0001 The Turn To Problematization Carol Bacchi
0001 The Turn To Problematization Carol Bacchi
0001 The Turn To Problematization Carol Bacchi
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to introduce and elaborate the varied meanings of problematization
in contemporary policy theory. The primary focus is on the different meanings and uses of the term
in interpretivism and in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism. The paper argues that interpre-
tive/argumentative adaptations direct attention primarily to how policy makers/workers develop
problematizations (ways of understanding a problem) while Foucault-influenced poststructural-
ists critically scrutinize problematizations (the ways in which “problems” are produced and repre-
sented) in governmental policies and practices. It concludes that Foucault-influenced adaptations
provide a more substantive critique of extant social arrangements than interpretive approaches,
which tend to be reformist in design and inclination.
Keywords
Problematization, Poststructuralism, Policy, Foucault, Interpretivism, Problem Representations
1. Introduction
It seems fair to say that the term problematization has taken the western theoretical world by storm. Alvesson &
Sandberg (2013: p. 116) identify “various ‘problematization turns’ (for example, interpretive, political, linguistic,
constructionist and postmodernist)”. Here are a few of the many theorists for whom problematization is an im-
portant concept in their analytic repertoire. They are listed in alphabetical order: Mats Alvesson, Carol Bacchi,
Michel Callon, Hal Colebatch, Mitchell Dean, Gilles Deleuze, Norman Fairclough, Frank Fischer, Paulo Freire,
Michel Foucault, Jason Glynos, Susan Goodwin, Steven Griggs, Barry Hindess, Robert Hoppe, David Howarth,
Colin Koopman, Peter Miller, Michael Meyer, Uma Narayan, Thomas Osborne, Paul Rabinow, Malin Rönnblom,
How to cite this paper: Bacchi, C. (2015). The Turn to Problematization: Political Implications of Contrasting Interpretive
and Poststructural Adaptations. Open Journal of Political Science, 5, 1-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2015.51001
C. Bacchi
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C. Bacchi
miliar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based” (Foucault, 1994
[1981]: p. 456). Webb (2014: p. 368) also offers a “policy problematization” approach that “seeks explanations
about the ways thinking is practiced and produced”.
The second verb use―to put something forward or constitute something as a “problem”―can refer to:
• How people (citizens, policy makers/workers, policy analysts) “frame” an issue, as in the interpretive tradi-
tion (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 231);
• How social scientists form a problem or an explanandum―that which is to be explained―as a “dialectical
moment” in social science practice (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 34-38); or
• How governing (broadly conceived) involves problematizing, shaping issues as “problems”, as in the Fou-
cault-influenced poststructural tradition (Rose & Miller, 1992: p. 181).
As a noun, problematizations generally refer to the outcomes of the processes of problematizing, be these the
ways in which “problems” are framed or governmental problematizing processes. Analysts tend to refer, there-
fore, to the need to interrogate problematizations, in the plural, or to offer an adjectival adaptation, “problema-
tized phenomena” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 205). However, at times the noun form appears simply as the
nominalization of the process of problematizing. So, you could talk about people engaging in problematization.
3. Analytic Applications
Analytic traditions do not divide along grammatical lines. That is, theorists across the analytic spectrum often
use variations of the verb and the noun form in relation to each other. For example, Foucault uses problematiza-
tion both as verb to describe his analytic strategy of “thinking problematically” and, as noun, to refer to the ob-
jects for thought that emerge in historical problematizing practices, including governmental practices (“the
forms of problematization themselves”) (Foucault, 1986: p. 11-12; Bacchi, 2012; Koopman, 2013: p. 98). Post-
structuralists in the Essex School use the verb form to identify the need to problematize, or interrogate, the dif-
ferent ways an issue has been problematized, or shaped as a “problem”, by key social actors. They describe what
social actors produce as problematizations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 168) or as “problematized social phe-
nomena” (Howarth, 2013: p. 267). Meanwhile, researchers in the interpretive tradition, who use problematize in
the verb form to mean framing an issue as a “problem”, use the noun form (“a problematization”) to describe the
outcome of this process.
Within these developments it is possible to identify two distinct analytic foci:
• A first, which encompasses those who broadly identify themselves as interpretivists, including the Essex
School (see above), who emphasize the role of people, be they policy makers/workers or social scientists, as
problematizing agents; and
• A second, Foucault-influenced perspective which directs attention to problematizations as the products of
governmental practices.
To elaborate this distinction, in the interpretive tradition, the emphasis is on how people, mainly policy mak-
ers/workers, engage in problematizing, that is, how they offer an interpretation of a problem. The Essex School
of poststructural theory shares this focus on the people engaged in problematizing (see above) but their interest
is primarily in how social scientists construct a problem for analysis. In Foucault-influenced poststructuralism,
by contrast, the analytic focus is on the conceptual underpinnings of identified governmental problematizations,
“the forms of problematization themselves” (Foucault, 1986: p. 11-12), rather than on social actors as problema-
tizing agents.
These contrasting forms of analysis reveal a basic ontological disagreement about the nature of political sub-
jectivity. For interpretivists political subjects are seen as “agentic”, that is, as sovereign or foundational subjects,
who stand outside of and shape “reality”. By contrast, in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism political subjects
are constituted in discourses, understood as broad, socially produced forms of knowledge (Bacchi, 2009: p. 35).
In the place of the “irreducible ‘real person’ who is ‘made’ (becomes a girl), or who ‘makes’ the world” (Jones,
1997: p. 262), Foucault-influenced poststructuralism proposes a non-essential “subjectivity which is precarious,
contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak” (Weedon,
1987: p. 32).
The Essex School of poststructuralism (Howarth, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000: p. 18), influenced by Laclau,
offers a complex understanding of political subjectivity. In line with a poststructuralist framework, it sees sub-
jects as assuming “subject positions within a discursive structure”. However, it also adopts an understanding of
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C. Bacchi
political subjectivity that “accounts for the agency of subjects”. As a result, their political analysis, which neces-
sitates acknowledging “a subject’s contextualized self-interpretation” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 15), aligns
with interpretivism and stands at a distance from Foucauldian perspectives.
For Foucauldians, problematizations are ways of thinking that emerge from practices rather than from people
as agents (Bacchi, 2012: p. 3). For example, in his study of “madness”, Foucault (2009) argues that “madness”
did not exist as an object for thought outside the practices that constitute it. He says that to see how “the mad”
came to be thought of as a specific kind of “entity”, we need to look at how they were treated (1969 in Eribon,
1991: 214)―how they were “set aside, excluded from society, interned, and treated”. By examining these prac-
tices (what people did) you can see how “madness” was thought about or “problematized” (Bacchi, 2012), and
that is what “madness” came to mean.
The same can be said to apply to the whole range of governed “objects”, e.g. “delinquency”, “out-of-wedlock
births”, “welfare”, “population”, “binge drinking”, “problem gambling”, and so on. These governmental catego-
ries, which we commonly think of as “entities”, are produced through the very practices that create them as cat-
egories―e.g. practices of measurement and comparison. Moreover, these condensations of thinking and other
practices shape and influence people in profound and uncharted ways. Attention, therefore, is directed away
from an intentional, agentic human subject, as seen in interpretivism (above), to the myriad complex strategic
relations that produce “subjects” in continual formation. Foucault (1986: p. 12-13) identifies “practical texts”,
such as regulations and decrees, as key sites where governmental “objects” and “subjects” are produced
through problematization.
A task becomes considering how these different configurations of problematization―the interpretive focus on
political agents who problematize, and the Foucauldian emphasis on the problematizations within policies that
shape us as subjects―map onto political visions and political agendas, and what this might mean for those in-
volved in policy development. At one level it might appear that the two positions simply align with different
analytic tasks, with interpretivists primarily concerned with those involved in processes of policy formulation
while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists assume, as their primary work, critical interrogation of the proble-
matizations within existing policies. However, Foucault-influenced perspectives have significant implications
for interpretivist goals and objectives, raising important questions about the form of critique they offer, as the
paper proceeds to argue.
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C. Bacchi
their own phenomenal [sense-perceptible] world”, and social constructionism, which emphasizes the extent to
which our understandings of the world are the product of social forces (Burr, 2003: p. 19-20). These two foci fit
the two analytic tasks identified above, with interpretivists paying primary attention to how policy actors
shape problematizations in ongoing policy processes while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists examine the
deep-seated conceptual logics that underpin governmental problematizations in existing policies, problematiza-
tions which shape who we are.
Interpretivists in the main, therefore, are social constructivists (Hoppe, 2011: p. 59). Theorists in this tradition
describe, as the “essential process”, “the joint construction of problems as a condition for joint responses”. “Par-
ticipants in policy making” are encouraged to problematize (or form problems) in ways that will “create some
common or shared understandings” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 50). The objective is to direct attention to “the develop-
ment of shared problematization which frames and justifies collective action” (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noorde-
graaf, 2010b: p. 236; emphasis added). By contrast Foucault-influenced poststructuralists do not engage the
question of how people shape problematizations for instrumental ends. Rather, they focus on teasing out and in-
terrogating the meanings within, and political implications of, existing forms of governmental problematization.
To tie this distinction back to meanings of problematization, in interpretive approaches, problematizations are
considered to be competing understandings or interpretations of a problem which people (e.g. policy makers/
workers, citizens, researchers) put forward (Colebatch, Hoppe & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 228), while in Fou-
cault-influenced poststructuralism, problematizations are deeply ingrained ways of thinking (conceptual schema)
that shape (to different degrees) who we are and how we live. It follows that interpretivists are primarily inter-
ested in the people engaged in problematizing (giving a shape to a problem) while, in the Foucault-influenced
poststructural tradition, the mode of analysis focuses primarily on studying problematizations (the ways in
which “problems” are produced and represented).
Put in other words, interpretivists direct attention to how people make meaning together (Colebatch, Hoppe,
& Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 230; Hoppe, 2011: p. ix; Hoppe, 1999), whereas Foucault-influenced poststructural-
ists emphasize the need to scrutinize and question meanings that are in place. As signaled earlier, a basic onto-
logical issue―how the political subject is imagined―separates the two traditions. Whereas interpretivists sup-
port a degree of rational agency (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010a: p. 8; Turnbull, 2005: p. 275), Fou-
cault-in- fluenced poststructuralists emphasize how subjects are constituted (or formed) within the very dis-
courses (knowledges) that shape understandings of “problems”. These contrasting views involve opposing con-
ceptions of power with interpretivists developing a view of power as “power over”, as the possession of “po-
werful elites” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 210), while Foucault-influenced poststructuralists describe power as produc-
tive, shaping subjects of particular sorts (Bacchi & Rönnblom, 2014: p. 6). These differences play out in the
kinds of political projects that are advanced, as elaborated in the following section.
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C. Bacchi
ways in which “subjects”, “objects” and “problems” are constituted within them. The objective is not to develop
a “shared problematization” but to facilitate critical interrogation of existing governmental problematizations.
Government, in this view, involves the multiple agencies and groups (academics, professionals, experts) who
contribute to societal administration―described as “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991: p. 2)―through the
knowledges they produce5. Government is understood to be a “problematizing activity” (Rose & Miller, 1992: p.
181), in which “policy cannot get to work without first problematizing its territory” (Osborne, 1997: p. 174). To
intervene, it is argued, government, including but beyond the state, has to target something as a “problem” that
needs “fixing”. The critical task, in this account, becomes examining the ways in which specific issues are prob-
lematized.
The status of “a problem” marks a further distinction between interpretivism and poststructuralism, despite
the apparent consensus that “problems” are constructions rather than fixed “entities” (see above). Those operat-
ing in the interpretive tradition agree with poststructuralists that it is necessary to challenge the notion of “prob-
lems” as “the pre-existing reason for the institution of a policy process” (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf,
2010b: p. 239). Yet there remains a tendency among interpretivists to refer to problems as if they exist separate
from interpretive processes, reflected in the languages of “problem setting”, “problem structuring”, and so on
(see above; emphasis added). In this vein, Colebatch (2010: p. 33; emphasis added) declares that policy is a
process “driven by a desire to identify and solve problems, and marked by uncertainty and disagreements about
the nature of the problems and the effectiveness of the responses to them”. Hoppe’s (2002: p. 309; emphasis
added) typology of kinds of public problems includes as one category, “structured problems”, “characterized by
high degrees of certain knowledge and consent”. Turnbull (2005: p. 269; emphasis added) describes “policy
problems” as arising “from the problems of collective life”. This fixing of problems and claims to “certain
knowledge” would generally be rendered problematic in a poststructural analysis.
Moreover, interpretivists tend to talk about problems in ways that give them a status as negative entities.
Hoppe (2011: p. 23), for example, describes a problem as “a gap between a current situation and a more desira-
ble one”. For Turnbull a “problem is a worry, or concern” and a policy problem is “something we are concerned
about that we refer for collective deliberation” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 238; emphasis added). In Foucault-influenced
poststructuralism, by contrast, while it is accepted that troubling conditions may exist, calling them “problems”
is held to give those conditions a particular, fixed meaning that needs to be interrogated. To this end scholars
working with this perspective create an analytic space to inquire into how the particular issue (the “problem”)
has been understood and represented (problematized).
For example, the Foucauldian scholar, Rose (2000: p. 58), uses the language of “questions” and “answers”
rather than of “problems” and “solutions” to study governing practices6. He suggests that we should approach
issues such as marketization, imprisonment and community care as answers, and direct attention to the implicit
questions that produce such “entities” as answers. In his view this relationship between questions and answers
creates the opportunity to inquire into the form of problematization―how the issue is constructed as a “prob-
lem”―that produces marketization, for example, as an intelligible answer. Pursuing this line of inquiry, he ar-
gues, makes it possible to reflect on the presuppositions and possible limitations in the identified problematiza-
tion. Attention is directed to entrenched “problematizations” (such as marketization) that potentially limit cur-
rent thinking about specific issues7.
Foucault-influenced poststructuralists, such as Rose, propose the usefulness of identifying patterns of use,
which they refer to as “govern-mentalities”, in these entrenched problematizations. The suggestion is that gov-
erning is facilitated through styles of problematization that affect our lives and impel us to act in particular ways.
Dean and Hindess (1998: p. 9), for example, argue that, in a neoliberal “mentality of rule” (or governmentality),
individuals are created as “the problem”, as the ones responsible for their own health, welfare and economic
5
Hoppe (2011: p. 4) notes the role of “bureaucratic policy staff and science-based experts” in helping governments “translate problems into
actionable policies and programmes”. While this comment acknowledges the role of groups outside of conventional political institutions in
governing, the emphasis remains on the active participation of experts in shaping policies in contrast to Foucault-influenced approaches,
which are concerned to highlight the role played in governing practices by expert discourses or knowledges.
6
The philosopher, Michael Meyer (Turnbull, 2014), treats “problem” and “question” as “equivalent terms” (Turnbull, 2005: p. 231). In his
analysis problematizing refers to critical questioning, aligned with the first verb meaning, discussed at the outset, of problematization as
critical analysis. For example he refers to answers that close off further questioning as “deproblematising” (Turnbull, 2008: p. 13). Hoppe
(2011: p. 4) also, at times, speaks about problems as questions in a “question-and-answer game”.
7
Meyer (see fn 6) also emphasizes that for every answer there is an implicit question. However, he does not look to the forms of problemati-
zation that render some “answers” intelligible.
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C. Bacchi
success (see also Turnbull, 2008: p. 23). Hence, they are impelled to assume responsibility for stresses and chal-
lenges in their lives, instead of considering how governing practices shape the constraints within which they live
and work. In this way, particular styles of problematization make governing possible by producing individuals as
“governable subjects”, highlighting the importance of identifying and interrogating these “patterns of rule”.
This fundamental challenge to governing practices stands in contrast to the declared goal of interpretivists
which, as described above, is to assist policy makers/workers to develop a “shared problematization” and to “set
problems” within current political arrangements. We turn next to probe more deeply these contrasting political
agendas.
6. Political Agendas
Researchers in the interpretive tradition have, as their primary objective, training policy makers/workers to
“problematize” (to shape problems) in ways described as effective, that is, in a manner that confronts, evaluates
and integrates “as much contradictory information as possible” (Hoppe, 2002: p. 321). They promote “the art
and craft of policy analysis” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 55). The objective is to endow “forensic policy analysts” with
“skills of problem reframing”, such as rhetoric and persuasion, in order to “avoid controversies and break dead-
locks” (Hoppe, 2002: p. 321). With these skills, it is suggested, policy makers/workers will be better able to
manage the diversity of meanings they encounter (Colebatch, 2010: p. 41). There is a clear link here with what is
described as the “argumentative turn” in policy analysis (Fischer & Gottweis, 2012; Hoppe, 2011: p. 173).
Through learning how to structure problems (how to problematize), it is argued, policy analysts will be able to
“move from inchoate signs of problematic situations, through the unraveling of multiple stakeholders’ problem
representations, to doable, solvable problems for public policy” and “shared problematization” (Hoppe, 2011: p.
29; Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010b: p. 236).
The focus on “doable, solvable problems”, and continuing references to “problem framing” and “problem de-
finition”, illustrate important conceptual connections between current interpretive approaches and earlier “polit-
ical rationalists” such as Lindblom, Wildavsky and Dery (see Bacchi, 1999: Chapter 1). There are links, for ex-
ample, between Dery’s and Wildavsky’s understanding of the place of problems in policy processes on the one
hand, and Hoppe’s “problem-solution couplings” on the other. Dery (1984: p. 40) offers an “interventionist
model” which “requires a problem to be defined in one way only, one that will promote its solution (ameliora-
tion or transformation)”. Wildavsky (1979: p. 3) concurs: “in public policy… creativity consists of finding a
problem about which something can and ought to be done. In a word, the solution is part of defining the prob-
lem”. This pragmatic view is echoed in Hoppe’s (2011: p. 68; emphasis in original) position that, in “moderately
structured and unstructured problems”, “the problem fits the solution―and not the other way round”.
Foucault-influenced poststructuralists have serious qualms about an agenda of creating “doable problems”.
Rather, their focus is on interrogating existing constructions or representations of “problems” (problematizations)
in order to point to possible deleterious consequences that potentially accompany these ways of thinking. As in-
dicated in the previous section on governmentality, the primary target consists of governmental problematiza-
tions, with governing understood broadly to refer to the “conduct of conduct”.
Bacchi (2009), for example, has produced an analytic strategy that builds on Rose’s premise (see above) that
we need to initiate our analysis from “answers” or “proposed solutions” and inquire into the problematizations
that render these answers intelligible. Her WPR (What’s the Problem Represented to be?) approach rests on the
simple idea that what we propose to do about something indicates what we think needs to change and, hence,
what we think is problematic. Following this line of thought, policies can be seen to contain implicit representa-
tions of the “problem” (problem representations) they purport to address8. As in Rose, the analytic task is to re-
flect on the “unexamined ways of thinking” (Foucault, 1994 [1981]: p. 456) in identified problematizations. To
this end, the WPR approach offers six questions which together probe the following issues: the conceptual pre-
mises underpinning particular problematizations; the contingent practices and processes through which certain
representations of the “problem” have gained authenticity and authority; the effects or implications of specific
problem representations, including subjectification and lived effects; and the possible benefits of alternatives.
8
It is helpful to contrast Bacchi’s (2009) concept of problem representation with the reference earlier, in Hoppe (2011: p. 29), to “multiple
stakeholders’ problem representations”. Hoppe here is referring to how stakeholders understand a problem whereas in Bacchi problem re-
presentations are located within policies.
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C. Bacchi
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C. Bacchi
While Koopman (2013: p. 3) is sensitive to Foucault’s project, which he describes as “this great problem of
who we are and who we can be”, he fails to take on board Foucault’s “purgative practice of historical nominal-
ism” (Flynn, 2005: p. x). For Foucault “madness” and “sexuality” are problematized objects for thought, pro-
duced in practices―no more, no less (see above). Hence, the critical task becomes considering how these
“entities” emerge in practices as “problems”, not to assign a problem status to them, as Koopman (2013: p. 3)
tends to do. This tendency to affix meanings to “entities” such as sexuality is necessary to Koopman’s argument
that Foucault intended to give us the tools to “specify the details of a problematic situation” and to assist us “to
appropriately perceive problems” (Koopman, 2013: p. 247; emphasis added). In the process, Foucault’s insis-
tence on the importance of problematization, “perpetual reproblematization” and self-problematization―proble-
matizing “even what we are ourselves” (Foucault, 1984b: p. 1431; emphasis added)―tends to get lost. So too
does Foucault’s commitment to a “philosophical ethos” as “a permanent critique of our historical era” (Foucault
1984a: p. 42; emphasis added).
As part of the practice of “permanent critique”, it is possible to reflect on the complex array of implications
that problematizations entail in specific contexts and to modify interventions in ways that reduce deleterious
consequences11. However, this kind of intercession does not make problematization a “diagnostic” tool to assist
the pragmatist “to articulate and innovate practices that promise a resolution of the problematic situation”
(Koopman, 2013: p. 225; 2011: p. 7; emphasis added). There is no attempt to seek “solutions” to “problems”
because there is no presumption that a problem exists12. Moreover, any proposal for change becomes subject to
self- problematization, as in the undertaking in the WPR approach to apply the six questions to one’s own pro-
posals (Bacchi, 2009: p. 19).
8. Conclusion
Both interpretive and poststructural approaches cultivate new thinking about how policy is done and encourage
practitioners to challenge technocratic styles of policy development. There is also a shared concern about finding
ways to engage and critique dominant “problem definitions” (Hoppe, 2011: p. 49) or pervasive “problem repre-
sentations” (Bacchi, 2009). The different languages here mark the distance between the two approaches. “Prob-
lem definitions” are seen as negotiated interpretations that sit outside of problems that exist. By contrast, prob-
lem representations are the ways in which particular policy “problems” are constituted in the real (Bacchi, 2009:
p. 35). In addition, whereas interpretive and some poststructural approaches work through the self-understandings
of political subjects (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; see above), Foucault-influenced poststructural approaches offer
strategies, including a practice of self-problematization, to help us to think about how we become the people we
are.
In the end the two analytic traditions―interpretivism and Foucault-influenced poststructuralism―line up with
divergent political projects. An interpretive view of problematizations as competing understandings of problems,
together with the conviction that the goal of the analyst is to train policy makers/workers in problematizing skills,
supports a reformist agenda. By contrast, the study, in Foucault-influenced poststructural accounts, of problema-
tizations as deep-seated conceptual schema that shape lives, offers a more thoroughgoing analysis of how we are
governed, a level of analysis that prefers “unregulated questioning” to “partial answers” (Turnbull, 2005: p.
206, 251; Turnbull, 2008: p. 27-28).
Interpretivists turn their attention to assisting policy workers to learn how to problematize (to shape under-
standings of problems) in order to negotiate shared problematizations (interpretations of problems) that will en-
able a reform agenda. Foucault-influenced poststructuralists, by contrast, recommend that we all (i.e. researchers,
policy makers/workers, etc.) engage in problematizing (critically interrogating) existing problematizations
(deep-seated conceptualizations of “problems” in policies and policy proposals), including our own problemati-
zations. Whereas the former aims to produce “doable problems”, the latter recommends a process of continuous
critique.
These reflections have implications for political theory more generally, specifically for Shapiro’s (2002)
widely endorsed “problem-driven research” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: p. 167; Fairclough, 2013: p. 185). Gly-
nos and Howarth (2007: p. 84) are concerned by Shapiro’s critical realism yet they quote him to support, as a
11
See Question 5 in Bacchi’s (2009) WPR approach to policy analysis.
12
There is slippage in Koopman around the term “problem”. While he makes the point that the nature of a problem is ambiguous and open to
contestation, at times he (2013: p. 147) refers to problems as if they are incontrovertible.
9
C. Bacchi
project, to “illuminate a problem that is specified independently” of a particular theory13. Glynos, Howarth and
others in the Essex School of Discourse Analysis (Glynos et al., 2009: p. 6; emphasis in original) state that they
take “problem-drivenness as a basic starting point” for “inter-approach conversations”, and wish to refocus the
debate “around common problem areas”. No specification is offered of what is meant in these references to
“problems” or how “problem areas” are to be identified. Given the ambiguity around the meaning of the term
“problem”―whether it signals a concern, a gap between the current situation and a more desired state (Hoppe,
2011: p. 23), or simply a question―perhaps it is time to leave the commonly used and vague notion of problem
out of political theory altogether and to institute problematization-driven analysis (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011).
As we have seen, however, recalling Tanesini’s (1994: p. 207) proposition that concepts are “proposals about
how we ought to proceed from here”, this initiative would need to be accompanied by robust discussion about
the political visions that underpin our uses of the term. This paper initiates this discussion.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Anne Wilson for comments on this and earlier drafts of the paper.
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