latter also
applies if there is a dispute concerning the rights of which the parties cannot freely dispose – in
such case a settlement is not allowed – Article 3/3, CPA). However a statement of parties in the
claim and the defence plea that the settlement is not possible, even if given by both parties, does
not per se mean that the court shall refrain from ordering a settlement conference. The experience
shows that even in such cases of initial refusal, a settlement can often be reached.3 Furthermore,
the court may do the same, if
3. it evaluates that a settlement does not represent a suitable means to resolve a dispute (eg, essential
actual inequality between the parties, violent disputes, precedents or pattern cases that dictate a
decision on merits, an action in which the legal and factual situation is clear, evidently ill-founded
claims etc.).17
In practice, settlement conferences do not play as important a role as it was expected.

Court-annexed mediation programmes are successful (see below), but the court makes the
proposal to the parties and (where they consent) refers them to mediation in an early stage
of the proceedings before the settlement conference (usually the defendant is invited to give
consent to the mediation upon service of the claim; if the consent is given, the court then
invites the claimant to do the same). Thus, by the time a settlement conference is called,
the parties have usually already been through an (unsuccessful) mediation or refused to
participate in one. On the other hand, and in line with traditional role of the judge in an
Austrian-based type of civil procedure, a civil judge in Slovenia undertakes an active role
in assisting parties to reach settlement during the whole trial, not only in the settlement
conference. The judge often openly discusses the case with parties and gives his preliminary
evaluations, which, if done in appropriate manner, is not considered to be incompatible
with the request of impartiality.
Mediation was further recognised by the Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters Act
2008, which encourages the use of mediation as a voluntary procedure.18 In 2009, Slovenia
introduced the Alternative Legal Dispute Resolution Act, which provided that all Slovenian
courts of first instance must offer mediation to parties from June 2010 and that by mid-
2012 all higher courts must also offer mediation or another ADR method.19 In this regard
the Act relied heavily on the experience of court-annexed mediation programmes which
existed in many Slovenian courts before enactment of this obligation. The Act introduced a
16
Civil Procedure Act, Arts 305a–305c.
17
ibid,102.
18
Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters Act (Zakon o mediaciji v civilnih in gospodarskih zadevah), Art 1.
19
Alternative Legal Dispute Resolution Act 2009 (Zakon o alternativnem reševanju sodnih sporov), Art 4.

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quasi-compulsory procedure with an opt-out. While the court can make an order requiring
the parties to mediate,20 any party can object. There is, however, the potential for an adverse
outcome for the objecting party as the court can order a party it considers has unreasonably
objected to mediation to pay all or part of the other party’s costs.21 The programmes are
administered by the court; in larger courts, separate ADR offices were established for that
purpose. The court provides a roster of mediators and establishes criteria for inclusion on the
roster, adopts rules regarding assigning neutrals to the case and guidelines for conducting
the ADR sessions.22 Mediation sessions are held in the court. When the programmes were
first introduced, most mediators were judges (who of course cannot mediate cases that are
assigned to them for adjudication), but over time attorneys and retired judges were included
on the roster.23 In practice, mediation is offered to parties automatically very early in the
proceedings and the invitation letter is a general one, not tailored for a case. Consent of
both parties for the mediation procedure is reached in about 30 per cent of cases and about
50 per cent of mediations are successful, resulting in a settlement. Pursuant to the Act,
mediators are reimbursed for their services from the state budget. In civil cases (including
small-claims) the first three hours of mediation are free of charge for the parties.
Mediation has existed longest in district courts, which are courts of first instance that deal
with relatively higher value disputes (today: over €20,000). Overall, mediation in civil cases
is most successful in disputes concerning claims for non-contractual damages, claims from
insurance contracts (including consumer contracts) and property cases. In county courts,
which deal also with small-claim procedures, programmes of court-annexed mediation
have been introduced only recently. Mediation is offered also in the small claims procedure,
but with limited success. There are no special rules concerning mediation in small claims,
which would make it even more expeditious and less formal (eg ‘on the spot mediator’) than
in normal cases.
The downside of court-annexed mediation is that the existence and successful conduct of
mediation in courts, which is almost free of charge for the parties, makes it more difficult for
private ADR providers to establish their activities on a market oriented basis. Furthermore,
the danger exists that the existence of court-annexed mediation schemes might result in a
decreased interest in self-regulation and promotion of autonomous ADR mechanisms in
important sectors of the economy. The decreasing workload of the Mediation Centre at the
Slovenian Insurance Association, established by their own association, where even traders
now prefer the court-annexed mediation over the scheme, shows that this concern might not
be entirely without value. However, the expectation that the court-annexed ADR programmes
could at least partially take over the role of genuine out-of-court ADR mechanisms, even
those which are purely consensus-oriented (such as mediation), is foremost limited by the
restriction that court-annexed programmes are only offered to the litigants after they have
already started litigation in the court (and paid the required court fee).
Nevertheless, it can be expected that the positive experience of court-annexed mediation
in Slovenia can benefit the further development of out-of-court resolution of consumer
disputes. As the value, goals and position of the ADR in the justice system have been widely
20
ibid, Art 19(1) and (2).
21
ibid, Art 19(4) and (5).
22
N Betetto, ‘Court-based Mediation and its Place in Slovenia’, in A Uzelac and CH Van Rhee (eds), Public and
Private Justice, (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2007), 211–223, 212.
23
See G Ristin, ‘New Legislation on Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Republic of Slovenia’, 18 Croatian
Arbitration Yearbook, (2011), 143–149.

promoted and accepted in Slovenia, both in the predominant part of the legal community
as well as society in general, this forms a solid ground for the promotion of different ADR
mechanisms for consumer disputes as well.
In regard to out-of court settlement of consumer disputes, the new Slovenian Arbitration
Act24, adopted in 2008 is also worth mentioning. The Act is based upon and closely follows
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The Act is aimed at
resolving business-to-business disputes but is not restricted to such disputes and neither is
it restricted to international cases. Arbitration pursuant to this Act can be used for deciding
consumer disputes as well. Indeed, the Act includes a separate chapter for consumer cases
and provides for certain safeguards to the benefit of the consumer which depart from the
general rules of commercial arbitration (such as concerning language of proceedings, seat of
arbitration, venue of hearings and scope of judicial review; Articles 44–47 of the Arbitration
Act). The most important provision, however, is the restriction that the consumer may not
enter an arbitration agreement (for binding arbitration) and thus waive his right of access
to court prior to the materialization of the dispute. This is in line with the EU Commission
Recommendation 98/257/EC.
Small Claims Procedure in Regular Courts
In cross border disputes, claimants in a Slovenian court may directly avail themselves of the
European Small Claims Regulation.25 The European small claims procedure is thus available
in Slovenia, but it has practically never been used so far. Small claims proceedings are,
therefore, conducted pursuant to the Slovenian Civil Procedure Act (CPA), which includes
a separate chapter on small claims. The CPA, including its chapter on the small claims
procedure (which is applicable if the amount in controversy does not exceed €2,000), has
been extensively amended in 2008.
Regrettably, the legislator did not find much inspiration in the aforementioned EU
Small Claims Regulation and did not use the opportunity to extend (at least some) positive
innovations from the European small claims procedure to domestic cases as well. In
general, the small claims procedure under the CPA does not significantly differ from the
procedure for regular cases. It is, therefore, dubious whether it can facilitate access to justice
in low value disputes and achieve the outcome that the costs and loss of time incurred by
litigation shall not be disproportionate to the value of the claim. For example, proceedings
are commenced with a regular and fully reasoned statement of claim, whereby the use of
standard forms is neither required nor facilitated.
Unlike in Articles 15–17 of the Brussels I Regulation in regard to international
jurisdiction, there are no special rules on territorial jurisdiction in the CPA, favourable
for consumers, which would enable the consumer to bring an action in the place of his or
her domicile. The consumer is thus required to bring an action to the court in the place of
the defendant’s (the trader’s) domicile or the place of the trader’s subsidiary or agent if the
dispute arises out of its operation. Neither are there any restrictions for the possibility of
entering jurisdiction agreements (in favour of the court in the place of the trader’s domicile)
24
Official Gazette No 48/2008.
25
Regulation No 861/2007.

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in consumer cases. Parties are strictly prevented from asserting new facts and evidence in
the oral phase of proceedings (trial). New facts and evidence can only be adduced in the
claim, the defence plea26 and in one further written submission each.27 True, on one hand,
this system contributes to acceleration and concentration of proceedings.
On the other hand, however, since no new facts and evidence can be adduced in the trial,
in which the adversarial principle is strictly adhered to and no facts and evidence can be
considered and taken ex officio, a judge cannot really play a more active role by stimulating
(with hints, questions and observations) a legally non-represented party (eg a consumer)
to supplement his or her insufficient factual assertions and evidence offered in written
pleadings.28 Thus, a party’s failure to state all relevant facts in the written stage of proceedings
(perhaps because he or she was unaware of the legal relevance of certain facts) cannot be
rectified during the discussion of the case in open court at a later stage. An active role by the
judge would be necessary in cases where parties do not have the benefit of legal advice, such
as is often the case in consumer disputes. The impossibility of conducting such an active role
makes legal representation, although not required by the law, rather necessary in order to
effectively pursue the case.
In regard to costs, the principle of ‘loser pays’ applies in Slovenian civil procedure. This
covers the right to recovery of opponent’s (necessarily occurred) attorney fees up to the limit
calculated pursuant to the state lawyers’ tariff. There are no exemptions from this rule for
small claims. The cost risk for a weaker party (eg a consumer) in a small claims procedure is
thus rather high. Not only is he or she encouraged to seek legal representation (as the court,
as explained above, cannot really play an active role in proceedings), but must be aware of the
risk of needing to reimburse the opponent’s (eg the trader’s) cost of legal representation in
case of losing the case. As long as the attorney fees are calculated in accordance with the state’s
lawyers’ tariff,29 the court has no authority to refuse to award costs that are disproportionate
to the claim. It is, however, true that reimbursable attorney fees under the state tariff are rather
low for small claims (the calculation is based on the amount in controversy, not according
to eg hours spent). In a typical case with a value of €1,000, the reimbursable fee would (for
procedure in two instances) amount to about €20030 Court fees, calculated in accordance to
the Court Fees Act31 would also amount to about € 200.32 Poor litigants can seek free legal
26
CPA, Art 451.
27
CPA, Art 452.
28
An active role of the decision making body is viewed as an element of the principle of effectiveness. See
both the Commission Recommendation (EC) 98/257 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for
the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes [1998] OJ L 115, and the Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes
and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR)’, COM
(2011) 793/2, final, 29 November 2011, 4.
29
Zakon o odvetniški tarifi, Official Gazette No. 67/2008. However, the system is expected to be significantly
changed in the near future.
30
Naturally, the calculation presented here does not mean that a lawyer can claim only such a fee from his
client. A different agreement between the lawyer and the party is possible. The state lawyers’ tariff is however
applicable when it comes to a question of reimbursement of costs from the opponent. In fact, it will be practically
very difficult for a party to find a lawyer who is willing to accept the case for such a low fee. In practice this often
means that the party will remain legally not represented in a small claims dispute or she will need to be aware that
her legal costs will not be reimbursed to a full extent to what she has paid.
31
Zakon o sodnih taksah (ZST-1), Official Gazette No. 37/2008.
32
This brings the overall cost risk in a typical small claims dispute with a value of €1,000 to an amount of about
€ 800, which includes the party’s own and her opponent’s costs. In a regular dispute for a value of €10,000 a rough
estimation to the cost risk would amount to about € 800 court fees (for the first instance and appellate court’s
procedure) and about €1,200 attorney fees pursuant to the state lawyers’ tariff. Taking into account the need to

aid pursuant to the law but it must be noted that even if a full free legal aid is granted in only
covers that party’s costs (her court fees and reimbursement of her lawyer’s fees). If, however,
the party loses the case, she remains fully and personally responsible for reimbursement of
her opponent’s costs (court and attorney fees).
On a more positive side, in the small claims procedure, a court may omit the oral hearing
if it establishes that only law, and not the facts, are in dispute. An oral hearing can also be
omitted if the court opines that the disputed facts can be established on the basis of written
evidence, but only if neither of the parties has requested an oral hearing to take place. The
court may not refuse such a request.33 Evidence taking is simplified34 in order to reduce
costs and speed up the litigation, but the adversarial principle must be respected. An appeal
against the judgment rendered in a small claims procedure is restricted to violations of the
substantive law and to grave procedural errors, but is still always available (in case of an
appeal the judgment is only enforceable after the case is decided on the appellate level). In
this regard it must be noted that the possibility to appeal against the first instance court’s
decisions comes as a matter of a constitutional guarantee35 and the legislator is thus not able
to entirely exclude an appeal in any kind of court proceedings.
The statistics of county courts, which decide—inter alia—small claims disputes, do not
show separate figures for small claims procedures (see Table 8.2). In any case, the duration
of proceedings and existing back-logs differ greatly among particular courts. In general,
however, a party cannot count on getting an enforceable decision (in a procedure involving
two instances) in less than a year and a half. Mediation is offered in county courts and thus
in small claims procedures as well. There are no separate statistics in that respect either.
Table 8.2: Statistics for civil litigation cases in all county courts in Slovenia
Unsolved cases as at 1.1.2010 15,202

New cases in 2010 3,864
Solved cases in 2010 4,296
Unsolved cases as at 31.12.2010 14,770

In general, Slovenia is still hampered by excessive duration of court proceedings in civil
cases and by backlogs in (some) courts, although the situation has improved considerably
in recent years. A typical case is, however, not finally decided until two years after the filing
of the claims.
Evaluation
Mediation has a comparatively lengthy history in Slovenia within the court system, although
independent ‘consumer ADR’ systems are relatively undeveloped. Data on the effectiveness
of current arrangements are scarce, but it does not seem that, for small consumer claims,
reimburse the opponent’s fees in case of losing the case, the overall cost risk is about €4,000 where both parties are
legally represented.
33
CPA, Art 454.
34
CPA, Art 9.
35
Art 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.

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sectoral ADR bodies have yet been established on a basis that would attract sufficient
support or custom, or that the problems of cost and duration have been overcome in the
court system and associated mediation techniques.
The size of the national market means that it would not be feasible to construct a large
number of sectoral ombudsmen, such as in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.36
A possible solution may be to create a single dispute resolution facility (perhaps a single
ombudsman covering both public and private sectors), and to outsource some sectoral
disputes (such as in telecoms or energy) to specialist providers located outside Slovenia.
36
The available resources mean that the solutions that apply in relation to public and private sector functions
differ from larger countries. This is illustrated by the fact that it was the EEC Slovenia office that in 2010 produced
a leaflet and handbook on hazardous chemicals, an educational video on chemical safety, and a brochure on the
European Small Claims procedure: these materials are produced in the United Kingdom by the Health and Safety
Executive (agency) and the Courts Service of the Ministry of Justice, possibly with duplicating materials also being
produced by trade associations or other bodies. See EEC Slovenia Annual Report 2010.

9
Spain
Iris Benöhr and Franziska Weber
Introduction
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Spain consists of three major out-of court models
– arbitration, conciliation and mediation. The most important out-of-court scheme is the
comprehensive and unique arbitration system for consumer disputes,1 which functions at
national and regional level. Another peculiarity of the Spanish ADR systems is that the
schemes are mainly public and free for both consumers and companies.
This chapter describes existing dispute mechanisms for consumers in Spain, focusing in
particular on out-of-court schemes. Section 1 provides a general overview of the judicial
system for civil litigation and highlights key regulations on consumer protection. Section
2 then outlines the existing consumer ADR options available, ie arbitration, mediation
and conciliation at national and local levels. Section 3 finally indicates key consumer ADR
schemes in specific sectors, including financial services and transport.
The Legal Framework and Consumer Claims within the Court

System
The Spanish state is organised into a central government and 17 autonomous communities,
which are divided into provinces and local authorities.2 Based on national unity, with
guarantees of autonomy for the regions,3 the Spanish constitution determines the respective
competences of the state and the communities.4 The autonomous regions and local
authorities have a range of powers to administer local affairs,5 including dispute resolution
and consumer protection services.6
1
Real Decreto 231/2008, por el que se regula el Sistema Arbitral de Consumo and Ley 60/2003 de Arbitraje.
2
L Carreras del Rincón, ‘Spain’, in Alexander Layton and Hugh Mercer (eds) European Civil Practice, vol 2
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 500.
3
Spanish Constitution 1978, Art 2.
4
Carreras del Rincón, (2004), 500.
5
Ley 7/1985 Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local
6
Spanish Constitution 1978, Arts 140–142.

Importantly, Article 51 of the Spanish constitution includes a section on consumer

protection. It establishes obligations on public authorities to guarantee the defence of
consumers, to protect their health and safety and economic interests through effective
procedures, and the promotion of education and information through consumer
organisations.
The Ministry of Health, Social Policy and Equality (Ministerio de Sanidad, Politica
Social e Igualdad) is the national body of public administration that is responsible for the
promotion and support of consumer protection laws.7
The national authorities have competence over the administration of justice.8 Civil
procedure is mainly determined by the Spanish code of civil procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Civil, (LEC))9 adopted in 2001. The LEC does not provide for a particular procedure for
consumer claims within the court system, so that general procedural rules apply.
The LEC distinguishes two types of proceedings, depending on the amount or type of
claims involved. Juicio verbal proceedings are applicable for small claims not exceeding
€6,000 (Articles 250.2 LEC), and juicio ordinario proceedings apply to claims over €6,000
(Articles 249.2 LEC).10 While the juicio ordinario generally deals with more complex cases
the juicio verbal is simpler and conceived to deal rapidly with small cases. In both types of
proceedings the claimants must first submit their allegations in written form; however in
the juicio verbal procedure this can be less detailed.11 At the next stage, the defendant in an
ordinario proceeding is allowed to present a written defence, whereas the verbal proceeding
is oral and the defendant will only have to appear at the hearing.12
The latter type of procedure is usually more relevant for consumers, given that their
claims often concern smaller amounts and will be explained in greater detail below. In the
juicio verbal the party who does not accept the decision of the Court of First Instance is
entitled to reiterate the case in the Court of Second Instance. Evidence is put forward and
taken orally during the hearing in a concentrated manner, concluding with submissions by
the parties.13
A judgment can be appealed within five days of its notification. The application for an
appeal is then forwarded to the other parties who must respond within ten days.14 Once
these pleadings have been submitted, the proceedings will be transferred to a higher court,
with the parties being summoned to appear before it.15
Particular rules apply for small claims regarding a value below €2,000,16 which state
that legal representation is not required in such cases.17 Another specific feature of these
small claims is that an application may be submitted by means of an optional standardised
form.18 These rules have been in existence since March 2011; before this they only applied
for cases valued below €900. The new provisions were adopted to facilitate the application of
7
www.consumo-inc.es/GuiaCons/leyes/RDL_1_2007.htm.
8
Spanish Constitution 1978, Arts 117–127, and Art 149; Ley Organica 6/1985 del Poder Judicial.
9
Ley 1/2000, de Enjuiciamiento Civil.
10
Ley 13/2009 of 3 November 2009 has changed the amount of claims from € 3,000 to € 6,000.
11
Carreras del Rincón (n 2), 513.
12
ibid.
13
ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/simplif_accelerat_procedures/simplif_accelerat_procedures_spa_en_claim.htm#1
14
ibid.
15
ibid.
16
Ley 4/2011 that changed the LEC in 2011.
17
See LEC, Art 23 (2.1).
18
This standardized form is provided by the Court of First Instance, ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/simplif_accelerat_
procedures/simplif_accelerat_procedures_spa_en_claim.htm#1.

Spain 211
Regulation (EC) 861/2007 of 11 July 2007, establishing a European small claims procedure
in the Spanish system.19
Finally, Article 19 LEC states that the parties have the right to withdraw from a case
or submit it for arbitration. If the parties reach a settlement, they have to appear together
before the court to receive the court’s approval to terminate the case.
Two types of judicial conciliation procedures exist in civil justice cases: conciliation
before the formal procedure has started and conciliation during the court procedure.
Before the formal procedure has started, the Court of First Instance or the Judge of Peace
can attempt to conciliate the parties under the Spanish Conciliation Act (Articles 460–480
Ley de Enjuicimiento Civil de 1881).20 The conciliation procedure is initiated by the judge,
who contacts the parties after the claim is brought. The plaintiff will then present the claim
and the defendant will counter with the necessary documents to support the arguments.
Both parties are given the possibility to respond to the other party’s argument.21 If the
parties do not reach an understanding directly, the judge will try to reconcile them.22 If this
remains unsuccessful, the regular court procedure will be applicable.23
Once the procedure has started and the parties appear before the court, the judges will
check if the dispute remains unresolved between them. If the parties have reached an
agreement or are willing to conciliate or require the court to approve an agreement the
court will examine the formal conditions and approve the agreement (Articles 415 LEC).
The approved agreement can then be enforced by the courts. Depending on the case, the
court can also ask the parties to attempt conciliation (Article 428.2 LEC 1/2000). If the
parties do not reach an agreement or are not willing to conciliate, the hearing will continue
as planned.
Furthermore, both collective consumer actions for damages and injunction procedures24
can be brought before the court in Spain.
According to Article 6 and 11 LEC affected consumers as well as the consumers
associations complying with national or regional legislation have a procedural standing to
defend consumer rights in courts. Public bodies such as the National Consumer Institute,
entities in autonomous communities dealing with consumer protection and entities from
other European Member States are also allowed to file cases.25
Consumer associations are only permitted to bring a collective consumer claim if
they comply with the provisions of Royal Decree Law 1/2007, which define and regulate
consumer associations.26 This means in particular that they must be non profit organisations
included in a State Register of Consumers and Users. For instance, the Spanish Organisation
19
See Ley 4/2011, de 24 de marzo, de modificación de la Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil, para
facilitar la aplicación en España de los procesos europeos monitorio y de escasa cuantía.
20
These provisions remained even in force after the adoption of the LEC, see: noticias.juridicas.com/base_
datos/Privado/lec.l2t1.html; see also Ley 13/2009, de 3 de noviembre, de reforma de la legislación procesal para la
implantación de la nueva Oficina judicial.
21
Leuven Study, National Report on Spain, 15 November 2006, 5.
22
ibid.
23
ibid.
24
Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interest [1998].
25
Organisations that are established for the protection of collective and diffuse interests of consumer and are
included in a list published in the Official Journal.
26
See Leuven Study, National Report on Spain, 2006; see also JA Fontanilla Parra, ‘Legitimación de las
asociaciones de consumidores y usuarios para litigar en interés de sus asociados y derecho de asistencia jurídica
gratuita’, Diario La Ley 5740, 1448–1463.

of Consumers and Users (OCU) is a major consumer association that is allowed to bring
collective consumer claims.27
Representative collective claims can be brought in respect to a large range of consumer
rights, such as unfair contract terms and breach of e-commerce regulations.
The LEC does not provide for a particular procedure for collective actions, so that the
ordinary proceeding usually applies, ie juicio ordinario and juicio verbal.28 However, LEC
provides specific rules that only apply to collective action. This will not be further explained,
as the focus of this chapter lies on out-of-court redress mechanisms.29
Overview of the ADR System in Spain
Apart from the judicial procedures various ADR mechanisms exist in Spain, including
a general arbitration system for consumers and a number of specialized schemes. While
the most characteristic ADR model is the system of arbitration for consumer disputes,
mediation and conciliation schemes are also available throughout the country.30
Arbitration for Consumer-related Disputes
With the adoption of the Spanish Consumer Protection Act 1984 (Ley 26/1984) the government
was obliged to set up an arbitration system specifically conceived for consumer disputes.31 As
a result, first experiences with consumer arbitration procedures were gathered in 1986 when
the system started as a pilot project. In 1993 the Real Decreto 636/9332 established a basic legal
framework for a consumer arbitration system (Sistema Arbitral de Consumo). Since 2007, the
current basis for the Spanish consumer arbitration system is provided in Articles 57 and 58 of
the Real Decreto Ley 1/2007,33 adopted with the aim of merging several Acts. This regulation,
changed substantive and procedural laws concerning consumer protection.
Real Decreto Ley 1/2007 provides for an extrajudicial arbitration system for the resolution
of disputes between consumers and businesses that is voluntary for the parties. This informal
resolution procedure is of a general nature and can apply to most types of consumer-related
disputes. However, the arbitration board is not competent to deal with disputes where a final
judicial decision already exists or that requires the intervention of the public prosecutor. In
particular, consumer arbitration is not permitted in cases of intoxication, injury, death or
upon reasonable suspicion of a crime.34
27
See BEUC The European Consumer’s Organization, Country Survey of Collective Redress Mechanisms: where
does collective redress for individual damages exist? July 2010, groupaction4consumers.eu/docs/Country%20
survey_Traffic%20Lights.pdf, consulted 15 February 2012.
28
F Gomez and M Gili, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the
European Union – country report Spain (2008, Civic Consulting).
29
More information can be found in JC Garnica Martin, ‘Las acciones de grupo en la LEC 1/2000 (I)’, Diario
La Ley 5391, 1–7; see also F Gomez and M Gili, Evaluation (2008).
30
For disputes between the government and citizens specific Ombudsmen (defensores del pueblo) provide ADR
services in the different regions and there is also a central Ombudsman at the State level.
31
Ley 26/1984, regarding consumer protection, Art 31.
32
Today this regulation was replaced by the Real Decreto 1/2007 (Arts 57 and 58) and the Real Decreto 231/2008
specifically regulates the consumer arbitration system.
33
Real Decreto Ley 1/2007.
34
Real Decreto Ley 1/2007 Art 57 (1).

Spain 213
Under the current framework access to arbitration is organised on a regional basis, while a
National Arbitration Board is responsible for supervision. The Spanish National Consumer
Institute (Instituto Nacional del Consumo (INC)) is responsible for the implementation,
development and dissemination of the consumer arbitration system.35 It is part of the
arbitration department of the Spanish Ministry of Health, Social Policy and Equality.36
Furthermore, the National Consumer Arbitration Board (Junta Arbitral Nacional) is
attached to the INC. This Board contains a Committee on Consumer Arbitration Boards
(Comisión de las Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo), which establishes uniform criteria in
the arbitration system and decides on appeals against decisions of the presidents of the
Consumer Arbitration Boards.37
The regional governments are responsible for the enforcement of consumer law in their
territory. Accordingly, arbitration boards exist at municipal, provincial and regional levels.38
INC provides legal and technical help and supports the regional arbitration boards (juntas)
with funding. The regional arbitration boards, in turn, periodically report back to INC.
The arbitration board (Junta Arbitral) plays a key role in the administration of the
procedure and designation of an arbitration body (órgano arbitral). It is this arbitration
body that will assess the case and issue the award. There are at present 71 arbitration boards
in Spain ranging from municipal to provincial, regional and national authorities.39
The Real Decreto 231/2008 that was enacted in 2008 defines the functions, composition
and competencies of consumer arbitration boards.40 Depending on the case, the arbitration
body can be composed of a single person or three accredited arbitrators.41 The body is
designated respectively by the public administration, a consumer association and a business
organisation to ensure a fair representation of interests.42 If arbitrators violate basic principles
of independence, impartiality and confidentiality they may lose their accreditation or be
withdrawn.43
The use of the arbitration system is voluntary for the parties. The Real Decreto is flexible
with the formalities required for the arbitral agreement to be valid.44 The Spanish consumer
arbitration system represents an important exception to the rule of the invalidity of
consumer arbitration clauses agreed before a dispute has arisen.45 According to the law,
companies can officially adhere to the Spanish arbitration system by making a ‘public offer’
(ofertas de adhesión). In such a case, the arbitration agreement will be concluded between
the parties by the consumer’s submission of a complaint and request for arbitration. A list
of the adhering traders can be found online, since the INC administers a public register of
companies participating in the scheme.46
35
www.consumo-inc.es/Arbitraje/home.htm.
36
Subdirección General de Calidad del Consumo, Subdirección General de Normativa y Arbitraje and Centro de
Investigación y Control de la Calidad (CICC).
37
Real Decreto 231/2008 por el que se regula el sistema arbitral de consumo, Arts 9–11.
38
ibid, Art 2(2).
39
www.consumo-inc.es/Arbitraje/juntas.htm.
40
For the Spanish consumer arbitration system, see F De la Rosa and G Orozco Pardo (eds), Mediación y
arbitraje de consumo, una perspectiva española, europea y comparada (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2010).
41
Real Decreto 231/2008, Arts 19–20.
42
Real Decreto Ley 1/2007, Art 57(3).
43
44
An agreement can be done in writing, by any electronic means or other legally authorized means. See Real
Decreto Ley 1/2007, Art 58(1).
45
See Real Decreto Ley 1/2007, Art 57.4, stating that an arbitration agreement concluded with a consumer other
than a consumer arbitration agreement can only be entered into once the dispute has arisen.
46
INC, Memoria 2010 (Madrid, Instituto Nacional del Consumo, 2010), 14. There are currently about 100,000
companies registered although some might have disappeared during the financial crisis.

In some sectors, special good practice codes exist that promote the participation of
companies in the arbitration system. For instance, in the the e-commerce business the
traders that participate in the code confianza online, also agree to adhere to an arbitration
procedure.47
Procedure
Real Decreto 231/2008 regulates in detail the arbitration procedure, from filing complaints
to the final binding decision.48 As a first step, an arbitration request form has to be filled
in by a consumer, his lawyer or a consumer association.49 It is not possible for traders to
file cases at the boards. Selecting the most suitable arbitration board usually correlates to
the consumer’s place of residence.50 The arbitration procedure is flexible and can be purely
written or partly oral depending on the nature of the case. It can also be conducted via
electronic means51 and allows collective claims, if required.52
The arbitration board will first assess if the dispute can be resolved through consumer
arbitration. If the company officially adheres to the arbitration system, the procedure can
start right away. If this is not the case, first an acceptance request has to be sent to the
company, which will be given 15 days to accept the competence of the arbitration board for
the particular case.53 Importantly, companies can adhere to the board just for a certain type
of case, or part of their business. Likewise, they can register with some regional, provincial,
or municipal boards whilst not registering with others.
In the second step a mediator will be appointed by the arbitration board who will try to settle
the dispute.54 This is excluded if one of the parties opposes this step or it has been established
that mediation has already been unsuccessful. Mediators must be impartial, independent
and have to respect the confidentiality requirements. The mediation will be carried out by
someone else than the arbitrator. The recommendations by the mediator are consensus-
orientated and voluntary, unlike the decision by the arbitrator that imposes a binding solution
upon the parties. The mediation procedure has to be finalised within a month.
If the mediation attempt is not successful the arbitration board will nominate the
arbitration body and the actual arbitration begins. Cases are dealt with by a single arbitrator
if both parties agree, the dispute is simple and straightforward, and the amount in dispute is
less than €300.55 The arbiter is usually appointed by the public administration.
For all other cases three arbitrators will be designated: one by the public administration
(who will act as the president) and the two others by each party (one from the consumer
side, one from the company side). Under certain circumstances, for instance when it comes
to doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality, parties can agree on a different president.56
Parties can insist on a procedure involving three arbitrators instead of a single arbitrator.
47
See www.consumo-inc.es/Arbitraje/distintivo.jsp. For annual report 2010, see www.confianzaonline.es/
confianzaonline/MEMORIA_CONFIANZA_ONLINE_2010.pdf.
48
49
For the details of the procedure see Art 33 of the Real Decreto 231/2008.
50
ibid, Art 8.
51
ibid, Arts 51–55. The online procedure is often applied in arbitration cases.
52
See more in J Paredes Pérez, ‘La nueva Regulación del Sistema Arbitral de Consumo’, in Arbitraje Revista de
arbitraje commercial y de inversiones 1, 189–190; see also Real Decreto 231/2008, Arts 56–62.
53
See Real Decreto 231/2008, Art 37.
54
ibid, Art 38. The mediation services offered in Spain vary significantly throughout the country.
55
ibid, Art 19. Prior to 2008 the decision was always to be taken by a board of three, but due to budget cuts this
single arbitrator system was established.
56
ibid, Art 20 (2).

Spain 215
By default all procedures and decisions are based on equity rather than law (more than
90 per cent of cases).57 Parties can, however, unanimously opt for a procedure in law. If the
procedure takes place on the basis of equity only one board member needs to have a legal
degree; in case of a procedure based on law all need to be fully qualified lawyers.
There is no limit regarding the amount of money that can be claimed. The use of the
arbitration mechanism is free of charge for both consumers and businesses. However, costs
incurred regarding evidence have to be borne by the party submitting the evidence. Parties
can submit additional evidence or alter the claim at any time before the end of the hearing.58
An ADR procedure will usually not take longer than six months and ends with an award
that has the same value as a court judgment. This means that the award is enforceable
through the courts if the trader does not comply with the arbitration decision.59
The compliance rate is very high; approximately only 1 per cent of traders do not comply
with the awards. However, these numbers are shaped by the fact that traders with no
intention to comply will not accept arbitration procedures in the first place.60
As with a court judgment, the parties can appeal against an arbitration decision in the
courts within two months. In addition, an appeal can be brought against decisions to admit
or reject requests for arbitration of consumer disputes by the Junta Arbitral de Consumo.61
Those cases are reviewed by a special committee, called Comisión de las Juntas Arbitrales de
Consumo or by the President of a Junta Arbitral territorial.
Despite a harmonised law procedure the arbitration boards are to a large extent
independently organized and work in different ways.62 The ‘Juntas’ receive all cases of
consumer complaints even though some of the boards are specialised. This specialisation is,
however, not apparent to the consumer from the outside with the exception of some special
Juntas for tourism or transport.63
For collective actions a unified arbitration procedure exists.64 If a larger number of
similar cases occur the Junta that has to be put in charge is that located where most of the
victims reside. If they are widespread, the Junta Nacional will be responsible. So far, there
has only been one case, and the trader did not accept the arbitration request for this case. In
a collective arbitration case the claimants have to join the procedures from the beginning.65
57
ibid, Art 33. See also, Sistema Arbitral de Consumo, Annual Report 2007 (Madrid, Sistema Arbitral de
Consumo, 2007), 23. In 2007 out of 18,653 awards, 93.8% were decided in a procedure based on equity and thus
6.2% in a procedure based on law.
58
See Arts 43–45.
59
This procedure might conflict with the principle of self-representation in courts, which sets a limit of €2,000.
In a court case up to €2,000 consumers do not need a legal representative; if, however, the claims value of the
ADR award is higher they would need representation when enforcing the award through the court. This appears
to be very costly for cases involving a claim value of more than €2,000 and might dilute incentives to follow this
procedure. Some courts construe this to mean that ADR cases will never need to involve legal representation and
thus despite a higher value than €2,000 no legal representation is needed when enforcing the award through the
courts.
60
Interview with OCU’s officials, 16 November 2011.
61
See Real Decreto 231/2008, Art 36.
62
Note that only some of them have their own homepage: Example: Cataluña, www.consum.cat/index_es.html;
An overview of the existing boards and addresses can be found at: www.consumo-inc.es/Arbitraje/juntas.htm.
63
The special juntas de transporte have been created in all autonomous regions. Their key legal bases are: Ley
16/1987, de Ordenación de los Transportes Terrestres, Art 37 and 38, modified by the Ley 29/2003; the Reglamento
of this Law, approved by the Real Decreto 1211/1990, Arts 6–12; Orden de 30 de marzo de 2001 por la que se
establecen normas para la realización por las Juntas Arbitrales del Transporte de funciones de depósito y enajenación
de mercancías. Juntas de turismo also exist in various autonomous regions.
64
65
In contrast, in a collective court case the parties are allowed to join the case at a later stage of the procedure.

Financing and Data
The ADR system in Spain is financed by the government, and is free to both consumers and
traders. The Spanish National Institute of Consumer Affairs grants €900,000 of funding to
the system.66 The main share of the funding comes from the municipalities or the regions in
which each board is situated and no comprehensive data is available on this.
The vast majority of complaints occur in the telecommunications sector, of which many
companies are registered with the arbitration board.67 Companies in the financial sector
do not generally register with the boards, and insurance or airplane companies are very
reluctant to register with the boards.
Due to the diffuse nature of the system the overall costs are not known, but on average a
procedure costs above €400.68
The last public annual report dates back to 2007 in which 61,759 applications were filed.
The number of personnel varies depending on the specific board.
More recent data suggests that the average value of an award in 2010 throughout the
country was €366. In 2010 92,355 applications for arbitration were received by the system
overall, which confirms the rising trend since 2007.
20,302 of the cases were resolved at the mediation phase. Awards were made in 33,849
cases, of which 22,216 were in favour of the consumer, 9,568 against the consumer and
2,065 resolved by conciliation. In 16,573 complaints, the arbitration procedure could not
be started because of non-acceptance by the trader, for which most occurred in relation to
mobile phones (1,439) and fixed phones (1,211).
The most complained-about sector was telecommunications, with 68.24 per cent (63,029)
of all applications comprising 38,284 applications filed over mobile phones (38,284 in
which traders adhered, 2,322 about non-adhering traders of which 1,439 were rejected by
the traders), fixed phones (13,674 adhering and 1,193 non-adhering traders, of which 1,211
of the latter were rejected) and internet providers (6,159 adhering and 1,397 non-adhering
traders, of which 773 of the latter were rejected).
In more than 50 per cent of cases the applications were brought directly by consumers,
38.74 per cent by consumers associations, and 5.93 per cent by public bodies. Only 4,912 of
the total number of applications were directed to companies that were not registered with
the ADR system.
In 2010 in total 33,849 awards were pronounced out of which 65.68 per cent totally or
partially in favour of the consumer. The remaining cases were decided against the consumers
or still settled in a mediation procedure.
66
Instituto Nacional del Consumo, Annual report 2010 (Madrid, Instituto Nacional del Consumo, 2010), 14; see
also www.consumo-inc.es/Arbitraje/docs/resolucionConvocatoria2010.pdf.
67
In addition a customer contact point exists, called Oficina de Atención al Usuario de Telecomunicaciones
(OAUT) within the SETSI, which resolves telecommunication-related disputes and provides information.
Consumers can contact this body if a company does not adhere to the ADR system or if the end user is a
company, which tries to solve the dispute within 6 months and the outcome can only be challenged through the
administrative courts. See Real Decreto 1554/2004 that develops the basic institutional structure of the Ministry of
Industry, Tourism and Trade, Art 8.3. See Ley 32/2003, Art 38.
68
Interview with ICN’s officials, 15 November 2011, Madrid.

Spain 217
Mediation and Conciliation
Mediation and conciliation procedures are also available to resolve consumer disputes
out-of-court, but are given less attention in the Spanish civil justice system. As explained
above conciliation can occur within or outside a court procedure and mediation can take
place in the context of an arbitration procedure.69 Nevertheless, a comprehensive national
framework regulating consumer mediation is missing, as the autonomous regions often
adopt their specific provisions. The legal framework regarding mediation is however,
currently changing due to the impact of the EU Directive on mediation in civil and
commercial matters adopted in 2008. Spanish legislation implementing this measure has
already been approved by government but is not yet in force.70
Consumer associations or chambers of commerce play a key role in the mediation
and conciliation procedures. They often offer mediation and conciliation services in the
autonomous regions without distinguishing clearly between both types of ADR.71 In
Spain 11 major consumer associations exist.72 Some of these associations receive funding
from the Spanish National Institute of Consumer Affairs, which is part of the Ministry
of Health, Social Policy and Equality.73 Others are financed via membership fees and
projects such as OCU (a major consumer organisation), FACUA—a regional consumer
association with headquarters in Sevilla—or AUC, a specialized consumer association for
the communications sector.74
For example, the Spanish consumer organization OCU only offers a mediation service
to its members, who pay membership fees. OCU’s mediation procedures have doubled
over the last years.75 While there were 4,321 procedures in 2008 and 5,239 in 2009; a large
number of 8113 procedures were managed in 2010. A mediation procedure on average
takes 1.5 months. In 2010, 52 per cent of the cases were solved in a satisfactory manner, in
17 per cent no response was given and the remaining 31 per cent did not result in a dispute
resolution.
69
Royal Decree 231/2008, Art 38.
70
European Directive (EC) 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008]
OJ L 136/3.
71
See conclusions of a recent study on mediation for Cataluña: www.llibreblancmediacio.com/phpfiles/public/
WBDownloadCounter.php (the rest of the study is only available in Spanish).
72
For more information on the associations see ec.europa.eu/consumers/overview/country_profile/ES_web_
country_profile.pdf.
73
In 2010 the total amount was €3,641,140.00, for a more detailed description of which amounts went to which
association see: Instituto Nacional del Consumo, Annual report (2010), 14.
74
There are only two specialized consumer associations operating in the country: AUC and Asociacion de
Usuarios de Bancos Cajas y Seguros an association in the banking sector (www.adicae.net).
75
OCU meeting 16 November 2011.

Figure 9.1: The mediation process managed by OCU
MEDIATION BY OCU
Notification
TRADER to member,
Letter OCU ACCEPTS Procedure
To trader CLAIM ends
With legal
grounds
EMPRESA/ENTIDAD
TRADER
OCU New letter ACCEPTS
Possible from OCU
Letter/ contacts CLAIM
outcomes TRADER with memberÕs
Email member to
member REJECTS request new submissions
CLAIM arguments +
and OCUÕs own
Possibility of submissions
evidence TRADER
mediation
REJECTS/
(at memberÕs Letter/ DOES NOT
request email REPLY
or offered by from
OCU) member
Follow up
OCU OCU TRADER
Contacts ACCEPTS
TRADER Trader again CLAIM
Notification
DOES NOT warning that
From OCU
REPLY other means
To member
of redress
Will be
(by email
proposed to Information
If possible)
member of further
TRADER
(follow up REJECTS/ means of
(new delay: redress to
By OCU) DOES NOT
20 days) member
REPLY
Consumer associations in Spain often also educate and inform consumers, including issues
on ADR. In addition, information centres have been established for consumers at local and
higher governmental level.76 These centres are consumer service points provided by the
government, which sometimes also offer mediation.77
No legal concept of conciliation exists in Spain.78 In the broad sense, conciliation covers
any form of agreement to solve a conflict.79 In the narrower sense it covers situations in
which two parties appear before a third party in order to avoid litigation. Extra-judicial
conciliation takes place before a body established by law or by custom and is also called
preventive or pre-procedural dispute resolution. Where there is a successful conciliation,
it is guided by the ordinary means of interpreting general contract law. Mediation and
conciliation are similar as they both aim at eliminating the dispute and take place before
non-judicial bodies. The outcome has the same value as a private agreement between parties.
However, an important difference is that mediation necessarily requires the existence of a
mediation procedure while conciliation does not.80
76
OMIC (Oficinas Municipales de Informacion del Consumidor), see: aplicaciones.consumo-inc.es/cidoc/
Consultas/dirMapas.aspx?tabla=omic for an overview of all OMIC.
77
In addition, in various sectors customer services centers have been established some of which employ
company internal Ombudsmen, meeting of the authors with Alicia Menéndez González, Director of the
Arbitration Department at the Spanish National Institute on Consumer Affairs and Secretary of the National
Arbitration Board (Jefe del Área de Arbitraje del Instituto Nacional de Consumo y Secretaria de la Junta Arbitral
Nacional).
78
M Blanco Carrasco, Mediación y Consumidores (Madrid, ICN, 2005) 45.
79
Judicial conciliation is explained above in this chapter.
80
While the conciliator has usually a more passive role, the mediator is active.

Spain 219
ADR in Specific Sectors
The Complaints Services for Financial Services Disputes
In the financial sector three specialised institutions are competent to resolve consumer-
related disputes out-of-court. These schemes provide alternative dispute resolution for
consumers to the arbitration and court system. Depending on the kind of claim the following
institutions are responsible for resolving a financial services dispute: the Spanish Central
Bank (Banco de España), the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds (Dirección
General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones),81 and the Investors Office of the National Stock
Exchange Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)).82
While the three authorities, providing complaints services are independent from each
other, they act as a singly entry point for claims. This means they are obliged to assess their
competence for a claim and forward it to the appropriate authorities in case they are not
directly competent for a specific case.83
All three financial institutions follow similar procedures and requirements in their
ADR schemes, which are free of charge for both parties. The ADR schemes have been
influenced by a number of Spanish regulations that required the state to provide out-of-
court procedures for consumers in financial services from 2002 onwards.84 The Spanish Act
44/2002 introduced a measure to reform the financial system and in particular provided rules
to strengthen the protection of financial services users.85 In addition, Order ECO/734/2004
provided detailed provisions about the departments, consumer help services, and defenders
of consumers in financial entities.
The Claims Service of the Spanish Central Bank
The Claims Service of the Spanish Central Bank (Servicio de Reclamaciones del Banco de
España, hereafter the ‘Bank’) aims to resolve disputes by users of financial institutions
supervised by the Bank. This Service is independent and operates on the principle of
transparency, efficiency, legality, freedom, representation and the adversarial principle.86
Established in 1987, it was based on and influenced by the Spanish Ministerial Order
(1987) concerning codes of practice of credit entities and the Ministerial Order (1989) about
codes of practice, providing information to consumers, and publicity of credit entities.87
The Claims Service provides dispute resolution support and advice to financial services
users. On the one hand, it assesses claims related to breaches of the transparency and
consumer law or best financial practices by a financial institution.88 On the other hand, it
81
see www.dgsfp.meh.es/reclamaciones/index.asp.
82
www.cnmv.es/PortalInversor/section.aspx?hid=20.
83
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/reclama.html.
84
Ley 44/2002 Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero; Real Decreto 303/2004 by which the rules for the
commissioners that defend users of financial services are approved; Real Decreto 1/2007 which contains the
General Law for the Defense of Consumers and other complementary laws; and the Ley 22/2007 about tele-
marketing of financial services.
85
Ley 44/2002 Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero.
86
ibid.
87
The Claims Service was also influence by the Circular letter 8/1990 of 7 September concerning transparency
while conducting operations and consumer protection.
88
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/reclama.html.

deals with enquiries about applicable legislation on matters of transparency and customer
protection.89
Approximately 30 employees work for the Claims Service, which is divided into three
sections: the General Secretariat; the Report Unit; and the Advice Unit, containing a call
centre.90
Consumers or organisations of financial services users representing consumer or group
interests have the standing to file a case with the Claims Service. The claimants can be
Spanish or foreign, but must be correctly identified and authorized as users of banking
services.91
A complaint may be lodged at the Claims Service against a large range of financial
services institutions, including:
• Credit institutions authorised to operate in Spain, which includes banks, savings
banks, the Official Credit Institute (ICO), the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks
(CECA), credit co-operatives and specialised credit institutions.
• Valuation companies.
• Currency exchange establishments authorised to sell foreign banknotes and travellers’
cheques or to make international transfers.
• Payment institutions.92
Before lodging a claim, the claimant should have tried to resolve the issue directly with
the Customer Care Department or Customer’s Ombudsman of the financial institution in
question.
By law, all institutions supervised by the Bank are obliged to have a Customer Care
Department or optionally a Customer’s Ombudsman.93 After formal verification of the
established in house schemes, the Bank publishes a list with the names and contact details
of all the Customer Care Departments and Customer’s Ombudsmen that are available to
claimants in Spain.94
If the consumer contacts the customer services section of the financial institution in
writing they have to acknowledge receipt of the claim and provide a written reply with
the reasons for their decision. The claimant can then file the case with the Bank’s Claims
Service, by proving that the request has been rejected or that two months have passed since
it was filed and it remains unresolved.95
A claim may be refused by the Banks’ Claims Service among others, if the claim relates to
issues within the jurisdiction of administrative, arbitration or judicial bodies. Furthermore,
a claim cannot be admitted if it repeats previous claims or if the time limit within which a
claim may be made or action taken has elapsed. Importantly, as to the kind of complaints,
89
The Claims Services Advice Unit has an assistance and consultation function, serving as an informal reference
point providing information and opinions regarding financial services matters, see: www.bde.es/webbde/en/
secciones/servicio/reclama/reclama.html.
90
Interview with officials of the Spanish Central Bank, 16 November 2011, Madrid.
91
If a financial institution belongs to another European Union country claims may be introduced through
FIN-NET, a European network solving cross-border financial disputes, see the description of FIN-NET in the EU
chapter of this book.
92
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/gen_contra.html.
93
Spanish law: Orden ECO/734/2004, de 11 de marzo.
94
In the case of credit institutions, electronic money institutions and payment entities, the Bank also publishes
their regulations, see www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/attcliente/attcliente.html.
95
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/gen_cuando.html.

Spain 221
the Claims Service of the Bank is not empowered to evaluate damages nor may it issue
decisions about amounts awarded as compensation.96
A claim against a financial service entity may be filed in two ways: either online or by
using an official form provided by the Bank. The claim may be presented directly to the
General Registry of the Bank or to any of its branch offices, or sent by post to the Claims
Service.97
Once the claim is admitted, the financial institution has 15 working days to submit its
allegations. The arguments are then assessed by the Bank. Interestingly, the Bank can assess
a case only on the basis of the law, not on principles of equity.98
The procedure may be terminated early if the financial institution recognises the
claimant’s allegations or if the claimant voluntarily withdraws the claim. If this is not the
case, the Claims Service issues a reasoned report for the parties. This report is of a voluntary
nature and is thus not an administrative ruling that can be appealed.
If the report is unfavorable for the defendant, the financial services entity has to inform
the Claims Service whether it is willing to accept the decision and then comply with it
accordingly.99 Where the financial entity decides not to comply with the Bank’s report, the
Claims Service cannot impose a sanction, but may inform the supervisory department of
the Bank of any legal violations. As a result, the supervisory department may then start
an investigation and impose administrative sanctions if deemed necessary. However, this
scenario does not happen very often.
The Spanish court and the Bank sometimes mutually influence each other in their
decision-making process. The court may consult reports made by the Bank, whereas the
Claims Service has been inspired by the courts’ case law when taking decisions on cases. In
specific cases the courts may require the Bank to provide an expert opinion on a technical
question. Conversely, the Bank can refer a case to the court regarding questions on evidence
and for specific unresolved legal questions.100
The Bank aims to improve transparency on market practices in the financial sector in
order to promote consumer information and protection. It publishes a detailed annual
report on the amount of complaints and compliance rate by the financial institutions to
boost best practice.
In 2010 the Claims Service received 14,760 new complaints, compared to 13,640 in
2009. Since 2001 there has been a continuous increase in complaints, with a particularly
high increase in 2009 and 2010. During 2010, 84.1 per cent of claims were submitted
by individuals, 15.3 per cent by companies and 0.6 per cent by others, including public
institutions.101
In 2010 the Claims Service also received 3,368 requests for advice through their virtual
platform and 29,529 information requests by telephone.102
The average duration of a complaint procedure is between four and six months from the
date of submission.
96
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/gen_supuestos.html.
97
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/gen_como.html.
98
Interview by the authors with officials of Central Bank’s Claim Service, 16 November 2011, Madrid.
99
www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/servicio/reclama/gen_como_tra.html.
100
Interview by the authors with officials of Central Bank’s Claim Service, 16 November 2011, Madrid.
101
Data from the Bank’s Annual Report 2010, Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones Banco de Espana 2010.
102
Data from the Bank’s Annual Report 2010, Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones Banco de Espana 2010.

Complaints Service of the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds

The Spanish Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds (Dirección General de
Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones: IPF)103 manages financial services-related complaints and
provides legal advice to consumers. This out-of-court disputes service was established after
the adoption of Spanish Law 44/2002 regarding measures to reform the financial system in
2002.
The complaints service of the IPF consists of approximately 35 employees that provide
consultations and assess complaints free of charge. These complaints must relate to
insurance contracts and pension plans issued by insurance entities, companies specializing
in pension funds’ management, and insurance mediators.104
A case can in particular be revised to highlight irregularities in the financial services
provided by corporate entities. Those irregularities could be caused by delays or any other
type of behavior, with the exception of a request for repayment or restitution. Furthermore,
complaints can be submitted when actions or omissions by financial organizations have
caused damage to financial users’ interests or rights. This damage can be due to lack of
compliance with contracts, transparency regulations and consumer protection or good
practices.
Individuals or organizations that are entitled to make a complaint and ask for consultations
include:
• Insurance takers
• Beneficiaries
• Damaged third parties or their representatives
• Participants and beneficiaries of pension plans
• Associations and organizations which represent legitimate collective interests of users
of financial services.105
The complaints procedure contains the following steps. First, the complaint is submitted to
the Directorate General of the IPF (either on paper or digitally). For a claim to be admitted,
the claimants must prove that he unsuccessfully attempted to solve the problem directly
with the financial services company. This means that at least two months must have passed
with no response or the claim must have been dismissed by the financial services provider.
The IPF will then contact the parties within ten working days. A copy of the complaint is
sent to the financial service provider so that it can provide an answer within 15 working
days. Once the answer from the relevant organisation is received, it will be sent to the
claimant for comments within 15 working days.
The case will finally be concluded with a reasoned decision by the IPF, based on the
law rather than equity. In its recommendation, the IPF will state if the financial service
organisation has breached the regulations on insurance and pension plans or violated the
principles of good practices and financial customs. However, the IPF never evaluates the
economic damages that a company might have caused.106
103
www.dgsfp.meh.es/reclamaciones/index.asp.
104
See www.dgsfp.meh.es/reclamaciones/index.asp.
105
Besides, the Information Offices and Services for Consumers and Users are also authorized to present
consultations, see www.dgsfp.meh.es/reclamaciones/index.asp.
106
See www.dgsfp.meh.es/reclamaciones/index.asp.

Spain 223
Since this recommendation is not an administrative act; it is not binding and can be
followed by the parties on a voluntary basis. Therefore, no appeal is possible against such a
decision. The parties will be informed of the decision by the IPF within ten working days,
starting from the date of issuance. The entire procedure has to be terminated within four
months of the date of submission of the claim.
Besides the dispute resolution services, the IPF also provides advice and information to
financial services users regarding their rights. However, consultations over the interpretation
of laws or regulations cannot be put forward. In such a case a formal claim has to be submitted.
The Annual Report of the IPF107 shows that in 2010 a total of 9,574 requests and
complaints applications were resolved. This means that there has been an increase in
complaints compared to the previous year. From this total number of applications, 5,702
were admitted as complaints, from which 2,231 were decided in favour of the financial
services institution, whereas 1,882 of the cases were decided in favour of the claimants. The
remaining cases were terminated in other forms.
Investors Department of the National Stock Exchange Commission
The National Stock Exchange Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(CNMV)) is the agency in charge of supervising and inspecting the actors in the Spanish
Stock Markets. It was created by the Spanish Securities Market Law, which instituted in-
depth reforms of this segment of the Spanish financial system.108 Law 37/1998 updated
the aforementioned Law and established a regulatory framework that is in line with the
requirements of the European Union.109
The CNMV aims to ensure the transparency of the Spanish market and the correct
formation of prices to protect investors.110 The Investor Assistance Office (Oficina de
Atención al Inversor)111 provides a public ADR scheme free of charge that is established by
law and is part of the legal department of CNMV. It offers both claims management services
and practical advice to investors and is permitted to handle investors’ complaints filed in
relation with the activities it supervises.112
In order to be admitted by the Investor Assistance Office a complaint should firstly be
submitted directly to the client service or ombudsman of the financial institution to which
they refer. The financial intermediaries are obliged to inform the public about the existence
and function of these services. If the claimant does not receive a reply within two months
of the filing of a complaint or if the case is not resolved, they can bring a complaint to the
CNMV.113 The average duration of the ADR procedure is four months.
The Investor Assistance Office issues a non binding recommendation, which cannot
include any economic evaluations regarding damages to the users of financial services.
Given that procedure of the CNMV is similar to the ADR scheme provided by the Bank
outlined above, it will not be described further here.114
107
www.dgsfp.meh.es/sector/documentos/Informes%202010/Informe%20Servicio%20Reclamaciones%20
2010.pdf.
108
www.cnmv.es/portal/quees/Funciones/Funciones.aspx?lang=en.
109
ibid.
110
ibid.
111
www.cnmv.es/PortalInversor/section.aspx?hid=20.
112
CNMV, Annual Report 2010 (2010, CNMV, Madrid) 177, www.cnmv.es/portal/Publicaciones/Informes.aspx.
113
ibid.
114
ibid.

The data from the Annual Report of the CNMV shows a gradual increase of complaints.
Between 2008 and 2009 the complaints have doubled, which is also due to the financial
crises. In 2010 2,296 complaints were filed by the CNMV and 1,774 were resolved.115
Table 9.1: Processed complaints by type of resolution
2008 2009 2010

Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total % change
10/09
Resolved 722 80 823 72 1,774 85 116
Report favourable to claimant 226 25 292 25 807 39 176
Report unfavourable to claimant 365 41 255 22 534 26 111
Report without decision 10 1 57 5 154 7 170
Resolved by mutual agreement 112 13 198 17 241 12 63
Complaint withdrawn 9 1 21 2 32 2 52
Unresolved 177 20 314 28 313 15 0
Competence of other authorities 41 5 86 8 128 6 49
Not accepted 136 15 228 20 185 9 -19
Total complaints handled 899 100 1,137 100 2,087 100 84
Pro memoria
Total filed 1,058 2,154 2,296 7
Source: CNMV.
Transport Arbitration Boards
Specialised arbitration boards (juntas de transporte) exist within the transport sector
which are independent of the general consumer arbitration system.116 Every autonomous
region in Spain has one transport arbitration board,117 whereas the coordination of the
arbitration system is ensured by the Departamento de Prensa de la Consejería de Transportes
e Infraestructuras.118
The competence of the boards covers road transportations, railways, buses, cars, taxis,
metros, trains, trams, and funiculars—whether urban, interurban or international. Arbitration
boards decide on both disputes between consumers and traders and disputes between traders.
Transport cases can involve a large range of actors such as operators, loaders and users of
land transport (eg passengers, car rental and goods). The transport arbitration board is also
entitled to handle the storage, valuation and auctioning of goods that are not paid for by
the recipient and store-rejected goods. However, it cannot decide on disputes regarding air
transport, for which claims should be brought to the general arbitration system.119
115
ibid.
116
The key legal acts are: Ley 16/1987, de 30 de julio, de Ordenación de los Transportes Terrestres, Arts 37–38,
(BOE del 31 de julio), modificada por la Ley 29/2003, de 8 de octubre; El Reglamento de esta Ley, aprobado por
Real Decreto 1211/1990, de 28 de septiembre, Arts 6–12, (BOE del 8 de octubre); Orden de 30 de marzo de 2001 por
la que se establecen normas para la realización por las Juntas Arbitrales del Transporte de funciones de depósito y
enajenación de mercancías (BOE del 14 de abril).
117
Interview with officials of ICN, 15 November 2011, Madrid.
118
In turn, the Consejero de Transportes e Infraestructuras is responsible for the development and monitoring of
the government’s transport policy. Ley 1/1983, Art 41.
119
www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?c=CM_InfPractica_FA&cid=1109168011158&idConsejeria=1109266187248&
idListConsj=1109265444710&language=es&pagename=ComunidadMadrid%2FEstructura&sm=1109265843983.

Spain 225
The territorial competence of the board is based on the place of origin or destination
of the transport. Jurisdication can be based on the place where the contract has been
concluded, or at the arbitration board’s location that both parties voluntarily accept.
Generally, the boards intervene in cases involving up to €6,000, but they can also act
when the case exceeds that level if the parties agree.120 The procedure starts with a written
complaint, which can be submitted online and is similar to the general arbitration
procedure.121 The parties will then receive an invitation to a hearing, for which no legal
representation is required. In the hearing the parties make their allegations and adduce
the evidence. The board will pronounce its award within a maximum of six months from
the day following the hearing. The legal value of the award is, as in the ordinary consumer
arbitration, final and binding and enforceable on almost equal terms to a judicial decision.
In 2010 2,175 arbitration requests were made and 925 awards were issued,122 which are
published online.123 Generally, the transport arbitration board seems to work effectively,
and has been evaluated positively by the consumer organisations.124
The Energy Customer Ombudsman
In the energy sector no specialised consumer arbitration boards exist.125 Consequently,

consumers can usually choose between two key ADR options to solve disputes: the general
public arbitration scheme or a private scheme.
The public consumer arbitration boards are available for all types of consumer related
disputes and have been described before.126 They can resolve disputes when both parties
agree to the procedure and the arbiter’s decisions are binding. However, the companies in the
energy sector are generally reluctant to adhere to these arbitration boards,127 so that they are
of little practical use in this area.128 While new European legislation requires Member States
to establish a single contact point for consumer complaints in the energy sector, this has not
yet been set up in Spain.129
Alternatively, a private ADR scheme is provided by ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de
Electricidad, S.A.), the largest electric utility company in Spain.130 Complaints can be
120
www.fomento.es/mfom/lang_castellano/direcciones_generales/transporte_por_carretera/servicios_
transportista/juntas_arbitrales/.
121
The arbitration procedure is set out in Ley 16/1987, de 30 de julio, de Ordenación de los Transportes
Terrestres y por el Real Decreto 1211/1990, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de desarrollo de dicha Ley. See
also among others Ley 36/1988 on arbitration, and Real Decreto 42/1991 that establishes the Juntas Arbitrales del
Transporte de Madrid.
122
E-mail communication with Ignacio Pérez Pérez (Jefe de Servicio de Juntas Arbitrales), 15 November 2011.
123
www.madrid.org/lauj/run/j/BusquedaLaudos.icm.
124
The major Spanish consumer association OCU reported that they receive few complaints about transport,
which indicates that the arbitration system is working satisfactorily. Interview with officials of OCU, 16 November
2011, Madrid.
125
The public regulator at state level is the National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía –
CNE). For consumers a CNE customer contact point was established, where they can obtain information and are
forwarded to the competent body to solve their disputes. See www.cne.es/cne/contenido.jsp?id_nodo=375&&&k
eyword=&auditoria=F.
126
See this chapter p 214.
127
See conversation with OCU’s officials, 12 December 2011; interview by the authors to ICN’s officials, 15
November 2011, Madrid. ENDESA, for instance, adheres to the Board in Cataluña.
128
According to the CCU, arbitration in the energy sector is non-existent.CCU annual report 2010, 126.
129
ibid, 126.
130
http://www.endesa.com/en/aboutEndesa/ourStrategy/Paginas/Home.aspx.

submitted to ENDESA’s ‘Customer Ombudsman’, established since 2002.131 This Ombudsman

resolves complaints from ENDESA’s customers who have previously contacted the client
services department and are not satisfied with its response or have not received an answer
within two months.132 However, the Ombudsman cannot act if a consumer has previously
opted for any other dispute resolution route to solve the case (eg judicial).
The Ombudsman is designated by the Board of Directors of the Company and has a duty to
provide feedback and recommendations to the Board with proposals for improving the qual-
ity of the customer services. Yet, the Ombudsman is independent from the company’s man-
agement and has his/her own budget and team.133 In the assessment of a case the Ombudsman
is required to remain impartial and has to respect principles of independence and fairness.134
After receiving a complaint, the Ombudsman starts a mediation procedure. He/
she analyses all the documentation received and may organise a meeting between
the customer and representatives from the company, in order to reach a mediation
agreement.135 If no amicable solution is found the Ombudsman issues a written resolution,
which is binding on the company but voluntary for the customer.136 ENDESA has agreed
to automatically accept resolutions issued by the Customer Ombudsman and must comply
with the decision within a 30 day period starting the day after the customer expressly
accepts the agreement.
The dispute resolution procedure takes on average two months and is free of charge for
the customer.
ENDESA is the only energy company in Spain with an Ombudsman and is a member
of the European Energy Ombudsman Group (EEOG), which is an independent non-profit
organization made up of the Ombudsmen of the main energy companies in the European
Union.137 The EEOG aims at ensuring consumer protection and at promoting mediation
between companies and consumers, fostering good practice in customer services.138
Every year the Costumer Ombudsman presents a Memorandum detailing his
recommendations to ENDESA’s CEO and Board of Directors and to the relevant bodies
representing clients.
In 2010 the Costumer Ombudsman’s office received a total of 2,104 complaints, of which
1,182 fell within the Ombudsman’s direct remit. The complaints in 2010 were concerned
with billing (36 per cent), the quality of supply (21 per cent), contracts (14 per cent), meter
readings (13 per cent) and the collection of payments and others (8 per cent). 89 per cent of
the complaints were resolved satisfactorily, with 80 per cent resolved by mediation between
the customer and the company, 18 per cent resolved via a resolution by the Ombudsman
and the remaining 2 per cent resolved by other means.139
The Customer Satisfaction Index for the ENDESA Ombudsman generally displays a high
score, averaging 8.1 out of 10 across various categories in 2010. As a private scheme it has
the advantage of having direct access to information from within the company.140 However,
131
See ENDESA, Annual Report 2010 Activities (2011, ENDESA).
132
http://www.energyombudsmen.com/spain.html.
133
http://www.defensordelcliente.endesa.es/defcl/quien_es.jsf.
134
www.defensordelcliente.endesa.es/defcl/index.jsf.
135
http://www.energyombudsmen.com/documentsmembres/ENDESA_Spain.pdf.
136
Customers remain free to bring the case to the court or to the public arbitration system: see http://www.
energyombudsmen.com/documentsmembres/ENDESA_Spain.pdf.
137
See for a list of participants, www.energyombudsmen.com.
138
http://www.defensordelcliente.endesa.es/defcl/datosArticulos.jsf.
139
ENDESA, Sustainability report 2010 (ENDESA, 2011), 60; see also Annual report (ENDESA, 2011), 69.
140
Information from ENDESA, October 2011.

Spain 227
the fact that it is an internal unit of the company is unavoidably a matter of concern from
the point of view of impartiality. The scheme is limited in scope to ENDESA’s clients.
Conclusions
Spain contains a distinct alternative dispute resolution system at national and local
level, which consists of three general out-of-court models – arbitration, mediation and
conciliation. Arbitration is the main out-of-court redress model established for consumer
related disputes, which is applicable to all sectors with a few exceptions. Specialised ADR
schemes exist in areas such as electronic trade, financial services and transport.
The arbitration system is well developed and effectively functions in general in many areas
of consumer law. The large number of cases in which decisions were formulated in favour
of consumers suggests that the ADR system is in fact consumer friendly.141 However, the
adherence to the arbitration system is voluntary and does not work when the parties do not
agree to the procedures. Traders can adhere to the system ex ante for all cases or only some
issues or accept arbitration on an ad hoc basis. This might lead to confusion, as companies
do not always make their partial adherence to the arbitration system sufficiently clear when
they advertise it to consumers. Furthermore, past experience has shown large differences of
effectiveness depending on the specific sector. While in sectors such as telecommunications
the arbitration system deals with many cases and seems to work effectively, in others such
as the air transport, energy or insurance arbitration remains underdeveloped. The reason
is often that companies in these sectors remain reluctant to agree to resolve their disputes
via arbitration.
Therefore, other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms remain important in Spain –
such as small claims procedures, mediation and conciliation – to provide consumers with
inexpensive and easy redress. Consumers are in general reluctant to file cases with the court
because of the complicated formal procedure.142
Mediation and conciliation procedures play a significant role in resolving consumer
disputes out of court. These schemes are often offered by consumer associations or
chambers of commerce that help to resolve disputes before arbitration or court procedures
are initiated. However, at present a comprehensive legal framework regulating in particular
consumer mediation is missing.
In-house dispute resolution services also sometimes exist in specific companies or
consumer sectors, which are provided by costumer services or company ombudsmen.
These might offer valuable support to resolve problems informally between traders and
consumers, but sometimes raise concern regarding impartiality. In particular sectors, such
as the energy sector, they provide de facto the only available option to resolve disputes out
of court.
Finally, another aspect of the Spanish consumer law enforcement landscape is that public
authorities often have sanctioning powers. Their existence and the threat of a sanction can
put pressure on traders to settle consumer disputes out-of-court. Here the effectiveness
141
The numbers have to be read with caution since only in very clear cases might consumers be encouraged to
go to the ADR board.
142
ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_empowerment/docs/report_eurobarometer_342_en.pdf.

again depends on the sector. While in the telecommunications the system seems to works
well, in the energy sector the different public authorities in the independent regions work in
a rather uncoordinated fashion and produce sometimes contradictory results.


10
Sweden
Franziska Weber, Christopher Hodges and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda
Introduction
Swedish consumer policy is based on providing consumers with access to advice both before
and, where necessary, after transactions, to enable consumers to make the right choices.
Most municipalities have local consumer advisers, and four complaints bureaux exist,
covering banking and financial services, insurance, telecommunications and electricity. The
standard path for resolving disputes is for consumers to be directed first to talk directly with
traders, then to contact local or sectoral consumer advisers before referring any unresolved
complaint to ADR.
The ADR system is comprehensive, developed, and widely used; the courts have almost
no function for C2B disputes. A range of ADR Boards exist for specific types of injuries or
sectors. The National Board for Consumer Disputes (ARN) is the comprehensive catch-
all option, which is a public authority that functions like a court, well-known and widely
used. Almost all of the ADR bodies are free to users. The ARN is funded by the state. It
has thirteen specialist chambers. It takes 5 to 6 months to deliver a recommendation in a
case, which is not binding but is highly likely to be observed by the parties. ARN decisions
are published and a consumer magazine uses the data to publish the names of traders who
do not comply with ARN decisions, which is given wide publicity and provides a strong
incentive for business compliance. Consumers may still go to court, but rarely do so:1 the
objective would usually be to sue after obtaining an ADR decision in the limited number of
instances where a trader has not implemented one.
The Policy of Prioritising Consumer Advice
Successive governments have emphasized the importance of providing local consumer

advice in documents on consumer policy,2 on the basis that many consumer issues relate
to having adequate information and pre- and post-sale advice. The first points of access
are local Consumer Advice Centres (konsumentvägledare),3 which exist in 266 of the 290
1
A Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, Sweden National Report, (2006), 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.
2
See Prop. 2000/01:135; Ds 2004:51; cf. Prop. 2005/06:1.
3
www.konsumentverket.se/sv/Personlig-Radgivning. The local consumer advisors have their own organization,
Konsumentvägledarnas Förening. The number of municipalities with consumer advisers was 235 out of 288 in
1994, and 254 out of 290 in 2004.

municipalities (kommuner) in Sweden, and employ expert staff, many on a part-time basis.
Municipalities are required by law to have finance and debt advisers, although employing
consumer advisers is voluntary. Some municipalities have recently chosen to ‘buy’ consumer
advice services from other municipalities. The consumer experts have good knowledge of
local traders and markets, and good links with many traders, which can be used to support
consumers so as to sort out issues that arise. The local Advice Centres always start by
advising consumers to discuss problems with traders direct. If necessary, the Advice Centre
may use its position and links with traders to mediate informally.
The Swedish Consumer Agency (Konsumentverket) is the central point for consumer
issues and advice. It works closely with the ECC-SE office, Konsument Europa (see
below), the ECC being a unit within the Consumer Agency. Information on consumer
law and rights is provided on various official websites, notably by the Consumer Agency,4
Konsument Europa5 and by advice bureaux and trade associations. In recognition of the
fact that the requirements of consumer and regulatory law can be complex, and a challenge
for businesses (especially SMEs) as well as consumers to understand, the ARN is launching
in 2012 part of its website aimed specifically at businesses to explain legal requirements. The
objective is to increase compliance and prevent disputes arising.
The four major business sectors maintain their own national advice Bureaux, which
provide free advice on problems and also to the local Consumer Advice Centres. The
sectors are insurance,6 banking and financial services,7 electricity supply8 and telecoms.9
The Bureaux are governed collaboratively by government and the trade associations
concerned, although the sector formally owns them and pays all the costs. They all have
websites giving information and refer consumers who have a problem with their supplier
to first contact the company. The Bureaux can provide the consumer with guidance and
information how to deal with the problem, such as information about relevant legislation
and how it is applied by companies. The Bureaux offer conciliation between consumers and
companies but do not offer other ADR functions themselves, but would refer consumers
who have not resolved their problems with companies to refer consumers initially to the
in-house Consumer Ombudsmen that exist within many large companies.
If a dispute is not resolved by these informal means, the advisers would always promote
sectoral ADR schemes, where they exist, or refer consumers to the ARN, the National
Board for Consumer Disputes, since it has comprehensive jurisdiction for any type of
4
www.konsumentverket.se.
5
ibid.
6
Konsumenternas försäkringsbyrå, see http://www.konsumentverket.se/kopa/Konsumentbyraerna/Konsumen
ternas-forsakringsbyra. This Bureau may attempt to conciliate disputes between policyholders and their insurance
companies, free of charge. Its principals are the Swedish Consumer Agency, the Financial Supervisory Authority
and the Swedish Insurance Federation.
7
Konsumenternas bank- och finansbyrå, see http://bankforsakring.konsumenternas.se. This Bureau is financed
by the Swedish Bankers Association, the Swedish Mutual Fund Association and the Swedish Association of
Securities Dealers; the Bureau’s Board of Directors also includes representatives of the Swedish Financial
Supervisory Agency and the Swedish Consumer Agency.
8
Konsumenternas elrådgivningsbyrå. www.konsumenternas.se. This Bureau’s principals are the three authorities
Swedish Consumer Agency, Swedish Energy Agency and the Energy Markets Inspectorate together with the
electricity industry organization Svensk Energi (Swedenergy).
9
Telekområdgivarna, see www.telekomradgivarna.se. This Bureau is owned by the Swedish IT and Telecom
Industry Association and is financed by the telecom, TV and Internet operators who have chosen to support
the agency. Its Board also includes representatives of the National Post and Telecom Agency and the Swedish
Consumer Agency. The authorities and industry representatives have an equal number of votes on the Board, and
one of the state authorities has the casting vote if this is necessary to facilitate a decision on the bureau’s operations.

Sweden 231
consumer dispute. The sectoral Boards comprise independent members who represent all
those interested: most of the members are lawyers. They function well, and therefore such
disputes are rarely brought to the ARN. Sectors that contain smaller businesses are less
likely to have sectoral dispute resolution schemes, so the comprehensive coverage afforded
by the ARN is an advantage.
Private Sector ADR
There is a large number of private consumer redress schemes organized by individual

companies, by business associations in certain sectors of industry and trade, or working
across industry sectors. In 2006, there were at least 45 such schemes, varying from in-
house company ombudsmen, consultative and advisory boards, dispute settlement boards,
and ethical boards.10 There is a wide variation in the number of cases attracted by sectoral
boards: some attract few claims.11 Johansson commented that in addition to resolving
disputes, sectoral boards: ‘also inform on the legal practice of the [ARN] and of the Swedish
courts. They effectively work as, figuratively speaking, a filter for the dispute settlement
bodies and thus contribute to lessen the workload of the courts and the [ARN].’12
Three examples are given below of sectoral structures, which illustrate different
configurations of prioritising advice from an expert Bureau, in-house ombudsmen, and
specific ADR bodies, and their relationships with the ARN. Another example of a sectoral
ADR is that of the trade association for real estate agents.13
Financial Services
Banks and the Swedish Consumers’ Banking & Finance Bureau14 provide advice to retail
customers and others on any finance issue. The Bureau is particularly active, and provides
advice on products, standard terms and prices. It has around eight employees, who are
mostly lawyers. It operates a phone advice line every weekday morning, and accepts
questions by email or letter. In 2010 the Bureau received approximately 6,000 contacts.
This sector relies primarily on in-house complaint schemes, and does not have its own
ADR body. Guidelines of the Swedish financial supervisory authority (Finansinspektionen,
FI) require the institutions under its supervision to establish satisfactory consumer
complaint management, including an in-house Consumer Ombudsman.15 Consumers who
wish to raise issues are first directed to the bank’s Customer Relations Department, which
10
A Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, Sweden National Report, (2006), 3.
11
Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (n 1), 4. Note that in 2002 the cases settled by Boards for plumbers were 3, driving
schools 25, undertakers 4, coin traders 0, hotel and restaurants 15–20, and heating pumps 40.
12
T Johansson, ‘Alternative dispute resolution in Sweden – The National Board for Consumer Complaints at a
glance’ (ARN, 2009), paper on file with the authors.
13
The Real Estate Market Board (Fastighetsmarknadens reklamationsnämndt: FRN) handles disputes between
eg a buyer/seller and a real estate agent/agency, also between buyers and sellers. Where a consumer succeeds in
the case brought here, the trader’s liability insurer has agreed to pay the compensation awarded. If the trader then
raises the dispute in court, it will not be allowed to be indemnified under the legal expenses insurance included
in its liability insurance.
14
http://bankforsakring.konsumenternas.se/Sidfot/Om-oss/In-English.
15
The latest guidelines are dated 29 November 2002 (FFFS 2002:23).

is headed by the internal Ombudsman. In a large bank, that Department might comprise
about 10 people. Statistics are not published but the banks believe that many issues are
solved at that stage, against the background that unsatisfied consumers may always bring a
claim in the ARN—provided the claim is worth over SEK 2,000.
The FI and the Swedish Banking Association recommend that consumers turn to ARN
if the consumers are dissatisfied with a company’s response. The financial sector is fully
supportive of the ARN, and has a high rate of compliance with ARN’s recommendations
(94 per cent in 2011: the remaining 6 per cent are believed to be smaller companies that are
not members of the trade association). It is very rare that a customer would bring a court
case: this occurs sometimes for customers with high net worth who complain about losses
on securities.
It is notable that the number of financial complaints that reach the ARN is noticeably
small (480 in 2010, 427 in 2011) and consumers succeeded in being awarded compensation
in only 18 per cent of cases in 2011.16 A survey of Swedish consumers’ confidence in traders
rates banking highly, second only to healthcare.17
Insurance
Extensive information and advice is provided to consumers by the Swedish Consumers

Insurance Bureau (KFB). It has twelve employees, and receives 13,000 inquiries a year,
80 per cent of which relate to insurance claims and 20 per cent other questions, such as
requesting pre-contract advice. The KFB is active in the market, trying to reach customers
and provide authoritative information and advice. It will advise on competing contract
terms and price issues. When it receives details about a dispute, the KFB will attempt to
conciliate a settlement.
Some of the insurance companies have in-house committees that review disputes with a
view to reaching settlement with the claimant.18 Most also have Customer Ombudsmen,19
some of whom are located in companies separately from Customer Relations Departments
or in-house complaints settlement boards,20 and some of whom are not. The Ombudsmen
have often previously occupied senior positions within a company before being appointed
as Ombudsmen. Although they are usually appointed from company staff, their function
is to adopt a pro-consumer advocacy stance from within, and they are viewed as acting
independently and voicing strong opinions about how the company should treat consumers
so as to be fair.
16
www.arn.se/Om-oss/Statistik.
17
Svenskt Kvalitetsindex, available at www.kvalitetsindex.se/images/stories/Results/2010/press_ekonomin_11.
pdf.
18
An FI guideline requires companies to have complaints officers, who tend to have separate regulatory
functions.
19
Kundombudsmannen Folksam. Kundsombudsmannen och kundpanelen (If); Kundombudsmannen
(Länsförsäkringar I Stockholm).
20
eg Försäkringsnämnden (Trygghansa). The company If, has operated an interesting two-tier complaint scheme
involving Customer Ombudsman and Customer Panel. Complaints could be made to one of five Kundombudsmäh,
who were under the supervision of the Board of Directors of the company but organizationally independent from
the company’s operative activity. A review of their decisions could be requested from a Kundpanelen, comprised
of eight members, of which six were ordinary. If customers without experience in insurance matters, and the
other two were a lawyer and a representative of the company who also administers the files. Kundpanelen can also
deal with certain issues without prior handling by Kundombudsmannen, for instance complaints concerning the
company’s marketing.

Sweden 233
If disputes are not resolved by companies, there are two statutory and five voluntary other
ADR entities that may decide any case that has been rejected by an insurance company that
has agreed that such cases may be so considered. All are free to consumers. All of these
Boards are owned by the Swedish Insurance Association, but are operated independently
and free to make their own decisions, each under an independent Chair, who is a senior
current or former judge. The Boards issue non-binding recommendations, almost all of
which (in practice 100 per cent) are followed by the insurance company members. Cases
are considered in writing, by five people: the Chair, two members representing customer
interests and two insurance experts. Expert external medical experts may also be asked to
contribute. Together, the Boards handle a total of around 1,800 cases a year.
The Swedish Insurance ADR is not notified to the European Commission because it is
fully financed by the industry. However, it is widely regarded (including by officials) as
operating rapidly, independently, impartially and objectively,21 and to fill an important gap
given the limited competence of ARN in disputes involving medical expertise.22 This is
partly because of the high standing of the chairs (respected judges) and of the involvement
of consumer representatives. Their details are as follows.
The Road Traffic Injuries Commission

The Road Traffic Injuries Commission (Trafikskadenämnden) and the Patient Injuries
Commission are established by law and hence mandatory for all insurance companies.
The Road Traffic Injuries Commission was created in 1936 in order to bring consistency
to awards of compensation.23 Under the Traffic Insurance Decree,24 all insurance
companies that provide traffic insurance must ‘maintain and pay for’ a road traffic injuries
commission. The regulations require that the Commission’s task is to work for ‘fair and
uniform’ compensation,25 that the Chairman is appointed by the Government, and that its
regulations must be approved by the government. The Commission comprises 68 people,
in three groups: six deputy Chairmen and their substitutes (all judges) appointed by the
Financial Supervisory Authority; thirteen representatives of insurance companies and
substitutes, appointed by the Financial Supervisory Authority on the recommendation
of the Swedish Association of Traffic Insurance; 13 lay representatives and substitutes,
appointed by the Financial Supervisory Authority on the recommendation of the labour
market’s organizations. Every case is decided by a panel of six, comprising two from each
of the above three groups. The secretariat has 20 employees, 17 of whom are lawyers, who
present cases to the meetings of the Commission and write up the recommendations.
An injured person has a choice of going to court or to the Commission. The Commission
must hear certain cases, before the victim and insurance company reach agreement, if the
case is not heard in court:
21
Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (n 1), 4.
22
L Heuman, Reklamationsnämnder och försäkringsnämnder, (Stockholm, Norstedt & Söner Förlag, 1980); 14
Konsumentpolitik i en ny tid (SOU 1994:14), 119.
23
A similar scheme exists in Finland.
24
Trafikförsäkringsförordningen.
25
Traffic Injuries Commission Regulations, s 1.

(a) where there is medical disability of 10 per cent or more; or annual loss of income
of approx. SEK 22,000 (the sum being connected to the Swedish consumer price
index); loss of support; or retrial (on certain conditions).26
(b) where the victim asks for the Commission’s recommendation.27
The Commission issues about 5,000 recommendations a year. It also annually publishes
compensation tables, which are used by courts and the Lawyers Association, and
recommendations on special matters. It applies tort law, and therefore the principle of full
compensation for relevant losses. The Commission applies decisions of the Supreme Court.
Any court may require the Commission to issue a recommendation on a compensation
issue.28 The Commission takes three to five months to process claims.
Decisions are not binding, but are accepted in 99 per cent of cases. Companies are
required to inform the Commission if they do not follow a decision, but it is not known
how many do not tell the Commission this.
The Patient Insurance

Sweden created a distinctive system for investigating and compensating medical accidents
in 1975,29 which was copied with some variations by other Nordic States.30 Compensation
is paid where an injury31 was avoidable.32 Unavoidable personal injuries caused by
pharmaceuticals are compensated by a similar scheme funded by the pharmaceutical
manufacturers.33
The Patient Insurance system provides ‘no blame’ compensation, and the National
Board of Health and Welfare deals separately with aspects of professional standards
and discipline.34 Policy-makers believe that this system has created a basis for increased
confidence and openness between medical staff and patients. This is illustrated by the fact
that 60 to 80 per cent of cases reported to Patient Insurance, the physician, nurse or social
worker involved helped the patient report the matter—rather than trying to cover it up or
not accept that it happened.
26
ibid, s 3.
27
ibid, s 4.
28
ibid, s 2.
29
A voluntary scheme was introduced in 1975, which covered 99% of claims, and was extended by law to full
coverage in under the Patient Injury Act (1996:799). See www.patientforsakring.se/Articl;es-in-English.html. See
generally U Hellbacher, C Espersson and H Johansson, Patient Injury Compensation for Healthcare-Related Injuries
(Visby, 2007).
30
Finland 1987; Norway provisional rules in 1988, law in 2003; Denmark 1992; and Iceland in 2001.
31
Both physical and mental injuries are compensated, as is defined economic and non-economic losses, and
death expenses.
32
Compensation is paid if the injury is caused by medical treatment, and could have been avoided either
by a different performance of the chosen procedure or by adopting some other procedure that, according to a
retrospective medical assessment by an experienced specialist, would have satusfied the need for treatment in a
less risky way. The rarity or severity of the injury are irrelevant.
33
www.lakemedelsforsakringen.se/default.aspx?id=16720. See C Hodges, ‘Nordic Compensation Schemes for
Drug Injuries’ (2006) J Consumer Policy 29, 143–175; J Dute, MG Faure and H Koziol (eds), Tort and Insurance
Law: No-fault compensation in the Health Care Sector vol 8 (New York, Springer, 2004). The drug scheme was
introduced in 1978.
34
Until 2011, this was the Health and Medical Care Liability Board. In 2010 it received 4,500 complaints, and
issued 400 reprimands.

Sweden 235
Most healthcare in Sweden (perhaps 95 per cent) is public, funded by county councils.
Patients pay only SEK 100 a day to public providers for any kind of treatment, from a minor
procedure to a triple heart bypass. Every healthcare provider (ie clinic, not individual) is
required to purchase patient insurance. The insurance companies are affiliated to the Patient
Insurance Association. If such insurance is not held, the Patient Insurance Association will
itself investigate and compensate the injury, thereby guaranteeing cover, and reclaim sums
paid from the caregiver. Councils pay insurance premiums of SEK 135 per inhabitant.
Independent Patient Advisory Committees exist in every region that help patients who
run into problems by offering information and advice: they receive 25,000 contacts a year.35
Patients usually register a claim with a social worker in each clinic, who sends notifications
to the relevant insurance company. A claim adjuster (usually a lawyer or nurse) appointed
by the insurer will investigate the facts from the records, usually obtaining an opinion from
a relevant medical expert, who is a member of a panel of around 90 specialists. The patient
merely has to say that he or she has an injury: unlike a legal claim, it is not necessary to
make any allegation of causation or fault, nor to provide evidence. A claim to the Patient
Insurance is completely free to the patient. The cost of Patient Insurance is around €900 per
claim, compared with an estimated €22,000 per court case.
If the patient is unsatisfied with the insurance company’s response, he or she may refer
the claim to the Patient Claims Panel operated by the Patient Insurance Association (or to
court). The Panel consists of a chairperson and six other members. The Chairman must be,
or must have served as, a regular judge. Three of the other members represent the interests
of the patients, one must be a medical expert, one must be familiar with the personal injury
settlement process of the insurers, and one must have special knowledge of health care
activities. The Panel’s opinion differs from that of the insurer in about 10 per cent of cases.
The questions considered by the Panel are predominantly highly technical, and are resolved
by applying combined medico-legal expertise. Some grey areas arise, in which case the
Panel tends to err on the side of a patient.
Around 12,000 claims are made a year, of which around 6,000 patients are compensated.
The Panel receives around 1,100 claims, of which 110 are awarded compensation: the courts
receive around 10 cases a year of which perhaps two succeed. The Patient Insurance system
resolves 50 per cent of claims within 6 months, and 80 per cent within 12 months. The
types of claims are shown in Table 10.1. The most expensive claims are those involving
brain-damaged infants: of 100,000 babies born each year, around 30 claims are made for
birth-related brain injuries, of which 12 cases are compensated as avoidable, and the total
compensation comprises 20 per cent of that awarded in the 6,000 total annual cases.
Table 10.1: Types of patient insurance claims: average 1997–2001
Specialty Percentage of claims Percentage of costs

Orthopaedic surgery 21 23
General surgery 15 13
Obstatrics & gynaecology 8 25
District care 9 7
Dental clinics 11 2
35
From 2010, the Patient Safety Act requires hospitals to inform patients of the system. The intention has been
to make the system more well-known and open: a similar change in Denmark, where notifications can be made
anonymously, resulted in a dramatic increase in claims.

A major reason why the Patient Insurance system is economic is that its awards are subsidiary
to benefits paid by the national welfare system. Thus, the general welfare system provides
80 per cent of salary during sick leave and 64 percent of salary if early retirement occurs
because of illness for income up to €32,000 a year. The Patient Insurance only pays amounts
over those levels, on the basis of the damages that would be awarded in court under the
Tort Liability Act. The cost is €7 per claim per inhabitant per year, with administration costs
taking 20 per cent of the total.
Voluntary Insurance Boards

There are five ADR Boards that are established voluntarily by the insurance sector. These
are:
• The Board for Insurance of Persons (PFN). This deals with disputes involving terms and
conditions and claims adjustments for life assurance, accident insurance and sickness
insurance, provided the dispute involves a medical assessment. Only the consumer
can start the procedure, and must apply in writing. The insurance company is required
to provide a written response, which is sent to the consumer for comment. There
are around 850 cases a year, and the Board recommends a change in the company’s
decision in about 5 per cent of cases.
• The Board for Bodily Injury Liability Insurance (APN). This reviews cases of serious
bodily injuries. Under its rules, it is compulsory for ascribing companies to consult
the APN (unless the claimant has a legal representative who agrees with the insurance
company that the process is unnecessary) before making a decision, whenever a case
involves medical disability of 10 per cent or more, a specified yearly loss of income
(SEK 22,000 in 2012), compensation for loss of financial support, re-evaluations of
agreed cases where facts have changed, or if the claimant so requests on any other issue.
The APN also provides opinions to courts, the ARN or authorities where requested to
do so. It handles around 200 cases a year, and recommends a change in about 20 per
cent of insurance companies’ decisions.
• The Board for Legal Protection Issues (FNR). This issues recommendations on
disputes involving (a) the extent of a legal and traffic insurance policy and the right to
claim for damages under such policies, and (b) the suitability of a legal representative
chosen by a customer when the insurance company objects to the representative. The
claimant has to apply in writing. Around 60 cases a year are handled, and the Board
recommends a change in about 20 per cent of cases.
• The Insurance Appeal procedure concerning an attorney’s suitability (POL).
• The Attorney Cost Board (OKN).
Disputes that are not resolved at the above stages may be dealt with by the ARN. However,
the existence of the advice and insurance ADR bodies means that many cases do not reach
the ARN (which handled 849 insurance cases in 2012).
Telecoms
As with other sectors, customer complaints may be directed at companies, who have in-
house Customer Relations Departments (only one provider has an in-house Ombudsman).

Sweden 237
The Authority (PTS) can receive complaints, and takes note of their content in relation
to provider and market behaviour, but cannot advise or resolve them. Instead, an impartial
sectoral advice Bureau, called Telecom Advisors, was created in 2006, to provide advice
and conciliation.36 There were various reasons for this. Firstly, the authorities perceived
there to be low standards of service by providers. Secondly, the ARN was excluded
from accepting complaints from small businesses, which had many problems similar
to consumers (especially around aggressive marketing) but were not able to rely on the
extensive consumer rights and could not afford to go to court. Thirdly, providers themselves
were dissatisfied with the fact that consumers who were frustrated by their inability to have
problems resolved tended to go to the media, which created bad publicity for the industry
even if they had acted correctly. Fourthly, the ARN has the ability to process telecom
complaints, but over a threshold of SEK 1,000, and many customers have problems below
that limit: many are young, and the financial impact on them can be significant. Fifthly,
the ARN procedure is mainly written, and some telecom complaints needed oral evidence.
Telecom Advisors is owned by the Swedish IT and Telecom Industry Association, and
its Board also includes representatives of the National Post and Telecom Agency and the
Swedish Consumer Agency. In contrast to the Bureaux for other sectors, Telecom Advisors
is funded by (currently eleven) operators under bilateral agreements, so it spends a lot of
time negotiating and collecting fees, and not all of the smaller providers fund it.
Telecom Advisors’ website gets around 100,000 hits a year. The number of complaints it
received from 2001 to 2011 is shown in Figure 10.1. Telecom Advisors adopts a policy of
positive conciliation, by telling both sides which one they expect to win or lose a case when
looking at it as an impartial organisation. An increase in complaints in 2010 was caused by
accepting cases relating to television.
Figure 10.1: Contacts received by Telecom Advisors 2007–2011 (cases per year)
8500
8000
7500
7000
6500
6000
Total 2007 Total 2008 Total 2009 Total 2010 Total 2011
36
It comprises 8 employees (a CEO, 6 lawyers and 1 communicator). See telekomradgivarna.se and Facebook.

In comparison, the number of complaints received by the Authority has fallen considerably
since 2000, as shown in Figure 10.2. In 2011, roughly 700 complaints related to mobile
telephony, 350 to mobile, 300 to internet and 80 to other services.
Figure 10.2: Contacts received by Telecom Advisers 2005–2011
Telecom Advisors has a strong role in providing feedback. It publishes the general common
statistics on complaints and their subject matter, and provides providers’ individual statistics
to them (but is not permitted to inform PTS or others of the individual statistics).
Telecom Advisors arranges regular meetings with operators, organisations and
authorities, individually and together, to discuss trends and issues, and to find constructive
solutions to consumer problems that occur on a larger scale. Providers currently find that
Customer Relations is one of their largest costs: there is therefore some interest in improving
performance on both service levels and complaint handling. The Swedish Quality Index
does not rank telecom providers particularly highly (around 67 per cent in 2011), although
they have increased slightly since 2005.37
Telecom Advisors considers that is has achieved a number of useful outcomes in market
practice. One change has been over marketing of broadband speeds, which used to be one of
the most complained about issues (together with complaint handling). Advertised speeds were
maximum speeds, and not only was that not made clear, speeds delivered were often some way
below. After Telecom Advisors raised this issue, providers changed to advertising minimum
speeds, and have found that they are now making money out of providing good levels of
service.
Other changes have been introduction of a code of conduct on information when
new contracts are agreed; agreement on information when number portability
fails; a 30 per cent decrease in consumer debts relating to mobile telephony after
a joint project with The Swedish Enforcement Authority and the operators. PTS has noted
that there has also been a decrease since 2000 in aggressive call centres, especially those of
small new operators trying to win market share. This is attributed partly to the activity of
Telecom Advisors and partly because a problem in modem hijacking reduced.
37
http://www.epsi-uk.org:80.

Sweden 239
There has also been a fall in the number of telecoms cases dealt with by ARN. Providers
have found that since Telecom Advisors became able to handle complaints, they win more
cases in the ARN, because issues are raised earlier with providers through the Telecom
Advisors route, so can be dealt with more promptly, and by the time some consumers
complain, the providers have changed their practices.
The National Board for Consumer Disputes
Structure
The Swedish National Board for Consumer Disputes (Allmänna reklamationsnämnden:

ARN)38 is the body at the apex of the national approach to settlement of consumer-to-
business dispute.39 ARN was established in 1968 as a quasi-adjudicatory body, although the
idea originated in the 1950s. It was originally attached to the Swedish Consumer Agency
but since 1981 has functioned as an independent public authority, financed from the
state budget. Issues over breaches of consumer protection law, such as unfair commercial
practices or advertising rules, are referred to the Consumer Agency. Its legal mandate from
2008 is established in Regulation 2007:1041.40
ARN’s principal task is to settle disputes between consumers and traders or businesses
arising out of goods, services or other utilities provided to the consumer. It also has a
number of other important tasks: to provide opinions on consumer disputes at the request
of courts; to support the municipal consumer counselling service in its handling of disputes
by providing education and information; and to inform consumers and businesses about
the Board’s case-law. The information function has been seen as increasingly important,
and in 2011 the ARN made a number of changes to its website, discussed below. Since the
ARN is a national body established by statute, it can handle a complaint against any trader
in Sweden.41
The Board consists of the Chairman (who is also the administrative head of the agency),
the Vice-Chairman (both of whom are appointed by the government, having been judges),
around 20 Chairmen of the thirteen divisions (who are all qualified judges or senior lawyers,
appointed by the government)42 and more than 200 individual members, the number of
which is determined by the government.43 The members are nominated by the Consumer
Agency (representing consumer interests), and consumer, labour, industry and other
interest organizations specified by the government, but are appointed by the Chairman of
the Board for a limited time.44
38
http://www.arn.se. A small but significant change was made in the ARN’s name in 2011: ‘Complaints’ was
changed to ‘Disputes’.
39
See T Johansson, ‘Alternative dispute resolution in Sweden – The National Board for Consumer Complaints
at a glance’ (ARN, 2009), paper on file with the authors.
40
Förordning (2007:1041) med instruktion för Allmänna reklamationsnämnden.
41
Thus, in contrast to the Netherlands, the trader does not need to be a member of a trade association that has
made an agreement to abide by decisions of a particular ADR body.
42
Instruction, s 11.
43
Typically they have a popular lawyer on board, see Lindblom (n 59).
44
Instruction, ss 31, 32. The Chair therefore has a veto.

Attached to the Board is a Consultative Council, which consists of representatives

of consumers, industry and of local government (municipalities) appointed by the
government. The Council assists the Chairman in decisions on important matters of policy
and direction of the Board’s activity.45 The composition thus serves a balanced participation
of the consumer and the business side.
There is an Administrative Secretariat, and disputes are handled by case officers in the
Legal Secretariat. The Board employs around 35 people, of whom 22 are lawyers, but also
has at its disposal a number of part-time lawyers working on specific disputes and other
members.
ARN has thirteen different departments, as shown in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2. ARN’s Departments
Department Scope
General Goods and services that do not belong to any other department, eg leisure
equipment, sporting goods, timepieces, optics, removal assignments.
Banking Services carried out by banks, financial institutions, brokerages, etc.
Housing Goods and services concerning housing and electricity, eg carpentry,
paintwork, construction or refurbishment of houses, plumbing and
heating.
Boating Leisure craft, sailboats, motorboats, repair services and boating
accessories.
Electronics TV, radio, mobile phones and other electrical domestic appliances and
home electronics.
Estate Agents Estate agents services.
Furniture Furniture.
Insurance Insurance policies, eg rights to compensation or level of compensation.
Motor vehicle New and used cars, motorcycles, tyres, accessories and repairs.
Travel Travel, scheduled and chartered flights, railway, coach or boat services,
package tours, eg delays, cancellations and lost luggage, cabin or cottage
rental etc.
Shoe Shoes and boots.
Textiles Clothes and household textiles.
Cleaning services Services provided by laundries.
The ARN is financed exclusively from public funds provided by the government. Its budget
in 2010 was SEK 28 million (around €3,017,000). There is no fee for submitting a complaint
to the Board, and no charges are allocated to any defendant company. There is no ‘loser
pays’ rule. In Norway and Denmark, the similar organisations are funded by business,
although consumers also pay a small fee in Denmark.
Since ARN handles around 10,000 claims a year, its pro rata cost per case is roughly
€300, that figure needs to be seen in the context of its function in providing a ‘shadow of
ADR’ below which a greater number of disputes are solved through other ADR routes or
negotiated at earlier stages.46
45
Instruction, s 9.
46
Sweden has a population of 9.1 million.

Sweden 241
Procedure
A consumer must first try to solve the issue with the trader bilaterally. The ARN does not
provide advice on individual cases. A complaint at the ARN has to be lodged no later than
six months after the trader has turned down a consumer complaint.47
A claim must normally48 exceed the following value thresholds, applicable to the various
departments:49
• 500 SEK: matters that fall under the Shoe, Textiles (clothes or household textiles) or
General Departments;
• 1000 SEK: matters that fall under the Electronics, Motor Vehicles, Travel, Textiles
(furniture), or Cleaning Service Departments
• 2000 SEK: matters that fall under the Banking, Housing, Boating or Insurance
Departments.
Certain types of disputes are excluded by the Board:
• disputes between private persons or between business operators;
• disputes concerning health care or medical care services: the Medical and Drug
Compensation Schemes handle such matters;
• disputes concerning legal services: complaints must be made to the Bar;
• disputes concerning the purchase of property and houses/flats;
• rental disputes and disputes with tenant-owners’ societies: special courts handle such
matters;
• disputes that have been submitted to court for trial;
• disputes concerning art and antiquities, to the extent that the dispute deals with the
goods’ artistic value or collector value;
• disputes where the business operator has entered bankruptcy.
The Board can also reject matters that cannot sufficiently be investigated or that are
otherwise not appropriate to the Board’s procedure, such as matters that require submission
of verbal evidence, or large or complicated cases that require a comprehensive investigation.
Claims of ‘insignificant value’ cannot be handled.50 It is not possible to obtain an ARN
recommendation if one has already been issued in the same matter.51
The Board normally only deals with contracts concluded in Sweden, so a complaint
against a foreign trader cannot normally be dealt with. It will accept cases where it thinks
that a foreign company will respect it, especially if there is a representative office in Sweden,
or the company is established in a neighbouring Nordic state. If a trader cannot be traced
the Board has to dismiss the case.52
The ARN procedure is purely written. The consumer does not need a representative.
Officially, the Board only accepts petitions and communications in Swedish, but it will
accept English if the trader understands English. The consumer files a written complaint
47
Instruction, s 5.
48
The Board can grant leave for handling the complaint although the redress sought does not exceed the
applicable level if it is of interest in principle or there are special reasons for such a deviation.
49
At 4 February 2012 the exchange rate was 1 SEK: 0.11 EURO.
50
Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (n 1), 2.
51
AH Persson, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European
Union – country report Sweden’ (2008), 10.
52
There is no legal possibility to transfer a case to a district court. Overall the board dismisses many cases.

with the Board, seeking a legal remedy (such as damages, to have a contract rescinded,
repair or replacement of faulty goods, or reduction of the price).
The complaint is allocated to one of the case administrators in the relevant sectoral
department. If the complaint is in due and proper form, the Board will send it to the
defendant, providing him or her with the opportunity to file an answer to the claim. If
the complaint is deemed not to be sufficiently clear, the plaintiff will first be requested to
supplement it, before the complaint is dismissed. The defendant’s answer is communicated
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff will be given the opportunity to provide a reply. In principle,
both sides see all evidence, and can submit comments: most do. From 2011, parties are able
to file cases online using ARN’s website, and to use it to view all subsequent materials: they
are allocated case numbers and passwords. Otherwise the papers are sent by post with a
letter informing a party what to do next. Within a few months of the introduction of this
system, 50 per cent of cases were filed this way. ARN considers this to be is a considerable
innovation, enabling cases to be processed more quickly.
Parties have to prove their statements, producing adequate evidence on burden of proof
rules as used in court: the Board itself does not collect any evidence. The types of evidence
involved are usually limited to simple documents, such as a receipt of purchase or pictures.
If a case can only be decided with external expertise, the party who needs to rely on the
expertise has to produce this, at their own cost, as for court proceedings. This cost can
be refunded at the end by the loser. In some sectors, it can be difficult to identify suitable
experts: lists can be consulted at local Chambers of Commerce, consumer advisers, or
ARN’s website
The merits of a dispute are decided upon at a meeting of the sectoral department, at which
the parties may not be present, nor are witnesses called. A complaint can be adjudicated on
in either of two ways: at a session of the Board, or at the Secretariat (without a session). In
the first situation, the meeting of the Board is chaired either by the President or the Vice-
President or by one of the Chairmen of the Departments, and with four sector representatives
(two from an organization representing consumer interests and two representing a business
organization). All members act impartially. The representatives have the advantage of
bringing sectoral expert knowledge. A quorum is four people, provided one is present from
each side, but any member can call for a full Board to sit on a case. The participation of
representatives nominated by both business and consumer organisations is considered to
increase the legitimacy of the operations of the Board.
A large number of cases are dealt with at every session, which usually lasts three hours.
Each case is presented to the Board by a case administrator of the Secretariat or by an
external legal officer. The Board has at its disposal the documentary evidence (eg contracts,
photographs) presented by the parties and sometimes also exhibits (physical evidence). Any
member of the Board may express a dissenting opinion, but the vast majority of decisions
are unanimous. After the session the legal officer drafts a proposal for a decision and sends
it to the chairperson for approval or amendments. When the chairperson has signed the
decision it is distributed to the parties to the dispute by the Secretariat and becomes public.
Straightforward cases, such as those where precedents exist, or where the defendant has
not presented an answer to the plaintiff ’s complaint, are delegated to the secretariat: about
5,000 of the 10,000 cases are solved by the secretariat. The trader cannot, therefore, block
the proceedings by not providing an answer. Such cases will be tried by the President, or
Vice-President, or another officer of the Board who has been granted such authority.
The Board is not competent to embark actively on mediation or conciliation in an
individual dispute. If a trader has made an offer to the consumer to settle the dispute in an

Sweden 243
amicable way, a local Consumer Adviser would be able to advise. A case administrator at
the ARN would be allowed, if asked, to give an opinion as to whether the consumer should
accept or reject the offer, but the decision would rest with the consumer. The ARN has
rejected a reform proposal for an official mandate to mediate between parties, and also the
introduction of an oral hearing in the preparation phase.
In deciding a case, the Board applies the law, namely legislation, general legal principles,
and legal precedents, such as the Consumer Sale of Goods Act, Consumer Services Act,
Act on Civil Aviation, Maritime Code and Package Tour Act. Where no legislation or
precedent exists, such as with coach services, the Board seeks to follow law in analogous
fields. The Board’s written judgments refer to Supreme Court cases and preparatory works.
The recommendation is generally about a page long, and never longer than 10 pages.
From July 2009, cases that are of significance for the application of the law (such as
complicated or new law, or where there are few precedents), or cases of major interest (such
as involving issues that arise frequently), can be heard by an enlarged Board (3 judge Chairs,
chairman and 4 members). On some occasions, plenary sessions of all members have been
held, to decide extremely important issues of law or to produce uniform application of the
law.
The Board’s decisions are mere recommendations, and thus not legally binding upon
either of the parties. They are in principle not subject to appeal.53 However, under certain
narrowly defined circumstances there is a possibility for the Board to review a decision.54 A
request for reconsideration must be filed within two months from the date of the disputed
decision. A party may resort to the district court. An advantage of the court procedure is
that it can hear witnesses, who might prove favourable to the case.
Cases normally involve straightforward subject-matter. The Board’s recommendations
are limited to issues of contractual liability,55 so the most typical remedy is compensation for
damages for breach of contract.56 However, the Board’s recommendations can include more
flexible instructions on how disputes should be resolved, for example a price reduction (if
the issue related to promised quality, such as if a breach of the travel contract has occurred),57
or conduct remedies (such as an obligation to perform, change or terminate contractual
agreements, or that the business operator shall repair the defect on a product).
Compliance and Publication
ARN publishes an annual report, summarising its activities and giving overall statistics.
It also updates its website every three months, showing general statistics of cases handled
and outcomes, and compliance with decisions. The motor vehicle trade association has
produced two books of compilations of decisions by the ARN, which are widely used.
53
Instruction, s 29.
54
(i) if the party makes it credible that he or she has had valid reasons for not having submitted a statement in
the matter; (ii) if the party refers to evidence and circumstances that have not earlier been referred to, that could
lead to a substantially different outcome and the party proves it probable that this could not have been done earlier;
(iii) the decision is manifestly wrong due to a mistake or omission on the art of the Board. The request for review
shall be made in writing within two months after a decision on a dispute. See Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (n 1).
55
Persson, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union
(2008), 11.
56
‘From the practice of ARN it follows that the Board does not issue decisions on claims for corporal damages
and for ‘non-material’ damages.’
57
Interview with L Nordling, Chair, formerly Director, of the ARN.

There are strong legal requirement over privacy of personal information in Sweden,
and as a result names of companies (and certainly of consumers) are not given. Details
of the more interesting cases are given, with names anonymised. These can be referred to
as precedents by courts, and by consumers and businesses as examples of how to resolve
everyday cases. However, under freedom of information law, the ARN will, if asked, give
out the names of those involved in any individual identified case, and the media frequently
make use of this route, although they rarely themselves publish the company’s name.
ARN’s 2011 IT system records the details of every claim and supporting documents,
status of case, outcome, and whether the business complied. The Authorities can access
ARN’s IT system and therefore extract all ‘market behaviour’ information that they wish.
The rate of compliance by traders with ARN’s decisions was 75 per cent in both 2008 and
2009, and 71 per cent in 2010. The compliance rate varies between sectors: that for package
travel cases being said to be 100 per cent. There is no mechanism for enforceability other
than commencing a separate court action, but many trade associations have undertaken to
follow the Board’s decisions.58 There is high media cover of consumer affairs in Sweden, and
companies contesting the decisions of the Board will in many cases be reported on by the
media. The level of compliance is considered to be high by ARN, and attributed to the fact
that the names of traders who do not comply with the Board’s decision can be published on
a ‘black list’59 in a consumer magazine,60 which is cited widely in the media. Appearing on
such a list is not thought to be good for business, and the perceived high level of compliance
has, in turn, increased consumers’ faith in the ARN system. ARN would like to be allowed
to publish names itself. Attention is being given to highlighting companies that have good
service records, through white lists.
Statistics
National cases
In 2010 it took on average 197 days to conclude cases where the Board held a meeting, and
155 days when settled by the Secretariat. In 2010, 2,119 of the 9,335 cases were dismissed
(23 per cent), 93 per cent of which were dismissed because the parties settled before the
ARN award, and the remaining 7 per cent were withdrawn.61
In general, it is believed that far more consumer law cases are decided at the ARN than in
the courts,62 but it is not possible to verify this from court statistics.
The number of cases received by ARN for the years 2008 to 2011, broken down into
sectoral boards, is shown in Table 10.3.63 The number of cases for some types, such as
banking, estate agents and insurance, are low because many such cases are dealt with in-
house or by sectoral dispute resolution boards.
58
See also PH Lindblom, ‘ADR – The Opiate of the Legal System? Perspectives on Alternative Dispute Resolution
Generally and in Sweden’ (2008) European Review of Private Law 1, 63–93, 81.
59
www.radron.se/Svarta-listan.
60
Rån & Rön. The magazine contacts a trader before publishing its name, and that procedure itself can result in
a trader accepting an ARN recommendation to pay. An example of such ‘naming and shaming’ concerned Ryanair
in 2008, see http://www.thelocal.se/10154/20080228.
61
ARN annual report for 2010.
62
Lindblom, ADR – The Opiate of the Legal System? (2008), 81; confirmed in authors’ interview with P
Hammarskiold.
63
See www.arn.se/Om-oss/Statistik.

Sweden 245
Table 10.3: Cases received by ARN 2008–2011
Division 2008 2009 2010 2011
General 1,072 1,119 988 1,071

Banking, financial services 398 629 480 427
Housing 1,426 2,035 1,345 1,312
Boating 102 89 72 61
Electronics 1,981 1,974 1,565 1,446
Estate agents services 114 96 78 94
Insurance services 779 796 849 793
Motor vehicles 1,657 1,575 1,520 1,702
Furniture 349 361 317 341
Travel 1,507 1,558 1,679 1,668
Footwear 141 124 139 128
Textiles 195 209 183 193
Cleaning services 137 117 120 106
Total 9,858 10,682 9,335 9,342
Thirty-five to forty per cent of ARN’s decisions are in favour of consumers, and 55–60 per
cent in favour of businesses. This rate illustrates the fact that many disputes are dealt with
at earlier stages, before being referred to ARN: the system is designed to make clear to
businesses where they should settle cases, and ARN finds that the majority of the cases that
are referred to it are ones where consumers are wrong to pursue them.
The reasons why ARN rejected cases in 2010, were: incomplete documentation (32 per
cent); exceeded time limitation of 6 months (22 per cent); below minimum value threshold
(19 per cent); lack of competence (13 per cent); and absence of a conflict (10 per cent).
Cross-border cases
The number of cross-border cases handled by ARN between 2006 and 2010 is at Table
10.4. The percentage of cross-border cases is usually under four per cent, but rose in 2010
because of the Icelandic volcanic ash problem.
Table 10.4: Total number of cross-border cases handled by ARN 2006–2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
National Total 8,694 9,096 9,858 10,682 9,335

Complainant from other country 75 88 94 140 176
Trader from other country 183 269 289 285 489
Total cross-border 258 357 383 425 665
Total cross-border in percentage 2.97% 3.92% 3.89% 3.98% 7.12%
The outcome of cross-border decisions in 2008–2010 is at Table 10.5. Significantly more

cases are resolved in favour of consumers in relation to foreign traders (outgoing) than
foreign consumers (incoming).

Table 10.5: Type of decisions in cross-border disputes 2008–2010
Decision 2008 2009 2010
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign

cons trader cons trader cons trader
Dismissed 40 62 40 58 40 48
In favour of consumer 16 102 21 103 70 232
Rejected 24 80 59 62 33 69
Solved without decision 14 38 15 49 23 82
Other 0 7 5 13 10 58
Total: 94 289 140 285 176 489
The compliance rate for cross-border disputes is at Table 10.6: the rate is again higher for
incoming than outgoing cases.
Table 10.6: Compliance rates 2008–2010
Decision 2008 2009 2010
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign

cons trader cons trader cons trader
Follow up 15 100 24 108 58 218
Correction 13 64 21 76 37 94
Compliance in 87% 64% 88% 70% 64% 43%
percentage
Courts
Starting an action in the courts always remains a separate option, but this pathway would
rarely be used in preference to an ADR option.64 Swedish people tend to avoid courts.
There is a clear cost advantage for ADR over the courts. Even though the cost of court fees
for typical consumer cases (small claims) is limited, there is a loser pays risk. In contrast,
the ARN system involves no cost and no cost risk. Instead, the courts might be used after
an ADR procedure where the trader does not follow the recommendation of the ADR
body. The decisions of the numerous private ADR schemes can be confirmed in a court
order.65 It follows from the reliance on in-house and external ADR bodies that the national
expenditure on the ARN, and especially on the court system, is kept low.
The legal system has the normal distinction between public and private law, with the
former being dealt with in administrative courts, and the latter in 48 district courts (tingsrätt)
and appealed to one of six courts of appeal (hovrätt; but labour cases go to Arbetsdomstolen,
which is highly regarded66) and then the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen).67
64
It has not been possible to identify consumer claims from within the general court statistics.
65
Lindblom (n 59), 81.
66
PH Lindblom, ‘National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden’ (2007) at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu.
67
A Layton and H Mercer, European Civil Practice (Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn, 2004).

Sweden 247
The Swedish small claims procedure was not specifically designed for consumer disputes—
unlike the cross-border European Small Claims Procedure. The former applies where the
value of the claim does not exceed SEK 21,400 (c€2,300).68 A simplified procedure for any
small claim under a financial limit was introduced in 1974,69 and revised in 1988.70 It seems
that the procedure has mainly been used by traders to collect their debts from consumers.71
A consumer would have to pay the court fee of €50 to start a small claim.
The loser pays rule applies in courts, in relation to costs that were reasonably incurred,
but not for court costs in small claims.72 Loser pays still applies in small claims to lawyers’
fees but the only recoverable costs are:
(a) one hour of legal counselling (at a fee fixed by the state);
(b) the application fee (SEK 450);
(c) travel expenses for appearance at one court session;
(d) witness testimony; and
(e) translation of documents.
There appear to have been no cross-border cases through the EU Small Claims Procedure,
in or out of Sweden. Konsument Europa surveyed the courts in 2010 to see if they used the
EU Small Claims procedure and found that it was unknown as well as unused.73
Professor Lindblom asserted in 1988 that Sweden did not have a wide tradition of mediation
within or outside of the court.74 A major reason for this may have been limited demand for
mediation within court proceedings because of the widely used ADR system. The Swedish
Code of Procedure now requires the court, if it is not considered inappropriate, considering the
nature of the dispute and other circumstances, to encourage the parties to reach a settlement.75
If the parties agree, the court can instruct them to appear in a mediation session before a
mediator appointed by the court. In practice the courts consult with the parties before issuing
a mediation order. The extent to which judges will order mediation varies.76 The approach
appears to have been widely used for some types of claims,77 but rarely used for consumer
disputes, perhaps because of the general absence of cases in courts that might be suitable for
mediation, given the wide reliance on ADR, and the fact that the mediator has to be paid by
the parties. If an agreement is reached, parties may have it confirmed in court by a judgment.
The current provision on this type of mediation is very soft but it is currently being considered
whether some form of obligatory pre-trial mediation can be feasible.78 Amendments to several
interacting codes concerning ADR came into force August 1, 2011.79
68
This is calculated as half of the base amount according to the National Insurance Act, in 2012 being SEK 42,800.
69
Lag 1974:8 om rättegång i tvistemål om mindre värden.
70
A revision of the Code of Judicial Procedure (Prop. 1986/87:89).
71
PH Lindblom, ‘Procedure’, in S Strömholm (ed), Introduction to Swedish Law (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1988),
105–145, 130; E Hällströmer, Konsumenttvister om mindre värden – en omöjlighet? Uppsala 2004, examensarbete,
available at www.alumn.uu.se/jurist/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=25&Itemid=48.
72
Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken), ch 18, section 8a. English translation available at
www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3926/a/27778.
73
Information from J Girzl: the findings are published in the ECC-Net report about EU Small Claims Procedure,
spring 2012.
74
Lindblom (n 59), 82. An area in which this works is the tenant landlord relationship. Here it is sometimes
mandatory before a trial can be initiated.
75
Ch 42, s 17 para 2.
76
The mediator can act more freely than a judge and take into consideration matters that are not strictly legal.
The mediator is also allowed to express an opinion both as to matters of fact and law.
77
T Johansson, ‘Alternative dispute resolution in Sweden – The National Board for Consumer Complaints at a
glance’ (ARN, 2009), paper on file with the authors.
78
Lindblom (n 59), p 83. This is the case in Finland and Norway.
79
See preparatory works (prop. 2010/11:128).

Further aspects of procedure are summarised by the Swedish government as follows:80

The Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure states that when the court has issued a summons in a civil
case, oral or written preparatory proceedings must take place. One of the aims of the preparatory
proceedings is to clarify whether there are prospects for conciliation. If conciliation is permitted
in the case, the court must endeavour to ensure that the parties are reconciled where appropriate,
having regard to the nature of the case and other circumstances. It is therefore the court which, if
it deems it appropriate, takes the initiative for conciliation talks between the parties. The presiding
judge in the case chairs the conciliation talks. The conciliation procedure is not required to take
any specific form, nor is it mandatory. The parties can therefore declare that they are not interested
in holding conciliation talks without suffering any repercussions. If the conciliation talks do not
lead to a settlement between the parties, the judicial proceedings continue as normal. The judge
who takes part in conciliation must ensure that he or she is impartial throughout the procedure.
Like judicial proceedings in general, the conciliation procedure is free of charge. However, an
application fee must be paid when the case is brought to court (currently around EUR 50).
If, having regard to the nature of the case, it is more appropriate for special mediation to take place,
the court can appoint a special mediator to chair the conciliation talks. The mediator is then not
the judge in charge of the case, but an outsider. The parties are usually consulted before the court
orders mediation. The costs for the specially appointed mediator are borne by the parties.
Parties may choose to refer any dispute to mediation outside the court system. There is a
National Mediation Office, whose mediation work is governed by statute. ‘The National
Mediation Office provides mediators for disputes between employers and employees over
negotiations on wages and general terms of employment or for disputes where a company
refuses to sign a collective agreement with a professional organisation.’81 The National
Mediation Office can also appoint mediators at the request of the parties, or even in the
absence of such a request, for example if one of the parties has given notice of a conflict
and the National Mediation Office82 considers that mediators can bring about a successful
resolution of the dispute. The procedure is free of charge.
The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce provides mediators where both parties agree to
refer disputes. The parties are jointly and severally liable for all costs and, unless otherwise
agreed, bear the mediation costs in equal shares.
The Consumer Agency
The Swedish Consumer Agency83 is a state agency whose task is to safeguard consumer
interests, including safety of goods and services, company advertising and contract
conditions, domestic finances and consumer-related disabled and environmental issues. Its
consumer policy objectives are determined by the government and Parliament. It has a staff
of about 120 people. The Agency trains the municipalities’ consumer advisers as well as
budget and debt advisers.
The Consumer Agency is headed by a Director General who is also Consumer
Ombudsman (Konsumentombudsmannen, KO). The reason why there are two functions
80
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_swe_en.htm.
81
ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_swe_en.htm.
82
www.medlingsinstitutet.se.
83
www.konsumentverket.se/otherlanguages/English/About-the-Swedish-Consumer-Agency.

Sweden 249
and titles is historical: the KO used to be separate from the Consumer Agency, and the
functions were joined in 1976. The KO’s core function is to represent consumer interests in
relations with businesses and represent consumers in individual cases and marketing issues.
The KO can take a case to the ARN, the civil courts, or the Market Court. When the KO
threatens to start a case, the company usually quickly settles it, in order to avoid attracting
adverse publicity. The KO has also been given the ‘group action’ power, discussed below.
Since 2007, the KO can participate in a court case commenced by an individual
consumer,84 although it only does so in two or three cases a year where general consumer
issues are raised. It does not answer individual questions or intervene in individual disputes,
but refers consumers to advisers in the local municipalities’ Advice Centres. However, the
ECC unit, Konsument Europa, co-located with the Consumer Agency, does actively involve
itself in seeking solutions to individual cases in cross-border disputes.
Group Claims
Nordic states have a distinctive model for handling mass individual cases, with some
variations between the Nordic states themselves. In Sweden, the Group Proceedings Act
of 200285 provides that Group proceedings can be instituted by (i) an individual member
of the group, which can be a natural person or a legal entity (a private group action), (ii)
an association of consumers or wage-earners (an organizational group action) and (iii) a
designated public authority (a public group action).86 For consumer disputes the Government
has designated the KO as the appropriate public authority. The KO may institute a group
action either in court or in the ARN.87 A consumer or wage-earner organization may also
bring a group case in the ARN.
According to an inquiry by the Government,88 10 private group actions were commenced
up to October 2007, but in reality the figure is much higher (probably 40-50 cases), since
most cases have either been settled or withdrawn before coming to court.89 There are clear
reasons for consumers to avoid instituting private group actions and instead to rely on a
public group action brought by the KO, notably costs, user-friendliness, and ability to rely
on inherent powers of status and enforcement. Starting a group case in a normal court
is unattractive, since the procedure requires all consumers to opt-in, and that becomes a
slow, cumbersome and costly process. One court class action has been brought involving
84
SF 2006: 1021. Before 2007, this was piloted for financial services cases, and extended in 2007 for all consumer
cases.
85
Lag (2002: 599) om grupprättegång, GrL.
86
Before a special form of out-of-court group action before the ARN was introduced to Swedish law: Förordning
(1997:9) om försöksverksamhet med grupptalan vid Allmänna reklamationsnämnden.
87
A recent example is KO vs Kraftkommision. The energy distribution company Kraftkommission (now
Stävrullen Finans AB) had agreed to distribute electricity to their customers at a fixed price. When the company
later cancelled the distribution, the customers where referred to another distributor that demanded a higher price
for the distribution. The consumers (and KO) claimed that Kraftkommission was obligated to remunerate the
consumers for the added cost. On 4 November 2011, the court of appeal ruled in favour of KO and the 2,300
energy consumers (Hovrätten för Övre Norrland (T 154-10)). The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court.
88
DS 2008:74. Some are described at PH Lindblom, ‘National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden’ (2007) and
PH Lindblom, ‘Global Class Action – National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden, update paper’ (2008), both at
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu.
89
Information from P Hammarskiold.

an energy company, and the appeals have taken seven years. There have as yet been no
group proceedings initiated by consumer or wage-earners’ organizations,90 perhaps because
consumer associations do not play a strong role in Sweden.91
In contrast, a two-stage process applies where the KO brings a case in the ARN, thereby
avoiding the requirements for giving notice and opt-in procedure that apply for a group
action in court. In the first stage, the KO can seek a generic92 decision on breach of consumer
law,93 and individual consumers can subsequently bring individual claims based on that
generic decision. In practice, it may not be necessary for individual consumers to launch
formal claims after such a generic decision, since they may be able to opt-in informally.94
It is open to the Board to recommend, although this is a spontaneous option not stated
formally under a power in the law, that a trader should compensate all consumers who are
in a similar situation and who have not complained to the board personally.95 Problems
may, of course, arise in cases where consumers are unknown to the trader.
Where the ARN has received several private individual complaints against the same
business operator, it may ask the KO if he wants to bring a group action so that a group of
consumers can be covered by a single decision. It is reported that the availability to settle
rises ‘dramatically’ after the KO becomes involved.96
Cross-border Claims
The Swedish European Consumer Centre (Konsument Europa: ECC-SE),97 the Swedish
member of the ECC-Net, is a unit within the Swedish Consumer Agency, co-financed
equally by the Agency and the European Commission. There was a significant 39 per cent
rise in complaints in 2010 due to the Icelandic volcanic ash issue.
The ECC-SE office firstly seeks to put a consumer in touch with the trader’s office to
discuss a complaint directly. If that does not resolve the issue, ECC-SE will share the case
with the ECC office where the trader is situated and the latter will contact the trader to try
to resolve the issues as an intermediary. ECC-SE has good contacts with many Swedish
companies, which facilitates case handling, and has access to the ARN database. This
informal mediation approach often assists in resolving problems. It has found that having
the EU internet claims form and facilities has greatly facilitated resolution of issues.
90
PH Lindblom, ’Group Litigation in Scandinavia,’ ERA Forum 10 (2009) 7–35, p 26.
91
ibid.
92
This does not involve an opt-in or opt-out procedure, since a generic issue of breach of law is decided, which
has a generic effect, similar to opt-out. An advantage of the ARN may be that the ARN will have greater flexibility
and acceptance in its standardized calculations of damages. However, a potential disadvantage is that a trader is
not bound by the ARN’s decision. See the Kraftkommission case discussed at PH Lindblom, ‘Global Class Action –
National report: Group Litigation in Sweden, update paper’ (2008), p 11, at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu.
93
The KO had brought 19 such group claims in the ARN up to the end of 2010.
94
An example of a case brought by the KO was where the ARN awarded a reduction in price to all passengers
on a summer bus trip to Spain, where the bus company had promised modern buses but the air conditioning was
defective. See http://www.konsumentverket.se/mallar/en/artikel.asp?lngCategoryId=665.
95
K Viitanen, ‘Enforcement of consumers’ collective interests by regulatory agencies in the Nordic countries’, in
WH Van Boom and M Loos (eds), Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law Securing Compliance in Europe through
Private Group Action and Public Authority Intervention, (Groningen: European Law Publishing, 2007), 83–103, 98.
96
Persson (n 52), 11.
97
www.konsumenteuropa.se.

Sweden 251
ECC case handlers are themselves members of ARN’s boards, unless they have a conflict
in an individual case. Twenty per cent of contacts received by ECC-SE are national, so
are referred to the local Consumer Advisers and then, if not successful, to the ARN or a
relevant ADR scheme (including the UNCITRAL ODR pilot scheme). This shows the high
profile of ECC-SE within Sweden. It finds that in order to deal successfully with claims
against foreign companies, it is necessary to have experienced case handlers, and to be
quick in responding. The sense of community amongst the leading national ECC-Net
offices is notably strong and collaborative. A response by a public authority is frequently
best, in case the trader disappears quickly.
Evaluation
Sweden could be described as an ADR state. The ADR system has worked well for some
decades, and is far more preferred and used by consumers than the courts, which are kept
as a long-stop for enforcing the few ADR decisions that are not observed by businesses. The
use of ADR for consumer disputes is culturally entrenched, and operates within a stable
structure.
The architecture of the system is in one sense simple, in that there is at the apex of the
system a single national ADR body that acts as a generic ADR body for any kind of dispute.
The ARN has competence to try a wide range of disputes and thus operates as a ‘one stop
shop’, although most personal injury cases are dealt with separately. This comprehensive
coverage is a clear advantage, as is the fact that the ARN is funded fully by the state, and
imposes no cost or cost risk on either consumers or business.
The architecture is in another sense more complex and less transparent, since an
unregulated number of private ADR bodies may exist in individual sectors. However,
such ADR bodies operate to high standards, and have an incentive to do so because of
the existence of the ARN as a residual competitor and the Swedish culture of resolving
problems without resort to the courts.
The availability of preliminary advice steps, with ADR and/or the ARN being available as
a last step, produces the effect that most disputes are solved at the preliminary stages, which
reduces the case load on ARN itself, and makes reliance on the courts particularly low,
thereby minimising public expenditure on the court system. Although the ARN is funded
by the state, the various private ADR bodies are funded by business sectors.
The fact that such emphasis is placed on the availability of expert and user-friendly
advice for consumers is a distinctive feature. This is intended to reduce the number of
problems that occur, as well as resolve those that do occur swiftly. The Advice Centres and
sectoral Bureaux seem particularly effective in achieving these aims. Not all sectors publish
complaint figures, but the general impression is that the number of consumer disputes that
occur may be comparatively low, and that they are resolved quickly. Such a situation has
obvious advantages in relation to cost-effectiveness of expenditure.
ADR in general, and the ARN in particular, is evaluated within Sweden in a very positive
way, particularly because of its low-cost procedure combined with a high rate of compliance.
An advantage of the ARN structure is that centralization in one single public body can
attract a lot of attention. Competences are accumulated and ‘transparency and uniformity
of the decisions of the Board’ is said to be ensured. The consumer can complain without

a representative at the ARN and cases are dealt with quickly. This guarantees low costs for
the consumer.
The ADR bodies function like a court and, when viewed from the perspective of some
ADR systems in other Member States that were established more recently, may appear
slightly old-fashioned and formal. The real problem is the duration of ADR processes,
which is constrained by the architecture and procedure, such as relying on decision-making
at meetings of panels of three or more people. Although the typical durations of 5 to 6
months are relatively short, some ombudsmen in other countries can now function more
quickly. The ARN does not include a mediation function, and the boards make decisions in
accordance with legal rules and procedures. Coverage might be wider if it had the possibility
of collecting evidence. The board can only be activated if the trader is located in Sweden and
if its location is known.
All decisions of the ADR bodies are non-binding recommendations. However, the
maintenance of a right by either party to go on to court mitigates to some extent concerns
over the lack of enforceability of decisions. ARN is proud of its 75 per cent compliance
rate by companies, which should be viewed against the fact that many decisions are settled
before they get to the ARN. However, that compliance rate is lower than the rate achieved
by the (not fully comprehensive) Netherlands system, although figures for particular sectors
in Sweden are virtually 100 per cent. The system might be tightened if the ARN’s decisions
were binding, or if there was a fast-track enforcement procedure in court, or the public
regulatory authorities could be given some oversight enforcement function.
Advice Centres, Bureaux, Ombudsmen, Boards and the ARN in Sweden exist not only as
an alternative to courts in the administration of justice, but as the main pathway.98 Indeed,
the courts play a very limited long-stop role in C2B disputes, even to the extent that their
procedures need not be designed for such cases. However, the relationship between the ARN
and the courts has evolved towards some cooperative integration, rather than competition.
The ARN and several Bureaux and Boards are asked by courts to give an advisory opinion
in consumer disputes at the request of a court of law. This recognises the ADR bodies’ deep
and disinterested expertise.
It is unlikely that the courts could manage all the disputes that arise if the Boards did not
exist. The culture of using Boards may be a factor in explaining why mediation has been
slow to be used for consumer disputes at least, whether in courts in Sweden or in the ARN
system, the latter having so far rejected introduction of a mediation role in every case.
Some of the ADR systems provide effective feedback on behavior and standards in
the market and on individual companies. Having feedback has proved to be particularly
effective in some sectors, a notable example being telecoms. Some improvements could,
however, be made in the feedback loop and in transparency of such information.
98
B Lindell, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Administration of Justice – Basic Principles,’ (2007)
Scandinavian Studies in Law 51, 311, 340.

11
The United Kingdom
Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Christopher Hodges and Iris Benöhr
Introduction
Consumer ADR is highly developed in the UK, operating on a sectoral basis without
unification or a single model, but with a number of different models. The crucial national
issues are the variability in the visibility of sectoral ADR systems, and some gaps in sectoral
coverage.
Ombudsmen have spread from sector to sector since the 1960s, often being designed
as an integral part of a new regulatory structure, operating alongside public regulators of
privatised or opened markets. In some sectors, an ombudsman operates under a statutory
mandate: decisions by the Financial Ombudsman Service, the Pensions Ombudsman, and
the Legal Services Ombudsman bind all traders operating in the sector. The services are
usually paid by levies on traders.
The UK also has a strong national policy and culture of self-regulation, complementing a
robust cadre of public regulatory authorities, which has provided a platform for a separate
universe of consumer ADR to grow since the 1990s. That universe comprises private sector
ombudsmen services, overseen by public authorities, with a high level of transparency both
of the performance of the ombudsman and of regulated businesses. In some sectors there
is a statutory obligation for traders in a sector to belong to a private ADR scheme, without
specifying which scheme. Other sectors have voluntary ADR systems, with some Code-
based systems qualifying for official approval. Under some Code schemes, trade associations
have provided effective conciliation services, coupled with outsourced arbitration where
relevant (sometimes fees are charged).
The public sectoral regulators usually oversee both public and private ADR systems,
providing both scrutiny of the operation of the ADR provider and also using the published
outcomes of ADR decisions as a means of regulatory control over the sector and individual
operators. Several ADR providers and/or regulators publish complaints data on complaints
that they receive: the combination of data received by regulators and by ADR providers can
be powerful information for the market (consumers and competitors) and provide pressure
to raise standards.
Courts have been expensive for all claims for many years, and legal aid, which was once
extensive, has been drastically cut. Since 1999, ADR, in the shape of mediation, has been
systemically integrated into civil procedure, where it has had a profound effect on claims
brought in courts. Mediation has also spread widely into specialist types of claims, from
disputes by citizens against government to family and employment disputes. Introducing
informality and mediation into the Small Claims procedure has had some success but has
been outperformed by Consumer ADR systems.

Courts and Mediation
It has been widely understood for many years that the English and Welsh common law
system of courts and lawyers paid primarily on hourly rates has led to costs that are often
disproportionate in low value cases, and hence individuals cannot afford to bring or defend
such claims.1 Compared with a European civil law civil procedure system, the primary
causes2 of such high costs in England and Wales are the need for parties to fund their lawyers
on the basis of hourly rate for work done, the rules on pleading of cases, the requirements
for parties to produce wide documentary and expert evidence, the unpredictability of work
done by either side and the amount of time that the court will take, and the absence until
recently of any ability to control costs on the basis of proportionality to the sum in dispute.
Since the 1950s, the solution to these problems that the state put in place in order to
maintain access to justice for citizens was state funding of legal services through the legal
aid scheme. However, the continuing inability to address rising costs on the side of supply
of legal services, and the fact that the decisions on grant of legal aid were made by lawyers (a
classic problem of capture by suppliers), meant that successive governments restricted the
availability of the supply of legal aid, and it has long since not been possible for individuals
rationally to be able to fund consumer claims. From 1995 to 2010, a private regulated
mechanism was permitted for funding of litigation by lawyers, who were incentivised by
the availability of success fees (Conditional Fee Agreements: CFAs) and the clients’ risk
of liability for adverse costs if the case was lost was able to be covered by after-the-event
insurance. However, various problems arose with the CFA system, such as distortions of
balance between claimants and defendants, and excessive cost in the system, and it was
not successful for some types of small claim. Although legal expenses insurance grew
significantly since the 1970s, many people did not realise that they had such cover. Instead,
two mechanisms were encouraged to overcome this access to justice gap: the small claims
procedure and the introduction of mediation.
One response to the growing costs problem was a simplified ‘small claims arbitration’,
introduced in the county courts as long ago as 1973 for claims of up to £100. The 1999 Civil
Procedure Rules replaced the small claims arbitration system by introducing a new Small
Claims Track, involving mediation, which applies to most straightforward claims with a
financial value of up to £5,000, or £1,000 for personal injury claims and claims by tenants
against their landlords in relation to disrepair of a property.
The fees for commencing claims are based on a tariff depending on the amount claimed.3
For example, the fee for an amount up to £300 is £30, and over £500 but not over £1,000 is
£65. Cost shifting applies for cases allocated to the multi-track and fast track, but for the
small claims track only in respect of court fees and disbursements, not lawyers’ fees.
The number of civil cases in county courts has fallen significantly since 2006, in 2010
standing at 1,617,000 non-family cases, typically relating to debt, repossession of property,
personal injury and insolvency, of which 79,925 were allocated to the small claims track.4 Of
1
See J Peysner, ‘England and Wales’ in C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding
of Civil Litigation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010).
2
Sixteen causes of high costs were listed at R Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London,
The Stationery Office , 2010), ch 4, para 3.1.
3
hmctscourtfinder.justice.gov.uk/courtfinder/forms/ex50_e.pdf.
4
Annual Judicial Statistics http://www.justice.gov.uk/.

The United Kingdom 255
those, many seem to be settled or undefended, since only 291,000 defences were filed, with
only 42,786 small claims hearings and 17,517 trials of fast and multi-track cases. On average,
small claims hearings occurred 31 weeks after the claim was lodged, and trials at 50 weeks.
By the mid-1990s, high, unpredictable and disproportionate costs for both low and high
value litigation, had led to a costs crisis5 and resulted in the fundamental reform of the
civil procedure system,6 along lines devised by Lord Woolf.7 The new procedure included
mediation as a fundamentally important goal of civil procedure. Pre-action contact
between parties was strongly encouraged by pre-action protocols, which should result in
negotiations and settlement in many instances,8 and the entire focus of civil procedure was
shifted from adversarial trial towards facilitating settlement, encouraging ‘the use of ADR at
case management conferences and pre-trial reviews’.9 Mediation was not made compulsory,
but was strongly encouraged, ultimately by introducing a power for the court to impose cost
sanctions on parties who had not made reasonable attempts to resolve issues, before and
during the process.10
Mediation fever spread through the legal and judicial professions: pilot mediation
schemes were trialled in different courts and for different types of claims,11 such as small
claims, county courts, and higher specialist courts. In 2003, the Civil Mediation Council
was established by institutions, mediators and the government to encourage use of
mediation in civil cases and to address issues of standards. In 2005, that Council introduced
an accreditation scheme for mediation organisations. Also in 2005 a National Mediation
Helpline was established to provide a central resource of mediators available on a rota
system. Since 2007, dedicated mediation advisers have been embedded in most county
courts to handle small claims cases.12 However, it appears that many of the calls to the
National Mediation Helpline (around 10,500 by 2009) were requests for advice, and few
ended as mediations (under 5 per cent around 2008), and that court referrals to mediation
do not show any evidence of a steady increase in the use of mediation since 1999.13
The Woolf Reforms led to a clear overall reduction in the average time from the issue of
proceedings to trial in the Queen’s Bench Division of the English High Court.14 Parties were
5
A Zuckerman, Civil Justice in Crisis: Comparative Perspectives of Civil Procedure (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1999).
6
Civil Procedure Rules 1999.
7
See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report (London, HMSO, 1995); Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim
Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales: Final Report (London, HMSO,
2006).
8
Practice Direction—Protocols (London, HM Court Service, 2008).
9
Lord Woolf, Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales, (London,
HMSO, 1996).
10
CPR, r 44.5(3).
11
See H Genn, Central London County Court Mediation Scheme: Evaluation Report (London, Lord Chancellor’s
Department, 1998); H Genn, Twisting Arms: Court Referred and Court Linked Mediation under Judicial Pressure
(London, Ministry of Justice, 2007); S Prince and S Belcher, An Evaluation of Guildford County Courts (London,
Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006); L Webley, P Abrams and S Bacquet, Evaluation of the Birmingham
Court-Based Civil (Non-Family) Mediation Scheme (London, Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006).
12
Based on a comparison of three approaches in different courts, the winning scheme being reported in M
Doyle, Evaluation of the Small Claims Mediation Service at Manchester County Court (London, Department for
Constitutional Affairs, 2006).
13
See S Prince, ‘ADR after the CPR: Have ADR Initiatives now assured mediation and integral role in the
Civil Justice System in England and Wales?’ in D Dwyer, The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2009).
14
In 1999, the average time to trial was 174 weeks, and it had dropped to 97 weeks in 2004: Judicial Statistics,
Ministry of Justice, 1999 to 2004.

better prepared before commencing litigation, and possibly therefore able to settle cases
more quickly, but at the expense of ‘front-loaded’ preparatory cost. By 2009, the perception
that cases remained too expensive again reached crisis point,15 and prompted a further
fundamental Costs Review by Lord Justice Jackson.16
Added impetus came from the negotiations leading up to the 2008 EU Mediation
Directive,17 although in England and Wales implementation of the Directive in 2011 had
limited impact, because mediation was by then so well established within the court system.
In January 2010, Lord Justice Jackson’s extensive Review of Civil Litigation Costs concluded
that ADR is ‘under-used, its potential benefits are not as widely known as they should be’
and recommended the promotion and embedment of a better understanding of mediation
in civil procedure by introducing a programme to educate litigants. Jackson’s review only
considered the role of the courts as a pathway for dispute resolution, and was a wasted
opportunity in that it almost completely18 omitted any consideration of the considerable
landscape of ombudsmen that had arisen for both public and private claims. He considered
that the prescription for restoring access to justice lay in ensuring an adequate supply of
privatised funding for lawyers and the introduction of more extensive controls by courts
on costs, so as to ensure proportionality. On the funding side, he favoured the extension
of contingency fees (‘damages-based agreements’) and third party funding, in place of the
unsuccessful CFA experiment. He stated that the goal was that all lower value cases would
be subject to fixed costs,19 but this would take time to introduce. As a first step, all costs for
personal injuries claims in the fast track should be fixed, and there should be an upper limit
of £12,000 (12.5 per cent higher for London) on pre-trial costs for any non-personal injury
fast track case.20 Many of the Jackson reforms have been implemented in the Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and others in Court rules. Among the
proposals is that the small claims limit be raised to £15,000, and all small claims should be
referred to mediation.21
Experience was noted from the United States of America, where the 1990 Civil Justice
Reform Act required every district court to introduce local rules requiring the litigants in
all civil cases, unless exempted by local rules,22 to consider the use of ADR at an appropriate
stage.23 Local rules making mediation mandatory for certain types of claim have been
introduced in various States, including California, Florida, Texas, Oregon and New York.24
15
Jackson’s Final Report referred to a survey of 128 cases dealt with by district judges, in which the total costs
paid to claimants were on average 203 per cent of the damages paid in CFA cases, but on average 55 per cent in
non-CFA cases. Other surveys produced similar differentials, the evidence overall showing that claimant costs
ranged between 158 and 203 percent in CFA cases and between 47 and 55 per cent in non-CFA cases. The implicit
conclusion was clearly that the disparity between the two types was unacceptably large.
16
R Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report (London, The Stationery Office, 2009); R
Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London, The Stationery Office, 2010), at. See C Hodges,
‘England and Wales: Summary of the Jackson Costs Review’ in C Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka (eds), The
Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).
17
Council Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [2008] OJ L136/3
18
The exception was a suggestion that housing disrepair claims might be better dealt with under an ombudsman
system: Jackson, Final Report, ch 15, para 6.17.
19
This did not say so, but the idea was copied from the German system.
20
Jackson, Final Report (2009), ch 15.
21
Solving disputes in the county courts: creating a simpler, quicker and more proportionate system, Consultation
Paper CP6/2011(London, Ministry of Justice, 2011), www.justice.gov.uk/docs/solving-disputes-county-courts.
pdf.
22
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 1998, s 652(b).
23
ibid, s 651(a).
24
JR Coben, SR Cole, CA McEwen, N Hardin Rogers, PN Thompson, Mediation: Law, Policy and Practice,
(Westlaw, 2010).

Despite the advantages of the small claims procedure, and some degree of use,
the statistics do not appear to show it to have been a notable success as a solution to
consumer claims. Simply adopting a mediation technique within a court setting was
never going to be a structural solution to claims of modest value. Instead, consumer
ombudsmen have appeared during the 2000s, spreading from sector to sector, to
the extent that ombudsmen and code-based ADR schemes have now increasingly—
and silently, without many people noticing—provided a solution to large numbers
of consumer-to-business disputes that had otherwise fallen out of the court system,
or any other pathway. Court small claims timescales of 31 weeks have been undercut
by ombudsmens’ and private ADR providers’ faster performance, and perhaps more
importantly by the latters’ high user-friendliness.
The Wide Culture of ADR
A policy of encouraging the resolution of disputes outside the courts can be identified in
many situations and sectors, but has emerged in an uncoordinated fashion. First, many types
of disputes are handled by 50 public sector tribunals rather than in the courts. Administrative
tribunals have been reconstructed into a highly judicialised system by the Tribunals Courts
and Enforcement Act 2007. Around 75 per cent of claims made to employment tribunals
are resolved without a hearing, many through the involvement of ACAS.25 Use of mediation
has been promoted for employment disputes,26 and the government proposed in 2011 to
promote the wide use of early dispute resolution, requiring all potential employment claims
to be lodged with ACAS, which would offer parties a voluntary conciliation service, before
being lodged with an employment tribunal.27
Secondly, public sector ombudsmen (notably The Parliamentary and Health Service
Ombudsman,28 and The Local Government Ombudsman29) handle complaints of
maladministration brought by individuals against public authorities.30 This pathway has
various advantages compared with judicial review.31 Strong government encouragement for
resolution of disputes between citizens and public sector bodies by extending the use of
25
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. See Success at Work. Resolving disputes in the workplace. A
Consultation ( London, DTI, 2007), www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=1461.
26
M Gibbons, Better Dispute resolution. A review of employment dispute resolution in Great Britain (London,
DTI, 2007).
27
The government also proposed to extend mediation, and introduce a non-judicial paper-only determination
of low value straightforward employment claims, akin to an ombudsman function. Resolving Workplace Disputes:
Government response to consultation (London, Department for Business Innovation & Skills, HM Courts &
Tribunals Service, 2011). Employment claims are usually heard in an employment tribunal rather than a court.
28
The Parliamentary Ombudsman for Administration (Parliamentary Ombudsman) was first appointed under
the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. During the next ten years other public sector ombudsmen were
appointed, so that by the end of the 1970s there were parliamentary, health and local government ombudsmen
services in each country of the British Isles. The Health Service Commissioner was created under the Health
Service Commissioners Act 1993.
29
Established under the Local Government Act 1974.
30
See T Buck, R Kirkham and B Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (London,
Ashgate, 2010).
31
Judges are restricted to identifying unlawful procedures, whereas Ombudsmen, committees, and auditors can
recommend better procedures: T Endicott, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2009). See also M Adler
(ed), Administrative Justice in Context (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).

public sector ombudsmen and other ADR routes has been stated since 2010.32 Some public
sector bodies use private sector ADR providers, such as Ofsted,33 the Charity Commission,
the Tenant Services Authority,34 the Land Registry, the Audit Commission and the Youth
Justice Agency (Northern Ireland).35
Thirdly, there are many private sector ombudsmen. The first such scheme, the Insurance
Ombudsman Bureau, was established in 1981 and was followed by many others, especially
in financial services.36 In 2001 a number of voluntary and statute-backed schemes (banking,
building societies, insurance and investment) were brought together to form a statutory
Financial Ombudsman Service (see below).
Realisation that discussion rather than adversarialism was far more appropriate for
assisting people who found themselves in disputes about family or child matters has led to
mediation being increasingly used in such areas.37
All social housing providers are required by law to belong to the Housing Ombudsman
Service (HOS), which decides complaints after landlords’ internal complaint procedures
and is free to tenants.38 This is mandatory for all providers registered with the Tenant
Services Authority, such as landlords, managing agents, and developers, and also non-social
housing providers that have joined it voluntarily. The Ombudsman’s decision is based on
what is ‘fair in all the circumstances of the case’, may order the landlord to do something to
put things right, to pay compensation or take a particular action. The HOS remit does not
include local authority housing: council tenants must complain to the Local Government
Ombudsman.
Models of Consumer Adr
In May 2010 the OFT published a summary guide to consumer dispute resolution
systems,39 which identified 95 discrete schemes across 35 sectors.40 More schemes related
to consumer services than goods (87 to 17), and more than half of the schemes offered
conciliation/mediation, many as a first stage of a two or three stage process. Just under half
32
Common Sense, Common Safety. A report by Lord Young of Graffham to the Prime Minister following a
Whitehall‑wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of the compensation culture, (London,
HM Government, 2010), available at www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/402906_CommonSense_acc.
pdf; Open Public Services. White Paper (London, HM Government, July 2011) www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/
default/files/resources/open-public-services-white-paper.pdf; Public Services Ombudsmen Law Commission No
329 July 2011 www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/lc329_ombudsmen.pdf.
33
Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills, see www.ofsted.gov.uk.
34
Complaints about how these three agencies themselves handled complaints may be referred to CEDR Solve,
for which see below.
35
Complaints about the latter three agencies may be made to an Independent Complaints Reviewer, Jodie Berg.
36
See A Samuel, ‘Consumer Financial Services in Britain: New Approaches to Dispute Resolution and
Avoidance’ (2002) European Business Organization Law Review 3, 649–694.
37
Since the Family Law Act 1996.
38
Established under the Housing Act 1996, amended by the Housing & Regeneration Act 2008.
39
Mapping UK consumer redress. A summary guide to dispute resolution systems, (London, Office of Fair Trading,
2010), OFT, available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/general_policy/OFT1267.pdf.
40
The sectors where consumer ADR does not currently exist were identified by the OFT as food and drink;
DIY materials/cleaning products; clothing and footwear; toiletries and beauty services; jewellery, silverware and
clocks; tobacco; nursery goods; sports and hobby equipment; toys and games; CDs, DVDs and computer games;
and photography: Office of Fair Trading Mapping UK consumer redress (2010).

provided arbitration as an option. The distribution is shown in Table 11.1. There has been
considerable change since a 2004 study found that coverage of consumer ADR was limited
and ad hoc, although the continued absence of a coherent national structure means that the
position ‘depends either on the type of problem faced or where the problem arises’.41
Table 11.1: Summary typology of Consumer ADR Schemes in UK
Consumer Services Goods and Total

Goods Services
Adjudication 1 16 2 19
Arbitration 3 35 5 43
Conciliation/Mediation 5 41 7 53
Ombudsmen 0 14 1 15
Unspecified 1 3 0 4
Total 10 109 15 134
Individual ADR systems are often overseen by sectoral regulators. Some of the major sectors,
regulatory authorities, and providers of consumer ADR services are shown in Table 11.2.
Table 11.2: Major sectors, regulatory authorities and consumer ADR providers
Sector Regulatory AuthoritySectoral Consumer ADR

Providers
Financial services Financial Services Authority Financial Ombudsman Service
(FSA): this is likely to be and Finance and Leasing
replaced by two new regulators: Association Code Scheme
the Prudential Regulatory
Authority and the Financial
Conduct Authority42
Pensions The Pensions Regulator Pensions Ombudsman
Communications OFCOM43 Ombudsman Services:
Communications,44 and CISAS45
Postal services OFCOM POSTRS46
Electricity and gas OFGEM47 Ombudsman Services: Energy48
Safety and economic issues for ORR49 none50
railways
Water and sewerage OFWAT51 The Consumer Council for
Water52
Higher education none Private bodies,53 and Office of
the Independent Adjudicator54
General consumer trading OFT (proposed CMA, see text) Many private sector schemes55
Legal services Legal Services Board Legal Ombudsman
41
Seeking resolution: the availability and usage of consumer to business alternative dispute resolution in the United
Kingdom (London, Department for Trade and Industry and National Consumer Council, 2004).
42
A new approach to financial regulation: the blueprint for reform (London, HM Treasury, 2011) www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_finreg__new_approach_blueprint.pdf; The Financial Conduct Authority: Approach to
Regulation (Financial Services Authority, June 2011) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/events/fca_approach.pdf.
See also Independent Commission on Banking: Final Report Recommendations (London, Independent Commission
on Banking, September 2011), available at bankingcommission.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/
ICB-Final-Report.pdf, and The Government response to the Independent Commission on Banking, Cm 8252
(London, HM Treasury, 2011), available at cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/govt_response_to_icb_191211.pdf.

It will be seen that various different models exist. In financial services and pensions services
there are statutory ombudsmen, but this does not exclude the existence of some private
ADR bodies. The Legal Ombudsman is a service established by a statutory body, although
its architecture is not specified in legislation. In communications, postal services and
energy, private ADR schemes are approved by the sectoral regulators: in communications
there are two competing schemes, but there is only a single approved scheme in the other
two sectors. In water and sewerage the complaint body, which may unusually mount an
investigation, is a non-departmental public body that is primarily responsible for consumer
representation: that arrangement may soon be reformed. ADR is set to expand for various
types of disputes within higher education.56 In the general consumer trading sector, not
covered by any specific sectoral arrangements, many private ADR schemes exist, some of
which have been officially certified. In the 2011 consultation, the government proposed
that redress schemes could be set up by business for consumers in the water, rail, coach, bus
and tram sectors to mirror those in the energy and postal services sectors, if the relevant
Departments and Devolved Administrations57 so decide.58
43
See www.ofcom.org.uk. Ofcom was created in 2004 by merging five authorities: The Broadcasting Standards
Commission, the Radio Communications Agency (covering spectrum management), the Independent Television
Commission, Oftel (telecoms regulation) and the Radio Authority. On 1 October 2011, responsibility for the
regulation of the UK’s postal services moved from Postcomm to Ofcom: see stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/post.
Complaints about Ofcom may be made to its internal independent adjudicator.
44
See section below.
45
Provided by CEDR Disputes Group: see below.
46
Provided by CEDR Disputes Group: see below.
47
See www.ofgem.gov.uk.
48
See below.
49
Office of Rail Regulation, see www.rail-reg.gov.uk.
50
Complaints should be made to individual train companies, and assistance can be given by Consumer Focus
or other bodies. See A short guide to how rail passenger complaints are handled in the rail industry (ORR) www.
rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/doc/comp-rlpasscmplnt_hndlng.DOC. However, the 2011 White Paper signified that an
ADR scheme is likely to be introduced.
51
The Water Services Regulation Authority, see www.ofwat.gov.uk.
52
See www.ccwater.org.uk. The Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) is a statutory organisation
representing consumers in water and sewerage, whose functions include handling and investigating complaints,
established in 2005 under the Water Act 2003, replacing earlier WaterVoice committees. Providers are required
to have a complaints procedure, which must be approved by Ofwat: Water Industry Act 1991 (as amended) ss
86A(1) and 116A(1). If providers do not resolve complaints themselves, CCWater has a duty to investigate. Many
issues are resolved by companies themselves, and after CCWater’s intervention. Where a service failure remains
unresolved, or if it considers the company should do more, CCWater undertakes a formal investigation. In 2009/20
companies received nearly 200,000 written complaints from customers, of which 15,389 were referred to CCWater
and CCWater received separately 22,802 enquiries including 7,479 Consumer Support site contacts. In 2009/20
CCWater initiated 635 complaint investigations. See Review of Ofwat and consumer representation in the water
sector (London, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Welsh Government, 2011), 95.
53
Including the Improving Dispute resolution Advisory Service for Further and Higher education (IDRAS), the
Equalities Mediation Service, and the Oxcheps Higher Education Mediation Service.
54
See www.oiahe.org.uk and Pathway 3 Consultation. Towards early resolution and more effective complaints
handling (London, Office of the Independent Adjudicator, 2011).
55
See below.
56
Higher Education. Putting Students at the Heart of the System (London, Department for Business Education
& Skills, 2011), at bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/higher-education/docs/h/11-944-higher-education-students-at-heart-
of-system.pdf.
57
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
58
Empowering and Protecting Consumers. Consultation on institutional changes for provision of consumer
information, advice, education, advocacy and enforcement (London Department for Business Enterprise and Skills,
2011), at www.bis.gov.uk/Consultations/empowering-and-protecting-consumers; http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/
biscore/consumer-issues/docs/e/11-970-empowering-protecting-consumers-consultation-on-institutional-
changes.pdf.

Thus, for C2B disputes, three broad models exist, which can be summarised as:
1. Statutory sectoral Ombudsmen systems, whose decisions are by law binding on
all traders in the sector but not consumers. Primary examples are the Financial
Ombudsman Service, and Legal Ombudsman.
2. Private Ombudsmen systems, which typically end in decisions that are binding on the
trader, irrespective of whether it agrees to be bound. Some of these systems are created
under (usually EU-based) legislation, which requires there to be an ADR system
without specifying how it should operate. The arrangements that have developed
usually involve private sector ombudsman providers, whose decisions are accepted as
binding by traders.
3. ADR built into sectoral business Codes of Conduct operated by trade associations,
which include dispute resolution systems. The model often involves a first mediation
stage operated either by a trade association or a body that is legally separate from
a trade association but close to it. There is usually a second stage that delivers
recommendations, which are accepted as binding by trade association members, made
by ADR providers or committees that are more independent of the trade association.
Criteria have been established by the OFT for Codes of Conduct that are deemed to
be worthy of official approval under the Consumer Code Approval Scheme (CCAS,
discussed below).
Examples of these three models are set out below from different sectors. Irrespective of the
model, they almost all involve arrangements that are based on applying first a mediation
technique, and if the dispute is not resolved, a second stage in which an independent person
has the ability to issue a recommendation that is binding or voluntarily accepted by traders,
but not binding on consumers unless the result is accepted.
ADR within Consumer Regulation
It is not possible to understand the architecture of consumer ADR in Britain without

clarifying its integral relationship as part of the regulatory structure. The United Kingdom
has maintained a strong system for regulation of markets and enforcement consumer
protection law since at least the 1960s, overseen by government departments, under which
are a number of public authorities, and often matrices of self-regulatory and/or ombudsmen
or other dispute resolution arrangements. There is a large number of public regulatory
authorities, working vertically and horizontally, whose activities might have particular
assistance in delivery of compensation to consumers. Consumer protection has been the
primary responsibility at national level of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT),59 shared with
sectoral regulators, and at local level of Trading Standards Services (TSS) operated by local
councils.
ADR developed spontaneously in a number of sectors but has increasingly become
subject to legislative regimes, usually as part of the imposition of a new regulatory regime
within a sector. Thus, in financial services a number of ADR schemes were merged by
statute in 2001 into the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) when the Financial Services
59
Established under the Fair Trading Act 1973.

Authority (FSA) was created; the Pension Ombudsman (1993), the telecoms ADR regime
(2003), and the Legal Ombudsman (2007) were all designed as integral parts of regulatory
regimes. The Energy Ombudsman was created in 2007 to follow a similar model, upgrading
the previous voluntary scheme. ADR schemes in general (non-vertically regulated) sectors
have been encouraged to adopt an official model, under the OFT’s CCAS.
The Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 required relevant businesses to
establish new statutory redress schemes for gas, electricity, postal services and estate agents,
to investigate and resolve complaints. The Act provided for these statutory arrangements
for redress to be overseen by powers for the relevant sectoral regulators to set standards of
complaint handling for businesses in each sector,60 and approve ADR providers.
The making of policy on markets, regulation and complaints has been supported by
data and research. Consumer Direct, the government-funded telephone and online service
offering information and advice on consumer issues, received over 1.6 million contacts and
recorded 1,171,794 cases in 2008–09.61 Four of the Top 10 Consumer Direct complaints
for 2009 were the subject of complaint for more than 10 per cent of consumers under a
2009 Consumer Conditions Survey.62 There were just over 5,400 complaints to Consumer
Direct in 2009 related to personal banking and in excess of 14,000 related to insurance.63
The 2009 Survey found that the following markets received complaints on average from one
in five consumers: renting a property or management services from a private landlord, gas/
electricity, internet service providers, and TV service providers. ADR schemes are available
in the first three of these markets but TV service providers are not regulated and there are
no ADR mechanisms for this market.
OFT consumer detriment research assessed consumer complaints behaviour to measure
the overall value of detriment in the economy.64 The report found that smaller value problems
are much more commonly experienced but the consumer is more likely to complain or take
action in relation to high detriment problems. When taking action most consumers choose
to complain direct to the company providing the goods/service rather than any other
organisation. Consumers who complained only reported complaining through Consumer
Direct in three per cent of cases.65 Consumers were more likely than average to complain
to Consumer Direct in relation to home maintenance and improvements, furniture and
second hand cars and less likely than average to complain about postal services, domestic
fuel, personal banking, insurance and internet facilities.66 Overall, consumers are more
likely to complain about insurance and personal banking problems than any other category.
These categories are also those with the highest average financial detriment levels. They do
not, however, feature in Consumer Direct’s Top 10.67
The government’s 2009 Consumer White Paper introduced significant reforms in the
consumer sector,68 in order to enhance aspects of scrutiny, representation and assistance
60
The Consumer, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007, s 43.
61
OFT (n 39).
62
Report on the 2009 Consumer Conditions Survey. Market research survey conducted for Consumer Focus
(London, ipsosMORI, 2009), available at www.consumerfocus.org.uk/assets/1/files/2009/12/Consumer-
Conditions-Survey-2009.pdf.
63
OFT (n 39), para 3.28.
64
Consumer detriment: Assessing the frequency and impact of consumer problems with goods and services,
OFT992 (London, Office of Fair Trading, April 2008).
65
OFT (n 39), para 3.25.
66
ibid, para 3.26.
67
ibid, para 3.27.
68
Modern Markets: Confident Consumers, The Government’s Consumer White Paper (London, Department of
Trade and Industry, 1999).

for consumers. First, a national first point of contact was established for consumers, called
Consumer Direct, which refers consumers to high quality specialist advice and redress
services.69 Secondly, seven pre-existing consumer bodies were amalgamated into a single
body, Consumer Focus,70 so as to enhance the regulatory effect of the consumer ‘voice’ in
a competitive marketplace.71 Thirdly, significant effort was put into consumer education,
particularly access to information on rights, responsibilities and options on redress.72
In 2011, the subsequent government announced plans so rationalise the landscape
further. First, the ‘front line’ of advice and support for consumers should be an enhanced
Citizens Advice service, deconstructing Consumer Focus and related bodies.73 Secondly,
the ‘front line’ of enforcement should remain local level TSS and the OFT would lose its
consumer protection role, national issues being coordinated by a new Trading Standards
Policy Board.74 Thirdly, consumer ADR arrangements are to be extended to new sectors but,
as a result of the proposed merger of the OFT and the Competition Commission to create
The Competition and Markets Authority,75 the OFT’s approval process for consumer ADR
schemes, the Code Approval Scheme (CCAS) is to be scrapped.76
The United Kingdom has a lengthy history of encouraging self-regulatory, or co-
regulatory, systems in preference to formal regulation.77 Self-regulatory structures, which
exist in a wide range of manifestations,78 are usually based on codes of practice, which
contain both ‘alternative’ dispute resolution procedures and sanctioning processes.79 Self-
regulatory systems can be designed to minimise self-interest bias (known in regulatory
theory as ‘capture’ of a system by those who should be subject to its controls)80 by harnessing
69
www.consumerdirect.gov.uk.
70
Strengthen and Streamline Consumer Advocacy: Consultation on consumer representation and redress
(Department of Trade and Industry, (2006). This estimated that expenditure of £29.9 million on the seven
bodies could be reduced by £18.0 million. An earlier example of such advocacy was a report that identified wide
variations in accessibility, standards and performance of dispute resolution mechanisms: Seeking Resolution
(London, National Consumer Council, 2004).
71
AO Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline on Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge
MA, Harvard University Press, 1970).
72
Consumer education: A strategy and framework, (London, Office of Fair Trading, 2004).
73
The bodies folded into Citizens Advice would be Consumer Focus, Consumer Council for water, Passenger
Focus, the Legal Services Consumer Panel, the Communications Consumer Panel, the Aviation Consumer
Advocacy Panel, Which?, and others in financial services and health. Department for Business Enterprise,
Empowering and Protecting Consumers (2011).
74
information, advice, education, advocacy and enforcement (London, Department for Business Enterprise and Skills,
2011). Further, the Local Better Regulation Office would be transferred to the Department for Business, as the
Better Regulation Delivery Organisation (BRDO).
75
A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform (London, Department for Business
Inovation and Skills, 2011), at www.bis.gov.uk/Consultations/competition-regime-for-growth?cat=open.
76
The CCAS is discussed below at p 312.
77
OECD, European Commission and UK Better Regulation Task Force published a sequence of reports
pressing the advantages of self-regulation from 1999: see Commission Communication on ‘A Strategic Review of
Better Regulation in the EU’ COM (2006) 689, 14.11.2006; The economics of self-regulation in solving consumer
quality issues OFT 1059 (London, Office of Fair Trading, 2009), available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_
research/oft1059.pdf; and Better business practice. How to make self-regulation work for consumers and business, PD
54/P/00 (London, National Consumer Council, January 2001).
78
Business leadership in consumer protection. A discussion document on self regulation and industry-led
compliance, OFT1058 (London, Office of Fair Trading, 2010), available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/
consumer-policy/oft1058.pdf.
79
The European Commission also adopted ‘new ideas’ for incorporating self-regulatory codes within a
legislative framework in its 2001 Green Paper on EU consumer protection. Commission (EC) ‘Green Paper on
EU consumer protection’, COM(2001) 531, final, 2 October 2001, available at: ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/
safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/green_pap_comm/fair_comm_greenpap_en.pdf .
80
AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, Oxford UP, 1994).

a series of forces, notably maximising transparency of the performance of markets and

companies.81 This is done by:
(a) affecting the market reputation of those businesses that rely for commercial success
on maintaining high reputations,82 especially in competitive markets and heavily
branded companies;83
(b) a tiered regulatory structure in which code sponsors (usually trade associations)
oversee enforcement of codes on their members, but are themselves subject to
scrutiny or formal supervision by a public regulatory body, which operates with
sufficiently strong enforcement powers, and is itself subject to governmental and
public, Parliamentary scrutiny and accountability.84
The operation and performance of all tiers are subject to public transparency, through
ensuring that the structure, rules, operation, personnel and decisions taken by the private
sector body are fully available for external scrutiny by the population, the media, the regulator,
and the legislature. This can be achieved through making regular reports, and having all
information on the website. The objective is to ensure that the key consumer requirements
are met: having adequate information on price, quality and terms of trade, to enable full
and fair purchasing choices to be made, and to ensure democratic accountability through
transparent governance systems that involve adequate external personnel. This structure also
means that the scope and cost of the formal regulatory structure can be contained.
One approach is for an official model to be created by the government or the regulator of
the parameters of how the business’ self-regulatory system will be designed or will operate.
An example of this is the OFT’s CCAS, which establishes benchmarks for approved redress
schemes, including a template and requirements that provide for oversight and governance
aspects in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Reflexive law theory suggests that the
oversight of the self-regulatory body should be procedural, on the basis of controlling
systems and transparency rather than intervening in individual outcomes.85
A further feature is for supervisory functions over the code, and decisions on disputes,
which are taken at trade association level, should be outsourced to independent committees,
somewhat akin to a ‘separation of powers’ approach under constitutional theory. Thus, both
the substance of business codes, and decisions on their interpretation and enforcement,
are often dealt with by decision-making and sanction-imposing committees that are
administered by the trade association but whose members are independent of the business
sector. Thus, the separate committee will have a chair and majority of the members are
independent of the sector (professors of law, consumer representatives, other outsiders).
81
I Bartle and P Vass, Self-regulation and the regulatory state – a survey of policy and practice, Research Report
17 (Bath, Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, University of Bath, 2005) available at www.bath.ac.uk/
management/cri/pubpdf/Research_Reports/17_Bartle_Vass.pdf.
82
Research found that reputation and the influence of consumers was the most important driver of business
compliance or non-compliance. Consumer Law and Business Practice. Drivers of Compliance and Non-compliance
(London, Office of Fair Trading, 2010), available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/
OFT1225.pdf.
83
See The Anderson Review of Government Guidance on Regulation. Business Perspectives of Government
Guidance. Research Study Conducted for Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. Final Report
(London, Ipsos MORI, 2008), available at www.berr.gov.uk/files/file49883.pdf.
84
The Australian ACCC even has power to impose a Code.
85
J Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-regulation’, 59 Mod L Rev 24–55 (1996); I Bartle and P Vass, Self-regulation
and the regulatory state – a survey of policy and practice (2005).

An international review in 2010 focused on four aspects of transparency: disclosure of

complaints data, disclosure of firms entering an enforcement process, the transparency
of regulators’ governance procedures, and disclosure of complaints data about financial
promotions.86 These factors parallel the approach adopted by the OFT’s CCAS and similar
requirements of OFCOM and other regulators.
A 2010 research report on the CCAS found that evidence of how codes signalled
quality, measured by surveying customer satisfaction levels across three different codes,
was variable.87 Three codes were studied, each at different stages of development. The
satisfaction rates of customers in the carpet sector, for which the Carpet Foundation Code
had been approved in 2007, was higher for customers of those firms who were members
than were not members (respectively 64 and 47 per cent). There was a similar but less
marked favourable variance for customers in the assisted-mobility products market, for
which the British Healthcare Trades Association had only achieved OFT code approval
after the research was undertaken (68 and 60 per cent for members and non-members
respectively). But for customers of motor vehicle service and repair garages, for which the
relevant Motor Industry Service and Repair Code88 only completed stage one of the OFT
approval process during the research, the reverse was true, with 24 per cent of clients of
non-applicant garages strongly agreeing that their purchase provided value for money,
compared with nine per cent for applicant garages.
A survey conducted by Ipsos Mori in late 2006 for Ernst & Young asked 1,925 consumers
about their experience of complaint handling, focussing mainly on complaints about
financial services.89 This survey included a question about consumers’ satisfaction with the
way their complaint was handled for a number of different industries. The results are shown
in Figure 11.1.
86
J Leston, Transparency as a regulatory tool. An international literature review (London, The Financial Services
Consumer Panel, 2010), available at www.fs-cp.org.uk/publications/pdf/fscp_transparency.pdf.
87
Consumer Codes Approval Scheme: Evaluating Consumer Experiences: Report by IFF Research, OFT1247
(London, Office of Fair Trading, 2010), available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/
oft1247.pdf.
88
The Service and Repair Code received full OFT approval in November 2011.
89
n 62 above.

Figure 11.1: Level of satisfaction with how a complaint was handled.
Retailer 18 31 14 7 17 1 11
Bank 19 27 19 11 17 1 6
Utilities 9 25 19 12 22 4 8
Telecoms 10 20 11 11 30 3 14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Very satis ed Fairly satis ed Neither satis ed Fairly dissatis ed Very dissatis ed Don´t know Not yet resolved
Private Sector Adr Bodies
The growth of ADR has occurred in parallel with the development of professional and
commercial organisations providing mediation services.90 The existence of a body of ‘ADR
professionals’, with their enthusiasm and commercial motivation to seek extended roles
for ‘ADR’, has provided the basis for the rapid growth of the ombudsman service industry.
Such consumer ADR services have grown out of the pre-existing community of legal
practitioners experienced in higher value commercial and international disputes based in
the City of London, who sought to extend their work into any further form of ADR. The
development of ADR in London took inspiration from earlier developments in the United
States of America.91
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb)92 established its first trade association
scheme in the late 1960s for ABTA, to handle the disputes that arose out of the collapse
of a number of travel companies. This was the first attempt to structure such a non-court
approach, although a model based on arbitration alone was not successful. Over succeeding
decades, business attitudes towards consumers changed radically, and techniques based on
adjudication and mediation grew in effectiveness and popularity. In 2007 CIArb established
a subsidiary IDRS Limited to provide third tier external dispute resolution services, as
90
The authors are grateful to Tim Hardy and Frances Thomas of CMS Cameron McKenna LLP for information
on the following paragraphs.
91
The concept of a ‘multi-door courthouse’ was coined by Professor Frank Sander in 1976 at the Roscoe Pound
Conference in Minneapolis. Institutional milestones in the spread of ADR were the establishment in 1979 of
The Centre for Public Resources by General Counsel of leading corporations, the 1979 Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services (JAMS), and the 1996 International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) of the American
Arbitration Association.
92
CIArb was established in 1915 to provide supervision of arbitrators in response to an increase in demand for
arbitration in the Great War to resolve construction and munitions disputes under public contracts. www.ciarb.org.

part of a pyramid of dispute resolution resting on a first tier of company in-house direct
negotiation, and a second tier of mediation/conciliation by a code sponsor or IDRS.
In 1991 a conference of ombudsmen from both the public and private sectors was held,
at which it was agreed to set up an association for ombudsmen, their staff, and other
organisations and individuals, such as voluntary bodies and academics interested in the
work of ombudsmen. The Association came into being in 1993 as the United Kingdom
Ombudsman Association and became the British and Irish Ombudsman Association
(BIOA)93 when membership was extended to include ombudsmen from the Republic
of Ireland in 1994. Its members comprise both public and private ombuds providers. It
published principles of good governance in 2009.94
The City Disputes Panel (CDP)95 was established by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
in 1994, primarily to develop ADR solutions for mass claim redress mechanisms. It
provides a specialist approach and experience,96 particularly for financial services. A panel
was recently formed for claims involving high net worth investors, which combines judicial
wisdom and experts in the field.
Various providers of mediators emerged, bringing mediation into business practice
and into the judicial system in England and Wales, creating a professional approach in
commercial mediation in the UK and internationally, and lobbying for ADR as a cheaper
and more effective means of conflict prevention and resolution. ADR Group was founded
in 1989. The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) was launched in 1990,
attached to the commercial world of the City of London.97 The Civil Mediation Council
was established in 2003 to provide a forum for mediators and to promote mediation.98 The
Ministry of Justice launched the Civil Mediation Online Directory in October 2011, which
lists CMC accredited civil mediation providers by county.99
The two major private sector providers of consumer ADR services are the CEDR Disputes
Group and Ombudsman Services, the range of whose services are outlined below.
CEDR Disputes Group

The CEDR Disputes Group provides all forms of commercial and consumer ADR services,
notably conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication and neutral evaluation. The
Group comprises CEDR Solve, which primarily provides commercial services, and IDRS
93
www.bioa.org.uk.
94
www.bioa.org.uk/docs/BIOAGovernanceGuideOct09.pdf.
95
www.citydisputespanel.org.
96
An example of a bespoke ADR solution is an industrial illness scheme, created for a specific company that
had purchased an industrial site and later found that it was contaminated. The company did not wish to spend
years in litigation, so a scheme was designed that dealt with several hundred claims over 3 years. The company
accepted liability, and the issue was to determine harm/detriment in individual cases. The panel comprised an
epidemiologist, a cancer specialist and a retired judge. Individual cases were decided on their particular facts,
some in favour of both sides. See case study on CDP website www.citydisputespanel.org/media/downloads/
cdp_18131276914b16998d5187a.pdf.
97
It was launched with the support of The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and leading law firms,
businesses and public sector bodies. CEDR Solve is the largest independent alternative dispute resolution body
in Europe, assisting with the resolution of disputes and deadlocked negotiations of all types and sizes around the
world and has access to over 5,000 mediators and neutrals worldwide. Its expertise has been called on by over
40,000 individuals and organisations across the globe. See: http://www.cedr.com/solve.
98
www.civilmediation.org. It was created by a senior judge, Sir Henry Brooke, to mirror the statutory Civil
Justice Council.
99
ibid.

Ltd, acquired from the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in November 2011, and which
covers a range of consumer schemes. The CEDR organisation also provides consultancy
and training services, including the internationally recognised Mediator Skills Training and
Accreditation programme.100 In 2011 CEDR established offices in Dublin and Hong Kong.
The CEDR Disputes Group provides more than fifty consumer ADR schemes, ranging
from disputes involving funerals,101 to coal mining subsidence,102 and including The
Communications & Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CISAS), The Postal Redress
Service (POSTRS), The ABTA Arbitration Scheme, my|deposits for tenancy deposit
disputes,103 The National House-Building Council (NHBC)104 scheme for disputes
arising under the guarantee to rectify defects in newly built houses, and The Consumer
Code for Home Builders’ Adjudication Scheme, subscribed to by a number of major
building companies and the NHBC under the Consumer Code for the House Building
Industry.105
CEDR Disputes Group operates a generic ‘catch all’ scheme for consumer disputes, called
the Independent Consumer Redress Service (ICRS),106 aimed at one-off consumers and
small businesses. This grew out of the existence of various sectoral schemes that were created
but experienced very low levels of complaints, that did not justify the cost of the sponsors’
annual fees, so they were rationalised into a generic scheme in which CEDR Disputes Group
itself sets the rules and complaints may be referred to the scheme as required.
CEDR Disputes Group operates three core models in consumer dispute resolution:
adjudication, arbitration, and conciliation. The adjudication model, such as for CISAS, is
the most widely used, and aims to end in a fair and reasonable outcome whilst employing a
simple ‘documents only’ process that delivers low cost, fast and proportionate resolution of
small claims. All CISAS adjudicators are trained in consumer law and qualified in applying
adjudication skills (training is a mixture of academic and skills modules). Settlement is
usually embedded in the adjudication process, by allowing a two week period for a company
respondent to settle spontaneously, and incentivised since CEDR Disputes Group will charge
a reduced fee if the company settles. Around 40 per cent of cases resolve at that stage. The
adjudicator’s written and reasoned decision is sent to both parties and is not binding unless
100
CEDR also provides the Independent Complaints Adjudication Service for Ofsted (the Office for Standards
in Education, Children’s Services and Skills, which inspects and regulates services that care for children
and young people, and those providing education and skills for learners of all ages), founded in 1990: www.
ofstedadjudicationservice.co.uk.
101
Clients who feel they have not received the service desired may, under the Code of Practice of the National
Association of Funeral Directors first try to resolve matters with the supplier, and may then contact the Funeral
Arbitration Scheme at 618 Warwick Road, Solihull, West Midlands B91 1AA, which provides independent
conciliation and arbitration through IDRS.
102
Claims for subsidence damage are made to the Coal Authority in respect of coal mining subsidence damage
under the framework of the Coal Mining Subsidence Act 1991: coal.decc.gov.uk/en/coal/cms/services/claims/
claims.aspx.
103
See section below.
104
www.nhbc.co.uk.
105
www.consumercodeforhomebuilders.com/dispute_resolution_service.html. The homebuyer lodges all the
evidence, plus a case registration fee of £100 plus VAT. If the builder resolves the complaint without a formal
adjudication (‘early settlement’) the builder pays a reduced case fee of £100 plus VAT, but if it files a statement of
evidence, the fee is £300 plus VAT. The adjudicator may make an award up to a maximum of £15,000 inclusive of
VAT, to include a discretionary award for inconvenience, up to a maximum of £250. The adjudicator’s decision can
be accepted or rejected by the home buyer, without appeal, save the option of instituting a court case.
106
www.idrs.ltd.uk/?p=36&parent=33&lang=e. The members as at 2011 were Albion Insurance, British Holiday
& Home Parks Association, Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists, Flights of Fancy, National Society
of Allied and Independent Funeral Directors, National Caravan Council.

the consumer accepts it, at which point it is immediately binding on the company.107 If the
consumer does not accept the decision, he or she has the option of instituting a case in court.
In regulated industry sectors such as communications and postal services, CEDR
Disputes Group monitors compliance with decisions by companies. On average, 60 per
cent of adjudicated cases are decided in favour of the consumer. Overall, the model typically
achieves about 80 per cent of acceptances by claimants, the difference of 20 per cent being
that claimants accept adverse decisions after they have seen the written reasons for the
decision, so accept the decision even if they lose. Compliance with decisions is high in the
regulated industries, many of whose Codes contain sanctions for breach, and this would
cover non-compliance. Compliance protocols are written into contracts between CEDR
Disputes Group and companies, with expulsion from the relevant service as the ultimate
sanction. An exception is the postal services industry where statute prevents expulsion
from the redress service. As an alternative, CEDR Disputes Group could take a company
to court to enforce compliance, based again on contractual provisions of membership, but
it has not needed to take such action to date. CEDR Disputes Group provides feedback on
firms’ performance. A website page of case studies was introduced in 2007, and the range of
published data is being extended in 2012.
The conciliation model was introduced in 2007. Conciliation typically has an 80 per cent
success rate. The time allowed for negotiation is 3–4 hours: the period is deliberately longer
than for other types of dispute, so as to allow for emotional aspects to be effectively aired. If
agreement is reached, it is recorded in writing by the conciliator (who is a CEDR Accredited
Mediator and may be legally trained) and sent to the parties to be signed by them. If no
agreement is reached, the conciliator either proposes a solution or identifies further points
for the parties to think about and makes a recommendation. Around 90 per cent of such
recommendations are accepted.
Ombudsman Services
Ombudsman Services (OS)108 is a private company limited by guarantee, established to

be an Ombudsman for the communications industry (as OTELO) in 2003, that provides
independent dispute resolution services in four sectors (communications, energy, property
and copyright licensing) in each of which its formal role differs.109 On 6 April 2011, OS
reorganised the four sectoral schemes into a single unified structure, so that the four
schemes operate as a ‘family’ of brands aligned under a single corporate umbrella. It has a
core set of terms and conditions, with appropriate variations for each sector. This approach
supports OS’s policy of being more consumer focused, improving accessibility and saving
costs. The four schemes are:
• Communications scheme110
• Energy scheme111
107
A variation in the model applies in tenancy disputes. The Housing Act 2004 provides that tenancy deposit
protection decisions are binding as soon as they are issued, and the courts have upheld that position. www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/34/contents.
108
www.ombudsman-services.org.
109
OS is appointed (by Ofcom) for telecoms, has a mandatory role under legislation for energy, and a contractual
role for property and copyright licensing.
110
www.otelo.org.uk. See p 296 below.
111
www.energy-ombudsman.org.uk. See p 307 below.

• Property scheme112
• Copyright licensing.113
OS comprises a Board and a separate Member Board for each sectoral service. It has 7
ombudsmen and 160 staff, divided into an Enquiry Department, which deals with incoming
consumer requests, and an Investigations Department, which looks at the complaints in
more depth.114
OS states that its vision is:
• to provide excellent, independent complaint resolution for consumers and participating
companies;
• to make recommendations for improvements or changes to companies procedures
within the sectors; and
• to promote the benefits of independent complaint handling to other industries and
their customers.
OS aims to make it as easy as possible for consumers to contact it to register a complaint. It
deals with complaints via online complaints forms on its website, by telephone, textphone,
post and email. OS operates a contact centre that can receive complaints from the consumer
and provide him or her with advice. OS can supply information to consumers in most
languages and formats and also arrange for a translation service if this is required.
The OS has jurisdiction to accept a complaint when a complaint has been made to a
company that is a member of an OS scheme and it has not been resolved within eight weeks,
or the company has issued a ‘deadlock letter’ within the eight week period. Where a third
party has written permission from a consumer, the third party may use the services of the OS.
The complaints system essentially operates as a pyramid, which people join at the bottom,
enabling individuals to obtain answers quickly without the system becoming too top heavy.
It is intended to be simple, so as speed up the process, and proportionate, to deal with
cases in an appropriate way. There are four stages: complaint, report, representations and
decision. The first stage is a triage system. If the resolution appears to be straightforward
OS will work with the consumer and the company to find an appropriate settlement that
is acceptable to both. An initial phone conversation by the OS case manager may solve a
complaint straight away. Around 35–40 per cent of cases are resolved at this stage.
If a complaint is more complicated, OS will investigate the case, starting by asking the
company to supply all relevant information. OS will look at all the facts and produce a
written report which gives its view of the complaint and recommend what action, if any,
should be taken. OS used to produce a 5 page report on a complaint, but since January 2011
this has been cut down to a much shorter letter, based on a template. This takes less time, is
clearer for the complainant, more personal, keeps the cost and the time to a minimum, and
has been welcomed by consumers and businesses. Investigators can order site visits, but it
112
www.os-property.org. See p 86 below.
113
www.prsformusic-ombudsman.org The Performing Right Society (PRS) deals with copyright licensing, and
this scheme is available for disputes arising out of its decisions. From 2009 it was required to have an ADR scheme,
which OS provides under contract. In 2010 the scheme was broadened to include musicians. The scope is pan-
European.
114
All the Enquiry Department staff are based at the Warrington headquarters. The Investigation Department
staff tend to work on a regime of 5 days at home and 5 days in the office. There are teams that lead on the four
sectors, but staff do not work exclusively in one sector. All staff are trained in both inquiries and investigations,
which increases flexibility, independence and capacity. The policy of independence is applied to mean that neither
organisation nor staff take sides, but make disinterested decisions based on the facts.

is not the norm. OS would employ an expert to deal with a specific issue if needed, but also
has some in-house expertise. OS considers it to be important that an expert should not be
the one to make a decision on a case, which is the responsibility of the ombudsman.
Disputes that remain unresolved are escalated through Decisions by Investigation
Officers,115 Recommendations by Senior Investigation Officers, and ultimately to one of the
Ombudsmen. Only around 10 per cent of complaints now proceed to final determination
by an Ombudsman. It is an OFT requirement that an ombudsman should be able to order a
hearing in a case. Hearings are at the ombudsman’s discretion, but are rare in OS’ practice.
There has only been one hearing, which was in the property sector.
When making decisions OS will use its experience of complaints handling to reach a fair
conclusion and may also make recommendations about how a participating company can
improve its procedures. Where OS find that the company has not acted correctly, OS will
recommend what it should do to put things right. This may include:
• Some practical action
• An apology or explanation
• A financial award (there are limits to any financial award we can make)
• OS may also recommend that the company makes changes to its procedures so that the
same problem is less likely to happen again.
OS works to set time limits so it is important that they know as soon as possible whether
a consumer accepts or declines a recommendation. OS provides the same report to
the consumer and the company. If the consumer or the company feels that there was a
significant error in the facts, or there is important new evidence that would affect the
proposed resolution, the parties may inform OS about this in writing. OS will then review
the case and make a decision.
If the consumer and the company then agree, OS will write and confirm the decision.
If at this stage the consumer or the company is still unhappy with the resolution, they can
write and tell OS why, and the ombudsman will consider the complaint and make the final
decision. OS work to set time limits and aim to resolve complaints as quickly as possible. It
is important that OS know as soon as possible whether a consumer and company accepts or
declines a recommendation or decision.
A consumer has 28 days to accept a final decision. If a consumer accepts the final decision,
the company must put in place any remedy that OS have asked for. OS final decisions are
legally enforceable. The implementation of decisions has not been found to be a problem. In
the property Scheme, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) guarantees that its
members will action OS decisions: there has been one disciplinary action by RICS against
a member firm. If a consumer rejects the final decision, he or she loses the right to any
resolution that OS has offered and retains the right to take the complaint elsewhere, such as
to court. With most complaints, both parties will agree with the decision and that concludes
the process. OS then make sure that the company carries out what they have asked it to do.
OS is entirely funded from the private sector, and is free to consumers. Funding is a
combination of a subscription fee and a case fee.116 The balance between the two fees has
115
In 2010 around 45% of Provisional Conclusions were challenged by one or both parties, which lead to
a demand for Final Decisions: Independent Review of the Energy Ombudsman, Report commissioned by Ofgem
(Risby, Sohnassociates, 2010), 30.
116
For the Property Scheme, RICS pays the subscription fee and decides how it is distributed amongst its
members. Individuals pay the case fees. Up to now RICS has paid part of the case fee for everybody.

sometimes proved to be difficult to strike, for example because volatility in the number of
complaints can upset budgets. A 50/50 balance between the two fees is currently operated,
thus with a measure of ‘polluter pays’. The fee structure varies between schemes and
individual members. Big firms pay a large subscription fee up front and smaller case fees.
The big firms therefore fund the fixed infrastructure costs through subscriptions, since it is
in their interests for the scheme to exist. Small firms tend to pay a small subscription fee but
a big case fee (partly because they have few cases).
OS’ annual turnover was £5,739,894 in the year to 31 March 2010 and £6,385,718 in the
year to 31 March 2011.117 The allocation of costs between sectors is shown in Table 11.3.
Table 11.3: Allocation of Ombudsman Service costs between service sectors
Expenditure 2009–2010 (£’000)

Communications 2,210
Energy – major suppliers 2,120
Energy – Networks 50
Energy – Small suppliers 19
Surveyors Ombudsman Service 19
Reserves 120
The OS’s Annual Report records major cases and trends. The aggregation of individual
decisions creates a body of ‘case law’, and the ability to feed back decisions in such a way
as to be able to be apply pressure for change through regulatory or public mechanisms
on companies’ behaviour is currently a problem with the ombudsman scheme. OS is
currently setting up a system that analyses the data more closely, and feeds them back to
the organizations. In 2011 it changed from publishing one in ten decisions on cases (but all
decisions involving property, and all decisions by an Ombudsman) to publishing a case of
the month that highlights a particular issue from one of the sectors, on the basis that this
would be a more useful and effective approach to achieving impact for traders.
Financial Services
Regulatory Powers
The policy for resolving customer disputes with financial services providers is that the parties
should first try to resolve their differences direct, so a regulatory obligation is imposed on
providers to operate complaint handling systems. That primary stage is supported, as a
secondary stage, by the existence of a statutory Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS),118
and at least two private sector ADR systems, run by the Finance and Leasing Association
and the CEDR Disputes group. The FOS exists as an alternative to the courts, and functions
117
Annual Report 2011, Ombudsman Services Limited, at www.ombudsman-services.org/useful-downloads-
os.html.
118
The Personal Insurance Arbitration Service and the Mortgage Code were established and run by the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, later under IDRS Ltd, but later, along with FIMBRA (covering financial
advisers), transferred to the FOS when it assumed statutory jurisdiction in 2001.

in close cooperation with the public regulatory authorities, the Financial Services Authority
(FSA)119 and the OFT (which is responsible for consumer credit licensing). Part of the
function of the FOS is to balance the bargaining powers of consumers against companies.120
The 2008 financial crisis placed renewed focus on financial consumer protection and on
strengthening consumers’ confidence in the financial sector,121 and as a result the regulatory
system is to be significantly reformed.122
The FSA can include redress within its enforcement activities, as part of an extensive
range of disciplinary, criminal and civil powers under the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000 (FSMA).123 These include power to take assets and distribute them (restitution
order),124 although this is not generally used. The FSA can turn on or off the ability for
customers to have a right to damages for breaches of the rules made by the FSA. The
purpose of this is to prevent inconsistent decisions between the FSA on regulatory issues
and the courts in a damages case.125
Redress is included in a significant number of agreed arrangements,126 especially cases
involving small losses to individuals, such as mortgage and payment protection insurance
(PPI).127 If a company settles a case, and agrees liability and a penalty, the FSA can then
agree a redress scheme. Such agreements can be encouraged by FSA’s power to reduce the
penalty, and reductions up to 30 per cent might be made.128
Since 2010 the FSA has been able to use powers in the revised section 404 of the FSMA
2000 that enable it to set up redress schemes under which firms can be required to review
their ‘back book’ proactively and pay redress according to criteria set by the FSA.129 These
criteria also ‘bind’ the FOS in the sense that, if it receives a complaint that is within the scope
of a redress scheme, it must determine that complaint not on its ‘fair and reasonable’ basis
(see below) but on the basis of what the outcome would have been had the firm applied the
FSA’s redress criteria correctly.
119
Its four objectives under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/
ukpga_20000008_en_1) are: maintaining market confidence; promoting public understanding of the financial
system; providing the appropriate degree of protection of consumers; and fighting financial crime. It has a wide
range of rule-making, investigatory and enforcement powers and is funded by the financial services industry:
www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/index.shtml. Complaints against the FSA itself may be referred to its Office of
the Complaints Commissioner.
120
I MacNeil, ‘The Future for Financial Regulation: The Financial Services and Markets Bill’ (1999) 62 Mod L
Rev 725.
121
www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2010/0624_sn.shtml.
122
See A new approach to financial regulation: securing stability, protecting consumers, Cm.8268 (London, HM
Treasury, January 2012), available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/fin_fs_bill_policy_document_jan2012.pdf.
123
See www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/contents.
124
FSMA, s 382–384.
125
FSMA, s 150.
126
See aggregate complaints statistics by the FSA (2006–2009): www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/complaints_data09.
pdf; see also the enforcement statistics at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar08_09/enforcement_report.pdf.
127
See www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Corporate/Annual/ar09_10.shtml.
128
See the FSA Enforcement Information Guide: www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/doing/regulated/law/pdf/enf_
procedure.pdf.
129
S Orton and K Edwards, ‘Consumer Redress in the Financial Services Sector’ (2010) 7 Journal of International
Banking and Financial Law 403.

Complaint Handling Rules of the FSA
The FSA‘s role includes setting and overseeing the rules about how firms handle complaints.130
Principle 6 of the FSA’s Principles for Businesses requires firms to treat customers fairly.131
The obligations placed on firms’ complaint handling include standards for:
• having an accessible process for handling complaints;
• assessing complaints promptly and fairly;
• identifying and putting right the underlying causes of complaints; and
• considering other affected consumers who have not yet complained.
Chapter 1 of the Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP) sourcebook sets out the minimum
standards for firms’ complaint handling. In 2007 these rules were updated,132 with the aim
of making them more effective, by removing some of the prescriptive detail and focusing
on the following key outcomes:
• dealing with complaints fairly and promptly;
• informing complainants appropriately of their rights; and
• seeking to minimise the number of complainants who turn to the ombudsman service
because they have not received a substantive response from the firm.
These rules were further updated in 2011 by, among other things, introducing requirements
for firms to:
• identify a senior individual responsible for complaints handling; and
• take account of ombudsman decisions and guidance, and carry out root cause analysis
in the light of ombudsman findings.133
The Financial Ombudsman Service
The FOS was established in 2001 under the FSMA 2000134 as an independent body to resolve
disputes between consumers and financial firms quickly and with minimum formality. It
is free to consumers and its recommendations are binding on providers. In addition to
the regulatory function noted above, the FOS assists in application of the law and rules.
Although the FOS is not a regulator it can influence the regulatory process in an indirect
way through cooperation with the FSA. The FOS was intended to form an integral part of a
new regulatory scheme that created a single sectoral regulator (the FSA) in place of previous
multi-sectoral regulators and more self-regulatory approaches.135 One of the advantages
130
AC Fawcett, ‘Examining the Objectives of Financial Regulation. Will the New Regime Succeed? A
Practitioner’s View’ in E Ferran and CAE Goodhart (ed) Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21
Century, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001) 37.
131
See FOS/FSA/OFT, Consumer Complaints (Emerging Risks and Mass Claims), 10/1 Discussion Paper,
(London, FOS/FSA/OFT, 2010) 9.
132
ibid.
133
See FSA/FOS, Consumer complaints: the ombudsman award limit and changes to complaints-handling rules,
10/21consultation paper, (London, FSA/FOS, 2011).
134
See R James and P Morris, ‘The new Financial Ombudsman Service in the United Kingdom: Has the Second
Generation Got it Right?’ in C Rickett and T Telfer (eds), International Perspectives on Consumers’ Access to Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 167.
135
FSMA ss 226, 226A and 227, as amended by the Consumer Credit Act 2006. See HM Treasury, Financial
Services and Markets Bill: A Consultation Document. Part One. Overview of Financial Regulatory Reform (London,
HM Treasury,1998) 8.

of the new system was to create a single point of contact for consumers’ enquiries and
complaints and clearer lines of accountability.136
The FOS cannot give personal advice about financial matters or debt problems. However,
it plays an important role in sharing knowledge and experience, helping consumers and
businesses settle problems themselves, and helping to eliminate the causes of complaints.
The technique of using an ombudsman for disputes with private-sector bodies was
first introduced with the Insurance Ombudsman Scheme of 1981. It was based on two
principles that still apply: decisions would be based on what was ‘fair and reasonable’ and
companies would be bound by decisions while consumers were free to take their cases to
court if they wished. The second aspect was important in order to encourage consumers to
use the ombudsman scheme. An ombudsman scheme for financial services disputes was
intended to overcome the clear reluctance of consumers to take disputes to court137 and
barriers such as lack of familiarity about the law, the cost of litigation and lack of legal
expertise in comparison to a bank.138 The Banking Ombudsman started operating in 1986
when companies joined a scheme under the Building Societies Act 1986. The Financial
Services Act 1986 (operational 1988) for investments led to other schemes, such as the
PIA Ombudsman, established by the Personal Investment Authority, and the Investment
Ombudsman, established by the Investment Management Regulation Organisation. All
existing financial services schemes were merged into the FOS on 1 December 2001, with
rationalisation of differences in eligibility criteria and time limits.139 The approach was
influenced by an increasing interest in the UK in ADR mechanisms, including arbitration,
early neutral evaluation, expert determination, mediation and conciliation,140 which were
promoted as an alternative to courts, including the small claims procedure.141
The FOS deals with complaints about most financial products and services, the way
firms make their business decisions, and investment performance evaluations. Products
and services include banking, insurance, mortgages, pensions, savings and investments,
credit and store cards, loans and credit, hire purchase and pawn broking, money transfer,
financial advice, stocks, shares, unit trusts and bonds (exceptions include occupational
pension schemes).
The FOS has three statutory jurisdictions:142
• compulsory jurisdiction: this applies compulsorily to around 21,000 financial services
firms (such as banks and building societies) authorised by the FSA, and includes
consumer complaints about acts or omissions by these firms in relation to certain
of their pension activities. In practice, this jurisdiction covers 98 per cent of the
complaints to the FOS.
• consumer credit jurisdiction: this applies compulsorily since April 2007 to around
100,000 businesses with standard licences issued by the OFT under the Consumer
Credit Act 1974 (as amended), and covers consumer complaints about these businesses’
consumer credit activities. However, if the licensee is also authorised by the FSA, its
136
A Georgosouli, ‘The FSA Regulatory Policy of Rule-Use: A Move Towards More Effective Regulation?’
(London, WP University of London – Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 2006) 2.
137
Banking Services and the Consumer, A Report by the National Consumer Council, (London, NCC, 1983), 106.
138
I Ramsay, Consumer Protection, Text and Materials (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989) 140.
139
H Davies, ‘Reforming Financial Regulation: Progress and Priorities’ in E Ferran and CAE Goodhart,
Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001).
140
E Ferran, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the UK Financial Sector, (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2002) 12.
141
R James, Private Ombudsmen and Public Law (Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 3.
142
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/sub-financialombudsmanservice.pdf.

consumer credit complaints are covered instead by the compulsory jurisdiction. The
FOS’s jurisdiction does not apply to holders of group consumer credit licences, such as
some solicitors or accountants.
• voluntary jurisdiction: this applies voluntarily to financial businesses and activities that
have chosen to opt in to the service provided by the ombudsman, including National
Savings & Investments, some cross-border business originating elsewhere in the EEA
directed at UK consumers and PayPal.143
The Financial Ombudsman Service Procedure
Consumers first have to complain to the financial service companies144 in order to give them
a chance to evaluate the problem.145 If the complaint handling by the firm is not satisfactory
or no solution is found within eight weeks the complaint can be referred to the FOS.146 The
consumer must do this within six months of the firm’s final response letter.
The FOS can be accessed by website, email, letter or phone. An adjudicator is assigned to
each case. The adjudicator will contact both parties and attempt to mediate a solution. If the
case is not settled, the adjudicator will make a finding. Either party may then appeal against
this finding to one of around 90 ombudsmen for a fresh review and final determination.
The requirement noted above that the FOS is to base decisions on what is ‘fair and
reasonable’ on a case by case basis gives it an extensive scope of discretion. This has been
criticised by firms since the FOS can, at least in theory, depart from the legal requirements
and lead to confusion. The FSA Handbook, however, requires the Ombudsman, in
considering what is fair and reasonable, to take into account relevant law and regulations,
regulators’ rules and codes of practice.147 In practice, most cases revolve around factual
situations only, for example where a customer alleges that she or he was not given a specific
piece of information (eg ‘she/he didn’t tell me this was excluded from my policy’), and the
firm asserts the converse. Many cases are also of low value, and the ‘fair and reasonable’
test is intended to avoid the disproportionate cost of a full judicial-style inquiry, in order
to facilitate access to justice and an equalisation of power between firms and consumers.
The FOS has power to dismiss a case if it would be better dealt with in court, for instance, if
there is an important question of law.
The Ombudsman can award up to £150,000.148 Historically, some complainants have
limited the amount of their complaints to the FOS to that figure, and may either forgo a
court claim, or not accept a favourable decision by the FOS but quote it in a subsequent
court claim, thereby increasing their negotiating position. The FOS considers that a high
143
On relocating from the UK to Luxembourg, PayPal opted to continue to accept the FOS jurisdiction to
resolve disputes.
144
www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/consumer/complaints.htm#1; H Davies, ‘Reforming Financial Regulation’
in E Ferran and CAE Goodhart (eds) Regulating Financial Markets in the Twenty First Century (Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2001), 20; E Ferran and CAE Goodhart ‘Regulating Financial Markets in the Twenty First Century: An
Overview’ in CAE Goodhart and E Ferran (eds) Regulating Financial Market and Services in the Twenty First Century
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001), 5.
145
See the webpage of the Financial Ombudsman Service: www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/consumer/
complaints.htm#1. As noted above, the FSA regulates the procedures that firms must put in place in relation to
their complaints procedures, including provision for fair compensation for upheld complaints: See FOS/FSA/OFT,
Consumer Complaints (2010), 9.
146
In 2010–11 the business had not issued a final response in 40% of cases referred to the FOS: Annual Review.
147
DISP 3.5.4R.
148
This was increased from £100,000 in 2011.

net worth investor is adopting this tactic, and it tends to dismiss such cases on the ground
that they are more suitable for a court.
If a consumer does not agree with the decision by FOS he or she can file a civil legal action
in court.149 In Scotland, most small claims are started in the Sheriff Court. In practice, courts
often agree with the FOS. If a consumer accepts an ombudsman’s decision, it is binding on
both them and the business. If a consumer rejects an Ombudsman decision, neither party
is bound.
Transparency and Feedback
In addition to resolving individual complaints, an essential objective of the FOS is to inform

firms how to improve handling of their complaints. In order to achieve this, a major tactic
is to use transparency to harness market forces. The FOS believes that transparency is a
major motivator of good behaviour in increasing compliance by companies and facilitating
complaints handling.150
Various approaches are adopted in order to enhance transparency. Firstly, under FSA
rules, individual financial services firms are required to publish their own complaints
data.151 This requires firms to publish information on how they handle complaints, to help
people see how firms are performing in this important area and to drive up complaints
handling standards across the industry.152 Firms that receive 500 or more complaints in a six
month period have to publish the following information twice a year:
• How many complaints they have opened and closed;
• The percentage closed within eight weeks; and
• The percentage of complaints upheld.
Firms need to present this information by five product areas: banking, home finance,
general insurance and pure protection, life and pensions, and investments.
Secondly, the FSA uses this information to publish a consolidated list of complaints data
covering all affected firms twice a year. It publishes the aggregate complaint figures on its
website showing how many complaints regulated firms have received and how they have
dealt with them.153 This data covers:
• the volume of complaints firms have received, by product type and cause of the
complaint, eg delays and misleading advice; and
• how firms have handled complaints, including the speed of complaints-handling and
the proportion of complaints that have been upheld by firms.
The most recent data published covered the period from 2006 to the first half of 2011 and
indicated that the overall number of complaints has increased by 32.6 per cent over this
period. The speed of firms’ complaints handling and the proportion of complaints upheld
149
FSMA, s 228.
150
See FOS policy statement on its strategic approach to transparency published in July 2008, which sets out
a transparency agenda, designed to provide a range of information about complaint-handling: www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/transparency.html.
151
PS10/1: Publication of complaints data including feedback to CP09/12, January 2010.
152
See the FSA’s websites: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_01.pdf and www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Other_
publications/complaint_handling/index.shtml.
153
See the FSA website at: www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/116.shtml.

by firms remained fairly stable over the period—during the period, around 13 per cent of
complaints took longer than eight weeks to resolve and around 40 per cent of complaints
were decided in customers’ favour.
The FSA carried out a review of complaint handling by the major banks in 2009/10 that
found that although examples of good practice existed, most banks had poor standards of
complaint handling.154
Thirdly, the FOS also publishes businesses complaints data on its website in order to help
people to see how individual firms handled their customer complaints.155 The complaints
data is published every six months, showing the number and outcome of the cases the FOS
has received, highlighting new cases received by the ombudsman which therefore show the
number of consumers dissatisfied with the financial business’s response to their complaint.
It also shows the percentage of resolved cases where the ombudsman service made a change
in favour of the consumer.156
Complaints tend to relate to firms’ behaviour, to specific products, or to a firm’s
complaint handling system. Problems with all of these aspects can be highlighted through
having transparent mechanisms. External commentators, such as Which? and the financial
press report them, and their comments have an impact on firms’ reputations (‘naming and
shaming’) and hence the ability to bring about internally led modifications in behaviour or
systems.
Finally, the FOS publishes enforcement case studies in its ‘Ombudsman News’, which
explain how cases have been handled and how many cases have been upheld. Over 1000
cases have now been published, which highlight issues, such as if a company has not trained
its staff adequately.157
Mass Cases
The statutory remit of FOS is to deal with individual cases, not mass issues. Thus, it lacks
specific collective redress mechanisms, such as the equivalent of a court’s Group Litigation
Order. However, the FOS inherently identifies market trends and issues that arise in similar
cases. It has, therefore, developed a number of procedures that can deal effectively with such
aggregate issues. The principal tools are:
1. Lead case process

The FOS identifies if a common principle exists in a group of cases. This is usually only the
case involving claims against an individual provider, in view of the fact that contractual
terms vary between different providers. If a common principle exists, the FOS can group
cases and identify an individual ‘clean case’ for each group (ie one in which the common
issue arises without other complications). The other group cases would be put on hold until
the resolution of the lead case. The FOS writes to individuals to inform them what is going
on. After the lead case has been decided, the FOS could ‘lean on’ the provider, who would
154
Review of complaint handling in banking groups (FSA, 2010).
155
See the complaints data at: http://www.ombudsman-complaints-data.org.uk/ (accessed 29 November 2010).
156
These figures cover financial businesses only where FOS received at least 30 new cases and resolved at least
30 cases in this six-month period from 1 January to 30 June 2010. Complaints relating to these businesses made up
around 90% of the total number of cases handled by the ombudsman service in this period.
157
See www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/90/90.htm.

usually settle the rest of the group cases. If the consumer lost the lead case, FOS would send
an anonymised copy of the decision to all group consumers, and say that if they think that
the circumstances in their case are different, they should inform FOS. It has been found
that only around 10 per cent of people tend to revert in those circumstances, usually on the
basis that they disagree with the lead case finding on principle rather than that they claim
that their cases are different.
The risk with this procedure is that a party will come up with a new argument that the
FOS has not considered during resolution of the lead case. This has not so far happened—it
is also an inherent risk in any court decision—but the FOS has addressed the point through
the ‘Wider Implications Process’ (see below).
2. Test case procedure

If one or more cases concern purely a point of law, and the provider agrees to pay the
consumer’s costs, a case can be referred to the High Court for determination. This avoids
the risk that a determination by the FOS will be taken to judicial review. The procedure
has not yet been used, although the House of Lords decision in Equitable Life was a similar
procedure, on referral from the former PIA Ombudsman. The case on interest rates for
unauthorised bank overdrafts reached court by a different route, by agreement between the
OFT and the banks.158
3. Wider Implications Process

This process arose from the 2-year review of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,
and was designed to enable regulatory solutions to be determined by FSA or OFT where
systemic problems had been identified from FOS’s caseload. It applied where there were
significant new implications for consumers in general, or for the industry, or even for one
business. Most issues were identified by the FSA or the FOS. The procedure required a
decision by the FOS and the relevant regulator to agree whether the issue had a wider
implication and whether the procedure should apply.159 However, the FSA did not always
have adequate powers to intervene.
The Wider Implications Process was replaced in 2011 by new procedures for liaison
between FSA, OFT and FOS, including a Co-ordination Committee made up of senior staff
from the three organisations. The stated purpose of this committee is to help to identify
emerging issues that could lead to widespread consumer detriment, and to co-ordinate
each organisation’s separate response to these.
Cost and source of finance
The Ombudsman service is free of charge for consumers. The budget of the FOS is calculated
on the basis of workload forecasts. For the financial year 2009/2010 the FOS operated on
a budget of £92 million and the total number of staff averaged 1,015 (in 2010/2011 £115.7
million and 1,300 staff).160 Actual income for 2009–2010 was £98.4 million, expenditure
Office of Fair Trading (Respondents) v Abbey National plc & Others (Appellants) [2009] UKSC 6.
158
See more at: www.wider-implications.info.

159
Annual Review. Financial year 2009/2010 (FOS, 2010) and Annual Review. Financial year 2010/2011 (FOS,
160
2011).

was £92.4 million, with a unit cost (ie cost per case) of £555 (respectively in 2010/11, £98.3
million, £105.9 million and £639).
The FOS is funded by an annual levy paid by the businesses it covers and by case fees
that it charges businesses for settling disputes. About 80 per cent of the budget comes from
these fees: a defendant currently pays £500 per case. In the financial years 2009/2010 and
2010/2011 the FOS did not charge businesses case fees for the first three disputes involving
them. Businesses were charged case fees only for the fourth (and any subsequent) dispute
during the year. The result is that only 5.5 per cent of firms ever pay this fee. The other 20
per cent of the budget comes from a levy on all firms, based on the justification that the
existence of the FOS and its ability to deal with and defuse many enquiries underpins public
confidence in the industry. The rates paid are aligned to the volume of work undertaken per
sector each year: number of accounts held by banks, and volume of investment income for
insurance. Financial details at Table 11.4.
Table 11.4: FOS budget figures
actual budget actual actual actual

year ended year ended year ended year ended year ended
31 March 2011 31 March 2011 31 March 2010 31 March 2009 31 March 2008
£ million £ million £ million £ million £ million
Income
annual levy 20.9 19.5 20.6 19.3 19.6
case fees 77.1 94 77.6 46.1 35.5
other income 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
total income 98.3 113.7 98.4 65.8 55.5
Expenditure
staff-related costs 88.8 99.7 78.3 47.8 41.2
other costs 15.0 13.9 12.3 8.7 10.0
financing charges 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2
depreciation 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.7
total expenditure 105.9 115.7 92.4 58.0 53.1
surplus/(deficit) (7.6) (2.0) 6.0 7.8 (0.5)
Statistics
In 2010/2011 FOS received 1,012,371 initial enquiries and complaints from consumers (a
17 per cent annual increase), averaging over 4,000 each working day. Only around 1 in 5 of
the initial enquiries, 206,121 cases, turned into a formal dispute requiring the involvement
of adjudicators and ombudsmen (an annual increase of 26 per cent).161 The average number
of cases resolved every week by each adjudicator in 2010 was 4.1. The number of cases
requiring the direct involvement of an ombudsman in issuing a final decision was 17,465.
Ombudsmen were more likely to be involved in pensions and investments, reflecting the
complexity of these disputes and the larger amount of money involved. In 2010–11, 61 per
cent of cases involved insurance (including PPI), 31.5 per cent banking and credit, and 7.5
161
FOS Annual Review 2010/2011.

per cent investments and pensions. The FOS resolved disputes in 49 languages. Seventy-
eight per cent of adults in UK said they were aware of the FOS.
Fifty-one per cent of the total number of cases related to just four of the UK’s largest
financial services groups, while 3,592 businesses accounted for only 5 per cent of the
caseload (in 2009/10, 2,259 businesses had one complaint each). In 2009–10, 164,899 cases
were resolved, resulting in compensation for consumers in 51 per cent of complaints. Apart
from PPI cases, which were delayed because of legal action by the banks, almost half of
disputes were resolved within three months, and three-quarters within six months.
The volume of cases received by the FOS can be subject to sudden surges, related to
particular issues that arise.162 This can present a major managerial challenge for firms
and the FOS, and can lead to a fall in the quality of complaint handling. Behaviours by
companies can sometimes be driven by market issues that might lead to keeping complaints
unresolved, such as firms’ need for cash in 2009–10. In 2009/10 and 2010/11 PPI cases
increased by 58 and 113 per cent respectively. In 2010/11, insurance disputes increased by
38 per cent and complaints about banking and credit rose by 30 per cent, but the number of
investment complaints stayed the same, motor insurance disputes decreased by 13 per cent,
and pension complaints fell by 27 per cent.
In its first ten years of operation, up to 2010/11, the FOS received a total of 1,172,719
cases, of which 26 per cent were about the sale of mortgage endowments, 17 per cent about
the sale of payment protection insurance and 4 per cent about unauthorised current account
overdraft charges. Recent complaints data is shown in Table 11.5.
Table 11.5: Complaints types 2007–2010163
Type of complaint 2010 2009 2008 2007

No of No of No of No of
% % % %
cases cases cases cases
banking and credit 44% 71,700 43% 55,038 66.5% 69,238 21% 20,099
insurance 42% 69,034 39.5% 50,168 22% 27,286 17% 15,730
investments and
14% 22,278 17.5% 22,265* 10.5% 12,787 13% 12,429
pensions
*mortgage endowment *mortgage endowment
complaints included complaints included
mortgage endowments 11% 13,778 49% 46,134
with investments and with investments and
pensions pensions
new cases in total 163,012 127,471 123,089 94,392
162
Examples in recent years include investors in Equitable Life, bank charges for unauthorised overdrafts, split
capital investment trusts, tax exempt special savings accounts and payment protection insurance. Issues have often
been driven by consumer champions, such as leading consumer advocates or claims management companies, who
may be seeking fees through furthering issues, as drove a general increase in consumer credit cases.
163
FOS Annual Review 2010/2011 p 32.

Finance & Leasing Association
The Finance & Leasing Association (FLA) is the leading trade association for the consumer
credit, motor finance and asset finance sectors, and the largest organisation of its type in
Europe.164 Its ninety members are banks, subsidiaries of banks and building societies, the
finance arms of leading retailers and manufacturing companies, and a range of independent
firms, which collectively provide facilities that account for a third of the UK’s unsecured
lending and half of all car purchases. Options include finance leasing, operating leasing,
hire purchase, conditional sale, personal contract purchase plans, personal lease plans,
secured and unsecured personal loans, credit cards and store card facilities.
The FLA operates two codes; the Lending Code, for B2C transactions, first introduced
in 1992;165 and the Business Finance Code, for B2B finance.166 This analysis is primarily
concerned with the Lending Code, which specifies FLA’s complaints procedures and
requires members to make it known to customers at the time of taking out a loan and
subsequently. The FLA considered applying for approval of its Codes under the OFT’s code
approval scheme,167 but decided against this because it regarded the approval procedure as
too lengthy.
The FLA Code scheme pre-existed the establishment of the FOS’s consumer credit
jurisdiction in 2007, following which consumer credit complaints had to be handled in
accordance with the FSA’s complaint-handling rules in DISP 1 (see above), under which
firms are allowed 8 weeks to resolve consumer complaints, at the end of which they must
send the complainant a final response letter which signposts them to the FOS if they
remain dissatisfied. The members of the FLA are able to refer customers to an outsourced
ADR facility operated by the FLA, with a view to reducing the number of complaints later
referred on to FOS, for reasons of maintaining customer relationships and avoiding the
£500 FOS case fee. FLA believes that it deals with roughly 30 per cent of its members’ cases
that would otherwise be decided by the FOS. The FOS refers to FLA cases that are outside
the jurisdiction of the FOS: the number of such referrals was 39 complaints in 2009 and 64
in 2008.
The jurisdiction of the FOS to decide cases on the basis of what is ‘fair and reasonable’ is
mirrored in the FLA Lending Code’s first ‘Key commitment’ to ‘act fairly, reasonably and
responsibly in all our dealings with you’. Individual complaints by personal or business
customers about a full member of the FLA may be made to FLA, provided the complaint
has not been subject to court proceedings. FLA can be contacted by phone168 or through
its website.169 Complaints are handled by the Compliance Team, and are dealt with in three
escalating stages: direct negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration.
The Compliance Team first encourages customers to contact their lenders and try
to sort out problems direct. The Compliance Team frequently acts as a conciliator
between the two sides. Team members are able to use their expertise in explaining legal
arrangements to consumers who might find them difficult to understand. This information
164
www.fla.org.uk The FLA was formed in 1992 from the merger of the Equipment Leasing Association and the
Finance Houses Association.
165
See www.fla.org.uk/consumer.
166
www.fla.org.uk/business/The_Business_Finance_Code.
167
See section below.
168
020 7836 6511.
169
www.fla.org.uk/consumers/complaints-process.

function is particularly useful for educating customers, and the provision of a channel of
communication is useful for both sides. Equally, the Team can use its authority to persuade
members to behave appropriately in responding to complaints.
Where the consumer does not accept the decision reached through the Conciliation
Scheme, and the type of complaint is not eligible for consideration by the FOS, it may be
referred to binding arbitration. The arbitration service is provided by IDRS in its standard
form.170 Two cases were dealt with in this arbitration scheme in 2009. The low number is
partly due to the success of the Conciliation Scheme.
The above procedures are capable of handling multiple similar cases. All cases are
considered individually on their merits, whilst general approaches can be applied. Examples
of mass situations have involved administration charges and Payment Protection Insurance
(PPI).
Consumers pay nothing to use the FLA’s conciliation or arbitration services. The FLA
member pays a £25 registration fee per case, and the FLA pays the remainder of IDRS’
£500 fee. The arbitration agreement includes the usual power for the arbitrator to award
costs against the losing party, but this power has not been exercised in any of the cases in
recent years. The arbitration agreement contains the standard provision on the award being
binding, so a consumer who signs the arbitration agreement waives the right to take the
case to the court or the FOS, unless in a judicial review.
In addition to providing a conciliation service, the FLA Compliance Team monitors the
number and type of complaints and reports them to the relevant Group. This information
is important in identifying potential industry-wide problems and emerging trends relating
both to compliance with the Code and the operation of the conciliation scheme. The Group
may also decide that further guidance might be needed to address a particular problem.
Where a significant breach of a Code has occurred, which the member company has failed
or refused to remedy to the satisfaction of the Group, or where it is considered that the
actions of the company have resulted or may result in serious consumer detriment or
significant reputational damage to the code, the Group will refer the matter to the FLA
Disciplinary Panel. The Disciplinary Panel comprises two members of the FLA Board and
three independent members,171 and is able to impose a hierarchy of sanctions.
In 2010, the total number of consumer complaints received by the FLA from members
of the public was 1,726. Of these, 1,084 were referred to FLA members for investigation, of
which 1,071 (99 per cent) were resolved.172 In the other 642 cases, the complainant chose
not to pursue the complaint further, or the complaint was resolved without the need for
FLA conciliation, or was referred to the FOS. This represents a decrease both in the number
of complaints received by the FLA and in those referred to the FLA membership for further
investigation.173 In 2010, 63 per cent of complaints came direct from consumers, and the
majority (623) related to PPI cases.
170
www.cedr.com/about_us. For more details on IDRS, part of the CEDR Disputes Group, see p 267 above.
171
The chair is Professor Geraint Howells, a professor of law at Manchester University, who is a barrister and
Member of the Board of the International Association of Consumer Law.
172
Of the total, there were 623 complaints about payment protection insurance (PPI) policies (57%).
173
Source: FLA Complaint statistics, 2010, Lending Code Group Annual Report for 2011 (FLA, 2011).

Pensions
Problems relating to pensions can be resolved or assisted by a number of possible

mechanisms, which differ for different types of pensions. The advisory, investigatory and
dispute resolution functions of the Pensions Advisory Service and the statutory Pensions
Ombudsman are outlined below: they can be regarded as a sequence of escalating stages.
The CEDR Disputes Group (see above) also provides a Pensions Mediation Service with the
National Association of Pension Funds.174
The Pensions Advisory Service
The Pension Advisory Service (TPAS) was established in 1983 as the Occupational Pensions
Advisory Service (OPAS) as a charity. From 1990 it became a voluntary organization and
has been in receipt of government funding. Its name changed from OPAS to The Pensions
Advisory Service. The TPAS is now a company limited by guarantee and is independent
of both the Government and the pensions industry. It provides free information, advice
and guidance on the whole spectrum of pensions, including state, company, personal
and stakeholder schemes.175 While TPAS deals with complaints about how company
(occupational) and personal pension schemes are run it does not deal with how they are
performing.176 Disputes about the selling or marketing of pensions are dealt with by the
Financial Ombudsman Service.
TPAS can be approached after a complaint could not be resolved directly with the pension
scheme administrator or manager and any of the following apply:
• the consumer is paying contributions,
• the consumer has a deferred pension from previous employment,
• the consumer is already receiving a pension,
• the consumer is the dependant of any of the above.
The Pensions Ombudsman
The Pensions Ombudsman deals with complaints about the administration of private
pensions and pension schemes.177 The office was created under the Pension Schemes Act
1993.178 The Pensions Ombudsman is appointed by the Secretary of State for the Department
of Work and Pensions (DWP), who may remove him at any time.179 The office is funded by
grant-in-aid from the DWP, which is recovered from a general levy on pension schemes
that covers the Pensions Regulator (TPR), TPAS and the Pensions Ombudsman, and is
174
www.cedr.com/?location=/library/releases/20060207_70.htm.
175
It was established as OPAS, a charity providing free advice and a free mediation service. It comprises
experienced advisers from the pensions world, mainly volunteers but with some technical resource.
176
www.pensionsadvisoryservice.org.uk.
177
Problems with State pensions have to be raised with the Pension Service, which is part of the Department for
Work and Pensions: see www.thepensionservice.gov.uk.
178
It was considered that a series of tribunals for pensions disputes should be created, but this was rejected and
the office of the Pensions Ombudsman was created instead. The office was inspired by the role of ACAS in relation
to Employment Tribunals.
179
Pension Schemes Act 1993, s 145(3).

invoiced and collected by TPR.180 The Pensions Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman
currently have 35 staff.
Jurisdiction and functions

The architecture of the Pensions Ombudsman is unique. The Pensions Ombudsman has two
distinct statutory functions. In addition to having the authority to decide disputes of fact or
law relating to pensions, and to issue binding decisions akin to a judge or arbitrator, he also
acts akin to a public sector ombudsman in relation to both public and private pensions in
determining complaints about maladministration of pensions.
The functions of the Pensions Ombudsman are established in section 146 of the Pension
Schemes Act 1993:
(1) The Pensions Ombudsman may investigate and determine any complaint made to him in
writing by or on behalf of an authorised complainant who alleges that he has sustained injustice
in consequence of maladministration in connection with any act or omission of the trustees or
managers of an occupational pension scheme or personal pension scheme.
(2) The Pensions Ombudsman may also investigate and determine any dispute of fact or law which
arises in relation to such a scheme between—
(a) the trustees or managers of the scheme, and
(b) an authorised complainant,
and which is referred to him in writing by or on behalf of the authorised complainant.
…
(7) The persons who, for the purposes of this Part are ‘authorised complainants’ in relation to a
scheme are—
(a) a member of the scheme,
(b) the widow or widower, or any surviving dependant, of a deceased member of the scheme;
(c) where the complaint or dispute relates to the question—
i. whether a person who claims to be such a person as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)
is such a person, or
ii. whether a person who claims to be entitled to become a member of the scheme is so
entitled,
the person so claiming.
The Pensions Ombudsman also acts as the Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman (PPFO),
and considers applications related to decisions made by the Board of the Pension Protection
Fund (PPF)181 under their internal procedures and appeals against decisions made by the
Scheme Manager under the internal review procedure of the Financial Assistance Scheme.182
Many bodies covered by the Pensions Ombudsman are unregulated, although some
bodies are regulated by either the FSA or the Pensions Regulator (TPR).183 There are both
180
In 2009/2010 the grant-in-aid was £2,930,000, and net expenditure was £2,864,625: see Annual
Report & Accounts 2009/10, available at http://www.pensions-ombudsman.org.uk/Publications/docs/
AnnualReport2009-10.pdf. A second levy supports the Pensions Protection Fund.
181
The role of the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) is to give compensation to members of eligible pension
schemes, when there are not enough assets in the pension scheme to cover the PPF level of compensation. www.
pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/homepage.aspx.
182
The Financial Assistance Scheme offers assistance to some people who have lost out on their pension because
they were a member of an under-funded defined benefit pension scheme that started winding up between 1
January 1997 and 5 April 2005. www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/FAS/Pages/FAS.aspx.
183
This contrasts with the position for general financial services firms that come under the jurisdiction of the
FSA and FOS.

overlaps and gaps between the jurisdictions of FOS and the Pensions Ombudsman. The FOS,
under its compulsory jurisdiction, deals with consumer complaints about the regulated
pension activities of firms authorised by the FSA. These activities potentially concern the
sale or administration of personal pension schemes and related investments, and in some
circumstances investments of occupational schemes. Conversely, the Pensions Ombudsman
deals with complaints and disputes concerning the management of both personal and
occupational pensions against the body responsible for management (including employers)
regardless of whether the body is subject to regulation—by either FSA or TPR.
The most significant overlap is that FOS and the Pensions Ombudsman can both deal
with complaints from individual consumers about the management of personal pensions
by a provider firm. In an attempt to make matters simpler for consumers, a memorandum
of understanding has been agreed between the two bodies.184 This states, in broad terms,
that the Pensions Ombudsman deals with complaints predominantly about management of
personal and occupational schemes and FOS deals with complaints predominantly about
sales or marketing.
The memorandum of understanding has not provided a complete solution, as it removes
neither the lack of clarity for consumers seeking redress nor the confusion amongst
firms. Although the majority of complaints come initially to the right ombudsman, many
do not. Each regulator requires signposting of complaints, but the requirements are not
themselves consistent with the memorandum of understanding. The system thus relies on
the wrongly signposted ombudsman transferring the case to the other. This does not imply
unsatisfactory performance on the part of the signposting firms, as interpretation of the
jurisdictional boundaries is complex.
The most significant gap relates to complaints about advice on transfers within and
between occupational pension schemes. This gap exists because FOS cannot deal with
such complaints because the activity is not an FSA-regulated activity. However, Pensions
Ombudsman cannot deal with them because they relate to advice about a scheme.
Procedure
The statutory rules185 of procedure encourage a sequencing of direct negotiation, and
conciliated settlement, against the backdrop of powers to make binding decisions. Thus,
before approaching the Pensions Ombudsman an individual should:
• try to resolve the complaint with the pension scheme administrator or pension scheme
manager: many schemes have a formal Internal Dispute resolution (IDR) procedure;
• if the above fails, usually then contact the Pensions Advisory Service186 who may
be able to help resolve the complaint, before making a complaint to the Pensions
Ombudsman.
A person who complains to the Pensions Ombudsman has to fill in the application form,
which can be done on the website.187 This sets out what the complaint is, who the complainant
thinks is at fault, and what he or she thinks should be done to put things right. Documents
184
www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/pdf/ memoran.dum-of-understanding.pdf.
185
The Personal and Occupational Pension Schemes (Pensions Ombudsman) (Procedure) Rules 1995, SI
1995/1053, as amended by the Personal and Occupational Pension Schemes (Pensions Ombudsman) (Procedure)
Amendment Rules 1996, SI 1996/2638.
186
www.pensions-ombudsman.org.uk/Complaints/How_we_deal_with_complaints/index.aspx.
187
www.pensions-ombudsman.org.uk.

not already held by TPAS are requested: they will usually be shown to the people who are
being complained about. All cases are screened to determine that the matter falls within the
Pensions Ombudsman’s mandate and rules. A complaint has to be made within three years
of the problem arising. The Ombudsman then has discretion about how to take the matter
forward, such as by asking one or other side for comments or more information, or writing
to one or both parties with the investigator’s preliminary view of the complaint.
The procedures of the Pensions Ombudsman are also designed and sequenced to achieve
tiered resolution of cases.188 First, the office may attempt to mediate a dispute informally
(for example by phone) on receiving a new complaint.189 Secondly, the investigator dealing
with the matter may inform one or both parties of his or her preliminary view of the matter.
Prior to 2009, such letters would only be written where it was thought that a company was
not going to succeed in its case, but since then views can be expressed on general likely
outcomes. Both sides have an opportunity to comment on a preliminary view before a final
decision is taken.
Cases are then passed to the Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman. He or she can then
write to the parties saying whether or not he or she agrees with the investigator’s initial view,
and that may produce settlement. If the view is not accepted by the party being complained
about, any further information sent by that party will be considered before the Ombudsman
issues a final and binding decision, which says whether or not the complaint is upheld and,
if so, what should be done to put matters right.
A complainant can nominate someone to help, including a solicitor. Around 24 per cent
of claimants are represented by someone else, whether legally qualified or not. In general,
the costs of any external advice or representation by either party are not recoverable from
the other party, but could be ordered to be payable in rare circumstances.
The Pensions Ombudsman may refer any question of law arising for determination in
connection with a complaint or dispute to the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of
Session.190
The rules of procedure, made by the Secretary of State, have an adversarial model, but are
in practice not often referred to, since principles of natural justice are instead applied. The
Ombudsman has power to require production of documents (which is used occasionally,
but the threat of use is usually sufficient in cases where a party is failing to respond) and has
power to require individuals to give evidence. Oral hearings can be held, and this tends to
occur when the honesty of a party is in issue, if there are large sums involved, or if there is
a conflict of evidence that cannot be decided on paper.
A decision in favour of an applicant will usually include instructions on how the other
party should put things right. Orders may include such matters as:
• putting a pension into payment;
• reconsidering a decision, for example concerning ill health and early retirement;
• delaying transfers;
• determining that a trustee is personally responsible and should make good the fund.
A determination by the Ombudsman is binding on all parties and has the status of a
County Court judgment. If it is necessary to enforce a decision, the complainant has to
188
The sequenced procedures noted here have developed over time: when the office was started in 1991 every
case went straight to the Ombudsman personally.
189
This stage is referred to in the official statistics as ‘resolved/withdrawn’.
190

institute enforcement proceedings in the County Court. That can present problems in
practice. However, only a handful of awards are not complied with every year: the Pensions
Ombudsman is aware of this since the Court procedure requires him to provide a certified
copy of his award.
Decisions of the Pensions Ombudsman can be appealed to the High Court.191 A limited
number of Pensions Ombudsman decisions have been appealed. A notable one involved
upholding the Pensions Ombudsman’s decision to order the Department of Transport to
repay a large sum that ended in a settlement of £355.8 million.192
The Pensions Ombudsman has appeared as a party in appeals to the High Court from
his jurisdiction, which is an unusual situation. However, the current Pensions Ombudsman
only does this in rare situations involving cases that concern his powers or jurisdiction,
rather than cases involving the merits of a dispute.
Cost
The complaints process involving the Pensions Ombudsman is free to applicants. There is
no adverse costs risk, so the procedure has obvious attractions as compared with a court
case. There are two reasons for the absence of a costs rule. Firstly, most pensions cases are
not appropriate for a cost shifting rule since it would penalise pensioners. Secondly, it is
quite often difficult to say who has won or lost. There has been discussion over whether it is
necessary to impose a registration fee so as to discourage frivolous complaints, but this has
not to date been thought appropriate. There are now very few pensions litigation cases that
involve an individual against trustees: there are many cases involving employers and trustees.
The Pension Ombudsman is funded by grant-in-aid paid by the Department for Work and
Pensions (DWP), which is mainly recovered from the general levy on pension schemes. In
2010/11 the office received £2,810,000 grant-in-aid, incurred net expenditure of £2,678,353
and had net assets at 31 March 2011 of £75,913.193
Statistics
In 2009/2010,194 the Pension Ombudsman accepted 950 complaints for investigation (43 of
which concerned the same issue and could be dealt with as one). The three highest areas of
complaint were ill-health pensions, misleading information and transfers. It took an average
of 9.6 weeks for the Ombudsman’s office to deal with initial enquiries and decide whether
to accept a complaint for investigation. The average time taken to complete investigations
was 10.9 months.
Of the 889 investigations closed during 2009/2010, only 231 needed to be formally
determined by the Ombudsman or his Deputy. Of the remainder, 187 cases were
discontinued, withdrawn or resolved informally, 152 investigations closed after a decision
of the investigator using the informal procedures, and 319 cases were determined by the
Ombudsman under the informal procedures following the investigator’s initial decision.
There were 4 appeals of Ombudsman determinations over the course of the year, with 6
other appeals remaining to be heard as at 31 March 2010. The Ombudsman observes that
191
192
See in re National Bus Superannuation Scheme [1999] 48 PBLR.
193
Annual Report and Account 2010/2011 of the Pension Ombudsman.
194
www.pensions-ombudsman.org.uk/Publications/docs/AnnualReport2009-10.pdf.

notice for 4 applications for judicial review had been received ‘most unusually and for no
obvious reason’.
The Ombudsman also undertakes the role of Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman. In
2009/2010, 45 applications for review of PPF decisions were received, 38 of which were
accepted for investigation, 18 cases were concluded (almost exclusively relating to the
calculation of the risk-based portion of the PPF levy) and in each case the decision of
the PPF was upheld. As at 31 March 2010, one notice of appeal of a PPF Ombudsman
determination had been received.
The Legal Ombudsman
Following the introduction of statutory regulation of the legal profession under the Legal
Services Act 2007,195 an Office for Legal Complaints (OLC) was created,196 with a duty to
administer an ombudsman service for England and Wales. The OLC must have regard
to best practice of those who administer ombudsmen schemes,197 and appoint a Chief
Ombudsman and, with the Chief Ombudsman’s consent, assistant ombudsmen.198 The
service is known as the Legal Ombudsman.199 The new scheme began on 6 October 2010, to
provide a single gateway for consumers of legal services to channel their complaints while at
the same time driving systemic improvement by feeding back to the profession information
and methods to improve. The Legal Services Consumer Panel stated in 2012: ‘The Legal
Ombudsman is a very important partner organisation for the Legal Services Consumer
Panel. It forms a vital part of the consumer protection machinery through its twin functions
of providing a dispute resolution service and using intelligence from complaints to help
raise standards.’200
The scheme rules, which set out the framework for how the Legal Ombudsman resolves
complaints about legal services, are approved by the Legal Services Board and the Lord
Chancellor, as required by the Legal Services Act.201 The first step is for a client to tell
the lawyer, and allow up to eight weeks to resolve the complaint. If the consumer is not
happy with the lawyers’ final response, they have up to 6 months to bring the compliant
to the Ombudsman. The complaint should also be brought to the Ombudsman no later
than 12 months from when the problem first occurred, or from when the consumer
should reasonably have become aware of the problem. An ombudsman may fix (and may
extend) a time limit for any stage of the investigation, consideration and determination of a
complaint. If any party fails to comply with such a time limit, the ombudsman may proceed
195
The Legal Services Board was established as oversight regulator (Legal Services Act 2007, Part 2 and Schedule
1) of ten Approved Regulators (including the bar, solicitors, and others), together with a Legal Services Consumer
Panel (s8 of the Act).
196
Legal Service Act 2007, s114 and Schedule 15.
197
Legal Service Act 2007, s116(3).
198
Legal Services Act 2007, s122.
199
www.legalombudsman.org.uk.
200
Consultation response: Legal Ombudsman: Strategy 2012–2015, Business Plan 2012–2013 (Legal Services
Consumer Panel, January 2012), available at www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/consultation_
responses/documents/2012-01-09_LEO_strategy2012businessplan2012.pdf.
201
www.legalombudsman.org.uk/downloads/documents/publications/OLC_Scheme%20rules_v1_201104-
1_FINAL.pdf.

with the investigation, consideration and determination; draw inferences from the failure;
where the failure is by the complainant, dismiss the complaint; or where the failure is by the
authorised person, include compensation for any inconvenience caused to the complainant
in any award.
The service is free to consumers. The Ombudsman service is open to all members of
the public and to very small businesses, charities, clubs and trusts. An ombudsman will
determine a complaint by reference to what is, in his/her opinion, fair and reasonable in all
the circumstances of the case. In determining what is fair and reasonable, the ombudsman
will take into account (but is not bound by): what decision a court might make; the relevant
Approved Regulator’s rules of conduct at the time of the act/omission; and what the
ombudsman considers to have been good practice at the time of the act/omission.
If the Legal Ombudsman agrees that the lawyer’s service has been unsatisfactory, he can
ask them to:
• apologise to the consumer,
• give back any documents needed by the consumer,
• do more work for the consumer if this can put right what went wrong,
• refund or reduce the legal fees, or
• pay compensation if the consumer has lost out or been badly treated anything up to
£30,000.
Once accepted, an Ombudsman’s decision is final. A binding and final determination can
be enforced through the High Court or a county court by the complainant. A binding and
final determination can also be enforced through the High Court or a county court by
an Ombudsman, if the complainant agrees; and the Ombudsman considers it appropriate
in all the circumstances. A court which makes an enforcement order must tell the Legal
Ombudsman, and then an Ombudsman will tell the relevant Approved Regulator; may
require that Approved Regulator to tell the Ombudsman what action it will take; and
may report any failure by that Approved Regulator to the Legal Services Board. The Legal
Ombudsman may publish a report of its investigation, consideration and determination of
a complaint. The report will not name (or otherwise identify) the complainant, unless the
complainant agrees.
A complaint is potentially chargeable to the lawyer unless the case is dismissed or
discontinued. No case fee is payable for the first two potentially chargeable complaints
closed during the Legal Ombudsman’s financial year relating to a business/partnership that
is responsible for any act/omission of any employee/partner; or any individual authorised
person for whom no business/partnership is responsible. The case fee is £400 for all
chargeable complaints. The remaining costs of running the Legal Ombudsman are covered
by a levy on Approved Regulators by the Legal Services Board.
In the first six months of operation,202 38,155 people contacted the Legal Ombudsman by
phone, email and letter. Of these, 3,768 complaints were accepted for investigation. A total
of 1,450 cases was resolved, of which 55 per cent were resolved within three months of a
consumer’s first contact, 76 per cent within four months and 92 per cent within five months.
Failure to advise and failure to follow instructions were the most common categories of
complaint. The annual budget in 2011 was £19.9 million.
202
Annual report 2011.

Telecoms
This section considers general complaints to the regulator, complaints about broadcasting
issues and Premium Rate Services, and complaint handling and dispute resolution
requirements on providers.
Complaints to the Regulator
Complaints about a service provider made to the regulatory body, OFCOM, will be
processed under published procedures in relation to various types of issues such as:
• considering complaints and carrying out investigations relating to breaches of licence
conditions;203
• handling complaints about unfair treatment or infringements of privacy during the
making or showing of programmes and advertising (‘fairness and privacy complaints’—
see below);204
• imposing sanctions for non-payment of licence fees;205
• consideration and determination of statutory sanctions.206
The number of contacts and complaints that OFCOM received between 2007/8 and 2009/10
is shown in Table 11.6, for the main types. By far the highest number of complaints each year
related to telecommunications issues, although the trend has been downward. In 2009/10,
127,300 contacts were initiated by telephone and 67,200 from internet forms, emails, letters
and faxes. Until 2011, OFCOM have felt obliged to look at every single complaint that is
received, but this policy is now under review, in order to save money: a general discretion
may be sufficient, which would allow OFCOM to focus on major issues.
Table 11.6: Total number of complaints to Ofcom 2007/8 to 2009/10
2009/10 2008/9 2007/8

Telecommunications 105,400 140,000 152,000
Spectrum issues and licensing 62,500 49,800 57,600
General enquiries 2,200 3,200 5,000
Broadcasting 24,400 29,100 22,000
Total 194,500 222,100 236,600
OFCOM has powers to enforce breaches of the statutory requirements by imposition of

penalties and taking enforcement action in court, but the primary means of control is through
use of setting ‘General Conditions’ in licences that apply to all communications providers
203
Procedures for the handling of broadcasting standards or other licence-related cases (Ofcom, 2009) available at
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/guidance/complaints-sanctions/standards.
204
Procedures for the handling of fairness & privacy complaints (London, Ofcom, 2009) available at stakeholders.
ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/guidance/complaints-sanctions/fairness.
205
Procedures for the consideration of statutory sanctions in cases of non-payment of license fees (London, Ofcom,
2009), at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/broadcast/guidance/complaints-sanctions/complaints_sanctions.pdf.
206
Procedures for the consideration of statutory sanctions in broadcasting or other licence-related cases (London,
Ofcom, 2009) available at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/guidance/complaints-sanctions/procedures-
statutory-sanctions.

who provide an electronic communications network and/or electronic communications

service in the United Kingdom.207 The sanction of being able to revoke a licence in response
to non-compliance with a General Condition, or to impose more detailed conditions, is a
powerful weapon.208
Complaints under the Broadcasting Code
Complaints may be made to OFCOM under the Broadcasting Code209 where a person has
been offended or unfairly treated, including unwarranted infringement of privacy of people
appearing in (or in connection with the obtaining of material included in) programmes.210
OFCOM must consider and, where appropriate, adjudicate on fairness and privacy
complaints.211 There is no charge for making a complaint to Ofcom: OFCOM bears its
own cost of the investigation and enforcement.
OFCOM has a team of around 20 people working on maintenance and operation of
the Broadcasting Code, plus six additional people who deal with low-level complaints. 90
per cent of complaints are received through the website. A complaint is reviewed through
internal procedures, and then an investigation may be held. The process is changing to be
more streamlined. In the initial phase nearly 30 per cent of complaints get filtered out. 80-
90 per cent of complaints do not raise issues under the Broadcasting Code: in such cases
the complainant will always be sent a letter to that effect. However, OFCOM records all
complaints, not least because they usually relate to the 10 major channels.
OFCOM divides cases into ‘straightforward’ cases, those in which OFCOM does not
need to contact the broadcaster to deal with the complaint, and ‘complex’ cases, those which
require investigation with the broadcaster. In 2009–10, 99.2 per cent of straightforward
cases were closed within 30 working days (target 80 per cent), and 72.1 per cent of complex
cases were closed within 60 working days.212
Ten per cent of the complaints lead to a serious investigation. OFCOM first writes to
the broadcaster for comments, and then makes its decision. For TV and radio complaints
the investigation team requires recordings. The findings are reported in a ‘bulletin’ that
appears fortnightly on OFCOM’s website. It contains complaints, compliance issues and
high-profile complaints. Some ‘not upholds’ are still important to establishing standards of
conduct, since they relate to relevant issues. The totality of complaints represents a tool for
207
Communications Act 2003, ss 45–51. Power to impose sanctions for breaches of license conditions or other
enforceable requirements are set out in the Communications Act 2003, the Competition Act 1998, the Enterprise
Act 2002, the Broadcasting Act 1990, the Broadcasting Act 1996, EU Regulations and the Wireless Telegraphy Act
2006, depending upon the type of license which has been granted to the relevant broadcaster.
208
Communications Act 2003, ss 94–104.
209
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code. See guidance at stakeholders.
ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/guidance/programme-guidance/bguidance The Broadcasting Code is updated
regularly. The code was reviewed in 2009: Broadcasting code review, Statement on the Ofcom Broadcasting Code,
(Ofcom, 2009), available at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/bcode09/summary/main.pdf;
procedures were reviewed in 2010 and streamlined: Review of procedures for handling broadcasting complaints,
investigations and sanctions, stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/broadcast-complaints-review; it was them
changed in 2011.
210
See Procedures for handling of Fairness and Privacy complaints, at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
broadcast/guidance/fairness.pdf. The Code requirements are Communications Act 2003, ss 319, 326 and
Broadcasting Act 1996 (as amended) s 107.
211
1996 Act, s 110.
212
Annual Report 2009–10.

measuring what the public think and feel about particular issues and ‘generally accepted
standards’, since these shift over time.
Some investigations into complaints are more complex. Some cases raise issues of
‘impartiality’, which is required by section 5 of the Broadcasting Code. News programmes
need to give equal exposure to all. Non-news items can give rise to rights on freedom of
expression under ECHR, and this can be difficult on issues on which there is controversy,
so it is necessary to look at issues widely. Other cases raise issues of fairness and privacy, on
which the Broadcasting Act sets out much detail.
A complainant can request a review of a decision by OFCOM. This gets dealt with afresh
by a different OFCOM executive, and does sometimes result in a different view. OFCOM
will consider whether to refer a matter to the Broadcast Committee. From 2011, a draft
decision will be shown to the provider, although not to the complainant, so as to provide
some opportunity and pressure for the broadcaster to respond spontaneously in resolving
the issue. It is always open to a broadcaster to seek judicial review of OFCOM’s process or a
decision, but this occurs very rarely.213
The number of complaints closed under the Broadcasting Code for three recent years
is shown at Table 11.7. The vast majority of complaints concerned programme standards.
Table 11.7: Number of complaints closed under the Broadcasting code214
2009/10 28,281 complaints, of which 28,072 were complaints about programme

standards (including issues relating to political advertising and the scheduling
of television advertising), and 209 were complaints about alleged unfairness
and/or unwarranted infringements of privacy.
2008/9 27,549 complaints
2007/8 64,742 complaints (including 194 over 44,500 complaints about ‘Celebrity Big
Brother’ 2007)
In 2009/10, of the 10,679 closed cases (28,072 complaints) relating to programme standards:
• 152 cases were found to be in breach either of the Broadcasting Code, other OFCOM
codes or of licence conditions. Of these, six cases were subject to statutory sanctions
(involving six separate broadcasters);
• 13 cases were resolved; and
• 10,514 cases were not in breach or out of remit.
Premium Rate Services and PhonepayPlus
Premium rate services (PRS) offer some form of content, product, facility or service that
is charged to a consumer’s bill for electronic communications services.215 OFCOM has the
power to approve a code for PRS that meets the legal requirements set out in section 121 of the
213
An example was a judicial review taken by Jon Gaunt/Talksport in 2008, which upheld Ofcom; www.
guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/18/utv-commercialradio; media.ofcom.org.uk/2010/07/13/high-court-backs-
ofcoms-judgment-in-jon-gaunt-case.
214
The following data is taken from Ofcom Annual Reports and relates to complaints considered under the
Broadcasting Code and closed in that reporting year.
215
PRS are defined in s 120(7) of the Communications Act 2003. They may be accessed by way of a conventional
voice call, but may also be accessed in other ways, such as SMS, PC, mobile phone downloads or interactive

Communications Act. OFCOM has approved the PhonepayPlus216 (formerly ICSTIS) Code
of Practice for these purposes.217 The most recent version is the PhonepayPlus Code (12th
Edition), dated 2011.218 In relation to those PRS that fall within the definition of ‘Controlled
PRS’, compliance with the Code is mandatory and OFCOM retains backstop powers under
the PRS Condition, which it may set.219 From 2011, all Controlled PRS providers are subject
to the PRS Condition, which enables OFCOM to require such providers to comply with
enforcement directions made by PhonepayPlus.220 Insofar as a particular PRS is not caught
within the definition of Controlled PRS, the PhonepayPlus Code of Practice applies to it,
but compliance is voluntary.
PhonepayPlus adjudicates complaints that are referred to it by consumers, members
of the public, industry, and through its monitoring of services. Complaints are recorded
and analysed, grouped with similar complaints relating to the same service, and are then
investigated by a specialist team. Adjudication is undertaken by an independent tribunal.
Tribunals meet fortnightly, and are drawn from a larger panel (the Code Compliance
Panel), which is chaired by a qualified barrister or solicitor having not less than 15 years’
relevant experience. Members of the Code Compliance Panel are appointed by the Board of
PhonepayPlus in consultation with the Chairman of the Panel, who is also appointed by the
Board. Tribunals are made up of three people, and comprise a legally qualified Chair, and
either two lay members or a lay member and a member of the PhonepayPlus board who has
no industry relationships.
PhonepayPlus currently operates three procedures for dealing with apparent breaches
of the Code. The Informal Procedure is used where the incident in question has caused
little consumer harm and the service provider has an acceptable history of complying
with the Code. In this instance, there is no formal investigation if the service provider
acknowledges the breach and agrees to take remedial action. At the other end of the
spectrum, the Emergency Procedure is used where the apparent breach has caused
serious consumer harm which requires immediate remedy. In this instance, PhonepayPlus
undertakes an immediate investigation of the service and presents its early findings to
the Code Compliance Panel with a view to securing their agreement to the service being
immediately removed from operation, pending formal adjudication within a subsequent
10 working day period.
In all other cases, PhonepayPlus operates the Standard Procedure. This involves the
service provider being supplied with all the necessary information giving rise to the apparent
digital TV. Common forms of PRS include TV voting lines, competitions, adult entertainment, chat lines, business
information services, mobile phone ringtones, game downloads, horoscopes, and directory enquiry services.
216
www.phonepayplus.org.uk. PhonePayPlus was formerly an agent of Ofcom, functioning like the ASA. It
is non-profit making and consists of eight non-executive part-time Board members (with one Chair and one
Executive Board member), supported by a full time Executive. Board members are required to make and keep up-
to-date declarations of any conflict of interest. See Governance Statement at www.phonepayplus.org.uk/~/media/
Files/PhonepayPlus/Corporate/GovernanceStatement.pdf.
217
The relationship between Ofcom and PhonepayPlus is set out in a Framework Agreement, which is
available at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/phonepayplus.
218
Approval of the PhonepayPlus Code of Practice (12th Edition) A statement and notification approving the
PhonepayPlus Code of Practice for regulating Premium Rate Services under section 121 of the Communications Act
2003 (London, Ofcom, 2011), at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/ppp/statement/statement.pdf.
219
Communications Act 2003, ss 120–124.
220
Modifying who is subject to the Premium Rate Services Condition Statement on amending the PRS Condition
to mirror the remit of PhonepayPlus under its new Code of Practice (Ofcom, 2011), at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
binaries/consultations/prs-2011/statement/statement.pdf.

breach of the Code, which has been received or acquired by PhonepayPlus. The service
provider is given the opportunity to respond in detail to this information, and following
such response, a report is prepared by PhonepayPlus for submission to a Tribunal. A service
provider may request, or a Tribunal may invite, oral representations from service providers
prior to an adjudication.
PhonepayPlus also operates a procedure that enables the information, or content, provider
to respond to allegations of breach of the Code in place of the service provider, upon
satisfaction of certain conditions and on receipt of appropriate assurances and undertakings.
PhonepayPlus has a Sanctions Guide221 that sets out criteria for imposition of sanctions,
the power to order a party to make refunds to complainants where there has been a serious
breach and/or intent to mislead or defraud,222 the power to impose bars on the service
provider, and to fine. There is an Independent Appeals Body.
Code of Practice for Complaint Handling and Dispute Resolution
Background and research

OFCOM is required to set general conditions governing:
(a) the handling of complaints made to public communications providers by any of
their domestic and small business customers;
(b) the resolution of disputes between such providers and any of their domestic and
small business customers;
(c) the provision of remedies and redress in respect of matters that form the subject-
matter of such complaints or disputes.223
OFCOM must also secure so far as they consider appropriate that the dispute resolution
procedures are ‘easy to use, transparent and effective’, and free of charge for customers to
use.224 OFCOM shall approve a code submitted ‘if and only if, in their opinion, it makes all
such provision as they consider necessary in relation to the matters dealt with in the code
for the protection of [customers].’225
The task of approving over 300 individual codes would have imposed too great a burden
on OFCOM, so a self-regulatory system was adopted. Until 2011, OFCOM exercised the
above duties through two regulatory obligations on communications providers regarding
the handling of consumer complaints:
1. providers must have a Complaints Code of Practice that is approved by OFCOM and with which
they must comply;226 and
2. providers must belong to an OFCOM-approved Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) scheme
and adhere to the final decisions made by that scheme.227
221
www.phonepayplus.org.uk/~/media/Files/PhonepayPlus/Policy%20_Industry%20support/Sanctions_
Guide_20080408.ashx.
222
The Guide states that the Tribunal will take into account when imposing a sanction whether the party in
breach has already begun to issue refunds or intends to issue refunds: p 6.
223
Communications Act 2003, s 52.
224
Communications Act 2003, s 52. This implements the Universal Services Directive 2002/22/EC arts 20(1)
and 34(1), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC.
225
Communications Act 2003, s 53(1).
226
General Condition 14.4.
227
General Condition 14.7.

The ADR schemes are independent bodies that can examine complaints that have not
been resolved within eight weeks, at no cost to consumers. Two such ADR schemes were
approved by OFCOM: the Office of the Telecommunications Ombudsman (OTELO, since
2011 renamed Ombudsman Services: Communications) and the Communications and
Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CISAS). Providers could be a member of either
scheme.
There is no legal requirement for internet service providers to belong to a dispute
resolution scheme, but the vast majority (over 95 per cent of the Broadband market) belong
to the Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA). ISPA’s Code provides that members
will attempt to resolve complaints within ten working days of receipt, after which the
customer can complete an ISPA complaint form, which ISPA takes up with the member,
who has five working days to respond, after which a second complaint may be made and
will be referred to CISAS unless resolved within two months.228
The approach was reviewed extensively from 2008, based on market research229 and
consultation,230 and revised in 2011. The 2008 review concluded:231
3.3 ADR is a well established and important mechanism for giving a consumer access to justice
where recourse to the court system by the consumer may be impossible or impractical due to cost
and resource restraints. It is an important way to redress the power imbalance in disputes between
consumers and [Communications Providers (CPs)] – who normally have greater resources,
knowledge and control over the products and services which are in dispute.
3.4 We think that the current regulatory regime for ADR is successful in many ways. However, we
think that there are ways in which it is appropriate to improve it.
The principal issues identified were:

• the period before consumers have a right to go to ADR was set at twelve weeks, and
this was thought to be too long, and reduced to eight weeks;232
• the level of awareness amongst consumers of the right to go to ADR was too low, so
providers were required to notify their consumers about ADR (5 days after a complaint
is lodged and subsequently when the consumer has the right to go to ADR); and
• the ease of access to the ADR Schemes, including the level of support provided to
consumers by the ADR Schemes themselves.
The 2011 regime set minimum standards for complaints handling by establishing a single
OFCOM-approved Complaints Code of Practice, instead of CPs having to submit their
individual codes to OFCOM for approval. It also facilitated OFCOM monitoring by
requiring CPs to keep appropriate records of their contact with consumers; and set the
criteria for its review of the approval of ADR schemes.
Research conducted between July and August 2007 indicated that 15 per cent of adults
were aware of at least one of the two ADR schemes. Awareness was higher for OTELO (13
228
See www.ispa.org.uk/complaints.
229
By Futuresight in 2006, at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/alt_dis_res/futuresight and by Synovate
in 2009, at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/complaints_procedures/annexes/annex8.pdf.
230
Available at: stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/complaints_procedures/summary/adr_
condoc.pdf.
231
Review of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Complaints Handling Procedures, 10 July2008, at stakeholders.
ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/alt_dis_res/summary/condoc.pdf.
232
The original 12 weeks timeframe (now reduced to 8 weeks) came from the companies’ quarterly billing cycle.
The energy regulator made this change before telecoms.

per cent) than CISAS (7 per cent). However, the vast majority of consumers had not heard
of either of the ADR Schemes (83 per cent). Market research showed that awareness of
ADR was considerably lower in the telecommunications sector than in most comparable
industries, as demonstrated in Figure 11.2.233
Figure 11.2: Awareness of official dispute resolution bodies
80
* Significant difference at 99%
64
59
Total sample FSA awareness: 57%
48 * Ofgem awareness: 46%
Source: TNS omnibus June 09
Complainants to relevant
provider
26 28
15 15
8
Financial Ombudsman Energy Ombudsman Postal redress Otelo or CISAS None of these /
Service Service Don´t know
Those consumers who were aware of at least one of the ADR Schemes were asked how they
had found out about it. Results highlighted a range of sources most notably the media—
magazines/newspapers (22 per cent) and TV/Radio/Advertising (20 per cent). Friends and
family (15 per cent) and the internet (12 per cent) were the next most mentioned sources
of information. Notably, relatively few (5 per cent) mentioned their phone bill as their
source of information. This suggested that an approach which relied merely on requiring
CPs to include details of ADR Schemes on the back of their bill, as Otelo did, would not be
particularly effective in raising awareness.
Further evidence showed that a significant proportion of consumers had a very poor
experience when pursuing a complaint with their provider:234
• 23 per cent of the population had made a complaint235 to a mobile, broadband, or landline
provider in the preceding year, with 30 per cent of these complaints being unresolved 12
weeks later, representing around 3 million consumer complaints each year;
• the majority of consumers who could not resolve their complaint promptly had
considerable difficulty getting their provider to recognise they were trying to make a
complaint and in finding out information about the complaints process;
233
The sample sizes do not allow for a comparison of awareness levels across the industries amongst those
complainants that could potentially take their complaint to their respective ADR schemes.
234
A Review of Consumer Complaints Procedures. Statement. 22 July 2010, at stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
consultations/complaints_procedures/statement.
235
A ‘complaint’ was defined as ‘an expression of dissatisfaction made to a service provider related to its products
or services, or the complaints-handling process itself, where a response or resolution is expected.’

• those consumers who were unable to resolve their complaint within 12 weeks were
much more likely to suffer financially or through stress;
• ADR significantly improved outcomes for consumers, but awareness of ADR in the
telecommunications sector was considerably lower than comparable schemes in other
sectors, undermined its effectiveness as a remedy of last-resort;236 and
• OFCOM continued to receive nearly 1,000 complaints a month from consumers who
were unhappy with their provider’s complaints handling process.
Research showed that dispute resolution services improved the outcome for those consumers
who would otherwise fail to pursue complaints out of frustration with their provider’s
response or lack of response. For example, of those complaints about mobile providers that
were not resolved within 12 weeks, 91 per cent of complaints were subsequently resolved
when taken to a dispute resolution service, compared with 51 per cent of complaints where
the consumer did not go to a dispute resolution service.
OFCOM proposed key criteria for approval of an ADR Scheme, as shown in Table 11.8.237
Table 11.8: OFCOM’s key criteria for an ADR scheme
Criteria Description
Accessible Consumers to be able to access an ADR Scheme free of charge. Procedures must be
easy to use and understand, including for disabled and vulnerable consumers.
Independent The ADR Scheme to be impartial and independent of both the consumer and the
CP.
Fair Decisions to be based on principles of fairness, taking into account relevant
principles of law and equity.
Efficient The ADR Schemes to operate efficiently. They must deal with complaints in a
timely manner and use their resources in a responsible and efficient manner.
Transparent The ADR Schemes to be transparent about the rules which govern the use of their
services and about the decisions which they make.
Effective The ADR Schemes to have procedures in place, which are followed, to monitor the
implementation of its decisions and compliance with rules. They must make sure
that decisions are implemented by CPs.
Accountable The ADR Schemes to provide detailed and transparent reporting on their operation
to us and the public. OFCOM anticipated that ‘it will be appropriate to review the
current KPIs which the ADR Schemes are required to provide to us to ensure that
they remain relevant and useful and to make them comparable where possible’.
The Synovate market research demonstrated that ADR improved the prospect of a resolution
for complaints that had not been resolved within 12 weeks. For example, as shown in figure
8 below, 91 per cent of mobile complaints that went to ADR were completely or partially
resolved, compared with 51 per cent of mobile complaints that were not resolved within 12
weeks (labelled as ‘eligible ADR non-users’).
236
Only 8 % of consumers were aware that they could take unresolved complaints to ADR, less than half that
in a number of other sectors with similar schemes): 23% of respondents to a survey had made a complaint in the
telecommunications in the preceding year, compared with 4% in post, 12% in energy, and 6% in financial services.
237
2008 Review.

Figure 11.3: The outcome of consumer complaints
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 %
Mobile (n=97) 54 37 7 2
ADR
Landline (n=97) 41 46 10 2
users
Broadband (n=97) 41 38 19 2
Mobile (n=151) 30 21 44 5
Eligible
ADR non- Landline (n=150) 40 19 40 1
users
Broadband (n=150) 41 20 36 3
Mobile (n=101) 66 15 17 2
Complaints
under 12 Landline (n=101) 73 18 8 1
weeks
Broadband (n=101) 65 19 15 1
Completely resolved Partly resolved Not resolved at all Don´t know
However, OFCOM noted that the evidence set out in its consultation suggested that there
was not a clear link between awareness of ADR and use of ADR. For example it said that
although awareness of the Energy Ombudsman was much higher than that of the respective
telecommunications ADR schemes (48 per cent and 8 per cent respectively), both the energy
and telecommunications sectors had a similar proportion of long standing complaints
going to ADR (10 per cent of energy complaints lasting 8 weeks go to ADR, while 12 per
cent of telecommunications complaints that lasted 12 weeks go to ADR).
The Code on Complaints Handling

The 2011 OFCOM Approved Code of Practice for Complaints Handling in relation to
complaints made by residential and small business customers (see Figure 11.9)238 establishes
a number of requirements, including:239
• Relevant text about ADR is to be included on paper bills provided to domestic
customers (providing the name of the relevant ADR scheme, noting that the ADR
scheme offers a dispute resolution service that is independent of the CP, noting that
the scheme cannot be accessed unless eight weeks have passed since the consumer
first complained to the CP, and stating that ADR can be utilised by the consumer at
no cost);
• CPs must ensure consumers whose complaint has not been resolved within eight
weeks of first being made to a front-line agent receive written notification about their
right to go to ADR;
• CPs must ensure front-line staff are fully informed of the right of consumers to use
ADR; and
238
The Code of Practice came into force on 22 January 2011. The new requirements to improve awareness of
dispute resolution services came into force on 22 July 2011.
239
See clause 4 of Ofcom code.

• On request from a complainant, CPs must issue a deadlock letter referring a matter to
ADR unless the subject-matter of the complaint is outside the jurisdiction of the ADR
scheme, the complaint is vexatious, or the CP has genuine and reasonable grounds
for considering the matter will be resolved in a timely manner and subsequently takes
active steps to do so.
Initially, the customer (consumer or small business) takes the complaint to the telecoms
provider. If the provider is unable to resolve the complaint within 3 months, or if the
provider tells the customer that the complaint cannot be resolved (‘deadlock’), the customer
may take the complaint to an ADR scheme. The role of the ADR scheme is to investigate
complaints fairly and decide what actions should be taken to resolve the complaint.
The aim is to make it easier for consumers to exercise their right to take unresolved
complaints to a free independent resolution service. The Code of Practice will provide
consistency in standards and will give OFCOM powers to take enforcement action against
those providers who do not treat complainants fairly. The Code requires providers to ensure
the fair and timely resolution of complaints, and have procedures that are transparent and
accessible so that consumers can easily find out how to make a complaint.
Figure 11.4: The OFCOM Approved Code of Practice for Complaints Handling240
This Ofcom Approved Code of Practice for Complaints Handling (the ‘Ofcom Code’) sets out the
minimum standards that Ofcom has set for Communications Providers (CPs) in the handling
of Complaints made by Domestic and Small Business Customers (as those terms are defined in
General Condition 14.7) about the provision of Public Electronic Communications Services (as
defined in the General Conditions of Entitlement). A list of further definitions can be found on the
page following the specific obligations. Explanatory guidance can be found on the Ofcom website.
A CP must have complaints handling procedures that:
1) Are transparent:
a) A CP must have in place a written code for handling complaints (‘Customer Complaints
Code’) made by their Domestic and Small Business Customers. A CP must comply with its
Customer Complaints Code in relation to each Complaint it receives.
b) The Customer Complaints Code must be concise, easy to understand and only contain
relevant information about complaints handling procedures.
c) The Customer Complaints Code must be kept up to date and as a minimum include
information about: i) the process for making a Complaint;
ii) the steps the CP will take to investigate with a view to resolving a Complaint;
iii) the timeframes in which the CP will endeavour to resolve the Complaint, including when
the CP is likely to notify the Complainant about the progress or resolution of a Complaint;
iv) the contact details for making a Complaint to the CP, including providing details about the
low-cost points of contact required in clause 2(c) below; and
v) the contact details for the CP’s Alternative Dispute Resolution scheme, with details on
when a Complainant will be able to access the service (with reference to the requirements on
a CP in both clause 4(c) and 4(d) below).
2) Are accessible:
a) The Customer Complaints Code must be well publicised and readily available, including:
i) being easily accessible on a webpage, with either:
1. a weblink to the Customer Complaints Code being clearly visible on a CP’s primary
webpage for existing customers (ie ‘1 click’ access); or
240
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/complaints_procedures/statement/statement.pdf.

2. a weblink to the Customer Complaints Code being clearly visible on a ‘how to complain’
or ‘contact us’ page, which is directly accessible from a primary webpage for existing
customers (ie ‘2 click’ access).
ii) ensuring the relevant terms and conditions for a product and/or service refer to the
existence of the Customer Complaints Code and should signpost consumers to how they can
access a copy; and
iii) being provided free of charge to Complainants upon reasonable request in hard copy or
other format as agreed with the Complainant.
b) Complaints handling procedures must be sufficiently accessible to enable consumers with
disabilities to lodge and progress a Complaint.
c) The means by which a CP accepts Complaints should not unduly deter consumers from
making a complaint. A CP must have in place at least two of the following three low-cost options
for consumers to lodge a Complaint: i) a ‘free to call’ number or a phone number charged at the
equivalent of a geographic call rate;
ii) a UK postal address; or
iii) an email address or internet web page form.
3) Are effective:
a) A CP must ensure the fair and timely resolution of Complaints.
b) There must be clearly established timeframes and a clear and reasonable escalation process
for dealing with Complaints.
4) [Facilitate appropriate access to Alternative Dispute Resolution:
a) A CP must ensure front-line staff are fully informed of the right of consumers to use Alternative
Dispute Resolution.
b) Every paper bill provided to domestic customers must include, in a reasonably prominent
manner, relevant text regarding the right of consumers to take unresolved complaints to
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Such text will:
i) provide the name of the Alternative Dispute Resolution scheme;
ii) make reference to the fact that the scheme offers dispute resolution, which is independent
of the CP;
iii) make reference to the fact that the scheme can only be accessed eight weeks after a
Complaint was first made to the CP; and
iv) make reference to the fact that consumers can utilise the scheme at no cost to themselves.
c) A CP must promptly issue a written Deadlock Letter when requested by a Complainant,
unless:
i) the CP has genuine and reasonable grounds for considering that the Complaint will be
resolved in a timely manner and subsequently takes active steps to do so; or
ii) it is reasonable to consider the Complaint to be vexatious; or
iii) the subject-matter of the Complaint is outside the jurisdiction of the CP’s Alternative
Dispute Resolution scheme.
d) A CP must ensure Complainants receive prompt Written Notification of their right to go to
Alternative Dispute Resolution eight weeks after the Complaint is first brought to the attention
of the CP, unless:
i) it is reasonable to consider the Complaint has been resolved; or
ii) it is reasonable to consider the Complaint to be vexatious: or
iii) the subject-matter of the Complaint is outside the jurisdiction of the CP’s Alternative
Dispute Resolution scheme.]
5) Retain appropriate records of contact with Complainants: a) A CP must retain written records
collected through the complaints handling process for a period of at least six months including, as a
minimum, written correspondence and notes on its customer record management systems.
Definitions for the Ofcom Code The following definitions should be used for interpreting this
Code of Practice: ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ means any dispute procedures approved by
Ofcom under section 54 of the Communications Act 2003. ‘Complaint’ means:

a) an expression of dissatisfaction made by a customer to a Communications Provider related

to either:
i) the Communications Provider’s provision of Public Electronic Communications Services
to that customer; or
ii) the complaint-handling process itself; and b) where a response or resolution is explicitly
or implicitly expected.
‘Complainant’ means a Domestic or Small Business Customer who makes a Complaint to a
Communications Provider. ‘Deadlock Letter’ means a letter or email from a Communications
Provider to a Complainant agreeing that the Complaint can be referred to the relevant Alternative
Dispute Resolution scheme. ‘Written Notification’ means a written notification sent to a
Complainant that:
a) is in plain English;
b) is solely about the relevant Complaint;
c) informs the Complainant of the availability of dispute resolution, which is independent of
the CP;
d) provides the name and appropriate contact details for the relevant Alternative Dispute
Resolution scheme; and
e) informs the Complainant that they can utilise the scheme at no cost to themselves.
OFCOM stated in 2011 that there are a number of benefits of a regulatory regime that
promotes effective access to ADR:241
• Giving consumers access to justice where recourse to the court system may be
impossible or impracticable due to cost and resource constraints, as well as reducing
the ‘system costs’ that would occur if a high volume of relatively low monetary value
disputes were instead required to be resolved by the legal system;
• Reducing the power imbalance between consumers and CPs, who normally have
greater resources, knowledge and control over the products and services in dispute;
• Improving the outcome for those consumers who would otherwise fail to pursue
complaints out of frustration with their CP’s response or lack or response;
• Empowering consumers to pursue their rights more effectively with their own CP,
with the knowledge that they have an alternative option for redress if the complaint
becomes intractable; and
• Providing additional incentives for CPs to improve their complaints handling
procedures and to resolve complaints quickly and effectively.
Feedback
Data on complaints made to the government’s Consumer Direct line ranks telecoms as the
most complained about sector in the UK. New entrants to a market may concentrate most
on obtaining market share and less on retaining customers. However, the telecom market
has changed since 2009, and there is now a reduced emphasis on ‘churn’, and more on
retaining the customer base. Thus, companies attend more closely to customer satisfaction.
There has also been consolidation in the market, and may be more.
Therefore, in order to increase transparency, OFCOM has published performance data. In
April 2011, OFCOM published for the first time the data on the consumer complaints that it
received in relation to telecom providers in the period October 2010 to February 2011, as the
241
The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a means to resolve disputes related to commercial transactions and
practices in the European Union (London, Ofcom, 2011).

first of a series of quarterly publications.242 It believed that the average of about 450 telecoms
complaints received a day from consumers were likely to be made where a consumer was
unable to resolve an issue with their provider to their satisfaction. By considering evidence
from the dispute system and its own consumer contact centre, OFCOM is able to address
systemic issues, recognize a trend, deal with it and reduce the detriment.
The approach to consumers and to seeking feedback varies significantly between
companies. Some consumers who ring call centres of mobile phone companies receive a
text message shortly afterwards asking them to rank the performance of the person who
dealt with them; the responses can be used not only in monitoring complaint handling but
also the remuneration or employment of individual handlers.
Companies differ in how they record complaints data. They are not required to make
their internal complaints data transparent. This was a major issue in the 2010 consultation.
The energy system has required logging every complaint, but it was thought to be too
expensive in telecoms. Escalations are logged if people ask to speak to a manager. Ofcom
can compel disclosure of the data by enforcement action.
ADR schemes: CISAS and OS:C
As noted above, the two ADR providers in the sector are CISAS243 and OS:C.244 Some 206
providers use the former (now run by CEDR Disputes Group) and around 250 companies
use OS:C. The former has 70 per cent of internet service providers, the latter 95 per cent
of fixed line providers, with mobile services split roughly equally. Although competition
between private sector providers is theoretically beneficial, it is only communications
providers who are able to choose between them, not consumers.
There is a slight difference between the modes of operation of the two schemes. CISAS
was originally modelled on arbitration, and OS:C invested strongly in mediation and in
identifying cases that would respond to mediation, but since 2011 both provide conciliation
stages. Attending a mediation hearing might cause significant inconvenience to a consumer
or small trader. Dealing with matters by documentary means, especially on the internet, or
by telephone, can be much more user-friendly.
In the ombudsman process, a case handler makes a précis of each side’s case, which is
sent to the other side and used as the basis of any final report and decision, whereas in
the CISAS process all documents of either side are sent to the other party and then to the
adjudicator. No comparative evaluation has been done on the advantages and disadvantages
of either approach, or whether there may be any difference in relevance for different types
or sizes of case. It is difficult to choose between these two models since either might be
swifter or more appropriate in particular circumstances.
The two schemes coordinate, so if a member of one does not comply with a ruling, that
scheme’s operator will inform the other, and the other will not accept the company into
membership until they have complied with all required conditions. The regulator can also
242
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/telecoms-research/complaints/oct-2010-feb-2011.
243
www.cisas.org.uk. CISAS was established in 2003, and is administered by IDRS Ltd. It was created following
discussions between the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Orange, NTL, Telewest, The Internet Service Providers’
Association and others who wanted their ADR provision to continue to be provided by the CIArb rather than
through an ombudsman model.
244
www.otelo.org.uk.

apply its authority to achieve compliance, since the operator may be in breach of Ofcom’s
General Conditions.
In 2010, OS:C had roughly 100,000 contacts a year (in 2009/10 averaging 392 a day, and
412 in 2009/10245) and 8,000 adjudications; CISAS had almost 5,000 contacts and 2,000
adjudications. In recent years, the number of contacts to OS:C have been fairly stable (Table
11.9) but those to CISAS have risen and fallen (Figure 11.4).
Table 11.9: Contacts received by OS:C 2007/08–2010/11
Year Contacts
2007/08 105,600
2008/09 101,882
2009/10 102,025
2010/11 103,702
Figure 11.5: CISAS enquiries and valid applications 2005–2010
7000
6464
6000 6141
5000 5143
4000 3953
3612
3255 Enquiries
3000
2667
2000 Valid
1650 1651 applications
1300
1000
497
0 185
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
The main reason for rejection of complaints to both schemes has been the same every year,
namely that consumers apply too early and do not give the company a chance to deal with
their complaint in line with its published complaints procedures (Table 11.10). However,
OS:C’s main reason for accepting a complaint is that companies do not deal with complaints
within the 8 week deadline (Table 11.11).
Table 11.10 Number of complaints 2009–2010
OS:S CISAS
2009–2010 2010
General enquiries 70,435 3,953
Complaints outside terms of reference 42,383 1,072
Valid applications 7,012 1,300
Cases concluded 6,801 1,327
245
Complaints received in 2010–11 were 68% by telephone (43% new calls / 57% follow-up calls) and 32 per
cent in writing (40% letter, 60% email and under 1% fax).

Table 11.11: Reasons for OS:C accepting a complaint 2009–2010
OS:C 2009–2010 OS:C 2010–2011

Greater than eight weeks (12 weeks before 76% 84%
September 2009)
Deadlock letter 23% 13%
Ombudsman’s discretion 1% 3%
The breakdown of contacts to OS:C for 2009–2010 is shown in Table 11.12.246 If a complaint
form is issued, consumers usually return it and it becomes an investigated case (of the
13,165 complaint forms issued in 2010–2011, 10,789 (82 per cent) were returned), though
a small percentage are withdrawn by the consumer or are subsequently discovered to be
premature or outside of the ombudsman’s jurisdiction. However, in many instances there
is a delay of several weeks between the date the form is issued and the date it is returned.
Table 11.12: OS:C Complaint Data 2009–10 and 2010–11
Total Total Forms Forms Informally Number of Average

Calls Written Issued Returned resolved awards value of
cases financial
awards
2009–2010 70,435 27,500 10,747 8,936 1,467 7,038 £99.47
2010–2011 63,244 30,523 13,165 10,789 2,229 7,175 N/A
The range of financial awards is shown in Table 11.13. The average amount claimed in OS:C
cases in 2009–10 was £587, an increase of £72 over 2009 (£515). The lowest average claim
value of £461 was in 2006. The total amount awarded as compensation by adjudicators in
2010 was £146,882, representing an average award of £198 (an increase of £25 on 2009).
Thus consumers received on average about 34 per cent of their claim in 2010 (also in 2009).
In 2010–2011, 68 per cent of OS:C final decisions issued contained a financial award and
the majority of them (81 per cent) also contained a non-financial award. In 17 per cent of
cases a non-financial award only was made. A non-financial award may include an apology,
an explanation, a service or some practical action to be provided by the member company.
Table 11.13: Ranges of awards made by OS:C 2009–10 and 2010–11
Number of awards Number of awards

Amount awarded
2009–2010 2010–2011
£ 1–50 2,619 3,282
£ 51– 100 1,216 1,744
£ 101– 200 626 914
£ 201– 300 204 225
£ 301– 400 73 89
£ 401– 500 61 44
£ 501– 1,000 67 44
£ 1,001– 2,000 13 21
£ 2,001– 3,000 6 6
£ 3,001– 4,000 2 1
£ 4,001– 5,000 6 1
246
Otelo performance report 2010, www.ombudsman-services.org/downloads/Otelo_performance_report_
Oct_2010.pdf.

The classification used by the two bodies for the nature of complaints is different (Table
11.14) and makes it difficult to compare the performance of communications companies
and the nature of their problems: it would be better if a standard classification were used.
Table 11.14: Nature of complaints to OS:C and CISAS
OS:C 2009/10 OS:C 2010–2011 CISAS 2010

Customer service 51% 55% 2.2%
Disputed charges 22% 20% 39%
Service 15% 17% –
Billing 8% 6% 17.5%
Equipment 2% 1% –
Security 1% 1% –
ISP Service – – 21%
Terms and conditions – – 11.6%
Loss of service – – 3.6%
Disconnection/reconnection – – 2.8%
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are agreed by the ADR bodies with OFCOM on an
annual basis. Performance figures are provided monthly to OFCOM, and published on
the ADRs’ website. The KPIs and performances in 2010 are shown in Table 11.15.247 In
comparing these, it should be noted that the types of cases dealt with may differ.
Table 11.15: Performance against OS:C Key Performance Indicators
OS:C OS:C OS:C CISAS CISAS

2009–2010 2009–2010 2010–2011 2010 2010
target actual actual target actual
Calls answered in less than more than 80% 90.4% 85% 95% 100%
two minutes248
Written correspondence 100% 99.2% 59%
responded to in less than 10
working days
Written correspondence 90% 95%
responded to in less than 5
working days
Provisional conclusions more than 90% 46.3% 81% 88% 85%
issued within six weeks
Provisional conclusions less than 1% 33.3% 4% 10% 5%
issued
after more than eight weeks
Unit cost as an indication of N/A N/A £300.90249
improved efficiency: 100%
of total cost divided by the
number of valid applications
247
OS:C annual report 2010/11, available at: www.ombudsman-services.org/attachments/download/369/
Communications%202011%20AR.pdf. Annual Report 2010 CISAS, http://www.cisas.org.uk/media/text/CISAS-
Annual-Report-2010.pdf.
248
The 2 minutes includes an allowance for the caller to listen to a pre-recorded information message, which
for CISAS lasts 1 minute 41 seconds and gives options to the caller on whether to record a message, request

Energy
Consumers may complain to their suppliers, then to the independent ombudsman, or to

Consumer Focus,250 the regulator, or may start a claim in court. Various codes established
by the trade association, the Energy Retail Association, are also relevant for disputes and
can be referred to the ombudsman.251
Establishment of the Energy Ombudsman
In 2005, OFGEM determined that a voluntary redress scheme should be introduced by

the six largest energy supply companies252 to resolve outstanding billing disputes relating
to retail energy supply. This followed an investigation by OFGEM into energy suppliers’
billing practices, and a ‘super-complaint’ in relation to such practices by Consumer Focus.
Consequently, in July 2006, energy suppliers who were members of ERA introduced an
alternative dispute resolution scheme. The scheme was operated by the Energy Supply
Ombudsman (part of The Ombudsman Service Limited). Initially, the Energy Supply
Ombudsman’s remit was limited to complaints relating to customer switching between the
constituent ERA member companies, however, the remit was later expanded to include
complaints relating to energy selling.
The Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 introduced, among other things, a
requirement that energy supply companies and energy network businesses should belong
to a redress scheme that is approved by the GEMA.253 In addition, a new duty was placed on
GEMA to establish binding complaint handling standards for energy suppliers. Accordingly,
in October 2008 the voluntary scheme established by the energy companies was replaced by
a statutory redress scheme. After a robust selection procedure, OFGEM decided to approve
a single redress scheme in the energy sector and appointed OS to provide this function.254
The name of the scheme was changed from the Energy Supply Ombudsman to the Energy
Ombudsman (EO). The terms of reference for the EO were broadened to include complaints
from micro-business as well as those from domestic consumers.
information or speak to a CISAS staff member. After the message or on selection by the customer, the average time
for CISAS staff to answer any call is 10 seconds.
249
The figure for 2010 was an increase of 9% over 2009, driven by two factors. Firstly, in 2010 the number of
cases concluded under the lower cost ‘Early Settlement Procedure’ rather than being referred to an adjudicator
reduced from 58% to 46%. Secondly, the total number of valid cases received dropped by 21%, increasing the
effective fixed cost per case.
250
The functions of the consumer body Energywatch (the Gas and Electricity Consumer Council) were taken
over by Consumer Focus (the National Consumer Council) under the Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress
Act 2007, ss 13, 30. In October 2010, the Government announced the abolishment of Consumer Focus and the
transfer of some functions to the Citizens Advice, Citizens Advice Scotland and the General Consumer Council in
Northern Ireland. It is expected that this transfer will occur in Spring 2013.
251
Such as the 2002 Code of Practice for Face-to-Face Marketing of Energy Supply, and the 2005 Code of
Practice for Accurate Bills.
252
British Gas, EDF Energy, E-ON, npower, Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern Energy.
253
Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007, ss 42–52; The Gas and Electricity Regulated Providers
(Redress Scheme) Order 2008, SI 2008/2268, available at www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/2268/contents/made.
254
OFGEM Decision report 26/08, 14th March 2008.http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080806
055225/http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/MARKETS/RETMKTS/COMPL/CONSREP/Documents1/Redress%20
Schemes%20Decision.pdf.

Thus, the scheme of the legislation in energy is that the Minister has a duty, but delegates
to the regulator, who delegates to OS. Hence, since OS is acting on behalf of the minister
in energy, it is subject to judicial review. The statutory scheme initially covered business
suppliers to households, and was expanded from 1 October 2008 to include all complaints
by networks, domestic and micro-businesses.
OS was reviewed for OFGEM in 2010.255 The independent review found that the model
delivered fair and independent redress, had appropriate governance, was accessible and
well organised, with well trained personnel. No evidence or belief was found that there
was bias in the views, behaviours or actions of the Ombudsman or Investigation Officers.
The major subject of criticism related to matching resource to fluctuating complaint levels:
various recommendations were made, most of which have been implemented.
The role of the Ombudsman is widening. The scheme is currently looking at including
feed-in tariffs and social aspects. Complaints against commercial decisions are now being
accepted, so OS is operating in a manner that is closer to a public sector ombudsman,
by taking all the circumstances of a customer’s requirements and complaint into account.
This extension in scope is interesting and it is unclear where it will end. OFGEM recently
delegated determinations on connection charges to the OS.
The 2010 review of OS’ energy function found that only 6.5 per cent of nearly 90,000
contacts and attempted contacts fell within the Energy Ombudsman’s terms of reference.256
A significant proportion of OS’ costs were therefore being spent on handling enquiries for
which it could make no impact. A major issue for the complaints handling process as a
whole, therefore, is how to capture complaints at the most appropriate stage (ie by companies
before outside authorities are involved) or how to reduce the total volume of complaints
overall. The former issue would seem to be one of providing information to consumers and
ensuring that companies seek and deal effectively with complaints. The latter issue is one of
seeking to reduce the total volume of complaints, by providers performing at a higher level
of service.
Market research indicates that the general public is becoming more aware of the Energy
Ombudsman.257
The Energy Ombudsman Scheme
All regulated energy providers holding a licence to domestic and/or micro business customers
are required to be members of the EO service.258 The EO has Memoranda of Understandings
(MoUs) in place with a number of bodies, including consumer representative organisations
such as Consumer Focus, and the regulatory body GEMA/OFGEM, to cross-direct any
complaints that fall within the remit of each other.
The services provided by EO members that fall within the scope of the EO’s powers
include:
• the metering and billing of customers for the supply of energy;
• problems relating to the transfer of customers between energy suppliers;
255
Sohn associates, Independent Review of the Energy Ombudsman,(2010).
256
ibid.
257
Customer satisfaction report commissioned by the Energy Ombudsman, July 2009.
258
The CEAR Act amended the relevant sections of the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989.

• complaints about an energy supplier’s sales activity, including sales of products and
services and the provision of regulated products and services by holders of a gas
transportation licence or electricity distribution licence;
• physical issues and problems relating to the supply of energy to a home such as power
cuts.
All EO service members are subject to the jurisdiction of the EO in relation to complaints
regarding such services. The EO does not deal with complaints about energy companies
that are not members of its service; pre-September 2007 complaints; complaints about
physical supply problems to homes before April 2008; problems being dealt with by the
courts or other complaints processes, or where the EO considers that the problem should
be dealt with by the courts of other complaints procedures; cases considered malicious or
unjustified; and issues relating to commercial decisions by member companies relating to
whether or not to provide a product or service, and the related terms (ie reduction in energy
tariffs).
The EO has an absolute discretion to decide whether a complaint is within the
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as prescribed by its Terms of Reference, and has the power
to refuse a complaint if it is considered that the complainant does not have a reasonable
prospect of success, recovery or redress.
The first step in the complaints process is to contact the energy company, to give them
a chance to sort out the problem. The consumer can do this by phone, email or letter,
following the energy company’s published complaints procedure. After eight weeks of
making the complaint to the energy company, the complainant can pass the complaint on
to the EO. This has to be done within nine months from the date the problem was first
brought to the company.
The ombudsman will also consider a complaint for investigation if a participating
company has issued a deadlock letter, before the end of the eight week period, stating that it
cannot do any more for the complainant. A deadlock letter can be issued if:
• there is no new information to be gained on the complaint;
• the complaint escalation processes have been followed;
• no agreement can be reached within the company’s complaint procedures; and
• having more time will not improve this position.
The complainant has six months from the date of the letter to pass the complaint to the
EO. The EO can accept a complaint if the complaint was brought to the gas or electricity
company within 12 months of first knowing about it. The ombudsman may also accept a
complaint for investigation at the ombudsman’s discretion, for example if a complaint is just
outside the required timeframes, but the complainant would have had no opportunity to
raise the complaint any sooner.
If the EO decides it has the power to deal with the complaint, it sends the complainant
a filled-in form to check, sign and return with copies of all the supporting documents. By
signing the complaint form, the complainant gives the energy company the permission to
release information relevant to the complaint.
The overall objective of the EO, as with communications, is to seek to achieve a mutually
acceptable settlement of a complaint wherever practical and appropriate. However, where
such a mutually acceptable settlement is not forthcoming or is withdrawn, the EO may
conduct a formal investigation of the complaint.

Following a formal investigation the EO will inform the complainant and the participating
company concerned in writing of the Investigation Report and its suggested remedies,
and will invite comments within a specified period. If this is accepted by both the energy
company and the complainant as a settlement of the dispute, then it will become the final
decision.
Following an investigation, the EO may decide to do the following:
• If it considers that the participating company is offering a fair and reasonable
settlement, or alternatively if the EO considers that no settlement is required, the EO
may terminate its consideration of the complaint.
• Where the complainant and the participating company accept the Investigation
Report, then that will become the final decision.
• If the complainant or the participating company do not accept the Investigation report
then a Final Decision will be issued. The Final Decision will be made after considering
any submissions and representations made in relation to the Investigation report and
the suggested remedies.
Where the EO issues a Final Decision that concludes that a participating company has
not acted fairly or reasonably, the Ombudsman is required to set out its reasons in writing
and may impose any of the following remedies requiring the participating company to: (i)
apologise or provide an explanation to the complainant; (ii) compensate the complainant
to an amount not exceeding £5,000; (iii) take other practical action to the direct benefit
of the complainant; or (iv) provide any combination of the above remedies. By signing a
‘deed poll’, the final decision of the EO is binding on the participating company, but not
the complainant/ customer. In addition to these remedies the EO may also make a (non-
binding) recommendation to the participating company concerned about changing its
policies or procedures, including the provision of services.
The complainant has 28 days to decide to accept the decision of the Ombudsman.
After the 28 day period, the complainant looses the right to the solution offered by the
Ombudsman.
Statistics
At the start of 2012 the EO had 113 participating companies.259 The complaint statistics are
shown in Table 11.16.
Table 11.16: Energy Ombudsman complaints 2008/09 to 2010/2011
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11

Contacts received 77,604 78,528 54,794260
Contacts were about companies that were not 729 N/A N/A
members of the Energy Ombudsman
Complaint forms issued 6,163 7,192 6,727
Signed complaint forms received 5,077 [80%] 6,419 [89%] 5,812 [86%]
259
Energy Ombudsman annual report 2010/11, available at: www.ombudsman-services.org/attachments/
download/333/2010%20annual%20reportEnergy.pdf.

During 2010/11, 24 per cent of new contacts related to complaints that could be considered
by Ombudsman Services: Energy: see table 11.17. The majority of new contacts (72 per cent)
related to complaints that could not be accepted by the service at that time. Complaints
about participating companies accounted for 93 per cent of new contacts, but almost three
quarters of these could not be accepted. Most commonly this is because the complainant
has contacted the Energy Ombudsman too early in the complaints process and has not
allowed the company adequate opportunity to resolve the complaint. About four per cent
were general enquiries or literature requests. Complaints usually include more than one
issue, and customer service is an element of most. It is common to have a delay of several
weeks from the date the complaint form is issued to the date it is returned and received.
Table 11.17: Reasons for accepting a complaint 2010–2011
Unresolved in 8 weeks 66%

Final response from the company (Deadlock letter) 25%
Ombudsman Decision 9%
In 2010–2011, 60 per cent of resolved complaints included a financial award (with an average
of £137), and of these 96 per cent also included a non-financial award, such as an apology,
an explanation, a service, or some practical action to be performed by the company. The
reasons for complaints are at Table 11.18.
Table 11.18: Reasons for the complaint 2010–2011
Billing dispute 88%

Transfer 8%
Sales 4%
Feedback
The EO is required to bring to the attention of OFGEM any trends or issues that are arising
across the industry. This includes any problems or patterns of behaviour that relate to an
individual energy provider.
The number of complaints about the six large energy companies made to Consumer
Direct, Consumer Focus and the Energy Ombudsman is compiled by Consumer Focus and
published every three months.261 The different types of complaints are weighted to reflect
the seriousness of the complaint.
260
This represented an average 214 contacts a day.
261
See energyapps.consumerfocus.org.uk/performance.

General Consumer Trading Sectors: Resolution of Disputes

under Codes of Business Practice
The OFT Consumer Code Approval Scheme
The approach to codes of practice, described above,262 has developed since at least the 1980s.
Some trade association schemes succeeded from an early stage in resolving significant num-
bers of consumer claims.263 Initially, the OFT assessed the detailed wording of individual codes,
but found this to be resource intensive. From 1991, it endorsed codes that met a series of ‘best
practice’ criteria.264 White Papers in 1999265 and 2001266 proposed new regimes for codes of
practice. A strong consumer brand was intended to be established for codes that were endorsed
by the OFT. The new approach introduced a two-stage approach which aimed to encourage
trade associations to re-assess their existing codes of practice or introduce new codes of prac-
tice that address consumer detriment within their sectors. The first stage (establishing core
criteria) could be delivered within OFT’s existing powers, and the second stage (an approval
power) was mandated under the Enterprise Act 2002. The core criteria for the new OFT CCAS
were published in July 2001267 and core criteria and guidance notes were issued in 2008.
Overview of the Scheme
Under the CCAS,268 the OFT publishes criteria that it regards as best practice for a business
code of practice. If a sectoral code satisfies the criteria, through a specified evaluation
process, that code gain formal approval by the OFT. Individual businesses operating to
that code qualify to use and display the OFT approved code logo. The assumption is that
businesses will see commercial advantage in marketing their business as having OFT code
approval, and that consumers will see advantages in choosing traders who are members of
an OFT approved scheme. The OFT’s function is to monitor codes of conduct operated by
the private sector and oversee their general development, without day-to-day involvement
in how they are run. The scheme is intended to raise standards of business practice and
provide a signpost to consumers so that they can identify businesses that will provide them
with excellent service and protection over and above the law.269
262
pp 261 ff.
263
Between 1983 and 1989, the ABTA scheme conciliated 42,253 cases, of which 1,764 were referred to
arbitration with 1,362 claims being upheld and 340 claims rejected in arbitration; equivalent figures for the
National Association of Retail Furnishers were 3.063, 3, 1 and 2: R Thomas. ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution –
Consumer Disputes’ (1988) 7 Civil Justice Quarterly, 206–219.
264
New guidelines were established: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft183.pdf. G
Howells and S Weatherill, Consumer protection law, 2nd ed (London, Ashgate, 2005) 72–77 and 580–585.
265
Department of Trade and Industry, Consumer White Paper (1999). The main critique of the previous scheme
had been that it took too long to get through the approval process. There were also problems of signposting for
consumers, since there were too many different badges and logos of different codes: this was too confusing for
consumers.
266
The OFTs new approach to consumer codes of practice, A consultation paper, (2001), available at www.oft.gov.
uk/shared_oft/Approvedcodesofpractice/oft331.pdf (accessed on 27 July 2010).
267
Available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/Approvedcodesofpractice/oft344.pdf (accessed 8 June 2010). An
earlier version was Consumer Codes Approval Scheme: Core Criteria and Guidance (London, OFT, 2004).
268
Consumer Codes Approval Scheme: Core Criteria and guidance 2008, available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
Approvedcodesofpractice/oft390.pdf (accessed on 1 November 2010).
269
OFT Report: Consumer Codes Approval Scheme – update of core criteria OFT’s response to the consultation
(London, OFT, 2006), available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/Approvedcodesofpractice/oft855.pdf.

Responsibility for drafting codes rests with the code sponsors (usually trade associations)
who have the necessary expertise in their sectors.270 The core criteria set out the standards
the OFT expects a code sponsor and its members to achieve in order to be approved by
the OFT.271 Codes developed by sponsors will only be approved if the OFT believes that
they will be effective in protecting and promoting consumer interests, and which offer
consumers benefits beyond the protection afforded by law. The core criteria are summarised
at Figure 11.6, they can be summarised as:
• a commitment to provide customers with adequate information about goods and
services,
• the use of clear and fair contracts,
• the protection of deposits or prepayments,
• low cost, independent dispute resolution if a complaint is not dealt with satisfactorily.272
The application process for OFT approval a consumer code has two stages. Code sponsors
complete Stage One by making a promise that their code meets the core criteria in principle.
They can then move on to Stage Two where they have to demonstrate with evidence that
their codes are compliant in practice and that consumer disputes are properly resolved. This
process usually takes at least 6 months. It includes auditing, consumer satisfaction surveys
and a final review of the code by the OFT. The approval process is intentionally diligent
and the benefit is that the scheme is now connected to outside support for the scheme,
the consumer advisory bodies, who are regarded as ‘critical friends’. Sponsors provide an
annual report to the OFT on the operation of their codes. There is a fundamental code-
review every three years where the code sponsors must consult with other bodies that are
committed to the scheme, such as Which?, Age Concern , Consumer Focus and Trading
Standards.
Figure 11.6: Overview of the core CCAS criteria:273
1. Organizational criteria
a. Code sponsors should have a significant influence on the sector.
b. Codes shall include a provision that compliance with the code is mandatory. Code sponsors
must be able to demonstrate that members are prepared to observe the code’s provisions.
c. Code sponsors shall have adequate resources and funding to ensure the objectives of the code
are not compromised.
2. Preparation of the code criteria

a. Code sponsors shall be able to demonstrate that organizations representing consumers,
enforcement bodies and advisory services have been adequately consulted throughout the
preparation of the code.
b. Code sponsors shall be able to demonstrate that organizations representing consumers,
enforcement bodies and advisory services have been adequately consulted throughout the
operation and monitoring of the code.
270
Sponsors of an approved code can be any body that can influence and raise standards within its sector. See
the Enterprise Act 2002: www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/legal-powers/legal/enterprise-act/#.
271
Consumer Codes Approval Scheme. Core Criteria and Guidance OFT 390 (Office of Fair Trading, 2008),
available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/Approvedcodesofpractice/oft390.pdf.
272
www.oft.gov.uk.
273
OFT Consumer Codes Approval Scheme core criteria and guidance 2008 available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_
oft/Approvedcodesofpractice/oft390.pdf.

3. Content of the code criteria

a. The code shall include measures directed at the removal or erasing of consumer concerns and
undesirable trade practices arising within the particular sector.
b. The code shall require that code members ensure that their relevant staff know about and
meet the terms of the code as well as their legal responsibilities. Appropriate training is to be
provided.
c. The code shall address clear and truthful marketing and advertising as appropriate to the
sector.
d. The code shall address clear and accessible pre-contractual information as appropriate to the
sector.
e. The code shall address high-pressure selling as appropriate to the sector.
f. The code shall address clear terms and conditions of supply and fair contracts as appropriate
to the sector.
g. The code shall address delivery and completion dates as appropriate to the sector.
h. The code shall address cancellation rights as appropriate to the sector.
i. The code shall address guarantees and warranties as appropriate to the sector.
j. The code shall address protection of deposit or prepayments as appropriate to the sector.
k. The code shall address customer service provisions as appropriate to the sector.
l. The code shall address the additional effort/help to be provided to vulnerable consumers as
appropriate to the sector.
4. Complaints handling criteria

a. the code shall include a requirement that code members shall have in place speedy, responsive,
accessible and used friendly procedures for dealing with consumer complaints. A specific
reasonable time limit for responding to complaints shall be prescribed.
b. The code shall include a requirement that code members will offer the same level of co-
operation with local consumer advisers or any other intermediary acting on behalf of a
consumer when making a complaint as they would to the complaint.
c. The code shall include procedures for dealing with complaints including the availability of
conciliation services directed at arranging a decision acceptable to both parties.
d. The code shall include the availability of a low-cost, speedy, responsive, accessible and user-
friendly independent redress scheme to act as an alternative to seeking court action in the
first instance.
The scheme shall be binding in respect of code members who shall not be able to refuse to allow a
complaint to go before the scheme if a customer so chooses.
The code member shall be bound to accept a decision made under the scheme. Any such scheme
shall be able to take into account possible breaches of the code where relevant to the complaint.
5. Monitoring criteria
a. The code sponsor shall develop performance indicators, eg mystery shopping exercises and
independent compliance audits, to measure the effectiveness of the code.
b. The code sponsor shall implement the performance indicators and make available the results
of their monitoring procedures and satisfaction surveys to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the code.
c. The code sponsor shall provide a written report annually to the OFT on the operation of the
code to include:
– Changes to the code agreed with the OFT and implemented
– Numbers and types of complaints including information on outcomes from the conciliation
process and the independent redress scheme
– Results from monitoring, satisfaction surveys and the disciplinary process
It would be preferable if the report were compiled by an independent person or body with
powers to recommend actions.

d. The code sponsor shall provide copies of the annual reports to the OFT.
e. The code sponsor shall regularly review the code and update its provisions in the light of
changing circumstances and expectations.
f. Consumer satisfaction shall be regularly assessed.
6. Enforcement criteria
a. code sponsors shall establish a procedure for handling on-compliance by members with
the code. The procedure shall include independent disciplinary procedure and reasonable
timescales for action.
b. The code sponsor shall also set out a range of sanctions, e.g .warning letters, fines, terminations
of membership, for dealing with non-compliance.
7. Publicity criteria
a. codes sponsors and members shall ensure that theur customers are aware of the code.
b. Code members are to make clear, eg in advertising, point of sale, their adherence to a code of
practice.
c. Copies of codes shall be available without charge to customers, to members, to local consumer
advisers and to others with a legitimate interest.
d. Copies of any code related publicity generated by the code sponsor shall be provided to the
OFT in advance of publication.
e. Code sponsors and members shall publicise the fact that OFT has approved the code by using
the CCAS logo in the prescribed manner.
f. Code sponsors shall comply with the terms of the standard copyright licence, disseminate the
terms to their members and monitor their members’ use of CCAS logo. Appropriate action shall
be taken by the code sponsors against a member for non-compliance with the copyright licence.
Stage Two was introduced in 2005, and extended the duration of the process. The CCAS
was criticised for taking too long for codes to gain approval, but the OFT defended its
position on the basis that to lower the criteria or cut corners in proof of compliance would
undermine the standards of consumer protection.
In 2011, the government proposed, as a cost-cutting measure, that the OFT would cease
to exist and the proposed new Competition and Markets Authority would not continue
operation of the CCAS. It explored alternative options for future accreditation of Consumer
Code Approvals, including roles for BSI, Trading Standards, and private and/or third sector
organisations.274 At the time of writing, it appears that the most likely way forward will
involve a Trading Standards body taking over control of the system.
Existing codes
As at 2011, 10 sponsors have achieved OFT approval for their codes, with dates of approval:
1. Motor Codes Ltd (New Car Code), 2004;275
2. Vehicle Builders and Repairers Association Ltd, 2004;276
274
information, advice, education, advocacy and enforcement (London, Department for Business Enterprise and Skills,
2011), at www.bis.gov.uk/Consultations/empowering-and-protecting-consumers; www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/
consumer-issues/docs/e/11-970-empowering-protecting-consumers-consultation-on-institutional-changes.pdf.
275
www.motorcodes.co.uk. The trade association SMMT comprises all volume car makers, and the majority of
smaller manufacturers, totalling 99.7% of the 2.5 million new car market. Several codes exist in relation to different
services for cars, such as those of the Retail Motor Industry Federation (RMIF) and the Vehicle Builders Repairs
Association.
276
www.vbra.co.uk.

3. Direct Selling Association, 2004;277

4. The Property Ombudsman Ltd (sales), 2005;278
5. The Carpet Foundation, 2007;279
6. Bosch Car Service, 2006280
7. British Association of Removers, 2008;281
8. Debt Managers Standards Association, 2008;282
9. British Healthcare Trades Association, 2009;283
10. Institute of Professional Will Writers, 2010;284
11. Motor Codes Ltd (Service and Repair), 2011.285
The following code sponsors have successfully completed stage one and are working towards
OFT approval of their codes of practice (as of October 2010):
• Motor Codes Ltd (Vehicle Warranty Products),
• Renewable Energy Association,
• SafeBuy.
Statistics
The cost to the consumer for accessing the ADR procedure under the approved codes, and
the fees charged for businesses, are shown in Table 11.19.
277
www.dsa.org.uk. Membership accounts for over 70 per cent of direct sales to the home.
278
www.tpos.co.uk. The Estate Agents Company Limited represents around 40% of estate agency offices in the UK.
279
www.carpetfoundation.com. This is the trade association for carpet manufacturers and retailers, with
1,090 independent retailers, whose sales make up over half of the independent sector, and a further 11 carpet
manufacturers.
280
www.bosch.co.uk/content/language2/html/715_5770.htm. Bosch Car Service is a 400-strong network of
garages.
281
www.bar.co.uk/Default.aspx. The British Association of Removers is a trade association for professional
removal and storage businesses representing over 650 members in the UK, ranging from small family businesses
to multinational companies.
282
http://www.demsa.co.uk. DEMSA currently has four members, who between them deal with around 38 per
cent of all fee-paying debt management cases handled in the UK.
283
aaa.bhta.net. BHTA’s membership consists of over 400 companies who provide a variety of products
including first aid medical equipment, mobility access and stair lifts, prosthetics, rehabilitation products and visual
impairment products. Many of the healthcare products of this sector are personal in nature, and are often sold to
consumers in the home.
284
www.ipw.org.uk. The IPW is a trade body for suppliers of will writing services, assistance in estate planning
and related legal services. It currently has 190 full members, representing an estimated 20% of independent will
writing businesses in the UK.
285
http://www.motorcodes.co.uk/; The code of practice is run by Motor Codes and has 6,500 franchised dealers
and independent garages as members.

Table 11.19: Cost to the consumer and fees for businesses of accessing ADR for the OFT
approved codes286

Code sponsor Cost of ADR to the consumer Cost of ADR to the member
business
Codes that have completed Stage 2
approval
Robert Bosch Ltd (Bosch) Free £350
Vehicle Builders and Repairers Conciliation by the code sponsor No information held
Association (VBRA) is free.
There is a fee payable if the
complaint is taken to arbitration:
Claim up to £1000 is £42.35 net
Between £1001–£5000 is £62.92 net.
Over £5000 is £83.49 net.
Motor Codes Ltd (New Car Code) Conciliation by the code sponsor The consumer and member
is free. business share the cost of
The consumer and member arbitration, £500 + VAT per case,
business share the cost of on a sliding scale dependent upon
arbitration, £500 plus VAT per case, the amount of money claimed. For
on a sliding scale dependent upon member businesses:
the amount of money claimed. For Claim up to £1000 is £440 + VAT
the consumer: Between £1,001 and £5000 is £400
Claim up to £1000 is £60 +VAT +VAT
Between £1,001 and £5000 is £100 Between £5,001 and £10,000 is
+ VAT £300+VAT
Between £5,001 and £10,000 is £200
Direct Selling Association (DSA) Free adjudication No information held
Carpet Foundation Conciliation by the code sponsor £55 + VAT
is free.
Arbitration is £55 net (refundable if
shown not to be at fault)
British Association of Removers Conciliation by the code sponsor £100
(BAR) is free.
The arbitration fee is dependent on
claim amount.
Claim up to £5000 is £100.
Claims over £5000 are possible but
may incur further one-off costs
Debt Managers Standards Free N/A
Association (DEMSA)
British Healthcare Trades Free No information held
Association (BHTA)
The Property Ombudsman (TPO) Free £120 + VAT
Institute of Professional Willwriters Arbitration cost is £75. £450 + VAT (correct as at 2008)
(IPW)
286
Annual reports provided by code sponsors vary in period covered, so do not fall neatly into calendar years.
The cost to the consumer of using the ADR/independent redress service if activated data from OFT under the
FOIA December 2010.

Codes that have completed Stage 1

Code sponsor Cost of ADR to the consumer Cost of ADR to the member
(Please note that there may be business
further negotiations on the code/
ADR before OFT approval of the
code.)
Renewable Energy Association N/A Both the consumer and member
business pays an initial fee
equivalent to the County Court Fee
(this fee is refunded to the consumer
if the independent arbitrator finds in
his or her favour, or recommends it.
Any further costs will be explained
to both sides and divided between
the consumer and member business,
as the independent arbitrator may
decide.
SafeBuy Mediation by code sponsor is free. £250 plus VAT

Arbitration costs to the consumer
is £25 plus VAT
Motor Codes Ltd (car service and Conciliation by the code sponsor The consumer and member business
repair) is free. share the cost of arbitration, £500
The consumer and subscriber + VAT per case, on a sliding scale
share the cost of arbitration, £500 dependent upon the amount of
+ VAT per case, on a sliding scale money claimed. For member
dependent upon the amount of businesses:
money claimed. For the consumer: Claim up to £1000 is £440 + VAT
Claim up to £1000 is £60 +VAT Between £1,001 and £5000 is £400
Between £1,001 and £5000 is £100 +VAT
+ VAT Between £5,001 and £10,000 is
Between £5,001 and £10,000 is £300+VAT
£200
Motor Codes Ltd (vehicle warranty Conciliation by the code sponsor The consumer and member business
products) is free. share the cost of arbitration, £500
The consumer and subscriber + VAT per case, on a sliding scale
share the cost of arbitration, £500 dependent upon the amount of
+ VAT per case, on a sliding scale money claimed. For member
dependent upon the amount of businesses:
money claimed. For the consumer: Claim up to £1000 is £440 + VAT
Claim up to £1000 is £60 +VAT Between £1,001 and £5000 is £400
Between £1,001 and £5000 is £100 +VAT
+ VAT Between £5,001 and £10,000 is
Between £5,001 and £10,000 is £300+VAT
£200
The administration cost of the code and their ADR systems for code sponsors and individual
businesses are not known, but include both one-off initial costs and on-going running
costs. The OFT criteria state that ‘Code sponsors shall have adequate resources and funding

to ensure the objectives of the code are not compromised’.287 It requires a written statement
from the code sponsor to confirm adequate resource and funding. A 2006 evaluation found
that the costs to businesses of implementing and maintaining an OFT approved code were
not substantial (little more than the costs of adhering to pre-existing codes), and were
estimated at between £142 and £252 per business per annum.288 The review also found that
costs to code sponsors varied substantially, dependant on whether satisfactory processes
were already in place (such as to meet the requirement for comprehensive monitoring of
members), and ranged from ‘minimal’ costs, to £50,000 per annum. It was suggested that
such costs were a factor in determining the uptake of the scheme. OFT’s budget for 2010/11
estimated its total staff cost for the CCAS at £0.8m.
The volume of cases dealt with under CCAS ADR schemes that were dealt with through
conciliation and/or an ADR mechanism, based on annual reports from sponsors, are shown
in Table 11.20.
Table 11.20: code sponsor complaint information
Code sponsor 2009 2010

Complaints Conciliation ADR Complaints Conciliation ADR
VBRA 12 0 21289 0
Motor Codes 3,692 contacts 430 13
(New Cars)
DSA 45 4
TPO 3,194 456 3,157 646
CF 9 3 10 1
Bosch 37 0
BAR 360 360 22
DEMSA 7 0 44 0 via DEMSA
(68 direct
to FOS, of
which 12 were
upheld and
56 rejected by
Ombudsman)
BHTA 20 20 0 22 10 0
IPW 3 3 0 5 5 0
Renewable
Energy
Assurance Ltd
Motor Codes
(Car service
and repair)
TOTAL 7,323 866 498 3,244 10 647
287
Consumer Codes Approval Scheme: Core Criteria and Guidance [2008], CCAS criterion 1c.
288
Review of the impact of business of the Consumer Codes Approval Scheme (OFT, 2006) oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
Approvedcodesofpractice/oft870.pdf.
289
http://www.vbra.co.uk/downloads/OFT%20Code%20Report%202011.pdf.

The annual reports to the OFT do not reveal details or percentages of outcomes of cases.
As examples of how the dispute resolution aspects of codes operate, further details are
given below of two code schemes, that for Motor Codes and that for Travel Agents.
Motor Codes
Overview
The motor vehicle sector currently has several motor codes. Three codes, dealing
respectively with new cars, with service and repair, and with vehicle warranty products, are
run by a dedicated company, Motor Codes Limited, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT).290 A CCAS approved code for
member garages is run by Robert Bosch, and is linked to garages selling Bosch products.
A Good Garage Scheme is backed by Fortis Oil, tied to sale of Fortis products by approved
garages but with no dispute resolution component.
Background
The motor vehicle trade associations were amongst the first to develop codes when they
became relevant from the 1970s. The Motor Industry Code of Practice operated from 1976
to 2004. That code covered everything from new car advertising through to the sale of petrol
across three trade associations, the SMMT, RMIF291 and the SMTA.292 The establishment of
CCAS induced manufacturers to produce their New Car Code of Practice so that it could
gain OFT recognition. That Code was achieved CCAS Stage 1 approval in June 2004, Stage
2 approval in September 2004, and was officially launched in December 2004.
Alongside those developments, an industry initiative to produce a series of modernised
codes was the result of a threat in 2005 by the National Consumer Council293 to institute
a competition law super-complaint294 against the car sector over service and repair issues.
The claim was that multiple small amounts of consumer detriment amounted to some £4
billion, and it was suggested that the industry should put its house in order.295 Subsequent
discussions between the government, the OFT and SMMT led to an industry-wide initiative
to create a conciliation scheme within new car codes (the government asked SMMT to draw
up a Service and Repair Code), and to obtain CCAS approval for them.
Dealer groups that were members of RMIF operated under a Repair Code prior to 2009,
but the manufacturing and dealership groupings within the industry all wished to operate
290
SMMT is the lead trade association that promotes the interests of the UK automotive industry to UK and EU
governments. It was registered as a company on 16 July 1902, and today is of the largest and most influential trade
associations, representing over 500 automotive companies. See www.smmt.co.uk.
291
The Retail Motor Industry Federation, which represents retail motor traders and providers of motor services
to businesses. It has around 8,000 members, including around 5,500 franchised garages in the United Kingdom,
the majority being single businesses. In addition, there are some 15,000 to 17,000 independent garages that are
involved in service and repair.
292
Scottish Motor Trade Association www.smta.co.uk.
293
Now part of Consumer Focus.
294
Under the Enterprise Act 2002, s 11.
295
S Brooker, At A Crossroads (Bertrams, 2005).

under a unified approach, so in 2009 the SMMT launched a rebranded New Car Code and
Vehicle Warranty Products Code (formerly the SMMT Mechanical Breakdown Insurance
Schemes) and expanded the latter to cover all insured and non-insurance products in
addition to extended warranty products and insurance warranty products.
Since CCAS codes should be independent of trade associations, SMMT, RMIF and SMTA
created a separate entity to operate the codes and be responsible for the self-regulation
of the motor industry, Motor Codes Limited (MCL). MCL is an independent subsidiary
of SMMT and has its own brand.296 The trade associations are not involved in operation
of the codes by MCL. MCL’s aim is to raise standards and increase consumer protection
for motorists. MCL has a Board comprising executive and non-executive directors. It has
nine employees and produces statistics on a regular basis, as required by OFT, as part of
MCL’s oversight function as code sponsor. MCL has a Committee for each Code, which
works with SMMT’s relevant committees to review issues and improve industry practice.
Thus, the New Card Code Committee works with SMMT’s Customer Service Committee,
and MCL’s Vehicle Warranty Products Committee works with SMMT’s Vehicle Warranty
Products Committee. Decisions on oversight of the Codes and on sanctioning are taken by
the Independent Compliance Assessment Panel (see below).
The Service and Repair Code was the first code to be launched by MCL in August 2008.
The Motor Industry Code of Practice for Vehicle Warranty Products achieved Stage 1
approval in May 2009, and Stage 2 and full OFT Code approval in 2011. The sector found
that obtaining Stage 1 approval of the CCAS was very difficult and took some time.
Some thirteen attempts have been made by various entities at producing a Service and
Repair Code: they have been unsuccessful broadly because they were too costly for small
garages and membership never reached critical mass. An attempt was made in 2010 to
launch a code for the 30,000 independent garages by the RMIF, but this was not taken
forward.297 MCL’s approach has been to get manufacturers to pay for the garages in their
franchised networks, but each individual garage still has to agree the terms and conditions
to join with MCL, and this involves multiple individual negotiations. The MCL Service
and Repair Code was launched in 2009 with 5,500 members, and numbers have since
reached 6,000, including 700 independents. The government wishes to see equal numbers
of independent and franchised members, so as to ensure a competitive market.
As discussions on codes have developed since the 1990s, there has been a sea change in
the attitude of industry towards the benefits of maintaining reputation and the advantages
of codes in assisting this. This can be seen in the approaches towards compliance and
sanctions, discussed below.
Before the codes were in place, OFT claimed that millions of pounds were lost by
consumers, since there was a large number of complaints that were then recorded by
Consumers Direct and Trading Standards Departments. OFT challenged SMMT to reduce
what they saw to be a high level of complaints. Consumers Direct have logged any contact
and counted it as a complaint. However, when complaints were re-routed to MCL, which
was able to analyse complaint data in greater detail, and to differentiate between types
of contact, it became clear that the clear majority of contacts that had been recorded as
296
www.motorcodes.co.uk.
297
RMIF has operated a National Conciliation Service since 1990, which can refer unresolved cases to
independent arbitration, drawing on a pool of four independent arbitrators, who are all Fellows of the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators, supported by a pool of nine technical experts (who act free of charge), for which both
parties pay a modest cost, not exceeding £262.

‘complaints’ were in fact merely requests for information or advice, and not substantive
complaints at all. Since 2004, MCL has consistently found that the ratio of contacts that seek
advice compared with those that make a complaint is 10:1.
One consequence of this recognition has been to highlight the importance of providing
consumer advice and information. Consumers Direct now directs all calls that it receives
to MCL. MCL has focused its main activity on its Customer Advice Line, which is its first
contact and means of assistance for consumers. A second consequence is recognition that
the number of complaints previously alleged was a misrepresentation of the true figures
and that the level of quality provided by the industry is far higher than was alleged. This
has changed the external perception of the industry with government, regulators and
customers, as well as internally.
Membership figures for each Code as at 2010 are shown in Table 11.21. All the major
vehicle manufacturers, franchise dealers and major quick fit chains subscribe to the codes,
since they see the advantages for their reputations and businesses.
Table 11.21: Code membership statistics 2010
Vehicle Warranty
New Car Code Service and Repair Code
Products
Vehicle manufacturers Garages Warranty administrators
Current subscribers 40 6,500 7
Market coverage 99% 25% 60%
OFT CCAS approval OFT approved code OFT stage 1 approval298 OFT stage 1 approval
stage
The current challenge is to persuade enough small garages to subscribe to the S&R code.
Small businesses see the length of time, effort and cost to gain accreditation as off-putting
barriers. It is important for consumer protection that coverage should be widespread,
but consumer choice is currently limited in this respect. Gaining accreditation is a slow
process. Under the S&R code, there is a £75 initial subscription fee, and a compliance
check by the RAC, which visits a garage every 24 months. There is a tension here between
ensuring that the level of consumer protection and performance is sufficiently high, and not
compromised, and between setting the entry requirements at a level that smaller traders find
too high. At present, the policy is not to compromise on standards, such as demonstrating a
consistent commitment to monitor. MCL has introduced a number of incentives for traders
to subscribe, such as a weekly newsletter to garages, running competitions under which
consumers nominate ‘best garage’.299
OFT approved code since November 2011.

298
299
Golden garage consumer survey, available at: http://www.motorcodes.co.uk/press-releases/14-million-
uk-motorists-feel-ripped-off-by-their-garage.html; information about the golden garage scheme: http://www.
goldengarages.co.uk.

The Three Codes
Motor Industry Code of Practice for New Cars

The Motor Industry Code of Practice for New Cars300 was the first code of practice in any
industry to gain ‘full approval’ from the OFT in 2004. In April 2009 Motor Codes took over
responsibility for running the Code from the SMMT. Over 98.9 per cent of all new cars regis-
tered in the UK are covered by the Code. The code commits car manufacturers to providing
high levels of customer satisfaction as a core element of their business. The Code states:
[Subscribers] confirm their promises made by vehicle manufacturers in the provision of new cars
and the cover provided by the manufacturer’s warranty. The code sets out standards that subscribers
will comply with regarding:
• Advertising
• Availability of Replacement Parts
• New Car Sales
• Complaints Handling
• Car Manufacturer’s Warranties
Subscribers are obliged to accept the Code in its entirety and ensure that their staff are aware of
their legal responsibilities as well as their responsibilities under this Code.
A consumer who feels dissatisfied with a subscriber’s performance under any item covered by this
Code is able to submit a grievance to the Conciliation and Advisory Service. The principles set out
in this Code are not intended to interpret, qualify or supplement the law, and are not intended to
be applied to non-consumer sales.
This Code has been developed by the motor industry to provide a self regulatory regime by which
vehicle manufacturers can demonstrate their intention to operate as responsible businesses and
have in place a cost-effective and speedy dispute resolution service that consumers can readily
access in the event of a disagreement.
Motor Industry Code of Practice for Service and Repair

The Motor Industry Code of Practice for Service and Repair301 was the launched to the
public in August 2008. The launch marked a major development in consumer protection in
the automotive sector. With the support of the industry, government, Consumer Focus and
Trading Standards, the Code completed full CCAS approval in 2011 and is now active in
more than 6,000 garages across the country.
Motor Industry Code of Practice for Vehicle Warranty Products302

The Motor Industry Code of Practice for Vehicle Warranty Products was officially launched
on 14 July 2009. The Code sets the standards that Vehicle Warranty Product Administrators
must comply with regarding the sale and administration of vehicle warranty products. Over
50% of all vehicle warranty products are covered by this Code.
300
Motor Industry Code of Practice: New Cars, 2008. Available at: http://www.motorcodes.co.uk/images/stories/
documents/new_car_code.pdf.
301
Motor Industry Code of Practice: Service and Repair, 2008. Available at: www.motorcodes.co.uk/images/
stories/documents/code_document_web.pdf.
302
Motor Industry Code of Practice: Vehicle Warranty Products, 2009. Available at: www.motorcodes.co.uk/
images/stories/documents/vehicle_warranty_products_code_[web].pdf.

The subscribers to a code agree to:

• Take effective and immediate action to achieve a just settlement to a consumer
complaint.
• Have in place an easily identifiable and accessible written complaints procedure.
• Provide every assistance to their dealers in handling and resolving complaints
• Co-operate with local consumer advisors or intermediaries where necessary.
• Give every assistance to the Code Advisory and Conciliation Service.
The Dispute Resolution Procedures
Initial complaint
The first stage is always to encourage dialogue between the consumer and the relevant
company. The New Car Code states:
A consumer or intermediary who has a complaint about a subscriber should, in the first instance,
refer the matter verbally to the subscriber’s dealer network. In the event that a complaint remains
unresolved at both dealer and manufacturer level, it is the subscriber’s obligation to make clear to
the consumer their right to refer the complaint to the Code Advisory and Conciliation Service. …
A consumer or intermediary who has a complaint about the quality of the vehicle or parts supplied
should, in the first instance, refer the matter to the selling dealer.
The complaint, preferably in writing, should be addressed to a senior executive, director, or the
proprietor of the selling dealer.
If the complaint relates to new car warranty and the dealer is unable to resolve the matter, a consumer
should take the complaint directly to the customer relations department of the manufacturer. The
claims procedure and the manufacturer’s (subscriber’s) contact details can be found in the new car
warranty document.
Any letters will receive a reply from the subscriber within 10 working days of receipt.303
The leading car manufacturers operate in-house Consumer Service Departments, which
keep in contact with their customers with the aim of keeping them for life. This provides
direct care, and is a means of resolving any problems directly. Some disputes or individuals,
however, benefit from being dealt with at a distance, so a court might be appropriate, or in
a middle way through a code. The key question in any dispute is: ‘what does the customer
want? Does the individual want a remedy, or is he simply expressing anger, frustration or
unrealistic desires?’
Consumer Advice Line and Conciliation

Where direct contact between customer and company is not proving fruitful, MCL will
attempt to assist through its Motor Codes Advisory and Conciliation Service. This provides
a free consumer advice line to assist consumers with motoring advice and help with disputes
consumers may have with a subscriber of one of the three codes of practice. If an issue can
be fixed with a phone call, MCL will contact the garage at that stage and suggest that the
garage takes the initiative to fix the dispute without further ado. MCL finds that it is able
to resolve the vast majority of issues at this stage by offering an independent channel of
303
Motor Industry Code of Practice New Cars 2008, available at: www.motorcodes.co.uk/images/stories/
documents/new_car_code.pdf.

communication, informed by experience, and by offering an objective view to both sides.

It leans on companies to be more responsive, and equally tries to inform rational attitudes
on both sides. Hence, warranty claims on clutches outside the six month warranty period
would not be supported.
However in certain complex cases it is not always possible to resolve a dispute quickly,
as it can take some time to gather all the information necessary to reach a decision and
a satisfactory outcome. The Code Advisory and Conciliation Service will advise both
subscriber and consumer on a remedy as appropriate.
If the consumer enquiry raised is a potential breach of a code, MCL’s Conciliation Service
will try to resolve the concern by investigating the potential breach and aim to review and
resolve any dispute with as little disruption to the consumer as possible. MCL will collate
all the documents, and then send a pack to the garage, and request its full written response
within 10 working days. MCL will assess the response. Consumers will be kept informed of
the progress and outcome of their conciliation case. If MCL is satisfied, it will tell both sides.
Arbitration
If a case remains unresolved or there is a difference of opinion that cannot be satisfactorily
addressed through conciliation, the case can be referred to independent arbitration. If a
consumer wishes to instigate an arbitration, the company may not object. The arbitration
service is provided by IDRS Ltd.304 The parties will be required to sign an application for
arbitration and pay the arbitration fee, which is split between them (see below). If the
consumer loses, the manufacturer has the right to reclaim the cost from the consumer.
The Code Advisory and Conciliation Service will submit the case file to IDRS. The case
file includes all documents submitted by the consumer and subscriber. The Arbitrator
has the power to direct any party to provide any additional document or information
considered relevant. As the arbitration service is designed to be low cost to allow it to be
accessible, any hearing will normally rely on documents only. None of the parties to the
dispute may be present or be represented by another person, unless the Arbitrator decides
to conduct an oral arbitration, in which case parties may attend to present their evidence.
Legal representation may only be employed if the Arbitrator so directs.
IDRS’ arbitrators apply the law, the Code and their common sense in deciding cases.
Arbitrators issue a thorough, reasoned decision. The decision of the Arbitrator is legally
binding upon both parties and concludes the complaint.305 There are only limited
circumstances where a case already considered under the terms of the Arbitration Act can
then proceed to court. The award of the Arbitrator will be published in writing to all parties
involved in the dispute and is enforceable in the Courts by any party.
Instead of opting for arbitration by IDRS, it is open to a consumer to start court
proceedings, or use any available alternative dispute resolution facility. MCL can accelerate
a case through its conciliation process where both sides wish to proceed to arbitration. This
occurred when Land Rover wanted to have the decision of an arbitrator in what it saw as a
test case so that it could apply it to a number of similar cases.
MCL has found that the number of consumers who wish to jump straight to the arbitration
option is increasing. However, MCL is trying to educate members and consumers about
304
Part of the CEDR Disputes Group, see p 267 above.
305
The authors were consistently informed by trade personnel interviewed that businesses trust the consistency
of decisions from the arbitration scheme more than they do those of the courts.

the service they provide, so as to avoid this. Trading Standards have a good working
relationship with MCL, and usually redirect the consumers back to MCL.
MCL’s experience has been that where customers choose to involve a solicitor or Trading
Standards, they have very high expectations of what their rights are, or something has gone
drastically wrong. Most consumers seek legal advice from solicitors, Trading Standards or
citizens advice because a ‘bloke in the pub’ tells them they are entitled to a new car or
compensation. MCL would like to see more solicitors advising consumers of the various
Code and ADR options, and see courts either refusing to accept cases that have not tried an
ADR approach or imposing cost penalties for not doing so.
The issues that arise under the New Car Code and Service and Repair Code relate
principally to warranty issues. It is almost inconceivable that issues of law would arise. The
law on supply of consumer goods and services is clear and well settled.
The number of cases dealt with under the schemes are shown in Table 11.22. The number
of cases involved at both conciliation and arbitration stages has been fairly constant in these
years. The conciliation stage resolves around 95 per cent of disputes, and under 15 cases go
on to arbitration every year.
Table 11.22: Complaint Statistics
Total 2005 Total 2006 Total 2007 Total 2008 Total 2009 Total 2010 Total 2011 Total
Contacts 4189 4315 3871 4038 7482 8494 8997
Conciliation 395 353 350 527 478 293 417
Fast track306 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 274 255
Arbitration 9 5 10 16 20 10 17
Transparency and Oversight
There are various vertical and external means aimed at making operation of the system trans-
parent, monitored and accountable. The OFT’s CCAS scheme requires a Code to be subject to
an independent compliance assessment panel. MCL’s Independent Compliance Assessment
Panel (ICAP)307 monitors the operation of the Code and subscriber compliance. The member-
ship of ICAP comprises individuals from the motor industry, consumer lobby, advisory ser-
vices, Members of Parliament and the broader business world. From 2011 its Chair is a senior
Trading Standards official. The report from each meeting, including details of all monitoring
and sanctions imposed, is circulated to all members of ICAP and is available on the website.
Each report will also form the core of evidence supplied to the OFT for its monitoring pur-
poses. The quarterly reports also form the basis of the Motor Codes Annual Report.308
The outcomes of all IDRS arbitration cases are assessed to determine whether any Code
compliance issues have been raised and if any amendments to the Code are required to
address any specific issues raised by the case. ICAP will also review cases of persistent or
serious breaches of the Code by subscribers.
306
Fast Track process before conciliation is a new approach whereby consumers can avoid the longer
full conciliation process, through one telephone call from Motor Codes to the Code subscriber to resolve the
consumer’s concerns. If Fast Track doesn’t resolve the concerns the case can then move to conciliation. If the
consumer remains dissatisfied after conciliation the consumer can request the case be progressed to independent,
legally binding arbitration.
307
http://www.motorcodes.co.uk/about-motor-codes/icap.html.
308
Independent Compliance Assessment Panel February 2011 Report.

The motor industry believes that in placing authority placed in an independent ICAP
reflects the serious nature with which it views non-compliance. The industry now feels
that it is under constant scrutiny and reassessment of issues raised and the performance of
the code system. ICAP issues regular reports on all code operations. ICAP will also review
cases of persistent or serious breaches of the Code by subscribers, and impose sanctions.
Consumer Focus also constantly monitors the codes. ICAP has the authority to instigate an
independent investigation, with which the subscriber is required to assist fully.
Depending on the outcome of any investigation, the Panel can impose a varied selection
of sanctions upon a subscriber. The sanctions policy adopted by ICAP has been that of a
stepped response dependent on the seriousness of the offence. Sanctions include education
and training, undergoing monitoring, put warning about a trader on MCL’s website, marking
the trader on the website as ‘EXPELLED’ from the Code regime and stating the reason for
the expulsion,309 and imposing financial penalties. If a financial penalty is imposed on a
subscriber, the penalty sum is donated to the motor industry charity BEN. A trader that has
been sanctioned may redeem itself, such as after inspection. The imposition of sanctions
attracts the attention of the local and motoring press, which picks up and publicises the
sanction and affects the local market. MCL also has support from ‘What Car?’ magazine
and the ‘Honest John’ column in the Daily Telegraph newspaper.
The process and outcome of any disciplinary action and of any customer complaint are
kept separate. However, where a number of similar conciliation cases occur regarding the
same subscriber, a disciplinary action could be instituted.
There is little evidence of any challenge to the motor codes schemes on the basis of lack
of independence of effectiveness in operation. The major challenges facing the code scheme
are limited awareness by consumers and gaining comprehensive coverage of industry
subscribers for the S&R code. Increased attempts are likely to make Citizens Advice Bureaux
and Law Centres aware of the existence of codes, and their advantages.
Costs
The costs for consumers and companies under the arbitration scheme are shown in Table
11.19. The full administration cost of the system is not published. The subscription and
annual costs for company members of the codes are shown in Table 11.23.
Table 11.23: Code subscription costs
New car code Service and repair code

Annual fee for vehicle £1,250 plus VAT Garage annual subscription £75 plus VAT
manufacturers fee
Fee per conciliation case £75 plus VAT Fee per conciliation case £75 plus VAT
opened invoiced quarterly
Annual garage inspection £175 plus VAT
by the RAC
309
This sanction has been used once, for a single garage.

Travel Disputes: The Abta Code and Schemes
Background
The Travel Association (formerly The Association of British Travel Agents, but still known
by its familiar acronym ABTA) was established in 1950 by 22 leading travel companies. The
ABTA brand is widely recognised by consumers.310 In 2010 its members comprise over 5,000
travel agencies outlets and more than 900 tour operators, ranging from small, specialist
tour operators and independent travel agencies through to publicly-listed companies, with
business models including call centres, internet booking services, and high street shops.
Members account for around 90 per cent of package holidays sold in the UK.
One of its founding objectives was to create a Code of Conduct that would be recognised
by the public as a guarantee of a high standard of service by members. The Code of Conduct,
which ABTA members are required to follow as a condition of membership,311 includes
requirements for dispute resolution processes.
It is also a condition of ABTA membership for an agent to provide ABTA with security
in the form of a bond or other applicable security for this purpose. If the agent’s business
should fail financially, this bond or security will help to ensure that their customers
can continue with their travel arrangements or are reimbursed the cost of their travel
arrangements. ABTA will also ask the agent to make a contribution to the Travel Agents’
Bond Replacement Scheme (TABRS), a low-cost alternative to bonding. In exceptional
circumstances, ABTA may also ask the agent to contribute to the Retail Fund.
ABTA has no bonding requirements for principals, but ensures that members acting
as a principal provide financial protection for their customers’ travel arrangements in
accordance with the law.312 The agent can bond their non-licensable packages or single-
element business with ABTA. If the agent decides to bond with ABTA, then they are asked
to make a contribution to the Shortfall Insurance scheme.
The ABTA Code of Conduct was approved by the OFT under its Consumer Code
Approval Service (CCAS) on 29 September 2005. However, ABTA voluntarily withdrew its
code from the CCAS on 1 September 2006 after it decided to change its financial protection
arrangements in a way that OFT concluded did not comply with the CCAS requirements.313
The withdrawal from the CCAS arose after the OFT considered that ABTA should provide
financial protection for customers of any member business if it were to fail financially.
However, ABTA did not consider that members should protect consumers’ deposits and
prepayments irrespective of the motives or reasons for customers’ losses. ABTA held to its
position that it was not appropriate for it to insure members and consumers against every
eventuality, including organised crime or fraud by members or their employees. ABTA’s
position remains that as a privately run protection scheme it should cover genuine business
failure, as most other payment protection schemes do. The extent of the commercial risk to
310
An Ipsos MORI survey in 2008 found that 74% of consumers recognised the ABTA brand: Business leadership
in consumer protection. A discussion document on self regulation and industry-led compliance, OFT1058 (London,
Office of Fair Trading, 2010), available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer-policy/oft1058.pdf.
311
The current ABTA Code of Conduct was adopted on 20 January 2009: www.abta.com/filegrab/?ref=84&f=
codeofconduct270410.pdf.
312
www.abta.com/join/member_introduction/financial_protection.
313
OFT: ABTA withdraws from OFT Consumer Codes Approval Scheme, 31 August 2006. Available at: www.
oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2006/127-06.

ABTA if it were to cover ‘gold-plating’ would simply be too great. It considers that consumers
have a large amount of information available to them. ABTA assesses each member
company’s risk under its strict financial security requirements, but cannot guarantee that it
is always told about every risk and every aspect of the member’s business. ABTA’s financial
ability to provide such unlimited insurance is limited by the fact that its bondholders would
not accept too great a commercial risk, nor could the second tier captive in Guernsey.
ABTA accepts that it is fair for traders to accept some risks, and consumers to accept some.
Separate insurances are available for consumers and they can also receive protection by
paying with credit cards and by VISA Debit Card. The OFT disagreed on the above issues,
so ABTA seceded from CCAS in 2006. Nevertheless, in all other respects ABTA’s Code and
the manner in which it is operated is recognised as being of benchmark status.
ABTA monitors all complaints to see if members have breached the Code, and if so can
launch a Code Investigation, for which there is a dedicated in-house team. If a breach is
found, the consumer is informed of the outcome. This procedure is intended to enable
ABTA to exert self-regulatory pressure over its members. ABTA considers that its leadership
has educated members in raising standards. The process of gaining OFT approval was
influential in pressuring industry to improve its processes and standards further. ABTA
has the ability to impose a fixed financial penalty on a member (set at £400 in 2010) and
can refer serious matters to the Code of Conduct Committee (see below). The penalties
imposed are listed monthly on ABTA’s website.
Two standing committees manage matters relating to ABTA’s membership rules.
The Membership Committee oversees the Accounts rules, and the Code of Conduct
committee oversees the Code. Both committees are made up of members of ABTA, and
their responsibilities include considering breaches of the rules, and ensuring that both sets
of rules remain relevant, proportionate, and fair. Independent consumer representatives
and Trading Standards officials sit on the Code of Conduct Committee, which reviews
the content of the Code and decides disciplinary cases. In 2008 ABTA’s Board structure
was changed to include both elected and appointed members, and two non-executives
from outside the travel industry. ABTA’s Secretariat, operating from the company’s offices
in London, comprises some 60 members of staff, who work to provide members with
services, to represent their interests, and to administer the membership systems and Codes.
The Code of Conduct Committee may impose a range of sanctions on members: accepting
an undertaking by a member, issuing a reprimand, imposing a fine, or terminating
membership. Fines have no financial limit, and vary in size depending on the seriousness of
the offence and the member’s previous record of conduct.314
Before the Code was introduced, there was a steady stream of cases that were brought
through the county courts: the court route has almost dried up now (perhaps to fewer
than one per cent of claims), although solicitors can still use the court route rather than
the code route.315 When cases go to court, the anecdotal but widely-held industry view has
consistently been that some judges make unpredictable and very curious decisions, ignorant
of the Code or of commercial realities. Judges have little experience or analysis of travel and
holidays other than a generic media-influenced aura of criticism so it’s arbitration presents
more certainty for businesses and consumers.
314
In the early 1990s, a fine of £100,000 was imposed in relation to a collection of offences; a fine of that
magnitude is unusual.
315
Industry stories circulate about solicitors objecting to companies seeking to contact their customers with
settlement offers after the solicitors had not passed on offers to their clients.

The industry views the Code as performing an essential commercial and social function
of enabling companies to placate unhappy customers swiftly, and also in managing
customers’ expectations. The number of complaints dealt with under the Code procedure
(including through direct contact between customers and companies) has clearly increased
overall since say the 1970s. Companies that trade on the basis of their reputations seek to
maintain them, and to avoid dissatisfied customers from failing to buy again. In achieving
customer satisfaction, industry practice adopts two approaches. First, swift response to
complaints and speedy resolution is critical. It is essential to have the right front line people
to handle complaints. They must act fast, know what they are advising about, be efficient,
and have sufficient authority to settle a case themselves without referring to a manager. The
call centres have to be well resourced and well staffed. Telephone mediations are thought to
be useful but rarely settle things: views tend merely to be further entrenched, whereas the
consumer wants someone to make a decision.
Companies are sometimes inundated by complaints, usually because they are insufficiently
resourced to handle them, such as after a merger, when it takes time to achieve operational
merger of complaint handling functions. ABTA can, and does, make help available to
members in such situations, so as to maintain the sector’s standards in complaint handling.
A good example of where companies ran into problems was when flights were suddenly
grounded in 2010 as a result of the Icelandic volcanic ash: companies did not have enough
people to deal with the volume of claims that arose.
Procedures
The Code: direct then assisted negotiation by ABTA

The stages in the process that customers are expected to follow, backed by time limits under
the Code for members to react, are as follows:
• Customers should first send their complaint directly to the ABTA member. The
company is required to send a full response within 28 days. The Code of Conduct
specifies that ABTA can impose a £400 fixed penalty fine on a member for failing
to respond to a complaint within the timescales set out in the Code of Conduct.
ABTA’s policy is to encourage a customer to make a reasonable attempt to resolve the
complaint with the company, and members must reply to each contact within 28 days.
• If attempts at direct discussion have failed to result in agreement, ABTA’s Consumer
Affairs Team will attempt to assist in resolving the dispute. Customers are encouraged
to send their complaint to ABTA online (with travel documentation if the holiday has
already taken place) by clicking on ‘Register a complaint’ on the ABTA website.
An individual complaint reference is given when each complaint is lodged with ABTA. If
an amicable settlement cannot be reached with the help of the Consumer Affairs Team, the
consumer will then have to decide whether to take formal action, and if so choose between
a court claim, the CEDR Solve Arbitration Scheme, or the separate scheme for personal
injury cases (see below). The arbitration rules require participants to try to settle issues
through direct negotiation first. ABTA’s complaints procedure and website signposts meet
this requirement.

The ABTA arbitration scheme

The arbitration scheme is administered by CEDR Solve316 for ABTA.317 The following are the
key elements of the arbitration process.
• Arbitration is used for claims for general compensation arising from breach of contract
and/or negligence by or on behalf of any person named in the booking form or other
contractual documents. If such a general compensation claim includes an element of mi-
nor illness or personal injury then this can also be considered by the arbitrator, although
for this specific element the arbitrator cannot award more than £1,500 per person. The
scheme does not cover disputes concerning serious personal injury etc, which may be
dealt with under the separate scheme for Personal Injury and Illness Mediation, below.
• The application can be made by post, online, or a combination. The online complaint
form provides a step-by-step guide to effective complaining, helping consumers to
understand the nature of their claim and how compensation is assessed by judges
and arbitrators. ABTA has found that this process tends to concentrate the minds of
companies on what is being complained about and encourages them to settle.
• ABTA must receive copies of the documentation within eighteen months of the date on
which the problem arose, or of the date of return from holiday, whichever is the later.318
Within the 18 month period, arbitration is compulsory if the consumer chooses, so the
ABTA company cannot object to the process. After eighteen months it can still be used
if the company consents.
• ABTA then issues a pre-arbitration process notice, which the customer must complete,
setting out the basis of the claim, and attaching evidence, and return it to ABTA within
14 days.319 A request can be made for a compensatory payment to be made in cash or
vouchers (to be used against a future booking). After the pre-arbitration form was
introduced, it was found that the numbers proceeding to arbitration fell since the
need to fill in the form focuses claimants’ minds on what they are requesting and
helps to resolve the majority of claims. ABTA had been considering introducing a
pilot conciliation stage, but decided to drop this because of the success of the pre-
arbitration notice.
• ABTA then forwards the materials to the member for its defence. The member then
has the opportunity to resolve the issue prior to more formal procedures or submit its
evidence and defence, which ABTA sends on to CEDR Solve.
• The consumer has to pay a fee on registering an arbitration claim, as shown in
Table 11.19 above, but from 2011 this is not due until the consumer’s comments to
the defence are requested by CEDR Solve, so if he settles prior to the defence being
submitted he have not been penalised.
• The claim will be dealt with ‘on the basis of the documents, including any photographic
evidence’. There is no hearing. Accordingly, the format is not suited for some matters,
for example, serious illness or injury claims.
• The arbitrator’s award is issued in writing and gives a summary of the facts, the
conclusions, and their reasons for reaching them. The arbitrator’s decision is legally
binding on both parties and is enforceable directly through the courts.
316
www.cedr.com/solve/schemes.
317
www.abta.com/consumer-services/travel_problems/arbitration.
318
The period was 9 months for many years, then extended to 12 months in May 2010, and to 18 months in July
2011, in order to attract more cases through the scheme, rather than the courts.

• The arbitrator will normally order the loser to pay the winner’s costs.
• Any party can ask for a review of the arbitrator’s decision, on paying a non-reimbursable
£350 review fee, although there are limited grounds on which this can be challenged.
An application to CEDR Solve must be made within 14 days of the date of the award
being dispatched. It must be accompanied by a copy of the arbitrator’s award together
with a statement setting out the reasons why the award is one that no reasonable
arbitrator should have reached on the basis of the documents presented.
The fees are fixed at a similar level to the fees payable in the courts’ Small Claims Track,
and at a level intended to discourage frivolous cases being lodged. Both consumers and
members have lodged cases for appeal. Arbitrations are usually concluded within seven
weeks of commencement.
Personal Injury and Illness Mediation

ABTA initially operated a separate scheme for personal injury claims, but it was never used
because lawyers invariably brought a claim in court. The court rules say that non-court
alternatives should be used first,320 but most courts are unaware of the ABTA scheme and
do not enforce that rule. The original personal injury scheme was replaced in 2008 with
a generic mediation scheme operated by IDRS, and was in turn replaced in 2011 by an
enhanced scheme from CEDR Solve. This scheme can also be used by members and their
employees for employee personal injury issues.
The Scheme applies to personal injury, serious illness, nervous shock, death or the
consequences of any of these. The following are the main elements of the process:
• Mediation does not apply to disputes where one or other of the parties has already
initiated legal action, unless it has been suspended or discontinued by agreement.
• Mediation takes the form of a meeting attended by the decision-maker for each of
the parties. Costs of representation are the responsibility of the parties, unless agreed
otherwise in any settlement agreement.
• The rules governing the mediation process will be set out by the mediator in advance
of the mediation day. It will take place at a venue to be arranged and agreed by all
parties and at their cost.
• If the dispute is resolved during mediation, the mediator will record in writing the
agreement reached by the parties. The signed agreement will be a binding contract
and, as such, can be enforced by the Court.
The cost of the mediator are set on a case-by-case basis by CEDR Solve. It has been found
difficult to set fixed fees for personal injury claims, partly because injuries can change during
the course of the mediation. CEDR Solve aims to appoint a mediator within 5 working
days. The mediator, who would only take the case if he or she is available to deal with it
expeditiously, would then contact the parties to arrange a suitable time to deal with the case.
The mediator should keep the parties informed of progress. It is difficult to generalise over
how long a case would take.
319
Before July 2011, the form had to be forwarded by the customer to the travel company, but it was thought
that returning the form to ABTA would encourage greater adherence to the scheme.
320
CPR, r 44.5(3).

Outcomes
The number of complaints received by ABTA, and the number of arbitrations initiated,
since 2000 is shown in Figure 11.8. The number of claims in the arbitration scheme has
fallen during this period. In 2010, 12,702 case files were opened, of which 1,216 were sent a
Pre-Arbitration Notice, of which 591 requested further details of the Arbitration Scheme, of
which 255 progressed to an award being issued (2 per cent of cases opened). An additional
19,169 telephone enquiries were received.
The overwhelming majority of complaints (perhaps 90 per cent) are settled in the
mediation stage. The existence of three stages (direct negotiation, mediation, then
arbitration) might be criticised as presenting a succession of barriers for consumers.
However, a different perspective is that it acts as a filter through which simple disputes
can be settled with lesser formality and cost. The referral of a case to arbitration frequently
itself produces settlements. Taking this step requires consumers to focus on the merits of
their claims and to be realistic about what it is they are seeking. Conversely, the cost of
defending a case through the formal process of either arbitration or the courts has the effect
of frequently encouraging companies to make a settlement offer so as to avoid the costs of
the process. A number of companies resent making offers of a few hundred pounds at that
stage to compensate what they regard as valueless claims, and argue that it is ultimately
all customers who are paying the costs of business customer complaint departments and
defence costs. However, a different viewpoint is that the process acts as a regulatory control
on business behaviour.
Figure 11.7: ABTA Complaint Statistics 2000/01–2008/09321
25,000
22,048
20,000 18,431
17,834 18,154
17,571
16,441 16,258
15,717
14,965
15,000
10,000
5,000
1,400 1,296 1,123 1,191 1,253 1,075 722 581 492

0
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
No of complaints No of arbitrations
321
The arbitration figures here do not tally exactly with those in ABTA’s annual reports since the figures relate
to the financial year (1st July to 30th June) and there is a time lag in the arbitrations that start during that period,
so that such arbitrations might not have been worked their way through the system by the time that the annual
reports are produced.

As at 2010, the average amount claimed through arbitration was £1,750, compared with
a ceiling on awards of £25,000. The average award was £630. For this level of claim, the fee
paid by the consumer was £62 (prior to 1 May 2010) and £90 (post 1 May 2010), and the
company pays £265(prior to 1 May 2010) £350 (post 1 May 2010).
There is an imbalance of expectation on the outcomes between some consumers and
businesses. Research undertaken by ABTA around 2009 shows that consumers claimed a
full refund of their holiday cost in about 24 per cent of claims. 76 per cent of consumers who
complain are successful in getting a solution through the Scheme – although not always
the solution that they were asking for, whereas in 17 per cent of all claims, consumers are
awarded no compensation at all. The existence of the fee, and differential between consumer
and company fees, gives rise to a cost risk: there is a cap on the total cost liability of the
consumer which equates to their original arbitration fee (which will not be refunded if
the customer loses the claim) plus having to pay the same amount again as a contribution
towards the company’s costs.322
The Code operates within a relatively stable legal environment of customer rights and
trader obligations,323 so the need to clarify the law arises very rarely and most cases turn on
facts and the extent of any compensation that should or might be paid.
ABTA sees no need for any extra collective procedure, since multiple similar individual
claims can be processed through existing channels. It is rare for large numbers of similar
claims to arise: numbers delayed by airlines or suffering health problems with hotels,
for example, are generally modest, but can sometimes mount up to hundreds but not
thousands. The system may be challenged by multiple cases, but can cope with them. A
member occasionally asks or agrees that similar claims by all family members should be
dealt with in a single arbitration, since this is more convenient for all and saves costs.
Customer complaints provide essential feedback for tour operators and travel agents on
whether standards are being met by their own suppliers, such as airlines and hotels. When
claims are received, UK operators notify their suppliers, and generally have contractual
rights to negotiate and settle claims bilaterally with customers. In larger claims, however,
suppliers’ insurers may become involved.
Aggregated statistics are published monthly on claims but not outcomes in individual
cases. ABTA used to publish anonymised case examples, which was found to be useful for
members initially but less so as experience with the Code grew. In 2010 website publication
of statistical data was introduced, which is being extended in 2012. Media reports, such as
by Holiday Which? give wider dissemination to potential purchasers.324
Estate Agents
The property sector has statutory regulation that is ‘diverse and incomplete. … It is a
patchwork of laws that have built up over decades in a piecemeal fashion that lacks a logical
322
Until 2011, ABTA used to maintain a budget from which to refund members’ fees where the consumer won
compensation but failed to beat any offer previously made by the member (reflecting the CPR Part 36 process in
the courts).
323
Notably The Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992 (SI 1992 No 3288), as
amended, implementing Directive 90/314/EEC on Package Travel and Holiday Tours.
324
See www.holidaytravelwatch.net.

consistency, a reflection of the historic development of legislation which initially focused on

physical standards and rent levels rather than consumer rights.’325 Partly because of this, the
concept of the ombudsman has grown into being widely accepted as an approach to dealing
with complaints across all aspects of public and many private services including the legal
and financial sectors.326
Schemes have been introduced in the housing market for deposits, accreditation of estate
agents, and landlords. From 2007 it is compulsory for landlords and letting agents to belong
to a scheme for resolving tenancy deposit disputes.327 Three approved schemes exist: the
Deposit Protection Service,328 my|deposits,329 and the Tenancy Deposit Scheme.330 Each
scheme offers an independent adjudication for disputes about tenancy deposits at the end
of a tenancy, which is free to tenants.
Statutory regulation required those engaging in estate agency work for residential
property to join an approved estate agents redress scheme by October 2008.331 The OFT
website provides the criteria that the members have to satisfy in order to be able to sign up
to the scheme,332 see Figure 11.6. The OFT is designated as the approval authority, and has
approved two schemes:333
• The Property Ombudsman.334 By the end of 2010,335 TPO had a total membership
of 8,008 firms covering 13,756 offices, with 11,321 of them handling property sales
325
Government review of regulation and redress in the UK housing market: Final Report to the Department for
Communities and Local Government (CLG) and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
(London, BERR, 2009), available at: www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49743.pdf.
326
ibid.
327
The Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007, (CEAR).
328
www.depositprotection.com/default.aspx?bhjs=1&fla=1. This holds deposits during the tenancy, and the
ADR element is funded by the interest, which results in no case fees for landlords or letting agents. Both landlord
and tenant have to agree to use the scheme, as the adjudicator’s decision is binding.
329
www.mydeposits.co.uk. This scheme is run by Tenancy Deposit Solutions Limited, a company jointly
owned by the National Landlords Association and HFIS plc trading as Hamilton Fraser Insurance (the Scheme
Administrator. If there is a dispute about the return of the deposit at the end of the tenancy, and the tenant chooses
to use the arbitration scheme, the disputed amount is lodged with my|deposits while the dispute is resolved by
an independent adjudicator appointed through IDRS. If the landlord refuses to lodge the disputed deposit with
the scheme, then the tenant cannot use the free ADR scheme, and will have to go to court. However, the scheme
guarantees to pay any amount ordered by the court, and will take responsibility for recovering this amount from
the landlord.
330
www.thedisputeservice.co.uk. This is run by The Dispute Service (TDS), and builds on a voluntary scheme
established in 2003 to provide dispute resolution and complaints handling for letting agents. Decisions are
overseen by the scheme’s own Independent Complaints Examiner, who has a team of adjudicators to deal with
disputes. If there is a dispute about the deposit, the landlord or agent has ten working days to try to resolve it. If
this is not possible, then the tenant, the landlord or the agent can refer the dispute to the TDS. The landlord or the
agent will transfer the deposit to TDS, and TDS will take responsibility for paying it out, as decided by the ICE. If
the deposit is not transferred, then the TDS will pay the tenant whatever is decided, and pursue the landlord or
agent for the money.
331
The Estate Agents (Redress Scheme) Order 2008, No. 1712, available at: www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx
?LegType=All+Legislation&title=estate+agents+redress+scheme&searchEnacted=0&extentMatchOnly=0&confe
rsPower=0&blanketAmendment=0&sortAlpha=0&TYPE=QS&PageNumber=1&NavFrom=0&parentActiveText
DocId=3493912&ActiveTextDocId=3493912&filesize=4489. This was made under The Estate Agents Act 1979, as
amended by The Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007.
332
oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/estate-agents/EARS.
333
A concern remains that people are paying twice in view of belonging as both individuals and as firms, and
to the Estate Agents and RICS schemes.
334
www.tpos.co.uk. This was established in 1998 as the Ombudsman for Estate Agents, and changed its name in
2009 to The Property Ombudsman (TPO). The Scheme is open to all those firms of estate agents with a principal,
director or partner who is a member of the National Association of Estate Agents (NAEA) or Royal Institution
of Chartered Surveyors (RICS); to all corporate estate agents (defined as those who are subsidiaries of a bank,

and 7,851 dealing with lettings. There were a total of 1,316 general enquiries, 11,794
complaint enquiries against all agents, of which 1,338 cases were opened. The total
amount of cases closed in lettings and sales was 1083. The total value of awards for
lettings £145,900.92 and sales £81,571.60. The financial award, if issued, is published
in the anonymous summaries of all cases on the TPO website.
• Ombudsman Services: Property (OS:P).336 It has about 7500 members.337 The OS:P
received over 5,843 contacts during 2010–2011, 74 per cent by phone and 26 per cent
by letter.338 It issued 465 complaint forms, 428 of which were returned, and resolved
260 cases. The origin of such complaints was: 29% non-company complaint; 37%
members outside the OS:P terms of reference; 16% general enquiries; 16% member
complaints inside the terms of reference; 1% non-member enquiry; 1% member
enquiry. The subject matter of complaints is shown in Table 11.24. The average award
over the year was £900.
Both schemes are free for consumers to use, but subject to a maximum award of £25,000
(including VAT).
Table 11.24: Subject matter of complaints to OS:P in 2010–2011
Valuations/surveyors 59%
Property management 23%
Residential sales 9%
Professional advice 4%
Auction 1%
Other 4%
building society or insurance company, or are themselves quoted on the Stock Exchange) and to other estate agents
who are sponsored and seconded by existing member agents. From June 2006, the OEA extended its services
to Lettings and Property Management agents. Many estate agents have in addition agreed to follow the CCAS-
approved TPO Code of Practice for Residential Estate Agents. Lettings and property management agents who join
the TPO also subscribe to the Code of Practice for Letting Agents.
335
TPO annual report 2010 available at: www.tpos.co.uk/downloads/reports/TPO_Annual_Report_2010.pdf.
336
www.surveyors-ombudsman.org.uk. This scheme started as a Scottish pilot scheme for chartered surveyors,
registered with the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) to deal with complaints about RICS members,
and was later extended across the UK: being subject to the determinations of the ombudsman is a requirement of
membership of the RICS. Non-RICS members, and also firms, can join voluntarily, so it has extended to letting
agents, estate agents, and management agents. The scope of the ADR scheme is global since RICS has members
across the world, especially across Europe. RICS funds the administration of the scheme, and firms that receive
cases pay a fee to the Ombudsman of £176.25 per case, so that OS:P costs nothing for firms whose complaints are
not converted into actual cases that require formal decisions by the Ombudsman. CCAS approval was obtained
in 2008: How the Surveyors Ombudsman Service demonstrates that it meets the OFT’s criteria for approval of estate
agents redress schemes OFT1075 (London, OFT, 2010). Available at: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/estateagents/
oft1075.pdf.
337
The list of members is at www.os-property.org/pages/26members.php.
338
Ombudsman Service Property, Annual report 2010, available at: www.os-property.org/downloads/2010_
annual_report_property.pdf.

Figure 11.8: Summary of OFT’s criteria for approval of the schemes339
1. The Ombudsman must be independent.

2. The scheme must be adequately staffed and funded and be able to demonstrate its ability to
attract and retain a sufficient number of potential members to ensure it is viable.
3. The scheme must be easily accessible to all those entitled to use it.
4. Members of the scheme should be required under the terms of the scheme to have an effective
internal complaints procedure set out in writing which should include:
• full contact details
• any information the complainant must provide – this must be reasonable and not require
excessive detail or form-filling
• reasonable timescales for dealing with the complaint, including a timescale for resolution,
and
• details of the approved redress scheme and how the complainant can access it.
5. The Ombudsman must proceed fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
6. Complainants must be informed that the decision will not be legally binding on them, and
that they will have the power to either accept or reject that decision, but that it will be binding
on the estate agent if accepted by the complainant. They must also be kept informed of what
their alterative or additional actions could be at each stage of the procedure.
7. The scheme must make provisions for dealing with all types of complaints from actual and
potential buyers and sellers of residential property against those engaged in estate agency
work in the UK. The scheme’s complaints handling procedures must include reasonable
timescales for dealing with the complaint, including a timescale for a decision to be made.
8. The scheme’s operation and its procedures must be transparent.
9. There must be a free exchange of information between all parties relating to a complaint.
10. There must be a range of awards which take into account the level and type of detriment
caused.
11. The scheme shall ensure that decisions are implemented and that procedures are in place to
deal with non-compliance with the ombudsman’s decision and/or the scheme’s rules.
12. Appropriate information on complaints dealt with by the redress scheme must be routinely
provided to:
• Other OFT approved estate agents redress schemes.
• Other consumer redress schemes.
• The OFT or any other person/organisation exercising regulatory functions in relation to
the activities of persons engaging in estate agency work.
13. Membership requirements to join the scheme must be fair and ensure that all those who are
required to sign up to a redress scheme can do so.
14. The scheme’s effectiveness must be monitored on a regular basis.
15. The scheme operator must publicise the scheme to consumers and to existing and potential
members.
16. There must be independent procedures in place to consider and resolve complaints by
consumer or member business about the service provided by the ombudsman.
339
OFT approval of estate agents redress schemes Criteria – final (London, OFT, April 2008), available at: http://
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/oft919.pdf.

Evaluation
The UK has a lengthy history of ADR in general, including consumer ADR. ADR has
appeared in many public and private disputes, but has been allowed to grow organically,
and now exists in a highly confused state such that it is difficult to say that a national
architecture of ADR exists. Nevertheless, ADR is now so widespread—although ironically
the existence and extent of ADR systems are little known—that it would take only small
further steps for consumer ADR to be made fully comprehensive in coverage, and for
ADR in general to be far more widely known. The different examples of Sweden and the
Netherlands show what can be achieved if the populace thinks ‘ADR’ instead of ‘courts’,
and if the consumer landscape could be simplified so as to have higher visibility and hence
become better known.
On one view, the current picture is confused by the existence of differing types of
public and private ADR systems, such as statutory regimes and ADR bodies or—a British
speciality—code-based private sector ADR systems closely integrated with self-regulatory
systems involving trade associations and separate specialist ADR providers. It might be
wondered whether the price of creating higher visibility for consumer ADR would be the
need to standardise all ADR bodies. However, existing practice shows that it would not, in
fact, be necessary for all consumer ADR bodies (or systems) to be statutory or private, as
long as every ADR system delivers a high quality of performance and outputs, and can be
recognised as operating within an integrated national system.
Indeed, in relation to the practice of ADR, the UK demonstrates a number of leading
examples of best practice across Europe. The FOS has achieved very high visibility, attracting
so many contacts that it has to confront human resource challenges. It handles more
consumer contacts and complaints than any other consumer ADR system across Europe.
Many other consumer ADR bodies achieve notably swift processing of complaints. There
is evidence of competition in relation to processes and duration of processing between
ADR providers, especially the two main private sector bodies, apparently without issues of
quality or mistrust by consumers who experience these services.
The UK places some emphasis on providing information and advice to consumers, both
before entering into transactions (so as to avoid problems arising later) and once a problem
has arisen (but there is less official emphasis on the latter aspect). This policy can also be
seen in other jurisdictions, but in UK it is not as advanced as in say Sweden. However, the
position may improve after the current government implements proposals to simplify the
consumer landscape, by rationalising a diverse range of bodies into a ‘first line’ of consumer
advice focused on a network of Citizens Advice Bureaux and by rationalising consumer
enforcement as between local Trading Standards Services and the OFT (with the latter in a
somewhat reduced role).
The involvement of regulators in controlling and encouraging improvements in
complaints handling by companies, and hence in private ADR schemes, is clear.
Improvements in telecoms took place as a direct result of the oversight and intervention of
Ofcom, improvements in general consumer ADR occurred as a result of the OFT’s CCAS,
and in energy as a result of the requirements of OFGEM. In all those cases, legislative
frameworks and support were necessary to empower the regulators, but the task of making
detailed specifications was omitted from legislation and delegated to regulators.

12
Best Practice in Customer Care in the UK
Christopher Hodges
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that the first tier in resolving issues between consumers and
traders is for them to communicate directly. This is a formal rule in almost every consumer
ADR system examined in this book. The expectation is that direct contact will resolve the
vast majority of problems, many of which will, at that stage, be queries rather than disputes.
An initial contact may turn into a dispute if it is handled badly. A rule requiring direct
contact as first stage, and banning referral to a third party within a reasonable timescale
unless there is good reason for the involvement of the third party, incentivises economic
efficiency in dispute resolution by avoiding the costs and time of third party involvement
and three-way communications. It also incentivises traders to have good customer relations
facilities.
Clearly, if traders are to respond well to customer feedback—good or bad—they will need
to have in place effective and responsive systems. There will no doubt be very considerable
variation amongst customer care systems, depending on national characteristics, the state
of a particular market, the extent of corporate resources, the need to maintain reputation,
and other factors. This chapter examines some examples of current best practice in direct
B2C customer care systems, taken from visits to three large traders located in the United
Kingdom. It is not claimed that these three are representative of any others, but the findings
are useful as a snapshot of corporate attitudes and systems.
An International Standard dated 2004 specifies how companies should approach the
process of complaints handling.1 It sets out a number of general principles (visibility,
accessibility, responsiveness, objectivity, freedom from charge to customers, confidentiality,
a customer-focused approach, accountability, and continual improvement), followed
by sections on the complaints-handling framework, planning and design, operation,
maintenance and improvement of systems. It also includes a specimen complaint form.
One of the most important requirements is that ‘Every reasonable effort should be made
to investigate all the relevant circumstances and information surrounding a complaint.
The level of investigation should be commensurate with the seriousness, frequency of
occurrence and severity of the complaint.’2
Directive 2006/123 on services requires that Member States shall ‘take the general
measures necessary to ensure that providers respond to the complaints referred to in
1
Quality management—Customer satisfaction—Guidelines for complaints handling in organizations, ISO
10002:2004.
2
ibid, para 7.6.

the first subparagraph in the shortest possible time and make their best efforts to find a
satisfactory solution.’3 Member States shall also ensure that, at the recipient’s request,
providers of services shall supply information that includes:
where a provider is subject to a code of conduct, or member of a trade association or professional
body which provides for recourse to a non-judicial means of dispute settlement, information in
this respect. The provider shall specify how to access detailed information on the characteristics of,
and conditions for, the use of non-judicial means of dispute settlement.4
Since the 1960s, there has been a transformation in the attitudes of major businesses in
competitive markets towards their customers. This change has, of course, run in parallel
with the rise of ‘consumerism’ and the implementation of extensive consumer legal rights.
Marks & Spencer was the first company to offer its customers a comprehensive ‘money back
without obligation’ returns policy. An important aim of the UK approach towards redress
mechanisms, as established in a sequence of papers by successive governments,5 is to make
it easier for business and consumers to resolve complaints between themselves. The stated
policy was strongly consistent with ‘responsive regulation’ and the ‘Hampton principles’:6
For most consumer complaints the least costly solution for both parties is direct resolution
of a complaint or claim. … A common incentive for businesses is the need to keep customers
happy and in most markets this will act as a deterrent against behaviour which causes consumers
major problems. Most consumer problems are dealt with bilaterally and retailers often compete
in terms of the ease with which they are willing to accept returns and correct faults. Building
a reputation for high levels of service is seen as a key variable in brand building and growing
profitable companies.7
It was said that where brand reputation plays little role, settlement by traders may depend on
the ease of access by consumers to advice on remedies and use of ‘small claims’ courts and
any mechanism for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) which is available to consumers.
In its 2010 ‘Statement of consumer protection enforcement principles’8 the OFT asserted:
most businesses aim to treat their customers fairly and comply with consumer protection law’ and
that OFT aims to enable and encourage them to do so, and to take enforcement action only where
there is no better route to securing compliance.
Effective meta use of complaint data requires standardisation in data recording. In order to
facilitate this, in 2010 the Commission issued its harmonised methodology for classifying
and reporting consumer complaints and enquiries, which encouraged Member States to
3
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market (OJ
No L 376, 27.12.2006, p 36, Art 27.1. Services that are excluded from this measure are finaicial services, electronic
communications, transport, temporary work agencies, healthcare services, audiovisual services, gambling services,
social services, private security services, notaries ands bailiffs.This is implemented in the UK by the Provision of
Services Regulations 2009/2009, which impose on suppliers duties to (a) respond to complaints from recipients of
the services as quickly as possible, and (b) make their best efforts to find a satisfactory solution to complaints from
such recipients. Para (b) does not apply to complaints that are vexatious.
4
ibid, Art 22.3(e).
5
Notably, Consumer White Paper, A Better Deal for Consumers. Delivering Real Help Now and Change for the
Future, 2009, Cm 2669, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file52072.pdf.
6
P Hampton, Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement (HM Treasury, 2005).
7
Comparative Report on Consumer Policy Regimes, (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003).
8
Statement of consumer protection enforcement principles (Office of Fair Trading, 2010), OFT1221 available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/OFT1221. See also OFT Prioritisation Principles,
(Office of Fair Trading, 2008), OFT953; Criminal Enforcement of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading
Regulations 2008, (Office of Fair Trading, 2010) OFT1273, 2010.

Best Practice in Customer Care in the UK 341
collect and register such data so as to develop a better understanding of market outcomes.9
The Commission noted that data on consumer complaints was a key indicator for market
monitoring and the development of outcome oriented policies in general. It said that
such data can be used to develop better regulation, to target enforcement and to design
information campaigns. Accordingly it produced a harmonised methodology for classifying
and reporting consumer complaints, so that the data could be compared.10
Examples are set out below of the internal complaint handling systems of three leading
companies: Boots is primarily a health and beauty care retailer, with some internal
manufacturing capability as well as extensive external manufacturing suppliers; BT is a large
telecommunications provider; and Procter & Gamble is a major multi-national consumer
product manufacturer. Hence, these examples offer contrasting products and services, from
different sectors.
The findings from the interviews strongly support the policy objectives of the importance
of maintaining high brand reputation and consumer trust for major brands in general
consumer trading, as commercial imperatives. The strength of the focus on customer care
is striking. It recognises that problems will occur and customers be hurt and unsatisfied, but
seeks to minimise and reverse customer dissatisfaction. That attitude may surprise some,
and it is undoubtedly not a universal approach, but the finding is striking. Academic theory
notes the importance of the surrounding culture in achieving compliance with regulatory
standards,11 and these findings illustrate what best practice can achieve.
Boots
Boots is a United Kingdom-based leading international pharmacy-led health and beauty

group delivering a range of products and services to retail customers.12 It is one of the
businesses of Alliance Boots Limited, whose revenue for the year ended 31 March 2010 was
£22.5 billion. It has around 50,000 product lines, over 115,000 employees, and dispensed
over 245 million medicines and related items annually through 2,600 stores and 600
opticians (3,250 stores worldwide). It serves 9 million customers every week (second only
to the Post Office in the United Kingdom), and 100,000 online each week through Boots.
com.
This company’s approach to ‘complaint handling’ (which is a term it does not use) has
made recourse to legal processes by customers, and to standards set by the substantive law,
irrelevant.
9
Commission Recommendation of 12.5.2010 on the use of a harmonised methodology for classifying and reporting
consumer complaints and enquiries, COM(2010) 3021, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/
consumer-complaint-recommendation_en.pdf (accessed 2 August 2010).
10
Commission Staff Working Document on the results of the public consultation and the introduction of a
harmonised methodology for classifying and reporting consumer complaints and enquiries Accompanying document
to the Commission Recommendation on the use of a harmonised methodology for classifying and reporting consumer
complaints and enquiries, SEC(2010) 572, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/consumer-
complaint-swd_en.pdf.
11
F Haines, Corporate Regulation. Beyond ‘Punish or Persuade’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
12
See http://www.boots-uk.com/About_Boots.aspx.

The Customer Care Approach
Boots’ vision is to be the world’s best pharmacy-led health and beauty retailer. In order to
achieve that status, it aims to be ‘number one’ in customer care. ‘In everything we do, we
will make the customer want to like us, including when things go wrong. We want to make
it easy for people to interact with us’. This policy is reflected in the company’s language: it
refers to problems to be solved rather than complaints.
The key is that everybody in the company is empowered to put things right if something
goes wrong. Such empowerment applies whenever a customer touches the company: in
a shop, online, by phone, or in a comment in social media. Every employee should feel
involved in customer care. Matters should only be referred to others if absolutely necessary,
for example if the customer wants this.
The aim is to deliver ‘legendary customer care’ – to deliver the best service.13 It is to
provide a level of involvement with, and understanding of, the customers’ points of view
that are closer than a traditional arm’s length trading relationship. It also involves acceptance
that, although the production and selling processes are intended to make things go well,
some things will go wrong in an enterprise of this size. Where that occurs, the company
will do what it can to put things right. The approach to customer care is inextricably linked
with the company’s policy on Corporate Social Responsibility,14 both of which reflect how
the company aims to behave.
The aim is to behave at a standard that is considerably in excess of legal requirements,
which are viewed as a basic consumer protection minimum. Accordingly, the company’s
refund and exchange policies go much further than those specified in the sale of goods or
unfair commercial practices legislation. In such circumstances, the attitude is: ‘If it was your
mum or grandma, what would you do?’
An illustration of this occurs with the development service for photographs. In the event
that any customer’s photographs are spoiled or lost, the legal liability is to refund the cost
of the film and provide a new film. Boots would respond to the situation in which the
customer found himself or herself. If wedding photos were involved, Boots would arrange
for repeat pictures to be taken.
Similarly, many consumer products involve electricity and many of Boots’ products are
medicines. It is unavoidable that such products may be associated with safety issues.
Companies that operate a high quality Customer care approach consider that compliance
issues arise only infrequently.
Being involved in the retailing function inevitably produces the result that a business
tends to be more customer-focused than some manufacturers are, since the latter are at
least one remove from daily interaction with human customers. Where a major retailer
adopts a Customer Care approach, however, the system inherently produces pressure on
manufacturers to look at things from the costumers’ point of view, since the retailer will be
the customer’s advocate in this process and be able to use commercial and legal pressures.
13
The company’s internal web lists stories of exceptional dedicated care, such as a manager staying in the store
all night so as to enable it to open on the following day in difficult weather conditions, and an employee driving
an elderly man home in the employee’s car with his medicine in atrocious weather when public transport failed. It
also states ‘Our customers trust us with their health and wellbeing and they expect us to provide safe, high quality
products and services. .. The CARE approach is not about apportioning blame where things have gone wrong. It’s a
process that allows us to put things right for customers now, learn from the past and ensure that similar situations
don’t happen again in the future.’
14
See http://www.boots-uk.com/Corporate_Social_Responsibility.aspx.

An example is over recalls of products, in which Boots has found that it wants to go further
than some manufacturers.
In earlier times, major companies had a central complaint function, with written proce-
dures, which grew over time. The focus on product recall and integrated pre- and post-market-
ing safety systems was given increased emphasis during the early 1990s when the EU General
Consumer Product Safety legislation was introduced.15 Around the mid-1990s, the complaint
handling function at leading companies was expanded to embrace any customer care issue.
Having details of customers through the loyalty card scheme enables Boots to write immedi-
ately to 80 per cent of the 14 million active loyalty card members if any safety issue arises.
An historical model of handling any liability issues was to refer claimants to external
insurers. That process would result in a financial settlement, but little customer satisfaction
with the outcome, process or attitude. The model still exists, but is anathema to companies
driven by modern standards of customer care. Boots handle all issues in-house, so as to
provide the desired content and style of response.
Perhaps surprisingly, Boots has no written customer care policy statement. Instead, everyone
in the company who inter-relates with customers is empowered to respond immediately and
effectively to any customer concerns. The company feels that having a written policy may
be too rigid. It thinks that a policy is something that can be hidden behind, and interpreted
in a legalistic fashion. Instead, Boots have an approach that allows instant responsiveness,
flexibility, empowerment and discretion. ‘It is designed to get people to contact us.’
A determination to set the highest standards is driven by competition. It incentivises a
value-led approach to business. It seeks to trade profitably on brand value and reputation,
through which consumers have confidence and faith in major brands. Cheaper suppliers
might not have the same approaches or systems. Indeed, less consumer oriented, ‘pound
shops’ cannot afford sophisticated customer care model. In contrast, the market is well
aware that Ryanair operates on a cost-cutting basis and does not offer refunds beyond the
legal requirements and may not respond to complaints: the low cost of its services take such
policies into account. The behaviour of other sellers does not cause the industry leaders a
particular problem, but may do for consumers.
The culture aims to delight customers. Accordingly, the company is constantly striving
to drive up its measures of Customer Care. Shop employees are incentivised by being
awarded bonuses on their individual scores. This process is linked to the Institute of Care
Management. The market leaders in customer care include John Lewis and Tesco.
What the Customer Sees
The objective is to make it easy for customers to contact the company, and to enable them
to choose whichever channel he or she chooses for contacting the company, and for the
company to be able to respond accordingly, consistently and effectively to satisfy the
individual customer. The slogans are ‘accessibility’ and ‘customer choice and satisfaction’.
Customers can talk to any person in any store, not just the one from which they purchased
a product. Contact details are on the back of every till receipt.16 Most brands have a contact
15
Directive 1992/95/EEC and 2001/95/EC.
16
The till receipt also states: ‘Please keep this receipt …. and we’ll happily give you an exchange, giftcard or
refund if you change your mind. Without a receipt, we’ll give you an exchange. There are some exceptions and we’ll
always make these clear. For the safety of our customers we can’t accept returned medicines, cosmetics or food,
unless faulty. This does not affect your statutory rights.’

phone number on the product. Boots also have the Advantage Card loyalty scheme, with
customer benefits. The company’s website at Boots.com17 has a facility saying ‘Contact us’
which leads to ‘Email us’, ‘Write to us’ and ‘Phone us’, all with the Customer Care team
details.
As a result of this high level of visibility and positively attracting customer feedback and
contact, Boots finds that many customers prefer to contact them rather than others, such
as well-known product brands. Thus, people who are unhappy over the quality of a bar of
chocolate could contact the chocolate manufacturer, but many choose to contact Boots.
Similarly, customers write to Boots rather than to the Financial Ombudsman Service in
relation to issues with some insurance products.
Making a complaint or contact to Boots should cost the customer nothing. The outcome of
the process should be that no further action, whether through the courts or any other channel,
is unnecessary. Boots has no time limit on when a complaint may be made: the statutory
limitation periods are ignored. Some other retailers have recently introduced limitations.
Organizational Aspects
The complaint process is illustrated in Figure 12.1. Boots has a Central Customer Care
Team in the company’s headquarters at Nottingham, comprising 250 people,18 which
handles all phone and email contacts from customers. It works with, and is supported by,
all the company’s other functions, notably technologists and the legal department. Thus,
any technical issue would involve analysis and advice from the technical staff, and any legal
issue (such as threats to involve the legal system, lawyers, regulators (Trading Standards), or
the media) would involve liaison with in-house legal assistance.
The Central Customer Care Team handles all direct customer contacts, including
maintaining the loyalty card, and initiates action on all customer insights, namely:
• Analysing central customer contact data
• Communication of key customer issues to the business
• Proposing product/service change & monitoring the effect
• Consultancy – products, services, initiatives, development & implementation
• Public Recalls
• Risk assessment
• Stakeholder management
• Customer/Store Communication.
The 250 Customer Care Advisers are considered to have trained expertise. They aim to ensure
consistency of response, and only members of that central team respond to complaints. The
care process has been recognised by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in
being published as an example of best practice.19
17
http://www.boots.com/en/Help/Contact-Us.
18
Cadburys have 30 people.
19
Examples of good practice by Early Learning Centre, NEC (UK) Ltd and Lego were given in Consumer
Product recall. A Good Practice Guide (Department of Trade and Industry, Confederation of British Industry
and British Retail Consortium, 199) available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.
dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/pdf1/consumer.pdf. See also Sambrook Research International, Product Recall Research
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2000) available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.
berr.gov.uk/files/file21808.pdf.

One advantage of a centralised customer care function is that data are captured that
inform the business about all issues with the quality, safety and effectiveness of goods,
services and procedures. All the data is reviewed by management, particularly with the
aim of identifying any pattern of similar issues, so that action can be taken such as a risk
assessment20 or a ‘Red Alert’.21 The review process is ‘owned’ by the Customer Care Team,
which represents the customer internally. All product recalls that have occurred have been
instituted through internal generation of data, rather than being externally generated from
Trading Standards or other sources. By the time that most contacts are made, the company
is already dealing with a problem. The company holds regular business briefings to review
all aspects of the care process and data generated, on products, services, organization and
procedures. The company sends daily and instant electronic customer care communications
to all its stores.
Two examples illustrate the approach. If a number of complaints are seen of breakages
of glass jars containing face cream, the answer may be that jars packed at the bottom of a
pallet have been broken because the packaging was inadequate or hen a pallet was dropped.
Appropriate changes are then introduced.
Isolated reports were received of glass in sandwiches. This was a curious occurrence. The
glass was analysed and found to be from ceiling lights. The matter was investigated with the
particular sandwich supplier, and evidence was found that the night shift had been playing
football and had shattered a light fitting, which had showered the production line and the
items had not been binned as should have happened. The shift members were sacked.
The system is designed to be highly responsive to customers. It is not designed to be
suspicious or defensive, although there are certain means, within the law, of identifying
habitual and fraudulent claims. The cost of responding generously to possibly unjustified
complaints is thought to be minimal, and certainly not worth jeopardising the advantages
of the positively focused approach.
A contact will be escalated to a business advisor if the customer or the handler needs
more information, or if the customer insists on talking to a more senior person, or if the
issue involves personal injury. There are 14 such senior staff, who therefore handle the
‘more tricky stuff ’.
Boots aims to respond to all contacts within 48 hours. On receiving a contact, Boots
liaises with the supplier, which may be internal (Boots manufactures some products itself)
or external. The response to the customer is that Boots will write to the supplier and expect
to see the supplier respond to the customer, copied to Boots, within 14 days. All major
retailers (such as Marks & Spencer and Waitrose and other supermarkets) have a supply
manual that sets out the terms and conditions of business between retailer and suppliers.
These manuals specify responsiveness to any issues that arise, and how things will be
handled. Boots retains control of making decisions on all customer complaints, rather
than hand things over to the manufacturer or insurers for either party. Boots charges
suppliers for the time of its in-house handling where the manufacturer has been in breach
of contract.
20
Company policy is that a risk assessment meeting shall be held ‘within 24 hours of discovering a potentially
serious problem that could have a major impact on the safety of our customers or the integrity of our brand. The
attendees will rapidly agree a course of action to minimise the risk to customers and the brand, and put steps in
place to avoid a recurrence.’ All relevant departments are to be involved: see Figure 12.2.
21
A Red Alert is a process that facilitates rapid response to incidents or issues that have the potential for high
risk to customer safety and/or brand integrity.

For personal injuries, Boots will retain control of the issue and work with the supplier to a
resolution, rather than be unilateral. Personal injury issues are handled by a dedicated team
in Boots’ legal department, whether relating to customers or employees. External insurance
with the National Pharmacy Association is held for claims arising out of dispensing
errors. Such injuries are rare but some can be serious. Appropriate reports are referred
for professional and regulatory control to the Boots Superintendent Pharmacist and the
regulator, the General Pharmaceutical Council.
Issues taken up by external media, notably the television programme Watchdog or the
Daily Mail have almost no internal effect on how the company operates. The company views
such media channels as aiming to provide stories or entertainment, rather than substance.
No such external stimuli have identified or affected the course of the company’s actions.
Boots has used Watchdog itself twice in order to communicate the recall of a product. If a
consumer threatens to ‘report’ the company, the response is ‘We are happy for you to go to
Watchdog or Trading Standards, and we will assist them’. The company notes a difference
in consumer attitudes in different companies: there is more of a claims culture in Ireland
(‘What are you going to give me?’) than in the United Kingdom.
If a customer chooses to involve a lawyer, which only a tiny percentage (perhaps two or
three a week) do, the company’s response is to respond by asking the customer to get in
touch direct.
The Customer Care Team will write to every customer to inform them of any action
taken as a result of their contact. For example, feedback will be given of any redesign of a
product, accompanied by a free sample: this is intended to generate a ‘wow’ factor and to
make the customer feel involved in the enterprise.
The company also asks customers how the contact process was for them: ‘Did we
exceed your expectations?’ As at late 2010, 77 per cent say that Boots more than exceeded
expectations. The industry produces an externally-researched Net Promoter Score,22 which
gives a ratio of customers who were unhappy at the end of the contact process (dissenters)
against those who were happy (advocates). Boots’ score is 62 per cent; British Airways in
below zero, British Gas has recently moved from 4 to 5 per cent.
The existing procedures are capable of handling any mass problem. There is no need for
any new collective procedure. The management process is shown at Figure 12.2.
Statistics
The Customer Care Team receives 53,000 contacts a week. 3.5 per cent of those are
complaints, of which a ‘tiny’ percentage are classified as serious. Statistics are not kept on
issues that are resolved at store level. The Team gives 26,000 customer responses a week.
Over 90 per cent of contacts are resolved by the person who answers the phone call.
An independent company offers Right First Time accreditation23 and surveys customers,
asking ‘Was your complaint resolved at the point of contact?’ Boots was the first company
in that scheme to reach an 80 per cent positive answer.
22
See http://www.netpromoter.com/np/index.jsp.
23
See http://www.rightfirsttime.org/?gclid=CI-inIex86UCFc0e4Qodwwsupw.

Relationship with Regulatory Authorities
The company has agreed a Primary Authority relationship with its local Trading Standards
Department, so any contact by customers to any Trading Standards officers around the
country have to be routed through the Nottingham Department. Boots is in regular contact
with its Principal Authority, and pro-actively informs it of any significant issues, so that
the Authority is in a position to inform or respond to other Authorities. The relationship
is positive and professional: there is no sense of ‘capture’ but of a professional arm’s-length
relationship If the authorities decide to prosecute, they will do so, although they have not
done so since 2000. Perhaps one individual complaint a year comes to the company from
Trading Standards, usually because the complaint has expectations that are higher than
normal. Since prosecuting authorities need to satisfy a public interest test before instituting
a prosecution, almost any issue is likely to fail that test as long as a company is already
taking appropriate action to rectify a problem once it has been identified and it did not arise
as a result of system failure.
Figure 12.1: The complaint journey process
Complaint arrives into department – by phone or by letter/email
Serious incidents identified and passed straight The admin team sort mail on the day it arrives
to a Senior Customer Manager (SCM) – these into the department. Serious incidents are
include any personal injury, serious adverse identified and placed in the SCM box. This
reaction and harm/potential to cause harm to work is then passed to the SCM team for
babies and children. checking. After checking it is logged onto Q2
by the admin team.
A Senior Customer Manager speaks with the customer

or store and logs the complaint on Q2. The complaint Each work group is worked daily by
is investigated. Certain serious incidents may trigger a member of teh SCM team in date
a serious incident email to key people around the order (oldest first). Usually the oldest
business (legal category, NPI and BM contacts). complaint is 4 days from arriving into
the department to being dealt with a
Boots brand product Prop. product SCM.
Product is requested Product is requested Boots branded product is sent to BM

from customer and from customer and then or NPI&D for investigation Prop.
then passed via the passed to the supplier Product is sent to supplier for their own
admin team to either for their investigation. investigation
BM or NPI&D for Supplier contacts
their investigations and customer and SCM team
comments. follow this through to
ensure the customer is Customer receives response when the
happy with oucome investigations are complete.
SCM responds to
customer when
investigation is complete.
All details are captured on Q2 and are used by

the Business Interface Team as part of their
monthly reporting to the business.

Figure 12.2: Boots Retail Issue management process
Potentially damaging information received,  Immediately

communicate by phone to relevant Co-ordinator Non- Product
Product
Relevant PQD Group Customer Service

Product Manager Manager
Medical Services Co-ordinator initiates RACI and

BM Quality (if a BM
(only for medicines communicates Immediately by phone
product)
& medical devices
or adverse SMU Development (if
reactions) they sourced product)
Category/ PQD Group Project

Product/Realm/ Customer Legal Group PR Manager
BRI Supply
Commercial Service Services Controller Manager
manager Manager
Co-ordinator arranges Risk Assessment  Within 24 hours
meeting by the ‘responsible people’
Action agreed by team
 Within 48 hours
Implement action
Measure success
Co-ordinator holds post incident

review by responsible people  1 month
Speed is of the essence for success
British Telecom
BT’s Customer Services Department has the lead on complaints. Complaint handling
comprises a funnel, with claims entering at the top and being filtered as they progress,
and are settled. BT has a series of different teams to handle special issues. If a complaint
ultimately cannot be resolved using the company’s internal resources, and takes the external
route involving Ombudsman Services, it is passed over to the ‘Specialist Dispute Resolution’
Team. BT’s view is that although use of an external ombudsman function is new territory, it
is a good thing. Commercial disputes go along a separate, legal track.
The consumer can reach BT through many channels: call/ write/email/twitter/blog/
facebook. BT uses social media as a pro-active way to reach out to customers and deal with
their concerns as soon as they are identified. The key to this external involvement is that it
all comes down to being a brand issue.
When a consumer calls into the voice channel, every adviser is expected to be able to deal
with the caller (empowerment) and to log the complaint. BT’s call centre advisers aim to
identify the customer’s need without the customer necessarily having to express that he/she
is ‘complaining’. Here, the challenge is to deal with situations where the standard operating
model does not fit with the specific customer’s needs. If the caller is not satisfied with the
advice provided then the complaint is escalated up to the next line manager. If the complaint

goes through two line managers, the team then look at the complaint operationally and take
it to the Complaints Review Service. Some complaints go around the side, for example
complaints directly made to directors or high-level complaints.
The company feels that its essential challenge is to identify who needs what help. BT has
several thousand advisers in the UK and India, trained in specific products (billing, faults,
initial orders, etc). BT uses algorithms to spot where a customer is in trouble, or shows signs
of distress. The advisers are trained to question and find out what the cause of an issue is. BT
receives hundreds of thousands of contacts every week ‘at the top of the funnel’: the biggest
challenge is to ensure that the right response is made so customers get the right help. Each
consumer has a personal log-in the system, into which the adviser logs each contact with
the customer. BT tries to make sure that operators log exactly what was said to a customer,
in order to record that issues were resolved, since sometimes customers come back and it is
unclear whether complaints are new or repeats of the same issue.
There is a specialist service desk that deals with chronically sick and disabled people:
some receive a call on the day the bill arrives to check if they have any issues or need help.
This service is viewed as worthwhile, since the cost for managing customers who need
individual attention if they make complaints within the general funnel system would be
too high.
If the consumer is not happy after 8 weeks and there has been no deadlock-letter, then the
consumer can go to the Ombudsman. When the ‘customer journey’ reaches stalemate within
the 8 week period, and BT is not able to advise or negotiate any further with a customer, it
issues a ‘deadlock letter’, which sets out the final position on a matter. The deadlock letter is
a fairly comprehensive letter, reviewing what steps have been taken, giving an overview of
the position reached, repeating any offer made, and stating that the Ombudsman may be
able to help the consumer take the issue further. The Ombudsman deals with service issues.
He cannot deal with issues regarding pricing and commercial policy; content, like vision;
complaints about infrastructure such as the position of ‘poles and holes’; and commercial
decisions like broadband speeds. It is up to the customer to take the complaint further, and
only about 30 per cent go on to consult the Ombudsman after receiving a deadlock letter.
The Ombudsman system is a good way of drawing a line under an unreasonable customer.
If a matter is taken to the Ombudsman, it is referred internally (electronically) within
BT to the Special Disputes Resolution Team. If the Ombudsman accepts a complaint then
the Special Dispute Resolution Team produces a case file for the Ombudsman, within 10
days. This contains the case file (screen-dumps) of the complaint with a brief summary and
recommendation. The Ombudsman can call for any information he wishes to see. He has
the power to hold an oral hearing but this is hardly ever done.
BT finds that most consumers accept the Ombudsman’s decision. The mediation stage
introduced in 2010 by the Ombudsman (called ‘Mutually Acceptable Settlement’) proved
to be quite effective: the objective was to resolve 40 per cent of Ombudsman complaints
this way.
Only about 200 cases are started by consumers against BT in court per year. Many start
if the consumer consults a solicitor, but BT does not feel that this gains the consumer and
particular advantage. Very few do so after they have been through the Ombudsman process,
and the claimants loose most of them: judges tend to side with the Ombudsman. BT tries
to mediate such cases.
BT operates a feedback review from complaints and Ombudsman decisions. It samples
its data for what went wrong. The company target in 2009 was to reduce complaints by 50

per cent. The 2011 focus is on insight, to identify the underlying issues of the complaints.
This was driven by failure, customer expectations, and performance/service. BT takes a
close look at the cases that go to the Ombudsman, and undertakes an in-depth analysis of
representative cases. BT works together with the Ombudsman Services to be able to forecast
the volume of complaints, for example before new products are put on the market. BT does
not see any cross-border issues.
Procter & Gamble
Procter & Gamble is the world’s top maker of household products, household care, beauty
and grooming, and health and well-being. The firm also makes pet food. The company’s
products are subject to several specific regulatory regimes, such as medicinal products,
cosmetics, general consumer products, electrical and low voltage items, batteries, and toys
(supplied with promotions).24
Its Consumer Relations team in Newcastle handles all consumer relations issues for the
United Kingdom and Ireland. The team comprises:
• A Contact Centre Manager
• Team Leads, who look after the consumer relation advisors (people management) and
handle escalations
• Senior advisors, who handle consumer calls and work on more complex cases (eg
health effects, damages etc)
• Consumer relations advisors, who handle consumer contacts (phone, e-mail, letter),
fully trained in product knowledge and processes.
The mission statement for consumer relations has been consistent for decades. The company
does not have a written customer care policy, but adopts a general approach towards
seeking to delight its customers. It has a Global Consumer Relations division, which adopts
a consistent approach across the company’s global operations. The company’s Consumer
Care goals are to:
increase consumer loyalty to P&G and its brands by building strong relationships with those
who contact us, representing their needs within the company, using these consumer insights top
increase our ability to delight consumers with improved products and services.
The company and its personnel see a clear commercial imperative in adopting an approach
that seeks to delight customers, given the desire to be the best in its chosen competitive
markets. The above Consumer Care mission is integrally linked with the company’s core
values.25
24
See C Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety (Oxford University Press, 2005).
25
These include leadership, ownership, integrity, passion for winning, and trust. Integrity is defined as ‘We
always try to do the right thing. We are honest and straightforward with each other. We operate within the letter
and spirit of the law. We uphold the values and principles of P&G in every action and decision. We are data-based
and intellectually honest in advocating proposals, including recognizing risks.’

Complaints Handling
The company has a standardised approach towards handling each consumer contact, which
varies only depending on the nature of the product and requirements of local regulation.
Complaints are received via phone, e-mail or letter. Telephone services are available
from 9 am until 5 pm every weekday, whereas a 24 hour service is provided to respond to
email, since email users tend to expect fast responses. The company is increasingly using
social media sites for promoting brands, and these are monitored for customer issues and
responded to. The company is always looking for further ways in which to get customers
to contact it.
Some contacts may come via retailers, especially large supermarkets. Procter & Gamble’s
policy is always to seek to contact the consumer direct, even if the retailer has already
formally closed an issue. Some retailers have a policy of not wanting brand manufacturers
to contact consumers, in which case Procter & Gamble cannot establish direct contact. It
considers that it is in the best interests of the customer to have a direct line of contact with
or from the manufacturer. In any event, all details of every case received are logged, since
they may provide relevant product information.
Contacts are handled by the team of consumer relations advisors, who:
• listen to the consumer to fully understand what the complaint relates to.
• utilise handling guidelines to provide the best advice/guidance.
• use this opportunity to further educate the consumer where relevant.
• will personally close out the majority of complaints based on internal guidelines/
policies.
• have the opportunity to escalate the case to a Senior Advisor and/or a Team Lead if
deemed relevant/necessary.
The objective is to deal with all issues consistently and quickly, in a way that is positive and
constructive. The company wants the customer to feel happy at the end of the process. The
essence of the process is one of constant listening, so as to identify issues. Advisers respond in
accordance with the company’s internal Guidelines, which contain all relevant information
on products, both before and after use, and provide them with a full briefing, and with its
Codes on uniform reporting. The way that individual advisers handle contacts, and the
feedback from customers, are monitored internally. Advisors are trained to accommodate
individual customers’ requests and personality types. Advisers mark consumers who reveal
unusual insights or emotion, since these may be particularly revealing. Some consumers
wish to talk to a more senior adviser, so will be passed on, but every adviser has authority
to close any issue.
The standard response by advisers is to reimburse the cost of the product by sending the
customer a voucher that can be exchanged with a retailer. Advisers have some discretion
on how to respond to particular facts in individual cases, within defined limits set out
in the Guidelines. Higher approval is needed before limits can be exceeded, and internal
controls monitor responses. The company’s policy is to treat everyone in a fair, consistent
and balanced way, and it believes that this principle will not allow it to respond to similar
situations in different ways, such as in responding to threats with excessive generosity.
Certain issues will trigger particular responses or internal processes. Issues are escalated
as necessary. Information will be shared as necessary with other parts of the company that
deal with such functions as Research & Development, Quality Assurance, Manufacturing,

External Relations, Legal, Regulatory, Knowledge and Advocacy (especially for new
brands). Safety issues, for example, will be tracked every day. Specific regulatory or legal
reporting requirements are covered in the Guidelines. If a consumer claims that products
have caused damage after use, there will be further investigation. This will particularly apply
if the consumer claims to have had a health effect as a result of using P&G products.
At present, from a P&G perspective, the majority of health effects concern the use of
hair colourants, with some individuals claiming they have had a personal sensitivity to the
product. Once personal sensitivities are identified, a user should not use a product with
the relevant ingredient. In very rare cases, anaphylactic shock may result. A dedicated
team deals with health issues, and can refer individuals to a dermatologist for sensitivity
testing and advice. Razors, especially if they are misused by banging the blade, can cause
cuts, although injuries are rarely serious enough for customers to go to their doctors. The
company requests photographic evidence of all personal injuries.
All contact details are logged. Consumers are rarely confrontational in their contacts
with the company. Very few consumers involve solicitors. When they say that they wish to
do so, the company’s response is to state that that is their choice and if they do so, the case
will be passed to the Legal Department. Until a solicitor becomes involved, the company
will continues to work with the consumer to try to resolve the issue. The involvement of
solicitors, or threat to do so, does not affect the outcome of complaints.
The company employs means of identifying repeat complaints. It will err on the side of
generosity in responding to repeat contacts, since consumers may genuinely be returning
for further care or advice. In the rare instances where company personnel perceive the
contacts are not genuine, they will escalate to higher-level management who will coordinate
with their Legal Department for guidance/advice. If a consumer states that he or she plans
to go to Trading Standards, the advisor will state that P&G will cooperate fully with Trading
Standards. Contact with any Trading Standards Office is routed through the company’s
Legal Department, which has a good working relationship with the Principal Authority at
Surrey County Council.
Statistics
The company has various measures and targets in place to check the level of service it is
providing. These measures include the following:
• Timeliness of response – percentage of calls answered, percentage of emails answered
within specified timeline.
• Quality of response – internal quality monitoring is carried out on calls and emails to
continuously coach advisors to provide excellent customer care.
• Quality of response – requesting feedback from consumers who have called or
e-mailed, via a Consumer Satisfaction survey.
The profile of contacts differs depending on the type of product. The percentage of contacts
that the company’s Newcastle team received for consumer contacts the UK in calendar 2010
were categorised as follows:
• Availability of product – 17%
• Complaints – 51%
• Inquiry – 29%
• Testimonials – 3%

Around a third of contacts are requests for advice or information. Roughly half of the
contacts are classed as complaints, but on closer examination the causes of a compliant may
be inappropriate use of the product by the consumer or some reason other than a cause
attributable to the company. Use of hair colorants is one of the major issues: users may
fail to follow the instructions to do a strand test, or may fail to do a key sensitivity test for
personal sensitivities, before applying the product to the entirety of their hair. It is very rare
that products have been contaminated, and extremely rare that they are not in accordance
with specification.
The company benchmarks the level of customer satisfaction with how calls are handled
(always in the 80 or 90 per cent satisfaction rate) and intent to repurchase (always over 70
per cent). Repurchasing intent can be affected by the company’s ability to identify which
retailers may hold stock of an item, which can be difficult to do.
Certain longer-term trends have been noted. Over recent decades, the number of contacts
over personal sensitivities appears to have increased, and this is attributed to heightened
cultural awareness of sensitivities in some countries (rates differ between countries) over
sensitivities, rather than changes in safety controls.
Advisers have also noted a change in language used by callers, with increased use of the
word ‘compensation’ and more demanding adversarial language during the past decade.
In contrast, the company’s policy is that compensation is not paid since legal liability is an
irrelevant issue, but it responds by making gestures of goodwill.
Procter & Gamble is a large company, with significant resources and sophisticated
structures, which enable it to deal with complaints as it wishes, and to escalate issues. It
invests considerable time and effort in its advisers, providing training, refresher training,
and monitoring performance quality, processes and policies.

13
Cross-border Consumer ADR
Christopher Hodges, Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda and Iris Benöhr
This chapter examines some of the existing mechanisms that provide for handling disputes
made by consumers in one Member State against a trader in another Member State. The
important EU-level institutional arrangements under ECC-net and FIN-net have
been noted in Chapter 1 so are not mentioned further here. A number of pan-EU CADR
schemes are being established, of which we note here two created by business, the European
Car Rental Conciliation Service (ECRCS) and the Direct Selling Association (SELDIA)’s
ombudsman scheme, and one network created by national ombudsmen for energy. At
global level we then note the long-established online dispute resolution (ODR) systems for
domain names and developments on ODR led by UNCITRAL. The European Commission’s
2011 proposals for ODR have been noted in Chapter 1 above.
European Car Rental Conciliation Service
The European Car Rental Conciliation Service (ECRCS)1 is a conciliation service aimed at
assisting all EU citizens2 who have an unresolved dispute against a rental company relating
to a cross-border car rental. It was established on 1 July 2010 with the involvement of
Leaseurope,3 the European trade association,4 after it was noted at the 2009 EU consumer
summit that there was an increasing number of unresolved complaints being reported to
ECC Net. A number of national schemes existed prior to the launch of this pan-European
scheme, but there were variations between them in terms of design and effective performance.
Having surveyed the practical options, the four major European rental companies decided
to establish the scheme to gain sufficient volume and momentum. It is now subscribed to by
Hertz, Avis, Alamo, Europcar, Budget, National car rental and Sixt, which together cover an
estimated 80 per cent of all 55 million car rental transactions taking place in Europe. Other
rental companies that provide cross border rental transactions are eligible to subscribe to
the ECRCS.
Companies subscribing to the scheme agree to adhere to a Code of Best Practice,5 which
includes standards on advertising, customer information, vehicle condition, pre- and
1
www.leaseurope.org/index.php.
2
The service is open to any consumers with EU residence.
3
A European association was established in 1972 as ECATRA, which subsequently merged with Leaseurope.
ECATRA, formerly the association for rental companies, was integrated into Leaseurope in 2006.
4
Alamo, Avis, Budget, Europcar, Sixt and Hertz.
5
www.leaseurope.org/uploads/Code%20of%20Best%20Practice.pdf.

post-rental inspections and billing. BVRLA was selected to operate the ECRCS, since that
association had successfully operated a national ADR scheme for 20 years, handled by
IDRS.6 ECRCS and the British national scheme are operated separately, but are based on
similar principles of offering an alternative dispute resolution which aims to offer restorative
justice. The scheme is funded by an annual subscription paid by all of the subscribing rental
companies: the amounts are not published.
The complainant must contact the company first. Only when he/she is not happy with the
outcome then there are two options to proceed, either the rental company makes the EU
citizen aware of the ECRCS within their final outcome letter, or the consumer can approach
ECRCS directly. The subscribing rental company refers the full complaint file to ECRCS.
ECRCS reviews the case file and identifies if there are any breaches of the Code of Best
Practice. The EU citizen and rental company are informed of the decision within 30 days:
up to February 2012 the average duration has been between 10–15 days. ECRCS launched
a website in 2012 to make the complaint process simpler and more accessible. If any money
is owed to the EU citizen this should be refunded within 10 working days. The decision is
binding on the subscribing company but is not binding on the consumer and there is no
cost to the consumer to use the system.
The service investigates potential breaches of the agreed Code of Best Practice, which
sets out the standards it expects from the vehicle rental industry. The conciliation service is
unable to investigate any matters which are criminal in nature, involve personal injury, or
fall outside the scope of the Code of Best Practice.
Statistics are published in the annual report. The initial results are:
• The ECRCS received a total of 123 complaints in 2011. The volume of complaints
increased in the second half of the year suggesting increasing awareness of the service.
• The number of complainants lodging their complaint directly with the service rather
than it being referred by the rental company has also increased.
• The average time taken to resolve a case was 11.83 days.
• The largest number of complaints related to charges. Complaints included charges for
winter tyres, and toll fees.
• 64 per cent of cases investigated were not upheld.
• The majority of cross border complaints related to rentals taking place in Spain, Italy,
Germany and France (respectively 23, 21, 18 and 26 per cents).
• 64 per cent of all complainants reside in the UK.
• Spanish customers raised 19 per cent of complaints.
• These statistics mirror those provided by the European Consumer Centre.
SELDIA: The European Direct Selling Association
Direct selling is a method of marketing and retailing goods and services directly to the
consumers, in their homes or in any other location away from permanent retail premises.
It is usually conducted in a face-to-face manner, either where products are demonstrated
to an individual or to a group (party plan), or where a catalogue is left with the consumer
6
BVRLA, established in 1967, is the UK trade body. See ch 11 for further details about IDRS.

Cross-border Consumer ADR 357
and where the direct seller calls later to collect orders.7 In 2010, the total EU sales of direct
selling companies were €11.5 billion, the largest markets being Germany, Italy, France,
UK and Poland.8 From May 2011, the EU trade association Seldia9 revised its Code of
Conduct,10 linked to the sector’s World Code of Ethics of the world direct selling association
(WFDSA).11 Every company that is a member of a Direct Selling Association (DSA) must
adhere to the Code of Ethics and should have a Code Compliance officer.
A consumer who has a complaint against a direct selling company that is a member
of a DSA in respect of any business practice believed to be unethical, illegal or a possible
violation of the Code of Conduct should first try to resolve the matter directly with the
company, particularly with the Code Compliance officer. A complaint should be in writing,
and should include the following basic information:
• The date and details of the incident;
• The parties involved;
• If possible, identify the Code violation you believe has occurred;
• Efforts you have made to resolve the matter;
• List the amount and cost of product, if relevant, include invoices or other supporting
documents;
• Any responses the other parties have made to resolve the matter;
• The current status of the complaint;
• How you would like to see the complaint resolved or remedied.
After that stage, if the consumer is not satisfied, he/she can complain to the independent
Code Administrators of national DSAs, which will accept consumer complaints by phone
or (e)mail. National DSAs have found that a great number of complaints can be handled
by the associations, notably where the consumer cannot trace the direct selling company,
the consumer is not aware of his rights, such as on the cooling off period. Where the DSA
is not able to solve the issue immediately, it will pass the complaint on to the national code
administrator. There are no time limits for national DSAs, but this may be reviewed.
Complaints may be made to the European Code Administrator12 where complaints at
national DSA are not effective in the following four instances:
1. Complaints from parties (consumers, direct sellers, direct selling companies, consumer
bodies etc) from one of the EEA countries without a DSA in membership of Seldia involving
a direct selling company in membership of Seldia or of a DSA in membership of Seldia
2. On complaints from parties related to cross-border transactions and involving a direct
selling company in membership of Seldia or of a DSA in membership of Seldia from
one of the EEA countries
7
Direct selling is suited to the sale and distribution of almost every category of consumer goods that can be
found in traditional retail locations and in department stores, especially cosmetic and personal care products,
household items and wellness, and is also cost effective for services such as telecoms, gas and electricity supplies.
8
Sales respectively of €2.8 billion, €2.4 billion, €1.8 billion, €1.3 billion and €0.5 billion. See www.seldia.eu/
sites/default/files/pdf-documents/annual_report-2010-2011_1.pdf.
9
www.seldia.eu. Members of Seldia represent directly and indirectly around 80% of the EU direct selling market.
10
European Code of Conduct towards consumers and direct sellers; available at: www.seldia.eu/~wwwseldi/
sites/default/files/uploads/content-pdf/seldia_codeofconduct.pdf. A list of code administrators can be found at:
www.seldia.eu/~wwwseldi/sites/default/files/uploads/content-pdf/ethics_commitee.pdf.
11
See www.wfdsa.org.
12
The European Code Administrator is the Ethics Committee of Seldia, at 2011 comprising: Professor Jules
Stuyck of Leuven University (Chairman), with Anders Berglund (Swedish DSA), Juan Turró (Spanish DSA),
Philippe Dailey (French DSA) and Maurits Bruggink (Seldia).

3. Decide on complaints from DSAs in membership of Seldia in one of the EEA countries
involving a direct selling company in membership of Seldia and;
4. Complaints from DSAs in membership of Seldia from one of the EEA countries
involving direct selling companies in membership of WFDSA, WFDSA CEO Council
or of DSAs outside membership of Seldia with the aim of mediation together with
such direct selling companies, WFDSA and the DSA in question.
The national DSA’s and national code administrators do not like the idea of a European
code administrator as a sort of ‘appeal administrator’. The national DSAs therefore try and
help consumers at national level, and will only turn to the European code administrator
in the above circumstances. Seldia also operates a B2B code, under which a national DSA
may alert the European ombudsman about bad practice of a company that has generated
a number of similar complaints. For example, if a company has confusing order forms
that lead to several consumer complaints, the national DSA will ask the European code
administrator to pick up the case.
European Energy Ombudsman Group
European Energy Ombudsman Group (EEOG)13 is an independent, non-profit Europe-

wide professional association made up of ombudsmen and mediators from European energy
companies. The principal aim is to promote mediation between companies and consumers
within the energy sector as a means to solve disputes and complaints. In the context of the
EU’s Third Energy Package,14 the Commission set up in November 2010 a Working Group
to identify best practices in ADR in the energy sector,15 which reported in 2011.16 Members
of EEOG organize meetings, exchange information and work together to increase awareness
and acceptance of mediation and its practice in the energy industry. EEOG members also
participate to reflections and works coming from the European Commission. EEOG does
not handle complaints submitted directly by consumers.
ODR
Any dispute resolution system, including courts,17 may adopt information and
communications technology (ICT), and this will usually assist in speeding up the process.
ODR has emerged as an ADR technique that is completely online, and is frequently now
13
www.energyombudsmen.com.
14
Directive (EC) 2009/72 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing
Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55, and Directive (EC) 2009/73 concerning common rules for the internal
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L211/94.
15
Commission Staff Working Paper ‘An energy policy for consumers’, SEC(2010)1407.
16
Working Group Report on Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Energy Sector. Report prepared for the
4th Citizens’ Energy Forum – October 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/citizen/my_rights/docs/
energy_adr_report_en.pdf.
17
For example the Online Money Claim of the courts in England and Wales, the online Small Claims Procedure
in Ireland, and the eCourt initiative in Australia; see Cortés, above, ch 1.

referred to as a separate technique and dispute resolution world.18 Like ADR, ODR has
capitalised on situations in which traditional dispute resolution techniques were inefficient
or unavailable.19 The adoption of ICT into dispute resolution is continuing to grow.
The driver for the expansion of ODR is commerce.20 In the United States the value of
e-commerce was at best $33 billion in 1999 and is projected to rise to $279 billion by 2015.21
The global volume is projected to be $1.4 trillion by 2015, of which 34 per cent will be in the
EU.22 The sheer volume of disputes that arise with e-commerce, and the cost of resolution,
in addition to legal challenges such as applicable law and enforcement, have led to the
development of solution-oriented (as opposed to blame-oriented) approaches to conflict
resolution.23
The first ODR schemes appear to have been created in U.S.A. in the mid-1990s, such as a
voluntary online arbitration procedure Virtual Magistrate founded by the National Center
for Automated Information Research at Villanova University, Philadelphia, U.S.A. in 1995,
but turned out to be unsuccessful.24 In 1996 there emerged the Online Ombudsman Office,
which offered mediation services for all internet disputes,25 and CyberTribunal, which was
replaced in 1999 by eResolution.26 As of 2006, at least 149 ODR services had been launched
worldwide, although many had closed down.27
Paypal.com has a dispute resolution centre that facilitates communications between
buyers and sellers that use its payment services.28 Cortés quoted Paypal as having found
that, after the launch of this centre, buyers’ claims decreased by 50 per cent, and seller losses
caused by chargebacks fell by 20 per cent.29 The dispute resolution service adopted escalation
techniques, starting in effect with conciliation through assisted communication, before a
formal complaint, If the buyer makes a complaint within 45 days after the payment, Paypal
will retain the funds in escrow until the matter is resolved, where the product purchased did
not arrive, or the product delivered was significantly different from that ordered.
EBay’s ODR platform handles over 60 million e-commerce disputes annually,30 primarily
relating to the following types:
1. The buyer did not receive the items within the estimated delivery date, or
2. The item received was wrong, damaged, or different from the seller’s description. For
example:
18
For recent legal studies see J Hörnle, Cross-Border Dispute Resolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2009) and P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Abingdon and New
York, Routledge, 2010).
19
Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution (2010) 9.
20
L Del Luca, C Rule and Z Loebl, Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce—Developing a Global
Online Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived from Existing ODR Systems – Work of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law) The Pennsylvania State University Legal Studies Research Paper No 25-
2011 (State College, Pensilvania State University, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970613.
21
K Saleh, How Big is E-Commerce Industry. THE INVESP BLOG, available at www.invesp.com/blog.
22
ibid.
23
Del Luca, Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce (2011).
24
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Online Dispute Resolution: E-Commerce and
Beyond’ in E-Commerce Development Report (2003) 203.
25
http://www.ombuds.org/center/ombuds.html.
26
Cortés (n 18), 55.
27
M Conley Tyler, ‘Evaluating Recent Developments in Online Dispute Resolution’, Presentation on 22 March
to the Fourth International Forum on ODR, Cairo.
28
Buyer and Seller Protection Policies at www.paypal.com.
29
Cortés, (n 18), 60.
30
Del Luca (n 20).

(a) Buyer received a completely different item.

(b) The condition of the item is not as described.
(c) The item is missing parts or components.
(d) The item is defective during the first use.
(e) The item is a different version or edition displayed in the listing.
(f) The item was described as authentic but is not.
(g) The item is missing major parts or features, and this was not described in the listing.
(h) The item was damaged during shipment.
(i) The buyer received the incorrect amount of items.31
Automated negotiation can be carried out on an ODR platform without the intervention of
a third party. Cortés found that current systems usually involve a ‘blind bidding’ negotiation
process, and it was attractive for insurance compensation and commercial claims.32 The
principal provider was CyberSettle, which handled over 200,000 disputes between 1998
and 2010 in the United States, but failed to take off in the U.K. because of the then inability
of lawyers to be paid out of the claimant’s proceeds. SquareTrade handled disputes between
sellers and buyers on eBay until 2008. Its software matched solutions to problems, and an
online mediator was also available for asynchronous e-mail and web communications.33
Trustmarks, such as Trusted Shops34 and Euro-label,35 have been a technique that has
developed in ODR, along with customer feedback systems such as ‘rate this transaction’
and the ability to comment on a trader’s level of service and responsiveness to complaints.
ODR for Domain Names
An example of a private ADR scheme that operates on an international basis, and incorporates
ODR as an integral operational feature is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) on
the recommendation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).36 The UDRP
came into effect in 1999. The speed, low cost, international application and transparency of
the UDRP have attracted considerable use in resolving trademark disputes, and especially
domain name disputes. By 2011 there had been around 22,000 UDRP cases.
The UDRP administrative procedure only covers disputes cconcerning an alleged abusive
registration of a domain name. This means that disputes need to meet the following criteria:
1. The domain name registered by the domain name registrant is identical or confusingly similar
to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant (the person or entity bringing the
complaint) has rights; and
2. The domain name registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name
in question; and
31
See Unpaid Item Policy, EBAY, INC. available at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html.
32
Cortés (n 18), 64.
33
ibid, 66.
34
www.trustedshops.com.
35
www.euro-label.com.
36
The following summary is taken from N Smith and E Wilbers, ‘The UDRP: Design Elements of an Effective
ADR Mechanism’ (2004) 15 American Review of International Arbitration 215; from information kindly supplied by
Erik Wilbers, the Director of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre, Geneva, and details on arbiter.wipo.int.

3. The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.37
The scheme relies on several key aspects. Firstly, practice in relation to the registration
of domain names is uniform around the world. There are currently around 100 million
domain names registered, and the number is set to expand considerably in 2012. However, a
domain name will be registrable without a check of existing trademark rights. Nevertheless,
action can be taken contractually under the UDRP, which applies universally. The ICANN-
imposed registration agreement imposes a contractual condition on all domain name
applicants to be bound by the UDRP, and on registrars to apply decisions taken under
the UDRP. Hence, breach of the UDRP can be invoked against all domain name holders
at any time, regardless of their identity or location, and decisions will be immediately
implemented. Thus, the problems of choosing, dealing with, and enforcing under different
legal systems are avoided.
The UDRP Procedure
A complainant who asserts breach of trademark rights may lodge a complaint to an

ICANN-accredited UDRP dispute resolution provider, of which there are currently four:
the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF),38 the
Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNRC),39 and the Czech Arbitration
Court (CAC).40
In the WIPO procedure, the complainant has to choose whether to have the dispute
resolved by a single arbitrator or a Panel of three.41 On inception of a procedure, the
complainant pays the fee, which is subject to two variables: the number on the Panel and the
number of domain names involved. For cases with up to 5 domain names (which involves
95 per cent of cases, the average number being one and a half) the fee for a single arbitrator
is U.S.$1,500, and for a Panel of three is U.S.$ 4,000.42 The fees have stayed the same since
the inception of the scheme. WIPO does not seek to make a profit from this service, which
it offers for policy reasons to support the sector.
The dispute resolution provider then contacts the registrar of the domain name to
confirm the identity of the domain name holder (the respondent) and to lock the domain
name so that it cannot be changed during the proceedings. The dispute resolution provider
will then send the complaint to the respondent, using all means of communication and all
available addresses. After 20 days, during which the respondent may file a response, the
dispute resolution provider forwards the file to an administrative Panel of one or three legal
experts for decision. Panels are selected from external, independent trademark lawyers
based around the world. The Centre maintains a list of around 400 such Panelists from 50
countries, whose details are published. If a complainant requests a panel of three, he may
nominate one member and the respondent may nominate another.
Once a Panel has been appointed, it has 14 calendar days to submit its decision. If the
Panel finds that the complainant has established its case under the requirements of the
37
UDRP Policy Rule para 4(a), see www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/index.html#a1.
38
Based in Minneapolis, Minnesota, see domains.adrforum.com.
39
Offices in Beijing and Hong Kong, see adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html.
40
See www.adr.eu.
41
UDRP Rules, para 3(b)(iv).
42
Schedule of Fees at arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html.

UDRP, it will issue a decision ordering the transfer of the domain name. The claimant must
establish the following:43
1. The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and
2. The domain name holder has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and
3. The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The complainant must choose between requesting the transfer or the cancellation of the
disputed domain name. The Panel is confined to accepting or rejecting such request.
The decision is forwarded to the registrar, who will implement it unless the decision
is challenged in court within 10 days. According to paragraph 4(k) of the UDRP Policy
Rule, the mandatory administrative proceeding requirement shall not prevent either the
respondent or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court for independent
resolution. It is possible for a party to start a lawsuit in court before an administrative
proceeding is commenced. A party can also commence a lawsuit after the administrative
proceeding is concluded if it is not satisfied with the outcome.44
The Center posts all Panel decisions on its website shortly after they have been notified
to parties.45 In order to assist Panels and the public, a Legal Index of decisions is available.46
Design Aspects
The UDRP was designed to encourage its use and to avoid legal challenge. Several features are
noteworthy. Firstly, parties retain the option of litigating in a competent court: the arbitration
jurisdiction is not stated to be exclusive. Secondly, the UDRP procedure does not permit a
damages claim. Parties use courts if they wish to pursue compensation,47 but the delays and
costs that can be inherent in a compensation claim are avoided by the UDRP procedure.
Thirdly, the complainant pays the only fee required by the procedure. A party may retain
lawyers or other experts if it wishes, but no extra costs are required, and costs are not shifted.
The fee is payable in a single lump sum at the start.
Fourthly, the language of the proceeding is normally the language of the registration
agreement used by the respondent to register the domain name.48 This rule optimises the
chance of properly notifying the respondent of a case and should minimise the cost of
defence. The parties can agree to apply a different language. The Centre has conducted
proceedings in 19 languages involving parties from over 150 countries in 1212.49 About 40
per cent of complains come from the United States,50 and the overwhelming majority of
cases were in English.
43
UDRP Rules, para 4(a). Examples of bad faith are an indication that the respondent acquired the domain
name primarily for the purpose of riding on the goodwill of a trademark holder to attract internet users to the
respondent’s website for financial gain, or circumstances indicating that the respondent acquired the domain name
to sell to a trademark holder for profit: ibid, paras 4(b)(iv) and 4(b)(i).
44
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/index.html#a1.
45
See arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions.
46
arbiter.wipo.int/cgi-bin/domains/search/legalindex.
47
The Centre believes that parties litigate in only 0.2% of its cases.
48
UDRP Rules, para 11(a).
49
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/countries_a-z.jsp.
50
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/countries.jsp?party=C.

Fifthly, the procedure is kept simple. No legal representation is required. Model forms of
complaint and defence are available online.51 The short time limits, limitation on remedies,
and built-in enforcement are noted above. There is a single round of pleadings, although the
Panel has discretion to conduct proceedings as it sees fit. Pleadings are limited to 5,000 words.
All communications are online: the Center offers an online system, the WIPO Electronic
Case Facility (WIPO ECAF), which provides a secure electronic docket into which case files
and procedural orders can be uploaded. It has proved to be particularly useful in massive
patent arbitrations, where lawyers and Panels are geographically dispersed.
Overall, this system has the effect of protecting both registrars and squatters from the
serious penalties that could be imposed by courts, whilst speedily policing the global system
through enforcement of holders’ rights.
Studies have criticised WIPO and NAF for deciding disputes more often in favour of
trade mark interests,52 and been met with strong rebuttal.53 Scholars have also criticised the
system.54
A dispute resolution service provider is usually required to publish all decisions in full
on the Internet.55
Statistics
The total number of cases from 1999 to 2011 are shown in Table 13.1 and the outcomes in
Table 13.2.56
Table 13.1: Total number of WIPO cases 1999-2011
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
No. 1 1857 1557 1207 1100 1176 1456 1824 2156 2329 2107 2696 2764
Table 13.2: Outcomes of WIPO cases 1999-2011
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Terminated 0 357 292 236 215 278 384 486 581 618 514 551 597 5107
Transfer 1 1182 983 792 753 770 926 1125 1326 1437 1331 1876 1741 14243
Transfer, cancellation in part 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 1 0 3 2 3 1 17
Transfer, cancellation in part
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
with dissenting opinion
Transfer with dissenting
0 7 10 6 3 2 2 5 3 5 3 5 1 52
opinion
Transfer, denied in part 0 7 6 5 5 5 7 8 6 8 7 3 5 72
Transfer, denied in part with
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
dissenting opinion
51
See arbiter.wipo.int/domains/gtld/udrp/index.html.
52
M Mueller, A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Disputes under ICANN’s UDRP (Syracuse University
School of Information Studies, 2002); M Geist, ‘Fair.com? An Examination of the Allegations of Systematic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP’ (2002) 27 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 903.
53
International Trade Mark Association (2002).
54
J Hörnle, Cross-Border Dispute Resolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), 186 ff; see also
Cortés (n 18).
55
Except where an Administrative Panel decides otherwise in exceptional circumstances: see para 16(b) of the
Rules.
56
WIPO web page 2012, at wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/cases.jsp.

Transfer with concurring

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
opinion
Transfer with dissenting and
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
concurring opinion
Cancellation 0 7 12 11 8 9 7 11 25 32 44 48 26 240
Terminated by panel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 11
Cancellation with dissenting
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
opinion
Cancellation, denied in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cancellation, denied in part
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cancellation, transfer in part 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Cancellation, transfer in part
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cancellation with concurring
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
opinion
Complaint denied 0 261 245 148 110 108 143 183 211 218 197 203 207 2234
Complaint denied,
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
cancellation in part
Complaint denied,
cancellation in part with 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
dissenting opinion
Complaint denied with
0 12 3 4 2 3 0 4 3 6 8 4 5 54
dissenting opinion
Complaint denied, transfer
0 4 6 3 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 21
in part
Complaint denied, transfer in
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
part with dissenting opinion
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
concurring opinion
dissenting and concurring 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
opinion
EU ODR
As noted in chapter 1 above, the EU has taken steps over a number of years to promote
e-commerce and e-dispute resolution. Examples include, the Directive on the Protection of
Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts,57 and the 1999 Consumer Complaint Form58
now available in 11 languages.59 The Electronic Consumer Dispute Resolution (ECODIR)
was funded by the European Commission at the Universities of Dublin and Namur,60
but suffered from lack of awareness and the withdrawal of funding, and was sold to the
National Arbitration Forum.61 It adopted a tiered approach, starting with negotiation, then
mediation, and finally recommendation. It can operate in English and French. In the area
of domain name disputes for .eu domains, ADR/ODR is regulated by Regulation (EC) No.
874/200462 which has been inspired by the UDRP Rules discussed above. There has been
57
Directive (EC) 1997/7 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts [1997] OJ L144/19.
58
Commission (EC) ‘Communication by the European Commission on the out-of-court settlement of
consumer disputes’, SEC(1998)576, final, 30 March 1998. It contains a European consumer complaint form.
59
At ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/compl/cons_compl/acce_just03_en.pdf.
60
www.ecodir.org.
61
See G Kaufmnn-Kohler and T Schultz, Online Dispute Resolution: Challenges for Contemporary Justice (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 346.
62
As amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1654/2005, Regulation (EC) No 1255/2007 and Regulation (EC) No
560/2009.

only one designated ODR provider for all .eu-related disputes, the Czech Arbitration Court,
which has been providing ODR services in 21 EU languages since 2006.63
The OECD has encouraged in-house dispute settlements, customer satisfaction systems,
and call centres, before resort to external ADR,64 as has the Global Business Dialogue on
E-Commerce65 and Consumers International.66
The EU considers that ‘the development of electronic commerce and online services
offers enormous potential for economic, social and societal change’67 and set a target for
building trust in the Digital Single Market by 2015 since it is far too low,68 and has enormous
potential to generate growth. One of the key objectives of this strategy is to facilitate the
settlement of online disputes. A 2009 survey found that reasons for lack of confidence in
e-commerce were difficulty of resolving after-sales problems (88 per cent) and the problem
of initiating legal action in the courts (83 per cent).69
The European Commission adopted a new action plan to double the share of e-commerce
in the EU by 2015 on 11 January 2012.70 Consisting of 16 initiatives, it aimed at fostering
a more dynamic digital single market with better cross-border access to online products,
improved internet security and more consumer protection. E-commerce currently accounts
for just 3.4 per cent of retail sales, with an estimated value of €11.7 billion. If this figure were
to be increased to 15 per cent, the value could be as high as €204 billion. To this end, the
Commission considered that improving consumer confidence, transparency and payment
and delivery methods are vital.
Consistent with this policy, the Commission’s 2011 proposals included the establishment
of an EU ODR platform for consumer disputes, as outlined in Chapter 1.
UNCITRAL
These developments run in parallel with the development by UNCITRAL of model

procedural rules for cross-border ODR of low value high volume disputes related to both
B2C and B2B e-commerce transactions.71 In addition to, and in close association with,
the preparation of UNCITRAL ODR rules, a number of ODR experts take the view that
the creation of a cross-border system for providing redress in low value, high volume
e-commerce transaction disputes requires certain pieces of digital infrastructure that do
not currently exist.
63
See www.adr.eu.
64
E-commerce Guidelines (Paris, OECD,1999) and Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and
Redress (Paris, OECD, 2007) 8.
65
Global Business Dialogue on e-commerce, New York Recommendations (2003), 56.
66
Consumers International, Disputes in Cyberspace 2001: Update on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in
Cross-Border Disputes, (Consumers International Office for Developed and Transition Economies, 2001).
67
‘Stimulating growth and employment: an action plan for doubling the volume of e-commerce in Europe by
2015’, European Commission Press Release IP/12/10.
68
In 2007 consumer spending constituted 58 per cent of the gross domestic product of the EU, yet only 29 per
cent of EU small and medium sized enterprises are involved in cross-border transactions, although 48 per cent of
them would be prepared to sell to consumers in other member States online, per M Kuneva, ‘Consumer Strategy
2007–2013’, Press Conference, Brussels, 13 March 2007.
69
Flash Barometer, 14 November 2009, 39–40.
70
Commission (EC) ‘Communication: A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for
e-commerce and online services’ COM(2011) 942, final, 11 January 2012.
71
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working_groups/3Online_Dispute_Resolution.html.

Such a cross-border resolution system will only be possible if there is a complimentary

system enabling the various resolution end-points (eg government agencies, buyers
and sellers, online dispute resolution service providers, entities involved in enforcing
judgments etc.) to exchange information in real time in multiple languages. This
information may include new dispute filings, messages between disputants, and proposed
solutions, resolution status, and agreement adherence. This information exchange system
will not provide case adjudication or enforcement of outcomes; it will only enable data
about disputes to be shared around the globe in multiple languages in an efficient and
seamless manner.72
This backbone cross-border ODR infrastructure, called ODR Exchange, will in principle
consist of a common ODR communication standard called ECRI (E-Commerce Resolution
Interchange) and a technology-neutral ODR technical protocol. ODR Exchange has
launched its cross-border pilot in January 2012 with participants from Europe, America
and Asia.73
The UNCITRAL Working Group considers that ODR providers are systems accessible
online, operated by private businesses. It has developed draft Principles applicable to ODR
providers and neutrals, which are:
1. Maintaining a roster of competent neutrals;
2. Independence;
3. Disclosure of terms of service and confidentiality;
4. Establishing identity of the parties;
5. System reliability and security;
6. Record and publication of decisions;
7. Sensitivity to language and culture;
8. Fees and costs;
9. Enforcement.
The Working Group is aiming to develop a multi-stakeholder model with stakeholders
including public agencies (policy makers, legislators and regulators), consumers, online
businesses, payment channels, and ODR providers. The model envisages a three-stage
approach:
1. In the first phase, the parties would negotiate with each other;
2. In the second phase a neutral would be appointed for the purpose of facilitating a
solution; and
3. In the third phase to resolve the very few cases not resolved by use of the first two
phases, a neutral (possibly the same neutral used in the second phase) would arbitrate
the dispute.
72
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution),
Twenty-third session, New York, 23–27 May 2011.
73
See www.odrexchange.com.

14
Empirical Findings
This chapter highlights some of the data findings from the national studies in previous
chapters.1 It is not, however, a complete statistical analysis of every scheme discussed in
this book. Depending on the structure of the national CADR architecture and method of
claim-data-collection, it is easier to access data for some schemes and more complicated or
impossible for others. It is evident that the disclosure and transparency (or lack thereof) of
data presentation in annual reports varies significantly. Moreover, there is a huge variety
in the approach of claim-data-collection which makes it very difficult to understand,
compare and draw general conclusions. If there was a basic harmonized approach to claim
registering, it would increase efficiency, save time, enable an exchange between schemes
and could encourage appropriate reactions by industry to consumer trends.
The incidence of claims by country2 is presented as a collection of detailed complaint
information. Bar charts represent the total number of contacts per scheme, divided into the
proportion that was classed as a complaint and the proportion of contacts redirected and/
or inquiries. It is clear that throughout the countries and across sectors, most contacts are
not complaints but information requests or do not fall into the contacted scheme’s terms
of reference. Data tables below the bar charts display, as far as possible, information on the
number of complaints that are accepted by a scheme and resolved/redirected.
Then, data is presented for telecoms and financial services sectors, as far as it is available.
Those two sectors are important because they attract the majority of contacts.
Following this, thresholds and limits, case fees for consumers, levels of loss and
detriment, the cost of major CADR schemes, the cost per inquiry and the average duration
are presented. Finally, a brief overview of EU consumer complaint data is provided.
Readers should note an issue over comparability of some of the following figures. First,
there are significant demographic variations between the countries for which data has been
collected. Those variables could theoretically be reconciled through per capita analysis
of the claims data. However, this has not been undertaken because the results would not
necessarily be conclusive, due to the fact that there are also notable variations in data
collection methodology and presentation employed by the relevant CADR providers. In
certain cases, the number of claims accepted and the number of claims redirected do not
add up to the figure provided for total contacts per CADR scheme in any given year. This
is due to irregular or unreported data, and deployment of variable methodology by the
relevant organizations in calculating the number of claims for each year. For example, some
schemes add the number of unresolved claims brought forward from the previous year to
1
2010 statistics were collected from annual reports and interviews.
2
France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

368 Findings
the current annual report without specifying that as a result the total figure given for that
year is a composite of new contacts and pre-existing unresolved claims. Some contacts
may not get logged at all. Further, the timeframe of the annual reports can vary according
to the financial year of the individual CADR providers. These variables in methodological
approach by the CADRs preclude comprehensive statistical comparison. Therefore, there
is no claim for entire accuracy of the figures below, and detailed conclusive comparison
between schemes is not possible. However, the data allows a best attempt to highlight trends
and give the reader a better understanding of the variations between the schemes.
Incidence of Claims
The Commission’s 2009 study found that incidence of ADR cases was increasing across the
EU with 410,000 cases recorded in 2006, 473,000 in 2007 and 530,000 during 2008.3 It also
found the median compliance rate by businesses was 99 per cent for those schemes that had
data, ranging from 100 per cent for schemes with binding decisions to 90 per cent where
decisions were non-binding.
In relation to cross-border ADR cases, 40 per cent of EU consumers bought goods and
services over the internet in 2010,4 and the ECC Network recorded 23,987 information
requests, 17,310 ‘simple’ complaints and 11,821 ‘normal’ complaints and disputes.5
The following main points emerge. Firstly, there is a considerably wide range in the
incidence of claims directed at CADR schemes between different states, from the one
million contacts received by the UK FOS, to far smaller numbers in many other countries,
whether generally or for financial services complaints. Secondly, it is almost impossible to
state any accurate data on this, since only a minority of CADR schemes have full national
coverage (the data indicate that there is one ARN claim for every 938 people in Sweden).
Thirdly, there is a consistent difference between the number of contacts received by a
CADR scheme and the number of claims that are accepted for processing. The latter
are often far lower than the former—sometimes dramatically so. This raises issues over
whether consumers do not allow enough time in contacting traders before contacting a
CADR scheme, whether CADR schemes have rules or jurisdictions that are sufficiently
wide or restrictive, whether there are gaps in coverage in adjacent schemes that encourage
consumers to try contacting an existing scheme, whether sufficient information is available
about the remit and rules of CADR schemes, and whether the cost of dealing with many
requests for information is too high or whether the function is useful but could be located
elsewhere.
Data on ECC-Net and FIN-Net are given in chapter 1. A summary of further EU
complaints data is at the end of this chapter.
3
Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union (Civic Consulting, 2009), at http://
ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf.
4
Consumer Conditions Scoreboard. Consumes at home in the single market. 5th edn—March 2011.
5
ibid.

Empirical Findings 369
By Country
A. France
Figure 14.1: Total number of contacts per sector divided into proportions of redirected
contacts and those categorized as complaints
20000
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000 redirected/inquiries
2000
0 complaints
F
om
t
ce
s
EZ
or
ED
nk
gi
an
er
p
SU
lec
ba
ns
r
'én
su
te
tra
F
el
in
D
G
ld
na
io
at
rn
eu
at
i
éd
M
Telecoms: Mediateur des communications electroniques6/Banks: l’Autorité des marchés financiers7/

Insurance: Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance8/Energy: GDF SUEZ9 / Médiateur national
de l’énergie10/Transport: SNCF11
6
www.mediateur-telecom.fr/home; annual report 2010: www.mediateur-telecom.fr/ressources/media/files/
Rapport_Mediateur_2010.pdf.
7
www.amf-france.org/; annual report 2010: http://www.amf-france.org/affiche.asp?id=10086.
8
www.ffsa.fr/; annual report 2010: www.ffsa.fr/sites/jcms/p1_460033/rapport-annuel-ffsa-2010-/ffsa-annual-
report-2010?cc=fp_8800.
9
Mediator’s report 2010: www.gdfsuez.com/document/?f=files/fr/16rm1-44.pdf .
10
http://www.energie-mediateur.fr/; annual report 2010: www.energie-mediateur.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/
RapportMNE_2010_UK.pdf .
11
www.sncf.com/fr_FR/flash/#/CH0001/BR0998/; annual report 2010: www.clubdesmediateurs.fr/sites/club-
desmediateurs.fr/files/upload/document/pdf/Mediation_der.pdf .

370 Findings
Table 14.1: Details of complaints by scheme
Telecoms Banks Insurance Energy Energy Travel

Mediateur des l’Autorité Fédération GDF Médiateur SNCF
communications des marchés Française SUEZ national
electroniques financiers des Sociétés de l’énergie
d’Assurance
Total 18,672 1,561 5,316 6,351 17,467 3,731

Number of
contacts
Redirected 15,118 1,041 2,593 6,246 12,227 773

inquiries Not within
competence
556
resolved
meanwhile
by after-sales
services
Complaints 3,554 520 3,056 105 5,240 3,671
Resolved 3,554 520 Formal advice 105 3,563 2,342

opinions given by mediator:
391
Opinions: 274
B. Germany
Figure 14.2: Total number of contacts per sector divided into proportions of redirected
60000
50000
40000
complaints
20000
10000
0
BnetzA Banking O Insurance O söp
Telecoms: BnetzA12 /Banks: Ombudsman Bundesverband deutscher Banken13/Insurance:

Ombudsman für Versicherungen14/Travel: söp15

Table 14.2: Details of complaints per scheme
Telecoms Banks Insurance Travel

BnetzA Ombudsman Bundesverband Ombudsman für Söp
deutscher Banken Versicherungen
Total Number of BnetzA: 69,886 of which: 6,494 18,357 6,200
contacts Telekom: 54,88016
Redirected (17417) 1,036 not admissible 5,636 124
1,234 not pursued by customer

Complaints Conciliation Telekom: 703 4,224 12,721 3,628
Resolved 679 1,716 18,609 1,611
resolved in favor of customer,
9% withdrawn cases 1,048 of which:
resolved in favor of bank, 1,508 train
46% rejected not comply- 178 98 plane
ing with the TKG agreement proposed
C. Lithuania
The State Consumer Rights Protection Authority18 receives around 12,000 complaints a
year, and around 2,300 requests for ADR. It takes an average of 37 working days to complete
a claim. In January 2010 through September 2011, the Authority investigated 2,290 disputes
through the ADR procedure. Figures for 2010 alone have not been available. Of these:
• 45 per cent (1020) were settled by the parties before the Authority adopted a decision.
• 7.7 per cent (163) were terminated under one of the reasons provided for in the Law,
such as involving no breach of the law, or as being an invalid complaint.
• 48 per cent (1107) involved adoption of a decision by the Authority. Of these,
consumers were wholly successful in 72 per cent (797) and partially successful in 16
per cent (180), and traders were successful in 16 per cent (180).
In that period, traders complied with the Authority’s decisions in 33 per cent of cases: the
66 per cent of non-compliance included a number of cases caused by bankruptcy of traders.
The process is free of charge to the consumer.
12
www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cln_1912/DE/Home/home_node.html; annual report 2010: www.bundes-
netzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BNetzA/Presse/Berichte/2011/Jahresbericht2010pdf.pdf ?__
blob=publicationFile.
13
www.bankenverband.de/themen/geldinfos-finanzen/schlichtungsstelle/index_html; Annual report 2010:
https://www.bankenverband.de/publikationen/ods/ombudsmann-taetigkeitsbericht-2010/ombudsmann-taetig-
keitsbericht-2010/download.
14
www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/home.html; annual report 2010: www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/
Ressourcen/PDF/Jahresbericht-2010.pdf.
15
https://soep-online.de/; annual report 2009/2010 https://soep-online.de/assets/files/Service/20110225_soep-
Jahresbericht-2010.pdf .
16
98.7% of telecom claims were redirected.
17
Of the 703 cases accepted, 174 were redirected. It is not clear if these 174 are included in the overall
amount of redirected contacts.
18
See vvtat.lt.

372 Findings
D. The Netherlands
Figure 14.3: De Geschillencommissie number of contacts per year showing the proportions
of initiated and processed claims
12000
10000
8000
6000 claims initiated

complaints processed
4000
2000
0
2007 2008 2009 2010
E. Poland
Table 14.3: Total number of contacts (if available) by sector showing accepted and resolved
cases
Telecoms Banking Energy Consumer Trade

(Head of the (Banking (Head of the Arbitration Inspection
Office of Electronic Ombudsman) Office for Energy Tribunals (general (consumer
Telecommunications Regulation and consumer issues affairs)
(OET), Consumer Ombudsman for apart from those
Arbitration Tribunal Fuel and Energy covered elsewhere,
of OET Recipients) health and social
services)
Total No of Contacts No data 1,165 No data No data No data
Cases accepted 2,600 mediations by 561 (of 1117 3,264 2,684 No data
Head of OET decisions,
556 consisted
206 cases before in rejecting
Ombudsman the case)
Resolved No data on Head of 561 3,045 1,599 (in the No data
OET; 6 arbitrations remaining cases –
by Ombudsman traders refuse to
take part)

F. Slovenia
Figure 14.4: ECC NET Slovenia proportion of complaints and request for information
900
800
700
600
500
request for information
400 Complaints
300
200
100
0
2009 2010
G. Spain
Spain has various ADR schemes, Figure 14.5 shows data for the general arbitration system
for consumers and Figure 14.6 and Table 14.4 highlight some specific sectors.
Figure 14.5: Spanish arbitration system for consumer disputes Sistema Arbitral de
Consumo proportion of complaints and redirected contacts
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
Redirected
50000
Complaints
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
Arbitration

374 Findings
Figure 14.6: Total number of contacts per sector divided into proportion of redirected
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
redirected/inquiries
40000 complaints
30000
20000
10000
0
CNMV Banking IPF Energy O
Investment: The Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)19 /Banking: Servicio de
Reclamaciones Banco de Espana20/Insurance/ Pensions: Directorate General of Insurance and Pension
Funds21 (Servicio de Reclamaciones de la Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones)/
Energy: Energy Ombudsman22
Table 14.4: Details of categorized complaints:
Investment Banking Insurance and pensions Energy

The Comisión Servicio de Servicio de Reclamaciones de la Energy
Nacional Reclamaciones Dirección General de Seguros y Ombudsman
del Mercado Banco de Espana Fondos de Pensiones (IPF) ENDESA
de Valores
(CNMV)
Total Number of 2,296 47,657 10,225 2,104
contacts (Plus 3,368 requests
for advice, 29,529
information
inquiries by phone)
Redirected 313 32,897 3,529 rejected 922
19
www.cnmv.es/PortalInversor/section.aspx?hid=20; Annual Report of the CNMV 2010, pp. 177, www.cnmv.
es/portal/Publicaciones/Informes.aspx.
20
Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones Banco de Espana 2010 www.bde.es/webbde/es/. annual report: www.
bde.es/webbde/es/secciones/informes/Publicaciones_an/Informe_anual/anoactual/.
21
Servicio de Reclamaciones de la Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones, see: www.dgsfp.meh.
es/reclamaciones/index.asp.
Annual report 2010: www.dgsfp.meh.es/sector/documentos/Informes%202010/Informe%20Servicio%20Rec-
lamaciones%202010.pdf .
22
www.defensordelcliente.endesa.es/defcl/index.jsf.

Cases accepted 2,087 14,760 new 9,231 1,182

complaints (5,702 were admitted
84.1 % of claims complaints, of which 2,231
were submitted by in favour financial services
individuals, 15.3% institution, 1,882 in favour of
by companies and claimants
0.6% by others, remaining cases were
including public terminated in other forms)
institutions
Resolved 1,774 No data 5,702 89% satisfactory
resolved, of which
80% resolved by
mediation and 18%
via resolution by
Ombudsman
2% other means
H. Sweden
The data here are from the national body, the National Board for Consumer Complaints,
Allmänna reklamationsnämnden,23 rather than sectoral boards.
Figure 14.7: ARN proportion of complaints dealt with and those dismissed
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
dismissed
5000
complaints
4000
3000
2000
1000
23
www.arn.se/.

376 Findings
I. The United Kindgom
Figure 14.8: Total number of contacts per sector showing proportions of redirected/
inquiries and complaints
1200000
1000000
800000
complaints
400000
200000
0
OS:C FOS PO FLA OS:E A BTA
Telecoms: Ombudsman Services: Communications24 /Banks/ Insurance: FOS25 / Pensions Ombudsman/

FLA26/Energy: Ombudsman Services: Energy27 /Travel: ABTA28
Table 14.5: Details of categorized complaints:
Telecoms Pensions Banks/ FLA Energy Travel

Ombudsman Pensions Insurance Ombudsman ABTA
Services: Ombudsman FOS Services: Energy
Communications
Total 3947 31,858
Number of 103,702 1,012,371 1,726 54,794
contacts (3632 new (12,689 case
written enquires files +
and 315 from 19,169
previous year) telephone
inquiries)
Redirected 66,369 2,520 806,250 642 48,067 No data
24
www.ombudsman-services.org/communications.html; annual report 2011, published in July: www.ombuds-
man-services.org/attachments/download/369/Communications /annual report 2010: www.ombudsman-services.
org/attachments/download/337/2010%20annual%20report%20Otelo.pdf.
25
http://financial-ombudsman.org.uk/ ; annual review 2010/2011: http://financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publi-
cations/ar11/index.html.
26
www.fla.org.uk/home.
27
www.ombudsman-services.org/energy.html ; Annual report 2010/11: http://www.ombudsman-services.org/
attachments/download/367/Energy%202011%20AR.pdf.
28
www.abta.com/home; annual review 2010: www.abta.com/filegrab/?ref=444&f=2010annual-review.pdf.

Complaints 25,925 1427 206,121 1,084 88% billing 12,504

referred 8% transfer complaints
(950 new to FLA 4% sales and 363
inquiries members for 5% other arbitrations
477 from investigation
previous year) 6,727 complaint
forms issued
5,812 returned
Resolved 71% Formally 889 164,899 642 5,812 255 progressed
resolved cases were cases, to an award
complaints 231 formally resolved of either the majority of being issued
determined which: complainant returned
187 cases were chose not to complaint 1,216 were
29% Informally discontinued, 147,434 pursue the forms are sent a Pre
resolved withdrawn Resolved by complaint accepted and Arbitration
complaints or resolved mediation further or the the case is Notice
informally complaint resolved
17,465 was resolved 84% formally 591 have
152 Resolved by without the 16% informally. requested
investigations Ombudsman need for FLA further
closed after a formal conciliation details of the
decision of the decisions Arbitration
investigator Scheme
using the
informal
procedures,
319 cases were

determined
by the
Ombudsman
under the
informal
procedures
following the
investigator’s
initial decision.
By Sector
It is apparent in this study that the two sectors with notable claims data are telecoms and
financial services. Part A presents the telecoms sector showing the total number of contacts
in 2010 across countries. Part B has two figures; the first chart shows the total number
of contact by country, and in view of the very high number of contacts to UK FOS the
next chart shows the same figures excluding the FOS, for a clearer comparison between
countries. A table with the number of contacts is below the figure.

378 Findings
A. Telecoms
Figure 14.9: Total contacts in 2010
120000
100000
80000
60000
Telecoms
40000
20000
0
France Germany NL UK
Table 14.6: Total number of contacts telecoms by country
France 18,672
Germany 54,880
the Netherlands 1,284
United Kingdom 103,702
B. Financial Services
Figure 14.10: Total contacts in 2010
1200000
1000000
800000
600000
400000
200000
0 Financial Services
RN
ch ce -ba n
ce n b e
EN FB
ks
SW EN S
D s
SW UK es
co pe ng
m -in ks
N issie ns
nc
e
a
O
Ki cas
s
om an
m
an - o ce ban
io
i
ED -K
ca
ED F
-A
su uds ura
an nk
su Spa uds
-
m ns
-
s
an Fra nce
Fi
b
a
m
n in
d
m
a
Fr
L-
n
b
n
ra
en
ra
ill
y
in
N -in
es
y-
m
ain
G
er
L-
m
Sp
G
er
G

Table 14.7: Total number of contacts financial services by country
France Banks 1,561

Insurance 5,649
Germany Ombudsman banks 6,494
Ombudsman insurance 18,357
Spain Bank 47,657
Insurance / pensions 10,225
The Netherlands Geschillencommissie cases 609
KiFiD cases 6,719
United Kingdom FOS 1,012,371
Sweden KFB 13,000
ARN 480
Figure 14.11: Total number of contacts without FOS
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
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Thresholds and Limits
Many CADR schemes are subject to high and/or low financial thresholds, or time limits
for making claims. Financial limits can often be found in financial services sectors, both to
limit exposure from what might be large individual claims and to ensure that large cases
are deflected to the courts, since they may be more complex and involve points of legal
principle. Examples that we have found are as follows.
• In Germany, the Insurance Ombudsman can make a legally-binding decision up
to €10,000, and a non-binding recommendation up to €100,000. The transport
ombudsman (Söp) has an upper claim value limit of €30,000. The Ombudsman of
Private Commercial Banks can make a binding decision on claims valued up to €5,000,
and a non-binding recommendation above that sum. The Legal Arbitration Board can
make a recommendation only in claims worth up to €15,000.

380 Findings
• In financial services cases in KiFiD in the Netherlands, the second Geschillencommissie

stage (after the Ombudsman first stage) has a minimum claim value of €100 and a time
limit of three months, and the third Arbitration Appeal Board stage has a threshold
case value of at least €25,000. At the second stage, all banks and most intermediaries
have agreed to accept all decisions up to €5 million.
• The value of a case before the Polish Tribunals of the Trade Inspection cannot exceed
10.000 PLN, unless it is brought before the Tribunal in Warsaw, which does not have
monetary limits on the value of claims under its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the
National Banking Ombudsman cannot exceed 8,000 PLN (around €2,000). A claim
must exceed 1,000 PLN to be brought before the Arbitration Tribunal of the Insurance
Ombudsman.
• Different types of claims brought to the Swedish ARN must exceed certain thresholds:
500 SEK for shoes, textiles or general types; 1000 SEK for electronics, motor vehicles,
travel, textiles (furniture), or cleaning services; and 2000 SEK for banking, housing,
boating or insurance. There is a series of types of claims that are excluded.29
• In UK, the Financial Ombudsman Service cannot award compensation over £150,000.
It would follow that if there were to be an obligation on Member States to provide full
coverage for all C2B disputes, this could not be satisfied unless there was either some
leeway to justify the seemingly quite widespread existing variations in coverage provided
by thresholds and other limitations, or their complete removal.
Case Fees for Consumers
As shown in Table 14.8, the vast majority of CADR schemes are free to consumers. This is
a general principle in France, Spain and Sweden, and applies in almost all of the schemes in
Germany30 and the UK (save for those post-conciliation arbitration stages of many private
schemes, for which a charge is imposed).31 An exception applies in the Netherlands, where
consumers pay a registration fee to SGC that varies depending on the sectoral Board, and
generally ranges between €25 and €125.
The principle of no cost to consumers has not been established in Poland. The Polish
Consumer Arbitration Tribunals are free of charge for consumers, although the Consumer
Arbitration Tribunal operated by the Chairman of the Electronic Communications Office
has a 100 PLN charge to lodge a case. The cost of lodging a case in the Consumer Arbitration
Tribunal of the Office of Electronic Communications is 100 PLN, and may involve further
costs. The fee for lodging a complaint with the National Banking Ombudsman is 20 PLN
if the value of the case is lower than 50 PLN, and 50 PLN in higher value cases. Fees for
lodging cases with the Arbitration Tribunal of the Polish Banks Association are far higher,
on a tariff basis, which for a claim over 10 million PLN will be 115,300 PLN plus 0.5 per
cent of the amount of the claim over 10 million PLN. Costs are also high in the Arbitration
Tribunal of the Insurance Ombudsman.
29
See p 241 above.
30
An exception is the BnetzA, there is a small fee of a minimum of €25 and increases with the value of the sum
in dispute.
31
See pp 312 ff above.

Table 14.8: Overview of cost to consumer by country and scheme
France Telecoms: free Insurance: no data Banks: no data National Energy GDF/ Travel: free
Energy SUEZ: free
mediator: free
Germany Telecoms: cost Insurance: free Banks: free Travel: free
Poland Telecoms: cost Consumer arbitration Banking: cost Trade Energy: free
tribunals: No cost of inspection
lodging the case32 consumer: free
Spain Insurance /pensions: free Banking: free Investment: free Energy: free
UK Telecoms: free Pensions: free Banks/ FLA: free Energy: free Travel:
Insurance: free cost for
arbitration
Levels of Loss and Detriment
Consumer disputes typically involve very small sums, but this varies from sector to sector.
Data reported above in this book for 2010 includes:
• In France, the FFSA médiateur reports handling many cases valued at around €100
and some as low as €5. The average award of the national energy médiateur was €373,
the average amount in dispute in the cases of the médiateur of EDF was €1,120 (with
23 per cent of cases over €2,000).
• In Germany, 86 per cent of claims made to the Insurance Ombudsman involved claims
under €5,000, and over 90 per cent were under €10,000. A normal claim made to the
transport ombudsman (Söp) is between €10 and €200.
• In the Netherlands, the average claim value for Geschillencommissie cases varies
between sectors, from €206 for taxis and an average of €5,980 for housing guarantees.
In 2009, 9 per cent of the Geschillencommissie claims were less than €250, there was no
claim involving a value of more than €10,000, and the largest segment of claims (24 per
cent) were for €1,001–2,000.
• The average value of an award in the arbitration system in Spain was €366.
• The average amount claimed in cases before the UK’s Ombudsman Service:
Communications was £587 and the average award was £198.
The Leuven Report concluded that small claims procedures would only be used by European
consumers if the amount involved exceeds around €500.33 However, it is clear from the data
in our study that many existing CADR claims are under that level. Discussions in Brussels
have considered whether a lower threshold might be introduced that would exclude very
small claims. The evidence, however, is that many C2B claims involve very low sums, and
CADR schemes can process them at relatively proportionate cost, if an inherent purpose of
a scheme is to collect aggregated data on generic market effects and act as a means of raising
standards in a sector.
Costs of experts and lawyers are covered by parties, with loser pays principle applicable.
32
J Stuyck, E Terryn, V Colaert, T Van Dyck, N Peretz, N Hoekx and P Tereszkiewicz, Study on Alternative
33
Means of Consumer Redress other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings (Catholic University of
Leuven, January 17, 2007) published April 2007.

382 Findings
The Cost of Major cadr Schemes
Total costs are not always published by schemes. Summarised below are some data for
selected major schemes: the residual Swedish scheme, the two Dutch systems, and large
individual sectoral schemes from Germany, France and the UK.
Sweden
The national CADR body, the ARN, which is fully funded by the state, had a 2010 budget of
just over €3 million, and received 10,000 claims covering all sectors (but others were made
to some sectoral boards).
The Patient Insurance scheme, which covers residual expenses not covered by social
security arising out of personal injury claims, which are usually more expensive to process,
costs around €900 per claim, and receives 12,000 claims a year of which about half receive
compensation.
The Netherlands
Across 50 sectoral Boards (excluding financial services), 7,826 claims were initiated in 2010,
5,799 of which were processed. The operational cost of the administrative coordinating
organisation, De Geschillencommissie Stichting, was only €5.5 million.34 The Ministry of
Safety and Justice subsidizes the annual costs for the infrastructure. Business pays for the
handling of the cases (caseload) of the system. This means that the annual costs for business
depend on the number of cases handled. Over the years, the ministry subsidizes between 15
to 20% of business between 80–85% of the costs.
The financial CADR system (KiFiD) had a budget of €9 million in 2010 and received
6,719 cases. Traders’ minimum yearly contribution was €170 for banks and insurers35 and
the lowest contribution for other members was €163. The registration fee per case was €25
for traders and €50 for consumers.36
Germany
In 2010 the Insurance Ombudsman received 18,357 claims, 12,720 of which were admitted.
The Insurance Ombudsman cost €3.2 million to run, for a staff of 45, had an income of €3,6
m which means a profit of €0,04 m.37
34
The total annual costs fluctuate between € 5.5 and 6.5 million, depending on the caseload and 50 trade orga-
nizations participating.
35
See cost rules: www.kifid.nl/fileupload/Kostenreglement_2011.pdf.
36
FAQ KiFiD, www.kifid.nl/consumenten/veelgestelde-vragen. If the Ombudsman himself transfers the case
to the Geschillencommissie the consumer is free from the fee, see Art 26.2 KiFiD rules, for instance due to pro-
cedural complexity. But if the Ombudsman has declared the claim ‘kennelijk ongegrond’ (clearly inadmissible)
according to Art 31.2 KiFiD rules the fee is €100.
37
Annual report 2010, www.versicherungsombudsmann.de/ressourcen/PDF/jahresberichte-2010.pdf.

The principal transport scheme (Söp) is funded by members’ annual fees (€1,000 for a
single company but groups of companies like Deutsche Bahn pay a maximum of €5,000)
and a case fee (€25 for unjustified claims and €150, €200, €300, €400, €600 or €800 per case,
depending on the time and expenditure involved). The scheme is too new for the level of
claims to have stabilized. The cost per case in 2010 was between €25 and €350. Since 2012 a
new fee structure has been implemented as the case handling efficiency increased and this
enables Söp to lower the cost per case by 20 per cent.
France
The national Energy Médiateur had a budget of €6.6 million for 40 staff in 2011. In 2010
he received 17,467 complaints. 68 per cent of cases that fall within the ombudsman’s remit
have been resolved or a recommendation was issued.
The Médiateur des communications electroniques had a budget of 1.3m€ and 12
employees.
The Médiateur SNCF has no defined budget: he requests funding from the President of
SNCF, who then grants necessary funds. A budget of €120,000 was allocated to set up the
online scheme in 2011.
UK
The largest CADR system in Europe, the Financial Ombudsman Service, received 1,012,371
initial inquiries and complaints in 2009/10, which yielded 206,121 formal disputes, of which
17,465 required the involvement of an ombudsman. The annual budget for 2009/2010 was
£92 million for a staff averaging 1,015 people. Actual income was £98.4 million, 20 per cent
of which was funded by a charge levied on financial institutions (adjusted every year to
reflect the volume of work undertaken per sector each year: the number of accounts held
by banks, and volume of investment income for insurance), and 80 per cent from case fees.
A defendant currently pays £500 per case, but no case fees were charged to businesses for
their first three disputes, which resulted in only 5.5 per cent of firms paying case fees. The
FOS had a unit cost (ie cost per case) of £555.
The Pensions Ombudsman, fully funded by the government, received £2,810,000 in
2010/11 and accepted 950 complaints for investigation. The subject-matter is often complex,
and average duration of investigations is 10.9 months.
The Legal Ombudsman had a budget of £9.9 million in 2011, obtained from a levy on all
firms regulated and a case fee of £400, which was not payable for the first two potentially
chargeable complaints in a year. He received 38,155 contacts and accepted 3,768 cases for
investigation.
The UK private Ombudsman Services had a turnover of £5,739,894 in the year to 31
March 2010 and £6,385,718 in the year to 31 March 2011.39 The allocation of costs between
sectors is shown in Table 14.9.
39
Annual Report 2011, Ombudsman Services Limited, at www.ombudsman-services.org/useful-downloads-
os.html.

384 Findings
Table 14.9: Allocation of Ombudsman Service costs between service sectors
Expenditure 2009–2010 (£’000) Number of contacts Cases opened

received
Communications 2,210 102,02540 8,936
Energy 2,189 78,528 7,192
Property 19 5,843 428
The private travel sector arbitration scheme operated by ABTA involved 12,702 requests in
2010, a further 19,169 telephone inquiries, and 255 awards. The average award was £630,
for which the consumer paid a fee of £90 and the trader £350. The total administrative
cost of the scheme is unknown, since the administration is largely assumed by the trade
association.
The cost of sectoral conciliation-plus-arbitration schemes established in various sectors
varies: a 2006 review of OFT-approved schemes found that the cost to members ranged
from ‘minimal’ sums to £50,000 pa. The costs of the Motor Codes’ were, for manufacturers,
an annual subscription to the new car scheme of £1,250 and case conciliation fee of £75, and
for garages a subscription to the service and repair code of £75, annual garage inspection
fee of £175 and case conciliation fee of £75 (all sums plus VAT).
WIPO
The cost of a single arbitrator involving up to 5 domain names is U.S.$1,500, and for a panel
of three arbitrators is U.S.$4,000.
Cost per Inquiry
In comparing processing costs of different schemes, it must be remembered that the annual
budget is expended in responding to initial inquiries and a smaller number of formal
investigations. Figures are not available that would accurately enable the cost of those two
functions to be differentiated. The cost of responding to many inquiries might be modest,
but the volume received might be large—and in some countries is clearly relatively limited,
for reasons discussed above. It is striking that the number of disputes referred to the Swedish
ARN and the Netherlands system are so low.
In contrast, the cost per case of handling formal disputes might be higher than that of
responding to individual inquiries, but much might depend on the nature of the case. The
UK Pensions Ombudsman has a high cost per case (roughly £3,000) but his cases are clearly
more complex than many simple consumer disputes, as indicated by the longer average
duration.
The above figures indicate that some recent ombudsman-style CADR systems are capable
of processing cases for under £400 each, and sometimes lower than that. The cost per case in
40
The regulator, OFCOM, also received 194,500 complaints in 2009/10.

Sweden was €300 and the Netherlands perhaps €900, but it must be remembered that these
are very general figures, averaged across many different types of cases. Comprehensive cost
data is not available from Spain, but the average cost per case is over €400, and the average
value of awards was €366 in 2010.
The costs of CADR schemes are lower, or at least compare favourably, with the cost of
court procedures in almost all countries, even small claims procedures.
All the major schemes raise funds by charging an annual fee to traders that are members
or imposed by law, and a separate case fee. In some cases, the case fee is not charged for the
first or second case. The reason for this is to encourage traders to resolve cases themselves
before they become complaints, and to recognize that some cases have poor merits for
which individual traders should not be penalised. Some case fees can rise as the number
of claims received rises. Similarly, the UK’s ABTA scheme incentivises both sides to resolve
their case between them by deferring the fee until after the consumer is sent the company’s
comments on the cases, shortly before the arbitrator sees the papers.
In some CADR schemes, the cost paid by traders covers more than a dispute handling
facility. Firstly, it may cover the administration of a self-regulatory Code of Practice, which
has extra value for traders and involves advice to them from the trade association (and
might be an insurance against the imposition of more costly regulation). Secondly, the
system may provide information and advice services to actual or potential customers that
would otherwise have to be funded separately.
Duration
The average duration reported for of the CADR processes are shown in Table 14.10. It is
precisely because the sums involved are small that there is a need to design a process that
involves proportionate cost, and does not merely try to adapt previously existing formalistic
processes (like the introduction of mediation into court procedures).
Table 14.10: Average duration per case in months by country and scheme
France Telecoms: Insurance: Banks: GDF/SUEZ: Travel:

3 3–6 6 2 2–4
National Energy
mediator: 6
Germany Telecoms: Insurance: Banks: Travel:
4 4.1 no data 3
Poland Telecoms: Consumer arbitration Banking: Trade inspection Energy: no data

no data tribunals: 0.5–2 1.1 consumer: no data
Spain Insurance /pensions: Banking: Investment: no Energy:

4 4–6 data 2
UK Telecoms: Pensions: Banks/Insurance: FLA: Energy: Travel:

6 or less 10.9 2.2 2 3 2–2.5

386 Findings
EU Consumer Complaint Data
Types of Disputes: Lessons for Prioritisation of ADR
The EU collects data on which types of disputes arise more frequently than others. The
2011 Consumer Markets Scoreboard reported that one tenth of EU consumers had
experienced one or more problems with a large range of surveyed markets for which they
considered they had a legitimate reason to complain. 41 In 2011, one in five consumers who
experienced a problem had not complained to the company, a complaint body, friends or
family. The sectors that experienced the largest number of problems in 2011 (with very
similar rankings to 2010) were, in descending order, internet, TV, mobile phone, trains,
second hand cars, real estate services, house and garden, current bank accounts, vehicle
upkeep and repair services, fixed telephone services, investments, pensions and securities.
Consumers were most satisfied with ‘books, magazines and newspapers’, ‘personal care
services’, and ‘glasses and lenses’, and least satisfied with ‘investments, pensions and
securities’, ‘mortgages’, ‘real estate services’ and especially ‘train services’.
The gap between problems and complaints, indicating that businesses in these sectors
should look at improving their services and complaint accessibility, was widest in train
services, legal and accountancy services, tram, local bus and metro services, airline services,
and second hand cars.42
The Commission collates consumer complaint data reported by national authorities.
However, it is difficult to draw conclusions over which countries are the ones in which
consumers make the most and least complaints: comparability of such data is problematic
because of the demographic variations between states, and because some countries (such as
Germany and Poland) include inquiries as well as complaints. The raw 2010 data indicated
that there were 2.4 million consumer complaints in Germany, 835,591 in the UK, 655,771 in
Poland, 396,797 in Spain, 123,951 in Sweden, 114,279 in France, 80,058 in Belgium, 64,063
in the Netherlands, 22,954 in Lithuania, and 15,830 in Slovenia.43
Responses to Problems
Important data was collected in February to April 2010 in relation to consumers’ preferences
about their reactions to encountering problems.44 More than one in five (21 per cent) of
respondents from 56,471 interviews across the EU had encountered a problem with a good,
a service, a retailer or a provider in the previous 12 months, for which they had a legitimate
cause to complain. The average estimated value of the losses was €375, and median €18.
More than three-quarters took some form of action in response (77 per cent) while 22 per
cent took no action. Those who took action were most likely to have made a complaint to
41
Commission Staff Working Paper. The Consumer Markets Scoreboard. Making markets work for consumers.
Sixth edition—October 2011, SEC(2011) 1271, 21.10.2011, para 2.4. See also Eurobarometer, Consumer attitudes
towards cross-border trade and consumer protection. Analytical report, 2011, at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
strategy/docs/consumer_eurobarometer_2011_en.pdf.
42
ibid, para 2.5.
43
Commission Staff Working Paper. The Consumer Markets Scoreboard. Making markets work for consumers.
Sixth edition—October 2011, SEC(2011) 1271, 21.10.2011, p 25.
44
Special Eurobarometer 342. Consumer empowerment (European Commission, 2011), at http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/consumer_empowerment/docs/report_eurobarometer_342_en.pdf.

the retailer or provider (65 per cent), with far fewer complaining to a public authority (16
per cent), the manufacturer (13 per cent), utilizing an ADR body (5 per cent) or court (2 per
cent).
The most frequently cited reason for not making a complaint was that the individual
had already received a satisfactory response from the retailer/provider (44 per cent). The
major reasons for not making a court claim were that the individual had already received
a satisfactory response from the retailer/provider (40 per cent), the sum involved was too
small (26 per cent), it would have taken too much effort (16 per cent), it would have been
too expensive (13 per cent) or too long (12 per cent). The level of financial loss that would
have caused people to go to court was given by the majority (53 per cent) as between €101
and €2,500. In comparison, the Commission’s 2004 Eurobarometer found that only 18 per
cent of EU citizens were prepared to go to court for amounts higher than €500 and another
18 per cent for amounts higher than €1,000.45
In the 2010 survey, the threshold for using an ADR body was given by 38 per cent as
around €200, and €101 by 15 per cent. A different survey, carried out in September 2010,
found that 52 per cent of EU consumers who had made a complaint were satisfied or very
satisfied with the way it was dealt with by the trader.46
In a 2010 study of retailers,47 only nine per cent had used ADR mechanisms to settle
disputes within the previous two years, and 44 per cent were unaware of the existence
of such mechanisms. Only six per cent said they were members of an ADR body. A slim
majority (54 per cent) said they would prefer to use an ADR mechanism to resolve issues.
The 78 per cent of respondents who had not encountered a problem in the February
to April 2010 study were asked what they would have done if they had, and 71 per cent
responded that they would have made a complaint while 22 per cent felt they would not.
The countries where most respondents felt they would have complained were Sweden (91
per cent), Luxembourg (87 per cent), the Netherlands, Germany and Cyprus (84 per cent).
The 2006 survey found that an average of 42 per cent of Europeans considered it easy to
assert their claims against suppliers through some alternative means of dispute resolution
such as arbitration, mediation or conciliation.48 However, the Commission noted that a
substantially higher percentage of consumers in northern member states, Cyprus and
Greece, as compared to consumers in Spain, Portugal and most new member states
including those in Central Europe, believed that resolving disputes through an arbitration,
mediation or conciliation body as well as through court is easy.49 With regard to alternative
dispute resolution, only around 30 per cent of consumers in the latter group of countries
considered it to be easy, against over 60 per cent of consumers in the former group.50
A 2008 UK survey found that although 34 per cent reported experiencing one or
more problems with goods or services in the previous year, amounting to an estimated
26.5 million problems within the UK and estimated consumer detriment of £6.6 billion,
45
Special Eurobarometer, European Union citizens and access to justice, October 2004, at http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/redress/reports_studies/execsum_11-04_en.pdf.
46
Eurobarometer, Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection. Analytical report,
2011, at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/consumer_eurobarometer_2011_en.pdf.
47
Eurobarometer, Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection. Analytical report,
2011, at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/retailers_eurobarometer_2011_en.pdf.
48
Eurobarometer Special Report 252 ‘Consumer Protection in the Internal Market’, European Commission,
2006, QB28.1.
49
The survey found that the majority of Slovaks (66%), Czechs (57%), Slovenes (57%), Portuguese (53%), Poles
(52%) and Hungarians (50%) find it harder to resolve disputes with suppliers through an arbitration, mediation
or conciliation body.
50
See Commission Staff Working Document, First Consumer Markets Scoreboard, COM(2008) 87, para. 3.2.

388 Findings
55 per cent of these resulted in consumer detriment below £5, only 4 per cent involved
detriment over £1,000, and no less than 64 per cent complained or took action (70 per cent
where detriment was over £5), of whom most (28 per cent) contacted the public authority’s
Trading Standards enforcement services or the national Consumer Direct service.51
51
Consumer detriment: Assessing the frequency and impact of consumer problems with goods and services, (Office
of Fair Trading, 2008), OFT992.

15
Findings and Conclusions
Findings on the State of Cadr in the Eu
The Unique Concept of Cadr
CADR systems must be distinguished from what has hitherto been described as ADR. ADR
is a technique, such as mediation or early neutral evaluation, which may be adopted in any
given dispute, but particularly in a dispute that exists within, or in the context of, the court
system. Thus, ADR has hitherto been alternative because it is alternative to the courts. But
ADR, as it is generally known, occurs within the architectural context, or shadow, of dispute
resolution through the courts. There is now often a formal link between court procedure
and ADR, in that many national civil procedure rules now encourage or require ADR to be
attempted for a claim that is proceeding in court, or before a claim is commenced in court.
In contrast, this book shows that CADR exists as its own distinct dispute resolution path-
way, within its own architectural structure that is independent of the courts. To some extent
CADR takes place within ‘the shadow of the courts’ and is an alternative pathway to resolve
disputes to that of courts, since consumers might choose to raise disputes in the courts or
CADR processes. But in reality CADR occupies its own world, and has its own ‘stand alone’
architecture and validity that is entirely unique and does not relate to the courts. CADR pro-
vides a complete, integral dispute resolution structure and pathway that does not particularly
depend on the ability to fall back on a court procedure in order to resolve C2B disputes.
The stage has now been reached where CADR and courts are alternatives to each other, on a
theoretically equal footing, and in which the ‘extra-court alternative’ is not an adjunct but an
equally valid means of dispute resolution, subject to its own structures and rules.
The Extent of CADR
CADR is far more widespread than is widely thought. Every Member State has a system of state
courts. But until recently CADR systems did not exist. The first systematic CADR models were
created from the 1960s, for example in Nordic States and the Netherlands. CADR systems have
grown steadily since then. Recent studies have suggested that there are 750 CADR systems across
the EU,1 and in the United Kingdom 130 ADR systems of any type2 or 95 CADR systems.3
1
J Stuyck et al, Study on alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through ordinary judicial
proceedings (Catholic University of Leuven, January 17, 2007), published April 2007; Study on the use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the European Union, (Brussels, Civic Consulting, 2009).

390 Findings
This book has not attempted to verify the number of CADR schemes that exist, but has
confirmed that there are indeed many individual schemes. The numbers previously claimed
may, however, be inaccurate. The large number claimed for, for example, Germany (247)
appears to be a significant over-calculation in that many schemes that have registered as
ADR schemes are in fact mediation or arbitration schemes that are primarily designed to
operate alongside, and in conjunction with, the court system, and are not designed to be
CADR schemes. Indeed, they are frequently rather small in scope, sometimes one or a small
number of individual mediators/arbitrators, and would not be designed for or expected to
handle many, if any, C2B disputes. On the other hand, we have found some national CADR
schemes of reasonable size that are not registered with the European Commission, such as
several sectoral schemes in Sweden.
CADR is growing in both the numbers of consumers who use existing systems, and in
the number of business sectors that offer a dispute resolution option. There has been a
significant increase in CADR schemes during the past five years. However, as a dispute
resolution technique, CADR has considerable further potential.
Coverage
There is a difference between coverage and the binding effect of decisions. The coverage issue
relates to the width of a given scheme, and the extent to which all existing schemes together
leave gaps in their collective individual jurisdictions so that certain types of complaints
cannot be directed to any particular CADR scheme. The ‘binding effect’ issue arises because
it does not follow from the fact that a CADR scheme exists, that traders will comply with
its outcomes. We now consider the coverage issue: binding effect and compliance are dealt
with below.
Some Member States have not yet developed more than embryonic CADR systems
whereas others have developed far more extensive coverage of market sectors. Such
development seems at least partly a question of timing (when an CADR system was
introduced, and over what period it has evolved), as well as of the State’s historical
background. It is reasonable to assume that CADR will develop further in every State, in
both sectoral coverage and sophistication of operating model, given further time. But if
such development is left to spontaneous forces, it may be slow. The Netherlands has taken
40 years since 1970 to reach its current sophisticated state. The pace of development of
CADR, and the volume of usage and functional utility, can clearly be increased if external
pressures are applied.
Broadly, the Nordic, Spanish and Central and Eastern European (CEE) states have systems
that have full coverage of all types of disputes. They are all (broadly) state-funded. The
structural difference is that the Nordic bodies are separate from the enforcement agencies,
whereas the CEE CADR functions tend to be located within the enforcement agencies, as
a historical hangover from Soviet systems. However, in our view, it would be preferable for
CADR systems to be independent of regulatory bodies.
2
M Tulibacka, Civil Justice in England and Wales – Beyond Courts. Mapping out Non-judicial Civil Justice
Mechanisms (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 2009) available at www.csls.ox.ac.uk/CivilJusticeSystems.php. Note
that the Civic Study above identified 43 schemes in the UK, whereas Tulibacka and the OFT found far higher
numbers.
3
Mapping UK consumer redress. A summary guide to dispute resolution systems, (Office of Fair Trading, 2010).

Findings and Conclusions 391
In contrast, CADR schemes have grown piece-meal, on a sector-by-sector basis, in the

Netherlands, UK, Germany and France. Many sectors are now covered in the Netherlands
and the UK, the difference between those two countries being that the Netherlands
broadly has a single, unified system for all CADR bodies apart from the separate structure
for financial services, whereas in the UK there is no unifying structure and the sectoral
systems are a somewhat confusing mixture of models. Those two countries have more
sectors covered by sectoral CADR bodies than in Germany (a major reason for this is
the comparative efficiency of the German court system and people’s reliance on it until
comparatively recently) and in France (where CADR has been concentrated until recently
on schemes at Département level, which seem to have failed since their funding has dried
up and on in-house systems).
Knowledge of CADR
Knowledge of the existence of courts must be taken to be universal. Knowledge of the

existence of ADR—where the alternative pathway is alternative to the courts, and often
closely linked in structural terms with court litigation systems—has increased considerably
in recent years, partly because of the wide adoption of mediation and related techniques by
lawyers and courts, and partly through the increased profile that mediation has received
through the passing and implementation of the EU Mediation Directive. Indeed, ADR is
probably now well familiar as a name, even if not always in practice, to lawyers, judges and
most European academics who specialise in either EU law or civil procedure.
In some states, consumers use the courts for their claims. We note above that in
Germany and similar states, the efficiency and comparatively low cost of courts, taken
with the availability of cheap insurance and predictable costs, is a reason for this, together
with cultural preferences. Cultural approaches towards direct negotiation and settlement
clearly apply in the Nordic states and the Netherlands. The Central and Eastern European
states tend to mistrust officials, courts and judges, but paradoxically also look towards state
institutions to provide solutions.
In contrast, knowledge of CADR systems—that is, systems that resolve B2C disputes
without involving the courts but through a different, separate architecture—appears to be
low amongst consumers, as reported in chapter 14.4
The existence of CADR is not generally well known in many Member States, even in
those where knowledge and use of ADR is extensive. One reason is that CADR structures
often exist within particular sectors, such as telecoms, energy or utilities. Such mechanisms
are well known to the businesses and (few) lawyers who work in each specific sector. But
the existence of a wide range of CADR only becomes known to consumers generally and
then to lawyers and judges where the number of sectors covered has grown to a sufficient
number, and especially where the sectoral schemes are either similar in operation or are
linked together as part of a formal or informal general system. Clear examples of where
a national umbrella of CADR bodies has developed now exist in the Netherlands and the
Nordic States. In short, CADR exists in vertical structures in many Member States, and not
horizontal structures.
4
Special Eurobarometer No 342, Consumer empowerment, April 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
consumer_empowerment/docs/report_eurobarometer_342_en.pdf.

392 Findings
The split of disputes between courts and CADR systems, or any other pathways, clearly
differs from country to country. It also appears to be changing, towards CADR systems
and away from courts. Although there are currently strong attempts to introduce or re-
invigorate mediation and similar techniques into court procedures, notably as a result of
the EU Mediation Directive, such procedures remain to overcome the user-friendliness,
cost and duration barriers for small C2B claims. It is unclear whether the number of C2B
court claims has fallen in most states, but this has occurred in England and Wales (to 80,000
small claims in 2010). In contrast, numbers of CADR inquiries and claims have been rising
significantly in many states.
In some countries, one may suspect that CADR systems have not yet achieved sufficient
visibility, effectiveness or efficiency to attract the level of consumer disputes that exist.
But in some countries, the low number can more confidently be attributed to efficient
prevention (through advice) and weeding out (through in-company and sectoral mediation
arrangements).
The National Context of Cadr Schemes
It is important to understand the influence that national culture and the pre-existing
national architecture of the legal system (especially courts and regulatory bodies) have
had on the development of the different models of CADR in different countries. CADR
has so far been primarily a national phenomenon, not an international or EU one. The
impact of the EU on national CADR systems in the past decade has been very limited. The
various EU measures, notably the 1998 and 2001 Recommendations and the existence and
development of ECC-Net bodies, have so far not had significant impact on the architecture
of national CADR systems, nor on the operation of national CADR schemes.
Principal examples of the impact of national context are as follows. Firstly, efficient and low
cost courts in Germany were thought to provide effective dispute resolution for consumer
claims—as for many other types of claims—until relatively recently. Blankenburg found
some decades ago that CADR had flourished in the Netherlands, but not in neighbouring
Germany, because the German court system was less costly than the Dutch and lawyers
had kept a monopoly on legal advice in Germany, whereas insurance companies, trade
unions and many other civil society bodies were able to develop their own solutions to
legal problems in the Netherlands.5 German reliance on clear rights, and the importance
of everyone doing what they say they will do, also affects reliance on courts as the fora
to restore social equilibrium. The introduction of mediation as a dispute resolution tool
has only occurred in Germany in the late 2000s with implementation of the Mediation
Directive, and almost all of the extensive discussion about mediation there has been
about how mediation fits into the context of court proceedings. The spread of consumer
ombudsmen is clearly more recent and slower than in some other Member States, but it is
gathering momentum.
The Dutch consensual approach, and their unique system of agreeing terms and
conditions, produced the Geschillencommissie system. In large part, this ‘back end’ dispute
resolution system grew out of the more important ‘front end’ of the unique system that
emerged for regulation of business’ consumer trading activities. A key driver for this
5
See recently E Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands compared to Neighbouring Germany’,
in The American Journal of Comparative Law, (1998) vol 46, 1 at 26; see ch 4 above.

approach was the Dutch ‘polder’ model, whereby parties compromise their individual
objectives so as to create a way forward in which all parties get something, and the total
good created is beneficial for all: that approach is widely applied to many situations in the
Netherlands.
The Nordic States’ consensual approach to problems produced the court-like separate
arbitration boards. Similarly, Nordic states developed no fault injury compensation schemes
that fitted their national cultures of social solidarity.6 The dispute resolution Board approach
in Sweden has a single national level apex (the ARN), under which sectoral Boards, and in-
house schemes, are incentivised and can operate as a holistic system. The ARN provides
both a last-resort appeal-like function sitting above the other ADR systems, and also a long-
stop function that fills any gaps. In view of these features, it does not attract a particularly
high volume of cases, but it provides a ‘shadow of the law’ function within which cases may
be resolved ‘below’ ARN. Significantly, the ARN is funded by the state. Further, the ARN
functions in close contact with the regulatory authority, the Swedish Consumer Agency,
and with the ECC-SE office.
The Nordic States have also continued to innovate by enabling regulators with powers to
order restitution of compensation, as an adjunct to their traditional enforcement powers.7 This
restitution approach has proved to be extremely successful, since it provides an incentive for
traders to take the initiative in resolving all issues arising out of an infringement at the same
time. Collective solutions can therefore be negotiated that provide speedier compensation,
at lower transactional cost, than any court or ADR procedure. Sweden’s Group Proceedings
Act 2002 is an example of this procedure, and similar systems exist in Finland, Norway
and Denmark.8 The Danish model is interesting because only the Consumer Ombudsman
has a collective redress power that is opt-out (since an opt-out approach makes some sense
where the collective mechanism is intended to have a regulatory function) whereas all
private claimants operate on an opt-in model (which makes sense for individual private
claims). In Finland, the collective compensation mechanism is restricted to the Consumer
Ombudsman, and not available to private parties.9
The growth of médiateurs in France within institutions of the state and within companies
is consistent with the integrated institutional architecture of the French state and economic
structure.10 Equally, the development of private CADR schemes in the UK is part of national
emphasis on self-regulatory structures and pragmatism.
The perception of expensive courts and lawyers in some jurisdictions has clearly spurred
the development of lower cost alternative pathways for any and all types of disputes. Leading
examples are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, and perhaps the Nordic States.
In England and Wales, mediation grew for family cases, ombudsmen were increasingly used
for citizen-state disputes, and so on. CADR systems were attractive for C2B complaints.
6
J Dute, MG Faure and H Koziol (eds), No-Fault Compensation in the Health Care Sector (Vienna/New York:
Springer, 2004); C Hodges, ‘Nordic Compensation Schemes for Drug Injuries’ J Consumer Policy (2006) 29:143–
175.
7
K Viitanen, ‘Enforcement of Consumers’ Collective Interests by Regulatory Agencies in the Nordic Countries’
in W van Boom and M Loos, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law: Securing Compliance in Europe through
Private Group Action and Public Authority Intervention (Europa Law Publishing, 2007).
8
C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework for
Collective Redress in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008).
9
Class Actions Act 2006. See comments of the Consumer Ombudsman at www.kuluttajavirasto.fi.
10
For a stimulating comparative analysis of the architectures and cultures of law in Germany, France and the
United Kingdom, see H-W Micklitz, ‘Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law’, EUI Working Papers Law
2011/02, available at ssrn.com/abstract=1824225.

394 Findings
But a more important factor in the adoption of CADR in the UK, and in EU legislation,
was the introduction of modern regulatory systems on a sector-by-sector basis. Such systems
were designed to be overseen by public regulatory bodies, working with a dispute resolution
system as an integral component. In part, the CADR component was intended to have
a regulatory function, since it would be able to capture information about the behaviour
of the market and of individual traders. Another rationale was that the imposition of a
regulatory system and its higher standards of behaviour on traders would produce an
increased number of disputes. Higher costs would be imposed on traders by both the
increased regulatory requirements and by the need to respond to the complaints. Hence,
systems that could solve customer complaints speedily and at low cost would be welcome.
In that context, CADR systems offered a more attractive solution than courts.
In Central and Eastern European States such as Poland and Lithuania, the legacy of Soviet
times is that citizens tend to look to the state to provide structural solutions to problems,
so CADR systems have evolved that are housed within state regulatory authorities. Thus,
a central role in CADR is played by the Trade Inspection in Poland, and by the State
Consumer Rights Protection Authority in Lithuania.
The insight that ADR forms part of differing national architecture and differing
approaches is of fundamental importance when considering to what extent any form of
harmonization or cross-border coordination may be possible. It cannot be assumed that a
technique that has arisen in a particular context, because it fits that context, will be able to
operate in a different context. In short, it would be foolish to specify at this point in time that
a particular CADR model or technique should apply in every EU Member State for every
type of dispute. Not enough is yet known about the extent to which national or sectoral
contexts differ, and hence what might be the parameters and preconditions for particular
ADR techniques, and whether they would work if transplanted to different systems.
It follows that three political decisions are appropriate at the current time. Firstly,
decisions on dispute resolution at national level should seek to examine best practice from
other jurisdictions, and see to what extent national systems could be amended so as to
incorporate new or innovative techniques. Such an approach would provide benchmarking
of best practice, removing obsolete techniques and adopting better ones, and may provide a
measure of alignment between national systems. The European Commission could facilitate
that process by encouraging and specifying best practice. Secondly, cross-border disputes,
especially those in new sectors such as internet trading, could adopt new dispute resolution
systems based on best practice. Thirdly, it is possible to define common criteria for CADR
systems—or any dispute resolution system. Hence, effort should be put into agreeing such
criteria, considering how they relate to standards of best practice and to the current status
of CADR systems, and making any appropriate reforms in existing schemes. These issues
are examined further below.
The Historical Development of Cadr Models and Techniques
The national consumer CADR systems can be viewed in a historical context as representing
evolving ideas of what extra-court ADR should be. The procedures that are applied in
national CADR systems have clearly been influenced by different ideas depending on when
the national CADR model was created.

Courts were, and remain, the paradigm context within which justice is sought and
dispensed within civil societies. Court procedures are subject to well-established norms of
due process, such as no-one being a judge in their own cause, full opportunity for parties to
be heard.11 The precedent of courts influenced the procedures adopted in the major private
sector break-away from state structures when arbitration systems were introduced. The
major change in moving courts to arbitration was in the number of decision-makers: what
was usually (but not always) a single state judge was typically replaced in arbitration by a
panel of three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and one neutral chair.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that CADR models that were created around the 1970s were
heavily influenced by the architecture, culture and procedure of state courts. The Boards in
Nordic States and the Netherlands all have operational structures and procedures that look like
courts or arbitration tribunals—as, by definition, does the Spanish arbitration system. Panels of
three decision-makers always have the function of representing consumers and business ‘sides’.
Thus, in the Netherlands, which established their sectoral boards from the 1970s onwards,
decisions are made by a panel of three ‘arbitrators’ of whom, based on standard arbitration
practice, one comes from a consumer list, a second from a business list, and the third, the chair,
from a neutral list of lawyers. Procedures involve a stage of submission of written complaints
and evidence, followed by gathering of any expertise, and then a decision stage.
In CEE States, where state authority can be exercised by officials within state regulatory
authorities as much as by state officials in courts, it is not surprising to see the former
making decisions on disputes, perhaps with less ‘due process’ requirements than would
typically operate in Western European States.
CADR systems that have been established more recently, especially in the United Kingdom
and in cross-border systems during the 2000s, the procedure is far more streamlined, and
might even dispense with a number of steps that are regarded as essential in courts if ‘due
process’ requirements are to be complied with. Thus there might be no ‘hearings’ at which
both parties present their cases, hear the opponents’ case, and have an opportunity to respond.
In recent systems, both parties might simply present their case and evidence in simple format,
often online, to a single neutral person, perhaps collated by a case handler. Such a system
assumes, firstly, that the parties have already exchanged the relevant evidence in the initial
required stage of direct contact between them, and have debated the arguments, and secondly,
that the facts are usually sufficiently straightforward for there to be no need for any further
evidence or elaboration by the parties. The neutral party will simply be in a position to take a
clear view of the merits of the dispute by considering the evidence presented.
Three issues therefore arise for consideration below: to what extent should due process
requirements apply to CADR systems, should certain models of CADR be considered to be
best contemporary practice, and should some models be streamlined further?
Market Regulation, Reducing Cost and Maintaining Business Reputation as

Drivers of Cadr
It has been identified above that CADR systems have either been imposed by law on traders,
or they have established them voluntarily. Why have these events occurred? Three broad
11
DJ Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996); European Convention on Human Rights, Art 6; Procedural Fairness: Transparency Issues in Civil and
Administrative Enforcement Proceedings (Paris: OECD, 2010).

396 Findings
drivers are examined here, which arise from the evidence of this study. Firstly, there is a
clear link between the creation of CADR systems as part of the regulatory landscape, to
control commercial behaviour in regulated markets. Secondly, businesses and governments
increasingly see cost saving advantages in CADR systems when compared with courts.
Thirdly, some businesses perceive that CADR systems will assist in maximising commercial
advantages, retaining customer loyalty and maintaining brand reputation. These three
factors are sometimes inter-linked, and their cumulative effect can be strong.
CADR occurred in some sectors as part of the imposition by the authorities of new
regulatory systems. Some governments privatised major service sectors, and this was
also frequently interlinked with simultaneous moves to create the EU internal market.
These objectives led to statutory imposition of requirements for CADR as part of market
regulation, transparency and competition. Legislation frequently either created a sectoral
ombudsman, whose decisions are binding on all traders in the sector, or required all traders
to have an ADR system, leaving the choice of system to the traders or the sector. The latter
approach left the choice of architecture of ADR to the market and, as noted above, has led
to some diversity of models.
Otherwise, where CADR has not been imposed by law, the origination and growth of ADR
almost always occurred because traders wished to provide cheaper and quicker solutions,
in order to support the commercial reputation of sectors. In some instances, CADR was
imposed by law, especially in sectors such as energy and telecoms where governments
privatised markets and/or were concerned at an absence of full competition in a sector.
CADR systems never originated because consumers wanted quicker and cheaper disputes
resolution system to the courts, even though the benefits to consumers would have been,
and are, considerable. To this extent, business support for CADR is crucial: systems are not
established, or paid for, or not marketed, or decisions observed, in this voluntary system,
without active business support. Further, where CADR schemes are financed by businesses,
usually on a sectoral basis, rather than by public funds, the commercial scrutiny provides
pressure both for efficiency and for innovation, to keep costs low.
In competitive markets, many sectors have radically changed their attitude to CADR
systems. Although this view is far from universal, there is strong evidence that long-
standing opposition to responding constructively to consumer complaints has given way to
enthusiastic support for a responsive approach, and for a CADR system, in order to achieve
the advantages of maintaining market reputation and hence market share and commercial
success. This change can even be called a ‘flip effect’. The realisation is that CADR systems
can defuse consumer problems, at lower cost and more cheaply than courts, thereby saving
money. They also identify market trends.
A principal benefit of CADR for both businesses and consumers is in overcoming the
problem that the courts in many States have been too expensive (and hence delivered a
service that was disproportionate in value, especially in terms of cost) and too slow, and
so little used by consumers. The 2009 Oxford study on litigation costs and funding in 36
jurisdictions found that high litigation costs and difficulties over obtaining funding for
bringing claims through the court system had led to the growth of pathways for resolving
disputes outside courts.12 Users want dispute resolution systems that are accessible, cheap,
swift, responsive, and easy to use. Courts often do not satisfy these consumer requirements.
12
C Hodges, S Vogenauer & M Tulibacka, The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Approach
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).

This situation has come about as a result of both over-pricing by lawyers, and a failure of
courts. Lawyers do not earn money by referring consumers to CADR systems, but many
lawyers may not be aware that CADR pathways exist. Even the Small Claims systems are not
that user-friendly. As the data in this study shows, the cost of using Small Claims systems
is often low but there is sometimes a loser pays risk. CADR systems, in contrast, have been
designed to be no more expensive than courts—and often lower cost or no cost. Small
Claims procedures have been designed to reduce procedural complexity and to use effective
and cheap techniques such as mediation. But above all they remain not user-friendly.
It might be expected that since many legislators have referred so often to gaps in access
to justice, which they wish to fill, they would have pursued CADR as a means of filling a
gap in bringing small C2B claims. However, it is clear that CADR has not been pursued for
that reason. One reason for this is that CADR comes under the governmental responsibility
of ministries of business, rather than ministries of justice. CADR systems are not only
not administered by the latter, they may even be largely invisible to them. Although an
empirical evaluation of the EU Small Claims Procedure is premature,13 small claims systems
nationally generally represent a failure of planning by those ministries of justice that did not
provide a proper service or alternative to the courts for C2B disputes. The CADR alternative
has largely been business-driven and driven by business and finance ministries that have
imposed ombudsmen under regulatory systems, such as for telecoms, banks and other
sectors, or have encouraged innovation by business sectors in adopting voluntary CADR
systems. Within long-standing political and academic debates over failures in access to
justice, consumer redress has been an area in which a major solution has arisen Cinderella-
like from an unexpected quarter, driven by regulation and by business, not by the justice
system or civil procedure.
In short, effective ADR systems have clearly provided major new avenues of access to
justice for consumer-to-business disputes. Such avenues have often provided pathways to
justice that were in practice not available through courts, for reasons of cost and complexity.
Why has CADR become topical in the political arena in the early 2010s? Three major
reasons are suggested. Firstly, the development of regulation of markets and of consumer
protection legislation has matured to a stage when dispute resolution and behaviour control
are the next issues on the agenda. Secondly, the European Commission has given strong
impetus to CADR as an alternative to adopting court-based class actions in an ongoing
debate over the best responses are to issues of collective redress.14 Thirdly, in seeking an
appropriate pathway for resolution of C2B disputes, the need by governments to cut public
expenditure programmes as a result of the current financial crisis has forced cuts on court
and judicial budgets, thereby raising the issue of whether other, and privately funded,
means of dispute resolution might be available and could be encouraged and expanded. The
Council of Europe’s Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ), established in 2002,
demonstrates the level of shared concern about the need to reduce the cost of accessing
justice in national systems.15
13
XE Kramer, ‘Small Claim, Simple Recovery? The European Small Claims Procedure and Its Implementation
in the Member States’ ERA Forum: Journal of European Law, vol 1, (2011) 119–134.
14
See CJS Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework
for Collective Redress in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008); CJS Hodges ‘Collective Redress in Europe: The
New Model’ (2010) Civil Justice Quarterly 370.
15
See European judicial systems – Edition 2010 (data 2008) Efficiency and quality of justice (Council of Europe,
2010), at http://book.coe.int/EN/ficheouvrage.php?PAGEID=36&lang=EN&produit_aliasid=2341.

398 Findings
Indeed, introducing a compulsory stage of mediation into an efficient civil procedure

system may positively add to costs and duration of cases with not particular advantage for
the parties. If a cheap ‘mediation’ option is too cheap, some providers may prefer to delay
addressing complaints and direct them towards mediation, since this would reduce the size
of their internal Complaints Handling resources. Adjudication requires consumers to be
more articulate in putting their case. There is clearly a trend towards making it compulsory
for traders to refer customer disputes to CADR systems and to abide by outcomes, whether
compulsorily or mandatorily.
Italian law made pre-trial mediation mandatory in telecoms disputes involving the
universal service obligations16 (USOs) established in EU law.17 The Alassini18 case serves as
an example of the need to re-examine the EU principles of effective judicial protection and
national procedural autonomy.
Cadr in the Context of Dr
It is important to see CADR within the context of all forms of DR (dispute resolution). The
main dispute resolution models can be characterised in a number of ways, one of which is:19
1. Direct negotiation between complainant and respondent.
2. Involvement of independent assistance, whether by mediation, arbitration or
adjudication services.
3. Restitution or compensation brought about by public regulatory authorities, as part of
their enforcement functions. An authority might have express powers to seek a court
order for payment of compensation (or itself order compensation), or compensation
might be paid by a trader voluntarily (in the shadow of an enforcement threat) or as
part of a plea-bargain as a result of a negotiation with the authorities. This interesting
and developing area is beyond the scope of this book.20
4. Civil litigation in the state courts.
In relation to category 2 above, the ADR category, this research has demonstrated that
ADR can take place within one of a number of different structures. As identified above,
the most familiar structure is that of the courts. Mediation as a process or technique can
be required or encouraged for claims that are proceeding within the court procedure, or
before they start it.21 A second possible ‘structure’ for ADR is ephemeral, since there is no
reason why any dispute cannot be discussed by the parties merely with the assistance of
any third party, such as a mediator. Nevertheless, such dispute resolution attempts do not
16
Review of the universal service obligation, available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
consultations/uso/statement/statement.pdf (accessed 21 December 2010).
17
J Davis and E Szyszczak, ‘ADR: Effective Protection of Consumer Rights?’ 35 EL Rev October 2010, available
at: www.littletonchambers.com/articles-downloads/adr-effective-protection-of-consumer-rights.pdf.
18
Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA, Filomena Californio v Wind SpA, Lucia Giorgia Iacono v Telecom Italia
SpA and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA, (C-317/8, C-318/08, C-319/08, C-320/08) March 18, 2010. See ch
1 above.
19
See C Hodges, ‘The European Approach to Justice and Redress’ (2011) 53 Canadian Supreme Court Law
Review (2n edn), 301.
20
See C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework
for Collective Redress in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008).
21
Such mediation can be encouraged (eg by court costs rules, as in England & Wales) or a formal part of the
litigation procedure.

take place entirely in a vacuum, since it is well recognised that they take place within the
‘shadow of the law’,22 in that the state courts are always present in the background and can
be fallen back on if necessary.
A third possible dispute resolution structure has its own distinct architecture—that of
CADR. In simple terms, it might be described as ‘ombudsmen’, but that is misleading since
some leading examples do not involve ombudsmen and instead might be summarised as
‘code-based dispute resolution systems’. In any event, the architecture is not that of courts,
but is quite separate from courts and distinct from that of courts. It is a separate universe.
As this book has identified, it is this separate architecture that now exists for C2B claims.
Undoubtedly, however, the ombudsmen model that operates in CADR was copied from
the pre-existing separate world of public sector ombudsmen. Public sector ombudsmen
are traceable to Sweden in the 18th century.23 The function of public sector ombudsmen
is usually wider than providing a dispute resolution option, and typically provides a
mechanism of scrutiny and control over public services and authorities. Structurally, an
ombudsman would typically be considered to be appointed by Parliament, and therefore
ultimately represent citizens in scrutinising the state, even though the office might at first
sight to be located more in the public sector than anywhere else. For the citizen wishing to
challenge decisions by the state, the ombudsman would offer an alternative to judicial review
of administrative action in the courts. Such an alternative has generally become increasingly
attractive, partly because of the costs of the litigation route, whereas ombudsmen are free
to citizens, and partly because the investigatory power of ombudsmen and their ability to
effect systemic change is wider than judicial review. Various parallels can, therefore, be
seen between public ombudsmen and CADR ombudsmen—and other CADR systems—in
terms of independence from the body being investigated, cost advantages, investigatory
power, and ability to affect generic change in the behaviour of the respondent.
Ombudsmen have also mushroomed in the United States since the 1960s inside public
agencies, universities,24 and corporations,25 spurred initially by a small number of academic
enthusiasts.26 Some landmarks were Resolutions of the American Bar Association in 1969,
1971, 2001 and 2004, the formation of the Corporate Ombudsman Association in 1985
(which changed its name to The Ombudsman Association in 1992) and its adoption of
a Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, the 1986 Defence Industry Initiative on
Business Ethics and Conduct, re-enactment of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
in 1996,27 Howard notes the wide range of activities of different ombudsmen in America,
and categorises their work into three broad areas: communications and outreach; issue
resolution; and identification of areas for systemic change and issue prevention.28
22
RM Mnookin and L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 88 Yale
Law Journal 950.
23
SD Anderman, ‘The Swedish Justitieombudsman’ (1962) 11:2 American Journal of Comparative Law 225–38;
T Buck, R Kirkham and B Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2010).
24
See CL Howard, The Organizational Ombudsman. Origins, Roles , and Operations. A Legal Guide (ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution, 2010).
25
An early article was I Silver, ‘The Corporate Ombudsman’, Harv Bus Rev May-June 1968, 77.
26
K Culp Davis, ‘Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action’ (1961) 109 Penn L Rev
1057; W Gelhorn, When Americans Complain: Governmental Grievance Procedures (1966); RV Peel, ‘Preface’ to
Symposium, ‘The Ombudsman or Citizen’s Defender: A Modern Institution’ 377 (1968) Annals Am Pol & Soc Sci,
ix; SV Anderson, Ombudsman Papers: American Experience and Proposals (1969).
27
See 5 U.S.C. § 571(3) (2007).
28
Howard, above, p 75.

400 Findings
Models of CADR
A wide variation in CADR models exists in EU Member States, across different sectors and
countries. In some Member States there is almost no organised CADR, whereas it has developed
significantly in other States, stretching back sometimes 40 years. Further, the national CADR
systems are frequently dynamic and still developing. Developments are occurring in terms of
structures, techniques, operational aspects, and a widening of sectoral coverage.
Broadly, three types of host structures can be identified for CADR systems:
a. CADR arrangements within public regulatory bodies. Examples are those within
the German Bundesbank and Bundesnetzagentur; in Lithuania, the State Consumer
Rights Protection Authority and various sectoral agencies; in France the Médiateur
of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers; in UK, the Financial Ombudsman Service is
not within the Financial Services Agency but a subsidiary of it; and in Poland the
Trade Inspection and other bodies. In addition, public regulatory or enforcement
bodies might not offer a dispute resolution facility, but they may nevertheless receive a
substantial number of complaints about traders, such as the UK’s OFCOM.
b. Independent decision-making bodies, which operate across an individual sector,
and might be called Boards (Nordics and the Netherlands), Tribunals (Slovenia) or
Ombudsmen (Nordics, UK, Germany). There is a range of models and arrangements.
There maybe a supervisory body, which might be private or statutory. Examples
of statutory ombudsmen are the UK Financial Ombudsman Service, Pensions
Ombudsdman and Legal Ombudsman, and the French Energy Médiateur. Examples of
private sector CADR providers are the German Insurance and Transport Ombudsmen,
the French communications Médiateur and his support body AMCE, and the UK
bodies Ombudsman Services and the CEDR Disputes Group.
c. Dispute resolution arrangements sponsored by a trade association in order to
resolve disputes arising under a code of business practice. These structures usually
combine stages of initial administration of complaint handling together with informal
conciliation between consumer and trader (such as the UK FLA scheme, the UK
CCAS schemes, like Motor Codes or the ABTA scheme), and then ultimately an
arbitration stage that would be outsourced to an independent body for a decision (in
effect to a private sector CADR provider of type b above). The outsourcing function
is designed to satisfy the requirement of independence. The first stage might or might
not be carried out by a body that is technically independent of the trade association
(the Motor Codes structure is independent of SMMT, whereas ABTA does not have an
independent body).
Various points can be made about the above arrangements. Firstly, the primary distinction
between the above three categories of host bodies turns on whether the host is a public or
private entity. An issue arises of the extent to which any of these three structures satisfies the
requirement that the CADR provider be independent of the parties: this is discussed below.
Secondly, the above three models can overlap or be combined together in some
circumstances, so the above categorisation should not be regarded as exclusive or final.
Companies or consumers might have the ability to access two or more different CADR
systems for the same complaint, and those systems might be examples of any of the above
three models. The models can also involve some intermingling: model c can involve an aspect
of model b.

Thirdly, some diversity exists, and hence there is opportunity for confusion, particularly
in the minds of consumers. Confusion or experience of poor quality CADR might lead to a
lack of trust in the system as a whole, as well as in individual CADR systems or providers.
Fourthly, it is obvious that no single model exists for CADR architectures across Europe.
Further, it is difficult to see how the existing models could be rationalised into a single
model. That realisation underpins the European Commission’s approach to CADR. The
Commission cannot insist on or propose a single model. The national models are the
structures that must continue and be built on, even if some structures are reformed.
Accordingly, the way in which the Commission proceeds to construct a structure for CADR
that can operate across borders within the single market has to be by way of requiring that
any individual CADR system that might exist has to conform to essential requirements that
are sufficiently generalised that they can encompass the majority of existing models, rather
than to a specific individual model.
Ombudsmen
There are at least two different types of ombudsmen:29

– public sector ombudsmen, who consider complaints about local councils, government
departments or other public bodies, and
– private sector ombudsmen, who consider complaints about a range of businesses such
as banks, insurers, telecommunication providers and estate agents.
In the dispute resolution context, the primary function of an ombudsman is to issue an
independent authoritative decision on the legal merits of a case, even though in many CADR
examples the decision might not be legally binding on one or both parties. As a preliminary
stage, the ombudsman or a member of his staff might attempt to reach agreement by
mediation. The investigative procedure is traditionally an inquisitorial mode of operation,
but CADR examples now increasingly involve merely considering the evidence put before
the ombudsman by the two parties. The process usually involves considering documentary
evidence only, rather than interviewing witnesses or holding hearings. That approach
contrasts with dispute resolution techniques that apply under codes (see below), where each
side asserts its case. A document-based approach brings the advantages of speed and low
cost. The ombudsman will usually have expertise in the relevant area of the dispute.
Ombudsmen who operate in CADR must be distinguished from other types of
ombudsmen. The most familiar ombudsmen are probably those who are appointed by
Parliament to resolve disputes between citizens and state entities. These exist in almost all
European states and, as noted above, their existence has influenced the development of
private ombudsmen. They usually have wide ranging investigative powers. Other types of
ombudsmen are not primarily involved in dispute resolution at all, but are public enforcement
officials. Such officials exist in all Nordic states, such as the Danish Consumer Ombudsman,
who is the principal national enforcement authority for consumer and competition law.
Thus, there are differences in the powers that different enforcers and ombudsmen have. A
contrasting example is the Danish (Parliamentary) Ombudsman, who holds investigative
29
See Mapping UK consumer redress. A summary guide to dispute resolution systems (Office of Fair Trading, May
2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/general_policy/OFT1267.pdf.

402 Findings
powers in relation to ‘decisions, acts or omissions’ of all Danish public authorities but no
enforcement power. His determinations are recommendations and not directly enforceable,
but in practice his standing and social authority (he reports directly to Parliament) are such
that the recommendations are almost always voluntarily complied with.
The adoption of the name ‘ombudsman’ or ‘médiateur’ for decision-makers who operate
in the CADR context has brought with it an aura of independence and hence authority in
relation to their office and recommendations or decisions. There is, however, a risk that
unless such individuals and organisations are in fact adequately independent or impartial,
consumer confidence in them and in CADR in general will suffer. The point is relevant also
for in-house médiateurs, as discussed below.
CADR With Business Codes of Practice
Although independent dispute resolution may be carried out by a body called an ombudsman
or some other name, or under another procedure such as referral to independent arbitration,
the context in which many sectoral CADR schemes operate is as the ‘back end’ of resolving
consumer disputes under a sectoral code of business practice. The norms that are being
applied are, therefore, those set out in the code, rather than under the law. This model exists
widely across European states, notable examples being the Netherlands and UK.
In the Netherlands, the two independent bodies operate to a model (that is slightly
different between them) under contract with sectoral trade associations with a single
national template, and thereby designed to provide a structure and mode of operation that
is transparent, consistent, and satisfies acceptable criteria.
The British model (where it does not involve statutory ombudsmen) typically involves
private sector CADR bodies providing contracted dispute resolution services to trade
associations where the CADR bodies are either approved by a regulatory body (eg OFCOM
and OFGEM for communications and energy respectively) or may operate to an officially
approved scheme (hitherto the OFT’s CCAS, but possibly moving to approval by a Trading
Standards body). The British model also relies on transparency of structures and operations
(information on complaints, naming respondents, identifying outcomes, identifying
problems, and responses, and on outcomes, duration and cost of the dispute resolution
processes), and on governance models in which the committees that oversee codes, dispute
resolution functions and sanctioning of members are not composed solely of traders but
involve independent personnel and stakeholders.
The objective behind these two national models is to ensure that the schemes satisfy
acceptable criteria, notably independence and impartiality in decision-making, and can be
trusted by the public. In contrast, equivalent private schemes in France and Germany are
not subject to official approval mechanisms, and tend to stress the personal integrity of the
chief ombudsman. One measure of the level of public trust in any private system will be the
incidence of use by the public. In this respect, it is interesting to note the differing levels of
usage of schemes from the data recorded in chapter 14 above.
Are there significant differences between ‘ombudsmen’ and ‘code’ dispute resolution
models? They seem to be roughly equivalent, in that both can operate well, and are
sometimes found alongside each other (the UK communications providers). It is only
necessary to have one or the other, but not both. However, one or the other might be more
appropriate in particular circumstances. The main difference is that an ombudsman is

usually more independent of the trade sector, especially if the provider works across several
different sectors. But other private CADR bodies also work across sectors and are regarded
as satisfactory. Any difference between the two approaches in this respect may lie more in
perception and public confidence than in the reality of independence.
Modes and Techniques of Dispute Resolution in Cadr Systems
CADR systems employ one or both of two techniques that are wholly familiar from courts
and other dispute resolution systems: mediation (or conciliation, and for present purposes
these two words are treated as meaning the same)30 and adjudication. The outcome of the
adjudication stage might be binding on the respondent company or it might not. If not
binding, it would simply be a recommendation.
Negotiation leads to an agreement between the parties themselves, whether the
negotiating process occurs direct between the parties or is facilitated by a third party, such
as a mediator or trade association. Adjudication occurs where an independent party such
as an arbitrator, panel or court, makes a determination on the merits of the dispute by
applying external criteria such as rules of law to the facts as they appear to the decision-
maker. Such techniques can be found in any CADR model and individual techniques, or
combinations of techniques, are not specific to particular CADR types.
Thus, on this analysis, there are only two distinctions between approaches in dispute
resolution, namely between resolutions that are agreed by the parties themselves and those
that are imposed by determination by a third party. Thus, these two paradigms of approaches
to dispute resolution represent opposed modes, which give rise to fundamentally different
considerations of individual and constitutional determinacy. The negotiation paradigm
involves self-determination, based on respect for an individual’s personal integrity, and his
or her freedom to enter into a contract or not. But, in such a situation, society may raise
concerns about an imbalance of negotiating power between the parties, for example through
one party’s inability to bargain fairly or effectively for various reasons, such as informational
asymmetry or some form of disability or dominance. At the other extreme a dispute is
determined by a third party, either as a result of acceptance by both parties of such a mode of
resolution (eg through agreement to mediation or arbitration) or as a result of the imposition
of such a mode by society through the power of the state (ie through the rule that the court
process and decision is binding on everyone if it is invoked by any claimant).
However, the distinction between these modes of resolution does not necessarily
infer that the two modes can never be combined. For example, a court or an arbitrator,
who possesses power to impose a determination, may still possess power, or de facto
discretionary freedom, to suggest solutions or behave more like a mediator in pointing
out views on the evidence or merits of a case, before imposing his or her independent
judgment on the parties. By contrast, a mediator is essentially an independent channel
of communication between the parties and does not possess power formally to impose
a solution. However, in practice some mediators can, through their behaviour or force of
personality, significantly influence the views of one or both parties by suggesting views on
the merits and likely outcome of how an independent adjudication would turn out, which
30
Some definitions state that a mediator is essentially a passive go-between, whereas a conciliator is more active
in proposing solutions: see Mapping UK consumer redress. A summary guide to dispute resolution systems (Office of
Fair Trading, May 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/general_policy/OFT1267.pdf.

404 Findings
will guide the parties towards agreement. Both third party adjudicators and mediators
are intended to be strictly independent and disinterestedly neutral between the parties.
Whilst any bias in an independent adjudicator (judge or arbitrator) will be condemned,
the activities of mediators have divided opinions on whether their function is validly to
influence parties based on their experience and independent assessment, or whether such
influence may overstep the bounds of acceptability.
Arbitration is sometimes referred to in CADR schemes, but the word is often misleading.
It is a form of adjudication, where the decision-maker is a private person or panel, rather
than a state official (judge). In its classic meaning, arbitration occurs where all parties
consent that their dispute will be heard before a third party arbitrator (rather than a court)
whose decision will be accepted by them all as binding (save in limited circumstances).
Arbitration has long been used in B2B contracts and practice as the preferred form of
dispute resolution, in preference to the courts. The reasons are usually avoiding media
interest in disputes, expertise and some flexibility in the procedure, and sometimes cost and
speed. However, a consumer contract that includes a term that any dispute will be referred
to arbitration would be an unfair term and so illegal: the consumer cannot be bound in
advance to an arbitration procedure at the time of purchase. Some CADR systems are based
on arbitration models (Spain, the Netherlands) or involve a final, optional, stage in which
the consumer may agree that the dispute will be referred to a binding arbitration procedure
but that situation appears to be rare and disappearing.
Since the 1980s, there has been a firm downward trend in the number of disputes that
UK-based CADR providers handle through arbitration. The rise in the popularity of other
dispute resolution mechanisms such as adjudication and conciliation, which provide
feedback on issues, is perceived by them to have had a demonstrably beneficial effect in
reducing the incidence of consumer detriment across a range of sectors.
Mediation and conciliation are the primary techniques used in many CADR systems. The
techniques of mediation and arbitration produce different results over whether the solutions
are binding or non-binding (see below). Decisions by a court do, of course, have the force
of law, and so are binding on the parties. Similarly, where the parties have contractually
agreed in advance that a dispute will be referred to arbitration, decisions by the properly
constituted arbitrator are, under both contract law and the substantive law of all advanced
jurisdictions, binding on both parties, and can be enforced through subsequent court
proceedings, without the need for a complete re-hearing of the underlying dispute by the
court, often through abbreviated procedures.
In the classic mediation situation, the principle has been that the process is voluntary
for both sides, and the purpose of the mediator is to assist communication between the
parties, so that they may reach their own agreement, if they wish. One or both may not
wish to reach agreement. The mediator is not empowered to impose any solution that could
be binding on the parties. If they reach any agreement, it will have the force of a private
contract between them, and be enforceable as such. ADR schemes vary over whether the
neutral party can suggest a solution.
However, the technique of conciliation/mediation can be used in some ADR systems
where the neutral party ultimately has the power to impose a binding solution, whether this
power is imposed by statute or by prior agreement of the disputing parties. In this respect,
the classic non-binding mediation situation is irrelevant, since the context is one in which
a binding solution may be imposed, but the neutral party chooses to adopt a mediation
technique as a preliminary to using the power to impose a solution.

Unless the CADR scheme ends in an arbitration stage, where the consumer has to agree
in advance to be bound by the outcome, no decision by a neutral ADR provider is binding
under any scheme on a consumer. The concerns here partly arise from issues of asymmetrical
power between trader and consumer, and partly under protecting the human rights of the
consumer under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which
guarantees maintenance of the consumer’s right to determination of her rights through a
judicial process.31
In some systems the consumer is required to agree at the time of pursuing the dispute
that the outcome under an arbitration system will be binding. This occurs in the Dutch,
Spanish, and some UK systems (such as ABTA). It does not technically offend Article 6
ECHR. However, it is less attractive than many other non-binding schemes.
The Sequencing of Dispute Resolution Pathways
Many CADR models involve a sequencing or escalation of techniques, starting with direct ne-
gotiation, then providing mediation, before ending with arbitration. Such sequencing there-
fore proceeds from negotiation to adjudication modes.32 The objective is to achieve efficient
outcomes through escalation of formality. The stages, which are illustrated in Table 1, are:
1. Direct negotiation between consumer and trader always comes first, and is a pre-
condition of access to almost every ADR scheme.
2. The ADR scheme frequently first employs a mediation/conciliation technique: it
suggests to either the consumer or the trader that their position in the case has no
merit, and thus the consumer need not pursue the issue further or the trader should
immediately make a voluntary satisfactory settlement offer. Several ombudsmen
comment that many of the cases they handle involve misunderstandings between
customers and traders, rather than breaches of rules.33
3. ADR schemes then differ on the nature of the next stage depending on whether they
have the right to make binding or non-binding solutions.
i. If they can only offer non-binding solutions, they make a recommendation: this
tends to occur in ADR systems that are relatively new, such as in Germany, and
almost all in France. The alternative open to the consumer in Germany would be
to enter a binding process, such as to make a court claim: only rarely is binding
arbitration an option.
ii. In contrast, countries that have longer ADR histories and experience, such as the
UK and the Netherlands, have progressed beyond having ADR bodies that can
make non-binding recommendations to allowing them to make decisions that are
binding on the business (whether through trade association membership, under
sectoral legislation, or voluntarily) but not on the consumer. In effect, this situation
is quasi-one-way arbitration.
31
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’
32
This was first described by I Ramsay, ‘Small Claims Courts in Canada: A Socio-Legal Appraisal’ in CJ Whelan,
Small Claims Courts. A Comparative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 38. The Leuven study suggested a
generalised theoretical model that matched amounts in dispute to different types of pathway: theoretically simple
as such an approach might be, it is arbitrary, and our findings do not support any such behaviour on the ground
based on any monetary categorisations: Stuyck et al, above n 7, p 42.
33
The French telecoms médiateur is one who holds this view.

406 Findings
Figure 15.1: Integrated use of techniques by CADR provider
Decision or
Recommendation
Conciliation
Complaint to ADR 3P
Direct complaint
Some schemes employ a more sophisticated series of steps than that shown in Figure 15.1,
so as to provide more stages for parties to consider their positions, and hence agree solutions
without the matter being referred by a case officer to the Ombudsman for formal decisions.
An example, based on the British Pensions Ombudsman’s procedures, is shown in Figure
15.2. Complaint systems in some French in-company médiateurs require complainants to
pass through a sequence of stages within the company’s complaint handling process, such
as local, regional then national level, before reaching the médiateur. The difference between
these two approaches is that in the former model the consumer is in touch with the neutral
party throughout the process, whereas in the latter model he/she is only in touch with the
médiateur at the end of the process. Company médiateurs argue that their model imposes
downward pressure on the company to agree solutions. Conversely, consumer associations
argue that the latter model imposes a succession of barriers for the consumer in obtaining
satisfaction, and many just give up. Certainly, the statistics of in-company médiateurs reveal
very low numbers of cases handled.
Figure 15.2: More sophisticated model for escalated use of techniques
Decision
Provisional Decision
by Ombudsman
Referral from manager to Ombudsman
Indication of Draft Decision by Manager
Conciliation
Complaint

Figure 15.3: Escalation model with an outsourced function of binding decision-making.
Decision or
Recommendation
Conciliation
Complaint to ADR 3P
Direct complaint
The First Stage: Direct Contact with Traders
Almost every CADR system not only encourages direct contact as a first stage, and many
CADR rules require that before they have jurisdiction to consider a complaint. This finding
was also made by the Leuven Study, which concluded that direct negotiations between
customers and businesses are by far the most popular form in which consumer complaints
are made.34
As the case studies in Chapter 12 demonstrate, in competitive markets, the best
companies now view complaints and complaint handling as integral parts of their goal of
improving their products and services, and are part of its quality system. An integrated
complaints handling system should make the consumer feel trust in the company. Each
sector develops its own culture, and there are some differences in complaints and dispute
handling between sectors. The retail sector trades on its attractiveness to customers, and has
no great reputational issue as a whole; its brands are respected and it wants to solve disputes.
Direct contact between complainant and respondent has several advantages. First, it
can maintain or rebuild the relationship between them. Splitting parents may benefit from
maintaining a communicative, as opposed to adversarial, relationship, especially where
children are involved. Companies that trade on high reputations may seek opportunities to
gain customer feedback for quality improvement reasons as well as pleasing customers, as
illustrated by the Customer Care approach at the companies noted in Chapter 12.
Secondly, as with all triage techniques, it manifests an application of the principle of
proportionality. An important goal is to provide a pathway that has proportionate cost
and time. If the consumer can provide evidence of a valid complaint, and/or the trader
is prepared to settle, resolution of the issue without undue delay, transactional cost or
formality delivers proportionality.
Thirdly, direct contact may result in communication that either weeds out some claims or
enables the respondent to respond in a flexible manner. A consistent message from CADR
providers, demonstrated by the statistics in Chapter 14, is that CADR schemes receive
many contacts that do not turn into claims (800,000 contacts to the FOS did not proceed in
2010). The evidence from the ABTA scheme is that making consumers focus on the matters
34
J Stuyck, above n 7, p 9.

408 Findings
that are required to complete the claim form makes them focus on what the dispute is really
about, what they want, and a sense of proportionality over what the value really is.
The main disadvantage of requiring direct contact is that it constitutes a barrier to
further forms of dispute resolution. Thus, if a dispute is not resolved at the initial stage of
direct negotiation, the complainant will have suffered delay and possibly extra cost. The
same argument was raised when mediation was introduced as a first step into English civil
procedure in 1999.35
Evaluation of whether there is force in this ‘barrier to justice’ argument depends on a
number of factors. How much delay and extra cost do claimants generally suffer as a result
of the existence of this barrier, as against the percentage of claims that are resolved (filtered
out) as a result of it being in place? Note that time limits can be placed on the initial direct
contact stage, which forces both parties, especially respondents, to respond quickly, and
limits the possible disadvantage of claimants.
It should be remembered that many court processes also include barriers to accessing
that dispute resolution pathway, such as fees to be paid to the court, forms to be filled in,
lawyers to be found, instructed and paid. These features can involve far greater cost and
delay than some ADR techniques, although a Small Claims track usually offers reduced
barriers.
Advice, Information and Dispute Resolution
There is a clear finding that many customer contacts to both traders (see chapter 12) and
CADR providers (chapter 14)36 are inquiries for information and not—at that stage at
least—complaints or disputes.37 Initial contacts may turn into disputes if they are badly
handled. A number of important consequences flow from this observation.
A national policy of ensuring that consumers and traders have access to accurate
information both before and after transactions does seem to reduce the incidence of
problems that arise after purchase. This is strongly indicated by the Nordic experience
and architecture (see the chapter on Sweden), but similar approaches can be seen in many
states (such as the UK’s planned reorganisation of a maze of consumer advice bodies into a
simpler structure focused on a network of Citizens Advice bureaux).
The ability for consumers to request information and on products and services is
clearly beneficial, and should be encouraged. Use of products and services should be safe,
appropriate, and effective. Happy customers are good for business. Contact points between
consumers and traders can collect useful data on products, services, consumer preferences,
trends and market data.
35
A Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure. Principles of Practice (London: Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell,
2ed, 2006); D Dwyer (ed), The Civil Procedure Rules. Ten Years On (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
36
In UK, statistics recorded on consumer contacts to official channels, such as Consumer Direct and Trading
Standards, initially indicated a high level of disputes over cars. However, after SMMT established their Motor
Codes dispute resolution scheme, to which all contacts to Consumer Direct were referred, it was discovered
that a significant number of contacts were merely requests for more information on a product or issue, and not
complaints. This information changed the general view of industry standards.
37
The point is illustrated anecdotally by the experience of Hodges in listening in to customer inquiry calls at
a major consumer products company. A significant number of calls in relation to, for example, shampoo were
along the lines of ‘this colour turns out to be the wrong colour for my hair, what colour should I try?’ and not ‘the
description of colour on the product is wrong’ or ‘the product has burned my hair’ or ‘my hair is falling out after I
used the product’. Callers who met a friendly, informed and reliable response went away satisfied.

Information can be provided by a number of different sources, such as traders, regulators,

consumer associations, or dispute resolution providers (theoretically including courts). It
may be appropriate, in some circumstances at least, for consumers to seek information
from a reliable source that is separate from a trader, but some consideration should be
given to what that source is. The Nordic arrangements, illustrated by Sweden, not only place
strong emphasis on providing consumer information but also provide a clear and efficient
structure for such provision. Pathways for providing information should be reliable, but
should also be efficient.38 Thus, there should not be too many possible sources, and the
attention of regulators and others should not be unnecessarily diverted, since the overall
costs would be disproportionate.
Although providing information to consumers is an inherent function of CADR
providers, it can become a challenge. Where, as often occurs, a significant proportion of
contacts are not disputes to be processed, CADR providers often have to structure effective
information and triage filtering systems as their first line, with significant cost. The wastage
rare is high for other reasons. Many CADR providers receive complaints that do not fall
within their remit (and should be directed to other CADR providers, if they exist) or are
made too early. CADR systems can exert some downward pressure on traders to provide
full information themselves in user-friendly fashion and to respond quickly to customer
contacts of any kind.
Care is needed in classifying consumer contacts. The motor vehicle sector was criticised
by the UK authorities over its apparently high number of customer complaints recorded
by the official agencies, but when it took over receipt of all complaints after establishing
its own code of practice, it found that a high proportion were solely requests for further
information (such as ‘how do I get a particular feature to work’, rather than ‘the feature does
not work’).
Cadr and Collective Redress
CADR schemes are designed to attract and process individual consumer disputes with
traders. In doing so, all of the current CADR schemes of any size inherently process multiple
similar cases, identify cases that raise similar issues, and make internal arrangements so
that their processing of mass cases is done efficiently and with consistent outcomes. In other
words, CADR schemes are entirely capable of handling collective mass issues.
Such an aggregation process is similar to that operated by some courts, notably the
process-driven Group Litigation Order in England. Such CADR systems that operate this
way are in general doing nothing unusual or inappropriate.
The largest CADR operation in Europe, the UK Financial Ombudsman Service, has
developed specific systems to identify and process mass cases. In recent years around half
of its caseload involves a number of mass issues, such as bank overdraft charges or payment
protection insurance. It does not have an externally-facing ‘collective procedure’ that can
be adopted by outside agents, such as lawyers or other representatives, but instead operates
the ‘collective procedures’ itself internally. That situation should clearly have advantages in
terms of reducing the transaction costs of processing mass claims.
38
The efficiency consideration is behind the UK government’s 2011 proposals to rationalise consumer advice
bodies into a ‘front line’ based on Citizens Advice bodies (and regulators with a front line of trading Standards
Services): see ch 11.

410 Findings
The FOS has no formal collective redress mechanisms, but has the flexibility to develop
various strategies to address multiple claims. Strategies include, firstly, grouping similar
cases so as to identify a lead case that can be resolved as a precedent and lead to formal
resolution or voluntary settlement of the other cases, secondly, where cases turn on a
point of law, referral of a test case to the court for its binding resolution, thirdly a ‘wider
implications’ procedure where issues may be resolved by a regulator or through some ADR-
style procedure.39 However, cases do not always turn on a single issue.
The signal that a mass issue might arise can come from any external source or internal
scrutiny. The selection of the appropriate handling procedure is left to the discretion of
the CADR provider. Unlike a collective action in the courts, there is no need for formal
procedures for declaration that particular procedures are appropriate, that certain issues
or representatives are appropriate, or that certain evidence or hearings or settlements are
appropriate: all these features are internalised.
A CADR provider may be very well placed to identify a mass issue at an early stage. Best
operating practice in regular scrutiny of the subject matter of contacts, whether they are
complaints or not, should enable generic issues to be identified at an early stage. It is possible
that such identification may be earlier than that made by traders or regulators. It is clearly
better to harness feedback mechanisms so as to reduce the number of complaints before
they escalate. This requires regulatory intervention: the telecommunications regulators
noted above for Lithuania and the UK are good examples of regulators that watch trends
and take positive interventionist action.
The issue comes back to having links with regulators. CADR cannot resolve issues that
a court or regulator should resolve. Changing the rules is a matter for parliaments, courts
and regulators, not CADR bodies. Systems need to be designed that enable all these levers
to work together.
There are two main challenges in dealing with mass issues: maintaining operational
performance and ensuring that decisions are sufficiently consistent as between similar
cases. Courts face the same problems. By their nature, mass issues concern a large number
of individuals, and the sudden arrival of a significant increase in claims can result in an
inability by CADR providers (as with courts or companies) in responding within previously
set time limits. There is emerging evidence that collective actions in European jurisdictions
are not capable of delivering outcomes with sufficient speed or proportionate cost.40 What
represents a ‘mass issue’ can involve different degrees of magnitude for different sectors. Of
course, providers of products and services to mass markets can by definition affect many
thousands of customers. On the other hand, holiday and travel companies may only have
to deal with a few hundred passengers in an aircraft or guests at a hotel, although food
contamination at a hotel can affect many people over time. CADR systems can and should
be designed to be able to process multiple cases. Extra capacity can be sought by calling
39
See ch 11 above.
40
The experience of product liability cases in England shows that many failed because of poor merits, and
lasted several years: see C Hodges, Multi Party Actions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The largest mass
litigation in England in the past decade, over injuries allegedly caused by the MMR vaccine, took 10 years and then
collapsed before trial when it was clear that the vaccine was not the cause of the claimants’ conditions. The German
litigation of Deutsche Telekom investors under the 2005 Capital Investors Class Action Law (KapMuG) is likely to
continue for 10 years. In contrast, the Dutch approach in the 2005 Class Action Settlement Law (WCAM), based
on incentivising parties to negotiate settlement of their disputes, which are then made binding by the court, has
proved to be attractive and largely efficient: see F Weber and WH van Boom, ‘Dutch Treat: The Dutch Collective
Settlement of Mass Damage Act’, WCAM 2005, Contratto e Impresa/Europa, No 1, pp 69–79, 2011.

on similar CADR schemes’ resources and expertise,41 perhaps in the same sector in other
countries or through EEC-Net and FIN-NET.
Variations in Effect: Persuasive or Binding?
Two issues arise. First, should a trader, or group of traders, be required to belong to a CADR
scheme and, secondly, whether the conclusions of the CADR third party are binding or not
on the trader and/or on the consumer.
CADR systems vary in the extent to which they are mandatory for traders, and this is
often related to whether they are delivered by public and private entities. In relation to the
first issue, the models are:
a. CADR is mandatory for all consumer traders, or for a specific sector of traders. The
CADR function is usually located within a public body, often a regulatory authority,
but sometimes a separate public body (such as the UK Financial Ombudsman Service).
There is sometimes no scope for any other type of CADR body to exist, although
sometimes public and private CADR bodies co-exist and there may be an element of
overlap and competition. The UK FLA scheme tries to attract complaints so as to avoid
them going to the Financial Ombudsman Service, and the French in-house energy
company médiateurs try to resolve complaints that might go to the national médiateur.
b. CADR is mandatory for all consumer traders, or for a specific sector of traders, since
the relevant traders are subject to a legal obligation to belong to a CADR scheme,
but are free to choose which CADR scheme. Here, CADR services would typically be
provided by one or more private sector bodies.
c. There is no legal requirement for traders to belong to any CADR scheme. CADR
services will always be provided by private sector bodies, either by individual companies
in-house (through customer care departments, or French médiateurs) or by external
providers, often operating on a sectoral basis, and frequently being organised by a
trade association.
Overall, C2B ADR schemes are therefore either imposed as binding on all traders in a sector
(often funded by a levy on all) or exist with the voluntary support of the majority of traders
in a sector, usually involving the relevant trade association.
In either event, decisions by the independent ADR provider may be binding on the trader:
in the first case, because decisions are made binding by law, and in the second case, as a
matter of prior voluntary acceptance by businesses, usually through their trade association.
This prior voluntary acceptance of decisions that are formally only recommendations
is a notable feature. The acceptance may be as a matter of contractual arrangements,
as in the Netherlands (sequences of contracts between member companies and their
trade associations, and then between the trade association and DGS), or as voluntary
commitments (some UK and German schemes, again usually involving trade associations
and companies). The result is an imaginative means of avoiding contravening Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (see further below).
41
An example here from England is where the trade association ABTA is able to provide extra resource to
member companies that experience unexpected spikes in numbers of claims, for example after a company merger
before systems have been rationalised.

412 Findings
This de facto one-sided binding effect (on business but not on consumer) is clearly an
important aspect not only of the principle of independence but also an important factor
in gaining consumer trust in the ADR system, as evidenced by the volume of its use. If
consumers do not trust the independence of an ombudsman, they will not use him. These
points are examined in greater detail below.
The proof of the effectiveness of a one-sided voluntary acceptance of binding effect is
the extent to which traders comply with decisions in fact. Here, the Swedish figures are
somewhat surprising: the average compliance rate is reported to be only 75 per cent,
although in some sectors it is effectively 100 per cent. The UK figures seem to be higher.
The approach that is most consumer-friendly is in the Netherlands, as a result of the trade
association guarantee noted above.
Acceptance in advance—or after an award—is, however, not universal by business. The
norm in France is that the ‘principle of voluntary mediation’ is relied on by many CADR
schemes to justify the situation that recommendations are not automatically accepted as
binding by sectors or companies. Business representatives in France say that even in such
cases 90 per cent of recommendations by médiateurs are observed by traders.
Looking now at whether CADR is binding on consumers, in those schemes that involve
arbitration the consumer has to agree at the time of lodging a complaint that she will
accept the decision as binding, thereby waiving her right to raise the matter in court. The
classic example is the Spanish arbitration scheme. This also arises under the UK’s private
code-based schemes. It should be noted that in some schemes, the impact of a consumer
surrendering rights to a court claim may be of less impact where there is a preliminary
conciliation stage that is, of course, not binding. However, those schemes that require
waiver of rights for use of an arbitration process are not the model that is widely used: most
schemes do not bind the consumer.
There is another interesting variant on the arrangements, which is found increasingly
widely as mediation spreads across national civil procedure systems. This is that access to
the courts is not denied but claimants are encouraged to use ADR as a first step. An example
is the English Court rule that where a claimant institutes a claim in the courts but should
reasonably have used an ADR approach, the claimant may be ordered not to recover his
costs from the losing defendant and may also be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs.42 This
preserves the consumer’s right to access a court whilst encouraging use of CADR.
Conceptual Issues with CADR
The Basis of Cadr Decisions: Law and Fairness
A feature on which national ombudsmen schemes differ is the extent to which they apply
the law or some other standard. This raises the question: Should decisions be based on law
or on some other criteria?
It might be thought that CADR schemes are based on applying standard consumer
protection law. However, although all schemes inherently do apply the law, many go beyond
42
Civil Procedure Rules, r 44.5(3).

the legal standards by applying either the provisions of codes of business practice, and/or
by basing decisions on fairness or equity. By definition, codes of business practice should
inherently include standards of trading practice that are required by the law, notably the
‘UCP’ Directive43 and other measures of the Consumer acquis, now including the Consumer
Rights Directive,44 but they may, and usually do, set higher standards. Indeed, that is a
major purpose of codes of practice.
The entire Netherlands geschillencommissie system is based on applying codes of
practice, as are many CADR schemes in Germany, France and the UK.
The 2011 French Mediation Charter provides that a médiateur forms his opinion on
the basis of law and equity,45 and the Charter of FFSA provides that advice issued by the
mediator shall be ‘prepared taking into account elements of law and equity but also with the
aim of achieving an amicable solution which cannot correspond to a judicial approach’.46
Including a ‘fairness’ or equity basis of decisions in the UK is widespread, for both
statutory and private CADR schemes. The jurisdiction of the UK FOS is to base decisions
on what is ‘fair and reasonable’ on a case by case basis, and to take into account relevant law
and regulations, regulators’ rules and codes of practice.47 This is mirrored in the FLA’s private
Code. Principle 6 of the FSA’s Principles for Businesses requires firms to treat customers
fairly.48 Similar rules on basing decisions on fairness apply to the Legal Ombudsman, the
Housing Ombudsman and the Energy Ombudsman, and under the OFCOM requirements
(which refer to law and equity).49
The banks, in particular, have long objected that the fairness criterion constitutes authority
for the FOS to decide a dispute in a way that might differ from how a court might decide it,
and possibly from the extensive regulatory rules to which they are subject. In other words,
a court applies the law, whereas the FOS decides what seems fair and reasonable. The banks
object that that difference produces a situation in which decisions of the FOS establish a
‘separate universe’ that may be inconsistent with the legal requirements, and one in which
decisions can be difficult to predict, and in effect impose requirements retrospectively
that can be higher than the legal requirements authorised by statute or by the statutory
regulators. Hence cases may also be difficult to settle.
Arguments can be made on both sides of this debate. Firstly, do we not expect that
decisions by any court or state-authorised independent decision-maker must be just, and
that justice requires that the substance of the decision be fair and reasonable?50 However,
this broad philosophical approach is more difficult to apply when dealing with the minutiae
of trading rules and standards. There can, indeed, be a difference between what is required
practice under a rule of law and a practice standard, and hence what some might consider
to be fair and reasonable at any particular time. Legal obligations on the terms or duration
43
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market.
44
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council.
45
See ch 3 above.
46
See p 53 above.
47
DISP 3.5.4R.
48
See FOS/FSA/OFT, Consumer Complaints (Emerging Risks and Mass Claims), 10/1 Discussion Paper,
March 2010, p 9.
49
See ch 11 above.
50
A Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009).

414 Findings
of a manufacturer’s guarantee, for example, may be extended beyond legal standards in a

code, or voluntarily.
The rule of law, and promotion of predictable and consistent business practice, requires
there to be one set of legal rules against which legal disputes should be decided. It may be
constitutionally dangerous for a CADR system to decide the rights and wrongs of a dispute
other than on the basis of the law. If a particular business, or sector, wishes to apply higher
standards to their activities, that should be a matter for their self-determination, having
defined what such standards are to be. If it is a legislator or regulator who wishes to apply a
higher standard than current law, then the mechanism should be to change the law. Trying
to achieve regulatory pressure through a ‘fair and reasonable’ test in dispute resolution has
some attractions but on closer analysis essentially smacks of unfairness and cheating.
It may, however, be observed that the unfair commercial practices are prohibited
by EU law, and that recourse to bodies that determine unfair practices under codes are
encouraged.51 Thus, fairness in commercial practice is a legal requirement, although that
provision might be obscured by other more detailed requirements, especially in sectoral
legislation and rules.
It is interesting to speculate whether there may be a difference in the legal approach
between civil law and common law jurisdictions here. The concept of fair trading that
emerged in the UCP Directive was based on civil law tradition and caused great concern
to common lawyers, although the latter includes principles of equity. Regrettably such an
inquiry is beyond the terms of this book.
There are, however, reasons of market policy why a CADR system may be designed
to reach decisions that are based on market norms of fairness rather than the lower legal
standards. One rationale is to enable prevailing market standards to be upheld if there is a
‘legal lag’, in other words a delay in amending the lower standards of the law. The dispute
resolution system would, therefore, contribute to an objective of raising standards rather
than upholding less acceptable behaviour.
Another rationale is based on consciously seeking to balance the well-known asymmetry
of power between traders and consumers, in favour of the latter. Marc Galanter famously
asserted that ‘haves come out better than have nots in courts’.52 he asserted that the good
law is the law that delivers access to justice conceived as a justice that occurs in many rooms
beyond the courtroom even when those rooms are rather sealed off one from the other.53
Mechanisms such as the FOS were designed specifically as integral parts of regulatory
systems, so as to frustrate repeat players’ advantage and to impose as behavioural pressure
on firms.
In summary, the position is somewhat confused, and it is difficult to reconcile the
competing arguments of principle and policy. There are obvious good reasons why it is
advantageous to be able to apply clear rules to resolve disputes, so as to provide certainty
for both traders’ behaviour and consumers’ expectations. Hence, achieving consensus on
51
Directive 2005/29/EC, Arts 5 and 10.
52
‘Courts produce not only decisions but also messages. These messages are resources which parties use in
envisioning, devising, negotiating and vindicating claims (and in avoiding, defending and defeating them).’ M
Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ 9:1 Law and Society
Review (1974) 165–230.
53
M Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms’, in M Cappelletti, (ed), Access to Justice and the welfare State (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1981), 147; C Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), chs. 3 and 4; J Braithwaite and C Parker, ‘Conclusion’ in C Parker, C Scott, N Lacey and J Braithwaite,
Regulating Law (Oxford University Press, 2004).

the rules that apply to particular circumstances should be achieved by having clear laws and
codes. The philosophical conundrum of to what extent a court of CADR body can declare
what a rule is, or whether that is a matter for a legislature or regulator, is perennial, and
not resolved in the specific circumstances of CADR bodies any more than it is for courts.
However, the issue of the relationship between CADR bodies and courts deserves further
attention, to which we now turn.
Should Cadr or Courts Decide the Law?
The German Insurance Ombudsman is careful to avoid making determinations of law, since
that is regarded as the exclusive role of the courts. It is felt that if that Ombudsman were to
make determinations that ‘clarified’ or differed from existing understanding of the law, he
would first be acting unconstitutionally and secondly establishing a ‘separate universe’ of
requirements that would affect business and consumers and which might be inconsistent
with legal requirements.
The British Pensions Ombudsman can go further, and may refer any question of law to
the court for determination.54
The logic of this position is that an ombudsman should not decide a dispute in which
the law is unclear. Instead, the matter should be referred to the court for clarification,
perhaps on a ‘reference procedure’ similar to that under which the Court of Justice (ECJ)
operates. The issue is important if a national Constitution exists that provides for separation
of powers of making law (the legislature), applying the law (the courts) and assisting in
resolving disputes without trespassing into the other two areas.
The solution that a CADR system should not decide issues of law is supported by the fact
that the strength of ‘due process’ requirements under a CADR procedure are normally less
stringent than under the civil procedure of courts. As discussed below, the former may be
constitutionally acceptable, but concerns would be higher if the CADR process were used to
decide issues of law. Indeed, a major attraction of CADR is that it is appropriate, simple and
swift in applying clear law to factual disputes, but it is not designed to deliberate on complex
legal questions. The emerging position is that CADR is good for facts whereas courts are
good for law. For relatively modest consumer claims, neither forum is particularly good
at the other function. This involves a redefinition of roles that may be controversial, but is
clearly emerging from current practice.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that a CADR system should not decide issues of law, which
should be left for a court. However, if the relationship between CADR and court systems
is to operate well, an important design point should be addressed. There is a need for a
simple, effective, cheap and speedy mechanism under which a CADR body can refer cases
to a suitable court for determination of the law (like the British Pensions Ombudsman). The
procedure would be similar to a reference procedure between member State courts and the
EU’s Court of Justice.
The same logic would point to the need for a mechanism under which regulators or
legislators may swiftly amend rules prospectively, so as to ensure clarity of the legal
requirements. An example of this is provided by the practice of various regulated sectors,
where issues that arise in CADR cases are considered by regulatory bodies, so that rules
54

416 Findings
can be amended. The Lithuanian telecoms agency, for example holds regular meetings with
providers for precisely this purpose.
Binding and Non-binding Decisions
Two issues arise here. Firstly, should it be a requirement for one or both parties to have, and
use, an CADR scheme? Secondly, should the decisions of a CADR body be binding on one
or both parties, or merely non-binding recommendations? The status of debate has partly
answered these questions, so that the topical ones are: should a CADR system be binding on
all traders, and should the outcome be binding on traders and/or businesses?
In almost all CADR schemes, consumers are not obliged to use a CADR scheme. It would
be contrary to the EU unfair contract terms legislation,55 Article 6 of the ECHR, and the
Commission recommendations on ADR,56 for a trader to seek to bind a consumer to CADR
or arbitration before the time of sale. Such provisions are, of course, common in commercial
contracts, but banned in B2C contracts because of the unequal bargaining power of the
parties. It is only a state’s courts that may issue decisions that are binding on any citizens,
for which enforcement is backed by the state’s exclusive coercive power.
It is legal for a consumer to agree after a dispute has arisen that it be resolved by binding
arbitration. This is the position in various CADR arbitration schemes, as noted above. In
some schemes, the consumer might access a conciliation function of an CADR scheme free
(or at low cost) but is required to agree to binding arbitration if agreement is not reached
and a decision is needed that is binding on the trader.
On the other hand, a trader can contractually agree to CADR on a standing basis that will
apply to all consumers. This is wide practice in those schemes where the result is not already
biding by law. The Netherlands scheme goes further, so payment of any sums ordered by the
CADR body to the consumer is guaranteed by the trade association, which has a contractual
right to collect it from its member firm.
However, the French Charter maintains that a trader has to be free to refer a dispute to
a CADR scheme or not, and will not be bound by any recommendation. The arguments
are made that a trader is otherwise locked into accepting every nuisance claim, and that
traders accept decisions voluntarily after they are made in the vast majority of situations.
There is a wide fear amongst some sectors of business that the risk of unjustified consumer
claims is significant. However, it is striking that the attitude of the companies discussed
in Chapter 12 take exactly the opposite view in their customer care policies, which are
designed positively to attract all customer contacts. Their finding is that the incidence of
unjustified claims is so low as to be negligible, and not worth bothering with in practice.
They do operate some anti-fraud checks, but these are designed to prevent repeat claims
rather than to discourage claims per se.
The clear majority practice in Nordic states (in Sweden traders are bound unless they
object within 30 days), the Netherlands, Germany and the UK is that CADR decisions are
not binding on consumers but are binding on traders either by law or by prior voluntary
acceptance. Estonia and Portugal consider it is not constitutional for decisions to be binding.
55
Case C-168/05 Mostazo Claro [2006] ECR I-10421 and Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v
Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira [2009] ECR I-9579.
56
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (98/257/EC), principle VI.

Even though decisions may not be binding on consumers, they may, of course, face
difficulties in objecting to an adverse decision. If the consumer subsequently takes the claim
to court, the courts may well be expected to follow the decision of an established CADR
provider, perhaps even imposing a costs sanction on the consumer for bringing the case.
It is sometimes noted that the conclusions of public sector ombudsmen are not binding
on the public administration. There is an important distinction, however, between disputes
between citizens and the state, and those between public parties. The reasons for the
difference is that it is not constitutionally appropriate for the discretion on the executive
branch of a state to be subject to external authorities. A state entity should have power
that includes a margin of discretion to reach decisions, since many conflicting factors may
have to be balanced. The state’s exercise of power should only be subject to the confines
of its constitutional power, as reviewed by the appropriate court, and should be subject to
democratic scrutiny by parliament. Public sector ombudsmen are invariably appointed by,
and report to, parliaments, so their recommendations may be adopted voluntarily by the
administration, but if not the administration will be answerable to parliament but not to
the parliament’s investigatory ombudsman. Thus, the functions of public and private sector
ombudsmen are significantly different. An argument cannot be made that just because
public ombudsmen’s decisions are not binding, the decisions of private sector ombudsmen
should not be binding. The argument that private sector ombudsmen’s decisions should be
binding on traders is, indeed, strengthened when part of their function is viewed as being
regulatory, in the public interest.
Underlying this debate is the practical issue of whether business wishes consumers to
trust CADR schemes, and therefore to use them. Consumer trust may be significantly
dented where business does not accept an advance binding effect. The issue is more one
of practice than principle. Our findings indicate that there is a clear link between CADR
schemes in which traders are bound to accept the decision and the level of consumer trust
in the scheme, which is usually reflected in the level of complaints directed to the scheme.
This effect can be seen from the statistics compared in chapter 14.
The conclusion is that current best practice in Sweden, Germany, UK and the Netherlands
is that decisions are binding on traders, whether this result is imposed by statute or
accepted voluntarily. It is open to legislators to impose requirements that membership of
CADR schemes by consumer traders, and observance of decisions by properly constituted
ombudsmen, is mandatory. That solution would have clear advantages in relation to the
use of CADR schemes. If a mandatory legal solution does not emerge, we urge businesses
across Europe to adopt this standard, which should assist in building consumer trust and
in supporting business.
Compliance
If ombudsmen’s decisions are ‘binding’ on traders, a further practical question is how to

ensure that decisions are in fact complied with by business. Various models are found:
a. Dutch-style trade association guarantees: the trade association contracts with
DGS that it will guarantee all decisions, and contracts with its members that they
will indemnify such guarantee. Thus, if, as happens only very rarely, a trader refuses
to pay on an adverse decision, the trade association will pay the consumer and
claim reimbursement from its member, probably then expelling the member from

418 Findings
membership of the association. That mechanism is extremely effective, but does not
cover traders who are not members of an association (assuming the association is
part of the Geschillencommissie structure, which may be true in the Netherlands but
might not be so if the system were to be copied in other states). The answer in the
Netherlands is that traders will be ‘named and shamed’ by the press.
b. A ‘name and shame’ technique, used in Sweden but also elsewhere, again operated
not by the ARN but by media take-up of a published list.
c. Enlisting pressure from a regulator. This is especially relevant for rogue traders and
where there has been a significant and continuing breach of the law.
d. An intermediary who blocks trading, such as under a chargeback mechanism, where
media decline to carry advertisements banned by an advertising standards body, or a
decision on domain name ownership by WIPO.
e. Fast track enforcement in the courts. Since ADR telescopes the evidence-gathering
process, there could be a leapfrog procedure (leaping the evidence-gathering stage) for
enforcement of ombudsmen’s non-binding decisions: new evidence and an objective
assessment would be guaranteed.
An issue that has arisen in our discussions in several countries is that some traders (and
the airline sector was mentioned frequently57) do not comply with CADR decisions. In
countries such as Spain, such traders do not agree to use the arbitration process. This raises
the issue of whether particular sectors need some compulsion, as occurs for example for
financial services.
Due Process Issues for Cadr
CADR systems can deliver speedy, low cost and effective dispute resolution. In this context,
courts should not be seen as separate, but as one dispute resolution option, alongside
CADR providers. The fact that courts are usually more expensive and slower than CADR
systems, as well as being less user-friendly, is a key reason for the success of good CADR
systems. This is not to argue for the obsolescence of courts in B2C disputes. Indeed, it is the
continued existence of courts that provides an incentive for both the establishment and the
ongoing use of CADR systems. There is both an element of competition here, and a ‘shadow
of the law’ phenomenon.
The rules of civil procedure (formality of proceedings) that are considered to be a
requirement for the acceptable operation of courts give rise to certain levels of cost and
duration. Attempts to simplify and avoid such procedural guarantees, such as through
Small Claims procedures and use of mediation alongside court claims, can only be taken so
far without offending requirements of procedural justice, such as due process.
In contrast, many consumer complaints are of such a nature that they can be resolved
through procedures that involve less formality than would be required for courts, and hence
deliver advantages of speed, low and proportionate cost, and informality and little effort for
those involved. They typically involve well-established rules of law, terms and conditions,
or provisions of a code of business practice, and relatively straightforward factual aspects.
But CADR systems still need to satisfy parameters of justice: there is a balance to be struck
between requirements and efficiency. This raises the issue of what essential requirements
57
See ECC-Net Air Passenger Rights Report 2011 (The European Consumer Centres’ Network, 2011).

are necessary for CADR systems, in order for them to operate acceptably in terms of the
requirements of procedural justice.
It has been found above that some CADR systems have evolved, and that some of the older
models are closer to court-style mechanisms, and hence process cases lore slowly than more
recent models. There is clear variation in the speed and cost of CADR systems, and their
ability to satisfy key parameters, such as independence. The result is a striking variation in
the attractiveness to consumers and the uptake and use of a system by consumers. Where the
key parameters are satisfied, use will be considerable, and the system will be highly effective.
The tension is between procedural guarantees of due process versus customer demands
for speedy resolution of their disputes. On one view, due process requirements have been
dangerously ignored by some CADR models. On another view, contemporary ideas about
how the principles of procedural justice should apply to dispute resolution procedures
have clearly evolved. It is no longer the case that the procedure necessarily has to look like
that of a court, with an ordered sequence of investigation and presentation of evidence
and arguments, and a hearing in the presence of all parties, with rules on admissibility
and forms. Indeed, the fact that ‘corners can be cut’ in traditional civil procedures in the
context of CADR is what gives rise to the new processes being able to realise the benefits of
increased speed, lower cost, and increased user-friendliness.
However, the question should be asked: what essential requirements of procedural justice
and protection of human rights should still apply to new forms of dispute resolution? How
many corners can validly be cut?
The procedural steps that occur in consumer CADR systems can be analysed as follows:
a. Lodging a claim. An explanation of what the dispute is about needs to be done concisely
and clearly. The procedure needs to be user-friendly, and many CADR providers offer
on-line facilities. In order to enhance consumer accessibility and trust in CADR, as
well as increased knowledge of the availability of CADR generally, we recommend
that a standard claim form is agreed at EU level, made available through guidance
rather than under law, so it can be adopted to particular types of claim, and evolved, as
necessary.
b. Presentation of evidence. Many ombudsmen have asserted to us that the evidence and
assertions in most consumer disputes are limited and straightforward. The evidence
should usually have been identified between the parties during the direct-negotiation
phase prior to lodging a claim with a CADR body. Consumers and traders are often
able to lodge documents on-line.
c. Obtaining expertise. Two approaches are adopted by CADR bodies. In some, the
ombudsman (and staff) has the necessary expertise personally: examples are the
German Insurance Ombudsman, who is a distinguished professor of law, and who is
familiar with almost all issues that arise. In other systems, the ombudsman may have
legal training, but it is necessary to obtain external assistance from an independent
expert who is familiar with the subject matter: an example of this is under the British
motor vehicle code system, where an engineer might be instructed to visit the vehicle, or
repair facility, make an inspection and report. The expert may be trained in mediation,
and able to assist the parties in reaching settlement on such a site visit. Otherwise, the
expert reports back to the ombudsman, and his report is made available to the parties.
A comment by one of the British car scheme operators was that in a dispute over
whether a repair used new or used parts, an expert can often decide the case simply by
looking at a photograph.

420 Findings
d. Evaluation. This function is performed by the neutral party as soon as all relevant
information is available. It involves examining the facts and applying the relevant rules
(law or code) to the issues that are raised. It is performed in the same way whether that
neutral party is subsequently to perform the function of mediator or adjudicator, ie
whether the view that he or she takes of the merits of the case are to be binding or not
binding on the parties.
e. Enforcement or follow-up. It is not the normal function of neutral CADR parties to pro-
vide an enforcement function after they have delivered their recommendation or decision
on the merits—unlike a court. However, some CADR systems include a means either of
ensuring that traders observe decisions (these means are discussed below in relation to
issues over binding decisions), and/or a means of checking whether they do so.
Key features that enhance the efficiency of CADR systems are:
a. a model in which adversarialism is minimised,
b. a lack of formality,
c. use of streamlined and especially online procedures,
d. absence of oral arguments, legal representation, or hearings at which all parties are
present, and
e. sectoral expertise.
The Purpose and Nature of CAdr
At this point, a strenuous debate should be noted for and against the use of alternative
dispute resolution methods, whether generically or individually, as against maintaining the
primacy or exclusivity of state courts as the proper forum for deciding issues of law and
rights. It is not the function of this book to enter into that debate, but the empirical finding
that CADR systems are now so widely used and growing cannot but have an effect on that
debate.
The debate involves examination of the function of dispute resolution, and of what
outcomes people are seeking.58 Some of the options are:
– resolution of a grievance
– vindication of rights: rectification of a wrong done in breach of a right
– rectification of loss; restoration of status quo ante
– declaration that a respondent has acted contrary to an accepted standard of conduct;
‘vindication’
– public upholding of a norm of society
– public imposition of a sanction
– triggering of wider public sanctioning, eg by a regulator
– day in court: being listened to, irrespective of outcome
– exposure of widespread irregularity, with a view to cessation and behaviour
modification
– deterrence: of the specific respondent and generally of the actors in the sector
58
M Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ 9:1 Law and
Society Review (1974) 165–230.

An important attack on ADR in general comes from the viewpoint that determinations of
civil and human rights recognised and upheld by the state should be the exclusive preserve of
state institutions. Some are concerned that the law itself will not be clarified and developed
if court determinations reduce in number. Further, privatised resolution procedures can
result in outcomes that have little to do with the rights involved, and raise concerns about
the risk of abuse flowing from imbalances of power. Debate can polarise around whether
enforcement of law should be dominated by concerns of efficiency or of justice, and the
constitutional implications.59
Different methods of dispute resolution may be more appropriate for different objectives
and functions, and discussion has altered the ADR acronym to talk of ‘appropriate’ dispute
resolution.60 The use of mediation has been strongly criticised by some as an alternative to
court adjudication.61 Mediation has strong advantages in the right circumstances, such as
where it is important for the parties to avoid an adversarial confrontation and to restore
bilateral relations and communication.62 Hence, it can be useful in disputes involving
families and children. In the C2B situation, it is often the trader who wishes to retain a
relationship with its customer, and hence wishing to make the CADR pathway attractive to
the customer, rather than the other way around.
Some general points can be made from this study over how CADR compares with the
courts. The essential advantages of CADR in relation to courts can be:63 speed, accessibility,
informality, expertise, lower cost to the state (but sometimes internalised cost to the sector),
potentially lower regulatory burden, and increased motivation.64 The disadvantages of
CADR can include failure to deliver just outcomes, lack of accountability or transparency,
failure to act in the public interest (and even continuation of anti-competitive rents), and
lack of performance or inefficiency.
The extent to which CADR offers advantages and disadvantages compared with the
courts differs from country to country. One important factor is the extent to which the
national courts are speedy and operate with low and predictable costs. It has been noted
above that countries that have efficient and low cost courts (such as those similar to the
German civil law system) have developed CADR to a lesser extent than countries where the
courts are slow and where costs are unpredictable and disproportionate (such as common
law jurisdictions like UK). Accordingly, extensive CADR mechanisms have developed more
quickly in some jurisdictions, notably the UK, the Netherlands and the Nordic states. Italy
also has its own form of CADR, since its courts are hopelessly clogged and slow. Another
key consideration is whether legal advice can be given only by lawyers (as in Germany) or
also by others (which contributed to historical development of advice and dispute resolution
schemes by trade unions and business in the Netherlands and the UK).
59
See generally C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Dispute Resolution’ in P Cane and HM Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of
Empirical Legal Research (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010).
60
ibid.
61
R Verkijk, ‘Mandatory Mediation: Informal Injustice?’ in A Uzelac and CH van Rhee (eds), Public and Private
Justice. Dispute Resolution in Modern Societies (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2007); H Genn, Judging Civil Justice. The
Hamlyn Lectures 2008 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
62
S Roberts and M Palmer, Dispute Processes. ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-Making (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
63
CH van Rhee and A Uzelac (eds), Civil Justice between Efficiency and Quality: from Ius Commune to the CEPEJ
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2008).
64
CJS Hodges, S Vogenauer and M Tulibacka, The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation. A Comparative
Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).

422 Findings
Adr as an Essential Aspect of Regulation and Behaviour Control
It has been noted that although some CADR techniques are stand-alone dispute resolution
procedures, many CADR schemes operate as an integral part of a wider regulatory scheme.
Overall, it is entirely misleading to view many dispute resolution mechanisms on their
own, without considering the broader context of how they operate within a system that is
primarily intended to deliver control of behaviour and in which resolution of disputes is a
secondary consideration, albeit a necessary and desirable one. In simple terms, therefore,
the dispute resolution function is the ‘back end’ of a system of regulation, or self-regulation,
that is primarily focused on the ‘front end’ of maintaining a standard of general business
practice, and disputes that arise over such practice are funnelled towards the tailor-made
resolution system that accompanies the regulatory system.
Accordingly, it is both misleading and unnecessarily limiting to consider a CADR
technique merely in terms of its dispute resolution function alone. Such a function is, of
course, important, and it is relevant to ask to what extent a CADR technique is successful in
delivering effective, efficient and desirable resolutions to disputes. But it is also important
to ask other questions. Does the technique deliver ex post controls on the behaviour of
individuals, businesses and governments? Does it deliver preventative justice, through
reducing the number of disputes that arise, or the number of instances of undesirable
behaviour, thereby acting as an ex ante control? Does it provide feedback for system
operators, or those responsible for external governance of the system or operator, of the
quality system and quality control of the operator’s activities? Hence, does the dispute
resolution system enable quality monitoring, improvement, and compliance?
Further, in designing modern dispute resolution systems, the opportunity to specify a
system in which the architecture and functionality can deliver appropriate and reasonable
behaviour control outcomes, as well as resolution of disputes, is a crucial goal and design
feature that should not be overlooked. Overall, the norm is that CADR systems are now
usually designed so as to provide regulatory outcomes.
Some systems appear to be particularly successful at contributing to a low incidence of
disputes nationally. Good examples are Sweden and the Netherlands. The Swedish model
relies strongly on providing easily accessible expert consumer advice, both before purchase
decisions are made and after complaints arise. There is also the collaborative attitude of
many traders, and their ability to reach solutions with customers. The general incidence of
problems appears to be reduced by these mechanisms, and the number of claims that reach
the ARN appears to be low.
In the Netherlands, compliance by traders with agreed standards appears to be achieved
by the ex ante model of agreeing terms and conditions in advance, thereby being the key
that opens the door to the official CADR process. The trade associations function to remind
their members of the agreed rules, and this seems to involve a low level of non-compliances
and enforcement action. Note it was only recently that the Netherlands saw the need (partly
imposed on it by an EU requirement) to create a Consumer Authority. A major function
of such a public authority is to use harder enforcement techniques against traders who are
outside the Geschillencommissie system, or otherwise behave in a manner that takes them
‘off the reservation’.
The British model relies on extensive self-regulation involving trade associations and
codes. The pressure for compliance exerted on their own members by, for example, ABTA,
is striking, and includes imposition of sanctions, thereby avoiding formal enforcement by

public authorities, who are in any event involved in the code committees. In contrast, the
German ex post model operates on the basis that traders work on their own terms and
conditions, but the trade practice association and consumer associations are active and
speedy in raising non-compliance issues, backed by the right to seek an injunction in case
of breach.
Capturing and Using Market Information
A major potential advantage of any dispute resolution system is that it can identify behaviour
that requires attention, and set precedents for future behaviour. CADR systems have a
particularly strong potential in this respect, arising from their ability to aggregate data from
multiple individual inquires and complaints. Their ability to achieve this arises from modern
information technology systems. The data that is valuable is not just the nature of issues
raised and decided in any decisions (the relatively few that reach the top of the pyramid
of the process, for which formal decisions are taken), but also those involved in the mass
of contacts that constitute the bottom of the pyramid. Theoretically, courts could disclose
their ‘entry level’ data, and some do, but the focus of courts is on the content of a relatively
small number of decisions that reach the top, output stage and provide important legal
precedents. In this respect, CADR systems can far exceed the mass regulatory capability of
courts, since, as mentioned above, a primary focus of courts is on clarifying the law.
The market has moved from issues about small individual issues to extensive implications
about major products that have huge commercial value.65 This development calls for a re-
examination of what forum is appropriate to deal with large and small issues: the legislature,
court, regulator, trade association, individual business, committee, consumers and the market?
ADR systems can provide data that provides the relevant behavioural (regulatory)
information. Further, they can provide such information cheaply, quickly and efficiently.
ADR systems therefore represent major opportunities to reduce the number of legal
problems before they proliferate, as well as a means of self-regulation in relation to ongoing
behaviour. Designing ADR systems that provide both dispute resolution and regulatory
functions can save a great deal of resource on enforcement. What is needed is for them to
operate as a Quality Management System for business.
CADR schemes can provide an ‘early warning system’ that identifies emerging trends
and addresses the issues before undesirable effects escalate and proliferate. Such issues may
be non-compliance with law (such as excessive bank charges or dangerous products), the
need for new or more elaborated rules, or merely changes in behaviour that would improve
situations even if no breach of law has occurred. Issues may relate to general trends in a
market, or the fact that the operations of individual traders give rise to concern. Many
ombudsmen commented to us that many consumer cases involve misunderstandings, and
this can be identified and sorted out by better communication.
The mechanism by which CADR systems produce the relevant data is based simply on
the principle of transparency. There is a clear trend for CADR schemes to publish data on
the issues that arise in their caseloads, and sometimes on individual traders. In order to
give a complete picture, of course, such market data need to be aggregated with similar
complaint data received by regulators.
65
N Huls, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy: A Third Way between Autonomy and Paternalism in Private Law’ (2010) 3.1
Erasmus Law Review 7, at www.erasmuslawreview.nl/files/ELR_2010-1_03_Consumer_Bankruptcy.pdf.

424 Findings
Should it be regulators that publish the names of individual companies? This already
occurs in some countries, where it is regarded as an essential behavioural tool, which
increases pressure on those firms who rely on high market reputations, reducing the need
for public authorities to take formal enforcement steps that would be more expensive. The
FOS published complaints data that identified individual traders, and this had a profound
effect. It showed that 50 per cent of the complaints that it handled came from just four
banks out of 100,000. The media publicity and pressure from regulators resulted in the four
(and others) paying more attention to improving their complaint handling.
It may be simple for disclosure of companies’ names to be made, but this may also be
disproportionately costly and even misleading in some circumstances. An example of the
misleading effect is that quoted in Chapter 11 where complaint data held by public agencies
seemed to indicate a problem with motor vehicles but when the substance of the data was
examined it was found that the majority of ‘complaints’ were requests for information.
We recommend that ADR systems should be designed to operate so as to achieve
regulatory outputs. We suggest that the issue of how much information should be disclosed
is a matter for consideration in the circumstances of a particular sector and scheme.
The ability to deliver feedback information that can be used to improve regulatory
compliance at proportionate cost could be immensely useful for small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). SMEs account for 99 per cent of enterprises, of which 92 per cent are
micro-enterprises, and provide more than two thirds of private sector employment.66 It is
well-recognised that ‘businesses, in particular SMEs, often lack clarity about how to comply
with regulation’.67 A ‘Key Finding’ of research by the UK’s OFT in 2010 was:
In general businesses seek to treat consumers fairly although they may have a limited understanding
of the law. SMEs in particular are likely to have less awareness of the detail of consumer protection
laws, and how they can access relevant information to assist compliance. Larger businesses are
more likely to understand the detail of the laws but may have different drivers for not complying.68
EU studies have found that ‘the smallest firms face the greatest costs in complying with
regulations’,69 a view echoed in national studies.70 For example, UK government research
into health and safety regulation found that, on a per employee basis, SMEs may be spending
almost six times more than larger ones on risk assessment.71
Noting SMEs’ limited capacities and resource, and the crucial relevance of SMEs in
stimulating economic growth, as part of the EU’s core economic strategy,72 the European
Commission has proposed:
66
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Minimizing regulatory burden for
SMEs Adapting EU regulation to the needs of micro-enterprises, COM(2011) 803, 23.11.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/
governance/better_regulation/documents/minimizing_burden_sme_EN.pdf.
67
Delivering regulatory reform. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (National Audit Office, 2011),
available at www.nao.org.uk/idoc.ashx?docId=89f6cf32-eeeb-4f0a-b862-d5a9feec4388&version=-1.
68
Consumer Law and Business Practice. Drivers of compliance and non-compliance (Office of Fair Trading,
2010), OFT1225, available at www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/OFT1225.pdf.
69
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Minimizing regulatory burden for
SMEs Adapting EU regulation to the needs of micro-enterprises, COM(2011) 803, 23.11.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/
governance/better_regulation/documents/minimizing_burden_sme_EN.pdf.
70
‘micro businesses … can find the cost of regulatory compliance to be disproportionately high, placing
additional calls on scarce resources’: Lightening the Load: The Regulatory Impact on UK’s Smallest Businesses
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2010), available at www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-
regulation/docs/l/10-1251-lightening-the-load-regulatory-impact-smallest-businesses.pdf.
71
Improving Outcomes from Health and Safety (Better Regulation Executive, 2008).
72
Communication from the Commission ‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’
COM(2010) 2020.

There needs to be a special effort to promote the development of SMEs, a major source of economic
growth and job creation in the Union, accounting for more than 67 % of private sector jobs and
providing more than 58 % of total turnover in the EU.73
In implementing this policy, the Commission has stated that the regulatory burden needs
to be minimized.74 Further, providing information and advice to economic operators
(especially SMEs) is a legitimate function of Member States that needs to be given a greater
priority.75 The approach here exactly mirrors that identified in this book in relation to
empowering consumers: finding and effective and efficient means of providing information
on appropriate market behaviour and trends to SMEs (as for consumers and traders
generally) will assist with regulatory compliance, reduce the need for (and hence cost of)
enforcement, and increase customer satisfaction.
What Criteria Should Apply to CADR?
Requirements for CADR systems have been established by EU Recommendations of 199876

and 2001.77 The titles and purposes of these two recommendations are somewhat confusing.
They are in fact directed at different types of CADR: the 1998 Recommendation was directed
at CADR bodies involved in resolving disputes that were proceeding within the court system,
whereas the 2001 Recommendation was focused on bodies that handle disputes outside the
court system. The latter is obviously now more relevant for what has become a separate
and distinct world of CADR systems. Nevertheless, the principles applicable to such bodies
should overlap to a great extent, if not be identical, not least because the CADR providers
often provide both types of service, and there is no reason in principle why the principles
applicable to them should differ.
We now seek to review the principles set out in the two Recommendations, and to
apply these requirements to the national systems that we have researched, noting major
compliances and issues, and other matters that might be relevant to provide as further
requirements.
The 1998 Recommendation, which is at Appendix 1, established the following ‘principles’:
I. Independence: guaranteeing the impartiality of the decision-making body.
II. Transparency: appropriate measures must be taken, including:
III. Adversarial: allowing all the parties to present their viewpoint and to hear the
arguments and facts put forward by the other party, and any experts’ statements.
IV. Effectiveness.
73
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Programme for
the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (2014–2020), COM(2011) 834 final,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0834:FIN:EN:PDF.
74
ibid.
75
The future of market surveillance in the area of non-food consumer product safety under the General Product
Safety Directive, (BSI, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/projects/docs/final_report_the_future_of_market
_surveillance.pdf.
76
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (98/257/EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:115:0031:0034:EN:PDF.
77
Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the
consensual resolution of consumer disputes (2001/310/EC), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/
out_of_court/adr/acce_just12_en.pdf.

426 Findings
V. Legality.
VI. Liberty: The decision taken by the body concerned may be binding on the parties only
if they were informed of its binding nature in advance and specifically accepted this.
VII. Representation: the procedure does not deprive the parties of the right to be
represented or assisted by a third party at all stages of the procedure.
The above principles are examples of their historical context. They were written at a time in
which the model of dispute resolution that people had in mind was a court, involving well-
established constitutional principles of procedural justice, and involving representation
by lawyers. In addition, the CADR system that was held in mind was one that operated
in a similar fashion to a court. The findings of this study have shown that requirements
that CADR systems be adversarial and involve legal representation and hearings with full
opportunity to hear all evidence are clearly out of place in relation to CADR systems.
At the present time, however, that context has evolved significantly, driven by market
practice. Complaints about the non-involvement of lawyers and various other developments
are not heard from consumers or their representatives (although they may be uttered by
lawyers, such as the 2010 dispute in Italy in which lawyers went on strike at their exclusion
under the proposed implementation of the Mediation Directive. The dispute was settled
by requiring lawyers’ involvement. That solution may be expected to defeat wide use of
the mediation procedure in Italy, and hence be economically self-defeating for lawyers as
citizens decline to use CADR.)
The 2001 Recommendation was designed for out-of-court bodies involved in the
consensual resolution of consumer disputes: hence, it was intended to apply to ‘new forms’
of ADR bodies and not courts. The model was that of conciliation and/or mediation, but
not arbitration or any form of binding process: ‘procedures that … attempt to resolve a
dispute by bringing the parties together to convince them to find a solution by common
consent’.78 The principles that apply here were said to be:
A. Impartiality.
B. Transparency.
C. Effectiveness.
D. Fairness.
It will be seen that there is some inconsistency between the 1998 and 2001 Recommendations.
In the European Commission’s 2011 proposal, the four 2001 criteria were repeated without
further elaboration: entities should offer impartial, transparent, effective and fair ADR
procedures.79
Proposed Essential Requirements and KPIs
We find that society and the market are looking for CADR schemes to satisfy both particular
criteria, or essential requirements, and also to meet certain performance standards, or key
performance indicators (KPIs). The former govern the acceptability of the process from
the point of view of justice. The latter are more concerned with the performance quality
78
para I.1.
79
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative dispute resolution
for consumer disputes and amending regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on
consumer ADR), COM(2011) 793, 29.11.2011, Art 1.

of an individual scheme, and would enable performance to be overseen and comparisons

to be made between different schemes. It should, however, be recognised that the same
performance levels should not be applied to every scheme. Some schemes handle cases that
are inherently short and simple (such as non-delivery of goods), and others handle complex
and lengthy ones (such as pensions). This is shown from the data collated in Chapter 14. It
is also recognised in the UK system that KPIs are agreed annually between some regulators
and individual schemes (see Chapter 11).
The Commission’s recommendations were drafted over 10 years ago, when CADR was
far less developed and there was almost no sign of ODR, and they should be refreshed in
the light of the current environment.
Further, the principles applicable to a CADR system should be the same as apply to
any other validly constituted legal dispute resolution mechanism—especially a court. All
DR systems should be evaluatable against their own essential requirements and KPIs—so
that CADR systems and courts and any other system can be compared by users, so as to
provide information on how to exercise free choice. There has been some discussion of such
criteria.80
We propose that the following essential requirements should apply to all dispute
resolution (DR) systems, including CADR and courts:
Proposed Essential Requirements

1. Accessibility
a. The DR system should be visible to potential users.
b. Its procedures, costs and duration should be clear in advance of use, and be
proportionate.
c. The service should be free to consumers.
d. It should provide a service in all languages appropriate to the nature of disputes that
it purports to handle.
2. Requirements of justice
a. Confidence and trust. Every DR system should maintain the confidence of the
public and not attract disrepute.
b. Impartiality and independence. Both those responsible for the DR system and
those involved in making decisions should be independent of all who might have
an interest in the outcome, and should demonstrably have no conflict of interest.
Decisions should be manifestly impartial.
c. Transparent Rationality. Reasons should be given for decisions.
d. Consistency. Decisions involving similar subject matter should be consistent and
sufficiently predictable. Consistency should apply both to decisions of the particular
DR system and to decisions made by similar DR systems.
e. Fairness. Decisions should conform to principles of justice and fairness. Systems
should not attract unmeritorious claims, and should identify them and stop them at
an early stage.
80
See C Hodges, ‘Towards Parameters for EU Civil Justice Systems’ in S Vogenauer and C Hodges (eds), Civil
Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2012); C Hodges, ‘Public and Private Enforcement: The Practical Implications for Policy Architecture’ in R
Brownsword, H-W Micklitz, L Niglia and S Weatherill (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2011).

428 Findings
f. Competence. The DR system should not make decisions on issues or cases for
which it does not have competence, or for which another DR system would be more
appropriate.
g. Confidentiality. Confidential information of the parties should be maintained
during the DR process. Once a decision is reached, the outcome should be available.
At that stage, parties should be able to assert the continuing confidentiality of facts
that are subject to legal obligations of confidentiality.
3. Effectiveness
a. The DR system should deliver outcomes appropriate to its role.
b. The duration of its procedures should be proportionate and acceptable, given the
nature of the subject matter.
c. The cost of the system as a whole, and the fees payable in individual cases should be
proportionate to the service provided and the disputes for which it is intended.
d. Decisions should be binding on traders.
e. The system should provide for an adequate level of compliance with its decisions.
4. Accountability and verification

a. There should be appropriate and transparent oversight mechanisms, to provide
democratic and social confidence in the process and in its outcomes.
b. The ADR provider should publish at least annually data on:
i. its KPIs (the number of claims received, how they were processed, what resolutions
were achieved, how long they took, and what the costs were)
ii. claims handled, in agreed formats, identifying types of claims, urgent issues,
whether the traders complied with any agreements or determinations.
Proposed KPIs
We propose that the following KPIs should be applied, so that the performance of ADR
providers may have democratic accountability. These are matters of operational data, such
as on:
1. Claims data:
a. the number of claims received,
b. how they were processed,
c. what resolutions were achieved,
d. how long they took,
e. whether the traders complied with any agreements or determinations,
f. what type of issues were raised,
g. which companies were involved,
h. what significant issues were raised.
2. The costs of the system.

Architectural Issues
This section addresses the issue of the design of CADR systems at national, or supra-
national, levels. The starting point is the finding that many of the existing national CADR
systems in European States are different, and there is no obvious unified or best national
model. The questions therefore arise: what models or features might be best? Is full sectoral
coverage necessary? If it is, how can more extensive coverage and use be created? What is
the minimum size, and optimal size, for regulatory, CADR and court systems? Can some
small Member States, and their businesses, afford or cope with the infrastructure necessary
for multi-sectoral CADR services?
Centralised and Sectoral Schemes
No state included in this study has only a single, integral CADR scheme that processes every
type of C2B claim. In that respect, the architecture of CADR systems differs somewhat from
courts: every state has a single court system, effectively operating as a monopoly provider
of justice, even if individual courts may have special jurisdictions and be geographically
decentralised. There are, of course, national models in which there is a central national
CADR body that can accept any type of cases, but this always acts as a residual rather
than exclusive body, and its existence does not preclude the existence of other, and hence
competing, CADR bodies, which are usually organised on a sectoral basis and sometimes
regionally (Spain and France).
The advantages of having sectoral schemes include:
– expertise in the type of dispute and hence less need for technical evidence, and so
quicker and more informed decisions, which will be useful for sectors that have a high
degree of technicality, that consumers may not posses;
– suitability of the technique to the regulatory architecture of the sector, such as the
ability of the CADR body to integrate more effectively with a sectoral regulatory body;
– application of practice or standards that appear relevant for the firms in the sector.
The disadvantages can be:
– the standards of the dispute resolution process, or of business practice in the sector,
remain insulated from general standards and are below a required standard: this is a
form of ‘capture’ of the process by the sector;
– the existence of a diverse range of options for redress can confuse consumers and
businesses.
The conclusion is that sectoral CADR bodies can be useful and efficient. But their quality
needs to be maintained. The architecture of CADR systems at national, EU and global level
needs to be consistent so as to provide inter-operative functionality. A clear risk exists that if
CADR systems are to proliferate, whether sectorally, nationally or supra-nationally, there is
a risk that the options will be unnecessarily diverse in architecture and means of operation.
That will be confusing to all, especially to consumers, and tend to chill use of CADR as
a means of attracting and capturing consumer issues. There needs to be some order and
consistency to the overall architecture. We have found that national architectures of CADR
systems are already significantly different, despite the fact that many schemes claim to

430 Findings
satisfy the EU Recommendations. There may be virtue in allowing some, or maybe all,
elements of the CADR provider system to operate freely within the private sector or freely
within national models, since this may lead to design elements that are appropriate to local
conditions and tend to encourage innovation. However, some order and consistency needs
to be introduced in order to maximise the benefits of CADR within the internal market.
We suggest that the keys to this problem of development of sustainable CADR coverage,
whilst avoiding proliferation of systems that are hugely diverse and confusing, are simplicity
and having a single portal for all consumer claims, whether it operates as a first- or last-
stop. In our view, the considerations favouring a full horizontal coverage outweigh the
considerations that argue against.
Maximising Usage: Unified Architecture, Visibility, Consistency and Trust
It is striking that there is a vast difference in usage between different CADR schemes across
different countries: see chapter 14. The differences between similar schemes clearly exceed
what might be expected, for example for similar sectors in different jurisdictions. The
major factors that encourage high usage appear to be high visibility of the CADR scheme,
confidence in its impartiality, and the fact that it is attractive in terms of cost and duration.
A significant number of CADR schemes fail such criteria and, accordingly, their usage
levels are very low.
The Netherlands (see Figure 15.4)81 shows that if consumers and those who signpost
CADR schemes are aware that there must be an CADR scheme for every, or most, sectors,
then visibility of all and every CADR scheme will be increased, and this will have a
considerable effect on usage rates. Consumers will think there is a suitable CADR scheme
that covers the particular sector in which the trader that they have an issue with operates.
This perception will increase pressure on traders to establish an CADR scheme in their
sectors if one does not exist. Hence, the key is having a comprehensive national umbrella,
which provides consistency of operation of sectoral schemes and a perception that most
areas will be covered.
The key appears to be that all sectoral schemes should form part of a single umbrella,
which provides consistency of operation, and also sufficient simplicity, such that all ADR
schemes will have high visibility. After all, high visibility is a feature enjoyed by courts:
citizens and businesses know that there is a court system that can handle legal disputes, even
if they are not familiar with internal procedures or with internal variations in procedures
between different types of courts.
Figure 15.4: The Netherlands Model
GCS
81
A similar unified national scheme exists in Korea.

The CADR system in the Netherlands has taken four decades to cover virtually every
sector, one at a time. But at a certain point of development, critical mass was achieved
that accelerated the addition of sectors to the national model. Once a sufficient number of
sectors had been covered, businesses in the non-covered sectors concluded that it would be
to their commercial advantage to have CADR coverage, and the rate of coverage increased
to its current comprehensive state. Hence, businesses wanted CADR systems for their
commercial benefit. Once a CADR system is in place, it can, if appropriately designed,
provide further and ongoing benefits, and thereby maintain or even raise the standards of
commercial practice that prevail in the sector.
Similarly, business leaders in France have made a strategic decision in favour of supporting
the growth and use of CADR, but the pre-existing CADR arrangements raise two challenges
for building consumer trust and hence usage. Firstly, reliance on in-company médiateurs
raises issues of their independence and hence does not build consumer trust. Secondly,
continuance of a situation in which recommendations will not be voluntarily treated as
binding by traders does not build trust.
Having a single national CADR architecture is clearly attractive. But it may not be
appropriate for some Member States, either because they are too small to support multi-
sectors (such as Slovenia) or because their national CADR systems have already developed
to a stage where a single unified model could probably not realistically be imposed (such
as the United Kingdom, France and Germany). What, therefore, is the way forward in such
situations?
We suggest that empirical evidence for the need for a CADR solution in a country
and a sector is needed as a pre-requisite to extension of CADR to a sector. Money should
not be wasted on unnecessary systems for disputes that do not need to be included in a
comprehensive CADR system merely for the sake of providing ‘complete CADR coverage’.
Evidence of need could come from business demand, a level of consumer complaints, or
evidence of significant consumer detriment or unfair trading in a sector.
Two extremes of where CADR might not be necessary arise. There may be situations in
which the level of trade, and the level and type of problems, do not justify a solution other
than the courts, or which justify a non-CADR solution, such as action by regulators or of
some other type. At the other extreme, although the volume of complaints might be high,
companies are capable of resolving a sufficient number through their internal customer
care schemes, and should be incentivised to do so. The need for additional CADR coverage
in those circumstances would have to be carefully evaluated, since companies are already
funding CADR in-house though customer care departments.
On the other hand, a major problem that is reported by almost all CADR providers is that
their areas of competence are limited, and that the more successful they are in attracting
complaints, the higher is the number that they have to reject because they fall outside
the particular scheme’s competence. In other words, a significant number of complaints
are directed to the wrong CADR provider. As a result, the complaint might have to be
redirected to another scheme, or there may be no relevant scheme, or it might be relevant
for more than one scheme (such as in transport or holiday issues). Hence the issues are that
the width of coverage of some schemes might leave gaps, and that there needs to be some
arrangement for deciding allocation or priority whether several schemes could apply.
Taken together, these considerations do indicate a need to fill gaps, and/or to have a
general means of catching any complaints, and allocating them to the most appropriate
CADR track. It should also be remembered that small countries are unlikely to be able to

432 Findings
support multiple tracks, so their most appropriate CADR model may initially be to have a
general front-end portal that captures all complaints and then allocates particular types of
claims on to such specialist CADR schemes as might exist at a second layer. That means of
operation is already how ECC-Net and FIN-Net national offices operate, and the Energy
ombudsmen have recently started.
A response to this diversity is for states or pan-EU sectors to adopt a model that provides
a general framework and general standards, and for there to be a recognised general brand
or access portal for users. Existing examples are the Lithuanian central state authority; the
national Board framework in the Netherlands, and more restricted examples are the CCAS
scheme in the UK, and France’s recent energy ombudsman.
A single point of access for consumers can provide considerable advantages for
consumers. The advantages of the Swedish approach of prioritising consumer advice
have been discussed above. Another example is the UK’s Consumers Direct, which is a
service provided by government as a single point of information and access for consumers.
Consumers Direct can be accessed online or by phone. Consumers Direct does not itself
attempt to mediate or otherwise assist in resolving individual complaints. It provides
information on options for procedures that could be pursued by complainants, and refers
consumers to relevant dispute resolution schemes. Consumers Direct may be discontinued
but the policy of having an easily identifiable advice facility appears to be transferred to the
Citizens Advice network.
It is not feasible that a single national architecture (like the Netherlands) should apply to
CADR in every Member State. Instead, strong consistency of functions and outcomes can
be identified, and could, depending on the state of local development of CADR, be extended
further or constructed from scratch. The key is to adopt unified EU-wide and national
umbrellas for dispute resolution structures within which individual schemes operate in
predictably consistent ways. This should include CADR providers as well as courts.
The objective is to make the CADR options highly visible to consumers. Consumers
should be familiar with CADR as a concept, and have the expectation that any valid
complaint about any trader in any sector will be able to be raised with the trader and
then, if necessary, with an independent ombudsman. The CADR schemes might vary as
appropriate between sectors, to take account of the particular type of dispute (such as expert
investigation or opinion might be necessary, say in automobile or building disputes) but the
basic processes and essential requirements should be the same. But consumers should be
encouraged to think ‘There must be a CADR for my dispute, and it is one that I can trust.’
This in turn generates incentives for traders to create sectoral Boards, and support them so
as to ensure that they are trustworthy.
Hence, it is unnecessary that every State should have the same internal architecture of
CADR systems. Indeed, some Member States have passed the point at which they could be
forced into a single-provider structure like the Netherlands. Small states such as Slovenia
could not support, and do not need, an CADR body for every sector, such as is developing
in Germany and the United Kingdom.
In those States where it is not feasible to have local CADR providers that cover every type
of dispute in every sector, there are two options for development of CADR systems:
a. Vertical: some CADR bodies might operate at both national and EU level. An example
might be for complaints to be referred by a national office (such as a national generic
CADR office, an EEC-Net office, or court, or regulator) to a competent CADR provider

for the particular sector, whether operating in another Member State or on a pan-EU
basis.
b. Horizontal: some CADR bodies might operate across several (or all) Member States.
Existing examples include the EEC-Net; the pan-EU ODR platform being considered
by the European Commission; or the global ‘jurisdiction’ available since 1999 under
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (‘UDRP’) of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (‘ICANN’) on the recommendation of
the World Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’). There is no structural reason
why CADR providers, especially those with sectoral expertise, could not provide
CADR services to consumers and businesses in other countries. Such a system already
operates under the EU’s New Approach system with notified bodies.
Some national disputes can be resolved by fora in other jurisdictions. For example, all EU
disputes involving PayPal, which is based in Luxembourg, are resolved by the UK FOS
system. Disputes requiring sectoral expertise could be outsourced to CADR providers in
other states.
Filling Gaps to Extend Coverage
The Leuven study recommended that an ADR scheme with general competence and
guaranteed geographical coverage is a necessary complement for sector specific mediation
and arbitration schemes.82 Some Member States have universal horizontal coverage of
CADR: a CADR body will exist to which consumers may bring any complaint against any
trader in that State. Examples are the Nordic states, Spain and CEE states. In contrast, some
large Member States do not have full horizontal CADR coverage. Consumer complaints
may only be brought to such CADR bodies as exist, and about such traders as are subject
to such sectoral CADR schemes. This is the position in the United Kingdom, Germany
and France. In the Netherlands, coverage depends on whether the trader belongs to a trade
association that has joined the CADR system, or has adhered voluntarily, which many
small traders will not have done. It is clear that coverage of CADR schemes is spreading in
those States from sector to sector, over time. But it is not comprehensive, as the European
Commission’s 2011 proposals would require. The example of the Netherlands and the UK
show that spontaneous sectoral CADR schemes can eventually coalesce to form an almost
universal comprehensive national system.
However there are three drawbacks that arise in considering how a comprehensive
national model might be created along the precedent of the Dutch system. First, organic
growth takes a long time. It took 40 years for enough individual Geschillencommissie
boards to be created, such that a reasonably comprehensive single national model can be
said to exist. Secondly, all the sectoral CADR schemes must have sufficient similarity in
structure and operation that they can be considered to be sufficiently compatible to form
a single national ‘system’. If there is too much diversity in sectoral CADR schemes, of
whatever kind, consumers would not be convinced that a reliable integral national system
with comprehensive coverage existed. Thirdly, if full coverage is desired, by definition
there must be no gaps. This means not only the obvious point that all sectors much be
covered, but also that all traders must belong, or be subject to, a CADR scheme. This
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434 Findings
is an inherent problem with any voluntary CADR scheme. There may be some traders,
especially small businesses, who are not members of a trade association and/or are not
members of a sectoral CADR scheme. That is certainly the case in the Netherlands, the
UK, Germany and France.
It can be argued that this third drawback can be seen as a strength. In the Dutch
system, for instance, there is an incentive for traders to adhere voluntarily to the code and
Geschillencommissie board for their sector, since the ability to advertise that fact brings
commercial advantage. Nevertheless, not every trader is subject to a Geschillencommissie
board in the Netherlands, so although the system has many admirable features, it is not
comprehensive, and consumers cannot bring every complaint to a CADR scheme. Gaps
in coverage, whether at sectoral or trader levels, can only be filled by making coverage
mandatory, and that comes with consequences and a cost.
The European Commission has proposed, and many policy-makers and consumer
representatives argue, that there should be full coverage by CADR pathways for every B2C
dispute. But how could this be achieved for states like France, Germany and the UK? The
issue is not whether ADR is a good idea for consumer disputes (almost every country
thinks it is), nor how a central, residual body could be established (a structure that would
fit into the national architecture is reasonably obvious in most countries), but how it
could be paid for in a time of economic stringency. Governments that are now completely
focused on cutting public expenditure will be reluctant to make public funds available to
establish a residual CADR scheme: they do not know how much it might cost, since they
do not know how many complaints it might attract. They also do not want to impose the
cost on businesses, since the overriding economic strategy is to encourage private sector
recovery as swiftly as possible. Could these issues be overcome? We believe they can.
The options for making CADR comprehensive across all sectors are:
a. To leave CADR as voluntary and let market forces gradually operate to extend coverage.
The problems with this approach are that progress might be very slow, and there is no
guarantee that all sectors would eventually be covered, if that is desired.
b. To make it mandatory on traders to offer CADR but without specifying which type of
CADR should be adopted. This is theoretically achievable. It has the advantage that
the market is left to devise CADR schemes that are appropriate for sectors, to pay
for them, and thus to exert pressure on CADR providers to offer cost-efficient and
effective services, and to innovate.
c. To create a statutory CADR provider, such as an Ombudsman.
But the problem with options b and c are that they are unattractive in the current economic
climate.
Creating a residual CADR scheme would involve two types of costs: the costs of
establishment and the running costs in processing whatever volume of claims occurs.
Various options arise for establishing a residual scheme, such as:
– Merge existing sectoral CADR schemes, so as to reduce gaps and introduce economies
of scale into shared overheads, and reduce wasted costs through the need to reject.
– Encourage more sectors to introduce sectoral CADR schemes funded by the business
sectors, which would reduce the number of residual disputes not covered by sectoral
schemes.
– Introduce more advice schemes, to reduce the number of disputes that arise.

– Maximise the transparency of complaint data held by CADR schemes and regulatory
agencies, so as to reduce the number of disputes by maximising the ability to identify
problems and the speed of doing so.
– Reject the CADR approach entirely, and direct consumer complaints at the courts
and/or at regulatory bodies. This is a highly unattractive option, which is really the
proof of the pudding. The UK’s OFCOM receives around 200,000 complaints annually.
Most of these should be directed at the CADR bodies, and represents a huge wastage
of the regulator’s resources. Equally, the cost of maintaining court systems is clearly
far higher than that of CADR systems: the whole point is CADR systems is that they
are far cheaper than courts. Furthermore, in most countries, courts involve significant
public expenditure, whereas CADR systems are mainly privately funded. This option
does not make economic sense. The rational economic solution is to transfer C2B
disputes away from courts to CADR schemes.
– Persuade or require business to fund a residual CADR scheme.
How many disputes would a residual CADR scheme have to process? The scale of demand
in countries may, in fact, be quite limited. This is particularly so in the Netherlands and
the UK. The reason is that many sectoral CADR schemes already exist in those states.
The demand, therefore, comes from, firstly, those sectors that have no CADR scheme and
no effective ability to handle disputes through other ways, notably by in-house customer
relations departments, and, secondly, traders who are not members of existing schemes,
usually because they are not members of trade associations, and usually because they are
small traders. There may be many small traders83 but how many disputes are they likely to
give rise to? How many consumers are they likely to affect through failure to deliver, failure
to deliver appropriate quality or safety, unfair contract terms, and so on? How significant is
likely to be their customers’ wish for redress?
It has been argued above that CADR could have advantages for SMEs and the economy
in providing an effective but low cost means of bridging the regulatory compliance gap
that SMEs face, and in providing effective and low cost regulatory enforcement by public
authorities.
In the Netherlands and the UK, private CADR bodies already exist that could provide
the infrastructure on which a residual scheme could be built. CEDR already has a residual
scheme, its Independent Consumer Redress Service, whose rules are set by CEDR, so
do not need to be negotiated with members, although fees are payable by members for
caseload. It would appear, therefore, that the establishment and basic infrastructure costs
would be limited, and case fees could cover the expanding capacity. There may be a need
for some additional initial establishment funding, but it might not be much, given existing
structures.
How could case fees be collected? The two options are for fees to be imposed on traders
by law, or accepted by agreement. Since the traders involved would probably not belong to
trade associations and may be small, they would not be expected to join a residual scheme
by agreement. But, in any event, the cost of administering a membership scheme for all
traders would be significant and the compliance rate would be questionable. The preferable
83
The definition of an SME covers all enterprises with less than 250 employees and equal to or less than either
€50 million turnover or €43 million balance sheet total. Micro-enterprises are the smallest category of SME,
with less than ten employees and a turnover or balance sheet total equal to or less than €2 million: Commission
Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises, OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p 36.

436 Findings
option seems to be that a residual scheme could be authorised by law to charge case fees
to traders who have been given an opportunity to respond to cases brought within clear
and fair procedures of the scheme. The determinations would either be binding or would
be enforceable in court on a subsequent but fast track procedure, and subject to extra cost
penalties unless the trader had good reason for not joining in the CADR procedure, or was
able with justification to bring forward further evidence that could not have been brought
forward earlier. The cost could be made a debt claimable by the consumer or the CADR
scheme. The latter may be preferable.
Thus, a residual CADR scheme could be created with standing procedures by adding
it on to an existing, substantial and well-funded scheme. The architecture could also be
designed to encourage trade associations and traders to establish (a) information facilities
and (b) sectoral CADR schemes, thereby reducing the number of claims that would be
coverable under the residual scheme. Various incentives could be envisaged. Firstly, there
could be cost advantages through lower case fees. Secondly, adherence to an official sectoral
CADR scheme could be marketed as having commercial and brand advantage. It might
have an officially recognised status, such as the UK’s CCAS badge. Thirdly, sectoral schemes
might apply higher trading standards than ‘normal’ CADR or court bodies, through being
linked to sectoral Codes of Practice that established higher standards than those required
under general consumer protection law. The Netherlands’ system is a clear example of such
an approach, as is the widely used self-regulatory Code approach adopted in UK. Fourthly,
sectoral schemes might be swifter than general residual schemes (and certainly than the
courts) since they could take advantage of specialist expertise and innovative information
technology processes. The object would not be to undermine existing CADR schemes, but
to make them more attractive for traders.
In short, it is arguable that the number of claims of a national residual scheme in the
UK and the Netherlands might be relatively limited, firstly because of the wide coverage of
existing schemes, secondly because incentives could be designed to encourage traders to
handle claims in-house, and to create more or join more sectoral CADR schemes.
In Germany, the situation may be different because of the existing culture that claims can
be brought in courts, and are backed by insurance, so the demand for CADR systems may
currently be limited, even though it might grow.
A further economic point is that the cost of CADR schemes saves money elsewhere.
Firstly, it saves money on courts. CADR schemes replace private enforcement through
courts, by functioning as what might be described as ‘surrogate private enforcement’. Both
the infrastructure and case costs of courts can be reduced if (lower cost) CADR pathways
operate effectively. Secondly, CADR schemes that have adequate transparency provide data
that can reduce the number of disputes and encourage trading standards to rise. These
points are discussed elsewhere. But the cost savings overall of these aspects could be
significant, as is shown by the data on the low level of disputes handled in Sweden and
the Netherlands. Thirdly, the best CADR systems have strong regulatory components,
and hence affect business behaviour and raise trading standards whilst reducing the need
for enforcement by public authorities. The nature of public authorities’ activities can be
altered by the presence of an effective CADR scheme, enabling the authority to alter both
its monitoring and enforcement activities, especially by concentrating more on ‘rogue’
traders whilst relying more on CADR’s more self-regulatory effects to police responsible
businesses. CADR should not be intended to deal with rogue traders: that is a matter for
regulatory enforcement by state bodies.

Best Operating Procedures
In this section, we examine some of the design and operational challenges that existing
CADR schemes face. This will consider some of the more important essential requirements
and with KPIs with which we have suggested above that schemes should comply.
Confidence and Trust
A conclusion from the empirical data in Chapter 14 is that CADR schemes will not be used
where they do not command the confidence and trust of consumers. Further, traders will
not support or, where they have a choice, fund such schemes without having trust in them.
These qualities are of fundamental importance.
It is difficult to measure levels of confidence and trust in any judicial or similar system
that decides on rights. To a large extent, the requirements of independence and impartiality
are tests that, if satisfied, themselves produce general confidence and trust in the system,
its procedures and outcomes. Requirements of procedural justice (due process) are also
important.
Ensuring high degree of confidence and trust in a CADR system is an important
requirement precisely because the system is not judicial. The state’s judicial system is
unique and monopolistic, and its decisions are backed by the coercive power of the state. In
contrast, an alternative dispute resolution system is by definition optional for consumers to
use. If it is going to be used, and to provide the benefits over courts that are desired, it must
be trusted by consumers. It must also be trusted by businesses. Both sides will in practice be
subject to its decisions, even if they are not legally binding. Hence, processes and outcomes
must be fair and just.
The measures of confidence and trust in a CADR scheme are, therefore, visible in its
statistics of use. Assuming its existence is known, if it is not trusted people will not use
it. As illustrated in Chapter 14, there is in fact a wide variation in usage rates between
different CADR systems in different Member States. That fact should tell us a great deal
about whether particular CADR schemes are trusted by one or both sides, and should
be a major pointer towards whether the internal arrangements about processes and the
independence of decision-makers is perceived as being satisfactory. It is perception that
matters here. The fact that a given mediator might be impartial is irrelevant if she is not
perceived to be independent. One conclusion is that statistics of usage and performance
need to be published so as to support democratic confidence in the impartiality of a system,
and give a measure of its level of trustability.
Accessibility
The Leuven study pointed out that the accessibility of ADR directly relates to the sort
of society Europe prefers.84 National CADR schemes use many available techniques to
draw consumers’ attention to their existence. A holistic approach is to provide consumer
education that can be utilised and inform choices at pre-contractual stages; and to provide
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438 Findings
information about complaint and dispute resolution options that can be utilised later if
necessary. Enforcement bodies can run general campaigns to make consumers and traders
aware of certain issues.
The current state of development in the UK, Germany and France is that business CADR
schemes are likely to continue to be adopted for several more sectors as part of codes of
business practice. How codes operate will continue to develop. (Developments in the court
systems and rules are also likely, such as over extending court-assisted mediation and
imposing lower and predictable costs for smaller cases. These developments will affect the
balance of use as between codes and the courts, but non-court mechanisms are likely still
to be highly attractive for consumer disputes.) There may be quite a proliferation of CADR
schemes in different business sectors. This should be good for consumers and business in
theory, but the proliferation will itself bring problems.
Several aspects should be examined. How should experience and best practice be analysed
and shared, and improvements made? Should there be a standard for CADR systems?
Should there be some centralisation of mediation, conciliation and arbitration functions? If
so, should there be multiple entry ports, or just a small number? How can improvements in
outcomes (speed, cost, effects) be obtained? How can those in dispute access information
about CADR and access its processes? Should there be greater promotion of CADR options?
Sweden has good accessibility because of the simple national structure of advice and
ADR bodies. The Dutch system also has the advantage of standardisation, which increases
visibility. The UK introduced a national first point of contact for consumer advice, called
Consumer Direct, which may be accessed by phone or website, which refers consumers to
the relevant high quality specialist advice and redress services (such as code schemes or
ombudsmen). This has been a considerable success. The Belgian Belmed takes a considerable
step forward in terms of accessibility through the single national web platform, but the
current challenge is to build enough sectoral CADR bodies for the system to function with
full or adequate coverage.
There are in fact many CADR schemes that are not particularly visible, and have not
been notified to the Commission since they do not satisfy every one of the notification
requirements. Some major schemes (examples in Sweden, French insurance and other
schemes) operate well, but are denied official recognition and publicity. Equally, some less
satisfactory schemes may exist and use the name ‘ombudsman’ or call themselves ‘CADR’
but not operate well. These issues of quality, use of names, and visibility need to be addressed.
Language
Language is the biggest barrier to cross-border complaints. But larger schemes have the
resources to provide translation facilities. The UK FOS is able to work in 49 languages.
This points towards the advantages of being able to employ economies of scale. Should
CADR bodies seek to pool resources, or might a centralised facility be useful? The language
capability of the ECC-Net is a useful resource in this respect. ODR can provide multiple
communication platforms: Stanford University is trying to establish a communications
standard, related to the B2B Electronic Data Interchange standard.

Access Cost
Should consumers have to pay a fee to access a CADR scheme? The principal argument in
favour of this is that every service has to be funded. In particular, the state charges users fees
for the dispute resolution services that it provides through the courts (France is one of the
few countries where court fees are very limited). Users also have to fund their own lawyers,
and the transaction fees, unless exempted through legal aid, are usually transferred to the
loser at least in part.85 There may be an argument that charging a fee would introduce a
proportionality check, since a user would review whether the cost justified the sum or issue
at stake. There may be a residual argument that some time-wasting or fraudulent claims
may be made, perhaps concerning types of issues rather than all. It would be useful to have
some empirical evidence on the second and third issues, but this study has not revealed
particular evidence of these risks.
On the other hand, the principal arguments would be that the policy is to encourage
consumers to use CADR systems, especially if the schemes are designed to produce
important feedback information on market issues. Identification of an important market
issue may have little relevance to the value of an individual claim, but the mere identification
of a dispute, especially where there is a mass issue, will be important. In those systems,
especially ODR systems, that may be attractive to SMEs, there is also a similar accessibility
point.
A 2005 study on ADR in the EU found that mediation would be more easily accepted
by unequal or private parties if it were free of charge.86 The Leuven study found that only a
limited number of arbitration schemes apply loser pays against the consumer.87
We have found that the clear majority of CADR schemes are in fact free to the consumer.
This is even established as a ‘principle’ in the French Charter (although the French ‘principle’
that the courts are fee has clearly influenced this rule). The ‘state of the art’ (or of the market)
is clearly that consumer CADR schemes should be free to consumers.
It should be noted that some ombudsmen believe that the pyramid structure (illustrated
in Figures 15.1 and 15.3) assist in resolving disputes, since the downward pressure (akin to
‘the shadow of the law’ as exerted by courts) focuses minds on problems and induces a sense
of proportionality.
Efficiency
Many of the procedures involve paper-based or online procedures only, and are hence quick
and cheap. Thus, they tend to have features that look more inquisitorial than partisan, at
least on the basis that many schemes do not hold hearings.
A major factor that affects the duration of processes appears to be whether decisions are
made by panels of three or by a single person. A panel of three has advantages of balance
and expertise. However, how important are these factors in cases where consumers and
businesses seek swift solutions, and costs can be cut? Might different models be appropriate
85
C Hodges, S Vogenauer & M Tulibacka, The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Approach
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
86
A De Roo and R Jagtenberg, ‘ADR in the European Union: Provisional Assessment of Comparative Research
in Process’ in L Cadiet, E Jeuland and T Clay, Médiation et arbitrage. Perspectives comparatives (Paris: LexisNexis,
2005) p 185.
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440 Findings
for different sectors or types of case, on a basis of proportionality? It may be that the level
of trust in courts or arbitrators in some Member States is less than in others, which might
strengthen the case for decisions by a panel of three. However, where trust in the impartiality
and independence of the decision-maker is not an issue, a single individual should suffice.
Many CADR providers report that they receive a significant proportion of complaints
that are not within their particular jurisdiction. This can waste a great deal of time on
the part of consumers and CADR bodies. There are various reasons for this situation.
Firstly, CADR bodies report that consumers have failed to give traders an opportunity (or
sufficient opportunity) to resolve the matter directly. Secondly, there may be confusion over
what complaints are within the scope of a particular CADR body, either because there may
be different CADR bodies with different jurisdictions, or because there may be no other
relevant CADR body (hence, a gap in coverage). Thirdly, such a gap in coverage may lead to
people trying to contact one CADR body because it is all that exists, even though it cannot
handle the case. Fourthly, many consumers may simply be requesting information about
a product or service, rather than wishing to raise a dispute. The solutions appear to lie in
encouraging higher visibility of CADR generically, and of the fact that in-company and
external assistance forms a holistic whole, such that the former should be contacted first.
Independence and Impartiality
We have found a range of arrangements in the CADR systems that claim to satisfy the
principles of independence and impartiality: CADR providers are located in regulatory
bodies, in traders, in or adjoining trade associations, in independent private bodies paid
by firms, or statutorily independent. A spectrum of arguments is used to justify these
arrangements.
The concept of impartiality requires that the third party must be neutral between the
parties and have no interest in the outcome of the dispute, and so be in a position to be
able to form a view that is not improperly influenced by either side and is also seen to
be unable to be influenced. Hence, the third party must have no conflict of interest as
between the parties. In order to overcome any perception of bias, the third party must
also be independent of the parties. A third party might in fact be impartial, even though
having some connection with one or other primary party. But in order to guard against
the possibility of bias, and to ensure that impartiality is demonstrated, the requirement of
independence is added.88 The concept of ‘independence’ requires that a party who makes a
decision on the merits of a dispute between two primary parties must have no connection,
especially any financial connection, with either of the primary parties, and especially not be
paid by either of them.
In applying these requirements of impartiality and independence to CADR systems, three
aspects arise: the structural position of the third party; the individual characteristics of the
third party; and the source of the rules that are applied by the third party. The concepts of
impartiality and independence are well understood in relation to judges and arbitrators.
The requirements apply both to the individual who makes the decision and to the body that
supervises the process.
88
The Commission’s 1998 Recommendation required ‘Independence: guaranteeing the impartiality of the
decision-making body’. The 2001 Recommendation only specified impartiality. The 2004 European Code of
Conduct for Mediators specified both independence and impartiality.

Many of the older CADR models operate on the basis of a balanced panel, based on the
arbitration model. The panel in Nordic and Dutch Boards comprises an independent chair
(often a judge) and two other members, one appointed by each ‘side’, usually from a pre-
existing list of approved consumer and business nominees. Such a system is intended to
create the impression of balance. The independent chair will have a casting vote.
In the more recently-established CADR systems, decisions are taken by individuals. A
case may be dealt with by a case handler, who mediates and can make recommendations,
and refer formal decisions to a more senior ombudsman. Case handlers and ombudsmen
should all satisfy the requirements of impartiality and independence. The reason why these
more streamlined systems have evolved, replacing panels of three people, is simply due to
the practical reality that ombudsmen systems have become victims of their own success
in attracting large volumes of complaints, and such volumes simply cannot be processed
within what are regarded as acceptable timescales and budgets by less streamlined systems.
The judicial approach, with a panel of three arbitrators, is something of a luxury, and comes
at a cost in terms of expense and time. Those who criticise a single ombudsman system
from the theoretical perspective have to bear in mind that some such systems have been
given a democratic vote of confidence by users, visible through high case volumes.
The presence of nominated experts on a panel can have another function, namely of
providing expertise. Some consumers cases may only be resolvable with the application of
expertise. The approach of a court system would be to commission external independent
expertise, involving cost and time. The CADR solution is based on the fact that many
consumer cases can be resolved by locating expertise within the CADR ombudsman or panel.
The German Insurance Ombudsman and the many UK FOS ombudsmen have and develop
expertise in the complexities of their particular fields. Where necessary, ombudsmen can
usually call for external expert help, but this seems to be rare. The Netherlands and Nordic
panel models believe that the presence of experts on their approved lists provides sufficient
internal expertise on a panel in many cases. For example, in a dispute over whether a garage
fitted a new or reconditioned engine in a car, the issue might be resolvable by one or both of
the nominated members of the panel simply looking at a photograph.
Independence of the decision-maker is assisted by the personal prestige of the individual.
This feature is seen in the German Insurance and Transport Ombudsmen, who are
distinguished judges and/or academics. The Chair of the FLA’s two panels are distinguished
academics. Consumers’ confidence is assisted where judges are involved as arbitrators, such
as in Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal.
A possible approach involves accreditation of individual mediators or arbitrators against
published standards, irrespective of whichever body organises the process. The technique
of accreditation is similar to the process of appointment and validation for judges and
professionals. The model has certain similarities to the EU’s New Approach to product
regulation, which involves accreditation of Notified Bodies prior to their empowerment to
exercise certain delegated approval or monitoring functions as services to business entities.
Trade association code schemes

A general feature of most arbitration services is that they involve decision-makers who
are independent of the consumer representation or of the business sector. Some mediation
schemes involve independent mediators, even if the sponsoring body is a trade association,
but some trade associations provide mediation as a preliminary stage, especially where they

442 Findings
act in a self-regulatory role in relation to their members (an example of ABTA and its travel
companies).
The degree of independence is supported where the substance of the rules being applied
by a business code are approved by an independent committee that has a majority of non-
business members,89 or a regulator. The UK’s CCAS model includes wider governance and
scrutiny than occurs just from business supervision of its code, by requiring the involvement
of stakeholders such as regulators and consumer associations on a governing body, which
oversees both the substance of the code and the operation of its processes.
The UK CCAS system has overcome the historical objection to self-regulatory systems
that business will use the system as a self-serving defence against consumer complaints
and the imposition of regulation. The code systems sponsored by trade associations have
developed a model in which different functions are exercised by people who have different
degrees of independence, depending on their function. In the UK model for CADR
schemes, the initial mediation function is carried out by a body that is hosted by the trade
association but usually formally separate from it, but any formal ‘decision’ is outsourced
to a CADR body that is completely independent of the sector (such as CEDR Disputes
Group and Ombudsman Services). This model is shown in Figure 15.3. The result is that
the decision, which is accepted as binding by both parties, is made by a panel or individual
that satisfies the principle of independence. There may be an objection that the body that
performs the initial stage of mediation is not sufficiently independent. Our anecdotal
observation of these systems leaves us with the clear impression that they currently operate
satisfactorily and impartially as between consumer and trader, but that should be subject to
more empirical analysis.
This example illustrates the point that different functions (mediation, the making of
recommendations, or of decisions that are binding on one or both parties) form a continuum
in which the degree of independence that is required can legitimately vary. Thus, the Code
body may provide conciliation and administration functions, but the outsourcing of formal
decisions to independent CADR bodies is intended to provide sufficient independence of
the ultimate decision-making.
A further feature is to provide for oversight functions of such a system, with sufficient
independent members of a governing board. Such arrangements should be fully transparent,
in that all governance structures, affairs and deliberations are published. From the evidence
assembled in our study, therefore, surrogate requirements for full independence can be
based on principles of governance, transparency and separating functions, which appear
generally to operate satisfactorily.
One model, although rare, involves an oversight and appeal function, such as in Sweden,
where decisions of the Kundombudsmannen can be appealed to, and the whole complaints
function overseen by, a Kundpanelen which includes a majority of external members.
The key to satisfying the requirements of independence and impartiality is to set standards
for operating procedures of CADR bodies. If such standards are not imposed on sectors by
law (such as in the telecoms or energy sectors), they can be established (as the Office of Fair
Trading has done) as official standards, the observance of which brings official approval (by
the OFT) of a scheme, and the ability to market such approval and use of the official logo.
This has come to be regarded as the ‘gold standard’ and worth achievement by some sectors
in the UK, such as travel (initially) and motor vehicles.
89
The Chairs of the Finance and Leasing Association’s panels, for example, are leading professors of finance
and consumer law.

This official scheme not only requires the adoption of operating procedures that comply
with the standards, but also auditing of compliance, and transparent scrutiny through
publication of performance data (both of the CADR provider and of complaints processed
on traders). The publication of such data provides ongoing transparency to the market and
to regulatory oversight by regulators. ‘Name and shame’ techniques can then be adopted by
market commentators, such as consumer bodies and the media, thus increasing competition
in the sector.
It should not be forgotten that the opposite problem can occur, where the CADR body
is too close to a regulator, or even to a consumer association. Examples of close connection
between CADR decision-makers and regulatory bodies are the UK FOS, and the German
dispute boards that are located within the Bundesbank and Bundesnetzargentur. An
example of where the CADR service is located within the consumer association is found in
Slovenia, although the association merely provides mediation and representation functions,
and not a decision-making function.
It is no surprise that UK banks, for example, have long objected that the FOS is not
sufficiently independent of the Financial Services Authority. We think there is force in
that objection, and that CADR bodies should not be hosted within a regulatory body.
Nevertheless, we consider that the data produced by the CADR body, and its operations,
should be fully transparent, whether to regulators, consumers, business, government or the
media.
In-house ombudsmen: a misclassification

There are several examples of where companies have built dispute resolution arrangements
in-house: notably French médiateurs, the rare but intriguing company Swedish
Kundombudsmannen and Kundpanelen, and the British Code bodies. Several of these have
particular characteristics. For example, in order to access a French company médiateur, a
consumer usually first has to pass through several internal complaint handling tiers (that
raises issues of accessibility and duration, as well as independence). The Swedish model
has an ‘ombudsman’ plus a second appeal tier that includes consumer representatives.
The British Code model has an initial mediation function that is increasingly technically
separate from the sponsoring trade association, although usually funded by the trade
association and sharing the same premises, but with a governance structure that includes
independent people and with the function of making formal decisions on cases outsourced
to a fully independent CADR body.
These models all grow out of in-house company complaint and customer care functions.
But are they sufficiently independent to be considered to qualify as external CADR systems?
Some companies’ ombudsmen/médiateurs ague that they are neutral and impartial, and able
to make decisions that are independent exercises of their own unbiased judgment. However,
consumer and academic commentators are frequently sceptical of such arrangements, and
observe that although experts imbedded in companies may be able to apply considerable
expertise, thereby assisting speedy understanding of the subject matter of what might be
a complex issue, the fact that they are paid by the company manifestly does not satisfy
the requirement of independence that is necessary to qualify as a CADR body. The latter
view would seem to be correct. Even if an in-house ombudsman is in fact impartial, there
remains a perception problem, and the empirical evidence appears to substantiate the fact
that consumers have not placed their trust in in-house médiateurs. The better way to view

444 Findings
in-house ombudsmen is as part of companies’ customer care systems and in-house dispute
resolution systems, but not as independent external CADR systems. The point is largely
one of the use of the name ‘ombudsman’ or ‘médiateur’, in a manner that may mislead
consumers, rather than the function of the personnel.
The European Commission clearly has the same view of the status of in-house ‘ADR’
functions, since they are excluded from the scope of the 2011 CADR proposals.90 The
contrary view may be particularly contested in France. However, the reality is clear: in house
dispute resolution is exactly that, and it does not satisfy the independence requirement to
qualify as ‘CADR’.
Nevertheless, in-house customer care and complaint mechanisms do fulfil a vital and
integral function, which is an essential first stage to independent CADR systems, and should
in our view also be an essential first stage of almost all court-based dispute resolution. So
in-house dispute resolution systems are highly important, and need to be efficient and
effective. But they are not a substitute for external CADR systems.
Conclusions on independence
A possible way of looking at the diversity of independence arrangements is to view them
as manifestations of evolving models in what is a new and fast-moving field. This reduces
the criticism of particular arrangements, as they are viewed in a wider pan-EU comparative
context that illuminates the aspects of evolution. However, some current arrangements are
not satisfactory and should be reformed. The fact that some arrangements are not seen to
be satisfactory will limit the effectiveness of an CADR system, and we have found clear
evidence of low usage in such cases. The case for full independence, therefore, is not just a
theoretical one but also a practical one of whether a particular CADR scheme is going to
deliver its full functional potential. Where schemes are reformed, consideration should be
given to the reasons why complete independence should not be achieved. Perhaps there
may be reasons for taking intermediate steps.
It is important that CADR providers should satisfy the criteria of independence and
impartiality, so that civil society can have trust and confidence in the fact that they deliver
fairness and justice. Hence, case handlers, ombudsmen or other intermediaries and decision-
makers must all have no conflicts of interest, nor any perception of any such conflict.
The criterion of independence is not satisfied by in-company ombudsmen or by
ombudsmen who are subsidiaries of ministerial or regulatory agencies. Such ombudsmen
are in reality part of the trader’s customer care team, and not independent. It is acceptable
for conciliation functions to be undertaken by in-company customer care personnel or
by code bodies that are paid by, but organisationally separate from, trade associations,
provided the formal governance and oversight of such operations is undertaken by a body
that is independent of the business sector and on which a majority of members, including
the chair, are fully independent and have no connection with the sector.
The tension that emerges is an organizational one. If consumers and businesses
demand faster and cheaper performance from CADR systems, illustrated by the European
Commission’s 2011 proposal that decisions must normally be given within 90 days, are
systems involving panels too cumbersome? Is the role of two members on a panel to be
partisan? If so, is it only necessary to have a single independent decision-maker, of sufficient
personal stature? In which sectoral boards is efficiency of processing enhanced by having
a decision-maker with detailed sectoral expertise, rather than obtaining such expertise

from an independent expert? In which types of case, and hence boards, can the necessary
expertise be located within a single decision-maker? If a single decision-maker is a general
judge, will she have adequate technical expertise if she sits alone? Is it preferable for a
single decision-maker to be a permanent ombudsman, since she will have a higher level of
technical expertise?
In these questions we can see why ombudsman models have developed, replacing panels
of three ‘arbitrators’. Both models can satisfy the requirements, such as independence
and impartiality. The key drivers, however, are cost and duration, and these have driven
developments in where expertise is located. This has produced a model that has evolved
from looking like a court or arbitration panel to a distinctive expert ombudsman model.
Transparency
How much should be published about the CADR process and its decisions? The publication
of details of processes and of decisions is intended to provide transparency, and hence
support trust and democratic support for the CADR process. Three aspects arise over what
and how much should be published, one relating to the CADR provider, and the other two
to the traders and consumers involved.
We have suggested above that the structure, and details of the actual operations of a
CADR provider should be published. The KPI targets and actual performance should be
published. There has been a clear trend towards publishing such data by many CADR
bodies, but not all of them yet do so.
Publication of the details of individual complaints is partly justified as a means of
maintaining transparency of the quality of decisions of the CADR body, but more
importantly as a means providing the market regulatory functions discussed above.
Publication of aggregated data on issues and trends is particularly important. Some
commentators argue that every decision should be published. This is currently resisted by
some CADR bodies, largely on the basis of cost, especially where there are many cases
involved (only important decisions are published in the Netherlands). One benefit would be
to have available a corpus of precedents that could guide business behavior, but this is less
important where CADR only applies settled law. The use of information technology may
make it economically feasible to publish individual decisions online, in a manner that could
be searchable, but to highlight the major decisions and aggregate data.
Some traders have no objection to their names being published in relation to every cases
processed, but some object. Publishing details of individual claimants and respondents
might affect their privacy rights. There is a general trend in the UK towards publication
by regulators (Information Commissioner,91 FSA,92 Ofcom93) and CADR bodies (FOS,94
Legal Ombudsman95).
90
Proposal, n 72 above, Art 2.2(a).
91
Access to information held in complaint files. Guidance for organizations (Information Commissioner’s Office,
2011).
92
FSA is required to report every six months on the complaints that it receives: see http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/complaints-data.html.
93
Telecoms Complaints. Q2 (April to June) 2011 (Ofcom, 2011).
94
Transparency and the Financial Ombudsman Service (Financial Ombudsman Service, 2011), at http://www.
financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/publishing-decisions-sep11.pdf.
95
Discussion paper. Publishing our decisions (Legal Ombudsman, 2011).

446 Findings
The solutions to these problems involve reaching a balance between different considerations:
confidentiality of individual human rights and commercial proprietary information;
openness/transparency; free speech.96 There is also the policy issue of the extent to which the
business community wishes to support the CADR system as providing credibility, trust and
independence. The central issue is whether the obligations of disclosure are binding or not.
Hence, the future may involve introducing a statutory requirement to produce information.
Some CADR providers and ECC-Net offices publish not only whether a determination
has been made but also whether the business has complied with it. This practice has
developed in those countries and systems where decisions are not accepted as binding.
Thus, the Nordic ECC offices and regulators of course have no power to take enforcement
measures against individual traders under recommendations by CADR bodies, but non-
compliance by individual traders is given substantial media publicity by consumer and
general media. Publication and transparency about individual respondents appears to be
a practice that is growing.
An issue that concerns EEC offices and CADR bodies is that they sometimes receive
information that fraudulent traders are operating, but that if there is delay in giving such
information to public regulatory bodies the trader will have disappeared, and any ADR
decision or private court enforcement cannot be enforced.
There is an issue over how much to make public of the details of individual disputes during
the CADR process. Many court processes are open to the public, for reasons of maintaining
transparency over the integrity of the process itself. However, there is an issue of whether
individuals would be inhibited from raising valid issues if they are concerned about losing
anonymity. An opposite concern is whether anonymity would encourage fraudulent claims,
and make them more difficult to police. The extent which these issues are relevant would
require empirical evidence, and might differ between types of claim.
A matter of concern in the mediation community is whether mediators can be compelled
to give evidence in civil proceedings. In Bulgaria, France and Poland, the mediator has
immunity and can refuse to testify. In Italy, ‘the confidentiality stipulations are more
rigorous, while the Swedish mediation rules state that confidentiality is not automatic and
a special agreement to that effect is required between the parties’.
Factors Affecting Costs, Efficiency and Incidence
What lessons can be learned about how to reduce the cost of disputes resolution, and
of CADR schemes in particular? The costs of a CADR scheme depend on a number of
variables, notably:
1. The scope (range) of the scheme, ie whether it is national or sectoral. The lesson here
is that economies of scale can be effected.
2. The number of cases that a scheme has to process. The lesson here points towards use
of individual case fees, to reduce the incidence of unnecessary cases, which could be
resolved at earlier stages.
3. The number of cases that fall outside the scheme’s jurisdiction, notably those that
should have been directed to some other scheme (if it exists) and especially the
96
Note Case C-506/08 P Sweden v MyTravel and Commission; Case C-71/10 Office of Communications v
Information Commissioner; Case C-104/10 Patrick Kelly v National University of Ireland (University College,
Dublin).

number that are merely requests for information, or that are premature since they
should first have been directed to the relevant trader before being sent to the CADR
scheme. Redirection has been found to be a significant problem for many existing
schemes. The cost of processing large number of ‘invalid’ cases is considerable for
many schemes. The lesson is that attempts to reduce the number of invalid cases will
cut case costs.
4. The type of case. Some cases require more work than others. For example, personal
injury cases (not the focus of this book, but examples of some relevant schemes are
given from Sweden, Germany and France) typically involve the need for examination
of detailed records and/or of the patient, and may require complex expert opinions.
In contrast, some CADR schemes attempt to build sectoral expertise into the case
handler, conciliator or adjudicator, notably for example in financial services or
communications cases. The lesson here is that certain types of case have inherent
features that make then more or less costly. However, some schemes can build in
economies in their processes, as noted next.
5. The efficiency of the scheme’s processing process. A major factor, for example, is
whether the scheme is based on placing papers before a panel of three decision-
makers, who need to be assembled together (such as in the Nordic or Netherlands
models), or whether a case officer may handle cases, referring where necessary to a
single ombudsman (as with may schemes in UK, Germany and France). Another
factor is the ability to cut costs by relying on information technology for lodging and
processing claims, which can significantly speed up cases and cut costs. A striking
example is the French telecom scheme’s refusal to accept complaints by telephone
since that mode costs too much to process. Economies may be made in lodging
allegations, collecting documents or obtaining expert opinions more quickly and
cheaply than if they were done as distinct and sequential operations as in a court
procedure.
6. The number of cases that are received by a CADR scheme is heavily influenced by the
number of inquiries and complaints that have to be dealt with, and therefore filtered
out, at ‘lower’ levels, by consumer advice systems, in-house CADR systems, or other
arrangements. For example, a national ‘residual’ CADR scheme might not have to
handle many disputes if they have been resolved by information systems, by earlier
independent advice to consumers, by traders themselves, by earlier independent
conciliation facilities, and so on. The Nordic model appears to be exceptionally
effective in achieving both avoidance and early resolution of disputes through
accessible advice systems on the demand side. The Dutch system of negotiating
sectoral terms and conditions as a preliminary stage in establishing a dispute
resolution Board also appears to encourage self-regulatory awareness by traders and
controls by trade associations on the supply side, which tend to reduce the incidence
of non-compliance and hence disputes. The power and effects of these features on
the demand and supply sides may be very powerful in reducing the need for dispute
resolution mechanisms, and hence their costs.
It is clear that significant economies of scale can be achieved in the supply of dispute
resolution facilities. Leading examples of where economies of scale have been achieved are
the Swedish national CADR system (the ARN), which handles all types of disputes that
are not resolved by sectoral CADR schemes; the UK FOS, which was formed by a merger
of a range of voluntary sectoral CADR schemes in 2001; the Dutch Geschillencommissie

448 Findings
system, where around 50 sectoral schemes are administered on the same model by a single
foundation; and the UK’s two leading private sector CADR bodies (CEDR Disputes Group
and Ombudsman Services), which administer a range of schemes on similar models.
Conclusions
CADR has grown quietly over as long as forty years from individual techniques of
mediation and arbitration into an extensive and distinct self-standing matrix of dispute
resolution schemes for consumer-to-business disputes. Both individually and collectively
CADR schemes now provide effective dispute resolution for a large and growing number
of issues. CADR has, in fact, matured into its own universe of dispute resolution that exists
independently of the courts, and deserves to be considered on its own terms. CADR systems
provide dispute resolution for many situations that have been quietly abrogated by courts.
CADR is continuing to grow spontaneously, and has considerable further potential.
In particular, CADR offers considerable efficiency and effectiveness, since it can provide
not just dispute resolution pathways but also regulatory and behaviour control of consumer
traders and markets. CADR can be designed to integrate with regulatory, and self-regulatory,
systems in an effective and cost-efficient manner.
CADR is still in a developmental phase. Experience is still developing with different
techniques and structures. Considerable experience is already available of some techniques
and general conclusions of them can be drawn. But it is too early to propose binding models
that would apply in all circumstances. There needs to be further evaluation of the context in
which particular techniques operate, so as to clarify parameters and requirements for best
practice. Such context includes the architecture of the national legal system, the regulatory
system, and the state of sophistication of regulators and business.
Incentives can be constructed so as to assist development by CADR schemes, especially
by the private sector. An example is an official code approval scheme, such as the CCAS.
It is almost startling how many CADR systems—and certainly many of the best current
examples—are funded by the private sector. This represents privatisation of the cost of
dispute resolution that is strongly resisted in terms of ‘loser lays’ rules, but is accepted when
the outcomes can be seen as providing regulatory and commercial benefits. The implications
are considerable for saving public expenditure, and redirecting public enforcement resource
on rogue operators. Similarly, CADR offers the potential to provide cost-effective collective
redress for small consumer claims that is far more effective, swift and cheaper than court-
based collective procedures.
This analysis has been limited to C2B contract issues, but similar approaches can be
developed for other types of claims such as personal injury cases. The demand for CADR
can be expected to continue because:
– The high cost of litigation will force consumers and traders to seek cheaper and quicker
pathways;
– CADR will be pushed by more businesses as part of customer care and quality systems;
– wider adoption of enforcement policies of restorative justice will pressure companies
to seek quick negotiated solutions to major disputes, especially mass issues that require
further restrictions in government expenditure on legal aid and courts will encourage

them and companies (and third party funders) to seek quick and cheap dispute
resolution;
– the trend towards greater transparency on governance and wider involvement of civil
society will be pursued by more businesses, and lead to adoption of more code-type
solutions since they involve more stakeholders.
CADR systems will undoubtedly develop further. Innovation is usually helpful, but the risk
is one of diversification within a single market. The key question is what form of external
stimulus by governments can assist consumer CADR systems to be developed further.
The major lesson is that structures should be kept simple, so as to be visible and attractive
to consumers and traders alike. It will also keep low costs low, since that is an essential
feature in the attractiveness of those who have chosen CADR over courts. The lesson from
the Nordic and Dutch systems is that structural simplicity is essential.
In short, we are witnessing the advent of a new European civil legal system. It is not based
on the paradigm of courts as exclusive purveyors of dispute resolution services, onto which
arbitration and mediation have been grafted. Instead, CADR systems have emerged as a
discrete and distinct world of their own.
If CADR is to be of use to European civil society and the internal market, it will need
nurturing on its own terms. The aspects that deserve particular attention are issues of
structure, the independence of CADR providers, the incentivisation of in-house services,
the relationship between CADR and courts, and between CADR and regulators. There
needs to be a strategy for promoting, and for signposting, and sharing good practice, and
encouraging
A Model for a National Consumer Adr Architecture
How would a European state design a CADR system so as to maximise:

a) swift, cheap, trusted dispute resolution of C2B complaints, with full restitution where
due;
b) identification of market and trader issues, wide compliance by traders with trading
laws and even higher standards so as to prevent problems arising, prevent escalation
or spread of avoidable problems?
The principal design considerations are:
1. to maximise effective trade, and thereby minimise the number of C2B disputes, by
providing expert, informed and reliable sources of consumer advice, from a small
number of trusted and clearly identifiable bodies. There needs to be a unified national
network of advice centres, linked to expert sectoral bodies.
2. to provide a similar structure of CADR, designed so that it is inherently more
attractive to consumers and traders than the court system as a process for resolving
small disputes involving applying established law to factual trading situations. Hence,
it needs be more user-friendly, quicker, and cheaper than courts, as well as satisfying
the essential requirements for any acceptable means of dispute resolution, such as
independence, accuracy and consistency of outputs, and so on.
Almost all C2B cases involve small sums of money. Hence, the dispute resolution system
has to be proportionate in terms of cost and duration. Even court small claims tracks are

450 Findings
often challenged to fulfil the current standards demanded by modern consumers and
markets of cost and duration. Above all, the system for C2B disputes has to be user-friendly:
court systems almost always fail that test, whether on their own or especially when CADR
systems are available as an alternative. Lodging a claim should be done online, and the case
taken forward by the CADR body, acting impartially but providing swift feedback to the
consumer and trader over settlement (conciliation, provided by phone or online), followed
by delivering a decision. Even a court system that involves lodging papers followed by a
decision to mediate, and then setting up a mediation, is too slow for modern consumers
and traders, and involves disproportionate cost.
It is suggested that the outline of a CADR system should be as follows.
1. There should be a national CADR system. It should be recognisable as a system, and
have a simple and consistent structure that can be easily identified and remembered
by consumers and traders. Hence, it should not consist of a multitude of different
models or operational arrangements. It is not necessary to impose a single operational
model on every kind of sector or dispute, since some sectors might differ, but there
should not be too many variations and the variations should be few and rational.
2. A CADR body must satisfy the essential requirements. All dispute resolution bodies
(including courts and stand-alone arbitrators or mediators) should satisfy the same
essential requirements. (A suggested list of essential requirements is discussed
elsewhere.)
3. The extent to which proof that a CADR body or scheme satisfies the essential
requirements might vary. The extent to which a certification process (whether
granted by the state, or an independent body, or self-certification) depends on the
circumstances. In any event, there should be an inspection/audit process, and a
power to disqualify.
4. The name ‘ombudsman’ or ‘médiateur’ should be reserved for independent CADR
bodies that satisfy the essential requirements. Such names should not be available
for in-house customer relations of customer complaint functions, or any bodies that
do not comply with the essential requirements. It is, of course, wholly appropriate
for traders to use mediation functions, whether in-house or outsourced. However,
confusion and misleading impressions as to independence etc must be avoided
between independent CADR bodies and traders’ in-house complaint handling
functions/personnel.
5. CADR bodies that have power to make determinations on merits, whether formally
binding or persuasive, should be independent of regulatory authorities, businesses
and consumers or any other interested parties, and have no conflicts of interest.
6. All individuals acting for CADR bodies as mediators or decision-makers should
be independent and have no conflicts of interest. They should have professional
certification, obtained after undertaking training courses and refreshers approved by
professional bodies.
7. The CADR system should be free of charge to consumers.
8. CADR bodies may be funded by the state, or from any other source, provided there
are sufficient safeguards to ensure a satisfactory level of trust in their operational and
decision-making independence and impartiality.
9. Funding from business is acceptable provided there are (a) governance arrangements
that guarantee a majority of non-business personnel on an oversight board, (b) full
transparency of the funding, mode of operation, personnel, and performance of the

body, and (c) the personnel who are involved in mediation and decision-making
functions have no conflict of interest and hold professional certification.
10. Consumers should be able to access accurate, independent and comprehensive
information and advice, both before making purchases (including on choosing
between competing products and services) and afterwards (on how to contact
traders, how to complain, and possibly assistance in the complaint process). The
purpose of the advice function is to support informed and competitive consumer and
trading decisions, and to reduce the incidence of problems that need to be resolved as
disputes.
11. Such advice should ideally available from state-authorised bodies, even if funded by
business (as on the Nordic model of local Consumer Advice Offices funded by local
government, and sectoral State Bureaux funded by business associations).
12. The structure of advice and information bodies, of regulatory and of CADR bodies,
should be simple and easy for consumers and traders to understand: a clear national
structure is important.
a. For advice bodies, there should be a national body with comprehensive web
information, linked with an appropriate number of local outlets, and with a
limited number of national sectoral bodies acting as centres of expertise.
b. For CADR, there should be an ultimate and residual national CADR body, linked
with an appropriate number of sectoral bodies that would be competent for
handling all issues within their sectors.
c. For regulators, there should be an ultimate and residual national consumer
authority function, linked with an appropriate number of sectoral authorities that
would be competent for issues within their sectors, and with a network of local
enforcement authorities.
13. When any issue arises with a product or service that has been sold, consumers should
be encouraged to contact (a) the supplier, (b) any appropriate source of independent
advice.
14. Traders may if they wish inform consumers of a relevant, approved CADR scheme at
any time, before or after purchase.
15. Traders should be required to refer consumers to the relevant CADR scheme, or
inform them of their ability to contact it, when a dispute has arisen, pointing out
that the facility is not available until the expiry of the time within which the trader
may try to resolve the issue, or unless the trader sends a deadlock notification within
that period. The cost of this should be kept to a minimum. If the existence of CADR
bodies is sufficiently well-known in the country, this notification requirement may be
unnecessary.
16. When a dispute arises, consumers should be required to contact the trader first
before referring any dispute to court or to a CADR scheme, and to allow the trader
an opportunity to respond to the problem within a fixed time. This would not be
required where the trader is suspected of being fraudulent or having committed an
offence, in which case the enforcement authority should be told as soon as possible.
17. CADR bodies should not be contacted until the trader has been given a reasonable
time to respond: the cost to CADR bodies of rejecting premature complaints can be
huge. This assumes that the advice function and the CADR function are split.
18. The time that the trader should be allowed to respond and to try to resolve the issue
should be fixed, and approved by the regulatory authorities, in consultation with all

452 Findings
stakeholders. Current standards of 8 weeks seem to apply, but this may vary with size
of trader and sector and type of problem. However, any variations should be kept to
a minimum, since a national standard time would be simple to remember.
19. The dispute resolution system should follow a simple sequence:
1. Consumer contacts the trader
2. Consumer contacts the CADR, or is referred by the trader.
3. CADR tries to conciliate.
4. CADR makes a formal determination on a fair solution.
20. In diagrammatic form, the consumer should start at the bottom of a pyramid
structure. Most disputes would be resolved at the bottom level, and more would be
solved at each higher level, leaving a minimal number to be formally resolved at the
highest level. (See the pyramid at Figure 15.1, p 406).
21. When a dispute is received by a CADR body, after the trader has been given a
reasonable time to solve it, the CADR body should normally first try to reach a
solution through conciliation, and if that is not possible within a reasonable time or
with reasonable and proportionate effort, should then make a determination on a fair
and legal outcome.
22. A CADR body should give a written decision that gives reasons of proportionate
length that substantiates the determination.
23. After a CADR body has given a determination, whether it is binding or non-binding,
the opponent should be given a reasonable (fixed) time to comply, or provide
reasoned objections. The nature of CADR cases is that it would be disproportionate
to provide a CADR appeal facility.
24. If a party to a CADR case wishes to enforce a non-binding CADR determination,
there should be a fast track court procedure, so as to save costs. The procedure should
not require the need to re-examine all the evidence afresh (the case file would be
transferred to the court by the CADR), and give a reasonable opportunity for either
side to introduce fresh evidence (but subject to a possible cost penalty if the court’s
time is wasted). The court should be free to make its own determination on the
evidence: there should not be a presumption of liability.
25. In principle, the outcomes of disputes, and performance of CADR bodies, should be
transparent. Relevant aggregated data should be published by CADR bodies, which
can be aggregated with data from public agencies or any other source, so as to give
a full picture of market issues that might affect consumer trading. Such aggregated
data could inform consumer advice and choice, safety issues, protection issues, and
enforcement action. The necessary data includes the number of complaints received,
the identity of the traders, the outcomes of contacts (settled by the parties, withdrawn,
subject to a decision by the CADR body, complaint upheld or rejected), the nature of
the issues raised.
26. However, it may be disproportionately costly to make available the outcome and
reasoning in every individual case. Hence, the amount of information made public
may vary sector and type of case. The level of information made public should be
decided by the oversight agency and stakeholders, in consultation with the CADR’s
governing body.
27. CADR bodies should publish Key Performance Targets, indicating if these are
agreed with regulators or stakeholders, and their outputs on performance achieved
against such targets, at least on an annual basis. Matters covered should include total

administrative cost, cost per case handled, number of complaints processed and
outcomes, duration of processing.
28. A consumer should be free to bring a complaint in court (thereby complying with
ECHR Article 6).
a. The court would be the correct track if any point of law needs to be decided.
b. The court would also be appropriate as a safety-net or long-stop for any case
where the CADR system has broken down, or for any other valid reason.
c. However, the court would normally not accept straightforward cases that could
be resolved by an available CADR system, unless and until that CADR system
had been tried and not produced a result.
d. Court guidance may provide that a case should not be commenced unless and
until appropriate contact and ADR has occurred between the parties.
e. Court rules may provide that where a case has been commenced before appropriate
contact and ADR has not occurred between the parties, the commencing party
may or should not be able to recover his costs, and may or should be liable for the
opponents’ costs.
29. The function of CADR bodies is to apply established law to factual disputes. In
principle, CADR bodies should not decide issues of law (although there can be a
measure of discretion in cases of little legal importance).
30. CADR bodies should refer issues of law to a court for determination.
31. Equally, courts should refer a case to a relevant CADR body if it involves application
of fixed law and it is proportionate for a CADR body to process it. This will usually be
the case in mass cases.

Commission Recommendation of
30 March 1998 (98/257/EC)
II
(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)
COMMISSION
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
of 30 March 1998
on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement
of consumer disputes (*)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(98/257/EC)
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community and in particular Article
155 thereof,
Whereas the Council, in its conclusions approved by the Consumer Affairs Council of 25
November 1996, emphasised the need to boost consumer confidence in the functioning
of the internal market and consumers’ scope for taking full advantage of the possibilities
offered by the internal market, including the possibility for consumers to settle disputes in
an efficient and appropriate manner through out-of-court or other comparable procedures;
Whereas the European Parliament, in its resolution of 14 November 1996 (1), stressed the
need for such procedures to meet minimum criteria guaranteeing the impartiality of the
body, the efficiency of the procedure and the publicising and transparency of proceedings
and called on the Commission to draft proposals on this matter;
Whereas most consumer disputes, by their nature, are characterised by a disproportion

between the economic value at stake and the cost of its judicial settlement; whereas the
(*) A communication on the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes was adopted by the Commission on
30 March 1998. This communication, which includes this recommendation and the European consumer com-
plaint form, is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24).
(1) European Parliament resolution on the Commission communication `Action plan on consumer access to
justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the internal market' of 14 November 1996 (OJ C 362, 2. 12.
1996, p. 275).

456 Appendices
difficulties that court procedures may involve may, notably in the case of cross-border
conflicts, discourage consumers from exercising their rights in practice;
Whereas the `Green Paper on the access of consumers to justice and the settlement of
consumer disputes in the single market’ (2) was the subject of wide-ranging consultations
whose results have confirmed the urgent need for Community action with a view to
improving the current situation;
Whereas the experience gained by several Member States shows that alternative mecha-
nisms for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes – provided certain essential
principles are respected – have had good results, both for consumers and firms, by reducing
the cost of settling consumer disputes and the duration of the procedure;
Whereas the adoption of such principles at European level would facilitate the implemen-
tation of out-of-court procedures for settling consumer disputes; whereas, in the case of
cross-border conflicts, this would enhance mutual confidence between existing out-of-
court bodies in the different Member States and strengthen consumer confidence in the
existing national procedures; whereas these criteria will make it easier for parties providing
out-ofcourt settlement services established in one Member State to offer their services in
other Member States;
Whereas one of the conclusions of the Green Paper concerned the adoption of a Commission
recommendation with a view to improving the functioning of the ombudsman systems
responsible for handling consumer disputes;
Whereas the need for such a recommendation was stressed during the consultations
on the Green Paper and was confirmed during the consultation on the `Action Plan’
communication (1) by a very large majority of the parties concerned;
Whereas this recommendation must be limited to procedures which, no matter what they
are called, lead to the settling of a dispute through the active intervention of a third party,
who proposes or imposes a solution; whereas, therefore, it does not concern procedures
that merely involve an attempt to bring the parties together to convince them to find a
solution by common consent;
Whereas the decisions taken by out-of-court bodies may be binding on the parties, may be
mere recommendations or may constitute settlement proposals which have to be accepted
by the parties; whereas for the purposes of this recommendation these various cases are
covered by the term `decision’;
Whereas the decision-making body’s impartiality and objectivity are essential for
safeguarding the protection of consumer rights and for strengthening consumer confidence
in alternative mechanisms for resolving consumer disputes;
(2) COM(93) 576 final of 16 November 1993.

(1) Action Plan on consumer access to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the internal market,
COM(96) 13 final of 14 February 1996.

Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 – 98/257/EC 457
Whereas a body can only be impartial if, in exercising its functions, it is not subject to
pressures that might sway its decision; whereas, therefore, its independence must be
guaranteed without this implying the need for guarantees
that are as strict as those designed to ensure the independence of judges in the judicial
system;
Whereas, when the decision is taken by an individual, the decision-maker’s impartiality can
only be assured if he can demonstrate that he possesses the necessary independence and
qualifications and works in an environment which allows him to decide on an autonomous
basis;
whereas this requires the person to be granted a mandate of sufficient duration, in the
course of which he cannot be relieved of his duties without just cause;
Whereas, when the decision is taken by a group, equal participation of representatives of

consumers and professionals is an appropriate way of ensuring this independence;
Whereas, in order to ensure that the persons concerned receive the information they need,
the transparency of the procedure and of the activities of the bodies responsible for resolving
the disputes must be guaranteed; whereas the absence of transparency may adversely affect
the rights of the parties and cause misgivings as to out-of-court procedures for resolving
consumer disputes;
Whereas certain interests of the parties can only be safeguarded if the procedure allows them
to express their viewpoints before the competent body and to acquaint themselves with
the facts presented by the opposing party and, where applicable, the experts’ statements;
whereas this does not necessarily necessitate oral hearings of the parties;
Whereas out-of-court procedures are designed to facilitate consumer access to justice;

whereas, therefore, if they are to be effective, they must remedy certain problems associated
with court procedures, such as high fees, long delays and cumbersome procedures;
Whereas, in order to enhance the effectiveness and equity of the procedure, the competent
body must play an active role which allows it to take into consideration any element useful
in resolving the dispute; whereas this active role is all the more important when, in the
framework of out-of-court procedures, the parties in many cases do not have the benefit of
legal advice;
Whereas the out-of-court bodies may decide not only on the basis of legal rules but also
in equity and on the basis of codes of conduct; whereas, however, this flexibility as regards
the grounds for their decisions should not lead to a reduction in the level of consumer
protection by comparison with the protection consumers would enjoy, under Community
law, through the application of the law by the courts;
Whereas the parties are entitled to be informed of the decisions handed down and of grounds
for these decisions; whereas the grounds for decisions are a prerequisite for transparency
and the parties’ confidence in the operation of out-of-court procedures;

458 Appendices
Whereas in accordance with Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention, access
to the courts is a fundamental right that knows no exceptions; whereas since Community
law guarantees free movement of goods and services in the common market, it is a corollary
of those freedoms that operators, including consumers, must be able, in order to resolve
any disputes arising from their economic activities, to bring actions in the courts of a
Member State in the same way as nationals of that State; whereas out-of-court procedures
cannot be designed to replace court procedures; whereas, therefore, use of the out-of-court
alternative may not deprive consumers of their right to bring the matter before the courts
unless they expressly agree to do so, in full awareness of the facts and only after the dispute
has materialised;
Whereas in some cases, and independently of the subject and value of the dispute, the
parties and in particular the consumer, as the party who is regarded as economically weaker
and less experienced in legal matters than the other party to the contract, may require the
legal advice of a third party to defend and protect their rights more effectively;
Whereas, in order to ensure a level of transparency and dissemination of information on

out-of-court procedures in line with the principles set out in the recommendation and
to facilitate networking, the Commission intends to create a database of the out-of-court
bodies responsible for resolving consumer disputes that offer these safeguards; whereas
the database will contain particulars communicated to the Commission by the Member
States that wish to participate in this initiative; whereas, to ensure standardised information
and to simplify the transmission of these data, a standard information form will be made
available to the Member States;
Whereas, finally, the establishment of minimum principles governing the creation and
operation of out-of-court procedures for resolving consumer disputes seems, in these
circumstances, necessary at Community level to support and supplement, in an essential
area, the initiatives taken by the Member States in order to realise, in accordance with Article
129a of the Treaty, a high level of consumer protection; whereas it does not go beyond
what is necessary to ensure the smooth operation of out-of-court procedures; whereas it is
therefore consistent with the principle of subsidiarity,
RECOMMENDS that all existing bodies and bodies to be created with responsibility for the
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes respect the following principles:
Principle of independence
The independence of the decision-making body is ensured in order to guarantee the

impartiality of its actions.
When the decision is taken by an individual, this independence is in particular guaranteed

by the following measures:
– the person appointed possesses the abilities, experience and competence, particularly in
the field of law, required to carry out his function,

– the person appointed is granted a period of office of sufficient duration to ensure the
independence of his action and shall not be liable to be relieved of his duties without just
cause,
– if the person concerned is appointed or remunerated by a professional association or an
enterprise, he must not, during the three years prior to assuming his present function,
have worked for this professional association or for one of its members or for the
enterprise concerned.
When the decision is taken by a collegiate body, the independence of the body responsible
for taking the decision must be ensured by giving equal representation to consumers and
professionals or by complying with the criteria set out above.
II
Principle of transparency
Appropriate measures are taken to ensure the transparency of the procedure. These include:
1. provision of the following information, in writing or any other suitable form, to any
persons requesting it:
– a precise description of the types of dispute which may be referred to the body concerned, as
well as any existing restrictions in regard to territorial coverage and the value of the dispute,
– the rules governing the referral of the matter to the body, including any preliminary
requirements that the consumer may have to meet, as well as other procedural rules,
notably those concerning the written or oral nature of the procedure, attendance in
person and the languages of the procedure,
– the possible cost of the procedure for the parties, including rules on the award of costs at
the end of the procedure,
– the type of rules serving as the basis for the body’s decisions (legal provisions,
considerations of equity, codes of conduct, etc.),
– the decision-making arrangements within the body,
– the legal force of the decision taken, whereby it shall be stated clearly whether it is binding
on the professional or on both parties. If the decision is binding, the penalties to be
imposed in the event of non-compliance shall be stated, as shall the means of obtaining
redress available to the losing party.
2. Publication by the competent body of an annual report setting out the decisions taken,
enabling the results obtained to be assessed and the nature of the disputes referred to it to
be identified.
III
Adversarial principle
The procedure to be followed allows all the parties concerned to present their viewpoint
before the competent body and to hear the arguments and facts put forward by the other
party, and any experts’ statements.

460 Appendices
IV
Principle of effectiveness
The effectiveness of the procedure is ensured through measures guaranteeing:

– that the consumer has access to the procedure without being obliged to use a legal
representative,
– that the procedure is free of charges or of moderate costs,
– that only short periods elapse between the referral of a matter and the decision,
– that the competent body is given an active role, thus enabling it to take into consideration
any factors conducive to a settlement of the dispute.
Principle of legality
The decision taken by the body may not result in the consumer being deprived of the
protection afforded by the mandatory provisions of the law of the State in whose territory
the body is established. In the case of crossborder disputes, the decision taken by the body
may not result in the consumer being deprived of the protection afforded by the mandatory
provisions applying under the law of the Member State in which he is normally resident in
the instances provided for under Article 5 of the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the
law applicable to contractual obligations.
All decisions are communicated to the parties concerned as soon as possible, in writing or
any other suitable form, stating the grounds on which they are based.
VI
Principle of liberty
The decision taken by the body concerned may be binding on the parties only if they were
informed of its binding nature in advance and specifically accepted this.
The consumer’s recourse to the out-of-court procedure may not be the result of a
commitment prior to the materialisation of the dispute, where such commitment has the
effect of depriving the consumer of his right to bring an action before the courts for the
settlement of the dispute.
VII
Principle of representation
The procedure does not deprive the parties of the right to be represented or assisted by a
third party at all stages of the procedure.

THIS RECOMMENDATION is addressed to the bodies responsible for the out-of-court

settlement of consumer disputes, to any natural or legal person responsible for the creation
or operation of such bodies, as well as to the
Member States, to the extent that they are involved.
Done at Brussels, 30 March 1998.
For the Commission
Emma BONINO
Member of the Commission

Commission Recommendation of
4 April 2001 (2001/310/EC)
II
(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)
COMMISSION
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
of 4 April 2001
on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of
consumer disputes
(notified under document number C(2001) 1016)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2001/310/EC)
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular
Article 211 thereof,
Whereas:
(1) In order to ensure a high level of consumer protection and to promote consumer
confidence, the Community should ensure that consumers have simple and effective access
to justice and encourage and facilitate the settling of consumer disputes at an earlier stage.
(2) The continuing development of new forms of commercial practices involving consumers
such as electronic commerce, and the expected increase in cross-border transactions,
require that particular attention be paid to generating the confidence of consumers, in
particular by ensuring easy access to practical, effective and inexpensive means of redress,
including access by electronic means. The e-Europe Action Plan, agreed by the Feira
European Council on 19 and 20 June 2000, recognised that for e-commerce to reach its full
potential consumer confidence must be enhanced, in partnership with consumer groups,
industry and Member States, by promoting access to alternative dispute resolution systems.
(3) On 30 March 1998 the Commission adopted Recommendation 98/257/EC on the

principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer

464 Appendices
disputes (1). However the scope of that Recommendation was limited to procedures
which, no matter what they are called, lead to the settlement of a dispute through the
active intervention of a third party, who proposes or imposes a solution. It did not concern
procedures that merely involve an attempt to bring the parties together to convince them to
find a solution by common consent.
(4) The Council, in its Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a Community-wide network of national
bodies for the extra-judicial settlement of consumer disputes (2), noted that those out-of-
court bodies falling outside the scope of Recommendation 98/257/EC play a useful role for
the consumer and invited the Commission to develop in close cooperation with Member
States common criteria for the assessment of such bodies which should ensure, inter alia,
their quality, fairness and effectiveness. In particular it indicated that Member States apply
such criteria to include such bodies or schemes in the network referred to in Commission
working document on the creation of a European extra-judicial network (EEJ-Net) (1).
(5) Article 17 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce in the internet market (2) stipulates that Member States should ensure their
legislation does not hamper the use of out-of-court schemes available under national law,
for dispute settlement.
(6) Electronic commerce facilitates cross-border transactions between business and

consumers. Such transactions are frequently of low value and therefore the resolution of
any dispute needs to be simple, quick and inexpensive. New technolgy can contribute to the
development of electronic dispute settlement systems, providing a mechanism to effectively
settle disputes across different jurisdictions without the need for face-to-face contact,
and therefore should be encouraged through principles ensuring consistent and reliable
standards to give all users confidence.
(7) The Council, in conclusions adopted on 29 May 2000 (3), invited the Commission
to draw up a Green Paper on alternative methods of settling disputes under civil and
commercial law to take stock of and review the existing situation and initiate wide-ranging
consultation.
(8) The European Parliament in its opinion on the proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (4),
called for the extensive use of extra-judicial dispute resolution for consumers transactions,
in particular where the parties are domiciled in different Member States and in view of
the cost and delay associated with going to court. The Council and Commission in their
statement for the adoption of the abovementioned Regulation stressed that in general it is
(1) Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (OJ L 115, 17.4.1998, p. 31).
(2) OJ C 155, 6.6.2000, p. 1.
(1) SEC(2000) 405. See Internet site: http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/acce_just/
acce_just06_en.pdf
(2) OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1.
(3) SI (2000) 519.
(4) Opinion delivered on 21 September 2000 regarding Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1).

Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 – 2001/310/EC 465
in the interest of consumers and undertakings to try to settle their disputes amicably before
resorting to the courts and reiterated the importance of continuing the work on alternative
methods of dispute settlement at European Community level.
(9) The principles set out in this Recommendation do not affect the principles laid down
in Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC which should be respected by those out-of-
court procedures which, no matter what they are called, lead to the settling of a dispute
through the active intervention of a third party, who proposes or imposes a solution,
usually by means of a binding or non-binding formal decision, upon the parties. The
present principles should be respected by any other third party procedures, no matter what
they are called, which facilitate the resolution of a consumer dispute by bringing the parties
together and assisting them, for example by making informal suggestions on settlement
options, in reaching a solution by common consent. The principles are limited to consumer
dispute resolution procedures which are designed as an alternative to resolving the dispute
in a court. Therefore customer complaint mechanisms operated by a business and conducted
directly with the consumer, or where a third party carries out such services by or on behalf
of a business, are excluded as they form part of the usual discussions between the parties
prior to any dispute materialising that would be referred to a third party body responsible
for dispute resolution or a court.
(10) The impartiality of these dispute resolution procedures must be guaranteed to ensure
that all parties have confidence in its fairness. Whether it is an individual or a group
responsible for the dispute resolution procedure, appropriate measures should be taken to
ensure impartiality and to ensure the disclosure of information to the parties demonstrating
their impartiality and competence to allow the parties to make an informed choice as to
whether to participate in the procedure.
(11) In order to ensure that both parties have access to the information they need, the
transparency of the procedure must be guaranteed. The agreed solution resolving the
dispute should be recorded and made available to the parties by the body responsible for
the procedure to avoid later uncertainty or misunderstanding.
(12) In order to enhance the effectiveness of these procedures in resolving cross-border

disputes, they need to be easily accessible and available to both parties wherever they are
situated. In particular electronic measures to facilitate this should be encouraged.
(13) If such procedures are to provide a realistic alternative to a dispute going through the
courts, they should aim to overcome the associated problems of cost, delay, complexity and
representation. Measures guaranteeing proportionate or no costs, easier access, efficiency,
the monitoring of the progression of the dispute and keeping the parties informed are
necessary to ensure its effectiveness.
(14) In accordance with Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention, access to the
courts is a fundamental right. Since Community law guarantees free movement of goods
and services in the common market, it is a corollary of those freedoms that operators,
including consumers, must be able, in order to resolve any disputes arising from their
economic activities, to bring actions in the courts of a Member State in the same way as

466 Appendices
nationals of that State. Consumer dispute resolution procedures cannot be designed to

replace court procedures. Therefore use of such procedures may not deprive consumers of
their right to bring the matter before the courts unless they expressly agree to do so, in full
awareness of the facts and only after the dispute has materialised.
(15) The fairness of the procedures should be safeguarded by allowing the parties to provide
any necessary and relevant information. Depending on the organisation of the procedure,
information provided by the parties should be treated as confidential unless they expressly
agree otherwise, or, if an adversarial approach is used at any stage appropriate measures
should ensure its fairness. Measures should be envisaged to encourage and monitor the
parties’ cooperation with the procedure, in particular by requiring information that may be
necessary for the fair resolution of the dispute.
(16) Before the parties agree to a suggested solution on how to settle the dispute they should
be allowed a reasonable amount of time to consider the details and any possible conditions
or terms.
(17) In order to ensure that procedures are fair and flexible and that consumers have the
opportunity to make a fully informed choice, they must be given clear and understandable
information in order that they can reflect on whether to agree to a suggested solution,
obtain advice if they wish or to consider other options.
(18) The Commission will include in its database of the out-of-court bodies responsible
for resolving consumer disputes information provided by Member States regarding the use
of such principles by consumer dispute resolution bodies falling within the scope of this
recommendation in order to participate in the European extra-judicial network (EEJ-Net).
(19) Finally, the setting out of principles for bodies responsible for consumer dispute
resolution procedures not covered by the principles in Recommendation 98/257/EC seems,
in these circumstances, necessary at Community level to support and supplement, in an
essential area, the initiatives taken by the Member States in order to realise, in accordance
with Article 153 of the Treaty, a high level of consumer protection. It does not go beyond what
is necessary to ensure the smooth operation of consumer dispute resolution procedures. It
is therefore consistent with the principle of subsidiarity,
HEREBY RECOMMENDS:
That the principles set out in Part II are respected by all existing and future bodies providing
out-of-court consumer dispute resolution procedures falling within the scope of this
recommendation as defined in Part I:
I. SCOPE
1. This recommendation applies to third party bodies responsible for out-of-court consumer
dispute resolution procedures that, no matter what they are called, attempt to resolve a
dispute by bringing the parties together to convince them to find a solution by common
consent.

2. It does not apply to customer complaint mechanisms operated by a business and

concluded directly with the consumer or to such mechanisms carrying out such services
operated by or on behalf of a business.
II. PRINCIPLES
A. Impartiality
Impartiality should be guaranteed by ensuring that those responsible for the procedure:
(a) are appointed for a fixed term and shall not be liable to be relieved from their duties
without just cause;
(b) have no perceived or actual conflict of interest with either party;
(c) provide information about their impartiality and competence to both parties prior to
the commencement of the procedure.
B. Transparency
1. The transparency of the procedure should be guaranteed.
2. Information about the contact details, functioning and availability of the procedure
should be readily available to the parties in simple terms so that they can access and retain
it before submitting a dispute.
3. In particular, information should be made available on:

(a) how the procedure will operate, the types of disputes that can be dealt by it and any
restrictions on its operation;
(b) the rules governing any preliminary requirements that the parties may have to meet,
and other procedural rules, notably those concerning the operation of the procedure and
the languages in which the procedure will be conducted;
(c) the cost, if any, to be borne by the parties;
(d) the timetable applicable to the procedure, particularly with regard to the type of dispute
in question;
(e) any substantive rules that may be applicable (legal provisions, industry best practice,
considerations of equity, codes of conduct);
(f) the role of the procedure in bringing about the resolution of a dispute;
(g) the status of any agreed solution for resolving the dispute.
4. Any agreed solution for resolving the dispute by the parties should be recorded on a
durable medium and should clearly state the terms and the grounds on which it is based.
That record should be made available to both parties.
5. Information on the performance of the procedure should be made publicly available,

including:
(a) the number and types of complaints it has received and their outcome;
(b) the time taken to resolve complaints;
(c) any systematic problems arising from complaints;
(d) the compliance record, if known, of agreed solutions.

468 Appendices
C. Effectiveness
1. The effectiveness of the procedure should be guaranteed.
2. It should be easily accessible and available to both parties, for instance by electronic
means, irrespective of where the parties are situated.
3. The procedure should be either free of charge to consumers, or any necessary costs should
be both proportionate to the amount in dispute and moderate.
4. The parties should have access to the procedure without being obliged to use a legal
representative. Nonetheless the parties should not be prevented from being represented or
assisted by a third party at any or all stages of the procedure.
5. Once a dispute has been submitted it should be dealt with in the shortest possible time
commensurate with the nature of the dispute. The body responsible for the procedure
should periodically review its progress to ensure the parties’ dispute is being dealt with
expeditiously and appropriately.
6. The conduct of the parties should be reviewed by the body responsible for the procedure
to ensure they are committed to seeking a proper, fair and timely resolution of the dispute.
If one party’s conduct is unsatisfactory, both parties should be informed in order to enable
them to consider whether to continue the dispute resolution procedure.
D. Fairness
1. The fairness of the procedure should be guaranteed. In particular:

(a) the parties should be informed of their right to refuse to participate or to withdraw
from the procedure at any time and access the legal system or other out-of-court redress
mechanisms at any stage if they are dissatisfied with the performance or operation of the
procedure;
(b) both parties should be able to freely and easily submit any arguments, information or
evidence relevant to their case on a confidential basis to the procedure unless agreement
has been given by the parties to pass such information to the other party. If at any stage, the
third party suggests possible solutions for resolving the dispute, then each party should have
the opportunity to present their viewpoint and comment on any argument, information or
evidence presented by the other party;
(c) both parties should be encouraged to fully cooperate with the procedure, in particular
by providing any information necessary for a fair resolution of the dispute;
(d) prior to the parties agreeing to a suggested solution for resolving the dispute, they
should be allowed a reasonable period of time to consider this solution.
2. The consumer should be informed in clear und understandable language, before agreeing
to a suggested solution, of the following points:
(a) he has the choice as to whether or not to agree to the suggested solution;
(b) the suggested solution may be less favourable than an outcome determined by a court
applying legal rules;

(c) before agreeing to or rejecting the suggested solution he has the right to seek independent
advice;
(d) use of the procedure does not preclude the option of referring his dispute to another out-
of-court dispute resolution mechanism, in particular within the scope of Recommendation
98/257/EC, or of seeking legal redress through his own judicial system;
(e) the status of an agreed solution.
THIS RECOMMENDATION
is addressed to Member States in so far as it affects them, in relation to those procedures

designed to facilitate the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes and to any natural
or legal person responsible for the creation or operation of such procedures.
Done at Brussels, 4 April 2001.
For the Commission
David BYRNE
Member of the Commission

European Code of Conduct
for Mediators
This code of conduct sets out a number of principles to which individual mediators may
voluntarily decide to commit themselves, under their own responsibility. It may be used by
mediators involved in all kinds of mediation in civil and commercial matters.
Organisations providing mediation services may also make such a commitment by asking
mediators acting under the auspices of their organisation to respect the code of conduct.
Organisations may make available information on the measures, such as training, evaluation
and monitoring, they are taking to support the respect of the code by individual mediators.
For the purposes of the code of conduct, mediation means any structured process, however
named or referred to, whereby two or more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a
voluntary basis, to reach an agreement on the settlement of their dispute with the assistance of
a third person – hereinafter “the mediator”.
Adherence to the code of conduct is without prejudice to national legislation or rules regulating
individual professions.
Organisations providing mediation services may wish to develop more detailed codes adapted
to their specific context or the types of mediation services they offer, as well as to specific areas
such as family mediation or consumer mediation.
1. COMPETENCE, APPOINTMENT AND FEES OF MEDIATORS AND PROMOTION

OF THEIR SERVICES
1.1. Competence
Mediators must be competent and knowledgeable in the process of mediation. Relevant

factors include proper training and continuous updating of their education and practice in
mediation skills, having regard to any relevant standards or accreditation schemes.
1.2. Appointment
Mediators must confer with the parties regarding suitable dates on which the mediation
may take place. Mediators must verify that they have the appropriate background and
competence to conduct mediation in a given case before accepting the appointment. Upon
request, they must disclose information concerning their background and experience to
the parties.

472 Appendices
1.3. Fees
Where not already provided, mediators must always supply the parties with complete
information as to the mode of remuneration which they intend to apply. They must not
agree to act in a mediation before the principles of their remuneration have been accepted
by all parties concerned.
1.4. Promotion of mediators’ services
Mediators may promote their practice provided that they do so in a professional, truthful
and dignified way.
2. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY
2.1. Independence
If there are any circumstances that may, or may be seen to, affect a mediator’s independence
or give rise to a conflict of interests, the mediator must disclose those circumstances to the
parties before acting or continuing to act.
Such circumstances include:
– any personal or business relationship with one or more of the parties;

– any financial or other interest, direct or indirect, in the outcome of the mediation;
– the mediator, or a member of his firm, having acted in any capacity other than mediator
for one or more of the parties.
In such cases the mediator may only agree to act or continue to act if he is certain of being
able to carry out the mediation in full independence in order to ensure complete impartiality
and the parties explicitly consent.
The duty to disclose is a continuing obligation throughout the process of mediation.
2.2. Impartiality
Mediators must at all times act, and endeavour to be seen to act, with impartiality towards
the parties and be committed to serve all parties equally with respect to the process of
mediation.
3. THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT, PROCESS AND SETTLEMENT
3.1. Procedure
The mediator must ensure that the parties to the mediation understand the characteristics
of the mediation process and the role of the mediator and the parties in it.
The mediator must in particular ensure that prior to commencement of the mediation the
parties have understood and expressly agreed the terms and conditions of the mediation

European Code of Conduct for Mediators, 2004 473
agreement including any applicable provisions relating to obligations of confidentiality on

the mediator and on the parties.
The mediation agreement may, upon request of the parties, be drawn up in writing.
The mediator must conduct the proceedings in an appropriate manner, taking into account
the circumstances of the case, including possible imbalances of power and any wishes the
parties may express, the rule of law and the need for a prompt settlement of the dispute.
The parties may agree with the mediator on the manner in which the mediation is to be
conducted, by reference to a set of rules or otherwise.
The mediator may hear the parties separately, if he deems it useful.
3.2. Fairness of the process
The mediator must ensure that all parties have adequate opportunities to be involved
in the process.
The mediator must inform the parties, and may terminate the mediation, if:
– a settlement is being reached that for the mediator appears unenforceable or illegal,
having regard to the circumstances of the case and the competence of the mediator for
making such an assessment, or
– the mediator considers that continuing the mediation is unlikely to result in a settlement.
3.3. The end of the process
The mediator must take all appropriate measures to ensure that any agreement is reached
by all parties through knowing and informed consent, and that all parties understand the
terms of the agreement.
The parties may withdraw from the mediation at any time without giving any justification.
The mediator must, upon request of the parties and within the limits of his competence,
inform the parties as to how they may formalise the agreement and the possibilities for
making the agreement enforceable.
4. CONFIDENTIALITY
The mediator must keep confidential all information arising out of or in connection with the
mediation, including the fact that the mediation is to take place or has taken place, unless
compelled by law or grounds of public policy to disclose it. Any information disclosed in
confidence to mediators by one of the parties must not be disclosed to the other parties
without permission, unless compelled by law.

French Charter of Consumer
Mediation1
PREAMBLE
Created by Law No. 2010-737 of 1 July 2010 the Commission of Mediation of Consumer
Affairs (CMC) is responsible for issuing advice and proposes measures of any kind to
evaluate, improve, and disseminate best practices for non-judicial mediation in consumer
matters.
The Commission of Mediation of Consumer Affairs is an independent body, consisting of

one President and five consumer representatives, of which five are professionals and two
qualified individuals.
This commission is not intended to address individual mediation cases but to participate
actively in the development of quality mediation in consumer matters.
While establishing the Commission on October 20, 2010, the Secretary of State for
consumers made it her particular mission to develop a charter of good practice for
mediation. The purpose of this charter is to establish principles and rules to be followed
by mediators as well as businesses, industries, and governments that implement mediation.
This Charter is part of the European Directive 2008/52/EC of 21 May 2008 “on certain
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.”
It will serve as a foundation for the evaluation of the practices of mediators by the
commission.
ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITION OF CONSUMER MEDIATION
Mediation of consumer matters is a structured process in which the mediator’s mission is to

facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two parties, one of which is a professional and
the other a consumer, an individual acting outside of his profession. Mediation is conducted
by an impartial mediator with competence and efficiency.
Mediation is a process freely agreed to by the parties. The parties free to stop at any time, to
continue, or not to enter into the mediation. Mediation requires the parties to show loyalty
that is characterized by a willingness to work together and to meet information requests
from the mediator.
1
http://www.mediation-conso.fr/charte.html.

476 Appendices
The mediation is free for consumers.
Mediation is a confidential process unless the parties agree otherwise.
ARTICLE 2 - THE COMMITTEE ON MEDIATION IN CONSUMER MATTERS (CMC)
The CMC is responsible for assessing good practices in mediation.
In this context, the CMC is to capture or takes notice of any proposed new charter of
mediation to ensure that the conditions for its establishment and its operation comply with
this Charter. The CMC performs the same evaluation regarding mediation of existing
consumer matters. Following this assessment, the CMC invited the Mediateur to agree
to this Charter. He will then appear as a signing mediator of this charter on the CMC
website: www.mediation-conso.fr.
The mediator may mention this listing by stating: “Mediation recognized by the Commission
of Consumer Mediation (CMC).”
A consumer can inform the CMC of the misapplication by any mediator who referred to
provisions in this Charter. The CMC may remove any mediator from its site who practices
or operates in a manner that is inconsistent with this Charter.
ARTICLE 3 – LE MEDIATEUR
Article 3.1 - Guarantees of impartiality and independence
The Médiateur must have the necessary guarantees of impartiality and independence in the
exercise of his functions. He must also have the assurance of the parties. For this purpose,
he is expected to adhere to the following rules:
- An advisory opinion of the consumer association may be requested to approve the

appointment.
- In the case of a commercial mediation, the appointment has to be at the highest level
- On his appointment, the Médiateur agrees to report any inconsistency or conflict of

interest that should arise during his term.
- The mandate of the Médiateur has a term which must be sufficient to ensure stability and
continuity in cases dealt with: a minimum period of three years, renewable in the same
manner as the appointment, is appropriate.
- A Médiateur cannot be revoked during his term of office, except for legitimate reasons.
He may not combine his mediation function with other functions within the company or
sector.

- The Médiateur must have his own means of operation, including an independent budget
and a dedicated team appropriate to his needs. His jurisdiction should be as wide as possible.
- The Médiateur is an identified person. When there is a mediation body, that body is
represented by its president.
Article 3.2 - Guarantees competence and efficiency
The Médiateur is chosen for his human qualities and competence. The Médiateur
warrants, as applicable, training or experience appropriate to the practice of mediation
in consumer matters. He is committed to regularly updating his knowledge.
Legal training or specialist expertise is not essential but the Médiateur must be able to call
upon people in the event that legal or technical assistance is needed.
ARTICLE 4 - MEDIATION PROCESS
Section 4.1 - Information and communication
A company that has its own Médiateur, or a business using a sectoral Médiateur, has to
inform consumers adequately about the existence of the Médiateur’s role, scope, free
proceedings, referral procedures and possibility for the consumer to be assisted by any
person of his choice.
All appropriate contractual documents between the professional and the consumer must
include details of the Médiateur.
Information on the Médiateur is communicated via the websites including businesses or

sectors concerned and should be easily accessible.
Eligibility to apply to the Médiateur, with contact information and referral procedures is
indicated at the negative response of the last level internal appeals procedure.
Communications on the Ombudsman should never be used for advertising purposes.
Article 4.2 – Reference
The Médiateur can only be approached after all other avenues of the consumer service have
been taken, or in the absence of a response of the customer services within the deadline of
two months.
The existence of a customer service and appropriate quality is essential for the proper
functioning of the mediation but cannot be confused with it.
The referral to the Médiateur must be made in writing and sent by mail, email or fax. Any
request for mediation results in an acknowledgment.

478 Appendices
It is recommended that the Médiateur redirects complaints to the right level if the case was
sent prematurely.
If he declines jurisdiction, the Médiateur must inform the consumer in writing.

In cases of multiple mediation systems, the consumer is free to enter the mediator of their choice.
Section 4.3 Conduct
The date of receipt of the request for mediation, if it is admissible, is the starting point for
mediation.
Each party must be able to hear their views.
The Médiateur and the parties are bound by confidentiality regarding the names of the
parties, the information obtained during the investigation of the dispute and the facts they
have learned in the context of mediation.
The Médiateur forms his opinions on the basis of law and equity.
He informs the parties in writing of the result of his mediation. His answer should be clear
and easily understandable. At that date, the statute of limitations begins to be operational.
The parties are free to accept or reject the Médiateur’s proposed solution; however, the
refusal to follow the Médiateur’s opinion must be substantiated and forwarded to the
consumer and the mediator.
The end of the mediation process may be found, at the request of the parties, in a
written protocol which states the points of agreement that the parties have decided to.
This MOU may be subject to approval by a judge as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
If the notice was accepted by the parties, the Médiateur is destined to be informed by them
of any difficulties in the implementation of this notice.
Article 4.4 Term
The duration of mediation should normally not exceed two months from the date of
acknowledged receipt of the request for an admissible mediation. In the case of complex
litigation, mediation can be extended once, for the same period, at the request of the
Médiateur.
Article 4.5 Freedom of mediation
Each party retains the right to terminate the mediation at any time. For consumers, the
mediation cannot, under any circumstances, be a prerequisite for legal action.

ARTICLE 5 - ANNUAL REPORT AND PUBLIC MEDEATEUR PROPOSALS
Each Médiateur prepares an annual report which is published and sent to the CMC for
information.
This report includes an analysis of cases (total number, number of cases rejected, number
of positive reviews to the professional or consumer...) and a summary of the main disputes
dealt with in the year. It also includes the charter under which the mediator holds office, his
career and the means at his disposal to accomplish his missions.
In addition, from the treatment of individual cases, the mediator may make proposals for
improvement to prevent the renewal of certain repetitive or significant litigation, and help
improve the quality of service sectors.
These recommendations, which follow the implementation, are included in the Médiateur’s
annual report.
The principles and rules defined in this document must be included in each of the charters
establishing a Médiateur for consumer matters.
This Charter refers in particular to the following texts:
- Articles L534-7, R534-11 and R534-12 of the Consumer Code
- Recommendation No. 98/257/EC of the European Union March 30, 1998 on the principles
applicable to bodies responsible for the resolution of consumer disputes (JOCEL115 of
April 17, 1998).
- European Recommendation No. 2001/310/EC of 4 April 2001 on the principles applicable

to court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes (JOCEL109 of
April 19, 2001).
- European Directive 2008/52/EC of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil

and commercial matters.
- Opinion of the National Consumer Council (NCC) of 6 July 2004 on mediation in the area
of consumer matters (BOCCRF March 1, 2005).
- Opinion of the CNC of 27 March 2007 on mediation in the field of consumer matters and
alternative dispute resolution.
- Charter of Médiateur of public services.
- Report of the State Council of July 20, 2010 “Developing mediation as part of the European
Union”


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Consumer ADR in Europe

Hodges Consumer ADR in Europe.indb 1 4/19/12 9:19 AM

Also in this series:

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MA (Oxon), PhD (Lond), FSALS

M Res and PhD (European University Institute, Fiesole)

MA (USQ Australia), PhD (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON

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Published in North America (US and Canada) by

© Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

ISBN: 978-1-84946-348-5 (Hart Publishing)

Typeset by Criteria International

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Consumer ADR at EU Level

Consumer ADR in Selected Member States

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1. Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable 455

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Summary Contents vii

Consumer ADR at EU level

1. Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU 1

Consumer ADR in Selected Member States

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The Institutional Landscape for Consumer Issues 38

6. The Netherlands 129

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10. Sweden 229

11. The United Kingdom 253

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Motor Codes 320

12. Best Practice in Customer Care in the UK 339

13. Cross-border Consumer ADR 355

14. Empirical Findings 367

15. Findings and Conclusions 389

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CADR with Business Codes of Practice 402

1. Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable 455

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The United Kingdom

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Table 14.1 Details of complaints by scheme 370

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Magdalena Tulibacka is an independent researcher whose published research work covers

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Lewis Shand Smith of The Ombudsman Service

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ABTA The Travel Association (formerly Association of British Travel Agents)

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MKB Brancheorganisatie voor het midden- en kleinbedrijf - Employers

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