Hybrid CoE Paper 12 Fifth Wave of Deterrence WEB

Hybrid CoE Paper 12
Deterring hybrid threats:

Towards a fifth wave of
deterrence theory and practice
Sean Monaghan – March 2022

Hybrid CoE Paper 12 – 2
Cover photo: Dmytro Kapitonenko / shutterstock.com
Hybrid CoE Papers are finalized pieces of analysis on a topic related to

hybrid threats, based on one or several research questions. They may
be either conceptual analyses or based on a concrete case study with
empirical data.
The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

tel. +358 400 253800 www.hybridcoe.fi
ISBN (web) 978-952-7472-28-6

ISBN (print) 978-952-7472-29-3
ISSN 2670-2053
March 2022
Hybrid CoE’s mission is to strengthen its Participating States’ security

by providing expertise and training for countering hybrid threats, and
by enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in this respect. The Centre is an
autonomous hub for practitioners and experts, located in Helsinki, Finland.
The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors.
Contents
Executive summary....................................................................................................................................5
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................................7
1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................8
2. What are hybrid threats?.................................................................................................................9

2.1. The hybrid threat landscape..............................................................................................................9
2.2. Seven features of hybrid threats.....................................................................................................11

3. Deterrence: the basics..................................................................................................................... 15
3.1. The ‘three Cs’ of deterrence: capability, credibility and communication............................. 16
3.2. Why hybrid threats are difficult to deter..................................................................................... 16
4. Restoring the foundations of deterrence against hybrid threats..................18

4.1. Deterrence by denial..........................................................................................................................18
4.2. Deterrence by punishment.............................................................................................................. 20
4.3. Restrictive deterrence....................................................................................................................... 21
4.4. Absolute deterrence: keep the relief valve open (in most cases)..........................................22
4.5. Cumulative deterrence......................................................................................................................22
4.6. Extended deterrence........................................................................................................................ 24
4.7. Reassurance........................................................................................................................................ 26
4.8. Inducement......................................................................................................................................... 26
4.9. Cyber deterrence: applying recent lessons to fast-forward hybrid deterrence................ 28
4.10. Re-inventing peace through rules and norms............................................................................ 29
4.11. Playing the long game...................................................................................................................... 30
4.12. Lessons from the ‘45-year-long grey zone struggle’................................................................ 30
4.13. The limits of deterrence.................................................................................................................... 31
4.14. Restoring the foundations................................................................................................................33
4.15. A framework for deterring hybrid threats....................................................................................33
5. New horizons...........................................................................................................................................35
5.1. The role of military force in deterring hybrid threats...............................................................35
5.2. Going beyond deterrence................................................................................................................. 41
5.3. The further evolution of hybrid threats and deterrence......................................................... 42
5.4. Deterring hybrid threats: towards a post-modern, ‘fifth wave’ of deterrence
theory and practice?......................................................................................................................... 46
Author................................................................................................................................................................ 51
Executive summary
This Hybrid CoE Paper looks again at theory and practice to restore the
foundations of deterrence against hybrid threats below the threshold of
war. It also looks to the future of hybrid threats and new horizons in de-
terrence – including the prospect of a post-modern, fifth wave of deter-
rence theory and practice.
Hybrid threats combine modern tools of statecraft to seek gains while

avoiding reprisal. Hybrid threats are not new – they exploit classical prin-
ciples of strategy such as winning without fighting, the indirect approach,
measures short of war and salami-tactics. But they are newly relevant to
strategic challenges in the years ahead. Future trends in power, interde-
pendence and technology suggest more motivated revisionist actors will
have more access to means that can target more vulnerabilities more cost
effectively, using tools and domains of action which cover the full spectrum
of modern domestic and international life.
The rise of hybrid threats can be traced to both successes and failures of
deterrence. While deterrence has often succeeded in dissuading revisionist
actors from resorting to conventional armed aggression, it has also failed
to prevent hostile state activity – in the form of hybrid threats.
Hybrid threats undermine the foundations of deterrence – capability,

credibility and communication – in specific ways. This paper develops sev-
eral insights and principles to help restore these foundations by refining
and applying classical principles such as absolute vs restrictive deterrence,
general vs. immediate deterrence, direct vs extended deterrence, denial vs.
punishment and deterrence vs compellence. It also offers a framework for

applying these principles to deter hybrid threats.
This paper also points to four new horizons for further development
and research. These include the role of military force in deterring hybrid
threats, going beyond deterrence, the evolution of hybrid threats and the
future of deterrence – on which the prospect of a post-modern, fifth
wave of deterrence theory and practice is outlined. This idea widens the
concept of deterrence across the breadth of hybrid threats, including the
established literature on cross-domain deterrence. Such a fifth wave has
elements of continuity with previous waves – such as psychology, the role
of military force, the centrality of state-actors – but also new elements, in-
cluding the predominance of non-military hybrid threats that span govern-
ment and society, unprecedented complexity, variety and connectedness,
a large sub-state component, and a shift away from punishment towards
denial through resilience.
Future tools of deterrence will be wielded less by the military and gov-
ernment and more by the whole of society, woven into the fabric of
everyday life. Just as some have described the coming era as involving the
‘weaponisation of everything’, deterrence in the era of hybrid threats may
become a post-modern case of the deterrence of everything. Looking fur-
ther into the future, the truly revolutionary implications of AI may invite a
sixth wave of deterrence theory and practice – when the essence of deter-
rence moves beyond the manipulation of human decisions to the inscruta-
ble logic of intelligent machines.
Acknowledgements
This paper is indebted to:

• the MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare project and everyone who
participated in it (many of these ideas were born there);

• the Dstl Head Office Decision Making project (including Aimee Feeney,
Sam Guthrie, Dr Adam Lyons, Ben Millman, Hamzah Muneer, Dr Gordon

Niven, Dan Sowik and Nik Taylor);
• the Hybrid CoE team who reviewed a draft of this paper – particularly
Viktorija Rusinaite and Stuart Mackie, who sponsored the project and
provided wise counsel throughout.
1. Introduction
Deterrence is the foundation of any strategy to used and developed further by communities
counter hybrid threats. This is why the Deter- of best practice like Hybrid CoE, and put into
rence Playbook published by the European action.
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid The paper proceeds in three parts. It first
Threats (Hybrid CoE) in 2020 is such an import- recaps the basic tenets of hybrid threats and
ant resource. The Playbook was based on the deterrence – including the foundations of
simple insight that “the rich theory and practice deterrence: the ‘three Cs’ of capability, credi-
of deterrence could be applied to efforts to bility and communication. Next, in light of the
counter hybrid threats”.1 unique challenges posed by hybrid threats, the
This paper seeks to build on those founda- rich history and recent developments in deter-
tions to develop further insights and principles rence theory and practice are examined. Several
for deterring hybrid threats. Hybrid CoE’s Play- insights are developed which might reinforce
book was practical in nature (hence the term the foundations of deterrence against hybrid
‘playbook’), whereas this paper is conceptual. threats. Finally, the paper looks to new horizons
The aim is to identify insights from deterrence in deterring hybrid threats – particularly the
theory which might improve the prospects for prospect of a post-modern, ‘fifth wave’ of
deterring hybrid threats. These insights can be deterrence theory and practice.
1. Hybrid CoE, ‘Hybrid CoE launches a playbook on hybrid deterrence’, News, 9 March 2020, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/news/
hybrid-coe-launches-a-playbook-on-hybrid-deterrence/; Vytautas Keršanskas, ‘Deterrence: Proposing a more strategic approach
to countering hybrid threats’, (Hybrid CoE Paper 2, March 2020), 6, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/
Deterrence_public.pdf. [All links were last accessed on 4 March 2022.]
2. What are hybrid threats?
2.1. The hybrid threat landscape Tools and domains
The globalized, interconnected and digitized
Hybrid CoE uses four pillars to help understand
modern world provides plenty of opportunities
the hybrid threat landscape.2
for motivated revisionists to cause or threaten
harm to create leverage.6 The tools used and
Actors
domains of action cover the full spectrum of
The shifting balance of global and regional
modern domestic and international life. Many of
power is producing more state actors that are
these offer options to cultivate ambiguity about
unsatisfied with their position in a changing
actors or actions – particularly in the digital
world. While motivated to seek actual (e.g. terri-
realm. Such a post-modern approach to conflict
tory or assets) or intangible (e.g. status or repu-
was predicted by futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler
tation) gains, they are also sufficiently entangled
in the 1990s, who said we make war how we
in the status quo to rule out acting definitively
make money.7
to break free.3 Such motivated-but-constrained
states use hybrid threats to pursue strategies of
Phases
measured revisionism.4 While non-state actors
Hybrid threat actors operate in the grey zone
may feature as threat actors and proxies in the
between peace and war. Hybrid CoE divides this
context of state aggression, they are rarely
dynamic spectrum of action into three types,
entangled or constrained enough to resort to
shown in Figure 1 below.
hybrid threats themselves. Instead they rely on
more revolutionary (violent) means.5
2. G. Giannopoulos, H. Smith & M. Theocharidou, ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model – Public Version’,
(The European Commission and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 26 November 2020),
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/conceptual_framework-reference-version-shortened-good_cover_-_
publication_office.pdf.
3. Entanglement is either ‘hard’ (e.g. dissuaded by the threat of punishment) or ‘soft’ (e.g. incentivized by the benefits of
globalized trade and interdependence).
4. Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict’, (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, December 2015), 22, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2372.pdf.
5. Including hybrid warfare, which is not the subject of this paper. See: Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Examining Complex Forms of Conflict:
Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges’, PRISM Journal, Volume 7, Issue 4 (2018), https://cco.ndu.edu/news/article/1680696/
examining-complex-forms-of-conflict-gray-zone-and-hybrid-challenges/; and Sean Monaghan, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare: So
What for the Joint Force?’, PRISM Journal, Volume 8, Issue 2 (2019): 83-88, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/
prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Monaghan.pdf. Note: Non-state actors may be used as hybrid threat tools, for example private
militias or cyber criminals.
6. For lists of potential instruments used to construct hybrid threats, see: Giannopoulos, Smith & Theocharidou, ‘The Landscape
of Hybrid Threats’, 33-35; Monaghan, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 89; S. Aday et al., ‘Hybrid Threats: A Strategic Communications
Perspective’, (NATO StratCom CoE, 2019), https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/hybrid-threats-a-strategic-communications-
perspective/79.
7. In their 1993 book War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe how, as the global economy evolves, so do the prevalent
forms of war. Based on the insight that “the way we make war reflects the way we make wealth”, they suggest ‘third wave’
economies – i.e. those increasingly dependent on information rather than raw materials and physical labour – will breed third
wave ‘war-forms’. See: Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and anti-war: survival at the dawn of the twenty-first century (Little Brown
and Company, 1993).
Figure 1: Hybrid threat phases, increasing in intensity from left to right.8
Hybrid threat phase: Priming Destabilisation Coercion
Efforts to interfere Operations or campaigns Destabilisation

and influence in to influence and achieve operations and
order to shape, goals which build on the campaigns with the
Description:
precondition and effect achieved and addition of coercive
obscure. information gathered in military threats or
the priming phase. ‘minor incursions’.
Another way of viewing this spectrum is through suggests three types of ‘grey zone aggression’
the severity or intensity of hybrid threats. RAND on this basis, shown in Figure 2 below.9
Figure 2: Hybrid threat severity, increasing in intensity from left to right.
Hybrid threat Persistent Moderate Aggressive

severity:
Broad-based, low-level, Direct, attributable, Direct, threatening,

non-military actions coercive action through attributable quasi-
with hazy attribution (mostly) non-military military or military
Description: that don’t clearly violate means which exploits action in violation of
international laws legal grey areas. international laws
and norms. and norms.
Difficult to deter as it
Very difficult to deter falls below conventional Can be deterred in
given the persistence threshoulds and can advance with
and low level of occur with little-to-no warning
interests engaged. warning.
8.Giannopoulos et al., ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats’, 11.

9. Michael J. Mazarr et al., ‘What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression’,
Research Report (RAND, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3142.html.
2.2. Seven features of hybrid threats that can target more vulnerabilities more cost
effectively.15
Hybrid threats create a defender’s dilemma
Hybrid threats combine modern tools of state-
Hybrid threats exist on a continuum of conflict
craft to seek gains while avoiding reprisal.10 They
Figure 3 below shows hybrid threats on a ‘con-
do so by presenting the target state with a
tinuum of conflict’. It also shows the ‘grey zone’
dilemma: whether or not to escalate in response
between peace and war, and ‘hybrid warfare’
to a ‘minor incursion’.11 This is known as the
(or the admixture of violent means).
defender’s dilemma.12
Hybrid threats exploit complexity

Hybrid threats are not new –
Exponents of hybrid threats seek new forms of
but they are relevant
leverage and power in an increasingly complex
Hybrid threats are not new. They exploit classi-
world. They exploit complexity to produce lever-
cal principles of strategy such as winning with-
age efficiently (i.e. while minimizing costs or
out fighting, the indirect approach, measures
downsides). Complexity is not just a problem for
short of war and salami slicing tactics.13 But they
early warning and detection,16 but for strategy
are newly relevant to the strategic challenges
writ large. This is achieved through combina-
of the coming decades. The preponderance of
tion, synchronization, ambiguity and non-linear
power amongst the status quo nations, the
effects.17 Figure 4 below shows these features
nuclear ‘balance of terror’ and the incentives
through the combination of instruments of
of participation in the globalized economy
power (stars), targeted at societal vulnerabilities
have contributed to the emergence of hybrid
(sectors), combining individual effects (penta-
threats.14 Future trends in power, interdepen-
gons) to achieve a whole effect which is greater
dence and technology suggest that more revi-
than the sum of its parts.
sionist actors will have more access to means
10. Hybrid threats are also referred to as grey zone strategies, hybrid war, hybrid warfare, political warfare, sub-threshold,
and other names. A general understanding of the concept is more useful than a strict definition. For a good recent overview,
see: The Economist, ‘What is hybrid war, and is Russia waging it in Ukraine?’, 22 February 2022, https://www.economist.com/
the-economist-explains/2022/02/22/what-is-hybrid-war-and-is-russia-waging-it-in-ukraine.
11. Elisabeth Braw, ‘Biden’s Gray-Zone Gaffe Highlights a Real Dilemma’, Defense One, 20 January 2022, https://www.defenseone.
com/ideas/2022/01/bidens-gray-zone-gaffe-highlights-real-dilemma/360982/.
12. Elisabeth Braw, The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression (American Enterprise Institute,
2021), https://www.aei.org/the-defenders-dilemma/.
13. See, respectively: Sun Tzu, The Art of War; Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (London, Faber, 1967 (1929),
4th Edn); George F. Kennan, Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-47,
(National Defense University Press, 1991); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (Yale University Press,1966).
14. Michael J. Mazarr et al., ‘Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition’, Research Report (RAND, 2018),
30, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html).
15. Monaghan, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 86. See below for more detail on the evolution of hybrid threats.
16. Patrick Cullen, ‘Hybrid threats as a new “wicked problem” for early warning’, (Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 8, June 2018),
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-strategic-analysis-8-hybrid-threats-as-a-new-wicked-problem-for-early-
warning/.
17. Sean Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Countering Hybrid Warfare’, (MCDC, March 2019), 13-15,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/784299/concepts_mcdc_
countering_hybrid_warfare.pdf.
Figure 3: Hybrid threats on a continuum of conflict
Lower
Major Theater War
Limited Conventional War

Probability
HYBRID
Irregular WARFARE
Warfare
Terrorism
HYBRID
THREATS Low intensity conﬂict
Higher
Confrontation ‘Gray zone’ Armed conﬂict
Intensity
Figure 4: Visualizing hybrid threats (synchronization, ambiguity and non-linear effects).18
Instruments of power
(MPECI)
Military
Political
Economic
Civil
E1
Information
E3 M2
Emergency
V1
Crisis
V2 M1 E2 Normality
V3
Target vulnerabilities
(PMESII)
M3
M4 Political
Military
Economic
Social
action Infrastructure
effect Information
18. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 15.

Hybrid threats challenge rules, order and values Thresholds are in the eye of the beholder
The challenge of hybrid threats is also about Frameworks to categorize hybrid threats (like
rules, order and values. Hybrid threats are those above) provide a helpful starting point.
designed to circumvent, unpick and subvert Yet thresholds for what matters are in the eye
the rules and norms that regulate aggression of the beholder. Such thresholds are a slippery
in the international system and in the domestic concept. In practice, thresholds for preventive
context. They represent an attempt to widen and retaliatory measures may only be deter-
the scope for aggressive action and turn Clause- mined post hoc due to the novelty of the threat.
witz’s famous dictum – that war is a continu- They may also vary depending on the nature
ation of politics by other means – on its head: or domain of the threat, as demonstrated in
instead, hybrid threats are the continuation of Figure 5 below.22 Response thresholds are cen-
war by other (unrestricted) means, towards the tral to the efficacy of hybrid threats and are
“creative weaponization of everything”.19 exploited by exponents.23
Ultimately, as Clausewitz observed, “the
political cause of a war has a great influence on Hybrid threats are tools of coercion
the method in which it is conducted”. Or, as
20
Despite the non-violent nature of hybrid threats,
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it: they are a tool of coercion. Hence the ‘hybrid’
moniker, which indicates the combination of
“Hybrid is the dark reflection of our less serious threats, such as disinformation
comprehensive approach. We use a and low-level cyberattacks, with more serious
combination of military and non-military ones, such as economic and military coercion
means to stabilize countries. Others use through threats (whether explicit or implicit).24
it to destabilize them.”21 The potency of hybrid threats often depends on
the prospect of escalation through the threat of
19. For Clausewitz, see: Monaghan, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 88. For ‘weaponization of everything’, see: Nathan Freier, ‘The
Darker Shade of Gray: A New War Unlike Any Other’, CSIS, 27 July 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/darker-shade-gray-new-
war-unlike-any-other; Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War (Yale University
Press, 2022). It is worth noting that this point was made by Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov in his 2013
article (referred to by many, erroneously, as the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’). He suggested that the “very ‘rules of war’ have changed.
The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown”. See: Valery Gerasimov (translation by Robert
Coalsen), ‘The Value of Science is in the Foresight’, Military Review, Jan–Feb 2016, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/
military-review/archives/english/militaryreview_20160228_art008.pdf.
20. Carl von Clausewitz (Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War, (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 400.
21. Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Keynote Speech’, NATO HQ, 25 March 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm.
22. For example, tolerance levels regarding public misinformation may differ from cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. For
more on setting thresholds for hybrid threats, see: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 21.
23. Braw, ‘Biden’s gray zone gaffe’.
24. As the UK’s Integrated Review puts it: “These tools of coercion and interference can also be used in ‘hybrid’ combination with
more traditional hard power methods”. Cabinet Office, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’, UK HMG, 70, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-com-
petitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.
Figure 5: Setting tailored, domain-specific thresholds for countering hybrid threats.25
E1
E3 M2
V1
V2 M1 E2
V3
M3
M4
hard power – without it, hybrid threats are tech- terms, the escalation dominance of the status
nically still threats, just much less concerning quo powers deters revisionists from resorting
ones. to armed action. More specifically, where revi-
The point is that hybrid threats cannot be sionists possess local escalation dominance they
considered in a vacuum, isolated from wider may be emboldened to use more serious hybrid
power dynamics. Escalation dominance creates threats or armed action. This is where deter-
the grey zone in the first place by dissuading rence comes in.
more serious, armed aggression. In general

3. Deterrence: the basics
In simple terms, deterrence aims to prevent their action will outweigh the potential gains.
a course of action by convincing a potential Some key principles of deterrence theory and
aggressor that the costs or consequences of practice are set out in Table 1 below. 26
Table 1: Basic principles of deterrence
Deterrence principle Focus Description
• Restrictive deterrence seeks to minimize the negative attributes

of an action – such as frequency or severity – but not deter it
outright.
Absolute vs. restrictive Scope/ambition
• Absolute deterrence seeks to prevent an action from occurring
absolutely, rather than restrict the occurrence or manage the
consequences.
• Immediate deterrence is undertaken through targeted actions in

response to a specific, imminent threat.
• General deterrence is generated over time by behaviour that
General vs. immediate Specificity
portrays a clear willingness and ability to respond to hostile
action. It can also decay over time if not re-established or if
challenges go unmet.
• The distinction between deterring attacks against oneself

(direct deterrence) and against others (extended deterrence).
Direct vs. extended Subject
• Extended deterrence applies the logic of deterrence to provide
protection to a third party (e.g. NATO’s Article 5 provision).
• Deterrence by denial aims to undermine the ability of the adver-

sary to achieve their objective in the first instance – for example
through increasing protection or resilience against specific
Denial vs. punishment Mechanism forms of attack.
• Deterrence by punishment aims to persuade the adversary that
the costs of achieving their objective will be prohibitive by cred-
ibly threatening something of value to them.27
• Deterrence is about preventing behaviour while compellence is

about changing it. This is the difference between telling a child
Deterrence not to do something and telling them to stop doing something.
Type of coercion
vs compellence • Thomas Schelling, who originally applied this distinction to co-
ercive strategy, considered ‘ambiguous aggression’ (or hybrid
threats) as requiring compellence, not deterrence.28
26. For some of the classic treatments of deterrence theory and practice on which this section is based, see: Patrick M. Morgan,
Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977); Schelling, Arms and Influence; Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence
and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Alexander
L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Columbia University Press, 1974).
27. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense.
28. Thomas C. Schelling and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Arms and Influence (2020 Ed), (Yale University Press, 2020), 69.
See also: Sean Monaghan, ‘To Change Putin’s Behavior, the West Needs a New Strategy’, World Politics Review, 9 Feb 2022,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30309/for-nato-deterring-a-ukraine-russia-war-isn-t-enough.
3.1. The ‘three Cs’ of deterrence: capability, from conducting hostile state activity – in the
credibility and communication form of hybrid threats. While revisionist states
such as Russia, Iran and China may be dissuaded
There are three core pillars to achieving effec-
from outright conventional aggression, they are
tive deterrence in practice (referred to herein as
systematically employing hybrid threats below
the ‘three Cs’):29
the threshold of decisive response.31 Future
trends suggest this form of aggression may well
• Capability is the ability or technical capacity
intensify (see Section 5.3.1).32
to implement deterrence measures.
The conscious intent of such strategies is to
• Credibility is the will to implement deter-
undermine the core tenets of deterrence. This can
rence measures.
be seen in Figure 6 below, which shows how hybrid
• Communication is the two-way understand-
threats erode the foundations of deterrence.33
ing and perception that informs cost-benefit
This is why several assessments of deterrence
calculations on both sides.30
in Europe and the Indo-Pacific suggest that the
state of deterrence against hybrid threats is
3.2. Why hybrid threats are difficult to deter
questionable.34
The rise of hybrid threats can be traced to both Hybrid CoE’s Deterrence Playbook attempted
successes and failures of deterrence. On the to renew and revitalize the strategy of deter-
one hand, deterrence has often succeeded in rence in the face of hybrid threats.35 Based on
dissuading revisionist actors from resorting to the specific challenges posed by hybrid threats
conventional armed aggression. Yet at the same to deterrence, some core tenets of deterrence
time it has often failed to dissuade those actors strategy can be revisited with this goal in mind.
29. Robert P. Haffa Jr, ‘The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition’, Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Volume 12, Issue 4 (Winter 2018), 96-97.
30. Deterrence requires altering the perception of the adversary, which also depends on understanding how that perception is
formed in the first place.
31. James M. Dubik and Nic Vincent, ‘America’s global competitions: the gray zone in context’ (Institute for the Study of War,
February 2018), https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Gray%20Zone_Dubik_2018.pdf; Michael J. Green
and John Schaus, ‘Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia’, CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield (CSIS, 9 May 2017), https://www.csis.org/
analysis/countering-coercion-maritime-asia; Michael Eisenstadt, ‘Operating in the Gray Zone: Countering Iran’s Asymmetric Way
of War’, Policy Focus (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 January 2020), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/poli-
cy-analysis/operating-gray-zone-countering-irans-asymmetric-way-war.
32. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Global Strategic Trends: the future starts today (Sixth Edition)’, DCDC, 2018, 132-133,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends.
33. Adapted from: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 37. See also: James Andrew Lewis, ‘Cross-Domain
Deterrence and Credible Threats’ (CSIS, 1 July 2010), https://www.csis.org/analysis/cross-domain-deterrence-and-credi-
ble-threats; Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone’.
34. See for example: Tim Sweijs et al., ‘Strengthening deterrence against nuclear, conventional, and hybrid threats:
Strengths, weaknesses, and insights for US allies in Europe and Asia’ (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2022),
https://hcss.nl/report/strengthening-deterrence-nuclear-conventional-hybrid-threats/; Michael J. Mazarr et al., ‘What Deters
and Why’; Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, ‘Competing in the Gray Zone: Russian Tactics and Western Responses’ (RAND
US, 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2791.html; Ben Jensen et al., ‘Shadow Risk: What Crisis Simulations
Reveal about the Dangers of Deferring U.S. Responses to China’s Gray Zone Campaign against Taiwan’ (CSIS, 16 February 2021),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/shadow-risk-what-crisis-simulations-reveal-about-dangers-deferring-us-responses-chinas-gray).
35. This call was originally made by two Danish analysts: Heine Sørensen and Dorthe Bach Nyemann, ‘Going Beyond Resilience:
A revitalized approach to countering hybrid threats’ (Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis, November 2018), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/
wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Strategic-analysis-13-Sorensen-Nyeman.pdf.
Figure 6: How hybrid threats undermine the foundations of deterrence.
DETERRENCE
COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY CREDIBILITY
Undermined by
targeting response
Undermined by Undermined by thresholds and
Hybrid threat ambiguity and the breadth and novelty avoiding detection
challenges: subjectivity of hybrid means thresholds
4. Restoring the foundations of

deterrence against hybrid threats
This section explores how the challenges 4.1. Deterrence by denial
posed to deterrence strategy by hybrid threats
4.1.1. Resilience is the foundation of hybrid
can be met. It revisits some fundamentals of
deterrence
deterrence and applies recent developments
Deterrence by denial is regularly advocated
in the theory and practice of deterrence. Doing
against hybrid threats, often in the form of
so reveals insights about how the founda-
resilience-building measures.36 In one survey of
tions of deterrence might be reinforced. Each
policy literature, around three-quarters of all
insight is designated as having the potential
measures planned or proposed were focussed
to strengthen one or more of the ‘three Cs’ –
on the denial of benefit.37 Even UK military doc-
thereby reinforcing deterrence in the face of
trine has swung towards deterrence by denial in
hybrid threats. This is summarized in a Table
recent years.38
towards the end of the section, alongside a
The allure of denial through resilience is
framework for deterring hybrid threats which
understandable. Defensive measures are gen-
incorporates some of these insights.
erally low cost and fit well within prevalent ‘risk
management’ paradigms of national security.39
36. See for example: Tim Prior, ‘Resilience: The ‘Fifth Wave’ in the Evolution of Deterrence’, Chapter 4 in Strategic Trends 2018,
ed. Oliver Thränert and Martin Zapfe (Center for Security Studies: ETH Zurich, 2018), https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/
special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/ST2018-06-TP.pdf); Lyle J. Morris et al., ‘Gaining Competitive
Advantage in the Gray Zone’ (RAND, 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.html; Braw, ‘The Defender’s
Dilemma’; Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’; Mikael Wigell et al., ‘Best Practices in the whole-of-society
approach in countering hybrid threats’, A study requested by the INGE committee (European Parliament, May 2021), https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653632/EXPO_STU(2021)653632_EN.pdf. Examples of resilience-building
measures include hardening infrastructure, public education (e.g. against disinformation, or on cyber security), resource diversi-
fication, anti-corruption, etc. These approaches have been described as a form of modernized ‘total defence’, involving the kind
of whole-of-society approaches to national resilience that were pursued by many nations during the Cold War – which have been
revitalized in recent years by nations such as Sweden (‘Total Defence’), Norway (‘Support and Cooperation’), Finland (‘Compre-
hensive Security’), Austria (‘Comprehensive National Defence’). See: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 44.
37. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 79-82; Albin Aronsson, ‘The state of current counter hybrid warfare
policy’ (MCDC Information Note, 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/803970/20190519-MCDC_CHW_Info_note_10-State_of_current_policy.pdf.
38. In 2014 UK Defence Doctrine characterized deterrence as dissuading a course of action through “the threat of a military
response” to “impose costs on an opponent to deter unwanted behaviour”. In 2019 the UK MOD released a new deterrence doc-
trine which emphasized the importance of deterrence by denial and encouragement of restraint alongside deterrence by punish-
ment to provide a more balanced approach. See: UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: UK Defence Doctrine
(Fifth Edition)’, DCDC, 62-63, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdp-0-01-fourth-edition-british-defence-doctrine;
and UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Doctrine Note 1/19: Deterrence: The defence contribution’, DCDC, 2019, 40-41,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/deterrence-the-defence-contribution-jdn-119.
39. Aronsson, ‘The state of current counter hybrid warfare policy’.
Building resilience has become a strategy in 4.1.2. Resilience is not a strategy in itself
itself in an increasingly complex and unpredict- Yet resilience is not a strategy in itself. In one
able world.40 The recent growth of cyber resil- sense, resilience is anti-strategic – it is focussed
ience practices and philosophy in the civil sector passively inwards (on the ability to recover from
may also be influential in national security think- shocks) rather than actively outwards on influ-
ing about resilience. Just as for cyber deter-
41
encing others and shaping the environment.
rence, retaliation against ambiguous or hard to As Michael Ruhle of NATO puts it, “hoping that
detect hybrid threats may be less valuable than one could signal to an opponent ‘that there’s no
deterrence by denial.42 point trying to disrupt our lives’ puts a level of
Another benefit is that resilience measures faith in deterrence that this concept can never
are vulnerability-focussed and so do not rely live up to”.44 Moreover, deterrence by denial only
on predicting the form of hybrid attack. For all works against risk-averse adversaries.45
these reasons, resilience should form the foun- Resilience also has its limits. One is the dif-
dation of any strategy to deter hybrid threats. ficulty of covering every possible attack vector.
For example, a recent case study of the Dutch The literature emphasizes protecting the politi-
reaction to the shooting down of flight MH17 cal and information spheres of society, yet these
suggests that societal resilience – in this case are porous domains which are less amenable to
measured by the presence of trust, social cap- government regulation than others (e.g. physical
ital, and credible narratives – has reinforced infrastructure).46 As two Danish analysts put it,
deterrence. 43
“the facts on the ground currently make resil-
Foundations: capability, credibility. Bolster- ience a challenging if not a Sisyphean task”.47
ing resilience enhances the capability available The desirability of large-scale resilience-
to deter hybrid threats and the credibility of building is also questionable. Paradoxically,
doing so. While resilience measures indicate overdoing resilience and government-led
resolve, they do not communicate directly. intervention within the liberal-democratic model
40. One example is the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of Security and Defence, which mentions ‘resilience’ 84 times and ‘resilient’
28 times. See: Cabinet Office, ‘Global Britain in a competitive age’.
41. See for example: Accenture, ‘The Nature of Effective Defense: Shifting from Cybersecurity to Cyber Resilience’, 2018,
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/accenture/conversion-assets/dotcom/documents/local/en/accenture-shift-
ing-from-cybersecurity-to-cyber-resilience-pov.pdf.
42. Patrick M. Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today’, Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 33, Issue 1
(2012): 101, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.659589.
43. Cees van Doorn and Theo Brinkel, ‘Deterrence, Resilience, and the Shooting Down of Flight MH17’, in NL ARMS
Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8.
44. Michael Ruhle, ‘Deterring hybrid threats: the need for a more rational debate’, NDC Policy Brief (NATO Defence College,
2019), http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1335.
45. King Mallory, ‘New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence’ (RAND US, 2018), 3, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/
PE259.html.
47. Sørensen and Nyemann, ‘Going Beyond Resilience’, 3.
may undermine the fabric of society that one is Foundation: capability. Going beyond resilience
trying to preserve in the first place, by height- opens up more capability avenues for deter-
ening the sense of threat and weakening the rence.
“cornerstones of Western democracy—state
restraint, pluralism, free media, and economic 4.2.2. Diversify the playbook
openness”. 48
The literature suggests a tendency to default
Foundation: credibility. Understanding to military and economic measures in threats of
the limits of resilience enhances deterrence punishment.51 But relying on such blunt instru-
credibility. ments may undermine their credible use or lead
to heavy-handedness. Serious hard power mea-
4.2. Deterrence by punishment sures should be saved for the most egregious
threats to retain their potency and manage
4.2.1. Go beyond resilience: balance
escalation. Instead, “alternative offensive means
denial and punishment
should be found to diversify the ‘playbook’ for
While deterrence by denial through resilience
countering hybrid warfare”.52
forms a solid foundation for deterring hybrid
The same principle applies to finding targets
threats, changing the behaviour of an adver-
for punishment measures which rely heavily
sary committed to hybrid aggression requires
on taking aim at the political vulnerabilities of
going beyond resilience to deter them through
hybrid aggressors.53 Targeteers across govern-
the credible threat of punishment.49 In practice,
ment need to get creative in finding and exploit-
deterring hybrid threats will require finding the
ing new vulnerabilities that hybrid aggressors
right balance between denial and punishment,
care about.54 Recent progress on creative,
tailored to the context and actor in question.50
tailored economic sanctions provides some
48. Kenneth Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence: A Revolution in Strategic Affairs?’, Survival, Volume 60, Issue 5 (2018): 20,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1518374; Mikael Wigell, ‘Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference’,
The Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 1 (2021): 49-67, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027.
49. Sørensen and Nyemann, ‘Going Beyond Resilience’; Duncan Allen, ‘Managed Confrontation: UK Policy Towards Russia
After the Salisbury Attack’, Research Paper (Chatham House, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/10/managed-con-
frontation-uk-policy-towards-russia-after-salisbury-attack; Ruhle, ‘Deterring hybrid threats’; Morris et al., ‘Gaining Competitive
Advantage’; Green and Schaus, ‘Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia’.
50. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 39 & 43.
51. The survey of policy literature for MCDC shows that the majority of actions planned or proposed to deter by punishment
relied on the military and economic instruments. As the authors suggest, “[t]his seems to highlight a shortfall in the ability of
Western governments (the majority of the sources analyzed) to summon creative ways to escalate horizontally through offen-
sive options”. See: Aronsson, ‘The state of current counter hybrid warfare policy’ and Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid
Warfare’, 79-82.
53. Ibid., 82.
54. As the MCDC Handbook puts it, “international law also provides for a wealth of measures to counter hybrid aggression
without requiring the use of force…there is ample legal basis for creative horizontal escalation to counter hybrid warfare”.
Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 57.
inspiration,55 as does the promise of ‘deterrence 4.3. Restrictive deterrence
by disclosure’.56 This ‘turn every stone’ approach
4.3.1. Restrict, don’t prevent,
should be applied to explore new vulnerabilities
low-level hybrid threats
across a broader spectrum of action. However,
Restrictive deterrence seeks to minimize attri-
much of this progress has been forged out of
butes such as effectiveness, frequency or sever-
necessity in response to further violations and is
ity, but not deter it outright. It is applicable to
(therefore) too little too late.
‘persistent’ or less serious hybrid threats. What
While punishment measures that require
counts as a ‘low-level’ or ‘persistent’ threat will
new regulation or legislation are more credible
depend on setting thresholds concerning the
as a result, this can take time and be subject to
type of threat (e.g. actor, domain, means) and
legislative and political vagaries.57 It would also
level of threat severity (e.g. the intensity, impact
be better here to prepare a diverse punishment
and frequency).
playbook in advance. Doing so – and commu-
This type of hybrid threat – such as nuisance
nicating this to adversaries – offers another
misinformation or cyber interference – is not
opportunity to enhance the prospects of deter-
realistically deterrable in absolute terms due to
rence. The credibility of these measures relies
ubiquity, low cost, deniability and low impact (at
on understanding two factors: what those being
least in the short term). Instead, they should be
deterred care about and the limits of political
managed, tolerated, or mitigated. A good way
will at home to enact such measures. To avoid
to start this conversation is to consider which
the same problems of developing new punish-
hybrid threats can be tolerated, rather than
ment measures too late or too slowly, practi-
which threats must be prevented.58 One parallel
tioners should develop diverse playbooks for
is crime prevention, whereby “not all crimes can
deterring hybrid threats now.
be deterred, and not all represent significant
Foundation: capability and credibility.
threats to national security”.59
Diversifying the playbook widens the capabil-
Rather than close down deterrence options,
ity aperture and – in doing so – enhances the
this approach may in fact open them up. Accord-
credibility of deterrence.
ing to MCDC:
55. Daniel Fried and Adrian Karatnycky, ‘A New Sanctions Strategy to Contain Putin’s Russia’, Foreign Policy, 4 May 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/04/sanctions-contain-russia-putin-west-us-eu-uk-europe-weaken-economy/; UK HMG,
‘First UK Annual Sanctions Report shows how UK independent sanctions underpin Global Britain’s role on the world stage’, Press
release, 13 January 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-uk-annual-sanctions-report-shows-how-uk-independent-
sanctions-underpin-global-britains-role-on-the-world-stage.
56. Eric Edelman, ‘The Pros and Cons of “Deterrence by Disclosure”’, The Dispatch, 21 February 2022, https://thedispatch.com/p/
the-pros-and-cons-of-deterrence-by?utm_source=url.
57. See for example the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, which gave Congress the power to block
the lifting of sanctions (US Government, Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, PUBLIC LAW 115–44, 2 August
2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ44/PLAW-115publ44.pdf; see also UK’s efforts to ensure sanctions relating to
Russia are implemented effectively after the UK leaves the EU: HM Treasury, ‘Financial sanctions, Russia’, UK HMG, 2014-2022,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-ukraine-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity.
58. Vladimir Rauta and Sean Monaghan, ‘Global Britain in the grey zone: Between stagecraft and statecraft’, Contemporary
Security Policy, Volume 42, Issue 4 (2021): 484, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1980984.
59. Wigell, ‘Democratic Deterrence’, 10.
“No longer is deterrence about abso- action to be deterred with a specific outcome
lutes. It is instead about finding ways to to be avoided, or even a specific actor to be
make attacks less likely or less effective… deterred. Restrictive deterrence may therefore
[This] insight is valuable because it vastly be a more useful and reliable concept against
expands the range of deterrence strate- most forms of hybrid aggression – at least all
gies from those that can deter entirely to but the most obviously grievous or totemic. The
the wider set of those that might help in difficulty lies in agreeing on such thresholds.
some way.” 60
This is difficult enough among domestic polities,
and is potentially fiendish in the multinational
Foundation: capability and credibility. Focus- context. Yet this is the exact challenge posed
sing on restrictive deterrence for low-level by hybrid threats – hence the calls for agreeing
hybrid threats provides a greater variety of new collective thresholds such as the loss of life
options and enhances credibility through a (e.g. through cyberattack).62
measured approach. If it can be achieved, absolute deterrence
comes with a health warning: if hybrid threats
4.4. Absolute deterrence: keep the relief can be successfully deterred but revisionist
valve open (in most cases) actors remain motivated, what comes next?63
One corollary of this observation is the argu-
Absolute deterrence seeks to prevent an action
ment to keep the grey zone ‘relief valve’ open to
from occurring absolutely, rather than restrict-
hybrid threats in all but the most severe cases.64
ing and managing it. NATO’s Article 5 guarantee
Foundation: credibility and communication.
against armed aggression is an obvious example.
Keeping the relief valve open reinforces the
Absolute deterrence is a binary test of credibil-
credibility of (residual) deterrent threats, while
ity: there can be no shades of grey. Given the
absolute deterrence can communicate resolve.
‘warlike’ dangers posed by hybrid threats – such
as loss of territory, damage to critical infrastruc-
4.5. Cumulative deterrence
ture, erosion of the rules-based order, conven-
tional and even nuclear escalation61 – absolute Immediate deterrence has merit prior to a
deterrence is relevant at some level. hybrid attack, but hybrid threats can confound
However, the nature of hybrid threats – traditional warnings and indicators of potential
gradual, ambiguous, and unconventional as they attacks.65 Hybrid threats also challenge general
are – makes it difficult to link an immediate deterrence because individual attacks are rarely
60. MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, ‘Hybrid Warfare: Understanding Deterrence’, (MCDC Information Note, March
2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795220/20190304-
MCDC_CHW_Info_note_6.pdf.
61. Rebecca Hersman, ‘Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age’, Texas National Security Review, Volume 3, Issue 3 (2020):
90-109, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10220.
62. Braw, ‘Biden’s gray zone gaffe’.
63. Monaghan, Countering Hybrid Warfare, 90.
64. Sean Monaghan, ‘Bad idea: winning the gray zone’, CSIS, 17 December 2021, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-winning-
the-gray-zone/.
65. On the invidious problem of indicators and warning for hybrid threats, see: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid
Warfare’, 25-32; and Cullen, ‘Hybrid threats’.
significant enough to justify the design of an gradual, unpredictable and difficult to counter.
entire deterrence posture to prevent them. The It may also be a more credible approach than
‘snowball’ effect of many low-level violations establishing red lines for adversaries to exploit
going unanswered over time can undermine the (by falling just short of, or testing their cred-
credibility of subsequent claims by the defender ibility). As Mike Mazarr puts it (citing Thomas
that they will act at any point in the future. Schelling):
This is compounded by risk confusion, “when
the hazards associated with action and inac- “When the act to be deterred is inherently
tion against gray zone rivals appear equally a sequence of steps whose cumulative
unpleasant”. Instead, a cumulative approach
66
effect is what matters, a threat geared to
to deterring hybrid threats combines the imme- the increments may be more credible than
diate deterrence of specific threat increments one that must be carried out either all at
with absolute red lines enforced to rule out once or not at all when some particular
never-ending gradualism and faits accomplis. point has been reached.”68
4.5.1. Combine immediate deterrence Yet cumulative deterrence still requires setting
with absolute red lines (in Schelling’s words) “true red lines” for an
Cumulative deterrence seeks compound effects overwhelming response (i.e. absolute deter-
over time, shaping and restricting behaviour. rence). This is the only way to rule out endless
The aim is to recharge deterrence credibility in transgressions or faits accomplis.69 Red lines
the face of gradualist hybrid threats. Just as can benefit from ambiguity (e.g. over where or
their power stems from the cumulative effect of in what form the punishment will be inflicted)
coordinated actions, any approach to deterring but the literature suggests best practice in most
hybrid threats must consider how to tip the bal- cases requires linking threats to specific deter-
ance through small steps. rence outcomes.70
This approach has recently been advocated Foundation: credibility. Cumulative deter-
in the context of deterring cyberattacks, grey rence recharges deterrence credibility against
zone strategies and Iranian aggression.67 It can hybrid threats.
be seen as the ‘mirror image’ of hybrid threats:
66. Freier, ‘The Darker Shade of Gray’.

67. Cumulative cyber deterrence seeks to “shape and limit [threats] by attacking the rival repeatedly in response to
specific behaviours, over a long period of time, sometimes even disproportionally to its aggressive actions” (Uri Tor,
‘“Cumulative Deterrence” as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 40, Issue 1-2
(2017), 95, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115975. In the context of Iran, Michael Eisenstadt argues for “the
pursuit of advantage through cumulative, incremental gains rather than dramatic, decisive blows that are liable to be
escalatory” (Eisenstadt, ‘Operating in the Gray Zone’).
68. Or in other, plainer, words: “The man who would kick a dog should be threatened with modest punishment for each
step toward the dog, even though his proximity is of no interest in itself”. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict,
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960), 42, cited in: Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone’, 135.
69. Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone’, 138.
70. Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Brookings In-
stitution Press, 1978); Richard Haass and David Sacks, ‘The Growing Danger of U.S. Ambiguity on Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs,
13 December 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-13/growing-danger-us-ambiguity-taiwan.
4.5.2. Tailoring deterrence to achieve Foundation: credibility. Tailored deterrence

a cumulative effect enhances credibility through targeted deter-
A cumulative approach to deterring hybrid rence measures based on enhanced under-
threats through small steps requires a tailored standing and marginal gains.
design approach to deterrence strategy. Five key
principles for designing deterrence strategies 4.6. Extended deterrence
tailored to hybrid threats have been proposed
4.6.1. Extended deterrence enhances
by MCDC.71 These can be summarized as:
leverage but raises the credibility bar
Extending deterrence commitments to third
• Disaggregate hybrid threats into component
parties offers enhanced leverage against hybrid
parts, then target specific elements of the
threats through at least two mechanisms. The
overall campaign with deterrence measures.
first is an increased deterrence ‘surface area’
• Focus on marginal gains and targeting key
through introducing new options for flexible
vulnerabilities (of both the defender –
deterrent action. For example, US reassurance
through resilience – and the aggressor –
missions in Europe offer legitimate, legal (i.e.
through punishment).
proportionate) and scalable options to deter
• Target enabling assets. For example, disin-
ambiguous hybrid aggression, short of armed
formation can (to some extent) be blocked,
conflict, which can be turned up or down.72 They
attributed and fact-checked.
also enable further detection and deterrence
• Think ‘performatively’ about the best means
options, such as surveillance or training local
to deter (i.e. the most credible – most effi-
forces. But this is not straightforward. While
cient or viable – rather than the most threat-
heavier forces may increase the deterrent effect,
ening means).
they are also more difficult to justify and pro-
• Adversary understanding is even more cru-
vide fodder for victim narratives.73
cial for deterring hybrid threats – not least
The second is the complication of adversary
because more types are involved in delivering
decision-making through multiplying trig-
hybrid campaigns (e.g. proxies, hackers, busi-
gers for and dimensions of deterrent action.
ness entities, militias, citizens, etc). Rather
Strengthened commitment and assurances
than complicate deterrence, this complex
to allies signals resolve and increases partner
actor landscape actually presents more
confidence and will to act.74 ‘Known-unknowns’,
opportunities for small-step deterrence.
such as the extended deterrence status of NATO
71. Taken from: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 44-45; and MCDC, ‘Hybrid Warfare: Understanding
Deterrence’.
72. The White House, ‘FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and
Partners’, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassur-
ance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support-.
73. Bryan Frederick et al., ‘Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces’ (RAND US, 2020),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html.
74. Do Young Lee, ‘Strategies of Extended Deterrence: How States Provide the Security Umbrella’, Security Studies,
Volume 30, Issue 5 (2021): 761-796, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.2010887.
non-members Finland and Sweden, or the US’s Foundation: capability, communication.
strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, inject further Extended deterrence communicates resolve and
uncertainty into the mind of the aggressor.75 The introduces new dimensions of deterrent action.
tripwire effect of extended deterrence measures
enhances guarantor credibility through ‘skin in 4.6.2. The hyper-extension of deterrence
the game’. 76
into public and private spheres
However, the benefits of extended deter- The nature of hybrid threats necessitates the
rence come at a high price for credibility and extension of security and deterrence guarantees
can provide the adversary with more links in the into non-traditional – or post-modern – spheres
deterrence chain to exploit. These principles – of national security.79 This will require tailored
benefits and costs – also apply to the extension government protection guarantees to non-gov-
of deterrence to different forms of aggression, ernment actors.
such as NATO’s extension of Article 5 to cyber Examples already abound. In the UK this
and hybrid attacks. Having multiple extended
77
includes the cyber and space sectors, on which
deterrence commitments also tests credibility. government services are reliant.80 National
For example, the US faces trade-offs between reserve forces are a key part of this effort. 81 In
the security guarantees it offer to its alliance Finland, local government is helping public ser-
network in Europe and Asia. 78
vices and businesses to address hybrid threats.82
75. Jeffrey Mankoff, ‘The U.S. Faces Hard Choices on Strategic Ambiguity in Europe and Asia’, World Politics Review, 10
December 2021, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30178/the-u-s-faces-hard-choices-on-strategic-ambigu-
ity.
76. Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg, ‘Trivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance’, Security
Studies (Feb 2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2038662.
77. In 2014, NATO formally stated that a cyberattack could be treated by the Alliance as an armed attack (thus invoking
Article 5), before doing the same for ‘hybrid warfare’ in 2016. The effect of this extended deterrence is difficult to judge.
Although given that Article 5 has only been declared once in NATO’s history, it seems unlikely that ambiguous hybrid
threats might cause the next instance. See: NATO, ‘Brussels Summit communiqué’, 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
78. Not least the one between its reputation for general deterrence and its prioritisation of immediate deterrence capa-
bility. See: Tongfi Kim and Luis Simón, ‘A Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US
Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions’, Security Studies, Volume 30, Issue 5 (2021): 725-760, https://doi.org/10.1080/0
9636412.2021.2010889.
79. Hence the UK Integrated Review suggests “responding to state threats can no longer be viewed as a narrow ‘national
security’ or ‘defence’ agenda’” (Cabinet Office, ‘Global Britain in a competitive age’, 70).
80. For example, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) offers expertise and resources to the private sector and
the general public to combat cyberattacks: a form of deterrence by denial through enhanced resilience.
81. Modern reservists may also be a “deterrent against overt military incursions…a defence against hybrid warfare tactics
such as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns…[and] step in to alleviate disruptions in critical services and sup-
plies” – but these benefits depend on governments “convincing the corporate world to rally behind them”. See: Gerhard
Wheeler, ‘Reservists are Key to Deterrence in Grey Zone Conflict – Businesses Must Be Part of the Effort’, RUSI Commen-
tary, 30 Jan 2020.
82. See Helsinki Region Chamber of Commerce, ‘Business Community and Hybrid Threats’, June 2018, http://view.24mags.
com/mobilev/bbc43250c51aa3c0b599cb18066f3c2b#/page=1; The City of Helsinki, ‘Helsinki in the era of hybrid
threats – Hybrid influencing and the city’, City of Helsinki, 2018, https://www.hel.fi/static/kanslia/Julkaisut/2018/hy-
bridiraportti_eng_020818_netti.pdf.
In Sweden, the whole of society has been followed through on their behalf enhance
asked to contribute to national ‘total defence’ deterrence credibility. That reassurance is a
efforts.83 product of both resolve and capability provides
The question of to whom governments may flexibility in designing reassurance strategies,
consider extending deterrence against hybrid which could be either high resolve/low capabil-
threats, and under what circumstances, are ity (e.g. ‘tripwire’ forces or individual sanctions)
now key issues for any hybrid threat deterrence or low resolve/high capability (e.g. offshore
strategy. Indeed, deterrence may “no longer be forces or cyber defences) to achieve similar
primarily the concern of the armed forces but a effects.86
product of deep cooperation between the mili- Against hybrid threats, reassurance is a tool
tary and civil society”.84 in its own right (rather than an enabler) because
Foundation: capability. Hyper-extending it can achieve useful influence effects . Reassur-
deterrence into public and private spheres ance is not performative, but a necessary com-
multiplies the capabilities available to deter. ponent of extended deterrence. The range of
actors that need to feel ‘reassured’ against the
4.7. Reassurance vast range of hybrid threats is much larger, from
local government, to the private sector and even
Any threat of coercion (whether deterring
individual citizens.
actions or compelling changes in existing
Foundation: credibility, communication.
behaviour) will be less credible without assur-
Assurance (and reassurance) bolsters credibil-
ances to remove the threat under compliance.
ity by demonstrating off-ramps to aggressors
As Thomas Schelling put it:
and communicates seriousness.
“To say, ‘One more step and I shoot’, can

4.8. Inducement
be a deterrent threat only if accompanied
by the implicit assurance, ‘And if you stop 4.8.1. Balancing sticks with carrots
I won’t’”.85 Where deterrence targets the fear of negative
consequences to manipulate the decision cal-
The same idea also applies to allies and partners culus, inducement seeks to attract compliance
in the context of extended deterrence. Measures through positive incentives. In the words of
to reassure them that deterrent threats will be Alexander L. George:
83. Bjorn von Sydow, ‘Resilience: Planning for Sweden’s “Total Defence”’, NATO Review, 4 April 2018, https://www.nato.int/docu/
review/articles/2018/04/04/resilience-planning-for-swedens-total-defence/index.html.
84. Wheeler, ‘Reservists are Key’.
85. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 74. See also: Stephen Pifer, ‘Managing US sanctions toward Russia’, Brookings, 11 December
2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/11/managing-us-sanctions-toward-russia/: “If the Kremlin
concludes that the sanction will remain in place regardless of what it does, it will have no incentive to change its behavior”.
86. Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg, ‘Trivial Tripwires?’.
Figure 7: A ‘suasion’ matrix showing negative and positive forms of influence.
SUASION
Per-suasion Dis-suasion
(“Do this!”) (“Don’t do that!”)
Positive Offer incentives Offer

(‘carrots’) and assurances alternatives
INCENTIVES
Negative Withdraw incentives Offer

(‘sticks’) and assurances disincentives
“What the threatened ‘stick’ cannot by some,92 their conclusion that inducement
achieve by itself, unless it is formidable, “may deserve more attention than it currently
can possibly be achieved by combining it receives” applies here too.93
with a ‘carrot’”.87 One way to exploit this is to accommodate
limited short-term goals in exchange for lon-
In this sense, it is part of the same process and ger-term stability: the ‘relief valve’ argument.94
should be treated as such. See Figure 7 for an
88
Such incentives also go with the grain of hybrid
example of this approach.89 threats by using “a measured revisionist’s will-
Several recent authors argue for re-estab- ingness to work gradually to side-step risks of
lishing holistic approaches to compliance-seek- conflict in the short term, while granting some
ing strategies. While the likes of George and
90
of their goals”.95 Inducement-thinking would
Schelling were “acutely aware of the need to put benefit from the same creativity as punish-
deterrence within such broader effort space”, ment-thinking, and new approaches to compli-
in recent years the carrot seems to have lost ance design that learn from related fields such
ground to the stick. While the role of induce-
91
as communication and advertising.96 Indeed,
ment in deterring hybrid threats is recognized the range of incentives on offer may be greater
87. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Second Edition: Westview Press, 1994), 17. See
also Peter Viggo Jakobsen’s idea of the ‘ideal policy’ in: Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Constructing a Theoretical Framework’, Chapter 3
in Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, ed. Peter Viggo Jakobsen (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 1998).
88. Assurance may also be viewed as a form of positive inducement. However, the theory and practice of offering positive re-
wards for good behaviour is distinct from that of reassuring that threatened costs will not be imposed.
89. Based on: Tim Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design’, (The Hague Centre for Strategic
Studies, 10 March 2020), 9, https://hcss.nl/report/reimagining-deterrence-towards-strategic-dis-suasion-design/.
90. Paul K. Davis, ‘Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial’, Working Paper (RAND, 2014), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/working_papers/WR1027.html; Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’.
91. Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’, 10.
92. See for example: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’; Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone’.
93. Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’, 3.
94. Of course accommodation comes with its own risks. As MCDC put it: “[w]hile the risk of coercion is inadvertent vertical esca-
lation, the risk of inducement is the perception of leniency – which could produce the same result”. See: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC
Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 54.
96. Tim Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining Deterrence’.
as “the ‘carrot’ in such a strategy can be any may share the apparent limits of cyber deter-
of a variety of things the adversary values”. 97
rence.100
Ultimately, as with all aspects of deterrence, Another parallel – and limit – is the non-mil-
inducement design relies on establishing a itary nature of cyber and hybrid threats, which
sophisticated understanding of what the adver- have an in-built ‘escalation firebreak’ effect
sary wants. where escalation is limited by the means used,
Foundation: capability, credibility, commu- rather than the severity of the effects of the
nication. Inducement introduces new measures attack.101 This works both ways: while it reduces
(e.g. the ‘carrots’), bolsters credibility by the likelihood of escalation (due to the propor-
demonstrating off-ramps to aggressors, and tionality principle), it also degrades deterrence
communicates seriousness. by undermining the credibility of an overwhelm-
ing response.
4.9. Cyber deterrence: applying recent
lessons to fast-forward hybrid deterrence 4.9.1. Punishment, attribution, whole-of-society
Despite conceptual limits, cyber (and hybrid)
The challenge of deterring cyber aggression
deterrence may be easier in practice than in
provides insights for deterring hybrid threats.
theory.102 Cyberattacks do not occur in a con-
Parallels between cyber and hybrid threats
textual vacuum, so they can be linked (to some
are notable. They include attribution difficulty,
extent) to perpetrators.103 In fact, practice may
ambiguity, communication, proportionality and
be leading theory on cyber deterrence.104 Three
an uncertain retaliation calculus.98 Cyberattacks
ideas from the past two decades of US policy
are also well-suited as a tool of hybrid aggres-
and practice of deterring cyberattacks may be
sion (Hybrid CoE treats cyber as both a means
directly applicable to deterring hybrid threats.
and a threat domain).99 Deterring hybrid threats
97. In the words of Alexander L. George. He continues: “The magnitude and significance of the carrot can range from a seemingly
trivial face-saving concession to substantial concessions and side-payments that bring about a stable settlement of the crisis”.
See: George and Simons, ‘The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’.
98. For more on the parallels between deterring cyber and hybrid threats, see: Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid
Warfare’, 38; and Richard Andres, ‘Cyber Gray Space Deterrence’, PRISM, Volume 7, Issue 2 (2017): 91-98.
99. Giannopolous et al., ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats’.
100. Mariarose Taddeo, ‘The Limits of Deterrence Theory in Cyberspace’, Philosophy & Technology, Volume 31 (2017): 339–355,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13347-017-0290-2.
101. Sarah Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘Escalation firebreaks in the cyber, conventional, and nuclear domains: moving beyond
effects-based logics’, Journal of Cybersecurity, Volume 5, Issue 1 (2019): 1-11, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyz007.
102. David Blagden, ‘Deterring cyber coercion: The exaggerated problem of attribution’, Survival, Volume 62, Issue 1 (2020):
131–148, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1715072.
103. In other words, “cyber deterrence remains connected to the physical and political worlds”. Will Goodman, ‘Cyber Deterrence:
Tougher in Theory than in Practice?’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 3 (2010): 102-135. This echoes MCDC’s finding
that “hybrid aggressors are deterrable” (Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 41).
104. Alex S. Wilner, ‘US cyber deterrence: Practice guiding theory’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 43, Issue 2 (2019):
245–280, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1563779. See also: Piret Pernik, ‘Hybrid CoE Paper 8: Cyber deterrence: A case
study on Estonia’s policies and practice’, (Hybrid CoE, 12 October 2021), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-pa-
per-8-cyber-deterrence-a-case-study-on-estonias-policies-and-practice/.
First, an increased reliance on deterrence by Foundation: capability, credibility, commu-
punishment measures over time. The same nication. Lessons from cyber deterrence can
‘denial bias’ is apparent in early efforts to deter enhance all three foundations of deterrence
hybrid threats (see above). These efforts may against hybrid threats.
also benefit from striking a better balance
between punishment and denial measures, with 4.10. Re-inventing peace through rules and
punishment “being used hand-in-glove with norms
denial…in practice, the two approaches reinforce
The rules, norms and institutions that comprise
each other”.105
the international order are designed to regu-
Second, using public attribution, or shaming,
late state behaviour. Historian Michael Howard
as a punishment in its own right. This approach
referred to this application of human agency and
holds promise,106 but is not well understood.107
reason to encourage stable relations between
Third, developing a whole-of-society – rather
nations as the invention of peace.110 Hybrid
than just a whole-of-government – deterrence
threats demand a re-invention of prevailing
posture. As the 2003 US National Strategy to
peace concepts to regulate their occurrence.111
Secure Cyberspace states: “Every American who
This echoes the regulation of behaviour in
can contribute to securing part of cyberspace
cyberspace through new international agree-
is encouraged to do so”.108 An ‘every citizen’
ments, organisations, laws and norms.112 Legal
approach to deterring hybrid threats along
scholars have also called for updated legal
these lines may bear fruit.109
105. Wilner, ‘US cyber deterrence’, 26. See also: Michael Sulmeyer, ‘How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense: Deterrence Isn’t
Enough’, Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-
offense.
106. In recent years, Russia (e.g. the Skripal poisoning), China (e.g. illegal island building and intellectual property theft) and
Iran (e.g. supporting drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities) have all been called out for ambiguous aggression with the intent of
harnessing international opinion against their actions. The success of these actions is harder to judge.
107. Wilner, ‘US cyber deterrence’, 27.
108. US Government, ‘US National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace’, February 2003, xiii (https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf).
109. As above, while Cold War ‘total defence’ strategies are being renewed in some nations, the understanding and application of
a ‘whole-of-society’ approach in the modern era remains immature. The aims of the US National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
to “raise cybersecurity awareness, train personnel, stimulate market forces, improve technology, identify and remediate vulnera-
bilities, exchange information and plan recovery operations” appear directly relevant to hybrid threats today (ibid).
110. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace (Yale University Press, 2001).
111. John Raine, ‘War or peace? Understanding the grey zone’, IISS, 3 April 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/04/
understanding-the-grey-zone. He calls for extending “existing conventions and regulations into the activities and means ob-
served in the grey zone”, aiming for the “inclusion of the grey zone in the realm of peaceful relations between states”.
112. Despite her views on the limits of deterrence in cyberspace, Taddeo believes cyber deterrence is possible if “a new do-
main-specific, conceptual, normative, and strategic framework” can be developed to underpin regulation of the behaviour of
states in cyberspace. Mariarose Taddeo, ‘Deterrence and Norms to Foster Stability in Cyberspace’, Philosophy & Technology,
Volume 31 (2018): 323–329, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-018-0328-0.
frameworks in the face of hybrid threats.113 But Framing the challenge in these terms provides
this re-invention of peace will not be easy. It will a more useful basis on which to proceed. It may
“require sustained, multilateral effort, and the also lead to a more sobering diagnosis. Today’s
gains will be incremental”. 114
long-term trends are different from the Cold
Foundation: credibility, communication. War. To some extent, they suggest that revi-
Developing new rules and norms can enhance sionists and challengers are gaining in strength
the credibility of deterrence and communicate and number, while the status quo powers are
limits, boundaries and consequences. in relative decline. NATO’s Michael Ruhle sees
hybrid threats within this context, as “another
4.11. Playing the long game manifestation of the West falling out of its illu-
sion that it will continue to dominate the inter-
Whether or not the international rules-based
national system”.117 If true, this will require new
system can be updated to better regulate hybrid
thinking about how to compete in and win the
aggression in the grey zone, the short-term
long game.
imperative to deter hybrid threats will remain
Foundation: capability. Seeing the bigger
so that hybrid aggression does not go unop-
picture and playing the long game can broaden
posed.115 However, such measures need to be
deterrence leverage (e.g. through bringing
situated within a wider, longer-term competi-
non-traditional domains into play, such as val-
tive strategy to be more than simply spoilers or
ues and technology competition).
speed bumps. A pertinent example is US Cold
War strategy, which was successful in large part
4.12. Lessons from the ‘45-year-long grey
because “the Western socioeconomic system
zone struggle’
was stronger, and long-term trends favored the
West”.116 Hybrid threats are a function or symp- The Cold War has been described as a 45-year-
tom of wider social, political and economic con- long ‘grey zone’ struggle.118 Novel approaches
ditions and trends. They should be understood were developed by Western governments to
and treated as such – not as a self-contained deter and counter Soviet ‘active measures’ and
problem that requires solving on its own terms. other measures short of war during that period.
Several insights and lessons stand out for the
practice of deterrence against hybrid threats.
113. Aurel Sari, ‘Hybrid threats and the law: Building legal resilience’ (Hybrid CoE Research Report 3, November 2021),
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-research-report-3-hybrid-threats-and-the-law-building-legal-resilience/.
114. Raine, ‘War or peace?’.
115. See for example: Melanie W. Sissons, ‘A Strategy for Competition’, CNAS, 27 August 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publica-
tions/commentary/a-strategy-for-competition; Katie Crombe et al., ‘Integrating deterrence across the gray — making it more
than words’, Military Times, 8 December 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/12/08/integrating-
deterrence-across-the-gray-making-it-more-than-words/; Clementine Starling et al., ‘Seizing the advantage: The next US Na-
tional Defense Strategy’, (Atlantic Council, December 2021), 47, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/
Seizing-the-Advantage_A-Vision-for-the-Next-US-National-Defense-Strategy.pdf.
117. Ruhle, Deterring Hybrid Threats, 4.
118. Joseph L. Votel, ‘Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone’, Joint Force Quarterly, Volume 80, January 2016,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-80/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/.
• Cold War concepts such as ‘flexible response’ The most salient insight from this analysis might
and ‘total defence’ can be modernized against be that what has worked before may work again.
hybrid threats.119 Moreover, through leveraging modern tech-
• The importance of a coherent approach – nology, these approaches may achieve greater
or doctrine – for assertive measures (like effectiveness than before.125
‘containment’ or ‘flexible response’). 120
Foundation: capability, credibility, com-
• Assertive measures were complemented by munication. Applying Cold War lessons can
simpler and cheaper methods to deter by strengthen all three pillars of deterrence.
denial, such as exposing disinformation.121
• Organizational design was novel, adaptive 4.13. The limits of deterrence
and responsive to the priorities of changing
Deterrence, like any strategy, has limits. Aside
administrations.122
from the fundamental and deep-rooted lim-
• A balance between oversight and freedom of
its on knowing what an adversary is thinking
action is required.123
or how they may react – hence the aphorism
• Collaboration is key – across government, the
deterrence is an art not a science126 – deterrence
private sector and society.124
has specific conceptual limits against hybrid
threats. These add up to the insight that “one

120. The guiding principles of George Kennan’s ‘containment’ strategy and the inauguration of ‘political warfare’ are well known
(see: Office of the Historian, ‘Kennan and Containment, 1947’, US Dept of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/
kennan; George F. Kennan, ‘The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare’ [Redacted Version], 30 April 1948, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.pdf?v=94). The associated, subsequent
doctrine of ‘flexible response’ was “a mobile, substantial, and flexible US capability for operations short of general war to meet
the threat of limited aggression”, guided by principles of moderation, proportionality and the primacy of diplomacy. See:
Justin Tiplady, ‘How did the Doctrine of Flexible Response Contribute to the Resolution of the Berlin Crisis of 1961?’ (2011), 5,
https://www.jfki.fu-berlin.de/academics/SummerSchool/Dateien2011/Papers/basosi_tiplady.pdf).
121. For example, the Reagan-era US Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) was an empowered, agile cross-government body
with a modest remit. The group could expose disinformation at a fraction of the cost necessary for the Soviets to create and
distribute it. One report specifically recommends re-establishing the AMWG. See: Kathleen H. Hicks et al., ‘By Other Means Part
II: Adapting to Compete in the Gray Zone’, (CSIS, 2019) viii, https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-com-
pete-gray-zone.
122. A ‘task force’ model worked well, providing inherent lines of authority and flexibility to change in a long-haul campaign.
Layers and hierarchy should be minimized, organizations empowered and initiative encouraged. See: Hicks et al., ‘By Other Means
Part II’, 69-71.
123. The proliferation of covert and clandestine activities in response to grey zone-like threats led to many innovations and
successes (such as the CIA’s role in covert action). But minimizing legislative oversight of these led to myopia and inertia. Done
right, oversight should enable effective policy, not impede it. See: Kath Hicks et al., ‘By Other Means Part II’, 70.
124. For example, public-private collaboration on information operations “was a major element of Western solidarity”. See: Kath
Hicks et al., ‘By Other Means Part II’, 71.
125. Steve Abrams, ‘Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia’, Connections, Volume 15, Issue 1 (2016): 27-28,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326426.
126. This is implied by, amongst others, Colin Gray: Colin S. Gray, ‘Deterrence in the 21st century’, Comparative Strategy, Volume
19, Issue 3 (2000): 255-261, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930008403211.
must accept that some hybrid threats cannot be 4.13.2. Upper limits: the deterrence gap
deterred”, 127
because they are too numerous or short of armed conflict
low-level, because the perpetrator is too com- The upper limits of deterrence suggest that
mitted, because the cross-domain deterrence even the most serious hybrid threats cannot
logic is too complex, or because deterrence has be reliably deterred, leaving a ‘deterrence gap’
already failed. short of armed conflict. The upper limits of
deterrence are exposed when the perpetrator
4.13.1. Lower limits: not all hybrid threats is more committed or risk tolerant than the
can be deterred all the time defender. If the defender is perceived as unwill-
The lower limits of deterrence require the least ing (or unable) to enforce red lines or limits
serious hybrid threats to be simply tolerated or on aggression, deterrence may well fail. This
absorbed: not all hybrid threats can be deterred returns to a fundamental challenge of deterring
all the time. For hybrid threats, the lower limits hybrid threats: the defender’s dilemma.
of deterrence can be found where the range of Assuming the defender’s credibility is
possible modes of attack are too numerous to reset above the line of armed attack (around
target (or simply unknown), or the costs of each which conventional deterrence thresholds are
individual violation are too low to justify taking set – such as NATO’s Article 5), this leaves a
measures – or taking a risk – to deter. This was ‘deterrence gap’ short of armed conflict for the
the essential logic behind US Cold War strat- perpetrator to exploit. The ‘escalation firebreak’
egy, which sought to focus limited resources limitation mentioned above adds to this diffi-
on addressing the most consequential Soviet culty. If public support cannot be generated for
actions, 128
rather than to deter and react to every an overwhelming decisive response to a non-mil-
minor transgression. Less consequential actions itary hybrid threat, the whole strategy of deter-
were tolerated or absorbed. This approach rence is undermined because the credibility of
contained the Soviet threat while allowing the any threatened punishment has disappeared.
larger trends – the shortcomings of the Soviet Foundation: credibility. Understanding the
system and the relative strength of the liber- upper limits of deterrence enhances credibility
al-democratic-capitalist model – to work in their by avoiding over-extension.
favour.
Foundation: credibility. Understanding the 4.13.3. Escalation ladder complexity
lower limits of deterrence enhances credibility. The potential variety and novelty of hybrid
threats complicates the ‘escalation ladder’ of
threats to deter.129 This complex escalation
127. Ruhle, ‘Deterring Hybrid Threats’, 4.

128. I.e. those that might provide political momentum to the global communist movement, directly threaten US national security
or trigger nuclear war.
129. For example, MCDC use the PMESII domains of action – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure – and
the MPECI levers of power – military, political, economic, civil, informational. See Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid
Warfare’. For the (original) ‘escalation ladder’, see Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1965). For more on the cross-domain deterrence problem see: Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current
Russian Art of Strategy’, Proliferation Papers, No. 54 (IFRI, November 2015), https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-li-
fri/proliferation-papers/cross-domain-coercion-current-russian-art-strategy; Mallory, ‘New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deter-
rence’; Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, Cross-Domain Deterrence (Oxford University Press, 2019).
Figure 8: The hybrid threat escalation ladder, with vertical and horizontal components
Vertical
escalation Instruments
of power
Military
Political
Economic
Intensity
Civil
Information
+ + + +
Horizontal
escalation
Synchronization
landscape also increases the potential for unin- if an adversary is already engaged in a campaign
tended escalation. As one analysis describes this of hybrid aggression, then deterrence has failed
challenge: to some extent. The only relevance that deter-
rence has to such a situation is in seeking to
“[T]he strategic implications of complex prevent more serious attacks. In reality, counter-
linkages between actions and effects ing hybrid threats in any meaningful way
across boundaries – the potential for therefore requires going beyond deterrence
escalation, the interpretation of signals, (see Section 5.3).
even the effects of operations – are as yet
still poorly understood. To compound the 4.14. Restoring the foundations
confusion, policymakers may not yet know
Hybrid threats undermine the ‘three Cs’ of
how their own governments will respond to
deterrence in specific ways (see Section 3.3
unconventional attacks.” 130.
above). Table 2 below shows how the insights
developed in this section can help restore these
Figure 8 above shows the escalation landscape
foundations of deterrence – brick by brick.
of hybrid threats, which can combine ‘horizontal’
escalation – by using different instruments of
4.15. A framework for deterring hybrid
power – and ‘vertical’ escalation – by increasing
threats
the intensity of each one.131.
Foundation: capability, communication. Figure 9 below integrates many of the insights
Exploiting the complex escalation landscape and principles above into a framework for
can broaden the capabilities available to deter deterring hybrid threats. From top to bottom, it
hybrid threats and provide more deterrence shows the ‘phase’ of hybrid activity (according
communication opportunities. to Hybrid CoE’s typology), the severity of hybrid
threat (based on RAND’s levels), and the key
4.13.4. Beyond deterrence components of any deterrence strategy related
Finally, an important limit of deterrence in to the phase and severity.
countering hybrid threats is a conceptual one:
130. Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay, ‘Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity’, 15 July 2014, 3,
https://quote.ucsd.edu/deterrence/files/2014/12/EGLindsay_CDDOverview_20140715.pdf.
131. Taken from Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 14.
Table 2: Mapping report insights into the three pillars of deterrence
Capability Credibility Communication
Resilience is the foundation of hybrid deterrence  

Resilience is not a strategy in itself 
Go beyond resilience: balance denial and punishment 
Diversify the playbook  
Restrict, don’t prevent, low level hybrid threats  
Keep the relief valve open (in most cases)  
Combine immediate deterrence with absolute red-lines 
Tailor deterrence to achieve cumulative effect 
Extended deterrence enhances leverage but raises the credibility bar  
The hyper-extension of deterrence into public and private spheres 
Assurance (and reassurance)  
Balancing sticks with carrots   
Cyber: Punishment, attribution, whole-of-society   
Re-inventing peace through rules and norms  
Playing the long game 
Lessons from the ‘45-year long grey zone struggle’   
Lower limits: not all hybrid threats can be deterred all the time 
Upper limits: the deterrence gap short of armed conflict 
Escalation ladder complexity  
Figure 9: A framework for deterring hybrid threats
Hybrid threat phase: Priming Destabilisation Coercion
Hybrid threat severity: Persistent Moderate Aggressive
Restricted Absolute
Deterrence approach:
Denial Punishment
COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY CREDIBILITY

5. New horizons
This final section points to four new horizons for non-violent means). Either way, it seems likely
further development and research: that conventional deterrence shapes the use
• the role of military force in deterring hybrid of hybrid threats.
threats;
• going beyond deterrence to counter hybrid 5.1.1. Seeing the bigger picture
threats; One way of appreciating the role of conventional
• the future evolution of hybrid threats and military deterrence against hybrid threats is
implications for deterrence; to see the bigger picture beyond the edges of
• the prospect of a post-modern, ‘fifth wave’ of competition in the grey zone between peace and
deterrence theory and practice that is cen- war.134 Figure 10 below shows grey zone com-
tred on deterring hybrid threats. petition in a continuum of relations between
states. It shows how changes in the intensity of
5.1. The role of military force in relations can lead to new phases once tipping
deterring hybrid threats points have been reached – including boiling
over from hybrid threats to armed conflict.
Conventional deterrence through military force
These changes are driven by both amplifying
does not play a central role in Hybrid CoE’s
and suppressive dynamics.
Deterrence Playbook, which “goes far beyond
Seeing this bigger picture beyond the ‘grey
military-centric classical deterrence thinking”.132
zone’ in which hybrid threats operate helps in
Yet hard power is still the sine qua non of deter-
understanding how conventional and nuclear
rence.133 The relevance to hybrid threats is, to
deterrence – in other words, escalation domi-
some extent, a matter of perspective. On the
nance in armed conflict – can have an important
one hand, hybrid threats suggest that conven-
latent deterrent effect against hybrid threats.
tional deterrence is succeeding: revisionists are
This effect acts to both suppress the severity of
not resorting to armed attacks. On the other
hybrid threats and to prevent them from boiling
hand, hybrid threats suggest that conventional
over into armed conflict. In the words of British
deterrence is failing: revisionists are still exhib-
Army Chief, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith,
iting aggressive behaviour (albeit through
132. Although it rightly advocates the integration of “civil and military elements” and recognizes the need to “consider a range of
both military and non-military response options”. Kersanskas, ‘Deterrence’, 8, 15. The same point is made by many others, includ-
ing in a chapter on deterrence in East Asia, titled ‘Beyond Military Deterrence’. See: Chin-Hao Huang and David C. Kang, ‘Beyond
Military Deterrence: The Multidimensionality of International Relations in East Asia’, Chapter 14 in Cross-Domain Deterrence,
ed. Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay (Oxford University Press, 2019), https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/
oso/9780190908645.001.0001/oso-9780190908645-chapter-14. See also James Lewis, who states: “Deterrence based on mili-
tary force is still valuable for dissuading opponents from undertaking certain kinds of attack, but this may need to be buttressed
by political actions that go beyond classic, force-based deterrence” (Lewis, ‘Cross-Domain Deterrence and Credible Threats’).
133. As one author notes: “Looking forward, there appears to be little reason to expect conventional deterrence to wane in
importance relative to other elements of national security policy in the near future.” Karl Mueller, ‘The Continuing Relevance of
Conventional Deterrence’, Chapter 4 in Annual Review, ed. Sweijs and Osinga (T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2020), 60. See also:
Robert P. Haffa Jr, ‘The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition’, Strategic Studies Quarterly,
Volume 12, Issue 4 (2018): 94-115.
134. Monaghan, ‘Bad idea: winning the gray zone’.
Figure 10: Grey zone competition (where hybrid threats operate) in a continuum of relations
between states135
Cooperation
Competition
Grey zone
competition
Amplifying Suppressive
dynamics dynamics
Armed
conflict
Tipping points
(phase changes)
“competitors operate below the threshold of military force is more often about peace than
war precisely because we maintain one”.136 war.138 Hybrid CoE’s Playbook highlights con-
Or as former NATO Supreme Allied Commander temporary examples, observing that “port vis-
Europe, General Philip M. Breedlove, puts it, “the its, snap exercises, the use of defence attaché
best defence against ‘little green men’ is ‘big networks, and other activities can be part of a
green men’”.137 coordinated response and can even be decisive
in changing the cost-benefit calculus of the hos-
5.1.2. Three dimensions: relevance, tile actor”.139 However, relying on the use of force
utility and trade-offs short of war invites a trade-off problem vis-à-vis
Using military force short of war to deter its role in conventional deterrence (i.e. the
is a long-established practice. The history of ability to prosecute high-end warfighting).140
135. Adapted from an internal report by the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. With thanks to Dr Gordon Niven.
136. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The Chief of the General Staff: Tomorrow’s army – An asymmetric army for the digital age’, The
British Army, 8 October 2020, https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2020/10/cgs-tomorrow-s-army/. See also Jack
Watling, who says: “the ability to escalate to a point unacceptable to an adversary, and the threshold at which that escalation
will occur, sets the parameters for ‘grey zone’ activity... The balance of deterrence fixes the confrontation within understood
limits” (Jack Watling, ‘We Need to Relearn How to do Deterrence’, RUSI Commentary, 5 December 2019, https://rusi.org/ex-
plore-our-research/publications/commentary/we-need-relearn-how-do-deterrence).
137. Quoted in Ruhle, ‘Deterring hybrid threats’, 2. See also: Geoff Hertenstein, ‘DIME without the ‘M’ is DIE’, The Strategy Bridge,
22 Sept 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/9/22/dime-without-the-m-is-die-a-case-for-conventional-mili-
tary-power-in-modern-strategy-discourse.
138. For studies of this see for example: Blechman et al., Force Without War; Barry M. Blechman et al., Military Coercion and
US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War (Routledge, 2020); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the
Modern World (London: Penguin, 2005).
139. Kersanskas, ‘Deterrence’, 15.
140. Hal Brands, ‘Pentagon’s new plan to fight China and Russia in the gray zone’, Bloomberg Opinion, 21 October 2021,
https://www.aei.org/op-eds/pentagons-new-plan-to-fight-china-and-russia-in-the-gray-zone/; Monaghan, ‘Countering Hybrid
Warfare’, 91-92; Monaghan, ‘Bad idea: winning the gray zone’; Becca Wasser et al., ‘Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force
Options for the Defense Department’, CNAS, July 2021, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/risky-business-future-strat-
egy-and-force-options-for-the-defense-department.
When it comes to hybrid threats or ‘hybrid war’, hybrid threats. Hence NATO’s two new ‘capstone
a pertinent question is: Are we most worried concepts’: one for warfighting, and one for
about the ‘hybrid’ or the ‘war’?141 deterrence.146
The role of military force in deterring hybrid This brief discussion puts forward three key
threats is at the heart of current debates over ideas about the role of conventional deterrence
defence strategy in many nations. To adapt to against hybrid threats: it is relevant; there is
“a competitive age”,142 defence forces will be widespread utility; and there is likely to be
required to “walk a tricky line: preparing for a trade-off between utility short of war and
war with other great powers while making high-end warfighting. Yet despite its relevance
peacetime efforts to ensure that war never and importance, the role of military force in
happens”.143 deterring hybrid threats is under-conceptual-
Notably, the US Department of Defense has ized.147 Further research is required to go beyond
placed the concept of ‘integrated deterrence’ these general principles. A small number of
at the core of its contribution to the ‘strategic studies have begun this task and are worth
competition’ with China and others.144 The same pointing to.
question will be at the heart of the debate over
NATO’s new Strategic Concept given that it rec- Relevance
ognizes that “strategic competition is rising”. 145
In terms of the first dimension (the relevance
With Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine of conventional military deterrence to hybrid
and designs on Europe’s security order, NATO threats), war games by RAND US suggest that
must articulate a new approach to deterrence the main effect is to “deter high-order aggres-
and defence against both conventional war and sion” rather than hybrid “grey zone tactics”,
141. The answer should be obvious. In Andrew Monaghan’s pithy formulation regarding Russian ‘hybrid warfare’, watch out for
“The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’”. Andrew Monaghan, ‘The “War” in Russia’s “Hybrid Warfare”’, Parameters, Volume 45,
Issue 4 (2015), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol45/iss4/8.
142. To use the title from the UK’s recent defence and security review: Cabinet Office, ‘Global Britain in a competitive age’.
143. Brands, ‘Pentagon’s new plan’.
144. The White House, ‘Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf; Jim Garamone, ‘Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy,
DOD Official Says’, DOD News, 8 December 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2866963/con-
cept-of-integrated-deterrence-will-be-key-to-national-defense-strategy-dod-o/. It is worth noting that the term ‘integrated
deterrence’ remains ill-defined. For one illuminating attempt at clarity, see: Frank Hoffman, ‘Conceptualizing Integrated Deter-
rence’, Lawfire, 8 January 2022, https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2022/01/08/guest-post-dr-frank-hoffman-on-conceptualizing-in-
tegrated-deterrence/.
145. NATO, ‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’, NATO HQ, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.
146. NATO ACT, ‘NATO Chiefs of Defence Focus on the Alliance’s Military Instrument of Power’, 14 January 2022, https://www.act.
nato.int/articles/nato-mccs-2022-1.
147. For example, see debates over the forthcoming US National Defence Strategy, which will be founded on the concept of
‘integrated deterrence’: Thomas Spoehr, ‘Bad Idea: Relying on “Integrated Deterrence” Instead of Building Sufficient U.S. Military
Power’, Defense 360°, 3 December 2021, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-relying-on-integrated-deterrence-instead-of-
building-sufficient-u-s-military-power/; Becca Wasser and Stacie Pettyjohn, ‘Why the Pentagon Should Abandon “Strategic
Competition”’, Foreign Policy, 19 October 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/19/2022-us-nds-national-defense-strate-
gy-strategic-competition/.
which are best countered by “civil organiza- to demonstrations of force. Second, coercion
tions”.148
Another RAND study – based on short of war is difficult. In the cases studied, the
case studies and historical analysis – offers a success rate was about 50% – and these cases
different view: a military presence and posture mostly achieved short-term effects (less than
short of war can deter the most serious hybrid six months) such as buying time for diplomacy.
threats through signalling and reinforcing part- That said, deterrence is easier than compellence,
ners.149 In fact, in cases of extended deterrence, which requires changing existing behaviour.152
“the ability of local U.S. forces to win a contest Third, factors associated with success include
outright is of less importance than the pres- demonstrating a consistent pattern of commit-
ence of some forces”. 150
These competing claims ment, moving forces from ‘outside to in’ the the-
deserve further investigation through dedicated atre of concern, understanding an adversary’s
inquiry via a diversity of methods – including perceptions and linking clear, specific demands
empirical and operational research using recent to coercive threats (ambiguity is generally not
case studies. helpful).
Utility Trade-offs
One example is a recent study on US military In terms of the third dimension of trade-offs,
coercion short of war, which examines the
151
plenty of authors identify the need to examine
second dimension of the breadth of the util- the relationship between maintaining the cred-
ity of military force in deterrence short of war. ibility of conventional high-end military deter-
The authors draw three broad conclusions. rence, and dedicating more resources to coun-
First, the military has broad utility to achieve tering hybrid threats through the prism of ‘daily
coercive effects (such as deterrence) short competition’.153 However, there are fewer studies
of war, from capacity and resilience-building that take on this analytical challenge.
148. Pettyjohn and Wasser, ‘Competing in the Gray Zone’.

149. Michael J. Mazarr et al., ‘What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression’,
Research Report (RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2451.html.
150. Mazarr et al., ‘What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression’, 15.
151. Blechman et al., US Military Coercion. See also the original study: Blechman et al., Force Without War.
152. The authors (Blechman et al., Force Without War) refer to this as ‘reinforcing’ behaviour (through deterrence, reassurance
etc.) vs. ‘modifying’ behaviour (through compellence, inducement etc.). As Thomas Schelling says: “it is easier to deter than
compel” (Schelling, Arms and Influence (2020 Edn), 100). The claims made by Prospect Theory also help explain this observation.
See: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2
(1979): 263–291, https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185; and Robert Jervis, ‘Political Implications of Loss Aversion’, Political Psychology,
Volume 13, Issue 2 (1992): 187–204, https://doi.org/10.2307/3791678.
153. See for example: Monaghan, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?’; Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering
Hybrid Warfare’; Mazarr et al., ‘What Deters and Why’; Morris et al., ‘Gaining Competitive Advantage’; Green and Schaus, ‘Coun-
tering Coercion in Maritime Asia’; Brands, ‘Pentagon’s new plan’; Watling, ‘We Need to Relearn How to do Deterrence’; Kathleen
H. Hicks et al., ‘By Other Means Part I: Campaigning in the Gray Zone’, Report (CSIS, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-
means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone; Jim Mitre and Andre Gellerman, ‘Defining DoD’s Role in Gray Zone Competition’, CNAS, 24
August 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/defining-dods-role-in-gray-zone-competition; Stacie L. Pettyjohn
and Becca Wasser, ‘Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff: Getting Force Design Right in the Next National Defence Strategy’, War on the
Rocks, 12 October 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/dont-sweat-the-small-stuff-getting-force-design-right-in-the-
next-national-defense-strategy/.
One notable recent example is a study by the US policing responses to incursions and increased
think-tank the Center for a New American Secu- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
rity (CNAS).154 It uses judgement-based tabletop (ISR) flights, both of which would impose costs.
exercises to examine the question: “Is the Pen- This finding is partly based on insights from the
tagon’s priority to compete below the threshold “criminological literature [which] unambiguously
of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat shows that the severity of the punishment is
a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to less important than the certainty and swiftness
strengthen deterrence?”. The authors compare of the sanctions”.159
a military strategy focussed on ‘high-end deter-
rence’ with one focussed on ‘daily competition’ 5.1.3. Further research: precedents
(against hybrid threats) and conclude that “the and promising avenues
high-end deterrence strategy is the best path The important implications of the role of con-
forward”.155 Even a military strategy optimized ventional military deterrence against hybrid
for deterring hybrid threats short of conven- threats combined with the paucity of detailed
tional deterrence is unlikely to succeed, accord- studies on this question suggests that more
ing to the authors – not to mention the “signifi- research is required. Such analysis has both
cant escalatory risks” of such an approach.156 precedents and promising avenues. One prec-
Another noteworthy – but narrower – analysis edent is the challenge of balancing forces
concerns how (and whether) deterrence works between “long-term stability operations or
against ‘sub-conventional’ violations of Esto- high-intensity conflict”.160 Rather than demand
nian airspace by Russia.157 It uses insights from such a false dichotomous choice, Frank G. Hoff-
criminology studies to assess NATO’s deterrence man advocated multi-modal hybrid threats as
as “elusive, because there is no consistency in “a better focal point for considering alternative
responding to these violations and no meaning- joint force postures”.161 The same approach may
ful punishment”.158 It sees a clear role for military be relevant in considering the role of military
assets to enhance deterrence through both air force against today’s hybrid threats.
154. Wasser et al., ‘Risky Business’.

155. Ibid., 1.
156. In their words: “The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provoca-
tions will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of
attack… We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge”.
See Wasser et al., ‘Risky Business’, 26.
157. Matus Halas, ‘NATO’s sub-conventional deterrence: The case of Russian violations of the Estonian airspace’, Contemporary
Security Policy (2022): https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2028464.
158. Halas, ‘NATO’s sub-conventional deterrence’, 1.
159. Ibid., 21.
160. Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict’, Strategic Forum, Issue 240
(April 2009): 1, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98862/SF240.pdf.
161. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid Threats’.
With this in mind, promising avenues for ana- and analysis is required on this question –
lyzing trade-off problems include those used as a matter of priority.166
in multi-objective or ‘robust’ decision-mak-
ing.162 These techniques have been employed to 5.1.4. Nuclear deterrence
analyze military force design portfolios in US A brief word on nuclear deterrence is also
‘security cooperation’ missions. 163
There is also a required. At first glance, the destructive power
range of tools available to consider a high-level of nuclear weapons makes them irrelevant
force design portfolio and strategic choices to to low-level hybrid aggression. But nuclear
support this analysis.164 weapons have played a role in the emergence
Finally, it is worth noting that many nations and implementation of hybrid threats. Nuclear
have already drawn initial conclusions to the weapons provide a powerful mutual incentive
question of conventional military deterrence rel- to relegate competition and conflict to the grey
evance and codified the answers in their national zone, where the risks of nuclear escalation are
defence strategies. Prominent recent examples lower.167 This ‘stability-instability paradox’ results
include the UK, Australia, and the US Marine from the relative stability of nuclear deterrence
Corps – all of which come to seemingly differ- driving instability down to lower levels.168
ent conclusions and investment priorities about Nuclear weapons may also be employed
the role of military force in deterring hybrid within campaigns of hybrid aggression.169 A
threats.165 For all of these reasons, more research nuclear ‘perimeter’ around a hybrid campaign
162. Robert J. Lempert et al., ‘Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative, Long-Term Policy Analysis’,
Monograph Report (RAND, 2003), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1626.html; Robert J. Lempert, ‘Ro-
bust Decision Making (RDM)’, in Decision Making under Deep Uncertainty: From Theory to Practice, ed. Vincent Marchau et al.
(Springer, Cham, 2019) (Open Access: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-05252-2); Yakov Ben Haim, ‘Dealing
with Uncertainty in Strategic Decision-making’, Parameters, Volume 45, Issue 3 (2015): 63–73, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2743&context=parameters.
163. Stephen W. Popper, ‘Robust decision making and scenario discovery in the absence of formal models’, Futures and Foresight
Science, Volume 1, Issue 3-4 (Sept–Dec 2019): https://doi.org/10.1002/ffo2.22.
164. See for example: Thomas G. Mahnken et al., ‘America’s Strategic Choices: Defense Spending in a Post-COVID-19 World’,
Report (Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 14 January 2021), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/
americas-strategic-choices-defense-spending-in-a-post-covid-19-world; CSIS, AEI and War on the Rocks, ‘The Defense Futures
Simulator’, https://www.defensefutures.net/; Michael E. Linick, ‘Hedgemony: A Game of Strategic Choices’, Wargame (RAND,
2020), https://doi.org/10.7249/TL301.
165. For a discussion of this, see: Monaghan and Rauta, ‘Global Britain in the grey zone’, 476 and 486.
166. This call is also made regarding the role of defence in countering hybrid threats writ large in: Monaghan and Rauta, ‘Global
Britain in the grey zone’, 485-486.
167. See for example: Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Order’, War on the Rocks, 22 December 2015,
https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray-zone-and-world-order/; Hal Brands, ‘Paradoxes of the Gray Zone’,
FPRI, 5 February 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/; Mazarr et al., ‘Understanding the Emerging
Era of International Competition’, 25, 30.
168. Originally proposed in Snyder, Deterrence and Defense. See also: Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1981).
can condition the response of the target(s).170 5.2. Going beyond deterrence
For example, nuclear coercion – through rhet-
Just as resilience is not a strategy (in itself),
oric, signalling and posturing – may have
neither is deterrence. As Hybrid CoE’s Deter-
enhanced Russia’s freedom of action to invade
rence Playbook already states: “deterrence as
Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 by deterring outside
a strategy does not stand alone – it has to be
intervention.171 As for conventional military
in line with other strategies governments and
power, it may be more accurate to describe the
institutions use to manage their external rela-
role of nuclear weapons as an enabler of hybrid
tionships”.175 Countering hybrid threats requires
threats, rather than a specific lever of power.172
more than just deterrence for at least two
Given the evolving and dynamic nature of
reasons. First, deterrence has several inherent
hybrid threats in an era of intensifying strategic
limits (see above). Second, in the case of ongo-
competition, the risk of so-called ‘wormhole
ing hybrid threat campaigns, deterrence has de
escalation’ (from low-level hybrid to conven-
facto already failed to some extent. Other strat-
tional and nuclear escalation) is ever-present.173
egies are therefore required to complement and
To combat this risk, nuclear and conventional
go beyond deterrence. A taxonomy of relevant
deterrence should be maintained where possible
strategies is shown in Figure 11 below.
through force superiority and escalation dom-
inance. The role of these factors should not be
underestimated – both to deter armed aggres-
sion and the most serious hybrid threats.174
170. For example, in the context of Russia: “Nuclear weapons are the foundation of the country’s national security and the
ultimate guarantee of its strategic independence. But they are not an instrument for risky endeavors – they ensure that other
powers do not engage in such endeavors against Russia.” See: Eugene Rumer, ‘The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action’,
Carnegie, 5 June 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254.
171. Jacek Durkalec, ‘Nuclear-Backed “Little Green Men”: Nuclear Messaging in the Ukraine Crisis’, Report (The Polish Institute of
International Affairs, July 2015), 5, 17-19, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193514/Nuclear%20Backed%20%E2%80%9CLittle%20
Green%20Men%E2%80%9D%20Nuclear%20Messaging%20in%20the%20Ukraine%20Crisis.pdf.
172. As one analyst of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ puts it: “Military power is the necessary enabler of hybrid warfare. Hybrid tools
can be an instrument of risk management when hard power is too risky, costly, or impractical, but military power is always in the
background.” See: Rumer, ‘The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action’. See also: Durkalec, ‘Nuclear-Backed “Little Green
Men”’, 5. As he suggests, Russia’s campaign in Ukraine “was backed up by Russia’s potential to use its full spectrum of military
capabilities, including conventional and nuclear forces”.
173. Hersman, ‘Wormhole escalation’.
174. Wasser et al., ‘Risky Business’.
175. Kersanskas, ‘Deterrence’.
Figure 11: Deterrence and beyond: a taxonomy176
PERSUADE DISSUADE
‘Do this!’ ‘Don’t do that!’
PUNISH
REASSURE
DENY
DETER
PRE-EMPT
ACCOMMODATE
CONTROL
COOPERATE
CONCILIATE PREVENT
INDUCE COMPEL
REINFORCE existing behaviour

MODIFY existing behaviour (more difficult)
This taxonomy is suggestive, not definitive. project’s framework identifies two other com-
More views abound on going beyond deterrence. ponents that complement deterrence: detection
For example, Thomas Schelling saw deterrence and response.181 RAND and CSIS outline compre-
as inherently defensive and compellence as hensive strategies that go beyond deterrence.182
offensive. 177
US scholar Alexander L. George sees Yet all of these analyses agree on the need to go
compellence as comprising two parts: a defen- beyond deterrence to counter hybrid threats.
sive form (to stop or undo an action) and an
offensive form (to give up something of value).178 5.3. The further evolution of hybrid threats
RAND’s Paul K. Davis equates dissuasion and and deterrence
deterrence, suggesting a model for ‘dissuasion
5.3.1. The evolution of hybrid threats
by denial’.179 Authors at the Hague Centre for
The evolution of deterrence will depend on how
Security Studies and RAND both take this idea
hybrid threats evolve in the prevailing strategic
further.180 The MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare
environment. As evolutionary biologists say,
176. Adapted from ideas in: King, ‘New Challenges’, 2 (the influence strategy typology); Blechman et al., Force Without War (the
‘modify vs reinforce’ distinction); Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’ (the ‘persuade vs dissuade’ distinction). These strategies
may rely on all available levers of power, not just military force.
177. Schelling, Arms and Influence (2020), 69. He saw the problem of ‘ambiguous aggression’ (e.g. hybrid threats) as being solved
primarily through compellence, not deterrence. This point is also made in: Monaghan, ‘To change Putin’s behaviour’; and Petty-
john and Wasser, ‘Competing in the Gray Zone’.
178. Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1991).
179.Paul K. Davis, ‘Towards Dissuasion (Deterrence) by Denial’, Working Paper (Rand, 2014), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/working_papers/WR1000/WR1027/RAND_WR1027.pdf.
180. Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’; Michael J. Mazarr et al., ‘What Deters and Why’.
181. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’.
182. Morris et al., ‘Gaining Competitive Advantage’; Hicks et al., ‘By Other Means Part I’.
“everything is everywhere, but the environment Moreover, at some point, increasingly motivated
selects.” The trends that have contributed to the and capable revisionists will ‘break out’ of the
rise of hybrid threats seem set to continue – but grey zone when they feel able to do so (as per
discontinuities can also be expected. Trends in the current crisis with an emboldened Russia).186
three areas – power, technology and interde- One dilemma is whether to act now or later to
pendence – are worth noting. prevent this from happening.187
Power Technology
The shifting balance of regional and global As well as shifting among states, power is also
power towards a more competitive, multipolar diffusing within them. This trend is driven by
international system means more state actors new technology which gives sub-state actors
will be more motivated and capable of challeng- and individuals more information, connectivity
ing the status quo.183 and tools.
The appetite for change of already active Digital and communication technology has
revisionists is unlikely to diminish in the near provided state and sub-state actors with more
future,184 and may well intensify where bolstered means to influence and threaten others in new
by economic growth and military expansion (e.g. ways that are often difficult to attribute or easy
China), or required by relative structural decline to deny.188 This technology can open new fissures
(e.g. Russia).185 The question is whether they will and frontlines across the whole of society, from
seek change through hybrid threats or more cyber phishing attacks executed by and targeted
drastic measures. at individuals, to disinformation battles played
183. The distribution of power among states is an important factor in the stability of the international system. See: Kenneth
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979). Although power is diffusing – both among states and towards non-
state actors, including multinational and transnational organizations – states retain a relative monopoly on economic and mili-
tary power. See: UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Global Strategic Trends’. The most problematic state actors can be defined primarily by
the extent to which they wish to revise or overturn the existing status quo. See: Linda Robinson et al., ‘Modern Political Warfare’,
Research Report (RAND, 2018), 16, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html.
184. Based on indicators such as rhetoric for change, capability to achieve it and actions taken. See for example: Dubik and Vin-
cent, ‘America’s global competitions’. Given that North Korea’s extreme revisionism is based primarily on the threat of a nuclear
strike or retaliation, their challenge (while important) does not fit the hybrid threat paradigm – unlike the gradual but aggres-
sive approaches of Russia in Europe, China in the South China Sea, and Iran in the wider Middle East.
185. For views on the persistence of Russian revisionism despite (or because of) relative structural decline, see: Michael Kofman
and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, ‘The Myth of Russian Decline: Why Moscow Will Be a Persistent Power’, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec
2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2021-10-19/myth-russian-decline; Richard Connelly and Michael Kofman,
‘What Putin Learned From the Soviet Collapse’, Foreign Affairs, 29 December 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rus-
sia-fsu/2021-12-29/what-putin-learned-soviet-collapse.
186. In fact, successfully countering hybrid threats may be a case of ‘be careful what you wish for’, as revisionist actors who re-
main motivated are provided with the incentive to pursue more drastic measures to achieve change. See Monaghan, ‘Countering
Hybrid Warfare’, 90.
187. Jensen et al., ‘Shadow Risk’.
188. See for example: UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Global Strategic Trends’.
out on social media.189 As Henry Kissinger and None of this suggests that armed conflict will
his co-authors put it: “A central paradox of our become obsolete. In fact, as more nations grow
digital age is that the greater a society’s digital their militaries, develop new military technology
capacity, the more vulnerable it becomes.” 190
and adopt more competitive or confrontational
Emerging technologies such as artificial intel- postures towards each other, the risk of military
ligence (AI) will accelerate these trends, chang- conflict will only grow.193
ing power balances and enhancing the power of However, should the strategic environment
citizens, governments and militaries well beyond continue to be characterized in large part by
the advances already realized through the infor- both disincentives for revisionists to resort to
mation revolution. 191
major war — such as the preponderance of hard
power belonging to the status-quo powers and
Interdependence the tempering effects of nuclear weapons — and
With increasing interdependence in the interna- incentives to retain a stake in the order — such
tional system, more states may be increasingly as economic growth and status for emerging
vulnerable to others in new and novel ways. powers — then would-be revisionists are more
The deepening of ‘complex interdependence’ likely to use hybrid threats to achieve measured
between nations has been intensified through aims, gradually over time, through a combination
accelerating globalization across all spheres of means.194
of life, from economic to cultural.192 Although While this trend has positive aspects – rather
this has brought many benefits to many peo- ‘hybrid war’ than real war – the increased range
ple, it also means that states are dependent and intensity of hybrid threats, combined with the
on –and therefore vulnerable to – each other to destabilizing effects of new technology, may lead
an extent never seen before, and in ways they to unintended and unpredictable escalation.195
might not even know about. This increases both
the target surface area and the level of ambi- 5.3.2. Deterring future hybrid threats
guity, opacity and surprise possible for future The evolution of hybrid threats will have impli-
hybrid threats. cations for deterrence. These can be examined
through the ‘three Cs’.
189. For example: “digitized propaganda, disinformation and political meddling with a larger scope and impact than in previous
eras. They are made possible by the expansiveness of the digital technology and network platforms on which these campaigns
unfold”. See: Henry Kissinger et al., The Age of AI: And Our Human Future (Little Brown and Company, 2021), 153.
190. Kissinger et al., The Age of AI, 153.
191. See for example: Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, 23; and Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Artificial Intelligence, International Competi-
tion, and the Balance of Power’, Texas National Security Review, Volume 1, Issue 3 (May 2018): 36-57, https://doi.org/10.15781/
T2639KP49.
192. Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Belknap Press, 2016).
193. See for example: James S. Johnson, ‘Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability’, Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring
2020), 17, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-1/Johnson.pdf. As he states: “the
increasingly competitive and contested nuclear multipolar world order will…increase escalation risks in future warfare between
great military powers – especially China and the United States”.
194. Mazarr, ‘Mastering the Gray Zone’.
195. Hersman, ‘Wormhole Escalation’.
Capability to a “Pax AI”, where – as with nuclear weapons –
As hybrid threats evolve to encompass the some nations shelter under the extended deter-
whole of digital and networked societies, so rence umbrella of others.200
too will the capabilities required to deter them. The risks of escalation and unintended effects
A more complex threat environment will make will multiply as new technologies are developed
predicting attacks and vulnerabilities more dif- and fielded.201 For example, “AI increases the
ficult, so nations may rely more on resilience.196 inherent risk of pre-emption and premature
Resilience best practice requires devolving use escalating into conflict”, yet “in contrast to
action to the most suitable stakeholders – these the field of nuclear weapons, no widely shared
will increasingly be private entities and individ- proscription and no clear concept of deterrence
ual citizens. (or of degrees of escalation) attend such uses
Advances in AI will help and hinder these of AI”.202 Advances in situational awareness
efforts, “shaping all conflicts from the lowest technology may both enhance and undermine
to highest intensity and the smallest to largest deterrence.203
scale”, as well as society itself.197 Because “the
‘attack surface’ of a digital, highly networked Credibility
society will be too vast for human operators Denial by resilience measures pose less of a
to defend manually…Countries, companies and credibility problem than threats of punishment,
even individuals should invest in fail-safes to which entail public support, cost absorption
insulate them from such scenarios”. 198
(e.g. for financial sanctions that also harm
New technologies will provide new threats of the deterrer), and escalation risk. Both will be
punishment too, such as cyberattack or AI-en- affected by trends in risk appetite and resilience
abled vulnerability detection.199 The unequal in Western nations, as well as emerging tech-
development of emerging technology between nology such as AI, which “changes the risks from
major powers will offer some nations capabil- using force, especially for casualty averse states,
ities that others will not be able to afford or which are most likely to field it...[this] may actu-
have access to. In the case of AI this could lead ally provoke conflict by making it affordable
196. On a more complex threat environment, for one example of the future range of hybrid threat capabilities, see: Monaghan,
‘Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 89.
197. Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, 8 and 19-20.
200. Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, 25.
201. See for example Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence’, 101: “This could readily generate severe reciprocal fear-of-surprise-attack
problems, with opponents guessing about each other’s capabilities and whether an attack is coming, each fearing the other is on
the verge of gaining a crucial technological edge”.
202. Kissinger et al., The Age of AI, 155-165. See also: James S. Johnson, ‘The AI-Cyber Nexus: Implications for Military Escalation,
Deterrence, and Strategic Stability’, Journal of Cyber Policy, Volume 4, Issue 3 (2019): 442–460, https://doi.org/10.1080/2373887
1.2019.1701693.
203. Rebecca Hersman and Reja Younis, ‘The Adversary Gets a Vote’, CSIS, 27 September 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
adversary-gets-vote; Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Great Power
Competition’, CSBA, 14 April 2020, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/deterrence-by-detection-a-key-role-for-un-
manned-aircraft-systems-in-great-power-competition; Johnson, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, 22.
for hitherto risk-averse states. AI could deter alter the psychological essence of strategic
aggression by adventurers seeking easy gains affairs”.209 For conventional military deterrence,
that are no longer below the threshold for AI “may alter cost-benefit calculations by
intervention”. 204
removing the fog of war, by superficially impos-
The credibility of deterrence is also chal- ing rationality on political decisions, and by
lenged by the complexity and unpredictability diminishing the human cost of military engage-
of the hybrid threat landscape. Hence one study ment” – all of which may speed up the pace of
advocates “some ‘better roughly right than coercive action beyond the point of human con-
precisely wrong’ multi-criteria decision-making trol and introduce fundamental uncertainty into
approaches” to calculating the likely costs of comprehension and signalling.210
deterrence measures.205 A study by RAND argues Signalling and interpretation problems are
for applying this uncertainty-centric approach also exacerbated by emerging technology.211
to designing deterrence and influence strategies Another complicating factor regarding AI and
writ large. 206
other emerging technologies is that, as the
pace and extent of their development remains
Communication an unknown quantity between states, percep-
Deterrence relies on both understanding and tion (as opposed to reality) will have an out-
conveying capabilities and intentions between sized effect on behaviour.212 For example, while
actors. Future trends look set to profoundly advances in situational awareness technology
complicate these efforts. To the extent that may enhance efforts to understand adversary
AI-enabled technologies feature in the future capabilities, these could also have destabilizing
hybrid threat landscape, the deepest challenge ‘arms-race’ effects.213
may be philosophical, as analyses of adversary
capabilities and intentions – and even the deci- 5.4. Deterring hybrid threats: towards a
sions that follow – involve non-human intelli- post-modern, ‘fifth wave’ of deterrence
gence (on both sides).207 The AI era risks moving theory and practice?
the conduct of strategy in international affairs
5.4.1. Four waves of deterrence theory
beyond human intention and understanding.208
and practice
In this sense, “nuclear weapons were arguably
The late US scholar Robert Jervis characterized
less revolutionary than AI, in that they did not
the evolution of deterrence theory and practice

205. Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’.
206. Paul K. Davis et al., ‘Influencing Adversary States: Quelling Perfect Storms’, Research Report (RAND, 2021),
https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA161-1.
208. Ibid., 139.
210. Alex Wilner and Casey Babb, ‘New Technologies and Deterrence: Artificial Intelligence and Adversarial Behaviour’, Chapter 21
in Annual Review, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2020), 402.
211. Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Signals of strength: Capability demonstrations and perceptions of military power’, Journal of
Strategic Studies, Volume 43, Issue 2 (2020): 309-330, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626724.
212. Johnson, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, 17.
213. Hersman and Younis, ‘The Adversary gets a Vote’.
Table 3: Five waves of deterrence theory and practice
Deterrence
Interpretive
Wave Empirical focus Actor focus focus (denial Domain focus
focus
vs punishment)
Deterrence
How to deter
First - State by punishment Nuclear weapons
nuclear use?
(e.g. MAD)
How to deter
Deterrence
Second rational military - State Military strategy
by punishment
actors?
The formation
How to deter
and role of norms, Deterrence
Third non-rational State Military strategy
identity, non- by punishment
military actors?
rational behaviour
Military strategy;
How to deter
non-military tools
actors with no Why do Deterrence by
(e.g. economic,
Fourth return address? people become Non-state punishment
cultural – deradi-
(E.g. terrorists, terrorists? (some denial)
calization, socie-
hackers)
tal resilience)
Non-military;
whole of govern-
Whose security? Deterrence by
How to deter ment and society;
Fifth Who is deterring State; sub-state denial (some pu-
hybrid threats? “threats more
who? nishment)
annoying than
deadly”
in ‘waves’.214 The first three waves can be char- that goes beyond military means.215 Fourth wave
acterized simplistically as being focussed on deterrence theory has also been credited with
nuclear deterrence (first), rational choice and incorporating the constructivist or interpretiv-
game theory (second), and ‘non-rational’ deci- ist perspectives sorely lacking in the first three
sion-making (third). All three were state-centric waves, which took states’ interests and motiva-
and primarily concerned with military-strategic tions as given.216
matters. Table 3 compares the established four waves
A subsequent fourth wave has been char- of deterrence theory and practice with a puta-
acterized by a shift towards deterring ‘asym- tive fifth wave, which is introduced and further
metric’ threats from non-state actors and the explained below.217
recognition of a broader concept of deterrence
214. Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence theory revisited’, World Politics, Volume 31, Issue 2 (1979): 289-324,
https://doi.org/10.2307/2009945.
215. See for example: Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘The fourth wave in deterrence research’, Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 31,
Issue 1 (2010): 1-33, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819; Amir Lupovici, ‘The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence
Theory –Toward a New Research Agenda’, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 3 (September 2010): 705–732,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40931133.
216. Lupovici, ‘The Emerging Fourth Wave’, 710-712.
217. Table adapted from Sweijs and Osinga, Annual Review, 526; Lupovici, ‘The Emerging Fourth Wave’; Morgan, ‘The State of
Deterrence’.
5.4.2. A putative fifth wave of deterrence in security strategy to prevent undesirable out-
The prospect of a fifth wave of deterrence the- comes, from the erosion of personal security to
ory and practice has been floated by a handful large-scale conflict.
of authors.218 Although it has not been labelled
as such, there is an established literature on Change
‘cross-domain deterrence’ that can be consid- Although the deterrence of military threats
ered part of this trend. 219
This field widens the remains the most important deterrence objec-
concept of deterrence across the breadth of tive (due to the potential costs of failure),
hybrid threats. the main focus is on deterring “threats more
No detailed characterization of a putative annoying than deadly”.221 These are predomi-
fifth wave of deterrence theory and practice nantly non-military hybrid threats that span the
exists as yet.220 An initial attempt is made to breadth of government and society, increasingly
sketch out its possible main features below, in blurring the distinction between international
terms of both continuity (from previous waves) and domestic, collective and individual. The
and change (new features). complexity, variety and volume of threats, actors
and targets – and therefore the scope of deter-
Continuity rence action – is unprecedented in previous
Deterrence remains – for now – a fundamen- waves. While the context of interstate competi-
tally psychological endeavour to manipulate the tion will drive the security and deterrence envi-
decision calculus (through risk, costs and incen- ronment, the reality of power diffusion (within
tives) of others to prevent them from pursuing states) and the connectedness of citizens neces-
undesirable courses of action. Preventing the sitates a large sub-state component – deter-
use of military – and nuclear – force remains rence will be less about elites managing crises
the primary objective of deterrence given the and more about whole societies maintaining
high cost of failure. The threat of military force their individual (personal) and collective (sub-
also remains the sine qua non of deterrence state and state-level) freedoms.
due to its potency. While non-state actors As a result of these new features of the deter-
remain relevant to the fifth wave, they are no rence environment, the emphasis of deterrence
longer of prime concern as state actors return strategy will shift away from punishment towards
to the stage in an era of multipolar competi- denial through resilience. The relevant levers
tion. Importantly, consensus remains – even of power and tools of deterrence action will be
intensifies – over the central role of deterrence wielded less by the military and government
218. Most notably by Sweijs and Osinga, Annual Review, 524-529. Tim Prior suggests “Applied resilience is becoming the corner-
stone of security policy, and represents the fifth wave of deterrence” (see: Prior, ‘Resilience: The ‘Fifth Wave’, 77). Michael Ruhle
proposes that “in short, the ‘fifth wave’ contends that the concept of deterrence can be adapted to reach far beyond existential
military contingencies and military threats”. He also cites Hybrid CoE’s Deterrence Playbook (Kersanskas, ‘Deterrence’) as part
of this trend. See: Michael Ruhle, ‘In Defense of Deterrence’, National Institute for Public Policy, April 27 2020, https://nipp.org/
information_series/ruhle-michael-in-defense-of-deterrence-information-series-no-457/.
219. See for example: Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion’; Mallory, ‘New Challenges in Cross- Domain Deterrence’; Tim Sweijs
and Samuel Zilincik, ‘The Essence of Cross-Domain Deterrence’, Chapter 8 in Annual Review, ed. Sweijs and Osinga (T.M.C. Asser
Press: The Hague, 2020); Gartzke and Lindsay, Cross-Domain Deterrence.
220. The most detailed effort is made by: Sweijs and Osinga, Annual Review, 526.
221. Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence’, 100-101.
and more by the whole of society, woven into deterrence in the era of hybrid threats may
the fabric of everyday life. ‘The way we make become a post-modern case of the ‘deterrence
war reflects the way we make wealth’ – and so of everything’. Patrick Morgan characterizes this
for deterrence. This development will open more new deterrence context well:
doors for interpretivist inquiry into deterrence
theory, as more actors and perspectives compli- “[W]e currently face threats more annoy-
cate the intersubjective context of threat forma- ing than deadly, much harder to detect
tion and the meaning of ‘security’ (and therefore and much more complicated to deter. We
deterrence). This will broaden the relevance of give them much attention as the threats of
non-military subfields of deterrence theory and the day and because they might become
practice, from crime to public health and the- far more than just annoying.”224
ology. 222
Such broadening and complexity is the
essence of hybrid threats. On the one hand, this prospect might entail the
Ultimately – fifth wave or not – the evolution unwelcome securitization of evermore aspects
of hybrid threats and the security environment of international, domestic and private life.225 On
will at the very least lead to a renaissance in the other hand, the shift of deterrent focus onto
deterrence theory and practice. This is already “threats more annoying than deadly” may actually
underway, due to a combination of the return of represent progress in international and human
intense competition between states to the front security. It may even be a form of ‘anti-war’:
and centre of the international stage, and the deterring hybrid war rather than actual war.226
novelty and proliferation of deterrence into new Looking further into the future, the truly rev-
areas of government and society. olutionary implications of AI may invite a sixth
wave of deterrence theory and practice – when
5.4.3. The deterrence of everything, anti-war the essence of deterrence moves beyond the
and the sixth wave manipulation of human decisions to the inscru-
Just as some have described the coming era as table logic of intelligent machines.227
involving the ‘weaponisation of everything’,223
222. See for example Sweijs et al., ‘Reimagining deterrence’, 7: “in academic disciplines other than political science, including
criminology, labor relations, public health, education, and religion.” See also: Halas, ‘NATO’s sub-conventional deterrence’.
223. Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything. See also: Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st
Century and the Future of American Power (Yale University Press, 2017).
224. Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence’, 100-101.
225. See for example: Jaap de Wilde et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); Thierry
Balzacq, Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Routledge, 2010); Rosa Brooks, How Everything
Became War and the Military Became Everything (Simon and Schuster, 2017).
226. According to 1990s futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler, “anti-wars involve strategic applications of military, economic and in-
formational power to reduce the violence so often associated with change on the world stage”. Anti-wars “include actions taken
by politicians, and even by warriors themselves, to create conditions that deter or limit the extent of war”. See: Alvin and Heidi
Toffler, War and Anti-war, 4.
227. Kenneth Payne (Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence’) suggests that there may only be two true ‘revolutions’ in human history: “The
first revolution separates Homo sapiens from other primates, via a cognitive explosion some 100,000 years ago that brought
about rich social interaction, language, the capacity for self-reflection and empathy with others, and the ability to make tools.
These are the foundations of human strategy. A second revolution, now under way, is moving strategy beyond purely biological,
human intelligence” (p. 11). See also: Kenneth Payne, Strategy, Evolution and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence (Washing-
ton DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).
Author
Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, where he focusses on European security and defence. His career as a civil
servant in the UK Ministry of Defence has focused on international defence policy, including NATO,
the European Union, and the United States. In recent years, his work as a policy analyst has seen him
contribute to the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review and lead multinational research projects, including
the MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare project.

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Hybrid CoE Paper 12

Deterring hybrid threats:

Sean Monaghan – March 2022

Cover photo: Dmytro Kapitonenko / shutterstock.com

Hybrid CoE Papers are finalized pieces of analysis on a topic related to

The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

ISBN (web) 978-952-7472-28-6

Hybrid CoE’s mission is to strengthen its Participating States’ security

2. What are hybrid threats?.................................................................................................................9

4. Restoring the foundations of deterrence against hybrid threats..................18

Hybrid threats combine modern tools of statecraft to seek gains while

Hybrid threats undermine the foundations of deterrence – capability,

punishment and deterrence vs compellence. It also offers a framework for

This paper is indebted to:

participated in it (many of these ideas were born there);

Sam Guthrie, Dr Adam Lyons, Ben Millman, Hamzah Muneer, Dr Gordon

Figure 1: Hybrid threat phases, increasing in intensity from left to right.8

Hybrid threat phase: Priming Destabilisation Coercion

Efforts to interfere Operations or campaigns Destabilisation

Figure 2: Hybrid threat severity, increasing in intensity from left to right.

Hybrid threat Persistent Moderate Aggressive

Broad-based, low-level, Direct, attributable, Direct, threatening,

8.Giannopoulos et al., ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats’, 11.

Hybrid threats exploit complexity

Figure 3: Hybrid threats on a continuum of conflict

Limited Conventional War

Confrontation ‘Gray zone’ Armed conﬂict

Figure 4: Visualizing hybrid threats (synchronization, ambiguity and non-linear effects).18

18. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 15.

Figure 5: Setting tailored, domain-specific thresholds for countering hybrid threats.25

25. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 21.

Table 1: Basic principles of deterrence

Deterrence principle Focus Description

• Restrictive deterrence seeks to minimize the negative attributes

• Immediate deterrence is undertaken through targeted actions in

• The distinction between deterring attacks against oneself

• Deterrence by denial aims to undermine the ability of the adver-

• Deterrence is about preventing behaviour while compellence is

COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY CREDIBILITY

4. Restoring the foundations of

66. Freier, ‘The Darker Shade of Gray’.

4.5.2. Tailoring deterrence to achieve Foundation: credibility. Tailored deterrence

“To say, ‘One more step and I shoot’, can

Positive Offer incentives Offer

Negative Withdraw incentives Offer

119. Monaghan et al., ‘MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare’, 44.

127. Ruhle, ‘Deterring Hybrid Threats’, 4.

Table 2: Mapping report insights into the three pillars of deterrence

Capability Credibility Communication

Resilience is the foundation of hybrid deterrence  

Figure 9: A framework for deterring hybrid threats

Hybrid threat phase: Priming Destabilisation Coercion

Hybrid threat severity: Persistent Moderate Aggressive

COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY CREDIBILITY

148. Pettyjohn and Wasser, ‘Competing in the Gray Zone’.

154. Wasser et al., ‘Risky Business’.

Figure 11: Deterrence and beyond: a taxonomy176

REINFORCE existing behaviour

204. Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, 25.