Relations The US will provoke North Korea into warSouth Korea alone will not BANDOW 2003 (Doug,

senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, Cutting the Tripwire: It's time to get out of Korea, Reason Magazine, July 2003, http://reason.com/archives/2003/07/01/cutting-the-tripwire/1) Calum Placing even greater pressure on this unequal arrangement is disagreement about proper policy toward North Korea. Some 24 million people, roughly half of South Korea's population, live in the Seoul-Inchon metropolitan region. Yet Seoul sits barely 25 miles from the border, vulnerable to artillery and Scud missile attack. Thus, the costs of mishandling the North would be horrific for the South. As President Roh has said, war "is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in such a way that we do not have to face such a situation." Washington, by contrast, has almost casually considered plunging the peninsula into war. Former President Bill Clinton admits that his administration prepared for a military strike against the North during the first nuclear crisis, without consulting the South. President Roh understandably complained. "We almost went to the brink of war in 1993 with North Korea," he later said, "and at the time we didn't even know it." Upon what can Seoul rely to avoid a new conflict? There are reports that President Bush rejected a military course after then-President Kim Dae-jung personally described the carnage of the Korean War. Yet Bush explicitly refuses to rule out any option. Secretary Rumsfeld has called the Kim Jong-il government a "terrorist regime," offering an obvious justification for action. And it is hard to find anyone who speaks with administration officials off the record who believes their publicly pacific intentions. Indeed, some hawks flaunt their lack of concern for Seoul's views. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) opines that "while they may risk their populations, the United States will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Korea's neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must." Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy hits a similar note: "The desire of dangerous nations' neighbors to accommodate, rather than confront, them is understandable. But it should not be determinative of U.S. policy. Such pleading today from South Korea and Japan is reminiscent of the Cold War advocacy for dtente by leftists in the West German government." Apparently, America's allies should gaily commit suicide at Washington's command.

1ac Solvency
Finally the US is the reason a war would start without US presence a war will never occur in Korea
BANDOW 2009 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, North Korea: Paper Tiger, Campaign for Liberty, June 4, http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100) Calum Yet the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an impoverished wreck. One American carrier group has more firepower than the entire North Korean military. It is the U.S. which threatens Pyongyang, not the other way around. U.S. entanglement with Korea began with the Japanese surrender in 1945. Washington and Moscow divided the peninsula at the 49th parallel and occupied the southern and northern sections, respectively. As the Cold War enveloped U.S.-Soviet relations, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea emerged as hostile independent states. In the early years the DPRK was the more fearsome player. The U.S. refused to arm the ROK with heavy weapons to discourage authoritarian President Syngman Rhee from fulfilling his threat to march north. The Soviets were not so scrupulous in dealing with the North's Kim Il-sung, who almost conquered the entire peninsula after invading in June 1950 before U.S. forces turned the tide. After three years of see-saw warfare, an armistice was agreed near the initial boundary. But no permanent peace was arranged, so American troops remained. Over the last half century, however, Chinese forces went home, South Korea raced past the North in economic development, Moscow and Beijing recognized Seoul, and the DPRK suffered economic collapse and famine. The balance of power of 1950 long ago disappeared. Pyongyang retains a quantitative military edge, but its equipment is antiquated; North Korean troops are malnourished and get little training. The North is effectively bankrupt and without allies. With about 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, Seoul could outmatch the Kim regime in any way it chose. With large military reserves, a strong industrial base, abundant allies, and generous access to international credit markets, South Korea is well-positioned to triumph in any conflict. It is obvious, then, that the DPRK doesn't pose much of a conventional threat to the South. The Kim regime could invade the ROK, but doing so would be far more likely to end in the destruction of the North than the South. And nothing suggests that Kim Jong-il is seeking martyrdom: he wants his virgins in this life, not the next. Japan worries about threats from Pyongyang, but the former is more than capable of defending itself. Japan possesses the world's second largest economy, noted for its technological sophistication. There is little that Tokyo could not build or buy. More than 60 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Japan to take over responsibility for its own defense. The DPRK has neither the interest nor the ability to challenge other nations in the region -- Indonesia, Australia, Philippines, et al. The North possesses an antiquated army and little else, not a globe-spanning military like that of the U.S. It is even more obvious that Pyongyang poses no meaningful danger to America. The North has no ability to project military power. If it attempted to do so, U.S. air and naval power would make quick work of North Korea's forces. The only Americans currently within range of the DPRK are the 28,000 troops stationed in the South. Their deployment, while unnecessary to protect the ROK, actually endangers the U.S. Disengagement would be the most effective means of reducing the threat to America. What of the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs? They are primarily a problem for the North's neighbors and thus give other countries a good reason to consider augmenting both defensive and deterrence capabilities. However, North Korea apparently has neither weaponized nor miniaturized actual nuclear warheads. Pyongyang possesses no long-range missiles capable of accurately hitting American territory. The North's capabilities do not match its bluster. That could eventually change, of course, but the DPRK obviously poses no present danger. There is no cause for precipitous action. In fact, Pyongyang is never likely to pose a genuine threat to America. The U.S. has the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal: any North Korean attack would be suicidal. Just one American missile with multiple warheads could destroy everything worth destroying in the North. If Washington could deter Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, two of the greatest mass murderers in human history, it can deter Kim Jong-il.

This would be just another adv to the aff

U.S. global power eroding

Roger Altman, Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners, He was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 199394.Foreign Affairs, February 2009, The Great Crash, 2008 Subtitle: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, p. 2
Much of the world is turning a historic corner and heading into a period in which the role of the state will be larger and that of the private sector will be smaller. As it does, the United States' global power, as well as the

appeal of U.S.-style democracy, is eroding. Although the United States is fortunate that this crisis coincides with the promise inherent in the election of Barack Obama as president, historical forces -- and the crash of 2008 -- will carry the world away from a unipolar system regardless. Indeed, rising economic powers are gaining new influence. No country will benefit economically from the financial crisis over the coming year, but a few states -- most notably China -- will achieve a stronger relative global position. China is experiencing its own real estate slowdown, its export markets are weak, and its overall growth rate is set to slow. But the country is still relatively insulated from the global crisis. Its foreign exchange reserves are approaching $2 trillion, making it the world's strongest country in terms of liquidity. China's financial system is not exposed, and the country's growth, which is now driven by domestic activity, will continue at solid, if diminished, rates. This relatively unscathed position gives China the opportunity to solidify its strategic advantages as the United States and Europe struggle to recover. Beijing will be in a position to assist other nations financially and make key investments in, for example, natural resources at a time when the West cannot. At the same time, this crisis may lead to a closer relationship between the United States and China. Trade-related flashpoints are diminishing, which may soften protectionist stances in the U.S. Congress. And it is likely that, with Washington less distracted by the war in Iraq, the new administration of President Obama will see more clearly than its predecessor that the U.S.-Chinese relationship is becoming the United States' most important bilateral relationship.

Hegemony Good Extension

Loss of leadership causes multiple nuclear wars, systemic global instability, and magnifies all impacts Ferguson, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, SeptemberOctober2004 (A World Without Power Foreign Policy) http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html
Niall

is left? Waning empires.Religious revivals.Incipient anarchy.A coming retreat into fortified cities.These are theDark Ageexperiences that a worldwithout a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is,
Sowhat of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology

has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it.For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war.The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead toeconomic stagnation and even depression. As the UnitedStatessought to protect itselfafter a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society,less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltrationof the EUwould become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensionsover the Middle Eastto the breaking point. An economicmeltdownin Chinawould plunge the Communist system into crisis,unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers.The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates.With ease,terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile,limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning inthe Korean peninsula and Kashmir,perhapsendingcatastrophicallyin the Middle East.In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their
privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If

the United Statesretreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier-not pretend that they are usheringin a new era ofmultipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for.The alternative to unipolaritywould not be multipolarity at all. Itwould be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.
itscriticsat home and abroadmust

CMR
Aff Answers
No backlash - the military will follow orders even if they disagree with them Ackerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, Productive Obama-Military Relationship
Possible, http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible] Some members of the military community are more sanguine. Several say that if they disagree with the decision, they respect Obamas authority to make it. In the end, we are not self-employed. And after the military leadership provides its best military

advice, it is up to the policy-makers to make the decision and for the military to execute those decisions, said a senior Army officer recently back from Iraq, who requested anonymity because he is still on active duty. Now, if those in the military do not like the decision, they have two choices. One, salute smartly and execute the missions given them to the best of their ability. Or, the other, leave the military if they do not feel they can faithfully execute their missions.
That is one way the military does get to vote in an all-volunteer force. Moss agreed. The military will just follow the order, he said. The great majority of Americans want U.S. forces out of Iraq. This is part of the reason Obama was sent to the White House.

Aff Answers
CMR is Resilient Gates and high ranking Generals will respect any Obama decision and shield it from opposition. Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution and holds the Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy, 9-4-9 (Kori, So far so good for civil military relations under Obama,
Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so_far_so_good_for_civil_military_relations_under_o bama) Crucial to Feingold's argument is that the Afghan people resent our military involvement. Both McChrystal, and now Gates, are persuaded that is not true. They argue that how we operate in Afghanistan will determine Afghan support to a much greater degree than the size of the force. Gates for the first time yesterday signaled his support for further force increases on that basis, indicating he will not be a political firewall for the White House if McChrystal and Mullen advocate politically uncomfortable increases. Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is

seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary. Yet the President may -- and perhaps should -- do exactly that, and for reasons that are laudable in our system of civil-military relations. The American way of organizing for warfare has distinct responsibilities for the leading military and civilian participants. To work up the ladder, it's the military commander's job to survey the requirements for success and make recommendations. It's the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the military judgment of that strategy and resourcing, advising the Secretary and the President on its soundness and other possible courses of military action. It's the Secretary of Defense's job to figure out how to provide those resources from a limited pool of people and equipment, to
identify and manage the risk it creates for other operations and objectives (e.g., Iraq, managing China's rise, deterring North Korea, etc). It is the Commander in Chief's job to establish the war's objectives and determine whether they merit the resources it would require to be successful. He may determine the objectives are too costly in themselves, or that achieving them would distract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we do not have the necessary partners in the Karzai government to achieve our objectives. It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is reported to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When the Bob Woodward article recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe

much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.

Aff Answers
Afghanistan is already destroying CMR. Haddick 9/4 [Robert, managing editor of Small Wars Journal, This Week at War: McChrystal Plays Defense, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/this_week_at_war_mcchrystal_plays_defense] Gen. Stanley McChrystal'sreport on the situation in Afghanistan is likely to strain relations between the Obama administration and the uniformed military. The arrival of McChrystal'sreport in Washington is likely to spark its own low-level war of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between civilian policymakers in the White House andMcChrystal's staff and defenders in the Pentagon. This strain in civil-military relations could last through the duration of the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan and beyond. McChrystal's report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely don't trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive. The first task for McChrystal's report (and its leaking defenders) was to show how President Barack Obama's supposedly limited war aims actually result in broad, expensive, and open-ended goals for Afghanistan: Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating alQaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy. McChrystal's report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally

the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims.
Next, according to the Washington Post, McChrystal's report lists numerous obstacles that could prevent success, barriers that are outside of the U.S. military's control: For instance, McChrystal thinks a greater push by civilian officials is vital to shore up local Afghan governments and to combat corruption, officials said. He is emphatic that the results of the recent Afghan presidential election be viewed as legitimate, but is also realistic in acknowledging that the goals of the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the coalition are not always as closely aligned as they could be, they said. Separately, officials said, McChrystal's assessment finds that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths. In others words, McChrystal is saying, don't hold me responsible for success if Karzai's election is a fraud, civilian officials don't show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol.

The report illustrates the basic struggle between civilian policymakers and military commanders. Each side looks to the other to solve its problems. The White House staff is hoping that McChrystal will deliver a clear, high-probability war-winning strategy, a strategy that would reduce Afghanistan as an issue of concern. McChrystal, like all field commanders, wants his political masters to give him a realistic and measurable objective, with the resources needed to accomplish it.
McChrystal's report implies a pessimistic outlook for U.S. success in Afghanistan. If he and his staff had an optimistic view about the Afghan challenge, there would have been no need to be so diligent about clarifying responsibility for what comes next. In the case of success, all would share the glory. McChrystal's report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations.

Aff Answers
CMR clashes wont escalate Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, World Affairs Winter 8, Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html However it begins,a clash between the next administration and the armed forces need not metastasize into a full-blown crisis. Military leaders should start to consider how they will react to civilian demands, and which of their traditions they will choose. Will they acquiesce after due advice and consultation, as the Constitution and our tradition of civilian control suggests? Or will they resist, employing techniques borne of decades of inside-the-beltway maneuvering? Will they confine dissent to the appropriate channels? Or will they go public, enlisting their allies in Congress, industry, and veterans groups? Will they collaborate with their new civilian superiors? Or will they work to thwart every recommendation harmful to their service? Much will depend on the capacity of military leaders to establish a workable relationship with their civilian superiors and to embrace their own tradition of professionalism.

Civilians have equal obligations. Will they tackle thorny defense issues in a serious, nonpartisan way, or will they succumb to their own posturing? Will they box themselves in with
their campaign promises? Will they apply Band-Aids to the Pentagon budget, or will they address the more fundamental problem of reorganizing a Cold-War military for an age of asymmetric threats? Will they consider seriously, if not always heed, the counsel of military expertise? A crucial intermediary here will be the next secretary of defense. Someone in the mold of Melvin Laird or James Schlesinger or William Perry will be indispensablethat is, someone knowledgeable and politically skilled who can gain and keep the confidence of the military, Congress, and the president. Whoever wins the job must wear his or her authority without bluster or arrogance, and lead firmly while holding the military to account. Above all, the secretary must act with courtesy, fairness, and decisiveness. A new administration might even ask Robert Gates to stay on; he has presided over the Pentagon with a calming, steady hand after Rumsfelds departure. Staffing decisions at less senior levels will be nearly as important. Neither party can afford to

populate the Defense Department with politicians on the make, congressional staffers beholden to special interests, or young know-nothings looking to plus-up their rsums. These positions require knowledgeable people from the business community, the federal bureaucracy, and other professions who understand and respect the military but will not be awed by medals and campaign ribbons. The service secretaries have the closest relationship with
the military leadership and have a critical say in picking senior leaders for advancement into the key commands and the Joint Chiefs. Finding the right individuals for these slots will be essential. The new secretary of defense would do well to assemble his deputy, under secretaries, and service secretaries into a cohesive executive committee that would formulate an agenda, rethink policy, and oversee its implementation. The next administration should also act quickly to insulate the military leadership from partisan politics. The first act will be, after due consideration, the reappointment of Admiral Mullen as chairman. Then there should be a concerted search within the services for loyal but

independent thinkers who understand the American system of civilian control but also know how to be dead honest in their advice. The recent appointment of General James Mattis of the Marines to head Joint Forces Command sends exactly the right message. Whoever comes into
office in January 2009, in turn, needs to make clear up front that he or she will not hide behind the military, that he or she will not compromise the militarys professional ethos by delivering partisan speeches in front of uniformed audiences or trotting out the brass to market administration policies. Last of all, the new president ought to reach out to the armed forces in their own communities:

visiting bases, praising the military with genuine sincerity, addressing veterans care, making certain that as troops are withdrawn from Iraq, no blame falls unfairly on them for what follows. The political leadership will have to consult widely about changes, cuts, consolidations, and other modifications to the defense
establishment. The next administration will need to establish a precedent for strict civilian control from the outset, all the while spending political capital on national defense and boosting the morale of what will likely be an anxious force. Consistent and vocal praise for military

(and public) service would go a long wayeasy for a Republican who abandons the demonization of government, difficult for a Democrat accustomed to ignoring or criticizing the military.

Aff Answers
Unequal CMR good Rumsfeld era proves Desch, 07 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at Texas A&M's
George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, (Michael, Foreign Affairs, Bush and the Generals, May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86309/michael-c-desch/bush-and-thegenerals.html) Cohen's thesis was that civilian intervention ...) handling of the Iraq war. Cohen's thesis was that civilian intervention at not only the strategic but also the tactical and operational levels was essential for military success. In order to overcome military resistance or incompetence, civilian leaders needed to be willing to "probe" deeply into military matters through an "unequal dialogue" with their professional military subordinates. Commenting in May 2003 on the Bush administration's performance, Cohen noted approvingly that "it appears that Rumsfeld is a very active secretary of defense, rather along the lines essential for a good civilmilitary dialogue: pushing, probing, querying. But not, I think, dictating in detail what the military should do. [On Iraq,] the Bush administration was engaged in what was a very intensive dialogue with senior military leadership, and I think that was right." As late as April of 2006, Cohen still thought that "one could say much to defend Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld against the recent attacks of half a dozen retired generals" who criticized his (and his deputies') handling of the Iraq war.

Aff Answers - PMCs Link Turn

PMCs kill civil-military relations Deborah Kidwell, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth Kansas, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 12 3, Public War, Private Fight? The
United States and Private Military Companies

PMCs can destabilize the traditional civil-military relationship. Singer identified several conditions where PMCs will have a negative impact: the pay differential for similar tasks favors contractors, private forces detract from the reputation of the local military, contractors remain segregated from regular units, employment of PMCs impairs advancement opportuni- ties or has authority over military units, and where private forces threaten to replace uniformed military personnel.69 While current policy advocates
a seamless integration of military and contracted personnel, training, pay differential, and other factors may upset the balance

T They give no standards, they take out key affs like ours which solve for important problems We gave c/I they didnt contest, we contested their intrp, we have better one.

Case They never contested, they said they can contest in rebuttal but they didnt. at this point in the debate they have has 3 opprotunitys. The debate is decided if the aff presents Inherency, Significance, and Harms , and solvency. They dont test this in any of their speeches which means you as a judge must vote on aff