Africa Affirmative – TDI 2022

1AC
 1AC – Plan
Plan: Justice requires the African Union adopt open borders for human migration.
 1AC – Migration
Open borders are an essential political and economic goal of Agenda 2063 – squo
legislation remains unsigned and unratified
Jason Mitchell 7/1/2021 [Investment Monitor, “Freedom of movement could unlock Africa’s rich
potential”] [DS] [https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/analysis/freedom-of-movement-unlock-africa-
potential]
In January 2013, African heads of state called for a new blueprint for the African continent for the next 50 years, which became known as
Agenda 2063. They ambitiously billed it as the masterplan for transforming Africa into a global economic
powerhouse of the future. It was adopted by African governments in January 2015 and is currently being implemented by the African
Union, the continental union that consists of 55 member states. One of its seven lofty aspirations is “an integrated
continent, politically united and based on the ideals of pan-Africanism and the vision of African
renaissance”. Its 15 flagship projects include the formulation of a strategy for transforming the African economy from a supplier of raw
materials to one that actively uses its own resources, the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), and the introduction of an ‘African Union passport’ and the removal of all visa requirements
for its holders within Africa. The initial stage of setting up AfCFTA has now been achieved (54 countries have signed the agreement
out of 55 on the continent, the exception being Eritrea), creating the world’s biggest free market by number of participating countries (with a
combined GDP of approximately $3.5trn). It started trading on 1 January 2021 and by March 36 countries had ratified it and undertaken the
legal obligations for market opening and reducing barriers to trade. African
freedom of movement: a game changer The
free-trade pact could be an economic game changer but one of the biggest obstacles to its success are
the myriad barriers to the freedom of movement on the continent. Since 2018, as part of its Agenda
2063 mission, the African Union has been promoting the Free Movement Protocol. However, by
February this year, only 33 African countries had signed up to the protocol (including Kenya, Ghana,
Angola and Tanzania) and only four countries had ratified it: Rwanda, Niger, Mali and São Tomé and
Principe. Africa’s three biggest economies – Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa – which make up more than
half the continent’s GDP – have not signed up to it, let alone ratified it. African governments seem
prepared to sign up to a trade deal but are reluctant to put into practice one of the vital elements –
freedom of movement – so that the pact can work effectively. They have also been slow to put in place frameworks that
recognise university degrees and technical qualifications from other African countries. “This could be a transformative time for Africa,” says
Paul Akiwumi, director, division for Africa, least developed countries and special programmes at the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). “There is a huge opportunity for the continent to escape from the yoke of the commodity-
dependent model that exists today. AfCFTA provides a wonderful chance for African firms to leverage economies of scale and to
trade across the region. “However, for it to work properly, freedom of movement is essential . Skills are missing in
certain parts of Africa that exist in other parts of the continent. People must be able to move around. African governments must have the
political will to implement the Free Movement Protocol and to allocate financial resources to doing so.”

Scenario 1 is the Economy –

Inter-African migration is inevitable which thumps neg DA’s, but legalizing it creates
immense economic benefits and avoids human trafficking.
Ottilia Anna Maunganidze and Julian Formica November 2018 [Institute for Security Studies,
“Freedom of movement in Southern Africa: A SADC (pipe)dream?”] [DS]
[https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-17.pdf]
Benefits of migration and arguments in favour of freedom of movement There are several benefits of migration to the
development of the region, and even greater future potential. A 2018 study by the World Bank reveals
that immigration has a positive impact on local employment, labour earning and wages. Although it is true that
unemployment is lower among foreign nationals than locals, the results of this research show that for every immigrant
employed in South Africa, two jobs are created for locals. Immigrants also take part in the economy by
paying taxes and rent, and providing cheaper goods and services to the community .63 In this way,
immigration has a direct and tangible positive impact on the economies of receiving countries .64
Furthermore, remittances (money sent home by migrants) account for a substantial share of the
economic development of the SADC region – on average 3.7% of SADC countries’ GDP. Countries such as
Comoros, Lesotho and Zimbabwe rely heavily on remittances, respectively for 21%, 15% and 11% of
their GDP.65 It generates economic stability – and, in turn, political stability – in sending countries.
People are less forced to move. And hosting economic migrants becomes less of a burden for receiving
countries.66 Considering the high cost of transferring money from South Africa in the SADC region, there is tremendous potential to harness
even more economic development from reducing remittance transaction costs and opening formal channels for remitting income and goods for
undocumented and low-income clients.67 Remittances are primarily sent directly to relatives and friends and do not go to a centralised fund
from which government can then allocate funding as part of a reserve. Some SADC member states individually acknowledge the benefits of
immigration. For instance South Africa, while increasingly policing its borders, sees migration as a way to
compensate for its loss of skilled workers. Its latest migration policy paper, the 2017 White Paper on
International Migration, mentions skills import as a core objective of South Africa’s immigration
approach.68 Similarly, Mauritius sees migration as a skills import and enhancing tool to its labour pool,
and the Seychelles – the most open African country in terms of visa requirements – relies greatly on
migration for tourism.69 Immigration has a direct and tangible positive impact on the economies of receiving countries Regarding
security concerns, a regional migration policy framework would allow for better control and management of migration. Freedom of
movement is about transparency. It would allow governments to better understand who is entering the
country and why, and hence be better prepared for their arrival. Importantly, it would protect migrants
from getting involved in vulnerable modes of access to the country – smuggling and trafficking .70 Both
the literature and the key stakeholders interviewed suggest that freedom of movement has the
potential to shore up economies across SADC, in both receiving and sending countries.71 In short, the more
developed a country is, the less its citizens are compelled to move for economic reasons – primarily poverty and lack of opportunity.

Voices from the field 9: Benefits of freer migration ‘When you make it more difficult for people to move one can see
more smuggling and informal routes of migration … if movement is made easier it becomes
automatically safer.’ (Interview July 9, 2018) ‘Well-managed migration can be positive for both countries of
destination and origin, especially in terms of labour, remittances, taxes .’ (Interview July 10, 2018) ‘If we want
not to attract more and more numbers of people, we need to promote development in the region. And I
think that migration itself could support that if it were properly managed .’ (Interview July 24, 2018) ‘Freedom of
movement will be about recognising and facilitating a system that is already there, that people de facto
are already moving fairly freely within the region. That would mean that those people would have some
level of protection and an entitlement of certain types of rights. I think the benefits would be about
lower costs of migration, probably an ease of and a formalisation of economic exchanges where banks
and others would take the place of smugglers and money lenders. That would probably promote a more
stable form of development and investment. I don’t think that we would see a massive demographic
shift. People who want to move, for the most part, are already doing so … It is in part an argument
based on fact and on ideology. I prefer to give people choice when there is no compelling reason not
to.’ (Interview July 18, 2018) ‘It is also an acknowledgement that people do not only move when there is a deficiency in the country from which
they are from … freedom of movement in terms of laws, at a regional level, is kind of following what people are already doing: people will move
and continue to move.’ (Interview July 5B, 2018)

Migration is necessary to solve Africa’s structural economic problems.

ILO February 2019 [International Labour Organization, “Labour Migration in Africa”] [DS]
[https://www.ilo.org/africa/areas-of-work/labour-migration/WCMS_670561/lang--en/index.htm]
Labour migration in Africa is largely intra-regional (80%)1 and mainly characterized by the migration of low-skilled workers. Of great importance
in the region is the consolidation of significant South-South migration corridors to neighbouring labour markets in the search for a job and
better wages. Indeed, today, there
are few African countries not participating in migration flows , whether as countries
of origin, transit or destination. Demand
in economic sectors such as agriculture, fishing, mining and construction
as well as services such as domestic work, health care, cleaning, restaurants and hotels, and retail trade
are significant drivers within the continent. African migrants, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons often use the same
migration routes. Growing inter-regional corridors to the Middle East and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as more traditional
flows to Europe and North America are noteworthy The International Labour Organization (ILO)’s strategy on labour migration in the African
region is guided by its International Labour Standards (ILS) and Decent Work Agenda , and implemented in close collaboration with the World of
Work actors (Ministries of Labour and workers’ and employers’ organisations from the 54 African countries). ILO’s rights-based approach takes
into consideration labour market needs and covers all migrant workers irrespective of nationality, skill level and immigration status. ILO’s labour
migration work contributes to the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted in December 2018 and falls in line with
the commitments of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in particular its migration-related aspects: SDG 8 to promote sustained,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all (SDG target 8.8: Protect labour rights and
promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in
precarious employment); and, SDG 10 on reducing inequality within and among countries (SDG target 10.7. Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and
responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies). Work
also includes support for constituents’ implementation of the new Mobility-related Guidance of the United Nations Development Assistance
Frameworks (UNDAFs). ILO’s work is strongly informed by Africa’s Agenda 2063 (particularly Aspirations 1 and 2 and related continental and
national strategies)2; the 2014 African Union Commission’s (AUC) “Ouagadougou + 10 Declaration and Plan of Action on Employment, Poverty
Eradication and Inclusive Development in Africa ” (notably Key priority area number 5: Labour Migration and Regional Economic Integration)
and its 5-Year Priority Programme of Action; the AU Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action 2018-2030 (mainly 2.1
National labour migration policies, structures and legislation, and 2.2 Regional cooperation and harmonisation of Labour Migration Policies); as
well as the AU Free Movement of Persons Protocol (particularly its labour migration and mobility-related provisions). ILO’s work includes the
promotion of labour migration policies based on accurate data and a deep analysis of the supply and demand for foreign labour (existing and
potential labour market needs) considered beneficial to the economy and development of both countries of origin and destination. Work
should be based on social and economic long-term development objectives while leaving a certain amount of flexibility permitting to respond to
short-term demands. ILO’s labour migration and labour mobility work is thus closely coordinated with ILO’s Decent Work Technical Teams
(particularly social dialogue, employment and skills, social protection and standards specialists) and capitalizes on its technical expertise on
labour market governance. In such efforts, the ILO fosters achievements at the local, national, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional level.
More particularly, ILO’s work aims to achieve fair labour migration and decent work outcomes for all migrant workers3. Since 2014, the ILO has
worked closely with the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) to develop a Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration (JLMP) in
Africa. The JLMP represents a broad framework in which to anchor most labour migration work in the region, particularly in supporting Africa’s
Regional Economic Communities. The JLMP was adopted by the African Heads of State and Governments during the 24th Ordinary Session of
the AU Assembly in January 2015. The
JLMP includes as one of its main objectives: achieving better governance of
labour and skills mobility within Africa (in particular with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)). It
focuses on facilitating the free movement of workers as a crucial means of advancing regional
integration and development in Africa. The ILO is directly implementing or contributing to the implementation of the JLMP
particularly through two main projects in the continent: a) The AU-IOM-ILO JLMP-Priority project (funded by the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)) and which has as its main objective to contribute to improved labour migration governance to
achieve safe, orderly and regular migration in Africa as committed in relevant frameworks of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs), as well as in relevant international human rights and labour standards and other cooperation processes; b) The project
“Extending social protection access and portability of benefits to migrant workers and their families in selected RECs in Africa” (funded by the
EU Pan African Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD) Facility) which principal objective is extending social protection to migrant workers
(including those in the informal sector), by strengthening Regional Economic Communities’ capacities (working mainly with EAC, ECOWAS, and
SADC) to provide as well as to drive the implementation of regional frameworks on the extension of social protection to migrant workers and
their families. It is also important to mention that one of the most important complementary areas of work
of the ILO is the promotion of job-rich employment policies and of decent work to combat migration
root causes. The economic outlook for Africa is set to improve, with growth projected to reach 3.7 per cent in 2017, up from 2.1 per cent in
20164 (ILO 2018 WESO report). While growth is anticipated to gradually recover and increase broadly in the
region, it will still remain below the level needed to tackle Africa’s current social and labour market
challenges effectively, particularly lack of job creation, underemployment and quality of work. Youth
unemployment is, and will continue to be, a major challenge that needs to be addressed. Other important
migration related push factors comprise: demographic pressure, political instability, extreme poverty, wide income inequalities, military
conflict, terrorism, corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, poor governance, and environmental degradation causing droughts,
deforestation, etc. The
African Union’s 2015 Report on Labour Migration Statistics in Africa highlighted that
international migration in Africa is largely across Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and that the
labour force participation rate of international migrants in Africa seems to be higher than that of the
general population representing the highest 93.3% for Mauritius to the lowest (71.7%) for Ghana. The AU’s
Regional Report also mentioned that the East African Community (EAC) registered the highest international migration rate, representing 2.2%
with ECOWAS, CENSAD and IGAD following closely with 2.1%, 1.6% and 1.2%, respectively. Expert
studies and data show that
migration, particularly labour migration, is an important enabler and beneficiary of regional integration
and economic development in Africa. For example, the key findings of a recent ILO/OECD study on the impacts of immigration on
developing countries’ economies5 showed the following: Migrants can have a positive impact on economic growth. The
study’s conclusions state that overall immigration is unlikely to depress gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, on the contrary. In some countries, the estimated contribution of immigrants to GDP
represents up to 19% in Cote d’Ivoir6 . Immigrants may also generate additional employment
opportunities for native-born workers. Overall, in South Africa7 the study shows that recently arrived
migrants actually represent a positive impact on native-born employment rates and monthly wages as
well as a decrease in unemployment rates. At the same time, when migrant workers are employed in
the formal economy, their employment can have a positive effect on public finance. In Ghana8, the
contribution of immigrants to the government’s fiscal balance exceeds the contribution of the native-
born population (on a per capita basis). In addition, in South Africa immigrants have a positive net
impact on the government’s fiscal balance.

Open borders redefines ICBT, alleviates poverty, and reduces reliance on the colonial
economic model. It’s also key to the success of the AfCFTA.
Rosemary Kamau King’Ori 1/28/2021 [Africa Portal, “The AfCFTA and open borders: Opportunities
presented by free migration”] [DS] [https://www.africaportal.org/features/afcfta-and-open-borders-
opportunities-presented-free-migration/]

(AfCFTA = AU measure passed and ratified to liberalize trade)

The coming into force of the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 1 January 2021 is particularly
significant given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade and the global economy. The AfCFTA presents an opportunity for traders, both
large multinationals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to trade across Africa through a liberalised market for goods and services.
It is worth noting that one of the general objectives of AfCFTA is to create a single market for goods and
services, facilitated by movement of persons (Article 3(a) of the Agreement). This consequently places free
migration of persons at the heart of free trade. The co-dependency between trade and free migration
is therefore not unexpected. In Africa, trade is largely propagated through informal cross-border trade
(ICBT). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines ICBT as trade
conducted between neighbouring countries by vulnerable and unregistered traders. In Africa, these
traders are predominantly women and youth. ICBT is not necessarily illegal in terms of the nature of trade but fails to meet the
formal requirements of recognised trade due to the lack of compliance to regulations on customs. Accordingly, a high percentage
of about 30%-40% of trade in Africa is through ICBT to the point that some refer to ICBT as “Africa’s Real
Economy”. With this in mind, free migration presents at least three opportunities that would catapult
Africa to greater economic prosperity. First, the recognition of informal cross border traders (ICBTs) and
their inclusion to the continent’s formal economic matrix. Second, the alleviation of poverty through
remittances. Third, building and growing the African economy by reducing reliance on the “colonial
economic model”. The recognition of ICBTs and their inclusion in the continent’s formal economic matrix The recognition of ICBTs and
their inclusion in the continent’s formal economic matrix has the potential of fast-tracking economic integration in Africa. ICBTs may be
recognised through policy and legislatives approaches such as: (a) Developing One-Stop-Border-Posts (OSBPs) across the eight regional
economic communities (RECs) in Africa, each with trade facilitation desk offices (TIDOs). Through the TIDOs, trade facilitation officers would
sensitise traders and collect information from small-scale traders which would be missed at the ordinary border post. This, therefore, would
encourage formalisation of cross-border trade. (b) Creating Simplified Trade Regimes (STRs) which will effect simplified customs documents,
simplified clearance procedures, a common list of products, a threshold for the value of consignment and a common passport or pass for
traders. STRs therefore ensure a reduction of clearance costs and encourage trade. (c) Developing efficient regional payment systems. ICBTs
require an efficient regional payment system such as the SADC’s Integrated Regional Electronic Settlement System (SIRESS), ECOWAS’s West
Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and EAC’s East Africa Payment System (EAPS). Accordingly,
ICBT has the potential to catapult
Africa’s economy with the proper recognition and trade facilitation input. The alleviation of poverty
through remittances The impact of the AfCFTA is expected to lead to the alleviation of poverty in Africa.
The World Bank estimates that by 2035, full implementation of the Agreement could lift 67.9 million
people on the continent out of moderate poverty. To achieve this, the interplay between free migration
and free trade must be exploited for the benefit of the continent and its people. There is no doubt that
an increase in economic migration leads to an increase in remittance flows. Thus, the liberalisation of
goods and services in Africa must be complemented with free migration. Building and growing the
African economy by reducing reliance on the "colonial economic model". It has been asserted that
Africa's economic model follows the "colonial economic model", which is based on exporting primary
products to countries in the North. The AfCFTA presents an opportunity to end this cycle of dependency
by developing Africa’s economy through trade and industry. In particular, Article 6 of the Agreement
makes provision for trade in goods, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights and a
competition policy. The Word Bank estimates that whole and retail trade participation in total
employment is expected to account for 20% growth by 2035 as the second most important employer on
the continent. It is therefore expected that the full implementation of the AfCFTA Agreement and its
Protocols and Annexes shall go hand in hand with the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African
Economic Community relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of
Establishment (FMOP) Protocol. The FMOP Protocol serves as a complementary text as it makes provision for employment through
the free movement of workers and the right of establishment, which grants nationals of member states the right to set up in the territory of the
host state: (i) a business, trade, profession, vocation; or (ii) an economic activity as a self-employed person. Accordingly, trade in services as
provided for in the Agreement is enhanced particularly when the Agreement is firmly implemented with the FMOP Protocol. However, it is
disconcerting to see that, to date, the launch of the Agreement has been met with little or no support for the FMOP Protocol. Since discussions
on the FMOP Protocol commenced, progress has been slow: only 33 states have signed it and four states – Rwanda, Niger, Mali and São Tomé
and Príncipe – have ratified it. Fifteen ratifications are required for the Protocol to enter into force. Conclusion From the foregoing, it is not in
doubt that the launch of AfCFTA serves as a historical moment in African history. It brings about hope and delight to Africa’s renaissance and
integration. It speaks of an African milestone in the making and signals continued innovation and trade, first within and among Africa. It is
Africa’s long and victorious quest, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While
the implementation of the AfCFTA is
expected to take years, its success must be hinged on a complementary rather than a corollary outlook
to free migration within the continent. Free migration offers complementing opportunities to trade such
as the one-stop-border-posts with trade facilitation desk offices at each post, the alleviation of poverty
through remittances and enhanced trade in services through the implementation of the FMOP Protocol.
Thus, the full and successful implementation of the AfCFTA requires African states to give equal
consideration to the FMOP Protocol and its ratification.

Slow growth in the wake of COVID causes inequality, social upheaval, and political
violence.
DESA 1/25/2021 [United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Development prospects
in Africa undermined by a severe economic downturn”] [DS]
[https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/development-prospects-africa-undermined-severe-economic-
downturn]
In 2020, the world economy shrank by 4.3 per cent, over two and half times more than during the global crisis of 2009. The modest recovery of
4.7 per cent expected in 2021 would barely offset the losses of 2020, says the latest World Economic Situation and Prospects. Developed
economies, projected to see a 4 per cent output growth in 2021, shrank the most, by 5.6 per cent, due to economic shutdowns and subsequent
waves of the pandemic, increasing the risk of premature austerity measures that would only derail recovery efforts globally. Developing
countries saw a less severe contraction at 2.5 per cent, with an expected rebound of 5.7 per cent in 2021, according to the estimates presented
in the report. However,
economic contraction among developing nations, falling exports and local
consumption rates as well as high levels of public debt will significantly increase poverty levels, says the
report. African countries are experiencing an unprecedented economic downturn with major adverse
impacts on development. Lower commodity prices, the collapse of tourism and lower remittances –
exacerbated by much-needed domestic lockdowns and other measures to control the spread of the
pandemic – have caused a severe and widespread deterioration of the economic situation. Limited fiscal
space, challenging financing conditions and rising public debt have increased the risks of debt distress.
“We are facing the worst health and economic crisis in 90 years. As we mourn the growing death toll, we
must remember that the choices we make now will determine our collective future,” said UN Secretary-General
António Guterres. “Let’s invest in an inclusive and sustainable future driven by smart policies, impactful investments, and a strong and effective
multilateral system that places people at the heart of all socio-economic efforts.” The report underscores that sustained recovery from the
pandemic will depend not only on the size of the stimulus measures, and the quick rollout of vaccines, but also on the quality and efficacy of
these measures to build resilience against future shocks. An unprecedented downturn with major consequences for
development in Africa Despite the relatively few number of cases compared to the number of cases in other continents, the COVID-19
pandemic will continue to strongly impact living conditions and development progress in Africa. The crisis is already increasing
unemployment, poverty and inequality. Most countries are facing enormous challenges to keep the
pandemic under control and mobilize financial resources to support health systems, protect vulnerable
groups, and support the recovery. After a contraction of 3.4 per cent in 2020, Africa is projected to achieve a modest recovery,
with regional GDP expanding by 3.4 per cent in 2021. This recovery is predicated on the rise of domestic demand and the pick-up of exports and
commodity prices. Nigeria’s GDP is projected to expand by 1.5 per cent in 2021, after a contraction of 3.5 per cent in 2020. Yet, tighter foreign
exchange liquidity, mounting inflationary pressures and subdued domestic demand cloud the medium-term outlook. In South Africa, GDP is
projected to expand by 3.3 per cent in 2021, after a contraction of 7.7 per cent in 2020. However, a strong and sustained recovery remains
uncertain, amid power shortages, elevated public debt and policy challenges. Egypt’s GDP is estimated to have grown by 0.2 per cent in 2020;
and in 2021, GDP growth is projected to climb to 5.4 per cent, underpinned by a strong recovery of domestic demand and facilitated by the
absence of severe balance-of-payments constraints. After a contraction of 0.5 per cent in 2020, the Ethiopian economy is projected to expand
by only 2.3 per cent in 2021. While agricultural exports are showing resilience, the tourism sector will remain restrained throughout 2021.
External financing and high debt levels pose major risks Elevated public debt is limiting the capacity to
boost spending across the continent. Also, meagre growth prospects mean less capacity to sustain debt
levels, as foreign reserves, remittances and capital flows falter and depreciations constrain the capacity
to service foreign currency-denominated debt . African countries need further support from the international community and
strong national efforts in averting a debt crisis. A debt crisis would not just cause a further economic deterioration, but also force painful fiscal
adjustments. Against
such a backdrop, social unrest and political tensions may easily escalate, which
could in turn worsen food insecurity, violence, internal displacement and migration pressures.
African economic decline also spills over.
Colin Coleman 2/4/2020 [Project Syndicate, “Africa Is the Last Frontier for Global Growth”] [DS]
[https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/africa-growth-potential-reforms-by-colin-coleman-
2020-02?barrier=accesspaylog]
NEW HAVEN – Africa today accounts for around 17% of the world’s population, but only about 3% of global GDP. These statistics not only attest
to a failure to tap the continent’s developmental potential, but also highlight the tremendous opportunities and risks ahead. As
long as
Africa continues to lag economically, it will be a source of global instability and extremism. But if it rises,
it could be one of the major sources of growth for the world. Africa is no stranger to suffering. The continent has been
ravaged by slavers, plundered by colonizers, exploited by world powers during the Cold War, and ravaged by the post-colonial conflicts leaving
a legacy of relentless volatility, horrific violence, and widespread poverty. Consider the atrocities committed by King Leopold II of Belgium in the
so-called Congo Free State (today the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) in the late 1890s, as he looted the country’s ivory and rubber. As
Adam Hochschild recounts in his book King Leopold’s Ghost, a young Edmund Morel, who witnessed Leopold’s plunder for profit, described the
forced labor, “directed by the [king’s] closest associates,” as “terrible and continuous.” Women were abducted and raped. Men were enslaved
and worked to death. Resisters risked death, and their hands would be severed – while they were still alive – as proof of punishment. And with
nobody left to cultivate or find food, millions suffered near-famine and died of diseases that they might have survived otherwise. “It must be
bad enough to stumble upon a murder,” recalled Morel. “I had stumbled upon a secret society of murderers with a King for a croniman.” Well
over a century later, the DRC still struggles to maintain peace and stability, let alone secure growth and development. Indeed, all of Central
Africa has suffered from seemingly unremitting conflicts – a dynamic that, since the end of the Cold War, “developed into an avalanche of killing
and destruction,” as the regional analyst and advocate Kris Berwouts put it a decade ago. Approximately six million people died as a direct or
indirect consequence of the two wars in the DRC – in 1996-1997 and 1998-2002 – which followed the brutal genocide in Rwanda. Yet, in spite
of this history, Africa has managed to make important gains in recent decades. In Sub-Saharan Africa, GDP growth has averaged 5% per year
since 2000. For the entire continent, the rate is only slightly lower. Moreover, according to a 2019 World Bank report, poverty in Africa (defined
as income of less than $1.90 per day) declined from 54% in 1990 to just over 41% – affecting around 400 million people – in 2015. If the
economy continues to grow at today’s rate through 2030, the continent’s poverty rate will decline to 23%. Given rates of poverty reduction
elsewhere in the world, however, this would still represent a rising share of global poverty. Africa
has the potential to go much
further. The world’s youngest and fastest-urbanizing continent, Africa will have 24 million more people,
on average, living in its cities each year between 2015 and 2045 – more than India and China combined
– according to a 2016 McKinsey & Company estimate. This implies major increases in consumption.
Already, spending by consumers and businesses in Africa totals $4 trillion. Household consumption is
expected to grow by 3.8% annually until 2025, reaching $2.1 trillion, and business spending should grow
from $2.6 trillion in 2015 to $3.5 trillion in 2025. Altogether, the McKinsey report predicts $5.6 trillion in
African business opportunities by 2025. Some of these opportunities lie in agriculture: if Africa, which
possesses 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land, intensified its agricultural productivity, it could
produce 2-3 times more cereals and grains, with similar increases in horticulture crops and livestock.
Other opportunities lie in infrastructure: as of 2010, Africa still needed at least $46 billion in additional
spending each year to upgrade its energy, water, and transportation networks. Of course, some valuable
investment opportunities also involve Africa’s abundant natural resources, which include 10% of the
world’s oil reserves, 40% of its gold, and 80% of its platinum. But the importance of such resources to Africa’s future
prosperity shouldn’t be overestimated. According to a 2019 Goldman Sachs economic research report, commodities have accounted for only
around 30% of Africa’s GDP growth since 2000. In
fact, the report concludes, the drivers of Africa’s “secular
acceleration” appear to be “deep and structural.” This reflects success, which needs to be reinforced from now on by
continuing to strengthen institutions, support political stability, promote democratization, enhance policy coordination, improve ease of doing
business, reduce debt, open financial markets, attract foreign direct investment, facilitate technology transfers, and nurture human capital
(such as through education and health care). Some countries – particularly the smaller economies of East Africa – are already demonstrating
how powerful such reforms can be. If the entire continent took this approach, sustaining and accelerating the
needed reforms over the next half-century, some believe that Africa could emulate China’s rapid rise of
the last 50 years. But not everyone is optimistic about Africa’s ability to fulfill its promise. Some doubt that the continent will manage to
overcome its legacy of slavery, colonialism, and great-power competition. There are also concerns about the global
economic landscape, especially trade tensions between the United States and China, and the attendant
effects on growth and commodity prices. Much will hinge on the performance of Africa’s largest
economies – Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa – and progress on making the African Continental Free
Trade Area a functioning regional economic bloc. If Africa succeeds, it could lift millions of its own out
of poverty, while serving as a stable and prosperous economic partner for the rest of the world.
Otherwise, the continent will remain constrained by poverty, institutional lethargy, and corruption,
which will feed instability, and possibly spill over to the rest of the world. Africa will soon to be home to
one-fifth of the global population. The world would sleep easier if the continent could put itself on the
road to growth and prosperity.

That causes nuke war.

Maavak ’21 [Mathew; Author @ Atlas Institute for International Affairs, external researcher
(PLATBIDAFO) @ Kazimieras Simonavicius University in Vilnius, Lithuania, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging
Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?” Salus Journal 9(1), p. 2-17]

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system,
marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system
isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined.
Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith
& McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of
intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum
(Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and
morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain
nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate
products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The
pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national
stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the
bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden,
Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in
history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a
real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as
both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk
management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic,
environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be
slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual
global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a).

As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging
threats through a systems thinking approach.
METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for
the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was
primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli &
Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010;
Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012)

Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its
contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial
crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a
trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US
history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to
the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019).
Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion
(Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19
outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva,
2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al,
2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global
billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth
$88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is
the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle
argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle
class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph
into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments.
Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland
repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly
followed suit.
According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical
precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to
Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if
something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it
(repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation
program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is
moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on
a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip,
the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the
economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion
by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national
sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear:
The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands.
Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style
debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand,
has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be
happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely
an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession
(Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity,
interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at
sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents?
Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade
climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al
(2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related
diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2
billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic
insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an
environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be
boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl
(1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the
result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian
Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of
ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left
204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless
(Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate
greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery
delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will
further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-
down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in
health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort
to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are
no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden
championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic
effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless
children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from
dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer
(DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent
ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste
disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia –
in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along
the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to
mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-
environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can
unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are
governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as
outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial

competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world.
Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and
wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by
nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a
Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect
familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-
Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019),
possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will
affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top
1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a
classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over
Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an
India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven
implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan
3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown.
From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-
interconnection-interactionadaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got
replaced.

Scenario 2 is Crime –

Open borders solve human trafficking in Africa – multilateral approaches are key.
Alpha Seydi 10/15/21 [IOM, UN Migration; “Free Movement of People a Top Priority, Say West African
Nations”] [DS] [https://www.iom.int/news/free-movement-people-top-priority-say-west-african-
nations]

Abuja – Free movement of people and goods, and fighting human trafficking should be top policy
priorities, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed at talks convened with the support of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Network for Migration and the African Union. Three days of consultations in Abuja this
week offered the first chance for ECOWAS members to collectively assess progress in implementing the Global Compact for Migration (GCM)
objectives and to decide key recommendations to be put to next year's International Migration Review Forum. Integrated
migration
governance should be a key goal and Ambrose Dery, Minister of Interior for Ghana, the Chair of ECOWAS Authority of Heads of
States and Governments, said it was essential African nations addressed trafficking in persons and its devastating
consequences on migrants. "Vile stories on international media concerning migrant slavery, as well as
mistreatment of young African domestic helps in some Gulf States, call for a reflection on appropriate
actions to be taken with a view to finding a lasting solution to this persistent problem that leads to the
loss of young Africans, without whom the continent cannot build a prosperous and peaceful future,”
Dery said. "In Ghana, the contribution of migrants has played a great role in shaping our national
development.” Governments must address the root causes of trafficking and ensure the free movement
of people in a safe, orderly and dignified manner. ECOWAS representatives emphasized the need to join
forces and align approaches to prevent and counter smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons to
promote rights-based management of migration. The meeting, which ended Thursday, also heard that policies must be
effectively applied by border officials to ease free movement while combatting trafficking in persons.
Aissata Kane, IOM's Senior Regional Adviser for Sub Saharan Africa, said the Global Compact for Migration was a landmark, multilateral
document. "It aims to catalyze and boost combined support and assistance for addressing legal and humanitarian challenges of migration and
foster its positive social, cultural and economic dividends within and outside the ECOWAS region.” IOM has been working with all stakeholders
at intergovernmental and national levels, as well as within the UN Network for Migration, to promote safe, orderly and dignified free
movement of people and economic exchange among ECOWAS Member States.
There’s only a risk of solvency – criminalization is counterproductive.
Lucia Bird July 2020 [“HUMAN SMUGGLING IN AFRICA: The creation of a new criminalised economy?”]
[DS] [https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2021-05-20-continent-report-stripped-
version.pdf]

Such controversy is in part due to a failure to recognise that without safe and legal migration routes,
irregular movement is inevitable. Further, that enhanced border control, including along borders which
were previously open, permitting circular migration and localised cross-border flows, heightens the
demand for smugglers. While practical and effective approaches to ‘managing migration’ remain
controversial, the evidence base regarding the impacts of approaches focusing merely on border control
is clear.

Migrant protection risks in Africa

The shift in the smuggling industry from a form of community resilience, supporting mobility when
required as a key element of livelihoods, to a far more criminalised market, has serious consequences
for the protection risks of those on the move. The journeys of migrants moving through many areas of
Africa are extremely high risk, in part due to the increasing commoditisation of migrants in the human
smuggling industry. Many current approaches drive the smuggling market towards its more exploitative
manifestations This can, to some extent, be tracked in migrant fatality figures. It is key to note that these
are believed to be a significant underestimate and do not relate only to journeys facilitated by smugglers
(with the exception of fatalities relating to the Mediterranean, where almost all will have been smuggler
facilitated). Between January 2014 and October 2019 almost 7 500 migrant fatalities were recorded
inside Africa. An additional estimated 19 000 fatalities, a significant proportion of which concerned
African nationals, occurred in the Mediterranean crossing. 11 Responses to addressing human smuggling
in Africa have largely adopted a criminal justice perspective, often backed by military power. Such
approaches drive the smuggling market towards its more exploitative manifestations, undermining state
governance structures and increasing risks faced by migrants. Continuing along this path is unlikely to
yield different results – clearly it is time for a rethink.

That causes African instability.

Lucia Bird July 2020 [“HUMAN SMUGGLING IN AFRICA: The creation of a new criminalised economy?”]
[DS] [https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2021-05-20-continent-report-stripped-
version.pdf]

Phase 3 of the smuggling industry, where smuggling revenues are central to the political economy of the
region, can drive greater emigration (due both to the drying up of a key livelihood and to existing
smuggling networks drumming up domestic business) and in some cases increasing unrest. Counter-
smuggling interventions, unless coupled with meaningful efforts to reduce the demand and untangle
migrant smuggling from the broader political economies of certain markets, thus risk being not only
ineffective but counter-productive. In Algeria, smuggling activities, predominantly of fuel, cigarettes and
other legal goods whose differing taxation across the borders created opportunities for profit, had long
occurred with the tacit support of state officials. These formed the core livelihood of many borderlands
communities, with the majority of the proceeds reinvested in local economies. 357 Consequently the
increasing militarisation of the border, which has had a significant effect on cross-border flows of fuel
and other legal goods, dealt a blow to the economies of borderland communities and in some cases
resulted in an increase in local unrest. For example, the 2018 protests in the northern border
settlements of Souani and Labtime, which relied heavily on cross-border trade. 358 The government has
recognised the economic impact of its actions to limit cross-border flows, both explicitly and tacitly. In
October 2018 it launched its ‘Special Programme for the Development of Borderlands’ focusing on the
development of Algeria’s southern borderland economies. 359 Of perhaps greater impact is the state’s
differentiated enforcement strategy which permits significant movement of licit commodities and
people across many parts of Algeria’s borders (other than that with Libya, which is predominantly
closed). This is at odds with the state’s publicly hostile stance to irregular immigration but constitutes a
tacit recognition of the importance of cross-border smuggling to the livelihoods of borderland
communities. Niger is one of the few pockets of relative stability in a neighborhood that includes
northern Mali, southern Libya, and northern Nigeria. In the past, revenues from human smuggling
offered a key livelihood opportunity to marginalised groups in the north amid economic uncertainty and
regional instability, acting as a force for stability. The migrant smuggling industry was deeply enmeshed
in formal and informal political and security structures and represented (and continues to a lesser extent
to represent) a substantial proportion of the local economy and state revenues. Smuggling profits were
invested in other sectors of the economy and also translated into greater informal political and military
influence for Tebu groups who consolidated their control of certain smuggling routes in the region. 360
The Tebu featured disproportionately in smuggling arrests, causing significant tensions among the
community. The concern triggered among authorities by a late 2016 call for rebellion by Adam Tcheke, a
former Tebu rebel, despite its being brief and entirely unenacted, demonstrates the perception of
enhanced volatility. 361 The crackdown also caused resentment among many former Tuareg rebels who
had been encouraged by authorities to work as migrant transporters following peace agreements in the
late 1990s and 2000s, and therefore saw Loi 2015-036 as a breach of the peace deal. 362 The Nigerien
government first closed the Djado goldmine while taking action against the smuggling industry, thus
depriving northern communities of two revenue streams simultaneously. It later sought to mitigate the
impact of its counter-smuggling initiatives in the peace agreement struck between the Nigerien
presidency and the Movement for Justice and the Rehabilitation of Niger (MJRN), an armed movement
claiming to represent the interests of Tebu in northern Niger. Key elements of this agreement remain
unimplemented. 363 The failure of the Nigerien government to ensure that cutting off this revenue
stream was coupled with credible and comparable alternatives worsened unemployment and
exacerbated the very drivers of migration that created demand for smuggler services in the first place.
364 In Niger this can be tracked in the increase in Nigerien migrants emigrating since 2016. As at
December 2019, local transport operators report that on average of 2 000 young Nigeriens leave for
Libya every week in what is locally termed an ‘exodus’ due to its size. 365 International Organisation for
Migration flow-monitoring data corroborate this, showing a two-fold increase in Nigeriens travelling to
Libya between July 2017 and 2019. 366 Similarly, flows of Nigeriens to Algeria also doubled in 2019. 367
The increasing effects of climate change on Niger’s agricultural sector, which employs about 80% of its
labour force, in part contributes to such increased emigration. However Global Initiative research
suggests that the primary driver is likely to be the collapse in demand by foreign migrants for smuggling
services. 368 Existing operators have sought to plug the gap created by the sharp decrease in foreign
migrants, so the smuggling industry continues. Now, however, it predominantly caters to Nigeriens
emigrating, rather than foreign migrants transiting the country. The lower prices paid by Nigerien
migrants also means the industry is far less lucrative.

African instability causes extinction – state collapse, refugees, terror.

Perez ‘18 [Alexandra; 2018; Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy. Masters in Public Policy at
Pepperdine. Project Manager, Health Policy at Cato Institute; "Food Security as U.S. National Security:
Why Fragile States in Africa Matter." https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1169&context=ppr]

The United States’ role in foreign affairs is guided by an interest to keep the general peace around the
world while protecting national security and economic interests. Stability in regions such as sub-Saharan
Africa is crucial to national security, and one way to keep peace is by supplying the basic human need of
food. According to the Fund for Peace, the three most fragile states in 2017 were in Africa— the Central
African Republic, South Sudan, and Somalia. 1 Several other African countries are fragile, suffering from
standard measures of instability, such as widespread corruption, weak institutions, and resource
scarcity. Together, these problems create displacement, human-rights violations, and power vacuums
where non-state actors can flourish. These issues should concern the United States not only for moral
reasons, but also because they negatively affect American interests. Food aid and agricultural systems
must be used as a tool to promote peace in Africa to decrease the region’s burden on the United States
and to help stabilize a region that is often referred to as a lost continent. With bipartisan support, the
Global Food Security Act became law in July of 2016. It requires the President and appropriate agencies
—including USAID, State Department, and the Office of US Trade—to formulate a plan to address food-
insecure countries and report on that plan annually.2 The bill cited the Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the US Intelligence Community (2014): “[l]ack of adequate food will be a destabilizing factor in countries
important to US national security that do not have the financial or technical abilities to solve their
internal food security problems.”3 Though it is uncertain whether annual reports will continue under the
Trump administration, the US has demonstrated (at least through the Global Food Security Act) that it
views food security as a matter of national security. According to the most recent Worldwide Threat
Assessment, Africa is among the regions most susceptible to terrorism, especially in Somalia and South
Sudan.4 This paper explores the ways in which food insecurity can enable conflict, how the US can
improve the ways it offers food aid, and why African food security is in America’s national security
interest. Consequences of Food Insecurity Enforcing and communicating a universal conception of
human rights by any party is difficult. Nevertheless, US national security strategy has placed an emphasis
on human rights in recent years. The former Secretary of State under President George W. Bush,
Condoleezza Rice, once remarked that: “[f]or the United States, supporting international development is
a vital investment in the free, prosperous, and peaceful international order that fundamentally serves
our national interest.”5 Fragile regimes in Africa cannot successfully maintain themselves, let alone pose
an immediate threat to the United States. However, these regimes are likely to seek alliances with
adversaries that may pose a threat, such as China, creating a region of the world adverse to American
interests and values. Secondly, migrant and refugee flows are concerns for the United States due to
their economic and social consequences. While many of the most serious cases of refugee crises today
are nowhere near the US, they do affect some of the United States’ key allies around the globe. A clear
example of this is Syrian migration into NATO member countries. In addition to military conflict,
bipartisan research has shown that climate can also contribute to mass migrations by impacting harvest
yields in regions still reliant on subsistence agriculture. For example, the famines in Somalia and Yemen
have sparked emigration caused by food insecurity. Such crises may not be front page news compared
to violent conflicts in surrounding states, but they present just as real a threat. The third reason why
the US should care about weak states is that terrorist organizations thrive in such environments. Since
September 11, 2001, US national security policy has been primarily driven by the war on terror. While
the fear of a repeat attack on American soil has calmed since 2001, the threat of terrorism is still
present, and the United States must be proactive to stay ahead of terrorist threats. Terrorists thrive in
weak state environments because either the lack of rule of law inhibits the host state’s ability to act
against them, or because corrupt governments refuse to act , such as when Sudan provided refuge to
Osama bin Laden in the 1990s.6 As a developing region, Africa is full of potential, and the United States
will have to decide whether it will help it stabilize or allow it to become a refuge and breeding ground
for terrorism. Africa can potentially threaten or support American interests. As stated above, food
insecurity in Africa creates problems for the US. The potential to politically align with other major
powers, the destabilizing effect of refugees on the US and its allies, and the propensity to breed
terrorism are all reasons to take Africa seriously as a national security concern. US interests include
promoting international market economies that it can easily access, so to increase economic power at
home. If the US ignores stability measures in Africa, this could negatively affect both American security
interests and global economic growth, 7 which are both American priorities. The US needs a strategy
that promotes food security in fragile states to address these concerns. Food prices in Africa are
expected to rise in the next few years due to famine,8 which means there is a risk that instability will
grow, heightening the security concern to the United States. Food insecurity, like any social ailment,
does not necessarily cause instability, but the two do reinforce each other. Obviously, American food
assistance by itself cannot solve every problem in these fragile states. Success will ultimately depend on
these countries establishing and enforcing the rule of law and shoring up government legitimacy. That
said, nation building is not a viable option in this region, as the US has already committed itself to this in
the Middle East and largely failed. The US can, however, provide developmental aid to help promote
stability and provide a foundation for future institutional growth. Therefore, it is important that the US
not only maintain food security efforts in weak states but also incentivize recipient behavior that will
make such aid more effective.

Scenario 3 is Disaster Preparedness –

Open borders solve disaster displacement.

Tamara Wood May 2019 [Platform on Disaster Displacement, “The Role of Free Movement of Persons
Agreements in Addressing Disaster Displacement”] [DS]
[https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/52846_PDD_FreeMovement_web-
single_compressed.pdf]

There are numerous ways in which free movement agreements could address the needs of disaster
displaced persons in Africa, by providing access to territory, status during stay, and access to lasting
solutions. Free movement agreements therefore provide a mechanism by which African states could
address the current ‘protection gap’ for disaster displaced persons in the region and implement their
commitments relating to disaster displacement under the Global Compact on Migration, including by
enhancing pathways for regular migration. Indeed, free movement agreements have a number of advantages over other cross-
border mobility mechanisms in the context of disaster displacement, including broad eligibility, access to employment and
opportunities for circular and seasonal movement . However, as the analysis in Section 4 shows, there are also potential
limitations to the use of free movement agreements in the context of disaster displacement, some of which have the potential to exclude its
application altogether. This Conclusion summarises the key advantages and potential limitations revealed in this report, and provides some
brief recommendations on further research that would help to assess the extent of potential limitations and identify possible measures to
resolve them 5.1 KEY ADVANTAGES OF FREE MOVEMENT AGREEMENTS IN ADDRESSING DISASTER DISPLACEMENT Free movement
agreements provide a framework for African states to implement their commitments to addressing the
challenges of disaster displacement278 and enhancing pathways for regular migration, including for
vulnerable migrants.279 Agreements for the free movement of persons in Africa have three key
advantages over other cross-border mobility mechanisms as a means of addressing the protection gap
for disaster displaced persons in Africa. These advantages are: 1) broad eligibility, 2) opportunities for
access to employment and other livelihoods, and 3) scalability. Eligibility under African free movement agreements is
broad. The primary criterion for entry into a host Member State is citizenship of another Member State of the same REC. The broad
eligibility is a significant advantage of free movement agreements over other cross-border mobility
mechanisms, including both international protection and labour migration mechanisms, where specific
eligibility criteria may provide barriers to access for disaster displaced persons. Even humanitarian
protection mechanisms that have been developed with disaster displaced persons in mind can pose
hurdles for those who move in the context of slow-onset disasters, as the result of a multitude of
overlapping reasons, or pre-emptively in order to avoid a disaster. As discussed in this report, access to territory under
African free movement agreements is not universal – citizenship requirements, Member States’ discretionary powers of suspension and
exclusion, and onerous procedural and financial requirements may prevent disaster displaced persons from accessing free movement in
practice. However, these potential barriers to access could be addressed at the domestic level, through national legislation, positive exercise of
state discretion, and waivers or assistance in relation to procedural requirements.280 Opportunities
for access to employment,
trade or business activities are also a key advantage of free movement agreements in the disaster
context, particularly when compared with international protection mechanisms, under which work
rights may be more limited. The ability to generate income is foundational to ensuring the self-
sufficiency of disaster displaced persons, 280 See further below, Section 5.2. and lawful employment reduces the
risks of abuse of exploitation of workers. As for general eligibility, above, opportunities for work under free movement
agreements are neither universal nor automatic. They require significant implementation by Member States, and meaningful access in practice
and may require intervention from others – for example, to support skill development and more sustainable livelihoods. Nevertheless,
free movement agreements provide a sound basis for this and, with the right support, could facilitate
long-term sustainable livelihoods for disaster displaced persons. Finally, the scalability of free movement
agreements provides flexibility to Member States to explore and implement smaller scale arrangements
with neighbouring states, and to test out arrangements before committing more broadly. Many of the sub-
regional frameworks that currently comprise the major sources of free movement in Africa are supported by smaller scale agreements, such as
bilateral agreements for the relaxation of documentation requirements or movements of border area populations between two or three states.
Many of these smaller scale agreements are envisaged in the sub-regional frameworks themselves.281 This is another advantage of free
movement agreements over protection-specific mobility mechanisms, which generally apply at the international or whole-of-region level and
where states may be reluctant to commit to widening existing commitments and obligations.282 While
bilateral or trilateral
agreements between African states are necessarily narrower in scope and may undermine efforts at
harmonisation, this increases the possibility of state uptake, by allowing states to ‘test the waters’
before committing to similar arrangements on a wider scale. This could be particularly helpful in those
RECs where economic disparities between Members States have proven an impediment to the broader
implementation of free movement agreements.283 They therefore provide considerable flexibility to
states to adopt situation-specific mechanisms that cater to the dynamics and needs of particular regions
or populations.

Disaster-displaced persons threaten international security.

Alexander Betts May 2013 [Forced Migration Review, “State fragility, refugee status and ‘survival
migration’”] [DS] [https://www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/betts]

The gaps in protection for people fleeing failed and fragile states matter for human rights. To take one
prominent example, large numbers of Zimbabweans fled their country between 2000 and 2010 (with an
estimated two million Zimbabweans entering South Africa alone during that period). They were fleeing a
desperate situation characterised by economic and political collapse, in which there were almost no
viable livelihood opportunities to sustain even the most basic conditions of life. Yet because only a tiny
minority had faced individualised persecution on political grounds, the overwhelming majority have
fallen outside the 1951 Convention’s definition of a refugee. Rather than receiving protection, the
majority have therefore received limited access to assistance in neighbouring countries; hundreds of
thousands have been rounded up, detained and deported back to Zimbabwe.

These protection gaps also matter for international security. We know that there is a relationship
between cross-border displacement and security, and that where international responses are
inadequate, displacement can exacerbate conflict or create opportunities, for example for recruitment
by armed groups. In the 1950s states’ motivation for creating a refugee regime was not exclusively
rights-focused. It was also based on the recognition that a collective failure to provide sanctuary to
people whose own states were unwilling or unable to provide their most fundamental rights would
have potentially destabilising effects. A similar logic applies to people fleeing serious rights
deprivations. Without coherent collective action, forced population movements – not least from failed
and fragile states – can have implications for regional security with the potential to create wider spill-
over effects.

It’s try or die aff – status quo border restrictions are inhumane and consistently fail.
Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo October 2018 [Institute for Security Studies, “Aligning South Africa’s migration
policies with its African vision”] [DS] [https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb117.pdf]

Anti-African measures

Problematising asylum seekers and low-skilled migrants without evidence At the core of most existing
Home Affairs policy developments is the implied or expressed problem statement that low-skilled
migrants and asylum seekers pose elevated risks and burdens. Most migrants in these categories come
from neighbouring African countries. Home Affairs has repeatedly claimed that the asylum system is
primarily an avenue for economic migrants to enter and remain in the country. While it is uncontested
that some economic migrants are abusing the asylum system, Home Affairs routinely overstates the
problem. Using Home Affairs statistics, the white paper claims that in 2015 more than 15.6 million
foreign arrivals were recorded, compared to only 14.2 million foreign departures in the same period,
meaning 1.44 million people remained in South Africa. It goes on to state that, ‘while most of the
international visitors and migrants do return to their countries … some overstay and in most cases apply
for asylum to legitimise their stay in the country’.22 The same section establishes that 62 000 people
applied for asylum in 2015. Simple math shows that 62 000 does not compose ‘most’ of 1.44 million.
There is no evidence that ‘most’ mixed migrants apply for asylum. The annual total of asylum
applications year on year makes up only a fraction of total migrant populations.23 Detention does not
deter migration; instead, it results in migrants’ taking greater risks These poorly developed positions are
part of an effort to label low-skilled migrants and asylum seekers as particularly problematic compared
to other migrant classes. This premise conceptually reduces them to fraudsters and, in turn, justifies
heavy-handed responses. Home Affairs demonstrates a similar low regard for lowskilled migrants from
neighbouring countries. The white paper emphasises a desire to prioritise ‘sought-after’ or ‘high-value’
migrants over economic migrants. It claims to use the National Development Plan (NDP) as a guiding
framework and references the NDP multiple times to justify recruiting highly skilled migrants.24
Meanwhile, the white paper omits the NDP’s other migration-specific calls, including adopting ‘a much
more progressive migration policy for skilled and unskilled workers’.25 This cherry-picking of the NDP
indicates worrying positions regarding migrants’ respective worth and intentionally problematises the
biggest classes of African migrants.

Prioritising detention

Home Affairs’ decision to prioritise asylum processing centres as a solution to the over-burdened asylum
system is particularly concerning. The proposed centres will operate on land borders and will have
sweeping impacts on African asylum seekers and migrants. Although Home Affairs has gone to great
lengths to avoid labelling the asylum processing centres as ‘detention’ centres, the proposed methods
contain many detention properties. The list of problems associated with detention centres is lengthy
and beyond the scope of this brief. It includes high human rights and financial costs and a historical
failure to sustainably reduce illegal migration or strains on immigration systems.26 The estimated cost of
building one processing centre is between R266 million and R298 million.27 This does not include
operations. By Home Affairs’ own admission, ‘the business process of a Refugee Processing Centre does
not support revenue generation’.28 Funding for on-going operations at the centres will come from
South African taxpayers. The white paper justifies the centres in part on the basis that the current
system is expensive. It maintains these centres will reduce migrant flows and thereby reduce costs to
the system: By reducing the incentive for abuse by economic migrants, the asylum system will be
transparent and responsive. It will also reduce the cost of managing a large number of asylum
seekers.29 This logic is deeply flawed. In particular, building and operating a series of processing centres
is unlikely to reduce department costs. It also conflates asylum seekers with economic migrants. In doing
so, it relies on the false premise that economic migrants rely exclusively on the asylum system for entry
or stay. A high number of irregular migrants enter either clandestinely or legally and then overstay. It is
further unclear how processing centres will streamline or reduce asylum claims. If the number of asylum
claims falls, it will be because economic migrants use alternative, irregular means. Evidence shows that
detention does not deter migration; instead, it results in migrants’ taking greater risks . In addition, it
weakens other migration management outcomes, reduces case resolutions, wastes resources and clogs
the court system.30 South Africa currently has one the biggest asylum backlogs in the world, with most
asylum seekers waiting several years for processing.31 The centres are not feasible solutions to backlogs
or endemic management issues, but will increase the hardships of legitimately vulnerable people. At a
time when Africa is agreeing to move away from detention models, it is alarming that South Africa is
prioritising them In addition to financial costs, the human rights costs of operating detention centres
could be steep. Other countries have been widely criticised for inhumane practices.32 No good
examples exist of detention centres providing humane treatment while reducing system abuses.
Instead, there are numerous examples of human rights violations, abuse of authority, corruption and
the use of detention as a cruel means to deter future arrivals.33 Home Affairs already has a problematic
history with running detention centres. In 2014 the South African Human Rights Commission released a
report detailing on-going human rights abuses at the Lindela Repatriation Centre. These included
procedural violations, inhumane and unsafe conditions, violence and the unlawful detention of high
numbers of people.34 The Common African Position on the Global Compact for Migration specifically
calls on all countries to [d]iscourage and abolish the utilization ‘migrant holding camps’ or ‘processing
centres’ (or whatever names they are called), as they are de facto detention centres and [a] serious
violation of human rights of migrants, regardless of their status.35 At a time when Africa is agreeing to
move away from detention models, it is alarming that South Africa is prioritising them despite the high
costs and low effectiveness.

Ignoring real problems

Shifting blame from department failures Several policy developments ignore departmental issues and
attempt to shift the blame onto migrants themselves. Home Affairs repeatedly claims that irregular
migration leads to corruption.36 Evidence indicates the inverse is true. It has been established that
migrants experience corruption at multiple stages of the documentation process37 and that existing
laws and norms in fact compel participation in the illicit document market.38 Home Affairs employees
themselves have estimated that as many as 85% of staff members participate in corrupt practices.39
This corruption leads to the inconsistent and obtuse application of immigration policies, such that even
lawyers and government officials themselves struggle to interpret and apply them.40 The white paper
and Refugee Amendment Act routinely cite a 90% asylum rejection rate as the basis for many restrictive
measures.41 For years, refugee advocates and others have challenged the poor quality of refugee status
determination processes and outcomes. In 2016/17, 1 232 immigration and 1 900 asylum litigation cases
were brought against Home Affairs.42 Recent statements from judges who overturned rejections have
included strong indictments of the state of the asylum system. These include labelling it as
‘incompetent’43 and ‘deplorable’ and accusing Home Affairs officials of ‘showing blatant disregard for
the law, dereliction of duty and bad faith’.44 Restricting people’s rights to deter future arrivals follows a
troubling and ineffective international trend Home Affairs further focuses on volume as the precipitating
issue in immigration systems.45 It justifies decreasing ‘pull’ factors as a means of ultimately reducing
volume.46 Yet reducing numbers is not a viable alternative to addressing management issues,
particularly when African migrant and refugee populations are at record levels.47 Furthermore,
subjecting people to harsh policies and restricting their rights in order to deter future arrivals follows a
troubling and ineffective international trend of using cruelty as a deterrent.
 1AC – Unity
Open borders reinvigorate the African Union and force cooperation.
Okunade 21 [Samuel Okunade, 21 January 2021, Migration Policy Institute, “Africa Moves Towards
Intracontinental Free Movement for Its Booming Population,”
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement] //L. Su

The African continent has the fastest growing population in the world and its number of residents is
expected to double between 2016 and 2050, to 2.5 billion. As Africa’s population surges, migration
within the region is growing even faster. Between 2008 and 2017, the number of international migrants
on the continent nearly doubled, from 13.3 million to 25.4 million, the African Union reports. While
there is a widespread perception that African migration is largely to Europe and other continents, in
reality slightly more than half of all Africans moving abroad remain in Africa, according to 2017
findings.

The African Union, comprised of 55 Member States, has prioritized enhancing regional integration and
development, and in 2016 decided to move towards a “borderless” Africa with seamless
intracontinental migration. The bloc created a single continental passport and gave it first to national
leaders, with a plan to distribute it more widely and enable Africans to move around the continent
without a visa. Two years later, the effort was codified in the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons.

This integration has been patchwork, however, and has occurred mostly on a subregional level, with
gradual steps to broader free movement. The continent’s self-imposed deadlines for rolling out the AU
passport and creating free movement have blown by, partly amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Travel
barriers have been eliminated between particular countries and within certain subregions at a much
faster rate than across the continent as a whole. Rather than a continent-wide free movement zone akin
to the Schengen area covering western and central Europe, the Nordic and Baltic countries, on which
the AU effort was modeled, Africa is more accurately described as a continent with multiple overlapping
subregions that allow varying degrees of free movement.

As of 2020, Africans could engage in visa-free travel or obtain a visa on arrival at 54 percent of their
continental neighbors, a 9 percent increase over 2016. It is important to note that countries such as
Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda, and the Seychelles all have taken unilateral decisions to relax their visa
restrictions for easy entry of Africans. By comparison, it has generally been easier for non-Africans,
especially those from the global North, to enter Africa. In contrast, ambitious efforts to create a
continental free trade area are moving at a faster rate, with implementation beginning in January 2021.

While not without its faults, the European Union has witnessed great success connecting people and
economies. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also is working towards a model that
would enhance the free movement of migrant workers in certain job sectors and protect their rights
within the region. Against the backdrop of these and other free movement areas, this article examines
the moves to ease intra-African mobility. While there exists a foundation for a borderless Africa, its
implementation is still a work in progress and governments must make significant changes to realize
the African Union’s promises for all Africans.
The plan creates cooperation and a strong economy—African integration program fails
now.
Apollos 3/14 [(Doreen, is an exemplary media expert, currently working at the African Union Commission, the secretariat
of the African Union), “2021 African Integration Report. “Putting Free Movement of Persons at the centre of Continental
Integration”, Africa Union, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20220314/2021-african-integration-report-putting-free-movement-
persons-centre-continental, March 14, 2022] SS

All African states participate in regional integration through membership of one of the many regional
and sub-regional organisations, the Regional Economic Communities, and the African Union. The states
agree to cooperate by setting up of common institutions and having common rules to create stability,
grow their economies, improve market efficiency, share costs of public goods or large infrastructure
projects, and address other issues such as epidemics and pandemics as well as peace and security.

Regional integration can also strengthen the voices of small nations that often face disadvantages in
dealing with the rest of the world because of their low bargaining power and high negotiation costs. That
is why regional integration is so important for Africa's small and fragmented states. These benefits
notwithstanding, we witness slow progress in African integration in spite of the many interventions and
projects to advance regional integration over the years. The third edition of the African Integration
Report comes at a time when the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) continues to ravage economies around the
world, and the continent is no exception. The economic impact of the pandemic on the African continent is already
clear: the first recession in 25 years, with economic activity falling by more than 3% in 2020, according to
a recent report by the World Bank. Returning the world to any kind of recognizable 'normal' will take years.

In Africa, regional integration has long been viewed as a catalyst for long-term prosperity. With COVID-19
placing severe strain on economies across the continent, regional coordination can be an effective
approach to manage the response and promote post-pandemic recovery . The African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), which has now been operationalised, has created a platform and dialogue to support this. In a
COVID-19 environment that has been defined by the closure of national borders and the collapse of global
supply chains, the continent will become more interdependent than ever. While COVID-19 has slowed down
regional integration, Africa was not performing well even before the pandemic, as documented in the previous African Integration Reports.

Plan causes African Unity by reinvigorating it’s economy, and reduces immigration of
natives to developed countries.
Ezeugo 2018 [Emeka Ezeugo, 11-12-2018: Why Africa Desperately need a Prosperity Case for Open
Borders https://www.africanliberty.org/2018/11/12/why-africa-desperately-need-a-prosperity-case-for-
open-borders/] TA 7-22-2022

Sometimes last month, Ethiopia made a bold move in advancing its economic prospects by announcing a
visa on arrival policy for any African willing to visit the country. It was an important win for advocates of
regional integration, especially for those on the ‘open border‘ side of the divide. It is also a definitive
rejection of the vague notion that there are no economic benefits in Africans emigrating within the
continent while they can stay in their countries and help them grow. However, this notion, if not
furiously rejected, could pose a far greater danger for the continent’s progress. The appalling state of
emigration in Africa For instance, the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa were influenced by this
notion. Likewise, the horrific slave market stories in Libya and the ordeal of crossing the Mediterranean
Sea continues to serve as another barrier to freedom of movement – a prove of how Africans suffer to
pursue a better life. This is in part due to the many borders that restrict free human interaction, which
ordinarily would have improved the economic security of many of these Africans. Unfortunately, most
closed border advocates fail to realize how, according to history, the freedom to move across different
territories promotes peaceful coexistence and prosperity. Maybe this story can help them understand
some things they probably choose to deliberately ignore. I quickly reminded him that if his own
generation had done the right thing many years ago, this generation would have no need to either leave
the country in the pursuit of prosperity or stay back and “fight” for anything. Recently, I was happy to
learn that one of my close friends, David (allonym), recently moved to Canada with his family. I paid a
congratulatory visit to his parents who are in Nigeria as a normal African way of sharing in the joy of
their son’s escape from the country. To my dismay, the father advised that he believes my generation –
his son’s generation too – should stay in the country to fight for prosperity. I quickly reminded him that
if his own generation had done the right thing many years ago, contemporaries would have no need to
either leave the country in the pursuit of prosperity or “fight” for any sort of future. What made our
conversation a sore reflection for me was not necessarily the advice in general, but the fact that he is
actually correct when he remarked that young Nigerians need to take their country back. From who?
Certainly not from Boko Haram or the Niger-Delta militants. But from power-hungry individuals that
have robbed Nigeria blind by stealing its resources for personal gains since its independence from
Britain in 1960. Or, to put it right historically, as early as 5 decades before that. Migrants help the host
economy Back to David. My friend, is well and bright in the ever beautiful serenity of Canada, not
without an itch though. In his search for a job, he discovered that his Nigerian level of ‘a genius’ was a
far cry from what he actually met in Canada. And for him to get a good job to actualize his dream of
investing in Nigeria at some point, he needs to be better than how he left his home country, which is
what most Africans in the diaspora actually do. It is why Africans, Nigerians specifically, have better
academic and professional qualifications than any other nationality in the diaspora. I can say for a fact
that throughout my years of travel across Africa, this continent has no reason to restrict people and
their aspirations with borders because every aspect of our economic life defies it. There are foreign
stores and malls – African and non-African – in every city I have visited, from Accra to Nairobi to
Bujumbura. Everyone is in one way or the other involved in commercial activities with someone from
somewhere else. But because of unnecessary customs policies, significantly high tariffs and taxes, the
full economic benefits of exchange are deprived in these markets as the price of commodities are often
overly expensive for the average consumer. In contrast, a 2018 UN report on global trade, found out
that migration alone is responsible for most durable growth and development benefits in international
trade, Africa inclusive. This is not a surprise as migrant workers tend to spend most of their income in
host countries. What is sent to their home countries is not in any way close to what they channel into
their host economy. It is rather unfortunate how in spite of all these, African governments – and some
nationalist xenophobes – would not allow people to move as they so desire. Africa needs to do better
My friends in East Africa prefer the ‘original’ West African Shea butter but customs policies sneer at any
attempt to bring such goods across the border without some sort of license. That is if the carrier himself
does not require a visa to enter East Africa in the first place. For example, one can safely say it is easier
for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a Nigerian to get a visa to Tanzania. Also, as I
have seen, Kenyan immigration officials never look happy at a Nigerian or Ghanaian coming into their
country – maybe for some reasons unavailable to rationality. They can easily frustrate an individual to
decide on catching the next flight back home at the entry point due to their endless harassments. I
remember when I arrived Burundi some months back and had to spend 5 hours at the airport because
some boss figure wanted to show he was ‘the boss‘, of course. Strict borders mean fewer foreign
businesses and as such, a missed opportunity for domestic employment and other value chain actors. It
took a lot of arguments and phone calls, and interestingly, the intervention of a higher boss before my
visa could be issued. If I intended selling my Shea butter in Burundi, I would have probably increased the
price considering the ordeal and financial cost of the delay at the airport. Unfortunately, this is the exact
frustration many African traders encounter when trying to move from one African country to another.
And from my travels to these African nations speaking on the ideas of a free society, I always get asked
the question, “how can you provide us with jobs?” These are closed countries where there are so many
opportunities for businesses to thrive but, government intervention in the market and existing
immigration policies serve as a barrier to the market and employment opportunities. What governments
of these countries do not understand is that strict borders mean fewer foreign businesses. And as such,
a missed opportunity for domestic employment and other value chain actors like the drivers, laborers
and even local food sellers that engage in the trade of value with the restricted foreigner. In the end,
leaders simply have to come to terms with what they are depriving their economies and unfortunately,
their people from, by not emulating Ethiopia. This is because the true reward of pan-Africanism lies in
the unrestricted cooperation among Africans and the respect of the ingenuity of one another. Until we
start tearing down the borders and get rid of the unnecessary custom policies, we would always lose
professionals like David to places where there is a better appreciation of bright and entrepreneurial
minds.

Scenario 1 is China –

Unity solves foreign intervention.

Taiwo 20. [https://81wolves.com/why-pan-africanism-is-important-for-african-development/] //L. Su
Pan-Africanism is the idea that people of African descent have common goals and should be unified in
order to achieve their interests. When the idea first came about, Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of
Ghana, thought that the best way to achieve the common interests of people of African descent was to
have Africa unified into one country. This notion was rejected, and over time, Pan-Africanism evolved
into the ideal that all African countries should be united in pursuing the goals of economic development
and democracy in Africa as a whole.

Why is Pan Africanism important?

Pan Africanism is desperately needed in Africa for many reasons. Firstly, many African countries have
similar problems but to varying degrees (e.g. bad infrastructure, famine, high levels of poverty, weak
institutions, instability, corruption etc). As we have seen since the end of colonialism, some progress has
been made in a few countries, but not enough. By virtue of having more brainpower and resources, as a
result of collaboration, the chances of each country resolving their issues should increase significantly.
Secondly, a unified and well-organized Africa has a lot of economic and political potential. Africa’s
median age is 19.7 years old, which shows that the continent has a large youth population ready to be
equipped with skills needed to be a part of a productive labor force. Once African countries use these
advantages, they could become economic powerhouses. Once economic prosperity is achieved, Africa
would be able to exert more of an influence on world politics, and this could support cooperation with
western countries on more equal terms.

How can Pan-African institutions ensure that African interests are met?

In order to achieve the collective goals of African nations, Africa must have strong Pan-African
institutions and rules to cooperate effectively. Currently, there are institutions such as the African Union
(AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC) and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC). These institutions are good in theory, but they must
play an active role in enforcing rules across the countries, settling any disputes be-tween nations and
promoting free trade and movement across the continent.

AU has already promoted free trade through the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), which has been joined by 54 out of 55 AU members. The AfCFTA will be the largest free trade
area in the world by number of members and will cover up to 1.2 billion people. This could have a
positive economic effect on Africa, as trade would increase. African citizens will receive cheaper
consumer goods and many jobs could be created as well. We have seen the benefits of countries being a
part of a free trade agreement or customs union, the greatest example would be the European Union.

Potential Challenges

One potential challenge that Pan-Africanism faces is the continued meddling of western countries,
specifically the old colonial powers and the US, in the economic and political affairs of the continent.
There is a long history of interference, from the overthrow of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah in
the 1960s, to the more recent overthrow of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and countless
acts of economic interference through unilateral and multilateral means. This could be overcome by
strength in numbers; if enough African countries stand together and do not fall prone to outside
interference, Pan-Africanist policies will have the desired effects.

Another challenge is the crippling amount of external debt accumulated by African countries. China, in
particular, is guilty of the neo-colonialist practice of debt trapping. Although China has invested billions
of dollars into African infrastructure projects over the years, it has given African countries loans that
they have not been able to pay, which have piled up. As of 2018, around 20% of all African debt was
owed to China. Once these debts are repaid or forgiven, African leaders should try to manage and
restructure any future debt they have in such a way that it will not limit the budgets they set for each
year or put them in a debt trap.

Conclusion

A unified approach in development is essential for the future prosperity of Africa. If this is fulfilled,
Africa can overcome all of its structural challenges and become a real powerhouse. Agreements such as
the AfCFTA give hope that Africa as a whole is starting to take this approach seriously, but the key is to
make sure that the rules created in these agreements are binding and respected. The benefits of this
may not come immediately, but they will definitely be seen in the long run.
Chinese influence in Africa causes extinction.
Knox 21. [Formerly a reporter at the Daily Star, Patrick Knox joined The Sun in 2016. He focuses on
World News in these tumultuous times. Attended the School of Journalism at Strathclyde University in
Glasgow. 6 May 2021, The US. Sun, “FLASHPOINT Africa could be massive battlefield in ‘inevitable’ war
between the US and China as Xi stakes claim to continent,”
https://www.the-sun.com/news/2835339/east-africa-china-us-war-battleground/]//L. Su

AFRICA could become a massive battlefield in a war between China and the United States as the
President Xi Jinping stakes claim to the continent, experts warned. The Communist Party is quietly
expanding into the eastern part of Africa as it sets up military bases and expands its influence through
infrastructure projects across in at least 11 nations. China has been investing heavily in African countries
infrastructure as it consolidates its power and influence in Africa with its base in Djibouti to counter
Japanese, French and US presence Experts told The Sun Online that Africa could be the theatre of a
potential land war between the US and China as fears of conflict continue to simmer between two of the
world's largest military powers. Both sides have military bases just eight miles apart in the key strategic
nation of Djibouti - which can be used to control entrance to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The US has
some 29 military bases in Africa, as well as plenty more in the nearby Middle East, and China has
previously boasted it wants to boost its presence on the continent to expand its power. U.S. Gen.
Stephen Townsend warned today said Beijing was looking to establish a large navy port capable of
hosting submarines or aircraft carriers on Africa’s western coast. Townsend said China has approached
countries stretching from Mauritania to south of Namibia, intent on establishing a naval facility. If
realised, that prospect would enable China to base warships in its expanding navy in the Atlantic as well
as Pacific oceans. Meanwhile, General Xu Qiliang, China’s second in command of the armed forces after
Xi, recently said war with the United States was "inevitable". And this comment came as Beijing called
for higher defence spending to match the might of the US. Military expert Robert Clark, from the Henry
Jackson Society, told The Sun Online: "The centre of gravity for the continent are the ports which offer a
strategic advantage for whoever controls them — and their access routes further into the continent.
"The Atlantic coast is relatively safe due to a NATO and US presence, but the east coast of Africa ranging
from Djibouti down to Mozambique would be incredibly contested in a peer state conflict with China.
"There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that China is increasing their sphere of influence across
Africa." 'IMPENDING CONFLICT' China already has a naval base at Djibouti and has integrated land
forces within various UN peacekeeping missions, including in Mali, where the British Army is also
operating. It also has been heavily investing in African countries in return for access to resources –
particularly central Africa – so has the ability to control access and land between both the Indian and
Atlantic oceans. Professor Gerald Horne, from the University of Houston, told The Sun Online:
"Certainly, the signs of impending conflict between China and the U.S. are worrisome, especially as
suggested in the recent novel by NATO former leader, James Stavridis. "Since Djibouti contains bases of
both China and the US (and others) it is likely the flashpoint." Gyude Moore, a senior fellow at the
Washington-based Center for Global Development and Liberia’s former minister of public works, gave
the same assement. He said: "The two countries have military bases within eight miles of each other in
Djibouti. "Should they become belligerents, it is plausible that hostilities could extend to their forces
stationed in Djibouti." The Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army already can field a fearsome ground force
comprising of 7,000 tanks and 3,000 infantry fighting vehicles as well as the largest navy in terms of
tonnage, and some 2.8million servicemen. Maj. Gen. Richard Coffman, director of the US Army Futures
Command's Next-Generation Combat Vehicle Cross-Functional Team, warned a war may involve a land
war in Africa. China opened its base in Djibouti which is located in the strategically important Horn of
Africa, in 2017. The People's Liberation Army deployed troops to the base, but assured China was "not
seeking to control the world". The small country lies on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a gateway to the Suez
Canal, which is one of the world's busiest shipping routes. Djibouti also provides a vital port for
landlocked neighbour Ethiopia, even more important now as a railway between both their capitals is
completed. The country is also home to military bases from the US and France, the former colonial
power. Many experts now anticipate more Chinese bases in the years to come, with Namibia rumored
as a potential location. Gen. Coffman, speaking at a Webinar, said any conflict would quickly change
from a naval war to a land war in Africa - even if the conflict started in Asia. Currently, major tensions
are growing with China’s neighbours over the oil and fish-rich South China Sea where Beijing has been
building bases on artificial islands in a bid to take it over. And another flashpoint is Taiwan which China
views as part of its territory and has long threatened to use force to bring it under its control. The top
general said: "We don’t want to go to war but what if? What does that look like? How will it happen? "It
wouldn’t self-limit to the South China Sea, they wouldn’t self-limit to the Taiwan Strait "They are
competing globally and in conflict, you can trust they will fight globally. It’s bigger than a piece of
ocean, I can guarantee that. "In Asia alone, the boot of China should this conflict occur will be felt on the
neck of men and women in Ho Chi Min City, Bangkok and other friendly countries. " "It will go… to Africa
and that’s over land, space, air, sea and cyberspace." But Dr David Monyae, the Director of the Centre
for Africa – China Studies at the University of Johannesburg, disagreed with Maj. Gen. Coffman’s land
war claims, saying it was an "alarmist statement designed to attract more resources under the Biden
administration". He told Sun Online: "There will be tensions around the South China Sea, specifically
Taiwan, but these tensions won’t lead to any war. "Africa is not in any way close to these military
calculus." But having said that, Dr Monyae said the US and China have military bases in Djibouti and
there could be "accidental military tensions between these actors".

Scenario 2 is the Environment –

African integration is key to pursue sustainable development goals and preserve

biodiversity.
Some et al 21. [https://africa.panda.org/?36702/Why-biodiversity-matters-for-Africa] //L. Su
Yes! We are losing nature at a rate never seen before, as is clear from WWF’s Living Planet Report (LPR),
which found that population sizes of mammals, birds, fish, amphibians and reptiles have seen an
alarming average decline of 68% since 1970. This cannot continue! We must stop destroying our natural
world and instead restore the biodiversity we all depend on.

For Africa, the LPR reports an alarming 65% decline in population sizes of mammals, fish, amphibians
and reptiles.

These declines are largely driven by increasing demand on natural resources to support a growing
population and global patterns of unsustainable consumption and production that lead to widespread
habitat loss (45.9%), over exploitation of species (35.5%), and invasive species and disease (11.6%).
The impacts of these drivers will be magnified through globalization and intensified under climate
change.

But why is biodiversity so important?

Biodiversity is the variety of all life on Earth.

Biodiversity and nature’s contributions in Africa are economically, socially and culturally important,
essential in providing the continent’s food, water, energy, health and secure livelihood, and represent a
strategic asset for sustainable development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

We are part of this huge biological web of natural organisms, which includes everything from the tiny
microorganisms that live in the soil to the iconic elephants or pandas we seek to protect.

The total biodiversity of our planet is immense, which is a good thing because diversity means more
resilient, and healthy, ecosystems.

Many people today are distanced from nature and its life-giving benefits. But the reality is that the air
you breathe, the water you drink and the food you eat all ultimately rely on biodiversity.

Biodiversity sustains us and is the building blocks of healthy, resilient and happy societies. We must
maintain this vital source of life.

How is biodiversity sustaining me?

We see biodiversity every day. Some examples are plants: without our leafy friends there would be no
oxygen. Tall trees and large swathes of lush forests and rainforests, like those in the Amazon, help
stabilise the climate, playing a critical role in carbon and water cycles.

Unknown territories - mangroves in Madagascar

There are also less known benefits of biodiversity - things like coral reefs and mangrove swamps provide
invaluable protection from cyclones and tsunamis for people living on coasts, while trees can absorb air
pollution in urban areas.

These environments are also home to some of the most incredible species: in Madagascar, mangroves
(small trees growing in coastal areas) provide shelter for crabs and shrimps and homes or food for birds,
sea turtles and dugongs, an endangered marine sea mammal.

This amazing biological diversity and the benefits it provides is why leaders around the world are taking
part in global meetings to protect nature and biodiversity. Join us in calling for them to secure a strong
biodiversity agreement next year that reverses nature loss and delivers a sustainable future for both us
and the planet! . Find out more about COP15 link

Africa policy commitments towards COP 15

WWF welcomes the progressive work of the African Group of Negotiators on Biodiversity towards the
development of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework for adoption at the fifteenth meeting of
the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity.
At its recently concluded 18th ordinary meeting, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
(AMCEN) called for ways to promote a biodiversity economy that can provide economic incentives to
overcome the drivers of biodiversity loss, and supports sustainable livelihoods, business. They also
stressed that mainstreaming is an essential tool for unlocking the necessary scale of investment in
biodiversity in Africa.

The integration of Agenda 2063 (The Africa we Want) goals and Sustainable Development Goals into
the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) is crucial to the conservation and sustainable use
of biodiversity that enhances human well-being and development outcomes in Africa.

For the rest of the world, the opening of COP15 is a critical opportunity for China, taking on the CBD
COP15 presidency, to lead and inspire world leaders to show political will to reverse biodiversity loss
towards a nature positive world by 2030.

Current institutions are incapable of adequately preventing environmental

degradation.
Adelle 16. [https://theconversation.com/how-africa-can-up-its-game-to-meet-environmental-
challenges-54204]//L. Su

Africa has enormous natural resource wealth. At the same time it is extremely vulnerable to the impact
of environmental degradation, including climate change. These are two good reasons, one might
assume, for prioritising the environment in development efforts. Yet the continent has a woefully
inadequate structure for the governance of the environment .

This predicament is partly due to obvious constraints on national governments. These include a lack of
finances, expertise, and data with which to design, implement and monitor effective environmental
policies. But much of the blame can also be laid at the door of regional organisations like the African
Union.

Environmental issues like climate change, air pollution and water scarcity do not stop at national
borders. The AU is ideally positioned to coordinate a pan-African approach for dealing with cross border
environmental problems. It certainly has made a number of longstanding commitments to safeguard the
environment.

One of the earliest conventions adopted by the AU’s predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity –
was the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.

Don’t let yourself be misled. Understand issues with help from experts

And in 2000, when the AU was set up, sustainable development was made one of its underlying
objectives. So, the executive council - consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of member states -
could take decisions relating to the environment.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development or NEPAD, an official programme of the AU, also
highlights the environment as one of its priorities. The AU’s latest Strategic Plan also places importance
on environment and natural resources management.
The challenge is to move beyond the rhetoric and translate these high level commitments and plans into
action. There must be robust institutions to ensure that regional and international decisions can be
translated into policy changes at a national level and then into on action on the ground.

What’s missing

The institutional arrangements for implementation, monitoring and enforcement of environmental

commitments are generally weak or absent. For example, until 2003, the African Convention on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources - an African wide agreement on the environment - had no
provision for a Conference of the Parties or a Secretariat. Both are central to the implementation of the
convention.

The Convention was amended in 2003 to include these but they haven’t come into force. This is because
too few member states have ratified it. Fifteen AU countries need to ratify it for it to come into effect.
But so far, only 12 have done so. This means countries that are not abiding by the Convention cannot be
brought to task.

Integration across all sectors is needed for regional environmental governance to work. Many
environmental agreements require cooperation between several different ministries and agencies.
These must span across multiple sectors like water, transport, energy, agriculture and the environment.
If not, then competing and conflicting sectoral strategies towards human and natural development are
inevitable.

This kind of policy coordination has been the eternal quest of governments around the world. But it
poses a particular challenge in Africa. This is because institutions can be unstable, scattered and
lacking in trained personnel and capacity.

The AU has a colossal task in promoting effective environmental governance infrastructure across the
continent. But Africa will suffer more acutely than other regions if the AU fails to act. Africa is more
dependent on renewable natural resources and ecosystem services than other regions. It also has fewer
resources than other regions of the world to adapt to environmental change.

Warming exacerbates biodiversity loss and causes extinction.

Jones 3/1. [Benji is an environmental reporter at Vox based in Brooklyn, NY. He previously covered the
energy industry as a senior reporter at Business Insider. His writing also appears in National Geographic,
Smithsonian, and Audubon Magazine. Benji has an MS in ecology and evolution. 1 March 2022, Vox, “5
signs of how climate change is unraveling Earth’s ecosystems,”
https://www.vox.com/down-to-earth/2022/3/1/22954531/climate-change-ipcc-wildlife-extinction] //L.
Su

By now, many symptoms of climate change, from heat-fueled superstorms to rising sea levels, are
impossible to ignore. But there’s another, less-visible consequence of global warming that is just as
disturbing: the staggering loss of plants and animals and the countless benefits they provide.

In a new report from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), researchers from 67
countries warned that warming is putting a large portion of the world’s biodiversity and ecosystems at
risk of extinction, even under relatively conservative estimates. Never before has an IPCC report —
considered the gold standard for climate science — revealed in such stark detail how climate change is
harming nature.

What ails wildlife ails us, the authors wrote. Humans are inextricably dependent on many species that
are in jeopardy from rising temperatures, whether they’re animals that pollinate crops, filter rivers and
streams, or feed us. In the US alone, for example, more than 150 crops depend on pollinators, including
nearly all fruits and grains, and climate change puts them at risk.

Humans have warmed the planet by an average of 1.1 degrees Celsius (2 degrees Fahrenheit) since the
19th century. While the landmark Paris agreement aims to limit warming to 1.5 to 2 degrees Celsius,
global temperatures are on track to grow to between 2 and 3 degrees C by the end of the century .

The IPCC’s lengthy report is packed with evidence of how rising temperatures are putting biodiversity
and ecosystems at risk — but the following five figures stand out. Each is a reminder of what we have to
lose and how much we can gain if governments and companies dramatically cut their carbon emissions.

14 percent of all species living on land are at risk of going extinct

If the planet warms by 1.5 degrees Celsius — which is almost certain — up to 14 percent of all plants
and animals on land will likely face a high risk of extinction, according to the report. The outlook
becomes graver if temperatures rise even further; with 3 degrees of warming, for example, up to 29
percent of species on land could face extinction.

In the next few decades, some plants and animals will likely experience temperatures “beyond their
historical experience,” especially those that live in polar regions, the authors wrote. Even 1.2 degrees
Celsius of warming — just above current levels — puts many ecosystems at risk from heatwaves,
drought, and other climate extremes, they added.

Climate change is likely to take a greater toll on animals that are found only in one location, known as
endemic species.

What “extinction” really means — and what it leaves out

47 percent of species have already lost some of their populations due to climate change

Global warming has already extinguished local populations of many creatures — roughly half of the 976
species that one researcher studied in 2016. The American pika, for example, has disappeared from a
large swath of its former habitat in the Sierra Nevada mountains in California, likely due to climate
change, according to a 2017 study. Adapted to cool weather, these small mammals are especially
vulnerable to unusually warm weather.

In 2005, heatwaves decimated a subspecies of lemuroid ringtail possum, a rare marsupial, in

Queensland, Australia, according to the report. And rising seas and storm surges were likely behind the
recent extinction of an Australian rodent called the Bramble Cay melomys.

Just last summer, scorching temperatures killed hundreds of millions of marine animals in the Pacific
Northwest, from sea stars to mussels. They also threatened millions of young salmon — fish with
intricate and important ties to Indigenous tribes. These kinds of species losses are worse in the tropics
and in freshwater ecosystems, the authors write.
Half of all species have moved toward the poles or up mountains

Climate change is also reorganizing entire ecosystems . To escape deadly temperatures, plants and
animals are moving to (once) colder climates — that is, toward the poles, up mountainsides, or into
deeper water.

Roughly half of all species studied have moved toward the poles or to a higher elevation, according to
the report. Those shifts are especially noticeable at sea, where they’ve traveled on average 59
kilometers (37 miles) per decade poleward, according to the report. Large numbers of Atlantic mackerel,
for example, have moved from waters near the UK and Scandinavia to Iceland, spurring geopolitical
tensions related to fishing rights.

The warming climate is changing animals in other ways, too. A large number of studies, for example,
suggests that it’s making many species smaller.

Coral reefs could decline by 90 percent

Climate scientists have an especially grim prognosis for coral reefs: Just 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming
could destroy up to 90 percent of tropical coral reefs, which are home to an incredible diversity of
organisms and form the basis of many fisheries.

Global warming hits reefs with a double-punch. Oceans absorb a third or more of the carbon dioxide
that enters the atmosphere, which makes them more acidic over time. That’s bad news for reefs — as is
unusually warm water. Rising ocean temperatures can cause coral to eject the algae that live
harmoniously with them, in a process known as bleaching. Bleached coral is more likely to die.

“Almost all coral reefs will degrade from their current state, even if global warming remains below 2
degrees C,” the researchers wrote. “Their global decline shows that we don’t need to look into the
future to recognize the urgency of climate action.”

Climate change will make 8 percent of the world’s farmland “unsuitable” by 2100

The impact of climate change on food production is equally troubling . According to the report, just 1.6
degrees C of warming this century will make 8 percent of today’s farmland “climatically unsuitable.” And
by 2100, there will be more, not fewer, mouths to feed globally.

The decline of fish caused by climate change also puts food security at risk, because so many coastal
communities worldwide depend on fisheries. Scientists project that in tropical Africa, people will lose
up to 41 percent of their fisheries’ yield by the end of the century “due to local extinctions of marine
fish,” under 1.6 degrees Celsius of warming. “Declining fish harvests could leave millions of people
vulnerable to malnutrition,” the authors wrote.

Climate change is also threatening varieties of coffee, chocolate, and other foods we love.

How to slow the extinction crisis

Later this year, government officials from around the world will meet to hammer out a global deal to
prevent the loss of biodiversity. The deal — which is part of an international treaty called the
Convention on Biological Diversity — is likely to include a commitment to conserve at least 30 percent of
all land and seas by 2030.
According to the IPCC authors, reaching that target would make ecosystems healthier and offset much
of the damage that climate change is causing. “Healthy ecosystems are more resilient to climate change
and provide life-critical services such as food and clean water,” said Hans-Otto Pörtner, who co-chairs
IPCC’s Working Group II, which published the report.

But ultimately, to protect nature, companies and governments — and, to a lesser extent, individuals —
will have to reduce their emissions, and fast. “Any further delay in concerted global action,” Pörtner
said, “will miss a brief and rapidly closing window to secure a livable future.”

Biod loss causes extinction

Wang 7/18. [Luyao Wang, Xi'an jiaotong-Liverpool University. 18 July 2022, Phys.org, “Action needed
to avoid mass extinction, say global team of experts,” https://phys.org/news/2022-07-action-mass-
extinction-global-team.html]//L. Su

"Biodiversity loss is one of our biggest environmental challenges in the world, probably more important
than climate change. The problem of climate change can be corrected by stopping the emission of more
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. If you lose a species, it's gone forever," says Professor Johannes
Knops, a researcher at Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University.

Professor Knops is one of more than 60 experts who have co-authored a major global study of
biodiversity loss, recently published in the journal Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment.

It is one of the first studies to bring together diverse geographical and demographic data from
thousands of international biodiversity experts. It aims to identify knowledge gaps and differences in
expert opinion across the field of biodiversity.

Each expert's perspective contributed to a comprehensive assessment of biodiversity loss and the most
influential factors affecting the world's ecosystems.

There was an overwhelming consensus that global biodiversity loss will likely limit functioning and
nature's contributions to people.

The findings suggest that more species may be threatened than previously thought. The experts
estimate that since 1500, 30% of species have been threatened with extinction or driven extinct. If
current trends continue, this could increase to 37% by 2100. However, with swift and extensive
conservation efforts, this can be lowered to 25%

Scenario 3 is Food Prices –

Africa is on the brink of food crisis – that causes malnourishment, poverty, and
increased risks of violence.
Eziakonwa 5/16. [15 May 2022, World Economic Forum, “Averting an African food crisis in the wake
of the Ukraine war,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/averting-an-african-food-crisis-in-the-
wake-of-the-ukraine-war/] //L. Su
Despite hosting 60% of the world's arable land, Africa is a major importer of food, and the war in
Ukraine threatens to cut off supplies to much of the continent.

Millions are now in danger of being pushed into poverty and malnutrition, and stability and security
could be at risk if food insecurity persists.

Multilateral initiatives, such as the upcoming 8th Tokyo International Conference on African
Development, can help to develop sustainable and home-grown solutions to the content's challenges.

In Nigeria in the late 1960s, one million people died of starvation during the Biafran war. A decade and a
half later, food shortages and hunger in Ethiopia triggered by a natural disaster cost the lives of 1 million
Africans.

Today, a fresh disaster — the war in Ukraine — threatens to plunge the continent into yet another
episode of famine and deprivation.

Fourteen African countries depend on Russia and Ukraine for more than half of their wheat imports,
while almost half the continent depends on imports for more than a third of their wheat. Apart from
the looming supply constraints, this crisis has already pushed food grain prices up by more than 25% in a
matter of weeks. Some countries are bracing for supply shortfalls.

Millions in danger

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating socio-economic impact across Africa, the
crisis in Ukraine threatens to place an inordinate burden on African households — many of which were
already struggling to put food on the table. Wandile Sihlobo, Chief Economist at the Agricultural
Business Chamber of South Africa, anticipates critical short-term supply and pricing effects — a food
crisis — unless the conflict is resolved expeditiously.

Higher food prices mean that fewer African households will be able to afford a single decent daily
meal. Malnourishment will rise. Africa’s food-insecure households will be left much further behind.
Their consumption rates will fall, savings will be depleted, debt will increase, and assets will be
liquidated.

In short, in a food crisis, millions will be in danger of malnutrition and deepened poverty.

Some African countries, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, have domestic price controls and
export restrictions in place. Benin has instituted an export ban. Others — such as Malawi, Zambia, and
Uganda — offer cash subsidies to vulnerable groups. But with the sharp rise in fuel and energy prices,
another consequence of the situation in Ukraine, very few African countries will have the fiscal space to
sustain such policies, even if they wished to pursue them.

Food crisis and human security

Food insecurity in Africa is not just a socioeconomic issue. It is also a matter of human security.

Rather than wars and insurgencies, riots and protests now account for over half of violent events in
Africa, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). Recent violent
protests sparked by domestic price increases in Sierra Leone illustrate how inflationary pressures can
easily foment instability. Recall, too, how the Arab revolts in the early 2010s sparked protests across
North Africa.

High food prices typically hit the most vulnerable households hardest, making them “multidimensionally
poor,” meaning they lack not just income but also access to electricity, cooking fuel, and basic social
services. Shrinking budgets will cause households to dispose of their assets, eroding their ability to
cushion themselves against future shocks. These indirect effects of the food crisis will constrain
economic activity, widen inequalities, and could trigger social tensions and unrest.

The impacts of the war in Ukraine on food security in Africa raise three pertinent questions: Why is the
continent with 60% of the world’s arable land unable to feed itself? Why is it difficult for African regions
with food surpluses to supply those with deficits? And how did Africa go from a relatively self-sufficient
food producer in the 1970s to an overly dependent food importer by 2022?

Answering these questions will help chart a way forward to sustained and sustainable food security
across the continent.

That food insecurity and food crisis have dire socio-economic and security implications for Africa’s
people, households, businesses, and governments are clear — and these could have profound
regional and global consequences.

Now is not the time for a retreat of development efforts in Africa or a diversion of resources from the
continent. Strategic investments in development and food security at this critical juncture will lay the
foundation for sustainability and self-sufficiency.

Regional cooperation is the most cost-effective solution for establishing food security.
Munang and Han n.d. [Dr Richard Munang is UNEP’s Africa Regional Climate Change Programme
Coordinator. Ms. Zhen Han is a doctoral student at Cornell University. UN Africa Renewal, n.d., “Food
security: Regional solutions key to solving Africa’s challenges,” https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-
features/food-security-regional-solutions-key-solving-africa%E2%80%99s-challenges] //L. Su

Africa faces a myriad of hurdles on its way to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and
the post-2015 development agenda. Climate change, population growth, youth bulge, widespread
unemployment, extreme poverty and hunger are some of the challenges that the continent is grappling
with.

People living in extreme poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa increased from 290 million in 1990 to 414
million in 2010. The region currently spends more than $35 billion on food imports per year and it is
projected that by 2050, Africa’s population will increase from the current 1.1 billion to 2.4 billion and
that two out of every five children globally will be African.

Of the challenges currently facing the continent, it is climate change that has greatly slowed down
Africa’s progress towards MDGs, especially those related to eliminating hunger and poverty, improving
human health and ensuring environmental sustainability. This is because climate change
disproportionately affects the livelihoods of the most vulnerable population by increasing the
occurrence of natural disasters, affecting the continuity of ecosystem functioning and the ecosystem
services it provides. Climate change also damages the critical natural resources that vulnerable
communities depend on.

Establishing food security is important for millions of people facing hunger in Africa and is crucial for
sustainable economic development and long-term prosperity of the continent. Addressing food
security in a changing climate, therefore, is key for a rising Africa in the 21st century.

Trans-border solutions

Climate change does not respect boundaries hence it is necessary for African countries to work together
to build resilience to its adverse weather effects. Many of the countries in Africa’s five regions share
trans-border natural resources on which millions of livelihoods depend. Countries within the same
region share ecosystems that are subject to similar climate change impacts on livelihoods. In these
situations, regional collaboration can provide the best strategy in working together to safeguard the
common trans-boundary ecosystems.

Regional approach to development can enhance African countries’ competitiveness for economic
growth and can also address human security issues in Africa. Human security means access to life’s basic
needs such as food, shelter, clothing, education and health care, as well as the non-material conditions
of human existence like freedom, liberty and participation in the decisions of the community that affect
their lives.

Around the world, regional approach has successfully improved human security. For example, through
cross-border collaboration, security issues related to water quality, fishery and flooding was greatly
improved in Rhine River in Europe and similarly, water security was greatly improved in Lake Uromiyeh
in Iran. Also the SARS and avian flu pandemics were fought jointly in the Asia region.

A regional approach to ecosystem-based adaptation can serve as a flexible and cost-effective solution
for addressing food security problems as it strengthens ecological foundation of food systems. It also
increases the resilience of the systems to adverse impacts, protects and restores critical natural
resources that communities depend on, especially for the poor. A good example is the reforestation of
mangroves in the Xai-Xai District in Mozambique which restored the ecosystem, which in turn increased
fishery productivity and yields. Also, the adoption of Zaï Pit technique (placing a mixture of soil and
manure in small pits in degraded lands) in the Sahel led to increased soil fertility, decreased soil erosion
and increased crop yields.

The power of working with nature

The UNEP’s regional approach ecosystems-based adaptation for food security programme is charting a
new paradigm shift in addressing food security across the continent. Food security ought to be looked at
at a regional rather than national level because regional integration, if driven by foods security concerns,
has a lot of potential for development in Africa.

This approach will ensure that limited resources are prioritized and targeted towards the most effective
solutions and therefore reduce the overall adaptation costs. Through cross-border coordination, region-
specific knowledge and tools can be developed jointly to accelerate adaptation planning.

Ecosystem monitoring and assessment programmes can also be conducted jointly to provide integrated,
high-quality information for decision-making across countries. Best practices can be shared and
implemented across countries to accelerate capacity building. In addition, management practices
implemented by one country could affect ecosystem services and food security of others. Coordinated
adaption planning at regional level can involve multiple stakeholders to assess tradeoffs, reconcile
multiple objectives and make joint decisions.

This approach provides an effective tool for African countries to work together in safeguarding
common trans-boundary ecosystems, improving climate change resilience and building sustainable
food systems. It corresponds with the African Union’s commitments in Maputo Declaration (2003) and
the Malabo Declaration (2014) on accelerating agricultural development and transformation, and the
objectives of Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). It can, therefore, be
implemented as a regional strategy for coordinating all the regional efforts in addressing food security,
climate change, as well as enhancing the productivity of the very ecosystems that underpin economies
and livelihoods.

Therefore, stronger political and financial support should be invested in wider implementation of such
projects in Africa. This will foster a future that is not marked by conflict but by cooperation, not by
human suffering, but by human progress as we seek to achieve, in the words of Nelson Mandela, “an
Africa where there is work, bread, water and salt for all’.

Food insecurity causes war.

Brown 5/19. [Tyson Brown is an experienced editorial director at National Geographic. 19 May 2022,
National Geographic Society, “Hunger and War,”
https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/hunger-and-war] //L. Su

Armed conflict can certainly bring about dangerous conditions of food insecurity, but some scholars
argue the reverse is also true: Food insecurity can precipitate violent political conflict. Most often, it is
only one among several causal factors, but a sudden change in the availability or price of basic
foodstuffs can trigger an explosion of social unrest. A famous example is the French Revolution of 1789,
which was fueled in large part by poor grain harvests and economic pressures that led to sharp increases
in the price of bread. More recently, the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 took place during a period of
historically high food prices in North Africa and the Middle East.

The history of warfare is filled with examples of military tactics deliberately used with the intent of
starving enemy armies or civilian populations. During the United States Civil War, Union soldiers fought
under rules of engagement known as the Lieber Code, which allowed them “to starve the hostile
belligerent, armed, or unarmed.” Nazi Germany drew up a “Hunger Plan” during World War II that, had
it been implemented, could have resulted in the starvation of some 20 million people or more in
territory controlled by the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands did starve to death during the German
siege of Leningrad (St. Petersburg), Soviet Union, between 1941 and 1944.
Case
 1AR – AT: Economy Case Turns
Migration increases wages and decreases wage inequality – comprehensive studies.
Esther Mirjam Girsberger et al June 2020 [Journal of Comparative Economics, “Regional migration
and wage inequality in the West African economic and monetary union”] [DS]
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596718305444]

This paper investigates the effect of intra-regional migration on wage inequality in the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). We exploit unique data from a unified labour force household survey which covers
natives and migrants in the seven economic capital cities of that region. We first estimate the counterfactual wage distributions of UEMOA
migrants in absence of migration to evaluate the compositional effect of migration (i.e., when wages are treated as exogenous) using a
selection-on-observables approach and a (parametric) selection model approach. Comparing
the counterfactual and the
observed wage distributions allows us to quantify the overall as well as the country-specific effects of
cross-border migration to the economic capital cities of UMEOA on wages and on wage inequality in
that region.

Our results show that regional migration to Abidjan - the economic capital of Côte d’Ivoire and the main
migration destination within the UEMOA - increased average hourly wages by 1.8% and reduced overall
inequality in the UEMOA by between −1.5% (for the Gini index) and −4.5% (for the interquartile ratio).
This effect is moderate but not negligible given that only 4.3% of the UEMOA population is composed of migrants.
However, the impact of regional migration differs across countries. Abidjan sees its average hourly wage and wage inequality levels drop as a
result of regional migration, while the main source countries (Burkina Faso and Mali) experience a rise in average hourly wages and
heterogeneous effects on wage inequality. These
results hold across different specifications and become even
stronger (for inequality) when we account for general equilibrium effects of migration. In particular, we
find an even larger decrease in inequality between countries due to the equilibrating role of migration,
which essentially takes place from low- to high-wage countries and acts to decrease natives’ wages in the destination capitals and to (slightly)
increase them at origin.

Open migration can achieve unparalleled economic success in host and origin
countries.
Ashraf El Nour March 2019 [Africa Renewal, “Migration can be a catalyst for economic growth”] [DS]
[https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/migration-can-be-catalyst-
economic-growth#:~:text=What%20economic%20gains%20do%20they,and%20human%20heritage
%20and%20civilizations.]

Migration has always been historically positive and plays a constructive role as a catalyst of economic
growth, a driver of population dynamics around the world and a blender enriching world culture and
human heritage and civilizations. Migrant workers across all skill ranges fill labour market gaps, promote
trade and investment and bring innovation, skills and knowledge to both host and origin countries. If
you look at the recent report by the McKenzie Institute [International], migrants contributed roughly
$6.7 trillion to the global GDP output in 2015, which is $3 trillion higher than they would have produced
had they stayed home. The other benefit is the remittances. In 2017 the World Bank estimated that
remittances by migrants globally stood at $596 billion, of which $466 billion went to developing
countries, including Africa. Remittances to sub-Saharan Africa accelerated 11.4 % to $38 billion in 2017.
Migrants also contribute to the transfer of knowledge and the enriching of civilization. If you look at a
place like New York, which has been built on the backs and brains of migrants, you will see the positive
contributions migrants have made to this diverse and global city – from people to food to culture, art
and economic output.
 1AR – UQ: Migration
African interstate migration is fragmented – visa requirements, failing of the AU
passports, restrictions on travel, and lack of leadership
Corrigan 17 (Corrigan, Terence[Terence Corrigan is a research fellow attached to the Governance and
APRM Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs.]. “Africa with Open Borders: A
Possibility or a Pipe Dream?” Africa Portal, 7 Dec. 2017, https://www.africaportal.org/features/africa-
open-borders-possibility-or-pipe-dream/. ) //VRao

Whether described as ‘African Unity’ or ‘integration’, and whether for ideological or pragmatic reasons,
overcoming the fragmentation of the continent has been an enduring theme in African statecraft since
the 1960s. The borders dividing Africa’s 55 states from one another, so this reasoning goes, have
lessened Africa’s global presence and kept markets small and anaemic. They have also prevented its
citizens from reaching out to one another and taking advantage of the vast potential that the continent
has to offer.

Adopted in 2015, the African Union’s (AU’s) long-term development blueprint, Agenda 2063, pledged to
bring about free movement of African citizens across the continent. It envisioned that all visa
requirements for travel by Africans within the continent would be abolished by 2018, and a common
African passport introduced by 2025. 

How is this progressing?

According to the 2017 Visa Openness Report – an initiative of the African Development Bank, the African
Union Commission and the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Africa – progress on
creating a ‘visa-free Africa’ has been modest. The report looks at the accessibility of Africa’s 55 countries
to visitors from each of the others. 

It analyses the requirements that each African country imposes on visitors from other countries on the
continent in terms of a three-phase model: how many countries’ citizens are required to obtain visas
prior to travel; how many countries’ citizens are able to obtain visas on arrival; and how many countries’
citizens can enter the country with no visa at all. 

In 2016 (the period covered by the report), there were 2,970 requirements imposed by African
countries on other African citizens – in other words, each of the 55 countries had a visa or non-visa
requirement for each of the other 54 countries. Of these, a little over half (54%) were for visas to be
obtained prior to departure. This suggests that, on balance, Africa’s borders remain closed. Just over a
fifth or requirements (22%) were for no visas, and around a quarter (24%) were for visas on arrival. 

Only one country, the Seychelles, was truly ‘visa free’ – it granted citizens of every other African country
entry with no visa, and had no requirement that they obtain one upon entry. 

The greatest strides in openness have been made among island states, and East and West Africa.
Rwanda and Ghana stand out as countries that have made particular progress. Ghana introduced a new
visa regime in 2016, extending visa-free or visa-on-arrival access to the citizens of all AU countries.
Rwanda has been opening up its borders to African travellers since 2013 – accommodating all AU visitors
with visas on arrival – and recently announced that this would be extended to all countries at the
beginning of 2018.  
Most recently, Kenya has followed suit in opening its borders. In late November 2017, newly
inaugurated President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that citizens of all African countries would be able to
obtain a visa on arrival.

But open borders are a far from the norm in Africa. Most countries retain visa requirements vis-à-vis
the citizens of other African countries. The northern, central and southern parts of Africa, as well as its
wealthier countries have taken less ambitious action on openness.  

Jeggan Grey-Johnson of the Open Society Foundation's Africa regional office questions the manner in
which the AU has conceptualized an open-border regime. He argues that the idea of opening up Africa’s
borders speaks to a long-standing aspiration, but it is not ideally suited to an AU or pan-African rollout.
Rather, borders should open to facilitate practical exchanges among the continent’s people – the
starting point should be reciprocal freedom of movement between neighbours . In this context, the key
obstacle to free movement of people has been the failure of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) – the Economic Community of West African States excepted – to take it seriously. 

In addition, Grey-Johnson points to the lack of leadership on freedom of movement provided by

regional hegemons, such as South Africa and Angola in the Southern African Development Community.
Perhaps because they are likely to attract migrants – with the possibility that this will fuel economic and
socio-political stresses – such countries have been lukewarm in their support for free movement.
"Africa’s powerhouses," Grey-Johnson remarks, "are holding integration back."

AU passport

Opening up Africa’s borders by way of visa free access is seen (officially) by the AU as a prelude to the
introduction of an AU passport. Launched at an AU summit in Kigali in July 2016, AU the document is in
very limited circulation. It is currently available to AU staff, national leaders and select officials from AU
member states. The first were presented to Chad's President Idriss Déby, and to the summit host,
Rwanda's President Paul Kagame. It has been reported that prominent Nigerian entrepreneur Aliko
Dangote is to be issued with one.

In theory, a continental passport should make visas redundant and imply open borders for all . The
official narrative is that it is to be made available to ordinary citizens by the middle of the next decade.
There is, however, little clarity about how this will be implemented.  

Veteran South African journalist wPeter Fabricius remarks that there was some unintended symbolism
in presenting the first AU passports to heads of state: "This sent a symbolic message that it was for
elites, not the ordinary populace. Governments will decide which of their citizens get it and also whether
to recognise passport holders from other countries. So, it seems likely that it might go to some
influential business people but not much further for a while."

An AU passport would raise a number of issues that go beyond mere freedom of movement and to the
heart of the long-term ideals of African integration. Passports do not serve only as travel documents but
also as signifiers of citizenship. Would this be the case in respect of an AU passport? If so, what rights
and obligations would that confer on its holders? Would it imply not only the right to travel, but the
right of settlement? And if it does indeed denote such expanded rights, can it justifiably be withheld
from the broader population while being made available to a small group of elites? Conversely, would
African countries that are fearful of their ability to handle increased migration be reluctant to recognise
an emerging AU citizenship? 

Added to this is the thorny issue of stateless people and refugees: those who are clearly of the continent
without a stable relationship to any country. Would this compromise their claims to AU citizenship? 

Each of these issues will inevitably arise as the AU passport becomes more common. Firm and
satisfactory responses will need to be crafted – they do not exist at present. 

A continent of free movement, an AU passport and the possibility of pan-African citizenship rights –
these are alluring aspirations, but at present, they remain for most of the continent largely in the realm
of aspiration. With some exceptions, rhetoric on these issues far exceeds reality. There is very little
prospect of a visa-free Africa or a common passport in general use in the foreseeable future. These goals
will best be achieved through recommitting to ground-level action aimed at practical outcomes. 

For example, opening borders– where possible, through the continent’s RECs – should in the first
instance seek to facilitate linkages between neighbours so as to encourage trade and tourism.
Continental ambitions can come later. The rollout of the African passport, likewise, needs to be
meticulously planned if it is indeed to signify a new and inclusive chapter in African integration.

Africa has no shortage of symbolism. Now it requires resolute action.

 1AR – AO: Unity Solves African Hegemony
African Unity builds heg that is necessary for the African economy
Makura 2021[Moky Makura, Moky Makura was born in Nigeria, educated in England and has lived in
London, Johannesburg and Lagos. She has been a TV presenter, producer, author, publisher and a
successful entrepreneur in her own right. She is currently the Executive Director of Africa No Filter, a
donor collaborative focused on shifting the African narrative 9-30-2021: Do we have what it takes to be
One Africa? https://newafricanmagazine.com/26957/]TA 7-23-2022

This summer I holidayed in Africa. This was partly from choice, but also because the wealthier nations
that so many middle-class Africans aspire to visit, think that their vaccines don’t work quite so well when
administered here, and that the continent is a cesspit of new, scarier variants of Covid that are best
managed by an enforced, two-week stay in a government-mandated hotel. So, we braved the multiple
Covid tests, airport protocols and the actual fear of contracting Covid at the end of it all, to spend our
hard-earned money on an African holiday. Travelling through Mombasa on a hot humid afternoon in an
air-condition-less taxi, looking at the people, the colours, the food, the traffic, the energy… I felt I could
easily have been in Lagos, Kampala, Accra or any one of Africa’s vibrant cities. It struck me then, that in
Africa we have so much more in common than we have differences, and that our whole is so much
stronger than the sum of our 54 parts. It felt like we had forgotten the promise on which many countries
had built their independence – the pan-African dream of One Africa. In 1961, Kwame Nkrumah, the
visionary who led Ghana to independence, knew this better than anyone when he said: “It is clear that
we must find an African solution to our problems, and that this can only be found in African unity.
Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.” But
before we can bring good to the world, we need to unleash that force on ourselves first – there is much
work to be done. For a start, Africa is the least connected continent in the world when it comes to road
and rail networks. Today, post-Covid, it is almost impossible to fly between African countries without
stepping into Europe, and Africans still need visas to enter more than half the countries on the
continent. Despite being officially ‘launched’ in 2016, there’s little evidence of the African Union
Passport being widely used. Like the passport, there are numerous continental initiatives working
towards this goal of One Africa but 60-plus years later, we are still a long way from achieving Nkrumah’s
vision. There is some progress: the African Union, AUDA-NEPAD, the Regional Economic Communities,
the AFC, AfDB and Afreximbank are examples of the pan-African structures we have been able to put in
place. In turn, they are creating the frameworks and the fabric; the many continental agreements that
cover trade, peace and security, governance and democracy in Africa that will lead us to that lofty goal.
Crucial role of soft power Continental integration is a key pillar of the AU’s Agenda 2063. It also
underpins the most ambitious, unifying initiative seen on the continent since the launch of the AU itself
in 2002: the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. And like many of the other
structures, agreements, and policies designed to support continental integration, the focus is on ‘hard
power’. They miss out on the growing importance of soft power, cultural diplomacy and the need to
develop a real ‘brotherhood’ and shared understanding of our history and culture. The EU has proved
integration can be done – from monetary, to trade, to the movement of its people. But what I learned
from Brexit was that the architecture and machinery required for the management of continental
agreements and initiatives is mammoth. The EU has a budget of about €1,082bn/yr for its 27 members
and over 60,000 employees in the system, while the AU’s budget for 2020 was $647.3m for its 55
members. Britain’s messy exit from the EU helped us all understand the benefits of being part of a union
– benefits they are negotiating to keep. The security and prosperity, access to bigger markets,
movement of labour, goods, services and capital are just some of the reasons why Europe came
together. It’s the same reason why we should. But it’s not just lack of funding holding African unity back,
some of the agreements that aim to connect and unite the continent are doomed to fail from the outset
because in many cases and for various reasons, they are not signed or ratified by African leaders. In fact,
very few countries have signed, ratified and domesticated all the agreements developed. The AfCFTA for
example, has been signed by only 36 countries. It’s not just issues with signing, often there are no
guidelines, frameworks, mechanisms, or institutions in place to manage how these agreements will play
out in country, or how potential conflicts of interest will be addressed. In other words, there is work to
be done if we are going to see One Africa in my lifetime.
 1AR – AO: Unity Solves Disease
Regional Cooperation is required to solve disease
Wetzel 20 Deborah Wetzel [a U.S. national with more than 25 years of experience in development
work around the world, is the World Bank Director for Regional Integration for Africa, the Middle East
and Northern Africa]“Pandemics know no borders: In Africa, regional collaboration is key to fighting
COVID-19” World Bank Blogs, May 20 2020 https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/pandemics-know-no-
borders-africa-regional-collaboration-key-fighting-covid-19]

Many African countries are all too familiar with the social and economic upheaval posed by outbreaks of
infectious diseases. Recent experiences with Ebola are fresh in peoples’ minds across West and Central
Africa, as are those with TB and HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. As a result, African countries understand
the need for regional coordination in overcoming public health challenges. The World Bank Group has
responded swiftly to each of these health emergencies – often through a regional response designed to
counter immediate threats while also strengthening countries’ capacity to be proactive in detecting and
responding to outbreaks.

There are important lessons to draw from these experiences as we combat the coronavirus pandemic
(COVID-19).

First, leverage existing regional networks and operations to catalyze an immediate, large-scale response.

Helping countries strengthen cross-border collaboration for detection and response to outbreaks is a
long-standing priority of the Bank Group’s regional integration efforts in Africa. Large-scale investments,
strong networks, and a joint vision among stakeholder countries are already in place. They are now
being activated and scaled up quickly in response to COVID-19.

The Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement Program (REDISSE)  – a $670 million operation
across 16 countries of West and Central Africa – has quickly mobilized over $193 million to help 13
countries with entry-point surveillance, reinforced laboratory testing capacity, infection prevention and
control, access to essential medical equipment and materials, and risk communication . Having
responded to Ebola in the last few years, REDISSE has provided countries with early and immediate
access to financing so that they can respond swiftly to emerging needs. Meanwhile, complementary
country-specific financing is being mobilized from the World Bank’s COVID-19 Fast-Track Facility.

Similarly, in East Africa, governments are leveraging capacities established under the $128 million East
Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking Project (covering Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and
Uganda) as they respond to the coronavirus. State-of-the-art laboratories located in the cross-border
areas have benefitted from the latest technologies to test and identify diseases that pose a risk to public
health.  Wajir Referral Hospital, located in remote northeastern Kenya on the borders with Somalia and
Ethiopia, has been designated a COVID-19 testing site and has capacity to process 60 to 100 samples in
24 hours. It represents how regional integration funding can be combined with government and country
leadership to bring critical COVID-19 testing to the most vulnerable groups.

At the regional level, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCs), with support from a
$250 million Bank operation, have been able to mobilize their infrastructure and networks quickly to
counter the spread of COVID-19.  In an exceptional response, the CDCs catalyzed health ministers in late
February to ensure coordination in the face of the crisis. Training by the Africa CDCs has supported a
rapid scale-up of testing and diagnostic capacity, from centers in only two countries in early February to
centers in 43 countries now.

Second, maximize economies of scale for scientific collaboration across borders

Several Africa Centers of Excellence – a World Bank-funded regional operation – are making important
contributions to the fight against COVID-19 and drawing on regional scientific research. These include
the Africa Center of Excellence for the Genomics of Infectious Diseases (ACEGID) at Nigeria’s Redeemers
University and the West Africa Center for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP) at the
University of Ghana, both of which are at the forefront in sequencing the virus. In collaboration with the
Nigeria Center for Disease Control, ACEGID was the first to sequence the genome of COVID-19 in Africa;
by completing this task within 48 hours it greatly reduced the 2-3 weeks it would take if samples were
sent overseas. The sequencing is foundational for diagnostics and vaccine development, and its data is
important to scientists and policy makers as they weigh policy actions and responses. ACEGID has also
been mandated by the Africa CDCs to sequence all samples from member states of the African Union
that lack sequencing capacities.

Third, while providing social support now, lay the groundwork for regional cooperation to support
recovery of the economy and jobs – so essential for reducing poverty as we go forward .  

Lockdowns and border closures are critical to flattening the curve of the COVID-19 pandemic. But they
impede the livelihoods of people who depend on cross-border trade, many of whom are poor informal
workers and women. The African Union and other regional institutions are rightly concerned about the
negative social, economic, financial, and security impacts of these measures on communities. And the
restrictions remind us that freedom of movement – whether across neighborhoods, countries, or
borders – is the norm that we all hope to return to.  It’s important to begin thinking now about how we
can build back better to support more regional economic activity and trade. 

COVID-19 presents a classic example of why regional coordination, cooperation, and integration are key
to Africa’s future. Given the ease with which diseases can spread across countries, we will continue to
draw on our regional programs to support countries in managing pandemic prevention and control.  The
virus knows no borders, and efforts to support regional coordination and cooperation will be essential to
defeating it, both in Africa and around the globe.

New and unknown diseases cause extinction even post-COVID

Mooney 21 [Tom Mooney, Senior Communications & Advocacy Manager for the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, “Preparing for the next “Disease X””, CEPI, 2-1-21, Available Online
at https://cepi.net/news_cepi/preparing-for-the-next-disease-x/, ] //VRao

Disease X represents the knowledge that a serious international pandemic could be caused by a
pathogen currently unknown to cause human disease. It was first included in the WHO’s list of priority
pathogens in 2018. COVID-19 represents the first occurrence of Disease X since its designation was
established, emerging much sooner than anticipated.
While the world battles to control COVID-19, we know that future outbreaks of Disease X are
inevitable. Our interconnected world has made us more vulnerable than ever to the rapid spread of
new emerging infectious diseases. Rapid urbanisation, deforestation, intensive agriculture, livestock
rearing practices, climate change and globalisation are increasing opportunities for animal-to-human
contacts and for human-to-human transmission of disease on a global scale. The threat of Disease X
infecting the human population, and spreading quickly around the world, is greater than ever before.

COVID-19: CEPI’s first Disease X

When CEPI was established in 2017 we classed Disease X as a serious risk to global health security, for
which the world needed to prepare. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, CEPI had initiated a rapid
response programme—including mRNA vaccines—against novel pathogens. Our goal was to be able to
start safety testing of vaccines within months of a new pathogen being genetically sequenced.

In January 2020—within 2 weeks of the publication of the genome sequence of the COVID-19 virus, and
with just 141 confirmed cases of COVID-19 globally—CEPI began work on developing vaccine candidates
against the virus. CEPI was able to move with such agility because it had already identified coronaviruses
as serious threats and invested over $140 million in the development of vaccines against MERS. Within a
few weeks of the COVID-19 outbreak, most of CEPI’s MERS vaccine development partners had pivoted
to work on the new virus.

Just one year later, two CEPI-supported vaccine candidates are amongst the first in the world to be
approved by regulatory authorities and deployed to protect people from the virus; and potentially over
one billion doses of vaccine enabled by CEPI investment will be available to the COVAX Facility in 2021.

The speed of the scientific progress has been astounding, compressing vaccine development—which
typically takes a decade into the space of 12 months—yet over 2 million lives have been lost to COVID-
19 already and economies the world over have been devastated.

So, could we move even faster next time?

What next for Disease X?

We don’t know where or when the next Disease X will emerge, only that it will. As COVID-19 has
demonstrated, diseases do not respect borders so we need to be prepared on a global scale to respond
to future outbreaks of Disease X, and we need to do it fast.

In many ways COVID-19 is a proof of concept for rapidly developing a vaccine against a new viral threat.
Scientists were already working on vaccines against MERS and SARS—pathogens from the same virus
family as COVID-19—which gave us a crucial head start this time around.

25 viral families are known to infect humans, and over 1.6 million yet-to-be-discovered viral species
from these viral families are estimated to exist in mammal and bird hosts—the most important
reservoirs for viral zoonoses.

We cannot develop vaccines against all potential viral threats, but we could produce a library of
prototype vaccines and other biological interventions against representative pathogens from each of
these 25 viral families. Having such a library of prototype vaccines, which could be ‘pulled off the shelf’,
and advanced into clinical testing as soon as a related threat emerges would dramatically accelerate the
development of vaccines.

We also know that beta coronaviruses that cause SARS and MERS are associated with case fatality rates
of 10-35% (25-88 times worse than COVID-19) and that coronaviruses circulate widely in animal
reservoirs. The emergence of a coronavirus variant combining the transmissibility of COVID-19 with the
lethality of SARS or MERS would be utterly devastating. We must minimise this threat as a matter of
urgency. One way to do this in the long-term would be to develop a vaccine that provides broad
protection against coronaviruses in general.

If we can produce vaccines against Disease X in a matter of months instead of a year or more, we could
revolutionise the world’s ability to respond to epidemic and pandemic diseases. Disease X and other
emerging infectious diseases pose an existential threat to humanity. But for the first time in history,
with the right level of financial commitment and political will, we could credibly aim to eliminate the
risk of epidemics and pandemics.
Off-Case
 1AR – AT: China DA
Uniqueness flips aff – newest commitments to Africa will re-entrench Chinese
influence
Adekoya 1/22 [Femi Adekoya, Adekoya is a writer for The Guardian. 1-27-2022, "China tasks Nigeria on trade imbalance, raises
stake in Africa to $300billion," Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News, https://guardian.ng/business-

services/business/china-tasks-nigeria-on-trade-imbalance-raises-stake-in-africa-to-
300billion/] // ww dl
As LCCI, CABC seal pact to strengthen bilateral ties The Chairman, China Africa Business Council (CABC), Chief Dana Chen, has announced
Chinese government is planning to invest over $300 billion in the African continent over the
that the
next three years. According to her, the move is expected to increase the volume of trade between Africa
and China from the current $30 billion. Chen stated this at the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signing ceremony
between LCCI and CABC in Lagos. “We are targeting the next three years to increase the trade volume
between China and Africa from over $30 billion to $300 billion. This is over 10 times the size of the
current trade between China and Africa. The trade increase is expected to benefit more African
businesses. “Nigeria imports too much and needs to also export to achieve a balance of trade level. This would also make the
Nigerian currency to be strong. There are lots of areas we can explore and strengthen our trade relationships. “We can invest more in
logistics, supply chain and product manufacturing in Nigeria. We are also increasing investments in promoting the culture in Nigeria,
because Nigeria’s creative industry is one of the biggest industries in the world where they can be developed to export to Asian countries
and it offers huge potentials for Nigeria”, she added. She
also unveiled plans to establish 10 medical and 10
housing projects for African countries, 10 poverty reduction, 10 agricultural projects, while also
reaffirming China’s commitment to help Nigeria address its security concerns by providing
military support programmes. Earlier, the president, Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), Dr. Michael
Olawale-Cole, explained that the MoU would further improve bilateral and diplomatic relations between the two countries, stressing
that the partnership is historic and significant to the LCCI as it would also strengthen its
international trade relations with China. He pointed out that China-Nigeria relations, which dates to the early 1970s, has
progressed significantly in recent years, saying that Nigeria is one of China’s largest trading partners in Africa. Over the years, China has
been a strategic import hub for Nigerian manufacturers and trade activities between both nations, which he said, has seen dramatic
improvement. In his words: “According to the National Bureau of Statistic, the trade volume between both countries grew remarkably to
Bilateral relations between both nations have also expanded
$16 billion in 2019 from $7.4 billion in 2018.
tremendously on growing bilateral trade and strategic cooperation till date.” He added that the
Chinese have shown interest in the Nigerian market, with presence across various sectors of the
economy including financial technology, construction, retail and e-commerce and
manufacturing. “As of May 2019, Chinese investment in Nigeria was above $20 billion given Nigeria’s status as a competitive
destination for the establishment of small and medium-sized firms. According to the China Chamber of Commerce in Nigeria, about 200,
000 Nigerians are employed by over 150 Chinese companies based in Nigeria. Even till date, China remains a major financier of several
developmental projects in Nigeria,” he said.

China soft power is dead – nationalism and propaganda fail – even oversea
investments can’t salvage it
Nye 15 [Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 7-10-2015, Nye is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, studied at Oxford
University on a Rhodes Scholarship, and earned a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard where he joined the faculty in 1964. In 2008, a poll
of 2700 international relations scholars listed him as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy, and in 2011 Foreign Policy
listed him among the 100 leading global thinkers. "The Limits of Chinese Soft Power," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/china-civil-society-nationalism-soft-power-by-joseph-s--
nye-2015-07?barrier=accesspaylog] //ww dl
China has been making major efforts to increase its ability to influence other countries without force or coercion. In 2007, then-President
Hu Jintao told the Communist Party that the country needed to increase its soft power; President Xi Jinping repeated the same message
last year. They know that, for a country like China, whose growing economic and military power risks scaring its neighbors into forming
counter-balancing coalitions, a smart strategy must include efforts to appear less frightening. But their soft-power ambitions
still face major obstacles. To be sure, China's efforts have had some impact. As China enrolls countries as members of its Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and doles out billions of dollars of aid during state visits abroad, some observers worry that, when it
comes to soft power, China could actually be taking the lead over countries like the United States. The American sinologist David
Shambaugh, for example, estimates that the country spends roughly $10 billion a year in "external propaganda." By comparison, the US
spent only $666 million on public diplomacy last year. Yet the
billions of dollars China is spending on its charm
offensive have had only a limited return. Polls in North America, Europe, India, and Japan show
that opinions about China's influence are predominantly negative. The country is viewed more
positively in Latin America and Africa, where it has no territorial disputes and human-rights
concerns are not always high on the public agenda. But even in many countries in those regions,
Chinese practices like importing labor for infrastructure projects are unpopular. Combining hard and
soft power into a smart strategy, it turns out, is not easy. A country derives its soft power primarily from three resources: its culture (in
places that find it appealing), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are
seen as legitimate and having moral authority). China has emphasized its cultural and economic strengths, but it has paid less attention
to the political aspects that can undermine its efforts. Two major factors limit China's soft power, as measured by
recent international polls. The first is nationalism. The Communist Party has based its legitimacy not only on a high
rate of economic growth, but also on appeals to nationalism. Doing so has reduced the universal appeal of Xi's
"Chinese Dream," while encouraging policies in the South China Sea and elsewhere that antagonize
its neighbors. With, for example, China bullying the Philippines over possession of disputed islands
in the South China Sea, the Confucius Institute that China established in Manila to teach Chinese culture can win only so much
goodwill. (China has opened some 500 such institutes in more than 100 countries.) The consequences of the country's foreign
policy can be seen in last year's anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam following the positioning of a Chinese
oil drilling rig in waters claimed by both countries. The other limit is China reluctance to take full
advantage of an uncensored civil society. As noted by the Economist, the Chinese Communist Party has
not bought into the idea that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and
civil society. Instead, it has clung to the view that the government is the main source of soft power,
promoting ancient cultural icons that it thinks might have global appeal, often using the tools of
propaganda. In today's media landscape, information is abundant. What is scarce is attention, which depends on
credibility — and government propaganda is rarely credible. For all of China's efforts to position the Xinhua
news agency and China Central Television as competitors of CNN and the BBC, the international audience for brittle propaganda is
The US, by contrast, derives much of its soft power not from the government, but from
vanishingly small.
civil society — everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture.
China does not yet have global cultural industries on the scale of Hollywood or universities capable
of rivaling America's. Even more important, it lacks the many non-governmental organizations that
generate much of America's soft power. In addition to generating good will and promoting the country's image abroad,
non-governmental sources of soft power can sometimes compensate for the government's unpopular policies — like the US invasion of
China, by contrast, has watched its government policies
Iraq — through their critical and uncensored reaction.
undermine its soft-power successes. Indeed, the domestic crackdown on human-rights activists undercut the soft-power
gains of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. And the benefits of the 2009 Shanghai Expo were rapidly undermined by the jailing of Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and the television screens around the world broadcasting scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies.
Marketing experts call this "stepping on your own message." China's aid programs are often successful and constructive. Its economy is
it will have to
strong, and its traditional culture is widely admired. But if the country is to realize its enormous soft-power potential,
rethink its policies at home and abroad, limiting its claims upon its neighbors and learning to accept criticism in order to
 As long as China fans the flames of nationalism and holds tight the
unleash the full talents of its civil society.
reins of party control, its soft power will always remain limited.
 1AR – AT: Borders Good DA
No link – conflating migrants with security risks is unwarranted and inaccurate
Mbiyozo 18 [Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, Mbiyozo is a senior research consultant at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. She is a
migration expert who has worked for six years as a senior migration consultant, researching and implementing responses in high-flow
regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Asia. She has a thorough understanding of migration drivers and migrant behaviour at a time
of unprecedented movement, particularly in high-risk and fragile environments. 10-25-2018, "Aligning South Africa’s migration policies with
https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/aligning-south-africas-
its African vision," ISS Africa,

migration-policies-with-its-african-vision ] //ww dl
The statement above forms part of a larger
pattern of making problematic links between migrants and threats
without substantiation. The leap from terrorism and drug smuggling to expanding job opportunities
lacks evidence and accurate conceptual links. There is no evidence that migrants pose elevated security
risks. Most irregular entrants are Africans seeking temporary work. While this does undermine border control and
integrity and must be managed, it does not constitute a significant national security threat. Properly
administered visa and asylum regimes also contain security properties, as they allow migrants to be
screened, counted and tracked. Treating migrants as high risk distracts from true threats. Expending South
Africa’s limited security resources on non-security threats will do little to close gaps in the existing and proposed systems for criminals to
exploit. Migration management is important, but should not be conflated with national security risks without clear
associations.
 1AR – AT: Kenya Politics DA
Ruto’s ahead in the polls
Mueni 5/5. [https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/05/ruto-maintains-lead-at-39pc-raila-32pc-in-
new-tifa-poll/] //L. Su

NAIROBI, Kenya, May 5- A new survey by TIFA has placed Deputy President William Ruto ahead with 39
per cent popularity, followed by Raila Odinga’s 32 per cent in the race to State House. According to the
findings, Ruto’s popularity slightly declined by 1 percent since the last poll done in February, while Odinga’s increased by 5 percent. TIFA’s
Research Analyst Tom Wolf explained that Odinga’s overall 5 percent gain was mainly contributed by the Lower Eastern region where he had 24
percent. “We will conduct another poll after naming of running mates, so as to evaluate if the situation remains the same,” he stated. Wolf
a large number of Kenyans are still undecided on their preferred presidential candidate at 16
noted that
percent, with other 12 percent unwilling to respond to the questions in the survey. The survey also revealed that
most of DP Ruto’s supporters are young Kenyans aged between 18-35, while Odinga enjoys support from old
Kenyans. “This finding begs the question is it because Odinga himself is older and therefore, older people have known him for long and what he
is been through, or because the young generation is attracted to Ruto because of his age? posed Wolf. The survey which was conducted in 9
regions also showed that Odinga is still popular in Nyanza, Lower Eastern and Nairobi, while Ruto is popular in Rift Valley followed by Mt. Kenya.
The survey was conducted between April 22 and 26, 2022, and was through telephone interviews in both Kiswahili and English languages.

Alt causes and 07 thumps – historical election violence, climate instability, ethnic
conflict all cause instability, it doesn’t matter who wins or loses
Crisis Group 19 [Crisis Group is an independent organisation working to prevent wars and shape policies that will build a more
peaceful world., 11-27-2019, "Kenya’s 2022 Election: High Stakes," https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/b182-kenyas-2022-
election-high-stakes] //ww dl

Elections have a history of flaring up existing tensions in Kenya, most notably in 2007. The next election is a few months away, but the parties
have already been negotiating for support and power struggles have taken form since mid-2021. It is likely that the presidential seat will be
However, the combination of
landed by political long-hauler, Raila Odinga, or the current deputy president, William Ruto.
increasing levels of climate change induced conflict, escalating ethnic and political tensions, and
histories of violence linked to the leading political contesters constitute a cocktail that could see the
country heading into a new outbreak of election violence. The following explains each of these factors. Kenya election 1.
A history of violent elections The fear of conflict has been a factor in past elections due to general divisions in
the population and many of the current candidates have previously incited or used violence. The sitting
president lost support in Laikipia and neighboring counties in the 2017 elections as a response to the government’s inability to handle growing
tensions. In the upcoming election, a number of candidates are building on government dissatisfaction in the wider Laikipia region. One of
them is the former leader of the mafia-like Mungiki movement, Maina Njenga, who is vying for the Laikipia Senate seat in support of Odinga.
Njenga is a divisive figure who stokes fear among some and fervent support in others, and his movement has been connected to violent attacks
following the 2007 election. Presidential
candidate Ruto also has a violent track record. His past campaigns
have been powered by inflammatory rhetoric and ethnic hatred, e.g. by encouraging supporters to ‘go
to war for him’ following the 2007 elections. Indeed, after the election riots in 2007, Ruto was charged with violence against
humanity at the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Specifically, he was accused of planning violence against the Kikuyu, and Uhuru
The divisive nature of past elections
Kenyatta was charged for mobilizing the Mungiki movement to attack Odinga’s supporters.
has created a precedence for violence as we near the August elections. Should Ruto win, the question is whether he
is able to assemble a unifying and effective coalition or whether he will carry his divisive leadership style and inflammatory rhetoric forward
under the presidency. The latter would open up new concerns for security and stability in Kenya and the East African region. 2. The link
between climate change and security Kenyan politics is about ethnicity, security and access to resources. Now
climate change is worsening existing challenges related to vulnerable livelihoods and conflicts over
natural resources. Several studies and reports have already documented how climate change has led to
food insecurity and a decrease in natural resources like water and pastures. The wildlife also seeks alternative
sources of food and habitat, which escalates conflict with farmers and pastoralists over use of the scarce resources. This has led to
increasing volatility and tension particularly in the northern parts of the country. Laikipia county
illustrates well the escalating conflicts in Kenya’s rural areas. The county is located on the frontier of the
arid north, from where climate change and conflicts push pastoralists south onto Laikipia’s plains. Here
they converge with farmers and owners of cattle ranches and private conservancies. Therefore, tension
related to population pressure, opposing claims to land has been at the heart of Laikipia’s conflicts for
decades. Elections have a history of flaring up existing tensions in Kenya In the last few elections, the topic has received increased attention
as levels of conflict have grown from repeated waves to latent insecurity. This has made conflicts over land a hot topic to speak to for politicians
on their campaign trails. Yet despite promises of resolution by different politicians, efforts have been few and inadequate. Solving the issues for
some would ostracise others, which carries its own political implications. The cabinet secretary for the Ministry of Interior, Fred Matiang’i, has
been very specific about the implications of the link between security and climate change, stating that: ‘No one knew [10 years ago] that at this
point in time, we would spend between 25 and 30 percent of our operational budget on climate change related security issues.’ Matiang’i’s
speech can be seen as a direct plea to the national and county governments to include security reform when tackling climate change. The need
for targeted security reforms and additional financial resources has now become urgent. To appropriately deal with climate change related
challenges will require reforms of the environmental and security sectors, where clashes over access and control over natural resources are
specifically targeted and funded. Until that happens, elections will be able to spark insecurity. Therefore, fears of escalating conflicts will be
prominent as Laikipians and other rural Kenyans cast their ballot on 9 August. 3.
Ethnic divisions and the Kikuyu vote The third
factor that may generate election violence is related to ethnicity. Traditionally, people have voted
according to their ethnic affiliation and election violence tends to follow ethnic lines – a situation that
fills workplaces and collegial relations with tension around election times. There are three major ethnic
groups – Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu – and the 2022 election is the first multi-party election since
independence with no Kikuyu candidate. This is significant since the Kikuyu population, as Kenya’s
largest ethnic group, have the power to determine an election. This factor forces groups into new and
less stable coalitions and threatens tensions that go beyond ethnic lines and into clan affiliations. A Kikuyu
vote split between Odinga and Ruto will turn counties with large Kikuyu populations into battleground counties due to the first-past-the-post
When the vote can go either way, the risk is high that a
system. This is especially the case for Laikipia, Meru and Kiambu.
substantial number of voters will end up feeling deceived and angered by the election result. Kenya's 2007-
2008 election crisis In the 2007 elections, presidential candidate Odinga and then coalition supporter, Ruto, allied the Luo and Kalenjin
communities to challenge incumbent President Kibaki, his ally Kenyatta and their Kikuyu-led coalition. Despite Odinga leading in the polls, the
final tallies saw Kibaki with a narrow win. International election observers reported manipulations in the vote counting and declared the
election as flawed. Widespread ethnic-based violence erupted and by late February, 1,300 deaths had been reported and 600,000 people had
been displaced. Peace was restored when a power sharing agreement made Odinga prime minister to President Kibaki’s government.
Individuals from both sides were later charged for violence against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague - Rutu for
being a principal planner of violence against the Kikuyu, and Kenyatta for mobilizing the Mungiki movement to attack Odinga’s supporters.
Neither Kibaki nor Odinga were charged. During the ICC trials, witnesses interference was reported and the inability to produce evidence
eventually led charges to be dropped. Sitting President Kenyatta, who is Kikuyu, has chosen to endorse Odinga rather than his deputy president,
Ruto. This is seen as ‘political betrayal’ by the Kalenjin community since Ruto, a Kalenjin, helped Kenyatta capture power in the 2013 and 2017
elections on the condition that the favour would be returned in 2022. They argue that now it is the Kikuyu’s time to pay back. If the Kikuyu
choose to vote for Odinga they run the risk of violent repercussions by the Kalenjin, in a way similar to the conflict following the 2007 elections.
In turn, Odinga is not necessarily a more Kikuyu-friendly choice because of a historical hatred between the Luo and Kikuyu that has developed
since independence and has expanded into extensive ethnic stereotyping. As one Laikipian noted, ‘the Kikuyu electorate, finds itself torn
between ‘the devil and the deep blue sea’ and it must choose who should ‘devour’ it.’ Ruto seeks to turn the Kikuyu against Kenyatta by
claiming that he has failed to support Kikuyu businesses. Indeed, Ruto runs on a bottom-up economic model that resonates well with small
business owners and farmers (the majority of whom are Kikuyu). However, Kenyatta’s endorsement still resonates among other Kikuyu
factions, where Odinga is supported by the wealthy and influential Kikuyu and widely among other ethnic groups, including the influential
Kalonzo Musyoka and the Azimio la Umodja party coalition. Although Ruto is likely to get the majority of Kikuyu votes, Odinga only needs 30%
of votes in the Mount Kenya region to become president – a region that comprises the densely populated Kikuyu counties and the diverse
division is inevitable. The risks of a close election At
counties of Laikipia, Embu and Meru. No matter how the Kikuyu vote falls out,
this point in time, all three factors are taking shape. Each holds inflammatory potential, and the
prospects for a peaceful election are uncertain. In the 2007 elections, both sides expected to win, and
the election result ignited violence based on feelings that voters had been deceived. If the 2022 vote turns out
to be similarly close, the risk of violence will grow dramatically. That said, the 2017 elections, where voters in some counties cast their ballot for
peace, may also prove inspirational. Two questions remain: are people willing to repress their political sentiments to avoid a repeat of violence?
And will the political leaders feed on the division or make responsible choices and reforms that can protect national security and ensure a free
and fair election?
Instability is inevitable
Patel 21 [Jaynisha Patel and Moses Onyango are authors for Mail & Guardian, 10-23-2021, "Pockets of instability in Kenya are
underpinned by unequal development," Mail & Guardian, https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-10-23-pockets-of-

instability-in-kenya-are-underpinned-by-unequal-development/ ] // ww dl
Marginalised groups have also been subject to underinvestment from the state. This includes lesser investments into education and healthcare.
Growth has failed to pave the foundations for equitable human development. Informal settlements such as Kibera in Nairobi, arid and semi-arid
regions of northwest and northeastern Kenya remain subject to deprivation and growing competition borne from scarcity. Millions
are
left vulnerable to shocks and open to manipulation by devious political actors. These are sites of
simmering tension and instability. The drivers of these conflicts can be traced to the political and economic marginalisation of
certain groups and regions. Without addressing these needs and advancing the basic capabilities of all Kenyans,
competition over scarce resources and opportunities will continue to breed pockets of instability. In the
case of political violence, young Kenyans with few prospects to offset their material desperation become weapons of use and destruction by the
political class. In informal settlements such as Kibera, they are often hired to disrupt and thwart efforts of their political opponents. But the
Covid-19 pandemic has affected the dynamics of informal settlements and predictable political violence. In consultations with the IJR, an expert
in Kenyan migration patterns noted many people are leaving Nairobi for other urban centres to look for work or even returning to rural areas
where they might take up subsistence farming. Many of the gangs that operate in Nairobi’s informal settlements have relocated to other urban
county informal settlements where vulnerable youth remain easy targets for recruitment. Devolved
gangsterism at local county
level might draw other urban centres into election violence in the 2022 general elections. A second
underdeveloped and marginalised area of Kenya is the northwest, home to pastoralists such as the Pokot and Turkana. This area is
characterised by people often in conflict with each other over natural resources such as grazing land and water. The climate crisis is expected to
exacerbate this scarcity and may further intensify this conflict. Worryingly, pastoralist conflicts have the potential to become regionalised as
raiding and grazing is often a cross-border activity. More
recently, the conflict has spilled over into the labour market
as employment opportunities in the growing oil sector offer pastoralists income opportunities. But, with
low levels of education, people are competing for low-wage, unskilled jobs in the absence of other
options. Devolution and oil resources have transformed the conflict dynamics between the Pokot and Turkana. The need to access political
power at the local level, associated with access to jobs and resources at the county level, is a prominent feature in the conflict. With little
government presence in this region, pastoralists are increasingly in possession of small weapons to defend their assets. There
has been a
sharp increase in the frequency of conflict in this region, which has become deadlier as more arms
penetrate the ungoverned area. In addition, one researcher in the region observed that people are not involved in the government
pillar projects that pass through the region. This has in some cases increased grievances against the state, especially where development has
not been for the benefit of local residents. Whereas governments are interested in big infrastructure projects to spur regional economic
growth, residents have their own immediate development and material needs such as having access to clean drinking water, schools, and
hospitals. Through IJRs research, a mismatch between local needs and central government priorities has emerged as a critical threat to both
inclusive development and stability. Women in ungoverned areas face further marginalisation as their communities struggle to stay afloat
through shocks like the Covid-19 economic downturn and climate induced scarcity. In consultation with the IJR, a gender expert in Kenya said
women are increasingly being sold into marriage for their dowry. But, during the Covid-19 pandemic, some women in the northeastern region
have devised methods of resilience against both the effects of slowed economic growth and growing unemployment. These women have
created income-generating opportunities by supplying solar power to the region. This presents a solution for the effects of the current
economic downturn and adverse effects of global warming. It also exemplifies that there are many avenues for inclusive development to take
hold in marginalised groups. Ultimately, human-development deficits have exposed the marginalised to forms of material desperation that
work to drive conflict systems. Without meaningful and far-reaching investment that progresses the basic capabilities of society,
vulnerability to capture by the political elite remains a considerable threat to stability. Without inclusive
consultation, development projects risk further alienating marginalised people, ultimately compounding their grievances with the state. And,
finally, without intersectional policy considerations, shocks such as the climate crisis and economic downturns risk further diminishing the
agency of women. At the heart of these considerations is the importance of upholding equity, one of the core values espoused in the Kenyan
Constitution.
Africa Negative – TDI 2022
1NC Offs
 Afro-exit CP
CP Text: The African Union should exit the Joint Africa-EU Strategy agreement.
The CP solves every aff internal link. The treaty serves as an instrument for the EU to
support itself at the expense of African progress and unity—only leaving allows for
meaningful development.
Stout 20 [Brian Stout is an Africa analyst who was previously a writer for the State Department, a copy
editor at Foreign Policy, and an Africa researcher for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], “It’s
Africa’s Turn to Leave the European Union”, Foreign Policy, (2-10-2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/10/african-union-european-union-trade/ //SLC PK
On Jan. 31, Britain left the European Union, bringing to an end nearly three years of tortured, all-consuming negotiations. With terms of
severance agreed and a path forward with the United Kingdom still to be charted, Brussels now faces another deadline that could redefine its
place in the world: The EU’s framework agreement with a 79-country bloc of African, Caribbean, and Pacific
states is due to expire on Feb. 29.

While simply extending the terms would be convenient for the EU, the global context is a world away from that of 2000, when the
Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States was signed in Benin. And as African heads of state wrap
up a two-day summit that began on Sunday at the 33rd Ordinary Session of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, they should
reconsider whether it’s wise to remain party to an arrangement that is not helping them achieve their
development goals, undermines the African integration project, and does not respect them as equal
partners.

African visions of an integrated continent with political solidarity and interlinked prosperity are as old
as decolonization, but until recently there were few indicators that it was heading in the right direction. The
Organization of African Unity, founded in 1963, was widely regarded a mere dictators’ club and was
succeeded in 2002 by the African Union, whose reputation fares marginally better. Modeled to a fault
on European Union institutions, the AU remains both overly centralized and lacking in capacity and
accountability. But in the last three years, the AU has begun to emerge as a globally relevant actor because
it overcame a major hurdle to pan-African progress.

In 2018, the African Union adopted the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the largest
trade agreement concluded since the World Trade Organization in 1995. At more than $2.5 trillion, the
economy of the African Union is nearly the size of the British and French economies, which rank sixth and
seventh in the world. Trading under the single continental market for goods and services begins on July 1, when most of the 30 ratifying
countries will drop tariffs on at least 90 percent of their products and progressively reduce tariffs to a maximum of 3 percent by 2035.

Developing in parallel to this trade liberalization and harmonization is a treaty on continentwide freedom of
movement, which together paves the way for a customs union and gives political momentum to the
African Union passport project, which would allow visa-free travel among the AU’s 55 member states. These developments
are expected to boost industrialization and exports, cut nontariff barriers and transport times, attract
foreign direct investment, diversify the commodity-driven economy, create jobs, reduce the prices of
goods and services, allocate resources more efficiently, and increase intracontinental trade —an area in which
Africa lags far behind the other continents.

While the AfCFTA will not transform Africa overnight, and its long-term prospects are contingent on successful implementation, it heralds a new
era in which the AU can finally leverage its collective economic clout in its political relationships with the rest of the world. Now
is the
time for African leaders to take stock of their existing relationships and examine whether they are
helping the AU achieve its Agenda 2063 vision , a 50-year strategic plan with goals closely linked to the U.N. Sustainable
Development Goals for 2030 that were adopted in 2015.

Since 2000, progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and their predecessor, the U.N. Millennium Development
Goals, has been slow and unevenly distributed . The 2019 Africa SDG Index finds that “Across the board, African countries
perform comparatively well in terms of sustainable production and consumption as well as in climate action … but perform poorly in goals
related to human welfare” such as poverty, hunger, and affordable and clean energy.

As Africanleaders consider their post-Cotonou Agreement options, they must weigh the merits of continuity against
unsatisfactory development progress in light of evidence that EU priorities for African development do
not correspond to the continent’s areas of greatest need. The joint institution between the EU and the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries for agricultural development ostensibly strives to “advance food security, resilience and inclusive economic
growth in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific through innovations in sustainable agriculture,” yet the solutions it envisions would
be marginal improvements, not transformational changes.

In many African countries, agricultural development is comparable to Western Europe in the early to
mid-19th century and requires major modernization to boost productivity, such as irrigation, tractors, improved grain
varieties, fertilizer, and better storage to ameliorate food insecurity and close the widening gap between African crop outputs and those of
other developing regions. The
joint institution is exclusively funded by the EU and flatly states in its strategic
plan that “More food is not the answer” to hunger in Africa despite acknowledging that food imports are high
and exports low.

Strengthening the value chains of small and medium-sized agribusinesses is desirable but not optimal, as it
reinforces the existing trade dynamic of exporting raw materials to Europe. In sum, EU agricultural
development policy is largely a neocolonial enterprise committed to protecting its own agricultural
market and producing value-added goods for export; it is a greater vehicle for European soft power and merchant
interests than for African capacity-building.

Aid is also a problem. The current architecture through which EU

institutions have in recent years provided about $6 billion in
annual aid to Africa—its second-largest source of multilateral donations—also stunts African economic integration and
divides the continent politically . While the EU provides assistance to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States through the
European Development Fund, it groups North Africa—the continent’s best-performing region on sustainable development criteria—
under its European Neighbourhood Policy funded through the European Neighbourhood Instrument. EU member states
also provide bilateral aid to Africa but are required to coordinate their development assistance to align with EU
prerogatives.
Not long ago, the European Union struggled with “reconciling its strategic interests with its value-driven agenda,” as a European Centre for
Development Policy Management paper noted in 2012. Self-interest decisively won out three years later with the launch of the
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which diverts 73 percent of the European Development Fund toward combating the European migration crisis
at its external points of origin.

Redistributing these funds as part of a crisis response to EU internal politics is inimical to Africa’s long-term needs.
Indeed, participating in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group prevents Africa from working with Europe toward
African-oriented solutions. Involvement in this top-down, donor-recipient framework deprives Africa of agency and
leaves it vulnerable to its patron’s priorities . The African Union recognizes this and has called for continent-to-continent
engagement, but some member states have gravely undermined their ability to negotiate with European interlocutors as equals by insisting on
operating under the African, Caribbean, and Pacific umbrella. Mali,
Togo, and Burkina Faso are among those whose
dependency and risk-aversion is responsible for weakening African unity and, ultimately, themselves.
The EU, for its part, has made it clear that it hears the African Union. New European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made a
symbolically significant trip to AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa a week after taking office in December 2019. She came bearing a $188 million
aid package for health programs, electoral systems, environmental policies, and economic development initiatives to buoy her message that
the EU is going to be more than just a source of handouts from now on: “The African Union is a partner I count on and I look forward working
within the spirit of a true partnership of equals.” If that sounds familiar, it’s because the EU has been deploying this flattering talking point of a
“true partnership of equals” for more than a decade.

The EU and AU launched an official bilateral framework in 2007 that has done nothing toward its intended
purpose of moving beyond a traditional north-south relationship, aside from providing 50 million euros
(about $55 million) for technical assistance in writing the AfCFTA regulatory standards. Von der Leyen’s rumored creation of an Africa
commissioner in the EU’s executive branch has not materialized, though she has rebranded the development commissioner as the
commissioner for international partnerships.

Most tellingly, despite not wanting to talk about migration in Addis Ababa, von der Leyen is continuing the post-Cotonou negotiations that
began in 2018—which inject aid conditioned on migration control as a central plank of the relationship between the
EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states, where under the current agreement it is not a feature. Little wonder that Zimbabwe’s former
finance minister said “dictation and prescription” are the defining characteristics of EU-Africa relations. “When you get to the negotiating table
it is very clear that we are not equals,” said Patrick Chinamasa, who served several stints as finance minister over the past decade.

The European Union’s actions make it clear that it wants to continue treating the African Union as a
junior partner for as long as possible. Even as Brexit has been a consuming priority item for Brussels, von der Leyen said last
month the EU is trying to conclude a trade agreement with the United States “in a few weeks.”

This behavior raises the question of how long the African Union will tolerate being strung along in arrangements that its high representative on
the post-Cotonou talks, Carlos Lopes, has denounced. Under the current arrangement, he said, “there is one loser: African
regional integration.” But Lopes has also indicated “there is no risk of no deal. It is not like Brexit. If we don’t have an agreement by 2020
then we will extend what we already have.”

The AU and its members have other options. Both China and the United States offer models of development assistance that meet Africa’s
development needs better than the European Union’s. The European Development Fund won’t vanish , and slow-growing
Europe is ill-positioned to compete with China’s largesse on infrastructure projects.

The AU could, however, use the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation as a frame of reference for how the EU should channel development aid
under the Africa-EU Partnership: country-led solutions and country-led implementation of initiatives that advance
Agenda 2063, such as irrigation, sanitation, and regional electrical grids—with positive conditionality but no threat of sanctions, as is in the
Cotonou agreement. Post-Cotonou negotiations are behind schedule and are likely to continue beyond the deadline, but a new African,
Caribbean, and Pacific Group secretary-general, Angola’s Georges Rebelo Pinto Chikoti, begins his five-year term on March 1. His tenure will be
successful if it is brief.
 China SoPo DA
China is retrenching from Africa now—FOCAC proves.
Sun 21 [Yun Sun is a nonresident fellow with the Africa Growth Initiative. She also serves as co-director
of the East Asia Program, and director of the China Program at the Stimson Center], “FOCAC 2021:
China’s retrenchment from Africa?”, Brookings, (12-6-2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2021/12/06/focac-2021-chinas-retrenchment-from-africa/ //SLC PK
The eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial meeting that took place in Dakar, Senegal, concluded just last week. Like
previous FOCAC meetings, China presented its vision for China-Africa relations for the next three years , this time
under the theme “Deepen China-Africa Partnership and Promote Sustainable Development to Build a China-Africa Community with a Shared
Future in the New Era.” A review of the content, however, illustrates significant shifts in China’s priorities ,
emphasis, and approaches from its earlier patterns. In fact, the Financial Times has lamented the
quantitative reduction of China’s
financial commitments from $60 billion in 2018 to $40 billion this year. However, it is the qualitative changes
that raise bigger questions as to whether China is leaving Africa after two decades of robust and ever-growing engagement. Some of
the shifts could be temporary and tactical. However, the impact of the others could be far-reaching and long-term.

A DOWNGRADE OF THE FOCAC MEETING?

Unlike the past two FOCAC meetings—Johannesburg in 2015 and Beijing in 2018—that, respectively, garnered 13 and over 50 African heads of
state or government, the Dakar FOCAC meeting this year was a ministerial-level meetin g. Chinese President Xi Jinping
delivered a speech virtually, which did boost the seniority level of the meeting, but such a change in attendance raises the question as to
whether FOCAC has been downgraded.

The answer is negative. Since its inception in 2000, FOCAC was a ministerial-level event that alternates between Beijing and Africa every three
years. The Chinese president has always attended the meetings in Beijing, but, before Xi, the premier attended FOCAC meetings in Africa
(Ethiopia in 2003 and Egypt in 2009). It is under Xi that the two FOCAC meetings in 2015 and 2018 were upgraded to leadership summits. This
most recent change creates the impression of the Dakar meeting being at a lower level. Though, admittedly, the COVID restrictions likely also
played a role.

SCALING BACK ACTIVITIES

The most significant changes for FOCAC happened quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantity-wise,
China is significantly scaling
back its planned activities in Africa. For agricultural assistance, climate and environment, health, peace
and security, and trade promotion, the number of committed projects for each category dropped from 50 projects in 2018 to 10
projects this year. For capacity building, the educational and training opportunities offered decreased from 50,000 government scholarships
and 50,000 training opportunities three years ago to 10,000 training and seminar opportunities for high-end talents this time. These are drops
of 80 and 90 percent, respectively.

Substance-wise, the content of each category also shrank . For example, under climate and environment, the 2018
commitment included items from maritime cooperation to wildlife protection, from policy dialogues to joint studies to professional training.
However, this year, only two items were included: the “Africa Green Great Wall” and demo centers for low-carbon and climate change
adaptation. The scope of public health support also was scaled back from a long list in 2018 covering the Africa Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (Africa CDC), disease control cooperation, information sharing, friendship hospitals, training of African doctors and medical teams,
traveling clinics, and special projects for women and children, to a very brief action item of “dispatching 1500 medical staff and public health
experts” this year. The rest of the actions are all related to COVID-19. Similar cutbacks are equally evident in the people-to-people exchanges
and peace and security categories.

SHIFTING AWAY FROM INFRASTRUCTURE

Perhaps themost striking element of China’s FOCAC commitment this year is the complete disappearance of
infrastructure from the narrative. Indeed, throughout Xi’s keynote speech, the word “infrastructure” did not appear
even once—a sharp contrast to the four direct references to infrastructure in his 2018 keynote. In China’s 2018 FOCAC commitment,
connectivity infrastructure was listed as the No. 2 priority among the eight action plans, focused mostly on hard infrastructure projects on the
ground.
Given China’s long history of infrastructure development in Africa, the
omission of infrastructure in China’s new
commitment is simply glaring. Despite China’s claim of altruistic intent, many of the projects are
controversial. Especially with the debt sustainability issues since the COVID-19 crisis, Chinese loans used for such infrastructure
development have put several governments in difficult spots, such as the potential Chinese takeover of Uganda’s Entebbe airport, the potential
seizure of Kenya’s Mombasa port, and the recurring debt repayment issues Zambia struggles with. These controversies loomed large in the
background of the FOCAC meeting this year.

The lack of reference to infrastructure in China’s FOCAC commitment does not suggest that China will exit the domain. After all, China has
accumulated a large number of ongoing infrastructure projects with loan terms, especially after their debt renegotiation, extending far into the
future. In addition, Chinese contractors still enjoy unique strengths on the market, such as in cost control and efficiency, which enable them to
continue to play their role in the future of the African infrastructure development market. However, this shift away from infrastructure
development in Africa, if sustained, could be the most significant change in China’s engagement with Africa in
recent years.
ENSUING CHANGE IN FINANCING

One of the primary drivers of Chinese lending, especially in terms of loans and export credit (totaling $35 billion in the 2018 package) was to
support this infrastructure development. Such lending has consistently facilitated the procurement of Chinese services and products. However,
as China shifts away from infrastructure, the pattern of Chinese financing is bound to change .

The change is well-reflected in the $40 billion China committed in Dakar. China
will continue to push Chinese companies to
invest a much smaller $10 billion in Africa in the next three years —at the same level as in the 2018 commitment. The
big change came in credit: Not only will China provide only half the previous amount , dropping from $20 billion to
$10 billion, but it also will provide the credit only to African financial institutions for them to support the
development of African companies. In the past, this line item was provided to African governments to fund
Chinese projects. The introduction of African financial institutions as the middleman will free China from the decisionmaking, hence
shielding it from being the direct culprit of the debt stress Africa has run into.

Opening African borders reverses that and incentivizes China to move back in which
dramatically increases Chinese influence.
HKFP 16[Contributor, Guest. “What a Borderless Africa Could Mean for China.” Hong Kong Free Press
HKFP, 14 July 2016, hongkongfp.com/2016/07/14/what-a-borderless-africa-could-mean-for-china/.
Accessed 25 July 2022.] //VRao

What is the borderless Africa move? It means visa-free

or visa-upon-arrival for Africans. This idea has been brought
to the table several times, but it was not until recently that it has been taken seriously. A few African
countries already opened their borders to all citizens of the AU member states. Mauritius, Comoros,
Seychelles, Rwanda and Ghana just joined the borderless train project. Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame and
Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta have been openly supportive of the eradication of borders to encourage intra-African relations. Some
scholars have argued this would be a terrific thing, pointing at how the GDP of the countries that open their borders have dramatically
increased, mainly because of an increase in tourism. Some folks have not been so open to the idea, citing issues of terrorism and how it will be
difficult to track down criminal activities. Of which Paul Kagame responded, “terrorists will always come into your country, but the terrorists do
not come to your embassy to get visas to fly into your country.” Someeconomists have argued that a more integrated
African economy would be good for the continent. They projected a GDP of around 30 trillion dollars
within 36 years. To put that into context; that is about the GDP of the European Union and the United States of America combined today.
An e-passport to facilitate the free movements of people and goods would be launched this July at the AU summit in Kigali, Rwanda. The
passport will first be distributed to diplomats, then to everybody as it is part of the AU 2063 agenda.

What could be the effects of the borderless Africa on Africa-China relations?  China built the AU headquarters as a gift, this
shows the support that China has for an integrated Africa . Unlike the Europeans who came with the ‘divide and rule’ policy, I
believe Chinahas done it the other way; ‘integrate and rule’. Many scholars have argued that the Chinese
engagements in Africa could be characterised as imperialistic in nature. They cite things like the Chinese
building a railway line that would link several African countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to
facilitate the movement of goods and people easily . This building of railways was the same method used by the British
before. The Chinese have established a military base in Djibouti. These all reflect how this integrated
Africa could be the stepping stone for China to go global. The Chinese state believes in no-strings
attached relations, they would not care that much about terrorism or any criminal activities that this
borderless policy might bring about. Thus unlike many investors who are not comfortable investing in an unstable region, China
will stay despite any turmoil. Why would China stay? Because China needs Africa more than Africa needs China.
China has never changed its behaviour towards Africa. It used the Africans to get international
recognition in competition with Taiwan. Today, it’s the same goal. China wants to go global and this is it:
the opportunity it has been waiting for.
President Xi Jinping last year went from one African country to another before he attended the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (中
非合作論壇) summit in Johannesburg. This jumping from one country to another establishing deals would not be necessary anymore, as with
a more integrated Africa, deals would be made with the AU and that would apply to all member
states. Deals would be made faster, and a more integrated Africa would mean countries would
specialise in certain industries, and this would bring growth in Africa which would then be attributed to
China’s ‘benevolence’, thus increasing China’s soft power.
How about the Chinese state enterprises and other Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa? These have been known for their lack of transparency in
conducting business. A
more integrated Africa, as they say, would be more keen on tackling issues of
corruption and lack of accountability. If this is  the case, there would be an increase in transparency. In
addition, we would most probably see less and less migration of Africans to Europe, and more and more
internal migration to greener pastures like South Africa. This would probably increase the supply of
labour for the Chinese companies, and would lead to lower wage payments.

On the other hand, it has been more difficult for African entrepreneurs to go across African borders than it has
been for Chinese entrepreneurs. Thus if Africans can move freely that would mean there will be more competition for the Chinese
businesses, which might lead to the Chinese raising their working conditions, which have been known to be so poor. Also, the Chinese
have been known for producing horrible goods (zhing zhong, as we call them in Zimbabwe). Upon asking a
Hong Kong friend, the word ironically means “deluxe.” More competition from African businesses might make them
make better quality goods. However, the bad news is the Chinese Joe, who also have been known to go
to Africa to get a job to push wheelbarrows. The migrants from other parts of Africa would compete
with these Chinese Joes for the same job. As for the ‘Shanghai beauties’, who have been increasingly
making it in the local market, this would be a big chance to exploit the Africans’ ‘orientalised’
imaginations of Chinese women, using Edward Said’s words if you will.

In the end, a more integrated Africa is a big win for China and a small win for African States, but still win-win.
The Chinese will win more, get to go global, and more soft power means a better perception of China.
More opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs would rise, along with the easy transportation of goods
within Africa and to ports. These goods will then be transported to China. As many Chinese businessmen in Africa like to say, “if you
want to get rich, first build roads.” These are the roads and bridges that China is facilitating in Africa, and it will be
China that will benefit more.
A rising China undermines the liberal order
Erickson, 16 [Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute,
associate in research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies], “AMERICA’S
SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA,” Naval War College Review, 69.1,
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-
Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx.

The Need for a Paradigm Shift¶ As Peter Dutton has long emphasized, the
way forward for the United States is clear: Even
as China advances, we cannot retreat . Together with the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, the South
China Sea is a vital part of the global commons, on which the international system depends to operate
effectively and equitably. Half of global commerce and 90 percent of regional energy imports transit the South China Sea alone. We
cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these international waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in which its neighbors face bullying
without recourse and vital global rules and norms are subordinated to its parochial priorities. This would set back severely what Beijing itself
terms “democracy” or “democratization in international relations.”* Instead, we
must maintain the national will and force
structure to continue to operate in , under , and over the South China, East China , and Yellow Seas and
preserve them as peaceful parts of the global commons for all to use without fear .¶ Accepting Moderate Friction.
Here, given China’s growing power and our own sustained power and resolve, we must accept a zone of
bounded strategic friction and contestation . Such friction is manageable, and we must manage it. To do so
effectively, we should develop the mind-set that we are in a great power relationship wherein we need
to act to protect our vital interests and support the global system even as China is working to promote
its own vital interests. It means preparing to live in the same strategic space together, with overlapping vital interests. This is the
essence of great power relations, reflecting a reversion to historical norms after the brief and unsustainable unipolar moment is over—even as
the United States remains strong as the world’s leading power, and the world remains far from being a true “multipolar” system.† ¶ This
robust but realistic approach includes accepting the fundamental reality that we will not roll back
China’s existing occupation of islands and other features, just as we will not accept its rolling back its
neighbors’ occupation of other islands and features . Most fundamentally, the U nited S tates must preserve
peace and a stable status quo in a vital yet vulnerable region that remains haunted by history .¶ Embracing
Competitive Coexistence. T¶ he paradigm we need to think about is a form of great power relations that I term
“competitive coexistence.”‡ It is not a comprehensive rivalry, as between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
Hence, charges that it constitutes a “containment strategy” driven by a “Cold War mentality” would be inaccurate. Rather, it has specific
competitive aspects that we should not exacerbate gratuitously, yet must not shy away from. China’s current leadership is clearly
comfortable with a certain level of friction and tension . Given the current unfortunate circumstances,
for the foreseeable future we too must accept—and make clear that we are comfortable with—a certain
level of friction and tension.¶ The above paradigm has important implications for both U.S. rhetoric and policy. First, American
officials must recognize what their Chinese counterparts have long understood: words matter. The U nited S tates must not

appear to embrace Chinese policy concepts or formulations that make us appear to fear tension , or to be
willing to yield to Beijing’s principled policy positions in order to mitigate it . Such optics would only
encourage Chinese testing and assertiveness vis-à-vis Washington and its regional allies . Accordingly, two
particularly problematic formulations favored by Beijing (and their variants) must be banished from the lexicon of American official discourse: ¶
1. “The Thucydides trap”¶ 2. “New-type great-power relations” ¶ Avoiding Thucydides Claptrap. As
invoked by none other than Xi
Jinping himself to pressure U.S. counterpart s, as well as by influential Chinese public intellectuals to call for U.S.
concessions, the idea of the imperative to avoid a “Thucydides trap” represents a misapplication of history.* It falsely
implies that only by taking drastic measures can the United States and China avoid previous patterns
of ruinous conflict between an established power and a rising power . The product of a time that human progress
over the past century has finally rendered obsolete, Thucydides offers a cynical, outdated interpretation that has no place in American values,
or the world that the United States seeks to promote: “The strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must.” I’m confident
that’s not the kind of world we’re here to promote today. ¶ Nor should we. As Thomas Christensen argues persuasively in his new book The
China Challenge—already recognized as one of the leading works on U.S.- China relations—the evolution of nuclear weapons, international
institutions, globalization, financial markets, and transnational production chains have made the world a very different place than it was just
over a century ago in 1914 when the Great War erupted. † Washington and Beijing certainly face friction, tensions, and even the possibility of
future crises of some severity, but significant shared interests—economic and otherwise—as well as collective reliance on a dynamic
international system, together with mutual deterrence, will enable them to avoid war. Both sides are restrained by these strong positive and
negative incentives; it is not necessary for Washington to shoulder the burden of restraint alone. Instead, raising false hopes in Beijing only to
have them dashed disappointingly is significantly more dangerous than being clear and firm from the start. U.S. policy makers must thus
consistently avoid embracing flawed historical analogies that encourage unrealistic expectations on Beijing’s part. Such dangerous “claptrap”
must be relegated to the dustbin of history, where it truly belongs. ¶ To set the right tone and expectations while safeguarding U.S. interests,
the Chinese policy bumper sticker that flows from falling for the “Thucydides trap” must likewise be rejected. As originated and promoted by
Beijing, the concept of “new-type great-power relations” is invoked to imply that Washington must yield to China’s principled “core interests”
(including, apparently, in the South China Sea) while not committing Beijing to corresponding accommodation in return.* As one Japanese
contact asked me pointedly, “Why would you choose to wrestle in China’s own sumo ring?” ¶ Why indeed? Instead, the United States should
proactively and consistently promote its own policy formulations. Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” concept is an excellent example,
and it was a serious mistake for the Obama administration to cede the field in this competition of ideas. To the extent that Beijing opposes the
idea of responsibilities being thrust upon it, I propose that “strategic stakeholder” might be a better phrase. In any case, each side is free to
employ its own concepts and rhetoric. But, at a minimum, the policy formulations that we ourselves embrace should at least meet the standard
of the Hippocratic oath of international relations: “first, do no harm.” That typically means using our own wording unless there is a compelling
reason to do otherwise. Specific Policy Recommendations¶ As for substantive efforts, we
must develop and maintain a force
structure and set of supporting policies and partnerships geared to ensuring access despite Chinese
development of counterintervention capabilities. Even maintaining mutual deterrence vis-à-vis China could be good enough
for the United States— Washington’s key objective is to prevent the use, or threat, of force to resolve regional disputes. But allowing even
the perception that such ability to “hold the ring” has eroded could gravely threaten the stability of a
vibrant yet vulnerable region. Key questions for consideration thus include:¶ • What systems do we need to develop and acquire?¶ •
How should we engage our military and other government forces to act?¶ • What risks must we accept?¶ • What should we ask of our allies
and security partners in support?

Liberal order caps extinction risks

Harari 18, [Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem], “We need a post-liberal order
now,” The Economist, (9/26/18), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-
post-liberal-order-now

The second thing to note about this

vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All
attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of
Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes
or Poles from Ukrainians.

This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and
prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common
rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly.

But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme
isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any
global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry
to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?”

Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—
including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-
in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-
existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade
network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order
that sets the rules of the game.
Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common
problems that make a mockery of
all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war,
climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or
against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It
won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense
potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its
dangerous lead for fear of being left behind.

An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the
arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself . For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse . Consider, for example,
conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But
how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.”

Similarly, consider
developing autonomous-weapon systems , that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again,
every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our
rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first ”.

The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not
an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian
Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally . We
need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans.

Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new
wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There
will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still
very national. Unless
we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries
might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world.
This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be
dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial
intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is
one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI.

In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the
only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over
the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order , and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The
first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity , who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them:
refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising , eventually the whole of humankind will feel the

squeeze.
 ---2NR – SoPo Key
Soft power is a centerpiece of their strategy to shape the external environment
Kallimudin, 18 [Major, Singapore Armed Forces, M.A., Brown University, Master of Military Art and
Science, Strategic Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College], “Soft Power in China’s
Security Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kalimuddin.pdf

The Role of Soft Power in Chinese Foreign Policy

The notion of soft power became commonplace in Chinese discourse around the mid-2000s, and has since
received “comprehensive and sophisticated” attention from Chinese intellectuals . It was also around this time
that the term “soft power” began to appear in statements by high-ranking Chinese officials with some
frequency. Surveying Chinese writings on the subject, Li concludes that the predominant interpretation of
soft power takes alignment from Nye’s definition of soft power but is generally not as restrictive. 19 Where the Chinese
conception of soft power departs markedly from Nye’s is in the application of soft power in a domestic context. 20 However, given the
objectives of this study, this particular aspect of Chinese soft power will not be examined.

In the context of Chinese foreign policy, the primary role of soft power is to shape the external environment so
that it facilitates China’s continued development . This involves shaping external perceptions of China —for
example, dispelling the “Chinese threat” narrative —and is a means to “avoid a collision with the
established great powers and the international status quo. ” China’s accumulation of soft power is also seen as a response
to other major powers working to increase their soft power. 2

Examples of Chinese soft power in action are numerous . Cultural soft power, an inherent strong point for China given its
long and illustrious history, manifests in initiatives such as the Confucius Institutes, the large numbers of foreign students and tourists who visit
China, and high-profile events such as the 2010 Shanghai Expo and 2008 Beijing Olympics. Chinese soft power is also highly visible in its
economic dealings with the Global South, the ideological attractiveness of the Chinese model of economic development, or “Beijing
Consensus,” as well as its participation and leadership—as in the case of the formation of the AIIB—in multilateral diplomacy. 22 Taking a more
expansive view of soft power, China’s status as a major contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions—its troop contribution is the largest
among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—is a notable example of soft power arising from its military strength. There
are, however, a number of areas where Chinese soft power appears to fall short: popular culture, the strength and credibility of its domestic
institutions, leadership in science and technology, and the quality of its institutes of higher learning, to name just a few. 23

In short, soft
power is undoubtedly a deliberate and integral part of Chinese foreign policy. In addition, the
forms that Chinese soft power can take are numerous and varied, but areas of “weakness” persist. The
next section explores the effectiveness of Chinese soft power in supporting its foreign policy goals.
 Borders DA
Lack of strong African borders causes mass regional instability—only proper
demarcation and control solves which also turns the case.
Ikome 12 [Dr Francis Nguendi Ikome is currently working with the Governance and Public
Administration Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)], “Africa’s
international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security”, Institute
for Security Studies, Paper 233, (May 2012) //SLC PK

After African
states obtained their independence, the artificial and poorly demarcated borders of many countries
were considered the most potent source of conflict and political instability . This resulted in heated debates on
whether to revise or maintain the colonial borders. The argument split the academic community and policy-makers into two camps, the
revisionists and the anti-revisionists.2 However, the continent’s pioneer integration organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
elected for a status quo on borders to avert the likelihood of chaos and anarchy resulting from boundary contestations.

Despite the decisions of the OAU and its successor, the African Union (AU), border conflicts became a source of instability
and conflict. Significantly, although intra-state conflicts seem to have replaced inter-state conflicts as the principal source of instability on
the continent since the late 1980s, the prospect of destabilising border conflicts is still very real, particularly
against the background of Africa’s ever-expanding population , which is accompanied by shrinking
economic resources and opportunities, and high levels of migration .

Africa’s borders are very porous because of a lack of proper demarcation and delimitation. This has been
identified as the principal reason for the ease with which governance-related national conflicts in
individual states have spilled over to entire regions , as has been the case in the Great Lakes region, West Africa and the Horn
of Africa. Significantly, many intra-state conflicts in Africa have been sparked by the forceful fusion of
incompatible national groups into one state by the imposition of artificial boundaries by colonial powers.
The ongoing debate on the appropriate pace and direction of Africa’s integration project, particularly the recent emphasis on the establishment
of a continent-wide government, has revived concerns about the ramifications of the continent’s borders for peace and security, raising it to
the top of Africa’s policy agenda. Some
have argued that the devotion of material and human resources to the proper
demarcation of the borders of Africa’s sovereign states contradicts both the spirit and the letter of continental
integration plans, on the grounds that regional or continental integration necessarily means the removal
of borders. However, others have observed that for any meaningful and successful integration to occur, Africa’s
borders must be properly demarcated and defined first so that they are able to serve as bridges for
integration, as opposed to being the barriers against integration they have been over the years.
Against this background, this paper examines the potential of Africa’s international boundaries as causes of conflict and threats to peace and
Africa’s poorly
security. It argues that although border-related conflicts have been displaced by governance-related intra-state contests,
demarcated boundaries are still potent sources of interstate conflict , particularly since porous boundaries
serve as conduits by which intra-state conflicts spill over to Africa’s regions . For this reason, the proper
demarcation and control of Africa’s borders is not only essential for achieving peace and security on the
continent, but will also serve as a catalyst for the regional and continental integration agenda.
Africa instability goes nuclear—also independently fuels terrorism in the region.
Mead 13. [James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College], “Peace in
The Congo? Why the World Should Care.” The American Interest. (12-15-2013). https://www.the-
american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained,
or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse
world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is
a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict . The Congo war (and
the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in
what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where
religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that
the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real.
But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and
sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence.

Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night.

The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that
the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us
today.
The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community
(which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various
international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards,
there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of
solving these conflicts.

That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a
million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and
we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly.

The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most
Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to
spread to places that we do care very much about . This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39
needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place
triggers problems in places that we care about very much . Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves
of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider
conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to
complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil
supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends .

Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many
people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that
straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract
local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries
potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern
Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading,
money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced
fighters—and know no other way to make a living . It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states
(like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us .

Al Qaeda and Boko Haram will get CBRNs---that causes existential WMD terrorism.
Fyanka 20. [Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos, Akoka Lagos Nigeria],
"Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism
strategy". Taylor & Francis. 2-17-2020.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2019.1698441?scroll=top&needAccess=true

The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured destruction ( MAD), but it did not necessarily dispel the
dangers of the nuclear age – in fact, to some extent the globalised proliferation of non-conventional weapons has
instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out . During the Cold War, the belligerents of any
nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable; however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and terrorist groups like
Boko Haram have emerged as potential players in a new variety of nuclear conflicts that would entirely be based on
terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind of warfare are indeed terrifying, and the rise in terrorist attacks around
the globe enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence . Since 9/11, the body of academic literature on the threat posed by
terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has increased. In
Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this
threat is overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, ample ideological incentive for the use of CBRN
devices has been provided by the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that
‘[t]he aim of carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is to inflict the largest human and material
casualties possible on American interests and its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni al-
Baghdadi, who maintained:

If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers, weapons, and money – even if this means using
biological, chemical, and bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His
Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow, Washington, and Paris.3

For Boko Haram and other groups, there definitely exists a strong motivation for the use of WMDs, and the global reach of
this thinking is not in doubt:

The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis on Islamic identity. In combination with the
ideological theme of revenge, the global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic worldview in
which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only means to significantly transform reality.4

Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that Boko Haram is one such group which has embraced the jihadist
world view that endorses the use of WMDs . In this regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms their ideological persuasions. The motivation
for Boko Haram to use such weapons is thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria against both military
and civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its
African allies.

In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in
mind, what Russell Worth Parker refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and advanced weapons of
war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality
and proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of
proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination proves strategically
impossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation
should not cause greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This proportionality argument is exemplified in the use
of nuclear weapons in the Second World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million Allied lives, with similar
estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that would likely have been incurred if Japan had been
invaded (see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on
their interpretation of the extent of the damage caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers.
Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into
the crowd and take on the face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all around the world. The risk of
WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups is largely dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material
like uranium and plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which make use of them. The global
proliferation of nuclear material has made this possible today.
Global proliferation of fissile material

The collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the
hands of states that sympathise with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the chaos that followed the
Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet
nuclear material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders on the black market.9

Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpiles
of plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In spite of these enormous quantities,
the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an
enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11

About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6 million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to
build a bomb – a tiny fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk. More than 130 nuclear reactors
powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries – the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut
down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under
notoriously light security, making it a very vulnerable target for terrorists.13

In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that details security lapses at civilian nuclear installations, citing a case in which the fences surrounding an unnamed foreign research reactor were in very
poor condition and there were no guards securing the reactor building itself. In this report, Harvard expert Matthew Bunn explains that unlike the bulky and extremely radioactive fuel rods used in commercial nuclear power plants,
research reactor fuel consists of small pellets that weigh only a few pounds each and moreover are easier to handle –a simple backpack can conceal several pellets.14 Naturally, civilian stockpiles are at greater risk of theft than
those held in military installations. Consequently, the possibilities of such dangerous material falling into the hands of terrorists groups have become increasingly plausible.

Regarding military stockpiles, Russia and the US possess the largest amounts of weapons-grade plutonium – 100 and 150 metric tons, respectively. Diplomatic attempts aimed at reducing these stockpiles have resulted in an
agreement for the two countries to dispose of 34 metric tons each via the method of turning the weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Although this agreement has not been effected yet, it is obvious
given the above that the process may expose the material to greater risk of theft rather than securing it.15 On the other hand, in 2005 the US Congress eliminated the long-standing restrictions that were placed on the exporting of
HEU to other countries for the purpose of manufacturing medical isotopes, which has also created new avenues for the proliferation of nuclear material through civilian use.16

Although the civilian use of nuclear material has increased the risk of its proliferation, the military facilities currently holding nuclear material around the world – especially in Russia – are also not well secured. Thousands of Cold-
War-era tactical weapons are stored at very poorly guarded military installations, and most of these weapons are small and do not have electronic locks that prevent unauthorised usage.17 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union
there has been no viable security strategy for securing the nuclear material contained in many of the former empire’s cities. During the Cold War era, the citizens of these cities had access to these facilities – and they still do, a
problem further compounded by the fact that a strict inventory of the nuclear material contained in these facilities is not maintained.18

The likes of infamous arms dealer Leonid Minin (who was found guilty in a court of law for supplying weapons to non-state actors in African conflicts) are all too willing to do business with terrorists.19, 20 Arms dealers and
smugglers all over the world are always seeking lucrative opportunities, and it is almost certain that some nuclear material has already been acquired by dangerous fanatics.

Several incidents in recent decades give every reason to believe that this is the case. In 1993, Kazakhstani authorities discovered HEU capable of arming 20 bombs in a building that was poorly secured.21 In 2006, Russian citizen
Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia for carrying 100 g of HEU and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed was many additional kilograms.22 In 2011, six men with 4 g of uranium were arrested by security forces in
Moldova. Upon questioning, they claimed that the 4 g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a
nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24

Efforts by terrorist organisations to purchase and use nuclear weapons continue unabated. The most high
profile of these known efforts is that of Osama bin Laden, who in 2001 attempted to purchase a canister of uranium in Sudan for US$1.5 million.
Intelligence reports claim that he also met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists, and sketches of nuclear weapons were found
at an al-Qaeda training camp.25
From the foregoing, it is clear that there exists a robust and thriving black market in fissile material that seems to be tailor-made for use by terrorists groups. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in its trafficking database a total of 2889 incidents involving losses, thefts and/or attempts to traffic fissile material across international
borders.26 This is an incredibly high rate of security lapses considering the security priority that nuclear facilities are supposed to possess. More pressing is the fact that the agency does not
inspect every nuclear facility globally, and as such is not in a position to comprehensively enforce strict security and safety regulations. As a consequence of this, fissile material often goes
missing and subsequently appears on the black market without being reported to the agency. Furthermore, several nations which maintain nuclear facilities do not possess the requisite
resources to subject employees to the kind of extensive background checks that can ensure their trustworthiness for working at such high-security sites. In the absence of this screening, the
likelihood of people with terrorist ties applying for jobs at nuclear facilities for the purpose of obtaining nuclear material is very high.

There is mounting evidence worldwide that increasing amounts of fissile material are being stolen and traded. Although the Russian government refuses to admit that it has lost any nuclear
weapons, at least four Russian nuclear submarines have sunk, and it is believed that the warheads on board are yet to be recovered. The US on the other hand has admitted to losing a
staggering 11 nuclear weapons.27

How can Boko Haram obtain nuclear material?

Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Since 2009, it has engaged with the Nigerian state in a
lethal terrorism campaign aimed at toppling the secular structure and replacing it with an Islamist state. By May 2014 over 12,000 Nigerians
had been killed in the insurgency,28 while one in five persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states had been internally displaced. According
to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram ranks as the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, with an all-time high death toll of
over 6000 in 2014 alone.29

With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million .30
By 2017, Boko Haram had been forced to retreat from the large areas it had previously occupied in the north-east of Nigeria, driven back by the
joint international military efforts of several countries in West and Central Africa. This created the need for them to reassert themselves. The
likelihood of this group re-strategising and reconsolidating is high. Consequently, their acquisition of fissile material for the development
and deployment of radiological ‘dirty bombs’ has increased in probability. The availability of this material on the continent
and within Nigeria itself presents ominous opportunities for the group. Apart from large deposits of uranium ore found in
Africa, several countries including South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria itself
presently possess nuclear research reactors.31
The IAEA has reported no less than 12 incidents of natural uranium smuggling between 1995 and 2005 in Africa alone. In fact, illegal uranium mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, DRC is presently a source of great concern.
More importantly, this is where the source material for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was obtained.32 The proliferation of fissile material across the continent heightens the possibility of non-state actors like Boko Haram
gaining access to it. Although there has only been one recorded theft of eight uranium fuel rods from a Kinshasa research reactor in 1997, the disturbing fact about this is that seven of the rods were never recovered.33

Within Nigeria itself, opportunities abound for terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other militant organisations to obtain fissile material for use in nuclear devices or dirty bombs. In 2004, Nigeria commissioned a 30-kW miniature
neutron source reactor (NIRR-1) for the purpose of nuclear energy research.34 This nuclear facility is located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in the north of the country, where
terrorist activities and Islamist extremism have been going on for centuries. The possibility of Islamist extremists infiltrating nuclear facilities and smuggling out fissile material has been an ongoing security concern for a number of
years. An outright attack on a lightly secured facility is a second possibility that actually played out in 2007, when a nuclear research facility in Pelindaba, South Africa was raided by armed assailants, who breached its security
perimeter and gained entry.35 Another concern is unsecured radioactive waste – namely 234 legacy sources presently located at the Ajaokuta Steel Company in Kogi State – that has not been disposed of and could easily be
obtained by Boko Haram.36 To complicate matters further, the construction of a low to medium radioactive waste management facility at Nigeria’s Nuclear Technology Centre has been abandoned.37

Can Boko Haram build and use non-conventional weapons?

The poor state of nuclear security combined with the tenacity of Boko Haram makes Nigeria a prime location for the advent of nuclear
terrorism. Knowhow on building a nuclear device is widely available, as is the key component, HEU, which can be found all over the
world in dozens of military and civilian nuclear facilities – like the one at Ahmadu Bello University. Once Boko Haram has obtained enough
HEU, a choice can be made between two types of nuclear device. The first is the gun-type mechanism, in which the HEU is smashed together to
produce an explosion. The second type, which is more advanced, requires a chamber in which the HEU is compressed in a highly symmetrical
manner in order to create an implosion. The gun-type mechanism is the more likely option for terrorist groups because it is simpler.38
In order to use the gun-type mechanism to activate a nuclear device, Boko Haram operatives would need to assemble a crude cannon that can smash HEU together – and the more highly enriched the uranium, the less advanced
the weaponry that is needed. The viability of any terrorist group accomplishing such a task has been tested by US senator Joe Biden. In 2004 he asked scientists at three national laboratories to see if they could assemble the
mechanical components of a gun-type bomb with commercially available equipment alone. A few months later, they reported back that they had succeeded.39 With over US$25 million in annual income, Boko Haram has the
resources to obtain both the scientific knowhow and the materials needed to build and deploy a gun-type nuclear weapon.

Radiological dirty bombs

The threat of non-conventional weapons proliferation and terrorism goes beyond nuclear weapons – it also encompasses radiological dirty bombs. The raw materials used to create nuclear weapons are very dangerous; they
contain highly radioactive substances that would pose a serious health hazard if dispersed in human populations using a detonation device. Plutonium and uranium could thus be weaponised in the form of a radiological dirty
bomb, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which would cause widespread fatalities and cost billions of dollars in clean-up, evacuation and relocation operations.40

Terrorist groups like Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD , given the widespread proliferation of fissile material – and
more importantly given the dual-use materials that can produce the same radiological effects as fissile material from nuclear installations.
Radiological dual-use materials from smoke alarms and medical services are among the most easily accessible; highly radioactive isotopes are in
fact used in life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments in hospitals all around the world, including several in Nigeria. These isotopes
include cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192, which can easily be used as base materials for a bomb or an RDD.41 The challenge is that most
of the medical, commercial and industrial groups that handle these materials are not adequately equipped to provide the security needed to
prevent them from being stolen. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory controls in many countries has led to thousands of instances of
missing or stolen radiological material that cannot be accounted for. Recently, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies found in an
alarming study that 170 incidents where nuclear or radiological material was lost, stolen or outside regulatory control occurred in 2014
alone.42
RDDs are viable weapons for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to pursue – and terrorist states have also attempted to obtain them. On 28 March 2002, Abu Zubaydah – a key al-Qaeda operative – was captured in Pakistan. He is
widely believed to have told US investigators that al-Qaeda was ‘interested’ in building or obtaining a dirty bomb. Further evidence emerged on 8 May 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested Abdullah al
Muhajir on charges of planning a radiological attack in the US at the direction of al-Qaeda operatives.

States that sponsor and support terrorist groups are likely to pass on fissile and radiological material to them. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is known to have sought radiological material for this purpose. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb
weighing 1400 kg that carried radioactive particles derived from irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide. A further 100 prototypes were designed from the casings of Muthanna-3 aerial chemical bombs, which were then modified
to a 400-kg weight so that aircraft could carry more of them. It is likely that only 25 of these prototypes were destroyed, and that the other 75 were sent to the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment, a massive Iraqi weapons facility; their
current status and whereabouts remain unknown.43

Chemical and biological weapons

The most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons
usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently –
starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying
them against enemies and their own citizens alike. For
terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological
weapons are uniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very attractive alternatives to nuclear; they are extremely
difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy . Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent,
odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent estimates
place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass
casualties per square kilometre.45

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century
due to advancements in technology. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the
manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car
are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time provided by the organism’s incubation period (three to
seven days in most cases), allowing the terrorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation by law enforcement and
intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infectious agent likely cause initial confusion because
of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists for
secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors.46
Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through
international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced technological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger
populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential
future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions outlawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has
been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is the
norm rather than the exception.

As stated previously, the contextual scenarios in Nigeria that validate this prognosis regarding Boko Haram’s possible actions are strongly supported by their ideological persuasions. The fact that Boko Haram embraces a jihadist
world view which endorses the use of WMDs is strengthened not only by its affiliation to ISIS through ISWAP but also by the similarities in its strategic modus operandi. Like ISIS, Boko Haram both believes in the slaughter of other
Muslims who are deemed to be in cahoots with infidels, and advocates for the destruction of civilian populations – whether Muslim or otherwise – that are regarded as obstructing the advancement or creation of their caliphate.47
This was practically demonstrated by ISIS in Syria and Iraq when they used chemical weapons against both civilian and military populations, as shown in Table 1.48

Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy

The central control measure for preventing nuclear terrorism is to ensure at the international level that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the first place.
This is very difficult to achieve, given the lax security measures found at nuclear installations all over the world. Recognising the danger, the US under the Obama administration committed in 2010 at a nuclear security summit in
Washington DC to securing all nuclear material within four years in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.49 Nigeria was a participant of this summit and is also committed to implementing the agreements that were reached.
These attempts by the Obama administration followed up on the efforts embedded in the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was meant to prevent nuclear material from
being obtained by terrorists. The provisions of this convention were amended in 2005, and by 2010 the Washington summit had created the needed sense of urgency regarding the security of fissile material.50 Negotiations around
the CPPNM started in 1979,51 and over the decades the growing proliferation of fissile material has combined with the increase in global terrorism to raise the profile of the issue of fissile material security. As of 2016, a total of 93
states including Nigeria had ratified the CPPNM, resulting in tighter security around the world at nuclear installations and border controls.

Nigeria has been engaged for decades in international efforts to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The country has ratified and acceded to over a dozen international instruments since 1963, including the Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the CPPNM (1987), the Amendment to the CPPNM (2006) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007).52 At the
level of global collective security, Nigeria is involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288.53 At the regional
and subregional levels, the counterterrorism strategies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been ratified and are in the process of being implemented. In pursuance of
effecting these various international agreements, Nigeria has also instituted their National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was revised in 2016. Presently the country is also working with the UN Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on projects designed to build community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthen judicial institutions.54

Towards an integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism protocol

The CBRN terrorism threat in Nigeria is both real and present. The country has one of the highest rates of terrorist activities in
the world; in fact, according to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria ranked third among 163 countries, with a terrorism death rate of
16.8% of the global total.55 Although attacks declined in 2017, Nigeria still retained third place on the Global Terrorism Index.56 Recently, Boko
Haram has initiated a comeback that has seen renewed attacks and the abduction of more girls from schools in the north-east of the country.
Security forces have continued to engage the group on the frontlines in their forest bases; with the assistance of local and international joint
task forces, much of the conflict has been shifted to more remote areas in the north-east. Although the government security forces have gained
the upper hand in their frontal clashes with Boko Haram forces, by January 2018 the group had successfully carried out several brutal assaults,
including one on UN and Doctors Without Borders staff, shifting their strategy back to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. During Easter of
the same year, a single attack utilising 5 suicide bombers resulted in over 29 dead and 84 wounded.57
The likelihood that Boko Haram may begin to use CBRN weapons is increasing, and biological and chemical terrorism is potentially more difficult to prevent than conventional terrorist attacks. Since the latter part of the twentieth
century, the Internet has contributed to the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowhow, thereby increasing the likelihood of Boko Haram being able to obtain not only the ingredients needed to create biochemical
weapons but also the information needed to build and successfully deploy them. Some of the base materials for such weapons even occur naturally, like castor beans, which can be processed to produce the dangerous toxin ricin
and deployed against unsuspecting populations. Furthermore, live strains of very dangerous viruses like Ebola can be found in high-tech research labs, like those at the African Centre of Excellence for Genomics and Infectious
Diseases (ACEGID) at the Redeemer’s University Ede in Osun State. If Boko Haram were to secure this virus and weaponise it, the age of biowarfare would arrive in Nigeria – with deadly consequences. More importantly, the
materials that are needed to create most chemical weapons exist in large quantities as dual-use materials that can be purchased on the open market and ferried into the country via forged end-user certificates.

The chemical and biological weapons conventions represent control structures geared towards the containment of these non-conventional weapons, and to a large extent state signatories like Nigeria have implemented a good
level of the instruments contained in them; however, some nations still maintain secret stockpiles and have used them in recent conflicts, like Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissidents in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Syrian
government, which is presently using them against its civilian population.

On the whole, the counterterrorism measures put in place to deal with the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack have gained more credibility in the international community. Although there is no dedicated international
inter-agency mechanism for coordinating the response to terrorism involving the release of toxic chemicals or biological agents, there are mechanisms that have evolved in the context of humanitarian assistance and emergency
response after natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes; these include the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS), the Global
Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) and the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). The primary inter-agency mechanism that coordinates responses to
emergencies involving the agencies mentioned above is the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).58 To further strengthen inter-agency coordination in the wake of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions, the
UN CTITF is also focusing on planning for such an eventuality.

At the local level, several key aspects of Nigeria’s NACTEST are presently being utilised. The strategy is divided into five work streams:

 Forestall: Prevent terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns and deradicalisation programmes.
 Secure: Ensure the protection of life, property and key national infrastructure and public services, including Nigerian interests around the world.
 Identify: Ensure that all terrorist acts are properly investigated, and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.
 Prepare: Prepare the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents can be mitigated.
 Implement: Devise a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated, cross-governmental, population-centred effort.59

Presently, the first three aspects of these work streams are receiving full attention. However, in regard to WMDs, the counterterrorism strategy is lacking a well-integrated CBRN protocol for engaging with the work streams for
preparation and implementation. Nigeria currently handles issues relating to nuclear and radiological matters through two institutions: the Nigerian Atomic Energy Agency (NAEC) and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
(NNRA). It is therefore expected that, given the growing CBRN threat level in the country, these agencies will collaborate with the Office of the Security Adviser to the President in order to initiate a proper CBRN counterterrorism
protocol.

The NACTEST does not currently include a dedicated protocol for handling CBRN threats; Nigeria is however involved in nuclear security at the international level, which has primarily provided for capacity-building and human
resources development. Activities in these areas include the gradual process of converting the miniature neutron source reactor in Zaria from using HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), partnerships for nuclear and radiological
security with the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the IAEA, establishing a nuclear security support centre in the country, reviewing the 2012 design basis threat (DBT) for protecting nuclear and radiological material, the
development of a programme for locating and securing orphan legacy radioactive sources, training security officers, the installation of a radiation portal monitor at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos in 2008 and
the acquisition of three more monitors for other international airports in the country.60
An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by
disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also
include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on
how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries
facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality.

Conclusion

Any terrorist attack involving WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario. Fortunately, at least some of these
potential attacks are preventable. If and when the nuclear security summit achieves its goals, the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in
Nigeria will be immensely reduced. Unfortunately, the likelihood of radiological, chemical and biological attacks is more difficult to regress,
making it all the more vital to integrate a CBRN protocol into Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy.

Preventing such a tragic event from occurring will require very close ongoing monitoring of the strategic
manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to
source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group
will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are
vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the
recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like
the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has
assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of
radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.
 Kenya Politics DA
Kenyan presidential elections are coming down to the wire - Odinga is currently
slightly ahead of Ruto.
Malingha 7-11 David Malingha is a reporter for Bloomberg. 7-11-22. “Opposition Leader Keeps
Narrow Lead in Kenyan Pre-Election Poll”
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-11/opposition-leader-keeps-narrow-lead-in-
kenyan-pre-election-poll#xj4y7vzkg ] Kelvin

Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga maintained a narrow lead over Deputy President William Ruto in
the latest opinion poll before next month’s election.

About 42% of sampled voters favored Odinga, compared with 39% for Ruto, according to a report
published by Nairobi-based pollster Tifa Research on Monday. That compares with 39% and 35% for the
two candidates respectively in the previous survey in May. The portion of undecided respondents
dropped to 10% in June from 15% previously.

Tifa Research’s report comes after the front-runners in the Aug. 9 vote presented their campaign
manifestos. Odinga has touted an economic plan that includes potentially restructuring government
debt and providing a monthly cash transfer to the poorest households, while Ruto has proposed
providing soft loans to small businesses in industries that are able to create the most jobs, such as
farming.

Whoever wins the election will have to contend with an economy struggling to recover from the impact
of the coronavirus pandemic and the fastest increase in consumer prices since 2017 that’s been
exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and the worst drought in four decades. The World Bank expects
economic growth in Kenya to slow to 5.5% this year from 7.5% in 2021.

To win the election and succeed outgoing President Uhuru Kenyatta, the candidates need to secure
more than 50% of the national vote and at least a quarter of the ballots cast in half of Kenya’s 47
counties.

Tifa Research conducted the survey June 25-30 with 1,533 respondents. It has a margin of error of plus
or minus 2.34%.

Xenophobia is rampant in Kenya – the plan causes mass migration which aggravates
natives.
Jenkins 12 Sarah Jenkins is a writer for the Royal African Society. 7-10-12 “Ethnicity, violence, and the
immigrant-guest metaphor in Kenya” https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/111/445/576/47210]
/recut Kelvin

Whilst arguably more intense and widespread than ever before, the 2008 post-election violence was not
an isolated incident in Kenyan political history. Indeed, episodes of ethnic violence have characterized
Kenyan elections since the transition to multi-party politics in 1992 and there is a wealth of literature
that has explored the country's tendency towards violent ethnic politics. Much of the attention,
however, both in relation to the Kenyan situation, and to ethnic violence more generally, has been
focused on the politicization of identity from above. While justified given the significance of elite actors
in these processes, this bias has meant that insufficient attention has been paid to bottom-up
processes.1 As a result, the participation of ordinary people in such bitter and intense violence still
eludes satisfactory explanation. This article addresses this gap by exploring how local-level dynamics and
processes interact with top-down incitement and manipulation, with a particular focus on the Kenyan
post-election violence.

I argue that geospatial imaginaries, which are embedded in everyday practices and which pervade
Kenyan consciousness, have helped to construct and maintain oppositional identities through a
narrative of ethnic others as immigrants. During periods of political transition or tension, the metaphor
is extended, both by elites and by local-level actors, to conceptualize the immigrant as a guest who is
expected to abide by certain rules of hospitality, namely conforming to the political wishes of the host
community. ‘Immigrants’ who are seen to be on the ‘right side’ of the political divide are recognized as
welcome guests and their participation in politics is largely accepted. However, tensions arise between
‘immigrants’ and ‘natives’ when the former are perceived to be in opposition to the political wishes of
the ‘host’ community, and the right of ‘guests’ to engage in local politics is challenged and contested.
The immigrant-guest metaphor therefore provides a powerful framework through which to understand
the 2007 general elections and the violent aftermath.2 However, while the immigrant aspect of the
narrative is durable and persistent, the guest element is remarkably flexible and open to negotiation and
renegotiation; questions of who is and who is not welcome are repeatedly raised and debated. Thus the
boundaries between brother and cousin, friend and ally, stranger and enemy are continuously
reformulated according to local and political contexts. These narratives do not preclude elite
mobilization – in fact they enable and facilitate its reception at the local level. However, they also have
the potential to operate independently of top-down incitement and manipulation. Not all violence is
elite-led and existing analyses which do not explore this dimension often miss ‘the compelling quality of
a cultural text’.3
My analysis is based on fieldwork conducte d in Kenya between October 2009 and August 2010, during which time 533 narrative interviews4 were conducted with residents of urban slums and peri-urban centres around Eldoret, Nairobi, and Nakuru.5 Respondents include d a broad range of local-level actors, from unemployed youths to local councillors , the only criteria for their selection being that they were resident in the field site during the events of 2007 and early 2008, and thus had personal experie nces of the violence in the area. Interview material is supplemented by newspaper sources, governmental reports, human rights documents, and participant observation.

Ethnic territoria lity and the immigrant metaphor

I once asked a Kikuyu matatu driver working in Kawangware if he was from Nairobi. ‘Nobody is from Nairobi,’ he laughed, looking at me incredulously. It was a sentiment I would hear on many occasions. This response could be understood as a simple reference to the promine nce of migrant workers within the city. However, when it is placed within the larger meta-narratives of ethnicity, territory, and belonging which pervade Kenyan society its deeper significance becomes apparent. The driver was not suggesting that nobody is born and bred in Nairobi; of course, they are. Rather, he was suggesting that nobody says that they originate from Nairobi; Nairobi is not considered to be the homeland of any particular ethnic group. His response is indicative of two important elements of Kenyan society: first, that ethnicity is a typical mode of thought in everyday life and social interaction, and second that ethnicity and land, or perhaps more accurately territory, are inextricably linked. Indeed, there is a virtual conflation of ethnicity and territory in Kenya, where to ask somebody where they are from is, in effect, to ask their identity.

[T]ribalism is entrenched in our very fibre. In fact you have not introduced yourself properly until you have answered the question ‘where are you from?’ This seemingly innocent question … is for the purposes of establishing your origin.6

Nobody can be from Nairobi, then, because everybody is from somewhere else; everybody has an ethnicity and therefore everybody has a rural home. People living outside of the rural home are regarded as ‘foreigne rs’ or, more commonly, ‘immigrants ’. Even families who have been resident in an area for generations, perhaps with younger members who have never even set foot in their rural ‘home’, are still subject to this immigrant status.

The construction and persistence of this metaphor form a part of the continuous imagination and reconstruction of ethnic identity – the invention of tradition – in contemporary Kenya. The ‘complex and ever-changing social landscape’7 of the pre-colonial period, in which both ethnic identity and territorial attachment were marked by instability and fluidity, was fundamentally transformed by colonial rule. The creation of rigid administrative boundaries, the regulation and monitoring of Native Reserves, and the reliance on provincial administrators strengthened macro-ethnic identities and constructed a sense of ‘ethnic territoriality’8 which was not only a (re)invention on the part of European colonists,9 but also a conscious imagining by African agents.10 While it is certainly the case that both ethnic and territoria l boundaries have transformed and been reimagined since the end of colonial rule, and indeed this should be understood to be a continuous process of reconstruction, the consciousness of ethnic territoriality– that is, the ethnicized understanding of belonging to and ownership of space – is remarkably durable and has become
embedded in everyday social practices, institutions, and discourses. The following section offers a brief illustration of the performance of this territorialize d identity narrative through an examination of burial customs and the formation of ethnic enclaves. These practices are not only indicative of migrants' continued ties and attachments to the ancestral homeland – a sense of belonging which underscores their very conceptualization as immigrants – but also illustrate how the processes of contestation, imagination, and transformation of ethnicize d space operate within the boundaries of these exclusionary citizenship discourses.

Burial customs

Several scholars have drawn attention to the pervasiveness and importance of burying the dead in the ancestral homeland, or the rural village, in many sub-Saharan African countries.11 In Kenya, similarly, this practice is common, and embeds the immigrant metaphor in everyday life. The ritual and custom of burying in the homeland is part of a larger group of practices – such as frequent travel to the rural village for festivals and celebrations, and the use of particular spaces for cultural events such as circumcision rites – which are indicative of the strong urban–rural connections maintained by many migrants and the ethnic associations of space.12 Burial is a particularly prominent and visible aspect of this and it underscores the powerful perception that, no matter how long you have lived outside the land of your ancestors , it remains the place where you belong. Therefore, upon death, the body should be returned to its ‘true home’ for burial.13 Indeed, the importance of this practice is highlighte d by its continuation during the post-election violence in Kenya. Despite the difficulties of movement, and the inherent risks in travelling through
the homelands of other ethnic groups, many people endeavoured to return the bodies of their loved ones to their rural homes in the midst of the turmoil. Similarly, the high-profile dispute over the burial of S. M. Otieno not only highlights the cultural significance of burying in the ancestral homeland, but also the exceptionality of disregarding the practice. Otieno was a Luo lawyer who, having bought land in Ngong and lived there for many years, reportedly expressed a wish to be buried there. After his death, however, a dispute arose between Otieno's Kikuyu widow, who wanted to bury him in Nairobi, and his fellow clansmen who insisted upon his remains being returned to the ancestral homeland in accordance with Luo burial customs. After a prolonged court case, and an appeal of the initial judgement, Otieno's body was buried in Siaya, Nyanza, in the heart of Luoland, in 1987.14 In this way migrants continue to demonstrate an attachment to their homeland that enables the emergence of autochthonous discourses of belonging and exclusion. Indeed, ‘defenders of autochtonie never tire of repeating that immigrants, no matter how long
they live in the city, still want to be buried in the village of their ancestors’.15

At the same time as reinforcing this immigrant status, the issue of burial location is often invoked as a means of authenticating native claims of ownership and justifying exclusionary citizenship discourses. Indeed, claims to belonging, and by extension citizenship rights, such as the right to cultivate land, are frequently justified by the presence of ancestral graves.16 This is particularly prominent among the Nubian community of Kibera whose entitlement to the land has never been recognized by the Kenyan government and whose claim to ownership of the space is questioned by governmental rhetoric,17 as well as by the numerical dominance of the Luo community. In the absence of title deeds the practice of burying the dead within Kibera is frequently invoked to substantiate claims of belonging. As a Nubian respondent told me:

We welcomed people here but they are buried at their rural areas. We have no rural area. Our culture , we implement it here. Our grandmothers are here. This is our land.18

Thus, burial practices are emphasized as being central to the practice of identity within a particular space and the justification of ownership claims in that territory. In this way, then, burial practices are illustrative of a deeper understanding of territorialized identity and belonging in Kenya. They reflect the continued attachment to the rural home that is at the heart of understandings of citizenship, belonging, and exclusion.

A home away from home

The formation of ethnic enclaves occurs in countries across the world and they often acquire names that are representative of the dominant community, such as Little Italy, Little India, and Chinatown. In a similar fashion, in Kenya ethnic enclaves are frequently named with reference to a promine nt place in the majority group's homeland. For example in the slums of Korogocho and Kibera in Nairobi, and Langas in Eldoret, there are villages by the name ‘Kisumu Ndogo’, meaning ‘little Kisumu’, thus linking these Luo-dominated enclaves with the Luo homeland of Nyanza, of which Kisumu is the capital. Similarly, the Kikuyu village of Kiambaa in Rift Valley echoes Central Province's Kiambu, from which the first Kiambaa residents originated. In these cases, the names of the villages are officially recognized; however, there are numerous other places across Kenya in which similar labels are widely used as nicknames, such as Othaya Ndogo in Marakwet, Kakamega Ndogo in Kericho and Kiambu Ndogo in Loitokitok.19 The use of these names by immigrants can be understood as a reflection of their affective attachment to ‘home’, and, furthe rmore ,
accentuates the visibility of immigrants in the area. Indeed ethnic enclaves can be understood as part of a broader ‘production of locality’20 within which the reproduction of home is generated through music and songs, ritual celebrations, food, dress, and the use of vernacular languages, sometimes even through burial within the space. Moreover, while evoking and reinforcing the macro-level attachment with a traditional homeland, ethnic enclaves simultaneously act as a ‘symbolic appropriation of territory and space’,21 reproducing the immigrant narrative at the micro-level, which may be more threatening to the native community. Everyday references to such spaces typically illustrate ideas of ownership and belonging; Kisumu Ndogo and Gatuikera within Kibera, for example, are spoken of as being ‘for the Jaluos’,22 despite Nubian claims to the land, and Munyaka in Eldoret is understood as being ‘Kikuyu territory’. Minority communities within these spaces are cast in the role of ‘strangers’ and are subject to the same secondary citizenship status as immigrants at the macro-level. Ethnic others are understood as being allowed to stay by
the majority community, echoing the native–immigrant dichotomy situated in the larger meta-narrative and illustrating the stickiness of ethnic territoriality in everyday consciousness.

Thus, burial and urban social structures are just two examples of a broader series of practices and
institutions that reinforce the notion of territorialized identities and the conceptualization of ethnic
others as immigrants. While a comprehensive analysis of the narrative's historical construction remains
outside the scope of this article, it should be noted that the coterminous relationship between ethnic
territorial boundaries and administrative political units, along with the association of space with
particular histories and cultural practices, generates an attachment that is simultaneously political and
cultural, instrumental and affective, rational and non-rational. Consequently, discourses of ethnic
belonging become conflated with questions of citizenship and political integration.

The immigrant as guest

Incorporated within the pervasive immigrant metaphor is a conception that ‘native’ communities have
‘welcomed’ or ‘invited’ other ethnic groups into their homelands or territories; they are, in essence,
guests. Indeed, the presence of immigrants is not in itself a major problem; population movements
continue and violent ethnic conflict is far from ubiquitous.

The Kalenjin have invited all the people here. They've invited all the tribes of Kenya here and they buy
their plots and they live here. There is no land issue here … if the issue is land they could say everyone
has their land in their area so they should go.23

However, in this host–guest relationship immigrants are expected to abide by certain rules of hospitality
and this has ‘serious consequences for the distribution of power’ as hosts have the right to ‘decide on
the rules of the visit, and accordingly to “put their foot down” when the guest does not conform’.24 It is
in the suspicion that guests are seeking to control the space politically and economically, to benefit
disproportionately from resources which do not ‘belong’ to them, that tensions and resentments reside.
Thus, the process of reproducing the homeland through enclaves is highly symbolic of an ethnic
appropriation of space and the permanency of immigrant occupation on the land. One Kikuyu
interviewee living in Eldoret articulates the tensions arising from this when he states:

If we Kikuyu come somewhere, we make our place, we dig and we plant and we behave as if this is our
home. So that's the hatred they are having with us.25

Moreover, the use of ethnicized names for such spaces is a more salient symbol of a challenge to native
claims to land – a source of tension raised by a number of interviewees, particularly amongst the Nubian
community in Kibera and the Kalenjin community in Rift Valley. One interviewee remarked:

The Kikuyu will come and dominate in an area and they will change the name of the place to a Kikuyu
name, like Kiambaa, it is a Kikuyu name, and the Kalenjin, you know they are quiet, but they will keep
that thing in their heart.26

Similarly, the perception that immigrants are dominating the economic resources of the area generates
underlying tensions and resentments. In Kibera, for example, a large number of landlords and business
owners are Kikuyu, which is regarded as unfair given their numerical inferiority in the slum.
Nevertheless, while these tensions persist, and are fundamental to developing an understanding of the
violence following the 2007 elections, it is at times of political tension or transition that the guest
dimension of the metaphor is of particular relevance. It is rarely the simple presence of immigrants
within the political realm that is regarded as an abuse of hospitality not to be tolerated, but rather their
involvement in opposition to the political leanings of the host community. There is a widely held
perception that the native community should have a greater say in decisions that impact on the area
and that guests are expected to acquiesce to their political wishes. Indeed, the very act of taking up
residence and land in a stranger's territory is understood as accepting a subordinate social status;27
there is an understanding that it ‘will cost you to go to someone else's land’.28

Some Kalenjin live inside Kikuyu areas so they can't vote for ODM because they're in a Kikuyu area. They
must vote for whoever that area votes for.29

Thus, if the immigrant community is seen to be in political opposition to the native community, their
conceptualization can be transformed from accepted guest to unwelcome occupier.
If alien communities did not respect the wishes of the Maasai who are their hosts, then the community
Maasai will have to think twice about continuing to host other tribes in the district after the general
elections.30

This host–guest relationship has been observed in other countries on the continent. Antoine Socpa, for
example, has identified a similar dynamic in Yaounde, Cameroon.31 He argues that the native Beti are
shocked by the political opposition of the immigrant Bamileke community to President Biya's party. Such
behaviour, he suggests, is considered not only to be a betrayal, but also to reflect a lack of appreciation
for Beti hospitality. Similarly, Ruth Marshall-Fratani identifies the theme of immigrant ‘rapacity’ and
‘ungratefulness’ in Côte d'Ivoire.32 However, this discourse, in the Kenyan context at least, has more
nuanced implications for the involvement of guests in local politics. While Socpa suggests that tensions
arise when immigrants want to emerge on the local political scene, my own research indicates that
participation in local politics is not necessarily an issue in and of itself. Rather, it is the involvement of
immigrants on the ‘wrong side’ of the political divide that raises tensions and is seen to constitute an
abuse of hospitality; indeed, some guests are more welcome to participate in local politics than others.
It has already been suggested that the labelling of ethnic others as immigrants, and the everyday practices and institutions that reinforce this categorization, underscore exclusionary citizenship discourses. The animosity that surrounds political opposition by immigrants conspicuously illustrates this contested citizenship status, as the label ‘is a means of defining their relations to state power and their access to benefit flows from its resources’.33 Thus, in the context of liberalization and the transition to multi-party politics in Kenya, this understanding of immigrants as guests is a ‘metaphor which has forgotten that it is a metaphor’.34 Moreover, the contested citizenship status must be understood in relation to the neo-patrimonia l, zero-sum political context that has bedevilled Kenyan history. As Susanne Mueller has noted perceptively, ‘the 2007 election was as much about what one might call exclusiona ry ethnicity and who would not get power and control of the state's resources as it was about who would’.35

Economic prosperity and development is understood by local-level actors as being directly linked to having a member of the ethnic group in power. Consequently there is a strong perception that, in addition to macro-scale development prospects , individual material benefits in the form of employment opportunities, access to land, loans, and localized development projects will result from a member of the ethnic group attaining political power:

In Kenya we have a culture that says to help someone who is closer to you, and someone of your tribe is closer to you. So if I vote my tribe he'll develop my rural area, bring infrastructure there. If I'm looking for employment it is easier for me if my own is at the top.36

Indeed, the promise of such benefits can lead to an understanding of elections as life or death matters, where if ‘somebody steals the elections, he is stealing my life’.37 Accordingly, politics ‘becomes a struggle among ethnic communities to put one of their own into a position of political power’38 and so ethnic voting patterns, while certainly not universal, are promine nt. As a result, there is a strong fear that, should immigrant numbers become too high, their numerical superiority could significantly challenge native claims on the land as they come to dominate politically, and therefore economically. The perception that immigrants or minorities are seeking to take control over a particular space is particularly galling when it is also perceived that these immigrants have their own rural home in which they are able to dominate; indeed, it is regarded as unjust that they should seek a share in the resources which ‘belong’ to other groups.

However, while there is certainly a strong anticipation of individualized benefits extending to the grassroots , the reality has been challenged by scholars who suggest that ‘there is no reason to believe that the overwhelming majority of clients derive significant wealth or empowerment from their relations with state patrons’39 – and by Kenyans themselves:

There is no such thing as ‘tribal rights’… . There are no special shopping vouchers for voters who share a tribe with the President. There are no special schools or supermarkets or marked lanes for citizens of President-producing communities. We're all caught in the damn jam and feel inflation.40

Indeed, whilst many interviewees indicate that there are benefits to keeping power in the hands of the community, many deny it, and suggest that the desire to have one of your own in power is rather more related to pride. Thus, working in conjunction with these instrumental aspects are the oft-neglected affective issues of pride , superiority, and inferiority. The perceived attempts by immigrants to dominate a native community are bitterly regarded as an indication of their superior attitude and the notion that immigrants could rule in ‘our home’ is an unacceptable affront to ethnic pride:

they feel as if they're the superiors there, not realizing that there were people originally from there who should have the most say in that area.41

Thus, exclusionary citizenship discourses and ethnic territoriality are rooted not only in material and instrumental, but also in more affective and non-rational factors – and both sets had a significant impact upon the participation in, and the dynamics of, violence following the 2007 elections.

The 2007 elections: an abuse of hospitality

The 2007 elections can be understood, in part, as a performance of a ‘deep cultural grammar’, demonstrating that the immigrant-guest metaphor is best understood as a socialized text that can give rise to ritualized forms of social action.42 This section examines the dynamics of the contest and violent aftermath, illustrating how the metaphor provided a framework for action during the 2007 elections.

During the campaign period, particularly within the intensive final month before polling day, the categorization of ethnic others as guests subject to certain rules of hospitality became more explicitly stated through daily discourse as well as through more performative and dramatic action. In the case of the former, minority or immigrant residents were made acutely aware of their guest status and the expectations placed upon them by the native community. The following anecdote was related to me by a Kikuyu resident of Eldoret town. He recalls that during the campaign period:

A friend told me, ‘my friend, if you come to me and you see me eating meat, then you must also eat meat, the way that I am eating meat. You don't eat greens because I am eating meat.’ Without knowing that maybe if I eat meat, that meat can bring a problem to my stomach and maybe I can get sick. But he was telling me that you must do what you get me doing. It was because I am not one of them, so the meaning is that here in Eldoret we are like visitors and we must do what the owners do. If it is to vote for Ruto, then we must vote for Ruto, and not to vote for someone else.43

In many cases immigrants and minorities were warned and threatened to conform to the host's political
position or they would be evicted from the area:

Ruto uses hatred from natives to gather political support, flipping the election.
Okuma 12-22 Daniel Okuma is a reporter for The Star. 12-22-20 “Ruto: Will populism trump tribalism
in 2022?” https://www.the-star.co.ke/opinion/columnists/2020-12-22-ruto-will-populism-trump-
tribalism-in-2022/] Kelvin

Ethnic-based persuasions and mobilisation have been the mode of Kenyan politics since
Independence. Almost all political strategies have been based on ethnic arithmetic, which led
political analyst Mutahi Ngunyi to coin the term ‘tyranny of numbers’.
However, Deputy President William Ruto seems to be breaking away from this political norm and
charting a new strategy for his 2022 presidential bid. The strategy is closely linked to populism,
which is increasingly becoming popular across the globe.
Currently, there is no universal definition of populism. However, based on the Oxford English
Dictionary, political populist strives to appeal to common people who feel or believe that their
concerns have been disregarded by the ruling elites. Populism, therefore, is people-centred, as
populists create the perception that common people are important, making them create an “Us v.
Them” narrative.
It is not possible to comprehensively define populism in this piece. Nonetheless, you only need to
listen to President Donald Trump’s campaign speeches and tweets to identify a populist, especially
in relation to his 2016 presidential campaign strategy.
Like Trump, Ruto has mastered the art of speaking directly to the ordinary people who feel that
their concerns have been disregarded by the political class. Ruto’s populism journey started with
the establishment of the ‘Hustler Nation’ narrative, identifying himself with the common people or
hustlers. The use of non-elite slogans like ‘Hustler’ is one of the most common populist practices.
The narrative helped Ruto to redefine himself after the handshake between President Uhuru
Kenyatta and former PM Raila Odinga. Also, realising that he cannot directly oppose the BBI
referendum, Ruto has resorted to populism to indirectly oppose the initiative. He is seen to be
speaking on behalf of hustlers, especially concerning the cost of BBI, the effect of the Covid-19
pandemic on Kenyans, and the need for common Kenyans to be part of the process. So far, populism
seems to be working for DP.
The big question, however, is whether populism will make DP Ruto the fifth president of Kenya, as
the primary objective of political populism is to ascend to power. Many people have dismissed the
notion of Ruto as a hustler, he is one of the richest people in Kenya. This fact, however, will not stop
hustlers from voting for him. Hustlers, or common people, are only keen to elect a person who is
successful and holds the same values and beliefs as theirs. Hustlers consider this person an
authentic representative of the common people.
Importantly, besides being seen to be speaking on behalf of common people, Ruto’s history is an
inspiration to many people who are struggling to make it in life. Thus, the hustler narrative is not
only effective but also makes him appealing to common Kenyans.

Ruto’s political opponents have created a narrative that he is corrupt. This is a narrative that is likely to
intensify towards the 2022 general election. Nevertheless, based on the election of Trump in 2016,
and a number of Kenyan politicians, voters are not keen to elect saints. Voters mainly vote for
people they identify with. This explains why Kenyans have voted in co-ethnics for years despite
politicians being accused of corruption. This is unfortunate but it is the reality of politics.
The main challenge to Ruto’s populism, however, is ethnic-based politics, which is deeply rooted in
Kenya. Historically, and based on recent past elections, Kenyans mainly vote for their co-ethnics.
This challenge can be minimised if a significant number of ordinary Kenyans internalise Ruto’s
hustler narrative or if he manages to convince them that he truly represents the concerns, beliefs,
and values of ordinary Kenyans. Voters are most likely to elect a person outside their tribe if that
candidate perfectly aligns with their preferences and he or she has a high probability of winning.
Populism thrives amidst crises, and the challenges faced by Kenyans currently, especially due to the
Covid-19 pandemic, give DP the opportunity to prove that he not only identifies with hustlers but is
also deeply concerned about their issues.

Ruto presidency causes instability and xenophobia.

Ochieng 21 Justus Ochieng is a reporter with the Daily Nation. 8-15-21 “William Ruto’s ‘hustler’
narrative instigates class war, says Raila Odinga” https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/william-ruto-
s-hustler-narrative-instigates-class-war-says-raila-odinga-3512496] Kelvin
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) leader Raila Odinga has criticised Deputy President William Ruto’s
‘hustler’ narrative, accusing him of instigating class war.

In a statement on Sunday, Mr Odinga said leaders must be cautious with how they mobilise support
during the campaigns lest they cause instability as the country heads to the elections next year.

“For me, it begins with the brand of politics we play, how we mobilise support, particularly during the
campaigns,” Mr Odinga said.

“In the recent US election campaigns, President Barack Obama made a fundamental statement: ‘If you
have to win a campaign by dividing people, you’re not going to be able to govern them. You won’t be
able to unite them later if that’s how you start,” the ODM leader said.

He said leaders must concentrate on uniting the people if at all they wish to govern later.

In reference to the DP’s ‘hustler’ narrative, Mr Odinga said it was divisive and easily prone to inciting
one group against the other.

Non-violent competition

“You begin by pitting people against each other; the poor against the rich, the young against the old, one
faith against the other, tribe against tribe, you end up with a hopeless government in a divided country,”
added the former prime minister.

Kenya, he noted, needs to build a tradition for inclusive political processes and non-violent competition
for political power.

In a diverse society like ours, no single man or woman can be the nation’s messiah, he said.

“We need a tradition of putting the people and the nation first. We must begin creating a shared
understanding by our people that we are one country in a continent struggling to find its space in the
world, and our progress depends on our ability to unite, pursue and defend our space and interests,
otherwise we all lose.”

He noted that unity of the country was a tall order in a political environment that thrives on drumming
up “chauvinistic and xenophobic support.”

“We need leaders who worry more about the future of the people and the country than their own
future. Such leadership translates into an environment that makes everyone realise that their individual
fates are intertwined with that of the nation.”

“In such an environment, citizens and leaders can fight for personal and sectional interests, but still put
the country's interest above their own.

Kenya, the ODM leader said, requires leadership whose core reflexes is for national and not individual
survival, with a demonstrated capacity to put national interests first and personal interests next, if at all.

“We need to cultivate a culture of political leadership that is able to create confidence in what the
government promises or does. When people begin doubting what the leaders are promising or doing,
everything gets lost, resisted or slowed down. Stability stems from the credibility of the leadership,” he
said.
With that credibility, added the ODM leader, the country’s leadership will be able to explain, implement
and mobilise mass support even for policies that are temporarily inconvenient to a section of the
population but good for the nation in the long run.

He cautioned that when leaders mobilise support through emotional and irrational appeals, “we have to
govern through similarly emotional and irrational policies, a clear recipe for instability.”

We need to pursue core long-term and consistent, not erratic policies with clearly defined goals, he said.

“There is no path to jobs, good schools, hospitals, industries and security other than political stability
enabled by constant pursuit of reform and development while always putting people and the nation
first. It takes sound politics and Kenya needs it now more than ever. Unity and stability or nothing,”
added Mr Odinga.

Political instability in Kenya spills over to the entire continent – turns food,
integration, and African instability and we have the strongest internal link
USAID 2012[USAID, March 2012: East Africa Regional Conflict and Instability Assessment
https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/uganda/conflict-7/1187-east-africa-regional-
conflict-and-instability-assessment-usaid-2012-1/file] TA 7-25-2022

Conflict and instability trends in East Africa continue to make it one of the most unstable regions in the
world.1 Significant portions of East Africa remain unable to break free of the lethal cocktail of armed
conflicts, violent crime, extremism, communal violence, political instability, and state failure that has
plagued the region for decades. Most of East Africa‘s zones of armed conflict and instability today are
concentrated near border areas; pose a major risk of spillover; and feature powerful crossborder drivers,
interests, and actors. In recent years, regional governments have made a much greater effort to police
their borders, and their renewed commitment to address transborder conflict issues constitutes an
important window of opportunity. However, few regional states have the capacity to effectively
administer their remote, expansive border areas. As a result, much transborder conflict management
and prevention falls on the shoulders of local communities and local authorities, in partnership with
central governments and interstate regional organizations. The resilience and adaptability of this
collection of local and regional actors are critical factors in determining whether, and to what extent,
crossborder conflict and instability issues are successfully managed. REGIONAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT
The diversity of East Africa makes it difficult to generalize about patterns of conflict and instability in the
region‘s borderlands, but several factors are of importance across most of the region‘s conflicts. 
Grievances. Across East Africa, many armed conflicts—especially insurgencies, civil wars, and violent
extremism—are fueled in part by frustration over limited economic opportunities; poverty;
unemployment; and politics of exclusion along ethnic, religious, or class lines. The region‘s high
population growth rates have produced a youth bulge which exacerbates problems of unemployment,
and steady urban drift is feeding the growth of large slums where these grievances are concentrated. In
rural areas, grievances are most pronounced over land access and alienation of land. Most of these
grievances are rooted in a sense of ethnic or sectarian marginalization. These grievances have been
easily tapped and sometimes manipulated by political elites.  Mobilization and resources. Insurgencies
and armed groups in the region face few constraints in translating local grievances into material support.
Recruits for armed gangs, tribal militia, insurgencies, and extremist movements are readily available as a
result of high unemployment, the youth bulge, and large refugee camps. Young men in rural areas are
often encouraged to join tribal militias by their community leaders. Financing of armed groups is rarely a
major constraint, due to the practice of militia living off the land as their principal form of payment,
support to tribal paramilitaries by regional governments, access to high-value ―lootables‖ such as gold
and diamonds, diverted aid, diaspora contributions, and the availability of cheap small arms across all of
East Africa.  History of civil war. The greatest single predictor of a civil war is the legacy of a civil war in
the recent past. East Africa has endured many internal wars over the past four decades, some of which
have left unresolved animosities and militarization.  Protracted nature of regional armed violence.
Many of East Africa‘s zones of conflict and instability are sites of long-running crises; some of its civil
wars and insurgencies have lasted decades. Long-running wars can create their own systems of
adaptation, economies, and interests, which can reinforce instability. This includes the rise of war
economies in which powerful interests seek to perpetuate conditions of lawlessness and violence. The
initial causes of the wars in East Africa are thus not always the same as the factors that perpetuate
them. 1 USAID East Africa Regional Mission (USAID/EA) covers Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Somalia, Republic of Congo (ROC), Central African Republic (CAR),
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi. vi EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND
INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT  Spoilers. East Africa‘s spoilers vary widely and cannot be
understood as a single category. Some qualify as total spoilers with no interest in a return to rule of law;
others are situational spoilers unhappy with the terms of peace or power-sharing; still others are groups
which desire a return of peace and rule of law but which are animated by risk aversion and fear that a
post-conflict state will be predatory. Many local actors are generally committed to peace and security
but are capable of instigating armed violence or instability when it suits them.  Local adaptation and
resilience. East Africa is replete with instances of local communities building systems of governance and
security arrangements in the face of state failure. These emerging orders are usually little more than
coping mechanisms, but in some locations can form the basis of a new political order. These local
systems of governance have variable relations with their central government, and variable legitimacy
locally. Central governments sometimes view informal local security and governance arrangements as
unlawful, extra-constitutional, and a threat, but in other cases forge fruitful partnerships with local
informal political orders. Local Peace Committees (LPCs) involved in regional conflict early warning and
prevention are all lawful and recognized by state actors.  Trends in government behavior and interests.
Both oppressive government and inadequate government are frequently cited as contributors to armed
conflict and instability. East Africa features both. Governments in the region vary widely in their
attitudes and legislation toward non-state or civic actors in managing transborder conflicts; some are
highly restrictive while others are amenable to forging hybrid peace-building partnerships with civil
society groups in border areas. The region‘s stronger states have been much more assertive about
projecting their authority into border areas and across borders into neighboring states, resulting in a
high level of regional armed interventionism and proxy wars. This has also helped to reinforce ―regional
conflict complexes‖ involving multiple states and non-state actors. Some instances of regional
interventionism reflect state security interests, but regional militaries have also been deployed in
pursuit of parochial economic interests. The impact of regional armed interventionism has been variable
—in some cases it has worsened insecurity and armed violence, in other cases it has reduced it. One of
the most important trends in government interests is a much greater commitment to border conflict
management and promotion of solutions to regional conflicts.  Political decentralization. The push
across much of East Africa for political decentralization is introducing new actors—district or regional
authorities within states—into crossborder conflict management. This has major implications for local
resilience in East Africa‘s border areas, especially where new governmental authorities are inclined to
represent local ethnic group agendas over national interests.  East Africa’s borderlands as zones of
opportunity. Three competing views exist over East Africa‘s borderlands: as remote hinterlands, as
security threats, and as zones of economic exchange and opportunity. Two new developments in the
region favor the latter vision—the revival and expansion of the East African Community (EAC) and the
proposed Lamu project linking South Sudan to northern Kenya.  Resource scarcity and transborder
conflict. Growing populations and fixed or declining natural resources, especially land and water, factor
in most local clashes across the region and are intensifying.  Unresolved borders. Dozens of borders
across East Africa are unresolved and contested. When incidents occur or valuable resources are
discovered in these areas, tensions spike between neighboring states, complicating peace-building
efforts. PRIORITIZING REGIONAL CONFLICT ISSUES Based on an initial survey by the team, 10 conflict
issues were selected for further research and prioritization. The issues selected for this round of
research were:  Crossborder and regional land use conflicts: to include land tenure and property rights,
land use conflicts, migration/settlement issues, and legal crossborder disputes over contested regions; 
Transborder crime and violent extremism: to include piracy, terrorism, insurgency, organized crime,
recruitment into armed groups, transborder crime, and illicit trade and trafficking; EAST AFRICA
REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT vii  Regional and transboundary
water conflict: to include issues of pastoral and ethnic conflict over water, climate change impacts,
access and water rights, fishery disputes, interstate disputes over water sources, and regional
management of transboundary water access;  Regional and crossborder mineral resource conflict: to
include a wide range of issues linked to the illicit mining and trade of high-value minerals in the Great
Lakes area, such as livelihood access, human rights abuses, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV),
mass displacement, regional governance, and government collusion and corruption;  Darfur proxy
wars: to include the impact of armed movements involved in the Darfur conflict on the emergence of
South Sudan, the stability of neighboring states, migration, and the spillover international influence and
intervention (such as the International Criminal Court [ICC]);  East Kivu proxy wars: to include the
impact of armed movements involved from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sub-region,
migration and spillover effects, regional and national-level engagement, and international influence
(such as the ICC);  Food security issues: to include climate change, environmental degradation,
migration, economic, political and social marginalization, use of food as a weapon, and land use policy; 
Weak regional institutions: to include an analysis of regional resiliency and governance gaps, regional
conflicts over trade, border security, regional organization management and influence, and peace and
stability mandates;  Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and crossborder and regional impact: to include
displacement; human rights abuses; livelihood impact in Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), South
Sudan, and DRC; regional transgressions, and current and past efforts to mitigate this movement on
civilian security; and  Failed states and ungoverned spaces: to include regional insecurity and conflicts
stemming from failed states in the region, poorly governed regions and borderlands, and countries in
transition over central government authority. To reduce these conflict issues down to a manageable
number for field research, the assessment created a basket of weighted indicators. Those indicators
included potential for destabilizing impact, number of people affected, geographic spread, potential to
impede development, conflict trajectory, and feasibility as a possible USAID target for intervention. The
issues were investigated and scored, and on that basis three conflict issues were selected for fieldwork
investigation:  Crime and violent extremism (CVE), with regional fieldwork conducted in Kenya and
Ethiopia, and follow-up interviews with visiting officials and civil society representatives from South
Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda;  Transboundary and regional water conflicts, with regional fieldwork
locations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia; and  Regional mineral resource conflict (MRC), with
fieldwork focused in the DRC sub-region. Regional fieldwork was conducted in CAR, Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania, and Uganda, and follow-up interviews conducted with officials and civil society
representatives from DRC. All three issues were understood to have the capacity to generate conflict as
well as cooperation. The analytic question that guided the fieldwork was under what conditions are
these factors causing or reinforcing conflict dynamics? Contextual factors—levels of resource scarcity,
government interests and commitment, strength and capacity of spoilers, organization and resilience of
local civic peace-building networks, capacity of regional organizations, and capacity and commitment of
local administrations—were critical in determining whether these three issues reinforced conflict
dynamics or cooperation. Fieldwork revealed that of the three issues, crossborder water conflict
currently constitutes the best-managed issue and is somewhat less likely to produce major violence and
instability in the near term. One exception is the Lake Turkana border clashes, an issue we highlight
separately in Annex 3, and which we believe could serve as a priority area for USAID programming in the
event that one of the two selected priority issues is, for whatever viii EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT
AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT reason, not viable. MRC and CVE were advanced as top
priority concerns for analysis and policy recommendations. IDENTIFYING THE THREE PILLARS: ACTORS
AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE REGION Across all of the conflict issues examined in the field, a common
pattern of institutional resiliency emerged. Specifically, the critical factor in determining local capacity of
peace in East Africa‘s border areas is the strength, legitimacy, and commitment of three actors: (1)
regional institutions and bodies, serving as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation on transborder
conflict issues; (2) subnational governmental authorities (district, county, provincial) whose area of
jurisdiction includes borders with neighboring states; and (3) civil society, often a hybrid coalition of civic
leaders, traditional leaders, religious figures, women‘s groups, youth groups, human rights activists,
business interests, and professionals. Most importantly, what appears to give border communities the
greatest capacity to manage and prevent crossborder conflict is the degree to which these three actors
and institutions are able to routinize cooperation with one another both within and across state
boundaries. This finding points to the potential utility of a three-pillar strategy for conflict prevention
and mitigation in East Africa, in which primary objectives are the strengthening of each of these
institutions and the facilitation of strong and routinized cooperation between them, both within and
across borders. This strategy is described in more detail below. Central state authorities are, of course,
critical as well, and a central government that is unable or unwilling to address transborder conflict
issues can undermine any one of these three actors or even serve as a spoiler. But this study confirmed
that central governments across most of East Africa are increasingly willing, if not always able, to
address transborder conflict and instability. In most of the border areas of East Africa, the physical
presence and capacity of central governments remains modest, but they are able to play an essential
role via regional institutions or via local state authorities. Where central government security forces are
deployed in border areas, their role must be accounted for. CRIME AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Preliminary assessment. Evidence from existing research led us to select CVE as a priority concern. That
research points to the following claims, which we tested in our fieldwork:  Very few border areas in the
region have been immune from the problem of crime. Smuggling and crossborder cattle rustling are the
most common forms of transborder crime, but others are gaining in importance.  Criminal elements
use borders as a safe haven, and borderlands offer ―affordances‖ for criminal activities.  Crossborder
criminality has grown in scale and scope due to commercialization of cattle rustling.  Some of the most
dangerous forms of crossborder crime and extremism are global in nature, involving powerful external
interests ranging from Al-Qaeda to international drug and gun traffickers.  Some crossborder violent
criminality in East Africa is at least partially driven by aims to drive rival ethnic groups off of contested
land, blurring the line between violent crime and acts of communal war.  Spillover of CVE has been a
major cause of instability; today, Kenya is most vulnerable to spillover of violent extremism from
Somalia.  Ready availability of small arms has greatly increased the lethality of crossborder crime and
violence.  Without effective state capacity to arrest and try criminals in border areas, local communities
resort to retaliatory attacks, producing cycles of violence that create deep ethnic animosities.  Finally,
governments in East Africa are increasingly justifying crossborder military as responses to security
threats posed by transborder crime or violent extremism. This alarming inventory of the impact of CVE
on East Africa is partially offset by three factors that existing research has also documented: EAST
AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT ix  Robust local systems of
public order exist in borderlands that at times effectively deter criminal and extremist violence. Some of
these arrangements are informal; others have been formally integrated into government-sanctioned
institutions. The widespread existence of these localized initiatives to ensure basic security and conflict
mitigation is a reminder that communities are not passive in the face of state weakness and armed
violence—they naturally seek to build mechanisms that provide some degree of law and order.  Shifts
in interests on the part of agents of violence and crime have occasionally led them to support systems of
governance. This has sometimes occurred when they accrue fortunes and begin to invest in legitimate
commerce; in other cases, it occurs when militia leaders seek to shift to a political role and calculate that
their political fate is tied to their ability to win over and maintain a local constituency.  Some activities
which are technically illegal—specifically, the smuggling of consumer goods across borders—are in fact
part of a vibrant, region-wide commercial economy that creates shared interests and alliances across
communal and state borders and which represent opportunities for market-based cooperation.
Research findings. Project fieldwork confirmed and amplified these claims. Our most significant findings
include the following:  Sustained efforts by local communities, regional governments, and external
donors to address transborder clashes over livestock raiding and other localized criminal activities have
helped to reduce and manage retaliatory violence and harmful spillover in recent years, though this
varies greatly by location.  Trans-regional criminality is increasingly taking on the form of large,
powerful, international syndicates. Recently, drug transiting—mainly through Kenya—has become a
major new criminal and potentially destabilizing force.  Evidence from Kenya and Somalia point to the
growth in the ―cartelization‖ of politics—that is, the growing political clout of a collection of distinct
networks operating largely out of the public view. These well-funded cartels have the potential to
overwhelm community-level systems of governance and security.  Regional and international pressure
is creating new opportunities to curb and combat at least some types of transborder criminality. East
Africa is seeing some progress in combating criminal impunity, because of a combination of genuine
government commitment, the threat of sanctions on individuals violating arms embargoes posed by UN
Monitoring Group reporting, US and other external legislation on conflict mineral trade, and the robust
activities of the ICC in the region.  Violent extremism in the eastern Horn of Africa—specifically Islamic
extremism, in the form of AlShabaab—is in decline. Al-Shabaab‘s legitimacy has dropped in most Somali
and Islamic circles, after a series of self-defeating policies by the movement. Kenya and Ethiopia‘s recent
military offensives into Somali territory have not, to date, produced blowback in the form of terrorist
attacks in Kenya, but this remains a serious concern, as a weakened Al-Shabaab is in some ways a more
dangerous movement.  The existence of a non-Somali, East African unit that has flown under the
banner of Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat to security in Kenya and Uganda. Many of the underlying
grievances among regional Muslim populations remain in place, even if direct support or sympathy for
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda has waned.  Local actors cannot easily be divided between peace
constituencies and spoilers; armed violence, criminality, and promotion of instability are selectively used
by local figures who may also, under other circumstances, promote rule of law. Most local
constituencies and leaders have mixed motives and mixed methods for pursuing their objectives. 
Leaders of subnational political administrative units (such as districts, provinces, counties, woreda) in
border areas play an under-appreciated but critical quasi-diplomatic role in managing borderland
conflict.  In the past, East Africa‘s border regions were with few exceptions (such as the Great Lakes
border areas) remote, poorly governed, of little economic interest, and zones of convenience for
criminal elements and x EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL
REPORT insurgencies. That condition is changing. Thanks to increased crossborder commerce, the
revival and expansion of the EAC, and proposed major infrastructure developments like the Lamu
project (a proposal to link South Sudan, northern Kenya, and southern Ethiopia with a highway and
pipeline), some of the region‘s once peripheral border areas are poised to become zones of important
commercial activity. This could increase both interest and demand in improved governance and security
in border areas. Regional governments recognize this and are now increasingly viewing their border
areas as ―bridges‖ rather than zones of security and governance troubles, and are more amenable to
strategies involving more open border zones for pastoral and commercial activities and access to
services. CONFLICT, INSTABILITY, AND REGIONAL MINERAL TRADE Preliminary assessment. No other
border region of the world has produced war-related fatality levels matching those that have beset the
Great Lakes region since the early 1990s. The region‘s multiple armed conflicts have had many causes,
but conflict minerals are a pivotal conflict driver. Specifically, certain high-value minerals, the mine sites,
and control of trade of these minerals are an important source of financing for government-affiliated
militias and violent non-state actors that are responsible for the horrific levels of physical violence and
coercion in eastern DRC. The instability and insecurity this breeds is felt primarily within the borders of
the DRC, but the actors, interests, trade, and spillover effects span the entire Great Lakes region. Most
of the findings in existing research on the Great Lakes‘ conflict minerals highlight the intractability of
instability and violence spawned by the mineral extraction and trade. Existing analyses emphasize that a
powerful array of local, regional, and global actors benefit from the illegal extraction and trade in high-
value minerals— gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten—out of eastern DRC. The political economy of
mineral extraction and trade in the Great Lakes has thrived in conditions of ―durable disorder‖ and
lawlessness that are essential for armed groups and others to capture and control artisanal mines,
coerce or tax mine labor, and smuggle the high-value minerals across the border. From this perspective,
the main beneficiaries of the trade in minerals constitute a powerful network of stakeholders in
perpetuating instability in the border areas. This line of analysis provides a compelling explanation for
the long duration and extreme violence of the crisis in eastern DRC and Great Lakes. Existing research on
MRC in the Great Lakes region points to the following claims, which we tested in our fieldwork: 
Chronically weak government presence in eastern DRC is a powerful impediment to a solution to Great
Lake transborder violence and instability.  Some elements within the DRC government and military are
beneficiaries of the existing crisis and trade in conflict minerals, and will resist efforts to bring
governance and stability to eastern DRC.  The governments sharing a border with eastern DRC continue
to enjoy benefits accruing from the mineral trade and are in varying degrees complicit in the crisis,
including their involvement in proxy wars inside DRC.  Failed demobilization programs and high
unemployment continue to drive youth into predatory militia involved in the trade of conflict minerals. 
The violence associated with militia tactics to control mines and mine labor is the source of some of the
worst human rights abuses in the world, and has especially devastating impact on women.  Violence
associated with clashes over control of mineral areas has been a critical driver of the region‘s high levels
of internal displacement, which in turn exacerbates communal tensions and insecurity.  A culture of
impunity has developed among the region‘s armed groups and their leaders and this is perpetuated by
weak national and regional systems of security, extradition, and justice.  A solution to the Great Lakes
crisis must include a regional regime to stop the illegal trade in conflict minerals. One approach that is
internationally recognized is to establish an effective certification system to ensure legally exported
minerals are free of conflict to protect trade and livelihoods in the region. This latter argument helped to
advance important recent legislation in the United States, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act requires all companies that are publically traded in the American EAST AFRICA
REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT xi Stock Exchange to ensure the raw
materials they use to make their products are not tied to the conflict in DRC, by auditing the mineral
supply chains from DRC and surrounding countries in the Great Lakes region. Recently, assessments of
the Great Lakes conflict have identified some promising regional and international developments which
constitute a window of opportunity and challenge the pessimism of previous analyses. These
observations include:  International pressure and sanctions targeting human rights abuses linked to
mineral smuggling is growing and is increasingly effective. Interests and political calculations of regional
governments are shifting in ways that offer hope for collaboration on the monitoring and management
of illegal crossborder and regional trade.  The Dodd-Frank legislation is having a ripple effect in building
greater international commitment to end the trade in conflict minerals, leading to creation of systems
for accountability and transparency that are more difficult for elite and criminal networks and armed
actors in the region to circumvent.  Country governments in the region have reacted by revising mining
codes, frameworks, and laws to adhere to some of these new systems, showing greater political will in
the region then has existed in decades.  Pressure from industry, reduction in international interest in
exploration, and a significant drop in concessions is driving states in the Great Lakes to reconsider the
desirability of illegal mineral exploitation, transit, and trade. Fieldwork findings. Our field research
confirmed that significant challenges remain in the region to mitigate illegal trade. There is ample
evidence that the political economy of conflict mineral trade still remains a powerful force across the
region and will resist initiatives to regulate mineral trade and improve governance and conflict
mitigation in the border areas. But it also confirmed that shifts in regional political will and international
interests to address conflict mineral trade constitute an opportunity to mitigate dimensions of a conflict
that clearly requires regional and international pressure to resolve. Some of the findings from field work
include the following:  There is a greater commitment on the part of regional states to empower a
regional body—the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)—to play a lead role in
supporting host country governments to stem illegal mineral trade, partially due to international
pressure to conform to industry and international standards. The cornerstone is ICGLR‘s Regional
Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR), which has been working since 2010
to promote harmonized regional approaches to curb the illegal exploitation of ―conflict minerals,‖ 2 by
creating tools to increase member state accountability for responsible mineral trade.  The RINR is
especially promising because of the breadth of the tools it and its member states are developing to
combat illicit and illegal mineral trade. These tools include (1) a Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM),
(2) harmonization of national-level legal frameworks governing the mineral sector, (3) a regional
database documenting regional mineral trade patterns, (4) capacity building for the formalization of
artisanal mining to improve taxation and transparency across borders, (5) peer learning mechanisms
between member states in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and (6) a whistle-
blowing mechanism to allow citizens witnessing illicit and illegal activity to anonymously report abuses
to the ICGLR through a web-based platform.  One of the most promising regional responses to the
problem of conflict minerals is ICGLR‘s RCM. This regional certification system will serve as a recognized
guarantee that minerals were mined under acceptable conditions, in areas free of conflict, and have
exited their country of origin in a legal fashion with all dues and taxes paid. Conflict-free mining
conditions will be monitored at the national level by 2 Referred to as “the three Ts and gold”, tin,
tungsten and tantalum are known at their point of extraction by the ores from which they are derived:
cassiterite (tin), wolframite (tungsten), and coltan (tantalum). xii EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND
INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT local systems, and will include third-party auditors to ensure
standards are independently verified. The ICGLR certificate will serve as the sole acceptable document
for intraregional mineral shipments and is critical in ensuring traceability of conflict-sensitive minerals
exported from the region.  Civil society groups are an important part of proposed independent
monitoring mechanisms for certification standards. Their capacity to play this role varies by location.
Strengthening the capacity of civic groups in monitoring, advocacy, and dissemination of information to
local communities is a critical link in the certification chain.  The shift in the interests of regional
governments—from complicity in conflict mineral trade and associated violence, to greater willingness
to explore a new, legitimate, and peaceful mineral trade regime in the Great Lakes—is real, but fragile.
Independent auditing and harmonized standards for conflict-free mining is essential in pressuring
country governments to mitigate exploitation of minerals by armed groups and in signifying to conflict-
affected communities that human rights infractions matter to central and regional governments. These
governments, and some powerful circles of interests within these governments, are calculating how
they can continue to profit from the mineral trade without incurring costs associated with violation of
proposed certification schemes. Those calculations can and will be shaped in large part by emerging
international and regional norms regarding certification schemes, and associated penalties for illegal
trade and transit of conflict minerals.  ICGLR officials acknowledge that smuggling of minerals will not
be completely eliminated by the emerging certification regime, but are confident that 70% or more of
total mineral exports will be certified and traceable. This will have a profound effect in reducing the
extent to which minerals finance armed groups and drive insecurity and human rights abuses across
eastern DRC. BUILDING A THREE-PILLAR APPROACH TO REGIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND
MITIGATION The two strategic program recommendations made here—one on crossborder conflict
management in the Horn of Africa, the other on promotion of responsible regional mineral trade and
access—seek to seize windows of opportunity now presenting themselves on these issues. Both are
relatively time-sensitive, requiring support and assistance to local conflict mitigation coalitions within
the near future if they are to have maximum impact. Both seek to strengthen and build on existing local,
state, and regional institutions and their resilience to conflict drivers, and to improve their capacity to
work with one another. In this sense, the recommendations correspond closely to the main finding of
the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, which was ―strengthening
legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break
cycles of violence.‖ The most resilient systems deterring or managing conflict and instability involve
three pillars of authority working in cooperation: (1) regional institutions and bodies, (2) subnational
governmental authorities in distinct conflict zones (district, county, provincial), and (3) legitimate and
committed civil society. Building the response capability of these three key pillars has the greatest
potential to mitigate regional and crossborder conflict. All three can only be effective when central
governments in the region are supportive. Little progress can be made in situations where central
governments act as spoilers rather than facilitators of borderland conflict mitigation. Local communities,
district or provincial authorities, and interstate regional institutions all play a vital role in managing a
range of regional crossborder conflict issues. They are chiefly responsible for variable and sometimes
dramatic improvements in borderland security across parts of the East African region in the past 15
years. Their capacity—both as stand-alone actors and as part of an integrated, three-pillar approach to
conflict-management— is a critical source of resilience in the face of mounting conflict pressures across
the region‘s troubled border areas. Regional institutions and bodies can serve as platforms for
intergovernmental cooperation on transborder conflict issues. These institutions and their technical and
strategic response capacities are often critical in preventing and responding to potential and protracted
crossborder and transnational issues such as crime, violent extremism, smuggling, and displacement as a
result of humanitarian emergencies or the impact of civil conflict. Subnational governmental authorities
in border areas are often the first responders to transborder conflict. The recommendations for both
priority issues identified by this assessment address the need for greater emphasis on EAST AFRICA
REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT xiii programming support to these
three pillars of conflict mitigation. Strategic and targeted programming for key regional institutions,
interventions that seek to strengthen units of governance essential for crossborder and regional
collaboration, and sustained support for committed civil society actors will provide an enabling
environment for conflict prevention, mitigation, and transformation. STRATEGIC APPROACH TOWARD
REGIONAL AND TRANSBORDER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT Recommendations in this section stem from
the fieldwork conducted in Kenya and Ethiopia looking at issues relating to CVE. Both our preliminary
research and subsequent fieldwork reinforced our conclusion that transborder crime constitutes a
serious and growing threat to borderland peace and stability. We concluded that modest levels of
funding for reducing transborder violent extremism, however, would not be likely to have a significant
impact, given the relatively weak results of recent civil affairs ―hearts and minds‖ outreach in the
region and the costs of large-scale media programs to counter radical narratives. Fieldwork reaffirmed
that local, national, and regional mechanisms are in place which are responding to criminal threats in
border areas; but with calibrated support, these entities could improve their capacity still further. It was
determined that recent and pending changes in local governance systems in border areas would
significantly benefit from increased capacitybuilding programs focused on conflict management and
mitigation. Programs that focus on strengthening these local capacities and civil society through
effective partnership with key regional institutions have the greatest future potential for impact.
Recommendations propose that the regional mission build on its current support of transborder conflict
mitigation mechanisms in East Africa via the following three integrated projects:  First, it recommends
continued, though carefully calibrated, support to the Conflict and Early Warning and Response
(CEWARN) mechanism in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to improve
interstate cooperation in conflict early warning, prevention, and management.  Second, it advocates
expansion of USAID‘s successful Peace II program on the Somali-Kenya border into other suitable border
areas in the region (while maintaining support for the current work on the Somali-Kenya border). Many
transborder corridors in the region merit attention, but feedback from government officials in the region
pointed to several locations as top priority areas, including the contested Sudan-South Sudan border,
portions of the South Sudan-Ethiopia border near Gambella, portions of the ―Karamoja cluster‖
especially in the Uganda-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Kenya border area, and the Moyale border area of
Ethiopia and Kenya.  Third, it envisions a new project involving peace building and diplomatic training
and support to local government authorities in the region. Major changes in the composition and nature
of local government are occurring now in Kenya, South Sudan, and southern Somalia; these changes
constitute a critical window of opportunity for borderland conflict prevention. Over the past 15 years, a
number of initiatives—some grassroots, others governmental—have sought to build and strengthen
borderland conflict management systems in the Horn of Africa. Most of the focus has been on two of
these three pillars. First, community-level peace building in border areas has been the object of
considerable attention, and has yielded excellent, though predictably uneven, results across the Horn of
Africa. Kenya‘s Peace and Development Committees (PDCs) embody this approach to enfranchising local
non-state actors in peace building and building partnerships between local community authorities and
local governments in border management; USAID‘s ―Peace II‖ program exemplifies donor support to
this pillar of borderland peace building. Second, regional states have, with substantial donor support,
sought to routinize intergovernmental cooperation in the prevention and mitigation of border conflicts.
IGAD‘s CEWARN is an example of this commitment. The next logical step in this program is to support
subnational government bodies which play an underappreciated role in border conflict issues, and
support routinized coordination between these three actors. xiv EAST AFRICA REGIONAL CONFLICT AND
INSTABILITY ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE
REGIONAL MINERAL TRADE The drivers of conflict and instability in the Great Lakes region are numerous
and complex, but unregulated mineral trade is especially significant both in triggering and perpetuating
armed conflict. Unregulated mineral trade helps to create an enabling environment for armed conflict,
fuels corruption, facilitates the illegal capture of resource minerals by state and non-state actors, and
deprives countries of wealth critical for promotion of national and local development. Promoting more
responsible regional mineral trade and strengthening the technical response capacity of regional bodies,
national governments, and targeted civil society platforms in the region can mitigate conflicts over
conflict minerals and protect essential livelihoods in the region. Recommendations call for the regional
mission to expand its programming into the Great Lakes region by providing support for regional
responses working to combat the negative impacts of illegal exploitation of conflict minerals. A variation
on the three-pillar strategy is applicable to conflict minerals as well, and informs our specific
recommendations for programming in support of regional institutions, local government, and regional
and local civil society groups and networks. The following summarizes the proposed program
components:  First, our study points to opportunities for USAID/EA to support institutional
strengthening of ICGLR, which is playing a critical role as a source of accountability and implementation
monitoring of regional states‘ agreements addressing trade of conflict minerals. In particular, we see
opportunities to provide support to the ICGLR Secretariat to improve donor coordination, and the RINR
technical unit to ensure effective implementation of regional tools and frameworks, designed to
formalize and harmonize mineral trade in the Great Lakes region. In addition, this program could include
training and capacity building for members of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (RIMC)
to ensure harmonized approaches and tools comply with regional and international standards regarding
conflict-free mining.  Second, it is recommended that the mission support country-level pilot initiatives
utilizing RCM or other tools of the RINR, promoting accountability and transparency between citizens
and government. This component could include assistance with the development of the third party
auditing system to strengthen collaboration between civil society, industry, and local governments in
conflict-affected mining areas. This would include technical support and training for local government
officials and civil society organization (CSO) networks to participate in mining audits to verify the status
of ―conflict-free‖ mines. This will support local and national initiatives that encourage regional
replication of best mining practices and approaches that mitigate conflict, prevent human rights abuses,
and increase employment.  Third, we recommend that a component of this program strengthen
national CSOs and their regional networks to promote increased citizen engagement in public campaigns
supporting conflict-free mining practices. This could include support for watchdog approaches,
community-based monitoring systems, or early warning systems that allow citizens to report abuses in
conflict-affected mining areas and in exploitive mining practices. Working to support CSOs and their
networks can contribute to regional awareness campaigns (CSOs, local media) on improved mining
practices and standards at the local and national levels, particularly in conflict-affected and high risk
border areas.
 ---2NR: Link

Empirically proven – Ruto has incited ethic violence in the past.

Baldauf and Pflanz 10 Scott Baldauf is a staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor. Mike Pflanz
covers Africa from his base in Nairobi. Since then, he has reported from 22 countries across the
continent, focused mainly on politics, economics, environment and international development. “The six
men accused of inciting Kenya's post-election violence”
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/1215/The-six-men-accused-of-inciting-Kenya-s-post-
election-violence/William-Ruto] Kelvin

William Ruto, a Kalenjin, got his start in politics in 1992 as organizing secretary of the ruling KANU
party’s youth league. He quickly made his mark by ensuring that young Kenyans, and particularly the
young members of his own Kalenjin ethnic group, showed up to vote for their tribe’s top politician, then-
President Daniel arap Moi.

For this reason, many Kenyans are not surprised to find that Mr. Ruto – who has since become a top
leader and powerful campaigner within the Orange Democratic Movement opposition party – has been
named by the International Criminal Court for his alleged role in “masterminding” ethnic violence in his
home district and parliamentary constituency of Eldoret. Eldoret was the site of the fiercest ethnic
fighting, where bands of youths carrying gas canisters and machetes chased out hundreds of thousands
of ethnic Kikuyus in the Rift Valley, people who were perceived to be supporters of President Mwai
Kibaki, who is himself a Kikuyu.

Seen by his ethnic Kalenjins as their strongest voice in the opposition, Ruto was appointed to be his
party’s toughest advocate in the mediation process of early 2008, led by UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, which produced the Government of National Unity that brought an end to the violence and
continues to rule today. Later, Ruto served briefly as minister of agriculture before being shifted to
minister of higher education after a scandal surrounding the mysterious sale of Kenya’s stock of maize in
the midst of a maize shortage. Ruto has since been suspended from his job as minister of higher
education in order to face corruption charges over the sale of public lands to the Kenya Pipeline
Company.
1NC – AT: Inherency
 --Top
Squo Solves
Mukeredzi 2016 [Tonderayi Mukeredzi, Tonderayi is an independent journalist and media consultant
based in Zimbabwe with over 16 years of experience of writing on politics, business, development,
climate change, energy, agriculture and humanitarian issues., University of South Africa August-
November 2016 ] TA 7-22-2022

The image of Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Chadian President Idriss Déby proudly holding the
first two copies of the newly launched pan-African passport at the African Union (AU) summit in the
Rwandan capital Kigali this month marked the type of historic moment rarely seen at such gatherings,
where outcomes are often measured in declarations or resolutions. With the launch of the new pan-
African document, the continent moved up a notch towards the free cross-border movement of goods
and people—in direct opposite to Brexit, the decision by British voters to exit the European Union. The
AU will issue the new biometric or electronic passport only to African heads of state, foreign ministers
and diplomats accredited by the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It will bear the AU’s name
and that of the issuing country. The plan is for African governments to roll it out to their citizens by
2018. Many thought the move was well overdue, since one of the AU’s regional trading blocs, the 15-
member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has been offering 90-day visa-free
entry to member states’ citizens since the late 1970s. Visas in Ghana One sign that the region is making
progress in dismantling intra-African trade barriers is that while the AU was launching its new passport,
Ghana, a member of ECOWAS, was starting to issue visas upon arrival to citizens of all 54 African
countries. Prior to the move, Ghana offered visa-free entry only to ECOWAS citizens. According to the
African Development Bank’s Africa Visa Openness Report 2016, acquiring a visa is a huge challenge for
travellers, with Africans still needing visas to travel to 55% of other African countries. Only 13 out of 54
countries offer liberal access (visa-free or visa on arrival) to Africans. Integrationists say restrictions on
movement across borders go against the continent’s goal of becoming “One Africa” and further negate
the spirit of the AU’s Agenda 2063, the continent’s long-term economic blueprint. They maintain that
visa-free regimes promote intra-African trade and investment, facilitate business and create
employment opportunities. So far Seychelles is the only country in Africa that has abolished visa
requirements for all African countries, with Ghana, Mauritius and Rwanda having made great strides.
Namibia and Zimbabwe have also made notable progress. In March, Zimbabwe scrapped its requirement
for visas for citizens of members of the Southern African Development Community ( SADC), another AU
regional trading bloc. The country is already one of only nine African countries offering e-Visas, which
allow visitors to apply online and pay for a visa on arrival, facilitating easy and hassle-free travelling.
Likewise, Namibia scrapped visa requirements in May for all holders of diplomatic or official passports
from AU member states. Although the visa exemptions do not apply to all Africans, they are widely seen
as a precursor to a continent-wide visa-free regime. Southern Africa ranks as the third most open sub-
region in Africa. It allows the highest number of the world’s population into its countries without visa
restrictions, while East Africa is the continent’s most visa-open sub-region. Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda
share the East Africa Tourist Visa, an open visa initiative for citizens from the three countries. In the
coming months, Rwanda could very well follow Seychelles’s footsteps, as it is carrying out a study
expected to recommend abolishing visa requirements for all African nationals. In the meantime, Burundi
and Tanzania have opted to stay out of the common tourist visa initiative for security reasons. Yves
Butera, spokesperson for the Rwanda Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration, said removing
visa restrictions would promote African unity and help the continent reduce its dependence on donor
aid. “The idea of an Africa with seamless borders is the way to go. Africa is endowed with vast natural
resources, including minerals and rich soil. If we can combine our strength, then we could live without
financial help from Western and European countries,” he told Africa Renewal. Mr. Butera said his
country’s non-restrictive visa regime has allowed more visitors to visit Rwanda, which has boosted trade
and development and created jobs. “We support the idea of visas on arrival; if necessary we should
remove visas to Rwanda so that people can freely visit our country and other African countries,” he said.
“As well, the idea of open visas and/or visas on arrival is beneficial to us because it facilitates the ease of
doing business between our country and other countries, and that helps investors to come here easily,
and to spend, which creates revenue and jobs.” He urged other African countries to adopt visa-free
policies, which is one of the many elements that have lifted Rwanda to its ranking among the top three
easiest places to do business in Africa. A high ranking on the World Bank’s ease of doing business index
means the regulatory environment is conducive to starting and operating a company. The World
Tourism Organization (WTO), a UN body that promotes tourism, notes that Africa has made significant
progress in simplifying the issuance of visas since the organisation started monitoring tourism visa
policies in 2008. “In 2008, Africans comprised on average 88% of the world’s population to apply for a
traditional visa prior to departure. This has decreased to 57% in 2015, because many African countries
have introduced travel facilitation measures such as visa on arrival and e-Visa,” Rut Gomez Sobrino, a
WTO media officer, told Africa Renewal. WTO research has shown that tourist visa facilitation can
deliver important benefits by increasing tourist numbers and generating more income, said Ms. Sobrino,
adding that “[visa facilitation] is also a key element in fostering regional integration, and we are thus
very pleased to see the progress that is being made in Africa.” This is corroborated by the Africa Visa
Openness Report, which observes that Rwanda, a country that abolished work permits for East African
Community citizens to support its open-visa policy, has increased its trade with Kenya and Uganda by at
least 50%, while the visa-on-arrival policy has increased African arrivals in Rwanda by an average of
about 22% per year. Foreign nationals, however, may be charged up to $100 for a 90-day East African
Tourist Visa or $30 for a 30-day Rwandan visa purchased at the airport. For a seamless Africa to be a
success, the WTO says it is imperative to continue to push for the elimination of visa requirements, the
continuous liberalization of international air transport to the benefit of all stakeholders, the promotion
of initiatives (such as one-stop border posts) that reduce delays, and the creation of interregional and
international transport and road transit. A one-stop border post merges two stops in a national border
control process into one to reduce transit costs and facilitate the easy movement of passengers and
goods. What are the threats? The greatest threats to a borderless Africa lie in the prospect of increased
risks to national security and heightened exposure to regional conflicts, contagion from public health
crises and the movement of the jobless from many parts of the continent. African countries with strong
economies tend to attract a large number of migrants from poor countries. The lack of technological
infrastructure and capacity to issue biometric passports is likely to create problems for many African
countries. Only 13 of the 54 African countries currently offer biometric passports. However, the
experiences of Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles and the ECOWAS bloc show the positive effects of open-
visa policies on economies, and that governments can address security concerns and economic
migration by investing in new technologies, effective traveller identification management systems and
integrated border controls. For full integration, open visas should also be accompanied by free
movement of goods and the removal of high, protective tariff barriers. According to the World Bank,
intra-African trade costs are around 50% higher than in East Asia, and are the highest of intraregional
costs in any developing region. In its December 2015 brief, “Deepening African Integration: Intra-Africa
Trade for Development and Poverty Reduction”, Anabel Gonzalez, the bank’s director of trade
competitiveness, notes that because of high costs, Africa has integrated with the rest of the world faster
than with itself. Effective regional integration, she suggested, must involve more than removing tariffs; it
must also involve addressing on-the-ground constraints that paralyze the daily operations of ordinary
producers and traders. This is done through regulatory reforms and building the capacity of institutions
tasked with enforcing the regulations. Africa seems to be going where the EU is coming from, given the
Brexit experience and the anti-immigration sentiment sweeping Europe; the majority of its citizens are
keen on moving towards a more integrated continent, although outbreaks of xenophobia have been
reported. Integration starts with making it easier for people and services to move freely across national
borders. The new AU passport is an important new addition to the steps Africa is already taking to
achieve the goals embodied in the Agenda 2063 vision.

This summer I holidayed in Africa. This was partly from choice, but also because the wealthier nations
that so many middle-class Africans aspire to visit, think that their vaccines don’t work quite so well when
administered here, and that the continent is a cesspit of new, scarier variants of Covid that are best
managed by an enforced, two-week stay in a government-mandated hotel. So, we braved the multiple
Covid tests, airport protocols and the actual fear of contracting Covid at the end of it all, to spend our
hard-earned money on an African holiday. Travelling through Mombasa on a hot humid afternoon in an
air-condition-less taxi, looking at the people, the colours, the food, the traffic, the energy… I felt I could
easily have been in Lagos, Kampala, Accra or any one of Africa’s vibrant cities. It struck me then, that in
Africa we have so much more in common than we have differences, and that our whole is so much
stronger than the sum of our 54 parts. It felt like we had forgotten the promise on which many countries
had built their independence – the pan-African dream of One Africa. In 1961, Kwame Nkrumah, the
visionary who led Ghana to independence, knew this better than anyone when he said: “It is clear that
we must find an African solution to our problems, and that this can only be found in African unity.
Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.” But
before we can bring good to the world, we need to unleash that force on ourselves first – there is much
work to be done. For a start, Africa is the least connected continent in the world when it comes to road
and rail networks. Today, post-Covid, it is almost impossible to fly between African countries without
stepping into Europe, and Africans still need visas to enter more than half the countries on the
continent. Despite being officially ‘launched’ in 2016, there’s little evidence of the African Union
Passport being widely used. Like the passport, there are numerous continental initiatives working
towards this goal of One Africa but 60-plus years later, we are still a long way from achieving Nkrumah’s
vision. There is some progress: the African Union, AUDA-NEPAD, the Regional Economic Communities,
the AFC, AfDB and Afreximbank are examples of the pan-African structures we have been able to put in
place. In turn, they are creating the frameworks and the fabric; the many continental agreements that
cover trade, peace and security, governance and democracy in Africa that will lead us to that lofty goal.
Crucial role of soft power Continental integration is a key pillar of the AU’s Agenda 2063 . It also
underpins the most ambitious, unifying initiative seen on the continent since the launch of the AU itself
in 2002: the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement . And like many of the other
structures, agreements, and policies designed to support continental integration, the focus is on ‘hard
power’. They miss out on the growing importance of soft power, cultural diplomacy and the need to
develop a real ‘brotherhood’ and shared understanding of our history and culture. The EU has proved
integration can be done – from monetary, to trade, to the movement of its people. But what I learned
from Brexit was that the architecture and machinery required for the management of continental
agreements and initiatives is mammoth. The EU has a budget of about €1,082bn/yr for its 27 members
and over 60,000 employees in the system, while the AU’s budget for 2020 was $647.3m for its 55
members. Britain’s messy exit from the EU helped us all understand the benefits of being part of a union
– benefits they are negotiating to keep. The security and prosperity, access to bigger markets,
movement of labour, goods, services and capital are just some of the reasons why Europe came
together. It’s the same reason why we should. But it’s not just lack of funding holding African unity back,
some of the agreements that aim to connect and unite the continent are doomed to fail from the outset
because in many cases and for various reasons, they are not signed or ratified by African leaders. In fact,
very few countries have signed, ratified and domesticated all the agreements developed. The AfCFTA for
example, has been signed by only 36 countries. It’s not just issues with signing, often there are no
guidelines, frameworks, mechanisms, or institutions in place to manage how these agreements will play
out in country, or how potential conflicts of interest will be addressed. In other words, there is work to
be done if we are going to see One Africa in my lifetime.

AFTC solves—
Kituyi 19 [(Dr Mukhisa is the secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.), Borderless
continent, that is where the future lies, The East African, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/kusi-ideas/borderless-
continent-that-is-where-the-future-lies-1432788, DECEMBER 13 2019] SS

At a time when the multilateral system is under siege and media speculation about Brexit and whether the European Union is in
decline is widespread, the African Union is quietly deepening economic, social, and political ties.

Africa has embarked on a journey of transformational change : while the international media may be portraying a dismal
picture of Africans as refugees fleeing on boats, the reality is much different.

Economic integration is progressing. The signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in January 2018, and
its ratification by 27 countries so far, is an important development milestone for the continent.

It has taken Africa almost 30 years since the signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991 to reach this stage. But
the continent cannot afford to wait another 30 years to translate AfCFTA and the potential it holds into
reality.

Africa’s success at augmenting economic prosperity for all on the continent will depend critically on its
capacity to transform AfCFTA into a catalyst for structural change and prosperity.

54
While the rest of the world has often felt captive to trade tensions between the world’s two largest economies, since July 2019 the
members of the African Union have entered the operational phase of AfCFTA, putting into action far-
reaching plans to tear down barriers to trade and mobility on the continent.

With further alignment and improved coordination, AfCFTA has real potential to foster the development
of robust regional value chains, which could increase intra-African trade.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Economic Development in Africa Report 2019 –
The
Made in Africa, Rules of Origin for Enhanced Intra-African Trade notes that the establishment of AfCFTA
could lead to a reorientation of trade towards the regional market, in the long-run associated with
significant overall welfare gains, output, and employment expansions.

welfare and output gains could be significantly enhanced if AfCFTA negotiations also effectively
In fact,
address not just tariff-related issues, but also non-tariff barriers such as trade facilitation issues, sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, and rules of origin.

sophistication of intra-African trade suggests that the regional market may offer a greater
Overall, the relative
– and so far, largely untapped – scope for supporting economic diversification provided that AfCFTA is
approached and implemented as an opportunity to enhance the consistency of Africa’s trade policy
framework and structural transformation agenda.

The new Pan-African agenda goes beyond trade and value chains, however, and includes free movement
of African citizens across borders for both work and leisure travel.

The African Union (AU) passport, aimed at facilitating the free movement of people on the continent, is beginning
to gain momentum.
According to the African Development Bank’s Africa Visa Openness Report 2019, African visitors no longer need a visa to travel to a quarter of
other African countries, whereas visa-free travel was only possible to a fifth of the continent in 2016. Currently, 21 African countries also offer
e-visas to make travel more accessible.

Africa’s airspace is going borderless as well, with significant progress on the AU Single African Air Transport Market initiative launched in 2018.

Signed by 23 countries it makes it easier for Africans to travel across the continent. But this wider scope of borderless Africa can also go further
in countering the false narrative around African migrants.

With deeper regional integration and cooperation, African countries must improve their migration
management by developing tools and capabilities to more effectively measure movement of people.

– Migration for Structural Transformation shows that, contrary

UNCTAD’s Economic Development in Africa Report 2018
to popular perception, international migration in Africa is primarily a continental phenomenon.
In 2017, more than half – 53 per cent – of Africa’s international migrants resided within the continent, many of them circulating within the
same region.
For many Africans, migration offers a chance at a better life for them and their families, with
benefits extending to future generations and spanning both the countries of destination and origin.

Countries of destination for African migrants fill critical skill gaps as well as benefiting from improved
productivity and increased output. Cote d’Ivoire – a leading migration destination on the continent – has reaped significant
benefits from international migration. In 2008, international migrants’ contribution amounted to almost a fifth (19 per cent) of Cote d’Ivoire’s
GDP.

Africa’s international migrants often acquire skills in destination countries that enable them to earn higher incomes and create better
livelihoods for themselves and their families.

Migrants’ countries of origin gain from remittances, diaspora investment, nostalgia trade generated by
migrants’ demand for products from their home countries, as well as knowledge, technology, and skill
transfer from returning migrants.

many African women, opportunities in domestic service, informal trade, retail, and other services
For
have enabled them to earn incomes that improve their livelihoods, support their families, and
contribute to poverty reduction.
Eliminating regulatory restrictions that hinder migrants from taking advantage of these opportunities is
paramount for realising the benefits of a borderless Africa. Recognising low and semi-skilled migrants’
qualifications can enhance their employment prospects and mitigate deskilling – a challenge that some
migrants face in destination countries.

The removal of preferences for nationals in Morocco and Rwanda’s temporary visa (H-4) for semi-skilled
migrants are examples of measures that have enabled international migrants to take up employment
legally and integrate in labour markets.

Ensuring legal protections for women who often work in vulnerable, unregulated employment in
domestic service, informal trade and other services, and tackling gender-related security risks that
inherently affect women’s migration journeys are also crucial.

Borderless Africa stands to reap further benefits from closer trade, industry, and migrant links among its
countries. The geopolitical moment is opportune, the economic case is solid, and the domestic political
stars seem aligned in most African countries. The time to capitalise on this potential for Africa’s youth to
benefit from this $2.5 trillion promise is now.

The squo solves—

Maliszewska et al 20 [(Maryla– Lead Author, is a Senior Economist in Trade and Regional Integration Unit (ETIRI) at
the World Bank. Her area of expertise covers various aspects of trade policy and regional integration with a special focus on the
impacts of trade on poverty and income distribution), (Michele Ruta – Lead Author, is a Lead Economist in the Trade and
Regional Integration Unit (ETIRI) at the World Bank. His research interests are in international economics, and particularly on
issues concerning international/regional integration),( Guillermo Arenas is an Economist in the Trade and Regional Integration
Unit (ETIRI) at the World Bank. His area of expertise covers various aspects of international economics and public policy
including trade policy, export competitiveness, and impact evaluation),( Paul Brenton is a Lead Economist in the Trade and
Regional Integration Unit (ETIRI) at the World Bank. He focuses on analytical and operation work on trade and regional
integration),( Cesar Calderon is a Lead Economist in the Chief Economist Office of the Africa Region at the World Bank. He was
worked on issues of growth and development —especially, the growth effects of infrastructure development and outward-
oriented strategies)( Roberto Echandi is a Lead Private Sector Specialist in ETIRI. He focuses on research and policy advice on
issues related to cross border trade in services, negotiation, implementation and maximization of potential benefits of Deep
Integration Trade Agreements and the AfCFTA negotiation and implementation process),( Israel Osorio Rodarte is an Economist
in the Trade and Regional Integration Unit at the World Bank. He more than 10 years of experience in international
development, particularly on areas of economic diversification, structural change, and in the distributional analysis of trade and
macroeconomic policy)( Dominique van der Mensbrugghe is Research Professor and Director of the Center for Global Trade
Analysis (GTAP) at Purdue University. The focus of his work during his career has been on long-term structural change of the
global economy and the analysis of global economic policy issues)( Maria Filipa Seara e Pereira consults in the Trade Regional
Integration Unit (ETIRI) at the World Bank. She works mainly on topics of international trade, and international development,
particularly in modeling, trade policy, distributional effects of trade and global value chains)( Yulia Vnukova consults in the
Trade and Regional Integration Unit (ETIRI) at the World Bank. Based on over ten years of experience, Yulia’s current work
focuses on trade policy and regional integration, with the focus on macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis of trade, trade
and sector competitiveness, global value chains, and private sector development in emerging economies across Europe, Asia,
and Africa.)“The African Continental Free Trade Area”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-
continental-free-trade-area, JULY 27, 2020] SS

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement will create the largest free trade area in
the world measured by the number of countries participating. The pact connects 1.3 billion people
across 55 countries with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) valued at US$3.4 trillion. It has the
potential to lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty, but achieving its full potential will depend on
putting in place significant policy reforms and trade facilitation measures.

The scope of AfCFTA is large. The agreement will reduce tariffs among member countries and cover
policy areas such as trade facilitation and services, as well as regu latory measures such as sanitary
standards and technical barriers to trade. Full implementation of AfCFTA would reshape markets and
economies across the region and boost output in the services, manufacturing and natural resources
sectors.

As the global economy is in turmoil due to the COVID-19 pandemic, creation of the vast AfCFTA regional
market is a major opportunity to help African countries diversify their exports, accelerate growth, and
attract foreign direct investment.

The World Bank report, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, is
designed to guide policymakers in implementing policies that can maximize the agreement’s potential
gains while minimizing risks. Creating a continent-wide market will require a determined effort to
reduce all trade costs. Governments will also need to design policies to increase the readiness of their
workforces to take advantage of new opportunities.

Key Findings

The African Continental Free Trade Agreement represents a major opportunity for countries to boost
growth, reduce poverty, and broaden economic inclusion. Implementing AfCFTA would:

Lift 30 million Africans out of extreme poverty and boost the incomes of nearly 68 million others who
live on less than $5.50 a day;

Boost Africa’s income by $450 billion by 2035 (a gain of 7 percent) while adding $76 billion to the
income of the rest of the world.

Increase Africa’s exports by $560 billion, mostly in manufacturing.

Spur larger wage gains for women (10.5 percent) than for men (9.9 percent).

Boost wages for both skilled and unskilled workers—10.3 percent for unskilled workers, and 9.8 percent
for skilled workers.

Under AfCFTA, extreme poverty would decline across the continent—with the biggest improvements in
countries with currently high poverty rates.

West Africa would see the biggest decline in the number of people living in extreme poverty—a decline
of 12 million (more than a third of the total for all of Africa).
Central Africa would see a decline of 9.3 million.

Eastern Africa would see a decline of 4.8 million.

Southern Africa would see a decline of 3.9 million.

Countries with the highest initial poverty rates, would see the biggest declines in poverty rates.
In Guinea-Bissau, the rate would decline from 37.9 percent to 27.7 percent

In Mali, the rate would decline from 14.4 percent to 6.8 percent.
In Togo, it would decline from 24.1 percent to 16.9 percent.

Of the $450 billion in income gains from AfCFTA, $292 billion would come from stronger trade
facilitation—measures to reduce red tape and simplify customs procedures.
Tariff liberalization is important, but by itself it would boost the continent’s income by just 0.2 percent.

Adding trade facilitation to the mix—including measures to reduce red tape, simplify customs procedures, and make it easier for African
businesses to integrate into global supply chains—would boost the income gains by $292 billion.

These gains will require major efforts by countries to reduce the burden on businesses and traders to cross borders, quickly, safely, and with
minimal interference by officials.

The World Bank report is designed to guide policymakers in implementing policies that can maximize the agreement’s potential gains while
minimizing risks.

Creating a continent-wide market will require a determined effort to reduce all trade costs. In general, this will require legislation and
regulations to enable the free flow of goods, capital and information across borders; create competitive business environments that can boost
productivity and investment; and promote increased foreign competition and foreign direct investment that can raise productivity and
innovation by domestic firms.

In a few sectors facing job losses, governments will need to be ready to support workers with adequate safety nets and policies to retrain
workers.

Governments will need to design policies to increase the readiness of their workforces to take
advantage of new opportunities.

Achieving the gains from AfCFTA is especially important due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which is
expected to cause up to $79 billion in output losses in Africa in 2020 alone.

COVID-19 has caused major disruptions to trade across the continent, including in critical goods such as
medical supplies and food.

By increasing regional trade, lowering trade costs and streamlining border procedures, full
implementation of AfCFTA would help African countries increase their resiliency in the face of future
economic shocks and help usher in the kinds of deep reforms that are necessary to enhance long-term
growth.
1NC – AT: Migration
 1NC – AT: Migration Solvency
Africans don’t move between open borders, it’s empirically proven
Jackie Bischof, 17 — [Jackie Bischof, “Not everyone shares the African Union’s dream of a borderless
Africa,” Quartz, 01-18-2017, https://qz.com/africa/867953/the-african-union-presidents-dream-for-the-
continent-is-also-its-worst-nightmare/, accessed 7-22-2022]

As part of that resolution, people living near the border got to choose their citizenship. But our research
suggests that people in the borderland still strongly cling to their national identities, even when
government officials seek to minimize the divide between nations . According to surveys that we
conducted in the border zone in 2016, few Nigeriens jumped at the opportunity to become Burkinabè,
finding the thought of switching nationalities preposterous.

Here’s how we did our research

This tenacity of national identity is striking in remote communities that receive almost no benefits from
the national government. In 2016, we surveyed 208 people in villages straddling the border between
Niger and Burkina Faso. We asked respondents, mostly Nigeriens, whether they had heard of the ICJ
ruling – and, if so, whether they intended to switch citizenship.

Africa’s big new free trade agreement, explained

We found that knowledge of the ruling was nearly universal, but less than 6 percent of respondents who
answered the question said they wanted to switch to become citizens of Burkina Faso.

Here was one big reason: Respondents said they wished to remain in the nation of their parents and
grandparents, who provide a social safety net in the absence of government support. Instead of claiming
ties to a nation-state, respondents professed attachment to a nation-family, explaining their decision to
remain Nigerien in terms of ancestral roots.

We also surveyed roughly 200 people in the capital cities of Niger and Burkina Faso and conducted focus
groups on the meaning of national identity. In contrast with the borderland respondents, urban
respondents were more likely to frame their nationalism in terms of benefits they receive from the
state. This makes sense, given that urban residents were more likely to receive public goods – education,
health care, etc. – than people in remote villages.

There’s a wider trend toward looser borders

Open borders are becoming fashionable across much of Africa, not just for forging partnerships in the
war on terror, but also for facilitating trade. On July 7, Niger hosted a multinational summit to launch
the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – an ambitious plan for a continent-wide trade zone.

Here’s why Ebola has been so hard to contain in Eastern Congo

Africa’s concerted push for political and economic integration is in stark contrast to the trend of
tightening borders in the United States and Europe. Economic integration has been a long-term project
for African leaders, with regional precedents including the Economic Community of West African States
and the Southern African Development Community.
After four years of negotiations, the AfCFTA finally seemed possible in April, once the requisite 22
countries ratified an agreement to open their borders and lower barriers to trade. At the July summit,
President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, gave free-trade advocates another
dose of hope by ceremoniously signing his name to the agreement, leaving Eritrea the only holdout of
the 55 African Union member countries.

Africans – and their allies – support free trade

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimates that looser borders stand to raise intra-
African trade by up to 25 percent, though key details of the AfCFTA, like e-commerce rules, have yet to
be settled. While it is uncertain whether the AfCFTA will benefit workers in Africa’s largely informal
economies, there is vocal public support for free trade. When the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda
shut their shared border in July amid a political feud, a coalition of East African citizens sued the two
governments over financial losses and insisted that the blockade be removed.

But citizens have shown that welcoming open borders is not the same as wanting to shed their national
differences. According to a recent Afrobarometer survey, Ugandans generally feel closer to their
national identity than to their ethnic identity, and 64 percent of them have never considered moving to
another country to live (data are unavailable for Rwanda).

Announcing the 6th annual TMC African Politics Summer Reading Spectacular!

What does this mean for African borders going forward?

Softer border controls between Niger and Burkina Faso, and across the continent more broadly, do not
mean African borders are disappearing altogether. Africa has seen significantly fewer changes to its map
than other parts of the world, with secessionist conflicts being extremely rare. Even people who feel
oppressed in African countries have tended to accept “artificial” colonial boundaries.

Here’s an example. Tuaregs in the Azawad region of northern Mali fought for independence in 2012 and
2013 but stopped short of trying to unite their co-ethnics in nearby countries with significant Tuareg
populations. Rebel leaders vowed to “respect all the colonial frontiers that separate Azawad from its
neighbours.” The name of their group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad,
underscored their national, rather than international, ambitions of self-governance.

Open borders may be on the way. But persistent nationalism in African countries, often passed down
through generations, suggests that open borders may not inevitably weaken national loyalties or
replace them with a Pan-African identity, despite the hopes of pan-Africanists.
 1NC – AT: Econ
The plan fails and increases inequality—
Cilliers 17 [(Jakkie, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security
Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of Pretoria), What drives instability in Africa and
what can be done about it, The Conversation , https://theconversation.com/what-drives-instability-in-africa-and-what-can-be-
done-about-it-87626, November 28, 2017] SS

Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor and young, but also because it is growing and dynamic.
Development is disruptive but also presents huge opportunities. The continent needs to plan accordingly.

Levels of armed conflict in Africa rise and fall. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Global Terrorism Database
and others indicate that armed conflict peaked in 1990/91 at the end of the Cold War, declined to 2005/6, remained relative stable to 2010/11
and then increased to 2015, although it peaked at lower levels than in 1990/91 before its most recent decline.

Armed conflict has changed. Today there are many more non-state actors involved in armed conflict in
Africa – representing a greater fracturing of armed groupings. So it’s not a matter of “government vs an armed group”
but a “government vs many armed groups”. Insurgents are often divided and sometimes even fighting
amongst themselves. This greater fragmentation complicates peacemaking.

Terrorism has also increased, but depending on how one defines it, it has always been widely prevalent in Africa both
as a tactic to secure decolonisation as well as between and among competing armed groups. The big question for 2017 is: is
violent political extremism going to move from the Middle East to Africa? Put another way, is it in Africa that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State will
find solid footage as they are displaced from the Middle East?

Anti government turbulence has also increased in recent years. In Africa, this has led to disaffection and
violence around elections that are often rigged rather than free and fair. Generally this is because governance in
many African countries present a facade of democracy but don’t yet reflect substantive democracy.

Seven relationships lie behind patterns of violence on the continent, and provide insights into whether it can be managed better.

Relationships explaining violence Poverty

Internal armed conflict is much more prevalent in poor countries than in rich ones . This is not because poor
people are violent but because poor states lack the ability to ensure law and order. The impact of poverty is
exacerbated by inequality, such as in South Africa.

Updated forecasts using the International Futures forecasting system indicate that around 37% of Africans live in extreme
poverty (roughly 460 million people).

By 2030, 32% of Africans (forecast at 548 million) are likely to live in extreme poverty. So, while the portion is
coming down (around 5% less), the absolute numbers will likely increase by around 90 million. It’s therefore unlikely
that Africa will meet the first of the Sustainable Development Goals on ending absolute poverty on a current growth path of roughly 4% GDP
growth per annum.

Democratisation

Democratisation can trigger violence in the short to medium term, particularly around elections. Recent events in Kenya are an example. Where
there is a large democratic deficit, as in North Africa before the Arab spring, tension builds up and can explode.

And a democratic deficit – where levels of democracy are below what can be expected when compared
to other countries at similar levels of income and education – often leads to instability.
Instability is also fuelled by the manipulation of elections and constitutions by heads of state to extend
their stay in power. Examples include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) and Uganda.
Regime type

The nature of the governing regime is another structural factor. Most stable countries are either full
democracies or full autocracies. But most African countries have mixed regimes with some elements of
democracy mixed with strong autocratic features. They present a façade of democracy but lack its
substantive elements. Mixed regimes are inherently more unstable and prone to disruptions than either
full democracies or full autocracies.
Population structure

Africa’s population is young, with a median age of 19. By comparison, the median age is 41 in France (a relatively young
country by European standards). So 22% of adult French are in the youth bulge of 15-29 years compared to 47% of Africans .

more turbulent because young men are largely responsible for violence and crime. If young people
Young countries tend to be
lack jobs and rates of urbanisation are high, social exclusion and instability follow.

Repeat violence

A history of violence is generally the best predictor of future violence. Countries such as Mali, Central
African Republic and the DRC are trapped in cycles of violence. This is very difficult to break. It requires a
huge effort and is very expensive, often requiring a large, multi-dimensional peace mission that only the UN can provide. But, scaling
peacekeeping back rather than scaling it up is the order of the day at the UN.

A bad neighbourhood

Where a country is located can increase the risk of violence becauseborders are not controlled and rural areas not policed .
Most conflict in Africa is supported from neighbouring countries. Violence spills over national borders and affects other
countries while poorly trained and equipped law and order institutions generally cannot operate
regionally.
Slow growth and rising inequality

Africa is quite unequal, so growth does not translate into poverty reduction. In addition, the world is in a
low growth environment after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, with average rates of growth
significantly lower than before. Africa needs to grow at average rates of 7% or more a year if it is to reduce poverty and create jobs,
yet current long term forecasts are for rates significantly below that.

Opportunity amid challenges

These seven related factors indicate that the notion that Africa can somehow “silence the guns by 2020”, as advocated by the African Union as
part of its Agenda 2063 is unrealistic.
Violence will remain a characteristic of a number of African countries for
many years to come and Africa should plan accordingly.

African infrastructure is inadequate to benefit from free trade

Haas 22 Astrid R.N. Haas [Fellow, Infrastructure Institute, School of Cities, University of Toronto] 7-25-
22 “Africa’s free trade area offers promise for cities – but only if there’s investment”
https://theconversation.com/africas-free-trade-area-offers-promise-for-cities-but-only-if-theres-
investment-187177 // CR

The African Continental Free Trade Area came into operation on 1 January 2021. This is a considerable
achievement. The free trade area is now the world’s single largest market for goods and services, when
measured by number of countries, after the World Trade Organisation. It is also the largest in terms of
geographic area and population size.

If implemented as foreseen by the agreement, the free trade area will unlock significant growth for the
African continent. The World Bank has estimated that by 2035, trade between African countries could
expand by 81%, boosting output by US$450 billion, raising wages by 10%, particularly benefiting women,
and lifting 30 million people out of extreme poverty.

These expectations, based on research into the links between trade and economic growth, have
generated excitement and political impetus around getting the free trade area working.

Less well understood, however, is the fact that for the agreement to fulfil its promises, the continent’s
cities are key. They are hubs for production and consumption, and will become significantly more so. But
their current set-up, lacking the necessary infrastructure and services, means most of Africa’s cities are
not yet ready to benefit from and support the free trade area. This will require substantially greater
investments in the continent’s cities.

This link between urbanisation and trade is analysed in the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa’s recently launched publication, Cities: Gateways for Africa‘s Regional Economic Integration.

What cities bring to the party

The importance of cities in unlocking the benefits of the free trade area is premised on three well
established advantages of the economic density that cities can provide.

Firstly, firms, which are the primary vehicles for producing goods for export, prefer to be in cities. There,
they are closer to a larger pool of labour and to each other. This proximity enables them to specialise
but still have access to inputs for their production processes from other firms. They can also learn from
each other, which spurs innovation.

Secondly, cities are the physical locations from which most trade takes place. Cities provide the main
transport links, including road junctions, ports and airports.

Think of the Port of Mombasa, which serves not only Kenya, but also Burundi, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. It is also difficult to think of a
major city that is not served by an airport.

Cities also provide their own internal markets. Rapid urbanisation, with an estimated 900 million
people set to enter African cities in the next 30 years, creates a large upcoming consumer pool. This is
the third advantage of density.

Particularly in the African context, it is not only the number of consumers that will make the difference.
As evidence shows, when people move to cities, their diets change as well. For example, there is a
greater demand for goods with higher value addition, such as refined grains and processed foods. This is
an opportunity for Africa’s farmers to gain, too, as this value addition will fetch a higher price.
Not yet fit for purpose

Substantial investments in infrastructure are needed for cities to be able to unlock the benefits of the
free trade area.

Most notable is the paucity of paved roads. Currently only an estimated 800,000km out of 2.8 million km
of the continent’s roads are paved. This statistic is critical because an estimated 80%-90% of African
trade takes place by road. This raises the costs of African trade. For example, while it costs about
US$2,000 to ship a container from China to the port in Beira, Mozambique, it costs more than double
that amount, namely US$5000, to move it 500km further inland to Malawi.

This lack of infrastructure is a hindrance in cities too. In particular, according to the UN Economic
Commission for Africa report, the cities that should drive the largest portion of trade and reap relatively
larger benefits from the free trade agreement’s provisions are small to medium size ones, especially
those located close to borders.

These are also the cities that have had comparatively less investment to date. Without basic
infrastructure, they will not attract firms – the drivers of production, value addition and export.

Whatever happens in implementing the free trade area, rapid urbanisation will continue across Africa.
Consumption preferences of the continent’s population will shift. If African firms can’t meet these
demands, imports from other regions of the world will do so.

Under this scenario, other countries will disproportionately gain from Africa’s new urban consumer
population.

Investing in cities

The current political support for the free trade agreement is significant, with all but one African country
having signed the deal and 43 countries already having ratified it. Harnessing the combined effect of
trade and urbanisation could positively transform the African continent’s economy.

This will require not only the signing of policies but their implementation.

To date, only Egypt, Ghana and South Africa have readjusted their national regimes to implement the
customs rules under the agreement. Well-managed urbanisation is still not a primary policy focus in
many countries. The result is that populations are settling in cities quicker than planning and
investments are happening. Rather than benefiting from well-managed density, major African cities are
characterised by the proliferation of slums and congestion. On top of this, substandard infrastructure is
deterring large firms.

Each of these challenges has its own host of policy reforms, programmes and actions that need to be
taken. But to unleash the combined benefits of trade and urbanisation, it will be important to build on
the political momentum that the free trade agreement has set in motion. This will ensure that national
legislation is centred on the agreement’s impacts on cities, and on the needs of cities.

Similarly, in planning for urbanisation, particularly intermediary and border towns, investments should
focus on unleashing their comparative advantages in relation to the free trade agreement
Globalization and borderless economies have negative effects – job loss, slow growth,
costs
Folbre 11[Folbre, Nancy(Nancy Folbre is professor emerita of economics at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. Her research focuses on the interface between feminist theory and political
economy, with a particular focus on the work of caring for others. Her book “Saving State U” (New Press,
2010) makes a case for strengthening public support for higher education in the United States.).
“Borderless Economy, Jobless Prosperity.” Economix Blog, 1295,
archive.nytimes.com/economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/borderless-economy-jobless-
prosperity/.] //VRao

Why has the economic recovery left workers behind? The question keeps coming up, in slightly different
versions. As the headline of a recent New York Times article by Michael Powell put it, “ Profits Are
Booming. Why Aren’t Jobs?” The term “jobless prosperity” – which surfaced in  1993 and again 2002 –
now bobs high.

Many journalists argue that globalization is partly to blame for historically low rates of job
creation over the last year. Companies in the United States are simply less reliant on American workers
– and American consumers – than they once were. Maybe they just don’t need us any more.

Few economists like this argument, but even some mainstream savants like Alan Blinder of Princeton
University express concern about the effects of offshoring. And the effects of globalization extend well
beyond job loss.

As Harold Meyerson pointed out in The Washington Post, a recent Standard & Poor’s report showed
that our largest 500 publicly traded corporations get roughly 47 percent of their revenue from outside
the country.

Writing in The Atlantic on “The Rise of the New Global Elite,” Chrystia Freeland provided a vivid
anecdotal account of the same phenomenon, letting the chief executive of a green-technology company
explain that most of his sales come from outside the United States, and, if he were starting from scratch,
most of his workers would, too. A hedge fund manager tells her why the vigorous growth of a new
middle class in China and India counterbalances the decline of the American middle class.

A recent Wall Street Journal article by Burton Malkiel warned against “home-country bias,” urging
investors to hedge their bets on the American economy by tilting their portfolios toward emerging
markets in developing countries.

A recent Time magazine article by Zachary Karabell referred to the new joblessness as a part of a
megatrend toward globalization that we just have to live with.

So much depends on who “we” are.

During the 25 years after World War II, the interests of American investors and workers were closely,
though not perfectly, aligned. Productivity increases were passed on in the form of higher wages that, in
turn, fueled increasing demand for domestically produced goods and services.
Businesses willingly paid taxes to support public programs designed to improve the education, health
and security of the labor force on which they relied.

Back in 1953, Charlie Wilson, the chief executive of General Motors, famously expressed the opinion
(often slightly misquoted) that what was good for the country was good for General Motors, and vice
versa. I doubt that was entirely true then, but it was certainly more true then than it is today.

Large corporations are no less patriotic now than they were then. But their economic incentives have
changed. Facing intensified international competition, they have little reason to care about the
nationality of their workers, consumers or investors.

Fans of globalization point to many economic benefits: lower-priced consumer goods, rewards for
technological innovation and higher living standards for many workers in developing countries.

But however significant these benefits, the other side of the ledger reveals significant costs arising from
political realignment and efforts to escape regulation and taxes.

Jobless growth is only one symptom of increased social conflict, intensified economic inequality and
weakened democracy. The prosperity in jobless prosperity exists only for the rich.

South Africa Economy Stable now—

Winning 21 [(Alexander, Reuters writer), “South Africa's economy reaches pre-pandemic size in strong Q1”, Reuters,
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-economy-reaches-pre-pandemic-size-strong-q1-2022-06-07/, June 7,
2022] SS

- South Africa's economy grew more than expected in the first quarter, recovering
PRETORIA, June 7 (Reuters)
to the level it was before the COVID-19 pandemic thanks to a strong performance by sectors like
manufacturing, data from the statistics agency showed.

The growth trajectory will offer some comfort to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who has
been under pressure to lift the growth rate.

Gross domestic product grew 1.9% in the first quarter in quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted terms
and by 3.0% year-on-year unadjusted in the first three months of the year.

Economists had predicted 1.2% quarter-on-quarter growth and a 1.7% year-on-year expansion.
Ramaphosa promised sweeping reforms after he took office in 2018, but COVID and persistent electricity cuts have constrained activity and
unemployment hit a record high above 35% last year.

Statistics South Africa said manufacturing grew 4.9% quarter-on-quarter, while the trade, catering and
accommodation category expanded 3.1% and agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.8%. Mining and quarrying
contracted 1.1%.

GDP was 1.15 trillion rand ($75 billion) in the first quarter of 2022, about the same as in the first quarter of 2020, a
presentation showed.

The rand was slightly stronger after the figures were released, trading up 0.4% on the day at 15.3800 versus the dollar at 1003 GMT.
 1NC – AT: Crime
Turn—low border security creates hotspots for trafficking
Akinyemi 19 [(Omolara Akinyemi, ) Macrothink Institute: International Journal of Social Science
Research, “Porous Borders and Increasing Human Trafficking in West Africa: Issues and Challenges,”
09/28/2019, https://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijssr/article/view/15537] SP

Apparently, the porous nature of African borders and the lack of proper security and identity
systems, encourage the continuous actions of human trafficking. Of the countries in West
Africa, Nigeria is one that has the largest land space unmanned, unreached, unused, or
without a functional governmental presence. This is also compounded by the high level of
poverty in the neighbouring countries. This is turn made Nigeria, a hot spot of human
trafficking activities, where traffickers are taking advantage of lack of effective
documentation, security and identity systems. Visas are acquired through illegal means or
through falsification of documents often in collaboration with immigration officials. In
addition, lapses in border security and ineffective identification systems in Ghana and Nigeria
have availed to traffickers, many hidden recruitment points for trafficking activities. In rural
areas where there is poverty and lack of education, children are often recruited from rural
zones to urban areas. It is important to note that the final destination of trafficked individuals
is dependent on the purpose of their exploitation. Nonetheless, in the case of most female
victims, Italy is the preferred target from Nigeria. As such, individuals who were unable to
reach Europe often found themselves stranded in North Africa. In cross-border child
trafficking, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo are the main countries of origin from which
child domestic labour is exported to the main urban centers of countries such as Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon and Nigeria. (UNICEF Report, 1998). It is of no
surprise that children are often times trafficked through the borders. And this is owing to its
poor management and weak security along the borders. For instance, four trafficking routes
were identified from northern Nigeria. This includes those leaving from Kebbi or Sokoto
travel to the Republic of Benin, on to Niger, Ghana, Senegal and move on the destinations as
Libya, Algeria or Morocco. These are transit countries for the destinations in the Middle East
or Europe.
5. Conclusion
This paper has been able to draw a connection between the porosity of West African borders
and its contribution to the ills of human trafficking. In this study, the impacts of border
insecurity have been systematically assessed and the trends and patterns of trafficking in
humans. Ironically, West African borders are not free for traded goods to cross but easy for
trans- border crimes due to the poor management. In other words, the borders are free for
contrabands and all kind of criminal activities without fear. This is due to poor management
and insecurity at the West African borders. Although, there are a number of concrete
measures that can transform borders for lives and property to be adequately secure. Thus, this
phenomenon however constitutes a great challenge to good governance for the entire region.
In view of this, the only feasible option for eradicating human trafficking in the foreseeable
future is to cooperate and pool West African human and material resources in order to expand
regional capacity for border security. The training and re-training of border officials for
effective management of the borders. Additionally, combatting the issue of trafficking
requires the strengthening and universal ratification of anti-trafficking protocols such as the
UN anti-trafficking protocol by all West African countries and domestication of these laws in
respective countries.
 1NC – L/T: Smuggling
Closed borders in Nigeria saves 2 billion naira a day from the 10 million litres of petrol
that would have been smuggled
Olayinka, Jeremiah, and Salau 2019 [Collins Olayinka, Energy and Labour Communication Expert
with a BA in dramatic arts from Ahmadu Bello University, Kingsley Jeremiah, journalist and reporter for
the energy sector of The Guardian. His experience cuts across oil and gas, manufacturing, international
trade, transportation and others. BA in Mass Communication/Media Studies from Kogi State University,
and Sulaimon Salau, BA in literature from the University of Ilorisn, 9-22-2019: Border closure: Nigeria
saves N2b daily from smuggled 10 million litres of petrol https://guardian.ng/news/border-closure-
nigeria-saves-n2b-daily-from-smuggled-10-million-litres-of-petrol/] TA 7-25-2022

Over 10 million litres of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), better known as petrol is now being saved due to
the ongoing partial border closure ordered by the Federal Government codenamed “Exercise Swift
Response.”Apart from the tremendous success the restriction of free movement across Nigerian borders
has recorded, as well as curtailing disorderly acts, it has also come with equal measure of agony to
citizens, just as it poses serious threats to other genuine businesses. Also, the Nigeria Customs Service
(NCS) says the border restriction has achieved a lot, in addition to the borders now being fully secured,
while smuggling has been reduced to the barest minimum. According to the Petroleum Products Pricing
Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), prior to the closure of the borders, the country’s daily consumption of
petrol was approximately 61 million litres, which has now reduced to 51.7 million as indicated in its
latest figures, which was obtained between September 9 and 15. The spokesman of the agency, Kimchi
Apollo, who disclosed this in Abuja, yesterday, said, “according to statistics, figures recorded from
various depots nationwide for the 5th to 11thAugust 2019 was about 61 million litres, representing the
average volume trucked out before the border closure.” Apollo, who is also the General Manager,
Corporate Services of PPPRA, added that the agency observed that from the statistics obtained between
August 12 and 18, 2019, a drop of about 35 percent in volume trucked out from the previous week was
noticed, which could be attributed to the reduction in activities of various facilities during the Sallah
holiday. However, he added that from August 19 to 25, 2019, which falls within the period the borders
were partially closed, the agency recorded an average daily truck out figure of about 57 million litres,
which fell below the daily average figure for the week 5 to 11 August 2019. “Similarly, from August 26 to
September 1, 2019, 371.82 million litres of petrol was trucked out, averaging a daily figure of 53 million
litres. This represents a decline of about four million litres when compared to the previous week.
“Available data from the Agency indicates that the downward trend continued from September 2 to 8.
The daily average truck out figure for that week was 50.22 million litres, indicating a further reduction of
2.9 million litres. However, there was a slight increment to 51.7 million from the September 9 to 15,
2019,” he explained.Apollos said the high truck-out volume recorded before the partial closure of the
borders could be attributed to the seepage of petroleum products across the borders, coupled with the
widening fuel price arbitrage with neighbouring West African countries. Said he: “While the downward
trend in the consumption pattern is a welcome development, the agency assures stakeholders that
efforts are being made not only to curb smuggling of products, but also to ensure that petroleum
products are available in the country.” The landing cost of petrol in Nigeria reportedly stands at N180
per litre, that is N35 higher than the pump price of N145 per litre. When put in context of the landing
cost, Nigeria may be saving as much as N1.98b (approximately N2b) daily on account of the PMS, which
would have been smuggled out.Similarly, the development translates to about N385m worth of subsidy,
which is being lost to neighbouring West African countries daily. While Nigeria was about two years ago
consuming about 35 million litres of petrol per day, the figure jumped up and soon hit 65 million litres
per day. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation blamed smugglers for the high consumption,
stressing that the product was being smuggled to as far as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Cote d’Ivoire because
of the price differences. SPOKESPERSON of the NCS, Assistant Controller-General (ACG) Joseph Attah,
informed The Guardian, yesterday, that the Exercise Swift Response has achieved “a significant increase
in patronage of local rice and that indigenous farmers and millers are now smiling to the bank. Actions,
movement and smuggling of illicit items that could easily compromise national security and economy
have been nipped in the bud,” he added. On why the exercise, which was meant to last for about four
week was yet to be called off, Attah said: “We have never set a timeline from the beginning. As the
spokesperson for the team, I cannot remember giving anybody a timeline for the action.” Denying that
operatives were undergoing dire challenges as a result of the extension of the joint exercise, the
spokesperson said, “for now, the operatives are not experiencing any technical challenge at their
stations as they carry out the enforcement order successfully. “Earlier, there were mixed feelings among
Nigerians. Now, we are experiencing better support from border community dwellers, and Nigerians are
beginning to appreciate why we are doing the exercise. Things are getting better, for instance, we have
so far arrested 289 illegal migrants and you can just imagine the consequences of this. Imagine if only 80
from the 289 people were coming to Nigeria to cause havoc. We have also intercepted bags of fertiliser,
and hundreds of bags of rice, among others. The Guardian learnt that smugglers have resorted to using
the waterways for their nefarious acts as a source said that smugglers now use the Isashi Jetty, Ijanikin
water route, Agbara area, and Vespa to smuggle in contraband in the dead of the night. “Come to
Ishashi Jetty or Ijanikin Jetty behind Customs Check Point, Agbara bridge by 5am, then you will realise
that we are deceiving ourselves. Some officers are being enriched by the restriction. My neighbour at
Vespa market told me how they are being escorted by the same security agencies after they have been
settled,” the source said. But the Customs Area Controller (CAC), Western Marine Command,
Comptroller Boyiliya Binga, said his men were determined to deal ruthlessly with smugglers. He said,
because of the closure of the border, some of the smugglers have taken the bar beach as their new
route to smuggle in contraband items.Binga, however, noted that since the smugglers are now using the
high sea, his men would take the battle to them down there. STAKEHOLDERS, including the former
President, Nigerian Association for Energy Economics (NAEE), Wunmi Iledare are insisting that the
partial border closure would not bring an end to smuggling of petroleum products out of the country,
adding that there was need for effective management of petroleum flow. Iledare said: “Of course, the
solution is enforcing the rule of law. Petroleum is an intergenerational asset. Stop the making of
millionaires through product allocations to celebrated traders with no risked dollar investment.” With
such development, Iledare noted that traders would stop dispensing products across the borders as,
according to him, access to markets outside Nigeria is prompted by the high price differential. “Once this
is corrected the border can be as porous as a sponge, petroleum product would not flow out there.” A
professor of law with expertise in petroleum, energy and environmental law, Damilola Olawuyi equally
insisted that the border closure may not achieve significant long-term results in terms of addressing
smuggling of petrol and other goods. According to him, without cautious move, the government may
end up stifling and hindering legitimate businesses that go through the borders doing genuine economic
activities. Olawuyi noted that a holistic reform was required to achieve greater transparency and digital
surveillance in the country’s petroleum products exportation system. “Rather than closing the borders,
countries such as Ghana and Kenya that had the same problem in the past have made significant
progress over the last years through a mix of increased coordinated security surveillance at border
points, as well as robust policy guidelines aimed at curbing illegal activities of unscrupulous individuals
and companies. “Some of the guidelines include the designation of one exit border for all petroleum
product exports; having designated days for export loading; establishing compulsory export licensing
and customs clearance process to formalise and regulate the export of petroleum products, and
ensuring that oil exports and bunkering are only carried out by companies licensed by the DPR.
“Furthermore, verification and registration of documentation on vessels, bunkering companies, and
point of delivery, through robust digital linkages to DPR, and other revenue agencies can significantly
reduce illegality and leakages,” the don said. The former Director General of the West African Institute
for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), Professor Akpan Ekpo corroborated Olawuyi’s claim
that the partial border closure would only bring short-term relief.“Border closure helps, but the best
approach is appropriate pricing of the products to discourage smuggling,” he noted. In his own reaction,
the ex-president of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, Prof. Segun Ajibola corroborated other
stakeholders noting that the more fundamental issue revolves around the compromises by those
manning the borders. MEANWHILE a former President of Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff
Association (PENGASSAN), Peter Esele has urged the Federal Government to adopt a “gradual upscale”
of petroleum price to stabilise the economy. Esele said: “I think Nigeria should adopt a gradual upscale
of petroleum price. Government must tell Nigerians how it intends to spend the money that will accrue
from stoppage of subsidy payment. That is what is making most Nigerians uncomfortable, especially the
labour movement. Labour has not gotten a template for that. How will Nigerians feel when they see
lawmakers collecting about N13m a month as salary, or see 10 cars in the convoy of ministers and
governors terrorising motorists on the road? Government will have to come up with a template on how
it intends to check the extravagant lifestyles of its officials. They cannot tell us to tighten our belts while
they have theirs loosened.”

Plan kills Nigerian and other African countries’ economies by incentivizing smuggling
Oneko 2019[Sella Oneko, reelance journalist working mainly for Deutsche Welle (DW) in Germany. She
works for Deutsche Welle's Africa and social media programmes and has experience in online, radio, TV
and social media. Prior to starting a career in journalism, she worked for the German Development
Service in Malawi. Sella holds a master's degree in journalism and anthropology from City University in
London and the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt respectively. Together with her trainee
group at Deutsche Welle, she received the CNN Journalist Online Award 2015 for the multimedia project
'My grandma, the regime and I' which unveiled the group's family histories., 12-18-2019: Africans want
open borders, but can they overcome stumbling blocks? https://www.dw.com/en/africans-want-open-
borders-but-can-they-overcome-stumbling-blocks/a-51716938] T 7-22-2022

"The continental free trade area symbolizes our progress toward the ideal of African unity," Rwanda's
President Paul Kagame said over a year ago as he welcomed African leaders to Kigali to a special African
Union summit in March 2018. Signed by 54 out of 55 African countries and ratified by 28, the African
Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), is the much anticipated deal, which many hope will enable
a single market economy and therefore cross border trade between African countries. Trading under the
agreement is due to begin rolling out in July 2020. If all goes well, African countries hope to increase
intra-African trade by 53% through a blend of consumer spending, investments and a reduction of
import duties. Is the continent — minus Eritrea — ready to open up its borders and cut down the tariffs
though? Under the current political climate of security concerns, for instance between Kenya and
Somalia, or in the Sahel region, fears of uncontrolled migration or the smuggling of substandard goods
as is the case with South Africa and Nigeria respectively and border spats, as is the case with Rwanda
and Uganda, a vibrant and yet controlled trading environment seems a long way off. Corruption and
poor infrastructure in great parts of the continent only enhance the problem. Read more: Africa's free
trade agreement: Curse or blessing? Checks and balances In 2017, only up to 17% of all trade on the
continent occurred between African countries, while Africa still relies greatly on imports from abroad.
And as it currently stands, African businesses face over 6% higher tariffs if they trade within Africa than
when they do their business outside the continent. Only two African countries, the Seychelles and Benin,
require no visas at all, while almost half the countries require visa applications in the country of
residence and only a quarter of all Africans can get a visa on arrival in other African countries.
Additionally air travel within the continent is often more expensive than traveling abroad. Read more:
2019 Visa Openness Index - African Development Bank State sovereignty still trumps unity and ease of
traveling or doing business — a far cry from the early pan-African visions of solidarity and self-reliance,
without the artificial borders that colonial forces drew up in a Berlin boardroom. It is understandable
that the concerns of the 54 AfCFTA signatories about border security and market protection are
legitimate, says Kenyan economic analyst Aly Khan Satchu. "We need to have some kind of support
mechanism or mediation scheme," he said, referring to a body or oversight authority that would
mediate in the case of disputes. "They also have the ability to bite and make things happen." Read more:
Africa free trade - read for the next steps? Watch video03:22 Talking free trade in Africa Actions must
follow words What is important, Satchu argued, is that countries don't only pay lip service to the idea of
a "borderless" Africa. Rwanda, for instance, has been on the forefront in the push for both intra-African
trade and the free movement of people. Rwanda is ranked second in sub-Saharan Africa for the ease of
doing business after Mauritius — it is followed by Kenya and South Africa. Yet Rwanda itself has closed
its border to Uganda for what analysts say is a long-standing spat between presidents Yoweri Museveni
and Kagame. The closure of the borders has crippled bilateral trade and also created a barrier between
communities where people have deep cross-border trade and family ties. "In Rwanda's case their model
is to be the Singapore of Africa," Satchu said. "If you want to be a Singapore of Africa you need free
trade." Read more: Rwanda and Uganda - neighbors at loggerheads Protectionism Another trade dispute
currently lies on the border between Nigeria and Benin. Nigeria, Africa's largest and most populated
economy with a record of protectionist trade policies, was last to ratify the AfCFTA. In August 2019,
Nigeria banned the import of over 40 items ranging from meat, to rice and cement. "Nigeria's central
concern is that its market will be flooded by goods from other African countries, which will undermine
local manufacturing and agricultural enterprises, many of which are performing well below their
potential and may not survive competition," said Dianne Games, of Africa at Work, a Johannesburg-
based business consultancy. To date, Nigeria still relies largely on crude oil exports. The African giant
doesn't have its own oil refineries and crude oil makes up to 90% of its foreign exchange earnings. And
despite the success of businesses like the Dangote empire, which initially specialised in cement and
sugar, its manufacturing and agriculture sector have failed to keep up with the demands of its growing
population. Thus Nigerian consumers largely rely on imports. "Tariffs and import bans have long been
used by Nigeria as part of its industrialization strategy,” said Games. "But smuggling of goods from
neighbouring states undermines this strategy." According to the World Bank, up to 80% of Benin's
imports are said to be destined for the Nigerian market. The closure of the border in August 2019 has
not only had a major effect on Benin, which relies heavily on transit trade with Nigeria, but also Ghana,
where trade unions have complained about trucks being stuck at the Nigerian border. Watch video03:20
Stuck at Nigeria's border Nigeria has reasons to be concerned about the opening of its borders, the
experts agree. Yet whether continued protectionist policies will provide the needed development for its
market and its people is another question. "I think if we really want to advance all our economies we
should not be scared of competition," Satchu told DW. Unfair competition, like selling imports or
dumping prices, such as the US chicken that flooded South African and Ghanaian markets, or selling sub-
standard goods is of course a different matter, he added. "I think we have to differentiate between
other African countries who are brothers and sisters and exports out of China, Asia, or even the United
States and Europe." Countries such as South Africa or Kenya, to some extent, belong to the bigger
competitors who stand to gain from the AfCFTA. But all in all, Satchu said, it's about putting proper
oversight mechanisms in place in order to make the deal beneficial to the continent as a whole. Not a
silver bullet "(AfCFTA) is not a silver bullet for the kinds of economic problems that many countries
experience,” Games said. "A lot more work needs to be done nationally to get countries ready to
participate meaningfully in the initiative." While similar initiatives have failed to take off, the AfCFTA
might stand a chance, Games said. "The political will behind the continental initiative and the publicity it
has received may keep the process on course this time," she said. While there are concerns that major
African players such as Nigeria might not play along, there also still seems to be a good deal of
enthusiasm about the implementation of the deal. Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo, this week urged
African trade ministers to conclude all outstanding issues before trading is due to start in July 2020.
Ghana has been selected as the host of the AfCFTA secretariat. At the same time, Mukhisa Kituyi UN
Secretary-General of the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) expressed
his views on the deal. "It has taken Africa almost 30 years since the signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991
to reach this stage," Kituyi wrote in the Kenyan media outlet The East African. "The Continent," he
wrote, "cannot afford to wait another 30 years to translate the AfCFTA."

Nigeria’s economic instability spills over—massive debt and continued effects of oil
crash
Soto 21 [(Alonso, Bloomberg editor)“Nigeria’s Cratering Economy May Become Africa’s Biggest
Threat”, Bloomberg, June 14, 2021] SS

If there was ever a time Nigeria could have taken off, it was in 1999. Democracy had been restored, with
its economy reopening after decades of mismanagement and plunder under military dictatorships.

Tomi Davies, a systems analyst, was one of thousands of Nigerians who came home to help rebuild the
country. After a few years working on public-sector projects, he was offered a bag full of dollars to add
ghost employees to the payroll system he was installing. When he refused, a group of men attacked him
at his home in the capital, Abuja.

“I arrived like many others full of hope, but had to escape in disgust,” said Davies, 65, who returned to
the U.K., where he is now chief investment officer of Frankfurtbased venture capital firm GreenTec
Capital Partners.

Others like him have left too, defeated by the dashed aspirations of a nation that wasn’t supposed to
turn out this way. Endowed with some of the world’s biggest oil reserves, plenty of arable land and a
young, tech-savvy population of 206 million that sets Africa’s music and fashion trends, Nigeria had the
potential to break onto the global stage.

Instead, policy missteps, entrenched corruption and an over-reliance on crude oil mean that a country
that makes up a quarter of the continent’s economy risks becoming its biggest problem. A dangerous
cauldron of ethnic tension, youth discontent and criminality threatens to spread more poverty and
violence to a region quickly falling behind the rest of the world.

Since its discovery in the 1950s, beneath the mangrove forests of its south eastern coast, oil has dictated
the boom and bust cycles of the former British colony, with the commodity now accounting for 90% of
exports and half of government revenue.

Poverty Capital

The economy has yet to recover from the oil crash of 2014, and is unlikely to do so anytime soon,
meaning its population will continue to out pace economic expansion adding more poor to what is
already the poverty capital of the world. Over 90 million people live in penury, more than India, which
has a population seven times greater.

Slow Decline

Population growth outpaces output expansion in Nigeria

A presidential spokesman referred questions to the government’s economics team. The finance ministry
and central bank didn’t respond to several requests for comment.

The coronavirus has only made things worse. Personal incomes are set to fall to their lowest in four
decades, pushing an additional 11 million people into poverty by 2022, according to the World Bank.
One in three Nigerians in the workforce unemployed, among the world’s highest jobless rates, fanning
social discontent and insecurity.

Policy blunders by President Muhammadu Buhari have complicated the road to recovery. He came to
power in 2015 pledging to create 12 million jobs in his first fouryear term; halfway through his second
term, unemployment has more than quadrupled.

Buhari, 78, revived an import-substitution drive that was popular when he was a military ruler in the
early 1980s, crippling businesses that can’t get goods to survive. He has banned foreign currency for
imports of dozens of products from toothpicks to cement, closed borders to halt rice smuggling and
refused to fully ease exchange controls.

Policies like this have curbed foreign investment, pushed food inflation to 15-year highs and scared off
companies such as South Africa’s supermarket chain Shoprite Holdings Ltd. The World Bank said in a
report on Tuesday that price increases are pushing seven million people into poverty and encouraging
criminality.
“The government made so many mistakes even before the pandemic made things worse,” said Amina
Ado, who was one of Buhari’s oil advisers from 2017 to 2020. “We need to urgently change course
because we are big enough to matter in the world.”

The roots of the malaise though, predate Buhari. Under British rule, Nigeria’s three main regions,
divided along ethnic and religious lines, were awkwardly sandwiched together in a 1914 amalgamation.
Since independence in 1960, elites from the largely Christian south west and south east have tussled for
power with the Muslim north.

“Political instability is a huge obstacle to the kind of deep, long-term institutional economic reforms
needed for Nigeria to be able to kick start,” said Zainab Usman, director of the African program at
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Oil led to the dismantling of what little industry there was by opening the floodgates to cheap imports
financed by a strong local currency. Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, which were as poor as
Nigeria in the 1960s, have surpassed it in per-capita income after diversifying.

Lagging Behind

After diversifying, Malaysia and Indonesia surpass Nigeria on GDP per-capita

A surge in corruption also wrested away resources needed for infrastructure and a reliable power supply
— both of which are lacking.

“In a lot of countries, people are used to officials skimming something off the top, but ultimately
delivering something,” said Matthew T Page, an associate fellow at Chatham House in London. “In
Nigeria, everything is skimmed off the top and nothing is delivered.”

Security Meltdown

Mistrust of the state and poverty seeded violence. A decade-long jihadist insurgency in the northeast
rages on despite Buhari’s claims to have defeated Boko Haram militants in 2015. Piracy has also made
the Gulf of Guinea one of the world’s most dangerous waters, while inland, a deadly conflict between
nomadic herders and farmers in the middle of the country is moving south. A new separatist rebellion is
emerging in the south east, where a secessionist attempt to create the republic of Biafra sparked civil
war in the 1960s.

Kidnapping has surged to its highest in at least a decade, according to data from the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project. Nearly 900 students were taken from schools in mass abductions since
December, according to the United Nations.

Booming Business

Kidnapping for ransom and political abductions surge

It wasn’t always like this. As a child in the 1980s, Alvari Banu remembers the short road trips to visit the
family farm between Abuja and the northern city of Kaduna. Now, kidnappings on the same road have
kept him away for almost three years.

“The situation is getting worse,” said Banu, 41, a financial consultant. “The government has completely
failed to provide even basic security.”
Disorder is a huge impediment for growth, costing the economy $10.3 billion in 2020 — more than the
federal government’s total revenue that same year, according to official estimates. Without key reforms,
Nigeria’s economy will remain anemic, expanding little more than 2% this year and next, still below the
population growth rate, according to the International Monetary Fund.

In the meantime, the government is living on borrowed money, with debt service costs eating up over
80% of its revenue.

“This could end up in an external debt default if things don’t change,” said Charlie Robertson, global
chief economist with Renaissance Capital, an emerging and frontier markets investment bank.
 1NC – AT: Disasters
AFF can’t solve for disaster preparedness in Africa – institutional effectiveness,
government capacities, etc. all ensure continued refugee crises
Rivera et al 20 Jason Rivera, Atta A. Ceesay, Aminata Sillah, [Ph.D. in Public Affairs, Rutgers
University (2016) Specialization: Community Development; MS in Public Affairs, Rutgers University
(2015); MPA, Rutgers University (2008)
Specialization:  Public Management; BA, Rowan University (2006) Major:  History;  Minor:  Political
Science] Challenges to disaster risk management in The Gambia: A preliminary investigation of the
disaster management system's structure, Progress in Disaster Science, Volume 6,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100075 // CR

Over the last twenty years, global disaster events have placed a heightened emphasis on disaster risk
management (DRM). The reason for this emphasis is based in the expanding frequency and scope of
disaster events throughout the world [1]; however, the situation has become ever more important in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The importance of disaster risk management and planning in SSA is more
pressing than in other regions of the world because the nations that compose this geographic area are
typically more limited in their ability to dedicate resources to disaster management functions in
comparison to other nations throughout the world [2,3]. Although this phenomenon is true in many
countries in SSA, it is particularly the case in The Gambia. Moreover, Bamutaze [4] maintains that issues
associated with the capacity of nations throughout this region of the world to deal with future disaster
situations will only become more complicated, which can be partially attributed to changes in climate
and variability in the types of disaster this region experiences.

A number of studies have investigated the frequency and impact of various disasters throughout SSA as
a basis for understanding nations' capacity for dealing with hazards [[4], [5], [6], [7]]. Specifically, this
research highlights that there are a number of factors that relate to the persistence and effect of
disasters, which include weak government capacities at the national and local levels, a lack of effective
national institutions, in addition to a reliance on vulnerable natural environments. Although disaster risk
management is a priority in SSA, in addition to other vulnerable regions throughout the world [8], the
goals of effective DRM that are set forth by the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 and the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015–2030, which involve understanding
processes that generate vulnerability and reduce resilience to disasters [9,10] as a means of reducing
harm to life, property, and the environment [10,11], have been difficult to achieve due to issues
associated with political will and capacity. As a result, reducing disaster vulnerability and enhancing
disaster response is a byproduct of political actions [10,12,13]. Moreover, as Rivera [14] argues, the
administrative and or institutional structure of disaster management is extremely important for
successfully pursuing programmatic goals.

However, before a government can begin developing or enhancing a DRM framework in line with the
HFA and the SFDRR it needs to have the political will and capacity to do so. As a result, understanding
the needs of a particular national disaster management system is a first step to reducing vulnerability.
To date, there is only one academic assessment of The Gambia's DRM system [15]. Although this
baseline research provides needed information on how the system is structured, data used to develop
assessments of the effectiveness of the system's structure in addition to the capacity of the government
to respond to disasters was based on limited data partly generated through interviews with Gambian
government personnel. However, since the assessment relied predominately on interviews with
government DRM representatives during a time when the nation was under an authoritarian political
regime, the data generated through interviews may not necessarily provide the most accurate
perspectives on the effectiveness of government programs because of potential fear of political
persecution on the behalf of respondents [16]. However, after twenty-two years of rule, the sitting
president was defeated in open elections in 2016, which has resulted in government employees and
officials being more open to discussing and assessing the effectiveness of programs that were
implemented under the old political regime [17].

Subsequent to the political regime change, in January 2018 the new government developed the National
Development Plan (NDP), 2018–2021 [18], through a consultative process with citizens and other key
stakeholders. This plan currently serves as the guiding framework with the specific goal and interest of
recovering from the twenty-two year authoritarian regime. Within the NDP, disaster risk management is
identified as one of seven “critical enablers” that will facilitate the achievement of the nation's strategic
priorities that are focused on delivering good governance and accountability, social cohesion, national
reconsolidation and revitalization, and transforming the national economy [18]. Fig. 1 visualizes how the
vision, goals, priorities, and enablers of the NDP work together to accomplish these goals.

Fig. 1. National development plan framework.

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs [60].

As Fig. 1 depicts, the seven enablers are meant to serve as the activities that support the
implementation and achievement of the strategic goals and vision. Although disaster risk management
is not specifically mentioned in the figure, it is conceptually situated within the “Environment, Natural
Resources, and Climate Change Land use Planning” enabler.

Among the seven enablers, the national government has identified the need to promote
environmental sustainability, climate resilient communities and appropriate land use. Along these lines,
one of the ways in which the government seeks to measure its success in pursuance of this objective is
through strengthening emergency and disaster risk reduction and response at all governmental levels
[18] (p. 121). The expressed interest to “…strengthen coordination at all levels to deepen understanding
and collaboration of community action plans and national and regional contingency plans… [18] (p.
121)”, is due to the current disaster risk reduction system's lack of attention to food security and
flooding hazards. With specific reference to flooding, Jaiteh and Sarr [19] observed that

Inadequate storm water management systems and lack of adherence to land use zoning regulations
have increased the frequency and severity of flooding in urban areas and the resulting loss of human life
and property damage they cause. Although catastrophic seasonal floods are rare in the Gambia, the risks
of are nevertheless present. As extreme weather events become more frequent due to climate change…
Because The Gambia has about 30% of the country at or below 10 m above sea level, such floods would
be cataclysmic of unimagined consequences.

Although these observations were made in 2010, little change occurred with the national disaster risk
management system, which was made more relevant with the server flooding that occurred through the
nation in 2017 [20].
As a result of these new social and political developments in The Gambia, in addition to the growing
need to understand disaster risk management in general, but specifically in SSA, this paper explores the
challenges posed to disaster management in The Gambia. Through the analysis of a survey with disaster
management officials responsible for national and regional operations in The Gambia that took place
between December 2017 and February 2018, this research finds that issues associated with disaster
management training, organizational capacity, and domestic political interference pose challenges to
effectively managing disasters. As a result, recommendations for future research are provided as a
means of expanding our understanding of disaster management in The Gambia. Finally, policy
recommendations are provided as a means of enhancing the nations' ability to deal with future disaster
scenarios.

1.1. Challenges to disaster risk management: structure and governance in The Gambia

Within the realm of disaster risk management, there are a number of factors that pose governance
challenges to reducing risk and vulnerability, in addition to responding to natural disasters themselves.
Along these lines various authors have highlighted the influences of perceived risk [[21], [22], [23]], a
nation's economic conditions [24,25], level of democratic development and electoral incentives
[[26], [27], [28]], the strength of civil society [[29], [30], [31]], international actors [15,30], legal and
institutional confines [32], in addition to a number of other factors that relate to how and to what
extent nations and other levels of government manage disaster risk. Moreover, most of these factors
are not mutually exclusive. In other words, many of these factors interact with one another,
subsequently affecting the relative influence of the others in this realm of governance.

However, according to Rivera [14] although there are a number of factors that contribute to emergency
management organizations' governance and planning decisions, the organizational structure of an
agency has profound implications on what programmatic goals are prioritized, in addition to the way in
which goals are achieved (see also [[33], [34], [35]]). The current conceptualization of disaster risk
management involves the inclusion of a number of different actors with varying roles and interests that
include a respective central government, local government, civil society, the scientific community, and
law-making bodies. As a result, organizational structures that have developed or have been created to
deal with disaster management must do so in both horizontal and vertical contexts [36]. In this
environment organizational decision-makers are involved in managing across governmental,
organizational, and sectoral boundaries, and through formal contractual obligations all at the same time.
Therefore, in order to effectively and efficiently deal with disaster situations, governments must have an
appropriate organizational structure.

In The Gambian context, the government has developed an institutional structure in which
responsibilities of various actors is well defined. The National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) of
The Gambia was created in 2008 through the passage of the National Disaster Management Act. The
NDMA is based on the concepts of the HFA that specifically calls for institutions and policy frameworks
that are dedicated to disaster response. This framework and institutional structure was developed
between 2005 and 2008 with the aid of the United Nations Development Programme. The agency has
the authority to engage in planning, coordination and implementation activities related to disaster risk
reduction at both the national and local levels. According to Agnihorti et al. [15], the framework that
structures the NDMA emphasizes disaster risk reduction through planning as opposed to disaster
response.
Based on the developed framework, the NDMA reports directly to the Office of the Vice President;
however, the agency is responsible for managing and accomplishing routine activities in addition to
implementing disaster management policies throughout the nation and working with NGOs and civil
society. Although the agency reports directly to the VP, the framework has also created a National
Disaster Management Council (NDMC) that operates as a technical advisory group to the VP that is also
chaired by the VP. This council is composed of secretaries from six different national departments, the
Attorney General, the National Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator of the National Search and
Rescue Council, and the Executive Director of the National Disaster Management Agency. In addition to
operating as an advisory group to the VP, the council is also tasked with soliciting civil society groups and
organizations, NGOs and other experts for feedback. Fig. 2 illustrates the structure of disaster
management in The Gambia.

Download : Download full-size image

Fig. 2. Gambian disaster management framework.

Within Fig. 2, the legally codified structure of the disaster management system highlights a framework
that appears to be inclusive of a variety of actors, both within government and outside. These
relationships are highlighted in Figure 2 by the solid arrows. This is especially true with the way NGO and
civil society organizations are theorized to operate within the system. However, NGO and civil society's
role in the framework appears to be one in which they work more directly with the NDMA for
developing and implementing plans, as opposed to their role in contributing to helping to prioritize
disaster management alongside other national interests. This more tentative relationship is illustrated
by the dotted lines in Figure 2 that highlight how the NDMC can solicit information from them; however,
the relationship is not necessarily reciprocal. Additionally, since the National Disaster Management
Council is composed of a variety of government representatives, decisions made by the VP that are
directly informed from the NDMA can be couched within the context of other national interests.
Therefore, the Gambian disaster management framework is horizontally specialized - placing disaster
management policies, programs and budget allocations in competition with other national agencies
[33,37] at the same time as discouraging organizations that do not have the mission of disaster
management to engage in collaboration and cross-sector relationships [38]. A report by the Gambian
Red Cross Society [32] also highlights the legal complications of this relationship by stating that the
institutional and legal context is both fragmented and nonconductive to efficient organizational
decision-making. As a result, the disaster management system may not work as effectively as it could if it
were structured in a different way.
 1NC – AT: African Instability
No escalation
Barrett 05 [(Robert Barrett, PhD Conflict & Post Doctoral Fellow, Conflict Analysis - University of
Calgary & Principal and Senior Partner De Novo Group LLC) “Understanding the Challenges of African
Democratization through Conflict Analysis,” IACM 18th Annual Conference, June 1, 2005]

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic
reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for
their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As
such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take
responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to
maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human
life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in
the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from
democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a
problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after
experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and
Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in
Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots
conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without
having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese
conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any
suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and
diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa.
No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in
which the intervening nation has very little interest. It would be a false statement for me to say that
there has never been a better time to incorporate the holistic insights of conflict analysis. The most
opportune time has likely come and gone. Yet, Africa remains at a crossroads – set amidst the greatest
proliferation of democratic regimes in history. It still has a chance. Yet, it is not only up to the West, but
also Africans themselves, to stand against corruption, to participate in civil society and to ultimately take
the initiative in uncovering and acknowledging the deep underlying issues perpetuating African conflict
in order to open the door to democratic advancement and global interaction. Analysis will be the key
that unlocks that door.
1NC – AT: Unity
 1NC – AT: Unity
The AU is strong now
Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 22 — [Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “The African Union at 20: a lot has been achieved
despite many flaws,” Conversation, 2-1-2022, https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-
lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932, accessed 7-22-2022]

Yet, the organisation is often at the heart of agenda-setting, decision-making, rule creation, policy
development and strategic leadership for the African continent.

It is, therefore, an oversimplification of the complex relationship between the African Union and its
members to treat the pan-African bureaucracy as a mere servant of the continent’s governments. The
African Union and its bureaucracy are neither glorified messengers nor docile followers of the orders of
African governments.

It has marshalled its 55 members to take common positions on many critical global issues. These have
included building consensus on United Nations reforms, the COVID-19 response, and financing of African
development.

Measuring impact, and failures

My paper shows the various pathways that the African Union exercises agency. It offers a nuanced way
to understand how the union:

shapes the drafting of international treaties

enforces regulations, promises and treaties

represents the collective will of member states

sets agenda, and directs, influences and shapes thinking at the global level

offers strategic leadership.

Drafting international treaties. The African Union has contributed to the drafting of treaties to promote
peace, democracy and good governance.

Many of its treaties contain global firsts. This is true even though many member states still have
loopholes in protecting democracy.

It has been able to contribute to treaties because it’s attracted some of the best policy minds on the
continent. This research shows that African Union staff are some of the most highly educated
international civil servants in the world. They also have extensive work experience.

Enforcing regulations, promises and treaties. The African Union has developed a well-oiled machine
promoting peace and security.

Its initiatives have included developing an institutional design for mediation, political dialogue, early
warning systems and peace-support operations. These have changed the game of peace missions and
led to relative success. One example is the intervention in Somalia.
The Union has also been effective in changing the mindset of African political elites from their
traditional posture of indifference to one that encourages them to intervene in each other’s affairs. It
intervened swiftly in the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 and rapidly deployed Operation
Democracy in the Comoros in 2008.

Collective will, setting the agenda and shaping thinking. The African Union has used the power of
recommendations to great effect.

It used it to rally members to support a slate of African candidates vying for positions in international
organisations. Examples include the election of Ethiopia’s Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as Director-
General of the World Health Organization and Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo as Secretary-General of
the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie.

In addition, studies indicate that the African Union was able to get members to take common positions
on more than 20 major issues.

Many of these positions shaped global debate and decisions. These include influencing the terms of
engagement between the UN and regional organisations.
 1NC – AT: Unity Solvency
A borderless Africa would not be united
Anoba 18[tribe, There are preferred modes of administration peculiar to each, et al. “5 Reasons Why a
United States of Africa May Fail - Ibrahim Anoba(Ibrahim B. Anoba is an African political economy
analyst and a Senior Fellow at African Liberty. He tweets via @Ibrahim_Anoba.).” African Liberty, 17
Sept. 2018, www.africanliberty.org/2018/09/17/five-reasons-why-a-united-states-of-africa-will-not-
work/. Accessed 25 July 2022.] //VRao

In a recent video, South African far-left leader, Julius Malema, admonished Africans to find indigenous
ways to address their challenges and unite under a single state. He proposed the elimination of borders
created by colonialists and the promotion of tolerance among Africans. To some extent, Malema is right.
Borders are alien to Africa and people need to love one another. But he is fundamentally wrong about
the prospects of Africa as a country.

Here are five reasons he and other advocates of a United States of Africa should have a rethink.

1. Africans are Historically Autonomous

One of the incoherent assumptions of this school of thought is that colonialism brought different tribes
together without considering their distinct cultures. This they suggest should be replaced by uniting all
ethnic groups on the continent—over 3,000 of them—under a bigger entity.

Perhaps, they are deliberately neglecting the fact that contemporary African countries are struggling
because of the bad arrangements by colonialists. Another amalgamation of a sort, especially a larger
one, will only create further problems, moreover, Africans have always been autonomous.

Before the scramble and partition of Africa in Berlin (1885), every African tribe lived within their own
space with peculiar values and customs. Trade was one of the few things that brought them together
while they always respected each other’s identity.

In fact, traditional Africans often broke away from their original tribes to form new communities for self-
realization and freedom. The thought that this way of life can be changed by imposing a single identity is
simply absurd and un-African.

2. The Language Barrier

Malema proposed Swahili as the ideal language for a united Africa considering it is the most widely
spoken indigenous language. But Swahili only has some 140 million speakers, which is less than 15
percent of the 1.2 billion population of the continent.

The adoption of such a language, if at all accepted by speakers of the other 2,000 African languages,
would require an extraordinary amount of effort, especially funding.

China and India are often referenced as good replicas for Africa in this regard, but both countries owe
their success to shared ancestral language among their people. Whereas, imposing an alien language on
a group, is an attempt to erase their identity. If Malema wants Africans to reject English and French
because they demean their identities, then he should not be guilty of the same.

3. What’s an Ideal Administrative System?

Most advocates of a United States of Africa often propose a unitary system with one parliament and
president. Others believe either federalism or confederalism would work better to preserve the
autonomy of the numerous ethnic groups. Either way, the geopolitical structure of the continent would
not allow for such unification.

African society is too complex to work under a unitary system. There are preferred modes of
administration peculiar to each tribe and country. It makes no sense to suggest they all adopt a
unilateral administrative pattern different from what they have known for thousands of years.

A unitary system is only ideal for a small geographical area with common values. Africa covers a
staggering 11.7 million square miles—almost three times the size of Europe—and it is deeply pluralized.
Equally, neither federalism nor confederalism would likely work. Both systems have horribly failed in
many African countries and blocs. Nigeria and the African Union (AU) are good examples.

Nigeria, for instance, has over 250 ethnic groups, just like there would be in the United States of Africa.
However, since the country adopted federalism in 1963, it has struggled with structural problems
ranging from resource control to ethnic marginalization and defining the extent to which federating
units should be autonomous.

Also, if the AU had achieved its goal of uniting Africa under a confederacy, there would be no calls for
another form of union. The bottom line here is, people do better when they are not forced into a
coalition.

4. Different Economic Values

Different tribes have specific attitudes toward the economy. Constricting everyone into a single mode
of economic reasoning would be inhumane as much as it would be, chaotic. It is antithetical to how
Africans have lived for centuries.

No traditional African society was the same in its approach to commerce and trade as the other, and
those values stand until today. This peculiarity is one reason centrally planned economic reforms in
many African countries often fail to yield expected results among different tribes.

Again, a critical reason the economies of equally larger unions such as China and India have worked is
because of the homogeneity of values among their people. Regardless of whatever economic model is
adopted in a unified Africa, it would be difficult to make it work for every society.

5. It is a Pathway to Tyranny

Perhaps Malema and his comrades have yet to realize that the more powerful a central government is,
the greater the possibility of tyranny. This is evident in the level at which post-independence African
leaders have grossly abused power. One leader in control of a big entity with enormous resources,
judging by the political history of modern Africa, would be extremely dangerous.

More so, rotating the office of the Head of State among each tribe without problems is almost
impossible as we have seen in the old Sudan, Rwanda, the Central African Republic and Nigeria.

There equally cannot be a parliament comprehensive enough to accommodate every tribe that makes
up the continent. The end result would be an insufficient representation of interests, which often result
in calls for secession.
Nonetheless, the effects of Colonialism on Africa’s political history is proof that bringing people together
without considering their traditional ways of life is wrong. What Africa needs to work is for countries to
allow more autonomy for local governments i.e., states, counties, provinces, etcetera, and prioritize
multinational cooperation on the regional level, i.e., through ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, etcetera. Not through
another catastrophic political unification.

The plan fails— uncoordinated development and growth causes more tension and alt
causes to instability
Cilliers 17 [(Jakkie, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security
Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of Pretoria), What drives instability in Africa and
what can be done about it, The Conversation , https://theconversation.com/what-drives-instability-in-africa-and-what-can-be-
done-about-it-87626, November 28, 2017] SS

Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor and young, but also because it is growing and dynamic.
Development is disruptive but also presents huge opportunities. The continent needs to plan accordingly.

Levels of armed conflict in Africa rise and fall. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Global Terrorism Database
and others indicate that armed conflict peaked in 1990/91 at the end of the Cold War, declined to 2005/6, remained relative stable to 2010/11
and then increased to 2015, although it peaked at lower levels than in 1990/91 before its most recent decline.

Armed conflict has changed. Today there are many more non-state actors involved in armed conflict in
Africa – representing a greater fracturing of armed groupings. So it’s not a matter of “government vs an armed group”
but a “government vs many armed groups”. Insurgents are often divided and sometimes even fighting
amongst themselves. This greater fragmentation complicates peacemaking.

Terrorism has also increased, but depending on how one defines it, it has always been widely prevalent in Africa both
as a tactic to secure decolonisation as well as between and among competing armed groups. The big question for 2017 is: is
violent political extremism going to move from the Middle East to Africa? Put another way, is it in Africa that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State will
find solid footage as they are displaced from the Middle East?

Anti government turbulence has also increased in recent years. In Africa, this has led to disaffection and
violence around elections that are often rigged rather than free and fair. Generally this is because governance in
many African countries present a facade of democracy but don’t yet reflect substantive democracy.

Seven relationships lie behind patterns of violence on the continent, and provide insights into whether it can be managed better.

Relationships explaining violence Poverty

Internal armed conflict is much more prevalent in poor countries than in rich ones . This is not because poor
people are violent but because poor states lack the ability to ensure law and order. The impact of poverty is
exacerbated by inequality, such as in South Africa.

Updated forecasts using the International Futures forecasting system indicate that around 37% of Africans live in extreme
poverty (roughly 460 million people).

By 2030, 32% of Africans (forecast at 548 million) are likely to live in extreme poverty. So, while the portion is
coming down (around 5% less), the absolute numbers will likely increase by around 90 million. It’s therefore unlikely
that Africa will meet the first of the Sustainable Development Goals on ending absolute poverty on a current growth path of roughly 4% GDP
growth per annum.

Democratisation
Democratisation can trigger violence in the short to medium term, particularly around elections. Recent events in Kenya are an example. Where
there is a large democratic deficit, as in North Africa before the Arab spring, tension builds up and can explode.

And a democratic deficit – where levels of democracy are below what can be expected when compared
to other countries at similar levels of income and education – often leads to instability.

Instability is also fuelled by the manipulation of elections and constitutions by heads of state to extend
their stay in power. Examples include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) and Uganda.
Regime type

The nature of the governing regime is another structural factor. Most stable countries are either full
democracies or full autocracies. But most African countries have mixed regimes with some elements of
democracy mixed with strong autocratic features. They present a façade of democracy but lack its
substantive elements. Mixed regimes are inherently more unstable and prone to disruptions than either
full democracies or full autocracies.
Population structure

Africa’s population is young, with a median age of 19. By comparison, the median age is 41 in France (a relatively young
country by European standards). So 22% of adult French are in the youth bulge of 15-29 years compared to 47% of Africans .

more turbulent because young men are largely responsible for violence and crime. If young people
Young countries tend to be
lack jobs and rates of urbanisation are high, social exclusion and instability follow.

Repeat violence

A history of violence is generally the best predictor of future violence. Countries such as Mali, Central
African Republic and the DRC are trapped in cycles of violence. This is very difficult to break. It requires a
huge effort and is very expensive, often requiring a large, multi-dimensional peace mission that only the UN can provide. But, scaling
peacekeeping back rather than scaling it up is the order of the day at the UN.

A bad neighbourhood

Where a country is located can increase the risk of violence becauseborders are not controlled and rural areas not policed .
Most conflict in Africa is supported from neighbouring countries. Violence spills over national borders and affects other
countries while poorly trained and equipped law and order institutions generally cannot operate
regionally.
Slow growth and rising inequality

Africa is quite unequal, so growth does not translate into poverty reduction. In addition, the world is in a
low growth environment after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, with average rates of growth
significantly lower than before. Africa needs to grow at average rates of 7% or more a year if it is to reduce poverty and create jobs,
yet current long term forecasts are for rates significantly below that.

Opportunity amid challenges

These seven related factors indicate that the notion that Africa can somehow “silence the guns by 2020”, as advocated by the African Union as
part of its Agenda 2063 is unrealistic.
Violence will remain a characteristic of a number of African countries for
many years to come and Africa should plan accordingly.
 1NC – AT: China
Competition’s not zero-sum and won’t lead to conflict – mutual interests
Lloyd Thrall 15, M.A. in international studies and diplomacy, SOAS, University of London, "China’s
Expanding African Relations Implications for U.S. National Security," 2015,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR905/RAND_RR905.pdf

Unlike the zero-sum geopolitical competition that defined the Cold War in Africa, contemporary Sino-
American interests in Africa are far less divergent and less dangerous. The United States and China share
a fundamental interest in the stability of African states and functioning markets as a prerequisite for
the economic benefits, deepening relationships, and global leadership image that each hopes to portray.
Neither state is promoting political ideologies or mercantilist economic aims that would naturally lead
toward conflict in the region. Washington and Beijing disagree about the most effective way of achieving
stability and growth, reflecting their domestic political structures and development histories. Neither
state, however, is inflexible in the application of its development philosophy. U.S. and Chinese interests
diverge most seriously over the role of foreign powers in supporting good governance and human rights
norms in Africa, particularly regarding pariah states. While Beijing has blunted international pressure on
such states as Sudan and Zimbabwe, it has also used its closer relationship with such states to curb their
behavior when it too seriously threatened stability or Beijing’s international reputation.
 1NC – AT: Food Prices
No food wars – no causal evidence, only maybe true for the poorest countries, and
government responses solve the impact
Rosengrant 13 [Mark W. Rosegrant, Director of the Environment and Production Technology Division
at the International Food Policy Research Institute, et al., 2013, “The Future of the Global Food
Economy: Scenarios for Supply, Demand, and Prices,” in Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability, p. 39-
40]

The food price spikes in the late 2000s caught the world’s attention, particularly when sharp increases in food and fuel prices in
2008 coincided with street demonstrations and riots in many countries. For 2008 and the two preceding years, researchers
identified a significant number of countries (totaling 54) with protests during what was called the global food crisis (Benson et al. 2008).
Violent protests occurred in 21 countries , and nonviolent protests occurred in 44 countries. Both types of protest took place in
11 countries. In a separate analysis, developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more food price protests between
2007 and 2008 than countries with high government effectiveness (World Bank 201la). Although the incidence of violent protests was much
higher in countries with less capable governance, many
factors could be causing or contributing to these protests,
such as government response tactics, rather than the initial food price spike. Data on food riots and food prices
have tracked together in recent years. Agricultural commodity prices started strengthening in international markets in 2006. In the latter half of
2007, as prices continued to rise, two or fewer food price riots per month were recorded (based on World Food Programme data, as reported in
Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). As prices peaked and remained high during mid-2008, the number of riots increased dramatically, with a
cumulative total of 84 by August 2008. Subsequently, both prices and the monthly number of protests declined. Several researchers have
studied the connection between food price shocks and conflict, finding at least some relationship between food prices and conflict. According
to Dell et al. (2008), higher food prices lead to income declines and an increase in political instability, but only
for poor countries. Researchers also found a positive and significant relationship between weather shocks (affecting food availability,
prices, and real income) and the probability of suffering government repression or a civil war (Besley and Persson 2009). Arezki and Bruckner
(2011) evaluated a constructed food price index and political variables, including data on riots and anti-government demonstrations and
measures of civil unrest. Using data from 61 countries over the period 1970 to 2007, they found a direct connection
between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and
demonstrations. Other researchers have broadened the analysis by considering government responses
or underlying policies that affect local prices, and consequently influence outcomes and the linkage between food price
shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates (2012) evaluated data from 30 developing countries for the time period
1961 to 2001, concluding that when governments mitigate the impact of food price shocks on urban
consumers, the apparent relationship between food price shocks and civil war disappears . Moreover,
when the urban consumers can expect a favorable response, the protests only serve as a motivation for a
policy response rather than as a prelude to something more serious, such as violent demonstrations or
even civil war. Many in the international development community see war and conflict as a development issue, with a war or conflict
severely damaging the local economy, which in turn leads to forced migration and dislocation, and ultimately acute food insecurity.
Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) ask if it could be the other way around, with food insecurity causing conflict. Their
answer, based on a review of the literature, is "a highly qualified yes," especially for intrastate conflict. The primary
reason is that insecurity itself heightens the risk of democratic breakdown and civil conflict. The linkage connecting food
insecurity to conflict is contingent on levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer
countries), existing political institutions, and other factors. The researchers say establishing causation directly is
elusive, considering a lack of evidence for explaining individual behavior. The debate over cause and effect is ongoing. Policies
can nevertheless be implemented to reduce price variability. Less costly forms of stabilization , at least in terms of
government outlays, include reducing import tariffs (and quotas) to lower prices and restricting exports to
increase food availability. However, these types of policy responses, while perhaps helping an individual country's consumers in the
short run, can lead to increased international price volatility, with potential for disproportionate adverse impacts on other countries that also
may be experiencing food insecurity.
1NC – Terror Turn
 --Top
Terrorists in Africa use open borders to facilitate attacks
Bensman 19 Todd Bensman 19 [Todd Bensman is the Center's Texas-based Senior National Security
Fellow. Prior to joining CIS in August 2018, Bensman led homeland security intelligence efforts for nine
years in the public sector. Bensman’s body of work with policy and intelligence operations is founded on
more than 20 years of experience as an award-winning journalist covering national security topics, with
particular focus on the Texas border.] Center for Immigration Studies “Data: Terrorist Migration Over
European Borders (2014-2018)” https://cis.org/Report/Terrorist-Migration-Over-European-Borders //
CR

Most migrant terrorists involved in thwarted or completed attacks were purposefully deployed to the
migration flows by an organized terrorist group to conduct or support attacks in destination countries.

Of the 65 migrant-terrorists involved in completed or thwarted attacks, at least 40 appeared to have

been purposefully deployed into migrant flows toward Europe, impersonating war refugees, to conduct
or support attacks in Europe. ISIS was responsible for this infiltration operation.36 Eleven others
apparently initiated attacks or plots in small groups of relatives or associates, not coordinated by any
foreign group. The balance were self-propelled lone offenders or information was insufficient to
determine whether they were deployed.

Of the 40 thought to have been deployed with training, logistical support, and plans, approximately 27
formed one single large cell of trained operatives deployed by ISIS into the migration flows, primarily on
the Western Balkan route through Greece and then Hungary, to conduct terror attacks in
France.37 Infiltrated cell members supported and conducted suicide bombings at six locations in Paris in
November 2015, which killed 130 and injured almost 500. In March 2016, surviving cell members that
were to conduct additional attacks in France changed plans under law enforcement pressure and
conducted three suicide bombings in Belgium that killed 32 and injured 320. Authorities would continue
to arrest or kill cell members for two more years.

In 2016, the New York Times reported, based on French intelligence material, that a clandestine
"external operations" division of ISIS in January 2014 sent its first of "at least" 21 well-trained operatives
to Europe camouflaged among refugee and migrant flows. He was a French citizen born in Algeria
named Ibrahim Boudina, who had been fighting in Syria with ISIS, which "dispatched" him back to
Europe through Greece with the intention of causing mass murder.38 Greek border police intercepted
him traveling in a taxi carrying cash and an instruction manual titled "How to Make Artisanal Bombs in
the Name of Allah", but allowed him to continue.39 French authorities arrested Boudina the next month
for a plot to bomb the annual Cannes carnival, seizing three Red Bull soda cans filled with 600 grams of
TATP, the explosive later used in Paris and Brussels, the newspaper reported.

More fighters trained by ISIS in Syria traveled the migrant routes alone or in pairs at the rate of every
two to three months through the balance of 2014 and early 2015, according to the Times.40

The insertion of the Paris/Brussels cell was planned and internationally sophisticated, involving a
Belgium-based fake-documents producer who created fraudulent Syrian passports that were used by
returning European citizens to pose as Syrian war refugees.41 Among the operatives, "Bilal C" scouted for open
borders, waiting times, refugee travel routes, and smuggling opportunities .42 A managing coordinator of Belgian
nationality named Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who served as an ISIS commander in Syria, orchestrated the movement of ISIS operatives and cash
along Bilal C.'s routes, sometimes transporting operatives from safe houses in Greece or Hungary to Belgium and France, where explosives and
weapons were stockpiled.43 Before Abaaoud was killed in a police shootout, he told a relative he had arranged for 90 operatives to be
transported into Europe among migrants, a number that has neither been confirmed nor refuted.

ISIS also apparently sent at least 13 others, in smaller cells and individuals unaffiliated with the Paris/Brussels group, to conduct other attacks.
Emblematic of those sent to the migrant trails for other attacks:

Syrian nationals Salah A., Hamza C., Abd Arahman A.K., and Mahood B. were fighting with ISIS in Syria in early 2014 when they were deployed
to Germany among the migrants moving via Greece through the Balkan route.44 Two of the men left with advance orders to conduct a
massacre in Germany, on the old town of Dusseldorf, using suicide vests and automatic rifles.45 They were plotting the attack from refugee
centers while applying for asylum when one cell member informed police about the plot.46

Syrian national Khaled H. was fighting with ISIS in April 2015 when the group reportedly picked him for deployment among migrants to conduct
a "spectacular atrocity" on a crowded German sports stadium. Khaled H. traveled the Balkan route through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia,
Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria. Authorities arrested him in a refugee center among 700 other asylum seekers.47

Tunisian national Charfeddine T. had been fighting with ISIS in Syria when he was deployed in October 2015 with a fake Syrian passport among
the migrants to Germany. He was arrested in December 2016 on charges of plotting an unspecified attack in Berlin, membership in a terrorist
organization, and document fraud.48 German prosecutors said the 24-year-old jihadist had been communicating, from a refugee center, with
the head of ISIS's external operations division who authorized the Berlin mission.49

Other plots involved approximately 23 self-initiated lone offenders and individuals in small closed groups who likely entered already
predisposed to radicalization. The data was insufficient to determine whether these offenders planned the attacks before or after arrival.

Mohammed Riyadh (aka Riaz Khan Ahmadzai) typified this group. In 2016, police shot dead the 17-year-old Pakistani asylum seeker after he
attacked train passengers at a German station with an axe and knife, critically injuring four.50 Riyadh arrived in Germany a year earlier claiming
to be an underage, unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan.51 The Pakistani sought asylum as an Afghan and radicalized on ISIS propaganda
while living in refugee centers and a foster home. Police found a hand-painted ISIS flag and evidence suggesting he was older than 17.52

Open borders in Africa facilitates Nuclear terrorism

Zwane 18 Zwane, Tengetile 2018 “Nuclear Terrorism as a possible threat to Africa.”
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nuclear-Terrorism-as-a-possible-threat-to-Africa-Zwane/
34df45ad31ad9ef5c09247ce0036d3d4f7f27184 // CR

The need to safeguard weapons-usable nuclear material from terrorist organisations has taken on
heightened significance on the continent in recent times. African leaders identify nuclear, chemical, and
biological proliferation as a common threat facing the international community. The expanding demand
in nuclear energy across the globe has seen a rising global interest in Africa’s considerable uranium
deposits. This means that the continent is vulnerable and at high risk to the unlawful trade and
trafficking of weapons-usable radioactive uranium. This chapter observes that this is mainly because of
the deficient control and regulatory systems in Africa which are often prone to malfunction and
corruption, such as existing weak borders that are not effectively controlled in several parts of the
continent; the inadequate safety and control of the operating uranium mining sites in Africa; and the
prevailing weak and corrupt governing institutions. The pending passage discusses the importance of the
principles of full commitment, efficient government coordination, and active participation in realising
Africa’s full implementation of global and regional nonproliferation initiatives. The research specifically
examines in detail these facilitating conditions because they have the most potential for producing
preventative advantage and results in determining the best strategies and methods in reducing the risks
of smuggling and theft of nuclear materials in the African context. In doing so, this has the potential to
prevent the possible threat of nuclear terrorism on the continent. The evaluation will address various
capacity and resource challenges preventing effective and complete implementation of UNSC Resolution
1540 in Africa and the action-steps essential to reduce the inadequate implementation of the multitude
of international and regional non-proliferation treaties, specifically the UNSC Resolution 1540.
Africa continues to present both a “facilitating environment and a target-rich environment ” (Cilliers
2003: 91) for various terrorist networks that seek to acquire more sophisticated measures of violence,
hence the need to prioritise initiatives preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials. The region
needs to strengthen its control and safety mechanisms and measures and various other facilitating
conditions which make the region conducive to illicit activity in order to minimise the risks of terrorist
organisations obtaining nuclear materials. ''[These] facilitating conditions are the social and physical
arrangements of society that make specific acts of terrorism possible” (Clarke and Newman 2006: 126).
Indeed, exploring these conditions is essential in identifying preventative measures against terrorist
from obtaining, transporting, and using these nuclear materials and components.

A key conducive condition to the threat of possible nuclear terror in Africa, crucial to this research
analysis, is the issue of the inadequate border control mechanisms found in various parts of the
continent. The existing weak borders that are not effectively controlled, especially in weak and under-
developed regions of the world, allows easy access for various terrorist networks to conduct their
hazardous affairs, including the smuggling of fissile materials. Border control systems in Africa, for
instance, are not effectively regulated because they are often understaffed, underpaid, and under-
skilled. In addition to the lack of manpower, other contributing factors to the issue of Africa’s weak and
porous borders are the prevailing unresolved border conflicts, the existing outdated, old-fashioned
control equipment for monitoring the entry ports, and the inadequate infrastructure. As a result, the
control system is often prone to malfunction and corruption, and in turn elevates the threat of illegal
terrorist activity in most of these vulnerable states as a potential breeding ground and safe place for
various extremist groups (Clarke and Newman 2006: 126). Several parts of the continent are
ungoverned territory, wrecked by internal border wars and territorial disputes. This makes the
unwatched area vulnerable to hazardous terrorist activity as the unguarded territory leaves room for
exploitation (Pan 2005). This is especially the case in the North-Eastern parts of the continent (the Horn
of Africa) prone to terrorist attacks, such as Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and other regions
with heavy Muslim influence and strong ties to international terrorist organisations like al Qaeda. A
highly skilled terrorist organisation like al Qaeda often recruits and funds
the various affiliated extremist groups such as Somalia-based militant group al Shabaab, which often
attacks high-prolife areas locally as well as neighbouring countries such as Kenya, as noted in the
subsequent passages (Khazan 2013). A case worth noting is the unexpected horrific attacks by the
Somali-based militant group al Shabaab at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya – a relatively
stable and thriving economy with increasing incidents of terrorist attacks – which killed about 68 people
in 2013. This confirmed the potential risks of terrorist organisations taking advantage of unstable and
easily accessible borders found in many African countries. Kenya was a target because it shares a
stretched, unprotected border with Somalia (see figure 8 below), commonly used by traffickers to
transport weapons and other illicit activities (Anderson and McKnight 2014: 3). Although the previously
cited terrorist attack in Nairobi by al Shabaab in 2013 can be said to be part of a broader distribution of
terrorist groups in the region, the Kenyan case is especially interesting as it shows a country which has
historically been both a target and victim of aggression by the bordering Somalia, owing to the Somali-
Kenyan conflict that has been a recurring internal challenge since the colonial period. The country’s
recent invasion of southern Somalia under Operation Linda Nchi in 2011 is in fact said to have ignited a
series of fatal attacks by the Somali-based al Shabaab in Kenya, some of which are highlighted below
(Anderson and McKnight 2014: 2). Figure 8: Al-Shabaab influenced zones in Somalia, February 2018
Source: BBC (2018), see direct hyperlink in bibliography 53
The al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist group al Shabaab is also said to have carried out East Africa’s most
horrific attack, involving a truck bombing that killed over 500 civilians in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital in
October 2017. The group also claimed responsibility for the deadly attacks on a Kenyan military base in
el-Ade, a Somalian town, killing an estimated 180 soldiers, and conducted numerous attacks in Kenya,
including a massacre that killed over 148 students in 2015 at Garissa University, a Christian university in
Kenya, near the border shared with Somalia (BBC 2018).
The cited border control and regulatory factors are the reasons terrorist groups successfully conquered
Mali and used the country as a station for planning their attacks on the natural gas factory in Algeria and
the strikes on the uranium mining site in Niger. This has also raised fears from many global leaders in the
West who worry that the next successful terror attack in Europe or the U.S could easily have been
planned in Africa and executed by a well-organised terrorist organisation with strong ties to African
terrorist groups, i.e. al Qaeda and al Shabaab (Khazan 2013). The research contends that weak and
vulnerable borders are a potential port to illicit trafficking of weapons-grade nuclear materials, such
as HEU, by terrorist networks. Poor border control and heavy affiliations with sophisticated
international terrorist groups interested in getting hold of, and using nuclear weapons, makes the
continent vulnerable and a target to potential acts of nuclear terrorism.
Causes nuclear retaliation and turns the case
Arguello & Buis 18 (Irma & Emiliano J., Irma Arguello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal
Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. She
holds a degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in
defense and security. Arguello previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic
Energy Commission. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Materials Working Group,
and a Chatham House Associate Fellow. Since 2010, she has participated in all the official non-
governmental events at the Nuclear Security Summits, Emiliano J. Buis is a lawyer specializing in
international law. He holds a PhD from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), a Master’s in Human and
Social Sciences from the University of Paris/Panthéon-Sorbonne, and a postgraduate diploma in national
defense from the National Defense School. Currently he is a professor in international law at UBA, and
co-director of the UNICEN Center for Human Rights in Azul. He is also a researcher and professor at the
NPSGlobal Foundation, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What
should we do?”, Taylor & Francis Online, Journal, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, Issue 2,
Special issue: Resilience and the climate threat, Pages 114-119,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812) TDI

The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack

A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on
Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the
developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario.

An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and
12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total
physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation,
would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero),
while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome –
would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would
be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square
kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2).

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly
propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and
its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be
put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the
countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience.

Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global
distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of
nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of
such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present
conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and
military expenditures.

Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the
attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The
main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product,
and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the
case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of
high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe
decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of
unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack,
which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the
current estimated 767 million.

In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics,
security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear
order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would
be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a re-assessment of existing security doctrines,
and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-first-use, proportionality, and negative
security assurances.

Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled
by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those
countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with
consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order –
possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become
tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a
deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others –
and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized
through social media.
2NR – AT: Disease AO
 2NR – AT: Disease Solvency
Current cross-border disease programs solve Africa disease
The World Bank 21 “Strengthening the Role of Regional Public Health Institutions to Improve
Cross-Border Disease Surveillance and Response in Eastern and Southern Africa”
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/03/18/strengthening-the-role-of-regional-
public-health-institutions-to-improve-cross-border-disease-surveillance-and-response

WASHINGTON, March 18, 2021 – The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and
its partners, including the World Bank, today launched a new report to help strengthen the role of public
health institutions in mitigating transnational threats of infectious diseases in Africa in general, and in
Eastern and Southern Africa in particular.

Titled "Disease Surveillance, Emergency Preparedness and Response in Eastern and Southern
Africa,” the new report financed by the Korea-World Bank Partnership Facility notes that while Africa’s
integration efforts have created new economic opportunities, they have also heightened the risk posed
by communicable diseases. Thus the need for strengthening regional disease surveillance systems and
emergency-response capabilities across the continent. The report underscores the indispensable role of
regional coordination in ensuring that outbreaks can be identified and addressed in every corner of the
continent. To safeguard the health of Africa and the world, continental institutions must be able to
swiftly detect and effectively address disease outbreaks anywhere before they become a threat
everywhere.

Through the Regional Integrated Surveillance and Laboratory Network (RISLNET), set up by the Africa
CDC and supported by the World Bank-financed  Africa CDC Regional Investment Financing Project ,
Africa’s scarce public health resources are being maximized by harmonizing laboratory systems,
leveraging the unique strengths of regional health leaders, and integrating national disease surveillance
and response capabilities into comprehensive networks operating under the aegis of the Africa CDC and
the African Union. This will be key for reducing the transnational threat of infectious diseases such as
COVID-19 across African Union member states. Using the One Health approach, RISLNET facilitates close
collaboration among national public health institutions, academic institutions, private and public
laboratories, centers of excellence, non-governmental and civil society organizations, and veterinary
services to address regional challenges, pandemic preparedness, and rapid disease detection and
response.

RISLNET is already operational in Central Africa, and the new report outlines an action plan for its
expansion to other regions.

“RISLNET is Africa CDC’s flagship initiative. Currently, RISLNET has been rolled out in Central Africa, and
the findings of this report are very timely in providing a roadmap for its rollout across the Eastern and
Southern Africa regions for which financing is provided under the Africa CDC Regional Investment
Financing Project,” said  Dr John Nkengasong, Director of the Africa CDC. “This initiative is fully aligned
with the continent’s drive to integration and the continental free trade areas.”

Laboratory networks in Eastern Africa have strengthened their clinical and analytical capabilities at
country level while fostering cross-border collaboration, providing compelling proof of concept for
RISLNET. For example, through the East Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking Project (EAPHLN),
health authorities in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi have developed a network of 40
well-equipped public health laboratories with trained personnel and robust diagnostic and surveillance
capacity. The EAPHLN has significantly increased cross-border outbreak preparedness and response
while enhancing the impact of national-level facilities, and it has played a crucial role in combatting the
regional spread of COVID-19.

“The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrates how the undetected transmission of pathogens across
borders can quickly transform a local disease outbreak into a regional health emergency or even global
crisis”, says Ms. Deborah Wetzel, World Bank Director of Regional Integration for Sub-Saharan Africa,
the Middle East, and Northern Africa. “There is an urgent need to combat present and future epidemics
through strong national and regional integration. This timely report provides critical findings towards
building an interconnected network for identifying, monitoring, and addressing infectious disease
outbreaks in Africa. It offers detailed guidance on how to harness Africa’s public health resources and
will inform countries and development partners in their efforts to enhance regional disease control
systems across the continent”.

The burgeoning pandemic intensified the report’s focus on identifying the medium and long-term
investments necessary to build a comprehensive institutional framework for monitoring, containing, and
addressing infectious disease outbreaks across Africa. In Eastern and Southern Africa, member states
vary widely in terms of strategic planning, laboratory capabilities, human resources and surveillance and
reporting mechanisms.

The report makes five main recommendations for the Africa CDC, including: (i) operationalizing RISLNET
in Eastern and Southern Africa within the next 12 months; (ii) strengthening regional and continental
laboratory networks by analyzing laboratory capabilities and creating standardized guidelines for
building staff capacity in diagnostics and strategic planning; (iii) building institutional and staff capacity in
the areas of testing, quality control, biosafety, specimen referral and information management; (iv)
enhancing national, regional, and continental disease-surveillance networks by enabling the adoption of
a unified electronic data platform while building data-reporting and analytical capacity; and (v)
developing multi-sectoral, multi-hazard preparedness and response plans, and conduct regular
simulation exercises at all levels in each member state in the sub-region.

Open borders severely increase disease transmission – border restrictions empirically

solve disease transmission
Liebig et al 21 Liebig, J., Najeebullah, K., Jurdak, R. et al. [Health & Biosecurity, Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Brisbane, Australia] Should international borders re-
open? The impact of travel restrictions on COVID-19 importation risk. BMC Public Health 21, 1573
(2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-11616-9

We model the expected number of COVID-19 importations into Australia between 1st  January and
30th June 2020. In particular, we consider two different scenarios. The first considers the actual travel
restrictions as implemented by the Australian government. The second scenario, which we refer to as
open borders, is hypothetical and assumes that no travel restrictions were enforced.

Figure 1 compares the expected number of importations for the two scenarios. The first travel ban that
was implemented by the Australian government affected foreign nationals travelling from, and
transiting through China within the last 14 days prior to arrival [25]. Figure 1 shows a clear reduction in
the expected number of importations after this restriction came into effect on 1st  February 2020,
compared to the open border scenario. The difference in the expected number of importations for the
two scenarios becomes smaller towards the end of the month, which is likely due to China being
successful in containing the outbreak. Our results indicate that Australia was able to lower COVID-19
importations from China by 94.45% (91.77 - 96.32) during the studied period. We estimate that
approximately 1,938 fewer cases were imported from China, out of the total 2,052 importations
projected for that period with open borders. The arrival card data reveals that the reduction of
importations cannot solely be attributed to the travel ban itself, which only affected foreign nationals.
During February only 19.57% of the expected number of Australian citizens/residents returned from
China, thus, contributing to the reduction in importations.

Fig. 1

Estimated daily COVID-19 importations. Our model estimates that a total of 6,003 COVID-19 cases were
importations into Australia between 1st January and 30th May 2020, considering the current travel
restrictions (solid line). Without any travel restrictions a total of 48,715 cases would have been imported
during the same time period (dashed line). The shaded are indicated the 95% confidence interval of our
estimations that was obtained by averaging over 100 model runs

The second travel ban affected foreign nationals arriving from Iran and came into effect on 1st March
2020 [26]. Our results indicate that this restriction was less effective than the travel ban on foreign
nationals arriving from China. COVID-19 importations from Iran were reduced by 32.81% (0 - 56.88).
Overall, only 14 fewer cases were imported from Iran. Presumably, this travel ban was less effective due
to the majority of arrivals from Iran being Australian citizens and residents who were exempt from the
ban.

On 5th March 2020 Australia denied entry to all foreign nationals arriving from South Korea [ 27], which
resulted in a 94.41% (92.05 - 96.14) reduction of cases being imported from this source. In contrast to
arrivals from Iran, arrivals from South Korea are dominated by foreign travellers, explaining the high
reduction in importations from this country. In addition, only 5.49% of the expected number of
citizens/resident arrivals returned to Australia during March. Overall, we estimate that 433 fewer cases
were imported from South Korea.

Six days later, on 11th March 2020 foreign nationals arriving from Italy were banned from entering
Australia [28]. This travel ban reduced the number of COVID-19 importations from Italy by 77.9% (69.21
- 85.76). In total, 994 fewer cases were imported. However, only 36.33% of the expected number of
citizens/resident arrivals returned to Australia.

Table 1 summarises the effects of the different travel bans. Note that the effects of individual travel
bans may be observable only several days after the actual implementation. For example, the travel ban
affecting Italy showed a reduction of 77.9% over the studied period. However, this reduction wasn’t
achieved directly after the travel ban was implemented (i.e. no observable reduction in the number of
imported cases in Fig. 2) but later during the outbreak. In other words, a very similar percentage
reduction would have been achieved if the travel ban had been implemented several days later. This is
likely due to a large number of residents only returning some time after the announcement of the travel
ban. This observation will be further discussed later in the manuscript.

Fig. 2

Comparison of importations by citizens/residents and visitors before and after the implementation of
travel bans. The stacked bar chart shows the estimated number of importations by Australian residents
and citizens before (dark blue) and after (dark green) the date of the travel ban. The light blue and light
green bars show the estimated importations by visitors before and after the date of the travel ban,
respectively

Table 1 Summary of the effect of individual travel bans. The confidence interval of the estimated
percentage reduction is shown brackets

The final travel ban enforced by the Australian government denied entry to all foreign travellers. This
restriction was implemented on 20th March [29]. Figure 1 shows a sharp decrease in the number of
importations on this date. We estimate that Australia imported on average between 15 and 22 cases a
day between 21st March and 30th April. During May and June the daily average dropped to three cases
a day. Our results show that the reduction of COVID-19 importations is partly due to fewer Australian
citizens and residents returning than expected during non-pandemic conditions. A significant factor
underlying this reduction is in reduced flight availability into the country. The reduction of importations
directly attributable to the individual travel bans is discussed later in this article.
Estimated percentage reduction of imported COVID-19 cases. The estimated cumulative number of
importations by Australian citizens/residents (dashed curve) and visitors (solid curve), assuming no
travel bans are implemented. The vertical dashed line indicates the date when the cumulative number
of visitor importations reached one. The corresponding label shows the expected percentage reduction
in the total number of importations over the studied period if a travel ban had been implemented on
the same day. The solid vertical line indicates the implementation date of the actual travel ban and the
corresponding percentage reduction in imported cases

Figure 3 reveals that the travel bans for the three largest visitor importation sources (UK, US and Italy)
were implemented in a timely manner. 91.53%, 93.5% and 93.66% of all importations that could have
been prevented, were prevented for the three respective sources. For example, the model estimates
that the cumulative number of visitor importations from the UK reached one case on 5th February. If the
Australian government had implemented a travel ban on visitors from this date onwards, the total
number of cases imported over the study period from the UK could have been reduced by 34.82%.
Instead the travel ban was implemented on 20th March, which resulted in a 31.87% reduction. In other
words, the maximum percentage of cases that could have been prevented is 34.82%, but in reality only
31.87% were prevented. That is, 91.53% of all cases that could have been prevented, were successfully
prevented from being imported. Among the studied countries, the reduction in importations from
Austria was the lowest. Only 66.26% of preventable importations could be averted. The extent of
importation reductions (solid vertical lines) are determined by the incidence rate in source countries,
the travel volume from that country, and the number of days after the day of first importation from that
country. Implementing travel bans closer to the date of first importation can further reduce the
importations from a source country.
Open borders contribute to uncontrollable disease spread and impede containment
WHO 15 World Health Organization 15 “Factors that contributed to undetected spread of the Ebola
virus and impeded rapid containment” https://www.who.int/news-room/spotlight/one-year-into-the-
ebola-epidemic/factors-that-contributed-to-undetected-spread-of-the-ebola-virus-and-impeded-rapid-
containment // CR
CHAPTER 3 - In Guinea, it took nearly three months for health officials and their international partners to identify the Ebola virus as the
causative agent. By that time, the virus was firmly entrenched and spread was primed to explode.

By 23 March 2014, a few scattered cases had already been imported from Guinea into Liberia and Sierra Leone, but these cases were not
detected, investigated, or formally reported to WHO. The outbreaks in these two countries likewise smouldered for weeks, eventually
becoming visible as chains of transmission multiplied, spilled into capital cities, and became so numerous they could no longer be traced.

Countries in equatorial Africa have experienced Ebola outbreaks for nearly four decades. Though they also have weak health systems, they
know this disease well. All previous outbreaks, which remained largely confined to remote rural areas, were controlled, with support from WHO
and other international partners, in periods ranging from three weeks to three months. In those outbreaks, geography aided containment.

Clinicians in equatorial Africa have good reasons to suspect Ebola when a “mysterious” disease occurs, and this favours early detection.
Laboratory capacity is in place. Staff know where to send patient samples for rapid and reliable diagnosis. Health systems are familiar with
Ebola and much better prepared. For example, hospitals in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, have isolation wards, and
staff are trained in procedures for infection prevention and control. Governments know the importance of treating a confirmed Ebola case as a
national emergency.

An old disease in a new context

In contrast, West African countries, which had never experienced an Ebola outbreak, were poorly
prepared for this unfamiliar and unexpected disease at every level, from early detection of the first
cases to orchestrating an appropriate response. Clinicians had never managed cases. No laboratory had
ever diagnosed a patient specimen. No government had ever witnessed the social and economic
upheaval that can accompany an outbreak of this disease. Populations could not understand what hit
them or why.
Ebola was thus an old disease in a new context that favoured rapid and initially invisible spread. As a result of these and other factors, the Ebola
virus has behaved differently in West Africa than in equatorial Africa, challenging a number of previous assumptions.

In past outbreaks, amplification of infections in health care facilities was the principal cause of initial explosive spread. Transmission within
communities played a lesser role, with the notable exception of unsafe burials. In West Africa, entire villages have been abandoned after
community-wide spread killed or infected many residents and fear caused others to flee.

Also in past outbreaks, Ebola was largely confined to remote rural areas, with just a few scattered cases detected in cities. In West Africa, cities
– including the capitals of all three countries – have been epicentres of intense virus transmission. The West African outbreaks demonstrated
how swiftly the virus could move once it reached urban settings and densely populated slums.

In past outbreaks, the primary aim of rapid patient isolation was to interrupt chains of transmission. Today, with so many people infected, the
primary aim must also include aggressive supportive care, especially rehydration and correction of electrolyte imbalances, which improves the
chances of survival. Life-saving supportive care is difficult to provide in a typical West African health care setting but is improving as more
treatment facilities are built by MSF, the UK and US governments, WHO, and other partners.

Damaged public health infrastructures

Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which are among the poorest countries in the world, had only recently emerged from years of civil war and
unrest that left basic health infrastructures severely damaged or destroyed and created a cohort of young adults with little or no education.

Road systems, transportation services, and telecommunications are weak in all three countries, especially in rural settings. These weaknesses
greatly delayed the transportation of patients to treatment centres and of samples to laboratories, the communication of alerts, reports, and
calls for help, and public information campaigns.

High population mobility across porous borders

West Africa is characterized by a high degree of population movement across exceptionally porous
borders. Recent studies estimate that population mobility in these countries is seven times higher than
elsewhere in the world. To a large extent, poverty drives this mobility as people travel daily looking for
work or food. Many extended West African families have relatives living in different countries.

Population mobility created two significant impediments to control. First, as noted early on, cross-
border contact tracing is difficult. Populations readily cross porous borders but outbreak responders do
not. Second, as the situation in one country began to improve, it attracted patients from neighbouring
countries seeking unoccupied treatment beds, thus reigniting transmission chains. In other words, as
long as one country experienced intense transmission other countries remained at risk, no matter how
strong their own response measures had been.

The traditional custom of returning, often over long distances, to a native village to die and be buried
near ancestors is another dimension of population movement that carries an especially high
transmission risk.

Disease doesn’t cause extinction

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh. Why Hasn't
Disease Wiped out the Human Race? June 17, 2016.
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/] //VRao

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the
threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-
grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large
proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be
sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a
quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good
reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out
an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of
Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed
half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost
exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and
antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed
in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the
8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid,
scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now?

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien
microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat
the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to
wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic
microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it
would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it
would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is
essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family
members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow
the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—
influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements . Influenza, for instance, despite its well-
established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift
away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries
about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to
its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective
vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors.
Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires
intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most
people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic
mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention
strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available
—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is
especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable
symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive
care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans
—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary,
diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary
heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of
vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can
adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open
up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild
symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large
proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.