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{126} Chapter VI

Deductive Arguments
Consider this argument:
If there are no chance factors in chess, then chess is a game of pure skill.
There are no chance factors in chess.
Therefore, chess is a game of pure skill.
Suppose that the premises of this argument are true. In other words,
suppose it’s true that if there are no chance factors in chess, then chess is
a game of pure skill—and suppose there are no chance factors in chess.
You can therefore conclude with perfect assurance that chess is a game of
pure skill. There is no way to admit the truth of these premises but deny
the conclusion.
Arguments of this type are called deductive arguments. That is, a
(properly formed) deductive argument is an argument of such a form that
if its premises are true, the conclusion must be true too. Properly formed
deductive arguments are called valid arguments.
Deductive arguments differ from the sorts of arguments so far
considered, in which even a large number of true premises does not
guarantee the truth of the conclusion (though sometimes they may make
it very likely). In non-deductive arguments, the conclusion unavoidably
goes beyond the premises—that’s the very point of arguing by example,
authority, and so on—whereas the conclusion of a valid deductive
argument only makes explicit what is already contained in the premises.
In real life, of course, we can’t always be sure of our premises either,
so the conclusions of real-life deductive arguments still have to be taken
with a few (sometimes many) grains of salt. Still, when strong premises
can be found, deductive forms are very useful. And even when the
premises are uncertain, deductive forms offer an effective way to
organize arguments.
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the much larger topic of
deductive logic. The “Resources” section on this book’s companion Web
site has links to books and online resources for those who would like to
explore deductive logic in more depth. Many of these resources are free,
and some are interactive.
{127} Rule 22: Modus ponens
Using the letters p and q to stand for declarative sentences, the simplest
valid deductive form is
If [sentence p] then [sentence q].
[Sentence p].
Therefore, [sentence q].
Or, more briefly:
If p then q.
p.
Therefore, q.
This form is called modus ponens (“the mode of putting”: put p, get q).
Taking p to stand for “There are no chance factors in chess” and q to
stand for “Chess is a game of pure skill,” our introductory example
follows modus ponens (check it out). Here is another:
If drivers on cell phones have more accidents, then drivers should be
prohibited from using them.
Drivers on cell phones do have more accidents.
Therefore, drivers should be prohibited from using cell phones.
To develop this argument, you must explain and defend both of its
premises, and they require quite different arguments (go back and look).
Modus ponens gives you a way to lay them out clearly and separately
from the start.
Rule 23: Modus tollens
A second valid deductive form is modus tollens (“the mode of taking”:
take q, take p).
If p then q.
Not-q.
Therefore, not-p.
Here “Not-q” simply stands for the denial of q, that is, for the sentence
“It is not true that q.” Similarly for “not-p.”
Remember Sherlock Holmes’ argument, discussed under Rule 1:
A dog was kept in the stables, and yet, though someone had been in and
fetched out a horse, [the dog] had not barked….
{128} Obviously the… visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.
Holmes’ argument can be put as a modus tollens:
If the visitor was a stranger, then the dog would have barked.
The dog did not bark.
Therefore, the visitor was not a stranger.
To write this argument in symbols, you could use s for “The visitor
was a stranger” and b for “The dog barked.”
If s then b.
Not-b.
Therefore, not-s.
“Not-b” stands for “The dog did not bark,” and “not-s” stands for “The
visitor was not a stranger.” As Holmes puts it, the visitor was someone
whom the dog knew well.
Be careful not to confuse modus ponens and modus tollens with their evil
twins, “affirming the consequent” and “denying the antecedent.” For
details on those two invalid argument forms, see page 249 in Appendix
I: Fallacies.
Rule 24: Hypothetical syllogism
A third valid deductive form is “hypothetical syllogism.”
If p then q.
If q then r.
Therefore, if p then r.
For instance:
If you study other cultures, then you start to realize the variety of human
customs.
If you start to realize the variety of human customs, then you become
more tolerant.
Therefore, if you study other cultures, then you become more tolerant.
Using the letters in boldface to stand for the component sentences in this
statement, we have:
{129} If s then v.
If v then t.
Therefore, if s then t.
Hypothetical syllogisms are valid for any number of premises as long
as each premise has the form “If p then q” and the q (called the
“consequent”) of one premise becomes the p (the “antecedent”) of the
next.
Rule 25: Disjunctive syllogism
A fourth valid deductive form is “disjunctive syllogism.”
p or q.
Not-p.
Therefore, q.
Consider, for instance, Bertrand Russell’s argument discussed under
Rule 2:
Either we hope for progress by improving morals, or we hope for
progress by improving intelligence.
We can’t hope for progress by improving morals.
Therefore, we must hope for progress by improving intelligence.
Again using the boldface letters as symbols, this argument goes
m or i.
Not-m.
Therefore, i.
There is one complication. In English the word “or” can have two
different meanings. Usually “p or q” means that at least one of p or q is
true and possibly both. This is called an “inclusive” sense of the word
“or” and is the sense normally assumed in logic. Sometimes, though, we
use “or” in an “exclusive” sense, in which “p or q” means that either p or
q is true but not both. “Either they’ll come by land or they’ll come by
sea,” for example, suggests that they won’t come both ways at once. In
that case you might be able to infer that if they come one way, then
they’re not coming the other way (better be sure!).
Disjunctive syllogisms are valid regardless of which sense of “or” is
used (check it out). But what else, if anything, you may be able to infer
from a statement like “p or q”—in particular, whether you can conclude
not-q if {130} you also know p—depends on the meaning of “or” in the
specific “p or q” premise you are considering. Take care!
Rule 26: Dilemma
A fifth valid deductive form is the “dilemma.”
p or q.
If p then r.
If q then s.
Therefore, r or s.
Rhetorically, a “dilemma” is a choice between two options both of
which have unappealing consequences. The pessimist philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer, for example, formulated what is sometimes called the
“Hedgehog’s dilemma,” which we could paraphrase like this:
The closer two hedgehogs get, the more likely they are to poke each
other with their spikes; but if they remain apart, they will be lonely. So it
is with people: being close to someone inevitably creates conflicts and
provocations and opens us to a lot of pain; but on the other hand, we’re
lonely when we stand apart.
In outline this argument might be put:
Either we become close to others or we stand apart.
If we become close to others, we suffer conflict and pain.
If we stand apart, we’ll be lonely.
Therefore, either we suffer conflict and pain or we’ll be lonely.
And in symbols:
Either c or a.
If c then s.
If a then l.
Therefore, either s or l.
A further argument in dilemma form could conclude, even more simply,
something like “Either way we’ll be unhappy.” I’ll leave this one to you
to write out formally.
Since this is such a jolly little conclusion, maybe we should add that
hedgehogs are actually quite able to get close without poking each other.
They can be together and comfortable too. Schopenhauer’s second
premise turns out to be false—at least for hedgehogs.
{131} Exercise Set 6.1: Identifying deductive
argument forms
Objective: To give you practice recognizing uses of Rules 22–26 in plain
English.

Instructions: State which of the preceding rules each of the following


arguments follows.

Tips for success: It’s easier to recognize which rule a deductive argument
uses if you use letters to abbreviate the different parts of the argument. For
instance, recall how we used the letters s and b to stand for different
independent clauses in discussing modus tollens (Rule 23). We used s to
abbreviate “The visitor is a stranger” and b to stand for “The dog barked.”
How do you figure out which parts of the argument to abbreviate? The
first step is to look for uses of “if,” “and,” and “or.” When these words are
used to connect two independent clauses, they are called “logical
connectives.” (An independent clause is a part of a sentence that could be a
sentence on its own. For instance, the sentence “If there are no chance
factors in chess, then chess is a game of pure skill” has two independent
clauses: “There are no chance factors in chess” and “Chess is a game of
pure skill.”)
When you find one of these logical connectives, circle it. Then, underline
the independent clauses that it connects. Assign a letter to each of those
clauses; write the letter underneath or beside the clause. Logicians often use
the letters p and q, but you can use any letters you want.
Remember that “if,” “and,” and “or” are not always used as logical
connectives. For instance, the word “and” appears in lists of two or more
things (e.g., “Lions and tigers and bears!”). Look for sentences that use
these words to connect two independent clauses. Those are the most likely
to be genuine logical connectives.
Once you’ve found all of the logical connectives in an argument and
assigned letters to the independent clauses that they connect, see if any of
those clauses appear elsewhere in the argument. If so, underline the clause
and write the letter for it underneath or beside it. Again, you can use any
letters you want, but you must be consistent. If you used p to stand for
“There are no chance factors in chess” once, you must use p for all and only
instances of “There are no chance factors in chess” in that argument.
Finally, check for sentences that say the opposite of one of the clauses
that you’ve symbolized. Put a “not” in front of the letter for that clause. For
instance, if you’re using b to stand for “The dog barked,” look for sentences
that say that the dog did not bark. Underline that sentence and write “not-b”
underneath or beside it.
{132} Once you have done this, you will probably notice that there are
phrases, clauses, or entire sentences that you have not yet symbolized. This
is perfectly normal. You will usually find arguments embedded in larger
passages. The passage might include background information or
commentary on the premises of the argument. You do not need to symbolize
these. They are probably not premises of the argument.
Note that the arguments you encounter in your daily life may not always
express one idea in the same way every time. If you’re confident that two
different clauses express the same idea, you can use the same letter to
symbolize them, even if they don’t use exactly the same words. For
instance, consider the argument:
Either the dog knew the visitor or the dog barked. The dog did not bark.
Therefore, the visitor was not a stranger.
The first clause and the last sentence express the same idea—namely, that
the dog knew the visitor—in different words. It makes sense to symbolize
them with the same letter.
Once you’ve assigned letters to the clauses in your argument, compare
the symbolized version of the argument to each of the preceding rules. If the
symbolized version matches the form given by one of the rules, then the
argument follows that rule. If not, it doesn’t. Note that the order of the
premises doesn’t matter, though of course it does matter which sentence is
the conclusion and which are the premises.
Sample
If money is the most important thing in life, then we will pursue it for its
own sake. We do not pursue money for its own sake, but rather as a
means to achieving something else. Thus, money is not the most
important thing in life.
Adapted from: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 5

Modus tollens.

To see why the answer is modus tollens, let p stand for “money is the
most important thing in life” and q stand for “we will pursue money for
its own sake.” We could symbolize the first sentence as “If p then q.”
The third sentence is not-q and the fourth sentence is not-p. This fits the
form of modus tollens. Notice that the phrase “but rather as a means to
achieving something else” is not part of the argument itself.

{133} 1. If I am thinking, then I exist. I am thinking. Therefore, I exist.


Adapted from: René Descartes, Discourse on Method, 4th ed., trans.
Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 18

2. Determinism is the view that everything that happens is fully


determined by the laws of nature and the way the world was long before
we were born. Either determinism is false or humans have no free will.
Humans do have free will. Thus, determinism is false.
Adapted from: Peter van Inwagen, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and
Determinism,” Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), 185–99

3. If the Great Spirit had desired me to be a white man, he would have


made me a white man. He did not make me a white man. Hence, he did
not desire me to be a white man.
Adapted from: Chief Sitting Bull, quoted in David Ross,
1,001 Pearls of Wisdom (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2006), 21
4. I’m offering you two pills: one red, one blue. You can take the red pill
or you can take the blue pill. It’s up to you. But once you’ve made your
choice, there’s no turning back. If you take the blue pill, you’ll forget
this ever happened and you’ll go on living your life in blissful
ignorance. If you take the red pill, your life will be changed forever by
what I am about to show you. Thus, your choice is really between the
life you know now and a totally different life that you cannot begin to
imagine.
Adapted from: The Matrix, directed by Andy Wachowski and Lana Wachowski
(Burbank, CA: Warner Bros., 1999)

5. Many medical texts suggest that the best way to treat bee stings is by
scraping the stinger without squeezing or pulling the stinger. In 1996,
some researchers tested this by allowing honeybees to sting them
repeatedly. They scraped some stingers out and pulled the others out.
They said that if scraping worked better than pulling, then scraping the
stingers should leave a smaller welt. They found {134} that scraping the
stingers did not leave a smaller welt. Therefore, scraping the stingers
out did not work better than pulling them out.
Adapted from: Anahad O’Connor, “The Claim: Bee Stings Can Be Treated by
Scraping out Stingers,” New York Times, May 30, 2006, http://www
.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/health/30real.html

6. The prosecution has presented a lot of evidence to show that the


defendant killed her husband. But if my client had killed her husband,
then she wouldn’t want to get caught, would she? And if she didn’t want
to get caught, then she wouldn’t have left all that evidence behind. So,
you see, if my client were guilty, then she wouldn’t have left behind all
of the evidence that the prosecution has presented!
Adapted from: Zach Weinersmith, “Comic for February 26, 2007,” Saturday Morning
Breakfast Comics, Feb 26, 2007, http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?id=743

7. Steve Salerno, a former self-help book editor for Rodale Press, said, “If
the self-help books we sold worked, then one would not expect people
to need further help from us on the same topic.” But he found that most
of his company’s customers did need further help from them—on the
same topic—after reading their self-help books. This implies that the
self-help books he sold did not work.
Adapted from: Michael Shermer, “SHAM Scam,” Scientific American, May 2006,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=sham-scam

8. If all the other Baratheon children have dark hair, then it is unlikely that
the king’s son would be blond. And if it is unlikely that the king’s son
would be blond, then the prince probably isn’t the king’s child! Thus, if
all the other Baratheon children have dark hair, the prince probably isn’t
the king’s child.
Adapted from: George R. R. Martin, A Game of Thrones
(New York: Bantam Spectra, 1996), 486

9. You say I’m some kind of demon. Well, either you’re right about that,
and I really am a demon, or you’re wrong about me, and I’m just a poor
old country boy. Now, if I’m just a poor old country boy, you’d better be
nice to me. But if I’m actually a demon, then you had really better be
nice to me, because I could cause you all kinds of trouble. So either
way, you’d better be nice to me!
Adapted from: Montgomery Pittman, “The Last Rites of Jeff Myrtlebank,” The Twilight
Zone video, 24:55, Feb 23, 1962, http://www.hulu.com/watch/440889

{135} 10. After drinking a potion labeled “DRINK ME,” which had made
her smaller, Alice found herself trapped. There was only one door out of
the room, but it was locked. The key sat on top of the table, far out of
her reach. Looking about for a solution to her problem, she discovered a
tiny little cake labeled “EAT ME.” She surmised that the cake might
change her size too, although she wasn’t sure in what way. It might
make her grow back to her original size, or it might make her shrink
even further. If it made her grow, then she would be able to reach the
key and unlock the door. If it made her shrink, then she would be able to
slip under the door. Therefore, she reasoned, she would be able to
unlock the door or she would be able to slip under the door. Either way,
she could escape from the room!
Adapted from: Lewis Carroll, Martin Gardner, and John Tenniel, The Annotated
Alice: The Definitive Edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 18
Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 362.
Exercise Set 6.2: Identifying deductive arguments in
more complex passages
Objective: To give you practice recognizing deductive argument forms
when they are expressed in more complicated ways.

Instructions: State which of the preceding rules each of the following


arguments follows.

Tips for success: Most of the deductive arguments you encounter won’t
come as neatly packaged as those in Exercise Set 6.1. Most will be
embedded in longer passages. Some will make their logical moves in ways
that are less obvious than in the arguments above.
Still, the basic technique for recognizing deductive argument forms in
more complex passages is the same as in Exercise Set 6.1. Look for logical
connectives. Assign letters to the independent clauses joined by the logical
connectives. Look for other occurrences of those clauses elsewhere in the
passage. Remember that you may find arguments embedded in larger
passages. Some of the phrases, clauses, or sentences in the larger passage
will not be premises of the argument. You do not need to symbolize
everything in the passage. Symbolize only those clauses or sentences that
express the premises or conclusion of the argument.
{136} One big difference between this exercise and the last one is that
you will need to know about alternative ways of expressing “if p then q.”
Three of the most common are:

p if q means if q then p
p only if q means if p then q
p unless q means if not-q then p

Another problem that sometimes arises has to do with the little word
“not.” Consider, for example, the following argument:
(1) If the murder was committed at noon, then the butler did not do it.
(2) If the butler did not do it, then the maid must have done it.
Therefore, (3) if the murder was committed at noon, then the maid must
have done it.
It would be natural to symbolize the argument as follows:
(1) If a then not-b.
(2) If not-b then c.
Therefore, (3) if a then c.
On the face of it, this may not look like a hypothetical syllogism (Rule 24),
since the discussion of hypothetical syllogism makes no mention of “nots”
(check it out). If you look just a little more carefully, though, you will see
that this arguments does exactly what any good hypothetical syllogism
does: it makes a tight link between a and c by means of an intermediate
term, which happens to be not-b in this case. To see this clearly, try using a
new symbol for not-b, like d. Then the argument reads:
(1) If a then d.
(2) If d then c.
Therefore, (3) if a then c.
and you can see that this argument forms just the sort of “chain” that makes
hypothetical syllogisms valid. (Can you figure out what not-d means in
English?)
By the same token, an argument like
(1) If not-m then not-j.
(2) Not-m.
Therefore, (3) not-j.
is a straightforward modus ponens, despite all the “nots.” As long as the
antecedent (i.e., the first part) of premise (1) exactly matches what’s in
premise (2), then the consequent (i.e., the second part) of premise (1)
follows. What matters is the relation between the premises.
{137} Sample
Scientists have known for some time now that Mars has water on it, but
they have been unsure about whether that water ever flowed across the
surface in streams or rivers. In 2012, NASA’s Curiosity rover found
rocks on Mars that have smooth, rounded pebbles embedded in them.
Pebbles have that shape only if they have been in a stream or river that
was flowing for a long time. Thus, the pebbles must have been in a
stream or river. This confirms that Mars had flowing water at some point
in the past.
Adapted from: NASA, “Pebbly Rocks Testify to Old Streambed on Mars,” nasa.gov, May 30,
2013,
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/msl/news/msl20130530f.html

Modus ponens.

The key connective here is the word if in the third sentence. If we use p to
stand for “the Martian pebbles have a smooth, rounded shape” and q to
stand for “the pebbles were in a stream or river,” then the third sentence
reads “p only if q.” We know that this means “if p then q.” So, once we
notice that the second sentence asserts p and the fourth sentence asserts
q, we know that we’re looking at an instance of modus ponens. Notice
that the first sentence is just background information, and the last
sentence tells us why the conclusion of our modus ponens argument is
important. We don’t need to symbolize either sentence. Notice also that
the “or” in “streams or rivers” isn’t a logical connective because it’s not
connecting two independent clauses.

1. In January 1610, Galileo pointed a new telescope at Jupiter. He noticed


three points of light beside Jupiter that weren’t visible with his other,
weaker telescopes. At first, he thought they were stars. But, as he wrote
in his notes, he reasoned that if they were stars, then they should be
about as bright as the other stars, and arranged randomly like the other
stars. But they were brighter than the other stars and arranged in a
straight line next to Jupiter. Thus, he concluded, they were not stars.
This was his first step in discovering the moons of Jupiter.
Adapted from: Robert J. Sternberg and Jacqueline P. Leighton, The Nature
of Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30–35

2. All of our actions are motivated either by respect for duty or by


something else. They will never treat others as means to an end if {138}
they are motivated by respect for duty, and they will never have moral
worth if they are not motivated by respect for duty. Thus, either our
actions do not treat others as means to an end or they have no moral
worth.
Adapted from: Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,
3rd ed., trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 11, 36

3. Without a government, people would have so little security that they


would choose to steal from others—even killing others if they must—
rather than try to produce and protect their own goods or food. If people
living without a government are prone to steal from and kill one
another, then life would be so terrible without a government that the
only rational thing to do is to set up a government to force everyone to
behave. Hence, we ought to set up a government to force everyone to
behave.
Adapted from: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 74–80

4. When federal prosecutors accused Ross Ulbricht of running the Silk


Road, an online marketplace for illegal goods, Ulbricht said he’d been
framed. He said he had no connection to the computers that hosted the
Silk Road. Furthermore, his lawyers argued, the FBI had hacked into
that server illegally, and so it could not use evidence from that server in
court. But a judge countered that Ulbricht couldn’t have it both ways.
Either he had some connection to the Silk Road server or he didn’t. If he
did, then he couldn’t claim that he’d been framed. On the other hand, he
had no grounds for objecting to the FBI’s methods of accessing the
server unless he did have such a connection. So, either he had to give up
his claim that he’d been framed or give up his claim that the
government’s evidence was inadmissable in court.
Adapted from: “The Silk Road Trial: Bitcoin Buccaneers,” The Economist,
Jan 17, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21639525-one-dread-
pirate-trial-what-about-others-bitcoin-buccaneers

5. In the 1700s, before the invention of modern chemistry, scientists


believed that flammable materials contained a substance called
“phlogiston.” When something burned, it was thought to lose {139}
phlogiston. This “phlogiston theory” of combustion explained many
scientific observations, but it also raised some puzzles. One puzzle was
that certain metals gained weight when they burned. But burning metals
would cause them to lose weight if burning was the release of
phlogiston. Thus, the puzzle led some scientists to suspect that the
phlogiston theory was incorrect.
Adapted from: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
50th Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 71–72

6. As surprising as it may seem, I am now prepared to share with you


something that philosophers have sought for centuries: a proof that the
external world really exists. Observe: my right hand exists. My left
hand, you will notice, also exists. Thus, there exist at least two hands.
Notice, however, that if there exist at least two hands, as these two
hands here exist, then the external world exists.
Adapted from: G. E. Moore, “Proof of an External World,” in Classics of
Analytic Philosophy, edited by Robert Ammerman (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), 81

7. Part of an economist’s job is to figure out why people do stupid things


—or at least, why they do things that appear stupid. Take celebrity
endorsements of consumer goods, for instance. Companies hire
celebrities to endorse their products even though the celebrities have no
expertise related to the product. For some reason, consumers respond to
these endorsements. That is, celebrity endorsements cause consumers to
buy more of a product. Some people might think this is just stupidity.
But economists assume it’s not. They reason that consumers wouldn’t
respond to celebrity endorsements if celebrity endorsements didn’t
signal a better product or a more trustworthy company. Thus, celebrity
endorsements must signal a better product or a more trustworthy
company. The puzzle for the economist is to figure out how celebrity
endorsements do this.
Adapted from: Steven E. Landsburg, The Armchair Economist (New York:
Free Press, 1993), 14

{140} 8. If a man is truly good, then he will recognize the difficulty of


everything he does. Furthermore, he will be hesitant to speak if he
recognizes the difficulty of everything he does. Thus, a man is truly
good only if he is hesitant to speak.
Adapted from: Confucius, Analects, tr. Edward Slingerland (Indianapolis:
ackett Publishing Company, 2003), 126

9. To call oneself a Christian, one must believe in certain things. At the


very least, one must believe in God and immortality. If someone does
not believe in those two things, that person is not truly a Christian.
Bertrand Russell did not believe in God or immortality. Thus, Bertrand
Russell was not a Christian.
Adapted from: Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1957; repr., London: Routledge, 2004), 2

10. This man just told us that he’s going to steal a ship, pick up a pirate
crew in Tortuga, and raid, pillage, and pilfer his way around the
Caribbean. If he were telling the truth, he wouldn’t have told us all that.
So he can’t be telling the truth!
Adapted from: Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl,
directed by Gore Verbinski (Burbank, CA: Walt Disney Pictures, 2003)

Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 364.

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