Report of the Maryland SFPC Task Group on Protection of Existing Nonsprinklered High Rise

Residential Structures

Submitted: February 7, 2019

Executive Summary

The State Fire Marshal, through the publication of a Draft Position Paper in November, 2017,
challenged the State Fire Prevention Commission to develop and implement retroactive requirements to
increase the level of safety in nonsprinklered high rise residential structures. The Commission had
questions on some of the technical and administrative issues raised. The Chairman of the Commission
appointed a Task Group to study the proposal and report on its recommendations back to the full
Commission. This report is the result of the Task Group effort.

A high rise building is a building where the floor of an occupiable story is greater than 75 ft
above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access. The TG focused on residential occupancies.
Current Maryland and national codes and standards were referenced.

At least 120 residential high rise buildings in Maryland are nonsprinklered. This does not include
Baltimore City. Baltimore County allows condominium owners in nonsprinklered buildings to opt out of
their retroactive sprinkler requirement by 75% vote of the owners association. The Town of Ocean City
already has retroactive residential high rise provisions that are more stringent than the State Fire
Prevention Code.

The State Fire Prevention Code is “intended to establish minimum requirements that will provide
a reasonable degree of fire prevention and control to safeguard life, property, and the public welfare”.
By declaring nonsprinklered high rise buildings an inimical hazard, the Commission has gone on record
as declaring the current level of safety in these buildings as “unreasonable”, requiring an increase in the
provided level of safety. Defining what this increased level of safety should be, how it should be
achieved, and the associated cost, is the challenge, and the primary objective of the Task Group effort.

A brief survey of other jurisdictions was performed. A number of large cities have retroactive
fire protection requirements for high rise buildings. In many cases, there are allowances for residential
occupancies which permits a degree of protection less than complete automatic sprinkler protection.
These allowances include the condominium owner opt-out provision. Few jurisdictions were identified
which require complete retroactive sprinkler protection in residential high rise occupancies.

The fire fatality rate per 1000 fires and the average loss per fire are generally lower in high-rise
structures compared to other buildings in the same category, according to statistics from the National
Fire Protection Association. NFPA attributes this lower risk to the greater use of fire protection systems
and features in high-rise buildings compared to non-high-rise buildings. Nationally, both the apartment
civilian fire fatality rate and the firefighter line of duty (LOD) fatalities due to fire are trending
downward. Maryland does not track fire loss statistics specifically to high rise occupancies. There is no

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aggressive effort by either the residential apartment industry or the State FM on preventative and
preplanning approaches to high rise fire safety as advocated by NFPA.

The positive fire loss trends should not be construed to suggest that high rise structures do not
pose a more-than-normal life and public safety challenge. A single, uncontrolled high rise fire might
threaten a large occupant load. Combating/controlling a fire could be a significant challenge. The threat
can be categorized as a “low probability, high impact” event. The “high impact” would be the potential
of multiple potential civilian and firefighter casualties, and major dollar loss of a large structure.

The TG recognized these challenges, and identified specific significant threats/challenges. These
can be generally described as: firefighter safety and effective firefighting operations; the risk of ignition
and fire spread from cooking; and the threat from nonconforming combustible exterior insulation.
Different risk/benefit approaches and data were analyzed. There is data to quantify the cost impact of
retroactive sprinkler protection and its associated reliability, but it varies widely. This data is not readily
available for other protection systems, particularly fire resistive construction. After deciding not to
pursue a risk or performance-based approach, Task Group developed four prescriptive code protection
options:

Option 1 - Provide a complete building fire suppression system:

Option 2 - Compliance with NFPA 101 for Existing High Rise Residential Occupancies (effectively
requiring all dwelling units to have an exit directly to the exterior);

Option 3 - Compliance with a set of parameters developed by the TG which include provisions
for: standpipes, a fire department elevator, protection of cooking equipment, smoke alarms, protection
of exit access corridors, protection of vertical openings and separation of hazards, elimination or
mitigation of hazards associated with combustible exterior finish material, maintenance of means of
egress, maintenance of manual fire alarm systems, and standby power; or

Option 4 – Compliance with the standpipe, FD elevator, cooking protection, and combustible
exterior mitigation features of Option 3. Additionally, alarms would have to sound throughout the
building, and, in buildings greater than 10 stories above grade, emergency power would be provided for
at least one FD elevator.

There was some differing opinions among TG members on the Option 3 corridor protection.
Also, the TG was divided on Option 4, a minority position to allow a more cost-effective alternative
which address key hazards and concerns.

All Options provide an increased level of safety over that which is currently permitted by the
State Fire Prevention Code. The proposed levels of protection are not equivalent; the complete
suppression option provides the greatest level of safety. Option 4, having a lower level of safety
compared to Options 1 and 3 (but improved over the current level), is likely the least costly to
implement. A full risk/cost benefit analysis was not performed.

There are a number of issues which the TG considered administrative items which should be
discussed and determined by the full Fire Prevention Commission. The Task Group did not make specific
recommendations on these issues, but did have some opinions. As a practical matter, retroactive

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requirements would need to be phased-in. The TG considered this an implementation administrative
issue and has no recommendation on this.

The TG does not endorse the idea of selectively allowing segments of the population to either
opt out (condo owners) or be exempt (Baltimore City) from retroactive increases in the level building
protection. The TG believes that the level of safety established by these recommendations should apply
to all Maryland residents subject to the laws and regulations promulgated by the State Fire Prevention
Commission and the state legislature.

Ocean City currently requires a higher level of safety in high rise buildings than the SFPC. The TG
believes their requirements meet the spirit of Option 2.

1.0 History/Background

A Draft Position Paper (hereafter referred to as the FM Draft) was prepared by the State Fire
Marshal (FM) and FM office. It was circulated to the Maryland State Fire Prevention Commission (SFPC,
or Commission) by the Commission Chairman via email on November 6, 2017. It posited that high rise
residential structures without a complete automatic fire suppression system pose an inimical hazard
(§6-206 of the Public Safety Code) requiring corrections to secure an adequate and reasonable level of
safety. No fire suppression essentially means no complete automatic sprinkler protection. The
corrections would require retroactive improvements to existing high rise residential buildings.

The FM Draft is undated and prepared under the name of the SFPC. It remains a draft, as
reiterated at the June 2018 meeting of the SFPC.

Commissioner Joseph Scheffey prepared a review of the FM Draft, “Comments to Draft Position
Paper on Existing High-Rise Residential Structures” dated December 4, 2017. It was circulated on that
day via email to the Commissioners, the FM office, and their respective legal counsels. It is hereafter
referred to as the Scheffey Comment Paper. It questioned some of the data and assertions which were
used to draw the conclusion of “inimical hazard”.

The FM Draft was discussed at the regular December, 2017 meeting of the SFPC. At that
meeting, Chairman Davis asked certain members to work on a task group (TG) to resolve issues raised in
the Scheffey Comments Paper. Commissioners Scheffey and Edward (Ted) Tochterman agreed to
participate. They were joined by Chief Fire Protection Engineer Kenneth Bush representing the FM. After
the first meeting of the TG, Mr. Ron Wineholt was invited to participate. He represents the Apartment
and Office Building Association (AOBA) of Metropolitan Washington. He had apparently been involved
in discussions with the FM prior to this issue being brought forward to the Commission.

The Task Group subsequently called on two fire experts to supplement the information
gathered. Battalion Chief Mathew Carrigan of the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Services
provided fire department operations input and guidance. Mr. Joe Felton of the Montgomery County
Department of Permitting Services provided fire suppression systems expertise.

The TG met a total of 8 times from the time period December 28, 2017 to September 12, 2018.
Initial TG discussions of potential recommendations focused mainly on full fire suppression protection or
complete compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101 existing high rise building

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requirements. Commissioner Scheffey requested guidance from the full Commission at their April 26,
2018 regular meeting. Specifically, did the Commission desire that potential protection options other
than complete automatic sprinkler protection be included for consideration? The Commission
responded with two actions. They directed the TG to consider options other than just complete
automatic sprinkler protection. Having the necessary quorum, they also formally voted to designate
existing nonsprinklered high rise residential buildings as an inimical hazard. The vote was four
Commissioners in favor, and one against.

To date, the SFPC has not quantified what constitutes an inimical hazard, other than to
designate existing unsprinklered residential high rises as such. The TG recommended that the SFPC go
on record with their actions related to the appropriate level of safety. At the June, 2018 regular meeting,
the SFPC directed that the FM Draft and the Scheffey Comment Paper be attached to the June meeting
minutes, so that there was a formal record on why the Commission was taking action. This TG report
further quantifies this effort, particularly as it relates to the April 2018 direction that the TG develop
options for nonsprinklered residential high rise buildings.

At their meeting on September 12, 2018, the TG finalized a set of four potential protection
approaches. This was the last TG meeting, pending review by the full Commission. An overview of the
TG effort and its recommendations was provided by Commissioner Scheffey at the December 20, 2019
Commission meeting. A hard copy of the TG technical recommendations was provided to the attending
Commissioners and interested parties attending the meeting. It was also submitted to the Commission
Secretary to be included for the record in the December, 2019 meeting minutes.

This report describes the history, background, findings, and recommendations of the TG. It is the
detailed basis of the presentation made by Commissioner Scheffey at the December, 2019 meeting. It is
intended to document the TG decision making process, serve as the basis of the recommendations, and
be the formal, final output of the TG.

2.0 Approach

After the first several meetings, it was determined that the TG would focus on the technical
aspects of providing the appropriate level of safety to occupants of unsprinklered residential high rise
buildings. There are a number of administrative and implementation issues which the entire
Commission must address. Some of these were identified in the Scheffey Comments Paper. While the
TG is not making any recommendations on these, as outlined in Section 10, some opinions and
considerations are given.

Commissioner Scheffey acted informally as the Chair of the TG, and Commissioner Tochterman
and FPE Bush formed the core group. The TG desired to achieve consensus on challenging technical
issues, and to a very large degree, did so. Disagreement mostly related to the resulting level of safety
achieved from detailed recommendations. In layman’s terms, this relates to “how good is good
enough”. Specific disagreements are noted in this commentary.

Where referenced, the documents used by the TG were the current Maryland codes and
regulations [1}. The Maryland Public Safety Code (PSC) was referenced, in particular Title 6 State Fire
Prevention Commission and State Fire Marshal, and Title 9 Fire Protection and Prevention. The Code of

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Maryland Regulations (COMAR), in particular Title 29, Subtitle 06 Fire Prevention Commission, Chapter
01, Fire Prevention Code, was referenced. This references the 2015 Edition of NFPA 101, The Life Safety
Code.

A high rise is defined for new construction in §9–401 of the PSC as a building for human
occupancy that is: four or more stories above grade level or over 45 feet in height. It does not include a
structure or building used exclusively for open air parking or a building used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. Exceptions for current sprinkler mandates in §9–403 are provided for buildings less than 75
feet in height. The TG decided to use the following NFPA 101 definitions for structures for which the TG
recommendations would apply:

High rise building - a building where the floor of an occupiable story is greater than 75 ft above
the lowest level of fire department vehicle access (3.3.37.3);

Residential Occupancy: An occupancy that provides sleeping accommodations for purposes

other than health care and detention and correction (3.3.196.13); and,

Apartment building: a building or portion thereof containing three or more dwelling units with
independent cooking and bathroom facilities (3.3.37.2).

The TG focused on residential high rise buildings, not including hotels. This includes apartments,
condominiums, dormitories and public housing. It was believed that most high rise hotels in Maryland
are already sprinklered. Business occupancies were not specifically addressed.

Baltimore City is generally, but not always, exempt from the PSC (§6-401). The TG did not
attempt to identify Baltimore unsprinklered residential properties. Section 10.5 describes whether
Baltimore should be include in the TG recommendations.

Section 10.4 describes the anomaly of exempting condominium owners from retroactive high
rise fire sprinkler requirements.

The TG made a modest attempt to further quantify the risk and cost benefit aspects of
retroactive protection requirements (see Section 7). Necessarily (because of time, and the voluntary
nature of the TG effort), a formal risk and benefit analysis was not performed. The following specific
aspects of residential high rise protection were investigated:

The extent of unsprinklered high rise buildings in Maryland (excluding Baltimore City):

The establishment of an acceptable level of safety, including:

That established in other major jurisdictions in the US, particularly the degree to which
retroactive high rise sprinkler protection has been implemented in the US;

Civilian and firefighter casualty and fatality data, and fire loss, in high rise residential
structures;

Performance-based and cost benefit analysis, including:

Example indexing method used in Chicago; and

The cost of retroactive sprinkler protection; and,

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 Hazard analysis – identification of key fire safety issues in unsprinklered residential high
rise buildings, including:

Fire department operations;

Cooking fire hazard; and

Combustible exterior insulation systems.

As the TG work progressed. It was decided not to focus on a risk/benefit analysis or an

engineered, performance-based approach to establish an appropriate level of safety. Instead, specific
requirements for several alternatives were developed (referred to as the prescriptive code approach).
By doing this, the TG established, de facto, levels of safety it considered appropriate. To the extent
possible, this quantifies the “inimical hazard” in unsprinklered residential high rise buildings (see Section
8.0).

3.0 Summary of Recommended Options

The following is a summary of the recommended protection options developed by the TG.
Section 9.0 provides the specifics on these recommendations.

Option 1 - Provide a complete building fire suppression system:

Option 2 - Compliance with NFPA 101 for Existing High Rise Residential Occupancies;

Option 3 - Compliance with a set of parameters developed by the TG which include provisions
for: standpipes, a fire department elevator, protection of cooking equipment, smoke alarms, protection
of exit access corridors, protection of vertical openings and separation of hazards, elimination or
mitigation of hazards associated with combustible exterior finish material, maintenance of means of
egress, maintenance of manual fire alarm systems, and standby power; or

Option 4 – Compliance with the standpipe, FD elevator, cooking protection, and combustible
exterior mitigation features of Option 3. Additionally, alarms would have to sound throughout the
building, and, in buildings greater than 10 stories above grade, emergency power would be provided for
at least one FD elevator.

There was some differing opinions among TG members on the Option 3 corridor protection.
Also, the TG was divided on Option 4, a more cost effective alternative which address key hazards and
concerns.

4.0 Extent of Unsprinklered High Rise Residential Buildings in Maryland

The TG attempted to quantify the number of nonsprinklered residential high rise buildings in
Maryland, excluding Baltimore. Appendix A provides the spreadsheets of the collected data for Prince
Georges (PG) and Montgomery counties.

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 In Prince Georges County, 25 nonsprinklered residential high rise buildings were identified by
the FM and ABOA, comprised of over 5135 individual units.

Battalion Chief Carrigan of the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Services identified 121
unsprinklered residential buildings five or more stories in height in his county. About 80 of these are
estimated to be 75 feet or greater in height (note, the Appendix A spreadsheets include all 121
buildings). The total number of individual dwelling units was not identified.

Baltimore County has a requirement that high rise buildings built before July 1, 1974 be fitted
with complete automatic sprinkler protection. There are a total of 199 high rise residential structures,
according to Marcus Johnson of the Baltimore County Fire Marshal’s office. Four of these structures are
currently unsprinklered. The County allows the owners of unsprinklered condominiums to request a
waiver to the sprinkler requirements provided the 75 % of unit owners agree to request such a waiver
every four years. The four unsprinklered condominiums have apparently elected to take this approach.

Mr. Joe Sexauer, a code official in Ocean City, MD, provided information on their high rise fire
protection requirements. Since 2005, Ocean City has had retroactive high rise requirements. The total
number of high rises effected by the legislation was 45 buildings. The total number of nonsprinklered
high rises, all apartment buildings, was 19. Of those 19, four of them retroactively sprinklered their
building. The remaining non-sprinklered high rises were permitted to provide alternative upgrades due
to having exterior exit access balconies, similar to the exception provided in the Life Safety Code
(31.3.5.12.2) and as proposed by the TG as Option 2.

AOBA identified approximately 119 residential high rises in Maryland without sprinklers, based
on partial data and excluding Baltimore City. This order of magnitude is consistent with the TG survey
results.

The TG did not attempt to survey Anne Arundel, Howard, or Washington County, or Annapolis
City.

Very tall buildings would pose a significant challenge to occupant emergency evacuation and
firefighter operations. In this scenario, occupant evacuation might be staged (although the trend is to
evacuate an entire structure, no matter how tall, see Section 7.3). Combating an uncontrolled fire in a
very tall building is especially challenging for accessing the source, containing fire and smoke spread,
and coordinating/communicating. There should be assurance that firefighters combating a fire haven’t
been exhausted in accessing the fire floor.

There is no absolute definition on what constitutes a tall building. However, once a building
reaches 328 ft (100 m), it might be called a skyscraper [2]. By this definition, no “tall” residential
buildings were identified in Maryland. The tallest apartment building identified was the Washingtonian
Tower, 9701 Fields Rd, Gaithersburg, which is 25 stories. Presidential Towers in PG County is almost as
high.

Baltimore City was not included in the survey. The number of existing high rise buildings in
Baltimore is qualitatively judged to be material in terms of the total statewide number, perhaps on the
order of 30.

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5.0 Level of Safety

5.1 Establishing the Level of Safety

The current level of safety in nonsprinklered residential high rise structures was established by
the codes in effect at the time these structures were built. Since 1974, Maryland has required high rise
structures to be sprinklered. Each high-rise building constructed after July 1, 1974, must be protected by
a complete automatic sprinkler system installed in accordance with accepted engineering practices as
approved by the authority with jurisdiction (§9–403(a) of the Maryland Code). Before this time, the
applicable building and life safety codes allowed two protection options for high rises:
compartmentation, or complete sprinklering. In simple terms, compartmentation uses fire resistive
enclosures around individual dwelling units, and between floors, to contain fire to what was deemed a
manageable size. In the sprinkler option, some of the fire resistive enclosure requirements were
reduced. There were many common protection features, including fire alarm, standpipe, and fire
department operational features such as a fire department command/communication center.

In the early 1970s, limitations of the compartmentation option became evident, particularly in
very tall buildings. Since fire was not controlled by sprinklers, fire and smoke spread could pose a threat
even with the installed fire resistive barriers. This was a challenge to the vertical evacuation of
potentially large numbers of building occupants, and was an associated challenge for firefighting
operations. In the mid-1970s, building and fire codes recognized these limitations to the
compartmentation option. Complete automatic sprinkler protection became and remains the pillar of
the required protection for these structures.

The State Fire Prevention Code (FPC) addresses the level of safety: it is “intended to establish
minimum requirements that will provide a reasonable degree of fire prevention and control to
safeguard life, property, and the public welfare (Title 29, Subtitle 06, Chapter 01 State Fire Prevention
Code). How is this “reasonable” degree established? The National Association of State Fire Marshals
(NAFSM) provides a good description of how the level of safety is established [3]. Members of the
community should determine the level of safety they are willing to accept and pay for. National codes
and standards attempt to codify the level of safety for most communities in the US. This becomes the de
facto “minimum” level of safety consistent with the national standard. NASFM notes that the acceptable
level of safety can change with time.

By declaring nonsprinklered residential high rise buildings an inimical hazard, the Commission
has gone on record as declaring the current level of safety in these buildings as “unreasonable”,
requiring an increase in the provided level of safety. Defining what this increased level of safety should
be, and how it should be achieved and paid for, is the challenge.

5.2 Other Jurisdictions

A review of the requirements of other jurisdictions which impose retroactive requirements on

high rise buildings was performed. This was mainly through an internet search and some discussions
with professionals in the field. An online posting by AP described how few US cities mandate sprinklers
in old residential buildings [4}. Additional information was gathered from several other jurisdictions.
These findings are reported in Appendix B. The trend has been to require sprinkler retrofit in
commercial structures (e.g. office towers). The trend has been for residential structures to be totally

8
exempt from retroactive sprinkler requirements, or to allow condominium owners to vote on whether
to sprinkler or not. Where the condo opt out is allowed, the trend has been for the condominium
association to vote for this opt-out. Some jurisdictions, e.g. Chicago, require a Life Safety Evaluation to
determine where alternative protection to sprinklering may be provided.

Florida was the only state identified that has a state-wide sprinkler retrofit requirement.
Condominiums are allowed to opt-out. There have been challenges to enforcing this requirement, for
example in condominiums actually voting for the opt-out and associated administrative tracking. There
is legislative movement to potentially eliminate the condo opt-out. Chicago has also had trouble tracking
and enforcing the Life Safety Evaluation requirement.

Sprinklers may be required to be retroactively installed in buildings where significant renovation

occurs. The definition of significant or major renovation varies among jurisdictions.

Recent initiatives for sprinkler retrofitting have been met with community/legislative resistance.
After a major recent high rise fire in Honolulu involving four fatalities and significant firefighting
challenges [4], there was a proposed legislative effort to invoke retroactive sprinkler requirements. This
legislation has evidently been modified, based on community concerns, to allow an alternative
assessment methodology, provide financial incentives for sprinklering, and also to potentially allow
condominium opt-out for sprinklering individual dwelling units [5]. The legislation remains under
process.

Likewise, in Pittsburgh, voting on legislation to require retroactive sprinklering of residential

high rises has been postponed due to cost concerns [6].

6.0 Fire Loss History

Sections 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the high rise apartment fire loss and casualties as reported in
the Draft Proposal and Comments Paper. Section 6.3 provides an update of this data during the TG study
period.

6.1 High Rise Fire Incidents and Civilian Casualties

It was reported in the FM Draft Proposal that, since 2007, there have been 15,000 apartment
fires in Maryland, with over 500 civilians injured, 94 civilians killed, 200 firefighters injured, and one
firefighter killed. This apparently was for all apartments, both high- and low-rise, sprinklered and
nonsprinklered. The entire inventory of these occupancies was apparently considered. Commissioner
Scheffey cited the publically available data on high-rise multifamily structure fires in Maryland using year
end summary reports. These reports do not distinguish between low- and high-rise structures. The
number of civilians killed in all apartment fires appears to be trending downward; between 2002 and
2011, the average annual number of fatalities was about 11 per year; since 2012, about 8 per year. The
fire fatality rate per 1000 fires and the average loss per fire are generally lower in high-rise structures
compared to other buildings in the same category. High-rise buildings have lower percentages of fires
with flame damage outside the room of origin. NFPA attributes this lower risk to the greater use of fire
protection systems and features (including automatic detection and fire resistive construction) in high-
rise buildings compared to non-high-rise buildings.

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6.2 Fire Department Injuries and Casualties

As with the apartment civilian fire fatality rate, the firefighter line of duty (LOD) fatalities due to
fire are trending downward as noted in the Comment Paper. According to the Maryland FM Annual
Reports, there were 22 fatalities between 1997-2006. There were 5 between 2006-2016.

A similar assessment of firefighter injuries was not made since data for Maryland firefighter
injuries were not readily available. National statistics were assessed. A November 2017 NFPA Research
Letter headlined “Firefighter injuries are at an all-time low”. The estimated firefighter injury rate in
2016 was the lowest since NFPA began reporting this data in 1981. One apartment fire incident was
highlighted where a number of firefighters suffered from cyanide poisoning. This was attributed to the
premature removal of their SCBA facepieces, when they thought the atmosphere was clear. There is no
specific reference or categorization of injuries with respect to high-rises.

6.3 TG Update of Fire Loss Data

The AOBA representative noted that fire deaths in Maryland apartments account for less than
10% of total fire deaths. Fire deaths in high rise apartments would be an even smaller percentage of the
total. An attempt was made to glean more detailed data on high rise fires from the Maryland fire
incident records. This effort was not particularly helpful since the analyst had trouble filtering the report
data.

Since the Comment Paper was issued, no additional high rise fire loss analysis has been
produced by NFPA. Commissioner Scheffey reviewed the last three Annual Reports and Annual Fire
Death Reports submitted to the SFPC by the FM. None of these reports identify apartment fires as a
“clear and present danger” requiring immediate action as referenced in the FM Draft Proposal. The FM
office still does not track loss data as it specifically relates to high rise buildings.

The TG updated the fire loss record based on the Maryland State Fire Marshall “Fire Deaths in
Maryland”, published in 2018 for calendar year 2017. Trends previously identified remain the same:

a. Fire deaths in apartments are not specifically identified as “high rise”

b. Apartment fire trends remain the same – 6% of fire deaths occur in apartments buildings
(same as 2016 report of 2015 calendar year data)

c. There were no firefighter LOD deaths. This is the same as 2015 and 2016; 2018 had one LOD
death, which was not related to a fireground incident.

The NFPA Standard 1710 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression
Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire
Departments defines a high rise as “high hazard”. The NIST 2013 manning and response study in high
rises, cited previously in the Comments Paper, included significant high rise fires (several apartment fires
were noted). The TG did not identify new, significant data/information on high rise fire losses, other
than anecdotal information that firefighters had significant challenges at the July 14, 2017 Honolulu high
rise condominium fire.

The TG agreed with the observations in the FM Draft and Scheffey Comment Paper that
firefighting operations in a high rise can be challenging. The TG recruited DC Carrigan to provide input

10
and recommendations, particularly where sprinklers are not installed. Option 3 reflects these concerns,
with heavy emphasis on firefighting capability, as evidenced by the recommendations related to
standpipes, FD elevator service, and emergency power. Even the “cost effective” Option 4 retains these
recommendations, and adds a requirement for FD elevator emergency power for taller buildings.

7.0 Risk, Benefit, and Cost

A formal risk, cost, and benefit analysis was not performed. It could be, but was beyond the
scope and effort of the TG. Elements of risk benefit were investigated to the extent available to the TG.

The fire loss and incident data does not suggest an urgent need. Any further risk quantification
would be hampered by the fact that Maryland does not collect fire loss and injury statistics specifically
as they apply to high rise structures.

This is not to say that high rise structures do not pose a more-than-normal life and public safety
challenge. The reason codes implemented the complete automatic sprinkler protection in the mid-
1970s, eliminating the compartmentation option, was in recognition of these challenges. While the
available data suggests that high rise incidents are not a statistically abnormal challenge, a single,
uncontrolled high rise fire might threaten a large occupant load. Combating/controlling a fire could be a
significant challenge. The threat can be categorized as a “low probability, high impact” event. The “high
impact” would be the potential of multiple potential civilian and firefighter casualties, and major dollar
loss of a large structure.

The TG recognized these challenges, and identified specific significant threats/challenges. These
can be generally described as: firefighter safety and effective firefighting operations; the risk of ignition
and fire spread from cooking; and the threat from nonconforming combustible exterior insulation.

An element of the benefit was further quantified by determining, to the extent possible, the
cost of potential improvements.

7.1 Fire Department Operations

The input from the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service was valuable in identifying the
strategic and tactical approaches used in high rise firefighting, and limitations associated with
unsprinklered tall structures. Tactics per se don’t change between a sprinklered and unsprinklered
building per se, but the resources needed may significantly increase if a fire is uncontrolled. The fire
department’s primary concern is occupant safety; life safety is their first priority. They would prefer that
the entire building be evacuated when there is a fire incident. They would use the installed standpipes
for firefighting, and a standard procedure would be to supply and pressurize the standpipe from a
pumper apparatus. The need for an installed standpipe is fundamental. Reliability of an installed
standpipe was considered important. The TG had a number of discussions related to standpipe reliability
and integrity.

They would not normally rely on an installed stair pressurization system. Their standard
procedure is to use their portable fans placed to pressurize stairs (note this can be an effective tactic
since they don’t have very tall buildings). The fire department did not feel strongly about the need for
smokeproof towers, given the stair pressurization tactics they employ.

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 Above ten stories, the fire department will have difficulty accessing an incident unless they have
department elevator control capability. The fire department must have this capability in high rise
buildings. Power to a fire department-controlled elevator must be reliable.

Montgomery County has found that code-mandated fire department command centers, with
associated fire department telephones and public address systems, have limited practical use in the
early stages of high rise fire (first 20-30 minutes). They establish command and communication using
their own state-of-the-art equipment.

There was a proposed idea to retroactively provide an installed breathing air system standpipe
for fire department use in high rises. The idea is that breathing air replenishment in a major incident
would be facilitated. Both the fire department and TG members in general identified limitations of this
type of system. There were concerns about the ongoing maintenance and associated air quality in such a
system. The TG decided not to pursue this proposal.

In reviewing the fire department views, the AOBA noted that standpipes have been required as
part of the national fire code for over 100 years. Most high rise buildings already have them. ABOA
members believe most high rises would currently have fire service operable elevators. They noted that
their members have faced challenges in retroactively installing emergency generator systems. In
particular, finding an acceptable location and configuration to meet associated codes can be a challenge.

7.2 Cooking Hazard

Both the FM Draft and the Scheffey Comments Paper identified cooking fires as a significant
threat in high rise apartment/multifamily buildings. The high rise fire statistics for these occupancies
provides evidence for this concern. Three quarters of high rise fires originate in the cooking area. Three
quarters of all fires originate from cooking equipment. Fire casualties in high rise apartments was not
specifically assessed, but 19% of home fire deaths and 44% of home fire injuries involve cooking
equipment. Similar trends likely hold true for high rise apartment fire loss.

The TG felt that retroactive sprinklering would be sufficient to contain/control most kitchen
fires. It should be noted that a NIST study concluded that, even with activated sprinklers, a tenability
hazard may result from a cooking fire [7], see Appendix C.

For non-sprinklered situations, the TG felt that some additional protection should be provided.
Two approaches were considered. One involves traditional means of protecting cooking areas as
embodied by UL Standards. The TG preferred that any protection provided meet some generally
recognized approval standard. UL 300A, Outline of Investigation for Extinguishing System Units for
Residential Range Top Cooking Surfaces, is one standard that could be used. This standard is an offshoot
from commercial cooking protection standards. All currently listed units are wet chemical extinguishing
systems, which generally also require power shutdown of the range.

There has been substantial research in the past 5-10 years on the development of range top
ignition prevention systems. The goal is to prevent overheating at the range top, which would result
food ignition. An example is overheating of cooking oil on a stovetop. UL 858 Standard for Household
Electric Ranges was developed to address this situation (see Appendix C). The standard is for electric
range tops and currently includes an ignition prevention test for open coil ranges. Gas-fired ranges are
currently not included. Most vendors are proposing the use of temperature sensing and limiting devices

12
built into new stoves. The effective date for UL 858, Section 60A, Abnormal Operation Oil Ignition Test, is
April 4, 2019. This means that all new open coil (not glass, not gas, not induction) range tops must
prevent ignition of cooking oil in a pan for no less than 30 minutes. Only one known product was
currently identified as meeting this standard, although other vendor approvals are anticipated. It is not
clear that there will be a retrofit application; currently, all proposals are for installation on new stoves.

TG participant Wineholt of ABOA pointed out that many residential units in Maryland use gas for
stovetop cooking. The retroactive cost of converting units with gas to electrical, in order to retrofit
ignition prevention stove units, would likely be substantial and potentially cost prohibitive.

There are a number of alternative cooking protection systems as identified in Appendix C. The
TG realized that some of this emerging technology is not yet listed or approved for use in the United
States. An example is a localized water mist protection system, Automist®, manufactured by Plumis. It is
a localized water mist system, supplied from the residential water supply. A detector is used to activate
the system automatically. British Standard (BS) 8458 and 9252 are referenced by the vendor. Another
technology is the Innohome Stove Guard® detection system which is designed to prevent overheating of
cooktop materials. It currently has a European Union approval EU 50615 related to cooktop fire safety
devices.

The TG recommends some type of additional protection of cooking areas where the building is
not fully sprinklered. The exception is for Option 2, where direct exits to the exterior are available.

7.3 Exterior Combustible Insulation Materials

One hazard that seems to have been overlooked in the FM Draft is combustible exterior
insulation systems. There have been a number of high profile, dramatic high-rise fires involving this
material. The difference between sprinklered and nonsprinklered structures where these fires have
occurred appears to be significant (e.g. Grenfell Tower in London vs. Dubai Marina Torch and Address
Downtown fires in Dubai). So far, the most dramatic fires have occurred internationally.

NFPA 285 Standard Test Method for Evaluation of Fire Propagation Characteristics of Exterior,
Non-Load-Bearing Wall Assemblies Containing Combustible Components was developed in the US to
allow for exterior wall systems to include combustible insulation material. This insulation is highly
desirable from an energy and aesthetic standpoint. The NFPA standard was developed so that an
installed system will resist self-accelerating and self-sustaining fires. It was implemented in the United
States through model building codes in the late 1980s. Maryland has adopted these requirements
through adoption of the International Building Code.

Potential “noncompliant” situations might occur in Maryland where:

1. There was a gap between introduction of technology by industry and code protection
adoption (this is not deemed to be a significant problem in Maryland); or,

2. Unscrupulous vendors install non-NFPA 285 compliant exterior insulation systems.

Because of the potential rapid exterior fire spread where systems are non-compliant, this hazard
was deemed significant by the TG for nonsprinklered residential high rise structures. Small scale material
tests can readily identify if material has a fire retardant, an attribute of most if not all NFPA 258-

13
compliant systems. The TG recommends that non-sprinklered residential high rise structures having
combustible exterior insulation systems be evaluated to determine their compliance with NFPA 285.

Where buildings do not meet NFPA 285 requirements, a life safety evaluation should be
performed. NFPA has developed a risk assessment tool which could be used for such an evaluation. The
risk analysis tool EFFECTTM [8] should be used by a building owner in a nonsprinklered building identified
as having noncompliant combustible exterior wall insulation. Commissioner Scheffey exercised the tool
when it was first released in early 2018 (see Appendix D). He found that a tall (>50m) residential building
with a code compliant combustible facade (e.g. NFPA 285 compliant system) would obtain a “tolerable”
risk score, provided an “all out” emergency evacuation system/approach is provided. This is true even
for a sprinklered building. It is not clear if the risk tool has since been modified, and there is a disclaimer
that the tool should not be used for buildings without combustible facades. However, the “all out”
attribute demonstrates the importance the developers placed on total evacuation of a high rise
structure in a fire emergency.

7.4 Cost and Reliability of Mitigation Features

7.4.1 Cost of Retroactive Sprinklering

A primary factor in the retrofit cost of a sprinkler system is the availability of an adequate water
supply and whether or not the building is already protected with a fire department standpipe system.
AOBA members provided input to the TG on retrofit costs, which might include:

New water lines – the large volume of water required to supply a sprinkler
system may require the installation of new, larger water supply lines from the
building to the nearest utility water main line. Even that may not assure
adequate water supply, as some hydrants even lack adequate water supply.

If adequate water supply lines cannot be installed, large water storage tanks on
site (if zoning allows) so the newly installed fire pumps don’t drain the water
supply lines dry.

Large emergency generators (sited somewhere) to power the fire pumps.

Asbestos or silica dust abatement

Removal of tenants from floors under construction

Increased costs if there is no suspended ceilings in which to run piping

Additional challenges to retroactive sprinkler installation include: drilling holes in structurally

important elements; working around other trades/systems (communication, power, HVAC, plumbing);
potential electrical power upgrades (e.g., pump/controller demand); achieving dry pipe grade for
adequate drainage; and freeze protection.

Commissioner Scheffey and AOBA representative Wineholt surveyed the large amount of
information available on sprinkler retrofit costs, see Appendix E. Given the large number of variables, it
is not surprising that the retrofit cost estimate varies widely. This cost is estimated to be two to eight
dollars per square foot of protected area ($2-$8/sq.ft.). For a range of individual dwelling unit sizes, this
is estimated to be $595 - $13,473 per unit. AOBA noted one 400-unit high rise apartment building that

14
cost $3.5 million to retrofit with sprinklers about 10 years ago ($8,750/unit). Using a mid-range
estimates of $5/sq.ft. sprinkler cost and 900 sq.ft. per dwelling unit, and the number of individual
dwelling units in PG County (5135 units, Appendix A), the cost in PG County is estimated to be on the
order of $26.3 million. Directly scaling this to 119 nonsprinklered buildings estimated in Maryland, the
total cost would be on the order of $125 million.

7.4.2 Reliability of Sprinkler Systems

NFPA has recently published a valuable study on sprinkler effectiveness and failure rates [9], a
follow-on to an earlier study. It found that sprinklers operated and were effective in controlling a fire in
88% of fires large enough to operate them. Sprinklers should provide a high degree of occupant life
safety and firefighter safety in terms of limiting/containing a fire. Complete sprinklering is considered as
providing the highest level of safety.

In terms of firefighter challenges, a NIST fireground experiment report [10] notes that many
high-rise buildings are not sprinklered. They caution against total reliance on sprinklers, noting that
“sprinkler systems fail in about one in fourteen fires. Thus, fire departments should be prepared to
manage the risks associated with unsprinklered high-rise buildings”.

7.4.3 Cost and Reliability of Other Protection System Upgrades

A brief review of the cost and effectiveness of other fire protection system upgrades was made,
e.g. Reference 11. These systems include: fire alarm and detection; fire resistive construction (including
closure of vertical and horizontal openings, and door self-closing features); emergency power; fire
department elevator control; standpipe system integrity and monitoring; and smoke control systems.
AOBA identified estimated costs of kitchen fire suppression systems that ranged from $1,500-$7,000 per
unit.

As with the industry at large, the TG found there were too many variables and unknowns to
quantify these costs and associated effectiveness.

7.4.4 Additional Considerations

Any assessment of costs should include not only the initial capital cost as described above, but
recurring costs. Sprinkler, fire alarm and detection, elevator, emergency generator, and smoke control
systems all require routine inspection and maintenance. Many inspections are code mandated. The TG
did not quantify these additional costs.

A change in the tax law provides potential cost savings incentives to install sprinkler systems
[12]. AOBA Representative Wineholt provided an analysis of this change (see Appendix F). The new
(2017) federal tax law increases depreciation of qualified property placed in service between September
27, 2017 and December 31, 2022. Mr. Wineholt concluded that the increase in annual Section 179
expensing applies to non-residential real property. He concluded that sprinklers and fire alarm and
detection systems would likely be eligible for the bonus depreciation, providing a cost savings benefit for
retrofitting these systems. He concluded that fire resistive enclosure improvements (stairs, openings,
corridors, and residential unit doors) would likely be ineligible for the bonus depreciation.

Commissioner Scheffey also investigated current preventative and preplanning approaches to

high rise fire safety as advocated by NFPA. They have published documents geared toward occupants of

15
residential high rise buildings [13-15]. The AOBA advised that some fire safety initiatives have been
advocated by their organization to their members, but could not describe specific programs. Likewise,
high rise fire prevention or action plans are not being actively advocated by the FM or Chief FPE.

8.0 Level of Safety Implementation - Performance-Based or Prescriptive Code Approach

During the spring of 2018, the TG gathered data as described above. The challenge was how to
implement any proposed improvements. In the absence of a detailed risk and cost benefit analysis, the
TG investigated two different approaches. One is a “performance-based” approach where a solution is
engineered to achieve broadly defined goals and objectives. The prescriptive code approach relies on
published mandated codes and standards to establish an inherent level of safety.

8.1 Indexing

A simplified approach to performance-based risk assessment is the indexing method. NASFM

provides a good overview of this approach [3}. The desired level of safety is impacted by occupant
evacuation, firefighter response and operations, and the overall economic impact to the building. Values
are assigned to different layers of fire protection used to achieve the desired outcome. The individual
scores of the protection levels are added or subtracted to determine an overall building score. “Pass”
and “fail” values are established by fire safety experts consistent with the desired level of safety.

Two existing standards use indexing: NFPA 101A Indexing Guide to Alternative Approaches to
Life Safety; and, The International Existing Building Code, Chapter 14, Performance Compliance
Methods. Unfortunately, neither has a readily adaptable indexing scoring system to evaluate existing,
unsprinklered high rise residential occupancies. NAFSM is in the process of developing such a system,
but its initial effort is evidently for use in office occupancies and was not deemed usable for the TG
effort.

The TG was aware of an effort by fire safety officials in Honolulu who were attempting to create
a risk indexing assessment for high rise residential structures. This effort was not formalized during the
TG effort and was not further considered. Commissioner Scheffey identified an existing indexing system
used in Chicago to assess and improve the level of safety in nonsprinklered residential structures. He
summarized the attributes and performed an example calculation of a hypothetical apartment building
(Appendix G). Chicago requires that one- and two-way voice communication systems must be installed,
except that residential units less than 15 stories and 60 units may have a one-way system only. One hour
rated stair doors and frames and doors are required. It is assumed there is a standpipe system. The
indexing factors evaluated include: height; construction type; maximum compartment size; separations;
corridor wall fire resistance ; vertical openings; HVAC interconnectivity; smoke detection;
communications; smoke control; means of egress capacity; dead end corridors; travel distance; elevator
controls; emergency lighting; mixed occupancies; sprinklers; and, auxiliary uses.

Commissioner Scheffey concluded that, to achieve a passing score, his hypothetical

nonsprinklered example building had many attributes that later evolved into Option C.

Chicago has apparently had difficulty in administrating and enforcing this indexing option.

16
8.2 Prescriptive Code Approach

Commissioner Scheffey was in the minority for advocating for a risk/benefit or performance
approach, even as simple as an indexing approach. His rationale was that it provided more flexibility and
potential cost effective trade-offs compared to a prescriptive approach. The TG subsequently adopted
the prescriptive code-based approach.

It is generally agreed that sprinklers provide the greatest level of protection. Other alternatives,
while they might be deemed as achieving an acceptable level of safety, would generally not be
considered equivalent. It is also recognized that, while absolute assurance of both occupant and
firefighter safety is desired, it cannot be achieved even with sprinklers.

It was with this in mind, and having wrestled with alternative approaches and levels of safety in
the four months of the TG efforts, that Commissioner Scheffey asked for clarification from the full
Commission. If the level of safety desired by the Commission was that of complete sprinkler protection,
then the TG could disband and the Commission could propose this requirement. The Commission
directed the TG to develop alternatives to complete sprinkler protection. By doing so, the Commission
signaled that alternative levels of safety developed by the TG could ultimately be acceptable. The
alternatives were developed using the prescriptive code approach.

9.0 Recommended Retroactive Requirements for Existing Nonsprinklered Residential High Rise
Buildings

As noted in the Summary of Options, four prescriptive approaches were developed, including: a
complete building fire suppression system: compliance with NFPA 101 for Existing High Rise Residential
Occupancies; compliance with a set of parameters developed by the TG; and, compliance with key
parameters of the TG-developed requirements, focusing on a less costly approach.

The TG decided to develop standalone requirements. If adopted, they do not require other
revisions to the State FPC. It is the intent of the TG that application of one of the options would be in
addition to any previously approved conditions that currently exist within the building. The levels of
current protection could not be reduced, but would not have to be improved other than what is stated
in the option which is used. It is anticipated that the exact wording and format of the proposals may
have to be refined for the adoption process.

In terms of level of safety, Option 1 complete sprinkler protection, would achieve the highest
level of safety. It is the level of safety established in the existing residential building requirements of
NFPA 101. Option 2 essentially requires all dwelling units to have an exit to the exterior. It is also
recognized in NFPA 101. It is hard to quantify the level of safety this achieves compared to sprinklers.
These 2 options/levels of safety exceed that which is found in most jurisdictions as noted in Section 5.2.

The TG took the approach that, if neither of these two options is used, the hazards specifically
addressed in Sections 7.1-7.3 should be addressed: provide for fire department operations; address the
cooking hazard identified in residential occupancies; and, assure any noncompliant combustible exterior
insulation does not contribute to reducing the level of safety. With more prescriptive requirements,

17
Option 3 provides a higher level of safety than Option 4, with an expected higher cost. Option 4 was a
minority position within the TG.

9.1 Option 1 – Building Fire Suppression System

9.1.1 Option 1 Proposal

Compliance with one of the following:

1. Installation and continued maintenance of approved, supervised automatic sprinkler

protection throughout the building in accordance with applicable standards referenced by
the State Fire Prevention Code; or,

2. Installation and continued maintenance of approved, supervised water mist protection

throughout the building in accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State
Fire Prevention Code

9.1.2 Option 1 Discussion

Option 1.1 means complete automatic sprinkler protection in accordance with (IAW) NFPA 13.
Option 1.2 means complete water mist protection IAW NFPA 750. Section 7.4.1 describes some of the
challenges of retroactive sprinkler installation. It was believed that the water mist option might provide
a more viable option where retrofitting of automatic sprinklers is physically challenging in a retrofit
situation. A noted water mist system expert, Gerard G. Back of Jensen Hughes, provided the TG with
approval and practical installation information. He agreed with Commissioner Scheffey that, generally
speaking, installation of a water mist system in an existing high rise would likely cost more than
retrofitting automatic sprinklers.

9.2 Option 2 – Comply with NFPA 101 Existing Residential Building Requirements

9.2.1 Option 2 Proposal - Compliance with all applicable requirements of NFPA 101 for Existing
High-Rise Residential Occupancies as referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code.

9.2.2 Option 2 Discussion

This means that the building must meet Chapter 31 of NFPA 101. A building must be completely
sprinklered, unless:

1. Every dwelling unit has exterior exit access (31.11.3.5.12.2); or,

2. An approved, engineered life safety system is provided (31.11.3.5.12.3). Other features must
be provided, including smoke proof towers and exit door unlocking (31.2.11).

Where Option 1 above (complete building suppression) is not selected, this effectively means
every dwelling unit must have exterior exit access IAW NFPA 101 Section 7.5.3, or have an approved,
engineered life safety system (see NFPA 101 Section 31.3.5.12).

If an engineered life safety system is developed, it must be by an experienced professional

engineer and approved by the authority having jurisdiction. It must include partial automatic sprinkler
protection, smoke detection systems, smoke control systems, compartmentation, and other approved
systems.

18
 Commissioner Scheffey identified a new proposal being circulated by the NFPA 101 Technical
Committee for revision to the next Edition. The proposal is to eliminate the existing high rise apartment
building alternative which allows an engineered fire safety study as an alternative (31.3.5.12.3 and .4).
This would effectively eliminate any performance-based approach.

9.3 Option 3 – TG-Developed Requirements

9.3.1 Option 3 Proposal

Compliance with all of the following;

1. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved Class I or Class III standpipe system
in accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code. All
piping for required standpipe systems shall be supervised by water or air pressure.

2. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved fire service elevator in accordance

with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code.

3. Protection of all fixed cooking equipment by one of the following;

a. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved hood extinguishing system

in accordance with UL 300A

b. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved ignition prevention system

in accordance with listing requirements

c. Installation and continued maintenance of another approved automatic fire

extinguishing system which provides protection to all cooking surfaces in
accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code
and/or other listing or manufacturers’ requirements.

4. Installation and continued maintenance of approved smoke alarms in accordance with the
provisions of the Maryland Public Safety Article for existing construction apartment
buildings.

5. Protection of all interior common spaces, including exit access corridors, including
associated unseparated spaces, in accordance with one of the following:

a. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved smoke detection system in

accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code
and arranged to sound a general evacuation alarm throughout the building upon
activation of any detector; or

b. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved fire suppression system

which is arranged to sound a general evacuation alarm throughout the building
upon activation of any component of the suppression system.

6. Protection of all vertical openings in accordance with the applicable provisions of the State
Fire Prevention Code for existing residential occupancies.

19
7. Protection of all areas in the building having a degree of hazard greater than that normal to
the general occupancy of the building in accordance the applicable provisions of the State
Fire Prevention Code for existing residential occupancies.

8. If a building has combustible exterior finish or insulation, the building owner shall
determine, using representative test samples or a review of building as-built drawings,
whether the finish meets the requirements of NFPA 285. If the materials do not meet these
requirements, they shall be removed, or a risk assessment performed to determine an
appropriate risk mitigation approach.

9. Means of egress designed and maintained in compliance with applicable provisions of the
State Fire Prevention Code for existing residential occupancies. The provisions of Paragraph
31.2.11.1 of NFPA 101, 2015 edition for smoke proof enclosures shall not apply.

10. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved, supervised manual fire alarm
system throughout the building in accordance with the applicable provisions of the State
Fire Prevention Code for existing residential occupancies, and which incorporates all of the
following features:

a. Upon activation, provides approved audible and visual notification throughout the
building.

b. Upon activation, provides alarm annunciation at an approved location within the

building.

c. Upon activation, automatically transmits the alarm by an approved means for

emergency services notification.

11. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved standby power system in

accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code for all of
the following;

a. Required emergency lighting.

b. Required exit markings.

c. Electric fire pump (if present).

d. Pressure maintenance pump for fire protection system (if present).

e. Air compressor serving dry-pipe or pre-action fire protection systems (if present).

f. Emergency command center equipment and lighting (if present).

g. Not less than one elevator serving all floors, with standby power transferable to any
elevator.

h. Mechanical equipment for smoke control (if present).

20
 9.3.2 Option 3 Discussion

Option 3 relies to a large extent on NFPA 101 Chapter 31 recommended requirements for
existing non-sprinklered low-rise buildings (NFPA 101 Chapter 31 would require sprinklers, exterior exits,
or an engineered life safety system, see 9.1. and 9.2). The kitchen protection system requirement
(Option 3. 3) and evaluation of exterior combustible insulation (Option 3.8) exceed the Chapter 31
requirements. It is unclear whether the elevator requirements exceed Chapter 31 requirements.

The current status of the building standpipe, elevator, and emergency power system would have
to be assessed. This option also requires a thorough building walk-down inspection to determine
compliance with the requirements for smoke alarms, exits, protection of vertical openings, protection of
hazards, and manual fire alarm systems.

3.1 Standpipes - The TG strongly felt that a working standpipe system was necessary for fire
department operations. It was felt that nearly all high rise buildings probably have a standpipe system.
Originally, the TG was going to prohibit manual dry pipe systems because of reliability concerns. It was
identified that there are many of these systems are installed in existing buildings. The finalized language
allows for manual dry pipe systems, provided supervisory air is included.

3.2 FD Elevator Service - Again, the TG felt strongly that at least one elevator configured for fire
service use be available for firefighting operations. It was unclear to the TG whether most buildings
would already have this. It was noted that NFPA 101 Section 31.5.3 references NFPA 101 Section 9.4.
Section 9.4.2.2 says that existing elevators shall be in accordance with the requirements of ASME A17.3
Existing Elevator Code. The fire service operation and emergency power criteria in A17.3 are in non-
mandatory language. The intent of this Option 3.2 is that at least one elevator serving all floors has fire
service operation.

3.3 Cooking Area Protection – As noted, cooking is leading cause of apartment fires and
associated fire loss and casualties. Where sprinkler protection is provided, it is anticipated that it will
contain the fire to the area of origin. The TG felt that there is significant potential for fire spread of an
unmitigated cooking fire. The TG is recommending some type of protection for cooking areas in
nonsprinklered high rise buildings.

All installed fire protection systems in all Options must be listed as defined by the FPC and the
referenced NFPA Standards. It is recognized that kitchen protection system technologies are evolving.
The TG believed that the authority having jurisdiction should have wide latitude in approving new
technologies, for example recognizing international listing/approvals. (e.g. EU 50615 related to cooktop
fire safety devices). It is intended that new localized water mist protection systems would meet Option
3.3.c.

3.4 Smoke Alarms - The PSC requires that existing apartments have single station smoke
detectors outside of sleeping areas (PSC §9-104). It was noted that in new construction, not applicable
under proposed Option 3.4, smoke detectors are required in each sleeping area, interconnected with
one another (PSC §9-103).

3.5 Exit Access Paths - The TG felt it was important to provide some level of safety for common
exit access paths. The option of smoke detection or sprinklering of these areas is proposed.

21
Commissioner Tochterman dissented on the inclusion of the smoke detector option. He believes that
the common exit access corridors should be sprinklered.

3.6 Protection of Vertical Openings - This means IAW NFPA Chapter 31, which references NFPA
101 Section 9.1 for utilities and 9.5 for waste chutes. These chapters have specific
requirements/allowances for existing buildings. Means of egress components should be IAW NFPA
Section 31.2.

3.7 Protection of Hazards - This means IAW NFPA 101 Section 31.3.2, which references NFPA
101 8.7 having specific existing building requirements.

3.8 Combustible Exterior Finish Material - There have been a number of high profile, dramatic
high-rise fires involving combustible exterior finish material. The difference between sprinklered and
nonsprinklered structures where these fires have occurred appears to be significant. NFPA 285 Standard
Test Method for Evaluation of Fire Propagation Characteristics of Exterior, Non-Load-Bearing Wall
Assemblies Containing Combustible Components was developed and implemented in the United States
through model building codes to address this situation. The Standard assures that wall systems will
resist self-accelerating and self-sustaining fires. Maryland has adopted these requirements, and it is
believed that most if not all buildings in Maryland comply with this Standard. Since the potential fire
spread is so dramatic and significant where noncompliant systems are installed, the TG felt that
nonsprinklered existing buildings should be checked for compliance with NFPA 285. The NFPA EFFECTTM
risk assessment tool is anticipated to be the appropriate risk tool to be used where non-NFPA 285
compliant materials are identified.

3.9 Exits - This means IAW NFPA 101 Ch 31.2. The TG believed that the smoke proof enclosure
requirements of NFPA 101 Section 31.2.11.1 were unnecessary for this Option.

3.10 Alarms – The TG felt it was important that activation of a manual alarm causes notification
throughout the building.

9.4 Option 4 - Cost Effective TG-Developed Option

9.4.1 Option 4 Proposal

1. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved Class I or Class III standpipe system
in accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code. All
piping for required standpipe systems shall be supervised by water or air pressure.

2. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved fire service elevator in accordance

with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code.

3. Protection of all fixed cooking equipment by one of the following;

a. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved hood extinguishing system

in accordance with UL 300A

b. Installation and continued maintenance of an approved ignition prevention system

in accordance with listing requirements

22
 c. Installation and continued maintenance of another approved automatic fire
extinguishing system which provides protection to all cooking surfaces in
accordance with applicable standards referenced by the State Fire Prevention Code
or other listing; or manufacturers’ requirements.

4. Installation and continued maintenance of approved smoke alarms in accordance with the
provisions of the Maryland Public Safety Article for existing apartment buildings.

5. Installation of a manual fire alarm system, which, upon activation, provides approved
audible notification throughout the building.

6. If a building has combustible exterior finish or insulation, the building owner shall
determine, using representative test samples whether the finish meets the requirements of
NFPA 285. If the materials do not meet these requirements, they shall be removed, or a risk
assessment performed to determine an appropriate risk mitigation approach.

7. In buildings greater than 10 stories above grade, Installation and continued maintenance of
an approved standby power system for at least one elevator which has fire department
operation capabilities.

9.4.2 Option 4 Discussion

This option adopts key provisions of Option 3 (but not all the requirements) and adds
emergency power for elevators in very tall buildings. This option was created to provide a more cost
effective alternative to the other options, while addressing issues identified in Sections 7.1-7.3. This
option presumes that buildings constructed under the previously allowed compartmentation option and
associated retroactive smoke alarm requirements in the PSC provide a good baseline level of protection.
This includes: building construction fire resistance; vertical and horizontal fire resistive separation;
separation of hazards; exit layout (means of egress capacity, dead end corridors, travel distance, and
capacity); protection of vertical openings; emergency lighting; and, emergency power. The level of
protection is increased by assuring a desired level of protection for fire department operations, kitchen
fires, and combustible exterior insulation. Recognizing the importance associated with total building
evacuation, activation of a manual fire alarm should sound an alarm throughout the building. There
could be no changes that would decrease the levels of safety previously accepted in the existing
building. Retroactively inspecting the building construction features is not required except to the extent
that the Option 4 requirements are applied.

Commissioner Scheffey developed this Option. His rationale was that compliance with proposed
Options 2 and 3 would likely be, in many cases, so costly as to effectively require adoption of Option 1,
complete sprinklering. The SFPC indicated their desire to have options to complete sprinklering. The TG
was divided on whether this option should be included as a recommendation; it was the minority
opinion of Commissioner Scheffey to include this option.

23
10. Other Considerations

10.1 Implementation of Recommendations

The TG did not take a position on how any increased level of fire safety should be implemented.
By designating nonsprinklered residential high rise buildings as an inimical hazard in its April, 2018
meeting, the SFPC has vested the authority to mitigate this hazard to the FM. He could act on his own to
seek mitigation; no additional action by the SFPC is necessary.

The assignment of a TG by the SFPC, and participation of the FM office (through the Chief Fire
Protection Engineer), implies that retroactive improvements will at least be made administratively by
the Commission. Presumably, this would be accomplished by revising regulations in Code of Maryland
Regulations (COMAR) Title 29 Subtitle 06, Chapter 01, Section 02 Prevention Fire Code. This requires
public notification and a subsequent public hearing (PS § 6-206(c)). The only legislative input would
come from review by the Committee on Administrative, Executive and Legislative Review (AELR), which
reviews all proposed regulations.

In his Comments Paper, Commissioner Scheffey argued that retroactive requirements for public
risk reduction measures requires public and political input and judgement. The public at large, through
the legislative process, should be allowed to assess the hazard and the associated costs of any
subsequent risk reduction. If the hazard is great enough that both the FM and Commission deem action
is necessary, a proposal to change the Annotated Code of Maryland should be developed. Commissioner
Scheffey argued that this places the risk-benefit decision on the body- politic (defined here as
represented by the Maryland Legislature), not in the hands of nine political (albeit expert) Commission
appointees. A recent change to residential smoke detector requirements is an example of a change with
far-reaching impact being made through the legislative process.

Local jurisdictions have the authority to impose greater levels of safety. The Public Safety Code
establishes minimum requirements which must be followed by Maryland jurisdictions. Nothing prohibits
individual jurisdictions from requiring a greater level of safety than is currently embodied by the State
Code (PS § 6-206(d)(2)).

10.2 Implementation of Retroactive Requirements

There was some discussion, instigated by correspondence from the FM, that retroactive
requirements be phased-in to reduce the cost impact and to take advantage of potential tax implications
(see Section 7.4.4). The FM has suggested a 12 year phase-in for retroactive sprinkler protection. Some
jurisdictions having retroactive implementation have, for example, used a ten-year phase-in period. The
latest national tax law change allows accelerated depreciation for sprinklers and fire alarms (Section
7.4.4). It was determined that this would not likely to apply to improvements/upgrades to fire resistive
construction. It is not clear if any improvements to exterior insulation cladding would be covered.

Some time period would obviously be required. For example, NFPA 1 Fire Prevention Code,
Section A.13.3.2.26.2 identifies issues to consider when phasing-in retroactive sprinkler requirements.
The TG considered this an implementation administrative issue and has no recommendation on this.

24
10.3 Jurisdictions Having Existing Higher Levels of Safety

Ocean City and Baltimore County have elected to require a greater level of safety. Other
Maryland jurisdictions have not. Anecdotally, it was reported that there was an attempt to impose
retroactive requirements in Montgomery County, but that it was rebuffed by the County Executive.

Ocean City uses a modified version of the NFPA 101 existing high rise provisions. For the exterior
exit option, there is a list of additional requirements related to fire alarm and detection, standby power,
FD phone system, Class I standpipe, and other features. A detailed review was not performed between
their requirements and proposed Option 2.

Baltimore County has the condominium opt out provision.

The TG did not take an official position on this issue. However, it seems that the Ocean City
requirements would meet the spirit of Option 2.

10.4 Condominium Owners

Baltimore County requires retroactive sprinkler protection of high rise residential structures.
Condominium owners may opt out of this requirement if 75% of the owners agree (Section 5.2). The
rationale is that individual owners, acting as a collective, can determine and select their desired level of
safety. In other words, they can accept a higher level of risk. Florida has a similar provision, although
there are indications that they are moving away from this to potentially require all residential buildings
to be sprinklered.

The TG does not endorse the idea of selectively allowing building owners the choice of opting
out of retroactive increases in the level building protection. The TG questioned why the PSC or SFPC
would set a statewide level of safety for everyone except one particular segment of the population
(condominium owners). The TG believes that the level of safety established by these recommendations
should apply to all Maryland residents subject to the laws and regulations promulgated by the State Fire
Prevention Commission and the state legislature.

10.5 Baltimore City

A question was raised whether retroactive high rise requirements should apply to Baltimore
City. Baltimore is exempt from the SFPC, but some requirements of the PSC do apply. For example, the
recent smoke detector retroactive requirement does apply to Baltimore City (PSC §9-102a). If the
Commission proceeds with a change to the SFPC via a COMAR change, Baltimore City would be exempt
since it is exempt from the SFPC.

The TG did not take an official position on this. But the TG reaction was similar to that for condo
owners: why would the PSC or SFPC set a statewide level of safety for everyone except one particular
segment of the population (Baltimore City).

25
11.0 Recommendations

The following recommendations are provided recognizing the following: Commissioner

Tochterman disagreed with the Option 3 allowance for smoke detectors for corridor protection; and,
Option 4 is a minority option developed by Commissioner Scheffey to provide a more cost-effective
approach addressing important issues. Also, AOBA does not endorse all aspects of the report’s
recommendations. They recognize the challenges of fighting fires in high rises and the need for effective
standpipes and fire service elevators to combat those fires. They question the Commission finding that
unsprinklered high rises are an inimical hazard. It is AOBA’s view that a policy change of this magnitude,
with potentially significant impacts on housing costs, should be decided by the Maryland General
Assembly and statewide in effect.

The Commission should carefully review the data and information provided in this report. The
Commission should first:

1. Conclude that a greater quantification of the risk, hazards, costs and benefits is required
before significant retroactive action is taken. If this is the decision, a professional consultant would be
needed since a further effort is beyond the normal capabilities of the Commission and the Task Group.

Or:

2. Reconfirm their position established at their April, 2018 meeting that nonsprinklered high rise
residential structures in Maryland are an inimical hazard. By doing so, they formally establish that these
buildings have an inadequate level of safety consistent with assuring occupant life safety, providing for
firefighter operations and safety, and limiting the economic impact from a significant fire event. The
basis for this decision are the review and analysis as described in this report, including: the extent of
nonsprinklered buildings in Maryland (excluding Baltimore City); the level of safety provided in other
jurisdictions and embodied in national codes and standards; fire loss history; risks and hazards from high
rise building fires; the impact of retroactive requirements; and the increase in the level of safety
embodied in Options developed by the TG.

The TG has established the technical basis of an improved level of safety, embodied by four
Options. These Options briefly summarized are: 1 - Provide a complete building fire suppression system;
Option 2 - Comply with NFPA 101 for Existing High Rise Residential Occupancies (exterior exits); Option 3
- Comply with a set of parameters developed by the TG (Section 9.3.1); or, Option 4 - comply with key
features of Option 3 (see Section 9.4.1).

In terms of level of safety, Option 1, complete suppression protection, would achieve the
highest level of safety. It is the level of safety established in the existing residential building
requirements of NFPA 101. This option/level of safety exceeds that which is found in most jurisdictions
as noted in Section 5.2.

Option 2 essentially requires all dwelling units to have an exit to the exterior. It is also
recognized in NFPA 101. It is hard to quantify the level of safety this achieves compared to sprinklers.

The Commission specifically directed the TG to develop alternatives to complete sprinkler

protection. By doing so, the Commission signaled that alternative levels of safety developed by the TG

26
could ultimately be acceptable. The TG took the approach that, if neither Option 1 nor 2 is used, the
hazards specifically addressed in Sections 7.1-7.3 should be addressed: provide for fire department
operations; address the cooking hazard identified in residential occupancies; and, assure any
noncompliant combustible exterior insulation does not contribute to reducing the level of safety. With
more prescriptive requirements, Option 3 provides a higher level of safety than Option 4, with an
expected higher cost. Option 4 was a minority position within the TG.

Assuming the Commission decides to move forward, they should revise these options as needed
based on the technical judgement and input from all Commission members. This would establish the
technical basis for retroactive improvements which would then be moved forward administratively.

The Commission could move forward by changing the COMAR or the Public Safety Code. Pros
and cons of this approach are identified. The Commission should identify the appropriate approach.

Likewise, the Commission should decide on the following administrative items, which were
discussed in Section 10:

Exempt or include condominium owners;

Exempt or include Baltimore City;

Establish a phase-in period;

Recognize the potential equivalent protection provided by Ocean City.

11.0 Acknowledgements

Thanks are extended to special experts Gerrard G. (Jerry) Back, Dan Gottuk, and Josh Dinaburg
of Jensen Hughes who provided expert information on water mist and cooking equipment. Thanks are
also extended to Jensen Hughes for the use of their conference room for most of the Task Group
meetings.

12.0 References

1. Maryland State Fireman’s Association, Fire Laws of Maryland, 2016 Edition, Mathew Bender &
Company, 2016

2. Kata, Yuka, 63% of the Wolds Tallest Building as are in Asia, originally posted via Fixer.com, reposted
by Tyler Durden of Zeroheadge.com

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-04-22/63-worlds-tallest-buildings-are-
asia?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28z
ero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29

3. National Association of State Fire Marshals, “Evaluating Fire Risk in Existing Buildings”, NASFM Fire
research Education Foundation, Maitland, FL, undated

http://www.firemarshals.org/resources/Documents/FAIL-SAFE/Evaluating%20Fire%20Risk.pptx

27
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Polo_condo_fire

5. https://www.phcppros.com/articles/7728-ordinance-18-14-safety-gaps

6. https://triblive.com/local/allegheny/14183284-74/pittsburgh-council-postpones-vote-on-mandatory-
fire-sprinklers-in-high-rises

7. Hamins, A., Kim, S.C, Madrzykowski. D., and Kent, J., “Investigation of Residential Cooking Fire
Suppression Technologies” National Institute of Standards and Technology TN 1969, Gaithersburg, MD,
February 12, 2018

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1969

8. Lamont, S., and Ingolfsson, S., “High Rise Buildings with Combustible Exterior Wall Assemblies: Fire
Frisk Assessment Tool”, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, February 2018

https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Data-research-and-tools/Building-and-Life-Safety/High-Rise-
Buildings-with-Combustible-Exterior-Wall-Assemblies-Fire-Risk-Assessment-Tool

9. Ahrens, M., “U.S. Experience with Sprinklers”, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, July
2017

10. J. D. Averill, L. Moore-Merrell, R. T. Ranellone Jr., C. Weinschenk, N. Taylor, R. Goldstein, R. Santos,

D. D. Wissoker and K. A. Notarianni, “Report on High-Rise Fireground Field Experiment”, NIST Technical
Note 1797, April 2013

11. Hall, J.R., Flynn, J., and Grant, C., “Measuring the Effectiveness for Fire-Related Portions of the
Code”, Fire Protection Research Foundation, Quincy, MA, July, 2008

12. National Fire Sprinkler Association, “FYI Series, Fire Sprinkler Incentives, Tax Reform Info”, NFSA,
Linthicum, MD, 2018

13. National Fire Protection Association, “Fire Alarms in Apartment Buildings”, NFPA Public Education
Division Tipsheet, Quincy, MA, 2016

14. National Fire Protection Association, “High Rise Apartment and Condominium Safety”, NFPA Public
Education Division Tipsheet, Quincy, MA, 2016

15. National Fire Protection Association, “Guidelines to Developing Emergency Action Plans for All-
Hazard Emergencies in High Rise Buildings”, NFPA High Rise Building Safety Advisory Committee, Quincy,
MA, January 2014

28
Respectfully Submitted:

Joseph L. Scheffey, PE Edward Tochterman Kenneth Bush

Vice Chairman, SFPC (Past) SFPC Chief Fire Protection Engineer

Ron Wineholt BC Mathew Carrigan Joseph Felton

Apartment and Office Building Montgomery County Fire Montgomery County Department of

Association of Metropolitan and Rescue Service Permitting Services

Washington

29
 Appendix A

Nonsprinklered Residential Units in Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties

Montgomery County

Last FH Inspector Building Name Street Address Full Address

entry
10/13/2016 Jones Alexander 8560 2nd Ave 8560 2nd Ave
House
10/6/2016 Jones Glen Lane Apts 4949 Battery La 4949 Battery La
7/20/2016 Jones Sussex House 4970 Battery La 4970 Battery La
2/21/2017 Jones Glen Dorra 4998 Battery La 4998 Battery La
Apts
7/28/2016 Jones Seasons Bldg 4710 Bethesda 4710 Bethesda Ave
Ave
10/27/2016 Jones Colesville 8811 Colesville Rd 8811 Colesville Rd
Towers
12/1/2016 Jones Lenox Park 1400 East West 1400 East West Hwy
Apts Hwy
9/16/2016 Jones Westlake 7420 Westlake 7420 Westlake Ter
Towers Ter
7/21/2016 Jones Highland 5480 Wisconsin 5480 Wisconsin Ave
House Ave
7/21/2016 Loveless Topaz House 4400 East West 4400 East West Hwy
Hwy
2/15/2017 Loveless Hermitage 3301 Hewitt Ave 3301 Hewitt Ave
Woods Condos
12/15/2016 Loveless Claridge House 2445 Lyttonsville 2445 Lyttonsville Rd
Rd
6/6/2016 Loveless Park Ritchie 7600 Maple Ave 7600 Maple Ave
7/14/2016 Loveless Park View Apts 7667 Maple Ave 7667 Maple Ave
7/22/2016 Loveless Maple Towers 7610 Maple Ave 7610 Maple Ave
7/20/2016 Loveless North Park 4620 N Park Ave 4620 N Park Ave
Apts
7/14/2016 Loveless Parkside Plaza 9039 Sligo Creek 9039 Sligo Creek Pkw
Pkw
8/16/2016 McSwain Windsor 13920 Castle Blv 13920 Castle Blv
Tower
10/3/2016 McSwain Triangle 4853 Cordell Ave 4853 Cordell Ave
Towers
9/1/2016 McSwain Washingtonia 9701 Fields Rd 9701 Fields Rd
n Tower
11/1/2016 McSwain Flower Oaks 8308 Flower Ave 8308 Flower Ave
Apts
8/16/2016 McSwain Franklin Apts 7620 Maple Ave 7620 Maple Ave

30
8/23/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9300 Piney 9300 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
8/23/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9302 Piney 9302 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
8/23/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9304 Piney 9304 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
8/23/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9306 Piney 9306 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
8/23/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9312 Piney 9312 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
8/23/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9314 Piney 9314 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
8/25/2016 McSwain Forest Park 9316 Piney 9316 Piney Branch Rd
Apts Branch Rd
11/4/2016 McSwain University 1111 University 1111 University Blvd
Towers I Blvd W W
11/4/2016 McSwain University 1121 University 1121 University Blvd
Towers II Blvd W W
8/24/2016 Schrader The Point at 8715 1st Ave 8715 First Ave
Silver Spring
6/21/2016 Schrader Blair Plaza 1401 Blair Mill Rd 1401 Blair Mill Rd
Apts
8/4/2016 Schrader Springwood 1220 Blair Mill Rd 1220 Blair Mill Rd
Apts
6/15/2016 Schrader Kenwood 5100 Dorset Ave 5100 Dorset Ave
House
6/23/2016 Schrader Twin Towers 1110 Fidler La 1110 Fidler La
6/23/2016 Schrader Deauville Apts 7520 Maple Ave 7520 Maple Ave
8/2/2016 Schrader Hampshire 7333 New 7333 New Hampshire
Towers Hampshire Ave
Ave
8/30/2016 Schrader Hampshire 7401 New 7401 New Hampshire
Towers Hampshire Ave
Ave
6/13/2016 Schrader Irene Apts 4701 Willard Ave 4701 Willard Ave
8/15/2016 Barnes Takoma 7051 Carroll Ave 7051 Carroll Ave
Towers
8/19/2016 Barnes Kensington 10225 Frederick 10225 Frederick Ave
House Ave
12/6/2016 Barnes Americana 9900 Georgia Ave 9900 Georgia Ave
Finmark
3/1/2017 Barnes North Park 4615 N Park Ave 4615 N Park Ave
Apts
4/3/2017 Barnes Elizabeth Apts 4601 N Park Ave 4601 N Park Ave
6/27/2016 Cole Suburban 8600 16th St 8600 16th St
Towers

31
9/8/2016 Cole Middlebrook 5015 Battery La 5015 Battery La
Apts
8/1/2016 Cole Miramont 6060 California 6060 California Cir
Villas Cir
8/1/2016 Cole Miramont 6050 California 6050 California Cir
Villas Cir
12/5/2016 Cole Halpine View 12907 Crookston 12907 Crookston La
Apts La
12/5/2016 Cole Halpine View 13001 Crookston 13001 Crookston La
Apts La
12/5/2016 Cole Kenwood 95 E Wayne 95 E Wayne Ave
House Ave
2/14/2017 Cole Silver Spring 816 Easley St 816 Easley St
Towers
6/7/2016 Cole Grosvenor 10401 Grosvenor 10401 Grosvenor Pl
Park III Pl
7/15/2016 Cole Grosvenor 10201 Grosvenor 10201 Grosvenor Pl
Park Condos Pl
12/14/2016 Cole White Oak 11700 Old 11700 Old Columbia
Towers Columbia Pik
Pik
6/8/2016 Cole Montgomery 415 Silver Spring 415 Silver Spring Ave
Towers Ave
3/10/2016 Cole Montgomery 11550 Stewart La 11550 Stewart La
White Oak
8/18/2016 Marchesani Willoughby 5500 Friendship 5500 Friendship Blv
Blv
8/25/2016 Marchesani Garland 8221 Garland Ave 8221 Garland Ave
Towers
4/14/2017 Marchesani Columbia 12001 Old 12001 Old Columbia
Towers Columbia Pik
Pik
2/17/2017 Marchesani Kenwood 5101 River Rd 5101 River Rd
House
4/13/2017 Marchesani Thayer Towers 575 Thayer Ave 575 Thayer Ave
2/21/2017 Marchesani Thayer Terrace 525 Thayer Ave 525 Thayer Ave
10/27/2016 Marchesani Hillbrook 515 Thayer Ave 515 Thayer Ave
Towers
3/30/2017 Marchesani Willoughby 4515 Willard Ave 4515 Willard Ave
7/12/2016 Schrader The Point at 8750 Georgia Ave 8750 Georgia Ave
Silver Spring
10/7/2016 Schrader Edinburgh 7513 Maple Ave 7513 Maple Ave
House
9/8/2016 Sudik White Hall 4977 Battery La 4977 Battery La
Condos
10/25/2016 Sudik Renesaince 14000 Castle Blv 14000 Castle Blv
Plaza

32
7/25/2016 Sudik Park Sutton 1900 Layttonsville 1900 Layttonsville Rd
Rd
8/10/2016 Sudik Park Bradford 8601 Manchester 8601 Manchester Rd
Apts Rd
8/17/2016 Sudik White Hall 8315 N Brook La 8315 N Brook La
West Apts
12/7/2016 Sudik Grosvenor 10500 Rockville Pik 10500 Rockville Pik
Park II
10/24/2016 Sudik Parkside East 710 Roeder Rd 710 Roeder Rd
Apts
6/1/2016 Sudik Silver Spring 555 Thayer Ave 555 Thayer Ave
House
12/1/2016 Sudik Sudbury 2100 Washington 2100 Washington Ave
House Ave
6/9/2015 Williams Warwick 1131 University 1131 University Blvd
Towers Blvd W W
3/1/2017 Williams Arcola Towers 1135 University 1135 University Blvd
Blvd W W
3/16/2017 Barnes Ambassador 2715 University 2715 University Blv W
Apts Blv W
2/23/2017 Donahue Mapleview 7710 Maple Ave 7710 Maple Ave
Apts
8/2/2016 Donahue Chateau Apts 9737 Mt Pisgah 9737 Mt Pisgah Rd
Rd
8/2/2016 Donahue Chateau Apts 9727 Mt Pisgah 9727 Mt Pisgah Rd
Rd
5/31/2016 Donahue Promenade 5225 Pooks Hill 5225 Pooks Hill Rd
Rd
8/24/2016 Patterson Georgia West 8708 1st Ave 8708 1st Ave
Apts
11/23/2016 Patterson Montgomery 8712 Colesville Rd 8712 Colesville Rd
Arms Apts
6/10/2016 Patterson Rebecca 10920 Connecticut 10920 Connecticut
House Ave Ave
6/13/2016 Patterson Manchester 25 E Wayne 25 E Wayne Ave
House Ave
11/7/2016 Patterson Summit Hills 1705 East West 1705 East West Hwy
Apts Hwy
10/28/2016 Patterson Summit Hills 1703 East West 1703 East West Hwy
Apts Hwy
10/28/2016 Patterson Summit Hills 1701 East West 1701 East West Hwy
Apts Hwy
5/4/2016 Patterson Ken Mil Apts 9119 Manchester 9119 Manchester Rd
Rd
6/6/2016 Patterson Monterey Apts 5901 Montrose 5901 Montrose Rd
Rd

33
9/8/2016 Patterson Park 8860 Piney 8860 Piney Branch Rd
Montgomery Branch Rd
9/9/2016 Patterson Carolyn 614 Sligo Ave 614 Sligo Ave
Condos
10/26/2016 Patterson Corona Apts 714 Sligo Ave 714 Sligo Ave
6/9/2016 Patterson Sligo House 603 Sligo Ave 603 Sligo Ave
9/14/2016 Patterson Waterford 3333 University 3333 University Blv W
Apts Blv W
10/24/2016 Sudik Silver Spring 815 Thayer Ave 815 Thayer Ave
Towers
7/19/2016 Thorn Blair House 8201 16th St 8201 16th St
8/23/2016 Thorn Connceticut 8101 Connecticut 8101 Connecticut Ave
Ave. Condos Ave
10/4/2016 Thorn Elizabeth 1400 Fenwick La 1400 Fenwick La
House
9/15/2016 Thorn Winexburg 2301 Glenallan 2301 Glenallan Ave
Manor Apts Ave
9/1/2016 Thorn Takoma 7611 Maple Ave 7611 Maple Ave
Phoenix
7/6/2016 Thorn Essex House 7777 Maple Ave 7777 Maple Ave
1/19/2017 Thorn Sligo Ave Apts 700 Sligo Ave 700 Sligo Ave
8/22/2016 Thorn Aldon Towers 8200 Wisconsin 8200 Wisconsin Ave
Ave
12/29/2016 Williams Summit Hills 8484 16th St 8484 16th St
Apts
7/29/2016 Williams Summit Hills 8504 16th St 8504 16th St
Apts
10/3/2016 Williams Summit Hills 8510 16th St 8510 16th St
Apts
2/15/2017 Williams Summit Hills 8508 16th St 8508 16th St
Apts
10/28/2016 Williams Summit Hills 8500 16th St 8500 16th St
Apts
10/28/2016 Williams Summit Hills 8502 16th St 8502 16th St
Apts
7/6/2016 Williams Blair East Apts 1220 East West 1220 East West Hwy
Hwy
1/27/2017 Williams Berkshire 11200 Lockwood 11200 Lockwood Dr
Towers Apts Dr
2/3/2017 Williams Berkshire 11215 Oak Leaf Dr 11215 Oak Leaf Dr
Towers Apts
1/27/2017 Williams Berkshire 11235 Oak Leaf Dr 11235 Oak Leaf Dr
Towers Apts
8/29/2016 Williams Forum Condos 11801 Rockville Pik 11801 Rockville Pik
3/15/2017 Williams Dalton Apts 733 Sligo Ave 733 Sligo Ave
3/15/2017 Williams Barbizon Apts 735 Sligo Ave 735 Sligo Ave

34
 4450 S Park Ave 4450 S Park Ave

Prince Georges County

A 3901 Suitland Rd Suitland 20746 AJO Realty 1 283 3-17 1970

A 9014 Rhode Island College Park 20740 College Prk 1 108 6-11 1971
Ave Hous. Auth.
A 2400 Queens Hyattsville 20782 Kettler 1 247 4-55 1965
Chapel Rd
A 4915 Eastern Ave Hyattsville 20782 Habitat America 1 88 4-55
A 6731,33,35 New Chillum 20912 Elisa Frankert 3 467 4-44 1968
Hampshire
A 2600 Queen Hyattsville 20782 Morgan 1 96 4-1 1960
Chapel Rd Properties
A 3001 Branch Ave Temple Hills 20748 Kay 1 334 3-29
C 4410 Oglethorpe Hyattsville 20781 1 143 4-7
St
A 5309 Riverdale Riverdale 20737 WC Smith Co. 1 180 4-7 1964
Road
A 6700 Belcrest Hyattsville 20782 Donaldson 1 288 4-1 1964
Road Group
A 1836 Metzerott Adelphi 20783 Mr. Bhola 1 510 4-34 1971
Road
C 3450 Toledo Hyattsville 20782 Linwood Taylor 1 176 4-1 1962
Terrace
A 4105 Southern Ave Capitol Heights 20743 Southern 1 69 3-17
C 6200 Westchester College Park 20740 OP 1 301 6-14 1972
Park Dr Management
A 6100 Westchester College Park 20740 1 301 6-14
Park Dr
3591

Total buildings 17+8 = 25 Total units 3591 + 1544 (Oakcrest Towers,

Brooks Drive) = 5135

35
 Appendix B

Review of Retroactive Requirements in Other Jurisdictions

Jurisdiction Auto. Sprk. Required? Ref

Chicago Commercial yes, residential no, Life Dept. of
Safety Evaluation for non-sprinklered Buildings
Houston yes, except privately owned condos WTOP/AP
NYC Commercial > 70 ft., residential when
significantly renovated WTOP/AP
LA All except residential, some partial AS
required WTOP/AP
Phila Commercial, not residential WTOP/AP
San Antonio All, except residential condos, where
common area sprinklering is required WTOP/AP
San Diego No for residential WTOP/AP
Dallas No for residential WTOP/AP
San Jose Yes WTOP/AP
San Francisco Commercial buildings and tourist hotels
only, other residential no WTOP/AP
Florida Yes, unless condo board votes to opt
out; trend towards sprinklering? SRHL,FFSA
Baltimore County yes, condo owners may opt out web link
https://wtop.com/national/2017/07/few-us-cities-mandate-sprinklers-in-old-residential-towers/
https://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/Agencies/fire/firemarshal/protectionsystems.html
http://www.floridafiresprinkler.com/files/4714/7122/2210/Hi_Rise_Retrofit_-
_FAQ_Final.pdf

36
 Appendix C

Supplemental Information on Cooking Area Protection

C.1 UL 858

The following information was provided by Mr. Josh Dinaburg, Senior Fire Protection Engineer
with JensenHughes. In November, 2017, he reported that UL 858 is the standard for electric range tops
and was updated to include an ignition prevention test for open coil ranges. The test is heating of oil in
a pan with no ignition for 30 minutes. Most existing stoves would ignite now in about 8 minutes. There
are no requirements on how to achieve this, but most are vendors will likely propose to use
temperature sensing and limiting devices built into the stoves. The manufacturers have agreed and
believe they are capable of meeting this. There is at least one existing product on the market which
meets the requirements, manufactured by Brown Stoves.

In May, 2018, Mr. Dinaburg provided an update to the TG. The effective date for UL 858 Section
60A, Abnormal Operation Oil Ignition Test, is April 4, 2019. This means that all new open coil (not glass,
not gas, not induction) range tops must prevent ignition of cooking oil in a pan for no less than 30
minutes. Mr. Dinaburg was still only aware of one product that is available, but believes other products
are in development and testing. I have heard through the STP that manufacturers have been testing.
Products from mainstream vendors should be appearing soon, but nothing is being marketed or placed
in stores yet. The Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers has indicated that they are close to
submitting a proposal for a ceramic glass top test that is basically the same as for the electric coil.

C.2 NIST Study on Residential Kitchen Fire Suppression

The National Institute of Standards and Technology published a study of residential cooking fire
suppression technologies (see main reference list). The abstract to the paper describes a wide range of
cooking fire experiments conducted to examine the effectiveness of retrofit residential kitchen fire
suppression systems. A series of experiments provided data on the hazard associated with cooking oil
fires. Then, a series of real-scale fire suppression experiments followed using scenarios outlined in the
UL 300A draft standard testing various fire suppression systems. Experiments were conducted in a full-
scale residential kitchen with dimensions 3.6 m x 3.4 m x 2.4 m high. Both gas and electric ranges were
used. Several types of cooking vessel and oil types were tested. The suppression systems tested included
automatic and manual suppression technologies. The manual devices included wet and dry chemical
type extinguishers. The automatic systems included room-wide and range hood-installed systems. The
room wide systems included water mist and residential sprinkler systems. The hood-installed systems
included water mist and wet and dry chemical systems. Manual extinguishers consistently suppressed
the oil fires while maintaining tenable conditions in the mock-up kitchen. One hood-installed wet
chemical system tested demonstrated success in extinguishing the oil fires in all experiments, and
maintained tenability in the mock-up kitchen throughout most of the experiments. The hood-installed
dry chemical system tested failed to extinguish the oil fire in all experiments, and introduced tenability
hazards not present prior to the system activation. All other system types tested provided mixed results,
they either could not reliably suppress the fire, or they consistently generated tenability hazards in the
test kitchen.

37
 The results of these experiments point the need to develop other approaches to kitchen fire
safety such as ignition prevention technologies and reliable early nuisance-free warning through smoke
alarms.

C.3 Ignition Prevention - New Stoves

Brown Stoves

See unit introduced in 2014, http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/brown-stove-works-

launches-industrys-first-heat-sensing-range-that-reduces-risk-cooking-1956255.htm See Coil LogicTM from
Brown, designed to meet UL 858. http://www.brownstoveworksinc.com/new-features.html .This is
apparently for new stoves, electric only.

C.4 Retrofit Devices - Ignition Prevention and Suppression

From Pioneering Technology

website http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/pioneerings-smartburner-first-meet-new-
industry-standard-electric-coiled-cooktops-ranges-2216567.htm : “The new UL858 (60A)
standard published by Underwriters Laboratories includes a new test requirement for cooking
oil ignition. To be listed for sale anywhere in the United States, all new household electric coiled
cooktops/ranges must meet the new test requirement by April 2019.

In its simplest form this new test requires that an electric coil stovetop be turned to its
maximum heat setting with a pan of oil on the element and allowed to operate for 30 minutes
or until the cooking oil ignites, whichever comes first. If there is ignition, then the product fails
and cannot be listed for sale in North America.”

Pioneering's SmartBurner® has passed this new testing requirement and is now listed as
meeting the new industry standard for sale in the United States.

This newly published UL858 standard and test procedure will, for now, apply only to electric coil
cooktops/ranges. Going forward AHAM has committed to working together with industry, the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Health Canada, as well as UL and CSA, to determine
how similar tests and requirements can be applied to radiant glass ceramic, induction, and gas
cooktops and ranges in future.”

Note this is a retrofit (“aftermarket”) device, and may also be applicable to new stoves.
Innohome

https://www.innohome.com/ Retrofit heat sensor. “Exceeds the requirements of the new BS EN

50615:2015 Household and similar electrical appliances. Several other devices are marketed.

38
IGaurd Stoves
https://iguardfire.com/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI8PeV85Cr2wIVjVmGCh2gFg6HEAAYAiAAEgIx2PD
_BwE “Automatically shuts off the stove after 5 minutes of no one being in the kitchen”.
Retrofit Timer device, kits for gas and electric stoves. Electric stove model has automatic sensor-
based restart, gas model has manual restart. Marketed for aged population and others more
likely to leave stove on unattended.
DFP Denlar

https://www.denlarhoods.com/ Residential suppression (residential hood using potassium

acetate). “ICC approved”. Also timer shut off device similar to IGaurd.
Restaurant Technologies, Inc.

https://www.rti-inc.com/solutions/automist AutomistTM, commercial duct and fan cleaning system.

RTI is geared toward the commercial market

Stovetop Firerstop

https://stovetopfirestop.com/product/plus/ “Plus” unit is a powder suppressant.

https://stovetopfirestop.com/stovetop-firestop-redefines-residential-cooking-fire-suppression-
with-new-sensor-based-product/

https://stovetopfirestop.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Is-StoveTop-FireStop-UL-Listed-
1.pdf

https://stovetopfirestop.com/products/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwkvMFTdo9Y

Plumis

https://plumis.com/taphead.html Automist, connects to faucet. Reportedly meets BS

8458:2015 Fixed fire protection systems. Residential and domestic watermist systems. Code of practice
for design and installation

Hydramist

http://www.watermist.com/en/products/15-ampu/

39
 Appendix D

Comments to NFPA EFFCT RISK Assessment Tool

Commissioner Scheffey exercised an early release version of the tool and reported the following to the
Task Group on February 23, 2018.

The report on high rise buildings with combustible exterior walls was published by the Fire
Protection Research Foundation. The link to the tool, called EFFECT, is:
https://www.nfpaeffect.com/signup . Commissioner Scheffey noted that the risk assessment tool, while
specifically applicable to combustible exterior walls, provides a good overall risk assessment
model/framework. He exercised the tool and found the following:

i. At the first level of general, overall assessment, if the building has combustible
exterior materials (code compliant or not), it must be assessed even if it has
sprinkler protection.
ii. There is heavy emphasis on evacuating the entire building (“all out” strategy). A
tall (>50m) residential building with code compliant combustible facade (e.g.
NFPA 285 Exterior Insulation and Finish System) would obtain a “tolerable” risk
score, provided an “all out” emergency evacuation system/approach is
provided. An “intolerable” risk score would result in the same building if
evacuation is “stay in place”. For example, if local residential unit detection is
provided, but alarms are not transmitted to the building, or transmitted alarms
only sound in common corridors, the default would be to categorize the building
as “stay in place”. Code compliant insulation material would still be designated
an intolerable risk in this scenario. Surprisingly, this also true if the building has
no combustible façade.
iii. More surprising, intolerable risk would even occur in a sprinklered,
noncombustible clad building (if each unit didn’t have an individual audible
device)! Commissioner Scheffey identified the stated model limitations: the tool
is for use in assessing buildings with possible combustible façade systems. The
tool should not be used for a risk assessment of fire safety provisions for a
building without combustible facades. The focus of the tool is on rapid exterior
fire spread to multiple floors. It is not focused on the limitation of interior fire
spread though compartmentation. Presumably, this is why a building with code
compliant combustible materials must be fully evacuated when using this tool,
even if sprinklered. This might be considered a conservative approach.

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 Appendix E

Sprinkler Retrofit Costs

Sprinkler retrofit costs vary widely. It is very difficult to generalize about the cost of retrofitting
sprinklers in an existing building, other than that it is very expensive and will vary based on the size,
structure and layout of the building.

The National Fire Sprinkler Association (NFSA) uses the following estimate: $1.25 – 3.00/sq. ft.
new construction cost of complete sprinklering, plus a cost plus 25-50% additional for retrofit. This
equates to $1.90 – 4.50/sq. ft.

AOBA representative Wineholt provided the following information:

o Cost – As reflected in the following sources, costs for retrofitting an existing high rise
vary wildly:

http://highriselifesafety.com/retrofitting/ - $4 - $8 / sq. ft.

http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/36801033/fewer-older-residential-
high-rises-to-be-required-to-have-fire-sprinklers-but-cost-still-an-issue - $4,305 -
$13,473/unit

http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/lsc/documents/CondominiumSprinkler
RetrofitReportOctober2009.pdf - $595 - $8,633/unit

https://www.greenbaumlaw.com/media/publication/126_FireSprinklers_Sirot.p
roof_1.pdf $5 - $7 / sq. ft.

http://www.nreionline.com/news/high-costs-hamper-fire-sprinkler-retrofits $2
- $3 / sq. ft.

References and Bibliography

National Fire Sprinkler Association, “Fire sprinkler Retrofit Guide. Making Your Community Safe from
Fire”, 2nd Edition, NFSA, Linthicum, MD, May 2017

https://www.google.com/search?source=hp&ei=JJJEXI_MFeKn5wLDtaHICw&q=Retrofitting+of+Sprinkle
r+Issues&btnK=Google+Search&oq=Retrofitting+of+Sprinkler+Issues&gs_l=psy-
ab.3...2768.10491..10973...0.0..0.88.1856.32......0....1..gws-
wiz.....0..0j0i131j0i22i30j33i22i29i30j33i160.It81DkKz90c

Butry, D.T., Brown, M.H., and Fuller, S.K., “Benefit-Cost Analysis of Residential Fire Sprinkler Systems, “
National Institute of Standards and Technology, NISTIR 7451, Gaithersburg, MD, September, 2007

41
 Appendix F

Tax Reform Impact on Fire Protection Systems

March 21, 2018

TO: Joe Scheffey

FROM: Ron Wineholt, AOBA

RE: Tax Implications for Fire Safety Improvements

You requested that I provide the Task Group what information I could find regarding tax benefits
available to property owners under the new federal tax law for fire safety improvements such as
sprinklers, alarm and detection equipment, and fire resistive enclosure improvements (stairs, openings,
corridors, and residential unit doors).

In evaluating this issue, I reviewed the flyer from the National Fire Sprinkler Association (NFSA), the
Congressional Report on the federal tax bill, and exchanged emails with a CPA that I trust, who is
experienced with business taxes. As you can appreciate by reviewing the language of the Congressional
Report, nothing is simple when trying to understand the federal tax law. As I am not a CPA, the
following is solely my opinion.

As summarized in the NFSA flyer, the new federal tax law conveys two primary types of benefits for
property owners making fire safety improvements: (1) Section 179 expensing of depreciable business
assets; and (2) Bonus depreciation of qualified property. Each is discussed below.

Section 179 Expensing

Section 179 expensing is generally limited to depreciable personal property, with limited exceptions for
qualified real property. Although the new federal tax law increased the amount of annual Section 179
expensing to $1 million, the provision that allows fire protection and alarm systems as a qualifying
expense is only for nonresidential real property.

Cost Recovery – Bonus Depreciation

The new federal tax law increases bonus depreciation to 100% of the cost of qualified property placed in
service after September 27, 2017 through December 31, 2022. To qualify, such property must have an
applicable recovery period of 20 years or less under IRS guidelines.

Depreciation is applied against business income to reduce taxable income. To the extent that the
depreciation exceeds business income for a year, the excess depreciation may be carried forward as a
net operating loss. Therefore, if a property owner makes $1 million in improvements, they must at
some point have $1 million in taxable business income against which to apply the depreciation expense.

42
To know what fire safety improvements qualify for the bonus depreciation requires comparison to the
IRS depreciation schedule for that type of improvement (see below IRS depreciation chart). The NFSA
states that sprinklers will qualify for the bonus depreciation, so presumably they must have concluded
that they have a depreciable life of 20 years or less under IRS regulations. Alarm and detection
equipment seems comparable, and would likely also be depreciated at 20 years or less.

However, fire resistive enclosure improvements (stairs, openings, corridors, and residential unit doors)
seem to fall under structural components of the property, with depreciation lives of over 20 years, and
thus not eligible for the bonus depreciation.

Table 2-1. MACRS Recovery Periods for Property Used in Rental Activities

MACRS Recovery Period

General Alternative
Depreciation Depreciation
Type of Property System System

Computers and their peripheral 5 years 5 years

equipment

Office machinery, such as:

• Typewriters

• Calculators

• Copiers 5 years 6 years

Automobiles 5 years 5 years

Light trucks 5 years 5 years

Appliances, such as:

• Stoves

• Refrigerators 5 years 9 years

Carpets 5 years 9 years

Furniture used in rental property 5 years 9 years

43
Office furniture and equipment, such
as:

• Desks

• Files 7 years 10 years

Any property that doesn’t have a class

life and that hasn’t been designated by
law as being in any other class 7 years 12 years

Roads 15 years 20 years

Shrubbery 15 years 20 years

Fences 15 years 20 years

Residential rental property (buildings or

structures) and structural components
such as furnaces, waterpipes, venting,
etc. 27.5 years 40 years

Additions and improvements, such as a The same recovery period as that of the property to which
new roof the addition or improvement is made, determined as if the
property were placed in service at the same time as the
addition or improvement.

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 Appendix G

Chicago Fire Risk Indexing

The Chicago Life Safety Evaluation (LSE) approach emphasizes residential occupancies. The
Chicago Ordnance which established the LSE has certain baseline conditions. Commercial occupancies
greater than 80 ft must be retroactively sprinklered. Residential occupancies with non-transient
occupants are exempt from this requirement. Residential units (apartments and condos) must pass the
LSE unless they are fully sprinklered. A building that passes the LSE is deemed to achieve a reasonable
level of safety. Specific details, including the scoring system, was circulated in a file titled “LSE Rules
scoring system included” in March 2018 by Commissioner Scheffey.

There are certain baseline conditions which must be met. One- and two-way voice
communication systems must be installed (exception: residential units less than 15 stories and 60 units
may have a one-way system only). They must have 1 hr rated stair doors and frames. The LSE assumes
there is a standpipe system.

The LSE uses fifteen attributes, scored as they effect Fire Safety, Means of Egress, and General Safety.
These are:

1. Building height (under 100 ft is discounted);

2. Building construction (there is a modest penalty for curtain walls which are judged to
promote floor-to-floor fire spread);

3. Compartmentation (fire areas greater than 10,000 sq. ft are penalized;

4. tenant/dwelling unit separation (doors without ratings or closers are penalized);

5. Vertica openings;

6. HVAC (positive credit if HVAC serves only 1 floor);

7. Smoke detection (positive credit for dwelling unit detectors, more for total building detection
(audible alarm requirements not clear to me));

8. Communications (emphasized - lots of credit for combined 1-and 2-way voice coms);

9. Smoke control (penalty for none, max credit for sandwich pressurization);

10. Means of egress capacity (significant max penalty for one route or noncompliant stair
doors);

11. Dead end corridors (max penalty >100ft);

12. Travel distance (max penalty > 200 ft);

13. Elevator controls;

45
 14. Emergency power for egress lighting (penalty for none);

15. mixed occupancy separation;

16. Sprinklers (credit given for partial sprinklers); and,

17. Auxiliary uses.

Commissioner Scheffey performed an example calculation of a hypothetical apartment building,

greater than 100 ft and in good condition. For the scoring system. I assumed:

1. Type 1A construction with curtain walls;

2. Floor compartment size of 10, 000 sq. ft, corridors 1 hr with self-closing 1 hr doors, no
unprotected vertical openings;

3. HVAC serving a max of 5 floors, the only smoke control being operable windows;

4. Tenant unit smoke detectors, no voice communications;

5. Egress – 2 stairs without locks, dead end of 75 ft, travel distance of 150 ft;

6. FD manual elevator control, egress lighting provided with emergency power, no mixed
occupancy, no sprinklers, and no auxiliary use separation problems.

The hypothetical building did not pass, but the addition of a one- and two- way communication
system nearly achieved a passing grade. This is evidently required in any event. Total area smoke
detection would add substantial credit. A single stair or inadequately protected stair would result in a
severe penalty.

Commissioner Scheffey conclude that, if the building separation integrity is good and there are
no serious egress deficiencies, residential high rise buildings with unit smoke detection would pass
provided voice communications are provided. They are required in any event. Good building separation
means no unprotected vertical openings, rated corridor walls with rated, self-closing doors, and rated
stair doors with closures. Egress deficiencies are long dead end corridors or single exit configurations.
Rated stair doors and standpipes are also required.

Commissioner Scheffey concluded that this “acceptable” configuration has many similarities to
the proposed required list of desired fire safety attributes initially prepared by Task Group member Ted
Tochterman which formed the basis of Option 3.

46