214 Philosophy Exam - Truth
214 Philosophy Exam - Truth
214 Philosophy Exam - Truth
Charles Sanders Peirce was the scientist, logician, and philosopher of science who
pioneered the philosophical movement known as pragmatism. Deeply sceptical of
metaphysical ideas—such as the idea that there is a “real” world beyond the world we
experience—he once asked his readers to consider what is wrong with the following theory: a
diamond is actually soft, and only becomes hard when it is touched. Peirce argued that there is “no falsity” in
such thinking, for there is no way of disproving it. However, he claimed that the meaning of a concept (such
as “diamond” or “hard”) is derived from the object or quality that the concept relates to—and the effects it
has on our senses. Whether we think of the diamond as “soft until touched” or “always hard” before our
experience, therefore, is irrelevant. Under both theories the diamond feels the same, and can be used in
exactly the same way. However, the first theory is far more difficult to work with, and so is of less value to us.
This idea, that the meaning of a concept is the sensory effect of its object, is known as the pragmatic maxim,
and it became the founding principle of pragmatism—the belief that the “truth” is the account of reality that
works best for us. One of the key things Peirce was trying to accomplish was to show that many debates in
science, philosophy, and theology are meaningless. He claimed that they are often debates about words,
rather than reality, because they are debates in which no effect on the senses can be specified.
Central to Peirce’s pragmatism was the theory that we do not acquire knowledge simply by observing, but
by doing, and that we rely on that knowledge only so long as it is useful, in the sense that it adequately
explains things for us. When it no longer fulfils that function, or better explanations make it redundant, we
replace it. For example, we can see by looking back in history how our ideas about the world have changed
constantly, from thinking that Earth is flat to knowing it to be round; from assuming that Earth is the centre
of the universe, to realizing that it is just one planet in a vast cosmos. The older assumptions worked
perfectly adequately as explanations in their time, yet they are not true, and the universe itself has not
changed. This demonstrates how knowledge as an explanatory tool is different from facts. Peirce examined
the nature of knowledge in this way, but James was to apply this reasoning to the notion of truth.
For William James , the truth of an idea depends on how useful it is; that is to say, whether
or not it does what is required of it. If an idea does not contradict the known facts—such as
laws of science—and it does provide a means of predicting things accurately enough for our
purposes, he says there can be no reason not to consider it true, in the
same way that Peirce considered knowledge as a useful tool irrespective of the facts. This interpretation of
truth not only distinguishes it from fact, but also leads James to propose that “the truth of an idea is not a
stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity
is in fact an event, a process.” Any idea, if acted upon, is found to be true by the action we take; putting the
idea into practice is the process by which it becomes true. James also thinks that belief in an idea is an
important factor in choosing to act upon it, and in this way belief is a part of the process that makes an idea
true. If I am faced with a difficult decision, my belief in a particular idea will lead to a particular course of
action and so contribute to its success. It is because of this that James defines “true beliefs” as those that
prove useful to the believer. Again, he is careful to distinguish these from facts, which he says “are not true.
They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among them.”
For example, "A cat is on a mat" is true if, and only if, there is in the world a cat and a mat and the cat
is related to the mat by being on it. If any of the three pieces (the cat, the mat, and the relation
between them which correspond respectively to the subject, object, and verb of the statement) is
missing, the statement is false.
Consensus theory: A statement is true iff (if and only if) there is a consensus in favour of accepting it.
For example, the existing consensus of us believing that the earth isn’t flat, and it suits us to accept
such a statement as true.
Coherence theory: A statement is true iff (if and only if) it coheres with some specified set of other
statements.
For example, we sometimes reject that a person saw a ghost, on the ground that they do not cohere
with the other common sense or scientific views that we also hold as true.
Pragmatism: A statement is true iff (if and only if) it is useful to believe.
For example, to believe my partner who cheated on me is actually faithful may help me feel better
now, but it is certainly not useful from a more long-term perspective because it doesn't accord with
the facts (and is therefore not true).
Redundancy theory: Strictly speaking, the concept ‘truth’ is redundant. The concept ‘truth’ is philosophically
uninteresting and is only a tool for talking about sentences. After all, ‘p’ and ‘“p” is true’ say the same thing.
For example, "’Snow is white', is true" is exactly the same as saying "Snow is white".
Shirah x
P.S.
If that statement over there is to be useful, then it must be possible to first know that it pays
to believe something, without knowing that it’s a truth.
But what does it mean to say that a belief pays?
o We must suppose that this means that the consequences of going along with the belief
are better than rejecting it.
o And to know if it would be better to reject it or go along with it, we need to know
whether the consequences would be good, which bad, which better and which
worse. That’s so subjective. How would I know what’s best? Which would differ from you. And you.
Russell gives an example about Roman Catholic faith and the French Revolution
which you’re more than welcome to scan through, but basically he’s saying: The
belief in a truth has consequences, yes. But whether these consequences are good or bad
has nothing to do with the truth itself.
Suppose I accept the pragmatic criterion, and suppose you persuade me that a certain belief is
useful. Suppose I thereupon conclude that the belief is true. Belief → Conviction → Truth
Isn’t it obvious that that there is a transition in my mind from seeing that the belief is useful
to actually seeing the belief as true? But it’s not supposed to be that way for the pragmatic
account of truth.
o Take the belief that other people exist.
o According to pragmatists, ‘it is true that other people exist’ means ‘it is useful to
believe that other people exist’.
o Which means that the one phrase then equals the other, because if I believe the one,
then I automatically believe the other one too.
o And if this were so, there could be no transition from the one to the other.
o Which makes no sense, because Russell just explained how there is a transition…
So, that shows us that the word “true” is different from what is presented by the whole ‘useful to
believe’ business.
And therefore, Russell claims, the pragmatic definition of truth ignores the meaning that is
commonly given to the word “true”, and surely its meaning is super important.
Psh. Surely.
4. Usefulness as Criterion of Truth does not imply usefulness as Meaning of Truth.
According to the pragmatic view, the criterion equals the meaning. I mean, sorta makes sense;
something consists of parts, and to be able to tell what the something is (what its meaning is), you
look at the parts. And Russell says NOPE, not the same thing, but with good reason.
So therefore, as useful as the criterion of truth might be, it does not imply its meaning.
Apparently pragmatism comes from the generalising the conception of ‘working hypothesis’.
But WAIT. Russell has three things to say about dat.
i. Working hypotheses are only a small part of our beliefs, and not the whole, as pragmatism
seems to think.
ii. Prudent people (yup, he just called them prudent) give only a low degree of belief to
working hypotheses, so why on earth then choose the working hypotheses to be the types
of beliefs in general.
iii. What does ‘working’ even mean?
→ When science says a hypothesis works, then it means that we can use this hypothesis
to verify and figure stuff out.
→ When pragmatism says a hypothesis works, it means that the consequences in
believing in this hypothesis is good.
This is totes too different. So it’s a no from Russell.
MOCK EXAM
Section A
Section B
State whether the following claims are true or false and give a short explanation justifying why you say the
statement is either true or false. Answer all the questions in this section.
Section C
Write an essay on one of the two questions stated below for 20 marks:
1) Descartes is said to represent a peak in early modern rationalist thought. Why does Descartes say we
cannot trust our senses and what is it in his answer to the mistrust of the senses that makes Descartes
a rationalist?
2) Hume raises the question of if we can ever truly know if one event is really the cause of another
event. What reason does he give for why we should doubt causal relationships and what reasons
does he give for why it is that we believe that the processes of causality exist in the first place?
[20]
TOTAL: 50