FIO of the Office of the Ombudsman vs.

Castillo

G.R. No. 221848 Aug. 30, 2016.

Ceniza vs. Ceniza (A. C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019)

Amalia and Jun were married in 1989. They have 2 children. In April 2008, while Amalia was away,
Jun inexplicably moved out of their house. In May 2008, Amalia went to Jun’s office to inquire about
his status. His staff members told her that they suspected that he was carrying an affair with Anna.
They provided her with an address. Next day, she went to this address only to be told by Anna’s
sister that she had moved to a new address with her new husband, Jun. Thus, she was able to
confront him. He simply denied any wrongdoing.
In July 2008, Jun filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Amalia, “alleging
her psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.” In Aug. 2008, Jun visited Amalia
and asked her to ”agree to the nullification of their marriage.” But she refused.

In Nov. 2008, Amalia filed a complaint for immorality against Jun with the Ombudsman. On April
2009, she wrote a letter with the same allegations to Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, which letter
was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).

Jun filed his comment with the OBC. He denied the allegation. In April 2011, the Ombudsman
rendered a decision finding him “guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an
extramarital affair with a woman in violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.” He was ordered suspended from the service for a period of 6
months without pay. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the
Ombudsman.

Meantime, the OBC referred Amalia’s letter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In Oct.
2010, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted this.

On Feb. 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a resolution, which considered the case “closed and
terminated for failure of the complainant to seek a reconsideration or appeal by petition for
review.” However, in June 2014, it received a letter of appeal with an attached motion for
reconsideration. On recommendation of the OBC, it set aside its resolution of Feb. 26, 2014, and
required Jun to file his comment. In Feb. 2016, it referred the case to the IBP, which issued
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The IBP then submitted its recommendation.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the IBP’s recommendation. But It stated that the “findings made
by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case x x x more than sufficed to show (Jun’s)
immorality, thereby showing his failure to live up to the legal and ethical obligations of a lawyer. In
this regard, we adopt and reiterate the apt findings x x x, to wit:

“Respondent is adamant in his denial that he has a relationship with (Anna). He insists that
complainant’s accusation that he was having an affair with (Anna) was purely speculative and
unsupported by evidence. Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not only of their daughter x
x x, but also of two others, x x x.”

Jun and Amalia’s teenaged daughter stated in her affidavit that she “met Myrna Flores, (Anna’s)
mother, (Anna) and (Anna’s) daughter. She tried to deny her relationship with my father, but just a
few minutes after, I heard her three aunts tell us that she had a new husband. She identified the
new husband as (Jun).” The second witness stated in his affidavit that “on December 22, 2008 at
around 8:00 PM, I personally saw (Jun), taking dinner, half-naked, facing the table x x x together
with a woman whom I later identified as (Anna) from the picture that Amalia x x x showed to me.”
The third witness, a private investigator hired by Amalia, stated in his affidavit that he saw Jun
parked his car in the house of his new address where a lady waited for him.

Amalia also presented photographs that Anna owned the house Jun frequently visited. She also
presented evidence, including a marriage certificate, that Anna was married to a certain Ebrahaim
Angeles Yap.

The Court held:

“In the face of the evidence presented by (Amalia), the bare denial and self-serving statements of
(Jun) crumble. The positive and categorical assertions of (Amalia) and the uncontradicted
statements of the witnesses x x x, have sufficiently established the administrative liability of the
(Jun). x x x.”  

The Court said that:

“We are cognizant of the fact that cases like this usually entail a ‘He said – She said’ version.
However, complainant was able to build her case against respondent. As afore-discussed,
complainant presented evidence to support her claims. There were documentary evidence and
affidavits proving, to the best of her ability, her accusations against respondent.”

The Court explained that:

“The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest standards of morality because
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.”

“There is no question,” the Court continued, “that a married person’s abandonment of his or her
spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes immorality. x x x. As a basis for
disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. That the illicit
partner is himself or herself married compounds the immorality.”

What is the burden of proof required of the complainant in disbarment proceedings? The Court
answered it in this manner: “Given the serious and far-reaching consequences of disbarment, only
a clearly preponderant showing can warrant the imposition of the harsh penalty of disbarment.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior
to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means evidence that is more convincing as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”

The Court examined the evidence presented, and said that Amalia ”presented clearly preponderant
evidence showing that the respondent, while being lawfully married to her, had maintained an illicit
relationship with a married woman. x x x. Time and time again, the Court pointed out that when the
integrity or morality of a member of the Bar is challenged, it is not enough that he or she denies the
charge, for he or she must meet the issue and overcome the evidence presented on the charge. He
or she must present proof that he or she maintains the degree of integrity and morality expected of
him or her at all times. The respondent failed in this regard.”

The Court then said:

“In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every lawyer, the respondent should
have desisted from the illicit relationship with his mistress, and should have avoided the impression
on the part of the public that he was defying the moral standards required of him. His leaving his
wife and family to cohabit with his married mistress definitely transgressed the clearly defined
bounds of decency and morality. His transgression inflicted on his wife and children a lot of
suffering, including depression, as borne out by one child’s attempt at suicide out of despair for
what he had caused to their family. These circumstances were more than sufficient to establish the
charge of gross immorality.”

The Court likewise stated,

“That the immoral conduct of the respondent pertained to his private life did not diminish the gravity
of his ethical violation. In Advincula vs. Advincula (A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 237,
248), we have exhorted all lawyers to always conduct themselves in a manner as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that they are flouting the moral standards of the legal
profession, thusly:

“…it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good
moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good
moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, that the
possession of legal learning.”

The Court added:

“Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the
misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Every lawyer is expected to be honorable and
reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by the laws of his private life cannot be expected
to do so in his professional dealings.”

The Court concluded, my dear Reader, that:

“By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, respondent showed that he did
not possess the requisite good moral character needed for the continued practice of law. He
deserves the extreme penalty of disbarment.” He was then disbarred and his name ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

JASMIN MAGUAD v. NICOLAS DE GUZMAN

[ AM No. P-94-1015, Mar 29, 1999 ]

This is a complaint filed by Jasmin Maguad and Rebecca Brioso against Nicolas de Guzman,
Sheriff of Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City and Ruby Barcenas, Court Social
Worker in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, for grave misconduct, falsification and
immorality.

The complaint alleges that respondent Nicolas de Guzman (lawfully married to Corazon Punzalan
de Guzman), and respondent Ruby Barcenas, single, unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as
husband and wife at 137 Ignacio St., Pasay City; that in October, 1983, when respondents' first
illegitimate child Nathaniel Roy was born, respondents unlawfully and maliciously conspired to
falsify an entry in the Birth Certificate of said child, making it appear that respondents were lawfully
married; that when respondents' second illegitimate child Natalia, was born in 1984, respondents
unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the said child's Birth Certificate, making it
appear that respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1984 (perhaps a typographical error
meant to be December 8, 1982 as in the first Birth Certificate).

In their joint comment and/or answer, the respondents admitted that respondent Nicolas de
Guzman was married to Corazon Punzalan in 1968 and has two legitimate children with her; de
Guzman explained that he and Corazon Punzalan had long been separated in fact and a
reconciliation between them for purposes of their living together again has become quite remote as
she is now living with another man by the name of Eliseo Almero; de Guzman added that he has
not been remiss in his obligations as a father to his two legitimate children, as he provided them
within his means all that they needed for their sustenance. Respondents denied the complainants'
allegation that they cohabited as husband and wife under scandalous circumstances; they also
denied that they unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify the entries in the certificates of live
birth of their two children. They claimed that the truth is that respondent de Guzman had no
knowledge, much less any participation in the entries therein relating to their alleged marriage on
December 8, 1982; that in the birth certificates of the children, the informant appearing therein is
only-respondent Barcenas. The respondents explained that Barcenas was "constrained to supply
such erroneous information as regards her civil status solely for purposes of shielding her two
children from the stigma of shame and disgrace that they might encounter in their later years in life
by reason of their illegitimacy." De Guzman and Barcenas took exception to the claim of the
complainants that they filed the present charges as "concerned citizens." According to the
respondents, "for some ulterior designs," the complainants allow themselves to be the willing pawns
of one Leoncio Cesar in the latter's attempts to unduly harass herein respondents because
respondent Barcenas was one of the private complainants against Leoncio Cesar for Grave Oral
Defamation before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 46, in Crim. Cases Nos. 93-
1300 to 1303.

In a resolution dated March 23, 1994, the complaint was referred to Executive Judge Conchita
Carpio Morales for investigation, report and recommendation. However, in view of the promotion of
Executive Judge Morales to the Court of Appeals, this case was referred to Acting Executive Judge
Alfredo J. Gustilo of Branch 116, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for investigation, report and
recommendation.

During the hearing of the case, instead of presenting proofs in support of the accusation, the
complainants offered in evidence their joint Affidavit of Desistance, dated August 12, 1994 stating,
among others:

xxxxxxxxx
"3. That, assisted by our private lawyer, we recently conferred with the said two accused about this
case and we have realized: (a) that they had no malicious or criminal intent when they made that
entry and that Ruby Barcenas innocently did it in the best interest of their said children to avoid
future social stigma upon the persons of the said children when they grow up; and (b) that Mr. De
Guzman had been separated for many years from his wife, who has likewise been living her own
life with a common-law husband in Mindoro; and that his wife and two children with her had
expressly condoned and consented to his relationship with Ms. Barcenas many years ago;

"4. That we are no longer interested to pursue this administrative case and that therefore, in the
interest of justice, we hereby request the Supreme Court, thru the investigating Executive Judge of
Pasay City to dismiss the same."
In his Investigation Report[6] dated November 2, 1994 Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo
(now Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan), made the following findings which the Court quotes
with approval:

"Misconduct means intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, specially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456) No act of the respondents appears or has been
established which can be considered as misconduct in office. The charge of grave misconduct
against them is therefore without any basis.

"With respect to the charge of falsification, the complainants allege that the respondents committed
the offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in the birth certificates of their children
that they were married on December 8, 1982, or December 8, 1984, in Davao City, when in fact
they were not. Apparently, this accusation is predicated on one of the ways of committing
falsification, i.e., by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code. One essential element of this kind of falsification is that there must be a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the fact claimed to be false. In other words, there must be a law
requiring, expressly or impliedly, the disclosure of the truth of the fact alleged to have been falsified.
No law has been shown by the complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a duty of an
informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are
married or not. Consequently, the charge of falsification against the respondents cannot likewise
prosper.

"It is alleged in the complaint that the respondents conspired with each other in making the entry in
the birth certificates of their children that they were married. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
rule is that conspiracy should be shown by strong and convincing evidence. No evidence has been
adduced in this case indicating that the respondents agreed and decided to make the entry in the
birth certificates of their children that they were married. Even on the assumption that such entry in
the birth certificates of Nathaniel and Natalia would constitute falsification by making an untruthful
statement in a narration of fact, only respondent Barcenas, the informant who made the entry, could
be held liable therefor. Respondent De Guzman could not be made to answer for it, since there is
no proof that he conspired with his co-respondent in making such entry.

"On the other hand, the circumstances in this case admitted by the respondents are sufficient to
sustain the charge of immorality. It is not in accordance with the norms of morality for a man who is
legally married to cohabit with another woman during the subsistence of such marriage. In the same
manner, it is against the tenets of morality for a woman to be living together with a married man not
her husband. The stigma of immorality attaches to this kind of relationship even if the married man
is separated from his wife and the woman living with him is single. This is specially so when the
persons concerned are public officers who are supposed to maintain a high standard of morality so
as to live up to their role to be looked upon as models in society.

"However, to temper justice with mercy, these circumstances may be considered to mitigate the
liability of the respondents:

"1. They have voluntarily admitted that they are living together as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage.

"2. Respondent De Guzman and his lawful wife have been separated in fact for a long time and his
wife is already cohabiting with another man, thereby rendering reconciliation between them
improbable.

"3. Notwithstanding their separation, respondent De Guzman has continued giving support to his
children with Punzalan.

"4. The relationship between the respondents is one of the realities of life which is difficult to prevent
from happening, more so because respondent De Guzman has been separated for a long time from
his wife.

"5. Apparently, the lawful wife and legitimate children of respondent De Guzman have tolerated the
relationship between the respondents as can be implied from the fact that none of them has filed a
complaint against them.

"6. There is no indication that the relationship between the respondents has caused prejudice to
any person or has adversely affected the performance of their functions and duties as officers of the
government to the detriment of the public service.

"7. The complainants have desisted from further prosecuting their complaint and asked for its
dismissal, admitting that the filing of the present charges was an offshoot of a civil case involving
complainant Maguad and the respondents."
The investigating Judge made the following recommendation:

"1. Respondents Nicolas de Guzman and Ruby Barcenas be exonerated of the charges of grave
misconduct and falsification; and

"2. Both respondents be found guilty of the charge of immorality.

"However, because of the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, only the penalty of suspension
from office for one (1) month without pay be imposed on them.

"Additionally, the respondents should be admonished to terminate their cohabitation or to take such
proper course of action as will legitimize the relationship between them."
The Court fully agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the
respondents be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, the same being
duly supported by the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the matter.

With regard to the third accusation, the stigma of immorality attaches to the kind of relationship
between the respondents, the same being improper, notwithstanding the fact that respondent de
Guzman was separated from his wife (who is now living with another man) and respondent
Barcenas was single. In Nalupta, Jr. vs. Tapec, this Court held that illicit relations is considered
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action pointing out that Memorandum
Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission has categorized disgraceful and
immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day shall be imposed for the first offense while the penalty of dismissal is imposed for the
second offense.

However, this being the first offense of the respondents and there being no allegation in the
complaint that respondent Barcenas knew that de Guzman was married even before they started
their relationship and came to know of it only when it was already too late to back out, with the birth
of their children, and taking into account the circumstances enumerated by the Investigating Judge
that may be considered to mitigate their liability, the Court, in order to temper justice with mercy is
inclined to impose a lighter penalty upon the respondents.

In a Memorandum for the Chief Justice dated September 28, 1998, the Court Administrator
recommended that the respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Social Worker Ruby
Barcenas be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, but respondent de
Guzman should be suspended for two (2) months without pay for immorality and respondent
Barcenas be suspended for fifteen (15) days without pay and that both respondents be admonished
to terminate their relationship or to take the necessary steps to legitimize the same.

Parenthetically, on February 5, 1999, the respondents filed a Manifestation[9] stating among others:

xxxxxxxxx
"5. That on May 25, 1995, respondent Nicolas de Guzman filed a

Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite;

"6. On August 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the Honorable Judge Dolores C. Español in
favor of the respondent;

"7. That on November 27, 1998, Entry of Final Judgment regarding the Annulment of Marriage was
issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite; and,

"8. That on October 19, 1998, the respondents had tied their marriage knot before the Honorable
Judge Leticia P. Morales of Regional Trial Court, Makati."

WHEREFORE, respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Court Social Worker Ruby
Barcenas are absolved from the charge of grave misconduct and falsification, but respondent de
Guzman is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay and respondent Barcenas for fifteen (15)
days also without pay, both for immorality.

SO ORDERED.

Tumbaga vs Atty. Teoxon A.C. No.

5573, Nov. 21, 2017

Facts:

Complainant met respondent sometime in September 1999. He was then the City Legal Officer of
Naga City from whom complainant sought legal advice. Thereafter respondent visited her often
at her residence and brought gifts for her son.

Complainant became pregnant. After the birth of their son, Billy John, respondent spent more time
with them. After Billy John was baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Naga City and gave it to respondent to sign. He hesitantly signed it
and volunteered to facilitate its filing. After respondent failed to file the same, complainant secured
another form and asked respondent to sign it twice. Thus, the Certificate of Live Birth was
registered.

Respondent compelled her to resign from her work, assuring her that he would take care of her
financial needs. As respondent failed to fulfill his promise, complainant sought assistance from the
Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City. Respondent gave complainant an affidavit of support and told
her there was no need for him to appear in the conference. Complainant showed the affidavit to
Fiscal Mampo, but the latter advised her to have the respondent sign the affidavit again.

To corroborate her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her complaint,
among others:
a) pictures showing respondent lying in a bed holding Billy John, respondent holding Billy John
in beach settings, respondent holding Billy John in a house setting and respondent and
complainant seated beside each other in a restaurant7;
 b) (b) the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John with an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admision
of Paternity showing respondent's signature;
(c) the affidavit of support executed by respondent;
(d) the promissory note executed by respondent; (
e) the police blotter entry11 dated September 9, 2001; and
(f) copies of pleading showing the signature of respondent.

In his answer, respondent denied that he lived together with complainant at the Puncia
Apartment. As complainant was his kumadre, he would pass by her house whenever he visited
the house of Representative Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. Respondent was then a member of
Representative Roco's legislative staff. Respondent accused complainant of taking the pictures
in order to use the same to extort money from him.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Teoxon is guilty in having an illicit affair with the
complainant?

Held:
Yes, respondent committed gross immorality by having an illicit affair with another
woman. The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of
law. Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in
fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives
in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.

More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent
is the Decision of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin. In said case, [MTCC]
is not persuaded by his allegation that he left his bag with [complainant] because he was in a hurry
in going to Manila. He boldly declared in [the trial court] that he has three residences in Naga City
and of all places he had to leave his shirt and underwear with a lady whom he had visited "only
twice". While the issues in the replevin case and the instant administrative case are indeed
different, they share a common factual backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting account of the true
nature of their relationship. Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy
John as proof of their romantic relations. A perusal of these pictures convinces this Court that while
the same cannot indeed prove Billy John's paternity, they are nevertheless indicative of a
relationship between complainant and respondent that is more than merely platonic.

Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his defense when the burden of evidence shifted
to him. He could neither provide any concrete corroboration of his denials in this case nor
satisfactorily prove his claim that complainant was merely extorting money from him.

Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

BALASBAS v. MONAYAO
G.R. No. 190524; February 17, 2014

Section 46 of the Administrative Code

FACTS:
In 2003, petitioner Atty. Balasbas filed a letter-complaint accusing respondent Monayao, then
employed by DSWD, of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement an
Order issued by the DENR in a land dispute filed by petitioner’s brother against respondent’s father.

In the said case, respondent appeared in lieu of her father, who she claimed passed away.
Petitioner claimed that despite judgment rendered in the said dispute awarding one-half of the
disputed land to her brother, and respondent’s subsequent notarized waiver of her rights to her half,
the latter illegally sold the portion, over which she had waived her rights, to her children via a 1992
deed of sale purportedly executed by her father, which was simulated considering that as early as
1987, respondent’s father was already deceased.

The DSWD informed petitioner that respondent was no longer an employee thereof, but was
devolved in 1992 to the local government of the municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao Province.
Petitioner thus filed with the Mayor of Alfonso Lista a sworn letter-complaint against respondent.
In a reply to petitioner, however, Alfonso Lista Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano refused to take action
on the complaint, citing an opinion of the CSC-CAR, which stated that petitioner’s complaint against
respondent may not be acted upon as the acts complained of were not in relation to the latter’s
duties and responsibilities as Municipal Population Officer.

Petitioner then sent a letter to the CSC, appealing the opinion of CSC-CAR. CSC denied
petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the opinion of CSC-CAR claiming that it had no jurisdiction over
petitioner’s complaint as it stemmed from a private transaction between the protagonists;
petitioner’s remedy was instead to seek execution of the DENR’s Decision.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration in the CSC, arguing that under Section 4 of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the jurisdiction of the CSC over public officers or
employees is not limited to their acts or omissions that are work-related; disciplinary action may be
taken for their acts of dishonesty, immorality, oppression, notorious undesirability, conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, habitual drunkenness, or gambling. Even the lending of money at
usurious rates, conducting illicit relations, and willful failure to pay just debts are grounds for
disciplinary action.

Petitioner concluded that respondent’s misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to

implement the DENR’s Order constitute acts unbecoming a public official and fall within the
jurisdiction of the CSC.

CSC dismissed the appeal; the CA dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Monayao shall be held responsible for the imputed acts and omissions
based solely on the allegations in the complaint of petitioner Atty. Balasbas.

HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s
office or connected with the performance of his duty. Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal,
need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty" by the public officer, for it
"inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline
and morale of the service."

Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a
forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.
In the present case, the acts complained of constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, an administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions.
However, petitioner’s allegations are nothing more than bare imputations against the respondent.
The allegations in her complaint were not duly supported by necessary documents that would
demonstrate the justness of her claims.

While technicalities may be dispensed with in administrative proceedings, “this does not mean that
the rules on proving allegations are entirely dispensed with. Bare allegations are not enough; these
must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least.”

While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees
whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend
to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.

ABAD VS DELA CRUZ 2015 (DIGEST) | APPOINTMENT

G.R. No. 207422, 753 SCRA 680, March 18, 2015

Facts:

Mayor of Muntinlupa, upon the concurrence of the majority of members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City Government of Muntinlupa, appointed the respondent (Dela Cruz) on 2006
as City Assessor in a permanent capacity as City Government Department Head III. Petitioner
(Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor, requested the
disapproval of Dela Cruz’s appointment, alleging that the position of City Government Department
Head III corresponded to Salary Grade 27, 9 salary grades higher than Dela Cruz’s former position
as Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz’s
appointment violated Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001, which prohibits
the promotion of an employee to a position more than 3 salary grades above his or her former
position. Abad added that he and 3 other qualified applicants were allegedly excluded from the
selection process, in violation of Item 10 of the same Memorandum Circular, which is the automatic
consideration of all the next-in-rank employees for promotions to the next higher position.

On 2009, CSC-NCR invalidated the appointment of Dela Cruz which the latter appealed to CSC
which revered the CSC-NCR’s decision stating that applicants for City Government Department
Head III based on the following criteria: performance, work history, awards, education, training,
potential, and physical characteristics and personality traits. Commission ruled that Dela Cruz’s
appointment was an exception to the three-salary-grade rule.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed Abad’s petition ruling that the three-salary-
grade rule only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, but
does not by any means give the employee next in rank the exclusive right to be appointed to the
said vacancy.  As long as the employee appointed to the position possesses the minimum
qualifications for the position, the appointment is valid.

Issues:

Whether or not Dela Cruz’s appointment is void for the violation of the next-in-rank rule; and
Whether or not Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the three-salary grade limitation.
Ruling:

1. No, Dela Cruz’s appointment is valid in accordance with the next-in-rank rule. Under the Section
21(2)(3) of the Civil Service Law, the appointing authority for promotion must automatically consider
the employees next-in-rank as candidates for appointment.

The rationale of the next-in-line rule is for the maintenance of the merit policy and rewards in the
civil service. Since appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed
that the appointments of employees next in rank are equally meritorious.  As long as the appointee
possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid.

2. Yes, Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the three-salary grade limitation.

Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular, Series of 2001 on the three-salary-grade rule states that “an
employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is not more than 3 salary, pay or job
grades higher than the employee’s present position.” However, this rule is subject to the exception
of “very meritorious cases.” These “very meritorious cases” are provided in CSC Resolution No. 03-
0106 dated January 24, 2003:

Any or all of the following would constitute a meritorious case exempted from the 3-salary grade
limitation on promotion:

1.The position occupied by the person is next-in- rank to the vacant position, as identified in the
Merit Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Positions (SRP) of the agency;
2.The position is a lone, or entrance position, as indicated in the agency’s staffing pattern;
3.The position belongs to the dearth category, such as Medical Officer/Specialist positions and
Attorney positions;
4.The position is unique and/or highly specialized such as Actuarial positions and Airways
Communicator;
5.The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the
candidates’ superior qualifications in regard to:
-Educational achievements Highly specialized trainings Relevant work experience
-Consistent high performance rating/ranking; and
6.The vacant position belongs to the closed career system.

In the case at bar, Dela Cruz’s appointment falls under the 5th exception. Contrary to petitioner’s
claim, the Personnel Selection Board conducted a deep selection process, ranking the candidates
for the position of City Government Department Head III based on approved criteria. Respondent’s
case, therefore, is a “very meritorious case” and is valid.

Petition is dismissed.

CONCEPCION C. DAPLAS vs. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 221153 April 17, 2017

FACTS

Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal
Treasurer of Kawit, Cavite sometime in 1968, and had held various posts until she was
appointed as the Pasay City Treasurer on May 19, 1989, with a gross monthly salary of
₱28,722.00. At the time material to the complaints, petitioner was concurrently holding the
position of Officer-in- Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government
Finance (BLGF) in Cebu City.

Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of
Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation
Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman; respondents) for averred
violations, constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true and detailed statement
of her assets, liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and financial connections, and
those of her spouse in her SALNs.

Petitioner insisted that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and
maintained that she was not totally dependent on her salary to finance the said
acquisitions. 

In a Joint Decision dated May 8, 2007, the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposed the
penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Joint
Order dated May 30, 2011, prompting her to elevate her case before the Court of Appeals
(CA)

In a Decision dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the
Ombudsman's ruling was sufficiently supported by substantial evidence.  It found that
petitioner's failure to declare all her assets and business interests constituted Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and a violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713. It gave no credence to her
defense of good faith. Moreover, it ruled that her resignation from the government service
did not render the Ombudsman ruling moot.

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied; hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Joint Decision of the Ombudsman
finding petitioner liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of
RA 6713, and imposing on her the corresponding penalties.

HELD

The petition is partly meritorious. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner
failed to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years 1997 to 2003 despite the legal
obligation to do so.

Both the Ombudsman and the CA held that such omission provides substantial basis
to hold petitioner liable for the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, warranting the supreme penalty of dismissal from
service, with all its accessory penalties. The Court disagrees.

Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the
administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant
petitioner's dismissal from service.

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a
wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her
husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in
KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious
intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes

Notably, petitioner readily admitted in her Counter-Affidavit her business interest in

KEI in 1997, which belied any malicious intent to conceal. While concededly, the omission
would increase her net worth for the year 1997, the Court observes that the Ombudsman
declared respondent's evidence insufficient to warrant a finding that petitioner had any
unexplained wealth. On the contrary, it found that her children have the financial capacity to
put up KEI.

Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner must fail. Verily, the
omission to include the subject properties in petitioner's SALNs, by itself, does not amount
to Grave Misconduct, in the absence of showing that such omission had, in some way,
hindered the rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection
between the two.

Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in
accomplishing her SALN.

The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one is entered finding petitioner Concepcion C. Daplas
guilty of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE in accomplishing her Statements of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth for the years 1997 to 2003, and is meted a fine in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month and one (1) day of her last salary.

EDITA S. BUENO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

GR No. 191712, Sep 17, 2014

FACTS
On February 13, 1998, former Administrator Teodorico P. Sanchez of the NEA
issued a memorandum "Re: Consolidated Guidelines on the Candidacy of Coop Officials
and Employees in Local, National and Barangay Elections and Related Matters." Said
memorandum provided, among others, that: (1) all board members, general managers and
employees of electric cooperatives shall be considered automatically resigned from their
respective positions effective upon filing of their Certificates of Candidacy; (2) directors who
ran and lost in the national and local elections shall not be eligible for re-appointment; and
(3) in the event that the spouse of an incumbent director runs and wins in these elections,
the director shall be considered automatically resigned when the spouse takes his/her oath
of office.

On the basis of the aforementioned memorandum of Administrator Teodorico P. 

Sanchez, petitioner Edita S. Bueno who was then NEA Deputy Administrator for
Cooperatives Development, issued on February 9, 2001 a memorandum addressed to all
regional electrification directors  on the subject "Candidacy of Electric Coop Officials and
Employees in the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections".

On June 25, 2001, in reply to NEA Administrator Manuel Luis Sanchez's letters, the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 115 stating that
the subject memoranda are not valid  rules and regulations, and hence have no force and
effect on electric cooperatives for the following reasons: (1) they have not been formulated,
adopted and approved by the NEA Board of Administrators which is the body vested by law
with the power to promulgate rules and regulations; and (2) they have not been filed with
the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.  In the same opinion, NEA was advised to have the subject
memoranda approved by the NEA Board of Administrators and filed with the UP Law
Center.

Under Resolution No. 56 issued on May 27, 2004, the NEA Board of Administrators
approved the subject memorandum issued by former NEA Administrator Teodorico P.
Sanchez. The said memorandum was likewise published in the Official Gazette on March
21, 2005.

On December 7, 2004, private respondents Napoleon S. Ronquillo, Jr., Edna G.

Raña and Romeo G. Refruto filed criminal and administrative complaints before the OMB
charging petitioner Bueno (now the NEA Administrator) with "Gross Neglect of Duty and
violations of the pertinent provisions of RA 6713. Private respondents alleged:

3.  That notwithstanding said advise from NEA's statutory counsel respondent BUENO who
was fully aware of its existence being then the Deputy Administrator for Cooperatives
Development and thereafter as Chief Operating Officer of NEA and eventually as its
Administrator continued its implementation to the damage and prejudice of the 119 electric
cooperatives nationwide;

4.  That its unlawful implementation specifically by respondents BUENO and QUINAJON
had caused and is still causing irreparable damage and injury to officers and employees of
electric cooperatives who happens to be victims of this null and void NEA Rules and
Regulations, the latest of which was the case of ALEJANDRO RANCHEZ, JR. of the Ilocos
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (INEC) who was unceremoniously and unlawfully removed
as director of said electric cooperative by respondents BUENO and QUINAJON using
aforesaid memoranda as basis, copies of the letter directives issued by them are hereto
attached and marked as ANNEX "D" and ANNEX "D-1" for ready reference and made
integral parts hereof;

5.  Respondent members of the NEA Board of Administrators chaired by DOE Secretary
VINCENT PEREZ are being joined and included in this complaint by virtue of their
tolerance and inaction in relation to the implementation of said null and void Rules and
Regulations notwithstanding their acquiescence of its infirmities.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, complainants pray that:

a) Pending hearing/investigation on the merits of this case respondents EDITA S. BUENO

and MILAGROS E. QUINAJON be placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION there being
sufficient grounds to warrant its issuance pursuant to the Ombudsman Act and pertinent
laws herein applicable;

b) That in aid of investigation that a subpoena duces tecum be issued to:

1. EDITA S. BUENO and MILAGROS E. QUINAJON for them to produce the original
copy of the advertive [sic] OGCC Opinion and the entire records of ALEJANDRO
RANCHEZ, JR. of INEC including the latest recommendation of the NEA Legal
Services Office issued a few days before the NEA Board meeting on November 24,
2004 making a pronouncement as to the impropriety/illegality of aforesaid
memorandum;

2. NOLLIE B. ALAMILLO for him to produce copy of the Petition for Review filed by
ALEJANDRO RANCHEZ, JR.  with the NEA Board of Administrators together with
the action/s taken by him and the NEA Board of Administrators specifically its board
meeting dated November 24, 2004.

c) That after the determination of the existence of a PRIMA FACIE CASE against all the
respondents, that the corresponding INFORMATIONS be filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN
considering that they are holding positions from SALARY GRADE 26 and above;

d) That respondents be dealt with administratively by DISMISSING them from the service. [8]

The administrative aspect of the above complaint was subsequently docketed as OMB-C-
A-05-0065-B for "Gross Neglect of Duty, RA 6713", while the criminal aspect was docketed
as OMB-C-A-05-0062-B.

Alejandro Ranchez, Jr. (Ranchez), who was mentioned in the complaint, was a duly elected
Director of the Ilocos Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (INEC) whose wife, Ms. Genaline
Judith R. Ranchez, was elected and sworn into office as a Sangguniang Bayan Member of
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte.  As per the letter dated July 20, 2004 of Quinajon, Ranchez was
considered automatically resigned as Director of INEC.  Ranchez sought reconsideration
but NEA Administrator Bueno, in her letter dated September 27, 2004, denied his request
and asserted that the subject memoranda shall be fully implemented unless and until
declared illegal or unconstitutional by a competent court. [9]

In his letter dated November 18, 2004 Ranchez had requested from Quinajon for a copy of
the memorandum of the NEA Legal Office dated November 18, 2004 addressed to
Quinajon. In another letter dated November 3, 2004 addressed to Bueno, Ranchez sought
deferment of implementation by the Board of Directors of INEC of NEA's decision on his
disqualification as Director pending resolution of his petition for review filed before the NEA
Board of Administrators.

On May 19, 2005, the OMB denied private respondents' prayer for the preventive
suspension of petitioners.[10]

In their position paper, petitioners denied having committed any neglect of duty in
connection with the implementation of the subject memoranda.  They explained that the
February 13, 1998 memorandum of Administrator Teodorico P. Sanchez, the basis of
Bueno's February 9, 2001 memorandum have been duly ratified by the NEA Board of
Administrators on May 27, 2004 under Resolution No. 56.  They also argued that the
private respondents have no sufficient interest in the controversy and filed the complaint in
bad faith since private respondent Ronquillo who is the Division Manager of NEA's Legal
Department should have advised the private respondents on the proper remedies. [11]

Private respondents in their position paper again discussed the case of Mr. Ranchez which
they said belied petitioners' averments in their counter-affidavit that they were not negligent
in the implementation of the subject memoranda declared as null and void by the OGCC. 
Attached to the position paper is the affidavit executed by Ranchez, which reads:

xxxx

4.  That sometime on the first week of October, 2004, I was accompanied by then INEC
Director Parado to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) and inquired from the
NEA Corporate Secretary if the Memorandum dated February 9, 2001 and the ELECTION
GUIDELINES which was made by NEA Administrator Bueno in removing me as a duly
elected Director of INEC had already been approved by the NEA Board of Administrators
and eventually submitted to the UP Law Center as required by the Administrative Code. 
The NEA Corporate Secretary informed me that there was no approval yet as of that date
and hence it had not yet been submitted to the UP Law Center;

5.  That relying on the pronouncement made by the NEA Corporate Secretary, I filed a
Motion [f]or Reconsideration with NEA on October 22, 2004 addressed to the NEA Board
[o]f Administrators inviting their attention on the legal infirmities caused by said
Memorandum of NEA Administrator Bueno, copy furnished the NEA Legal Department;

6.  That on October 29, 2004, the NEA Corporate Secretary Mr. Nollie Alamillo sent to me a
letter with the information that my request will be taken up in the next regular meeting of the
NEA Board of Administrators;

7.  That thereafter and when I made follow ups with the Office of the Corporate Secretary,
Mr. Alamillo informed me that upon instructions made by NEA Administrator Bueno, said
request for reconsideration was not included in the agenda for the Board Meeting and other
meetings of the Board that transpired;

8.  That on November 2004 I again prepared another letter communication addressed to
Administrator Bueno with the request that I be allowed to sit as Director pending resolution
and determination by the NEA Board of Administrators of my Motion [f]or Reconsideration;

9.  That I made several follow ups with NEA but I was only referred to its different Offices
one of which was the NEA Legal Office whom per information relayed by the Office of
Administrator Bueno was tasked to attend to my case;
10.  That the Legal Department made a favorable recommendation on my case and I was
instructed to follow up their recommendation with the Office of Director Milagros Quinajon;

11. That at the Office of Director whereby I was made to wait until 7:30 in the evening, I
again reiterated the issue on the legal infirmities of the aforesaid Memorandum and they
had even a telephone conversation with our local officials but Director Quinajon just told me
to come back the following day;

12.  That when I came back the following day, I was informed by her staff that she
(Quinajon) was on travel in the Province;

13.  That despite follow ups made, all efforts I had exerted resulted in futility because of the
uncalled for acts unbecoming of public servants demonstrated by Administrator Bueno and
her staff MILAGROS QUINAJON;

14.  That I ventilated this matter with the Office of the President thru the Malacañang Legal
Staff whereby my case had [already been] submitted for decision;

x x x x[12]

Ruling of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case against respondent officials except
petitioners, thus:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocination, this Office finds, as follows:

1. The complaint filed against former Secretary of the Department of Energy, VINCENT
S. PEREZ; and PABLO M. PAN III, WILFRED L. BILLENA and JOSEPH D. KHONG
HUN, all members of the Board of Administrators, NEA, is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of substantial evidence; and

2. EDITA S. BUENO and MILAGROS E. QUINAJON, Administrator and Director,

respectively, National Electrification Administration (NEA) are hereby found guilty of
Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 in relation with Section 3(a)(2),
Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6713.  Absent any showing of
intent or bad faith on their part, they are accordingly meted the penalty of
REPRIMAND pursuant to Section 10(a), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7. 
Further, the charge of Gross Neglect of Duty against them is hereby dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Secretary of the Department of
Energy for his information and the proper implementation of the same, with the directive
that he should submit a compliance report to this Office within five (5) days from the
implementation of this Decision.

SO DECIDED.[13]
According to the Ombudsman, since the NEA Board of Administrators already passed its
resolution approving the subject memoranda as early as May 27, 2004, it cannot be said
that Secretary Perez and Board of Administrators members Pan, Billena and Khong Hun
are remiss in their duties or tolerated the problem.  It was found that said officials resolved
to put an end to the controversy after much deliberation and taking into consideration the
advice given by the NEA Legal Division through Atty. Hernandez.

However, as to petitioners, the Ombudsman found sufficient evidence for violation of

Section 5(a) of RA 6713, viz:

Records would show that the letter dated November 3, 2004 of Alejandro E. Ranchez was
received by the NEA Records Section on November 4, 2004 x x x.  It would appear
however, that on May 27, 2004 or almost six (6) months before the said letter of Ranchez,
the NEA Board of Administrator[s] had already passed Resolution No. 56.  Nonetheless,
there is nothing in the records that would show that the NEA administration exerted efforts
to enlighten Ranchez of the effect of Resolution No. 56 to his petition for review or
reconsideration nor put an end to the issues brought about by his petition for review or
reconsideration.

Although it may be argued that the subject Resolution itself would be enough to answer the
query posited by Ranchez, the above-quoted provision is clear that there is a need for the
agency to give a definite answer on the said letter/s of Ranchez. [14]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that they cannot be found guilty of an
offense which was not even charged in the complaint.  They claimed that they attended to
all the queries of Ranchez through the letters dated November 18, 2004 and November 19,
2004 sent by Quinajon, attaching copies thereof to the motion. [15]

In denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman pointed out that in all
the directives sent to petitioners, it is very clear that the charge of violation of RA 6713 was
always indicated.  In addition, the complaint couched their charge in general terms: "xxx for
GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and violations of pertinent provisions of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Government Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713)."  Further, it was explained
that even if the charge does not appear or is not explicitly written in the complaint, the
Ombudsman is not precluded from charging and finding the respondents guilty of RA 6713
based on (a) the allegations of the complaint itself and the facts appearing in the records of
the case; and (b) the administrative charge of Neglect of Duty as defined, means a failure
on the part of a public officer to do and perform some of the duties of this office, and hence
Section 5(a) would fall under this category.[16]

As to the alleged letters sent to Ranchez by Quinajon, the Ombudsman found that there
was no proof presented that Ranchez indeed was furnished copy of the said documents
and the same were never submitted in evidence or attached to their counter-affidavits or
position papers.[17]

Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in holding that the petitioners were properly informed of
the charge against them and that they were guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713,
thus:

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, there is no proof that Ranchez received the
November 19, 2004 letter.  Furthermore, even if such letter was indeed received by
Ranchez, under the circumstances, such letter fails to address the situation.  It bears
repeating that, at the time the alleged November 19, 2004 letter was made, the Board of
Administrators of NEA had already approved the questioned memorandum.  Thus, the
Petitioners should have, at the very least, notified Ranchez of such a fact instead of merely
stating that [they] are evaluating [his] position in coordination with the NEA Legal
Department.  While this Court will not characterize the acts of the Petitioners as deliberately
misleading, they have certainly withheld crucial information which would have answered the
query of Mr. Ranchez once and for all.[18]

In their motion for reconsideration, [19] petitioners stressed that Ranchez is not the
complainant in the case before the OMB but only private respondents; hence, it is incorrect
for the OMB to have found petitioners administratively liable.  They also contended that it is
legally presumed that Ranchez received the November 19, 2004 letter of NEA addressing
his queries.  The CA denied the said motion.

Petitioners' Argument

Petitioners aver that the CA failed to consider the fact that the Ombudsman erroneously
found them administratively liable notwithstanding that Ranchez, who was the subject of
the purported nonfeasance, was not even a complainant in the case before the
Ombudsman.  Citing Section 20, paragraph 4 of RA 6670 (Ombudsman Act), petitioners
argue that private respondents have no sufficient personal interest in the violation which
have been committed.

It was also asserted that the dispositive portion of the Ombudsman' decision stating the
absence of proof that petitioners' act was intentional or tainted with bad faith, even
validates such lack of substantial evidence of violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713.  Thus,
the penalty of reprimand imposed on petitioners is not justified.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute illegal and unjust acts of
those who are in the public service emanates from no less than the 1987 Constitution. 
Section 12 of Article XI states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,  and shall,  in  appropriate  cases, 
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, The Ombudsman Act was enacted in line with the
state's policy of maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service and take effective
measures against graft and corruption.[20]  Section 15 (1) of said Act provides:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases;

xxxx

There is clearly no question on the legal standing of private respondents to file the
administrative complaint against petitioners before the Ombudsman. Indeed, the Office of
the Ombudsman is mandated to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." The Ombudsman
can act on anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official
acts or omissions from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper.  Thus, any complainant may
be entertained by the Ombudsman for the latter to initiate an inquiry and investigation for
alleged irregularities.[21]

It must also be mentioned that while Ranchez was not joined as complainants before the
Ombudsman, he executed an affidavit attesting to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint that petitioners failed to respond to his letters in connection with his pending
motion for reconsideration with the NEA Board of Administrators and inform him of the
status of the subject memoranda.  This affidavit was submitted by the private respondents
before the Ombudsman in support of their charge of gross neglect of duty and violations of
RA 6713 against the petitioners.

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman erred in not dismissing the administrative complaint
as there was no showing of sufficient personal interest on the part of private respondents,
pursuant to Section 20(4) of RA 6770 and this Court's ruling in Baltazar v. Hon.
Ombudsman[22] where an administrative complaint was dismissed due to want of personal
interest in the subject matter.  They point out that as admitted by them in their sworn
complaints, private respondents were former employees who were replaced upon the
reorganization of NEA and have not been candidates to any elective position in any electric
cooperative in the Philippines. Private respondents thus do not even stand to be affected
by the subject memoranda which were declared null and void by the OGCC.

We disagree.

Section 20 of RA 6770 provides:

SEC. 20. Exceptions.  The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:

(1)  The complainant has adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;

(2)  The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman;

(3)  The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;

(4) The complaint has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or

(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.  (Emphasis supplied.)

In Filipino v. Macabuhay,[23] the Court interpreted the fifth exception under the above
provision, as follows:

The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as
petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman
whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after
one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the
complaint is not barred by prescription.[24]  (Emphasis supplied.)

According to petitioners, the foregoing ruling is not applicable because it pertains to Section
20(5) and the issue therein was prescription of the administrative offense, whereas the
present petition concerns the legal standing of complainants under the Section 20(4).

Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that Section 20(4) is a bar to the Ombudsman's
investigation into their acts or omissions in the case of Ranchez based on the supposed
lack of personal interest on the part of private respondents who are the complainants in
OMB-C-A-0065-B.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court noted that Section 20 of RA

6770 has been clarified by Administrative Order No. 17 [26] (AO 17), which amended
Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07), otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Section 4, Rule III [27] of the amended Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, reads:

Section 4. Evaluation. Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to
determine whether the same may be:

a) dismissed outright for any grounds stated under Section 20 of Republic Act No.
6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be
discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned;

b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public

Assistance Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2 , Rule IV of this
Rules;

c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, R.A. 6770 for the
taking of appropriate administrative proceedings;

d) referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation; or

e) docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the

Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied.)

Thus, even if the ground raised is the supposed lack of sufficient personal interest of
complainants in the subject matter of the grievance under Section 20(4), the dismissal on
that ground is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint.

In this case, the Ombudsman proceeded to investigate and decide the complaint filed by
private respondents, and even assuming the latter may have no sufficient personal interest
in Ranchez's grievance mentioned in their complaint, such was deemed irrelevant and not
enough basis for outright dismissal of the complaint.  The Ombudsman in this case cannot
be faulted for exercising its discretion under Section 20 of RA 6670, which allows the
Ombudsman to decide not to conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act
or omission complained of, if it believes that the complainant has no sufficient personal
interest in the subject matter of the grievance.

Petitioners' reliance on the ruling in Baltazar v. Hon. Ombudsman[28] is likewise misplaced. 

The Court therein clarified at the outset that there was no question on petitioner's legal
standing "[i]n so far as the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is
concerned" but that the filing of the petition for review on certiorari before this Court, after
the Ombudsman, upon re-investigation, ordered the dismissal of the criminal complaint, is
another matter.  Thus, applying the rule on real party-in-interest under Section 2, [29] Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner in said case was found to be a
stranger and not an injured private complainant in a criminal complaint who has direct
interest in the outcome of the criminal case.

On the finding of petitioners' administrative liability, we find no reversible error committed by

the Ombudsman.

Section 5(a) of RA 6713 explicitly mandates as follows:

SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In the performance of their duties, all
public officials and employees are under obligation to:

(a)  All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public.
The reply must contain, the action taken on the request.

xxxx

Records showed that despite Ranchez's written and verbal requests made between
September and November 2004 in connection with his pending petition for
review/reconsideration on his disqualification on the basis of the subject memoranda and
its approval by the NEA Board of Administrators, petitioners did not respond to his queries
or at the very least inform him that as early as May 27, 2004, the NEA Board of
Administrators had already approved the subject memoranda.  Notably, Ranchez had
invoked the OGCC's Opinion declaring the subject memoranda to have no binding force
and effect on electric cooperatives which is contrary to petitioner Bueno's stance that the
said regulations remain valid until declared illegal by a competent court.  Moreover, despite
constant follow ups, Ranchez was not informed as to when the NEA Board of
Administrators will take up or its action on his petition for reconsideration.  In any event,
petitioners clearly failed to disclose crucial information sought by Ranchez within fifteen
working days, in violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713.

We note that the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees emphasizes promptness in attending to requests made upon
government offices or agencies.  Rule VI, Sections 1 and 3(2) provides:

SECTION 1.  As a general rule, when a request or petition, whether written or verbal, can
be disposed of promptly and expeditiously the official and employee in charge to whom the
same is presented shall do so immediately, without discrimination, and in no case beyond
fifteen (15) working days from receipt of the request or petition.

xxxx

SEC. 3.  In case of written requests, petitions or motions, sent by means of letters,
telegrams, or the like, the official or employee in charge shall act on the same within fifteen
(15) working days from receipt thereof, provided that:

(b)  If the communication is within the jurisdiction of the office or agency, the official and
employee must:

(1) x x x

(2)  Where the matter is non-routinary or the issues involved are not simple or ordinary,
write a note or letter of acknowledgment, informing the interested party, petitioner or
correspondent of the action to be taken or when such requests, petitions or motions
can be acted upon.  Where there is a need to submit additional information, requirements,
or documents, the note or letter of acknowledgement shall so state, specifying a
reasonable period of time within which they should be submitted, and the name of the
particular official or employee in charge thereof.  When all the documents or requirements
have been submitted to the satisfaction of the department or office or agency concerned,
the particular official or employee in charge shall inform the interested party, petitioner, or
correspondent of the action to be taken and when such action or disposition can be
expected, barring unforeseen circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners violated the above mandate and presented no proof whatsoever that they made
a written reply to Ranchez's requests within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days. This
constituted neglect of duty which cannot be countenanced. [30]  Petitioners should be
reminded that as government officials and employees they are expected to adhere to the
standards set by law in the discharge of their official duties, among others, commitment to
public service, professionalism, justness and sincerity and responsiveness to the public. [31]

Under Section 52 (C) (13) and (15), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, petitioners' infraction is classified as a light offense.

SEC. 52.  Classification of Offenses. x x x

xxxx

C. The following are Light Offenses with corresponding penalties:

xxxx

13. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt x x x

1st Offense Reprimand
2nd Offense Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense Dismissal
xxxx
15.  Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or
act promptly and expeditiously on public transactions

1st Offense Reprimand
2nd Offense Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense - Dismissal

This being petitioners' first offense, the penalty of reprimand imposed by the Ombudsman
was thus proper. As to the Ombudsman's pronouncement in the fallo of its decision that
petitioners have not been shown to have acted in bad faith and with malice, this will not
exculpate them from administrative liability. There is nothing in RA 6713 or its implementing
rules that requires a finding of malice or bad faith in the commission of the administrative
offense defined under Section 5.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The Decision dated November 4,

2009 and Resolution dated March 18, 2010 of the Court of Appeals  which upheld the
Decision dated January 22, 2007 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-05-0065-B
are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Imperial v GSIS 658 SCRA 497

FACTS:
GSIS charged Monico Imperial Jr., Branch Manager of GSIS Naga Field Office, with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. He was said to have
approved salary loan requests of 8 GSIS Naga Field office employees who lacked the contribution
requirements under GSIS Policy and Procedure Guidelines No. 153-99. As a result, he gave them
unwarranted benefits through his evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross negligence, and
caused injury to the pension fund. Atty. Molina, counsel for Imperial Jr., said that the loan was
granted based on a board resolution and that the loans were fully paid back. The Hearing Officer
first set the venue for the pre-hearing conference in the GSIS Legazpi Field Office but later moved it
to the GSIS Naga Field Office. Atty. Molina filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the venue
should be at the GSIS Main Office in Pasay City based on GSIS Rules of Procedure. The Hearing
Office denied the motion for reconsideration in August 11, 2006. A fax copy of this decision was
given on August 14, 2006 but Atty. Molina received the registered mail that contained the order only
on August 18, 2006. Hence, Imperial and Atty. Molina failed to appear at the pre-hearing
conference on August 17, 2006. The Hearing Officer declared the petitioner to have waived his right
to file his answer and to have a formal investigation of the case, and expunged the unverified
answer and other pleadings filed by Atty. Molina. GSIS President Winston Garcia found petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He took into
consideration the pleadings filed by Atty. Molina despite that fact that it was expunged from the
records but found the defenses put up in the pleadings to be unmeritorious. He imposed the penalty
of dismissal with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of
eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government. Atty. Molina filed for
a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Monico Imperial said that he was denied due
process when the pre-hearing on August 17, 2006 was conducted during his absence without prior
notice of the order changing the venue.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Imperial was denied due process
2. Whether MOnico committed grave misconduct

HELD:
1. No, Monico Imperial was not denied due process. The essence of procedural due process is
the opportunity to be heard. In this case, although the petitioner did not get to attend the pre-
hearing on August 17, 2006, President Garcia still made his decision on the matter taking
into consideration the pleadings filed by petitioner’s attorney despite the fact that they were
expunged in the pre-hearing conference. Also, it is important to note that when petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration after President Garcia’s decision, it cured any defect or
due process infirmity the Hearing Officer might have committed during the pre-hearing
conference.

2. No. Under the circumstances of the present case, we do not see the type of open defiance
and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed.  In fact, the CSC's findings on the
petitioner's actions prior to the approval of the loans negate the presence of any intent on
the petitioner's part to deliberately defy the policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS branch managers
have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan applications beyond the
prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient practice in the
approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the existing GSIS
 policy; and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate supervisor before
acting on the loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the characteristic
flagrant disregard of the rules that grave misconduct requires.

Thus, the petitioner's liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct. As
Branch Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies,
guidelines and procedures in carrying out the agency's mandate in the area.  By  approving
the loan applications of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who did not fully meet the
required qualifications, he committed a serious lapse of judgment sufficient to hold him liable
for simple misconduct.

The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) classifies simple
misconduct as a less grave offense.  Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil Service
Rules, the commission of simple misconduct is penalized by suspension for one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the
second offense. While records show that this is not the petitioner's first offense as he was
previously suspended for one (1) year for neglect of duty, we believe that his dismissal
would be disproportionate to the nature and effect of the transgression he committed as the
GSIS did not suffer any prejudice through the loans he extended; these loans were for GSIS
employees and were duly paid for. Thus, for his second simple misconduct, we impose on
the petitioner the penalty of suspension from the lapse of his preventive suspension by
GSIS up to the finality of this Decision.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. ROGELIO F. MANALO, 

G.R. No. 208979, September 21, 2016

FACTS:

In 2004, Rogelio F. Manalo,4 Computer Operator IV, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
was assigned as membership processor at the Membership Department I (Manila) where his main
duty was to process membership applications.

Sometime in 2005, the Internal Audit Service Group (IASG), GSIS, conducted an audit examination
and found that on several occasions in July 2004, Manalo’s operator code and terminal ID was
used in creating the membership records and policies of fictitious and terminated employees of the
City Government of Manila (CGM).

Manalo was formally charged with Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Gross Neglect of
Duty. The acts of Manalo constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as they
violate the norm of public accountability.

Issue:

Whether Manalo committed gross neglect of duty.

Held:

Yes. For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the creation of 17 anomalous policy records
which were in turn used to defraud GSIS of P621,165.00, respondent is guilty not of grave
misconduct or dishonesty, but gross neglect of duty which is punished with dismissal under Rule
10, Section 46(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Respondent Rogelio F. Manalo is ordered DISMISSED from the Government Service Insurance

System for gross neglect of duty, with cancellation of civil service eligibility; forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution; and bar from taking civil service
examinations.

Doctrine

Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence ‘refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property.’ It denotes a flagrant and
culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public
officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

CATIPON vs JAPSON

The Facts:

Macario Catipon Jr. (Petitioner), though lacking 1.5 units in Military Science, was allowed to join the
graduation ceremonies for B.S. Criminology students of the Baguio Colleges Foundation, with a
restriction that he must cure the deficiency before he can be considered a graduate.  He joined the
Social Security System in 1985.  In September, 1993, he took the Civil Service Professional
Examination (CSPE) on the belief that the Civil Service Commission still allowed CSPE applicants
to substitute length of service government service for any academic deficiency they may have,
unaware that in January, 1993, the CSC had issued Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 42, Series of 1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992 which discontinued the
policy.  He took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993, obtained a rating of 80.52% and was later
promoted to Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head of the SSS.  He completed his 1.5 units
deficiency in Military Science in 1995.

In March, 2003, Jerome Japson (respondent) filed a letter-complaint with the CSC-CAR Regional
Director, alleging that Macario made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, by stating
therein that he graduated in 1993, when he actually graduated only in 1995 after removing his
deficiency in Military Science.  As a non-graduate in 1993, Macario was not qualified to take the
CSPE examination, thus Macario was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR after
preliminary investigation.  In his Answer, Macario alleged good faith, lack of malice and honest
mistake; he alleged that he was of the honest belief that length of service may substitute academic
deficiency in taking the CSPE exam.

The CSC-CAR Regional Director, noting that all the entries in the application form submitted by
Macario for the CSPE exam were typewritten, except for the entries on “Year Graduated”, “School
Where Graduated”, and “Degree Finished” ruled that Macario consciously drafted the application
form and meticulously prepared it before submitting to the CSC.  But the pre-drafted application
form showed Macario’s confusion as to how the entries should be filled up; in sum, the CSC-CAR
Regional Director noted, Macario had tried to show the real state of his educational attainment,
mitigating his liability, and did not show a blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to
violate the law.  Thus, the Regional Director exonerated him on all charges except as to the charge
for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, where he was found guilty and penalized
with suspension of six months and one to one year.  Macario appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, after his motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC-CAR Regional Director. 
To forestall his impending suspension, Macario filed a Petition for Review to assail the CSC-CAR
Regional Director’s ruling, which the Court of Appeals denied.  It ruled that instead of filing a
Petition for Review directly with the CA, Macario should have interposed an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1), 43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases; by filing the petition directly with the CA, Macario violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies; the absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or
disregard established rules or norms in the service does not preclude a finding of guilt for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that petitioner did not act with prudence and care,
but instead was negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE application form and in failing to verify
beforehand the requirements for the examination.  Macario elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.  He argues that he filed the petition for review in view of his imminent suspension, and to
prevent serious injury and damage to him; that he should be completely exonerated from the
charges against him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be
accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms
in the service – which is absent in his case; and that his career service professional eligibility should
not be revoked in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves
civil service eligibility.

The Issues:

Whether or not Macario violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies;

Whether or not Macario should be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

The Ruling:

The Court denies the Petition. Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article DC-
B, state that –

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Thus, “the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.”1 

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel
agency of government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC
adopted Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement.
Section 4 thereof provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall
have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency
of such officers and employees.

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission
Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional
Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, “decisions of heads of
departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a
penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be
appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof.”2 
“Commission Proper” refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.3 

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for
review, under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the
Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court.4 

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the
CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and thus dismissible.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that “before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to
give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.” Indeed, the administrative agency concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in
the “best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum.”

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as “[t]he doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.”  When petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to
acknowledge petitioner before it.
We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE
examination. Petitioner’s claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy
or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.8  Moreover, petitioner – as mere applicant for
acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE – cannot expect to be served on a silver
platter; the obligation to know what is required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or
his colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the appellate court:

In Bacaya v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the
deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal case.
Respondent judge in the said case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in
good faith and that it has been a practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and
that he would simply sign the prepared order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated
that negligence is the failure to observe such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person
would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is necessary & deliberate intent to exist;
such is not necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam.
He simply relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his
deficiency in Military Science with the length of his government service. He cannot lay blame on the
personnel head of the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules
contained in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a
reasonably prudent and careful person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the
requirements imposed on prospective examinees. In so doing, he would certainly have been
informed of the new CSC policy disallowing substitution of one’s length of government service for
academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service
employee’s advice since it was not shown that the latter was authorized to give information
regarding the examination nor that said employee was competent and capable of giving correct
information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a reasonably prudent and
careful person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his failure was not a deliberate act
of the will, such is not necessary in an act of negligence and, as in Bacaya, negligence is not
inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.10 

The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be
imposed upon an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and
integrity of the office; and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official
functions. Under our civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions
have been treated as such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to
report back to work without prior notice; failure to safekeep public records and property; making
false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun,
and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s participation in the
execution of a document conveying complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s
family; selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during
office hours; a CA employee’s forging of receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP
address, which caused network problems within his office and allowed him to gain access to the
entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state of security;11  a public
prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but by a judge;12  and
a teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the Code of Ethics for
Professional Teachers.13  In petitioner’s case, his act of making false entries in his CSPE application
undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a
willful or deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service “may or may not be characterized by
corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules.”14 

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner’s plea that “in the interest of justice and in the spirit of
the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility,” his career service professional
eligibility should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one’s
benefit not only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in
prejudice to the government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no
place in the public service.“Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public
interest that requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office
must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.”16 

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180845, June 06, 2018

GOV. AURORA E. CERILLES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al

The Facts

On November 7, 2000, Republic Act No. 8973 entitled "An Act creating the Province of Zamboanga
Sibugay from the Province of Zamboanga del Sur and for other purposes" was passed. As a
consequence thereof, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the province of Zamboanga del Sur
(province, for brevity) was reduced by thirty-six percent (36%). Because of such reduction,
petitioner [Gov. Cerilles], sought the opinion of CSC on the possibility of reducing the workforce of
the provincial government.

The CSC advised the Governor that in the event reorganization is carried out in that province, the
same must be authorized by appropriate Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) resolution, so that
necessary funds may be correspondingly released, among other purposes, to aid the provincial
government in the implementation thereof.

Subsequently on August 21, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur passed
Resolution No. 2K1-27 approving the new staffing pattern of the provincial government consisting
only of 727 positions and Resolution No. 2K1-038 which authorized petitioner to undertake the
reorganization of the provincial government and to implement the new staffing pattern.

Pursuant to said authority, petitioner appointed employees to the new positions in the provincial
government. The private respondents were among those who were occupying permanent positions
in the old plantilla and have allegedly been in the service for a long time but were not given
placement preference and were instead terminated without valid cause and against their will. On
various dates, private respondents filed their respective letters of appeal respecting their
termination with petitioner. However, no action was taken on the appeals made; hence, private
respondents brought the matter to public respondent's Regional Office No. IX (Regional Office, for
brevity). In the meantime, the province submitted its Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for
January 1, 2002 to the Regional Office No. IX for attestation. x x x

The Ruling of the CSC Regional Office IX, the CSCRO, in a Letter dated June 3, 2002, found that
the subject appointments violated Republic Act No. (RA) 66567 for allegedly failing to grant
preference in appointment to employees previously occupying permanent positions in the old
plantilla. As a result, the CSCRO invalidated a total of ninety-six (96) appointments made by Gov.
Cerilles after the reorganization.

The CSCRO likewise took cognizance of the appeals by Respondents, allegedly due to Gov.
Cerilles' failure to act thereon. Thus, on June 24, 2002, the CSCRO issued an Omnibus Order
directing the reinstatement of Respondents to their former positions. Dismayed, Gov. Cerilles
sought reconsideration with the CSCRO. Therein, Gov. Cerilles claimed that it was not within the
prerogative of the CSCRO to revoke an appointment as the same was within her exclusive
discretion.

Thereafter, the CSC informed Gov. Cerilles that her Letter was treated as an appeal and was
forwarded to it by the CSCRO. Thus, in an Order, Gov. Cerilles was required to comply with the
requirements for perfecting an appeal pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 02-319 dated February 28,
2002.

Gov. Cerilles filed a motion for reconsideration which was eventually denied by the CSC.

Unfazed, Gov. Cerilles elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
on the following grounds, inter alia: (i) that the CSC is without original jurisdiction over protests
made by an aggrieved officer or employee during government reorganization, pursuant to RA 6656,
and (ii) that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the invalidation of the subject
appointments.

Ruling of the CA

In the CA Decision, the CA observed that Gov. Cerilles resorted to the wrong mode of review, the
proper remedy being an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules, which governs appeals from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the CSC. Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the
petition and upheld the CSCRO's jurisdiction to entertain the appeals of Respondents. Notably,
however, no discussion was made on the CSC's power to invalidate the subject appointments.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Gov. Cerilles, which was denied by the CA.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

The Petition questions the CA Decision on the following grounds:

(i) Whether Gov. Cerilles correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules when she filed her petition before the CA questioning the invalidation of the
subject appointments, there being no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law;
 (ii) Whether the CA misapplied Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Powers and
Functions of the CSC to Approve and Disapprove Appointments) in ruling that an
aggrieved applicant for a position due to reorganization does not need to seek recourse
first before the appointing authority (i.e., Gov. Cerilles as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur);

(iii) Whether the CA deliberately misapplied Section 7 of RA 6656 in favor of Respondents in

order to evade discussion on the validity of the subject appointments;36 and

(iv) Whether the CA misinterpreted the jurisdiction of CSCROs,as contained in Section 6[B1]
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99.37

Ruling

The Petition is denied.

The Rules and prevailing jurisprudence are settled on this matter. It is well-established that as a
condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari, there must be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.38 In this case, the CA correctly observed
that a Rule 43 petition for review was then an available mode of appeal from the above CSC
resolutions.

It bears reiterating that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is a prerogative writ and never issues
as a matter of right. Given its extraordinary nature, the party availing thereof must strictly observe
the rules laid down and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.
Hence, where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion.

Applying the foregoing, the Court thus finds Gov. Cerilles' failure to abide by the elementary
requirements of the Rules inexcusable. That she repeatedly invoked "grave abuse of discretion" on
the part of the CSC was of no moment; the records failed to demonstrate how an appeal to the CA
via Rule 43 was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy as would allow a relaxation of the rules
of procedure.

Gov. Cerilles also faults the CA for upholding the CSCRO's jurisdiction over the appeals directly
lodged before it by Respondents. Gov. Cerilles anchors her claim on Sections 7 and 8 of RA 6656,
which provide the appeal procedure for aggrieved applicants to new positions resulting from a
reorganization:

SEC. 7. A list of the personnel appointed to the authorized positions in the approved staffing pattern
shall be made known to all the officers and employees of the department or agency. Any of such
officers and employees aggrieved by the appointments made may file an appeal with the appointing
authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.

SEC. 8. An officer or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing authority
may further appeal within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to the Civil Service Commission which
shall render a decision thereon within thirty (30) days and whose decision shall be final and
executory. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the cited provision, Gov. Cerilles claims that it was erroneous for the CSCRO to
have taken cognizance of the appeals of Respondents as the same should have first been filed
before her as the appointing authority. Specifically, Gov. Cerilles posits that the foregoing provisions
conferred "original jurisdiction" to the appointing authority over appeals of aggrieved officers and
employees and only "appellate jurisdiction" to the CSCRO. Thus, she claims that Respondents'
failure to observe the proper procedure deprived the CSCRO of jurisdiction over their appeals.

The Court disagrees.

The records indicate that Respondents did in fact file letters of appeal with Gov. Cerilles on various
dates after their separation. Said appeals, however, were not acted upon despite the lapse of time,
which prompted Respondents to instead seek relief before the CSCRO. While Gov. Cerilles
disputes this fact, the Court, being a trier of law and not of facts, must necessarily rely on the factual
findings of the CA. In Rule 45 petitions, the Court cannot re-weigh evidence already duly
considered by the lower courts. In this regard, it was held by the CA:

Even assuming that petitioner correctly relied on Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. 6656, We still find that
private respondents fully complied with the requirements of the said provisions.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, private respondents indeed filed letters of appeal on various dates
after their termination. Said appeals however, were unacted despite the lapse of time given the
appointing authority to resolve the same which prompted private respondents to seek redress
before public respondent's Regional Office. We, thus, cannot give credence to petitioner's claim that
no appeal was filed before her as the appointing authority. As what petitioner would have private
respondents do, the latter indeed went through the motions of first attempting to ventilate their
protest before the appointing authority. However, since the appointing authority failed to take any
action on the appeal, private respondents elevated the same to the Regional Office and correctly
did so. x x x

While no decision on the appeals was ever rendered by Gov. Cerilles, it would be unjust to require
Respondents to first await an issuance before elevating the matter to the CSC, given Gov. Cerilles'
delay in resolving the same. In such case, an appointing authority could easily eliminate all
opportunities of appeal by the aggrieved employees by mere inaction. It is well-settled that
procedural rules must not be applied with unreasonable rigidity if substantial rights stand to be
marginalized; here, no less than Respondents' means of livelihood are at stake.

Proceeding therefrom, the Court cannot therefore ascribe any fault to the CSCRO in resolving the
appeals of Respondents due to Gov. Cerilles' refusal to act, especially since the Csc is, in any case,
vested with jurisdiction to review the decision of the appointing authority.

The foregoing issues resolved, the Court now confronts the principal issue in this case: whether the
CSC, in affirming the CSCRO, erred in invalidating the appointments made by Gov. Cerilles.
Otherwise stated, can the CSC revoke an appointment for violating the provisions of RA 6656?

No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been
appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification
requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to
positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such
positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. (Emphasis
supplied)
The following may be derived from the cited provisions — First, an officer or employee may be
validly removed from service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization; in such case, there is no
violation of security of tenure and the aggrieved employee has no cause of action against the
appointing authority. Second, if, on the other hand, the reorganization is done in bad faith, as when
the enumerated circumstances in Section 2 are present, the aggrieved employee, having been
removed without valid cause, may demand for his reinstatement or reappointment. Third, officers
and employees holding permanent appointments in the old staffing pattern shall be given
preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern, which shall be
comparable to their former position or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to
positions next lower in rank. Lastly, no new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers
and employees have been appointed unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature.

Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Court now discusses the matter of appointment.

Appointment, by its very nature, is a highly discretionary act. As an exercise of political discretion,
the appointing authority is afforded a wide latitude in the selection of personnel in his department or
agency and seldom questioned, the same being a matter of wisdom and personal preference. In
certain occasions, however, the selection of the appointing authority is subject to review by
respondent CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government. In this regard, while there
appears to be a conflict between the two interests, i.e., the discretion of the appointing authority and
the reviewing authority of the CSC, this issue is hardly a novel one.

In countless occasions, the Court has ruled that the only function of the CSC is merely to ascertain
whether the appointee possesses the minimum requirements under the law; if it is so, then the CSC
has no choice but to attest to such appointment. The Court recalls its ruling in Lapinid v. Civil
Service Commission,54 citing Luego v. Civil Service Commission,55 wherein the CSC was faulted
for revoking an appointment on the ground that another candidate scored a higher grade based on
comparative evaluation sheets:

We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil Service Commission has no
power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review
the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the
required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory
qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better
qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.

Clearly, the CSC is not actually directing the appointment of private respondent but simply ordering
his reinstatement to the contested position being the first appointee thereto. Further, private
respondent was already holding said position when he was unlawfully demoted. The CSC, after
finding that the demotion was patently illegal, is merely restoring private respondent to his former
position, just as it must restore other employees similarly affected to their positions before the
reorganization.

It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who
have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to
implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the
present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons clearly
explained therein, is undubitably (sic) in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and
strengthening the civil service.

The reorganization of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur was tainted with bad faith

Following the discussion above, the resolution of the Petition simply hinges on whether the
reorganization of the Province of Zamboanga Del Sur was done in good faith. The Court rules in the
negative.

In Blaquera v. Civil Service Commission, citing Dario v. Mison, the Court had the occasion to define
good faith in the context of reorganization:

Good faith, is a basic ingredient for the validity of any government reorganization. It is the golden
thread that holds together the fabric of the reorganization. Without it, the cloth would disintegrate.

"Reorganization is a recognized valid ground for separation of civil service employees, subject only
to the condition that it be done in good faith. No less than the Constitution itself in Section 16 of the
Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No. 81 and Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6656, support this conclusion with the declaration that all those not so appointed
in the implementation of said reorganization shall be deemed separated from the service with the
concomitant recognition of their entitlement to appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement
plans of the reorganized government agency."

A reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute
economy and greater efficiency in its operation. It is not a mere tool of the spoils system to change
the face of the bureaucracy and destroy the livelihood of hordes of career employees in the civil
service so that the new-powers-that-be may put their own people in control of the machinery of
government.

As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reason or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid
abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic reduction of plantilla positions in
the new staffing pattern in order to address the LGU's gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that
in the municipal treasurer's office and waterworks operations unit where respondents were
previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been
abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which
had 129.

The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility
worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso.
Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proffered any proof that the new positions do
not perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. And nowhere in
the records does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents.
While the CSC never found the new appointees to be unqualified, and never disapproved nor
recalled their appointments as they presumably met all the minimum requirements therefor, there is
nothing contradictory in the CSC's course of action as it is limited only to the non-discretionary
authority of determining whether the personnel appointed meet all the required conditions laid down
by law.

Congruently, the CSC can very well order petitioner to reinstate respondents to their former
positions (as these were never actually abolished) or to appoint them to comparable positions in the
new staffing pattern.

A final note. The Court is not unmindful of the plight of the incumbents who were appointed after the
reorganization in place of Respondents. However, as a result of the illegal termination of
Respondents, there was technically no vacancy to which the incumbents could have been
appointed.

ISSUE:

Was the reorganization of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur tainted with bad faith?

RULING: YES

First, as initially observed by the CSCRO, no less than ninety-six (96) of the appointments made by
Gov. Cerilles violated the rule on preference and non-hiring of new employees embodied in
Sections 4 and 5 of the said law.

Second, Respondents were replaced by either new employees or those holding lower positions in
the old staffing pattern - circumstances that may be properly appreciated as evidence of bad faith
pursuant to Section 2 and Section 4 of RA 6656.

Further, in the case of Pan, the Court once again found that the appointment of new employees
despite the availability of permanent officers and employees indicated that there was no bona
fide reorganization by the appointing authority.

Moreover, the Court notes that the positions of Respondents were not even abolished. However,
instead of giving life to the clear mandate of RA 6656 on preference, Gov. Cerilles terminated
Respondents from the service and forthwith appointed other employees in their stead. Neither did
Gov. Cerilles, at the very least, demote them to lesser positions if indeed there was a reduction in
the number of positions corresponding to Respondents' previous positions. 

Luego v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. L-69137 August 5, 1986

Facts:
Luego was appointed Administrative Officer 11 (AO 11), Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent" but the CSC approved it as
"temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by Tuozo and another employee,
and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the
approval of the appointment
CSC found Tuozo better qualified than Luego for the contested position and, accordingly, directed
"that Tuozo be appointed to the position of AO 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place
of Luego whose appointment as AO 11 is hereby revoked." Tuozo was so appointed by the new
mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. Luego, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now
questioning that order and the private respondent's title.

Issue:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground
that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter?

Held:
No. The appointment of Luego was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so,
and it was not for CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. The stamping of the words
"APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly
described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February
18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself And
what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition
specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position. The
Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the
Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove"
appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shag have inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in the civil service,
except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police
forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. (emphasis supplied) However, a full reading of the
provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is actually
allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts
on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper
authorities.

Codilla vs Martinez

FACTS:

 The Mayor of Tagum left for Negros Occidental to attend to a sick brother.
 DESIGNATED the VM to act in his place until further advice. (VM designated Ranking
Councilor, then the latter designated the 2nd Ranking councillor all for health reasons)
  Bermudez was not also in good health and so he DESIGNATED the 3rd ranking councillor
Martinez effective on the same date (Jan. 25, 1956 until further notice)
 The 3rd ranking councillor (Martinez) was designated as Mayor.
 Martinez assumed office and his 1st official act was to separate from the service the
petitioners as policemen of the municipality
 He appointed several persons as Municipal policemen who immediately qualified by taking
his oath of office.
 Petitioners filed a petition for Mandamus against the acting Mayor alleging that their
separation was illegal because being civil service employees, their employment cannot be
terminated except for cause.
 Respondents answered that the appointments of the petitioners were made in temporary
capacity, because they are not civil service eligible, same was only valid for 3 months,
continuance beyond the expiration of the period was illegal.
 Even assuming that Acting Mayor had no authority to terminate their employment, his action
was validated when incumbent Mayor endorsed and ratified the same
RTC: dismissed the petition. Separation was made in accordance with law

ISSUES:

WON designation was not valid and separation is illegal

HELD:

Separation was illegal because the designation of the Acting Mayor was not made in
accordance with the Revised Administrative Code; such designation must be made by the
Provincial Governor with consent of the Provincial Board.

 Acting Mayor is not a usurper, but at most a de facto officer whose acts may be given
validity in the eye of the law
 Although designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority as
distinguished from a usurper who is one who has neither title nor color of right to an office.
 Acts of the acting mayor are official acts of a de facto officer if made within the scope of
authority vested by law. VALID AND BINDING
 All his official acts done were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor
when he returned to office.
 All elements of a de facto officer are present.
 There must be an office having a de facto existence, or lease one recognized by law and
claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority.
De Facto vs De Jure

 De facto officer is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he
assumed to be but who, in fact, under the law has no right or title to the office he assumes to
hold.
De Facto vs Usurper or intruder

 De facto holds by some color of right or title while usurper intrudes upon the office and
assumes to exercise its functions w/o either legal title or color of right to such office
Eligibility

Refers to the endowment/requirement/accomplishment that fits one for a public office.

Qualification

Endowment that fits one for office or acts which a person is required by law to do before assuming
office (e.g. Oath taking)

There must be rational connection between the requirement and duties.

Who prescribes qualification?

Congress prescribes eligibility, qualifications, and disqualifications and provide for methods of filling
offices, subject to Constitutional limitations.

Time of Possession of Qualifications

If specified by the Constitution or law: Time specified

If Constitution or law is silent:

 At the time of commencement of term or induction into office

 At the time of the election or appointment
GR: at the time of election, appointment or assumption

LAYGO vs. MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SOLANO, NUEVA VIZCAYA

G.R. No. 188448 January 11, 2017

FACTS:

The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 103922 and its Resolution dated June 19, 2009.

In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) sent two letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor
Santiago O. Dickson and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the
illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo over Public Market
Stalls No. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, which petitioners leased from the Municipal Government.
Bandrang claimed that petitioners told her to vacate the stalls, which they subsequently subleased
to another. Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify against petitioners if need be, and
appealed that she be given priority in the future to lease the stalls she vacated.

In August 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang and a copy of Resolution
No. 183-2004 to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sanggunian informed Mayor Dickson
that the matter falls under the jurisdiction of his office since it (Sanggunian) has already passed and
approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor Dickson to enforce the provision
against subleasing of stalls in the public market.

Mayor Dickson, in response, informed the Sanggunian that the stalls were constructed under a
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the petitioners had the right to keep their
stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He then asked the Sanggunian if provisions were
made to sanction lessees under the BOT scheme similar to the provision against subleasing (Item
No. 9) in the contract of lease.

Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sanggunian, praying and recommending to Mayor
Dickson, by way of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality and
petitioners for violating the provision on subleasing. She suggested that after which, the stalls can
be bided upon anew and leased to the successful bidder. She made the suggestion because Mayor
Dickson did not act on her concerns even after the Sanggunian referred them to him. 

The Sanggunian once again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of Resolution No.
183-2004, to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sanggunian opined that they no longer
need to make any recommendation to Mayor Dickson because Resolution No. 183-2004 already
empowered and authorized him to cancel the lease contracts pursuant to its pertinent provisions.

Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of the
Sanggunian. Thus, Bandrang filed a Petition for Mandamus against him before the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (RTC). Subsequently, she amended her petition to implead
petitioners. Bandrang alleged that despite already being aware of the violations of the lease
contracts of petitioners with the Municipality, Mayor Dickson still refused to enforce the provisions of
the lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang concluded that Mayor Dickson's inaction can only
be construed as an unlawful neglect in the performance and enforcement of his public duty as the
Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Thus, she sought an order directing Mayor Dickson to
immediately cancel the lease between the Municipal Government and petitioners over Public
Market Stall Nos. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, and to lease the vacated stalls to interested persons.

In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, Mayor Dickson claimed that under the
principle of pari delicto, Bandrang had no right to seek remedy with the court as she was guilty
herself in leasing the market stalls. Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law by
referring the matter to the Sanggunian for appropriate action. He also argued that Bandrang had no
cause of action against him and that she was not a real-party-in-interest. He likewise asserted that
the subject of the mandamus was not proper as it entailed an act which was purely discretionary on
his part.

In his Pre-Trial Brief, Mayor Dickson elaborated that Bandrang had no cause of action because the
stalls were on a BOT scheme covered by an ordinance. During the hearing, Mayor Dickson
presented a copy of the resolution of the Sanggunian indicating that there was a directive to all stall
owners in the public market of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to build their own stalls after a fire gutted the
public market.

On the other hand, petitioners denied that they were the lessees of Stalls 77 A and B and 78 A and
B. They clarified that Clarita Laygo (Clarita), their mother, was the lessee of the stalls by virtue of a
BOT scheme of the Municipality. At the time they entered into a contract of lease with Bandrang, it
was agreed that the contract was subject to the consent of the other heirs of Clarita. The consent,
however, was never given; hence, there was no subleasing to speak of. Even on the assumption
that there was, petitioners maintained that the prohibition on subleasing would not apply because
the contract between the Municipality and Clarita was one under a BOT scheme. Resolution No.
183-2004 only covered stall holders who violated their lease contracts with the Municipal
Government. Since their contract with the Municipal Government was not a lease contract but a
BOT agreement, Resolution No. 183-2004 would neither apply to them, nor be enforced against
them. Further, even granting arguendo that the prohibition would apply, petitioners claimed that
there was no more ground for the revocation of the lease because the subleasing claimed by
Bandrang had ended and the subsequent receipt by the Municipality of payments ratified the
contract with petitioners.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not mandamus is proper

2. Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004 be applied against
petitioners despite the absence of a contract of lease between them and the Municipal
Government

RULING:

1. No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. As a rule,
mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer,
board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such
court, officer, board, or person bas unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. Neither will the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are discretionary in nature.

Applying the foregoing distinction, we find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts
sought to be done are discretionary in nature.

2.Yes. There is preponderant evidence that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal
Government is one of lease. The type of contract existing between petitioners and the Municipal
Government is disputed. The Municipal Government asserts that it is one of lease, while petitioners
insist that it is a BOT agreement. Both parties, however, failed to present the contracts which they
purport to have. It is likewise uncertain whether the contract would fall under the coverage of the
Statute of Frauds and would, thus, be only proven through written evidence. In spite of these, we
find that the Municipal Government was able to prove its claim, through secondary evidence, that its
contract with petitioners was one of lease.

 In view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED the previous decision REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Petition for Mandamus against Mayor Santiago O. Dickson is DISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST: IN RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP

IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR
NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B. HABAWEL. A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC;
December 10, 2013.

FACTS: Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas sought to

invalidate the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the
nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the replacement of IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. He noted that on the IBP By-Laws which
considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official of the IBP who files
a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public office. Under the amended By-
Laws, the resignation takes effect on the starting date of the official campaign
period.

Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel,
filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the
Province of Ifugao. Hence, he is considered ipso facto resigned from the IBP.

Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governors' approval of Atty. Chaguiles
succession as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as
yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting where his
replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to name a replacement.
Second, the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in
the IBP Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region; thus, the
IBP Board of Governors approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra
vires.

In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. x x x x x x[x] In case of any vacancy in the office of
Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote,
elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned
governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.

In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by Atty.
Ubano by saying that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant
before a successor may be appointed or elected. As for the second ground, the IBP
Board of Governors argued that it has been the "tradition"of the IBP that "where the
unexpired term is only for a very short period of time, it is usually the Board of
Governors which appoint a replacement or an officer in charge to serve the
unexpired term."

Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to prevent Atty. Chaguile from
exercising the functions as IBP Governor of Northern Luzon.

A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC: The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of

the election of the IBP Executive Vice President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente
M. Joyas was elected IBP Governor for Southern Luzon.

Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election claiming that the IBP
election of the EVP was marred by inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent
hostility, manifest bias and prejudice, as well as the presiding officers absolute lack
of independence and that the election violated Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws which
requires that the EVP be elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano
emphasized that Atty. Chaguiles vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty.
Chaguiles appointment as governor was itselfultra vires, and therefore, voidab initio.

ISSUES: [1] Was the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as Governor ultra

vires, therefore restraining her to exercise functions relative to the
position?

[2] Is the election for the IBP EVP void in violation Section 47 of the IBP
By-Laws and restrained Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his
duties?

HELD: As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its Compliance, "the term
of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30,
2013."A new Governor for Northern Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected. As
Atty. Chaguile is no longer serving as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, the matter
of ousting or restraining Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions of such office is
no longer an available relief.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

(Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010)

However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguiles appointment as Governor

for Northern Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of this office,
especially her participation in the IBP Board of Governors election of the IBP EVP,
which is the subject of the second Administrative Matter.

We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in
a de facto capacity.

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: 1) There must
be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460

In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office, that of IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon exists. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed
the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit
"irregular or informal, so that she is not a mere volunteer,"that is, not through her
own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so
under "color of authority, Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 473 Phil. 844
(2004).

The IBP Board of Governors approval was secured through a process that it
characterized as a "tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who
vacates his or her office shortly before his or her term expires.

Although being in violation of the IBP By-Laws, this supposed tradition cannot earn
our imprimatur. Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by the IBP Board of
Governors, the authority of replacement governors was derived from a process,
which, though irregular, enabled them to act as and be accepted as governors.

Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes, the
IBP By-Laws "violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or
custom, or practice to the contrary." CIVIL CODE, Art. 7. We do not validate the IBP
Board of Governors erroneous practice. To reiterate our earlier words: "We cannot
countenance this. No amount of previous practice or "tradition" can validate such a
patently erroneous action."

Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in
a de facto capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer.
Accordingly, all official actions of Atty. Chaguile as de facto IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon must be deemed valid, binding, and effective, as though she were
the officer validly appointed and qualified for the office. It follows that her
participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22, 2013 are in
order. DENIED.

Exam 1-4 Saturday

Everything discussed until de jure and de facto officers and appointment

Effects of the acts of the de facto officer.