Rand Rr1681

Sectarianism in the
Middle East
Implications for the United States
Heather M. Robinson, Ben Connable, David E. Thaler, Ali G. Scotten
C O R P O R AT I O N
For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1681
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-0-8330-9699-9
Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

© Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation
R® is a registered trademark.
Cover: Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims attend prayers during Eid al-Fitr as they mark the end of
the fasting month of Ramadan, at the site of a suicide car bomb attack over the weekend
at the shopping area of Karrada, in Baghdad, Iraq, July 6, 2016. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation
of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized
posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this
document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is
required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents
for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit
www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public

policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure,
healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the
public interest.
RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
Support RAND
Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at
www.rand.org/giving/contribute
www.rand.org
Preface
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a proj-

ect titled Implications of a Religious War in the Middle East for the U.S.
Army sponsored by Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-8, Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office. The
purpose of the project was to examine sectarianism in the Middle East,
focusing on Syria and Iraq.
The project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is HQD146841.
This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s
Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center,
part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and
development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army.
RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance”
(FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations
for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR
46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the imple-
mentation guidance set forth in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews
and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human
Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of
sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent
the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government.
iii
Contents
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER TWO
The History of Sectarianism in the Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Demographics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Early History and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Middle Ages: 800–1500. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Early Modern Era: 1500–1920. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Modern Era: 1900–1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Contemporary Era: 1979–Present.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CHAPTER THREE
Sectarianism in Iraq.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Pre-Ba’ath Sectarianism: Challenging Assumptions and
Tracing Identities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Ba’ath-Era Sectarianism and Other “-isms”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Post-Ba’ath Sectarianism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Implications of Sectarian Division for the Iraqi State and the Region. . . . . . 63
Possibilities for the Future.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
v
vi Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
CHAPTER FOUR
Sectarianism in Syria.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
The Role of Sectarian Identity in Syria Prior to the 2011 Revolt. . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Sectarianism in Syria Following the 2011 Revolt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Conclusions and Implications of Sectarianism in the Syria Conflict. . . . . . 100
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion and Policy Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Figures
2.1. Shi’a and Sunni Populations in the Middle East.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.1. Ottoman Provinces of Iraq Pre-1916. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1. Distribution of Religious and Ethnic Groups in Syria. . . . . . . . . . . 73
vii
Summary
This report on sectarianism in the Middle East was written in 2015

with the intent of informing U.S. policy in Iraq and Syria. Since the ini-
tial draft was completed, the United States and its allies have defeated
the main combat contingent of the Islamic State, the Syrian regime
of Bashar al-Assad has rebounded from near defeat, and the Govern-
ment of Iraq has solidified its control over state territory. While the
United States begins to withdraw some of its forces from Syria, tensions
between the predominantly Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabian state and
the predominantly Shi’a Muslim Islamic Republic of Iran have flared.
Many observers of the Middle East perceive an intensifying proxy war
between the two heavily sectarian states playing out in Yemen, Syria,
and Iraq. War between Saudi and Iranian coalitions seems more likely
now than at any point in recent history. Although the analysis and
findings in this report date back to 2015, none of the rapidly emerg-
ing events in the interim have changed their substance: This report is
as relevant today as it was in its earliest draft. What follows is the text
from the original report.
Sectarianism in the Middle East
Increasingly, policy decisions are being made based on the assump-

tions that the Middle East is riven by a purely dualistic sectarian war
between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, that sectarian identity is immu-
table, and that the underlying sectarian problems in the region are
intractable. Following these assumptions, many pundits recommend
that the United States not only allow the Middle East to realign to
match the sectarian schism but also help reinforce these schisms by
supporting the creation of new states and substate regions aligned by
sect. Our research shows that the assumptions behind some of these
recommendations are often flawed, incomplete, and misleading. While
sectarian identity is certainly relevant, it is often less relevant than eco-
nomic, geographic, political, and other social identities; in most cases,
these identities are deeply interwoven. Our research also shows that
these sectarian problems are not necessarily intractable: Despite the
long history of sectarian divisions in the Middle East, there is also a
narrative of cross-sectarian collaboration and supersectarian national-
ism. Reinforcing the apparent sectarian rift in the Middle East is likely
to undermine rather than further U.S. efforts to stabilize the region.
Long-term, strategic success in such places as Syria and Iraq requires
a more nuanced understanding of these conflicts and their underlying
causes.
While Sunni and Shi’a sectarian conflict in the Middle East
spans more than 1,300 years, the nature of sectarianism and sectar-
ian conflict has developed and changed significantly over that time.
Contrary to the oft-heard narrative that there is an ancient and con-
tinuous history of intractable conflict between the two sects over theo-
logical disagreements, a close examination of the interactions between
the Sunnis and the Shi’a since their schism shows that political, legal,
geographic, economic, ethnic, and other issues have been equally, if
not more, important in dividing these groups than the role of theo-
logical disagreements. While sectarianism is a driver of conflict in such
countries as Iraq and Syria, it would be too simplistic to claim that
violence in each country is the result of Sunni-Shi’a religious divisions;
rather, geopolitical competition, local disputes, and political rivalries
form the core reasons for conflict in each country. Throughout history,
these sects have come into conflict more when religion is the primarily
expressed identity over other identities, such as ethno-nationalism or
local tribal affiliation.
ix
x Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
Key Findings
The drivers of conflict between the Sunnis and Shi’a are mostly political in
nature, and political and social contexts inform the primacy of sectarian
identity and the prevalence of sectarianism. Sectarianism often reemerges
in response to a real or perceived threat to resources, security, or ade-
quate representation in a political system. This has especially been the
case in the past century, with individuals increasingly desiring a more
direct stake in political representation along religious lines, causing sec-
tarianism to become inseparable from the political discourse. When
sectarian actors perceive that there is a political threat from another
sect due to specific behaviors or rhetoric, there is a tendency to respond
in a sectarian manner to protect political and religious interests, and
this can lead to a vicious cycle of distrust among the sects.
Sectarianism can best be described as an interrelated but generally
two-pronged phenomenon: internal and external. Internal sectarian-
ism occurs at the intrastate level and usually derives from a country’s
state leaders, religious leaders, or oppositionists who are using sectar-
ian identity for their own political purposes. Top-down pressure has
often translated into popular sectarian discord. Historically, sectarian
tensions have also flared around sectarian actors’ suspicions that other
sects are collaborating with foreigners, either sectarian or nonsectarian.
Again, this is rooted in a concern that one sect might gain the political
upper hand over other sects. In these cases, because of long-standing
political concerns, accusations and violent conflict perpetuate further
trust erosion between the sects. For U.S. policymakers, foreign internal
sectarianism creates a dilemma: Favoritism toward one side of an inter-
nal political conflict can backfire, especially if that conflict is based on
sectarian divisions. Policymakers should be keenly aware of risk when
it proves impossible to remain aloof from an internal sectarian conflict.
External sectarianism takes place on an interstate level and involves
a sectarian actor’s encouragement of sectarian divisions in foreign coun-
tries internally for their own political purposes. This is most commonly
seen with state sectarian actors, most recently between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. It also takes place between transnational Islamist groups.
External sectarian actors exacerbate sectarianism by supporting sec-
Summary xi
tarian sides in regional conflicts. This manifests as a larger geopoliti-

cal contest between states or groups portraying themselves as sectarian
“champions” to increase their power and regional influence.
Exploitation of sectarian identity tends to exacerbate tensions. One
of the main ways sectarian actors involve themselves in conflicts is by
appealing to religious identity in their political rhetoric to promote
their opposing sectarian brands of Islam. This approach tends to breed
sectarian animosity that politicizes the fundamental, but often non-
violent, theological differences between the Sunnis and the Shi’a. The
continued politicization of sectarian identity is further exacerbated by
the modern speed of communication.
Sectarianism is one of many competing regional identities in the
Middle East. In a region where identities are complex, coexisting, and
changing, many other individual and group identities can take pri-
mary importance over sect. For example, tribal loyalties have trumped
religious identity at times when it was more politically expedient or
judicious to side with tribe over sect. This could also be said for such
other identities as professional, ethnic, or national. Further, Sunni and
Shi’a Islam are internally divided along often-important subsectarian
lines. Even sectarian state and nonstate actors have to manage these
competing identities and deal with the ethnic and religious diversity
in and outside of their territory. No actor can operate solely along sec-
tarian lines. Sectarianism is more a political tool than a major driver
of conflict, although it seems, with the increased intensity of sectarian
rhetoric, that this is changing.
The nature of sectarianism differs significantly by country across
the Middle East. Each sectarian conflict, as well as each state in the
Middle East region, has a different balance of internally and externally
fueled sectarianism. This is partially attributable to the different ethno-
religious composition of each country that results in a unique sectarian
and political environment. It is also attributable to the different rela-
tionships each state has with external sectarian actors and the different
political goals the external actors have in each state or conflict. As is the
case with the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq, external sectarianism
seems to be more prevalent in Syria, while internal sectarianism has
dominated in Iraq.
xii Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
Iraq suffers from lasting sectarian divisions, but there is nothing

inherently intractable or immutable about them. Sectarianism in Iraq
can exist alongside nationalism, regionalism, tribalism, and many other
“isms” without necessarily causing the disintegration of the Iraqi state.
Lasting, if uncomfortable, heterogeneity is possible in Iraq, the way it
is in other states. Instead of focusing on sectarianism as a cause of the
current problems in Iraq, it would be more effective to think about
the intensification of sectarian identity as a consequence of decades
of ineffective and oppressive governance and disastrous external inter-
ventions. While sectarianism does not necessarily need to dominate
the long-term Iraqi political landscape, it seems undeniable that ethno-
sectarianism will play a strong and perhaps dominant role in Iraqi poli-
tics for the foreseeable future. Nearly two centuries of Sunni oppres-
sion of the Shi’a will not soon be forgotten, nor will the intense violence
of the 2006–2007 civil war or the more recent government oppression
of the Sunni. However, the history of sectarianism in Iraq suggests that
it is not too late to avert state fragmentation.
The origins of the war in Syria are nonsectarian. The 2011 upris-
ing in Syria was antiregime rather than anti-Alawi (the Alawis being a
Shi’a sect). It took on sectarian overtones after external sectarian actors
began to offer their support to sides in the conflict that would ensure
their political interests. Despite efforts by several parties to exploit sec-
tarian tension to promote their own political agendas, it would be sim-
plistic to refer to sectarian identity as the main source of the uprising
against Bashar al-Assad or as the sole motivator of continuing violence.
Even now, there are key constituencies inside Syria not motivated by
sectarianism.
U.S. policymakers and war planners should avoid oversimplification.
Sectarianism manifests itself differently across the Middle East. U.S.
decisionmakers should avoid placing people and groups into large, sim-
plified categories for easier identification and, instead, should identify
individuals and groups with which the United States can find common
ground on political objectives. Sectarianism cannot and should not be
eliminated from consideration, but it can be more carefully and effec-
tively situated in policy debates and decisions.
Summary xiii
The United States should not choose between Shi’a and Sunni
Muslim groups or states. Rather, the U.S. government should be pre-
pared to work with multiple individuals and groups with various sec-
tarian affiliations.
The United States should avoid policies that institutionalize sectari-
anism. This means working with leaders who are committed to pursu-
ing nonsectarian and pluralistic policies, especially in such places as
Iraq where the U.S. military has worked with such individuals. The
United States should support and encourage local and state institu-
tions and provide incentives across the sects to achieve participation
and inclusiveness in governing institutions.
xiv Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to the sponsor of this research, Timothy

Muchmore, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-8, Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office. Summer associ-
ate Megan Stewart provided a literature review of sectarianism in Syria
and Lebanon. We would also like to thank the director of RAND’s
Army Research Division and Arroyo Center, Tim Bonds; the director
of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Center, Sally Sleeper; and our
peer reviewers, quality assurance managers, editors, publishing profes-
sionals, and graphic artists at RAND.
xv
Abbreviations
AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq

CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
FSA Free Syrian Army
IDP internally displaced person
IS Islamic State
ISCI Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SoI Sons of Iraq
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
This chapter and those that follow were written in 2015. We have limited
our modification of the 2015 text to retain the original research. Events
through mid-2018 have changed the dynamics on the ground in Iraq and
Syria: The Islamic State (IS) caliphate no longer exists as a contiguous,
large-scale entity, and IS has devolved from a substantial ground combat
organization into a mostly clandestine guerrilla and terrorist force. The
emphasis of this work is more on the context of sectarianism to current
events than on the events themselves.
This study sought to provide an in-depth historical and contem-

porary analysis of the nature of sectarianism and what factors drive
sectarian conflict in the Middle East, focusing on Iraq and Syria as case
studies. Those countries were selected because they are currently expe-
riencing the greatest level of sectarian-influenced conflict in the region.
The U.S. military is fighting IS through a sustained air campaign in
both Iraq and Syria. While the U.S. Army currently has few combat
forces on the ground in the fight against IS, it is crucial that Army
leadership understand the sectarian nature of conflict in the region to
devise specific policies in fighting groups such as IS.
This chapter provides an introduction to the report, while Chap-
ter Two examines the history of sectarianism in the Middle East to
aid our understanding of why sectarianism has worsened in recent
decades. Chapter Three examines the history of sectarianism in Iraq
and what factors have contributed to internal sectarianism there specif-
ically. Chapter Four provides a similarly in-depth look at sectarianism
1
2 Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
in Syria. Chapter Five provides conclusions and recommendations for

policymakers, scholars, and war planners.
The research here was based on scholarly literature in English but
also uses primary regional sources in Arabic and Farsi. In addition, the
research utilized domestic and foreign news media analysis, leadership
analysis, comparative analysis, and political forecasting.
Sunni-Shi’a tensions in the Middle East have been on the rise for
more than a decade. Resurging amid the power vacuum following the
U.S. toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, sectarianism has increas-
ingly come to be seen as the defining feature of conflicts throughout
the region, from Iraq to Syria to Bahrain and Yemen. Numerous ana-
lysts now warn that sectarianism has become the biggest source of
instability in the Middle East and a growing threat to U.S. interests.1
However, contrary to the common perception that the regional blood-
shed is rooted in a centuries-old dispute over the prophet Mohammed’s
rightful successor, violent conflict in each country can be found in the
current social and political contexts specific to each country and in the
way in which communal identity has been manipulated by both local
and foreign actors.
Sectarianism refers to the politicization of religious communal
identity. One’s sectarian affiliation is only one part of one’s identity,
which also includes national, ethnic, class, and other affiliations. The
broader social and political environment greatly influences which facet
of identity one asserts. In the 1960s, for instance, ethnic identity domi-
nated politics in the Middle East, as such leaders as Egyptian president
Gamal Abd al-Nasser attempted to unify the Arab world based on a
pan-Arab identity. With the increase of regional instability during the
past decade, sectarian identity has surged as the salience of national
identity has waned alongside Arab leaders’ growing inability to ensure
the security of all citizens.2 Meanwhile, illustrating the context-specific
1 See Afshon Ostovar, “Iran Has a Bigger Problem Than the West: Its Sunni Neighbors,”
Lawfare Blog, June 7, 2015; Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the
Rebirth of the Shi’a Sunni Divide, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013.
2 Gregory F. Gause, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War, Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2014.
Introduction 3
nature of religious identity is the finding from Pew Research Center

polling that many Muslims in East Asia do not even know whether
they are Sunni or Shi’a.3
Government repression has played a significant role in creating
sectarian-based grievances in the Middle East. Because repressive gov-
ernments do not allow individuals to express their political opinions,
many people are forced to organize based on outwardly recognizable
identities, such as ethnicity or religion.4 Furthermore, because people’s
ideological positions are not known, rulers often simply direct gov-
ernment largesse toward fellow members of their broader kin groups
(under the assumption that communal affiliation breeds loyalty).
Because religious affiliation tends to overlap with clan affiliation, dis-
enfranchised groups have invariably interpreted government favoritism
as being based on sect.5
While government oppression and instability have increased the
importance of sectarian identity in the Middle East, large-scale sectar-
ian violence invariably has been the result of deliberate efforts by domes-
tic and foreign actors to foment social conflict for their own political
ends. These “sectarian entrepreneurs” have successfully manipulated
latent religious identities to cleave society along communal lines that
they can better control.6 Local politicians, for instance, often have
heightened fear of other sects as a means of strengthening control over
members of their own religious communities. Leaders also have painted
the activities of their opponents as sectarian to dismiss their politically
based grievances, often exaggerating their ties to foreign patrons of the
3 Neha Sahgal, senior researcher, Pew Research Center, “The Escalating Shi’a-Sunni Con-
flict: Assessing Arab Public Attitudes,” conference address, Stimson Center, Washington,
D.C., February 18, 2015.
4 Justin L. Gengler, “Understanding Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf,” in Lawrence G.
Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst and Company, 2013, pp.
31–66.
5 Madawi al-Rasheed, “Middle East Dictators Feed Sectarianism,” Al-Monitor,
December 15, 2014.
6 Toby Dodge, “Seeking to Explain the Rise of Sectarianism in the Middle East: The Case
Study of Iraq,” Project on Middle East Political Science, March 19, 2014.
same sect.7 Foreign governments can also take advantage of sectarian

grievances to gain inroads among local communities, ultimately exac-
erbating sectarian conflict in the process. In their rivalry for influence
over the region, for instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran support other sec-
tarian regimes, like the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and use mil-
itant proxy groups that pursue sectarian goals. In addition, the rise
of transnational extremist groups has also precipitated sectarianism
regionally. For their part, these groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),
now IS, have been the ultimate sectarian entrepreneurs, targeting the
Shi’a with the express goal of stoking sectarian warfare.
Sectarianism exists along a continuum in the Middle East. On
one end of the spectrum, people simply fall back on their religious com-
munity for protection and other practical considerations. At the other
extreme, actions are fueled by hatred based on theology—namely, the
belief that members of another community are apostates, or heretics.
The proportion of foreign jihadists fighting for theological reasons is
greater than that among local fighters, many of whom are pursuing
local political objectives.8 Therefore, the more that sectarian actors and
internal grievances have drawn in foreign fighters, the more violent and
intractable these conflicts have become. In the case of Iraq, in particu-
lar, the internal sectarianism driving conflict has been exacerbated by
the role of external sectarian actors, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Posing a significant obstacle to countering sectarian conflict is
that regional sectarian actors appear to reject the notion that they have
contributed to the problem; Gulf Arab leaders do not see themselves
as responsible for spreading sectarian hatred, while the Iranian govern-
ment does not fully acknowledge how its actions are perceived as sec-
tarian.9 It is worth noting that, in most of the current conflicts in the
region, the majority of foreign fighters animated by religious goals have
tended to be Sunni, although large numbers of Shi’a are also active in
7 Gengler, 2013.
8 Fanar Haddad, “Sectarian Relations and Sunni Identity in Post–Civil War Iraq,” in
Lawrence G. Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst and Company,
2013, pp. 67–115.
9 Ostovar, 2015.
Introduction 5
Syria and Iraq (particularly if one includes Iranian-backed Shi’a mili-

tias operating in Syria). This is largely the result of a strategy employed
by numerous Sunni leaders to highlight sectarian divisions to counter
what they see as Iran’s attempts to establish Shi’a hegemony over the
Middle East. Thus, while thousands of Sunni Arabs from the Persian
Gulf have traveled to fight in Syria, most of the Shi’a in those countries
largely remain focused on attaining rights at home rather than fighting
jihad abroad.10
For its part, Iran has not employed an overtly anti-Sunni strategy,
but rather seeks to downplay sectarian differences so as not to alienate
the Sunni-majority population of the Middle East. The Islamic Repub-
lic’s defense of the Palestinians as Arab Sunnis, for example, as well as
its long-standing support to the Sunni militant group Hamas, stand as
examples of Iran prizing shared goals over sectarian identity. Tehran’s
tactical support to Sunni Taliban insurgents fighting U.S. forces in
Afghanistan is yet another example.11 This strategy is a critical compo-
nent of Iran’s effort to overcome the political disadvantage of being a
minority-Persian, Shi’a government in a majority-Sunni Arab region.
This is not to say that Tehran has not played a role in fostering
sectarianism. While Iran is not opposed to cooperating with Sunnis
who share its regional objectives, the majority of “proxy” groups will-
ing to seek Iranian aid are Shi’a groups that tend to believe in (or pay
lip service to) the Islamic Republic’s religious ideology. Moreover,
Iran has attempted (with varying levels of success) to breed loyalty to
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei among Shi’a communities
abroad through funding religious foundations and cultural institutes.
In the end, Iran’s current actions may be more accurately character-
ized as de facto sectarian—the result of having to rely predominantly
on Shi’a groups to gain inroads in the Arab world rather than part of a
strategy focused on countering Sunnis.
10 Frederic Wehrey, “The Roots and Future of Sectarianism in the Gulf,” Project on Middle
East Political Science, March 21, 2014; “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” Washington Post,
October 11, 2014.
11 Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad,
Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, RR-616, 2014.
The report’s first case study centers on Iraq, a country that, in

mid-2015, appeared to be divided along ethno-sectarian lines. Many
observers take a reductionist view of the Iraq problem: The Shi’a major-
ity is in control of the government, the Kurds are verging on indepen-
dence, and the Sunnis are in revolt in the west and northwest. Through
this lens, Iraq sits on the regional fault line between Sunni and Shi’a
Muslims in the Middle East, and Iraq’s slow-motion fragmentation
seems to be emblematic of the regional sectarian divide. Chapter Three
argues that, in reality, Iraq is more complex and that the reductionist
analyses are insufficient and may actually be misleading to policymak-
ers. While many of the overarching assumptions about sectarian divi-
sions in Iraq are accurate, there is a parallel yet interwoven narrative of
identity that allows for a deeper understanding of these divisions.
In mid-2015, Arab Muslim Iraqis do tend to emphasize their
sectarian identity. Shi’a Iraqis developed a common sectarian identity
while suffering through decades of primarily Sunni-led oppression.
The Shi’a hierarchy offered a convenient and effective framework for
self-defense and for collective action. Sunni Arab Iraqis who had orga-
nized along nationalist, Ba’athist, and other nonsectarian lines through
2003 are now struggling to establish a common Sunni polity. How-
ever, while sectarianism intensifies in the wake of the 2006–2007 civil
war and more-recent government oppression against the Sunnis, other
identities remain relevant. These include but are not limited to tribal-
ism, regionalism, and nationalism, with the latter retaining significant
relevance even as the country appears on the surface to fragment. In
previous decades, all of these competing identities have proven to be
resilient and, more importantly, strong influencers on Arab Iraqi behav-
ior. Sunnis and Shi’a have much cause for collaboration and much to
dissuade them from state fragmentation.
If Iraq is emblematic of the regional sectarian conflict, it also rep-
resents hope for a less sectarian and more collaborative future. Iraq may
yet divide along sectarian lines, or it may muddle through to reemerge
as a different yet semi-united nation-state. Current crisis makes
this nuanced analysis of Iraq less digestible, but understanding this
nuance—that extreme sectarianism can coexist with powerful, com-
Introduction 7
peting identities, including nationalism—is essential to finding reason-

able solutions to the Iraq crisis and perhaps the regional crisis as well.
In Syria, sectarianism is only one of several factors that under-
lie violent conflict, but its importance appears to be increasing. These
other factors—geography and locale, political exigency, class differ-
ences, and tribal loyalties—both feed and are fed by sectarianism in
Syria. Moreover, Syria’s historical foundations do not necessarily render
sectarianism in the conflict self-evident. This has led one scholar to
term the Syrian war “semisectarian.” Both regime supporters and
opponents have instigated sectarian-based violence, yet much of the
killing of civilians has been indiscriminate (and Sunni IS has massa-
cred Syrian Sunnis who oppose it). But the longer the Syrian conflict
continues under the influence of these agendas, the greater the likeli-
hood that parties to the conflict will default to sectarian preferences.
This can also be said of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries and
across the region, which could increase instability in the region, par-
ticularly in Lebanon.
Beginning in 2011 as a nonsectarian revolt against the Bashar
al-Assad regime’s growing corruption and bad governance, the con-
flict quickly took on sectarian overtones due to the regime’s brutal
response, the involvement of external regional actors with conflicting
political agendas, and the expanded participation of extremist groups
with inherently sectarian ideologies as major combatants in the Syria
arena. The regime’s strategy was to combine divisiveness based on
communal identity with inclusiveness and nationalism depending on
the targeted constituency. The regime—whose ultimate goal was sur-
vival—sought to magnify sectarian fears among Alawis and Shi’a to
maintain a strong constituency, and among Christians and Druze to
maintain their neutrality (if not gaining their support). It portrayed
itself as a protector of religious moderation and stability against oppos-
ing “terrorists.” Largely Sunni opposition forces represent a wide array
of interests, from nonsectarian moderates (the National Coalition and
the Free Syrian Army, or FSA) to violent extremists with inherently
sectarian agendas (IS and Jabhat al-Nusra). As radical Sunni jihadist
groups have emerged as a more dominant force among the opposition
both on the battlefield and in the public eye, so too has a more strident
form of sectarianism against Alawis, Shi’a, and other minority groups.
The involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran and their respective
“blocs” in the Syrian conflict is less an originating factor in the upris-
ing and more a catalyst that exploits and fans the increasingly sectarian
nature of the conflict in the context of their own geostrategic compe-
tition. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran vie for regional prominence
and influence, and this competition has a strong bearing on sectarian-
ism in the Syrian conflict. Saudi and Iranian provision of resources
and support to opposing forces in Syria, in combination with calls for
Sunni or Shi’a jihad against the other from clerics on both sides, pro-
vides fertile ground for reinforcing sectarian trends in the conflict.
But in the midst of heavily publicized acts of sectarian violence
and rhetoric, there exist important groups in Syria that are not moti-
vated by sectarianism and do not fit neatly into constituencies ascribed
to them by outside observers. Antiregime Alawis, proregime Sunnis,
moderate rebel groups, and tribes whose allegiance is based on self-
preservation all present counterpoints to what appears to be common
wisdom about the Syrian conflict as a “sectarian war.” Sectarianism
plays an important role in fueling the Syrian conflict, but it has not
been the only factor, nor is it uniformly the most important. The con-
flict is too complex to explain away as a simple explosion of sectarian-
ism with roots in distant history. Allegiances are crosscutting and are
based also on political ideology, substate identity, geography and war
experience, and economic motivation. However, while caution is war-
ranted in attributing the conflict solely—or even primarily—to sectar-
ian motivations, there is ample reason for concern that sectarianism
could lead to worsening of the conflict or to outcomes that do not stop
the violence and destabilize the rest of the region.
CHAPTER TWO
The History of Sectarianism in the Middle East
Sectarianism between the Sunnis and the Shi’a is not a modern phe-
nomenon, but it has changed considerably in modern times. Therefore,
it is important to examine the 1,300-year history of Sunni-Shi’a sec-
tarian conflict in order to understand what has caused sectarianism to
worsen to the heightened level at which it stands today. This historical
analysis challenged the oft-heard narrative that a continuous history of
ancient and primordial conflict over theological disagreements between
the two sects is responsible for the current state of sectarianism in the
region. In fact, this interpretation of the history since the Sunni-Shi’a
schism asserts that political, legal, geographic, economic, ethnic, and
other issues played a role that was equal to, if not more important than,
theological disagreements in dividing the Sunnis and Shi’a.
Weighing the salience of sectarian identities to the people of the
region is crucial for determining the nature of sectarianism between the
Sunni and Shi’a throughout history. Key to this is whether the overall
trend during each period of time examined displays that the conflict-
ing sects were identifying primarily on religious lines or whether divi-
sions were driven by theological differences or political, economic, or
other issues. It is no surprise that, over time, the Sunnis and Shi’a have
come into conflict more when religion is the primarily expressed iden-
tity over other identities, such as ethno-nationalism or local tribal affil-
iation. However, throughout history, the drivers of conflict between
the sects have been mostly political in nature—whether that conflict is
a struggle against resources and security or for greater representation in
a political system. As many scholars have noted, sectarianism is not a
9
constant fight over religious differences but more a reflection of centu-

ries of identity politics being played out between the sects.1
It is argued here that a confluence of three factors in the past
century have contributed to the rise in sectarianism in the region to
its current peak. First, the surge in mass participation in the political
processes of the region and an increased desire for a more direct stake
in political representation has made sectarianism stronger than it has
been at any other time in history. This can be attributed mainly to
people asserting religious identity more than in previous centuries as a
response to the development of secular nation-states and to the profu-
sion of secular dictators clamping down on political Islam in the region
in the past 100 years.
Second, in a further acceleration of the political dimension of
sectarian identity politics, the post-1979 and post-2003 environments
in the region have seen an even stronger uptick in sectarianism due
to increased external encouragement of sectarian divisions. Iran and
Saudi Arabia, Shi’a and Sunni, respectively, have used religious identity
as a political tool by asserting direct influence in other regional coun-
tries’ politics in order to promote their opposing political interests. As a
senior Shi’a Lebanese cleric, Sayed Ali Fadlullah, remarked,
Sectarian tools are used in these struggles because they have a

greater impact. If you were to call upon people now to fight for a
regional or international influence, they won’t act. But people will
act when it is said that your sect is under threat.2
Third, the relatively recent establishment and growing appeal of

transnational extremist groups, some with the direct support of state
sectarian actors and some without, have further accelerated sectarian-
ism in the region. These groups adhere to an essentialist interpreta-
1 These include Aslam Farouk-Alli in “Sectarianism in Alawi Syria: Exploring the Para-
doxes of Politics and Religion,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2014, pp.
207–226; Vali R. Nasr in The Shia Revival, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007;
and Karen Armstrong in Islam: A Short History, New York: Modern Library, 2002.
2 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Sunni-Shiite Conflict Reflects Modern Power Struggle, Not Theo-
logical Schism,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2015.
The History of Sectarianism in the Middle East 11
tion of the Quran and espouse deeply sectarian ideologies and poli-
cies. These are worrisome trends because sectarianism in the region is
being increasingly politicized around the fundamental theological dif-
ferences between the Sunnis and the Shi’a, making conflict resolution
more difficult than before.
Demographics
Demographic realities have played a role in shaping the nature of sec-

tarianism in the region historically. Today, of the 1.6 billion Mus-
lims in the world, Sunnis constitute approximately 85 percent and
Shi’a approximately 15 percent.3 Historically, since Islam was divided
between the Sunnis and Shi’a in the late seventh century Sunni Mus-
lims have consistently constituted the majority of the population in the
Middle East. As a consequence of their continuous minority status,
the Shi’a of the region have experienced more persecution and more
pressure to convert than Sunni Muslims. Understanding the sectarian
composition of certain societies in the region helps shed light on the
interactions between the sects in these places.
The countries in the Middle East with the largest populations of
Muslims are Egypt and Iran, one predominantly Sunni and the other
Shi’a.4 The countries with the greatest proportions of Sunnis in their
total populations are Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, where Sunnis
make up around 90 percent (or more) of those populations.5 There are
also substantial majorities of Sunnis in Qatar, the United Arab Emir-
ates (UAE), the Palestinian Territories, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Paki-
stan, with slight majorities in Yemen, Syria, and Kuwait.6
Shi’a Muslims are a majority in the populations of Iran (90 to
95 percent of the population), Iraq (65 to 70 percent), Azerbaijan
3 “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Center, January 27, 2011.
4 “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” 2011.
5 “Sunnis and Shi’a in the Middle East,” BBC News, December 19, 2013.
6 Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population, Appendix C: Data
Sources by Country,” October 7, 2009.
Figure 2.1
Shi’a and Sunni Populations in the Middle East
Percentage of
Muslim population
who are Shi’a
<10
10–25 Azerb.
25–450 Turkey
50–75
75–100 Syria
Tunisia Iran Afghanistan
Lebanon
Morocco Israel
Iraq
Kuwait
Jordan Bahrain
Algeria Qatar Pakistan
Palestinian
Libya Egypt Territories
UAE
Saudi
Arabia
Oman
Sudan Yemen
INDIAN
South OCEAN
Sudan
RAND RR1681-2.1
(65 to 75 percent), and Bahrain (65 to 75 percent); see Figure 2.1.

They have a slight majority in Lebanon (45 to 55 percent) and minor-
ity populations in Yemen (35 to 40 percent), Turkey (25 to 30 percent,
although most are Alevi Muslims, members of a subdenomination of
Shi’ism),7 Kuwait (20 to 25 percent), Syria (15 percent, mostly Alawi,
members of a subdenomination of Shi’ism),8 Saudi Arabia (10 to 15
percent), Afghanistan (10 to 15 percent), and Pakistan (10 to 15 per-
cent). The largest Shi’a communities in the region are located in Iran
(37 to 40 percent of the world’s Shi’a), Pakistan (10 to 15 percent), Iraq
(11 to 12 percent), Turkey (4 to 6 percent), Yemen (5 percent), and
Azerbaijan (3 to 4 percent). The Shi’a populations in these countries
7 “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples—Turkey: Alevis,” United

Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008.
8 “Syria:International Religious Freedom Report 2006,” Washington, D.C., U.S. Depart-
ment of State, 2006.
constitute roughly 80 percent of the world’s Shi’a community, while

a significant number of Sunni Muslims reside outside of the region.9
Early History and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide
The early history of sectarianism between the Sunnis and the Shi’a is
vital in understanding the theological reasons that catalyzed the divide
between the two sects, but it also exposes the reality that, as a sectarian
conflict, it has always been both political and religious in nature, even
during the years following the schism, when the theological debate
was very active. While sectarianism during this period took place on
an individual level as people chose the sect with which they would
identify, it manifested mainly on an organizational level between lead-
ers of the religious communities fighting over theology, converts, and
territory.
The divide between the Sunnis and the Shi’a is fundamentally
about the political succession to the Prophet Mohammed, as well as
the questions relating to the qualifications of the successor and the
scope of his responsibilities and duties. Mohammed’s death in 632
A.D. led to an immediate debate over who would succeed him as ruler
of the Muslim community. An elite group of Mohammed’s followers
selected Abdullah Ibn Abi Qahaafah, known as Abu Bakr, Moham-
med’s companion and father-in-law, as his successor to run the com-
munity as caliph. A minority favored Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and
son-in-law of Mohammed. The majority of the Muslims who followed
Abu Bakr became known as the Sunnis, coming from the word sunna,
meaning “way” in Arabic, and promoted electing caliphs to succeed
Mohammed. Those who followed Ali became known as the Shi’a,
coming from shi’atu Ali, meaning “partisans of Ali,” and believed that
succession should occur only from Mohammed’s bloodline.
In the Rashidun caliphate, the first caliphate after Mohammed’s
death, the first three caliphs were not directly descended from Moham-
med, and the Shi’a lived under their authority but did not view them
9 Pew Research Center, 2009.

as legitimate. Ali became the fourth caliph in 656, but he ruled for
only five years before he was assassinated for his differing views and
those of his followers. After his death, the caliphate was ruled by those
who defeated Ali and created the Umayyad dynasty (661–750), which
held the majority of the lands in the Middle East under its authority.
Ali’s followers were frequently persecuted and killed throughout this
period, but they continued to consider Mohammed’s line through Ali
to be the rightful lineage of authority, following Ali’s son Husseyn as
their leader.
The major catalyst for the Sunni-Shi’a schism was the Battle of
Karbala, which took place in Iraq in 680. During a clash between
Husseyn’s followers and the much larger army of the caliphate, the
second Umayyad caliph ordered the assassination of Husseyn and his
followers. After the death of Husseyn, the Shi’a continued to follow the
descendants of Husseyn and Ali in a line of distinctly Shi’a imams10
as their legitimate religious and political leaders, Ali being the first
imam, his eldest son Hassan the second, his younger son Husseyn the
third, Husseyn’s son Ali the fourth, and so on. To this day, the Battle
of Karbala has a highly meaningful place in Shi’a identity. The Shi’a
collectively mark the event annually in the commemoration of Ashura.
The prevalence of such themes as bravery, martyrdom, and victimiza-
tion in Shi’a identity can be drawn back to this seminal event that
clearly distinguishes Shi’a Muslims as distinct from the Sunnis. After
Karbala, the Sunni caliphate continued to reign victorious over the
region, and the Shi’a continued to live in varied states of persecution
for their beliefs.11
10 Imam is a general term for an Islamic leader for all Muslims. However, for Shi’a Muslims,
the role of an imam is more important because of the concept of Imamah, that Shi’a imams
have been chosen by God as infallible examples for humanity that all the faithful must
follow. Therefore, Shi’a imams play a central role in leading Shi’a Muslims both religiously
and politically.
11 John Morris Roberts and Odd Arne Westad, The History of the World, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013, p. 345.
Middle Ages: 800–1500
While early sectarian conflict was initially concerned with practical

and theological differences in Islam and people identified primarily
along sectarian lines, as the two sects became established, the sectar-
ian division between Sunnis and Shi’a took place less on an individ-
ual level and increasingly on a leadership level as political contests for
resources, land, and the right to rule continued. Thus, sectarian con-
flict between the Sunnis and Shi’a worsened in the Middle Ages, par-
ticularly during the Sunni Abbasid caliphate (750–1258), which, at
its height, controlled all of the Middle East, South Central Asia, and
North Africa from its headquarters in Iraq and then Syria. The Abbasid
Sunni caliphs brutally cracked down on uprisings by Shi’a communi-
ties in their territory for mainly political reasons. They were fearful
that there would be a Shi’a reprisal for the death of Husseyn and for
the persecution of Shi’a in the caliphate or that the Shi’a would rise up
and try to unseat the caliph.12 The clashes between the Sunnis and the
Shi’a during this period can be characterized as increasingly political
in nature, as they were not fighting solely for the original theological
reasons behind their differences, which were still a significant factor in
their conflict, but now also for territory, access to resources, and the
right to be ruled under their own sect’s interpretation of religious law.13
This is perhaps best evidenced by the lives and fates of the early
Shi’a imams and their interactions with the Sunnis and their caliphs:
By killing Shi’a leaders, the Sunnis could more easily subject the Shi’a
to their rule and keep them powerless. According to Shi’a sources, all
of the Shi’a imams who lived during this period, from the sixth to the
11th imam,14 are confirmed or strongly suspected to have been slain or
12 V. Nasr, 2007, p. 53.

13 Stephen
F. Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
14 The 11th imam was the last imam whose life has been recounted in the history. The 12th
imam was said to have disappeared in the late ninth century. The majority of Shi’a Muslims
today are Twelver Shi’a, meaning that they believe that the 12th imam is the Mahdi, or
the one who will return to Earth as the ultimate savior of humanity. Other sects of Shi’ism
diverge over opinions on the line of succession of the Shi’a imams.
poisoned on orders of the Sunni caliphs living at the time.15 The persis-
tence of the Shi’a in continuing to practice under such harsh conditions
continued; by the mid–ninth century, the Shi’a had built considerable
communities in majority-Sunni areas, such as in Qom and Sabzevar
because these areas were isolated enough that the weakening Abbasid
caliphate struggled to control them centrally.16
Aside from internal sectarian conflict within the large Abbasid
caliphate, the rise of a rival Shi’a caliphate from North Africa created
intensified sectarianism in the region. The Fatimid caliphate (909–
1171) was the only Shi’a-ruled caliphate in the region’s history, and
it eventually ruled Israel, Lebanon, and western Saudi Arabia, rival-
ing the Abbasid caliphate as a major regional power. Though the
Fatimids were headquartered in Cairo and part of the Ismaili Shi’a
sect,17 they began successfully spreading Shi’a Islam in parts of Abba-
sid territory and conducting assassinations of Abbasid leaders as an
attempt at political subversion.18 By the middle of the tenth century,
caliphs were struggling to rule over the people in their vast swaths of
territory and became little more than religious figureheads in practice
as local rulers began taking control.19 In the tenth and 11th centuries,
several successful smaller Shi’a dynasties emerged to rule modern-day
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
During this era, caliphates’ encouragement of a politicized reli-
gious identity and persecution of sects besides their own worsened divi-
sions in these societies and set the precedent for the modern politiciza-
tion of sectarianism.
15 Sayyid Mohammad Hosayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ ite Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, trans., New
York: State University of New York Press, 1977.
16 “The Abbasid Dynasty: The Golden Age of Islamic Civilization,” Saylor Foundation,
2012.
17 The Ismaili Shi’a are an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, the members of which believe the line of
Shi’a imams should have followed a different person from the seventh imam, rather than the
person whom other Shi’a sects believe it followed.
18
Francis Robinson, The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 34; Armstrong, 2002, p. 87.
19 “The Abbasid Dynasty: The Golden Age of Islamic Civilization,” 2012; and Armstrong,
2002, p. xix.
Early Modern Era: 1500–1920
Sectarianism in the early modern period continued to manifest itself

mainly as a political contest between regional powers, Shi’a Safavid
Persia and the Sunni Ottoman Empire.20 The Safavid ruler Ismail I, of
Turkic descent, was determined to create a Shi’a empire with a separate
identity from the Turkish Ottoman Empire. At its height, the Safavids
ruled over modern-day Iran and Azerbaijan, the eastern half of Iraq,
southeastern Turkey, southwestern Turkmenistan, and the western half
of Afghanistan.
In order to establish his empire in a majority-Sunni area, Ismail
invited clerics and scholars from major Shi’a centers in Egypt and Leb-
anon to come to Iran and create a legal system based on Shi’a juris-
prudence.21 The Sunnis living in Safavid territories were forced to con-
vert to Shi’a Islam, and many Sunni clerics and scholars were expelled
from the empire or killed, which led to the same reaction against the
Shi’a in the Ottoman territories.22 In many ways, the Safavid-Ottoman
rivalry set a precedent for sectarian divisions today, although peace-
ful coexistence, intermarriage, and cooperation among the Sunnis and
Shi’a on local and individual levels were still commonplace despite the
attempts of these sectarian powers to create religious divisions for polit-
ical purposes.
The period of the late 18th and 19th centuries is considered one
of relative sectarian stability in the Middle East. Tolerance for other
sects became more commonplace as empires declined, less able to
govern over large swaths of territory, and tribal and local ethnic affili-
ations became the more prominent political identity.23 But under the
Tanzimât reforms, the Ottomans developed a new millet system
through which they gave some autonomy to the non-Sunni sects under
20 V. Nasr, 2007, p. 65.

21 V. Nasr, 2007, p. 66.
22 Armstrong, 2002, p. xxiv.
23 Richard C. Martin, “Empires: Ottoman,” in Richard C. Martin, ed., Encyclopedia
of Islam and the Muslim World, Vol. 1, New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004, pp.
214–217.
their rule. This led to greater pluralism, but there was less of an impact
on Sunni-Shi’a relations because the Ottomans lumped the Shi’a into
the same Muslim millet as the Sunnis, failing to recognize them as a
separate, legitimate sect.24 This led to occasional instances of sectarian
conflict, particularly when the Ottomans violently cracked down on
Shi’a uprisings in the mid-1800s. But there were also other instances
of pluralism in the region, as when Nader Shah created the Afsharid
Empire in Iran in the mid-1700s based on principles of religious toler-
ance, as an army of both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims had supported him.
Additionally, the region saw more cohesion as identity politics shifted
from local and tribal identities to ethno-nationalist identities25 based
on Western ideas of nationalism.
Modern Era: 1900–1979
The fall of the Ottoman Empire was a turning point in Middle East
politics; the collapse of the last remaining vestige of centuries of dynas-
tic, imperial rule started an era of mass political participation. Replac-
ing the local, tribal rule that had come to dominate the region in the
19th century, powerful Western states began to divide the previously
Ottoman territories into what resembled more “modern” nation-states.
The infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 determined which areas
would be under British or French mandate, with the French controlling
upper Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Turkey and the British controlling
lower Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen. The British and French
organized political representation in each country along sectarian lines,
in some cases organizing the political system by confession (Lebanon)
and in other cases (Syria and Iraq) splitting the countries into sectar-
ian states. During the mandates, both the British and the French fol-
lowed a strategy of favoring one sect to administer each country while
24 DonaJ. Stewart, The Middle East Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural Perspectives,
New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 54.
25 S. V. R. Nasr, “European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States,”
Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2016.
also encouraging existing sectarian divisions in order to keep the states

weak and reliant on their colonial rulers.26 This practice helped sectari-
anism take deeper roots in the modern Middle East.
Nevertheless, there was a trend of Sunni and Shi’a cooperation in
response to foreign intervention during this period. The Great Syrian
Revolt of 1925, an early example of mass political participation in the
Middle East, was a collective effort of Syrians across sectarian lines to
counter French attempts to divide and rule their country.27 In Leba-
non, the Sunnis and the Shi’a worked together to resist inclusion in
the “Greater Lebanon” under domination by Maronite Christians with
close ties to the West. In 1943, they agreed to a National Pact under
which sects had roughly proportional representation in government.28
In Iraq, the Sunnis and the Shi’a briefly worked together to drive out
British occupation in the 1920s before achieving independence.29
This was followed by a widespread pan-Arabist movement, which
established political authority under secular authoritarian rulers who
emphasized ethnic and national unity instead of narrow sectarian
interests. For example, Egyptian president Gamal Abd-al Nasser sup-
ported Shi’a clerics against the “corrupt” Shah of Iran and allowed a
leading Sunni center for learning, Al-Azhar University, to teach Shi’a
jurisprudence starting in 1959.30 A more aggressive stance against sec-
tarian divisions took place in Ba’athist Syria and Iraq, where leaders
were militantly secular and anti-Islamist. In Syria, Hafez al-Assad care-
fully crafted a culture of national unity by strategically including mem-
bers of the Sunni majority in key government positions.31 However, he
26 See Omri Nir, “The Sunni-Shi’i Balance in Light of the War in Syria and Regional
Changes,” Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs, April 7, 2014; Imad Salamey,
The Government and Politics of Lebanon, London: Routledge, 2013; and Farouk-Alli, 2014.
27 Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 214.
28 Nir, 2014.
29 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2007, pp. 41–42.
30 Jacques Neriah, “Egypt’s Shiite Minority: Between the Egyptian Hammer and the Ira-
nian Anvil,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 23, 2012.
31 Reva Bhalla, “Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis,” Stratfor, May 5, 2011.
also brutally cracked down on Islamist challenges to his rule, as dem-

onstrated by the crushing of Hama’s Sunni-led uprising in 1982.
But despite the dominance of secular ethno-nationalist rule, a
growing pan-Islamist trend began to bubble beneath the surface among
those who favored a stronger place for religion in government. Secular
but repressive governance resulted in the rise of an Islamism that would
pave the way for the greater sectarianism seen today.
Contemporary Era: 1979–Present
The Iranian revolution of 1979 is, in many ways, the starting point of
modern sectarianism in the Middle East. Sectarian divisions became
more prominent as regional populations became increasingly dissatis-
fied living in states without religious ideology or adequate representa-
tion across sectarian lines. This was seen most clearly in the Iranian
revolution, a mass political movement that unseated Iran’s secular shah
and established a theocratic Shi’a government. Further, the revolution
intensified the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, each of
which claimed to be the rightful leader of the Muslim world.
The Iranian revolution became an inspiration for both Shi’a and
Sunni Islamists, encouraging many to become more active politically.
Iran’s new ruler, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was charismatic and
politically astute: He envisioned Iran having a larger political role in the
world and positioned himself not only as a champion of Shi’a Muslims
but also as a pan-Islamic leader. Khomeini instituted the concept of
velayat-e faqih (rule of the supreme jurisprudent) in Iran’s constitution,
which established the Supreme Leader as the temporal and religious
ruler of Iran. This concept would become the basis of Iran’s attempts to
export the revolution throughout the Middle East.32
Inspired by the Iranian revolution, Iraqi Shi’a groups sought to
depose Saddam’s secular Ba’athist regime.33 In addition, Iran supported
32 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami, New York:
Routledge, 2003, pp. 26–27.
33 David Gritten, “Long Path to Iraq’s Sectarian Split,” BBC News, February 25, 2006.
Shi’a groups throughout the region, helping create the Lebanese Shi’a
Hezbollah (Party of God), an organization that the United States con-
siders a terrorist group and is closely aligned with Iran, in 1982. But
Iran’s regional policy was not motivated by purely sectarian objectives,
as evidenced by its alliance with Hafez al-Assad’s secular and Alawi-
dominated regime in Syria. Many Iranian clerics would consider the
Alawi sect not as an offshoot of Shi’a Islam but as a heterodox or hereti-
cal sect.
The Islamic Republic’s assertive foreign policies were viewed with
alarm by Arab Sunni authoritarian regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia.
There was a growing fear among the Sunnis that the Iranian revolution
was a threat to Sunni dominance in the region.34 In reaction, Saudi
Arabia promoted its own Wahhabi creed as a counter to Iran’s revolu-
tionary ideology.35 Saudi Arabia and Iran had been competitors even
under the shah’s reign, but the Iranian revolution introduced a more
sectarian and ideologically driven sense of rivalry between the two.36
Riyadh’s perceived threat of expanding Iranian power and a need to
appease the fundamentalist Wahhabi clerics at home led Riyadh to a
more assertive regional foreign policy, which espoused radical Sunni
Islamism throughout the region.37
34 S. Nasr, 2016, pp. 143–144.

35 Wahhabism is a fundamentalist form of Islam that began in the Arabian Peninsula before
the creation of the Saudi state. It promotes the return of Muslims to a literal interpretation
of the Quran to cleanse the religion of the mystical and heretical elements that the Wah-
habis felt that Islam picked up over time. They believe that all other interpretations of Islam
are heretical. The Wahhabis have an important role in the modern Saudi state because of an
alliance made between the al Sauds and the Wahhabis to unite the different territories of
Arabia into one kingdom. The al Sauds agreed to implement Wahhabi ideology as the king-
dom’s religion in return for Wahhabi support. In this way, the al Saud royal family still must
appease the Wahhabbis to keep the Saudi state together, a difficult feat as the Saudis began
to modernize and open Saudi Arabia to the international community
36 Andrew Scott Cooper, “Showdown at Doha: The Secret Oil Deal That Helped Sink the
Shah of Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4, August 2008, pp. 567–591.
37 Claude Moniquet, “The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply
of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World,” European Parliament Policy Department,
June 11, 2013.
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is key to understanding the growth

of sectarianism in recent years. As Gregory Gause pointed out, Saudi
Arabia and Iran did not cause the resurgence of sectarianism in the
region, but they have certainly exacerbated it to serve their own politi-
cal interests.38
Much of the Middle East experienced relative sectarian peace
during the 1980s and 1990s. With some key exceptions, including Sad-
dam’s crackdown against the Shi’a following his invasion of Kuwait
in 1990, Egypt, Syria, and even Iraq experienced relatively little sec-
tarian violence as the leadership in these countries encouraged ethno-
nationalist identity rather than sectarianism as the basis of political
legitimacy.
Sectarianism has continued to intensify in the past decade with the
growing popularity of political Islamism, the recent growth in trans-
national extremist groups, and the accelerating competition between
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s power grew as a result of the U.S. inter-
ventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) and institution of pro-
Iranian governments in both countries. U.S. policies had a marked
effect on regional power dynamics and Sunni perception of a rising
“Shi’a threat.” With fewer obstacles to Iranian influence, Tehran has
been able to support several nonstate groups in the region, especially
Shi’a groups vulnerable to Sunni jihadi violence. Saudi Arabia now
sees an Iranian hand in almost every regional conflict, and Iran views
Saudi Arabia as an intractable rival. Violent conflict in such places as
Iraq and Syria may not have been caused by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry,
but the two regional powerhouses continuously feed the flames of war
in both countries.
38 Gause, 2014.
CHAPTER THREE
Sectarianism in Iraq
Iraq is a study in sectarian division, but also in the dynamism and

fickle nature of human identity. In 2015, many assumed that Iraqis
were, and had always been, on a fixed path toward ethnic and sectarian
civil war, that Iraqi nationalism had never been more than a façade,
and that the Iraqi state was moving inexorably toward ethno-sectarian
devolution.1 This chapter confirms many of the subordinate assump-
tions in this overarching forecast, showing how the current Sunni-Shi’a
split in Iraq germinated, grew, and was nurtured by the shortsighted
actions of various occupying powers. But this chapter also shows how
both Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis have previously had, and perhaps retain,
the capacity for self-serving yet productive cross-sectarian, and even
genuinely nationalist, relationships.2 It would be wishful thinking in
1 See, for example, Dawn Brancati, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” Washington Quar-
terly, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2004, pp. 5–21; Namo Abdulla, “The View from Kurdistan: Divide
Iraq in Order to Save It,” Al Jazeera, June 13, 2014; Ramj Alaaldin, “If Iraq Is to Survive,
Then It Must Be Divided into Separate Regions,” Independent, August 17, 2014; Tim Lister,
“Iraq to Split in Three: So Why Not?” CNN, July 8, 2014; Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E.
B. Choksy, “Defeat ISIS, but Let Iraq Split,” World Affairs, undated; and Delovan Barwari,
“Partition Will Help End the Turmoil in Iraq,” Jerusalem Post, March 8, 2015.
2 Assumptions, findings, and narrative detail for this chapter are derived primarily from
Haider Ala Hamoudi, Negotiating in Civil Conflict: Constitutional Construction and Imper-
fect Bargaining in Iraq, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014, Kindle; Hanna Batutu,
The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1978, Kindle; Dawisha, 2003, 2009; Michael Eppel, Iraq from Monarchy
to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam, Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of
Florida, 2004; Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity, Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2011, Kindle; Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of
23
2015 to assume that Sunni and Shia’ Iraqis can soon or easily reconcile.
Yet the same historical narrative that explains the current situation also
offers hope for eventual, imperfect, but functional national unity.
While many scholars of the Middle East see nuance and sub-
tlety in the evolution of the Sunni-Shi’a relationship, primordialism
currently dominates policy debates. For primordialists like Carsten
Wieland, Occam’s razor cuts through the complexity of Iraqi ethno-
sectarian identity: If it looks like a three-way ethno-sectarian civil war,
it must be so.3 Other schools of thought present different arguments.
Iraq scholar Fanar Haddad takes the ethnosymbolist perspective, but
he also makes a more general argument about human identity:4
The fact is that the social and political relevance of sectarian iden-
tity [in Iraq] advances and recedes according to wider socioeco-
nomic and political conditions. Likewise, sectarian harmony or
division is dictated by context. . . . Perceptions of the sectarian
self and other, as indeed with any form of identity, are constantly
being renegotiated in what is a perpetually fluctuating dynamic
that is neither cyclical nor linear . . . [W]e should begin by recog-
nizing the inherent ambiguity of identity.
Modern Iraq, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989 (1998); Phebe Marr, The
Modern History of Iraq, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2012; Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’ is
of Iraq, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994; Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for
National Identity, Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass and Co., 1995; V. Nasr, 2007; Simon, 1986
(2004); Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tajirian, eds., The Creation of Iraq: 1914–1921,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, Kindle; Tripp, 2007; and Reidar Visser and
Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008. Efraim Karsh, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of
the Iran-Iraq War,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1990, pp. 256–268, and others offer
plausible counter- and alternate narratives to the notion that Sunni and Shi’a are caught up
in a more-than-1,300-year sectarian rivalry.
3 Carsten Wieland, “The Bankruptcy of Humanism? Primordialism Dominates the
Agenda of International Politics,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2005, pp. 142–158.
4 F. Haddad, 2011, loc. 107, Kindle.
Sectarianism in Iraq 25
This chapter rejects the simplicity of the primordialist argument

without necessarily adopting any other school of thought wholesale.5
Single-scope analyses can be useful for cutting through complex social
issues like those in Iraq, but they also incur significant risk in an effort
to simplify a seemingly unmanageable problem. It is enough to say
that Iraqis are drawn to multiple simultaneously existing and shifting
identities out of fear and a need for human security. Sectarianism is
currently dominant, but there is sufficient evidence to show that Iraqis
are more complex than bit players in a Manichean sectarian war that
appears to many experts to be playing out across the entire Middle
East.
This chapter builds from the assumption that Arab Iraqi identi-
ties are complex rather than starkly sectarian. It progresses historically
and describes the simultaneous descent into sectarianism, as well as
the periodic waves of increased “less-sectarian” nationalism through-
out the 20th and early 21st centuries. It describes how other issues,
including regionalism, tribalism, security, and land rights, affect Iraqi
sentiment and behavior to help policymakers identify other factors that
stem from or drive conflict. The first part of this chapter summarizes
the long and complex history of sectarian division in Iraq, specifically
focusing on how modern sectarianism in Iraq takes its roots from the
Ottoman period to the Ba’ath revolution in the 1960s. Next it describes
how the Arab Socialist Ba’athists, first under Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr
and then under Saddam, helped to cement the institutionalization of
sectarianism between the Sunnis and the Shi’a. The following section
describes the rise of the Shi’a in post-Ba’athist Iraq and the concurrent
yet weaker and uneven growth of Sunni Iraqi identity and the impact
that it has had on how sectarianism manifests in Iraq today. The final
two sections address the implications of the current sectarian divide
and forecasts possible futures.
5 Some of the language used in this chapter will be familiar to constructivists, but the
analysis was not applied strictly through a constructionist lens.
Overview
As of mid-2015, Arab Iraqi Muslims found themselves in a de facto

sectarian and regional civil war. Cross-sectarian collaboration was lim-
ited and appeared to be waning, while cross-sectarian killings and geo-
graphic “cleansing” were becoming as common as in the mid-2000s.
Shi’a Iraqis representing various political and militant groups led the
government from Baghdad and exercised de facto control over the
heavily Shi’a regions in the center, south, and east, while Sunnis were
in various stages of revolt in the west and northwest.6 The Shi’a received
direct support from Iran based on a historical relationship dating back
to the late 18th century, a dynamic we explore throughout the remain-
der of this chapter. While the Shi’a are currently unified against the
Sunni-led threat of IS and against the broader Sunni revolt against
the central government, they suffer from considerable internal divi-
sion along regional and political lines; even in these extreme circum-
stances, the notion of monolithic sectarian blocs in Iraq is unfounded.
The Sunni polity is even more badly fragmented but is in general oppo-
sition to what a great number of Sunnis perceive as an unjust Iranian
puppet regime in Baghdad.7 Because many Sunnis believe that they
constitute at least half of Iraqis (see following), and because they cur-
rently control few economic resources, they have considerable incentive
to sustain their revolt until they achieve parity or overmatch with the
Iraqi Shi’a.
Sunni sectarian revolt against the Iraqi state is driven by the per-
ception of sectarian and regional repression, by historical expectations
of sectarian hegemony, and by basic demands for human security.8 As
of mid-2015, the Iraqi population was estimated to range from 32 to
6 Kurdish Iraqis anchor the north and northeast, controlling this territory under the Kurd-
ish Regional Government.
7 See, for example, Mushreq Abbas, “Iraq’s ‘Sunni’ Rebellion Shows Splits Between ISIS,
Others,” Al-Monitor, June 24, 2014; Dafna H. Rand and Nicholas A. Heras, “Iraq’s Sunni
Reawakening: How to Defeat ISIS and Save the Country,” Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2015.
8 For definitions and explanations of human security, see UN, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, December 10, 1948; UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
General Comment Number 27—Freedom of Movement (Article 12), November 2, 1999; and
35 million people, of whom approximately 75 to 80 percent were Arab

and 15 to 20 percent were Kurdish, while Turkmen, Assyrians, and
other smaller minorities rounded out the overall population estimates.9
Ethnic estimates are generally accepted in broad terms, but the sectar-
ian divisions within the estimated 95 to 99 percent of Iraqi Arabs who
are Muslims are far more hotly contested. Estimates from generally
objective sources range from 32 percent Sunni to 42 percent Sunni and
approximately 65 percent to 47 percent Shi’a, out of the approximately
75 to 80 percent Muslim Iraqis who are Arab.10 However, many Arab
Sunni Iraqis and Sunni supporters claim that the Sunnis constitute
as much 50 percent or even as much as 62 percent of the entire popu-
lation of Iraq.11 There are no empirically defensible data to back the
UN, The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports: A Review of
Experiences and Current Debates, May 2006.
9 These estimates are drawn from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, which may have drawn from
the (also cited) Iraqi Ministry of Planning data; the probability of circular reporting in some
of these data sets is high. Because there has been no successful official census in Iraq since
1997, these numbers are extrapolations drawn from multiple sources; see UN, Data Sources
for Population Estimates, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
Population Estimates and Projections Section, 2015b. For estimates, see UN, Iraq: Popula-
tion (Thousands), Medium Variant, 1950–2100, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, 2015a; CIA, “The World
Factbook: Iraq,” undated; and Republic of Iraq, 2010. For a historical perspective on census
analyses in Iraq, see Doris G. Adams, “Current Population Trends in Iraq,” Middle East Jour-
nal, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1956, pp. 151–165.
10 See,for example, World Values Survey, “Wave 5 2005–2008: Results, Iraq 2006, Tech-
nical Record,” World Values Survey Association, 2014; Michael Lipka, “The Sunni-Shia
Divide: Where They Live, What They Believe and How They View Each Other,” Pew
Research Center, June 18, 2014; CIA, undated. The World Values Survey data from 2006,
with a sample size of 2,701 and an approximately ±3 percent margin of error, showed that
respondents identified as Shi’a three times more often than as Sunni, but the question was
so poorly written that it should not be used as a basis for further analysis. Note that these
data form the basis for some Pew Research Center reports on Shi’a populations in the Middle
East. See World Values Survey, 2014, p. 37, and Pew Research Center, 2009.
11 For example, prominent Iraqi political and religious leaders Mohsen Abdel Hamid,
Harith al-Dhari, and Osama al-Nujaifi have all claimed that Sunnis constitute 50 percent
or more of the entire Iraqi population. See Shafiq Shuqir, “At-ta‘dud al-‘araqi wah ad-dini
fi bina’ ‘Iraq al-mustaqbal” [Ethnic and religious diversity in the composition of the future
Iraq], Al-Jazeera, March 10, 2004; Ayad Mahmud Husayn, “Are the Shia Really the Major-
most-extreme claims, and the more-moderate estimates are, at best,

extrapolations from generally poor and dated information. The absence
of defensible, objective demographic data undermines accurate analy-
sis, but, even if the data were present, existing and deep-seated cultural
narratives might make them irrelevant to the issue of intersectarian
tension in Iraq.
Because Iraqis have little reason to trust in official data based on
their long experience with abusive and disingenuous governance, and
because it is in Sunnis’ and Shi’as’ immediate and practical benefit
to claim a strong majority, cultural perceptions and issues of political
advantage are more relevant than objective reality to the present analy-
sis. Distrust and dominance are intrinsically linked and have evolved
over the course of at least four centuries. While it has become almost
cliché in the fast-moving world of policy analysis to state that the roots
of the Sunni-Shi’a split in Iraq are deep, understanding how and why
this split emerged—and how it has been temporarily but successfully
diminished or overshadowed by other issues in the past—will remain
central to finding possible solutions to the current crisis.
Pre-Ba’ath Sectarianism: Challenging Assumptions and

Tracing Identities
The state of modern Iraq was created as a kingdom under British man-
date in 1921 and was granted independence as a nation-state in 1932.12
Some leverage these dates and cite Western collusion at various confer-
ences designed to shape Iraq’s modern borders to argue or imply that
ity in Iraq?” Al-Arab News, April 11, 2005; Faruq Ziada, “Is There a Sunni Majority in Iraq?”
counterpunch, website, December 27, 2006; Abdulaziz al-Mahmud, “New Evidence . . . for
the Sunni Majority in Iraq,” Defense Network for the Sunnis, March 9, 2010; and Harith
al-Qarawee, “The Rise of Sunni Identity in Iraq,” National Interest, April 5, 2013. Claimants
to the 50+-percent figure often cite the 1997 Iraq census, the 2003 UN Ration Card Pro-
gram review, and 2010 Iraqi Electoral Law as sources for their claims.
12 Iraqwas formed as a mandate state in 1921 and then achieved independence under the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1932. See Marr, 2012, and Abbas Khadim, Reclaiming Iraq: The 1920
Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State, Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press,
2012, among others.
the Iraqi nation is an artificiality of the post-Ottoman order.13 These

arguments then conclude that the 1921 state structure has done little
more than temporarily repress long-standing enmities between Sunni
and Shi’a Arabs who, following the same lines of argument, have lived
in separate geographic and cultural cantonments for centuries.14 Fol-
lowing these arguments, therefore, one might conclude that breaking
apart the Iraqi state would allow for naturally occurring stability built
on sectarian homogeneity. Ottoman-era provincial divisions, depicted
in Figure 3.1, reinforce these assumptions and offer a template for
future ethno-sectarian fragmentation.
These assumptions and conclusions are only partly accurate and
are, therefore, partly misleading. While the modern state of Iraq did
not exist until 1921 (or, officially, 1932), Iraq existed as a region, a group
of aggregated provinces, or a semi-amorphous yet state-like entity for
well over a millennium under Abbasid, Mongol, and then Ottoman
rule.15 Several scholars make strong arguments that, despite European
involvement in the delineation of Iraq’s modern borders, the concept
of Iraq as a communal region and as a state-like entity long predates
the complex series of international and national meetings and agree-
ments that “created” modern Iraq.16 This matters for the present analy-
13 See,for example, Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a His-
tory Denied, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
14 For example, see Jeffrey Goldberg, “After Iraq,” Atlantic, 2008; Jeffrey Goldberg, “The
New Map of the Middle East,” Atlantic, June 19, 2014; Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a
New Authoritarianism, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012; and Sami
Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, 2002, pp. 205–215.
15 Phebe Marr refers to the Iraqi state under the Abbasid Empire dating from the seventh
through 13th centuries, and noted Iraq scholar Abbas Khadim presents compelling evidence
that the concept of an Iraqi, and the term al-Iraq, emerged as early as the 13th century. See
Marr, 2012, p. 5, and Khadim, 2012, p. 7.
16 See Alistair Northedge, “Al-Iraq al-Arabi: Iraq’s Greatest Region in the Pre-Modern
Period,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of
a Federal Democracy? New York: Columbia University Press, 2008a, pp. 151–166; Reidar
Visser, “Two Regions of Southern Iraq,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield, eds., An
Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? New York: Columbia University
Press, 2008a, pp. 27–50; F. Haddad, 2011; and Sara Pursley, “‘Lines Drawn on an Empty
Figure 3.1
Ottoman Provinces of Iraq Pre-1916
Turkey
Mosul
SYRIA
Mosul IRAN
Baghdad Baghdad
JORDAN
SAUDI
Basra
ARABIA al-Basrah
RAND RR1681-3.1
sis because it undermines the argument that the Iraqi state is strictly
a modern Western construct artificially stitching together people who
would otherwise be naturally segregated by Islamic sect.
Map’: Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State (Part 1),” Jadaliyya, June 2, 2015.
Treaties, meetings, and agreements include the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention; the 1916
Sykes-Picot Agreement; the 1920 Treaty of Sevres; the Cairo Conference of 1921; the 1922
(ratified 1930, in effect 1932) Anglo-Iraqi Treaty; the 1922 Uqair Protocol; and the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne. See, among others, Visser, 2008a; “Historical Myths of a Divided Iraq,”
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2008b, pp. 95–106; Richard Scho-
field, “Borders, Regions and Time: Defining the Iraqi Territorial State,” in Reidar Visser and
Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008a, pp. 167–204; Marr, 2012; and Khadim, 2012.
Further, Iraqi nationalist identity existed well before the 1920 rev-
olution and continues to exist as one of many Iraqi identities.17 Fanar
Haddad, 2011, identified three identity forms held by Iraqi Arabs:
unified Iraqi nationalism, Sunni-Iraqi nationalism, and Shi’a Iraqi
nationalism.18 In Haddad’s interpretation, all three types of nationalist
identity exist simultaneously, but Sunni nationalism and Shi’a nation-
alism have been in a perpetual state of competition to control the more
ephemeral and contested notion of the unified state.19 Another way to
view this dynamic is to see nationalism as a distinct identity that Sunni
and Shi’a seek to monopolize or influence. Visser argued that region-
alism is another strong identity and that, in most cases, regionalism,
particularly subprovincial regionalism, influences individual and group
behavior more strongly than sectarian identity does.20
Another misleading interpretation of Iraqi history persists and
feeds current arguments for state fragmentation: the concept that the
Sunni-Shi’a split in Iraq is practically timeless, perhaps dating back
to the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 (or more than 1,300
years prior to the 2015 conflict). While prerevolution Iraq was on
the centuries-long front line between the Sunni Ottoman and Shi’a
Safavid and Persian Empires, Shi’ism did not proliferate in Iraq until
the late 18th century.21 Up to this point, the Iraqi Arabs were almost
entirely Sunni and, in what would become the predominantly Shi’a
south in the 19th century, mostly nomadic. Nakash writes, “There is
no evidence . . . that the Shi’is were ever close to forming the major-
ity of the population in Iraq before the nineteenth or even the twenti-
eth century.”22 With some effort, one might trace the broad historical
dynamic that feeds the current state of civil war back to the origins of
17 Visser, 2008a; F. Haddad, 2011.

19 F. Haddad, 2011, locs. 735–800, Kindle.
20 Visser, 2008a.
21 The eternal nature of the Sunni-Shi’a split is implied and perpetuated in most of the
profederalist and prodissolution articles cited herein. Nakash and others have provided the
historical, primary-source counterargument. See Nakash, 1994, pp. 26–28, among others.
22 Nakash, 1994, p. 25.
Islam, but, in practical terms, Iraqi sectarianism emerged in the late

18th century as the Ottoman Empire faded from southeast Iraq and
Persian Shi’a began to immigrate and proselytize. Therefore, the com-
petition between settled Sunni and Shi’a in Iraq is, in practical terms,
no more than 200 years old.23
Sunni elites in Baghdad—educated, mentored, and nurtured by
Sunni Ottomans since the 16th century—saw the Persian Shi’a arrival
from the late 18th century through 1920 as a direct threat to their near
monopoly over the state.24 Here, Phebe Marr describes the impact of
the Ottoman bureaucracy on Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a perceptions:25
[Under the Ottoman Empire, the] native elite was drawn from
only one segment of the population, the urban Sunnis. It was pri-
marily the Sunnis, whether Arab or Kurd, who attended public
schools and were given posts in the army and bureaucracy. Not
surprisingly, the Sunni came to think of themselves as the coun-
try’s natural elite and its only trustworthy leaders. Two impor-
tant segments of the population, the rural tribal groups outside
the reach of urban advantages and the Shi’a, were consequently
excluded from participation in the government. Little wonder
they should form the nucleus of opposition to the government in
the early decades of the twentieth century.
In the late 19th century, the Sunni Ottoman developed Sufi orders
in the north in order to counteract perceived growth in Shi’a numbers
and influence.26 Shi’a nomads and fellahin (farmers), increasingly ostra-
cized by Baghdad through the 19th and early 20th centuries, sought to
strengthen their own regional identities. Shi’a mujtahids, or recognized
religious and political experts on jurisprudence, who were inspired by
the Iranian Shi’a revolution, fed this fear both before and after the
23 Nakash, 1994, and others also describe how Shi’ism did not obtain in a significant por-
tion of the Iraqi population until well into the 19th century, coinciding with the mostly
forced or induced settlement of the southern tribes.
24 See, for example, Nakash, 1994; Dawisha, 2003, Kindle; and Marr, 2012.
25 Marr, 2012, p. 8.
26 Nakash, 1994, p. 24.
1920 revolution by pressing for a theocratic and presumably Shi’a-led

state in Iraq.27 Beginning in the late 18th century and accelerating in
the early 20th century, then, Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a engaged in an evolv-
ing tit-for-tat series of exchanges that would incrementally erode trust,
strengthen sectarian nationalist identity, and shape the very nature of
both Sunni and Shi’a Iraqi interpretations of Islam.
Sunni Identity: 1920 to 1968

This section and the subsequent section on Shi’a identity from the Iraqi
revolution against British control in 1920 through the practical begin-
nings of the Ba’ath era in 1968 present the development of Sunni and
Shi’a sectarian identities in Iraq. These are the single-scope interpreta-
tions of identity leveraged in 2015 to argue for changes in Iraq’s state
structure.28 Together, these generally monochromatic narratives show
how the current state of distrust evolved (or perhaps devolved) from
the prerevolutionary period in a series of path-dependent actions and
reactions.29 The section following the one on Shi’a identity examines
alternative identity narratives and injects critical caveats that should
inform current analyses.
From the 1920 revolution to the onset of the Ba’ath period in the
mid–20th century the Sunni Arab Iraqis retained and reinforced their
control over the state apparatus centered in Baghdad. Under British
patronage, the Sunni took control of the new Iraqi Army and Parlia-
ment, and elements within the Sunni elite increasingly came to view
the army as a tool to retain control of the state and to shape Iraqi
national identity. Prior to 1920, Ottoman-trained Sunni Arab military
and political officers were educated and indoctrinated in the Ottoman
27 A mujtahid is a learned religious scholar who, in Shi’ism, has practical and coercive politi-
cal power. See, for example, Bernard Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of
Ijtihād,” American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1978 [Proceedings of an Inter-
national Conference on Comparative Law in Salt Lake City Utah, February 24–25, 1977], pp.
199–212.
28 Brancati, 2004; Abdulla, 2014; Alaaldin, 2014; Lister, 2014; Choksy and Choksy,
undated; Barwari, 2015.
29 Path dependence is the process of acting in accordance with previously demonstrated
behavior rather than deviating to develop new and perhaps more-effective behaviors.
dogma that envisioned the state as strongest when unified and when
troublesome ethno-sectarian divisions are minimized. These Sunni
elites also retained a residual fear and resentment of Persian influence
in Iraq.30 Existing fears were stoked by the physical presence of tens
of thousands of Persian citizens in southern Iraq, as well as the gener-
ally mistaken perception that Shi’a politico-religious leaders (primarily
clerics) were unified and under the sway or direct control of Iran.31
To counter this perceived threat, the Sunni elite centered in Bagh-
dad pressed hard to remove sectarian and even religious identity from
the organs of the state to co-opt nationalist identity as a distinctly Sunni,
elite identity. At the same time, they moved to settle both Sunni and
Shi’a itinerant tribes to reduce the threatening influence of tribal iden-
tity and to increase control over the population. They viewed national-
ist identity as not only a good unto itself but also a tool with which to
keep all Iraqis—and particularly the Persians and Shi’a Iraqis—at bay
or under control. As Sunni resentment of the British increased, Sunni
elites slewed to German National Socialism and other fascist philoso-
phies as they sought out an alternative patron and an alternative ruling
ideology. These strongly nationalist movements further reinforced the
Sunni elites’ belief that nonsectarian nationalist identity was the key
to maintaining centrally controlled state unification, and they fed into
the development of Iraqi Ba’athism.32 Marr writes of the emerging Iraqi
dictatorial leanings:33
30 Simon, 1986 (2004); Marr, 2012; and the other historians cited herein explain the impact
of perceived Persian expansionism and influence. We cite examples throughout this chapter.
31 Nakash, 1994, cites a range of primary sources explaining how this unity was imagined
and never a practical reality. Analysis of modern Shi’a politico-religious organization in the
following sections reveals ongoing fissures and a near-total absence of Shi’a political unity.
32 Reeva Spector Simon explored the inculcation of midcentury German nationalism on
the development of Iraqi Sunni military elite and shows how the German-Iraqi relationship
accelerated Sunni efforts to unify the state under nonsectarian cultural dictates rather than
under a unified version of Islam or as a federal entity (Simon, 1986 [2004]). Also see Lukitz,
1995, pp. 100–101, among others.
33 Marr, 2012, p. 45.
A monolithic form of government seemed to offer a more effec-

tive means of unifying fragmented countries and modernizing
backward societies than did constitutional democracy and the
free enterprise system . . . Fascist Italy and Germany in the early
days of Adolph Hitler were the models.
Pan-Arab identity and the pan-Arab movement also influenced

the development of Sunni Arab Iraqi identity throughout the early
to mid-20th century. Pan-Arabism evolved as a structured movement
from the 19th century, but it was particularly attractive to some ele-
ments within the Sunni Arab Iraqi elite after the 1920 revolution. Pan-
Arabism generally aligned with, and mutually reinforced, the Ottoman
and German nationalist philosophies and identities in that it argued
for supersectarian unity.34 Reeva Spector Simon and Adeed Dawisha
traced pan-Arabist educator Sadi’ al-Husri’s incorporation of pan-
Arabist and nationalist philosophies into the Iraqi civil and military
education systems and the subsequent Sunni use of military conscrip-
tion and forced military education to indoctrinate primarily Sunni
Iraqis as extreme nationalists.35 Al-Husri, a secularist, had particularly
strong influence on the development of Sunni Arab Iraqi identity as
not only nationalist but also peculiarly nonreligious.36
On the surface, then, the Sunni Arab Iraqis who formed the core
of the Ba’ath Party in the 1960s and who subsequently benefited from
Saddam’s presidency were influenced by nearly five centuries of Sunni
elitism; they were culturally influenced and educated to expect con-
tinuing Sunni domination of the centralized state controlled from the
enduring Iraqi capital of Baghdad. Perhaps more importantly, their
Sunni identity had very little to do with Sunni interpretations of Islam.
While Islam remained important in various aspects of Sunni life and in
government, it was eclipsed by Ottoman-, German- , and pan-Arabic–
34 There were also distinct divisions between pan-Arabist Iraqis and nationalists, with
nationalists arguing that Iraq mattered more than Arab ethnic identity. While there were
differences in the two identities, they both fed Sunni aspirations for centralized power in
Baghdad and control over both the state and the Iraqi population.
35 Simon, 1986 (2004); Dawisha, 2003. Also see Eppel, 2004, pp. 38–39.
36 Simon, 1986 (2004); Tripp, 2007, pp. 92–93.
influenced nationalism; in many ways, Sunni Arab Iraqi identity was

mostly Iraqi, somewhat Arab, and only nominally Sunni. By the late
1960s, the Sunni Arabs had thoroughly rejected British- and Amer-
ican-style democratic ideals, and they had successfully shaped and
co-opted the unique philosophies and iconography of the Iraqi state.
Because many Sunni elites feared, resented, and, in some cases, looked
down on Shi’a Arabs and their Persian influencers, the Sunni leveraged
their unique brand of Iraqi nationalist identity to marginalize Shi’a
Arabs while periodically buying their loyalty or assuaging their fears
with partial participation in government and in the military. Sunni
Arab Iraqi identity in 1968, then, appeared to be in direct opposition
to Shi’a Arab Iraqi identity and Shi’a aspirations for and interpretations
of the state.
Shi’a Identity: 1920–1968

Shi’a Iraqis led the revolution against British control and articulated a
vision of a cohesive, Arab, multisectarian state both before and during
the revolt.37 By creating the Sharifian Haras al-Istiqlal (Independence
Guard), the Shi’a were able to congregate around a movement that rep-
resented both business elites and mujtahids, Shi’a and some Sunni.38
Despite this (albeit limited) nationalist outreach to Sunni Arab Iraqis,
the Shi’a were quickly sidelined in the postrevolutionary process of
government formation. After the revolution, Shi’a remained second-
ary or tertiary partners in governance, and the mujtahids’ vision of
a more theocratic—though not necessarily Persian-influenced or
even Shi’a dominated—state did not materialize. Over the course of
the subsequent 48 years, Shi’a Iraqis found themselves increasingly
sidelined and, in many cases, violently oppressed by the Sunni-led
regime.39 As the Sunni continued to secularize and nationalize, the
37 Nakash, 1994, pp. 64–77.

38 Tripp,2007, pp. 40–41; Simon and Tejirian, 2004, locs. 1003–1016, Kindle. Sharifians
were followers of Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali, leader of the anti-Ottoman revolt from 1916 to
1919.
39 Marr points out that Shi’a probably exceeded Sunni representation in senior government
officials during World War II because many Sunni elites were otherwise engaged (Marr,
central and southern Shi’a Arab Iraqis in Najaf, Kut, Karbala, Nasiriya,
Diwaniya, and Basra, for example, increasingly came to view Imami
Shi’ism as a logical organizing identity for self-defense, for opposition
to the unrepresentative central government, and for semi-autonomous
self-governance.40
Unlike Sunnism, which generally envisions a personal relation-
ship between worshipper and God, Iraqi Shi’ism organized around
imams and mujtahids. As in Iran, this allowed for the formation of a
structured, hierarchical framework that, in turn, gave the Shi’a con-
siderable ability to organize and to maintain control over political and
religious messaging. Further, the Shi’a narrative of manhood and vic-
timhood originating in the legacies of Ali and Husseyn provided a
useful backdrop and corollary for continuing victimhood at the hands
of the central government and even via external assaults from Sunni
Wahhabi tribes pressing north from what is now Saudi Arabia.41 There-
fore, while Iraqi Sunnism became less important as a religious iden-
tity and perhaps secondary or tertiary in terms of a politico-religious
identity, Shi’ism became increasingly important and cohesive while the
southern Iraqis remained in opposition.42
Sunni elites’ fear of Shi’a opposition led to a series of legal and mil-
itary actions against Shi’a mujtahids and political leadership through-
out this period. In several instances, the central government expelled
Shi’a mujtahids, forcing them to Iran and therefore somewhat closer to
the Iranians.43 While this did strengthen the relationship between Ira-
nian and Iraqi Shi’a, Yitzhak Nakash, 1994, argues, it did not homog-
2012, p. 57). Nakash, 1994, Marr, 2012, and Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History, Princ-
eton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009, Kindle, all carefully document the degradation
of the relationship between the Sunni central elites and the Shi’a southerners.
40 Nakash, 1994, and others contend that there are significant differences between Iraqi and
Persian Shi’ism, and that Iraqi Imami Shi’ism differs in both political and religious context
from Persian (Iranian) Shi’ism.
41 Nakash, 1994, p. 78.
42 Thisoccurred despite the relative weaknesses in the Iraqi Shi’a waqf, or religious endow-
ment, in comparison with the Iranian Shi’a waqf. See Nakash, 1994.
43 Nakash, 1994, pp. 82–83.
enize cross-border Shi’ism. Instead, Iraqi Shi’a retained their unique

precepts and perspectives. The power and influence of the mujtahids
ebbed and flowed through 1968, but, by the time the Ba’athists came
to power, the Shi’a religious and political networks in the south were
essentially one and the same. While Shi’a religious identity flourished,
it merged with regional identity in the same way that Iraqi Sunnism
merged with nationalist identity.44
Many Shi’a dabbled in alternative identities throughout the post-
1920 period. Iraqi communism emerged in the late 1920s in Shi’a-
dominated Basra and Nasiriya and gradually evolved to include Kurds
and Arab Sunnis, primarily in Kirkuk and Baghdad. Ultimately, a
number of the Iraqi Communist Party’s (ICP’s) leftist precepts were
co-opted by the Sunni-dominated state. The ICP emerged as a social
movement driven by anticolonialism and class struggle, and it remained
at least partly aloof from the churning sectarian issues that emerged
and evolved throughout the 20th century. Shi’a who formed or joined
the ICP retained their Shi’a identities, but the most-prominent mem-
bers claimed primary allegiance to the party. A primordialist would
classify ICP activity as a diversion from the essential nature of Iraqi
Arab Shi’ism. Alternatively, the cross-ethnicity, cross-sectarian ICP not
only offered a different organizing identity but also demonstrated Shi’a
willingness to find common cause with non-Arab, non-Shi’a Iraqis.45
After the 1920 revolution, or uprising, the other major turn-
ing point in Shi’a identity through 1968 occurred after the 1958 Free
Officers’ coup. In what Marr, 2012, termed the Shi’a revival in Iraq,
mujtahids and other Shi’a leaders rapidly expanded their opposition to
state repression under the dictatorship of Sunni Arab Iraqi president
Abd al-Karim Qasim. Marr writes, “The intense secularism of the
regime and its support for leftist policies soon provoked a reaction from
conservative Shi’i elements and a religious revival among Shi’i youth.”46
44 Visser, 2008a, p. 18.

45 IlarioSalucci, A People’s History of Iraq: The Iraqi Communist Party, Workers’ Movements,
and the Left 1924–2004, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2003 (tr. 2005), provides a detailed
description of ICP evolution and activities.
46 Marr, 2012, p. 103.
Opposition activists formed the southern Shi’a Da’wa (Call) Party, led
by Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, the father-in-law of contemporary Iraqi
politician and militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr.47 Formation of Da’wa
solidified several elements of the long-standing Shi’a opposition into
what would be an enduring and powerful, primarily sectarian politi-
cal force that would eventually fracture into several competing Shi’a
political movements, including the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). This dynamic of surface-level sectarian
unification paralleled by severe and sometimes violent internal division
would continue in both the Sunni and Shi’a camps through 2015.
Understanding of Iraqi Identity from 1920 to 1968

Both of these sectarian identity narratives are generally accurate, and
the mutual sense of mistrust developed from 1920 through 1968 does
provide an important part of the general framework for viewing the
current Sunni-Shi’a divide. However, several other factors shape what
could be a more nuanced analysis of Iraqi identity in the pre-Ba’ath
era. First, a range of competing identities was sustained, developed,
or emerged during this same period. Tribalism predates Islam and
was only slightly diminished by settlement, institutionalization, and
ethno-sectarian unification.48 Regionalism, closely associated with
tribalism—tribes tend to exist as at least semihomogeneous entities in
most rural areas—also persisted as a critical Iraqi identity. Most Iraqis
included, and continue to include, either a tribal or regional nisba, or
the equivalent of a Western surname, in their formal names, both indi-
cating and reinforcing tribal and regional identification.49 Other com-
peting identities also affected decisionmaking, including urban versus
rural residency. This was particularly relevant for Sunni elites in Bagh-
dad, who often viewed themselves as superior to both Shi’a and Sunni
47 SeePatrick Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for
Iraq, New York: Scribner, 2008; Tripp, 2007, and Marr, 2012, among others.
48 See Judith Yaphe, “Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 7,
No. 3, 2000, pp. 51–58; and Nakash, 2003, among others.
49 See Beth Notzon and Gail Nesom, “The Arabic Naming System,” Science Editor, Vol. 28,
No. 1, 2005, for a lay explanation of Arabic naming conventions.
farmers, and for southern Shi’a, who resentfully viewed urbanized

Iraqis as, in one characterization, an effendi class who had adopted sus-
pect Western attitudes.50 Yaphe, 2000; Khadim, 2012; Nakash, 1994;
Visser, 2008a; and most other historians cited in this chapter provide
significant evidence that tribal and regional identities strongly influ-
enced individual decisionmaking and group behavior during the 1920
revolution and at various times through 1968.51 While it would not be
possible to make an empirical argument that tribalism or regionalism
trumped sect in any one place or time, empirical evidence that sectar-
ian identity trumped tribal or regional identity in individual decision-
making is equally absent. As noted in the previous section, communist
also emerged as a significant political identity beginning with a tiny
student movement in 1924 and peaking in the late 1950s.52 Commu-
nists and their political leaders played important roles in major events
throughout the 20th century, and communist Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a
Arabs and Kurds showed how Iraqis could organize around an alterna-
tive social and political identity.53
Sectarian identity became an anchor point for a great deal of
interregional competition, but practical, economic issues like land
ownership and access to services also drove decisionmaking through-
out the 1920–1968 period. Central government officials in Baghdad
generated a cascading series of economic setbacks for southern, primar-
ily Shi’a Iraqis when they passed the 1932 Land Settlement Law54 and
50 Effendi describes educated, wealthy notables in various Middle Eastern and Mediterra-
nean societies. In this case, the Shi’a probably used the term to associate urban Sunni elites
with the Ottomans. See, for example, Lukitz, 1995, p. 133.
51 Visser, 2008a.
52 See Dawisha, 2003; Salucci, 2003 (2005); F. Haddad, 2011; and Marr, 2012.
53 John F. Devlin, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis,” American Historical Review,
Vol. 96, No. 5, 1991, pp. 1396–1407; Salucci, 2003 (2005); F. Haddad, 2011; Marr, 2012.
Haddad describes how Iraqi pan-Arabists used the Iraqi communists’ connection with Ira-
nian Tudeh communists to label the Iraqi travelers as “un-Arab.” See F. Haddad, 2011, loc.
945, Kindle.
54
“Lazma Law No. 51 of 1932,” Iraq Government Gazette, No. 23, June 5, 1932, pp.
423–424.
the redistributionist 1958 Agrarian Reform Law,55 the latter of which

became a tool for land appropriation.56 Southern Iraqi Shi’a Arabs who
had any stake in land ownership probably based their future decisions
in part on their reactions to this social and economic policy. In effect,
therefore, landowner was a viable Iraqi identity that could coexist with
Shi’a, southerner, or other identities, and any landowner might act
against the prevailing interests of sectarian leaders at any point in time.
The idea that Iraqis would act against the interests of de facto or de jure
sectarian leaders is overlooked in more surface-level treatments of Iraqi
identity, but Nakash, Marr, Dawisha, and other historians show that
these diversions were commonplace.
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly for present analyses, there
were periods of genuine, large-scale, cross-sectarian unity, countless
incidents of more individual-level cross-sectarian collaboration, and
many incidents of intrasectarian division throughout the period in
question. The first and most prominent event of collaboration was the
1920 revolution against the British occupation. Southern Arab Shi’a
Iraqis initiated the revolt and constituted the majority of the fight-
ers who had success against the British as far north as Hilla, while
Sunni opposition was more compartmented. However, Khadim, 2012;
Nakash, 1994; and others describe how Shi’a and Sunni collaborated
against the British in an overarching, generally nonsectarian, yet also
informal nationalist movement. While there were many subsequent
low points in cross-sectarian unity, particularly from the mid-1940s
through the mid-1950s as the Sunnis consolidated their control of the
state, the Iraqi Ba’ath Party was, at its origins, a genuinely cross-sectar-
ian organization. At least eight prominent founding members, includ-
ing Fu’ad al-Rikabi and Ali Salih al-Sa’adi, were Shi’a Iraqi Ba’athists
who helped both empower and transform the party from a fledgling
enterprise into a ruling elite in just under two decades.57 Divisions
55 Government of Iraq, “Agrarian Reform Law of the Republic of Iraq,” No. 30, Baghdad,
Iraq, October 1958.
56 See, for example, Marr, 2012, p. 41.
57 See Dawisha, 2009, p. 174; and Marr, 2012, pp. 114–115, among others. Rikabi left the
party in 1963 (Dawisha, 2003, p. 224).
within the sects were rife throughout the 1920–1968 period. For exam-
ple, Dawisha describes how election rigging and the passage of a uni-
versal conscription law in 1934 led several prominent Sunni leaders to
consider overthrowing the government; later coups and countercoups
all revealed deep intrasectarian division.58
Ba’ath-Era Sectarianism and Other “-isms”
Iraqi Ba’athists maintained unbroken control of the state from the 1968
coup to the 2003 U.S.-led coalition invasion, first under the colead-
ership of al-Bakr and Saddam, and then from 1979 to 2003 under
Saddam alone. Ba’athist ideology, imagined in the 1940s in Syria as
a high-minded vehicle for unity, freedom, and socialism, was quickly
co-opted as paranoid anti-shu’ubiyin nationalism.59 By 1968, in Iraq,
Ba’athism had fully morphed into a stridently nationalist and function-
ally fascist and secular identity.60 By the early 1970s, Iraqi Ba’athism
had become little more than an organizing identity that primarily
Tikriti Sunni Arab Iraqis used to centralize authority, stifle resistance,
and exert control over the arms of government and the population.
Some Shi’a remained Ba’athists but only to retain a few existing posi-
tions of power, to serve as well-compensated ministerial and parlia-
mentary tokens for rural southern Shi’a, or because the alternative to
party membership was exclusion from all other lucrative government
opportunities. Iraqi Ba’athism branched sharply away from Syrian
Ba’athism, which the Sunni Iraqi Ba’athists came to associate with Ira-
nian Shi’ism and Iranian geopolitical expansionism. Enmity between
Sunni Arab Iraqi Ba’athists and Shi’a Iranians would not only con-
tinue to grow but would flourish under the al-Bakr-Saddam regime,
58 Dawisha, 2009, loc. 671, Kindle.

59 Shu’ubiya was a term used by Ba’athists as a straw man or perhaps bogeyman, repre-
senting Shi’a, non-Ba’athists, Persians, Westerners, or anyone else not in agreement with
Ba’athist ideology. Shu’ubiyin is one loose transliteration for individual shu’ubiya (Makiya,
1989, pp. 216–220).
60 Devlin, 1991; Marr, 2012; Tripp, 2007, pp. 183–228; Makiya, 1989 (1998), p. 16.
and then explode into all-out war after Saddam seized power in 1979.
This ongoing external struggle, rooted in the centuries-old Ottoman-
Safavid conflict, would continue to influence relations between Sunni
and Shi’a Iraqis and concurrently harden sectarian divisions within the
state. However, as in the 1920–1968 period, alternative explanations
for behavior and alternative identity theories are also relevant to under-
standing sectarianism under Ba’athist rule.
Shi’a in Opposition and Revolt

While some Shi’a Arab Iraqis were Ba’athists, served in the army, or
avoided sectarian political activity, the paranoia and repression of the
primarily Sunni Ba’athists would eventually impel the Shi’a to revolt.
As al-Bakr and Saddam cracked down on the Sunni in Anbar and else-
where, tightening control of the party structure and bringing the his-
torically troublesome officer corps into line, Sunni elites continued to
view the south, and more broadly the Shi’a, as the central threat to the
regime. Another sweeping land reform decree passed in 1969 (after the
1932 and 1958 laws) seemed designed to sow distrust within the Shi’a
community, revealing the leading edge of what some analysts view as
the Ba’athists’ anti-southern, anti-Shi’a agenda.61 The 1979 Iranian rev-
olution accelerated Sunni Ba’athist paranoia, particularly as Saddam
ousted al-Bakr and assumed control of the state; al-Bakr was more
moderate toward the Shi’a than Saddam was.62 Arrests, sham trials,
expulsions, and executions of key Shi’a leaders hardened antigovern-
ment (and therefore anti-Ba’athist, anti-Sunni) sentiment. Crackdowns
on Shi’a religious ceremonies and the targeting of the Shi’a religious
leadership—and particularly the 1980 arrest, torture, and killing of
Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr—would harden Shi’a opposition, strengthen
61 Amatzia Baram noted that this decree also led to the seizure of large portions of some
Sunni-held land. This led to violence with primarily the Jubbur tribe (Amatzia Baram,
“Neotribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991–1996,” International Journal
of Middle East Studies, No. 29, 1997, pp. 1–31, pp. 4–6).
62 Marr, 2012, pp. 177–178.
the Da’wa party’s draw, and set the stage for eventual intrasectarian
fractures between Da’wa and the Sadrists.63
Dawisha argues that Saddam saw Da’wa as “an advance bridge-
head for the [Iranian] ayatollahs’ ambitions in Iraq [and as] a mortal
danger to his political order.”64 In Saddam’s interpretation, he invaded
Iran primarily out of sectarian fear and animus, spurred by the 1979–
1980 Shi’a demonstrations, riots, and assassinations of Ba’athist offi-
cials. But other scholars, including Karsh, 1990, and Tripp, 2007, have
argued that nationalism and geopolitical rivalry featured more promi-
nently in Saddam’s decisionmaking. In this interpretation, nationalist
identity and practical need, or perhaps greed, were the primary drivers
of violent behavior, not sectarian animosity. Whatever the reasons for
the Iraqi invasion, the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War would help both to
solidify the practical aspects of the Sunni-Shi’a rivalry and to convince
many politicians and scholars that the centuries-old, Ottoman-Safavid,
regional Sunni-Shi’a rift was not only ongoing but accelerating.
Formation of the anti-Ba’athist Badr Corps in the early 1980s
would have long-reaching consequences for all Iraqis. Throughout
the remainder of the Ba’athist period, the geopolitical maneuvering
between Iraq and Iran would have strong sectarian overtones, and
the actual tit-for-tat actions taken by both sides even after the end of
the Iran-Iraq War (including covert infiltration and direct violence)
would continue to fuel sectarian fears. In Saddam’s paranoid mind,
the Shi’a were Persian agents, while the Iranian marjaiyeh viewed the
Ba’athist Sunni Arab Iraqis as embodying secularism, anti-Shi’ism, and
Arab nationalism.65 This ongoing external hot and cold war with Iran
inflamed and hardened sectarian fears and identities in both Sunni and
Shi’a camps in Iraq.
From 1980 through 2003, Saddam and his Ba’athist Sunni Arab
Iraqi subordinates wavered back and forth between anti-Shi’a violence
and rather thinly veiled efforts to sustain and build what Fanar Haddad,
2011, calls Shi’a nationalism. This often included manipulation of Shi’a
63 Marr, 2012, pp. 170–175.

64 Dawisha, 2009, loc. 4147, Kindle.
65 Marjaiyeh refers to Iran’s religious leadership.
tribal identity, an aspect of southern Arab Iraqi identity often over-

looked in contemporary analyses.66 During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam
made an effort to show he was religious, and his government increased
donations to the Shi’a waqf to encourage Shi’a volunteerism.67 Indeed,
many thousands of Shi’a Arab Iraqi soldiers fought against Iran, partly
because they were conscripted and threatened but perhaps also in part
out of nationalist zeal. By the mid-1990s, this partly manufactured
cross-sectarian sentiment had all but disappeared at the national level.
The post–Gulf War, SCIRI-inspired, Badr Corps–led intifada in 1991
was, according to Nakash, 1994; Marr, 2012; and other scholars, gen-
erally a Shi’a sectarian revolt against the Ba’athist Sunni Arab state.68
Even though some Shi’a supported the government and abstained from
participating, the failure of the revolt and the brutal repression that
followed further hardened southern Shi’a Arab identity and opposi-
tion to the state.69 Marr writes, “Among the Shi’i population of the
south, alienation from the regime was higher than at any time since
the founding of the state.”70 By the mid-1990s, the Ba’athists had fully
co-opted nationalism for their own uses and transformed it into some-
thing unattainable for Shi’a outside of the co-opted Shi’a Ba’athists.
While Saddam continued to try to co-opt the Shi’a, primarily leverag-
ing tribal rather than sectarian or nationalist values, his actions and
policies made clear his true intentions.71 In the wake of the intifada, the
66 Baram, 1997, accurately treats tribalism as a separate identity that is relevant to all Arab
Iraqis.
67 Makiya, 1989, and others make convincing arguments that this newfound religiosity was
a practical tool for repression and state consolidation rather than a genuine reflection of belief
in Sunni or broader Islamic teachings.
68 This was also a Kurdish and partly Sunni revolt. All of the various uprisings in Iraq were
complex, and most crossed ethno-sectarian lines in some way or another. Because this report
deals with Arab Sunni-Shi’a conflict, this chapter does not expressly touch on Kurdish par-
ticipation in various events.
69 Baram, 1997, pp. 8–9.
70 Marr, 2012, p. 232.
71 For example, see Baram, 1997, p. 20.
Shi’a mujtahids and politicians accelerated efforts to recast nationalism

in terms relevant for southern Shi’a Arabs.
Sunni, Tribal, and Military Identities Within the Ba’athist State

Throughout the Ba’athist period, the Sunni elites in Baghdad and
Tikrit strengthened their overall control of the state using brutality,
intimidation, torture, and pervasive state security measures.72 While
the Shi’a and Kurds suffered most directly under Saddam, the central
Ba’athist authorities also had a complex relationship with the Sunni
Arab population in the west and northwest. Saddam and his top lead-
ership viewed the Sunni fellahin, tribal leaders, and lower-middle class
in the center and central north as a threat to the state. Baram and
others describe both al-Bakr’s and Saddam’s efforts to eliminate, or at
least weaken, tribal identity across Iraq. These efforts generally failed,
and instead Saddam co-opted tribal leadership and leveraged tribal law
and identity to his own ends.73 Sunni military officers, most of whom
had some Ba’athist affiliation, were also a continual source of trouble
for the regime. While the military had been co-opted and controlled
by the Ba’athists, long-running Sunni Arab efforts to leverage the mili-
tary as a nationalist force also generated considerable pride in military
service. Military officer continued to be an Iraqi identity unto itself, and
it was one that frightened Saddam and senior nonmilitary Ba’athists.74
72 See Makiya, 1989 (1998); Tripp, 2007; Marr, 2012; Dawisha, “‘Identity’ and Political
Survival in Saddam’s Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999; and F. Haddad, 2011,
among others.
73 Keiko Sakai, “Tribalization as a Tool of State Control in Iraq: Observations on the Army,
the Cabinets and the National Assembly,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawood,
Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, London: Saqi Books, 2003,
pp. 109–135; Hosham Dawood, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of
the State: The Case of Iraq,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawood, Tribes and Power:
Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, London: Saqi Books, 2003, pp. 83–108; and
Faleh A. Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes
Under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968–1998,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham
Dawood, Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, London: Saqi
Books, 2003, pp. 53–81, provide the best description of this effort and its outcome. Also see
Baram, 1997, p. 3.
74 Jabar, 2003, pp. 80–81.
This identity was further mixed with Naqshabandi Sufism, an order or

practice that transcends religious identity boundaries and has become
closely linked with post-2003 antiregime sentiment.75 After Saddam’s
fall, this mix of Ba’athist, nationalist, Anbari-Ninewi, tribal, and Sufi
identity would take on as much importance as Shi’a nationalist, tribal,
and southern regional identities.
Western Sunni Arabs in Anbar Province, the primary recruiting
pool for the Sunni Arab military, had a long history of fickleness toward
centralized control. Saddam was equally fickle in his treatment of the
Sunnis in the periphery, and, in 1995, some Anbaris staged a signifi-
cant revolt against the state.76 What began as a small movement spread
quickly to include Sunni Arabs from both the Dulaymi and Sham-
mar tribal confederations and members of the Iraqi Army.77 Sunni
Arabs in Anbar, technically cosectarians with Saddam, rallied around
tribal identity and their own interpretation of nationalist identity. In
a foreshadowing of the series of Anbari-led movements in the post-
2003 period, Sunni Anbaris formed the Armed Dulaymi Tribe’s Sons
Movement. Despite support from a rebellious Republican Guard Army
unit, this revolt was violently defeated.78 In the revolt’s wake, Saddam
increased efforts to co-opt tribal identity, rearranging tribal leadership
under a new (1996) High Council of Tribal Chiefs. This led to the
creation of what U.S. officials in the post-2003 period often referred to
as “fake sheikhs,” so called because they claimed lineage or authority
they did not possess. However, while tribal identity was simultane-
ously weakened and co-opted during the Ba’athist period, tribal iden-
75 Michael Knights, “The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency,” West Point, N.Y.:
Combating Terrorism Center, 2011; Quil Lawrence, “U.S. Sees New Threat in Iraq from Sufi
Sect,” National Public Radio, June 17, 2009.
76 Baram, 1997, p. 6; David Wurmser, Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam
Hussein, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999.
77 Anbar Province is the former Dulaym Province, named for the central geographic distri-
bution of the loosely associated tribal confederation. Many Shammar also live in Anbar, and
many Dulaymis are closely related to Shammar in other parts of Iraq and across the region.
78 Wurmser, 1999, provides one of the best descriptions of this revolt. The citations in
Baram, 1997, are the most exhaustive, although nearly all references to this uprising are from
secondary rather than primary sources.
tity would continue to either dilute or reinforce sectarianism as identi-

ties merged and morphed in the wake of the 2003 invasion.
Post-Ba’ath Sectarianism
As with the pre-2003 period, there are two ways to view post-2003
sectarianism. A starkly sectarian interpretation paints a dire picture of
rapid and perhaps irrecoverable state and social disintegration driven
by, and in turn hardening, long-standing religious divisions between
Sunni and Shi’a Arabs. Many elements of this interpretation are accu-
rate, and, in the chaos of the occupation period, sectarian identity in
its various forms did play a significant and, in many cases, overriding
role in shaping individual and group behavior. However, for the most
part, Arab Iraqis split on sectarian lines because sect provides the most
convenient and useful “level” of identity; in practicality, this was also a
regional civil war between west-northwest and center-south-southeast.
Regionally aligned sectarianism became an organizational vehicle for
collective self-defense.
Fanar Haddad described how sectarian identity can shift from
banality and passivity to take on a dominant and aggressive form.79
Toby Dodge, 2012, argued that this is exactly what occurred in the
aftermath of the invasion. Alternative analysis blends together vari-
ous identities, including sect, tribe, region, insurgent group, political
party, landowner, military officer, and, perhaps most importantly, Iraqi
nationalist. This lens of analysis offers greater hope for the future of
Iraq, but there is perhaps an equal or greater argument to be made
that the hardening of sectarian identity in the post-Ba’ath era, and the
leveraging of sectarian identity to justify extreme violence, have pushed
Arab Muslim Iraqis beyond the point of national reconciliation.
A snapshot of the overarching sectarian dynamics after 2003
offers a stark picture for the present and future of Iraq. Operation
Iraqi Freedom completely, and in all likelihood permanently, upset the
centuries-old power relationships within the Arab Iraqi community.
79 F. Haddad, 2011, p. 25.

Through 2003, the Sunni elites mentored, shepherded, and empow-

ered by the Ottomans and the British retained some or nearly all con-
trol of state authority. Sunni military officers, fellahin, urban laborers,
tribal elders, and business executives had been conditioned to expect
not only indirect, nominal control of the state but also most of the
privileges and benefits that came with power and control. The impact
of this cultural expectation-shaping cannot be overstated: Most Sunni
deeply believe not only that they are privileged to control Iraq but
that (as explained in the first part of this chapter) their numbers far
exceed the most-likely estimates of the actual Arab Sunni population.
The Sunnis’ fall from power was rapid, shocking, and, as this chapter
describes, strictly unacceptable to people so deeply conditioned to the
status quo.80 On the other hand, the Shi’a, shaped by approximately
200 years in subordinate opposition, by the religious and historic nar-
ratives of victimization, and by very real and recent experiences with
Ba’athist Sunni violent oppression, were perhaps unnecessarily grace-
less in victory. While some thoughtful Shi’a, including Grand Ayatol-
lah Ali al-Sistani, sought a stable peace and even reconciliation, some
of the Shi’a who assumed control of the state reportedly adopted the
most-inhumane Ba’athist Sunni tactics—including sectarian cleans-
ing, torture, and murder—to retain state control. This placed the dis-
organized Sunnis in what appears to be perpetual opposition to the
state they once controlled.
Sunni Realign in Opposition

In both his 2011 book Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of
Unity and his 2014 article “Reinventing Sunni Identity in Iraq After
2003,” Fanar Haddad laid out a precise, well-reasoned, and plausi-
ble explanation of the Sunni Arab Iraqi response to the system shock
of the invasion. He argued that, prior to 2003, there was no Sunni
Arab Iraqi identity to speak of, at least not in religious sectarian terms.
Sunni was one of many descriptors an Arab Iraqi might use for self-
identification, rather than a deeply held, belief-driven identity. Iraqi
80 See,for example, Fanar Haddad, “Reinventing Sunni Identity in Iraq After 2003,” Cur-
rent Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 17, 2014, pp. 70–101, p. 81.
Sunnism had been so thoroughly enmeshed with, isolated from, or co-

opted by nationalism, pan-Arabism, tribalism, and Ba’athism that it no
longer had distinct substantive meaning. Because the Sunnis had been
in control of the state for so long, they had never been pressured to gen-
erate effective group organization for self-preservation or opposition.81
After the invasion and the dissolution of both the Sunni-dominated
government and the security services, all Arab Iraqis who were also
Sunnis were effectively thrust into the unfamiliar and uncomfortable
position of powerless minority.82
In the rural areas of the predominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar,
Nineweh, and Salah al-Din, many Sunni Arab Iraqis immediately
reverted to tribal identity.83 Tribal identity was particularly convenient
for local self-organization and self-defense because it was immediately
available and because, in the mid- to late 1990s, the tribes had obtained
substantial arms—including artillery—from the regime and from
illicit activities.84 But as it became apparent that the Shi’a were taking
control of the reins of state power, it was increasingly necessary to orga-
nize above tribal level. Because the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath Party was
decimated and overtly banned, and because the Sunnis had no real or
widespread practice in political organization, the Sunnis consistently
failed to organize around an even remotely cohesive or broadly repre-
sentative political movement. Authority figures with genuine coercive
power and popular draw among some elements of the Sunni polity
tended to be high-level Ba’athists who were legally excluded from the
political process following the passage of the Coalition Provisional
81 F. Haddad, 2014, p. 74. Tribal and regional identities far superseded Sunni sectarian
identity in the Ba’athist era. See, for example, Baram, 1997.
82 Dodge, 2012, describes this process in plain and convincing detail.
83 See, for example, Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, eds., Al-Anbar
Awakening Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives from Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–
2009, Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University Press, 2009.
84 Baram, 1997, and Dodge, 2012, both describe how the mid- to late-1990s dynamics
between the regime and tribal elders led to the distribution or acquisition of weaponry.
Authority (CPA) Order 1.85 Dodge, 2012, describes the failure of the
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hezb al-Islami al-Iraqiyeh) and the Iraq Accord
Front (Jibhet al-Tawafuq al-Iraqiyeh) to generate any real grassroots
support, even considering various political successes. In the absence
of political organization, and in the face of increasing political dis-
enchantment and social violence, Sunni Arab Iraqi identity gradually
hardened and then evolved from 2003 through 2015.
It took several years for Sunnis to identify as Sunni. At first,
national representatives were reluctant to frame any issue in sectar-
ian terms.86 This was due at least in part to the aggressive efforts
dating back to the Ottomans, and later al-Husri and the Ba’athists,
to remove sectarianism from Iraq’s national lexicon; acknowledgment
of sectarianism was generally viewed as benefiting Shi’a and Persian
rather than Sunni nationalist narratives.87 Over time, many Sunnis,
and particularly those Sunnis who had self-selected or were assigned
as political representatives, began to adopt the pre-2003 Shi’a narra-
tive of victimhood. They almost precisely, if perhaps unintentionally,
reversed roles with the Shi’a whom the elite Ba’athist Sunnis had once
repressed.88 This sense of isolation and victimhood was reinforced by
external actors (more on that later), by the continuing failure of Sunni
political elites, and by the increasingly paranoid and aggressive Shi’a-
led government that enacted policies and supported actions that, like
the Ba’athist policies of the previous era, seemed tailor-made to evoke
aggressive opposition.
Despite considerable efforts by the U.S.-led coalition to reduce
sectarian discord, by the end of the U.S.-led occupation in December
2011, many Sunnis believed that they had been almost completely dis-
enfranchised from the state.89 The results of the 2010 parliamentary
85 CPA, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi

Society,” Baghdad, Iraq, 2003.
86 F. Haddad, 2014, pp. 81–82.
87 F. Haddad, 2014, p. 97, among others.
88 F. Haddad, 2014, p. 82.
89 PriyankaBoghani, “In Their Own Words: Sunnis on Their Treatment in Maliki’s Iraq,”
Public Broadcasting Service, October 28, 2014; Kurt Sowell, “Iraq’s Second Sunni Insur-
elections, which effectively cemented Shi’a control of the government,

proved to be the last straw for Sunnis who, after seven years of inef-
fective self-organization and revolt, were beginning to coalesce at the
grassroots level around a series of mostly justifiable grievances.90 The
Iraqi Army, which, according to Dodge, had refrained from participat-
ing in the sectarian civil conflict in 2006, was being picked apart and
refilled with loyal but generally incompetent Shi’a officers. The army,
which had, for so long, been a bastion of Sunni pride and power, was
transforming into a symbol of anti-Sunni repression. Opposition was
particularly strong in the 99-percent Sunni province of Anbar, which
received comparatively little of the oil-funded largesse handed out in
Baghdad, the south, and the Kurdish areas and which suffered consid-
erably throughout the 2003–2008 insurgency.
Beginning in 2012, Sunni Arab Iraqis in Anbar, Kirkuk, and
Nineweh Provinces began a long-running series of social and political
protests against the Baghdad regime led by then–prime minister Nuri
al-Maliki. These protests culminated in violent clashes in Hawija in
early 2013 and then an aggressive clampdown on protestors in Ramadi
in late 2013.91 By early 2014, Anbar Province was in full revolt, and IS
had seized Fallujah and other parts of Anbar. By the summer, Mosul
was under IS control, and the Iraqi Army had all but collapsed in the
west and northwest. As of 2015, Sunni politicians had either been
expelled or become generally irrelevant in the state decisionmaking
process. The Sunnis continued to articulate their victimhood at the
hands of the Shi’a state, and now at the hands of increasingly confident
Shi’a militias. Simultaneously, they refused to accept their minority
status. Nonetheless, social media data in Anbar Province in 2013 and
2014 revealed an almost complete absence of sectarian propaganda.
Instead, the Sunnis in Anbar framed their revolt against the state in
gency,” Hudson Institute, 2014.

90 See Ben Connable, “A Long Term Strategy for a Democratic Iraq,” War on the Rocks, June
30, 2014, for a list of these grievances.
91 See, for example, Tim Arango, “Dozens Killed in Battles Across Iraq as Sunnis Escalate
Protests Against Government,” New York Times, April 23, 2013; and Kamal Namaa, “Fight-
ing Erupts as Iraq Police Break up Sunni Protest Camp,” Reuters, December 30, 2013.
historical, nationalist terms, evoking images of Saddam and retaining

their claim on Baghdad.92 Sunni identity may be emerging in Iraq, but,
at least as of mid-2015, it remained tightly entwined with nationalist
and regional identities.
Shi’a Struggle to Define a Cohesive and Inclusive Majority Identity

On the verge of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the southern Shi’a Arab
Iraqis, who probably constituted a sizable majority of the national
population, were more than ready to help expel the Ba’athists from
power. Shi’a nationalism, in Fanar Haddad’s construct, had completely
diverged from the Ba’athist Sunni articulation of nationalist identi-
ty.93 When military actions destroyed the Iraqi state, it presented a
nearly clean slate from which the Shi’a, initially empowered by the
CPA, could begin to reverse their perpetual misfortune and assume
control of the state as a genuine (if not empirically proven) majority.
Unlike the Sunnis, the Shi’a already had a robust sectarian identity
they could attach to and leverage to assume control of the government
and the security services. Nearly two centuries of constant pressure
from the Sunni-led state had forced together the Shi’a hawza and polit-
ical movements, deeply intertwining sectarian with political, regional,
and (their interpretation of) nationalist identity. Unfortunately, three
factors would hinder, and in some ways cripple, what might have been
a triumphant and successful righting of the sectarian balance in Iraq.
First, the Shi’a had been so violently and ruthlessly oppressed
for so long that they possessed an understandably deep-seated mis-
trust and hatred of the elite Ba’athist Sunnis.94 Some Shi’a were able to
compartmentalize these sentiments and allow for the idea of a unified
ethno-sectarian state, continuing the widespread grassroots-level inter-
actions and communalism with Arab Sunnis, Kurds, and other Iraq-
92 This finding is derived from a structured analysis of selected months of Twitter data from
al-Anbar Province posted online between December 2013 and August 2014.
93 F. Haddad, 2011; V. Nasr, 2007.
94 Marr, 2012, p. 300.
is.95 However, a significant number of Shi’a elites saw the 2003 reversal
as an opportunity to unify and benefit the Shi’a at the expense of the
Sunnis. In turn, many Sunni Arabs played into the hands of the most
aggressive and paranoid of these Shi’a leaders by adopting anti-Shi’a
rhetoric and participating in intersectarian violence.96 Some of the first
instances of sectarian cleansing came from the Sunni Arab refugees
from Fallujah in 2004 as they fled into western Baghdad and began
attacking Shi’a residents. This gave Shi’a leaders the excuse to at first
suppress, and then repress and disenfranchise the Sunnis.
Second, the Shi’a had little to no experience in governance. While
many Shi’a were Ba’athists and held high positions in government and
the military, these Shi’a were generally excluded from the post-2003
political process. There were very few Shi’a politicians in the emerging
Shi’a elites who could claim expertise in senior leadership or manage-
ment positions. As a result, the first decade of Shi’a-dominated gov-
ernance was messy, inefficient, and corrupt. Political patronage took
on greater importance than governance. This general lack of compe-
tence and overt patronage to the fractured Shi’a political class simply
reinforced Sunni Arab perceptions that the Shi’a Arabs were incapable
of leading the Iraqi state. This in turn reinforced the enduring Sunni
Arab nationalist, but countergovernment, agenda.
Third, despite the relatively greater cohesion of Shi’a Arab Iraqi
identity compared with that of Sunni Arab Iraqi identity, the Shi’a
were still badly fractured and remained so in mid-2015.97 Old divisions
between Da’wa, SCIRI, and the Sadrists came to full fruition in the
wake of the invasion. Muqtada al-Sadr was able to co-opt a version of
Shi’a identity, leveraging what Visser, 2008a, and Nakash, 1994, aptly
describe as a type of Shi’a regionalism, in Sadr’s case centered on Najaf
95 Anecdotal evidence of these recent cross-sectarian relations was presented to one of the
authors of this report during multiple research interviews for an ongoing RAND project
between 2013 and 2015. Also, Sunni militias fought alongside Shi’a militias and the Shi’a-
dominated Iraqi Army in Anbar Province in 2015.
96 F. Haddad, 2013.
97 See Marr, 2012, pp. 308–310, among others.
and Karbala.98 SCIRI, transformed into the Islamic Supreme Council

of Iraq (ISCI), leveraged the Badr Corps to gain and maintain power
through 2010. Both Shi’a and Sunnis came to see ISCI and Badr as a
thinly veiled extension of Iranian identity and influence in Iraq, which
turned off even some hard-core Shi’a Arab sectarians. Further, ISCI’s
support base is in Basra; Basrawis tend to be federalists rather than
nationalists, and this regional identity colors ISCI’s political and sec-
tarian policies.99 ISCI and Da’wa forged a semi-unified political front
to lead Iraq under Prime Minister al-Maliki, and now under Haider
al-Abadi, but Da’wa has overshadowed ISCI since the 2010 elections.
This intrasectarian miasma reveals not only the fractures within Shi’a
political identity but also the underlying regional and external identity
narratives that influence Shi’a Arab Iraqi behavior.
Al-Maliki, a Shi’a Arab from a district near Karbala, Iraq, was
elected with U.S. support in 2006 and retained control of the state
through mid-2014. In his first few years in office, Maliki made a
number of overt and aggressive efforts to both assuage Sunni fears and
to rein in Sadr and other Shi’a he viewed as dangerous malcontents.
His initial statements in office in 2006 and 2007 probably helped to
influence many Sunnis to take a chance on the Awakening Move-
ment that helped to reverse the AQI-dominated Sunni insurgency.100
In 2008, the Maliki-led government passed the Provisional Powers
Act, which granted some authority to provincial governments; this was
a clear effort both to address Sunni complaints and to help channel
some of the ongoing Shi’a city-regional activism in the south.101 Mali-
ki’s 2008 “Charge of the Knights” into Basra was designed to rein in
Sadr and, perhaps as a secondary objective, to demonstrate Maliki’s
resolve to form a unified, ethno-sectarian state.102 However, as relations
with the United States began to sour after 2008, Maliki articulated
98 See V. Nasr, 2007; Cockburn, 2008; Marr, 2012; and Dodge, 2012.
99 See, for example, Visser, 2008a.
100 See, for example, Montgomery and McWilliams, 2009.
101 See Marr, 2012, p. 322, among others.
his policies in increasingly sectarian terms. He directly undermined

and, in some cases, attacked the post-Awakening Sunni militias, undo-
ing the cross-sectarian goodwill developed from mid-2006 through
2008. Alienation of the Sunnis accelerated after the U.S. withdrawal
in December 2011, and, by mid-2014, both elite and grassroots Sunni
Arab Iraqis had come to see Maliki as not only a vehemently anti-Sunni
leader but also a tool of Iranian anti-Arab and anti-Sunni activities.
As of mid-2015, the Shi’a-led state has proven unable to extend
genuine reconciliation opportunities to the Sunni.103 Hopes that the
new prime minister al-Abadi would be able to reverse Maliki’s sectar-
ian policies foundered in great part because Abadi was increasingly
beholden to Iranian leaders who, it appeared, were happy to allow the
Sunni Arab Iraqis to remain in revolt.104 Shi’a identity continues to
play a centralizing and safeguarding role for Shi’a Arabs in Baghdad
and across the south and southeast, but it has also evolved into an iden-
tity of political and social dominance that appears increasingly at odds
with Sunni Arab Iraqi identity. The rise of Shi’a militias to counter IS
threatens not only to alter Shi’a Arab Iraqi identity but also to thrust
it toward anti-Sunni militancy. What remains unclear is the degree to
which Arab Iraqis living in central, southern, and eastern Iraq, most of
whom happen to be Shi’a, will be amenable to national reconciliation
over time.
External Influence: The United States, Iran, and the Gulf States
Influence Iraqi Identity
In retrospect, it is difficult to view U.S. involvement in post-2003 Iraqi
identity politics as anything but harmful. The first acts of the CPA,
including de-Ba’athification, the dissolution of the Sunni-dominated
army, and the elevation and inclusion of unpopular expatriate Shi’a
103 Despite several announcements since assuming office in 2014, Prime Minister al-Abadi
had been unable (as of mid-2015) to enact major reforms that might further reconcilia-
tion. An August 2015 anticorruption measure did not directly address Sunni grievances. See
Haider al-Abadi, “PM’s First Package of Reforms to COM,” official text, Government of
Iraq, August 9, 2015.
104 Sunni revolt in western and northwestern Iraq would allow increased Iranian interven-
tion in Iraq and Shi’a leaders affiliated with Iran to increase their influence over time.
figures into the governing process, gave the immediate and forceful
impression that the invasion and occupation were designed to remove
Sunni Arab Iraqis from power and influence.105 De-Ba’athification and
the dissolution of the army also unintentionally gave the impression
that the CPA was punishing all Sunnis for the past transgressions of
the Sunni elite. With the assistance and influence of the UN and other
external influencers, the CPA then brokered the formation of the Iraqi
Interim Government under Ayad Alawi, a Shi’a with cross-sectarian
popularity.
Ayed Alawi may have been an acceptable candidate to lead Iraq,
but, by taking a strictly ethno-sectarian approach to divvying up
authority within the Iraqi Governing Council, the United States and its
partners encouraged Iraqis to harden identities along ethno-sectarian
lines.106 This affected all Iraqis, but the composition of the ICG—13
Shi’a, five Sunni, and five Kurds, one Turkman, and one Assyrian—
made Shi’a majority and Sunni minority an official reality.107 Well after
the dissolution of the CPA, coalition leaders continued to try to stabi-
lize Iraq by supporting what seemed to be equitable power distributions
along ethno-sectarian lines, forcibly imposing the best-guess estimates
of Iraqi population data on an unwilling Sunni polity. Shi’a politi-
cians leveraged these U.S. policies to control the state, which, in turn,
inflamed both anti-Shi’a and anti-U.S. sentiment among the Sunnis.
Worse still, U.S. policy and apparent favoritism toward the Shi’a
wavered as the insurgency gained momentum and Sunnis challenged
the new status quo.108 U.S. military and political leaders began to court
the Sunnis and tried to rein in Shi’a political leaders and Shi’a security
force and militia leaders. This apparent fickleness hardened sectarian
identity as Shi’a leaders began to feel isolated from the United States
and therefore more vulnerable to Sunni revanchists. Direct U.S. sup-
port to the Sunni Arab Awakening Movement and formation of Sons
105 See, for example, CPA 2003.

106 Tripp, 2007, pp. 267–286; Marr, 2012, pp. 288–345.
of Iraq (SoI) militias, which generated approximately 100,000 armed

members, led some Shi’a to believe that the United States was naively
giving the Sunnis the means to overthrow the Shi’a state.109 These
militias also harkened back to the Sunni elites’ use of National Guard
militia units to oppress the Shi’a in the 20th century.110 Maliki’s anti-
Awakening and anti-SoI actions were probably intended to assuage
both his own fears and the concerns of his constituents.
Discussed in more detail later in this report, sectarian activity in
Iraq incited by regional state actors like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf has
been equally disruptive, although far less equitable toward the Sunnis,
Kurds, and other Iraqis, as that of the United States and the UN. Seen
through a geopolitical lens, Iranian concerns with Iraq date back to
the Ottoman-Safavid conflict. Contemporary Iranian policy on Iraq
began to emerge in the early 20th century as the new Iraqi government
began to expel Iranian citizens who had been living in southern Iraq.
In the latter part of the 20th century, Iran supported the development
of SCIRI and the Badr Corps to influence Iraqi politics and to help
undermine the Ba’athist state. In practical terms, Iran has been directly
involved in covert, clandestine, and overt political warfare in Iraq since
the 1980s.111 After 2003, Iranian leaders simply leveraged SCIRI (then
ISCI) and Badr to influence Iraq from inside the new government.
They also helped to inflame the anti-U.S. insurgency by arming Shi’a
militias with heavy rockets and advanced improvised explosive devices,
further driving the United States away from the Shi’a at the height of
the insurgency.112 Iranian support to the Shi’a and the presence of Ira-
nian advisers and business professionals in Baghdad gave the Sunni a
rallying cry in opposition. To the more-militant Sunnis, and then to
many at the grassroots level, Shi’a became “Safavids,” and Iraqi Shi’a
109 See Marr, 2012, p. 310, among others.

110 See, for example, Dawisha, 2009, loc. 3431, Kindle.
111 See,
for example, Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and
“Other Means,” West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy,
October 13, 2008.
112 Felter and Fishman, 2008.
became “puppets of Iran.”113 As of mid-2015, Iran had an overt mili-

tary presence across north-central Iraq, and it appears that the Iraqi
government places more confidence in Iranian than in U.S. support.114
Direct Iranian support for openly anti-Sunni militias like Asa’ib Ahl
al-Haq has led many Sunni Arab Iraqis to believe that Iran is intent on
helping Iraqi Shi’a to cleanse Iraq of its Sunni population.115 As with
U.S. actions in Iraq, nearly all Iranian actions have been either unin-
tentionally or, in this case, intentionally harmful to Sunnis and other
minorities.
Gulf Sunni Arab involvement in Iraq has, perhaps, been equally
harmful. While Gulf involvement in Iraq has been far murkier than
U.S. and Iranian involvement, there is evidence to show that wealthy
Gulf donors and some states provided direct support to Sunni insur-
gents.116 Motivations for this support were probably varied, but many
Gulf leaders and analysts view the ongoing war in Iraq both as a cen-
tral struggle between Sunnis and Shi’a and as a potential proxy war
between Sunni Arabs and Shi’a Iranians. If the Gulf Sunni Arabs can
help sustain an anti-Shi’a Iraqi revolt, and perhaps even overthrow the
Shi’a-led, Iran-backed regime, Iran will be set back and will have less
influence over the Gulf and less opportunity to threaten Arab Gulf
states. While this analysis requires some supposition, it fits within the
overt rhetoric found in open-source data.117
113 These
terms and associated images emerged consistently in a review of publicly available
Twitter postings from Sunni areas of Iraq from late 2013 to late 2014.
114 Michael Knights, Philip Smyth, and Ahmad Ali, “Iranian Influence in Iraq: Between
Balancing and Hezbollahzation?” Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, June 21, 2015.
115 Thissentiment was revealed to the chapter author by Sunni Iraqi interlocutors in a series
of interviews, emails, and informal discussions between December 2013 and August 2015.
116
See, for example, “Saudis Reportedly Funding Iraqi Sunni Insurgents,” USAToday,
December 8, 2006.
117 These assumptions are reinforced by an extensive review of public Twitter data, news
reports, and Iraqi-generated YouTube videos from December 2013 through August 2015.
Intersectarian Violence and Its Impact on Identity

Invasion plunged Iraq into a continuous cycle of high-intensity and low-
intensity violence ongoing through mid-2015. Rationales behind vio-
lent actions are complex and differ from act to act and target to target.
A significant amount of Sunni and Shi’a violence between 2003 and
2008 was directed at coalition forces and may have been only remotely
or incidentally influenced by sectarianism. However, beginning in
mid-2004, Sunni Arab Iraqis and Shi’a Arab Iraqis began to target
each other with increasing frequency. By mid-2006, Dodge, 2012, and
others argue, Iraq was in the midst of a full-blown sectarian civil war.
There is considerable evidence to back these claims. While casualty
figures from Iraq have dubious accuracy—a 2008 survey of available
data revealed a range of between 34,832 and 793,663 from various
sources—there is little doubt that Sunni Arab Iraqis killed thousands
of Shi’a Arab Iraqis, and vice versa, throughout the 2004–2008 peri-
od.118 Many of these killings were overtly motivated by sectarian ani-
mosity. Sunni insurgent leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, lever-
aged Sunni Arab Iraqi fears of Shi’a and Persian domination to paint
Shi’a as dangerous apostates who must be killed.119 Extremist Shi’a
political leaders and militia commanders painted Sunnis as Ba’athist
fascists seeking to return the Shi’a to a position of servitude.120
As stated earlier in this section, intersectarian violence during
the war both reflected and hardened Muslim Arab sectarian identities.
Fear led to killing; killing exacerbated fear, which, in turn, led to more
killing. Both fear and killing encouraged Arab Iraqis to seek identities
that would offer them the most security and stability. Shi’a had a short
line of reasoning to travel to arrive at a hardened Shi’a identity; all the
pieces were in place. For the Sunnis, the options were less obvious.
Very few Sunnis demonstrated overt identification with Sunni political
118
Hannah Fischer, Iraqi Civilian Death Estimates, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, RS22537, August 27, 2008.
119 Emily Hunt, “Zarqawi’s ‘Total War’ on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide Among Sunni
Jihadists,” Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, November 15, 2005.
120 See, for example, Cockburn, 2008.
groups or social movements.121 However, many Sunnis joined, actively

supported, or passively supported either nationalist insurgent groups,
like the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Islam, or regional sectar-
ian groups, like Ansar al-Sunnah or (more commonly) AQI.
The nationalist groups tended to focus their efforts against the
coalition, while AQI split its exertions against the coalition and Shi’a
Arabs. Therefore, at the top level of analysis, the Sunnis who sided
with nationalist groups tended to hew to a nationalist form of Sunni
identity, while those with AQI were probably more susceptible to salafi-
jihadi ideology that, in the Iraq context, viewed Shi’a as an apostate
threat. However, many Sunnis who sided with AQI did so not because
they believed in Zarqawi’s stridently pro-Sunni, anti-Shi’a message
but because AQI was the strongest insurgent group in the western and
northwestern regions or because AQI offered opportunities to pillage
the local Sunni communities. Further, zealots within AQI also saw
Sunni nationalists, particularly Sufis who constituted a sizable por-
tion of several key nationalist Ba’athist groups, as apostates. Therefore,
even the most overtly Sunni insurgent group was, counterintuitively,
also anti-Sunni and not clearly representative of any genuine Sunni
identity.122
AQI’s inability to motivate the Sunnis was manifested in the
Anbar Awakening.123 Sunni Anbaris who had suffered at the hands
of both the coalition and AQI eventually decided to rise up against
AQI and assist the coalition in securing western Iraq. The Awakening,
commonly referred to as the Sunni Awakening, harkened back to the
1995 Armed Dulaymi Tribe’s Sons Movement. Motivations for join-
ing the Awakening were myriad; Sunni, tribal, regional, economic, and
other identities and motivations were in play. This movement spread to
the center and northwest as SoI and concerned local residents groups
121 This is made evident in election results through 2010, as well as the inability of any Sunni
political party to mobilize the Sunni Arab Iraqi population.
122
Analyses of Sunni motivations for insurgency in Iraq are ongoing. See, for example,
Montgomery and McWilliams, 2009, and Sterling Jensen, Iraqi Narratives of the Anbar
Awakening, London: King’s College, thesis, 2014.
123 See, for example, Montgomery and McWilliams, 2009.
formed to defend against various insurgent and militia groups. After

Maliki began to erode the Sunni militias, the insurgent movements
sprang back to life. Two groups, one nationalist and one salafi-jihadi,
would emerge from the eventual, slow-rolling ruin of the Awakening.
The first, Jaysh al-Rijal al-Tariqiyeh al-Naqshibandieh was a Sufi Sunni
nationalist group led by former Ba’athist military officers. The other
was the Islamic State in Iraq, which later evolved into IS.
As the Iraqi Army’s politically appointed Shi’a leaders wavered or
failed in the face of the IS onslaught in 2014, intensely sectarian Shi’a
militias stepped in to fill the gap.124 These militias, including Sadr’s
Mahdi Militia, also morphed, endured, and expanded. Sadr now leads
the Peace Brigades and the Promised Day Brigades, while the Badr
Corps and Asa’ib Ahi al-Haq have grown in both size and strength with
the help of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’s Quds Force.125 As
of mid-2015, the Iraqi government had become dependent on the Shi’a
militias to not only secure major urban areas but also conduct counter-
IS offensive operations. Both militias are increasingly open about their
links to Iran, their reverence for the Supreme Leader, and their hatred
for Sunni Arabs. The power and influence of Shi’a militias and their
overt connection to Iran have both drawn in tens of thousands of Shi’a
recruits and terrified the Sunni Arabs. For the time being, at least, IS
has co-opted the Sunni narrative, and Iran-backed militias have co-
opted the Shi’a narrative. Mid-2015 represented a new high—or low—
in intersectarian relations in Iraq.
Implications of Sectarian Division for the Iraqi State and

the Region
Hardening sectarian identities among Muslim Arab Iraqis seemed,

in mid-2015, to be the harbinger of state devolution. Many analysts
124 See, for example, Matt Bradley and Ghassan Adnan, “Shiite Militias Win Bloody Battles
in Iraq, Show No Mercy,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2014.
125 See,
for example, C. J. Chivers, “Answering a Cleric’s Call, Iraqi Shiites Take Up Arms,”
New York Times, June 21, 2014.
already assume that Kurdish independence is a “when, not if” propo-

sition.126 Southern and eastern Iraq appear at least on the surface to be
monolithic, Iranian-backed Shi’a cantonments supporting aggressive
militia-driven land grabs in formerly mixed areas like northern Babil
Province and Diyala. Western and northwestern Iraq appear to harbor
an intransigent, Gulf Arab–backed, Ba’athist-driven, Sunni minority
who either actively or passively support IS. Putting aside the short-
sightedness of this monochromatic viewpoint and the myriad other
identities and drivers of behavior that are relevant to the current prob-
lem, it is necessary to explore the federal option and the possibility of
breaking Iraq completely into three separate regions.
Federalism is attractive because it appears to both accept a given
ethno-sectarian reality and correct an egregious Western imperialist
error: the fabrication of a supposedly impossible Iraqi state. Certainly
the vitriol and violence mid-2015 made it difficult to imagine an alter-
native. Some steps have already been taken toward federal devolution,
including the passage of the 2008 Provisional Powers Act. By formal-
izing the existing federal segregation while retaining the benefits of
a central government, Iraq might be able to find naturally occurring
stability. Unfortunately, the federal option is unrealistic. Announce-
ment of a federalist policy would immediately accelerate ethno-
sectarian cleansing already under way across the front lines between
the Shi’a militias and Iraqi Army, the Kurdish security services, and
IS.127 There would be a race to carve out territory before new federal
borders were established. Sunni civilians would be most likely to suffer
under these conditions, and this suffering would serve only to elongate
and inflame the ongoing Sunni revolt against the state.
Once the accelerated cleansing was accomplished, the Sunnis
would find themselves with minimal representation in the central gov-
ernment, no economic resources to speak of, damaged cities, and, in
126 See,
for example, Zalmay Khalilzad, “Get Ready for Kurdish Independence,” New York
Times, July 13, 2014.
127 Forecasting analyses in this section represent the informed expert opinions of the authors.
all likelihood, very little support from the center.128 Given the past
reluctance of the Shi’a-led central government to fund development
and reconstruction in Sunni-dominated provinces, it is highly unlikely
that central government oil revenue would be distributed to Anbar,
Nineweh, Salah al-Din, or even the remaining Sunni parts of Ta’mim
and Diyala. Further, there is a good possibility that central oil revenues
would plummet. Increasing Kurdish independence through federal-
ism would make Kurdish independence more, not less, likely. At the
very least, the Kurds would be loath to share in the revenue from their
existing resource-rich areas and from those they have seized during the
recent fighting. In the south, there is an equally good chance that Basra
would seek to negotiate not only increased independence but perhaps
even provincial devolution. Basrawi leaders would almost certainly
seek to retain greater control over the province’s significant oil income.
Federalism would exacerbate, not solve, Iraq’s problems.
Splitting Iraq along sectarian lines and creating new independent
Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a states—the complete dissolution of Iraq as
a nation—is equally problematic. While some Sunnis have argued for
greater federal authority, there is not even a perceptible minority of
Sunnis who seek the destruction of the Iraqi state. Instead, driven by
cultural expectations and a general belief that population estimates
grossly understate Sunni representation, many Sunnis seek to regain
control of the state. Nationalism, not devolution or antinational-
ist revolt, is the primary driver behind Sunni Arab opposition. Simi-
larly, there are no indications that a sizable minority of Shi’a seek the
complete disintegration of Iraq. Only Kurdish leaders have expressed
an interest in leaving the state, but even these aspirations have been
blunted by security fears and by unexpected economic challenges.129
128 There is ongoing debate as to how much oil and natural gas exists in the ground in Anbar
Province and other Sunni-dominated provinces. Extracting resources in these areas will take
considerable time and investment, even if they are sufficient to sustain an independent or
semi-independent state. See, for example, John Leland and Khalid D. Ali, “Anbar Prov-
ince, Once a Hotbed of Iraqi Insurgency, Demands a Say on Resources,” New York Times,
October 27, 2010.
129 See, for example, Isabel Coles, “Iraq Chaos Fuels Kurds’ Independence Dream, but Hur-
dles Remain,” Reuters, July 6, 2014.
There is also no practical way to split Baghdad or the areas around the
capital without forcing extraordinary ethnic violence. Deconstructing
Iraq would lead to equally artificial borders that would create prob-
lems as egregious as—if not more so than—the reviled Sykes-Picot and
Anglo-Iraqi accords.
Hardening sectarian identities in Iraq pose a serious problem for
the region and for external powers drawn into regional geopolitical
rivalries. Because external perception of Iraqi identity is most often sim-
plistic and reductionist, the Saudis, Iranians, and other major regional
powers are all quick to view extreme intersectarian violence in Iraq
as a clear indicator that Iraq is the epicenter of a regional Sunni-Shi’a
war. Western governments seeking a rapid end to the conflict are also
quick to define the problem in the simplest terms (as they did in 2003),
ignoring centuries of Iraqi history and the complexities of identity that
Fanar Haddad, Visser, and other scholars of Iraq believe should receive
thoughtful consideration. Just as intersectarian violence has created a
fear-kill-fear loop inside Iraq, it has also fed a similar loop across the
Middle East. Sunni states see a unified mass of Shi’a across Iran, Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon and attempt to counter Shi’a influence by funding
salafi-jihadi extremist groups. These groups then reinforce Shi’a fears
of Sunni hegemony and violence. Iran supports the introduction of
Lebanese Hezbollah into Iraq, and some Sunnis appear to go as far as
to fund IS because it seems like the least bad option in Iraq. As long as
Iraq is destabilized, these two fear-kill-fear loops—external and inter-
nal—are likely to continue to turn and feed each other for some time.
Possibilities for the Future
There are counternarratives to the notion of a Manichean sectarian

divide in Iraq. Fanar Haddad, 2011, offers a different lens through
which to view Iraqi identity. He sees identities as coexistent, diffuse,
and varying in intensity over time. Through this lens, a Sunni in
Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, might identify as a Sunni, with the
Sufi subsect; as an Anbari; as a Ramadian; as a tribal confederation
member; as a tribal member, as a part-time insurgent group member,
as a subtribal member; as a former military officer; as a professional;

as a politician; as a parent, brother, sister, son, or daughter; and as a
nationalist all at the same time.130 Because these identities coexist in
one Iraqi, they merge and accrue meaning from each other. National-
ism becomes Sunni nationalism, or perhaps Sunni Anbari nationalism.
Similarly, a Shi’a from Sadr City might identify as a Shi’a; as an Imami
Shi’a; with her city, block, tribe, family, political party, and business
council; and as a nationalist. In 2015, sectarian identity was the most
obvious Iraqi identity, but it is not the only Iraqi identity. This gives at
least faint hope for a postsectarian détente, and perhaps lasting recon-
ciliation and reunification.
There are also practical examples of cross-sectarian relationships
during even some of the most-extreme moments of intersectarian vio-
lence. Sunni Tarek al-Hashemi’s Iraqiyya Party, although it eventu-
ally failed and although Hashemi was expelled from Iraq by al-Maliki,
was cosectarian. Shi’a Ayad Alawi may not have proven to be the
most dynamic or successful leader of Iraq, but his staying power and
his acceptance by Sunni Iraqis is remarkable in an era of stark sec-
tarian divisions. The Sunni-led Board of Tribes and Notables of Iraq,
a virtual conglomerate of senior Iraqi tribal figures, is constituted of
50-percent Sunni and 50-percent Shi’a membership.131 Despite years of
on-again, off-again ethno-sectarian cleansing, many Sunnis and Shi’a
remain closely related by marriage and by tribe. Both the Dulaymi
and Shammar confederations cross the sectarian divide. As of early
2016, some Iraqi Arab Sunni internally displaced persons (IDPs) are
living in Shi’a areas, primarily in Shi’a homes or Hussayniyah lodg-
ings normally reserved for Shi’a pilgrims. While armed Shi’a groups
have reportedly conducted ethnic cleansing of Sunni areas, such as Jurf
al-Sakhr, and stopped Sunni IDPs from crossing into safe zones in
Fallujat-al-Amariyah, perhaps thousands of Sunni IDPs are reported
130 Fora detailed analysis of this argument in the context of military intelligence analysis,
see Ben Connable, Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, OP-377-RC, 2012.
131 This group is led by Majed Abed al-Razzaq al-Ali Suleiman al-Dulaymi.
to be living generally safe lives in Shi’a homes and Hussayniyahs across

southern Iraq.132
If given genuine security and stability, there is little doubt that
average Sunnis and average Shi’a would again begin to commingle
at the grassroots level. Recent interviews conducted with Sunni Iraqi
tribal elders, former military officers, and members of the business
community revealed not only a strong sense of nationalism but also
a surprisingly strong belief in cosectarian nationalism. While it may
have been difficult to envision a unified ethno-sectarian Iraq in mid-
2015, envisioning alternative possibilities to ongoing chaos, federalism,
or state deconstruction is an important step in moving past the surface-
level interpretation of Iraqi identity that continues to hinder both Iraqi
and international decisionmaking.
Because the Shi’a now dominate the state almost completely, and
because the Sunnis are so badly fragmented and disorganized, it would
be incumbent upon the Shi’a leadership to take the first genuine step
toward national reconciliation. Sunnis articulated their grievances far
more clearly in 2015 than they had during the U.S.-led occupation.133
Negotiations for reconciliation are probably not possible because there
are no Sunni politicians who represent a sizable majority of Iraqis.
Therefore, a Shi’a reconciliation package will have to be effected
through a massive and convincing fait accompli. This will involve
the release of prisoners, extensive funding for reconstruction, and a
withdrawal of both Iraqi Army and Shi’a militia forces from Sunni
areas. IS’s presence will greatly complicate these options, but, if they
are properly timed, the Sunnis will help to eject the group from Iraq
or to return it to post-2008 dormancy. Genuine hope of reconcilia-
tion grounded in state-level legal and economic changes, not payoffs to
Sunni elites, is the only reasonable pathway to the second Awakening
called for by many Western analysts. Concurrently, the poorly written
Iraqi constitution will have to be recrafted to ensure genuine minority
protections, to eliminate opportunities for the government to leverage
132 This 2016 assessment is drawn from discussions with senior Iraqi political leaders and
Shi’a political leaders in Baghdad, Iraq, in mid-March 2016.
133 Connable, 2014.
anti-Ba’athism laws against the Sunnis, and to more effectively and

realistically address power differentials across the sects and ethnicities
in Iraq. This process will give both old and new Sunni politicians a
chance to come to the fore in an effort to establish genuine minority
rights for Sunnis.
IS is not the greatest hurdle to overcome in achieving stability and
security in Iraq. Instead, the greatest hurdles are Shi’a reluctance to
trust the Sunnis, and Sunnis’ reluctance to accept their de facto minor-
ity. Both sets of fears are deeply rooted in Iraqi history. They may be
insurmountable, but the alternatives to attempting reunification are
either equally bad or far worse.
This chapter has shown that, while Iraq suffers from lasting sec-
tarian divisions, there is nothing inherently intractable or immutable
about these problems. Sectarianism in Iraq can exist alongside nation-
alism, regionalism, tribalism, and many other “isms” without necessar-
ily causing the disintegration of the Iraqi state. Lasting, if uncomfort-
able, heterogeneity is as possible in Iraq as it is in other states. Instead
of focusing on sectarianism as a cause of the current problems in Iraq,
observers would find it more effective to think about the intensifica-
tion of sectarian identity as a consequence of decades of ineffective and
oppressive governance and external interventions.
Of course, a strong argument can be made that sectarian identity
is and will continue to be decisive in Iraqi politics. It seems undeniable
that ethno-sectarianism will play a strong and perhaps dominant role
in Iraqi politics, at least for the foreseeable future. Nearly two centuries
of Sunni oppression of the Shi’a will not soon be forgotten, nor will the
intense violence of the 2006–2007 civil war or the more-recent govern-
ment oppression of the Sunnis. However, the history of sectarianism in
Iraq suggests that it is not too late to avert state fragmentation.
Sunni identity in Iraq has little to do with Sunni interpretations of
Islam, and Sunnis did not identify primarily along sectarian lines until
well into the past decade. This was perhaps also true of Shi’a Iraqis in
the early 1800s: There was a point at which the Ottoman government
could have included the Shi’a rather than forcing them to self-organize
along sectarian lines. In 2015, Prime Minister al-Abadi had publicly
acknowledged that government reform is the key to stability and state

survival and that reconciling with the Sunnis is central to this effort.
While poor governance and disastrous intervention intensified
sectarianism in Iraq, improved governance and less-meddlesome exter-
nal support might offer a recipe for eventual stability. This may be true
in Iraq and in other areas in the Middle East currently riven by sectar-
ian conflict.
CHAPTER FOUR
Sectarianism in Syria
Introduction
The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, is likely to persist for the
foreseeable future, with very bleak prospects for a political solution.
Sectarianism among Sunni, Alawi and other Shi’a, and other minority
groups is playing an increasing role in helping ensure that the Syrian
conflict will be a protracted one, but it would be simplistic to refer to
sectarian identity as the main source of the uprising against Bashar al-
Assad or as the sole motivator of continuing violence. How the conflict
is perceived—whether based on sectarianism or other factors—will
have an important influence on policies the United States formulates
and pursues in Syria and the wider region.
The Bashar al-Assad regime, thanks to Russian intervention and
increased Iranian support, remains in control of strategic areas criti-
cal to its support base—namely, the capital (Damascus), parts of Idlib
and Aleppo and the western region along the Mediterranean coast,
and contiguous areas connecting the two. Opposition groups have
succeeded in confronting government forces in more-rural areas and
small towns of the north, south, and east but are themselves beset
with disunity and often battle each other for dominance. Complicat-
ing matters significantly are the expanding power of Islamist extrem-
ist groups, particularly IS and al-Nusra, and the involvement of com-
peting regional powers, as well as the United States and Russia. The
toll this is taking on Syria’s population of 22 million already reaches
catastrophic proportions, with more than 250,000 killed, more than
71
1 million wounded, and half the population displaced (3 million in

neighboring countries).1
In this chapter, we argue that, while governments and groups have
used sectarianism effectively to bolster support for their own political
agendas, it is only one of several factors that underlie the conflict in
Syria, although its importance appears to be increasing. These other
factors—geography and locale, political exigency, class differences, and
tribal loyalties—both feed and are fed by sectarianism in Syria. More-
over, Syria’s historical foundations do not necessarily render sectarian-
ism in the conflict self-evident. This has led one scholar to term the
Syrian war “semi-sectarian.”2 But the longer the Syrian conflict con-
tinues under the influence of these agendas, the greater the likelihood
that the parties to the conflict will default to sectarian preferences. This
can also be said of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries and across
the region, which could increase instability in the region, particularly
in Lebanon.
Following an overview of the mix of ethnic and religious groups
in modern Syria, the chapter offers a brief history of the various sects
and how their positions in society developed under key periods of pre-
and postindependence rule. Subsequently, the chapter describes the
role of sectarian association in the context of the 2011 uprising against
Bashar al-Assad and how that role quickly evolved as other factors were
introduced to the conflict. Finally, the chapter identifies a number of
implications of the sectarian factor in Syria and the broader region and
presents possibilities for the future.
Syria’s Religious and Ethnic Composition: Majority Sunni Arab, but

Considerable Diversity Exists
Sunnis make up 68.4 percent of Syria’s population, with some 13 per-
cent of Sunnis of Kurdish ethnicity and the remainder Arab. Sunni
Arabs are spread throughout Syria, as seen in Figure 4.1, while Kurds
1 See UN News Centre, “News Focus: Syria,” undated; and Uri Friedman, “Almost Half
of Syria’s Population Has Been Uprooted,” Atlantic, August 2014.
2 Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 36, No. 2, March 24, 2015, p. 357.
Sectarianism in Syria 73
Figure 4.1
Distribution of Religious and Ethnic Groups in Syria
TURKEY
Aleppo
Idlib Euphra
tes
Latakia
Hama
SYRIA
Tartus
Homs
LEBANON
Sparsely IRAQ
populated
Damascus area
Alawi
Other Shi’a
Sunni Arab
ISRAEL Sunni Kurd
Druze
JORDAN Christian
RAND RR1681-4.1
reside mostly in the northeast and northwest sections of the country

near the Turkish border. The next-largest sects are the Alawis, who
constitute 11.3 percent of Syria’s population, and Christians, at 11.2
percent. Alawis are concentrated in the western mountain region of
Jabal Nusayriyyah along the Mediterranean coast between the Turk-
ish border to the north and the Lebanese border to the south. Chris-
tians (mostly Eastern Orthodox) are to the east, between this moun-
tain range and the cities of Idlib, Hama, and Homs; there are also
concentrations in the southwest near Damascus and Deraa, as well as
to the east near Deir az-Zur and Hasaka. Ismaili and Twelver Shi’a
represent about 3.2 percent, as do the Druze. The Shi’a reside primarily
near Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, and Homs, while the Druze are in the south
along the border with Jordan and to the west abutting the borders of
Lebanon and the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights. The remaining 2.6
percent of the population is composed of Circassians, Turkmen, and
others.3 No region is entirely homogeneous, and ethno-religious groups

commingle in most areas, or did until the civil war.
While variations among Sunnis and Shi’a are discussed earlier
in this report, in Syria’s case, it is important to focus on the Alawi
community. The Alawis are a sect that has been associated for various
reasons with Shi’ism (see next section) but in fact has separate tenets
and practices and has been shunned in the past by both Sunnis and
Shi’a in part because of its heterodoxy. The Alawi faith originated in
the tenth and 11th centuries and adopted pagan, Shi’a, and Christian
practices.4 The sect was founded by Muhammad Ibn Nusayr al-Bakri
an-Namiri—Alawis are referred to as “Nusayris,” particularly by Sunni
salafi or jihadist elements whose intention is derogatory—and took
root in the Mediterranean town of Latakia and the surrounding moun-
tain communities. The Jabal Nusayriyyah mountain range served to
geographically separate the Alawis from other sects and allowed them
to maintain a homogeneous identity until modern times, leading his-
torians to term them, like the Druze in Lebanon, a compact minority.5
The Role of Sectarian Identity in Syria Prior to the 2011

Revolt
Historically, friction among sects in Syria (and Lebanon) has been

driven less by religious or theological differences over Islamic succes-
sion or heterodoxy than by other, more “practical” factors. Though
religious heterodoxy has appeared periodically as a source of open con-
tention among communities, other factors, including geography and
3 Michael Izady, “Syria: Religious Composition (Summary),” map, Columbia University

Gulf 2000 Project, 2015.
4 The Alawis adopted the ideas of a divine triad from paganism, the cult of Ali (Moham-
med’s cousin and son-in-law) from Shi’ism and mysticism from Ismaili Shi’ism, and the use
of ceremonial wine and observance of Christmas from Christianity. See Farouk-Alli, 2014,
p. 209.
5 A term popularized by historian Albert Hourani, compact minority is one that makes up a
large proportion of the population in a geographically limited or restricted area. See Farouk-
Alli, 2014, p. 210.
locale, political exigency, class differences, and economic inequalities

have also driven sects in Syria to draw together in a defensive crouch or
to criticize or demonize their opposites. For much of their history until
modern times, for example, the Alawis had been a separatist minor-
ity sect that often had been economically deprived, geographically iso-
lated, and at times persecuted. When it has arisen in Syrian history,
sectarianism has occurred mainly between Alawis and Sunnis and
occasionally has involved the Shia, Druze, and Christian communities.
Early Sectarian Identity in Preindependence Syria

While much of the sectarian history of the region is covered earlier in
this report, it is important here to note that certain key events in Syria’s
early history have informed today’s sectarian environment. The region
of Latakia and its environs remained somewhat insulated from whole-
sale Islamicization during conversion efforts by various rulers, which
allowed the Alawi sect west of Jabal Nusayriyyah to expand over time
and to borrow rituals from Shi’ism while maintaining a separate iden-
tity. But Alawi-Sunni tension was substantial in the Crusader Wars,
during which the Sunnis accused the Alawis (and the Christians) of
supporting the Europeans, and persisted into the 14th century, when
Sunni salafi scholar Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah issued a fatwa
proclaiming the Nusayris, as he termed them, to be
more disbelieving than the Jews and the Christians. . . . There

is no doubt that fighting these . . . is a great sign of obedience
(to God); it is superior to fighting polytheists and “people of the
book” [Jews and Christians] who do not fight the Muslims.6
Alawi conscription into the army under the Ottomans in the

mid–19th century broke the geographic isolation afforded by Jabal
Nusayriyyah and “was the first step towards the social transformation
and integration of the Alawis into the institutional apparatuses of the
6 Quoted in Nazib Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, London:
Routledge, 1993, pp. 88–89. The role of Ibn Taymiyyah in the jihadist movement today is
profound; some portray him as one of the ideological fathers of the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant.
State and, as such, into the broader social fabric of Syrian society as
well.”7 At the same time, Western advancement of political and eco-
nomic interests in the weakening Ottoman Empire involved cham-
pioning individual religious communities in Syria. The provision of
education (and growing secular nationalism among Arab intelligentsia)
awakened the Alawis’ desire for integration with the Muslim main-
stream and led them to declare themselves as adherents to Shi’a Islam.8
However, as stated previously, the French sought during the Man-
date for Syria and Lebanon in the 1920s and 1930s to weaken the
growing nationalist aspirations of the Sunni majority by sharpening
sectarian separatism and fragmentation in Syria.9 The French elevated
the Alawis’ economic and political status and offered autonomy but did
not succeed in quelling the growing Alawi desire to unite with other
communities in a single Syrian state. The 1936 Franco-Syrian Treaty
of Independence, along with a fatwa by the Mufti of Palestine that
the Alawis should be considered Muslims, paved the way for political
and social integration despite some efforts by separatist Alawis to vio-
lently resist the Sunni-dominated nationalist government before and
after Syrian independence in 1946.10 By this time, the Sunni Arabs
had come to dominate the officer corps in the Syrian Army and con-
trolled the government, while the Alawis were overrepresented among
the army’s rank-and-file soldiers.11 The army attracted minorities from
disadvantaged backgrounds and provided them with upward economic
7 Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 212.

8 Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 213.
9 League of Nations, “Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon,” London, July 24, 1922. In fact,
the French emphasized sectarian differences as an argument for the mandate. See Daniel
Neep, Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 26.
10 See Eyal Zisser, “The Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect,” in
Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1999, pp. 131–133; and Farouk-Alli, 2014, pp. 213–216.
11 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria,” Middle East Policy Coun-
cil, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2012.
and social mobility; at the same time, Sunni urban elites avoided rank-
and-file service, seeing it as “socially undistinguished.”12
The societal integration among the sects that evolved under the
banner of nationalism in preindependence Syria helped pave the way
for a unified republic. But it did not erase centuries of marginalization
of the Alawis or Sunni resentment of Alawis as socially inferior and
undeserving of advancement. This would lay the foundation for latent
sectarian tension under the al-Assad regimes.
Sectarian Identity in Modern Syria: From Independence Through the

Rule of Hafez al-Assad
The decade following Syrian independence in 1946 was a time of polit-
ical instability and uncertainty as multiple coups brought down a suc-
cession of governments in Damascus. Two important movements were
established in Syria—the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba’ath Party—
that had an important bearing on the political and sectarian develop-
ment of the country. The Brotherhood, originally established in Egypt
in 1928, arose in Syria during the 1930s as a social movement. Its orien-
tation was, and remains, sectarian and Sunni Islamist and would later
bring it into conflict with the regime of Hafez al-Assad. In contrast,
the Ba’ath Party—founded by a Christian named Michel Aflag—took
root in both Syria and Iraq in the 1940s with a focus on secularism
and socialism. The party was instrumental to the Alawis’ later ascen-
sion to power in Syria (though less so than the army was) because of its
nondiscriminatory agenda that attracted minority communities. The
party expanded quickly in the Latakia region and served as a means
of incorporation of the increasingly educated Alawis into the Syrian
polity. By the time of the Ba’athist overthrow of the government in
1963, Alawis and other minorities had joined Sunnis in reaching the
officer corps in the army and the upper echelons of the Ba’ath Party
and had become largely integrated into society. At the same time, an
urban elite and middle class had emerged, consisting largely of Sunnis
12 Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 217.

but also including these minorities. This was a time of relative sectarian
comity in Syria.13
After a period of instability under the Ba’athist government, one
of these Alawi officers, Hafez al-Assad, took power in 1970. His rule
until his death in 2000 emphasized anti-imperialism, redistribution
of wealth to poorer classes, pan-Arabism, and nostalgia for ancient
glory of Arab empires. He sought outwardly to temper sectarian divi-
sions through secularism but also co-opted various sectarian groups
and developed patrimonial networks to strengthen his rule. He even
embraced Islamic symbolism as a means of attracting Sunni support,
including praying in Sunni mosques and making hajj to Mecca like
other Muslim leaders in the Middle East. He had Alawis declared Shi’a
Muslims under the auspices of an influential Iranian cleric in Lebanon,
Ayatollah Musa Sadr, which helped forge common political interests
between the Alawis and the regime on one hand and Syria’s small Shi’a
minority on the other and laid groundwork for a strategic alliance with
Iran. All of this helped the secular al-Assad burnish his Islamic creden-
tials, but his use of religion was “no more than a convenient tool for
influencing politics.”14
Hafez al-Assad’s secularism and co-option of the various sects
in Syria were instrumental to his survival and power by deemphasiz-
ing his own status as a minority Alawi while portraying the Alawi
sect as mainstream. Still, al-Assad ruled through his own personal
constituency. Though he appointed Sunnis to key positions, includ-
ing his longtime defense minister, Mustafa Tlas, the core member-
ship of the ruling elite extended outwardly from his family, tribe, and
Alawi sect. Al-Assad created a “mukhabarat state” that involved mul-
tiple layers of security apparatus to ensure identification and elimi-
nation of internal threats—at times violently. Notably, after three
years of internal strife against Islamists described as “close to civil
13 See Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict 1946–
1970, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999.
14 See Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 219. Al-Assad even had an amendment added to Syria’s consti-
tution that mandated that the president must be Muslim, a stipulation put forward in the
1950s by the founder of the Brotherhood’s Syrian branch.
war,” the Hafez al-Assad government ruthlessly put down a Muslim

Brotherhood–inspired uprising in Hama in February 1982, besieging
the town for nearly a month and killing an estimated 20,000 people—
an event that essentially eliminated the antisecular Brotherhood as a
political force in Syria.15 Until the Hama massacre, al-Assad had risked
losing the support of large parts of his constituent base, including
public-sector workers and the urban middle class.16 His son Bashar
al-Assad drew lessons from this chapter in Syrian history in his brutal
responses to the 2011 uprising.
Internally, the government of Hafez al-Assad maintained his tight
grip on power through a number of complex strategies implemented
through the Ba’ath Party. While he provided minority groups, includ-
ing his own Alawi sect, with privileges and access, he also perpetuated
secularism while empowering government-sanctioned Sunni clerical
networks. Economically, he secured the fortunes of Sunni and Chris-
tian merchant classes in return for their loyalty. He used sectarian-
ism to divide and conquer, but under the guise of national unity and
secularism. Externally, Hafez al-Assad’s focus on pan-Arab causes and
resistance to Israel—including support of Shi’a groups, such as Leb-
anese Hezbollah, and Sunni Islamist Palestinian groups like Hamas
and Islamic Jihad—helped attract broad-based support and distracted
observers from the fact of minority rule in Syria by emphasizing non-
sectarian nationalism. Hafez al-Assad also cemented a close strategic
relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran when the Soviet Union,
Syria’s long-time patron, dissolved in the early 1990s.17
Hafez al-Assad’s use of nationalism and secularism was instru-
mental to maintaining a tight grip on power for 30 years, and large
sectors of Syrian society “seemingly bought into the regime and its
15
Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria Under Assad, London: I. B. Taurus and
Company, 1997, p. 136.
16 Perthes, 1997.
17 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi Series, Vol. 53,
No. 438, June 14, 2013, p. 18. See also Heydemann, 1999.
inclusive nationalist rhetoric.”18 But his power also derived from exploi-
tation of communal interests. His power base had an Alawi core. That
community benefited considerably under his rule, both economically
and politically, creating in the minds of many Syrians deep resentment
and an inextricable linkage to the regime.19 This privilege and resent-
ment, which increased under Hafez’s son Bashar al-Assad, would later
sow the seeds for sectarianism during the civil war by rendering anti-
Alawi and antiregime narratives by extremist Sunni groups attractive
to broader Syrian audiences.
Contemporary Sectarian Identity in Syria Under Bashar al-Assad

Bashar al-Assad continued his father’s policies and strategies after the
elder’s death in 2000 but also adopted liberalizing economic policies
that had the effect of disenfranchising the al-Assads’ traditional power
base among rural populations and the working class while perpetuating
and even deepening corruption and “center-periphery inequalities.”20 It
was frustration with the Syrian government’s clientelism and inabil-
ity to provide basic services in the periphery—not sectarian tension or
animosity—that helped fuel the initial protests of March 2011.
But Bashar’s actions in the decade prior to the revolt also encour-
aged an environment in which sectarianism could be more easily
exploited to support political and ideological agendas once public order
devolved into open conflict. To consolidate his power, Bashar removed
Sunni stalwarts of his father’s administration in 2005 in favor of mem-
bers of the al-Assad family, thereby increasing Alawi domination of
the regime. Second, Bashar’s economic policies enriched a new, Alawi-
dominated elite that flaunted its wealth and “became a visible symbol
18 Phillips,
2015, p. 366. For more on how al-Assad co-opted large sectors of Syrian society
through the use of secularism and nationalism, see Perthes, 1997; and Hanna Batutu, Syria’s
Peasantry, The Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999.
19 Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 220.
20 Benedetta Berti and Jonathan Paris, “Beyond Sectarianism: Geopolitics, Fragmentation,
and the Syrian Civil War,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 16, No. 4, January 2014, pp. 22–23.
See also Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian
Resilience, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012.
of regime excess” and increased animosity and jealousy among other

sects, which began to resent the Alawis for their economic and political
entitlements.21 This helped inextricably tie the Alawi community to the
al-Assad regime. Third, social and other services at the local level were
increasingly abandoned by the government and taken up by nonstate
groups defined by religion or sect. Finally, Bashar’s Iraq policy, aimed
at weakening the U.S. occupation of and interests in Iraq by facilitat-
ing the transit of jihadist fighters, opened the door for a return of those
fighters to Syria and the spread of their extremist ideologies.22
While sectarianism did not appear outwardly in Bashar’s first
decade of rule, one anthropologist’s fieldwork in Syria in the 1990s
corroborated the reemergence of sectarian affiliation not based on reli-
gion or heterodoxy but on a combination of communal interest, class,
and region.23 Noting that the once-downtrodden Alawis experienced
“a stunning reversal of fortune within living memory” that displaced
traditional urban elites (largely Sunni but only by affiliation), she
writes that “each group assumes the other’s advantage: Alawis point
to the enduring prosperity of Damascus’ [Sunni] ‘merchant princes;’
[Sunni] Damascenes to well-placed Alawis’ control of licensing and
smuggling.”24 Thus, while sectarian animosity was not a primary fea-
ture of Syrian society under Bashar, its existence as an undercurrent
allowed it to bubble to the surface when political factors triggered the
breakdown of civil–government relations.
Sectarianism in Syria Following the 2011 Revolt
The uprising against the Bashar al-Assad regime began as a non- (or
cross-) sectarian revolt against authoritarian rule, corruption, social
inequality, and bad governance. Mobilization of various internal
21 Phillips, 2015, p. 367.

22 Phillips, 2015, pp. 366–368.
23 See Christa Salamandra, “Sectarianism in Syria: Anthropological Reflections,” Middle
East Critique, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2013, pp. 303–306.
24 Salamandra, 2013, p. 305.
groups was based more on where members lived and their relationship
with the government than on religious affiliation. This is particularly
the case given that the uprising began in the southern Syrian town
of Deraa, a poor agricultural region of mixed sects that suffered the
loss of government services under al-Assad’s economic policies.25 While
the revolt was indeed overwhelmingly Sunni, it was communal resent-
ment rather than ideological or sectarian motivation that sparked it.
It is important to note that, at times, al-Assad has turned his guns on
his own sect: The Syrian navy shelled the predominantly Alawi “capi-
tal” city of Latakia in response to antigovernment demonstrations in
August 2011.26 Similarly, IS is known for combating rival Sunni armed
groups—including so-called jihadists—as much as Shi’a and other
non-Sunni armed elements.
However, the conflict quickly took on sectarian overtones due to
the Bashar al-Assad government’s response, the involvement of external
regional actors with conflicting political agendas, and the expanded
participation of extremist groups as major combatants in the Syria
arena. Actions on both sides have raised the enmity of Sunnis and
Alawis against each other for communitarian, not theological, reasons.
Graham Fuller suggests that
The problem is that if we view these conflicts through primar-

ily religious lenses we are indeed accepting them as “primor-
dial” conflicts, that is, never really susceptible to rational solu-
tion. But to view them as power struggles, rival interests, at least
reduces the problem to issues of changeable conditions of political
governance. It is astonishing how quickly sectarian differences
can vanish again under conditions of social order and prosper-
ity, when members of both communities have other interests to
absorb their attention than simply pursuing sectarian rivalries.
But right now we don’t at all have conditions of social order and
prosperity; the destruction of Iraq in the US invasion, and the
25 See Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to
Survive to 2013,” Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 2012, p. 6.
26 Michael J. Totten, “Assad Shells Alawite Stronghold,” World Affairs Journal, August 13,
2011.
subsequent internal war in Syria, have both produced optimal

conditions for today’s sectarian hatreds in their most emotional
and violent form.27
The complexity of the Syrian Civil War is demonstrated in the

approach to and behavior of some tribes in the Raqqa region, now
controlled by IS. Traditional tribal elites, who tend to outwardly sup-
port the strongest party to ensure that the tribe can avoid violence
and repression, are important sources of local mobilization. Prior to
the 2011 uprising, for example, the Sunni al-Bariyaj clan of the al-
‘Afadla tribe was considered the Bashar al-Assad government’s closest
ally in Raqqa. In the immediate aftermath of the uprising, al-Assad
enlisted al-Bariyaj fighters as shabiha militia—a paramilitary force of
regime loyalists (mostly Alawis in other parts of the country) created
to violently suppress demonstrations and attack antiregime activists.
Yet when IS became the dominant power there, the clan was actively
courted by and transferred allegiance to IS and, in mid-2014, provided
an important segment of local fighters for the group. Sectarianism has
little to do with tribal loyalties that derive from the complicated but
more-pragmatic motivations of self-protection and local rivalries.28
Sectarian identity is being exploited by several key parties to the
conflict to ensure support of constituencies and instill fear, while the
most-extreme elements on both sides “are inherently motivated by sec-
tarian animus” as a matter of ideology.29 There are Alawi and other
minority groups who oppose the Bashar al-Assad government and
Sunnis who have thrown their lot in with it—for reasons of political
belief or economic well-being. Clearly, then, the conflict is not divided
neatly along sectarian lines.
27 Graham E. Fuller, “Why Does ISIS Hate Shi’a?” lobelog.com, December 17, 2014.
28 Felix Legrand, “The Colonial Strategy of ISIS in Syria,” Arab Reform Initiative: Policy
Alternatives, June 2014, p. 6.
29 M. Zuhdi Jasser, “Sectarian Conflict in Syria,” PRISM, Vol. 4: Syria Supplemental,
Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2014, p. 60.
The Bashar al-Assad Government Has Fueled Sectarian Tension to

Ensure Survival
The government response to peaceful protests in 2011 was a violent one
that not only forced the opposition to take up arms, but also brought
out sectarian identity as a factor in the conflict. The al-Assad regime—
whose ultimate goal is survival—has sought to magnify sectarian fears
among Alawis and Shi’a to maintain a strong constituency and among
Christians and Druze to maintain their neutrality if not gain their
support. The regime has enlisted Iran’s military, political, and finan-
cial support,30 which has in turn recruited external Shi’a militias using
anti-Sunni rhetoric and calls to defend Shi’a holy sites in Syria (see the
section later in this chapter on external actors).
Early on, the regime employed sectarian rhetoric as a means
of perpetuating an image of embattled minorities whose well-being
depended upon unity with the government and of opposing forces that
were Islamist extremists supported by foreign backers. Soon after the
initial protests, Syrian state media began referring to demonstrators
(who were predominantly Sunni but in fact hailed from all sects) as
sectarian Islamists. Shabiha were used to deliver sandbags to Alawi
villages under the guise of protecting them from rampaging Sunnis
nearby but with the real intention of instilling fear in the Alawi com-
munity. Later, as battlefield losses prompted the regime to enlist exter-
nal sectarian actors like Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias, it also began
creating sect-based local defense units among Druze, Christians, and
Alawis and allowed the public appearance of sect-based symbols (such
as the Druze star and the Shi’a sword) alongside national symbols—
something forbidden prior to the revolt.31
The 2013 battle for the town of al-Qusayr in a mixed Sunni-Shi’a
area near the border with northeast Lebanon was an important turn-
ing point that exacerbated the sectarian vector of the conflict. Lebanese
Hezbollah forces assaulted surrounding Sunni villages and, in combi-
nation with Syrian Army units, took the town from Sunni rebels in
30 See Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism),” Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 36, No. 4, Spring 2013, pp. 79–93.
31 Phillips, 2015, p. 369.
June. In strategic terms, this could be seen as an effort by the Bashar al-
Assad regime to strengthen lines of communication for support from
Lebanese territory. However, the entry of the prominent Shi’a militant
group into the Syrian Civil War in support of the regime also served
to emphasize some of the sectarian nature of support for al-Assad and
intensify Sunni sectarian rhetoric, particularly from external sources.32
The regime commonly refers to the Sunni Arab–dominated
opposition as takfiris who present a severe threat to Syria’s ethnic and
religious minorities.33 Al-Assad himself has been quoted frequently
making this case, for example in a meeting with the Syriac Orthodox
Church, where he is reported to have said that “the terrorist aggres-
sion against the region and the takfiri extremist mentality underlying it
target the diverse social and cultural fabric of the region in general and
Syria in particular.”34 It makes little distinction between Sunni extrem-
ists in the opposition, such as IS and al-Nusra, and more-moderate
elements in the FSA or the National Coalition, referring to them all as
“terrorists” and emphasizing their Sunni nature. In a 2013 interview
with Le Figaro, al-Assad commented, “We are fighting terrorists. . . .
80–90 percent belong to al-Qaeda. They are not interested in reform
or in politics. The only way to deal with them is to annihilate them.”35
The regime has sought to magnify the sectarian nature of violence
perpetrated by the opposition, emphasizing its brutality as a means
of reinforcing fears among Alawis, Christians, and other minorities
that they cannot live safely under a Sunni-dominated government in
Syria.36 State media widely report cases of sectarian cleansing by mili-
32 See Steven Heydemann, “Syria’s Uprising: Sectarianism, Regionalisation, and State

Order in the Levant,” Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
working paper 119, May 2013; and Aaron Reese, “Sectarian and Regional Conflict in the
Middle East,” Middle East Security Report 13, Institute for the Study of War, July 2013.
33 A takfiri is a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of being apostates and deserving of
death (Philip Smyth, The Shiite Jihad in Syria and its Regional Effects, Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 138, 2015).
34 “Assad: Takfiri Terrorism Targets Diverse Social, Cultural Fabric of Region,” Syrian Arab
News Agency, June 11, 2015.
35 Quoted in Berti and Paris, 2014, p. 24.
36 Smyth, 2015, pp. 8–12.
tant Islamist groups, while “car bombings, including a massive explo-

sion in the Alawi district of Mezze 86 in Damascus in November 2012,
seemed to justify the fear of an impending jihadi slaughter” of what
the extremists viewed as Alawi heretics.37 At the same time, the regime
has portrayed itself as a protector of religious moderation and stability
to appeal to “the multi-confessional urban middle class and the large
number of bureaucrats and public sector employees whose status and
benefits depended on the regime.”38 This message was attractive to that
audience, which justifiably felt threatened by the rise and influence of
jihadist groups advocating Islamic law and oppression of minorities.
The regime’s strategy has been to combine divisiveness based on com-
munal identity with inclusiveness and nationalism depending on the
targeted constituency. Bashar al-Assad has sought to walk a fine line
between raising the mantle of security, counterterrorism, and national-
ism to appeal to broad domestic constituencies and international (espe-
cially Western) audiences on one hand, and stoking fears of sectarian
persecution to draw in minority communities in Syria and external
actors like Iran and Hezbollah on the other.
Sunni Anti-Alawi and Anti-Shi’a Sectarianism in Syria Has Grown

As radical Sunni jihadist groups have emerged as a more dominant
force among the opposition both on the battlefield and in the public
eye, so too has a more strident form of sectarianism. The ideologies of
these groups are fundamentally based on an essentialist worldview and
the vehement rejection of heterodoxy as they define it. Anti-Shi’a and
anti-Alawi (or anti-Nusayri) rhetoric—as well as ideology and violent
action—is particularly virulent from IS, while strong but somewhat
more moderate from the al-Qaeda–affiliated al-Nusra. Sectarianism
has also appeared in areas it has held for a period of time where the
areas must administer services to populations under their control.
IS habitually refers to Shi’a as rawafidh, or rejectionists, who are
infidels and reject the true Islam, and to Alawis as Nusayri in a manner
37 Hokayem, 2013, p. 53.

38 Hokayem, 2013, p. 54.
meant to be derogatory. In a March 2015 video produced by its Hama

Province Media Office, an IS representative exclaimed that
“The rafidhi [Shi’a] is an impure disbeliever.” Allah the most

exalted said: “So when you meet (in fight—jihad in Allah’s cause)
those who disbelieve, smite (their) necks.” . . . We will not forget
what happened in the 1980s, or what the immoral Nusayri regime
did to the Muslims in Hama. We will not forget every single drop
of Muslim blood that was shed on that blessed land. It is the same
as the Caliph said: “So by Allah, we will take revenge! By Allah,
we will take revenge! Even if it takes a while, every amount of
harm will be responded to with multitudes more.”39
While its ideology and rhetoric are vehemently anti-Shi’a, IS has

mostly fought other Sunni-dominated opposition groups in Syria—
an important distinction from its pursuits in Iraq. This may derive
from the group’s dedication to gaining control of territory to establish
a caliphate, a pursuit that pits it against other Sunni groups in areas
where the regime has ceded territory. Moreover, it is important to note
that IS does not have a state patron and has been largely self-funded.
While some wealthy individuals in the Gulf states have provided mon-
etary contributions and volunteers have come from these countries to
fight under IS, there is no evidence of direct support from the Saudi or
Qatari governments, and, in fact, they see IS as a threat to their own
interests. Thus, the virulent sectarian rhetoric and actions taken by IS
should not be seen fundamentally as originating externally.40
In its governance of Syrian areas under its control, IS has insti-
tuted a pact with minorities who were unable or chose not to flee as
its fighters defeated regime forces and rival groups in eastern Syria—a
decidedly political decision by a highly ideological group as a means
of ruling a diverse ethno-religious population. This pact levies a spe-
cial tax (jizya) on remaining Christians in Raqqa and prohibits them
39 “Smite Their Necks,” video, SITE translation, Hama Province Islamic State, March 28,
2015.
40 Gause, 2014. Much of the funding for IS has come from oil sales, extortion, and
smuggling.
from displaying religious symbols in public, repairing or building new

churches, or in any way disparaging Islam. The jizya was tradition-
ally levied on Christian and Jewish citizens under the early Muslim
caliphs because they had special status as “people of the Book” (ahl
al-dhimmi). These people were considered second-class citizens but had
certain rights protected under sharia law. But rather than serving to
protect minorities as the pact had been intended under the caliphs, IS
uses it as a form of disenfranchisement.41
Al-Nusra’s sectarian rhetoric is somewhat toned down from that
of IS, leaving it somewhat more open to temporary alliances of conve-
nience with less sectarian Sunni opposition groups, though it remains
strongly sectarian in ideology and rhetoric. It refers to Alawis by the
derogatory Nusayri (except in interviews with foreign media), and calls
Shi’a rawafidh less frequently than does IS. But its communiqués con-
tinue to state that killing rawafidh (Shi’a) is obligatory, chastises IS for
not killing enough of them, and even draws parallels between Shi’a and
IS in its competition with that group. Accusing IS of “betrayal, treach-
ery, and lies,” al-Nusra states that “this is a quality that resembles the
qualities of the rawafidh.”42
In an interview with Al Jazeera in May 2015, al-Nusra emir Abu-
Muhammad al-Julani stated that Alawis would be accepted only if
they converted to al-Nusra’s brand of Islam, commenting that “Alawis
who turn their backs on the regime, repent, and embrace Islam will be
regarded as brothers and will be forgiven.”43 Alawis are thereby given
a choice of conversion or death. In the same interview, al-Julani offers
Christians a more lenient choice because, while many of them support
the Bashar al-Assad regime, “we are not at war with them.” He goes
on to offer that, “if the Christians repent, they will be succumbed to
Shari’a laws and will pay jizya,” or tax levied upon ahl al-dhimmi. Thus,
41 Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, ISIS Governance in Syria, Middle East Security
Report 22, Institute for the Study of War, July 2014, p. 16.
42 Al-Nusra, “The Group of ‘Dawlah’—and the Islamic Ruling Regarding It,” SITE trans-
lation, March 5, 2015a.
43 Pieter Van Ostaeyan, “Al-Jazeera: Interview with Jabhat al-Nusra Amir Abu-Muhammad
al-Julani,” blog post, translation, May 27, 2015.
al-Nusra would demand conversion from Alawis but not from Chris-
tians. In areas it controls, al-Nusra appears to be providing food, elec-
tricity and water, and health care, in one town “provided from a small
clinic that treats all comers, regardless of whether they have sworn alle-
giance to the emirate or not.”44 However, while the differences between
the competing IS and al-Nusra may leave the latter more amenable to
working with other opposition groups, both remain highly sectarian in
terms of rhetoric, ideology, and actions.
External Actors Have Exacerbated Sectarianism in Syria

The power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran and their respec-
tive “blocs” in the Syrian conflict is less an originating factor in the
uprising and more a catalyst that exploits and fans the increasingly
sectarian nature of the conflict in the context of the two countries’
own geostrategic competition. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran vie
for regional prominence and influence, seek to preserve their own anti-
thetical political systems, and lay opposing claims to leadership of
the Muslim world. While this competition for influence is covered in
greater depth in Chapter Six, it has a strong bearing on sectarianism in
the Syrian conflict. Saudi and Iranian provision of resources and sup-
port to opposing forces in Syria, in combination with calls for Sunni or
Shi’a jihad against the other from clerics on both sides, provides fertile
ground for reinforcing sectarian trends in the conflict.
Besides providing the Bashar al-Assad government military mate-
riel, training, and advice, Tehran has orchestrated an influx of for-
eign militias and fighters into Syria to shore up the regime. This effort
became urgent in 2012 as battlefield losses by Syrian government forces
increasingly threatened the survival of Iran’s close ally in Damascus.45
Lebanese Hezbollah offered its fighters and its considerable battlefield
experience to help reinforce key lines of communication in Syria and
reverse government territorial losses in strategically crucial areas. Hez-
44 GeithAbdul-Ahad, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front—Ruthless, Organised and Taking Control,”

Guardian, July 10, 2013.
45 Luke Harding, Miriam Elder, and Peter Beaumont, “Assad Losing Syria War, Russia
Admits for First Time,” Guardian, December 13, 2012.
bollah’s motivation was, first and foremost, a deep concern that it could
lose a strong ally in Damascus and its primary conduit for arms and
other support from Tehran. It has also waded into the sectarian divide.
But it has had to be quite cautious because of its position in Lebanon
as part of the government and where an overt sectarian approach to the
war would exacerbate existing tensions with other, particularly Sunni,
sectors of the Lebanese population.
More broadly, however, Tehran has appealed to other foreign
fighters and groups to pursue a Shi’a jihad to defend their fellow Shi’a
and the holy places, drawing them into the Syrian Civil War on Bashar
al-Assad’s side. Multiple Shi’a militia organizations have appeared in
Syria composed of fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, and even
Afghanistan, attracted by their shared willingness to combat takfiri
jihadists and protect their coreligionists.
A central factor drawing outside Shi’a groups has been defense
of the sacred, gold-domed shrine of Sayyida Zainab, sister of the mar-
tyred third Shi’a imam al-Hussein Ibn Ali Ibn Abi Talib, located just
south of Damascus. The mantra “Labayk ya Zainab!” (At your service,
O Zainab!) has been chanted at funerals of Lebanese and Iraqi fight-
ers killed in Syria, and the shrine’s distinct gold dome is prominent in
Shi’a martyrdom posters.46 One of the more-prominent militant Shi’a
groups in Syria, Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, claimed in its first official
statement in June 2013 that its only goal was to “defend holy sites in
Syria.”47 As the war has drawn on, a form of “pan-Shi’ism” has emerged
in which Shi’a militant groups, as well as Iran itself, claim to protect
not only sacred sites but also the Shi’a community writ large.48
In terms of demonizing the opposition, Iran and Shi’a groups
such as Hezbollah have cast the opposition as takfiris.49 Such expres-
46 Smyth, 2015, pp. 3–4.

47 Smyth, 2015, Appendix 2, p. 2.
48 Smyth, 2015, pp. 7–8.
49 Hezbollah’s official news outlet, al-Manar, provides multiple examples of this language.
See, for example, “Takfiri Terrorists Commit Massacre Against Syrian Druze in Idleb Coun-
tryside,” al-Manar, June 11, 2015; and “Hezbollah, Syrian Army Advance in Jarajir Barrens,”
al-Manar, June 12, 2015.
sions have been underwritten by Iran’s Supreme Leader, who, while not
issuing a public fatwa on the war, has reportedly encouraged subordi-
nate clerics to issue their own fatwas justifying jihad in Syria and issued
religious obligations (taqlif sharii) to Shi’a militant groups to join the
fight. Failure to heed these obligations is seen as the equivalent of dis-
obeying the word of God.50
External Sunni actors—which include not only Saudi Arabia but
Qatar and Turkey, as well as individual clerics—also have couched
some of their support of Syrian opposition groups and motivations
for defeating the Bashar al-Assad government in sectarian terms,
although not uniformly. Turkey had allowed foreign fighters to cross
into Syria during the initial uprising against al-Assad and has only
recently sought to systematically crack down on these movements.51
Turkey has also sought to protect the small Syrian Turkman minority
of about 200,000, considered ethnic kin, and has supported Turkman
militias.52 The Saudis have sought to exploit sectarianism in Syria to
bring down Iran’s ally in Damascus yet initially supported the least
sectarian of the rebel groups in Syria, the FSA, and other anti–al-Assad
groups in Syria that shunned alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood,
which has competed with the Saudis in the past. They were joined by
the UAE, which has sought to support anti-Islamist rebel forces against
the al-Assad regime and has participated in coalition air strikes against
IS.53 Lack of battlefield success by the FSA led the Saudis to shift some
of their support to more-sectarian Salafi groups, such as the Islamic
50 Smyth, 2015, p. 16. The Grand Ayatollah, the venerated Shi’a religious leader based in
Najaf, Iraq, has refused to issue a fatwa urging Shi’a jihad in Syria. One might speculate that
the Supreme Leader has left the issuance of projihad fatwas to subordinates to avoid open
disagreement with the Grand Ayatollah.
51 “Turkey Cracks Down on Foreign Fighters Crossing Border to Join ISIS,” CBSnews.com,
September 29, 2015.
52 These militias were recently targeted in Russian air strikes. See Ihsaan Tharoor, “Syria’s
Turkmen Rebels, the Group at the Center of the Russia-Turkey Clash,” Washington Post,
November 24, 2015.
53 Alissa Fromkin, “Part Three: UAE Foreign Policy in Iraq and Syria,” International Affairs
Review, Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, March 5,
2015.
Front, but they continue to shun direct support of al-Qaeda–linked al-

Nusra and certainly IS.54 Conversely, Qatar, also a member of the anti-
IS coalition, has supported Islamist rebels and reportedly is seeking to
make al-Nusra more attractive as a “lesser evil” than IS.55
At the same time, however, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have sup-
ported Jaish al-Islam and Arhar al-Sham, which have worked directly
with al-Nusra and seek Shari’a law in all of Syria. The leader of Jaysh
al-Islam in 2013 when it merged with the Syrian Islamic Front, Zahran
Alloush—who became the Syrian Islamic Front’s military commander
and was killed on December 25, 2015, in what was believed to be a
Russian air strike—had been considered a moderate opposition leader
by the Saudis, as well as by Turkey and Qatar. But his rhetoric was
salafist, virulently anti-Shi’a, and called for establishment of an
Umayyad caliphate in the region. In a September 2013 video, Alloush
stated, “We will bury the heads of impure Shi’a in Najaf, God will-
ing. The Umayyad glory will return to the Levant in spite of you.”56
Alloush was reported to have met multiple times with al-Nusra leaders
and provides an example of external support for sectarian Sunni actors
in Syria.
Sunni clerics abroad have called for jihad against the Bashar al-
Assad government and against Hezbollah, lacing their statements with
anti-Shi’a and anti-Alawi rhetoric. One of the most renowned of these
is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential head of the International Union
of Muslim Scholars, based in Qatar. Using the historical term for the
Alawi sect in quoting Ibn Taymiyyah, he exclaimed in May 2013,
The Nusayris are more disbelieving than the Jews and the Chris-
tians, as Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah said about them. We see
them today killing people like mice and cats, by the thousands
54 Gause, 2014, pp. 6–7.

55 Yaroslav Trofimov, “To U.S. Allies, al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria Becomes the Lesser Evil,”
Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2015.
56 Ali Mamouri, “Was Zahran Alloush Really a Moderate Leader?” Al-Monitor, January 14,
2016.
and tens of thousands. Assad has come to rule by his own author-
ity and with him his Nusayri sect.57
Qaradawi went on later that year to call on “every Sunni Muslim

with military training to go and fight Shi’a and Alawis in Syria,” essen-
tially calling for a jihad.58 Such statements by influential Sunni clerics
have helped motivate foreign fighters to join the battle in Syria, often
with jihadist militias, including IS. According to one foreign fighter,
“The war in Syria is between the Alawi and Shi’a people and the Sunni.
We have to follow the orders of God to help [the Sunni].”59 This atti-
tude is emblematic of the motivations of many foreign Sunni fighters
and has been contrasted with those of Syria-born Sunni rebels and
civilians who have particular political grievances against the Bashar al-
Assad government.60 For Qaradawi and other Sunni clerics, “the Syrian
war is evidence of the Shi’a drive for power over the Sunnis, no matter
the cost.”61
Regime and Opposition Elements Have Employed Sectarian-Related

Assaults, but Much Violence Remains Indiscriminate
Violence and “cleansing” against Sunni and Alawi/Shi’a communities
have been committed in a number of cases by proregime militias on
one hand and rebel groups on the other, and these atrocities have been
accompanied by extreme anti-Shi’a and anti-Sunni rhetoric that fuels
a widening of the sectarian divide. It stokes fear that minority groups
(e.g., Alawis, Christians) are unable to safely live under Sunni rule, and
vice versa.
57 Quoted in Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 207.

58 Quoted in David Schenker, “Qaradawi and the Struggle for Sunni Islam,” PolicyWatch,
No. 2157, Washington Institute, October 16, 2013.
59 Quoted in Vera Mironova and Sam Whitt, “A Glimpse into the Minds of Four Foreign
Fighters in Syria,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 6, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,
June 2014, p. 7.
60 Mironova and Whitt, 2014, p. 7.
61 Abdo, 2013, p. 42.
Bashar al-Assad’s violent response to initially peaceful, nonsectar-

ian demonstrations helped set the conditions for increasingly sectarian
violence as the conflict extended over time and broadened in space.
Hoping to quickly crush public dissent in these early stages, the al-
Assad regime “would have to rely on predominantly Alawite military
units, armed intelligence operatives, and criminal auxiliaries to put
down an uprising that was mostly, although far from exclusively, Sunni
Muslim.”62 In so doing, the regime exacerbated existing prejudices
among the Sunni majority that rendered the entire Alawi community
as complicit in regime survival and in maintaining Sunni inferiority
politically and economically. It also helped both regime supporters and
detractors to mobilize some constituencies based on sectarian identity.
Subsequent violence directed at homogeneous communities has
helped fuel sectarian actions in the conflict. There are a number of
examples of reported massacres that appear to be directed at oppos-
ing sects. The al-Assad regime and, in particular, its brutal shabiha
paramilitary groups have instigated several widely reported and uti-
lized instances of targeted attacks against Sunni civilians. In the small
Sunni town of Taldou, near Houla northwest of Homs, 108 civilians—
including 49 children and 34 women—were “summarily executed in
two separate incidents” on May 25, 2012, by armed men who moved
house to house late into the night.63 It was alleged that these shoot-
ers were shabiha from nearby Alawi villages to the south of Houla. A
second massacre occurred in nearby al-Qubeir, northwest of Hama,
less than two weeks later. Seventy-eight civilians—most of the small
village’s inhabitants—were shot, beheaded, and burned. A UN mission
to assess the site was initially blocked by the Syrian Army; when UN
personnel finally were permitted to enter the town, no corpses were
62 Frederic C. Hof, “Syria: Does the Threat of Sectarian ‘Cleansing’ Stay the West’s Hand?”
Atlantic Council, May 17, 2013.
63 See Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “Syria Massacre Victims in Houla Executed, Says UN,” Huff-
ington Post, May 29, 2012; and “Houla: How a Massacre Unfolded,” BBC News, June 8,
2012.
present. The massacre was again attributed to the shabiha.64 A year

later, in May 2013, some 150 civilians in the Sunni town of Bayda and
the Sunni Ras al-Nabaa district of the city of Baniyas (both along the
Mediterranean coast south of Latakia) were killed, this time reportedly
by Syrian soldiers with shabiha involvement, also causing hundreds of
Sunnis to flee their homes. Notably, this was followed by a joint call on
YouTube from an Alawi militia leader and an Alawi religious figure for
plans to “cleanse Baniyas of the traitors” and has been linked to Bashar
al-Assad’s alleged plan to secure an Alawi-dominated rump state in the
coastal region in the event Damascus falls.65
Nonstate armed groups opposing the government—the vast major-
ity of which are Sunni, whether secular or pious—have also engaged
in sectarian-related violence. Generally, like their political and social
expressions, self-proclaimed jihadists (e.g., al-Nusra, IS) tend to perpe-
trate the most egregious examples of this. Sunni extremists abducted
at least 54 Alawi women and children during operations in the Latakia
region in August 2013, and they were reportedly held by mujahideen
in the Latakia countryside.66 In February 2015, IS raided a number of
rural Assyrian Christian villages west of Hasaka in northeastern Syria
and kidnapped some 150 civilians, including children and the elderly.67
Massacres against primarily Alawi and Christian communities have
been reported, with 15 murdered in Homs in April 2012, 300 in Aqrab
in December 2012, 16 in Maksar al-Hesan in September 2013, and 45
in Sadad in October 2013.68 Also in 2013, a video posted by radical
Sunni rebels of bodies of Shi’a massacred in Hatla was accompanied by
64 See Rick Gladstone, “UN Monitors in Syria Find Grisly Traces of Massacre,” New York
Times, June 8, 2012; and Ruth Sherlock and Magdy Samaan, “Syria: Full Horror of al-
Qubeir Massacre Emerges,” Telegraph, June 7, 2012.
65 Quoted in Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Syria Update: Assad Targets Sunni Along Syria’s Coast,”
Institute for the Study of War, May 10, 2013.
66 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015, “Country Summary: Syria,” January 2015, p.
5.
67 According to the Syriac National Council of Syria. See Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Islamic
State in Syria Abducts at Least 150 Christians,” Reuters, February 25, 2015.
68 Phillips, 2015, p. 360.
a militant calling them “dogs” and threatening the same fate to other
Shi’a.69
However, while such examples of sectarian violence are prevalent
in the rhetoric of groups seeking to mobilize adherents to their causes,
they do not necessarily dominate the overall prosecution of security
and combat operations in the Syrian Civil War. Killing of civilians has
most often been indiscriminate. Human Rights Watch has noted,
In 2014, Syria’s armed conflict grew increasingly bloody with

government and pro-government militias intensifying their
attacks on civilian areas and continuing use of indiscriminate
weapons. Government forces also continued to arbitrarily arrest,
disappear, and torture detainees, many of whom died in deten-
tion. Non-state armed groups opposing the government also car-
ried out serious abuses including deliberate and indiscriminate
attacks on civilians, use of child soldiers, kidnapping, and torture
in detention.70
Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions and barrel

bombs in populated areas held by rebel groups and have enforced sieges
that reportedly affect 200,000 civilians in an effort to starve them into
submission. Nonstate armed groups have launched indiscriminate
mortar and artillery attacks on civilian neighborhoods under govern-
ment control that have “repeatedly hit known civilian objectives, includ-
ing schools, mosques, and markets.”71 And, as noted earlier, intrasect
fighting has occurred as well; for example, clashes between Alawi elites
and government security forces occurred in Qardaha, hometown of the
al-Assad family, in the fall of 2012 after prominent Alawi families took
part in antiregime street protests.72 More recently, in August 2014,
the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights reported that IS executed
69 Reese, 2013, p. 14.

70 Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 1.
71 Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 4.
72 O’Bagy, 2013.
700 civilians from the Sunni al-Sheitaat tribe, which IS had been fight-
ing in eastern Syria over two oil fields it had taken.73
There Are Key Constituencies Inside Syria Not Motivated by

Sectarianism
The Alawis find themselves in the position of being inextricably linked
to the fate of the regime, “which still strives to exploit sectarian soli-
darity to maintain its support base.”74 Yet there are Alawi groups that
have expressed opposition to the regime and are calling for a unified,
democratic Syria to follow the Bashar al-Assad regime. At the same
time, there are Sunni-Arab communities that continue to support the
al-Assad regime.
Toward the beginning of the conflict, an Alawi writer from Syr-
ia’s coastal region exclaimed that it was not the jihadists persecuting
her sect, but the security services and the state who were “making the
Alawis line up behind the regime and defend it” despite the “state of tyr-
anny, miserable circumstances and widespread corruption” the regime
encouraged. She called on Syrians, particularly Alawis, to “smash the
narrative of this criminal regime with the truth of the revolution. . . .
This is a revolution and not a sectarian war.”75 Some Alawis, particu-
larly among the rural poor and professional classes, have denounced
the al-Assad government because of its clientelism and failure to pro-
vide adequate services.76
There remain important Sunni elements of Syrian society that
support the minority-rule al-Assad regime and a number of Sunni-
dominated groups opposing the regime that shun sectarian rhetoric
and emphasize national unity, including Sunni tribes, the National
73 Oliver Holmes and Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Islamic State Executed 700 People from Syrian
Tribe: Monitoring Group,” Reuters, August 16, 2014.
74 Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 221.
75 From Samar Yazbek, A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution, trans.
Max Weiss, London: Haus Publishing, 2012, quoted in Jose Ciro Martinez, “Rebellion,
Sectarian Slaughter or Civil War? Reading the Syrian Melee,” New Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 3, 2013, p. 5.
76 Martinez, 2013, p. 10.
Coalition, and the FSA. The regime maintains loyalty from Sunni
bureaucrats who rely on government paychecks and from some
middle-class and wealthy Sunni merchants in Damascus and Aleppo.
In largely Sunni Aleppo, when rebels attacked in 2012, Syria’s largest
city (and a financial center) was divided along economic lines, with the
wealthy western sectors divided from the poorer east.77 Tribal leader-
ship in Syria has been a voice of unity across sectarian lines. The Syrian
Arab Tribes Council, made up largely of Sunni tribes who oppose the
Bashar al-Assad government, emphasizes national unity and avoids
derogation of Shi’a or Alawis. In a June 2012 statement, they upheld
the legitimate rights of the Syrian people with their right of self-
defense and national resistance that aim[s] to bring down the
usurped gang of the authority and all its symbols, along with the
murderer of children Bashar al-Assad. . . . The council will con-
tinue to work in order to achieve this goal, and pay for all possible
resources and precious sacrifice for the homeland and its unity and
cohesion of its components with all sects and religions and nationali-
ties 78 [emphasis added].
A prominent leader of the Syrian Arab Tribes Council and head

of the Baqara tribe, Nawaf al-Bashir, criticized foreign backers of the
al-Assad regime in nonsectarian terms as “nothing but mafia; they are
tyrants, sinners, and murderers.”79 In 2014, the Sunni Baqara tribe bat-
tled IS, resulting in 400 deaths. This was followed by a truce, which IS
threatened in January 2015 by abducting three of al-Bashir’s sons.80 The
National Coalition and FSA maintain nonsectarian political agendas,
but they have weakened in relation to militant Sunni Islamist groups.
77 Phillips, 2015, p. 361.

78 Syrian Arab Tribes Council, Facebook post, June 5, 2012.
79 “I Praised Assad at Gunpoint, Says Syrian Tribal Leader,” Reuters, January 17, 2012.
80 See Redwan Bizar, “Islamic State Abducts Sons of Tribal Leader in Eastern Syria,” ARA
News, January 2, 2015a; and Redwan Bizar, “Islamic State Holds Meeting with Syrian Arab
Tribes in Hasakah,” ARA News, January 3, 2015b.
The Syrian Kurds tend toward the nonsectarian end of the spec-
trum in territories they administer. According to one Syrian Kurdish
rebel leader,
A year after we had liberated the Kurdish territories in Syria

from the regime’s troops, we realized that it would be necessary
to set up an administration. . . . In doing so, we included all
the territory’s other ethnic groups, such as the Arabs, Assyrians,
Turkmens.81
The Kurdish Democratic People’s Union, with the help of its

armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), has consolidated
control of a number of ethnically and religiously heterogeneous ter-
ritories in northern Syria and provides basic services, including edu-
cation in Arabic rather than Kurdish. In Kobane, where the Kurds
make up about 97 percent of the indigenous population, there were
some 300,000 internally displaced Syrians, mostly Arabs. Accord-
ing to one report, the displaced population lived in good conditions
under Kurdish administration and continued to receive education in
Arabic according to the Syrian curriculum—but without the subject of
“nationalism.”82 Finally, Syrian Kurds have, in some cases, sought to
promote cultural diversity. Large numbers of Syrian Kurdish school-
age children reportedly called for cultural diversity and multilingual-
ism on International Mother Language Day, stating that, “on this day
we Kurds greet all nations in the world, but particularly our beloved
Assyrian and Arab brothers and sisters here in Syria.”83 Yet it should
be noted that the Kurds have mobilized along ethno-sectarian lines to
counter IS and other extremist groups threatening Kurdish-dominated
territories in northern and northeastern Syria and have drawn support
81 “Austria: Syrian Kurds Fight al-Qa’idah on Europe’s Behalf Too, Says Rebel Leader,”
BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, January 9, 2014.
82 “Aleppo’s Kurds: Living Under Siege,” Al-Akhbar (English), January 12, 2014. This is
akin to what the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party did in Kurdish-controlled multiethnic
regions of Iraq after the no-fly zone was implemented in 1991.
83 “Minority Kurds Promote Cultural Diversity amid Syrian Civil War,” video, Your Middle
East, February 25, 2014.
from and coordinated with Iraqi Kurdish political parties and armed
forces as well.
In sum, various internal and external actors in the Syrian con-
flict have found sectarianism to be a useful means of mobilization,
and they have used it to sow fear among constituencies and demon-
ize the “other.” Early on, the regime of Bashar al-Assad used sectar-
ian rhetoric to solidify the support of his Alawi base and to ensure
that other minorities remained in his camp, or at least neutral. Sunni
extremist groups like IS and al-Nusra—whose very ideologies glorify
violence against other sects—have spread sectarianism against Alawis,
Christians, Shi’a, and other minorities. External actors like Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and nonstate groups or individuals have, in various
ways, promoted sectarian agendas as a means of defending or seeking
to bring down the al-Assad regime. Both proregime and rebel groups
have committed acts of sectarian-based violence and ethnic cleans-
ing. Yet, in the midst of these heavily publicized acts of violence and
rhetoric, there exist important groups in Syria that are not motivated
by sectarianism and that do not fit neatly into constituencies ascribed
to them by outside observers. Antiregime Alawis, proregime Sunnis,
moderate rebel groups, and tribes whose allegiance is based on self-
preservation all present counterpoints to what appears to be common
wisdom about the Syrian conflict as a “sectarian war.”
Conclusions and Implications of Sectarianism in the

Syrian Conflict
While there has been a long history of sectarian identity in Syria, sec-
tarianism has not been a primary feature of a heterogeneous Syrian
society. But it has provided an underpinning that rises to greater
prominence—and is given to exploitation—in times of strife. The
al-Assads, while seeking to promote nationalism and secularism to
obscure the fact of minority rule, have also exploited sectarian dis-
course to cement their hold on power. As strife intensified in 2011,
sectarianism became an attractive tool for multiple competing political
agendas.
Sectarianism plays an important role in fueling the Syrian con-

flict, but it has not been the only factor, nor is it uniformly the most
important. On one hand, Hokayem notes, as the conflict goes on,
Syrian society becomes ever more fragmented along communal lines:
While the struggle is not primarily defined by sectarianism, the

warring sides increasingly brandish communal identity as a tool
of protection, mobilization, and exclusion. Distrust among and
within Syria’s various social and confessional groups has deep-
ened. Many Sunnis perceive themselves to be the victims of a
repression approved, explicitly or tacitly, by many members of
the main minority groups and designed to keep them away from
power. . . . On the other hand, minorities observe with alarm
and trepidation the growing radicalism of the opposition and
its assumed hostility towards them. Jihadi violence and isolated
instances of sectarian revenge have had a major psychological
impact on minorities. Many Alawi families have abandoned large
cities for the safety of their villages and joined regime-backed
militias, while many Christians have begun making plans for
expatriation to Lebanon and beyond. Shi’a communities have
built closer ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi Shi’a par-
ties, while the Kurds have looked to the Iraqi example of de facto
autonomy.84
The longer the conflict goes on, the more such tensions are likely
to gain prominence as a motivating factor in the civil war and as
an obstacle to a solution. Marc Lynch has termed this “ratcheting,”
whereby, “under conditions of state failure, uncertainty, violence, and
fear . . . [i]t is far easier to generate sectarian animosities than it is to
calm them down. . . . Identity entrepreneurs may think that they can
turn the hatred on and off as it suits their interests, but at some point
these identities become self-sustaining and internalized.”85
84 Hokayem, 2013, p. 192.

85 Marc Lynch, “The Entrepreneurs of Cynical Sectarianism: Why the Middle East’s
Identity Conflicts Go Way Beyond the Sunni-Shiite Divide,” Foreign Policy, No. 4, Novem-
ber 13, 2013, p. 5.
On the other hand, sectarianism did not create the revolt against
Bashar al-Assad in 2011, and it is not the only factor fueling it. The
conflict is too complex to explain away as a simple explosion of sec-
tarianism with roots in distant history. Important constituencies sup-
port or oppose the regime across sectarian lines. External actors are
exploiting communal identity to promote their own geostrategic agen-
das. And the considerable gains by the most-extreme elements of the
opposition—namely, IS and al-Qaeda–linked groups—are as alarm-
ing to their coreligionists as they are to minority sects. Allegiances are
crosscutting and are based also on political ideology, substate identity,
geography, war experience, and economic motivation.86 Given these
other factors, it is not appropriate to term Syria’s conflict a “sectarian
war.” Sectarianism is but one factor whose prominence varies depend-
ing on the actor, despite its high profile in reporting on the conflict.
An Extended Conflict Has the Potential to Raise Sectarian

Motivation Inside and Outside Syria
Though the conclusion of this review of the Syrian Civil War suggests
caution in attributing the conflict solely—or even primarily—to sec-
tarian motivations, there is ample reason for concern that sectarian-
ism could lead to worsening of the conflict or to outcomes that do not
stop the violence and destabilize the rest of the region. At the time of
this writing, the possibility of a negotiated settlement seems remote.
Moreover, there does not appear to be a clearly dominant actor that
can bring the conflict to a conclusion by force, and the parties that are
more likely to control the state over time—the Syrian government and
jihadist forces, with moderate opposition forces a distant third87 —pos-
sess sectarian strategies or ideologies:
• A regime “win,” in which government forces push rebel groups

out of much of western, northern, and southern Syria, would leave
86 Phillips, 2015, pp. 360–361.

87 The U.S. effort to train and equip 3,000 moderate rebels by the end of 2015 (and 5,400
per year after that) appears to be faltering, with fewer than 100 volunteers undergoing train-
ing at the time of this writing. See Robert Burns, “U.S. Program to Train Syrian Rebels Has
Fewer Than 100 Volunteers,” Stars and Stripes, June 29, 2015.
minority rule in place in Damascus and would not address the

political and economic grievances that fueled the revolt in the first
place. Because of the “baggage” that years of conflict have cre-
ated, sectarianism might play a more prominent part in govern-
ment policy and rhetoric than it did prior to the revolt.
• A jihadist “win” in Syria would not end bloodshed or repression
and would lead to more sectarian-based violence and policies. Vio-
lence and cleansing would likely be meted out against Alawis and
Shi’a who had not fled, while any remaining Christians would be
vulnerable to repression via the jizya tax and other administrative,
economic, and social policies.
• Another possible outcome could include the emergence of ethno-
sectarian territories, ministates, or fiefdoms due to battlefield
results or regime collapse, with each entity situated in an area
of relative homogeneity in ethnic, religious, or political terms—
homogeneous historically or because of migration. Thus, an
Alawi ministate could emerge in the coastal areas and Jabal
Nusayriyyah, a Kurdish one in the northeast, a Sunni salafi-jihad-
ist emirate in the north and east, and a Sunni statelet in the south
between Damascus and the Golan Heights formed by less sec-
tarian, Sunni-dominated opposition groups. Other minorities—
Christians, Druze, Shi’a, and others—might reside in some com-
bination of these areas or expatriate themselves. Violence would
not necessarily cease, as each actor seeks to solidify or expand its
own borders. The level of sectarianism within and among each of
these fiefdoms would depend upon the actor.88
Notably, any of these outcomes would likely involve the addi-

tional mass transfer of populations, some of which would likely be
sectarian-based.
The war has already provoked sectarian-related tension and strife
outside Syria’s borders. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey host hundreds of
88 Drawn from a workshop on alternative Syrian futures held at RAND in December

2013. See Andrew M. Liepman, Brian Nichiporuk, and Jason Killmeyer, Alternative Futures
for Syria: Regional Implications and Challenges for the United States, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, PE-129-RC, 2014, p. 3.
thousands of Syrian refugees. Many of these, especially in Jordan, are

Sunni and have formed views of the war and of other Syrian sects based
in no small part on the experiences that drove them from their homes.
One scholar indicates that populations in Syria have experienced
the war in different ways across the state and that “victims of ethno-
sectarian violence are far more likely to view the conflict through a sec-
tarian lens than those who have not been subjected to it.”89 Such views
can affect populations’ perceptions in host countries and complicate
the development and implementation of policies; notably, 80 percent of
refugees in Jordan live outside the refugee camps in towns and cities.90
And in the event of repatriation, the possibility of reprisal killings and
land disputes will be high.
The sectarian divide in the Persian Gulf—a divide that has roots
in official policy in some states—is being exacerbated by the increas-
ingly sectarian nature of the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq, as well as
government worldviews that drive their approaches to those conflicts.91
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain have Sunni-dominated govern-
ments with significant Shi’a populations (and in the case of Bahrain,
a Shi’a majority), and each faces spillover from the two conflicts. For
example, IS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Shi’a
mosque in Kuwait in late June 2015 that killed 27 people and wounded
more than 200. Extremist fighters in Syria aim to continue the jihad
and “free the Arabian Peninsula.”92 Sectarian tension could increase
in those countries, leading to instability and violence like that seen
recently in Yemen.
Lebanon, built upon a fragile sectarian balance, has already experi-
enced increased instability and a growing inability to effectively govern
its sovereign territory, particularly in the north. Fighting has broken
out in the coastal city of Tripoli, as well as the Hezbollah redoubt in
the Bekaa Valley, where the Shi’a group has allied with local Chris-
89 Phillips, 2015, p. 361.

90 Jasser, 2014, p. 65.
91 “Saudi Arabia Has a Shiite Problem,” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2014.
92 Mironova and Whitt, 2014, p. 4.
tians and where Sunni leaders in nearby Arsal have openly supported
the insurgency against Bashar al-Assad.93 Shi’a political expressions
in Lebanon describing the fight in Syria have taken on increasingly
theological rather than geopolitical tones. In one Shi’a neighborhood
in Beirut, for example, pamphlets explain the Syrian war in terms of
the apocalypse—a fight against the dajal (the false messiah who will
appear before the Day of Resurrection) that is linked with the return
of the mahdi from Shi’a millenarianism and eschatology. Such imag-
ery has attracted foreign Shi’a fighters to Syria from as far away as
Pakistan and Azerbaijan.94 Al-Nusra confirmed in March 2015 that it
considers striking Hezbollah in Lebanon to be an objective because of
Hezbollah’s violence against Sunnis in Syria. Calling Hezbollah by the
derogatory name Hezb Lat (Party of Lat, the pre-Islamic goddess of the
Underworld), al-Nusra has stated that “this vexed Hezb Lat, that the
Sunni people possess a thorn, so it incited the army to strike them. . . .
It is no longer a secret to anyone what the Party [Hezbollah] commits
against the Sunni people in Syria. Therefore, our objective in Lebanon
at this stage is to hit the strongholds of the Iranian Hezbollah, for the
party and whoever supports it is a legitimate target for us. . . . we collect
our efforts to push away the assailing Nusayri enemy and its allies.”95
Lebanon, therefore, is highly vulnerable to the spread of sectarian vio-
lence from Syria.
Thus, while the Syrian conflict should not be considered a “sec-
tarian war” whose foundation is based on confessional animosities,
important parties to the conflict have used sectarianism effectively
to mobilize constituencies. And there is ample reason to worry that
sectarianism could grow internally the longer the conflict goes on—
making it more intractable to a negotiated solution—and spread exter-
93 Anne Barnard, “Sectarian Wedge Pushes from Syria to Lebanon,” New York Times, Octo-
ber 27, 2014.
94 “The Escalating Shia-Sunni Conflict: Assessing the Role of ISIS,” Stimson Center Con-
ference, Middle East Program, December 15, 2014.
95 Al-Nusra, “Statement No. 24: Statement Clarifying What Came in the Interview of
Sheikh Abu Malik al-Shami, May Allah Preserve Him,” translated by SITE, March 15,
2015b.
nally to other parts of the region where important U.S. interests lie.
Alternatives that involve a regime or jihadi “win,” or a devolution of
Syria into statelets with continued violence, are not agreeable outcomes
in this context. Therefore, the sooner the conflict can be brought to an
acceptable conclusion, the better.
This suggests two policy paths for the United States. The first
involves substantial support to moderate anti–al-Assad groups in
Syria—not only so-called moderate rebels, but also other groups with
nonsectarian grievances, including Alawis and tribes—in combination
with redoubled efforts to bring about a negotiated solution. U.S. sup-
port should be perceived as equitable and nonsectarian. The second
requires development of an effective strategy for the defeat of IS and
others in Syria with whom it is not possible to negotiate because of
their extremist agendas and exclusively sectarian ideologies. Failure to
pursue these two tracks may lead to increased sectarianism in a con-
flict that could last many years longer. That said, managing the balance
between seeking the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the denuding of IS will
continue to be a severe challenge.
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Sectarianism is often claimed to be the root cause of current conflicts

in the Middle East. Although sectarianism does play a major role, we
argue against the depiction of it as one ancient, continuous, and intrac-
table conflict between the Sunni and Shi’a over theological disputes.
Taking a historical approach and using diverse primary and sec-
ondary sources, this report demonstrates that sectarianism is a com-
plex political phenomenon shaped more by social, economic, political,
and other practical considerations than by theological disagreements or
religious animosity. As detailed in the history of Sunni-Shi’a conflict
in the region, the examination of Syria and Iraq as case studies, and
the discussion of regional sectarian competition, specific nonreligious
factors drive and exacerbate sectarianism and sectarian conflict rather
than sectarianism driving these conflicts.
State governments; regional sectarian actors, such as Saudi Arabia
and Iran; and transnational extremist groups, such as IS, utilize sectar-
ian rhetoric or action for their own political purposes. State repression
often causes individuals or groups within civil society to respond to a
perceived or real threat to their sectarian identities. For example, the
2011 Syrian Civil War began as a series of political demonstrations
against the Alawi-led state but morphed into a conflict with sectarian
overtones as the Bashar al-Assad regime shot demonstrators en masse
and released Islamist prisoners, precipitating the Syrian war we witness
today. Additionally, while not the cause of sectarianism, regional sec-
tarian actors and transnational extremist groups exacerbate preexisting
107
sectarian divisions and cause conflicts to worsen. One sees this in both
Iraq and Syria.
It seems undeniable that ethno-sectarianism will play a strong
and perhaps dominant role in Iraqi politics, at least for the foreseeable
future. Nearly two centuries of Sunni oppression of the Shi’a will not
soon be forgotten, nor will the intense violence of the 2006–2007 civil
war or the more-recent government oppression of Sunnis. However,
the history of sectarianism in Iraq suggests that it is not too late to
avert state fragmentation. Sunni identity in Iraq is not entirely about
Sunni Islam, and the Sunnis did not identify primarily along sectarian
lines until well into the past decade. This was perhaps also true of Shi’a
Iraqis in the early 1800s: There was a point at which the Ottoman gov-
ernment could have been more inclusive of the Shi’a rather than forc-
ing them to self-organize along sectarian lines. In 2015, Prime Minister
al-Abadi has publicly acknowledged that government reform is the key
to stability and state survival and that reconciling with the Sunnis is
central to this effort.
While poor governance and disastrous intervention intensified
sectarianism in Iraq, improved governance and less meddlesome exter-
nal support might offer a recipe for eventual stability. This may be true
in Iraq and in other areas in the Middle East currently riven by sectar-
ian conflict.
Despite efforts in Syria by several internal and external parties to
the civil war to exploit sectarian tension to promote their own political
agendas and mobilize constituencies, it would be simplistic to refer to
sectarianism as the main source of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad
or as the sole motivator of continuing violence. The anti–al-Assad upris-
ing began as a cross-sectarian rebellion, and, even now, there are key
constituencies inside Syria (progovernment Sunnis, antigovernment
Alawis, and groups with nonsectarian agendas) not motivated by sec-
tarianism. Allegiances are crosscutting and are based also on political
ideology, substate identity, geography, war experience, and economic
drivers.
However, though we suggest caution in attributing the conflict
solely—or even primarily—to sectarian motivations, there is ample
reason for concern that sectarianism could make the war more intrac-
Conclusion and Policy Implications 109
table to a negotiated solution and lead to worsening of the conflict or

to outcomes that do not stop the violence and destabilize other parts of
the region where there are vital U.S. interests. Alternatives that involve
a regime or jihadi “win” or a devolution of Syria into statelets with con-
tinued violence will not stanch growing sectarianism in this context.
Therefore, the sooner the conflict can be brought to a conclusion that
addresses mainstream Syrian grievances and interests, the better.
Having examined how sectarianism can manifest differently in
different places, the U.S. government, especially the U.S. Army, should
consider several factors when determining the best policy for involve-
ment in conflicts in which sectarianism is part of the equation. Sec-
tarianism needs to be viewed as a complex political problem and, thus,
needs comprehensive policy prescriptions.
Acknowledge Limits on the U.S. Ability to Influence the Role of

Sectarianism in Middle East Conflicts
First and foremost, it is important for U.S. policymakers to internal-
ize the fact that the power of the United States to actively and directly
dissipate sectarianism as a factor in regional conflict is limited. U.S.
policies and actions can seek to support non- or pansectarian agendas
and avoid the appearance of favoritism, but they are not likely to play
a direct role in either broadening or contracting sectarian identity as a
motivator of violence. It is difficult to foresee anything but a cessation
of hostilities and a broad-based solution to the conflicts (as well as con-
tainment or elimination of the most-extremist groups, such as IS) that
would be an effective counter to growing sectarianism. Recent U.S.
efforts to forge a common approach to UN-sponsored peace talks on
Syria and support for Iraqi operations against IS are important in this
regard. Our policy prescriptions therefore focus on ensuring that U.S.
policies do not exacerbate sectarianism or play into sectarian narratives
that already exist on all sides of the conflicts. Where possible, we rec-
ommend that the United States use its influence to persuade friends in
the region to consider less sectarian narratives of the conflicts in pur-
suit of equitable solutions.
The U.S. presence in the region and the U.S. Army’s role in lead-
ing the coalition against IS do provide the United States influence
and leverage, and U.S. policymakers should exploit its position to the
extent practicable to shape a shared strategic vision among its friends
and allies that crosses sectarian boundaries.
Avoid Oversimplification
Sectarianism is not the same in each country or region, and it mani-
fests itself differently in different places. Policymakers need to be aware
of this to avoid making generalizations about the role of sectarian-
ism in Middle East conflicts in order to tailor a unique and effective
approach to each conflict.
U.S. decisionmakers should avoid placing people and groups
into large, simplified categories for easier identification. Instead, they
should identify individuals and groups with which the United States
can find common ground on political objectives. This will take long-
term, wide-scale intelligence collection and in-depth analysis.
Address Political Issues at Hand, Given That Sectarianism Is Usually

a Symptom of Conflict, Not a Cause of It
It is important to note that, while the political environment of the
region currently lends itself to a surge in sectarianism, sectarianism
might not be the most important way in which to understand regional
conflict, which, in its most simplified form, looks like solely sectar-
ian conflict. Viewing regional conflict through a strictly sectarian lens
could be a major pitfall for policymakers, especially because sects are
not homogeneous blocs.
U.S. decisionmakers should identify nonsectarian motivations to
work with those “acting outside of their sect.” This entails cooperat-
ing as much as possible with current government and local actors to
assuage practical concerns contributing to conflict.
The United States Should Not Choose Sides or Be Perceived to Be

Choosing Sides
Sectarianism can be best described as a two-pronged phenomenon:
internal and external sectarianism. Internal sectarianism is sectarian
conflict or rhetoric on an intrastate level, usually from a country’s state
leaders, religious leaders, or oppositionists who are using sectarian
Conclusion and Policy Implications 111
identity for their own political purposes. For policymakers, internal

sectarianism causes a dilemma of whom to support and whether to
get involved at all; as history has too often shown, foreign favoritism
toward one side of an internal political conflict can backfire, especially
if that conflict is based on sectarian divisions. Any involvement must
be carefully considered, given that choosing can make the situation
worse and possibly undermine both U.S. national security interests and
the interests of the groups in conflict.
Explicitly Utilize Train-and-Equip and Coalition Efforts to Promote

Nonsectarian Narratives and Cross-Sectarian Dialogue
The U.S. Army is at the forefront of efforts to advise, train, and equip
forces fighting IS in Syria and Iraq, and its presence as part of the coali-
tion provides an opportunity to forge cross-sectarian partnerships and
to promote dialogue among Shi’a, Sunni, and other sects in the region.
The Army could begin to view training and equipping programs
not just as a means to increase military capability but also as a way of
shaping partners’ perception of the threat and of the utility of work-
ing across sectarian lines. Inculcation of professionalism and respect
for human rights are among the key counters to the sectarianism that
appears to be increasing in the region. Army advisers can also serve as
interlocutors between anti-IS fighters who are from different sects or
between local groups and the Iraqi government.
Do Not Contribute to the Institutionalization of Sectarianism in

State and Local Institutions
U.S. decisionmakers should avoid policies that institutionalize sectari-
anism in local or state institutions. This entails working with lead-
ers committed to pursuing nonsectarian and pluralistic policies. The
United States should support and encourage local and state institu-
tions and provide incentives across the sects to achieve participation
and inclusiveness in governing institutions.
Institutions throughout the region have been undergoing transi-
tion since the Arab Uprisings in 2011. The United States must take the
long view that this period of transition is likely to be unstable and often
violent. But policies should also be developed with a view to shaping
longer-term outcomes. In Iraq, this means encouraging programs that

seek to undo the damage of years of Iraqi government alienation of the
Sunni minority and reintegrating Sunnis into Iraqi society and govern-
ment and, most importantly, the Iraqi Army.
Determine Unique Approaches to Mitigate the Sectarianizing

Policies of External Sectarian Actors
External sectarianism takes place on an interstate level and involves a
sectarian actor’s encouragement of sectarian divisions in foreign coun-
tries internally for its own political purposes. The continued regional-
ization of sectarianism has the potential to cause conflict in individual
states to spread to other states by way of sectarian groups being incited
internally by foreign sectarian conflicts or by way of external sectarian
encouragement. It is important to note that many U.S. partners in the
region—especially the Gulf Arab states—see the conflicts and even
their foreign policies through a largely sectarian lens. U.S. policymak-
ers should encourage alternative narratives in interactions with these
partners, including through senior leader engagements on political and
military matters.
Bibliography
Al-Abadi, Haider, “PM’s 1st Package of Reforms to COM,” official text,

Government of Iraq, August 9, 2015. As of August 15, 2015:
http://pmo.iq/pme/press2015en/9-8-20152en.htm
Abbas, Mushreq, “Iraq’s ‘Sunni’ Rebellion Shows Splits Between ISIS, Others,”
Al-Monitor, June 24, 2014.
Abdo, Geneive, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the
Shi’a Sunni Divide, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013.
Abdul-Ahad, Geith, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front—Ruthless, Organised and Taking
Control,” Guardian, July 10, 2013. As of June 17, 2015:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/10/syria-al-nusra-front-jihadi
Abdul-Jabar, Faleh, and Hosham Dawod, Tribes and Power: Nationalism and
Ethnicity in the Middle East, London: Saqi Books, 2003.
Abdulla, Namo, “The View from Kurdistan: Divide Iraq in Order to Save It,” Al
Jazeera, June 13, 2014. As of June 7, 2015:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/iraq-isil-
kurds-201461274633487455.html
Adams, Doris G., “Current Population Trends in Iraq,” Middle East Journal,
Vol. 10, No. 2, 1956, pp. 151–165.
Alaaldin, Ramj, “If Iraq Is to Survive, Then It Must Be Divided into Separate
Regions,” Independent, August 17, 2014. As of June 7, 2015:
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/if-iraq-is-to-survive-then-it-must-
be-split-into-ethnic-and-religious-regions-9674794.html
Ala Hamoudi, Haider, Negotiating in Civil Conflict: Constitutional Construction
and Imperfect Bargaining in Iraq, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014,
Kindle.
Arango, Tim, “Dozens Killed in Battles Across Iraq as Sunnis Escalate Protests
Against Government,” New York Times, April 23, 2013. As of July 8, 2015:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/middleeast/
clashes-at-sunni-protest-site-in-iraq.html
113
Armstrong, Karen, Islam: A Short History, New York: Modern Library, 2002.
“Assad: Takfiri Terrorism Targets Diverse Social, Cultural Fabric of Region,”
Syrian Arab News Agency, June 11, 2015.
“Austria: Syrian Kurds Fight al-Qa’idah on Europe’s Behalf Too, Says Rebel
Leader,” BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, January 9, 2014.
Baram, Amatzia, “Neotribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991–
1996,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, No. 29, 1997, pp. 1–31.
Barnard, Anne, “Sectarian Wedge Pushes from Syria to Lebanon,” New York
Times, October 27, 2014.
Barwari, Delovan, “Partition Will Help End the Turmoil in Iraq,” Jerusalem Post,
March 8, 2015. As of June 7, 2015:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Partition-will-help-end-the-turmoil-in-Iraq-393315
Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Invasion Iraq,” Middle East Policy,
Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 47–58.
Batutu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978, Kindle.
———, Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Bhalla, Reva, “Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis,” Stratfor, May 5, 2011
Bizar, Redwan, “Islamic State Abducts Sons of Tribal Leader in Eastern Syria,”
ARA News, January 2, 2015a.
———, “Islamic State Holds Meeting with Syrian Arab Tribes in Hasakah,” ARA
News, January 3, 2015b.
Boghani, Priyanka, “In Their Own Words: Sunnis on Their Treatment in Maliki’s
Iraq,” Public Broadcasting Service, October 28, 2014. As of July 8, 2015:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/iraq-war-on-terror/rise-of-isis/
in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-malikis-iraq/
Bradley, Matt, and Ghassan Adnan, “Shiite Militias Win Bloody Battles in Iraq,
Show No Mercy,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2014:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
shiite-militias-win-bloody-battles-in-iraq-show-no-mercy-1417804464
Brancati, Dawn, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27,
No. 2, 2004, pp. 5–21.
Burns, Robert, “U.S. Program to Train Syrian Rebels Has Fewer Than 100
Volunteers,” Stars and Stripes, June 29, 2015.
Caris, Charles C., and Samuel Reynolds, ISIS Governance in Syria, Middle East
Security Report 22, Institute for the Study of War, July 2014.
Bibliography 115
Çetinsaya, Gökhan, “The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy Towards the
Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2005, pp. 561–574.
Chivers, C. J., “Answering a Cleric’s Call, Iraqi Shiites Take Up Arms,” New York
Times, June 21, 2014. As of August 16, 2015:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/world/middleeast/iraq-militia.html
Choksy, Jamsheed K., and Carol E. B. Choksy, “Defeat ISIS, but Let Iraq Split,”
World Affairs, undated. As of June 7, 2015:
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/defeat-isis-let-iraq-split
CIA—See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Coalition Provisional Authority, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number
1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” Baghdad, Iraq, 2003.
Cockburn, Patrick, Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle
for Iraq, New York: Scribner, 2008.
Cole, Juan, Marsh Arab Rebellion: Grievance, Mafias and Militias in Iraq, Fourth
Wadie Jwaideh Memorial Lecture, Department of Near Eastern Languages and
Cultures, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., 2008.
Cole, Juan R. I., and Moojan Momen, “Mafia, Mob, and Shiism in Iraq: The
Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala, 1824–1843,” Past and Present, No. 112, 1986,
pp. 112–143.
Coles, Isabel, “Iraq Chaos Fuels Kurds’ Independence Dream, but Hurdles
Remain,” Reuters, July 6, 2014. As of August 16, 2015:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/06/
us-iraq-security-kurds-idUSKBN0FB0Y620140706
Connable, Ben, Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-377-RC, 2012. As of August 1, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP377.html
———, “A Long Term Strategy for a Democratic Iraq,” War on the Rocks, June 30,
2014. As of August 6, 2015:
http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/a-long-term-strategy-for-a-democratic-iraq/
Cooper, Andrew Scott, “Showdown at Doha: The Secret Oil Deal That Helped
Sink the Shah of Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4, August 2008, pp.
567–591.
CPA—See Coalition Provisional Authority.
Dale, Stephen F., The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. As of August 16, 2015:
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0813313597
Dawisha, Adeed, “‘Identity’ and Political Survival in Saddam’s Iraq,” Middle East
Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999, pp. 553–567.
———, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair,

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003, Kindle.
———, Iraq: A Political History, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2009, Kindle.
Dawood, Hosham, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the
State: The Case of Iraq,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawood, Tribes and
Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, London: Saqi Books, 2003,
pp. 83–108.
Devlin, John F., “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis,” American Historical
Review, Vol. 96, No. 5, 1991, pp. 1396–1407.
Dodge, Toby, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
———, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.
———, “Seeking to Explain the Rise of Sectarianism in the Middle East: The
Case Study of Iraq,” Project on Middle East Political Science, March 19, 2014.
Edelman, Marc, “Social Movements Changing Paradigms and Forms of Politics,”
Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 30, 2000, pp. 285–317.
Eich, Thomas, “Patterns of the 1920 Rising in Iraq, the Rifaiyya Tariqa and
Shiism,” Arabica, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2009, pp. 112–119.
Eppel, Michael, Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of
Saddam, Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2004.
Farouk-Alli, Aslam, “Sectarianism in Alawi Syria: Exploring the Paradoxes of
Politics and Religion,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2014,
pp. 207–226.
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett, “The Historiography of Modern Iraq,”
American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, 1991, pp. 1408–1421.
Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other
Means,” West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy,
October 13, 2008.
Fildis, Ayse Tekdal, “Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria,” Middle East Policy
Council, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2012
Fischer, Hannah, Iraqi Civilian Death Estimates, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, RS22537, August 27, 2008.
“Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” Washington Post, October 11, 2014.
Fromkin, Alissa, “Part Three: UAE Foreign Policy in Iraq and Syria,” International
Affairs Review, Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University, March 5, 2015.
Bibliography 117
Fuller, Graham E., “Why Does ISIS Hate Shi’a?” lobelog.com, December 17,
2014.
Gause, Gregory F., Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War,
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2014.
Gengler, Justin L., “Understanding Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf,” in Sectarian
Politics in the Persian Gulf, Lawrence G. Potter, ed., London: Hurst and Company,
2013, pp. 31–66.
Gladstone, Rick, “UN Monitors in Syria Find Grisly Traces of Massacre,” New
York Times, June 8, 2012
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “After Iraq,” Atlantic, January–February 2008. As of June 20,
2015:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/01/after-iraq/306577/
———, “The New Map of the Middle East,” Atlantic, June 19, 2014. As of June
20, 2015:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/
the-new-map-of-the-middle-east/373080/
Government of Iraq, “Agrarian Reform Law of the Republic of Iraq,” No. 30,
Baghdad, Iraq, October 1958.
Gritten, David, “Long Path to Iraq’s Sectarian Split,” BBC News, February 25,
2006. As of June 20, 2015:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4750320.stm
Haddad, Fanar, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity, Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2011, Kindle.
———, “Sectarian Relations and Sunni Identity in Post–Civil War Iraq,” in
Lawrence G. Potter, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst and
Company, 2013, pp. 67–115.
———, “Reinventing Sunni Identity in Iraq After 2003,” Current Trends in
Islamist Ideology, Vol. 17, 2014, pp. 70–101.
Haddad, Fanar, and Sajjad Rizvi, “Fitting Baghdad In,” in Reidar Visser and
Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 51–74.
Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of
War, backgrounder, 2010. As of June 4, 2015:
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/
Backgrounder_ShiaMilitias.pdf
Harding, Luke, Miriam Elder, and Peter Beaumont, “Assad Losing Syria War,
Russia Admits for First Time,” Guardian, December 13, 2012.
Heydemann, Steven, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict
1946–1970, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1999.
———, “Syria’s Uprising: Sectarianism, Regionalisation, and State Order in the

Levant,” Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
working paper 119, May 2013.
“Hezbollah, Syrian Army Advance in Jarajir Barrens,” al-Manar, June 12, 2015.
Hof, Frederic C., “Syria: Does the Threat of Sectarian ‘Cleansing’ Stay the West’s
Hand?” Atlantic Council, May 17, 2013.
Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi Series,
Vol. 53, No. 438, June 14, 2013, p. 18.
Holmes, Oliver, and Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Islamic State Executed 700 People
from Syrian Tribe: Monitoring Group,” Reuters, August 16, 2014.
Hornsey, Matthew J., “Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory:
A Historical Overview,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass, Vol. 2, No. 1,
2008, pp. 204–222.
“Houla: How a Massacre Unfolded,” BBC News, June 8, 2012.
Hudson, Michael C., “Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics,”
Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1969, pp. 245–263.
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015, “Country Summary: Syria,” January
2015, p. 5.
Hunt, Emily, “Zarqawi’s ‘Total War’ on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide Among
Sunni Jihadists,” Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, November 15, 2005.
As of August 16, 2015:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
zarqawis-total-war-on-iraqi-shiites-exposes-a-divide-among-sunni-jihadists
Husayn, Ayad Mahmud, “Are the Shia Really the Majority in Iraq?” in Arabic,
Al-Arab News, April 11, 2005. As of June 24, 2015:
http://alarabnews.com/alshaab/2005/04-11-2005/19.htm
“I Praised Assad at Gunpoint, Says Syrian Tribal Leader,” Reuters, January 17,
2012.
Izady, Michael, “Syria: Religious Composition (Summary),” map, Columbia
University Gulf 2000 Project, 2015. As of August 16, 2015:
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Syria_Religion_summary_lg.png
Jabar, Faleh A., “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of
Tribes Under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968–1998,” in Faleh Abdul-
Jabar and Hosham Dawood, Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the
Middle East, London: Saqi Books, 2003, pp. 53–81.
Jansen, Michael, “Repression by Iraq’s Shia Regime Sparks Sunni Revolt,” Irish
Times, January 4, 2014. As of July 1, 2015:
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/
repression-by-iraq-s-shia-regime-sparks-sunni-revolt-1.1643809
Bibliography 119
Jensen, Sterling, Iraqi Narratives of the Anbar Awakening, London: King’s College,
thesis, 2014.
Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Matthew Adam Kocher, “Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular
War: Iraq and Vietnam,” Politics and Society, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2007, pp. 183–233.
Karsh, Efraim, “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War,”
Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1990, pp. 256–268.
Kennedy, Elizabeth A., “Syria Massacre Victims in Houla Executed, Says UN,”
Huffington Post, May 29, 2012
Khadim, Abbas, Reclaiming Iraq: The 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the
Modern State, Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2012.
al-Khalidi, Suleiman, “Islamic State in Syria Abducts at Least 150 Christians,”
Reuters, February 25, 2015.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, “Get Ready for Kurdish Independence,” New York Times,
July 13, 2014. As of August 16, 2015:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/opinion/iraqs-urgent-need-for-unity.html
Knights, Michael, “The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency,” West
Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, 2011.
Knights, Michael, Philip Smyth, and Ahmad Ali, “Iranian Influence in Iraq:
Between Balancing and Hezbollahzation?” Washington, D.C.: Washington
Institute, June 21, 2015. As of August 15, 2015:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
iraq-and-iranian-influence-between-balancing-and-hezbollah-ization
Kumaraswamy, P. R., “Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East,” Middle
East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2006, pp. 63–73.
Lawrence, Quil, “U.S. Sees New Threat in Iraq from Sufi Sect,” National Public
Radio, June 17, 2009. As of August 6, 2015:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105507397
“Lazma Law No. 51 of 1932,” Iraq Government Gazette, No. 23, June 5, 1932, pp.
423–424.
Landis, Joshua, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to
Survive to 2013,” Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 2012, p. 6.
League of Nations, “Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon,” London, July 24, 1922.
Legrand, Felix, “The Colonial Strategy of ISIS in Syria,” Arab Reform Initiative:
Policy Alternatives, June 2014, p. 6.
Leland, John, and Khalid D. Ali, “Anbar Province, Once a Hotbed of Iraqi
Insurgency, Demands a Say on Resources,” New York Times, October 27, 2010. As
of August 16, 2015:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/world/middleeast/27anbar.html
Liepman, Andrew M., Brian Nichiporuk, and Jason Killmeyer, Alternative Futures
for Syria: Regional Implications and Challenges for the United States, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-129-RC, 2014. As of August 3, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE129.html
Lipka, Michael, “The Sunni-Shia Divide: Where They Live, What They Believe
and How They View Each Other,” Pew Research Center, June 18, 2014.
Lister, Tim, “Iraq to Split in Three: So Why Not?” CNN, July 8, 2014. As of
June 7, 2015:
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/07/world/meast/iraq-division-lister/
Lukitz, Liora, Iraq: The Search for National Identity, Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass
and Co., 1995.
Lynch, Marc, “The Entrepreneurs of Cynical Sectarianism: Why the Middle East’s
Identity Conflicts Go Way Beyond the Sunni-Shiite Divide,” Foreign Policy, No. 4,
November 13, 2013, p. 5.
Al-Mahmud, Abdulaziz, “New Evidence . . . for the Sunni Majority in Iraq,” in
Arabic, Defense Network for the Sunnis, March 9, 2010. As of June 29, 2015:
http://www.dd-sunnah.net/records/view/action/view/id/2659/
Makiya, Kanan, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1989 (1998 edition).
Mamouri, Ali, “Was Zahran Alloush Really a Moderate Leader?” Al-Monitor,
January 14, 2016.
Marr, Phebe, The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2012.
Martin, Richard C., “Empires: Ottoman,” in Richard C. Martin, ed., Encyclopedia
of Islam and the Muslim World, Vol. 1, New York: Macmillan Reference USA,
2004, pp. 214–217.
Martinez, Jose Ciro, “Rebellion, Sectarian Slaughter or Civil War? Reading the
Syrian Melee,” New Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 3, 2013.
Marschall, Christin, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami, New
York: Routledge, 2003
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 6, 1977,
pp. 1212–1241.
Milani, Mohsen, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism),” Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, Spring 2013, pp. 79–93.
“Minority Kurds Promote Cultural Diversity amid Syrian Civil War,” video, Your
Middle East, February 25, 2014.
Bibliography 121
Mironova, Vera, and Sam Whitt, “A Glimpse into the Minds of Four Foreign
Fighters in Syria,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 6, Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point, June 2014, p. 7. As of October 22, 2015:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/
posts/a-glimpse-into-the-minds-of-four-foreign-fighters-in-syria
Moniquet, Claude, “The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and
Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World,” European Parliament Policy
Department, June 11, 2013.
Montgomery, Gary W., and Timothy S. McWilliams, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening
Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives from Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–
2009, Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University Press, 2009.
Nader, Alireza, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila
Mahnad, Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-616, 2014. As of July 25, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR616.html
Nagel, Joane, and Susan Olzak, “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States:
An Extension of the Competition Model,” Social Problems, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1982,
pp. 127–143.
Nakash, Yitzhak, The Shi’ is of Iraq, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1994.
Namaa, Kamal, “Fighting Erupts as Iraq Police Break up Sunni Protest Camp,”
Reuters, December 30, 2013. As of July 8, 2015:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/30/
us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE9BT0C620131230
Nasr, S. V. R., “European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim
States,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2016.
Nasr, Vali R., “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity
Mobilization Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 32,
No. 2, 2000, pp. 171–190.
———, “When the Shiites Rise,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2006, pp. 58–71,
73–74.
———, The Shi’a Revival, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007.
Neep, Daniel, Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and
State Formation, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012
Neriah, Jacques, “Egypt’s Shiite Minority: Between the Egyptian Hammer and the
Iranian Anvil,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 23, 2012.
Nir, Omri, “The Sunni-Shi’i Balance in Light of the War in Syria and Regional
Changes,” Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs, April 7, 2014.
Northedge, Alistair, “Al-Iraq al-Arabi: Iraq’s Greatest Region in the Pre-Modern

Period,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions:
Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? New York: Columbia University Press, 2008,
pp. 151–166.
Notzon, Beth, and Gail Nesom, “The Arabic Naming System,” Science Editor,
Vol. 28, No. 1, 2005. As of June 29, 2015:
http://www.councilscienceeditors.org/wp-content/uploads/v28n1p020-021.pdf
Al-Nusra, “The Group of ‘Dawlah’—and the Islamic Ruling Regarding it,” SITE
translation, March 5, 2015a.
Al-Nusra, “Statement No. 24: Statement Clarifying What Came in the Interview
of Sheikh Abu Malik al-Shami, May Allah Preserve Him,” translated by SITE,
March 15, 2015b.
O’Bagy, Elizabeth, “Syria Update: Assad Targets Sunni Along Syria’s Coast,”
Institute for the Study of War, May 10, 2013.
Ostovar, Afshon, “Iran Has a Bigger Problem Than the West: Its Sunni
Neighbors,” Lawfare Blog, June 7, 2015.
Pelham, Nicolas, A New Muslim Order: The Shia and the Middle East Sectarian
Crisis, London: I. B. Taurius and Co., 2008.
Perthes, Volker, The Political Economy of Syria Under Assad, London: I. B. Taurius
and Company, 1997.
Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population, Appendix C:
Data Sources by Country,” October 7, 2009. As of June 18, 2015:
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/datasources.pdf
Phillips, Christopher, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 36, No. 2, March 24, 2015, p. 357
Pursley, Sara, “‘Lines Drawn on an Empty Map’: Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of
the Artificial State (Part 1),” Jadaliyya, June 2, 2015. As of June 20, 2015:
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21759/
lines-drawn-on-an-empty-map_iraq’s-borders-and-the
Al-Qarawee, Harith, “The Rise of Sunni Identity in Iraq,” National Interest,
April 5, 2013. As of June 23, 2015:
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/sunni-identitys-rise-iraq-8314
Rand, Dafna H., and Nicholas A. Heras, “Iraq’s Sunni Reawakening: How to
Defeat ISIS and Save the Country,” Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2015. As of July 1,
2015:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-03-16/iraqs-sunni-reawakening
al-Rasheed, Madawi, “Middle East Dictators Feed Sectarianism,” Al-Monitor,
December 15, 2014.
Bibliography 123
Reese, Aaron, “Sectarian and Regional Conflict in the Middle East,” Middle East
Security Report 13, Institute for the Study of War, July 2013.
Republic of Iraq, “Iraq’s Governorates by Area and Their Relative Share of Area
and Population: 1997, 2009,” spreadsheet, Ministry of Planning Central Statistical
Organization, 2010.
Roberts, John Morris, and Odd Arne Westad, The History of the World, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Robinson, Francis, The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Sahgal, Neha, Pew Research Center,“The Escalating Shi’a-Sunni Conflict:
Assessing Arab Public Attitudes,” conference address, Stimson Center,
Washington, D.C., February 18, 2015.
Sakai, Keiko, “Tribalization as a Tool of State Control in Iraq: Observations on
the Army, the Cabinets and the National Assembly,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and
Hosham Dawood, Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East,
London: Saqi Books, 2003, pp. 109–135.
Salamandra, Christa, “Sectarianism in Syria: Anthropological Reflections,” Middle
East Critique, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2013, pp. 303–306.
Salamey, Imad, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, London: Routledge, 2013.
Salucci, Ilario, A People’s History of Iraq: The Iraqi Communist Party, Workers’
Movements, and the Left 1924–2004, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2003 (tr. 2005).
“Saudi Arabia Has a Shiite Problem,” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2014.
“Saudis Reportedly Funding Iraqi Sunni Insurgents,” USAToday, December 8,
2006. As of August 16, 2015:
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/
2006-12-08-saudis-sunnis_x.htm
Schenker, David, “Qaradawi and the Struggle for Sunni Islam,” PolicyWatch, No.
2157, Washington Institute, October 16, 2013.
Schofield, Richard, “Borders, Regions and Time: Defining the Iraqi Territorial
State,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions:
Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? New York: Columbia University Press, 2008,
pp. 167–204.
Sherlock, Ruth, and Magdy Samaan, “Syria: Full Horror of al-Qubeir Massacre
Emerges,” Telegraph, June 7, 2012.
Shuqir, Shafiq, “At-ta‘dud al-‘araqi wah ad-dini fi bina’ ‘Iraq al-mustaqbal” [Ethnic
and religious diversity in the composition of the future Iraq], Al Jazeera, March 10,
2004. As of June 23, 2015:
http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/
b560023c-4cef-438c-94ff-759a2613e2f8
Simon, Reeva Spector, Iraq Between the Two World Wars, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000 (2007 edition).
Simon, Reeva Spector, and Eleanor H. Tajirian, eds., The Creation of Iraq: 1914–
1921, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, Kindle.
“Smite Their Necks,” video, SITE translation, Hama Province Islamic State,
March 28, 2015.
Smyth, Philip, The Shiite Jihad in Syria and its Regional Effects, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 138, 2015.
Sowell, Kurt, “Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency,” Hudson Institute, 2014. As of
July 8, 2015:
http://www.hudson.org/research/10505-iraq-s-second-sunni-insurgency
Stewart, Dona J., The Middle East Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural
Perspectives, New York: Routledge, 2013
"Sykes-Picot Agreement," Encyclopaedia Britannica, May 31, 2016.
“Syria: International Religious Freedom Report 2006,” Washington, D.C., U.S.
Department of State, 2006.
Syrian Arab Tribes Council, Facebook post, June 5, 2012.
“Takfiri Terrorists Commit Massacre Against Syrian Druze in Idleb Countryside,”
al-Manar, June 11, 2015.
Tharoor, Ihsaan, “Syria’s Turkmen Rebels, the Group at the Center of the Russia-
Turkey Clash,” Washington Post, November 24, 2015.
“The Abbasid Dynasty: The Golden Age of Islamic Civilization,” Saylor
Foundation, 2012.
“The Escalating Shia-Sunni Conflict: Assessing the Role of ISIS,” Stimson Center
Conference, Middle East Program, December 15, 2014.
“The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Center, January 27,
2011.
Totten, Michael J., “Assad Shells Alawite Stronghold,” World Affairs Journal,
August 13, 2011.
Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
Trofimov, Yaroslav, “Sunni-Shiite Conflict Reflects Modern Power Struggle, Not
Theological Schism,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2015a.
———, “To U.S. Allies, al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria Becomes the Lesser Evil,” Wall
Street Journal, June 11, 2015b.
“Turkey Cracks Down on Foreign Fighters Crossing Border to Join ISIS,”
CBSnews.com, September 29, 2015.
Bibliography 125
UN—See United Nations.

United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948. As of
February 12, 2011:
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html
———, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment
Number 27– Freedom of Movement (Article 12), November 2, 1999.
———, The Human Security Framework and National Human Development
Reports: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates, May 2006.
———, Iraq: Population (Thousands), Medium Variant, 1950–2100, Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and
Projections Section, 2015a. As of June 17, 2015:
http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp
———, Data Sources for Population Estimates, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section,
2015b.
United Nations News Centre, “News Focus: Syria,” undated. As of March 22,
2016:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=146
UN News Centre—See United Nations News Centre.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Iraq,” undated. As of
June 17, 2015:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html
Van Ostaeyan, Pieter, “Al-Jazeera: Interview with Jabhat al-Nusra Amir Abu-
Muhammad al-Julani,” blog post, translation, May 27, 2015.
Visser, Reidar, “Two Regions of Southern Iraq,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth
Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? New
York: Columbia University Press, 2008a, pp. 27–50.
———, “Historical Myths of a Divided Iraq,” Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2008b, pp. 95–106.
Visser, Reidar, and Gareth Stansfield, eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a
Federal Democracy? New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Walker, Martin, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2,
2003, pp. 29–40.
Wehrey, Frederic, “The Roots and Future of Sectarianism in the Gulf,” Project on
Middle East Political Science, March 21, 2014.
Weiss, Bernard, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihād,” American

Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1978 [Proceedings of an International
Conference on Comparative Law in Salt Lake City Utah, February 24–25, 1977],
pp. 199–212.
Wieland, Carsten, “The Bankruptcy of Humanism? Primordialism Dominates
the Agenda of International Politics,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2005,
pp. 142–158. As of March 24, 2016:
http://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG4_2005/10_WIELAND.PDF
Wikipedia, "Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930," last updated June 17, 2018. As of August
3, 2018:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_Treaty_of_1930#Full_text
Wimmer, Andreas, “Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq,” Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2007, pp. 111–134.
“World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples—Turkey: Alevis,” United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008.
World Values Survey, “Wave 5 2005–2008: Results, Iraq 2006, Technical
Record,” World Values Survey Association, 2014. As of June 18, 2015:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp
Wurmser, David, Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein,
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999.
Yaphe, Judith, “Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New,” Middle East Policy,
Vol. 7, No. 3, 2000, pp. 51–58.
Yazbek, Samar, A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution, trans.
Max Weiss, London: Haus Publishing, 2012.
Ziada, Faruq, “Is There a Sunni Majority in Iraq?” counterpunch, website,
December 27, 2006. As of June 19, 2015:
http://www.counterpunch.org/2006/12/27/is-there-a-sunni-majority-in-iraq/
Zubaida, Sami, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, 2002, pp. 205–215.
Present unrest in the Middle East has many causes and takes on many forms.
A collective sense of disenfranchisement, inadequate governance, geopolitical
discord, and religious extremism all contribute to the conflicts in Iraq, Iran, Syria,
Yemen, and Libya. Many Western observers and policymakers view unrest in
the Middle East through the lens of binary religious sectarianism, focusing on the
divisions between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. This split is most clearly articulated
in the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and it plays
out through violence in Iraq and Syria. But the complexities of human identity
and of regional culture and history do not lend themselves to this arguably too-
simplistic interpretation of the situation. The authors analyze sectarianism in the
region, evaluate other factors that fan the flames of violent conflict, and suggest a
different interpretation of both identity and the nature of regional unrest.
ARROYO CENT ER
www.rand.org $23.00
ISBN-10 0-8330-9699-0
ISBN-13 978-0-8330-9699-9
52300
RR-1681-A 9 780833 096999

Rand Rr1681

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rand Rr1681

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rand Rr1681

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sectarianism in the

Heather M. Robinson, Ben Connable, David E. Thaler, Ali G. Scotten

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public

This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a proj-

2.1. Shi’a and Sunni Populations in the Middle East.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

This report on sectarianism in the Middle East was written in 2015

Sectarianism in the Middle East

Increasingly, policy decisions are being made based on the assump-

tarian sides in regional conflicts. This manifests as a larger geopoliti-

Iraq suffers from lasting sectarian divisions, but there is nothing

The authors are grateful to the sponsor of this research, Timothy

AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq

This study sought to provide an in-depth historical and contem-

in Syria. Chapter Five provides conclusions and recommendations for

nature of religious identity is the finding from Pew Research Center

same sect.7 Foreign governments can also take advantage of sectarian

Syria and Iraq (particularly if one includes Iranian-backed Shi’a mili-

The report’s first case study centers on Iraq, a country that, in

peting identities, including nationalism—is essential to finding reason-

The History of Sectarianism in the Middle East

constant fight over religious differences but more a reflection of centu-

Sectarian tools are used in these struggles because they have a

Third, the relatively recent establishment and growing appeal of

Demographic realities have played a role in shaping the nature of sec-

(65 to 75 percent), and Bahrain (65 to 75 percent); see Figure 2.1.

7 “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples—Turkey: Alevis,” United

constitute roughly 80 percent of the world’s Shi’a community, while

Early History and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide

9 Pew Research Center, 2009.

Middle Ages: 800–1500

While early sectarian conflict was initially concerned with practical

12 V. Nasr, 2007, p. 53.

Early Modern Era: 1500–1920

Sectarianism in the early modern period continued to manifest itself

20 V. Nasr, 2007, p. 65.

Modern Era: 1900–1979

also encouraging existing sectarian divisions in order to keep the states

also brutally cracked down on Islamist challenges to his rule, as dem-

Contemporary Era: 1979–Present

34 S. Nasr, 2016, pp. 143–144.

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is key to understanding the growth

Iraq is a study in sectarian division, but also in the dynamism and

This chapter rejects the simplicity of the primordialist argument

As of mid-2015, Arab Iraqi Muslims found themselves in a de facto

35 million people, of whom approximately 75 to 80 percent were Arab

most-extreme claims, and the more-moderate estimates are, at best,

Pre-Ba’ath Sectarianism: Challenging Assumptions and

the Iraqi nation is an artificiality of the post-Ottoman order.13 These

17 Visser, 2008a; F. Haddad, 2011.

Islam, but, in practical terms, Iraqi sectarianism emerged in the late

1920 revolution by pressing for a theocratic and presumably Shi’a-led

Sunni Identity: 1920 to 1968

A monolithic form of government seemed to offer a more effec-

Pan-Arab identity and the pan-Arab movement also influenced

influenced nationalism; in many ways, Sunni Arab Iraqi identity was

Shi’a Identity: 1920–1968

37 Nakash, 1994, pp. 64–77.