MANU/SC/1252/2010

Equivalent Citation: (2010)14SC C 419

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 9726-9727 of 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 14520-14521 of
2010)
Decided On: 12.11.2010
Appellants: Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Subrata Borah Chowlek and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Devinder Kumar Jain and H.L. Dattu, JJ.
ORDER
Devinder Kumar Jain, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals, by special leave, are directed against order and judgment dated
29th January, 2010 passed by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, whereby
Appellants' application seeking condonation of delay of 59 days in preferring the appeal
was rejected and their writ appeal was dismissed in limine as being barred by
limitation.
3. The Respondents herein filed writ petitions in the High Court seeking regularization
of their services from the dates of their initial appointment with consequential benefits.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide his judgment dated 29th April 2009,
allowed the writ petitions, and directed Appellant No. 2 viz. the Assam Oil Division of
the Indian Oil Corporation to treat the Respondents as having been regularly appointed
from the date of their initial appointment, and to give them all the consequential service
benefits.
4 . Being aggrieved by the said order, the Appellants preferred an appeal before the
Division Bench of the High Court on 29th July 2009, along with an application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal. It was pleaded that the delay of 59 days had
occasioned because of the time taken by the company's consultant at Delhi, mainly on
account of summer vacation.
5. As afore-mentioned, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal, on
the ground of limitation, observing thus:
As such, the averments made in the application do not disclose any weighty or
convicting cause to construe the same as sufficient within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Act. The applicant corporation had since the delivery of the
judgment and order involved been cavalier and nonchalant in its approach. No
urge or concern to act with expedition or dispatch in view of the period of
limitation prescribed is discernible in its enterprise to decide the next course of
action following the decision of the Single Judge. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the applicants

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 are not entitled to the equitable relief of condonation of delay, they having
utterly failed to offer a sufficient cause therefore in filing the accompanying writ
appeals.
6. As stated above, the Appellants had pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal was
unintentional and bona fide in as much as on receiving an uncertified copy of the
judgment, they sought legal opinion from their local lawyer on 7th May 2009, which
was received by them on 21st May 2009. Thereafter, the same was forwarded to the
General Manager (HR), Refinery Headquarters, New Delhi on 28th May 2009. Vide his
letter dated 6th June 2009, the said General Manager sought some documents,
including a certified copy of the judgment. Subsequently, the General Manager
forwarded the case file to the company's legal advisors at New Delhi on 18th June 2009.
The said legal advisors gave their opinion on 7th July 2009, advising the Appellants to
file an appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge; the proposal was approved by
the headquarters of the Appellants; whereafter the case file was handed over to the
counsel for preparing and filing the appeal, which was ultimately filed on 29th July
2009.
7 . Having heard the Learned Counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a
sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and
therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even
upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a
matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally
follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be
imputed to the party. (See: Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and Ors.
MANU/SC/0335/1968 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006; The State of West Bengal v. The
Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Ors. MANU/SC/0534/1971 : (1972) 1 SCC 366;
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy MANU/SC/0573/1998 : (1998) 7 SCC 123; Sital
Prasad Saxena v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0294/1984 : (1985) 1 SCC 163).
8 . In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. MANU/SC/0042/1961 :
(1962) 2 SCR 762, this Court held that:
In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favor of the
decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other
words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder
has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond
challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse
of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown
discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This
discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial
power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial
justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v.
Chathappan ILR (1890) 13 Mad 269 "Section 5 gives the court a discretion
which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial
power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well
understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona
fide is imputable to the Appellant.

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9. Similarly, in Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao and Ors.
MANU/SC/0135/2002 : (2002) 3 SCC 195, this Court observed that:
But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of
finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in
over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be
the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand,
while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by
not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a
routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of
the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are
high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing
enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lies
terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a
party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have
to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon
the parties either way.
10. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan MANU/SC/7946/2008 : (2008) 14 SCC 582,
while observing that although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government
which, in similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but
take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent
to the slow motion of its wheels, highlighted the following observations of this Court in
State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. MANU/SC/0250/2005 : (2005) 3 SCC 752:
It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow
pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and
keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or
otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of
latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for
such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis
suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be
considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process."(See also: Special Tehsildar,
Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma MANU/SC/0694/1996 : (1996) 10
SCC 634; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. MANU/SC/0426/1996 :
(1996) 3 SCC 132)
1 1 . It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the
explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and makes no distinction between
the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of
the Government, which is dependant on the actions of its officials, who
often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to grave
miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such
cases.

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12. Examined on the touch-stone of the afore-noted observations, we are of the view
that in the present case, the conduct of the Appellants does not indicate inaction,
negligence or mala fides. The explanation furnished for the marginal delay of 59 days,
in our opinion, constitutes a sufficient cause and therefore, deserves to be accepted.
13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgment is set
aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Division Bench of the High Court for
consideration on merits. There shall be no order as to costs.

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