6611 - Grp6 - Module 2
6611 - Grp6 - Module 2
6611 - Grp6 - Module 2
Team Members =
1. Muhammad Palize Qazi - 24027
2. Muhammad Hassaan Imran - 24062
3. Muhammad Azlan Tehseen - 24036
4. Muhammad Hassaan - 24802
5. Saifullah Soomro - 24626
6. Wasaiu Ahmed - 24281
Group 6
SLOT = 6611
m
IBF PROJECT | 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
INTRODUCTION 6
LIQUIDITY RATIOS 7
CURRENT RATIO 7
QUICK/ACID TEST RATIO 7
DEBT RATIO 13
TIMES INTEREST EARNED (TIE) RATIO 13
PROFITABILITY RATIOS 15
CONCLUSION 25
IBF PROJECT | 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
LIQUIDITY RATIOS:
LUCK dominated its competitors in the liquidity ratios for 2018-2022, starting at a high point but later
converging with the ratios for its competitors and the industry average in 2020. MLCF started off with
the lowest ratio in 2018 but had some recovery due to policies of reducing short term borrowings,
and overtook DGKC, which has faced a stable decline.
CURRENT RATIO
This ratio measures the extent to which a company’s liabilities are covered by assets that are to be
converted to cash in the near future. The current ratio of all cement industries shows a downward
trend from the financial year of 2018 to 2020. The current ratio reached its lowest point 2020 where
the industry average fell below 1.0 and reached a value of 0.95, meaning that the average current
liabilities of cement industries were greater than their current assets. However, from 2020 the
cement industries have all been on an upward trend with the exception of DG Khan Cement, whose
current ratio fell from 0.94 to 0.91 in 2021 because current assets increased minimally but trade
payables increased by 32%. They have not recovered in the financial year of 2022, as their current
ratio fell more further to 0.90, which means the company is having a hard time meeting its debt
obligations. This happened because even though current assets increased by 11% (mostly driven by
a 46% increase in inventory) and trade payables decreased, but short-term borrowings increased by
37%. It is important to note that despite a big drop between 2018 and 2019, Lucky Cement
maintained a higher current ratio than the industry average throughout the financial years of 2018-
2022 and held a current ratio around or greater than 1.0. This shows that Lucky Cement is successful
at paying short term debts using its assets and has a comparative advantage at managing its liabilities
respective to the rest of the cement industry. On the other hand, DGKC has been consistently below
the industry averages, which may be due to the high short-term borrowings, which is something not
found in the financial statements of LUCK until 2019. By extension, it can also be inferred that the
drop in 2019 for LUCK can be attributed to short term borrowings.
The average turnover ratio remains stable throughout the five years, oscillating around a 3.0 ratio.
The inventory turnover ratio has remained greater than the industry average throughout the period
for Lucky Cement, reaching a peak of 3.80 in 2021. Lucky Cement’s high inventory turnover rate
indicates high sales, market share, and performance as compared to the rest of the cement industry.
DG Khan Cement’s inventory ratio starts at an impressive peak of 3.62 in 2019, attributed to their
33% increase in sales from 2018, higher than both LUCK and MLCF, but suffers a big decline through
the next three years, reaching the lowest value of 2.48, relatively lower than other cement
companies. As discussed before, this is because even though sales have increased by 92% from 2017,
but the inventories have increase by 274%. The turnover ratio for Maple Leaf Cement Factory remains
stable except for a major rise in 2020 reaching a peak value of 3.12, after which it dips back to the
normal level. However, it has stably improved over the years due to efforts to solve supply chain and
logistical issues by the company.
The industry average for this turnover ratio remains stable after the financial year of 2019. In 2018,
the receivables turnover ratio for DG Khan Cement is at a very high ratio of 150.16, meaning that
credit sales were being quickly converted to cash. This is impressive considering DGKC is one of the
largest cement exporters and have sales in the highest number of countries. This influenced the
industry average too, but since 2018 the DGKC turnover ratio has fallen. Excluding 2018, the
receivables turnover ratio for Lucky Cement remains around the industry average, which means
Lucky Cement are moderate at keeping converting receivables to cash effectively as compared to its
competitors, whereas DGKC has reliably outperformed its competitors. This turnover ratio for Maple
Leaf Cement Factory is well below the industry average, indicating a potential weak credit policy with
receivables being held and risk increasing.
The industry average fixed assets turnover ratio is relatively stable throughout the five years, with a
slow gradual decline from the financial years 2018 to 2020 which returns back to the around the
same turnover level by 2022, with an inventory turnover ratio of 1.05. In the years 2020-2022 the
quantity of cement sold decreased overall for the 3 companies, but we see an increase in revenue,
and as a result in fixed asset turnover, due to the increases in price of cement both locally and
Debt Ratio (this ratio expressed in %) represents the proportion of total assets that are financed
through debt/conscious financing. In this case, the debt-to-asset ratio for lucky cement was stable
and below the average of the industry during the years 2018 to 2020 with a ratio of 0.08, 0.10 and
0.14, while the industry average during these years, was 0.29, 0.34, and 0.38 respectively. However,
the ratio then rose to 0.15 in 2021 and then jumped towards 0.16 in 2022 which was not a good sign
for the company as there was 200% increase in debt financing from 8% to 16% within five years. The
reason for this jump being was that lucky cement had acquired large amounts of long-term loans and
external financing from banks to begin new projects to be able to meet the demands as a result of
CPEC. DGKC and MLCF both had higher debt ratios than the industry average for the time period. The
ratio for MLCF was particularly high and increased from 2017-2020 due to them taking additional
debt to finance the grey cement line-III and line IV expansion projects.
Through the financial years of 2018-2022, Lucky Cement’s profit margin suffered minimum
fluctuations with the only case of a huge decline seen in 2020. However, the industry average of Net
Profit Margin encountered several fluctuations as the value fell from 20.29% in 2018 to -5.06% in
2020, indicating that during the pandemic peak the cement industries were largely unsuccessful in
converting sales into profit. Some reasons for this include higher coal rates, power costs, devaluation
of Pak rupees and lower sales retention. However, in the forthcoming year of 2020, the industry
average of Net Profit Margin showed signs of recovery as Lucky Cement’s competitor, MLCF’s Net
Profit Margin rose greater than the industry average to a value of 17.6%, indicating its success in
increasing the amount of net income MLCF generated as a percentage of its sales. Anyhow,
continuing its volatility trend, the Net Profit Margin of MLCF decreased substantially in 2020 to a
value of 7.47%, thus falling short of Lucky Cement’s and the industry’s average, displaying its
instability and inability to consistently generate steady stream of profits over a period of time, in
relation to its revenue. The overall trend is again, due to a higher debt ratio for MLCF and DGKC,
which increases the volatility of its profitability ratios, and the recovery for MLCF is due to reasons
mentioned before in the sections above. 2021 and 2022 were still profitable years due to an increase
in cement prices, and particularly for MLCF due to their reduction in short term borrowings and other
factors mentioned above.
The Operating Margin displays the amount of earnings a company can generate before paying taxes
and interest, in relation to the number of sales the company makes. During the financial year of 2018,
Lucky Cement’s Operating Margin is 22.5%, which is roughly the same as the industry average.
Whereas Lucky Cement’s competitor, DGKC, has a greater Operating Margin than Lucky Cement in
2018, indicating its efficiency in managing its expenses which ultimately leads to maximizing its
profitability. However, in the financial years of 2019 and 2020, the Operating Margin of Lucky Cement
and its competitors decline significantly, as the Operating Margin value of the industry average falls
from 14.01% in 2019 to 0.12% in 2020. Nevertheless, in 2021, Lucky Cement and its competitors
increase their Operating Margin, as the competitor that stands out and increases its Operating
Margin by the highest amount is MLCF with a value of 24.72%, indicating the fact that operating
expenses, such as salaries and utilities are efficiently managed. Their policies for debt and reduction
of expenses allow them to go from the worst operating margin in 2020 to the best in 2021, and they
maintain their position in 2022. Furthermore, in 2022, Lucky Cement and its competitors face minimal
fluctuations except for MLCF, that encounters a decline in its Operating Margin that falls to a value
of 19.36%, displaying that it was unsuccessful in reducing its operating costs.
The financial statements of 2018 show that Lucky Cement had a ROIC of 2.64% that was close to the
industry average of 2.5%. However, in the forthcoming years of 2019 and 2020, it was observed that
ROIC value of cement industries declined substantially, as the industry average fell to a value of -
0.08%, displaying that the earnings before interest and tax fell significantly short not only for Lucky
Cement but also for its competing industries in the financial years of 2019 and 2020. Additionally,
Lucky Cement showed trends of increasing ROIC in the years 2021 and 2022, but it still fell below the
industry average of 3.98% in 2022, indicating that Lucky Cement should further adjust its capital
investments as well as investigate ways to increase its earnings in the future so that ROIC can be
further improved. Also, Lucky Cement’s competitor, MLCF, was highly successful in increasing its ROIC
to a value of 6.63%, which was significantly higher than the industry average. Other profitability ratios
showed a decrease in 2022 for MLCF, but the continual increase as seen in the ROIC shows that long
term debts and capital is being utilized efficiently, but there’s issues with managing and reducing
short term debts which is reducing profitability for the company. Lastly, DGKC simply trends below
the industry average similar to other profitability ratios, meaning that its issues of reduced returns
are not due to the short-term debts but instead an issue of efficient production.
P/E RATIO
The Lucky cement P/E ratio shows dipping in the first two fiscal years 2018 and 2019, as it fell from
13.60 to 11.67 in 2019 when the YoY stock price was reduced by 33% and EPS by 15%. and performed
below the industry average when DGKC and MLCF had their greater ratio values of 15.39 and 17.50
in the year 2019. Later in the forthcoming fiscal year 2020, the P/E ratio value for Lucky cement hiked
to 42.54 despite the pandemic effect as the stock price increased by 21% and investors had hope for
positive future performance, although the EPS fell from Rs.32.59 to Rs.10.85 due to inefficient
operations and a decrease in sales. In contrast, the pandemic had an adverse effect on the P/E ratios
of DGKC and MLCF and their earnings went negative, so their P/E ratio and it pushed the industry
The investors evaluate whether a company's stock price is fairly valued using the market-to-book
value ratio. Although the average industry trend has kept fluctuating above and below 1 due to the
fluctuating trend observed by the market-to-book ratios of DGKC and MLCF, the Lucky cement
Market-to-Book ratio has remained above the unit value of 1 each of the five fiscal years, indicating
that the stock price for Lucky cement never went undervalued in comparison to the book value price.
In 2018, this ratio showed a value of 1.9 for Lucky and a relatively low but stable 1.82 for Maple Leaf,
while the industry average stumbled to 1.42 that year as Dera Ghazi Khan cement's market-to-book
value ratio dropped below the value of 1. The value of this ratio for DGKC over the subsequent three
fiscal years (2019-2022) continued to remain below the industry average, which infers that the
company's stock price has remained undervalued in comparison to the book value. We can attribute
this to a lack of effective communication between DGKC's analysts and shareholders, as well as a
significant decline in the demand for its stocks. For Lucky cement, the ratio soared up to the value of
2.47 in 2021 when the market price for Lucky shares upsurged to Rs. 863.44 in comparison to the
book value price i.e., Rs. 350, stimulating the high demands of its stocks in 2021 and for MLCF, after
this ratio staying below 1 for the two consecutive FY 2019 and 2020, showed great improvement and
jumped up from 0.89 in 2020 to 1.34 in 2021 which pulled the overall industry average to 1.5 in the
fiscal year 2021. This overall increase in the market to book ratio in 2021 is due to SBP increasing
their policy rate, which revitalized the interest of investors in the stock market. Nevertheless, MLCF
has strived to maintain this ratio close to the industry average while Lucky cement outperformed the
industry average each year due to better overall profitability and more effective operations.