Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Biological Psychology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/biopsycho

Impulsive action and motivation

Nico H. Frijda
Amsterdam University, Seranggracht 1, 1019PM Amsterdam, Netherlands

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: This paper explores the way in which emotions are causal determinants of action. It argues that
Received 2 September 2009 emotional events, as appraised by the individual, elicit changes in motive states (called states of action
Accepted 2 January 2010 readiness), which in turn may (or may not) cause action. Actions can be elicited automatically, without
Available online 11 January 2010
prior intention (called impulsive actions), or intentionally. Impulsive actions reflect the simplest and
biologically most general form in which emotions can cause action, since they require no reflection, no
Keywords: foresight, and no planning. Impulsive actions are determined conjointly by the nature of action
Emotion
readiness, the affordances perceived in the eliciting event as appraised, and the individual’s action
Motivation
Impulsive action
repertoire. Those actions from one’s repertoire are performed that both match the perceived affordances
Action readiness and the aim of the state of action readiness.
ß 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Emotions and action processes that cause actions, autonomic changes, feelings, and
perhaps further phenomena.
Emotions are intimately related to action. They are among the There is another reason for questioning the causal nature of the
main direct causes of action. They are integral to action control emotion–action relationship. Actions occurring with a given
(Reis and Gray, 2009). Interestingly, action is hardly mentioned in emotion are usually highly variable, so much so that the
the contributions that compose this issue. It may therefore be conception of ‘‘a given emotion’’ (fear, say, or anger) may come
useful to take emotional action as the starting point for the to be viewed as erroneous (Barrett, 2006; Baumeister et al., 2007;
reflections to which this issue of Biological Psychology gave rise. Kagan, 2006). Fear, for instance, may lead to fleeing, but also to
An intimate relationship between emotions and action may racing one’s car to the hospital after hearing that one’s child had an
appear obvious. Murders are committed out of hatred, in the accident (the example is from Baumeister et al., I think). Anger
political as well as the marital domains. Affections and sexual may set off a bout of rage, but also make one silently turn away, or
desires, one would say, often cause intimate actions. There also are apologize for having given offense (Mesquita, 2003). Guilt may
simple, common, and frequent sequences of events and actions lead to wringing one’s hands or scratching one’s face, but also to a
elicited by affective causes. When humans and non-human decision to be more circumspect at a next occasion. Situational
animals are hurt, they may shriek, whimper, or cry. specifics, rather than a specific emotion, seem to determine the
Yet, the notion that emotions cause action is being contested. action (Barrett, 2006).
One reason is that emotions often are just feelings. People may There is a confusion at play here, however, due to forgetting
confess to them while not doing a thing. One may suffer great grief about the differences between impulsive and reflective processing
in silence. To many researchers and laymen, the word ‘‘emotion’’ (Strack and Deutsch, 2004). Reflective processing of emotions may
therefore just refers to feelings. It did so to Darwin (1872), it did so drastically modify or overrule impulsive processing. Focusing on
to James (1890), and still does so to Kagan (2006). This leaves the vicissitudes of reflective processing of emotional events may
explaining actions like running away from a bear in the woods, as mistakenly lead to assigning impulsive processing a merely trivial
well as feelings, to other processes, such as stimulus–response role in action control (Baumeister et al., 2007), whereas any
connections (James, 1890). This entails making a sharp distinction emotion originates in impulsive processing.
between emotional feelings and those other processes, which then I will approach the emotion–action relationship by first
together form emotion proper. Wundt (1900) did so, using the examining impulsive action. Impulsive emotional actions suggest
word ‘‘Affekte’’. Damasio (2000) also did so, using ‘‘emotion’’. So did a rather direct, non-arbitrary causal relationship to emotions. They
Scherer (2005), and so do I (Frijda, 1986). Emotions are the manifest elementary processes of remote evolutionary origin, since
impulsive actions are observed from birds and squirrels to humans,
if not even from oysters and squid onward. They point to what it is in
E-mail address: n.h.frijda@uva.nl. what we call ‘‘emotions’’ that does directly cause action.

0301-0511/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.01.005
 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579 571

2. Impulsive action Second: ‘‘stimulus-driven’’ is a shorthand for the feature that

impulsive actions are stirred and steered by the present.
Psychology distinguishes different sorts of action: habits and Impulsive actions are initiated by events or objects present
deliberate actions. Older psychology, in addition recognized a here and now (Frijda, 1986, 2010; Pacherie, 2001). The eliciting
different sort: impulsive actions (Frijda, 2010; Pacherie, 2001). event, for instance, influences the progress of an action and
Wundt (1900) labeled them ‘‘drive actions’’ (Triebhandlungen); striving underway. One encounters an obstacle, or notices that
McDougall (1923) called them instincts. Both notions included an obstacle gives way. Or something is perceived here and now
not only species-specific action sequences, like modes of hostile that affords a consummatory action like inhaling or kissing. Or,
attack and courting, but also simpler actions. I first borrow my by contrast, something that should be within reach appears as
examples from Pacherie (2001), and extend them from everyday out of reach; or there is something here that should not be here;
observation. They include punching someone in a bar brawl, or a void is sensed where something loved was expected. In
running away upon perceiving threat, following an attractive impulsive action, the presence, not the future, stirs action. Flight
person with one’s eyes, or kissing that person without is not towards safety but away from danger. Focusing one’s
ascertaining that it is welcome; taking one more drink after glance is not towards seeing clearly but away from seeing
deciding that the previous one was the last. They include biting indistinctly. Impulsive desire is not towards something not here
during a fight (children do it, and so may drunken adults), and but towards bridging the gap between oneself and a coveted
smashing objects that resist being properly used or that one hurt object. Emotions may respond to sequences of this sort. What
oneself by (Hall, 1899), throwing objects at threatening stirs an embrace is the urge to kiss, what stirs the urge to kiss is
individuals. They further include crying and most laughter, the perceived kissability of lips. The perceived affordance primes
and threat and power displays, condescending as well as humble the afforded action. All this is effortless, as befits automatic
and submissive ways of interacting. They include freezing in fear processes. The prospect of safety in fear and of lovemaking when
and timidity and in black-outs during an examination. They being attracted are added by reflection or imagination, if they
include verbal actions like uttering insults and violent emerge at all before doing one’s thing. Seeing and smelling
reproaches. They include emotional expressions, as in some of fresh-baked bread make one’s mouth water and reach out before
these examples. realizing what one wants it for, or that one wants it at all. All
Use of the term ‘‘impulsive action’’ has three connotations. One this amounts to the generalization: what stirs and steers
is absence of prior deliberation: one does it before consciously impulsive actions is ‘‘directed discontent’’ (Rietveld, 2008a,b),
having decided to. The second is use of only part of the available which need not include foresight of contentment. And all this, in
cues that might indicate the adequacy of action: one hits someone turn, implies: impulsive actions are driven by stimulus events as
who is clearly stronger; one says things that while saying them one appraised. ‘‘Appraisal’’ itself primarily refers to automatic,
realizes one may regret later: ‘‘I have never loved you!’’, ‘‘where nonconscious processes due to innate representations, previous
were you last night?’’, ‘‘I will leave my spouse for you!’’ The third is experience, or acute interactions (Frijda, 2007) that only on
a sense of ‘‘urge’’ before or while performing the action, that is, occasion are reflected in conscious experience.
both an expectation of gain after completing it, and haste to fulfill it The third feature of impulsive actions is that they indeed are
(Wittmann and Paulus, 2008). actions. They are Intentional in the broad sense of having bearing
’’Impulsive action’’ resonates with the notion of impulsive upon some object (Searle, 1983). They are not reflexes or mere
processing as used in dual processing conceptions (e.g., Strack movements. One hits and embraces someone; one runs away
and Deutsch, 2004, impulsive versus reflective processing). from something; one loses interest in everything, as when in
Impulsive responding in that sense, however, has a broader grief one shuts out the world, goes to bed, and draws the blanket
meaning than what is meant here by impulsive action, since it over one’s head.
includes grasping for the car’s gear shift when having come to Fourth, impulsive actions are directed. Their being non-
drive one with automatic transmission. The third connotation is intentional (small letter) notwithstanding, they are purposive.
absent there. They have an intent, an inherent end point at which they
My analysis of impulsive action is inspired by those of Pacherie terminate. They implement an aim. Impulsive actions seek to
(2001), of unreflective skillful action by Rietveld (2008a,b), by establish, modify, or abandon a relationship with their Intentional
descriptions of actions performed during emotional excitement object. Looking at something, looking away, smashing an object:
(e.g., Hall, 1899), and, not the least of relevant sources of they all do modify a relationship. Purposiveness or the presence of
inspiration, by analyses of species-specific animal behavior (e.g., an aim is evidenced by the variability of impulsive actions, in
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Kortlandt, 1955; Tinbergen, 1951), that is adapting to situational variations, with a constant relational
non-reflective (and non-habitual) almost by definition. outcome. Their course of execution is guided by that aim. Running
Let me try to analyze the features of actions with the above away increases spatial distance from the frightening event, while
connotations more closely, and the problems for understanding zigzagging when needing to; it may utilize obstacles to obstruct
them that they raise. being sighted by a pursuer.
The first and central feature of impulsive actions is their being That impulsive action implements some aim is not a coinci-
automatic; this they share with impulsive processes in Strack and dence. Impulsive action is triggered by events as appraised as
Deutsch’s (2004) sense. They show a number of the properties that having affective valence. They are pleasant or unpleasant, or at
Moors and De Houwer (2006) list as properties of automatic least intriguing. They raise the discomforts of discrepancy between
responses. They are unintentional, in the sense that they are not a current and a desired state, or between potentiation of some
initiated by a prior cognitive representation of some future state, as action schema and its enablement, execution, or completion. Those
deliberate intentional actions are (Kruglanski, 1996). This feature are what stir action, and what stir that action onward. The aims
is illustrated by the differences between reactive and proactive triggered by appraisal of one’s present state thus include affective
aggression, which extend into autonomic concomitants (Scarpa dynamics.
et al., 2010). They also possess further automaticity features. They The aims underlying impulsive action thereby not only have
emerge without effort. And they are stimulus-driven (or driven by direction but also have some degree of urgency. This action
an emerging thought), rapidly following advent of the stimulus readiness contains no planning and no implementation intentions
event. that both are central in voluntary behavior (Gollwitzer, 1999).
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‘‘Get it!’’, ‘‘away from here’’ is all that is needed, and generates At the subpersonal level of analysis, ‘‘aims’’ can be understood,
being set for finding some action schema that may achieve the not as articulate and reportable representations of states of the
aim. ‘‘Get it, now!’’ also sets a time for it: now. ‘‘Get it now, world to be, but as ‘‘sets1’’: as pre-motor or motor representations
dammit!’’ also sets an urgency. of being set for action, often with their to-be parameters of
Aims and dynamics: do they apply to all impulsive action? Do direction, force, and timing, and as being set for receiving sensory
they apply to expressive behavior, for instance? representations (‘‘efferent copies’’) of particular action outcomes
I think they do, at least to most of it. As Wundt (1900) already and relational changes, at some level of abstraction. The states of
pointed out, the designation ‘‘expressive behavior’’ is confusing. being set are nonconceptional, non-propositional ‘‘executive
It is not why the behaviors are there; they just happen to be cues representations,’’ as posited by Pacherie (2001). Their content is
to feeling states, just as smoke happens to signal fire. The idea reflected, I assume, by action readiness awareness: sketchy images
that facial and other expressions developed to communicate of aims, with their parameters of force, direction, and timing
feeling states served Darwin’s (1872) purpose to explain the (Jeannerod, 2006).
evolutionary survival of behaviors that otherwise ‘‘are of no The main outcome of the preceding exploration of impulsive
use’’. But the idea is incorrect. The so-called ‘‘expressive action, I think, has been what I undertook this exploration for: to
behaviors’’ are of direct use in emotional interaction. Darwin’s clarify how emotions can directly cause action. Impulsive actions
interpretation of expressions as communications is being suggest what it is in emotions that do so. It indeed is an ‘‘impulse’’:
followed in most current literature, but has for long been a state of action readiness, a motive state.
seriously contested. Prominent investigators such as Wundt
(1900), Bühler (1934), Kafka (1937), and Dumas (1948) all held
4. Motivation
that such behavior mainly consists of actions that establish or
modify subject–object relationships, or that influence the
Motive states form the central process in several analyses of
actions of others to modify such relationships, by helping,
emotion. They did in several earlier emotion theories (e.g.,
stopping aggression, or coming closer. They do not communicate
McDougall, 1923; Bindra, 1959). It is the conception of Lang and
inner states but implement behavioral intents, or invitations to
Bradley (2010), Harmon-Jones et al. (in press), and myself (Frijda,
collaborate or comply. A facial expression of fear does not
1986, 2007). Lang and Bradley (2010) provide an excellent
express fear but implements attending, withdrawing, and self-
framework for situating this central process. External events
protection, for instance. Hess and Bourgeois (2010) provided
engage motive circuits that, on the one hand, ‘‘engage sensory
theoretical support and experimental evidence for this position.
systems that increase attention and facilitate perceptual proces-
‘‘Expressive behavior’’, in other words, fully qualifies as
sing, and on the other [. . .] initiate reflex responses that mobilize
impulsive action that participates in implementing aims
the organism and prompt motor action’’ (p. 3). To accommodate
regarding person–environment interaction. It serves to modify
emotions in general, the description has to be widened somewhat,
subject–object relationships by partaking in increasing or
since some emotions involve decreased attention and prompting of
decreasing interaction, tuning or not tuning to other individuals,
inaction, as do bliss and beatific serenity.
and coping with actions by others. I have elaborated on this view
Motivation is not being given this central place in all emotion
elsewhere (Frijda, 1953, 1969, 1982, 1986, 2007).
analyses. It was not in those of James (1890) and Damasio (1994),
for instance, who both described emotions as behavioral reflexes to
3. Aims and goals
‘‘emotionally exciting facts’’. Interposition of motive states
between event perception and motor action, however, explicitly
‘‘Aim’’ and ‘‘goal’’ may seem rather similar. They both refer to
accommodates the multiple mental and motor actions that given
intents. But they distinguish two kinds of intent that differ
events may engage or initiate. It explicitly provides for the
importantly.
considerable flexibility in emotional responding that reflex
The term ‘‘goal’’ is here reserved for intents involving cognitive
systems would not predict.
structures established prior to action, and pertaining to some
Stressing this role of motivation in emotions needs a caveat. The
future event. These cognitive structures have to be maintained
word ‘‘motivation’’ has two quite different denotations in
with some effort over the time from instigation to action
psychology. One of these refers to an individual’s more or less
completion (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Aims of states of action
stable dispositions such as sensitivities, needs, and attachments
readiness, by contrast, are established and maintained by the
that cause certain events to appear of interest to him or her. For
perceived, recalled, or imagined events as appraised. They are
instance, sexual motivation renders individuals of one’s preferred
maintained effortlessly for as long as event affordances and
sex interesting and worth interacting with, and an attachment
appraisal maintain them, with an urgency that comes from those
renders actions and the fate of its object of interest. I refer to
same affordances and appraisals. In impulsive actions, they need
dispositional motives as ‘‘concerns’’. The other meaning refers to
not involve such cognitive structures at all. As argued earlier, the
occurrent states, that is, event-induced states of relatively short
orientation towards a future state can be restricted to the present.
duration. It refers to actually being interested and inclined to act or
It can merely involve change from the present, – change from now:
not to act. Occurrent motivation is at stake here. I will refer to it as
disappearance of pain, disappearance of the desired object being
‘‘motive states,’’ as ‘‘states of action readiness’’, or as ‘‘action
out of reach. This is why action can be purposive without involving
tendencies’’, depending on the connotation to be emphasized in
a goal, as for instance Frankfurt (1988) has emphasized. In fact,
the context.
Pacherie (2008) describes a conceptual framework for distinguish-
The word ‘‘motivation’’ may evoke the hydraulic metaphor of
ing ‘‘intentions’’, that differ in degrees of specification of intent
reservoirs of motivation-specific energy that accumulates over
content. ‘‘Aim’’ is the least specified one.
time, and is then released in motivation-specific – sexual,
This underlines the importance of distinguishing between goals
aggressive, affiliative, etc., – action (Lorenz, 1963). That model is
(in the present sense) and what I call aims. Animals other than
implausible, if only because the evidence for release-like
humans do not posses the cognitive capacities enabling repre-
sentations of future states (with the possible exception of scrub 1
The word ‘‘set" is used in psychology to denote ‘‘a predisposition to a response"
jays; Clayton et al., 2003). At least all vertebrates, however, do (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1982, p. 964, meaning 4), translating the German term
show impulsive purposive action. ‘‘Einstellung".
 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579 573

spontaneous emotional actions is scant. Emotional action is and their neural circuits. The systems are motivational. The
usually elicited by encountering stimulus events or thoughts. This appetitive system promotes enhancement of interaction of the
basic fact has led to the conception of incentive motivation (Bindra, individual with the environment; the defensive system promotes
1959; Toates, 1986). Motive states consist of being set to achieve decrease of such interaction.
particular aims, or of potentiated action dispositions and support The reported empirical work focuses on autonomic reflexes,
processes to in fact achieve such aims (Gallistel, 1980). States of attention variations, and neural concomitants. But even when
action readiness are in general aroused by encountering concern- not elaborated in their exposition, overt action has a central
relevant events (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 2007) which, place in the model. As Lang and Bradley write (p. 2): ‘‘the
however, include internal events such as stomach contractions and reflexes tune sensory systems and mobilize the organism for
the restlessness of young mammals in spring that stem from the action. They instigate and support the execution and modulation
activation of concerns. of overt action, which the neural circuit accesses by way of the
States of action readiness are states of being set to achieve their basolateral amygdala and dorsal and ventral striatum.’’ (their
aims, and if possible to produce some action that can do something Fig. 1).
about those aims. The aims serve as cues to find and potentiate One can augment the number of action-relevant processes that
relevant action schemas. Any aversive stimulus prepares the the motivational states instigate directly or indirectly, in conjunc-
individual to do something defensive towards it, for instance, tion with stimulus events: activation of preparatory or initial
which ‘‘anything defensive’’ may get more specific by including action components, such as advance salivation, muscular tensing,
more information in the cue, until readiness settles on one selected intention movements, cognitive processes that prime relevant
action schema. In impulsive action, this process is inclined to select stimulus events (e.g., Ferguson and Bargh, 2004; Markman et al.,
the first or most directly available schema that matches the cue, 2009), recall of possibly useful action schemas (Kruglanski, 1996),
exemplifying the second of the mentioned properties of impulsive and elicitation of emotional feelings.
actions. All these processes directly or indirectly serve dealing with the
In deliberate action, representation of properties of the goal emotional contingency by overt action, mental action (attention,
(e.g., its direction or location) precedes specification into thought), or refraining from action. The driving force of the
potentiating some action schema proper (Gazzaniga et al., 2002; processes appears to be the moment’s motivational aim: achieving
Georgopoulos, 1995), and can be present in the absence of a change from the present situation, by correcting what bothers,
activation of motor activity, as evident from movement imagery filling up what lacks, obtaining what attracts, enhancing what is
(Jeannerod, 2006). The same probably occurs with the aim of remote or weak, or seeking to maintain or enhance whatever is
impulsive action. One usually is aware of what one wants or does satisfactory.
not want before having shaped an image of what to do about it. In Operation of these motive aims proceeds on the whole along
fact, states of action readiness may remain at that stage. Response the lines of the traditional view that emotional striving results
may be held in abeyance, as action readiness proper, without any from states of imbalance. Motive states are traditionally viewed as
appreciable motor consequences, and give rise to a feeling of urge due to perturbations or caused by encountering opportunities for
or desire or of some specific emotion like anger or fear. Activation achieving satisfactions, that is, when current state falls short of, or
of action schemas after neural potentiation is inhibited anyway threatens to fall short of, the reference value given by the concern
until criteria for acting are met, and inhibition during preparation to which the event at hand is appraised as relevant. These
is lifted (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). Those criteria, again, are lenient formulations are those of negative feedback control, as for instance
for impulsive action. exemplified by Carver and Scheier (1998). All this is maintained by
States of action readiness represent the distinguishing mark of the perception, thought, or image of the eliciting event as
emotions, as distinct from reflexes. Their aims can be understood appraised, and with an urgency that reflects the event’s appraised
as potentiating sets of action schemas with equifinality. They importance and the discrepancy between current state and
thereby offer adaptive flexibility, by allowing selecting from reference state.
among those action schemas that each may best correspond to
different contingencies. Threat can be countered by fleeing and by 4.1. Resource mobilization
freezing; harm infliction by others can be countered by physical as
well as by verbal aggression, and by turning one’s back, and by all The consequences of that urgency form part and parcel of
three in succession (Van Coillie and Van Mechelen, 2005). The emotions. They provide the event-elicited aim with the sense of
resulting flexibility is adaptive. Yet, it makes for the despair of urge and with suboptimal information gathering mentioned
those who seek to identify different emotions by identifying earlier as characteristics of much impulsive action. The various
emotion-specific behaviors rather than emotion-specific aims. urgency consequences have been summarized elsewhere (Frijda,
‘‘Fear clearly involves a desire to avoid harm or loss, but from 1986, 2007) under the heading of ‘‘control precedence’’. They
knowing only that they are afraid, we cannot predict whether include priority setting for the actions involved, sustained
people will sell their stocks, listen to the weather report, or start attention, persisting in action, overcoming obstacles or opposition,
running.’’ (Schwarz and Clore, 2006, p. 16). seeking alternative action options upon failure or delay.
A model of motivation developed along similar lines is lucidly The resource mobilization usually goes under the names of
worked out and examined empirically by Lang and Bradley (2010). ‘‘degree of arousal’’ or ‘‘degree of activation’’; it does so in Lang and
It is applied to an analysis of what happens in response to pleasant Bradley’s contribution. During picture processing it becomes
and unpleasant (and neutral) events. The reported empirical work manifest in skin conductance increases, pupil dilation, and late
beautifully shows the engagement of autonomic, attentional, positive potential. In situations requiring more protracted mental
perceptual, and experiential response components, and their or overt action, it is manifest in striving and in wanting (Berridge
variation when eliciting circumstances vary, such as the distance and Aldridge, 2009).
to the eliciting event in the looming-simulation experiments, the Much of this becomes behaviorally manifest in the dynamics
appropriateness of response variations to momentary action and prosody of the actions: their speed, amplitude, power, scope,
requirements, and responsiveness to feedback from the outcomes and the like (Frijda, 2007; Kafka, 1937; Strehle, 1954). All of these
of previous processing. Such widespread response activation leads define the strength of motive states or the intensity of emotions
to identifying ‘‘appetitive’’ and ‘‘defensive’’ motivational systems (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Brehm, 1999; Frijda, 2007), together with the felt
574 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579

inclinations, longings, hankerings, and feelings of craving (Tiffany, shows three bipolar clusters at the top of the hierarchy: pleasant–
1990). unpleasant, certain–uncertain, and interested–uninterested
An important account of behavioral phenomena and feelings of (Frijda, 1970).
wanting is offered by Berridge and co-workers (e.g., Berridge, Several motive states can co-occur in the response to a given
2007; Berridge and Aldridge, 2009). They provide strong evidence event, and interact in producing action. Approach and inhibition
that the phenomena reflect the consequences of midbrain together make for slow and hesitant approach, for instance. It can
dopamine activity, and that the phenomena of liking and of be argued that most emotion regulation is to be understood in this
wanting are independent (Berridge, 2007; Leyton, 2009). The way: two opposing concerns generate opposite, mutually moder-
findings provide major challenges for theory, and for the question ating action tendencies, as in the gentle anger sometimes elicited
on how wanting (or ‘‘incentive salience’’) is established and by a loved one (Frijda, 2009). The interaction of simultaneous
maintained in the first place. An extensive review of evidence for motive states has been examined at depth in the interactions
distinct motivational circuits is offered by Panksepp (1998). between appetitive and defensive motivation, usually under the
heading of the structure of evaluative space (Norris et al., 2010).
4.2. Motivational failure Appetitive and defensive motivation form separate systems (Gray
and McNaughton, 2000; Norris et al., 2010; Watson and Tellegen,
A full understanding of emotional responding needs to include 1985). They can, however, operate independently, as in states of
failures of the motivational systems. Events not always elicit ambivalence or mixed feelings (Schimmak, 2001), operate by
organized action or circumscribed emotion to deal with the event reciprocal activation, as when events or objects are rated on a
or the aroused feelings. After threat or loss, loss of motivation may bipolar pleasant–unpleasant scale, or by coactivation, as they do in
occur, resulting in apathy, undirected anxious restlessness or the pleasure taken in suspense. Interestingly, as Norris et al. (2010)
unrest, depressed mood, sense of disorientation, confusion, and argue, the appetitive and defensive motivational systems appear to
emotional shock (Dumas, 1948). Some of such emotional states have different operation characteristics. It may be a challenge to
may well be intelligible from the motivational perspective. Apathy, also investigate other high-level motivational systems in this
diffuse restlessness, and undirected anxiety may be due to the regard.
absence of some relevant action schema, or absence of energy ‘‘High-level’’, because motive states can be distinguished at
resources to put appropriate defensive action programs into effect, different levels of abstraction. Appetitive, defensive, and cognitive
as under exhaustion and prolonged severe stress (Seligman, 1975; are distinctions at a higher level than anger, fear, and disgust, or
Strassman et al., 1956) or after loss of cognitive grip by cognitive curiosity and fascination. Such a lower level is reflected in emotion
disturbances or drastic changes in circumstances (Marris, 1974; taxonomies, as well as in the intercorrelations of actions in social
McReynolds, 1976; Rimé, 2005). situations. Van Hooff (1972), for instance, performed cluster
The motivational perspective has powerful implications for analyses of the co-occurrence and sequencing of chimpanzee social
understanding emotions. behaviors. The analyses yielded clusters such as ‘‘antagonism’’,
First: states of action readiness embody the adaptive functions ‘‘affinity’’, ‘‘sex’’, ‘‘play’’, and ‘‘excitement’’, which resemble human
of emotions. When the time or occasion is there, they may become emotion categories and are readily understood as implementing
manifest in situation-adapted actions. Such readiness may persist different social (and some non-social) aims. The clusters suggest
for an indefinite time. engagement of motivational subsystems, each wanting something
Second: states of action readiness may prevail and be felt different from all others. Fig. 1 illustrates this, with terms that
without any manifestation in action, because action readiness does allude to different modes of action readiness entering the
not necessarily generate action. Motive states may persist without meanings of different positive and negative emotion labels. Each
action and impulsively orient perception, thought, and imagina- of those modes or labels may be further specified. Seeking
tion. They may even do so nonconsciously, persisting as senti- intimacy, for instance, can take the form of seeking emotional,
ments: representations of facts, issues, or persons that include sexual, or spatial intimacy (with sitting shoulder to shoulder or
appraisal aspects as their major properties (Frijda, 1986, 2007). singing together as action schemas). The processes of specification
Third: what emotional events elicit in the first place are states of of aims are well caught in the notion of motivational and emotional
action readiness. Actions represent a possible but not necessary cascades (e.g., Bradley et al., 2001; Stemmler, 2003), in which
second stage.
Fourth: What is impulsive are states of action readiness. They
emerge automatically upon event perception or thought, even
when action only follows reflectively.
Fifth: motive state or state of action readiness: it is what
emotion ‘‘itself’’ is, when it is observed that emotions cause action.
‘‘Motivation follows directly from the exciting fact, and motive
state as it occurs is the emotion’’: that is how one may modify
James’ (1884, pp. 189–190) famous statement.

5. Motivation and motivations

Obviously, there are more kinds of motivation than appetitive

and defensive ones. For instance, Gray and McNaughton (2000)
proposed a Behavioral Inhibition System, manifest notably in
anxiety, motivating reticence in the face of possible punishment.
There also is cognitive motivation, manifest in wonder, interest,
curiosity, exploration, and fascination, which all are elicited by
unpleasant as well as pleasant events (e.g., Rimé et al., 2005).
Hierarchical cluster analysis of the co-occurrence of emotion
words used to interpret facial expression photographs in fact Fig. 1. Appetitive and defensive action tendencies.
 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579 575

processing increasingly uses further information to further specify 5.1. Hierarchical organization
the aims.
Which modes of action readiness and motivational systems can The relationships between motive states just mentioned have
be meaningfully distinguished, can only become clear from given rise to the hierarchical model of motivation, described by
observation of behavior co-occurrences and equifinalities in Gallistel (1980). It originated largely in the observational
natural settings. Such observation can, in turn, only be obtained ethological work of Kortlandt (1940, 1955, labeled ‘‘brilliantly
from ethological study of animal and human behavior and erudite’’ by Dawkins, 1976, p. 11) and of Tinbergen (1951).
interaction in ecologically valid action surveys. Wilhelm and Hierarchical organization indeed represents a general principle
Grossman (2010) convincingly discuss the need for ecological valid of action control (Miller and Cohen, 2001): activation of an
assessments and for naturalness of observation and elicitation encompassing system stepwise potentiates its dependent sub-
conditions. They also survey the host of methods to obtain such systems. It can take several forms. In one form, activation of a
information that are presently available. As an example of such an motivational system state is implemented by successive activation
approach to analyzing the motivational structure of action, I give of several lower-level systems. For instance, seasonal activation of
an example from Kortlandt’s (unpublished) observational studies the reproductive system of the male three-pined stickleback
of the behavior of cormorants.2 activates motivations for fighting, nest-building, mating, and care
Cormorants catch a live fish of a pound, or a living half-meter for offspring, in that order. Activation of the mating subsystem in
eel, by opening their beaks, grasping the fish with much vigor, turn motivates performing a zigzag dance in front of the female,
and swallowing it. They also feed their infants by predigesting leading her to the nest, showing her the entrance, quivering, and
their catch, regurgitating it, and keeping the porridge in their fertilizing the eggs, again in that order (Tinbergen, 1951, p. 104). In
lower beak, and then with their beak grasp the infant’s head, another form of hierarchical organization, a higher-level motiva-
which then swallows the porridge. This latter grasping is done tional system may activate one of several lower-level motives,
very prudently and with great care. The modification of the aim dependent on situational specifics.
of grasping is presumably triggered by ‘‘mood-inducing’’ aspects A major example of this latter organization is presented by
of the mother cormorant’s current state and the stimulus Harmon-Jones et al. (in press). Aversive stimulus events may be
properties of a begging infant. assumed to activate the defensive motivational system proposed
Ethological study of human action is sparse, but some exists. by Lang and Bradley (2010). Usually, such activation, in turn,
Examples are observational studies of opposite sex encounters arouses withdrawal motivation. However, as Harmon-Jones et al.
(Grammer et al., 1998; Perper, 1985; for a survey of other (in press) extensively show, the defensive motivational system
studies, see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). Failing such work, useful sometimes activates approach motivation, as shown both by
information can come from systematic self-report studies. There approach behavior and left frontal neural activation. It does so
exist valuable surveys of angry actions based on human action when internal or external cues also activated a hostile or ‘‘go
self-reports (e.g., Hall, 1899; Van Coillie and Van Mechelen, against’’ motive state, that is, a state of anger. Approach motivation
2005), showing the predominance of offensive and destructive can evidently be activated by defensive as well as by appetitive
actions, augmented by offensive and destructive action tenden- stimulus events.
cies that are not followed up.
Very useful insight has come from the analysis of descriptive 5.2. Lattice hierarchy
items used by subjects in describing a variety of emotion
experiences by Davitz (1969). The items were turned into As these findings show, the various motivations do not really
questionnaire format. Cluster analysis of item co-occurrence form a hierarchy. Evidently, any motive state may employ any
resulted in medium-level clusters labeled ‘‘moving towards’’, other motive system in seeking to serve its aims. Each motivational
‘‘moving away’’, ‘‘moving against’’, ‘‘helpless’’, ‘‘submission’’, system has a large measure of independence, can be relevant in
‘‘rest’’, ‘‘in command’’, ‘‘excited’’, ‘‘disinterested’’, and ‘‘undo’’, very different motivational contexts, and be called by various
which more or less matched groups of different emotion labels. The different motivational systems that then function as being of
outcomes, divided by a top-level appetitive-defensive clustering, higher order.
and phrased in action-tendency terms rather than emotion labels, The organization of motivation is therefore best described as a
are illustrated in Fig 1. hierarchical–heterarchical or lattice organization (Gallistel, 1980).
Each mode of action readiness may appear in somewhat The approach system in the left frontal cortex can in fact be
different contexts that specify them a bit more. Submission, for activated not only by the appetitive and the defensive systems. It
instance, shapes the emotions of shame, embarrassment, humility, can also be engaged by the investigative system. One approaches
and deference. and stretches one’s head forward to get a better look, to be closer in
Each mode of action readiness may instigate physical as well as desire, and to hurt in anger.
mental actions. The many modes of avoidance illustrate this: there Interesting examples of multiple motivational engagements
is physical avoidance, glance avoidance, avoidance of emotional can be found in animal instinctive behavior sequences. They
encounters generally. The latter is observed, for instance, in represent, in fact, the strongest instigations for viewing complex
dismissive attachment styles in the elderly (Jain and Labouvie-Vief, actions as outcomes of interactions of motive states, rather than as
2010). They include action readiness directed at emotional action fixed action patterns (Kortlandt, 1955). Recall the example of
itself, in the action modes of restraint and enhancement of cormorants, feeding their infants: the act of grasping the head of
emotional action, differentially stirred by emotional control and those infants. The action is of the same sort as that of grasping a
emotional ‘‘authenticity’’ values, themselves empowered by more heavy live fish, but performed with more care and less vigor. A
encompassing values of social harmony and individual singularity similar variability is shown by cats. Cats – all cats, from house cats
(Mauss and Butler, 2010). to tigers – grasp the neck of others with their teeth under several
different circumstances. Play elicits it, with considerable restraint.
2
Nurturant motivation does it, with more muscle power, for
Toning down the force of actions already begins when the female cormorant is
on the point of laying her eggs (Kortlandt, 1995). Male and female begin to treat
carrying infants back into the nest. Predation does it, with great
each other with more trust and ‘‘friendliness", that is, by showing decrease of the power and speed, to kill prey (Leyhausen, 1979). In the sexual
watchfulness action of pointing their beaks forward. repertoire of European cormorants, tenderness also occurs:
576 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579

seeking comfortable bodily proximity or contact. Relevant actions 2010; Stemmler and Wacker, 2010). Stephens et al. (2010)
include turning one’s beak away from the other (a general prudent obtained above chance assignment of arousal patterns to the
social acceptance action); touching the other’s head with one’s different emotions involved in their experimental study. Kreibig
own head; putting one’s neck alongside the neck of the other et al. (2010) found differences between different emotions
(Kortlandt, 1995). Tenderness also occurs in the male walrus, (interest, pride, joy, and surprise) in autonomic reaction patterns
which may casually put its flipper on the head of a passing female, for emotions during task performance and goal achievement,
and not only as an introduction to mating (personal observation). reflecting active coping or action readiness enhancement.
The structure of human tenderness is similar. The lattice structure At the same time, these emotion differences appear insufficient
is evident throughout action. For instance, aggression occurs as to explain the distinctions between the emotional feelings. Within
impulsive defensive action as well as deliberate instrumental states labeled by the same word, autonomic patterns still vary
action, with different contexts of autonomic engagement (Scarpa (Friedman, 2010; Kreibig, 2010; Wilhelm and Grossman, 2010).
et al., 2010). Also, support for the autonomic specificity hypothesis, drawn from
differential autonomic response patterns elicited by voluntarily
6. Arousal, motivation, and emotional feelings adopting different facial expressions (Ekman et al., 1983, and
mentioned by Friedman, 2010), is weak. The data have been
Autonomic specificity of emotions is of interest because, if it contested (Zajonc and McIntosh, 1992). Moreover, voluntarily
exists, this might support the hypothesis of innate basic emotions. adopting facial expressions influences respiration rate and requires
It also, as James (1890) supposed, might form the substance of effort, and does so differently for different expressions. The
different emotional feelings. But, alternatively, it might reflect autonomic effects in fact correlated with the number of facial
acute resource requirements of different modes of action readiness action units engaged in the expressions (Boiten, 1996).
and action, and thereby indirectly correspond with different I think that the current evidence offers support neither for
emotions. general autonomic specificity of basic emotions, nor for equating
Kreibig (2010), in her very careful and insightful review, clearly emotional feelings with patterns of autonomic feedback. The
comes out in favor of the latter view. Autonomic responses appear observed differences found are apt to be due to the action and
largely to result from anticipation of action requirements, action action readiness differences that in turn are reflected in emotional
preparations, motivated abstention of action, and immobilization. feelings and emotion labels. It has to be taken into account that
Functional interpretations along these lines are supported by the reported differences in body experience usually represent mix-
observed response variations following variations in appraisal over tures of autonomic awareness and awareness of action tendencies
time that result from the fine grain of events during the course of a and action (Friedman, 2010; Nieuwenhuyse et al., 1987). Theory
given emotional episode. Such variations are detailed by Lang and should keep these two kinds of body experience separate.
Bradley (2010) and by Kreibig et al. (2010). The multi-channel Awareness of action readiness as such probably provides much
second-by-second studies and their growth curve analyses show a more distinctive information than autonomic feedback can provide
veritable anatomy of emotions that goes far beyond mere (Frijda, 1986, 2007).
knowledge of autonomic response variations. The functional level
of analysis also shows its fruitfulness in Kreibig’s (2010) treatment 7. Emotion elicitation
of autonomic response differences between emotion subtypes,
such as those between anger in and anger out, and between fear In the present perspective, emotion elicitation amounts to
and anxiety. It also fits the occurrence of autonomic responses elicitation of a change in action readiness. Such elicitation is due
when no meaningful action appears possible, as in emotional shock to a conjunction of external or mental events and inner
(Dumas, 1948) and helpless despair (Seligman, 1975; Stemmler conditions. The external events, as was mentioned, include the
and Wacker, 2010). fates (initiation, progress, obstruction, and success) of actions
It has become abundantly clear that autonomic responding and interactions (Kreibig et al., 2010). The inner conditions have
cannot be subsumed under a single construct such as Cannon’s been labeled ‘‘concerns’’: dispositional motivations such as
(1927) emergency response. Different functional response pat- needs, sensitivities, attachments, and other sentiments. The
terns are observed, such as the patterns of active and passive impact of events upon concerns is what renders events
coping (Obrist, 1981), and of challenge versus threat cardiac meaningful to the individual. Registering and foreseeing that
response (Mauss and Butler, 2010). Pattern differences are impact is what allows the individuals to function as ‘‘autono-
confirmed and extended in several of the contributions (Friedman, mous systems,’’ that can fend for themselves in uncertain
2010; Stephens et al., 2010). The range of functional interpreta- environments. It needs the use of information in addition to
tions is enlarged, for instance, when Pu et al. (2010) discuss the brute sensory stimulus inputs. Emotion study tends to collect
possible role of vagally controlled heart rate variability in these information processes under the label of ‘‘appraisal’’
expression regulation; Mauss and Butler (2010) observed that (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 2007; Scherer, 2005).
patterns of cardiac response differed with the culturally deter- As I mentioned, the processes of appraisal are largely automatic
mined meaning of emotion control as manifesting positive social and nonconscious (e.g., Moors and De Houwer, 2005), and so is
sensitivity or personal authenticity (at least among subjects high in much of the information that they use. One need not be aware of
emotion control). them for their contributing in the elicitation of affect and action
These functional conclusions are relevant to the hypothesis that readiness changes (Frijda, 2007; Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Scherer,
different emotion feelings correspond with different patterns of 2005). That assumption is largely confirmed by the studies on the
autonomic feedback. This question has been extensively analyzed effects of nonconscious priming (e.g., Hassin et al., 2005). Some of
by Friedman (2010), who concluded that an answer is possible only the appraisal processes are effected cognitively, by using
when comparing the patterns occurring with different basic information from an event’s spatiotemporal context and stored
emotions (Stephens et al., 2010). Development and application of previous experience. But much of it emerges directly in actual
new methods for pattern comparison has found considerably more confrontations and interactions with other people and events
consistency in pattern differences between different emotions (Parkinson, 2007; Parkinson et al., 2005). One perceives that one’s
than would have been expected from Cannon’s (1927) critique and ongoing actions succeed or are opposed, one is acting but bumps
later discussion (Friedman, 2010; Kreibig, 2010; Stephens et al., into things, one’s competences proceed smoothly or are challenged
 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579 577

or fail, one’s action yields satisfaction or disappointment. One’s principles for action learning. Gallistel and Gibbon (2000) indeed
perceptions are perfused by the precipitates of previous and have argued so. Infant action acquisition brims with little insights,
potential interactions by way of the perceived affordances of as is evident from the work by Premack (1990), Spelke and others
objects and events: perceiving the fitness of objects or situations (1995). Outcome expectancy generally results from noticing
for specific actions (Gibson, 1979; see also Frijda, 2007; Rietveld, similarity or overlap, their perceptual causality links, between
2008a,b). features of situations, actions, and their affective and material
As also already mentioned, appraisals may continuously outcomes. Those features may well be primary in establishing their
change over the course of an emotion episode and as a result of coherence (Dickinson and Balleine, 2009). They may well form the
the ongoing interaction. They also change very considerably over essential elements in ‘‘common coding’’, the integration of event
the lifetime, as a result of increases and subsequent decreases in knowledge and action knowledge (Prinz et al., 2009).
emotional coping potential, as demonstrated by Jain and Many complex and acquired actions probably fit their outcomes
Labouvie-Vief (2010), in particular among those individuals in similar informational fashion. Drawing a knife can be an
who tend to respond with an avoidant or dismissive motive state automatic impulsive action, not because one has killed or wounded
or affiliation style. so often before (although it may help), but because sticking-inside,
and forward, and with force, match the dynamics of effecting
8. Action selection change by bare fist movements towards any object that offers
resistance. Action selection from one’s action repertoire probably
Under the present perspective, emotional events elicit aims that profits from previous and actual ‘‘sculpting the response space’’—
may activate action schemas that, at some level, may fulfill them. examining and reordering the relationships between stored
The outcomes of the activated schemas at some level match the mental elements when perusing the response space in search of
aims. With impulsive actions, this occurs automatically. How does fits (Fletcher et al., 2000).
that proceed?
Current theory posits that impulsive actions are automatic 9. Impulsive and reflective action
because they are overlearned (Strack and Deutsch, 2004). That
would not appear to apply to most of the impulsive actions with Action selection in implementing aims is not restricted to
which the present paper is concerned. Newborn babies may cry and selecting impulsive action. No adequate impulsive action schema
thrash about when hungry, suck when their lips touch the nipple, may be available, or any impulsive action may be considered to
which may be a reflex, but begin to root soon after. They also soon have its disadvantages, among which its very impulsiveness in the
start to focus their eyes on salient visual stimuli. When, a little later, first place. This is the point where impulsive action is replaced by
they see something of interest they stretch their arms and seek to pausing or by reflected action. Generally, reflection sets in when
grasp. They begin to do it before it is either goal-directed and hitting an impasse in impulsive responding (Norman and Shallice,
planned and overlearned. Sure, it gets well-trained, by doing it over 1986). Reflection proceeds by replacing or augmenting the aim –
and over again (Piaget, 1936), and it gets effortless and automatic in change from now – by setting a goal: forming a representation of a
that sense. But it was impulsive from the beginning. desired future state, planning and forming some implementation
What then allows impulsive actions to be automatic? I would intention, which together characterize goal-directed action
suggest that many impulsive actions are part of a basic repertoire (Gollwitzer, 1999). Transforming an aim into a goal can occur at
of elementary skills that are rooted in how the body is built and in once, or it can occur hours or years after the emotional event, if
biologically prepared ‘‘coordinate structures’’ (Bernstein, 1967) plans have persisted, or if aims re-emerge when recollecting the
that are exercised daily. Moreover, they all –crawling, walking, event or issue that generated the emotion in the first place. Acts of
grasping, throwing, biting, approaching, and withdrawing – are of revenge are often of this nature (Frijda, 2007), and so are acts of
wide applicability. Biting is used to break up a piece of cracker, to erotic and of intellectual pursuit.
evoke sounds from the mother, to draw in a blanket, to hold a toy, Reflection allows search for and construction of appropriate
and to defend a possession. Walking happens to move oneself action schemas as goal-directed action theory proposes (Kru-
forward, thanks to neural oscillators. And so forth. All these actions glanski, 1996; Prinz et al., 2009). In other words: actions of any sort
are not ‘‘learned’’ in the way that using a pencil is learned, but only or complexity can be caused by emotions. Reflective processing
by learning to adjust various parameters to each other and to forms a tool for the formation and selection of emotional action. It
external cues. Those external cues are, I think, essential in can go long ways in handling subgoals in reaching the emotional
impulsive actions. The aims that drive those actions operate in aims, in handling obstacles met on the way, and in dealing with
conjunction with information from the situation at hand, since motivational complexity, the interferences of action due to the
appraisal of this information is what elicited the aim. Dual multiple concerns that actions and their expected outcomes may
determination of action by motivation and by stimulus context evoke. Emotion regulation generally is caused by such interfer-
forms a basic general principle of action generation (Morgan and ences (Frijda, 2009). Actions serving regulation thus, for the most
Stellar, 1950). part, are a long way from the impulsive actions that are caused by
In addition, the outcomes of these actions visibly correspond emotional motive states. Actions may also serve mood repair,
with their geometries. It is no surprise that moving forward brings which again is a long way from the actions directly instigated by
you closer, in the way that pressing a button surprises you when it the emotional action readiness. Recognizing the manifold indirect
yields a pellet of food. Outcomes fit the completion of those ways in which emotion may lead to actions, and notably control by
actions, and they do so gradually during their execution. Turning reflective processing (as transpiring in the contributions by Pu
its head away from a stranger and creeping back to the mother et al., 2010, and by Jain and Labouvie-Vief, 2010) clarifies the
diminishes the former’s nearness and increases that of the latter. predicaments of Barrett (2006), Baumeister et al. (2007), and
Outcome learning of actions, in action theory, is explained by Kagan (2006), mentioned in the beginning of this paper,
association, and as following the principles of contiguity and concerning the emotion–action relationship.
consistency (Prinz et al., 2009), but that does not appear to Impulsive and reflective processing thus intertwine in the
represent the main mechanism here. Automaticity of impulsive generation of emotional action and experience. In fact, I think it is
action, I think, is not primarily explained by association but by inappropriate to consider them as products of impulsive and
information. Contiguity and consistency probably are poor reflective systems, respectively. There is no impulsive processing
578 N.H. Frijda / Biological Psychology 84 (2010) 570–579

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