IMMANU EL

KANT
R T QUE 0
G E T
Critique of Judgment

BY

IMMANUEL KANT

Translated, with an Introduction, by

]. H. BER ARD

HAFNER PUBLISHING CO.

NEW YORK
 CONTENTS

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION XIII

GLO ARY XXXVI
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . XXXVll
NOTE 0 THE TEXT XXXIX

CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

PREFACE 3
INTRODUCTION
I. Of the division of philosophy 7
II. Of the realm of philosophy in general 10
III. Of the critique of judgment as a means of com-
bining the two parts of philosophy into a
whole . 12
IV. Of judgment as a faculty legislating a priori 15
V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of
nature is a transcendental principle of judg-
ment . 17
VI. Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure
with the concept of the purposiveness of
nature 23
VII. Of the aesthetical representation of the pur-
posiveness of nature 25
VIII. Of the logical representation of the purposive-
ness of nature 29
IX. Of the connection of the legislation of under-
standing with that of reason by means of the
judgment 32
v
VI CONTENTS CONTE TS V ll

FIR T P RT . 11. T he judgment of taste has nothing at its

CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETIC L JUDGMENT basis but the form of the purposivene s of an
object (or of its mode of repre ntation) 56
FIRST DIVISIO ANALYTIC OF THE AE THETICAL § 12 . The judgment of taste r tsonapriorigrounds 57
JUDGMENT § 13. The pure judgment of taste is independent
of charm and emotion . 5
FIRST BOOK. ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL
§ 14. Elucidation by means of examples 59
FIRST MOMENT OF THE JUDGME NT OF TASTE, § 15. The judgment of taste is quite independent
ACCORDING TO QUALITY
of the concept of perfection 62
§ 1. The judgment of taste is aesthetical . 37 § 16 . The judgment of taste, by which an object is
§ 2. The satisfaction which determines the judg- declared to be beautiful under the condition
ment of taste is disint erested . 38 of a definite concept, is not pure . 65
§ 3 . The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up § 17. Of the ideal of beauty . 68
with interest 39
FOURTH MOME T OF THE JUDGME T OF TASTE,
§ 4. The satisfaction in the good is bound up with ACCORD! G TO THE MODALITY OF THE SATIS-
interest 41 FACTION I THE OBJECT
§ 5. Comparison of the three specifically different § 18. What the modality in a judgment of taste is 73
kinds of satisfaction 43
§ 19. The subjective nece ity which we ascribe
SECO D MOME T OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE, to the judgment of taste is condi tioned . 74
ACCORDING TO QUANTITY § 20. The condition of necessity which a judgment
§ 6. The beautiful is that which apart from con- of taste asserts is the idea of a common
cepts is represented as the object of a sense . 74
universal satisfaction 45 § 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common
§ 7. Comparison of the beautiful with the pleas- sense? 75
ant and the good by means of the above § 22 . The necessity of the universal agreement that
characteristic 46 is thought in a judgm nt of taste is a sub-
§ 8 . The universality of the satisfaction is repre- jective necessity, which is represented as
sented in a judgment of taste only as objective under the presupposition of a
~M~ ~ common sense 76
§ 9 . Investigation of the question whether in a GENERAL REMARK 0 THE FIRST SECTION OF THE
judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure ANALYTIC 77
precedes or follows the judging of the object 51
THIRD MOMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF TASTE ACCORD-
SECOND BOOK. ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME
ING TO THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSES WHICH § 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of
ARE BROUGHT INTO CO SIDERATION IN THEM
the beautiful to that which judges of the
§ 10. Of purposiveness in general 54 sublime 82
 ,
viii CONTENTS

p
.. , CO TENTS ix
§ 24. Of the divi ions of an investigation into the Of the empirical interest in the beautiful 138
feeling of the sublime . 85 Of the intellectual interest in the beautiful 140
A. OF THE MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME Of art in g neral 145
§ 25. Explanation of t he term sublime . Of beautiful art 147
86
Beautiful art is an art in so far as it eems
§ 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of
149

~)
natural things which is requisi te for the idea like nature
§ 46 . Beautiful art is the art of genius . 150
of the sublime 89
§ 27. § 47 . Elucidation and confirmation of the above
Of the quality of the satisfaction in our
explanation of genius 151
judgments upon the sublime . 96
48. Of the relation of genius to taste 153
B. OF THE DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME IN NATURE Of the faculties of the mind that constitute
§ 49 .
§ 28 . Of nature regarded as might . 99 genius 156
§ 29. Of the modality of the judgment upon the Of the combination of taste with genius in
sublime in nature
GENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE
AESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE JUDGME T
104

106
-
l_50.

§ 51.
§ 52 .
the products of beautiful art .
Of t he division of the beautiful arts .
Of the combination of beautiful arts in one
163
164

DEDUCTIO OF [PURE] AESTHETICAL JUDGMENTS / and the same product .

Comparison of the respective aesthetical
169

§ 30. The deduction of aesthetical judgments on v''/ worth of the beautiful arts 170
the objects of nature must not be directed Remark 175
to what we call sublime in nature, but only
to the beautiful 120 ECO D DIVISIO DIALECTIC OF THE AE THETI-
§ 31. Of the method of deduction of judgments CAL JUDGME T
of taste 122
§ 32. First peculiarity of the judgment of taste
I § 55. 182
123 § 56. R epresentation of the antinomy of taste 183
§ 33. Second peculiarity of the judgment of taste 125 57. Solution of the antinomy of taste 184
§ 34. There is no objective principle of taste § 58 . Of the idealism of the purposiveness of both
possible 127 nature and art as the unique principle of the
§ 35. The principle of taste is the subjective prin- aesthetical judgment . 192
ciple of judgment in general 128 § 59. Of beauty as t he symbol of morality 196
§ 36. Of the problem of a deduction of judgments Appendix. Of the method of taste 200
§ 60.
of taste 130
What is properly asserted a priori of an
object in a judgment of taste . 131 SECOND PART.
Deduction of judgments of taste . 132 CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT
Of the communicability of a sensation 133
Of taste as a kind of sensus communis 135 § 61. Of the objective purposiveness of nature 205
X CONTENTS CONTENT xi

FIR T DIVI IO ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL 77. Of the p culiarity of the human understand-
.TUDGME T ing by means of which the concept of a
natural purpos 1 po ible 253
§ 62 . Of the objective purposiveness which 1s § 7 . Of the union of the principle of the uni-
merely formal as distinguished from that ver al mechani m of matter with the teleo-
which is material 20 logical principle in the technique of nature 25
§ 63 . Of the relative, as di stinguished from the
inner, purpo iv ness of nature 212 APPE DIX. METHODOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGI-
CAL JUDGMENT
§ 64 . Of the peculiar character of things as natural
purposes . . . 216 § 79. Whether teleology must be t reated as if it
§ 65. Things regarded as natural purposes are belonged to the doctrine of nature 265
organized beings 218 80. Of the neces ary subordination of the
§ 66. Of the principle of judging of internal pur- mechanical to the teleological principle in
posiveness in organized beings 222 t he explanation of a thing as a natural
§ 67 . Of the principle of the teleological judging purpose 266
of nature in general as a system of purposes 224 § 81. Of the association of mechanism with the
§ 68 . Of the principle of teleology as internal teleological principle in the explanation of a
principle of natural science 228 natural purpo e as a natural product 271
§ 82. Of the tel ological system in the external
SECO D DIVISIO . DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGI- relations of organized beings . 274
CAL JUDGME T § 83. Of the ul timate purpo e of nature as a teleo-
logical system 279
§ 69. What is an antinomy of the judgment? . 232
§ 84. Of the final purpo e of the existence of a
§ 70. Representation of this antinomy . 233
world , i .e. of creation itself 284
§ 71. Preliminary to the solution of the above
5. Of physicotheology 2 6
antinomy 235
6. Of ethicotheology 292
§ 72. Of the different systems which deal with the
§ 7. Of the moral proof of the Being of God . 298
purposiveness of nature 236
88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof 304
§ 73. one of the above systems give what they
§ 89. Of the u e of the moral argument 310
pretend 239
§ 90. Of the kind of beli f in a teleological proof of
§ 74 . The reason that we cannot treat the
t he Being of God 312
concept of a technique of nature dogmati-
91. Of t he kind of belief produced by a practical
cally is the fact that a natural purpose is
faith 318
inexplicable . 243
GENERAL REMARK ON TELEOLOGY . 327
75. The concept of an objective purposiveness
of nature is a critical principle of reason for
the reflective judgment 245
§ 76. Remark . 249
 PREFACE
We may call the faculty of cognition from principles a priori
pure reason, and the inquiry into i ' possibility and bounds
generally the Critique of Pure Reasqn, although by this faculty
we only understand reason in its th oretical employment , as it
appears under that name in the fy)rmer work, vyithout wishing
to inquire into its faculty, as practical reason, according to its
special principles. That [critiq e] goes merely into our faculty
of knowing thing a piori an busies itself therefore only with
the ~ogm.tive faculty, to1the clusio of the feeling of pleasure
an d pain and the faculty of desire; and of th cognitive faculties
it only concerns it elf with understandin , according to its
principles a priori, lto the e usion of jud me;: and reasonj (as
faculties alike belonging to theoretical cognition) , because it is
found in the sequel t hat no other cognitive faculty but the
understandin g can furnish constitutive principles of cognition
a priori. The critique, then, which sifts them all , as regards
I the share which each of the other faculties might pretend to
have in the unmixed po session of knowledge from its own
peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the understanding pre-
s ribes a priori as law for nature a the complex of phenomena
(whose form also is given a priori). It relegate all other pure
concepts under ideas, which are transcenden t for our theoretical
faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless or to be dis-
pensed with. For t hey serve as....regulative principles, partly to
check j;he dangerous preten ions of understanding, as if it
(because it can furnish a priori the conditions of the po sibility
of all things which it can know) had thereby confined within )
these bounds the possibility of all things in general, and partly
to lead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle
of completene ss-although it can never attain to this-and thus
to further the final design of all knowledge. V
3
I L r

f s.C,
 lL '

4
I , ~.-.,

PREFACE PREFACE
(_c- 5

It was then properly the understanding which has its special a principle peculiar to it (some uch it must contain a priori in
realm in the cognitive faculty, so far as it contains constitutive it elf , for otherwi i would not be et apart by the commonest
principles of cognition a priori, which by the critique, generally critique a a pecial cognitive faculty). This principle mu t not
called the critique of pure reason, wa to be placed in certain be derived a priori from cone pt , for these belong to the under-
but sole possession against all other competitor . And so al o standing , and judgment is only concerned with their aQ lica-
to reason, which contains constitutive principles a priori no- tio ! It mus , erefore, furni sh of it elf a concept-J4.1rough
where except simply in r p ct of the faculty of desire, should which, properly speaking no thin · cognized, but whi ch only
be assigned its place in the critique of practical reason. serves as a rul , though n~ an objectjve one";" to which it can
(, (...;(, ... f Whether now the judgment, which in the order of our cogni- adapt it judgment; bccau e for this ll:ttter another faculty of
tive facult ies forms--a-Inediating link between under tanding judgment would be requi ite, in order to be able to di t inguish
and reason , has al o principles a priori for itself; whether these wh th r [any given ca e] is or is not the ca e for t he rule.
are constitutive or merely regulative (thus pointing out no This perplexity about a principle (whether it is subjective or
special realm); and whether t hey give a rule a priori to the objeptive) pre ents it If mainly in tho e judgments t hat we
feeling of pleasure and pain, as the mediating lin~between the call fes~which con ern the beautiful and the sublime of
cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire (just as the under- nat ur or of art. And , nev rtheles , the critical investigation
standing prescribes laws a priori to the first, reason to the of a prin iple of judgment in the e is t he mo t important part
second)-these are the questions with which the present of a critique of this fa ulty. For although t hey do not by t hem-
Critique of Judgment i concern d. selves contribute to he knowledge of tlh ing yet they belong to
A critique of pure reason, i.e. of our faculty of ·udging a the cognitive facult alon and point to a immediate reference #
priori according to principles, would be incomplete i the judg- (;ftb]s facult to t he f ling of ple re or pam according to I
ment , which as a cognitive faculty also makes claim to such some principle a priort, without confu ing t hi with what may
principles, were not treated as a particular part of it, although be the determining ground of the fa ulty of desire, which has
its principles in a system of pure philosophy need form no par- its principle a priori in concepts of reason. In the logical
ticular part between the t heoretical and the practical, but can judging of nature, experien e exhibit a conformi ty to law in
be annexed when needful to one or both as occasion requires . things, to the under tanding or to the explanation of which the
For if sue a system is one day to be completed under the general concept of t he en ible doe not attain; here the judg-
general name of metaphysic. (which it is possible to achieve ment can only deriv from it lf a principle of t he reference of
quite completely and which is supremely important for the use the natural thing to the unknowable uper ensible (a principle
of reason in every reference), the soil for the edifice must be which it must only u e from its own point of view for the cogni-
explored by critique as deep down as t he foundation of the tion of nature). And so, though in thi case uch a principle
faculty of principles independent of experience, in order that it a priori can and mu t be applied to he cognition o the bein of I ~{/. ,
may sink in no part, for this would inevitably bring about the the worldj and opens out at t he same time pro pects. which. are
downfall of t he whole . advantageous for the practical rea on, yet 1t has no 1mmed1ate
We can easily infer from the nature of the judgment (whose reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain. But this reference
right use is so necessarily and so universally requisite, that by is precisely the puzzle in the principle of judgment, which
the name oi_§Qund under tanding nothing else but this faculty renders a spe ial ection for this faculty nece ary in the Critique,
is meant) that it must be attended with great difficulties to find since the logical judging according to concepts (from which an
 6 PREFACE

immecliate inference can never be drawn to the feeling of

pleasure and pain), along with their critical limitation, has at
all events been capable of b ing appended to the theoretical
part of philosophy.
The examination of the faculty of taste,. as the aesthetical INTRODUCTION
judgment, is not here planned in reference to the formation or
the culture of taste (for this will take its course in the future as
in t he past without any such investigations), but merely in a I. OF THE DIVISIO OF PHILOSOPHY

transcendentalpoint of view. Hence. I trust that, as regards the We proceed quite correctly if, as usual, · "de philosoQhy,
deficiency of t he former purpose, it will be judged with indul- as containing the principles of the rational cognition of thing
gence, t hough in the latter point of view it must be prepared by means of concepts (not merely, as logic does, principles of
for the severest scrutiny. But I hope that the great clifficulty of t he form of thought in general without distinction of objects),
solving a problem so involved by nature- may serve a excuse into theoretical and practical . But then the concepts, which
for some hardly avoidable obscurity in its solution , if only it be furni sh their object to tbe principles of this rational cognition ,
clearly established that the principle is correctly stated. -I g.cant must be specifically distinct; otherwise they would not justify
that the mode of deriving the phenomena of the judgment from a division , which always presupposes a con trast between the
it has not all the clearness which might be rightly demanded principles of the rational cognition belonging to the different
elsewhere, viz. in t he case of cognition according to concepts, parts of a science .
but I believe that I have attained to it in the second part of Now there are only two kinds of concepts, and these admit
this work. as many distinct principles of t he possibili ty of their objects,
H ere, then, I end my whole cri tical undertaking. I shall viz. natur_jtd concepts and the concept of freedom. The former
proceed withoUtdelay to t he doctrinal [part] in order to profit, render possible theoretical cognition according to principles a
as far as is possible, by the more favorable moments of my in- priori; the latter in respect of this theoretic~gnition only
creasing years . It is obvious that in this [part] t here will be supplies in itself a negative principle (that of mere contrast),
no special section for the judgment, because in respect of this but on the other hand it furnishes fundamental propo itions
faculty critique serves instead of theory; but, according to the which extend the sphere of the determinat ion of the will and are
division of philosophy (and also of pure philosophy) into therefore calledpractical. Thus philosophy is correctly clivided
theoretical and practical, the metaphysic of nature and of into two parts, qui te clistinct in their principles : the theoretical
morals will complete the under taking. part, orflCJ:_tural Philoso]Jhy; and the practical pa rt, or Moral
Philosophy (for that is the name given to the practical legislation
of reason in accordance with the concept of freedom). But up
to the present a gro s mi u e of these expressions has prevailed,
both in t he division of the different principles and, consequently,
also of philosophy itself. For what is practical accorcling to
natural concep ts has been identi e with the practical according
to the concept of freedom; and so with the like titles, "theoreti-
cal" and "practical" philosophy, a eli vision has been made by
7
 9
8 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
;..,- ..('A • 711(1-<'
which in fact nothing has been divided (for both parts might in The solution of the probleiDS of pure geometry doe not belong
uch case have principle of thy same kind). to a particular part of the science; mensuration does not deserve
, The will, regarded as the faculty of de ire, is in fact one of the name of practical, in contrast to pure, geometry, a a second
the manyJE.atura ~ in e worfd, vi z. that cause which part of g ometry in g neral; and just a little ought the mechani-
acts in accordance with concepts. All that is represen ted as cal or chemical art of experim nt or ob ervation to be reckoned
possible (or necessary) by means of a will is called practically as a practical part of the doctrine of nature. Ju t as little, in
possible (or necessary), as distinguished from the physical fine, ought housekeeping, farming, state man hip, the art of
possibility or necessity of an effect, whose cause is not deter- conversation, the prescribing of di t, the universal doctrine of
mined to causality by concepts (but in lifeless matter by mechan- happine s itself, or the curbing of the inclinations and checking
ism and in animals by instinct). Here, in respect of the practical, of the affections for the sake of happiness to be reckoned as
it IS eft undetermined whet her the concept which gives the rule practical philosophy or taken to constitute the second part of
to the causality of the will is a natural concept or a concept of philosophy in general. For all these contain only rules of skill
freedom. (and are consequently only technically practical) for bringing
But the last distinction is essential. For if the concept which about an effect that is po sible according to the natural concepts
determines the causality [of the will] is a natural concept, then of causes and effects, which, since they belong to theoretical
the principles are technically practical; whereas, if it is a concept philosophy , are subject to tho e yrecepts as mere coroll aries
of freedom, they are morally practical. And as t he division of a from it (vi z. natural science) and can therefore claim no place
r;tional science depends on the distinction between objects in a special philosophy called practical. On the other hand, the
whose cognition needs distinct principles, the former will belong morally practical precepts, which are altogether based on the
to theoretical philosophy (doctrine of nature) , but the latter concept of freedom, to t he complete exclusion of the natural
alone will constitute the second part, viz. practical philosophy determining grounds of the will, constitute a quite sp cial class.
(doctrine of morals) . Thes , like the rules which nature obeys, are called simply laws,
All technically practical rules (i.e. the rules of art and skill but they do not, like them, rest on sensuous conditions but on a
generally, or of sagacity regarded as skill in exercising an influ- su ersensible rinciple; and accordingly they require for them-
ence over men and their wills), so far as their principles rest on selves a quite different part of philosophy, called practical,
concepts, must be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical corresponding to its theoretical part.
philosophy. For they concern only the possibility of things We hence see that a complex of practical precepts given by
according to natural concepts, to which belong ot only the philosophy does not constitute a di tinct part of philo ophy, as
means which are to be met with in nature, but als the will itself opposed to the theoretical part, because these precepts are
(as a faculty of desire and consequently a \natural faculty), so practical; for they might be that, even if their principles were
far as it can be determined conformably to these rules by derived altogether from the theoretical cognition of nature (as
n atural motives. However, practical rules of this kind are not technically practical rules). [A distinct branch of philosophy is
called laws (like physical laws), but only precepts, because the constituted onlyJ if t heir principle, as it is not borrowed from
will does not stand merely under the natural concept, but also the natural concept which is always sensuously conditioned,
under the concept of freedom, in relation to which its principles rests on the supersensible, which alone makes the concept of
are called laws. These with their consequences alone constitute freedom cognizable by formal laws. These precepts are then
the second or practical part of philosophy. morally practical, i .e . not merely precepts or rules in this or
..

10 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 11
that aspect, but, without any preceding reference to purposes concept of freedom is carried on by the reason and is merely
and designs, are laws. practical. It is only in the practical [sphere that the reason can
be legislative; in respect of theoretical cognition (of nature) it
II . OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY I N GENERAL can merely (as acquainted with law by the understanding)
deduce from given laws consequences which always remain
So far as our concepts have a priori application, so far extends within [ the limits of] nature. But, on the other hand, reason is
t he use of ourcognitive faculty according to principles, and not always t herefore legislative where there are practical rules,
with it philoso y. for they may be only technically practical .
But the complex of all objects, to which those concepts are JLnderstanding and reason exercise, therefore, two distinct
referred, in order to bring about a knowledge of them where it legislations on one and t he same territory of experience, without
is possible, may be subdivided according to the adequacy or prejudice t o each other . The concept of freed o~ as li ttle dis-
inadequacy of our [cognitive] faculty with this design. turbs the legislation of nature as the natural concept influences
Conce ts, so far as they are referred to objects, independently the legislation through the former. The possibili ty of at least
o t he possibili ty or impos ibility of t he cognition of these thinking without contradiction the coexistence of both legisla-
obj ects, have their field , which is determjned merely according tions and of t he corresponding faculties in the same subj ect
to the relation that their object has to our cognitive faculty in has been shown in the Cri ti que of Pure R eason, while it has
general. The part of this field in which knowledge is possible annulled t he obj ections to this [ theory] by exposing the dialec-
' for us is a ground or terri tory (territorium) for these concepts t ical illusion which they contain.
and the requisite cognitive faculty. The part of this territory, J hese two different realms, t hen, do not limit each ot her in
where they are legislative, is the realm (ditio) of these concepts their legislation , though they perpetually do so in the world of
and of the corresponding cognitive faculties . Empirical concepts sense . That they do not constitute one realm arises from this
have, t herefore, their territory in nature, as t he complex of a~l that the natural concept represents its objects in intuition, not
objects of sense, but no realm, only a dwelling place (dom~­ as t hings in themselves, but as mere phenomena; the concept of
cilium); for t hough they are produced in conformi ty to ~~~ · freedom , on the other hand , represents in its obj ect a t hing in
they are not legislative, but the rules based on them are empm- itself, but not in intui tion . Hence neither of t hem can furnish
cal and consequently contingent. a theoretical knowledge of its object (or even of the thinking
Our whole cognitive faculty has two realms, that of natural subject) as a thing in itself; t his would be the supersensible, the
concepts and t hat of t he concept of freedom, for through both idea of which we must indeed make the basis of the possibility
it is legislative a priori . In accordance with this, philosophy is of all the e obj ects of experience, bu t which we can never extend
divided into theoretical and practical. But t he terri tory to which or elevate into a cogni tion .
its realm extends and in which its legislation is exercised is There is, then , an unbounded but also inaccessible field for
always only the complex of objects of all possible experience , our whole cognitive facul ty- the field of the supersensible-
so long as they are taken for nothing more than mer~ ph~­ wherein we find no territ ory and therefore can have in it, for
nomena, for otherwise no legislation of the understandmg m theoretical cogni tion, no realm either for concepts of under- (;:
respect of t hem is conceivable. standing or reason . ]'his field we must indeed occupy with I ';/,..
Legislation t hrough natural con~epts is carried on by means ideas n behalf of the theoretical as well as the practical use oft" tt';.s~ft •j
-
of the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the reason, but we can supply to them in reference to the laws
 INTRODUCTION I TROD CTION 13

[arising] from the concept of freedom no other than practical The natural concept , which contain the ground of all theor ti-
reality, by which our theoretical cognition is not extended in cal knowledge a priori, rest on the legislation of the under tand-
the slightest degree toward the supersensible. ing. The concept of freedom, which contains the ground of all
Now evenjf an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible sensuously unconditioned practical precepts a priori, rests on
realm of the concept of nature an_a: the supers n ible realm of the legislation of the reason. Both faculties, th refore, besides
e concept of freedoro., so that no t ransition is pos ible from the being capable of application as r gard their logical form to
first to the second (by means of the theoretical use of reason), principles of whatever origin, have also as regards their content,
just as if they w~n two different worlds of which the fir t could their special legislation above which there i no other (a priori),
have no influence upon the econd, yet the second i meant to and hence the division of philosophy in to theoretical and prac-
have an influence upon the first. The concept of freedom is tical is justified.
meant to actualize in the world of sen e the purpo e proposed But tn the family of the supreme cognitive faculties there is
by its laws, and consequently nature must be so tho~ht t hat a middle term between the under tanding and the reason . This
the conformity to law of its form at 1 astfharmon ize~ with the is the judgment , of which we have cause for supposing according
pos ibility of t he purposes to be effect d ill. it according to laws to analogy that it may contain in it elf, if not a special I gi la-
of freedom. There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity tion, yet a special principle of its own to be sought accord ing
of the supersen ible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that to laws, though merely subj ective a priori . This principle, even
which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the if it have no field of objects as its realm , yet may have some-
concept of this ground, although it does not attain either where a territory with a certain character for which no other
theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and principle can be valid .
hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the But besides (to judge by analogy), there is a new ground for
t ran ition from the mode of thought according to the principles bringing the judgment into connection with another arrange-
of the one to that accordi ng to the principles of the other. ment of our representative faculties, which seems to be of even
greater importance than that of its relationship with the family
of the cognitive faculties. For all faculties or capacities of the
III. OF THE CRITIQUE OF J U DGMENT AS A MEANS OF
- OMBINING
- soul can be reduced to three, which cannot be any fur ther

--
THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO A WHOLE

The critique of the cognitive faculties, as regards what they

can furnish a priori, has, properly speaking, no realm in respect
derived from one common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the
f eeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire. 1 For the
1
lf we have cause for supposing that concepts which we use as empirical
of objects, because it is not a doctrine, but only has to investi- principles stand in relationship with the pure cogn it ive faculty a priori it
gate whether and how, in accordance with the state of these i!5 profitable, because of this reference, to seek for them a transcenden'tal
faculties, a doctrine is possible by their means. Its fi ld extends definition, i.e ., a. definition through pure categories, so far as these by
to all their pretensions, in order to confine them within their themselves adequately furnish the distinction of the concept in question
fegitimate bounds. But what cannot enter into the clivi ion of from others. We here follow the example of the mathematician, who leaves
undetermined the empirical data of his problem and only brings their
phi1o ophy may yet enter , as a chief part, into the critique of relation in their pure synthesis under the concepts of pu.re arithmetic, and
the pure faculty of cognition in general, viz . if it contains thus generalizes the solution. Objection has been brought against a similar
principles which are available neither for theoretical nor for procedure of mine (cf. the Preface to the Critique of Practirol Reason
practical use. Abbott's translation, p . 94), and my definition of the faculty of desir.e h~
16 INTRODUCTIO . I TRODUCTI6N 17

a law for it elf in order to be able to subordinate the particular not for determining) ; but thi facul ty t hus gives a law only to
In nature to the universal. But ~ the forms of nature are so itself, and not to nature. 1
manifold and there are so many modifications of the universal _row the conc~t of an object( so far as it contains the ground
fran cendental natural concep ts left undetermined by the of the actu ality of this object, s the p_urpose; and the agreement
laws given, a priori, by the pure understanding- because these of a thing with that constitution oF thingsWhich is only pos ible
only concern the possibility of a nature in general (as an object according to purposes is called the purposiveness of it form .
of sense)- that th ere must be laws for t hese [forms] also. Thus the principle of judgmen t, in respect of the form of thing
These, as empirical, may be contingent from the point of view of nat re under empirical laws generally, is t he purposiveness of
of our under tandin i;" and yet, if they a re to be called laws (as .J
nature ·nits variety That is, nature is represented by means of
the concept of a nature req uires), they must be regarded as this concept as if an understanding contained the ground of the
necessary in virtue of a principle o the unity of the m anifold, unity of the variety of it empirica l laws.
though it be unknown to us. The refl ective judgment, which is The ur o ivene s of nature is t herefore a pa rt icula r concept,
obliged to ascend from the par t icular in nature to t he universal, a priori, which h as its origin solely in the r flective judgment.
requires on that account a principle that it cannot borrow from For we cannot ascribe to n atural products anyt hing like a
experience, because its function is to establish the unity of all reference of nature in t hem to purposes; we can only use this
empirical principles under higher one , and hence to establish concept to reflect upon su ch products in respect of the connection
the possibility of th eir systematic subordination . Such a trans- of phenomena whi ch is given in them according to empirical
cendental principle, then, the reflective judgment can only give laws . This concep t is also ui te different from practical pur-
as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from outside po iveness (in human a rt or in morals), though it is certai nly
(because t hen it would be the determinant judgment) ; nor can thought according to the analogy of these last.
it pre cribe it to nature, becau e reflection upon the laws of
nature adjusts itself by nature, and not nature by the conditions
according to which we attempt to arrive at a concept of it which
V. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPO rYE ESS OF
I S A TR.t\.NSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF J DGMENT
ATURE) ~
I ;. I
;r
I .; I
is quite contingent in respect of nature.
This principle can be no other than the following: As uni- A transcendental principle is one by means of which is repre-
versal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, sented, a priori, the univ rEal condi tion und er which alone
which prescribes them to nature (although only according to things can be in general objects of our cognition. On the other
the universal concept of it as nature), so particular empirical hand , a principle is called metaphy ical if it repre en ts the
laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these a priori condition under which alone objects, whose con pt
universal laws, must be considered in accordance with such a mu t be empirically given, can be furth er determined a priori.
unity as they would have if an understanding (although not our Thus the principle of the cognition of bodies as substances and
understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties, as changeable substances is transcendental if thereby it is
was to make po sible a system of experience according to asserted that their changes musL liave a cause; it is metaphysi cal
particular laws of nature. Not as if, in this way, such an under- if it asserts that their changes must h ave an external cause. For
standing must be assumed as actual (for it is only our reflective in the former case bodies need only be thought by means of
·ud~nt to which this idea serves as a pr inc iple-=for re ecting, ontological predicates (pure concepts of understanding), e.g.
 I NTRODUCTION I TRODUCTION 19

substance , in order t o cognize the propo ition a priori; bu t in propo itions and t ry it by th p ychological method , we violate
th e la tter case the empirical concept of a body (as a m ovable their sen e . For they do not tell u what happ ns, i .e., by what
thing in space) must lie at the ba is of the propo ition, although rule our cognitive powers actually op rate and how we jud"' ,
once this basi has been la id down it m ay be seen completely bu t how we ought t o judge· and this logical objective nece ity
a priori tha t this lat ter predi cate (motion only by external does not emerge if the principl es are merely empirical. H ence
causes) belongs to body . Thu , as I shall pre ently show, the tha t purposiveness of natur for our cognitive facul ties and
principle of the purposiveness of na ture (in the manifoldne of their use, which is plainly appar n t from them , is a t ran c n-
its empirical laws) is a transcendental principle. For the concept dental principle of judgments a nd needs therefore also a t rans-
of objects, so far as they are th ought as standing under this cenden tal deduction , by m eans of whi ch he round for o
principle, is only the pure concept of objects of po sible empirical judging mu t be sough t in the sourc of cogni tion a priori .
cognition in general and contains nothing empirical. On the We find in the grounds of the po ibili ty of an experi ence in
other hand, the principle of ractical purposiveness, which the very fir t place something neces ary, viz. t he universal laws
must be thought in the idea of the determination of a free will withou t which nature in gen ral (as an object of sen e) cannot
is a metaphysical principle , because the concept of a faculty of be though t ; a nd the e re t upon the categories , applied to the
desire as a will must be given empirically (i .e . does not belong formal condi tions of all int ui tion po sible for us, so far as it is
to transcendental predicates) . Both principles are, however, also given a priori . ow under the e laws the judgment is
not empirical, but a priori, because for the combination of the determinant , for it has nothing to do bu t to subsume und r
predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their given laws . For exampl e, t h under tanding says that ev ry
judgments no further experience is needed, but it can be appre- change has iteau e (universal law of nature) ; the transcenden tal
hended completely a priori. judgment has nothing fur ther t o do than t o supply a priori the
That the concept of a purpo iveness of nature belongs t o condi tion of subsump tion under the concept of the under tand-
transcendental principles can be sufficiently een from the ·ing pl aced before it, i .e. the succe ion · 'roe] of t he deter-
~xims of the iudgment, which lie at the basis of the investiga- minations of one and the same thing . For na ture in genera l
tion of nature a priori and yet do not go further than the po si- (as an object of possible experien e) that law is cognized as
bility of experience, and consequently of the cognition of absolutely necessary. But now the obj ects of empirical cognition
nature-not indeed nature in general, but nature as determined are determined in m any other way than by that formal time
through a variety of particular laws. These maxims present condi t ion, or, at least as far a we can judge a priori, are deter-
themselves in the course of this science often enough, though in minable . H ence pecifically different n a tures can be cau es in
a scattered way, as sentences of metaphysical wisdom , who e a n infinite variety of ways, as well as in virtue of what they have
necessity we cannot demonstrate from concepts. " ature takes in common as belonging to na ture in general ; and each of the e
the shortest way (lex parsimoniae); at the same time it m::tkes modes must (in accordance wi th the concept of a cause in
no leaps, either in the course of its changes or in the juxta- general) have its rule, which is a law and therefore bring
position of specifically different forms (lex continui in natura); neces ity with it, although we do not at all comprehend this
its great variety in empirical laws is yet unity under a few necessity , in Virtue of the con titu t ion and the limi tations of
principles (principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multipli- our cognitive faculties . ~mu s t therefore think in nature, in
canda) ," etc. respect of its merely empirical laws, a possibility of infinitely
If we propose to set forth the origin of these fundamental various empirical laws which are, as far as our insight goes ,
20 I TRODUCTION INTRODUCTIO)I 21
contingent (cannot be cogniz d a priori) and in respect of which a tran cendental principle of cognition, ju t consider he magni-
we judge nature, according to empirical laws and the possibility ude .Q.Uhe probl The problem, which lie a pr on m our
of the unity of experience (as a sy tern according to empirical understanding, is to make a connected experience out of given
laws), to be contingent. But such a unity must be necessarily ~cfll)tions of a -ru;:t'ure containing at all eveii'ts an infinite
pr upposed and assumed, for otherwise t here would be no variety of empirical laws. The understanding is, no doubt, in
thoroughgoing connection of empirical cognitions in a whole of poss ssion a priori of univer al law of nature, without which
experience. The universal laws of nature no doubt furnish such nature could not be an object of experience, but it needs in
a connection of things according to their kind, as things of addition a certain order of nature in it particular rules, which
nature in general, but not specifically, as such particular beings can only be empirically known and which are, as regards the
of nature. H ence the judgment must assume for its special use under tanding, contingent. These rules, without which we
this principle a priori that what in the particular (empirical) could not proc; d from the universal analogy of a possible
laws of nature is from the human point of view contingent, yet experience in general to the particu lar , must be thought by it
contains a unity of law in the combination of its manifold into a laws (i.e. as neces ary), for otherwise they would not consti-
an experience possible in itself-a unity not indeed to be tute an order of nature, although their nee ssity can never be
fathomed by us, but yet thinkable . Consequently as the unity cognized or comprehended by it. Although, therefore, the
of law in a combination, which we cognize as contingent in und r tanding can determine nothing a priori in respect of
itseU, although in conformity with a necessary design ~.~- ~ .need) / --: objects, it mu t, in order to trace out these empiri cal so-called
of understanding , is represented as the purposiveness of objects Jaws, place at the basis of all reflection upon object an a priori
(here of nature), so must the judgment, which in respect of principle, viz. that a cognizable order of nature i possible in
things under possible (not yet discovered) empirical laws is accordance with these laws. The foll owing propo ition expre
merely reflection , think of nature in respect of t he latter accord- some uch principle. There i in nature a subordination of
ing to a principle of...;I!]!!!J!JJ~veness for our cognitive facul ty, genera and species comp rehen ib le by us. Each one approxi-
which then is expressed in t he above maxims of the judgment . mates to some other according to a common principle, so that a
This t ranscendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is transition from one to another, and so on to a higher genus, may
neither a natural concept nor a concept of reedom, because it be pos ibl . Though it seem at t he outset unavoidable for our
ascribes nothing to the object (of nature), but only represents understanding to a sume different kinds of causality for the
the eculiar way in which we must proceed in reflec tion upon specific differences of natural operations, yet these different
the objects of nature in reference to a thoroughly connected kinds may stand under a small number of principle , with the
experience, and is consequently a subj ective principle (maxim) investigation of whi ch we have to bu your elves.t!'his harmony ~
of the judgment. Hence, as if it were a lucky chance favoring of natur 1vith our cognitive faculty ·s pre uppo ed a priori by
our design, we are rejoiced (properly speaking, relieved of a the judgment, on behaU of its reflection upon nature in accord-
want) if we meet with such systematic unity under merely ance with its empirical laws, while the understanding at the
empirical laws, although we must nece arily assume that there same time cognizes it objectively as contingent, and it is only
is such a uni ty without our comprehending it or being able to the judgment that ascribes it to nature as a transcendental
prove it. - purposivenes (in relation to the cognitive facul y of the sub-
In order to convince our elves of the correctness of this deduc- ject). For without this presupposition we should have no order
tion of the concept before us and the necessity of assuming it as of nature in accordance with empirical laws, and consequently
 ~ ,
I
INTRODUCTIO INTRODUCTIO 23
22
no_guiding thread for an experience ordered by these in all their it is only so far as that holds that we can make any progress with
variety, or for an mvest1gation of them. the use of our understanding in experience or gain knowledge.
For it might easily be thought that, in spite of all the uni-
formity of natural things according to the universal laws, with- VI. OF THE COMBINATIO OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH
out which we should not have the form of an empirical cognition THE CONCEPT OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE
in general, the specific variety of the empirical laws of nature,
including their effects, might yet be so great that it would be The conceived harmony of nature in the variety of its par-
impossible for our und erstanding to detect in nature a compre- ticular laws with our need of finding universali ty of principles
hensible order; to divide its products into genera and species, for it must be judged as contingent in respect of our insight, but
so as to use the principles which explain and make intelligible yet at the same time as indispensable for the needs of our under-
one for the explanation and comprehension of another; or, out standing, and consequently as a purposiveness by which nature
of such confused material (strictly we should say, so infinitely is harmonized with o desigri, which, however, has only know!- .Ats -'" ,(_4
various and not to be measured by our faculty of comprehen- edge for its aim. Tlul universal laws of t he understanding, which
sion) to make a connected experience. are at the same tim laws of natille, are just as nece sary (al-
The iudg!Jlent has therefore also in itself a principle a priori though arising from spontaneity) as t he material laws of motion.
of the possibility of nature, but only in a subjective aspect, by Their roduction presupposes no design on the p art of our c~g-
l S only by means of them that we, in
0

which it prescribes not to nature (autonomy) , but to itself nitive faculty , becau
(heautonomy) a law for its reflect ion upon nature . This we the first place, attain a concept of what the cognition of thing
might call ~ .the specification of nature in respect of its (of nature) is and attribute them necessarily to nature as object
empirical laws . The Judgment oes not cognize this a priori in of our cognition in general. But so far as we can see, it is con-
nature, but assumes it on behalf of a natural order cognizable t ingent that the order of nature according to its particular laws,
by our understanding in the division which it makes of the in all its variety and heterogeneity possibly at least transcending
universal laws of nature when it wishes to subordinate to these our comprehension, should be actually conformable to these
the variety of particular laws . If, then, we say that nature Qaws]. The discovery of this [order] is the business of the
specifies its universal laws according to the principles of pur- understanding, which is designedly orne toward a necessary
posiveness for our cognitive faculty , i.e. in accordance with the _purpose, viz. the bringing of unity of principles into nature,
necessary business of t he human understanding of finding the which purpose then the judgment must ascribe to nature,
universal for the part icular which perception offers it, and again because the understanding cannot here prescribe any law to it. //
of finding connection for the di verse (which, however, is a The attainment of that design is bound up with the feeling of ~
universal for each species) in the unity of a principle, we thus pleasure, ~ce the condition of this attainment is a r pre-
neither prescribe to nature a law, nor do we learn one from it sentation a priori-as here a principle for the reflective judg-
by observation (although such a principle may be confirmed by ment in general- therefore the feeling of pleasure is determined f/
this means). For it is not a principle of the determinant but by a ground a priori and va I for every man, and that merely
merely of the reflective judgment. We only require that, be by the reference of the object to tbe cognit1ve faculty, t he con-
nature disposed as it may as regards its universal laws, investi- cept of purposiveness here not having the least reference to the
gation into its empirical laws may be carried on in accordance faculty of desire. It is thus quite distinguished from all practical
with that principle and the maxims founded thereon, because purposiveness of nature .
 (

24 INTRODU CTION
INTROD UCTION 25
In fact, although from the agreement of perceptions with
laws in accordance with univer al natural concepts (the cate- were told that a de per or wider knowledge of nature derived
gories) we do not and cannot find in our elves the slightes t effect from observation mu t lead at last to a variety of laws, which
upon the feeling of pi asure, becau e the underst anding neces- no human underst anding could r duce to a principle, we should
sarily proceeds according to its nature without any design et, at once acquiesce. But still we more glad ly listen to one who
on the other hand, the discovery that two or more empirical offers hope that th more we- know nature internally and can
heterogen ous law of nature may oe combined under one prin- compare it with external members now unknown to us, the
ciple comprehending them both is the ground of a very marked more simple shall we find it in its principles, and that the further
pleasur , often even of an admirat ion , which does not cea e, our experience reaches, the more uniform shall we find it amid
though we may be already quite familiar with the objects of it. the apparen t heterogeneity of its empirical laws. For it is a
We no longer find, it is true, any marked pleasure in the com- mandat e of our judgme nt to proceed according to the principle
prehensibility of nature and in the unity of its divisions into of the harmon y of nature with our cognitive faculty, so far as
genera and species, by which all empirical concepts are possible , that ~aches, without deciding (because it is not the determi nant
t hrough which we cognize it according to its particul ar laws. judgme nt which gives us this rule) whether or not it is bounded
But this plea ure has certainly been present at one time, and anywhere. For although in respect of the rational use of our
it is only ecause the commone t experience would be impossible coO'nitive faculty we can determine such bounds, this is not
without it that it 1s gradually confounded with mere cognition pos ible in the empirical field.
and no longer -;_rrests particul ar attentio n . There is, then,
something in our judgmen ts upon nature which makes us VII. OF THE AE THETICA L REPR.'E!SE TATION OF THE
attentiv e to its purpo iveness for our underst anding- an en- PURPO IYENESS OF NATURE
deavor to bring, where possible , its di imilar laws under higher
ones, though still always empirical- and thus, if successful, That which in the represen tation of an object is merely sub-
makes us feel lea e in that harmon y of the e with our cogni- jective, i.e. which decides its reference to the subject, not to
-~
~the object, is it aestheti cal characte r; but that which serves or
tive faculty, which armony we regard a merely contingent.
ODthe other hand, a representafion of nature would altogeth er can be u ed for the determi nation of the object (for cognition)
di. plea e, by which it should be foretold to us that in the small- is its\¢,.?gical validi y. In the cognition of an object of sense,
est inve tigation beyond the commonest experience we should both references present themselves. In th sense repre entation
meet with a heterogeneity of its laws , which would make the of external things, the quality of space wherein we intuit them
union of its particul ar laws under univer al empirical laws im- is t he merely subjective [elemen t] of my repr sentatio n (by
possible for our und erstandiug. For t his would contrad ict the which it remains undecided what t hey may be in t hemselves as
principle of the subj ectively purpo ive specification of nature in objects), on account of which reference the object is t hought
its genera and al o of our reflec tive judgme nt in respect of such ther by merely as henomenon...:.. But space, notwith tanding
principle. its merely subjective qualitY, 'is at the same time an ingredient
This pre uppo ition of the judgme nt is, however, at the same in the cognition of things as phenomena. Sensation, again (i.e.
time so indeterminate as to how far that ideal purposiveness of xternal sensation), expresses the merely subjective [elemen t]
nature for our cogni tive faculty shou ld be extended that, if we of our repre entation s of external things, but it is also the proper
material (reale) of them (by which something exi ting is given),
 ,
26 INTRODUCTIO
I TRODUCTION 27
just as space is the mere form a priori of the po ibility of their
intuition. everthele s, however, sensation is also mployed ment upon the purpo ivene of the object, which does not base
in the cognition of external objects. itseli upon any present concept of the object, nor does it furnish
But th~ ubjective [element] in a representation, which can- any such. In the ca e of an object who e for!Il (not the matter
not be an ingredient of cognition, is t e pleasure or pain whi h.i of its representation or ensation), in the mere reflection upon
bound up with it; for through it I cognize nothing in the object it (without reference to any concept to be obtained of it), is
of t e representation, although it may be the effect of some judged as the ground of a plea ure in the representa~ion of
cognition. ow the purpo ivene of a thing, so far as it is such an object, this plea ure i judged as bound up w1th the
repre ented in perception, is no characteristic of the object representation nece sarily, and, consequently, not only for the 4
itself (for such cannot be perceived) although it may be inferred subject which apprehends this form, bu~ery judging being
from a cognition of things. The purposiveness, therefore, which in general. The object is then called beautiful, and the facu ty
precedes the cognition of an object and which, even without our of judging b?means of such a plea ure (and, consequently, with
wishing to use the representation of it for cognition, i at the univer a! validity) is called taste. For since the ground of the
same time immediately bound up wifu it, is that subj ctive pleasure is placed merely in the form of the object for reflection
[element] which cannot be an ingredient in cognition. Hence in general-and, consequently, in no sensation of the object,
the obj ct is only called ur osive wh~n its representation is and also without reference to any concept which anywhere in-
immediately combined with the feeling of pl asure, and this volves deign-it is only the conformity to law in the empirical
very representation i an aesthetical representation of pur- use of the judgment in general (unity of the imagination with
posiveness. We have only to ask whether there is, in general, the understanding) in the subject wit w c tbe representation
such a representation of purpo iveness. of the object in reflection, whose conditions are universally valid
If pleasure is bound up with the mere apprehension (appre- a priori, harmonizes. And since this harmony of the object
hensio) of the form of an object of intuition, without r ference with the faculties of the subject is [only] contingent, it brings
to a concept for a definite cognition, then the representation is about the r presentation of it purpo iveness [only] in respect
thereby not referr d to the object, but simply to the subject, of the cognitive faculties of the subject.
and the pleasure can exiJr ss nothing el ethan its harmony with Here, now, is a pleasure which, like all pleasure or pain that
the cognitiw facultie which come into play in the reflective is not produced through the concept of freedom (i.e. through
judgm nt, and so far as they are in play, and hence can only the preceding determination of the higher faculties of desire by
expre s a subjective formal purpo iveness of the obj ct. For pure reason) can never be comprehended from concepts, as
that apprehension of forms in the imagination can n ver take neces a1ily bound up with the representation of an object. It
"' place wit out the re ective judgment, though unde ignedly, at mu t always be cognized as combined with this only by means
east comparing th m with it faculty f referring intuitions to of reflective perception, ana ;consequently, 1ike all empirical
concepts. If, now, in thi comparison the imaginatio (as the judgments, it can declare no objective neces ity and lay c~aim
faculty of a priori intuition ) i placea by means of a given to no a priori validity. But the judgment of taste also claliDS,
representation undesignedly in agreement with the understand- as every other empirical judgment doe , to be valid for all men,
ing, a the faculty of concepts, and thus a f e1ing of pleasure i and in spite of its inner conting ncy, this is always possible.
-afoused, the object must then b regarded as purpo iv for th The strange and irregular thing is that it is not an empirical /
reflective judgment. uch a judgment i an a sthetical judg- concept, but a feeling of pleasure (consequently not a concept at
all) w~by the judgment of taste, is attributed to everyone,

.)fl. If <{0 ; • 3d
BARD C LEGE LI •
 30 I TRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 31

empirical laws i not a concept of the object, but only a principle But the t ranscendental principle which represent a pur-
of the judgment for furnishing it elf with concepts amid t he po iveness of nature (in subjective reference to our cognitive

-
immen e variety of nature (and thus being able to ascertain its
own position), yet we thus ascribe to n ature as it were a
regard to our cognitive faculty according to 'the analogy ' of
purpose. Thus we can regard~uralOeautu as the presentation
faculty) in the form of a thing as a principle by which we judge
of nature leaves it quite undetermined where and in what ca 1i'
I have to judge of a product according to a principle of pur-
posiveness, and not rather according to univer al natural law .
of t he concept of the formal (merely subjective) purpo iveness, It leaves it to the aesthetical judgment to decide by ta te the
and natural purposes as the presentation of the concept of a harmony of tbis product (of its fNm) with our cognitive faculty
real (objective) purposiven ss. The former of t hese we judge (so far as this decision rests not on any agreement with con-
of by taste (aesthetical, by the medium of the feeling of pleas- cepts but on feeling) . On the other hand, t he judgment teleo-
ure), the latter by under tanding and reason (logical, according logically employed furnishes conditions determinately under
to concepts). which something (e.g. an organized body )is to be judged accord-
On this is based the divi ion of the Cri tique of Judgment into ing to the idea of a purpo e of nature; but it can adduce no
the cri t ique of aesthetical and of teleological judgment . By t he fundamental proposition from the concept of nature as an object
first we understand the facul ty of judging of t he formal pur- of experience authorizing it to ascribe to nature a priori a
posiveness (otherwise called subj ective) of nature by means of reference to purposes, or even indeterminately to assume this
the feeling of pleasure or pain; by the second , the faculty of of su ch products in actual experience. The reason for this is
judging its r a! (obj ective) purposiveness by means of under- that we must have many particular experiences and consider
standing and reason. them under the unity of thei r principle in order to be able to
In a cri tique of judgment the part containing the aesthetical cognize, even empirically, objective purposiveness in a cer tain
judgmen t is essential, becau e this alone contains a principle object . The aesthetical judgment is t herefore a special faculty
which the judgment places quite a priori at t he basis of its re- for judgi~ ofthings according to a rule, bu t not according to
flection upon nature, viz. the principle of a formal purposiveness concepts. The teleological judgmen t is not a special faculty,
of nature, according to its pa rticula r (empirical) laws, for our -but only the reflective judgment in genera1, so far as it proceeds,
cognitive facul ty, without which the understanding could not as it always does in theoretical cognition, according to concep ts,
find itself in nature . On the other hand no reason a priori could but in respect of certain obj ects of nature, according to special
be specified-and even the possibility of a reason would not be principles, viz . of a merely refl ective judgment, and not of a
apparent from t he concept of nature as an object of experience judgment that determin es objects . Thus, as regards its applica-
whether general or particular- why there hould be objective tion, it Q.elongs t o the theoretical part of philo ophy, and on
purpo es of nature, i .e. t hings which a re only possible as natural account of its special principles, which are not determin ant, as
purposes ; but the judgment, wi thout containing such a principle they must be in doctrine, it must constitute a special part of
a priori in itself, in given cases (of certain products), in order the Critique . On the other hand, the aesthetical.iudg];ne,pt con-
to make use of. the concept of purpo es on behalf of reason , tribu tes nothing toward the knowledge of its obj ects , and thus
would only contain the rule according to which that trans- must be reckoned as belonging to the critique of the judging
cendental principle already has prepared the understanding to subject and its cognitive faculties only so far as they are sus-
apply to nature the concept of a purpose (at least as regards its ceptible of a priori principles, of whatever other use (theoretical or
form) . practical) they may be. This is the propaedeutic of all philosophy.
32 I TRODUCTIO
INTRODUCTION 33
IX . OF THE CON ECTION OF THE LEGI LATIO OF U DERSTANDI G ance with the concept of fr dom i the final purpo e which (or
WITH THAT OF REASO BY MEA S OF THE J U DGMENT its phenom non in the world of ense) ought to exi t, and the
condition of the po sibiliLy of thi i presuppo ed in nature (in
The understanding legislates a priori for nature as an object the nature of the subject as a ensible being, that i , as man).
of n for a theoreti al knowledge of it in a po ible experi- The judgment presupposes thi s a priori and without referenc
en e. Rea on legislates a priori for freedom and its peculiar o the practical, and thus furnishes the m diating concept be-
causali ty; as the supersensible in the subject, for an uncondi- tween the concepts of na ure and that of freedom. It mak s
t ioned practical knowledge . The realm of the natural concept po sible the transition from the conformity to law in accordance
under the one legi lation and that of the concept of freedom with the former to 'the final p\lrpo ej in accordanc with the
und r the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence latter, and this by the concept of a purposiveness of nature. For
which they might hav on one anot~er (each according to its thus is cognized the po ibility of the final purpo e which alone
fundamental laws) by he great gulff that separates the su?e.r- can be actualized in nature in harmony with its laws.
en ible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determmes The understanding, by the possibili ty of its a priori laws for
nothing in re pect of the theoretical cognition of nature, and nature, gives a proof t hat nature is only cognized by us as
the natural concept d te rmines nothing in respect of the prac- ph nomenon and implies, at the same time, that it ha a super-
ti al laws of freedom. o far, then , it is no t po sible to throw sensible substrate, though it leaves this quite undetermined.
a bridg from the one realm to the other. But although the The judgment, by its a priori principle for the judging of nature
determining ground of causali ty, according to the concept of according to its possible particular laws, makes the supersensible
fr edom (and the practical rules which it contains), are not substrate (both in us and ffithout us) determinable by means of
resid nt in nature , and the sensible cannot determine the the intellectual faculty. But the rea on, by its practical a priori
sup r n ible in the subject, y t this is po ible conver ely (not law, determines i ; and thus the judgment makes po ible the
to be sure, in re pect of the cognition of nature, but as r gards transition from t he realm of the natural concept to t hat of the
the effects oJ the up · ensib upon the sensible). Thi in fact concept of freedom.
is involved in the conc.c of a causality through freedom the As regards the facult ies of the soul in general , in their higher
-;ffect of ,,·hi ch is to take place in the worln according to its aspect, as co~ining an autonomy, the understanding i that
formal laws. The word cause, of course, when used of the super- w ch contains t he constitutive principles a priori for t he cog-
sen ible, only signifies the ground which determines the causality nitive faculty (the theoretical cognition of nature). For the
of natural thing to an effect in accordance ffith their proper f eeling of pleasure and pain there is the judgment, independently
natural laws, although harmoniously with the form al principle of concepts and sensations which relate to t he determination of
of t he law of rea on . Although t he po sibility of this cannot be the faculty of desire and can thus be immediately practical.
omp rehended , yet the objection of a contradiction alleged to
b found in it can be sufficient ly answered. 2 The effect in accord- ance is not between nature and freedom, but between the former as phenom-
enon and the effects of the latter as phenomena. in the world of sense. The
• One of the var ious pretended contrad ictions in this whole distinction
causality of freedom itself (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of a.
of the causali ty of nature from that of freedom is this. It is objected that ,
natural cause subordinated to nature (i.e. of the subject considered as
if I speak of obstacles wh ich nature oppo s to causality according to (moral)
mao, and therefore as phenomenon). The intelligible, wh ich is thought
laws f freedom or of the assistance it affords, I am admitting an influence
under freedom, contains the ground of the determination of this [natural
of the former upon the latter. But if we try to understand what hM been
cause] in a. furth er inexplicable way (just as that intelligible does which
said , this misinterpret ation is very easy to avo id . The opposition or assist-
constitutes the rmpersensible substrate of nature).
 3-! J
<'~./" - M~"'
' I
I. TRODUCTION
·. . . . ?t
For ~he jaculty of desire there is jJle reason , which i practical
without t,he mediation of any pleasure whate ver. I t determine
.5 .,....v-< ~
I I I
) ,· k
fo r th facul ty of de ire, as a' superior faculty, t he fi nal purp e ('~11,
which carries wi th it the pure in tellectual satisfaction in the
obj ec t,. The concept formed by judgment of a purposiveness of
nature belongs t o natural concepts, but only as a regulative
principle of the cogni tive fac ul ty, although the ae t,het,ical
judgment upon certain obj ects (of nature or a rt) whi ch occasions
it, is in respect, of the feeling of pleasure or pain a constituti ve
principle. The spontaneity in t he play of the cognitive fac ul ti e~, PART ONE
the harmony of which contains t he ground of thi pleasure,
makes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETI AL
be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept
and that of the concept of freedom in its effects, while at the JUDGMENT
same time it promotes the sensibility of the mind to moral
feeling. The following table may facilitate the review of all the -
1u{;,...-t
:I.' V"f
._.7
6"
higher faculties according to their systematic unity. 3
~..
ALL THE FACULTIES OF THE Mrno fa. c '" .( 15 (/
Cognitive faculties Facult,~ of desire
Feeling of pleasure and pain
COGNITIVE FACULTIE S
("5' .;y! "' (

1,. (t ..(.( r/
Understanding Judgment, Reason
A Pruoru PRINCIPLES 1ln's~t-'
Confonnity to law Purposiveness Final purpo e ~lq s,
APPLICA'£10 TO
Nature Art Freedom
a It has been thought a doubtful point that my divisions in pure philoso-
phy should always be threefold. But that lies in the nature of the thing.
If there is to be an a priori division, it must be either analytirol, according
to the law of contradiction, which is always twofold (quodlibet ens est aut
A aut non A), or it is synthetirol. And if in this latter case it is to be derived
from a priori concepts (not as in mathematics from the intuition correspond-
ing to the concept), the div ision must necessarily be trichotomy. For
according to what is requisite for synthetical unity in general, there must
be (1) a condition, (2) a conditioned , and (3) the concept which arises from
the union of the conditioned with its condition.
 FIRST DIVISION

Analytic of the Ae th tical Judgment

FIR T BOOK

A LYTI OF THE BEA TIFUL

FIR T MOMENT

F TII E .J DG '.IE T F T TE , 1 ACCORD! G T

Q LITY j

§ 1. THE J UDOME T OF TASTE I S AESTHETICAL

In order to di tin gui h wh th r anything i beautiful or not,

we refer the representation , not by the under tanding to the
object for cognition, but by the imagination (perhaps in con-
junction with th und r an ing) to th subj ect and its f elin g II',,
of plea ure or pain. The judgm nt of taste i erefore not a
judgm nt of cognition, and is on equently not logi cal but
aesth t i al , by which we under tand that who e determining
ground can be no other than subjective . Every r ference of repr -
entation , even that of sen ations, may be objective (and then
it ignifi es he real [elemen t] of an empirical representation),
1 The defin it ion of "taste" which is la id down here is that it is the fac ulty

of judg ing of the beau . But the ana.lysis of judgments of taste must
show what is req uired in order to call an obj ct beautifu l. The moments
to which tlti judgm nt has regard in its reflection I have sought in accord-
ance with the guidance of the logical fun ctions of judgment (for in a judg-
ment of taste a reference to the understand ing is always involved). I have
co n idered t he moment of quality first because the aesthetical judgment
upon the beautiful first pays attention to it .
37 .;.. 'f ,' I
 3 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL J UDG 1EKT [ 2] [. 3] ANALYTIC OF THE BEA UTIFUL 39
save only t he ref renee to the feeling of plea ure and pain, by R ou eau, I may rebuke the vanity of the great who wa te the 1
which nothing in the object i signified, but through which there "Sweat o e people on such uperfluou trnn . In fine, I could 1
~ a feeling in t he subject as it is affected by th r pr s ntati on. easily convi nce my elf that if I found my elf on an uni nh:tbited

-··
To B;Pprehend a regular , purposive building by m ans of one'
cogmtJve faculty (whether ill a cl ar or a confused way of
r presentation) ~omething qui te different from b ing con-
island without the hope of ever aO'ain comi ng among men, and
could conjure up ju t such a splendid building by my mere wi h,
I should not even give myself the trouble if I had a uffici ntly
scious of tills representation as conn ected with the ensation of comfortable hut. Th is may ali be admi tted and approved, bu t
sa 1sfaction. H ere the represent~~ion is altogether referred to we are not now talking of thi . We wi h only to know if t his
the subj ect and to.Jis feelin g 24Jife under t he nam of the mere representation of the obj ect is accompanied in me with
feeling of pleasure or pain. Tills e tabli hes a quite separate -satisfaction, however indifferent I may be as regar.d t he xi t-
faculty of distinction and of judgment, adding notrnn g to ence of the object of this r presentation . We easily see t hat,
cognition, but only comparing t he given repr sentation in th e in saying it i beautiful and in showing that I have taste, I a m
subj ect with the whole faculty of repres ntations, of whi ch t he concerned , not wi th that in which I depend on the xi tence of
mind is conscious in t he feeling of its state. Given represen ta- the obj ect, bu t ,vjth that wrnch I make ou t of this rep r entation
tions in a judgment can be empirical (consequen tly, aesthetical); in myself. Everyone must admit that a judgment about b auty,
but the judgment wrnch is formed by means of t hem is lo ~cal in wrn ch the least interest mingles, i v ry partial and j not a
provided t hey are referr d in th e judgment to t.he objegt: pure judgment of taste . We must not be in t he least pr judiced
onversely, if t he given r presentations are rational, bu t are in favor of the existence of t he thi~gs, b t b . qui te indi iTerent .(4.-1
referred in a judgment simply to t he subj ect (to its feeling), the in tills respect, in order to play th~ Judge t bmgs of ta te. ''
judgment is so far always aesthetical. We cannot, however, better elucidate this propo ition , which
( is of a~l im12ortancG,.\ t han by contrasting the pur di inte r- ;, I' 1;..
e ted 2 sati ·f etion in judgment of taste wi t h that whi h is 1
§ 2. THE SATISFACTIO WHICH DETERMII\TES TH E J D GMENT
OF TASTE I S DISI NTERESTED
bound up wi th an interest, pecially if we can at the arne t ime
, ( , 1 •
t < ( r>r - be certain that t here are no other kinds of in tere t than tho e
The 'f!a.tisfaction which we combine wit,h the representation of which are to be now specified .
~e exiJ?tence of an object is called "interest ." Such satisfaction
always has reference to the faculty of desire, either as its deter- § 3. THE SATISFACTIO TH E PLEA ANT I BOU D U P
" minillg ground or as necessarily connected with its determining WITH I NT E REST
ground. ow when t he question is if a tiling is beautiful, we
do not want to know whether anytillng depends or can depend That which pleases the senses in sen ation is " pleasant." H ere
, _ on the existence of the t hing, either for myself or for anyone the opport unity pre ents it elf of censuring a very common
el , but how we judge it by mere t>ba&rva ion- (int ui tion or confusion of the double sense wrn ch the word "sensation" can
reflection) . If anyone asks me if I find that palace beau tiful have and of calling attention to it . All satisfaction (it is said or
I -

which I see before me, I may answer: I do not like trn.ngs of that • A judgment upon a n object of sat isfaction may be quite disinterested,
kind which are made merely t o be stared at. Or I can answer but yet very interesting, i.e . not based upon an in terest , but ~ a n ,,.,;•• "
interest 'l;h it; of this kind are all pure mor !l.l judgments. Judgments of
like t hat Iroquois achem, who was p leased in Pari by nothing t aste , ho we ver , do not in themselves establish any mterest . Only in society ~ 'I(
more than by the cook shops. Or again, after the manner of is it interesting to have taste; the reason of this will be shown fu the equel.
C/..-y. ~~ £r~ 1 , , >t -1
/1 , I
.,..' l
J •
Q ... ,t. ·~ ; ,_ / r ,
42 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTBETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 4]
[§ 5] A ALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 43
the same as to say that lasting pleasure and the good are the
same. But we can soon see that this is merely a confusion of worth in itself, even if he at the same time is conducive as a
":'ord , for_ the concepts which properly belong to these expres- roans to the best enjoyment of others and shares in all their
sJOns can ill no way be interchanged. The nleasant which a gratifications by sympathy. Only what he does, without refer-
sueh , represents the object simply in - relation A;: '
to sense, '
mu t ence to enjoyment, jn full freedom and inde endently of what
first be brought by the concept of a purpose under princip1es of nature can procure for him_passively, gives an [absolute] 3 worth
rea on, in order to call it good, as an object of the will. But to his presence [in the world] as the existence of a person; and
that there is [involved] a quite different relation to satisfaction happiness, with the whole abundance of its pleasures, is far
in calling that which gratifies at the same time good may be from being an unconditioned good. 4
seen from the fact that, i_n the case of the good, the que tion However, notwithstanding all this difference between the
always is whether it· is mediately or immediately good (useful pleasant and the good, they both agree in this that they are
or good in itself); but on the contraryj n the case of the ple~nt, always bound up with an interest in their object; so are not
t?er~ can be no _questi~n about this at all, for the word always
only the pleasant (§ 3), and the mediate good (the useful)
s1grufies somethmg which pleases immediately. (The same is which is pleasing as a means toward pleasantnes somewhere,
appli cable to what I call beautiful.) but also that which is good absolutely and in every aspect, viz.
moral good, which brmgs W1 1 e 1ghest interest. For the
Even in common speech men distinguish the pleasant from
the good. Of a dish which stimulates the taste by spices and good is the object of will (i.e. of a facu1ty of desire determined
other condiments we say unhesitatingly that it is pleasant - b reason). But to~ something and to have a satisfaction
though it is at the same time admitted not to be good · fo; in its existence, i.e. to ta e an interest in it, are identical.
~('
though it immediately delights the senses, yet mediately,' i.e.
considered by reason which looks to the after '"results, it di _ § 5. COMPARISO OF THE THREE SPECIFICALLY DIFFERENT
pleases. Even in the judging of health we may notice this dis- KINDS OF SATISFACTION
tinction. It isj_mmediately p)eii:sant to everyone po sessing it
(at l~ast negatively, i.e. as the absence of all bodily pains).
But ill order to say that it i~ good, it must be considered by
------
The pleasant and the good have both a reference to the faculty
- they bring with them, the former a satisfaction
of desire, and
reason w1th reference to purpo es, viz. that it is a state which pathologically conditioned (by impulses, stimuli), the latter a
makes us fit for all our b usiness. Finally, in re pect of happi- _Qure_ practical satisfaction which is determined not merely by
~ s everyone elieve himself entitled to describe the greatest
the representation of the object but also by the represented con-
sum of the pleasantnes of life (as regards both their number nection of the ~ubject with the existence of the object. It is not }"'" ~ .-/"<;.(.
and their duration) as a true, even~ the highest, good. How- merely the obJect that pleases, but al o its exisience.] 5 0 the
ever'... reason is o .J?O ed to this. Pleasantness is enjoyment. And otlier band, the judgment of taste is .merelYTcontenrplative, i.e.,
if we were concerned with this alone, it would be foolish to be it is a judgment which, indifferent as regards the existence of an
scrupulous as regards the means which procure it for us or 1 [Second edition.]
, - I' /
[to care] whether it is obtained passively by the bount; of • An obligation to enjoyment is a. manifest absurdity . Thus the obliga-
nature or by our own activity and work. But reason can never tion to all actions which have merely enjoyment for their aim can only be
be persuaded that the existence of a man who merely lives for a pretended one, however spiritually it may be conceived (or decked out),
e:njoyme:nt (however busy he may be in this point of view) has a_. even if it is a mystical, or so-called heavenly, enjoyment.
I
& [Second edition.]
I
 ../.)(' -1( },s,'' , £t / ,
40 CRITIQUE OF THE AE TIIETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 3] [§ 4] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL --;r,;;;- ~4~
thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Con cquently Now that judgment about an object by which I describe
everything that please 1s plea ant because it plea es (and it as pleasant expresses an interest in it, is plain from the fact
according to its different degrees or its relation to other pleasant that by sensation it excites a-4ffiir. for objects of that kind;
sensations it it!!:£lreeable, lovely, delightful, en}oyable, etc .) But consequently' the sat1s ac wn presupposes, not the mere judg-
if this be admitted, then impre ions of sense which determine ment about it, but the relation of its existence to my state, so
the inclination, fundamental propo ition of reason which d ter- far as this i affected by such an object. Hence we do not
mine the will, mere reflective forms of intuition which determine merely say of the pleasant, it pleases, but,i!,.grati~s. I give to
t he judgment, are quite the same as regards the effect upon the it no mere as ent, but inclination is aroused by it; and in the
feeling of pleasure. For this would be pleasantness in t he case of what is pleasant inthe most lively fashion there is no
;ensation of one's state; and since in the end all the operations judgment at all upon the character of the object~ for th se
of our faculties must issue in the practical and unite in it as [persons] who always lay themselves out for enjoyment (for
their goal, we could suppo e no other way of estimating things that is the word describing intense gratification) ~ould fain
and their worth t han that which consists in the gratification dispense with all judgment.
that they promise. It is of no consequence at all how this is
attained, and since t hen the choice of means alone could make
§ 4. THE SATISFACTION IN THE GOOD ~D ~p
a difference, men could indeed blame one another for stupidity
WITH WTEREST
and indi cretion , but never for baseness and wickedness. For
thus they all, each according to his own way of eeing things, Whatever by means of reason pleases through the mere con-
seek one goal, that is, gratification. cept is good. That which pleases only as a means we call good
If a determination of the feeling of plea ure or pain is called for something (the useful), but that which pleases for itself is
sensation , this expres ion signifi s omething qui te different good in itself. In both there is always involved the concept of a
from what mean when I call the repr entation of a thing (by purpose, and consequently the relation of reason to the (at
sense, as a receptivity belonging to the cogrutive facul ty) least possible) volition, and thus a satisfaction in the presence
sensation. For in the latter case t he repre entation is referred to of an object or an action, i .e. some kind of interest.
the object, in the form er simply to the subj ect, and is available In order to find anything good, I must always know what
for no cogrution whatever, not even for that by which the sort of a thing the object ought to be, i.e. I must have a concept
subj ect cognizes itself . - of it. But there is no need of this to find a thing beautiful.
In the above elucidation we understand by the wor " en a- _Flo.yvers, free delineations, outlines .intertwined with one an-
~an objective representation of sense; and, in order to other without design and called [conventional] foli age1 have no
avoid misinterpretation, we shall call that which must always meaning, depend on no definite concept, and yet they please.
remain merely subj ective and can constitute absolutely no repre- The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on the reflection
~ / ~ht11 sentation of an object by the ordinary term "feeling ." The upon an object,~ading to any concep (however indefinite),
_green col or of t he meadows belongs to ob}ective sensation, 'iSa and it is thus distinguished from the pleasant, whi ch rests
percep tion of an object of sense; the pleasantness of this belongs entirely upon sensation .
to sub}ective sensation by whi ch no object is represented , i.e. to It is true the pleasant seems in many cases to be the same
feeling, by which the object is considered as an object of satis- as the good. Thus people are accustomed to say that all gratifi-
faction (which does not furnish a cognition of it). cation (especially if it lasts) is good in itself, which is very much
 44 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME T [ 5] [ 6] A ALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 45

object, compare ils character with the feeling of plea ure and tb re may be mann r (conduct) without virtue, poliLene

f pain. B_ut this contemplation its If is not directed to concepts;

for the Judgment of ta te is not a cognitive judgment (either
without good will, decorum wiLhout modesty, Lc. For where
lhe moral law :meaks th re is no longer, objectively, a free
choice as regards what is to be done; and to di play taste in
I(
theoretical or practical), and thus is not based on cone pts, nor
has it concepts as its !Purpose. iL fulfilllnen or m judging of another's fulfillment of it) is
.._ he pleasant, the beautiful, and the good designate then omeLhing quite difTerent from manifesting the moral attitude
three differ nt re ations of representations to the fe ling of of thought. For this involves a command and generates a want.,
pleasure and pain, in reference to which we distinguish from while moral taste only plays with the objects of sati faction,
one another object.s or methods of representing them. And the without attaching it elf to one of them.
expres ions corre ponding to each, by which we mark our com- Explanation of the B eautiful R esulting from the First Moment
placency in them, are not the arne. That which JJratifies a
man i called pleasant; that which merely pleases him is beautiful; Taste is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of /
that which is esteemed [or approved] 6 by him, i.e. that to which r presenting it by an entirely disinterested -satisfaction o dis-
he accords an objecLive worLh, is good. Pleasantness cone rns satisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful. 7
irrational animals also, but beauty only concerns men, i.e.
~ni mal, but still rational, b ings- not "ine{·ely qua rational (e.g.
spirits), but qua animal also-and the good concerns every
rational being in general. This is a proposition which can only
SECOND MOMENT
be completely established and explained in the sequel. We
may say that, of all these three kinds of satisfaction, that of
taste in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfac- OF THE JUDGME T OF TA TE, ACCORDING TO
tion; for no interest, either of ense or of reason, here forces our Q A TITY
assent. ence we may say of sati faction that it is related in the
three afore aid ca es tojnclination, to iavor, or to resper;t. ow
6. THE BEAUTIFUL IS THAT WHICH APART FROM CO CEPTS IS
favor is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination and ~
REPRESENTED AS THE OBJECT OF UNIVERSAL ATISFACTION Cl ~ )•
one that is propo ed to our desire by a law of reason leave us no
_fr edom in forming for ourselves anywhere an object of pleasure. This explanation of the beautiful can be derived from the
~~nterest presuppose or ~enerates a wan , and, as the deter- preceding explanation of it as the object of an entirely disinter-
mmmg ground of assent, 1t leaves the judgment about the ested satisfaction. For the fact of which everyone is con cious,
object no longer free. 7 [Ueberweg points out (History of Philosophy, II, 528, English transla-

As regards the interest of inclination in the ca e of the pleas- tion) that Mendelssohn had already called attention to the disinterestedness
ant, everyone says that hunger is the be t sauce, and everything of our satisfaction in the beautiful. "It appears," says Mendelssohn, "to
be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated with quiet
that is eatable is relished by people with a healthy appetite; and
satisfaction, that it pleases , even though it be not in our possession, and
thus a satisfaction of this sort shows no choice directed by taste. even though we be never so far removed from the desire to put it to our
It is only ~hen the want is appeased that we can di tinguish use." But, of course , as Ueberweg remarks, Kant's conception of dis-
which of many men has or ha not taste. In the same way interestedness extends far beyond the idea of merely not de iring to possess
• [Second ed ition.] · t he object. ]

16,, ~
"'
,'Y, u 5,
 46 CRITIQ E OF THE AESTHETICAL J DGMENT [§ 7] D 7] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 47

that the satisfaction is for rum quite disintJ e ted, implies in his to anyone' eye and ear . To one, violet color is sof~ and lovely;
judgment a ~round of satisfaction for all meQ. For since it does to another, it is washed out and dead. One man likes the tone
not rest on any inclination of the subject (nor upon any other of wind instruments, another that of strings. To strive here
premeditated interest), but since the person who judges feels with the design of reproving as incorrect another man's judg-
himself quite free as regards the satisfaction which be attaChes ment which is different from our own, as if the judgments were
o the object, he cannot find the ground of this satisfaction in logically opposed, would be folly. AB regards the pleasant,
any private conditions connected with his own subject, and therefore, the fundamental proposition is valid: everyone has
hence it must be regarded as grounded on what he can pre- his own taste (the taste of sense) .
suppose in every other person. Consequently he must believe The case is quite different with the beautiful. It would (on
that he has reason for attributing a similar satisfaction to thec ontrary) be laughable if a man who imagined anything to
everyone."-He will therefore speak of the beautiful as if l?_eauty his own taste thought to justify himself by saying: "This object
were a characteristic of the object and the judgment logical (the house we see, the coat that person \vears, the concert we
constituting a cognition of the object by means of concepts of hear, the poem submitted to our judgment) is beautiful for me."
it), although it is only aesthetical and involves merely a reference For he must not call it beautiful if it merely pleases him. Many
of the representation of the object to the subject. For it has things may have for him charm and pleasantness-no one
this sim.Varity to a logical judgment that we can presuppose its troubles himself at that-but if he gives out anything as beauti-
alidity for all men. But this universality cannot arise from ful, he supposes in others the same satisfaction; he judges not
concepts; for from concepts there is no transition to the feeling merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks 0 beauty as
of pleasure or pain (except in pure practical laws, which bring if it were a property of things. Hence he says "the thing is
an interest with them such as is not bound up with the pure beautiful"; and he does not count on the agreement of others
judgment of taste). Consequently the judgment of taste, with this his judgment of satisfaction, because he has found this
accompanied with the - consciousness of separation from all agreement several times before, but he demands 'it of them. He
interest, must claim validity for every man, without this blames them if they judge otherwise ana be denies them taste,
univ-ersality depending on objects. That is, there must be which he nevertheless requires from them. Here, then, we
bound up with it a title to subjective universality. cannot say that each man has his own particular taste. 'or
!f ~ !l ( this would be as much as to say that there is no taste whatever,
i.e. no aesthetical judgment which can make a rightful claim
§ 7. COMPARISON OF THE BEAUTIFUL WITH THE PLEASANT
upon everyone's assent.
AND THE GOOD BY MEANS OF THE ABOVE CHARACTERISTIC
At the same time we find as regards. the pleasant that there is
AB regards the pleasant, everyone is content that his judg- an agreement among men in their judgments upon it in regard
ment, which he ases upon private feeling and by which he to which we deny taste to some and attribute it to others, by
says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely this not meaning one of our organic senses, but a faculty of
to his own person. Thus he is quite contented that if he says, judging in respect of the pleasant generally. Thus we say of a
"Canary wine is pleasant," another man may correct his expres- man who knows how to entertain his guests with _pleasures (of
sion and remind him that he ought to say, "It is pleasant to enjoyment for all the senses), so that they are all pleased, "he
me." And this is the case not only as regards the taste of the has taste." But here the universality is only taken compara-
tongue, the palate, and the throat, but for whatever is pleasant tively; and there emerge rules which are only general (like all
 ~6n d/(,f) • ,'f
(
U. t•
l(L' I ~.,
/ t
4 CRITIQUE OF THE AEsTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ J [§ J A ALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 49

empirical ones), and not u iversal , which latter the judgment of or pain connected with anything) is not valid univ rsally, but
ta te upon t he beautiful undertakes r lays claim to. It is a everyone is content..not to impute agr ement with it to other
judgment in reference to ociability so far as this rests on (although actual1y there is often found a very extend d con-
empirical rules. In respect of the goo it is true that judgments cmTence in these judgments). On the other hand, the taste
make rightful claim to validity for everyon ; but the good is of reflection has it claim to the uni versal validi ty of its judg-
represented only by means of a concept as the object of a universal ments (about the beautiful) rejected often enough, as exp rience
sati faction, which is the case neither with the pleasant nor teaches, although it may find it possible (as it actually does) to
with the beautiful. repre ent judgments which can demand this universal agree-
ment. In fact it impu tes this to everyone for each of it judg-
ments of taste, without the person~ that judge disputing as to the
§ · THE ~¥ERSA:bl'I'Y OF THE SATISFACTION I S REPRESENTED
po ibility of such a claim, although in part icular case they
A J U DGMENT OF TASTE ONLY AS SUBJECT) VE
cannot agree as to the correct app~ication of this facu t . ,
This particular determinat ion of the -u~ivemal ity of an Here we must, in t he fir t place, remark t hat a univer lity
aesthetical judgment, which is to be met with in a judgment of which does not rest on concepts of objects (not even on empiri cal
taste, is noteworthy, not indeed for the logician, but for the ones) is not logical but aesthetica; i .e . it involves no objective
tran cen enta1 philosopher . It requires no small trouble to quantity of the judgment, but only t hat which is subjec tive.
J:iscover its origin, but we thus detect a property of our cogni- For this I use the expression general validity 1 which signifi s the
tive faculty which without this analysis would remain unknown. validity of the reference of a representation, not to the cognitive
First, we must be fully convinced of the fact that in a judg- faculty, but to the feeling of pleasure and pain for every subject.
ment of taste (about the beautiful ) the satisfaction in the object (We can avail ours lves also of the same expre sion for the
is imputed to everyone, without being based on a concept (for ( logic l quantity of the judgment, if only we prefix "objective"
then it would be the good). Further, thi · claim to univers~l to " ikrsal validity," to distinguish it from that wl'lich is
validity so essentially belongs to a judgment by which we merely subjective and aesthetic IJ ,_, ./
J. desc ribe anything as beautiful that, if this were not thought in it A judgment with objective niversal validity is also alway
it would never come into our thoughts to use the expressiorl' at valid subjectively; i.e. if the judgment holds for everything con-
all , but everything which pleases without a concept would be tained under a given concept, it holds also for everyone who
countedas pleasant. In respect of the latter, everyone has his represents an object by means of this concept. But from a
~own opinion; and no one assumes in another agreement with his subjective universal validity, i.e . aesthetical and resting on no
judgment of taste, which is always the case in a judgment of concept, we cannot infer that which is logical because that kind
taste about beauty. I ma call the first the taste of ense the of judgment does no extend to the object . But, therefore, the
second ~he taste of reflection, so far as the first 1ays down ~ere aesthetical universality which is ascribed to a judgment must
private""'jllagment and the second judgments suppo ed to be be of a particular kind, because it does not unite the predicate
generally valid (public), but in both cases aesthetical (not of beauty with the concept of the object, considered in its whole I'
practical) judgments about an object merely in respect of the logical sphere, and yet extends it to the whole sphere of judging
relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and pain .
1
Now here is something/ strange As regards the taste of sense
not only does experience show that its judgment (of pleasur~
persons.
In respect of logical quantity, all judgments of taste are
singular judgments. For because I must refer the object im- 7
 ,.
52 CRITIQUE OF T.HE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 9] [§ 9] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 53
thus that this latter can be objective, and only through thi has in the same and i the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of
it a universal point of reference, with which the representative the cognitive facultie ; but on that univer ality of the subjective
(a pow r of everyone is comp lled to harmonize. If the determin- conditions for judging of object is alone ba ed the universal
ing groun of our judgment as to this universalcommunicability ubjective validity of the sati faction bound up by us with the
of the repre entation is to be mer ly subjective, i.e. is conceived repres ntation of the object that we call beautiful.
independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing That the power of communicating one's state of mind even
el e ~an the state of mind, which is to be met with in the relation though only in respeclof tbe cognitive faculties, carries a pleas-
of our representative flOwers to each other, so far as they refer ure witb it, this we can easily show from the natural propension
a given repre entation to cognition in ge:neral. of man toward sociability (empirical and psychological). ut
The cognitive powers, which are involved by this representa- tbis is not enough for our design. The pleasure that we feel i
tion, ~rc here in free play, becau e no definite concept limits in a judgment of taste, necessarily imputed by us to everyone
them to a definite 8 rule of cognition. Hence the state of mind in el e, as if, when we call a thing beautiful, it is to be regarded as
this representation must be a feeling of the free play of the repre- a characteristic of the object which is determined in it according
sentative powers in a given r presentation with reference to a to concepts, though beauty, without a reference to the feeling
cognition in general. ow a representation by which an object of the subject, is nothing by itself. But we must reserve the
is given that is to become a cognition in general require:;; imagina- examination of this question until we have answered that other
tion for the gathering together the manifold of intuftion and -if and how aesthetical judgments are possible a priori.
understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the r~p;esen­ We now occupy ourselves with the easier question, in what
tations. This state of free play of the cognitive faculties in a way we are conscious of a mutual subjective harmony of the
representation by which an obj ct is given must be universally cognitive powers with one another in the judgment of taste-i
communicable, because cognition, as the determination of the it aestheticaTiy by mere internal sense and sensation, or is it
object with which given repre entations (in whatever subject) intellectually by the consciousness of our designed activity, by
are to agree, is the only kind of representation which is valid for which we bring them into play?
everyone. If the given representation which occasions the judgment of
The subjective universal communicability of the mode of taste were a concept uniting understanding and imagination in
representation in a judgment of taste, since it is to be possible the judging of the object, into a cognition of the object, the
without presupposing a definite concept, can refer to nothing consciousne s of this relation would be intellectual (as in the
else than the state of mind in the free play of the imagination objective schematism of the judgment of which the Critique 9
~n toe understanding '{s_o far as they agree with each other J as treats). But then the judgment would not be laid down in
is requisite for cognition in general). We are conscious that this reference to pleasure and pain, and con equently would not be
subjective relation, suitable for cognition in general must be ·a judgment of taste. But the judgment of taste, independently
valid for everyone, and thu must be universally co~unicable of concepts, determines the object in re pect of satisfaction and
just as if it were a definite cognition, resting always on that of the predicate of beauty. Therefore that ubjective unity of
relation as its subjective condition. relation can only make itself known by means of sensation. The
This merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the object, or xcitement of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to
of the representation by which it is given, precedes the pleasure indeterminate but yet, through the stimulus of the given sen-
8
[First edition has "particular."] ' [1'he Critique of Pure Reason, "Analytic," Bk. II, Cb. 1.]
I

I) (.
 ..........
'
50 CRITIQUE OF THE AE!'!THETICAL JUDGME T [§ J [§ 9] J ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 51

mediately to my feeling of pleasure and pain, and that not by by a logic lly universal judgment becau e it can adduce reasons);
means of concepts, they cannot have the quantity of objective it only imputes this agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule
generally valid judgments. Nevertheless, if the ingular repre- in respect of which it expects, not confirmation by concepts,
sentation of the object of the judgment of taste, in accordance but assent from others. The universal voice is, therefore, only
with the conditions determining the latter, were transformed by an idea (we do not yet inquire upon what it rests). It may be
comparison into a concept, a logically universal judgment could uncertain whether or not the man who believes that he is laying
result therefrom. E.g., I describe by a judgment of taste the down a judgment of taste is, as a matter of fact, judging in con-
rose that I see as beautiful. But the judgment which results formity with that idea; but that he refers his judgment thereto,
from the comparison of several singular judgments, "Ro es in and consequently that it is intended to be a judgment of taste, he
general are beautiful," is no longer described simply as aestheti- announces by the expres ion "beauty." He can be quite certain
cal, but as a logical judgment based on an aesthetical one. of this for himself by the mere consciousness of the separating
Again the judgment, "The rose is pleasant" (to use) is, although off everything belonging to the pleasant and the good from the
aesthetical and singular, not a judgment of taste but of sense. satisfaction which is left; and this is all for which he promises
It is distinguished from the former by the fact that the judg- himself the agreem nt of everyone-a claim which would be
ment of taste carries with it an aesthetic quantity of universality, justifiable under these conditions, provided only he did not
i.e. of validity for everyone, which cannot be found in a often make mistakes, and thus lay down an erroneous judgment
judgment about the pleasant. It is only judgments about the of taste.
~ / ,(' r • ( h' " • Jl~)
good which, although they also determine satisfaction in an
~
object, have logical and not merely aesthetical universality , § 9. INVESTIGATION OF THE QUESTION WHETHER I THE JUDG-
for they are valid of the object as cognitive of it, and thus are MENT OF TASTE THE FEELING OF PLEASURE PRECEDES
valid for everyone. OR FOLLOWS THE JUDGING OF THE OBJECT
If we judge objects merely according to concepts, then all
representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can be no rule The solution of this question is the key to/ the critique of
according to which anyone is to be forced to recognize anything taste and so is worthy of all attention.
as beautiful. We cannot pre s upon others) by the aid of any If he pleasure in the given object precedes, and it is only its
reasons or fundamental propositions our judgment that a coat, universal communicability that is to be acknowledged in the
a house, or a flower is beautiful. People wish to submit the judgment of taste about the representation of the object, there
object to their own eyes, as if the satisfaction in it depended on would be a contradiction. For such pleasure would be nothing
sensation; and yet, if we then call the object beautiful, we different from the mere plea antne s in the sensation, and so in
believe that we speak with a universal voice, and we claim the accordance with it$ nature could have only private validity,
assent of everyone, although on the contrary all private sensa- becau e it is immediately dependent on the representation
through which the object is given. ' H <.
tion can only decide for the observer himself and his satisfaction.
We may see now that it: the judgment of taste nothing is Hence it is the universal capability of communication of the
postulated but such a4.Lniversal voice, in respect of the satisfaction mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective
without the intervention of concepts, and thus the possibility of condition of the judgment of taste, must be fundamental and
an aesthetical judgment that can, at the same time, be regarded must have the pleasure in the object as its consequent. But
as valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and
postulate the agreement of everyone (for that can only be done representation , so far as it belongsj,9_.cognition. For it is only

1
(. ,... , c
 tl .(I - f I (.4 // ( ,

I( ( ~ , " ' , /
54 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME T [§ 10] [§ 10] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL

sation, harmonious activity, viz. that which belong to cognition piricallike the feeling of pleasure), [we ay that] the purpo e i
in general, is the sem(ation who e universal communicability i the object of a concept, in so far as the concept Is regard d a
postulated by the judgment of taste. An objective relation can the cau e of the object (the real ground oLU:.s possibility); and
only be thought, but yet, so far as it is subjective according to the causality of a concept in respect of it opject is its purpo ive-
its conditions, can be felt in its effect on the Inind ; and, of a ne s (forma final is). Wh r then not merely the cognition of an
relation based on no concept (like the r~lation of the representa- obj ct but the object itself (its form and exi tence) is thought
tive powers to a cognitive facul ty in general), no other con- a an effect only po sible by means of the concept of this latter,
sciousness is possible t han t hat t hrough t he sensation of the th re we think a purpo e. The r pre entation of the effect is ' ' I ~(~
effect, whi ch consists in the more lively play of both mental here the determining ground of its cau e and precedes it. The
powers (the imagination and the un derstanding) when animated con ciou nc s of the cau ality of a repre entation, fo r main-
by mu tual agreement . A representation which, as individual taining the subject in the sam state, may here g nerally denote
and apart from comparison with others, yet has an agreement what we call 1easur ; while on the oth r hand pain is that
with t he conditions of universality which it is t he business of rcpre entatio-;; which contains the ground of the etermination
the understanding to supply , brings t he cogni tive facult ies int o of the state of repr entations into their oppo ite [of restraining
that proport ionate -aooord which we require for all cognition , r removing them]. 10 r ,..J. ...
and so regard as holding for everyone who is determined t o The~culty of desire, so far as it is detenninable to act onl y vt '5 .•;f
judge by means of understanding and sense in combination (i .e . through oncepts, i .e. in conformity with the repr sentation of ft
for every man). a purpo e, wou ld be the will. But an object, or a tate of Inind,
or even an action is called purpo ive, although its po ibi lity
Explanation of the B eautiful R esulting from the S econd Moment does not necessari ly presuppose the r pr entation of a pu rpose,
The beautiful is that which pleases universally wit hout merely becau e its possibility can be xplained and conceived
[requiring] a concep t. by us only so far as we as ume for its ground a causali.ty accord-
ing to purpo e , i.e. in accordance with a >viii which has regulated
it according to the repre entation of a certain rul e. There can be,
then , purpo iveness without 11 purpose, so far as we do not
place the causes of this fo rm in a will , bu t yet can only make the
THIRD MOMENT explanation of it po sibili ty intelligible to ourselves by deriving
it from a wi ll . Again, w are not alway forced to r gard what
we observe (in re pect of its po ibility) from the point of view
OF J UD GMENT OF T A T E, ACCORD! G T O THE of reason . Thus we can at lea t ob erve a pur o iveness accord-
R E LATIO OF _THE P URPO ES WHI H ARE ' 0 [Second edition. Mr. Herbert pencer expresses much more concisely
BROUGH T INTO CON !DE R ATION I N T H EM what Kant has in his mind here. "Pleasure ... is a fee ling which we seek
to bring into consciousness and retain there; pain is . . . a feeling which
we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out." Principlu of Psy-
§ 10 . OF P URP O IVE ESS\ I N GE ERAL chology, § 125.]
11 [The editions of Hartenstein
If we wish t o explain what a purposehs according_to its trans-_ and Kirchmann omit "ohne" before
"Zweck ," hich ma kes havoc of t he sentence. It is correctly printed by
cendental determinations (with out presupposing anything em-
Rosenkranz.]
 I ,
56 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [ 11]
ing to form, without basing it on a purpose (as the material of
[ 12] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 57
. ' J
the nexus finalis), and remark it in objects, although only by § 12. THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE REST ON A PRIORI GROUNDS

reflection. .. To establish a priori the connection of the feeling of a plea ure

or pain as an effect, with any repr sentation whatever (sensa-
tion or concept) as its cause, is absolutely impossible, for that
§ 11. TTIE JUDGMENT OF TASTE HAS NOTIDNG AT ITS BASIS BUT would be a [particular] 12 causal relation which (with objects of
TilE FORM OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OE .AN OBJECT (OR experience) can always only be cognized a posteriori and through
OF ITS MODE OF REPRESENTATION) the medium of exp rience itself. We actually have, indeed, in
the Critique of Practical Reason, derived from univer a! moral / ,
Every purpose, if it be regarded a a ground of satisfaction , .
concepts a priori the f eling of respect (as a speCJal an d pecu1"Jar //'""'I,, .... ,<"
always carries with it an interest-as t e determining ground of modification of feeling which will not strictly corr spond either
the judgment-about the object of pleasure. Therefore no to the pl asure or the pain that w get from empirical objects).
subj ective purpose can lie at the basis of t he judgment of taste . But there we could go beyond the bounds of experience and call
l3ut also he judgment of ta te can be determined by no repre- in a causality which re ted on a supersensible attribute of the
sentation of an objectiv purpose, i.e. of the possibility of the subj ect, viz. freedom . And even there, properly speaking , it
object itself in accordance with principles of purposive combina-
, l :f. tion, and con equently by no concept of the good, becau e it is
was not t his f eeling whi ch we derived from the idea of the moral
as cause, but merely the determination of the will. But the state
an aesthetical and not a cognitive judgment. It therefore has to of mind which accompanies any determination of the will is in
do with no concept of the character and in ternal or external itself a feeling of pleasu re and identical with it, and therefore
po sibility of t he object by means of this or that cau e, but does not follow from it as its effect. Thi last must only be
merely with the relation of the repr entative powers assumed if the concept of the moral as a good precede the deter-
~to one another , so far as t hey are determined by a mination of the will by the law, for in that case the pleasure
representation. that is bound up with t he concept could not be derived from it
ow this relation in the determination of an object as beau- as from am recognition.
tiful is bound up with t he feeling of pleasure, which is declared ow the case is similar with th pl asure in a sthetical judg-
by the judgment of taste to be valid for everyone; hence a ments, only that h re it i merely contempl ativ~ an d does not
· pleasantness [merely] accompanying the representation can as bring about an interes in the obj ct, while on the other hand
little contain the determining ground [of the judgment] as the in the moral judgment it is practical. 13 The con ciou ness of
representation of t he perfection of the obj ect and the concept 12
[First edition.]
of the good can. Therefore it can be nothing else than the sub- 11 [Cf. Metaphysic of Morals, Introduction I. "The pleasure wh.ich is
jective purposiveness in the representation of an object without necessarily bound up with the desire (of the object whose representation
any purpose (either objective or subjective), and thus it is t he affects feeling) may be called practical pleasure, whether it be cause or
mere form of purpo iveness in the repre entation by which an effect of the desire. On the contrary, the pleasure which is not necessarily
bound up with the desire of the object, and which, therefore, is at bottom
object is given to us, so far as we are conscious of it , which con- not a pleasure in the existence of the object of the representation, but
stitutes the satisfaction t hat we withou t a concept judge to be clings to the representation only, may be called mere contemplative
universally communicable; and , consequently, this is the deter- pleasure o r r · satisfaction. The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure we
mining ground of the judgment of taste. call taste."(A ott trans.-Ed .)]

~. . ,.,I.q·; 1 ~ ~
 5 CRITIQUE OF THE AES'I'IIETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 13] 59
[§ 14] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL

the mere formal purposivene sin the play of the subject/ co ni- the case of beauty (which properly speaking ought merely to
tivc powers, in a repre entation through which an obj ect i be concerned with form) as contributory to the aesthetical
given, is the pleasure itself, because it contain a determining univer al sati faction, but they are pas ed off as in themselves
ground of the activity of the subject in respect of the-excitement beauti s · and thus the matter of satisfaction is substituted for
of its cognitive powers, and therefore an i,nner causality (which the for~. This misconception, however, which like so many
is purposive) in respect of cognition in general, without howev r others, has something true at its basis, may be removed by a
being limited to any definite cognition, and con equently con- careful determination of these concepts.
tains a mere form of the subjective purpo iveness of a repre enta- A judgment of taste on which charm and emotion have no
tion in an aesthetical judgment. This pleasure i in no way influence (although they may be bound up with. the satisfa?t!on
practical, neither like that ari ing from the pathological ground in the beautiful)-which therefore has as Its determmmg I, ~ It
of pleasantness, nor that from the intellectual ground of the $round merely the purpo iveness of the form-is a pure .iudgment ~ , , /'. :
presented good. But yet it involves causality, viz. of maintain- 7
of taste.
ing without further design the state of the representation itself
and the occupation of the cognitive powers. We linger over the
contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation r § 14. ELUCIDATION BY MEANS OF EXAMPLEs ) r
strengthens and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (though Aesthetical judgments can be divided just like theoretical
not of the same kind as) that lingering which takes plac when (logical) judgments into empirical and pure. Tht: first assert
a [physical] charm in the representation of the object rep ated ly pleasantness or unpleasantness; the second assert the beauty of
arouses the attention, the mind being passive. an object or of the manner of repr senting it. The former are
judgments of sense (material aesthetical judgments); the latter
[as formal]t 4 are alone strictly judgments of taste.
§ 13. THE PURE JUDGMENT OF TASTE IS INDEPE DE T OF
A judgment of taste is therefore pure only so far as no merely
CHARM AND EMOTIO
empirical sati faction is mingl d with its determining ground.
But this always happens if charm or emotion have any share in
Every interest spoils the judgment of taste and takes from its
the judgment by which anything is to be described as beautiful.
impartiality: especially if the purposiveness is not, as with the
ow here many objections present themselves which, falla-
interest of reason, placed before the feeling of pleasure but
ciously put forward, charm not merely as a necessary ingredient
grounded on it. This last always happens in an aesthetical
of beauty, but as alone sufficient [to justify] a thing's being
judgment upon anything, so far as it gratifies or grieves us .
called beautifuL A mere color, e.g. the green of a grass plot, a
Hence judgments so affected can lay no claim at all to a univer-
mere tone (as distinguished from sound and noise), like that of
sally valid satisfaction, or at 1east so much the less claim, in
a violin, are by mo t people described as beautiful in themselve ,
proportion as there are sensations of this sort among the deter-
although both seem to have at their basis merely the matter of
mining grounds of taste. That ta te is always barbaric which
representations, viz. simply sen ation, and therefore only de-
needs a mixture of charms and emotions in order that there may
serve to be called pleasant. But we must at the same time
be satisfaction, and still more so if it make these the measure
of its assent. remark that the sensations of colors and of tone have a right
to be regarded as beautiful only in so far as they are pure. This
Nevertheless charms are often not only taken account of in 14 [Second edition.]
 60 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [§ 14] [§ 14] A ALYTIC OF THE BE AUTIFU L 61

is a determination which concerns their form and is the only crude and unexercised. But they actually do injury to the judg-
[element] of these repre ntations which admit with certainty ment of taste if they draw attention to them elve as the grounds
of universal communicability; fo~; we cannot a ume that the for judging of beauty. o far are they from adding to beauty
quality of sensations is the same in all ubjects, and we can that they must only be admitted by indulgence as aliens, and
hardly say that the pleasantness of one color or the tone of one provided always that they do not disturb the beautiful form in
musical instrument is judged preferable to that of another in cases wh n taste is yet weak and unexerci ed.
the same 16 way by everyone. In painting, sculpture, and in all the formative arts - in archi- I

If we assume with Euler that colors are i ochronou vibrations tectur and horticulture, so far as they are beautiful arts-the It'S f"'
(pulsus) of the ether, as ounds are of the air in a state of di - delineation is the essential thing; and here it is not what gratifies
turbance, and- what is the most important- that the mind not in sensation but what pleases by means of its form that is funda-
only perceives by sense the effect of these in exciting the organ, mental for taste. The colors which light up the sketch b long to
but also perceives by reflection the regular play of impre ions the charm; they may indeed enliven 17 the object for sensation,
(and thus the form of the combination of different r pre enta- but they cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful.
tions)- which I very much doubtl 6- then colors and tone can- In most cases they are rather limited by the requirements of the
not be reckoned as mere sensations, but as the formal determina- beautiful form, and even where charm is permissible it is en-
tion of the unity of a manifold of sensations, and thus as nobled solely by this.
beauties. Every form of the objects of sense (both of externals nse and
But "pure" in a simple mode of sen ation means that its also mediately of internal) i i ther figure or play. In the latter
uniformity is troubled and interrupted by no foreign sensation, case it is either play of figur s (in space, viz. pantomime and
and it belongs merely to the form; because here we can abstract dancing) or the mere play of ensations (in time). The charm
from the quality of that mode of sensation (ab tract from the of colors or of the pleasant tones of an instrument may be added, A

colors and tone, if any, which it represents). Hence all simple but the delineation in the first case and the compositi9n in the I I'' ?

colors, so far as they are pure, are regarded as beautiful; com- second constitute the prop r object of the pure judgment of
posite colors have not this advantage becau e, as they are not taste. To say that the purity of colors and of tones, or their
simple, we have no standard for judging whether they should be variety and contrast, seem to add to beauty does not mean that
called pure or not. they upply a homogeneous addition to our atisfaction in the
But as regards the beauty attributed to the object on account form because they are pleasant in themselves; but they do so
of its form, to suppose it to be capable of augmentation through because they make the form more exactly, definitely, and com-
the charm of the object is a common error and one very prejudi- pletely, intuitible, and beside , by their charm [excite the repre-
cial to genuine, uncorrupted, well-founded taste. We can sentation, while tbey] 18 awaken and fix our attention on the
doubtless add these charms to beauty, in order to interest the object itself.
mind by the representation of the object, apart from the bare Even what we call "ornaments" [parerga], 19 i.e. tho e things
frr, ·k &n-" ~ • satisfaction [received], and thus they may serve as a recom- which do not belong to the complete repre entation of the object
1-/ ·4'J'f (.,.,. mendation of taste and its cultivation, especially when it is yet internally as elements, but only externally as complements, and
[First edition has "gleiche"; second edition bas "solche. "]
16 which augment the sati faction of taste, do so only by their
[First edition has "nicht zweijle" for "sehr zweijlc," but this was
10 17 ["Belebt machen"; first edition had "beliebt."]
apparently only a. misprint.] u [Second edition.] IP [Second edition.]
62 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [~ 15] [§ 15] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 63

form; as, for example, [the frames of pictures 20 or] the draperies philosophers 22 as the same as beauty, with the proviso, if it is
of tatues or the colonnades of palace . But if the ornament does thought in a confused way. t is of the greatest importance in a
not itself consist in beautiful form, and if it is used a a golden critique of taste to decide whether beauty can thus actually be
frame is used, merely to recommend the painting by its charm, resolved into the concept of perfection.
it is then calle<Lfinery and injures genuine beauty. To judge of objective purposiveness we always need, not only
Emotion, that is a sensation in which pleasantness is produced the concept of a purpo e, but (if that purposiveness is not to be
by means of a momentary checking and a consequent more external utility but internal) the concept of an internal purpose
powerful outflow of the vital force, does not belong at all to which shall contain the ground of the internal po sibility of the
beauty. But sublimity [with which the feeling of emotion is o,bject. ow as a purpose in general is that whose concept can " / r''l··~ ".1
bound up] 21 requires a different standard of judgment from that be regarded as the ground of the po sibility of the object itself; •
which is at the foundation of taste; and thus a pure judgment of so, in order to represent objective purposiveness in a thing, the
taste has for its determining ground neither charm nor emotion concept of what sort of thing it is to be must come first. The
-in a word, no sensation as the material of the aesthetical agr ement of the manifold in it with this concept (which fur-
judgment. nishes the rule for combining the manifold) is the qualitative
perfection of the thing. Quite different from this is quantitative
perfection, the completeness of a thing after its kind, which is a
§ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE IS QUITE INDEPENDENT OF THE
mere concept of magnitude (of totality). 23 In this what the thing
CONCEPT OF PERFECTION
ought to be is conceived as already determined, and it is only
Objective purposiveness can only be cognized by means of the asked if it has all its requi ites. The formal [element] in the
reference of the manifold to a definite purpo e, and Lherefore representation of a thing, i.e. the agreement of the manifold
only through a concept. From this alone it is plain that the with a unity (it being undetermined what this ought to be),
beautiful, the judging of which has at its basis am rely formal gives to cognition no objective purposiveness whatever. For
purposiveness, i.e. a purposiveness without purpose, is quite since abstraction is made of this unity as purpose (what the
independent of the concept of the good, because the latter pre- thing ought to be), nothina remains but the subjective pur-
supposes an objective purpo iveness, i.e. the reference of the po iveness of the repr sentation in the mind of the intuiting
object to a defi~ite purpose. subject . And this, although it furni hes a certain purposiveness
Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e. the utility, or 22
[Kant probably refers here to Baumgarten (1714-1762), who was the
internal, i.e. the perfection of the object. That the satisfaction first writer to give the name of aesthetics to the philoso phy of taste. He
defined beauty as "perfection apprehended through the senses." Kant is
in an object, on account of which we call it beautiful, cannot :1i to have used a a textbo k at lectures a work by Meier, a pupil of
rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently obvious B um<>arten's, on thi3 subject.]
from the two preceding sections; because in that case·it would 13
[Cf. Preface to th Metaphysical Elei1'Ufflt8 of Ethics, p. v: "The word
not be an immediate sati faction in the object, which is the perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is sometimes understood as
essential condition of a judgment about beauty. But objective a concept belonging to Transcendental Philosophy; viz. the concept of the
internal purposiveness, i.e. perfection, comes nearer to the t?tr:I.lity of the manifold, which, taken together, constitutes a Thing; some-
t imes, again, it is understood as belonging to Teleology, so that it signifies
predicate of beauty; and it has been regarded by celebrated
the agreement of the characteristics of a thing with a purpose. Perfection
10 [Second edition.] in the former sense might be called quantitative (material), in the latter
11
[Second edition.] qualitative (formal), perfection."]
 [§ 16] A ALYTIC OF TITE BEAUTIFUL 67
66 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 16]
sati faction grounded on a concept; but the sati faction in
purposiveness, to which the collection of the manifold is referred. b aut)" 1 uch a pre upposes no concept, but is immediately
Many birds (such as the parrot, the humming bird, the bi rd of bound up with the r presentation through which the object is
paradise) and many s a shell are beauties in themselves, which
do not belong to any object determined in respect of its purpose
giv n (not through which it is thought!. 1!
now the judgment of
ta te in reap ct of the beauty of a thmg IS made dependent on
by concepts , but please freely and in themselves. · o also delin-
eations a la grecque, foliage for borders or wall papers, mean
the purpose in iLs manifold, like a judgment o! reason,
and thus limited, it js no lonaer a~free and pure/Jud~ment
nothing in themselves; they repres nt nothing- no object
of ta te .
under a definite concept-and are free beauties. We can refer It is true that taste gain by this combi nation of ae thetical
to the same class what are called in music phantasies (i.e. with inLellectual ~ati faction, inasmuch as it becom s fixed; and
pieces without any theme), and in fact all music without words. t hough it i not univer al, yet in r pect to certain purpo iv~ly
In the judging of a free beau ty (according to the mere form ), d termined obje ts it becomes_po sible to pre cnbe rules for It.
the judgment of taste is pure. There is presupposed no concept The c however, are not rules of ta te, but merely rule for the
of any purpose which the manifold of the given object is to serve, unific~tion of taste with rea on, i.e. of the beautiful with the
and which therefore is to be represented in it. By such a concept good, by which the former becom . available as an i~ trum~nt
the freedom of the imagination which disports itself in the con- of design in respect of t he latter . Thus the tone of mmd whJCh
templation of the figure would be only limited. is self-maintaining and of subj e tive universal validi ty is sub-
But human beauty (i.e. of a man, a woman, or a child), the ordinated to the way of thinking which can be maintained only
beauty of a horse, or a building (be it church, palace , a rsenal, by painful re olve, but i of obj~ctive .univers~l validi ty. Pro-
or summer house), presupposes a concept of the purpose which perly speaking, however~erfectwn gams nothmg by beauty~ or
determines what the thing is to be, and consequently a concept beauty by p rfection; but wnen we compare the repr entatwn
of its perfection; it is therefore adherent beauty. ow as the "by which an obje t is given to us with the object (as regards
combination of the pleasant (in s nsation) with beauty, which what it ought to be) by mean of a concep t, we cannot avoid
properly is only concerned with form, is a hindrance to the considering along with it the sensation in the subj ect. And thus
purity of the judgment of taste, so also is_)s puri ty injured by when both states of mind are in harmony our whole faculty of
£he combination with beauty of th good (viz. that manifold
repr sentative power gains . . .
which is good for the thing itself in accordance with its purpose). A judgment of taste, then, in respect of an obJect Wlth a
We could add much to a building which would immediately defi ni te internal purpo e, can only be pure if either t he perso_n
please the eye if only it were not to be a church. We could adorn judging ha no concept of this purpo e or else ab tracts from It
a figure with all kinds of spirals and light but regular line , as in his judgment. uch a person, although forming an accurate 1
the New Zealanders do with their tattooing , if only it were not judgment of taste in judging of the object. as. free beauty , would
the figure of a human being. And again this could have much yet by another who considers the beauty m It only as a depend-
finer features and a more pleasing and gentle cast of countenance ent attribu te (who looks to the purpose of the object) be blamed
provided it were not intended to r present a man , much le s a and accused of false taste, although both are right i~ thei r own \
warrior. way-the one in reference to what he has before h1s eyes, the
Now the satisfaction in the manifold of a thing in reference other in reference to what he has in his thought. By m ans of
to the internal purpose which determines its possibility is a I
;
"~ ft.., • "I "'Y'

R~.( -1.,
64 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 15] [ 16] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 65
of the representative state of the subject, and so a facility of of the representative powers which are occupying them elves
apprehending a given form by the imagination, yet furnishes no therewith. The judgment is called aesthetical ju t becau e its
perfection of an object, since the object is not here conceived determining ground is not a concept, but the feeling (of internal
by means of the concept of a purpo e. For example, if in a sense) of that harmony in the play of the mental powers , o far
forest I come across a plot of sward around which trees stand as it can be felt in sensation. On the other hand, if we wish to
in a circle and do not t hen represent to myself a purpose, viz. call confused concepts and the objective judgment based on
that it is intended to serve for country dances, not the least them aesthetical, we will have an understanding judging ensibly
concept of perfection is furnished by the mere form . But to or a sense representing its objects by means of concepts [both
represent to oneself a formal objective purposivene s without of which are contradictory]. 25 The faculty of concepts, be they
purpose, i.e. the mere form of a perf ection (without any matter confused or clear, is the understanding; and although under-
and without the concept of that with which it is accordant, even standing has to do with the judgment of taste as an aesthetical
if it were merely the idea of conformity to law in general), 24 is a judgment (as it has with all judgments), yet it has to do with it,
veritable contradiction. not as a faculty by which an object is cogni zed, but as t he
ow the judgment of taste is an aesthetical judgment, i.e. faculty which determin s the judgment and its representation
such as rests on subjective grounds, the determining ground of (without any concept) in accordance with its relation to the
which cannot be a concept, and consequently cannot be the subj ect and the subj ect's internal feeling, in so far as t his judg-
concept of a definite purpose. Therefore by means of beauty, ment may be possible in accordance with a uni versal rule.
regarded as a formal subj ective purposiveness, there is in no
way thought a perfection of the object, as a purpo ivene
alleged to be formal but which is yet objective . And thus to § 16. 'l'HE JUDGMENT OF TA TE, BY WHICH A OBJECT IS
DECLARED TO BE BEAUTIFUL UNDER THE CONDITION
distinguish between t he concepts of the beautiful and the good
OF A DEFINITE CO CEPT, I S NOT P RE
as if they were only different in logical form, the first being a
confused, the second a clear concept of perfection, but identical There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo
in content and origin, is quite fallacious . For then there would vaga), or merely dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). The
be no specific difference between them, but a judgment of taste first presupposes no concept of what the obj ct ought to be; the
would be as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment by second does presuppose such a cone pt and t he perfection of
which a thing is described as good; just as when the ordinary the object in accordance therewith. The fi rst is called the ( elf-
man says that fraud is unjust he bases his judgment on confused subsistent) beauty of this or t hat thing; the second , a dcp nd-
grounds, while the philosopher bases it on clear grounds, but ent upon a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects
both on identical principles of reason. I have already, however, which come under the concept of a particular purpose.
said that an aesthetical judgment is unique of its kind and gives Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone but a
absolutely no cognition (not even a confused cognition) of the botanist knows what sort of a thing a flower ought to be; and
object; this is only supplied by a logical judgment. On the con- even he, though r cognizing in the flower the reproductive
trary, it simply refers the repre entation, by which an object is organ of the plant, pays nor gard to this natural purpo e if he
given, to the subject, and brings to our notice no characteristic is passing judgment on the flower by taste. There is, then, at
of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination the basis of this judgment no perfection of any kind, no internal
"[The words "even if .. . general" were added in the second edition.] u [Second edition.]
 6 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [ 17] [ 17] A ALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 69
this di tinction we can ettle many di pute about beauty be- rnu t judge every object of taste, every example of judgment
tween judges of taste, by showing that the one is speaking of by taste, and ven the ta tc of everyone. Idea properly rn an a
fr e, the other of d pendent, beauty-that the first is making rational cone pt, and ideal th r presentaLion of an individual
a pure, the second an applied, judgment of taste. b ing, r garded as adequate to an idea. 27 Hence that archetype
of taste, which certain ly rests on the indeterminate idea that
r ason has of a maximum, but which cannot be r presented by
§ 17. OF THE IDEAL OF BEAUTY
con epts but only in an individual pres ntation, is better called
There can be~o objective rule of taste which shall determine th~idea..\lQ.f the beautiful. Although we are not in po ssion of
by means of concepts what is beautiful. For every judgment this, we yet strive to produce it in our elves. But it can only
from this source is aesth tical; i.e. the feeling of the subject, be a id al of the imagination becau e it rests on apr entation ~
and not a concept of the object, is its determining ground. To and not on cone pts, and the imagination is the faculty of pre- 4 Aslr/4
seek for a pl"inciple of taste which shall furnish, by means of sentation. How do we arriv at such an ideal of beauty? A
definite concepts,~ universal criterion of the beautiful is fruitless priori, or empirically? Moreover, what species of the beautiful
trouble, because what is sought is impo sible and self-contra- is susc ptible of an ideal?
dictory . ....:;J;E_e univer al c..ommunicability of sensatiop (satisfac- Fir t, it is well tor mark that ~he beauty for which an ideal is
tion or dis atisfaction) without the aid of a concept- be agree- to be ought cannot be vague beauty, but is fixed by a cone pt of
,.!!lent, as far as is po ible, _of all times and peoples as regards objective purposiven s ; and thus it cannot appertain to the
this feeling in the repr sentation of certain objects- this is obj ct of a quite pure judgment of taste, but to that of a judg-
.1 he ern irical crit~on, although weak and hardly sufficing ment of taste which is in part intellectual. That is, in whatever
for probability, of the derivation of a taste, thus con- grounds of judgment an ideal i to be found, an id a of reason in
1:"
·r
q.t'
._,o. firmed by examples, from the deep-lying general grounds
I of agreement in judgi'Ii.g ·of the ioms under which objec-ts
accordance with definite concepts must lie at its basis, which
determine a priori the purpose on which the internal po ibility
1 re given. t of the object rests. An ideal of beautiful flower 1 of a beautiful
Hence we consider some products of taste exemplaryJ.N.g_t pi ce of furniture, of a b autiful view, is inconceivable. But
that taste can be acquire<! b im.itaii!tg others, Ofitillust be neither can an ideal be represented of a beauty dependent on
an original faculty. He who imitates a model shows no doubt definite purposes, e.g . of a b autiful dwelling house, a beautiful
--- -
in so far as e attains to it, ski ll; but only shows taste in so far
' tree, a b autiful garden, etc.; presumably because their purpo e
as he can judge of this model itself. It follows from hence that
26 is not sufficiently determined and fixed by the concept, and
the highest ruodel,Jthe ar~het~pe of ~e_;)i_s a ~ere idea which thus the purposivene is arly as free as in the ca e of vague I r
everyone must produce m himself and accordmg to which he beauty. The only being~ has the purpo e of its exi tence
25
Models of taste as regards the arts of speech must be composed in a in it elf '"rn.an1 who can determine hi purpo es by reason· or,
dead and learned language. The first in order that they may not suffer where he must receive them from external perception, yet can
that change which inevitably comes over living languages, in which noble
27 [This distinction between an idea and an ideal, as also the further
expressions become flat, co=on ones antiquated, and newly cre~>ted ones
have only a short circulation. The second because learned languages have contrast between ideals of the reason and ideals of the imagination, had
a gra=ar which is subject to no wanton change of fashion, but the rules already l;>een given by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, " Dialectic,"
of which are preserved unchanged. Bk. II, Ch. 3, § 1.]

I I.
 70 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL J U DGMENT [ § 17] [§ 17] AN.\LYTIC OF TilE BEAUTIFUL 71

compare th m with essential and universal purpo es and can ber of images (perhap t he whole thousand) to fall on one
judge this t heir accordance aesthetically. This man is, then , another . If I am allowed to apply here the analogy of optical
alone of all objects in t he world, susceptible of an ideal of pr s ntation, it i in the spa e where roo t of t h mare combined
beauty , as it is only humanity in his person , as an intelligence, and inside the contour, where th place is illuminated with the
that is susceptible of the ideal of perfection . most vivid colors, t hat t he average size is cognizable, whi ch,
But there are here two elements . First , there is the a stbetical both in height and br ad th, is equally far removed from t he
~"~""' ., ·'·I. "' rwrmal idea, which is an individual intuition (of t he imagi na- ext reme bounds of the gr ate t and malle t stature. And thi s is
tion), representing the standard of our judgment [upon man] the tature of a beau tiful man . (We could arrive at t he same •
.,as a thing belonging to a particular animal species . econdly , t hing mechan ically by adding together all thou and magni tud ,
there is t he rational idedJ which makes the purposes of humani ty, heights, breadths, and thi ckne s, and divicling t he um by a
~o f~r as they cannot be sensib~y represented the prin !!iple foy th ousand. But the imagination does t his by means of a dynami-
Judgmg of a figure through which, as their phenomenal effect cal effect, which ari s from the vari ous impres ions of such
those purposes are revealed. The normal idea of the figure I figures on t he organ of intern al en e.) If now, in a similar way,
an animal of a part icular race must take its elements from ex- for this average man we ek the average head , for this head th e
perience . But t he greatest purposiveness in the construction of average no e, etc., such fi gur is at t he ba is of the normal idea
the figure t hat would be available for the universal standard of in t he count ry where t he omparison is insti tu ted . Thus nee s-
aesthetical judgment upon each in dividual of t his species- the sari ly und er t he e empirical conditions a .r egro must have a ;;
image which is as it were designedly at t he ba is of nature's different normal idea of the beauty of the [human figu re] from
technique, to which only the whole race and not any isolated a whi te man, a hin aman a different normal idea from a Euro-
individual is adequate-this lies merely in the idea of t he judg- pean, etc. And the same is theca e with the model of a beautiful
ing [ subject]. And this, wi th its proportions as an aesthetical horse or dog (of a certain breed) . This normal idea is not derived
idea, can be completely presented in concreto in a model. In , from proportions gotten from exp ri ence [ and rega rded] as definite
order to make intelligible in some measure (for who can extract rules , :but in accordance with rules or judging become in the IP
her whole secret from na ure?) how t his comes to pass, we shall first instance possible. It is the image for the whole race, whi ch
attempt a psychological explanation . floa s among all t he variously cliff rent intui tion of individual ,
which nature takes as archetype in her productions of the same v o( A"' ' q,
1

We ust remark that , in a way quite incomprehensible by

t/
1
us, t he imagination cannot on y recall on occasion the signs for
concep s long past, ut can also reproduce the image of t he
figure of the obj ect 0Ut of an unspeakable number of objects of
species, but whi h appear not to be fully reached in any indi-
vidual case. It is by no means the whole archetype of beauty in
the race, but only t he form constituting the indi pen able con-
different kinds or even of t he same kind . Furt her , if the mind is dition of all beauty, and t hus merely correctness in the [mental]
concerned with comparisons, the imagination can , in all proba- presentation of the race . It i , li ke the celebrated " Doryphorus"
bility, actually , though unconsciously, let one image glide into of P olycletus , 28 the rule (Myron's 29 Cow might also be used thus
U another ; and t hus.t...by t he concurrence of several of t he same •a [Polycletus of Argos flour isned about 430 B.c . His statue of the
.., kind , come by an average, whi ch serves as the common measure "Spear bearer" (Doryphorus), a fterward became known as the "Canon ,"
.f of all. Everyone has seen a thousand full-grown men . Now if because in it the artist was suppo ed to have embodied a perfect represe nta-
tion of t he ideal of the h uman figure.]
"' you wish to judge of their normal size, estimating it by means u [T his was a celebrated statue executed by Myron , a Greek sc ulptor ,
of comparison , the imagination (as I think) allows a great num- contemporary with Polyc letus.]
 72 RITIQUE OF THE AESTH ETI CAL JUDGM E NT [ 17] [§ 1 J ANALYTI C OF T H E BEAUTI FUL 73
for its kind) . It can therefore contain nothing specifically and that a judgment in accordanc with an ideal of beauty is
characteristic, for otherwise it would not be the normal idea for not a mere judgment of t aste.
the race. Its presentation pleases, not by its beauty, bu t
merely because it contradicts no condition, under which alone
Explanation of the B eautiful D erived from this Third Moment
a thing of this kind can be beautiful. The pre entation is merely
.-"'\. correct. 30 B eauty is the form of the purposiveness of an obj ect, so far
We must yet distinguish the normal idea of the beautiful from as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose. 31
the ideal, which latter, on grounds already alleged, we can only
expect in the human figure. In this the ideal consists in the ex-
pression of the moral, without which the object would not please
universally and thus positively (not merely negatively in an
'fl.< Yf£• ": accurate presentation) . The visible expression of moral ideas FOURTH MOMENT
#. • "/1'1 that rule men inwardly can indeed only be gotten from experi-
1!4/' ;' t ence; but to make its connection with all which our reason OF THE JUDGMENT OF TA TE, A ORDI G TO THE
"',/1'/f/<-' unites with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposive- MODALITY OF THE SATI FA TION I THE OBJECT
ness- goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace, etc.- visible
as it were in bodily manifestation (as the effect of that which is
internal) requires a union of pure ideas of reason with great § 18. WHAT THE MODALITY IN A JUDGME T OF TASTE IS

imaginative powere ven in him who wishes to judge of it, still I can say of every representation that it is at least possible
more in him who wishes .t_o present it. The correctne s of such that (as a cognition) it should be bound up with a pleasure. Of
an ideal of beauty is shown by its permitting no sensible charm a representation that I call pleasant I say that it actually excites
to Iningle with the satisfaction in the object, and yet allowing us pleasure in me. But the beautiful we think having a necessary
to take a great interest therein. This shows that a judgment in reference to satisfaction. Now this ecessit ·a of a pecu 'arlrind.
accordance with such a standard can never be purely aesthetical, !tis not a_theoretical objective ne essity, in which case it would
be cogruzed a priori that everyone will feel this satisfaction in
ao It will be found that a perfectly regular countenance, such as a painter
might wish to have for a model, ordinarily tells us nothing because it
contains nothing characteristic, and therefore rather e>..'Presses the idea of
the race than the specific [traits] of a person. The exaggeration of a
31
---
the object called beautiful by me. It is not a practical necessity,

It might be objected to this explanation that there are things in which

we see a purposive form without cognizing any purpose in them, like the
characteristic of this kind , i.e. such as does violence to the normal idea stone implements often gotten from old sepulchral tumuli with a bole in
(the purposiveness of the race), is called caricature. Experience also shows them, as if for a handle. These, although they plainly indicate by their
that these quite regular countenances co=only indicate internally only a shape a purposiveness of which we do not know the purpose, are neverthe-
mediocre man, presumably (if it may be ~umed that external nature less not described as beautiful. But if we regard a thing as a work of art,
expresses the proportions of internal) because, if no mental disposition that is enough to make us admit that its shape has reference to some design
exceeds that proportion which is requisite in order to constitute a man free and definite purpose. And hence there is no immediate satisfaction in the
from faults, nothing can be expected of what is called genius, in which contemplation of it . On the other hand a flower, e.g. a tulip, is regarded
nature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the mental powers as beautiful, because in perceiving it we find a certain pOrposiveness which,
on behalf of some special o.ne. (
-in our judgment, is referred to no purpose at all.
 I
76 CRITIQUE OF TilE AE TIIETICAL JUDGMEN'I' [ 22] A ALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 77
I r, I; ' .,
ever, · t suclrthat this internal relationA by which one were objective) ovi w ar sure that we have correctly
. wental faculty is excited by another, shall beg nerally the mo t subsumed [the particular ] under it.
1
5J~""" beneficial for both faculties in respect of cognition (of given This indeterminate norm of a common ense is actually pre-
!> n, ~,.., objects); and this l:tCCOidance can only be determined by feeling suppos d by us , as is shown-by our claim to laydown judgments
11
(not according to concepts). ince now Lhis aeeet;Q.anGe itself of taste. Whether there is in fact such a common ense, as a
, must admit of universal communicability, and consequently con tituti;eprinciple of the possibility of xperience..._gr whether
n:
~ !.f 1 7\ also our feeling oflt(m a given representation), and since the a yet higher principle of reason make it only into a r gulative
universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a co~ principle for producing in us a common sense for higher purposes;
, , ~se, we have ground for a suming this la ter. And this com- whether, therefore) taste is an original and natural faculty or
d ,....,,.""~'"' ...-
mon-sense JS . assume d '"lt . observa-
. on p ychologJCal
. h out r lymg only the idea of an artificial one yet to be acquired, so that a
tions, but simply as he neces ar co · ·OILOf the universal judgment of taste with its assumption of a universal assent in
communicability of our owledge, which is presupposed in fact is only a requirement of reason for producing such harmony
every logic and m every prmCJp e of knowledge that is not of sentiment; whether the ought, i.e. the objective necessity of
sceptical . the confluence of the feeling of any one man with that of every
other, only signifies the possibility of arriyjng at this accord,
~ ~,/ and the judgment of taste only affords an example of the appu-
§ 22. 'l'HE ECE I'l'Y OF THE WO·~L AGREEME T THAT
cation of this principl these questions we have neither the
I THO GHT I A JUDGMENT OF TASTE IS A BJECTIVE
wi h nor the power to investigate as yet; we have now only to
~ECESSI'l'Y,\ WHICH IS REPRESENTED AS OBJECTIVE U ' D • R
resolve the faculty of ta te into its elements in order to unite
~ P,LOS~'l:,IQ @--;: OMMO SENSE
them at last in the id a of a common sense.
In all judgments by which we de cribe anything as beautiful,
we allow no one to be of another opinion withQ\lt however Explanation of the Beautiful R esulting from the Fourth Moment
, fl"' grounding our judgment on concepts, but 'm;Jy on ;ur feeling:
I I r
which we therefore place at its basis, not as a private} but as a The beautiful is that which without any concept is cognized
? .... 11-t;
I .J.. I common feeling. ow this common sense cannot be grounded as the object of a necessary satisfaction .
l)l on experience, for it aims at justifying judgments which contain
an ought. It does not say that everyone will agree with my GE ERAL REMARK 0 THE FIRST SECTIO
judgment, but that he ought. And so common sense, as an OF THE A ALYTIC
example of whose judgment I here put forward my judgment of
ta te and. o~ ac~ount of which I attribute to the latter anft,xem.,: If we seek the result of the preceding analysis, we find that
)\. 'E,la:y vali~; a !!}ere ideal norm, under the suppo ition of everything runs up into this concept of taste-that it is a facul ty
whJCh I have a nght to make into a rUle for everyone a judgment for judging an object in reference to he imagination's free
that accords therewith, as well as the satisfaction in an object conformity to law. ow, if in the judgment of taste the imagina-
expressed in such judgment. For the principle which concerns tion must be considered in its freedom, it is in the first place not
the agr~~ of different judging persons, although only sub- regarded as reproductive, as it is subject to the l~ws of associa-
jective, is yet assume as su Ject1vefy universal (an idea neces- tion, but as pro uc 1ve and spontaneous (as the author of arbi-
sary for everyone), and thus can claim universal assent (as if it trary forms of possible intuitio . And although in the appre-
 ·- ! .........
.
.,. L, •

CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME:-IT L 2o] [' 21] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 75
in which case, by .concepts of a[pure rational will erving as a
rule for freely actmg being , the sati faction is the nece sary
necessity for his judgment. If they were devoid Of all prinfiple, f •I 3' b ;:;
1 e tho e of the mere taste of sense, we would not allow th m
result o an objective law and only indicate that we ab olutely
in thou~ht any necessity whatever. Hence they must h ' ve a , '
(without any further design) ought to act in a certain way. But
the necessity which i thought in an aesthetical judgment can ffi>bject/ve principle which dete<mines what plea es o< di'p[:es '
only ~ feelmg and not by concepts, but yet with uni ersal _ /< #_. !
only be called exemp lary i.e. a necessity of the a ent of all to
a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule validi . But such a principle could only be regarded as a - .1'1 J;
comm n sense, which is essentially different from co on
hat we cannot state. ince -;,n aesthetical judgment is not an
objective cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived
understanding which people sometimes call common sense ,1,}. 7'0
(sensus communis); for the latter does not judge by feeling but -
from definite concepts and i therefore not apodictic. till less
always by concepts, although ordinarily only as by obscurely
can it b inferred from the tmiversality of experience (of a com-
represented principles.
plete agreement of judgments as to the beauty of a certain
Hence it is only under the presupposition that there is a ( " , s , "'(
object). For not only would exp rience hardly furnish suffi-
ciently numerous vouchers for Lhis, but also, on empirical judg-
common sense (by which we do not understand an external ,. ..-.. "'lA'
sense, but~ffect resulting from the free play of our cognitive .' ')
ments, we can ba e no concept of the necessity of these judg-
powers)- it is only under this presupposition, I say, that t he
ments.
judgment of taste can be laid down.

§ 19. THE SUBJECTIVE ECESSITY 1 WHICH WE ASCRIBE TO THE

J ·H,,:.,. "
§ 21. HAVE WE GROU D FOR PRESUPPOSING A COMMON SENSE?
J UDGME T OF TASTE, IS CONDITIONED
. j I .... ~~- I
... t
Cognitions and judgments must, along with the conviction
The Judgment of taste .requires the agreement of everyone,
that accompanies them, admit of universal communicabili ty;
and he who describes anything as beautiful claims that everyo~e
for otherwise there would be no harmony between t em an e
ought to give his approval to the object in question and also
object, and they would be collectively a mere subjective play of
?escribe it as beautiful. The ought in the aesthetical judgment
JS therefore pronounced in accordance with all the data which
•}' the r.e~ resentative pow.ers, exactly as scepticism desires. But if
flt ... t(cogrutwns. are ~o adm1t of tcommunicabi1lty, so must a lso the
are required for judg=ug, and yet is only conditioned. We k
for the agreement of everyone el e, because we have for it a
1 111 ~"" state of mmd- J.e. the accordance of the cogn tive powers with
I groun that is common to ~ll; and we could count on this agree-
J ~· a cognition generally and that proportion of them which is
sui table for a representation (by which an object is given to us)
ment, provided we were always sure that theca e was corr ctly
in order that a cognition may be made out of it-admit of
subsumed under that ground as rule of assent.
univer al communicability. For without this as the subjective
condition of cognition, cognition as an effect could not arise.
§ 20. THE CO IDITIO OF ECESSITY WHICH A JUDO ME T OF This actually always takes place when a given object by mean,s
TASTE ASSERTS IS THE IDEA OF A COMMO SE E of sense excites the imagination to collect the manifold, and
the imagination in its turn excites the understanding to bring
If judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) had a definite
about a unity of this collective process in concepts. But this
objective principle, then the person who lays them down in
accordance of the cognitive powers has a different proportion
accordance with this latter would claim an unconditioned
according to the variety of the objects which are given . How-
 78 CRITI QUE OF THE AESTHETICAL J UD GMENT [§ 22] [§ 22] ANALYTI C OF THE BEAUTIFUL 79

hension of a given object of sense it is tied t o a definite foTm of to make intelligible the relation of the parts of it, when divided ,
this objec t and so far has no free play (such as that of poetry), to one another and to the whole, t hen regular fig ures and tho e
yet it may readily be conceived that the object can furni sh it of t he simplest kind are needed, and the sati faction does not
wi th such a form containing a collection of the manifold as the rest immediately on t he aspect of the figure, but on its availa-
imagination itself, if it were left free, would project in accord- bili ty for all kinds of possible d es ign s.~ room whose walls form
ance with t he conformity to law of the understanaing in genera1. oblique-angl es, or a par terre of t his kind , even every violation
u t that the<'i maginative pow~ sh ould be free and yet of itself clsymmetry in the figure of animals (e .g . being one-eyed), of
conformed to law , i.e. bringing autonomy with it, is a con tra- buildings, or of flower beds, displeases becau e it contradicts
diction . The understanding alone gives t he law. If , however , the purpose of the t hing , not only practically in respect of a
th e imagination is compelled t o proceed according to a definite defini te use of it, bu t also when we pa s judgment on it as
law, its product in respect of form is determined by concepts as regards any possible design . This is not the case in the judgment
..to what it ought t o be. But then , as is above shown, the sa tis- of taste, which when pure combines satisfaction or dissatisfac-
faction is not t hat in ~he beaut iful , bu t in the good (in perfection, tion- without any reference to its use or to a purpose--with
at any rate m mere formal perfe tion), and the judgment is not t he mere considerati on of the object .
a judgment of taste. Hence it is a conformity t o law wit hout a The regularity which leads to the concept of an object is
law; and a subjective agreemen t of t he imagination and under- indeed the indispensable condition (condi tio sin e qua non) for
standing- without such an obj ective agreement as t here is grasping the object in a single representation and determining
when t he represen tation is referred to a definite concept of an the manifold in its form . This determination is a purpo e in
object-can subsist along with t he ree conformit y t o law of the respect of cognition , and in reference to this it is always bound
~d erstanding (which is also calle purposiveness without pur- up with satisfaction (whi ch accompanies the execution of every,
pose) and with t he peculiar feature of a judgmen t of taste. even problematical, design) . T here is here, however , merely
ow geometrically regular figu res, such as a circle, a square, the approval of the solut ion sat isfying a problem, and not a free
a cube, etc., are commonly adduced by critics of t aste as t he and indefinite purposive en tertainment of the mental powers
simplest and most indisputable examples of beaut y, and yet t hey with what we call beaut iful , where t he understanding is at the
are called regular because we can only represent t hem by service of imagination , and not vice versa .
regarding them as mere presentations of a definite concept which In a t hing that is only possible by means of de ·ign- a buil d-
prescribes the rule for the figure (according to which alone it is ing, or even an animal- t he regularity consisting in symmetry
possible) . One of t hese t wo must be wrong, either that judgment must express t he unity of t he intui tion t hat accompanies t he
of the critic which ascribes beauty to the said figures, or ours concep t of purpose, and this regulari ty belongs to cognition.
whi ch regards purposiveness apart from a concept as requisite But where onl a free play of the representative po>m s (under
for beauty. the condition, however , t hat the understanding is to suffer no
Hardly anyone will say t ha t a man must have taste in order shock thereby) is t o be kept up , in pleasure gardens, room
that he should find more satisfaction in a circle than in a scrawled decorations, all kinds of tasteful furni ture, etc ., regularity tha t
outline, in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in shows constrain is avoided as much as possible . T hus in the
one which is oblique, irregular , and as it were deformed, for E nglish taste in gardens or in bizarre t aste in furni ture, t he
t his belongs t o the ord:r;ry understanding and is not t aste at freedom of the imagination is pushed almost near to the gro-
all. Where , e .g., our def gn is to judge of the size of an area or tesque , and in this separation from every constraint of rule we

fl ¢VI?,.,·,. t / ~v I
J
 0 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 22] [ 22] ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 81

have the ca e where ta te can display its greatest perfection in Again beautiful obi ct are to be di tingui hed from beautiful
the enterprises of the imagination. vi ws of obj ct (which often on account of their distance can-
All stiff regularity (such as approximates to mathematica l not be more clearly eognized). In the latter ca e taste appears,
regularity) <has something in it repugnant to taste; for our not so much in at the imagination apprehends in this field ,
entertainme nt in the contemplation of it lasts for no length of a in the impul it thus gets to fiction, i.e. in the peculiar fancies
time, but it rather, in so far as it has not expressly in view with which the mind entertains it elf, while it is continually
cognition or a definite practical purpo e, produces weariness. being arous d by the variety which strikes the eye. An illus-
On the other hand, that with which imagination can play in an tration i afforded, e.g . by the sight of the changing shape of
unstudied and purposive manner is always new to us, and one a fire on the hearth or of a rippling brook; neither of the e has
does not get tired of looking at it. Marsden, in his description beauty, but they bring with them a charm for the imagination
of umatra, makes the remark t hat the free beauties of nature because they entertain it in free play.
surround the spectator every>vhere and t hus lose their attraction
for him. 32 On the oth r hand, a pepper garden, where th stakes
on which t his plant twines itself form parallel rows, had much
attractivenes s for him if he met with it in the middle of a forest.
And he hence infers that wild beauty, apparently irregular, only
pleases as a variation from the regular beauty of which one has
seen enough. But he need only have made the experiment of
spending one day in a pepper garden to have been convinced
that, if the understandin g has put it elf in accordance with t he
order that it always needs by means of regulari ty, the object
will not entertain for long- nay, rather it will impose a burden-
some constraint upon the imagination. On the other hand,
nature, which there is prodigal in its variety even to luxuriance,
that is subjected to no constraint of artificial rules, can supply
constant food for taste. Even the song of birds, which we can
bring under no musical rule, seems to have more freedom and
therefore more for taste, than a song of a human being which '
is produced in accordance with all the rules of music· for we
very much sooner weary of the latter if it is repeated often' and
at length. Here, however, we probably confuse our participa-
tion in the mirth of a li ttle creature that we love with the
beauty of its song, for if this were exactly imitated by man (as
sometimes the notes of the nightingale are), 33 it would seem to
our ear quite devoid of taste.
82 [W. Marsden, The History of Suma.tra (London, 1783), p. 113.]
u [Cf. § 42.]
 (I
I ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 3
[§ 23]
And the latter sati faction i quite diiTerent in kind from the
former for thi .[the be.au,_tifui] 1 directly bring with i eling
of the 'rurthera.:oce of life and thu i compatible with charms
and with t he play of the imagination. But the other [ th
feelin g of the sublime] 2 is a plea ure that arises only indirectly;
SECOND BOOK vi z. it is produ ced by the feeling of a momentary checking of the
vital powers and a consequent tronger outflow of them , so
ANALYTI OF THE SUBLIME that it seems to be regarded as emotion- not play , bu t earnest
in t he exerci e of the imagination. H ence it is in compatible with
[phy ical] charm ; and as t he mind i not mer ly attr~ct d .by
§ 23. TRANSITION FROM TilE FACULTY WHICH J U DGES OF T HE
the obj ect but is ever being altern ate! repelled, t he sat1sfactwn
BEAUTIFUL TO TH AT WH I CH J U DGES OF T H E SUBLIME
in the sublime does not so much involve a positive plea ure as
The beautiful and t he sublime agree in this that both please in admiration or respect, whi ch rath r deserves t o be called
themselves . Furt her , neither presupposes a judgment of sense negative pleasure.
nor a judgment logically determined, bu t a judgment of refl ec- But t he inner and most important distinction between the
tion . Consequently t he satisfaction [belonging t o them] does sublime and b autiful is, c rtainly , as follows. (Here, as we
- not depend on a ensation , as in t he ca e of t he pleasant , nor are en titled t o do , we only bring under consideration in t he
on a defi ni te concept, a in the case of the good ; but it is never- first instance t h e su blime in natu ral objects, for the sublime of
theless referr~ to concepts, although indeterminate ones. And art is always limi ted by the conditions of agreement "·ith
so the satisfaction is connected wi th t he mere presentation [of nature.) Iatural beau ty (which is independent) brings with it
the obj ect] or wi th the faculty of presentation, so t hat in the a purpo iv ness in its form by which the objects ems t o be, as
ca e of a given intui tion this facul ty or the imagination is con- it wer , pr adapted to our judgment, and thu constitu te ·. in
sidered as in agreement wi th the faculty of concepts of under- itself an object of sati faction. On the other hand, that whi ch
standing or reason , regarded as promoting t hese latter. H ence excit s in u without any reasoning about it, but in t he mere
bot h kinds of judgments are singu lar, and yet announce them- appreh ensi o~ of it , the f ling of the u blimc may appear , as
selves as universally valid for every subj ect ; alt hough they lay regards it. forlll , to violate purpo e in respect of th judgment,
claim merely to the feeling of pleasure, and not to any cognition to b un ui ted to our presentative faculty, and a it were to do
of th e object. 1 violence to the imagination ; and yet it is judged to be only the
Bu t there are also remarkable differences between the two. more u bliro .
The beautiful in na ture 1s connected with the form of the obj ect, Tow we maY ee from this that, in general, we express our-
whi ch consi ts in having [definite] boundaries. The sublime , on elve incorrectly if we call any obj ect of n ature ublime , although
the other hand , is to be found in a formless obj ec t, so far as in it we can quite COIT ctly all many objects of nature beautiful.
or by occa ion of it boundlessness i represented , and yet its For how can that be marked by an ex pre ion of approval which
totality is also present to thought . Thus t he beautiful seems is apprehended in it elf a being a violation of purpo e? All
to be regarded as t he presentati on of an indefini te concept of that we can snY is t hat the object i fit for t he pre entation of a
understanding, the sublime as that of a like concept of reason . sublimit y whi ch can be found in the mind, for no sen ible form
Therefore the satisfaction in the one case is bound up with the 1 rSecond edition.] 2
[Second edition.]
representation of quali ty , in the o her with that of quantity.
82
 84 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTIIETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 23] [§ 24] ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 5

can contain the sublime properly so-called. Thi concern only make the theory of th ublime a mer appendi o the ae theti-
ideas of the rea on which, although no ad quate pre entation is cal judging of that purpo iv ne , b cau e by cans of it no
po sible for them, by this inad quatene that admits of sen ible particular form is repre ·cnted in natur , but there is only
pre entation are aroused and ummoned in o the mind. Thus developed a purpo ive use which the imagination makes of its
t he wide ocean , disturbed by the storm, cannot be called sub- repre entation .
lime. Its aspect is horrible; and t he mind must be already filled
with manifold ideas if it is to be determined by such an intuition
24. OF THE DIVISIO S OF A I VESTIGATION I TO THE
to a feeling itself sublime , as it is incited to abandon sen ibility
FEEL! ro OF THE SUBLIME
and t o busy itself with ideas that involve higher purposiveness.
Independent natural beauty di covers to us a technique of As regards the division of the moments of the aesthetical
nature which represents it as a system in accordance with laws, judging of objects in reference to the fe ling of the sublime, the
the principle of which we do not find in the whole of our faculty Analytic can proceed accord ing to the same principle as was
of understanding. That principle i the principle of purposive- adopted in the analysis of judgments of taste. For as an act of
nes , in respect of the use of our judgment in regard to phenom- the aesthetical reflective judgment, the satisfaction in the sub-
ena, [which requires] that these must not be judged as merely lime mu t be represented just as in the case of t he beautiful-
belonging to nature in its purpo eless mechanism , but also as according to quantity as univ ersally valid, according to quality
t) belonging to something analogou to art . It therefore actually
extends , not indeed our cogni tion of natural obj ects, but our
as devoid of interest, according to relation as subj ective pur-
po ivenes , and according to modality as necessary . And so
concept of nature, [which is now not regarded] a mere mechan- the method here will not diverge from that of the preceding
i m but as art . This leads to profound inve tigations as to t he section, unle s indeed we count it a difference that in the case
po sibility of such a form. Bu t in what we are accustomed to where t he aesthetical judgment is concerned with the form of
call sublime there is nothing at all that lead to particular the obj ct we began with the investigation of its quality, but
objective principles and forms of nature corresponding to them; here, in view of the formle sne s which may belong to what we
so far from it that, for the most part, nature excites the ideas call sublime, we will begin with quantity, as t he first moment of
of t he sublime in it chao or in its wildest and mo t irregular th aesthetical judgment as to the sublime. The reason for this
disorder and desolation , provided size and might are perceived. may be se n from the preceding paragraph.
H ence, we see that the concept of the sublime is not nearly o But the analysis of the sublime involves a clivi ion not needed
important or rich in consequences as the concept of the beauti- in the ca e of the beautiful, viz. a clivi ion into the mathemat- r-/, A, f
ful; and t hat, in general, it displays nothing purpo ive in nature ically and th dynamically sublime. JI 7 ·
7
itself, bu t only in that possible use of our intuitions of it by For the feeling of the sublim~ bring with it ~its c~ara~teris- / 8 )
which th re is produced in us a feeling of a purposivenes quite tic feature a movement of the mmd bound up WJth the Judgmg of
independent of nature. We mu t e k a ground externa1 to t he object, while in the case of the beautiful taste presuppo es
Q.]lrselves for the beaut iful of natur , but seek it for the sublime and maintains the mind in restful contemplation. ow this
merely in ourselves and in our attitude of thought, which intro- movement ought to be judged as subj ctively purpo ive (be-
·duces sublimity into the repre entation of natu r . This is a cause the sublime pleases us), and thu it i referred through the
very needful preliminary remark, which qui te separates the imagination either to t he facuUy of cognition or of desire. In
ideas of the sublime from that of a purpo iveness of nature and either reference t he purpo iveness of the given representation
 6 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THE'l'ICAL J UDmtE:\'T [~ 25] [§ 25] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 87

ought to be judg d only in re pect of furs faculty (without If now I say simply that anything is great, it appears that I
purpo e or inlere l), but in th fir t case it i a cribed to the have no compari on in view, at least none with an objective
o):>ject a a mathematical dete rmination of the imagination, in measu re, becau e it is thus not determined at all how grea t the
the second as dynamical . · And h ence we have this t wofold way object is. But although the standard of comparison is m rely
of r presenting the sublime . subj ctive, yet the judgment nonethele s claim universal
assent; "this man is beautiful" and "he is tall" are judgmen ts,
not limited merely to the judging subject , b ut, like t heoretical
judgm n ts, demanding t he assent of everyone.
In a judgment by which anything is designated simply as
A. OF THd M THEMATI ALLY BLIME great, it is not mer ly meant that the object has a magnitude,
but that this magnitude is superior to that of many other objects
of the same kind , without, howev r, a ny exact determination of
§ 25. t{'LANATIO OF TIIE TERM SUBLIME
this superiori ty. 1Thus th re is a! ways at the basis of our j udg-
We call that s lime w~ich is absolutely great. But to be gr. at ment a standard whi ch we assume as t he same for veryone;
and to be a grea. w: hmg are q u1Ee d1fferent concepts (magni- this, ho ever , is not available for a ny logical (mathematic ally
tudo and quantitas) . I n li ke manner to say simply (simpliciter) definite) judging of magnitude, bu t only for aesthetical judging
that anything is great is quite different from saying that it is of the same, because it i a merely subjective standa rd ly ing at
ab solutely great (absolute, non comparative magnum) . The latter t he basis of the reflective judgment upon magrtitJt:tde. It may be
is what is great beyond all comparison. What now is meant by empirical, as , e.g. , the average size of the men known to us, of
the expre sion that anything is great or small or of medi um animals of a certain kind, t rees, houses, mountains, etc . Or it
size? It is ~t a pure concept of under tanding that is thus may be a standard given a priori which , t hrough t he defects of
signified ; still le sis it an intuition of sene; and just as little the judging subj ect , is limi ted by t he subjective condi tions of
is it_a concept of reason, becau e it brings with it no principle of presentation in concreto, as, e .g. , in t he practical sphere, the
cognition. It mustJ,herefo re be a concept of judgment or de- greatness of a cert ain vir tue or of the public libert y and justice
rived from one, and a subjective purposiveness of the representa- in a country , or, in t he theoretical sphere, the greatness of the
tion in r ference to the judgment must lie at its ba i . That accuracy or the inaccuracy of an observation or mea uremen t
anything is a a nitude (quantum) may be cogn ized from the t hat has been made, etc .
thing itself, without any compari on of it with other t hing , viz . H ere it is remarkable t hat, although we have no in terest what-
if there is a mu ltipli city of the homogeneous con tituting one ever in an obj ect-i .e . its existence is indifferent to us- yet its
thing. But to cognize how great i.t i always requires some other mere ize, even if it is considered as formless, may bring a satis-
magnitude as a measure . But because the jud.,.ing of magnitude faction with it t hat is universally communicable and that con-
depends, not merely on multiplicity (number), but a! o on the sequen tly involves the consciousnes of a subj ective purposive-
magnitude of the unit (the measure), and ince, to judge of the ness in t he use of our cognitive faculty . This is not indeed a
magnitude of this latter again requires another as measure with satisfaction in the object (because it may be formless), as in the
which it may be compared, we ee that the determination of the case of the beautiful , in which the reflective judgment finds
magnitude of phenomena can supply no absolute concep t itself purposively determined in reference to cogni tion in general,
whatever of magnit ude, but only a comparative one. but [a satisfaction] in the extension of the imagination by itself.

\V
88 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 25] [§ 26] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 89

If (under the above limitation) we say simply of an object objects on behalf of thi latter feeling that is absolutely gr~a~,
"it is great," this is no mathematically definite judgment, but and in comparison every other u e is small. on quently 1t 1s
a mere judgment of reflection upon the representation of it, the state of mind produced by a certain representation with
which is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive which the reflective judgment is occupied, and not the object,
powers in the estimation of magnitude; and we always then that is to be called sublime.
bind up with the representation a kind of respect, as also a kind We can therefore app nd to the preceding formulas explaining
of contempt, for what we simply call "small." Further, the the sublime this other: the sublime is that, the mere ability to
judging of things as great or small extends to everything, even think which shows a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard
to all their characteristics; thus we describe beauty as great or of sense.
small. The reason of this is to be sought in the fact that what-
('
ever we present in intuition according to the precept of the f 1
§ 26.
judgment (and thus represent aesthetically) is always a phenom-
OF THAT ESTIMATION OF THE MAGNITUDE OF NATURAL
THI GS WHICH IS REQUISITE FOR THE
""'
enon, and thus a quantum.
IDEA OF THE SUBLIME
But if we call anything, not only great, but absolutely great
in every point of view (great beyond all comparison), i.e. sub- The estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number
lime, we soon see that it is not permissible to seek for an adequate (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that [p rformed]
standar of this outside itself, but merely in it elf. It is a magni- by mere intuition (by the measurement of the eye) is aesth~tica~.
tude which is like itself alone. It follows hence that the sublime is ow w can come by definite concepts of how great a thing 1
not to be sought in the things of nature, but only in our ideas; but [only]a by numbers, of which t he unit is the measure (at all
in which of them it lies must be reserved for the "Deduction." events by series of numbers progressing to infinity), and so far
The foregoing explanation can be thus expressed: the sublime all logical estimation of magcitude is mathematical. But since
is that in comparison with which everything else is small. Here we the magnitude of the mea ure mu t then be as umed known,
easily see that nothing can be given in nature, however great and this again is only to be estimated mathematically by means
it is judged by us to be, which could not, if considered in another of numbers- the unit of which mu t be another [smaller]
relation, be reduced to the infinitely small; and conversely there measure--we can never have a first or fundamental measure,
is ::1othing so small which does not admit of extension by our and therefore can never have a definite concept of a given
imagination to the greatness of a world if compared with still magnitude. o the estimation of the magnitude of the fund a-
smaller standards. Telescopes have furnished us with abundant mental measure must consi tin this, that we can immediately
material for making the first remark, microscopes for the second . apprehend it in intuition and use it by the imagination for the
Nothing, therefore, which can be an object of the senses is, presentation of concept of number. That is, all timatio~ of
considered on this basis, to be called sublime. But because there the magnitude of the objects of nature is in the end aesthetJCal
is in our imagination a striving toward infinite progress and in (i.e. subjectively and not objectively determin d).
our reason a claim for absolute totality, regarded as a real idea, Now for the mathematical e timation of magnitude there is,
therefore this very inadequateness for that idea in our faculty indeed, no maximum (for the power of numbers extends to
for estimating the magnitude of things of sense exci in us the infinity); but for its aesthetical estimation there is always a
feeling of a supersensible faculty. And it is not the object of maximum, and of this I say that, if it is judged as the absolute
sense, but the use which the judgment naturally makes of certain • [Second edition.]
90 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL roDGMENT [§ 26] [§ 26] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 91

measure than which no greater is possible subjectively (for the The same thing may sufficiently explain the bewilderment or,
judging subject), it brings wit h it the idea of the sublime and as it were, perplexity which it is said seizes the spectator on his
produces that emotion which no mathematical estimation of its first entrance into t. Peter's at Rome . For there is here a
magnitude by means of numbers can bring about (except so far feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the
as that aesthetical fundamental measure remains vividly in the ideas of a whole, wherein the imagination reaches its maximum,
imagination) . For t he former only presents relative magnitude and , in striving to surpass it, sinks back into itself, by which,
by means of comparison with others of the same kind , but the however, a kind of emotional satisfaction is produced. ,,..J ,)
latter presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can I do not wish to speak as yet of the ground of this satisfaction,
grasp it in an intuition. which is bound up with a representation from which we should
In receiving a quantum into the imagination by intuition , in least of all expect it, viz. a representation which makes us remark
order to be able to use it for a measure or as a unit for the estima- its inadequacy and consequently its subj ective want of purpo-
tion of magnitude by means of numbers , there are two operations siveness for the judgment in the estimation of magnitude. I only
of the imagination involved: apprehension (apprehensio) and remark that if the aesthetical judgment is pure (i.e. mingled
comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica). As to apprehension with no teleological judgment or judgment of reason) and is to
there is no difficulty, for it can go on ad infinitum, but compre- be given as a completely suitable example of the critique of t he
hension becomes harder the fur ther apprehension advances, and aesthetical judgment, we must not exhibit the sublime in pro-
soon attains to its maximum, viz. t he greatest possible aestheti- ducts of art (e.g. buildings, pillars, etc.) where human purpose
cal fund amental measure for t he estimation of magnitude. For determines the form as well as the size, nor yet in things of
when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representa- nature the concepts of which bring with them a definite purpose
tions of sensuous intuition at first apprehended begin to vanish (e.g. animals with a known natural de tination), but in rude
in the imagination, while this ever proceeds to the apprehension nature (and in this only in so far as it does not bring with it any
of others, then it loses as much on the one side as it gains on the charm or emotion produced by actual danger) merely as con-
other; and in comprehension there is a maximum beyond which taining magnitude. F or in t his kind of representation nature
it cannot go. contains nothing monstrous (either magnificent or horrible); the
""Hence can be explained what Savary 4 remarks, in his account magnitude that is apprehended may be increased as much as
of Egypt, viz. that we must keep from going very near the you wish, rovided it can be comprehended in a whole by the
Pyramids just as much as we keep from going too far from them, imagination. An object is monstrous if, by its size, it destroys
in order to get the full emotional effec t from their size. For if the purpose which constitutes the concept of it. But the mere
we are too far away, the parts to be apprehended (the stones presentation of a concept is called colossal, which is almost too
lying one over the other) are only obscurely represented, and great for any presentation (bordering on t he relatively mon-
the representation of them produces no effect upon the aestheti- strous) , because the purpose of the presentation of a concept is
cal judgment of the subject. But if we are very near, the eye made hard [ to carry out] by the intuition of the object being
requires some time to complete t he apprehension of the tiers almost too great for our faculty of apprehension. A pure judg-
from the bottom up to the apex , and then the first tiers are ment upon the sublime must, however, have no purpose of the
always partly forgotten before the imagination has taken in object as its determining ground if it is to be aesthetical
the last, and so the comprehension of them is never complete. and not mixed up with any judgment of understanding or
• [M. Savary, Lettres sur l'Egypte (Amsterdam , 1787).] reason.
 I

92 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 26] [§ 26] ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 93

Because everything which is to give di interested pleasure to but not the comprehension in an intuition of the imagination
the merely reflective judgment must bring with the repre enta- (not possible by comprehensio aesthetica, although quite possible
tion of it, subjective and, as subjective, universally valid pur- by comprehensio logica in a concept of number). In both cases
posiveness- although no purposiveness of the form of the object the logical estimation of magnitude goes on without hindrance
lies (as in the ca e of the beautiful) at the ground of the judg- t o infinit y.
ment-the question arises, What is this subjective purposive- But now the mind listens to the voice of reason which, for
ness? And how does it come to be prescribed as the norm by every given magnitud even for those that can never be en-
which a ground for universally valid satisfaction is supplied in tirely apprehended, although (in sensible representation) they
the mere estimation of magnitude, even in t hat which is forced are judged as entirely given- re.9,uires totality . Reason conse-
up to the point where our faculty of imagination is inadequate quently desires comprehension in one intuition, and so the
for t he presentation of the concept of magnitude? [joint] presentation of all these members of a progressively
In the process of combination requisite for the estimation of increasing series . It does not even exempt the infinite (space
magnitude, the imagination proceeds of itself to infinity without and past time) from this requirement ; it rather renders it
anything hindering it; but the understanding guides it by means unavoidable to think the infinite (in the judgment of common ·
of concepts of number, for which it must furnish the schema . reason) as entirely given (according to its totality). t/. ·"" •
And in this procedure, as belonging to the logical estimation of But the infinite is absolutely (not merely comparatively)
magnitude, there is indeed something objectively purposive-in great. Compared with it everything else (of the same kind of
accordance with t he concept of a purpose (as all measurement magnitudes) is small. And what is most important is that to be
is)-but not hing purposive and pleasing for the aesthetical able only to think it as a whole indicates a faculty of mind which
judgment. There is also in t his designed purposiveness nothing surpasses every standard of sense. For [ to represent it sensibly]
which would force us to push the magnitude of the measure, and would require a comprehension having for unit a standard
consequently the comprehension of the manifold in an intuition, bearing a definite relation , expressible in numbers, to the infinite,
to the bounds of the faculty of imagination, or as far as ever which is impossible. evertheless, the bare capabi lity of thinking
this can reach in its presentations . For in t he estimation of this infinite without contradiction requires in the human mind
magnitude by the under tanding (arithmetic) we only go to a a faculty itself supersensible. For it is only by means of this
certain point, whether we push the comprehension of the units faculty and its idea of a noumenon-which admits of no intui-
up to the number 10 (as in the decimal scale) or only up to 4 tion, but which yet serves as the substrate for the intuition of
(as in the quaternary scale); the further production of magni- the world, as a mere phenomenon- that the infinite of the
tude proceeds by combination or, if the quantum is given in world of sense, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude,
intuition, by apprehension, but merely by way of progression can be completely comprehended under one concept, although in
(not of comprehension) in accordance with an assumed principle the mathematical estimation of magni tude by means of concepts
of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude of number it can never be completely thought. The faculty of
the understanding is equally served and contented, whether the being able to think the infinite of supersensible intuition as
imagination chooses for unit a magnitude that we can take in given (in its intelligible substrate) surpasses every standard of
in a glance, e.g. a foot or rod, or a German mile or even the sensibility and is great beyond all comparison even with the
earth's diameter-of which the apprehension is indeed possible, faculty of mathematical estimation, not, of course, in a theo-
96 CRITIQU E OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 27] [§ 27] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 97

our highest mea ure of magnitude. Therefore t he inner percep-

§ 27. OF THE QUALITY OF THE SATISFACTION IN OUR
tion of the inadequacy of all sensible standards for rational
JUDGMENTS UPON THE SUBLIME
estimation of magnitude indicates a correspondence wi th rational
The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea which is a laws; it involves a pain, which arouses in us the feeling of our
law for us is respect. Now the idea of the comprehension of every supersensible destination, according to which it is purposive and
phenomenon that can be given us in the in tuition of a whole is an therefore pleasurable to find every standard of sensibility inade-
idea prescribed to us by a law of reason, which recognizes no quate to the ideas of understr-nding .
other measure, definite, valid for everyone, and invariable, The mind feels itself moved jn the representation of the sublime
than the absolute whole. But our imagination, even in its in nature, while in aesthetical judgments about the beautiful it
greatest efforts, in respect of that comprehension which we is in restful contemplation. This movement may (especially in
expect from it of a given object in a whole of intui tion (and t hus its beginnings) be compared to a vibration, i.e. to a quickly
with reference to the presentation of the idea of reason) exhibits alternating attraction toward, and repulsion from, the same
its own limits and inadequacy, although at the same time it object. The transcendent (toward which the imagination is
shows that its destination is to make itself adequate to t his idea impelled in its apprehension of intuition) is for the imagination
regarded as a law. Therefore the feeling of the sublime in nature like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself; but for the rational
is respect for our own destination, which, by a certain subrep- idea of the supersensible it is not transcendent, but in conformi ty
tion, we attribute to an object of nature (conversion of respect with law to bring about such an effort of t he imagination, and
for the idea of humani ty in our own subject! into respect for the consequently here there is the same amount of attraction as
obj ect). This makes int uitively evident the superiority of the there was of repulsion for t he mere sensibility. But the judgment
rational determination of our cognitive faculties to the greatest itself always remains in this case only aesthetical, because,
f culty of our sensibility. ( 1 .:, l.- without having any determinate concept of the object at its
The feeling of the sublime is therefore a feeling of pain basis, it merely represents the subj ective play of the mental
arising from the want of accordance between the aesthetical powers (imagination and reason) as harmonious through their
estimation of magnitude formed by the imagination and the very contrast. For just as imagination and understanding, in
estimation of the same formed by reason . T here is at the same judging of the beautiful, generate a subjective purposiveness of
time pleasure thus excited, arising from the correspondence the mental powers by means of their harmony, so [in this case] 6
with rational ideas of this very judgment of the inadequacy of imagination and reason do so by means of their conflict. That
our greatest faculty of sense, in so far as it is a law for us to is, they bring about a feeling t hat we possess pure self-subsistent
strive after these ideas. In fact it is for us a law (of reason) and reason, or a faculty for the estimation of magnitude, whose
belongs to our destination to estimate as small, in comparison superiority can be made int uitively evident only by the inade-
with ideas of reason, everything which nature, regarded as an quacy of that faculty [imagination] which is itself unbounded
object of sense, contains that is great for us ; and that which in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible objects) .
arouses in us the feeling of this supersensible destination agrees The measurement of a space (regarded as apprehension) is
with that law. Now the greatest effort of the imagination in the at the same time a description of it, and thus an objective
presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude indicates movement in the act of imagination and a progress . On the
a reference to something lab solutely great, and consequently a ) other band, the comprehension of the manifold in the unity-
.:_eference to the law of reason, which bids us take this alone as ' [Second edition.]
 (

94 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 26] [§ 26] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 95

retical point of view and on behalf of the cognitive faculty , but its ideas (no matter what they are)-i.e. that it may produce a
as an extension of the mind which feels itself able in another state of mind conformable to them and compatible with that
(practical) point of view to go beyond the limits of sensibility. brought about by the influence of definite (practical) ideas
Nature is therefore sublime in those of its phenomena whose upon feeling.
intuition brin s with it the idea of its infinity. This last can We hence see also that true sublimity must be sought only
5 t• ~,. only come by; the inadequacy of the greatest effort of our imag- in the mind of the [subject] judging, not in the natural object
- inatio to estimate the magnitude of an object. But now, in the judgment upon which occasions tbis state. Who would call
rmathematical estimation of magnitude, the imagination is equal sublime, e.g., shapeless mountain masses piled in wild disorder
to providing a sufficient measure for every object, because the upon one another with their pyramids of ice, or the gloomy,
numerical concepts of the understanding, by means of progres- raging sea? But the mind feels itself raised in its own judgment
sion, can make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. if, while contemplating them without any reference to their
Therefore it must be !he aesthetical estimation of magnitude form, and abandoning itself to the imagination and to the
in which the effort toward comprehension surpasses the power reason- which, although placed in combination with the imag-
of the imagination. Here it is felt that we can comprehend in a ination without any definite purpose, merely extends it-it yet
- whole of intuition the progressive apprehension, and at the finds the whole power of the imagination inadequate to its ideas.
same time we perceive the inadequacy of this faculty, unbounded Examples of the mathematically sublime of nature in mere
in its progress , for grasping and using any fundamental mea ure intuition are all the cases in which we are given, not so much a
available for the estimation of magnitude with the easiest appli- larger numerical concept, as a large unit for the measure of the
cation of the understanding . Now the proper unchangeable imagination (for shortening the numerical series). _A tree, [the
fundamental measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, height of] which we estimate with reference to the height of a
regarding nature as a phenomenon, would be infinity compre- man, at all events gives a standard for a mountain; and if this
hended. But since this fundamental measure is a self-contra- were a mile high, 1t would serve as unit for the number expres-
~ dictory concept (on account of the impossibility of the absolute sive of the earth's diameter, so that the latter might be made
totality of an endless progress), that magnitude of a natural intuitible. The earth's diameter [would supply a unit] for the
object on which the imagination fruitlessly spends its whole known planetary system; this again for the Milky Way; and the
faculty of comprehension must carry our concept of nature to a immeasurable number of Milky Way systems called nebulae,
supersensible substrate (which lies at its basis and also at the which presumably constitute a system of the same kind among
basis of our faculty of thought). As this, however, is great themselves, lets us expect no bounds here. Now the sublime in
beyond all standards of sense, it makes us judge as sublime, not the aesthetical judging of an immeasurable whole like this lies,
so much the object, as our own state of mind in the estimation not so much in the greatness of the number [of units], as in the
of it. fact that in our progress we ever arrive at yet greater units. To
Therefore, just as the aesthetical judgment in judging the this the systematic division of the universe contributes, which
beautiful refers the imagination in its free play to the under- represents every magnitude in nature as small in its tum, and
standing, in order to harmonize it with the concepts of the latter represents our imagination with its entire freedom from bounds,
in general (without any determination of them), so does the and with it nature, as a mere nothing in comparison with the
same faculty, when judging a thing as sublime, refer itself to the ideas of reason if it is sought to furnish a presentation which
reason, in order that it may subjectively be in accordance with shall be adequate to them.
 I
9 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 27] [§ 28] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 99
not of though t but of intui tion- and consequently the compre- measure (thus avoiding the concepts of a law of the succes ive
hension of the succe ively apprehended [elements] in one production of concepts of magnitude) is alone purposive for it .
glance is a r gres which annihilates the condition of time in If now a magnitude almost reaches the limit of our faculty of
this progr ss of the imagination and makes coexistence intuitible. 8 comprehension in an intuition, and yet the imagination is
It is therefore (since the time series is a condition of the internal
sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of the imagi-
nation, by which it does violence to the internal sen e; thi must
invited by means of numerical magnitudes (in respect of which
we are conscious that our 'facult is u d &> to aesthetical
comprehension in a greater unit, then we mentally feel ourselves
-
be the more noticeable, the greater the quantum is which the confined aesthetically within bounds. But nevertheless t he
imagination comprehends in one intuition. The effort, t herefore, pain in regard to the necessary extension of the imagination for
to receive in one single intuition a measure for magnitude that accordance with that which is unbounded in our faculty of
requires a considerable time to apprehend is a kind of repre- reason, viz. the idea of the absolute whole, and consequently
sentation which, subj ectively considered , is contrary to purpose; the very unpurposiveness of the faculty of imagination for
but objectively, as requisite for the estimation of magnitude, it rational ideas and the arousing of them, are represented as
is purposive. Thus that very violence which is done to t he purposive. Thus it is that the aesthetical judgment itself is
subject through the imagination is judged as purposive in subjectively purposive fo the reason as t he source of ideas,
ref erence to the whole determination of the mind . i.e . as the source of an intellectual comprehension for which all
,., The quality of t he feeling of the sublime is that it is a feeling aesthetical comprehension is small, and there accompanies the
of ain in reference to the faculty by which we judge aestheti- reception of an object as sublime a pleasure, which is only
cally of an object, which -pain, however, is represented at the possible through the medium of a pain. r
same time as purposive. This is possible through the fact that
the very incapacity in question discovers the consciousness of "'
an unlimited faculty of the same subject, and that the mind can
only judge of the latter aesthetically by means of the former.
In the logical estimation of magnitude, the impossibility of B. OF THE DYNAMICAL LY SUBLIME IN NATURE
ever arriving at absolute totality, by means of the progress of
the measurement of things of the sensible world in time and
"'
space, was cognized as obj ective, i.e. as an impossibility of f.f § 28 . OF NATURE REGARDED AS MIGHT

thinking t he infini te as entirely given , and not as merely sub- Might is that which is superior to great hindrances. It is
jective or that there was only an incapaci ty to grasp it. For called dominion if it is superior to the resistance of that which
there we have not t o do with the degree of comprehension in an itself possesses might. Nature, considered in an aesthetical
intui tion, regarded as a measure, but everything depends on a judgment as might that has no dominion over us, is dynamically
concept of number. But in aesthetical estimation of magnitude, sublime.
the concept of num,ber must disappear or be changed, and the If nature is to be judged by us as dynamically sublime, it
comprehension of the imagination in reference to the unit of must be represented as exciting fear_ (although it is not true
6 [With this
should be compared the similar discussion in the Critique of conversely that every object which excites fear is regarded in
Pure Reason, " Dialectic," Bk. II , Ch. 2, § 1, "On the System of Cosmological our aesthetical judgment as sublime). For in aesthetical judg-
Ideas."] ments (without the aid of concepts) superiority to hindrances
 100 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 28] [§ 2 J ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 101

can only be judged according to the greatness of the resistance. different kind, which give us cou rage to measure our elves
ow that which we are driven to resist is an evil and, if we do against the apparent almightiness of nature.
~w, in the immensity of nature and in the in ufficiency of 't:--r
not find our faculties a match for it, is an object of fear.
H nee nature can be regarded by the aesthetical judgment as our faculties to take in a standard proportionat e to the aestheti-
might, and consequently as dynamically sublime, only so far as cal estimation of the magnitude of its realm, we find our own
it is considered an object of fear. limitation, although at the sap1e t ime in our rational faculty we
But we can r gard an object as fearful without being afraid of find a different, nonsensuous rstandard ,,which has that infinity
it, viz. if we judge of it in such a way that we merely think a itself under it as a unity, in comparison with whi ch everything
case in which we would wish to resist it and yet in which all in nature is small, and thus in our mind we find a sup riority
resistance would be altogether vain. Thus the virtuous man to nature even in its immensity. And so also the irresistibility
7
fears God without being afraid of Him, because to wish to of its might, while making us recogni ze our own [physical]
resist Him and His commandme nts he thinks is a case that he impotence, considered as beings of nature, disclo es to us a
need not apprehend. But in every such case that he thinks as not faculty of judging independently of and a superiority over
impo sible, he cognizes Him as fearful. nature, on which is based a kind of s lf-pr ervation entirely
He who fears can form no judgment abou t the sublime in different from that which can be attacked and brought into
nature, just as he who is seduced by inclination and appetite danger by external nat ure. Thus humanity in our person re-
can form no judgment about the beautiful. The former flies mains unhumiliate d, though the individual might have to sub-
from the sight of an object which inspires him with awe, and it mit to this dominion. In this way nature is not judged to be
is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously felt. sublime in our aesthetical judgments in so far as it excites fear,
Hence the pleasurableness arising from the cessation of an but because it calls up that power in us (which is not nature) of
uneasiness is a state of joy . But this, on account of the deliver- regarding as small the things about which we are olicitow;
ance from danger [which is involved], is a state of joy when (goods, health, and life), and of regarding its might (to which
conjoined with the re olve that we shall no more be expo ed we are no doubt subjected in respect of the e thing ) as never-
to the danger; we cannot willingly look back upon our ensa- theless without any dominion over us and our personality to
tions [of danger], much less seek the occasion for them which we must bow where our highest fundamental propo i tions,
again. and their assertion or abandonmen t, are concerned. Therefore
Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening rocks; clouds nature is here called sublime merely because it elevates the
piled up in the ky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder imagina wn to a presentation of t hose cases in which the mind
l
(
peal ; volcano s in all their violence of de truction; hurricanes can make felt the proper subtimit 1 of its destination, in com-
with their track of devastation; the boundle s ocean in a state parison with nature itself.
of tumult; the lofty waterfall of a mighty river, and such like- This estimation of ourselves\loses nothing through the fact
these exhibit our facu lty of resistance as insignificantly small in that we must regard ourselves asJ safe in order to feel t his in-
comparison with their might. But the sigh t of them is the more spiriting satisfaction and that hence, as there is no seriousness
attractive, the more fearful it is, provided only that we are in in the danger, there might be also (as might eem to be the case)
security; and we willingly call these objects sublime, because just as tittle seriousness in the sublimity of our spiri tual faculty.
they raise the energies of the soul above t heir accustomed For the satisfaction here concerns only the destination of our
height and discover in us a faculty of resistance f a quite 7 [Second edition .]
102 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTRETICAL JlJDGMENT [ 28] [ 2 J ANALYTiC OF THE SUBLIME 103
faculty which disclo e it elf in such a case, so far as the tend- wrath and yet in His ublimity, in the tempest, the storm, the
ency to this de tination lies in our nature, while its development earthquake, etc.; and that it would be fooli hand criminal to
and exercise remain incumbent and obligatory. And in thi imagine a superiority of our mind over the e works of His and,
there is t rut h [and reality], however conscious tae man may be as it seems, even over the designs of such might. Hence it would
of his present actual powerlessness, w~en he t urns his reflection appear that no feeling of the sublimi ty of our own nature, but
to it. rather subj ection, abasement, and a feeling of complete power-
No doubt this principle seems to be too farfetched and too lessness, is a fitting state of mind in the presence of such an
subtly reasoned, and consequently seems to go beyond [the object; and thi is generally bound up with the idea of it during
scope of] an aesthetical judgment; but observation of men natural phenomena of this kind. In religion in general, pro tra-
proves the opposite and shows that it may lie at the root of the tion, adoration with bent head, with contrite, anxious demeanor
most ordinary judgments, although we are not always con- and voice, seems to be the only fitting behavior in presence of
scious of it. For what is that which is, even to t he savage, an
I, the Godhead, and hence most peoples have adopted and still
object of the greatest admiration? I t is a man who shrinks from observe it. But this state of mind is far from being necessarily
nothing, who fears nothing, and therefore does not yield to bound up with the idea of the sublimity of a religion and its
danger, but rather goes to face it vigorously with the most object. The man who is actually afraid, becau e he finds reasons
complete deliberation. Even in the most highly civilized state for fear in himself, while conscious by his culpable disposition of
this peculiar veneration for the soldier remains, though only offending against a might whose wi ll is irresistible and at the
under the condition that he exhibit all t he virtues of peace, same time just, is not in the frame of mind for admiring the
gentleness, compassion, and even a becoming care for his own divine greatness. For this a mood of calm, contemplation and
person; because even by these it is recognized that his mind is a quite free judgment. are needed. Only if he is conscious of an
unsubdued by danger. H ence whatever disputes t here may be upright disposition pleasing to God do t ho e operations of
about the superiority of the respect which is to be accorded might serve to awaken in him the idea of the sublimity of this
them, in the comparison of a statesman and a general, the Being, for then he recognizes in himself a sublimi ty of disposi-
aesthetical judgment decides for the latter. War itself, if it is tion conformable to His will; and thus he is rai ed above the fear
carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the rights of of uch operations of nature, which he no longer regards as
citizens, has something sublime in it, and makes the disposition out bursts of His wrath. Even humili ty, in t he shape of a stern
of the people who carry it on thus only the more sublime, the judgment upon his own faul ts- which otherwise, with a con-
more numerous are the dangers to which they are exposed and sciousness of good intentions, could be easily palliated from the
in respect of which they behave with courage. On the other frailty of human natur is a sublime state of mind, consi ting
hand , a long peace generally brings about a predominant com- in a voluntary subj ection of him elf to the pain of remor e, in
mercial spirit and, along with it, low selfishness, cowardice, and order that the causes of this may be gradually removed. In
effeminacy, and debases the disposition of the people .8 this way religion is e sentially distinguished from superstition.
It appears to conflict with this solution of the concept of the The latter establishes in the mind, not reverence for the sublime,
sublime, so far as sublimity is ascribed to might, that we are but fear and apprehension of the all-powerful Being to who e
accustomed to represent God as presenting Himself in His will the terrified man sees himself subject, without according
8 [Cf. § 83.] Him any high esteem. From this nothing can arise but a seeking
 104 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 29] [§ 29] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 105
of favor and flattery, instead of a religion which consists in a yet is attractive. [It is attractive] because rea on exerts a
good life. 9 dominion over sensibility in order to extend it in conformity
ublimity, therefore, does not r side in anything of nature, with its proper realm (the practical) and to make it look out
but on1y in our mind, in so far as we can become conscious that into the infinite, which is for it an abyss. In fact, without
we are superior to nature within, and therefore also to nature development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture,
without us (so far as it influences us). Everything that excites call sublime presents itself to the uneducated man merely as
this feeling in us, e.g. the might of nature which calls forth our terrible. In the indications of the dominion of nature in destruc-
forces, is called then (although improperly) sublime. Only by tion, and in the great scale of its might, in comparison with
supposing this idea in ourselves and in reference to it are we which his own is a vanishing quantity, he will only see the
capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being misery, danger, and distress which surround the man who is
which produces respect in us, not merely by the might that it exposed to it. So the good, and indeed intelligent, Savoyard
displays in nature, but rather by means of the faculty which peasant (as Herr von aussure 10 relates) unhesitatingly called
resides in us of judging it fearlessly and of regarding our destina- all lovers of snow-mountains fools. And who knows whether he
tion as sublime in respect of it. would have been so completely wrong if aussure had under-
taken the danger to which he exposed himself merely, as most
~ 29. OF THE MODALITY OF THE JUDGMENT UPON THE
travelers do, from amateur curiosity, or that he might be able
SUBLIME IN NATURE
to give a pathetic account of them? But his design was the
instruction of men, and this excellent man gave the readers of
There are numberless beautiful things in nature about which his travels soul-stirring sensations such as he himself had, into
we can assume and even expect, without being widely mistaken, the bargain.
the harmony of everyone's judgment with our own. But in But although the judgment upon the sublime in nature needs
respect of our judgm nt upon the sublime in nature, we cannot culture (more than the judgment upon the beautiful), it is not
promise ourselves so easily the accordance of others . For a far therefore primarily produced by culture and introduced in a
greater culture, as well of the aesthetical judgment as of the merely conventional way into society. Rather has it its root in
cognitive faculties which lie at its basis, seems requisite in human nature, even in that which, alike with .common under-
order to be able to pass judgment on this peculiarity of natural standing, we can impute to and expect of everyone, viz. in the
objects. tendency to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e. to what is moral.
That the mind be attuned to feel the sublime postulates a Hereon is based the necessity of that agreement of the judg-
susceptibility of the mind for ideas . For in the very inadequacy ment of others about the sublime with our own which we include
of nature to these latter, and thus only by presupposing them in the latter. For just as we charge with want of taste the man
and by straining the imagination to use nature as a schema for who is indifferent when passing judgment upon an object of
them, is to be found that which is terrible to sensibility and nature that we regard as beautiful, so we say of him who remains
unmoved in the presence of that which we judge to be sublime:
e [In the Philosophical Theory of Religion, Pt. I (Abbott's trans., p. 360),
!{ant, as here, divides "all religions into two classes- favor-seeking religion
He has no feeling. But we claim both from every man, and
(mere worship) and moral religion, that is, the religion of a good life"; and we presuppose them in him if he has any culture at all-only
he concludes that "amongst all the public religions that have ever existP.d 10 [H. B. de Saussure, Voyages dans les Alpes. Vol. I was published at
the Christian alone is moral."] Neuchatel, in 1779; Vol. II at Geneva, in 1786.]
 106 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [§ 29] [§ 29] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 107
enjoyment. On the other hand, the beautiful requires the repre-
with the difference that we expect the former directly of every- sentation of a certain quality of the object, that can be made
one because in it the judgment refers the imagination merely to intelligible and reduced to concepts (although it is not so reduced
the understanding, the faculty of concepts; but the latter be- in an aesthetical judgment); and it cultivates us, in that it
cause in it the imagination is related to the reason, the faculty teaches us to attend to the purposiveness in the feeling of
of ideas, only under a subjective presupposition (which, how- pleasure. The sublimejconsists merely in the relation by which
ever, we believe we are authorized in imputing to everyone), the sensible in the representation of nature is judged available
viz. the presupposition of the moral feeling [in man]. 11 Thus it for a po sible supersensible use. The absolutely good, subjectively
is that we ascribe nece sity to this aesthetical judgment also. judged according to the feeling that it inspires (the object of the
In this modality of aesthetical judgments, viz. in the necessity moral feeling), as capable of determining the powers of the
claimed for them, lies an important moment of the critique of subject through the representation of an absolutely compelling
judgment. For it enables us to recognize in them an a priori law, is specially distinguished by the modality of a necessity
principle, and raises them out of empirical psychology, in that rests a priori upon concepts. This necessity involves, not
which otherwise they would remain buried among the feelings merely a claim, but a command for the assent of everyone and
of gratification and grief (only with the unmeaning addition of belongs in itself to the pure intellectual rather than to the
being called finer feelings). Thus it enables us too to place the aesthetical judgment, and is by a determinant and not a mere
judgment among those faculties that have a priori principles at reflective judgment ascribed, not to nature, but to freedom.
their basis, and so to bring it into transcendental philosophy. But the determinability of the subject by means of this idea, and
especially of a subject that can feel hindrances in sensibility
and at the same time its superiority to them by their subjugation-
involving a modification of its state-i.e. the moral feeling, is
yet so far cognate to the aesthetical judgment and its formal
GENERAL REMARK UPO THE EXPOSITION OF THE conditions that it can serve to represent the conformity to law
AESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE JUDGME T of action from duty as aesthetical, i.e. as sublime or even as
beautiful, without losing purity. This would not be so if we
In reference to the feeling of pleasure an obj ect is to be classi- were to put it in natural combination with the feeling of the
fied as either pleasant, or b eautifu~, or sublime, or good (abso- pleasant.
lutely) (jucundum, pulchrum, sublime, honestum). If we take the result of the foregoing exposition of the two
The pleasant, as motive ofdesire, is always of one and the kinds of aesthetical judgments, there arise therefrom the
same kin , no matter whence it comes and however specifically following short explanations:
different the representation (of sense, and sensation objectively The beautiful is what pleases in the mere judgment (and _,
considered) may be. Hence, in judging its influence on the therefore not by the medium of sensation in accordance with a
mind, account is taken only of the number of its charms (simul- concept of the understanding). It follows at once from this
taneous and successive), and so only of the mass, as it were, of that it must please apart from all interest.
the pleasant sensation; and this can be made intelligible only The sublime is wiat pleases immediately through its opposi- I'/
by quantity. It bas no reference to culture, but belongs to mere tion to the interest of sense.
~1 [Second edition.] Both, as explanations of aesthetical universally valid judging,
 ,I
, _....~ 5 ,...,.., f.:~~ -? "'...,. s 1-r
cj
[ 29] A ALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME
108 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHET ICAL JUDGMEN T [ 29]
mind (dynamic al). And this judgmen t is based upon a feeling
are referred to subjectiv e grounds- in the one case to grounds
of the mind's de tination, which entirely surpas s the realm of
of ensibility, in favor of the contemp lative understa nding; in
the form er (i.e. upon the moral feeling), in respect of which the
the other case in oppositw n to sen ibility, but on behalf of the
represent ation of t he object is judged as subj ectively purposive.
purposes of practical reason. Both, however, united in the same
In fact, a feeling for the sublime in nature cannot well be
subj ect, are purposive in reference to the moral feeling. The
thought without combining therewit h a mental di po ition which
beautiful prepares us to love disinterestedly something, even
is akin to the moral. And although the immedia te pleasu r in
nature itself; the sublime prepares us to esteem something
the beautiful of nature likewjse presupposes and cultivate a
highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest.
certain liberality in our mental attitude , i.e . a satisfacti on inde-
We may describe the sublime thus : it is an object (of nature)
pendent of mere sensible enjoymen t, yet freedom is thus repre-
the representation of which determines the mind to think the unat-
tainability of nature regarded as a presentation of ideas.
sented as in play rather than in t hat law-directed occupation
Literally taken and logically considered, ideas cannot be which is the genuine character istic of human morality, in which
present d. But if we extend our empirical r presentat ive facul ty reason must exercise dominion over sensibility. Bu t in aestbeti-
(mathem atically or dynamically) to the intuition of nature, cal judgmen ts upon the sublime this dominion is represent ed
reason infallibly intervene s, as t he faculty expressing the inde- as exercised by the imagination regarded as jan instrument of
reason.
pendence of absolu te totality, 12 and generates the unsucces ful
The sati faction in the sublime of nature is then only negative
effort of the mind to make the represent ation of the senses ade-
(while that in the beau tiful is.positive), viz. a feeling that the
qu ate to these [ideas]. This effort- and t he feeling of the unat-
imaginat ion is depriving itself of its freedom, while it is pur-
tain ability of the idea by means of the imaginat ion- is itself a
posively determined according to a different law from that of
presenta tion of the subj ective purposiveness of our mind in the
its empirical employm ent. It t hus acquires an extension and a
employm ent of the imaginat ion for its supersen sible destination
might greater than it sacrifices- the ground of which, however,
and forces us, subj ectively, to think nature it elf in its totality
is concealed from itself- while yet it f eels the sacrifice or the
as a presentat ion of something super ensible, wjthout being
able objectively to arrive at this pre entation. deprivati on and, at the same time, t e cause to which it~ sub-
jected. Astonishm ent that borders upon terror , the dread and
For we soon see that nature in space and time entirely lacks
the holy'awe which seizes the ob erver at the sight of mountain
the uncondition d and, conseque ntly, that absolute magnitud e
peaks rearing themselves to heaven, deep chasms and streams
which yet is des1red by the most ordinary reason. It is by this
raging therein , deep-shadowed solitudes that dispo e one to
that we are reminded that we only have to do with nature as
melancholy medi tation - this, in the safety in which we know
phenome non and that it must be regarded as the mere pre enta-
ourselves to be, is not actual fear but only an attempt to feel
tion of a nature in itself (of which reason has the idea). But this
fear by the aid of the imagination, that we ~Y feel the1migh t
idea of the supersensible, which we can no further determin e-
of this faculty in combining wjth the mind's repose the menta
so that we cannot know but only think nature as its presentat ion
moveme nt thereby excited, and being thus superior to internal
-is awakene d in us by means of an object whose aesthetical
na,ture- and therefore to external- so far as this can have any
appreciat ion strains the imagination to its utmost bounds,
iiiHuence on our feeling of well-being. For the imaginat ion by
whether of extension (mathem atical) or of its might over the
the laws of association makes our state of contentm ent depend-
["Als V ermiigen der lrulependenz der absoluten Totalitat," a curious
ent on physical [causes]; but it also, by the principles of the
12

phrase.]
 )

110 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [§ 29] [' 29] ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 111

schematism of the judgment (being o far, therefore, ranked regard it as poets d , merely by what strikes the eye- if it is at X >(
under freedom), is the instrument of reason and its ideas, and rest, as a clear mirror of water only bounded by the heaven; 1 _
as such has might to maintain our independence of natural if it is restless, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm everything. W. 1
~
influences, to regard as small what in reference to them is great, The like i to be aid of the sublime and beautiful in the human ) ~ .,..,- S
and so to place the absolutely great only in the proper destina- figure. We must not regard as the determining grounds of our
tion of the subject. The raising of this reflection of the aestheti- judgmenttbe concepts of the purpo es which all our limbs serve,
cal judgment so as to be adequate to reason (though without a and we must not allow this coincidence to influence our aestheti-
definite concept of reason) repres nts the object as sub ·ectively cal judgment (for then it would no longer be pure), although it
purposive, even by the objective want of accordance between is certainly an ces ary condition of aesthetical satisfaction that
the imagination in its greatest extension and the reason (as the there should be no conflict between them. Aestbetical purpo ive-
faculty of ideas). ness is the conformity to law of the judgment in its freedom .
We must here, generally, attend to what has been already The satisfaction in the object depends on the relation in which
noted, that in the transcendental aesthetic of judgment we we wish to place the imagination, always provided that it by
must speak solely of pure aesthetical judgments; consequently itself entertains the mind in free occupatioq. If, on the other -
our examples are not to be taken from such beautiful or sublime band, the judgment be determined by anything else-whether .,
objects of nature as presuppose the concept of a purpose. For, sensation or concept-altho ugh it may be conformable to law,
if so, the purposiveness would be either teleological or would be it cannot be the act of a free judgment.
based on mere sensations of an object (gratification or grief), If, then, we speak of intellectual beauty or sublimity, these
and thus would be in the former case not aesthetical, in the expressions are, first, not quite accurate, because beauty and
latter not merely formal. If, then, we call the sight of the sublimity are aestbetical modes of representation which would
star eaven sublime, we must not place at the basis of our not be found in us at all if we were pure intelligences (or even
judgment concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings and regarded ourselves as such in thought). Secondly, although
regard the bright points, with which we see the space above us both, as objects of an intellectual (moral) satisfaction, are so
filled, as their suns moving in circles purposively fixed with far compatible with aesthetical satisfaction that they rest upon
reference to them; but we must regard it, just as we see it, as a no interest, yet they are difficult to unite with itbecause they
tJJ "'~"( distant, all-embracing, vault. Only under such a representation are meant to produce an interest . This, if its presentation is to
tYl~ can we range that sublimity which a pure aesthetical judgment harmonize with the satisfaction in the aesthetical judgment,
1f
1~.,.q
1
"ascribes to this object. And in the same way, if we are to call could only arise by means of a sensible interest that we combine
with it in the presentation; and thus damage would be done to
'"- .-.') ,·{ the sight of the ocean sublime, we must not think of it as we
- - - [ordinarily] do, as implying all kinds of knowledge (that are the intellectual purposiveness, and it would lose its purity.
not contained in immediate intuition). For example, we some- The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual sati fac-
times think of the ocean as a vast kingdom of aquatic creatures, tion is the moral law in that might which it eJS:ercises in us over
or as the great source of those vapors that fill the air with all mental motives that precede it ._This might only makes itself
clouds for the benefit of the land, or again as an element which, aesthetically known to us through sacrifices (which causing a
though dividing continents from each other, yet promotes the feeling of deprivation, though on behalf of internal freedom, in
greatest communication between them; but these furnish merely return discloses in us an unfathomable depth of this super-
teleological judgments. To ca:ll the ocean sublime twe must '>ensible faculty, with consequences extending beyond our ken);

I/'
..;. ,.....,
 112 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETIC AL .TUDGMENT [§ 29] [ 29] A. ALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 113

thu the satisfaction on the aesthetical side (in relation to sensi- more powerfully and la tingly than the impul e ansmg from
bility) is negative, i.e. against this interest, but regarded from sen ible representa tions . But (which seem strange) the absence
the intellectual side it is positive and combined with an interest. of affection (apatheia, phlegma in signifu;atu bono) in a mind that
Hence it follows that the intellectual, in itself purposive, (moral) vigorous y follows its unalterable principle i sublime, and in a
good, aesthetically judged, must be represented as sublime far preferable way, because it has a! o on its 1 e e ati faction
rather than beautiful, so that it rather awakens the feeling of of pure reason. 15 A mental tate of this kind is alone called
respect (which i dains charm) than that of love and familiar ble; and this expression is subsequently applied to things,
inclination; for human nature does not attach itself to this good e.g. a building, a garment, li terary style, bodily presence, etc.,
spontaneou Iy,out only by tb ~which reason exercises when these do not so much arouse astonishment (the affection
over sensibility. Conversely also, that w ·ch we call sublime in produced by the representa tion of novelty exceeding our expec-
nature, whether external or internal (e.g. certain affections), tations) as admiration (a tonishmen t that does not cease when
is only represented as a might in the mind to overcome [cer- the novelty isappears); and thi is the ca e when ideas agree
tain]18 hindrances of the sensibili ty by means of moral funda- in their presentati on undesignedly and artlessly with the
mental propositions, and only thus does it interest. aesthetical satisfaction.
I will dwell a moment on this latter point. The idea of the Every affection of the strenuous kind (viz. that excites the
good conjoined with [strong] affection is called "{enthusia~ consciousness of our power to overcome every obstacle- animi
'This state of mind seems to be sublime, to the extent that we strenui) is aesthetically sublime, e.g. wrath, even despair (i.e. the
commonly assert that nothing great could be done without it. despair of indignation, not of faintheartedness). But affections
Now every affection 14 is blind, either in the choice of its purpose of the languid kind (which make the very effort of resistance an
or, if this be supplied by reason, in its accomplishment; for it object of pain- animum languidum) have nothing noble in them-
is a mental movement which makes it impossible to exercise a selves, but they may be reckoned under the sensuously beautiful.
free deliberation about fundamen tal propositions so as to deter- Emotions, which may rise to tile strength of affections, are very
mine ourselves thereby. It can therefore in no way deserve different. We have both spirited and tender emotions. The
the approval of the reason. evertheless, aesthetically, enthu- latter, if they rise to [strong] affections, are worthless; the
siasm is sublime, because it is a tension of forces produced by propensity to them is called sentimentality. A sympathe tic gri f
ideas, ~hich give an impulse to the mind that operates far that will not admit of consolation, or one referring to imaginary
evils to which we deliberately surrender ourselves- being
11
[Second edition.] deceived by fancy-as if they were actual, indicates and pro-
14
Affecti0'1'18 are specifically different from pa.ssi0'1'18. The former are duces a tender 16 though weak soul, which shows a beautiful
related merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty of desire and are side and which can be called fanciful, though not enthusiast ic.
inclinations which render difficult or impossible all determinatio n of the
[elective] will by principles. The former are stormy and unpremedita ted,
Romances, lacrymose plays, shallow moral precepts which toy
the latter are steady and deliberate; thus indignation in the form of wrath with (falsely) so-called moral dispo itions, but in fact make the
ia an affection, but in the form of hatred (revenge) ia a E_assion. The latter
u [In the Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, § 17, Kant
can never and in no reference be called sublime, because while in an affection
gives the term "moral apathy" to that freedom from the sway of the
the freedom of the mind ia hindered, in a passion it is abolished. [Cf. Preface
to the Metaphysical Elemen/.8 of Ethics, § 16, where this distinction ia affections , which ia distinguished from indifference to them.]
more fully drawn out. Affection ia described as ha.sty, and passion ia defined n [Reading "weiche" with Ro enkranz; Hartenstein and Kirchmann
as the sensible ~ppetite grown into a permanent inclination. ] have "weise," which yields no sense.]
 ' A Air 1 ~~;..- r

114 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL J UDGMENT [§ 29] [§ 29] ANALYTI C OF THE SUBLIME 115

heart languid , insensible to the severe precept of duty, and or to be improved by a tragedy when he is only glad at his
incapable of all respect for the worth of humani ty in our own ~ ,~
ennui being happily di pelled. o the sublime must always. have (/,t_,.tf(•~..O'Jf• (
person, and for the rights of men (a very different th ing from reference to the di :i;ien, i.e. to the maxims which furnish to 1 ,t.
their happiness), and in general incapable of all steady principle; the intellectual [part] and to the ideas of reason a superiority "
even a religious discourse 17 which reCOJllmends a cringing, abj ct over sensibility.
seeking of favor and ingratiation of ourselves, whi ch proposes We need not fear that the feeling of the sublime will lose by
the abandonment of all confidence in our own faculti es in oppo- so abstract a mode of presentation- which is quite negative in
sition to the evil within us, instead of a sturdy resolution to respect of what is sensible-for the ima ination, although it
I ~~· ... e.
endeavor to overcome our incljnations by means of those powers finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach itself,
,_ 5 -
which with all our frailty yet remain to us; that false humility yet feels itself unbounded by this removal of its limitations;
which sets the only way of pleasing the Supreme Being in self- and thus that very abstraction is a presentation of the Infinite,
depreciation, in whining hypocritical repentance and in a mere which can be nothing but a mere negative presentation, but
passive state of mind- these are not compatible with any frame which yet expands the soul. Perhaps there is no sublimer
of mind that can be counted beautiful, still less with one which passage in the Jewish law than the command, "Thou shalt not
is to be counted sublime. make to thyself any graven image, nor the likeness of anything
But even stormy movements of mind which may be connected which is in heaven or in the earth or under the earth," etc.
under the name of edification with ideas of religion or-as This command alone can explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish
merely belonging to culture-with ideas containing a social people in their moral period felt for their religion, when they
interest, can in no way, however they strain the imagination, compared themselves with other peoples, or explain the pride
lay claim to the honor of being sUblime presentations unless which Mahommedanism inspires. The same is true of the moral
they leave after them a mental mood which, although only law and of the tendency to morality in us. It is quite erroneous
indirectly, has influence upon the mind's consciousness of its to fear that, if we deprive this [tendency] of all that can recom-
strength and its resolution in reference to that which involves mend it to sense, it will only involve a cold, lifeless assent and
pure intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible). For other- no moving force or emotion. It is quite the other way; for
wise all these emotions belong only to motion, which one would where the senses see nothing more before them and the unmis-
fain enjoy for the sake of health. The pleasant exhaustion, takable and indeli ble idea of morality remains, it would be
consequent upon such disturbance produced by the play of the rather necessary to moderate the impetus of an/ unbounded . -
affections, is an enjoyment of our well-being arising from the imagination to prevent it from rising to enthusiasm, than
restored equilibrium of the various vital forces . This, in the through fear of the powerlessness of the e ideas to seek aid for
end, amounts to the same thing as that state which Eastern them in images and childi h ritual. Thus governments have
voluptuaries find so delightful, when they get their bodies, as willingly allowed religion to be abundantly provided with the
it were, kneaded and all their muscles and joints softly pressed latter accompaniments, and seeking thereby to relieve their
and bent, only that in this case the motive principle is for the subjects of trouble, they have also sought to deprive them of
most part external, in the other case it is altogether internal. the faculty of extending thei r spiritual powers beyond the limits
Many a man believes himself to be edified by a sermon when that are arbitrarily assigned to them and by means of which
indeed there is no edification at all (no system of good maxims), they can be the more easily treated as mere passive 18 beings.
17 [ Cf. p. 102fT.] u [Kirchmann haa "positiv," but this is probably a mere misprint.]
116 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME NT [ 29] [ § 29] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 117

This pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality partly hateful, partly contemptible. There is indeed a mis-
brings with it, on the other hand, no danger of anaticism, willch anthropy (very improperly so called) , the tendency to willch
is a belief in our capacity of seeing something beyond all bounds frequently appears with old age in many right-thinking men,
of sens-Loility, i.e. of dreaming in accordance with fundamental which is philanthropic enough as far as good will to men is con-
propositions (or of going mad with reason); and this is so just cerned, but which, through long and sad experience, is far
because tills presentation is merely negative. For the inscru- removed from satisfaction with men. Evidence of t hi s is afforded
tableness of the idea of fr eedom quite cuts it off from any positive by the propensity to soli tude, the fantastic. wi h for a secluded
presentation, but the moral law is in itself sufficiently and orig- country seat, or (in the ca e of young persons) by the dream of
inally determinant in us, so that it does not permit us to cast 11. t he happiness of passing one's life with a li ttle family upon
glance at any ground of determination external to itself. If some island unknown to the rest of the world , a dream of which
enthusiasm is comparable to madness, fanaticism is comparable storytellers or writers of Robinsonade know how to make good
to monomania, of which t he latter is least of all compatible with use. F alsehood , ingratitude, injustice, t he cillldishness of the
the sublime because, in its detail, it is ridiculous. In enthusiasm , purposes regarded by ourselves as important and great, in the
regarded as an affection, t he imagination is without bridle; in pursuit of which men inflict upon one another all imaginab le
fanaticism, regarded as an inveterate, brooding passion, it is evils, are so contradictory to the idea of what men might be if
without rule. The first is a transitory accident willch sometimes t hey would , and conflict so with our lively wish to see them
befalls the soundest understanding; the second is a disease better, that, in order that we may not hate them (since we can-
which unsettles it. not love them), the renunciation of all social joys seems bu t a
Simplicity (purposiveness without art) is, as it were, the style small sacrifice. This sadness- not the sadness (of which sym-
of nature in the sublime, and so also of morality, willch is a pathy is the cause) for the evils willch fate brings upon other ,
second (supersensible) nature, of which we only know the laws but for tho e tillngs willch men do to one another (which d pends
without being able to reach by intuition that supersensible upon an antipathy in fundamenta propositions)- is sublime,
faculty in ourselves which contains the ground of the legislation. because it rests upon ideas, while t he former can only count as
Now the satisfaction in the beautiful, like that in the sublime, beautiful. The brilliant and t horough aussure,1 9 in his account
is not alone distinguishable from other aesthetical judgments by of his Alpine travels, ays of one of the Savoy mountains,
its universal communicability, 1but also because it acquires an called Bonhomme, "There reigns there a certain insipid
interest through this very property in reference to society (in sadness." He therefore recognized an interesting sadness,
which this communication is possible) . We must, however, which the sight of a solitude might inspire, to which men might
remark that separation from all society is regarded as sublime if wish to transport themselves, that they might neither hear nor
it rests upon ideas that overlook all sensible interest . To be experience any more of the world, willch, however, would not
sufficient for oneself, and consequently to have no need of be quite so inhospitable that it would offer only an extremely
society, without at the same time being unsociable, i.e. without painful retreat . I make tills remark solely with the design of
flying from it, is sometillng bordering on the sublime, as is any indicating again that even depression (not dejected sadness)
di~ensing with wants. On the other hand, to fly from men may be counted among the sturdy affections if it has its ground
from misanthropy, because we bear ill-will to them, or from in moral ideas. But if it is grounded on sympathy and, as
anthropophoby (shyness), because we fear them as foes, is u [Op. cit., II, 181.]
 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 29] [ 29] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 119
118

such, is amiable, it belongs merely to the languid affections. confirms this explanation, not only by cases in which the imag-
[I make this remark] to call attention to the state of mind ination, in combination with the understanding, can excite in
which is sublime only in the first case. us the feeling of the beautiful or of the sublime, but by cases in
which it i combined with sensation. As psychological observa-
tion , these analyses of the phenomena of our mind are exceed-
We can now compare the above transcendental exposition of ingly beautiful and afford rich material for the favorite inve ti-
aesthetical judgments with the physiological worked out by gations of empirical anthropology. It is also not to be denied
Burke and by many clearheaaed men among us, in order to see that all repre entations in us, whether, objectively viewed, they
whither a merely empirical exposition of the sublime and beauti- are merely sensible or are quite intellectual, may yet subjectively
ful leads. Burke, who deserves to be regarded as the most be united to gratification or grief, however imperceptible either
important author who adopts this mode of treatment, infers may be, because they all affect the_feeling of life, and none of
by this method "that the feeling of the sublime rests on the them, so far as it i'Sa modification of the subject, can be indif-
impulse toward self-preservation and on fear, i.e. on a pain, ferent. And so, as Epicurus maintained, all gratification or
which, not going as far as actually to derange the parts of the grief may ultimately be corporeal, whether it arises from the
body, produces movements which, since they purify the finer repr sentations of the imagination or the understanding, because
or grosser vessels of dangerous or troublesome stoppages, are life without a feeling of bodily organs would be merely a con-
capable of exciting pleasant sensations, not indeed pleasure, but sciousness of existence, without any feeling of well-being or
a kind of satisfying horror, a certain tranquillity tinged with the reverse, i.e. of the furthering or the checking of the vital .?.1 ~ ''1-
Lo

terror. " 20 The beautiful, which he founded on love (which he powers. For the ..mind is by itself alone life (the principle of " -
wishes to keep quite separate from desire), he reduces to "the life), and hindrances or furtherances must be sought outside it
relaxing, slackening, and enervating of the fibres of the body, and yet in the man, con equently ·n union with his body.
and a consequent weakening, languor, and exhaustion, a faint- If, however, we place the satisfaction in the object altogether
ing, dissolving, and melting away for enjoyment."
21
And he in the fact that it gratifies us by charm or emotion, we must not
assume that any other man agrees with the aesthetical judgment
so [See Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful, Pt. IV, Sect. 7. "If the
which we pass, for as to these each one rightly consults his own
pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious; if the pain is
not carried to violence, and the terror is not conversant about the present individual sensibili ty. But in t at ca e all censorship of taste
destruction of the person, as these emotions clear the parts, whether fine would disappear, except indeed the example afforded by the
or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome incumbrance, they are capable of accidental agreement of other in their judgments were regarded
producing delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of as commanding our assent; and this principle we should prob-
tranquillity tinged with terror; which, as it belongs to sell-preservation, is
ably resist, and should appeal to the natural right of subjecting
one of the strange t of all the passions." Kant quotes from the German
version published at Riga in 1773. This was a free translation made from the judgment, which rests on the immediate feeling of our own
Burke's fifth edition.] well-being, to our own sense and not to that of any other man .
"[Ibid., Pt. IV, Sect. 19. "Beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the If, then, the judgment of taste is not to be valid merely
whole system. There are all the appearances of such a relaxation; and a egoistically, but according to its inner nature--i.e. on account
relaxation somewhat below the natural tone seems to me to be the cause of of itself, and not on account of the examples that others give of
all positive pleasure. Who is a stranger to th::.t manner of expression so
their taste-to be necessarily valid pluralistically, if we regard
co=on in all times and in all countries, of being softened . relaxed, ener-
vated, dissolved, melted away by pleasure?"] it as a judgment which may exact the adhesion of everyone,
 120 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 30] [§ 30] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 121

then there must lie at its basis some a priori principle (whether accordance with concepts (for a cognitive judgment), but
objective or subjective) to which we can never attain by seeking merely has to do in general with the apprehension of this form, '7/<"' ..-.a.d
out the empirical laws of mental changes. For these only enable so far as it shows itself conformable to the faculty of concepts
us to know how we judge, but do not prescribe to us how we and of the presentation (which is identical with the apprehen-
ought to judge . They do not suppl:y an unconditioned com- sion) of them in the mind. We can thus, in respect of the/
mand, 22 such as judgments of taste presuppose, inasmuch as beautiful in nature, suggest many guestions touching the cause I
they require that the satisfaction be immediately connected with of this purposiveness of their forms, e.g. to explain why nature X
the representation. Thus the empirical exposition of aesthetical has scattered abroad beauty with such profusion, even in the
judgments may be a beginning of a collection of materials for a depth of the ocean, where the human eye (for which alone that
higher investigation; but a transcendental discussion of this purposiveness exists) but seldom penetrates.
faculty is also possible, and is an essential part of the "Critique But the sublime in na ure-if we are passing upon it a pure
of Taste." For if it had not a priori principles, itcouldnoL possibly aestlietical judgment, not mixed up with any concepts of per-
pass sentence on the judgments of others, and it could not fection or objective purposiveness, in which case it would be a
approve or blame them with any appearance of right. teleological judgment- may be regarded ~ quite formless or
TheremainingpartoftheAnalytic of the Aesthetical Judgment devoid of figure, and yet as the object of a pure satisfaction; and
contains first the it may display a subjective purposiveness in the given repre-
sentation. And we ask if, for an aesthetical judgment of thi
kind-over and above the exposition of what is lthought in it
a deduction also of its claim to any (subjective) a pnori principle
may be demanded.
DEDU TIO OF [PURE] 28 AE THETICAL JUDGMENTS To which we may answer that the sublime in nature is im-
properly so called and that, properly speaking, the word should
I ·I I 'I I

c (. ~ I § 30. ,.TilE DEDUCTIO OF A ESTHETICAL JUDGMENTS ON THE

only be applied to a state of mind, or rather to its foundation in
human nature. The apprehension of an otherwise formless and
unpurpo ive object gives merely 1 he occasion, through which we
OBJECTS OF NA'f(ffiE MUST ~BE DIRECTED TO WRAT WE
CALL s_yBLIME I NATURE, ~T ONLY TO ~EAUTIFUL
become conscious of such a state; the object is thus employed as
The claim of an aes~etical judgment to universal validity subjectively purposive, but is not judged as such in itself and
for every subject requires, as a judgment resting on some a priori on account of its form (it is, as it were, a species finalis accepta,
principle, a deduction (or l itimatizin~ of its pretensions), in non data). Hence our expo ition of judgments concerning the
addition to its exposition, if it is concerned with satisfaction or sublime in nature was at the same time their deduction. For
dissatisfaction in the form of the object. Of this kind are judg- when we analyzed the reflection of the judgment in such acts,
ments of taste about the beautiful in nature. For in that case we found in them a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties,
the purposiveness has its ground in the object and in its figure, which must be ascribed ultimately to the faculty of purposes
although it does not indicate its reference to other objects in (the will), and hence is itself purpo ive a priori. This, then,
22 [Reading "Gebot" with Hartenstein and Rosenkranz; Kirchmann
immediately involves the deduction, i.e. the justification of the
has "Gesetz."] claim of such a judgment to univer l and necessary validity.
u [Second edition.] We shall therefore only h~ seek for the deduction of
 ~ L.' 5

122 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [~ 3 1] [ 32] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 123

judgments of taste, i.e. of judgments about the beauty of natural validity, which is not a logical universality in accordance with
things; we shall thus treat satisfactorily the problem with which concepts, but th ni r lity of a singular judgment . econdly,
the whole faculty of aesthetical judgment is concerned. it has a necessity (which must always rest on a priori grounds),
which however does not depend on any a priori grounds of
proof, through the representati on of which the assent that e.'l""·-=--
§ 31. OF THE METHOD OF DE DUCTION OF J U DGMENTS OF T AST S ~ ....-z...
everyone concedes to the judgment of taste could be exacted.-
A deduction , i.e. the guarantee of the legitimacy of a class of The explanation of these logical peculiari tie , wherein a
judgments, is only obligatory if the judgment lays claim to judgment of taste is different from all cognitive judgments- if
neces ity. This it does if it d mands even subj ective univer- we at the outset abstract from all content, viz. from the feeling
sality or the agreement of everyone, although it is not a judg- of pleasure, and mer ly compare the ae thetical form with the
ment of cognition, but only one of pleasure or pain in a given 'p'u •'-rr form of objective judgments as logic prescribes it- is sufficient
object, i.e. it assumes a subj ective purposiveness thoroughly by itself for the deduction of this singul ar faculty. We shall then
valid for everyone, which must not be based on any concept of represent and elucidate by examples the e characteristic proper-
the thing, because the judgment is one of taste. ties of taste.
We have before us in the latter case no cognitive judgment-
neither a theoretical one based on the concept of a nature in § 32. FIRST PECULIARITY OF THE J UDGMENT OF TASTE
general formed by the understandi ng , nor a (pure) practical one '-

based on the idea of fr eedom , as given a priori by reason . There- The judgment of taste determines its obj ect in respect of
fore we have to justify a priori the validity, neither of a judg- satisfaction (in its beauty) with an accompanyi ng claim for the
ment which represents what a thing is, nor of one which pre- assent of everyone , just as if it were objective.
scribes that I ought to do something in order to produce it. To say that "this flower is beautiful") is the same as to assert
We have merely to prove for the judgment generally the univer- its proper claim to ati y everyone. By the pleasantness of its
sal validity of a singular judgment that expresses the subjective smell it has no su ch claim. A smell which one man enjoys gives
purposiveness of an empirical representatio n of the form of an another a headache. ow what are we to presume from this
object, in order to explain how it is possible that a thing can except that beauty is to be regarded as a property of the flo wer
please in the mere act of judging it (without sensation or con- itself, which does not accommodat e itself to any diversity of
cept) and how the satisfaction of one man es:n be proclaimed ' -J-!f- persons or of their sen itive organs, but to which these must
as a ~lefor every other, just as the act of judging of an obj ect accommodat e themselves if they are to pass any judgment upon
for the sake of a cognition in general has uni versal rules . it? And et this is not so . For a judgment of taste consists in
If, now, tills universal validity is not to be based on any calling a thing beautiful just because of that characteristic in
collecting of the suffrages of others or on any questioning of respect of which it accommodates itself to our mode of appre-
them as to the kind of sensations they have but is to rest, as it hension.
were, on an utonomy of the judging subj ec m respect of the Moreover, it is required of every judgment which is to prove
feeling of pleasure (in the given representation), i.e. on ills own the taste of the subj ect that the subj ect shall judge by himself,
taste, and yet is not to be derived from concepts, then a judg- without needing to grope about empirically among the judg-
me rt like this-such as the judgment of taste is, in fact- has a ments of others , and acquaint himself previously as to their
ofold logicalpecul iarity. ' First, there is its a priori universal satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the same object ; thus his
126 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDG 1ENT c~ 33J [§ 34] ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 127

ta te on a knowledge of a sufficient number of object of a and my palate, and thereafter (and not according to universal
certain kind (just as one who believes that he recognizes in the principles) do I pass my judgment. ,, ~
distance as a forest something which all others regard a a town In fact, the judgment of taste always ake the form of a
doubts the judgment of his own sight). But he clearly sees that singular judgment about an objec . The understanding can
the agreement of others gives no valid proof of the judgment form a universal judgment by comparing the object in point of
about beauty. Others might perhaps see and observe for him; the satisfaction it affords with the judgment of others upon it:
and what many have seen in one way, although he believes that e.g., "All t ulips are beautiful." But then this is not a judgment
he has seen it differently, might serve him as an adequate ground of taste but a logical judgment, which takes the relation of an
of proof of a theoretical and consequently logical judgment. object to taste as the predicate of things of a certain species.
But that a thing has pleased others could never serve as the That judgment, however, in which I find an individual given
basi; of an aesthetical judgment. A judgment of others which tulip beautiful, i.e. in w chI find my satisfaction in the object
is unfavorable to ours may indeed rigbtly make us scrutinize to be universally valid, is alone a judgment of taste. Its peculiar-
our own carefully, but it can never convince us of its incorrect- ity consists in the fact that, although it has merely subjective
.ness. There is therefore no empirical ground of proof which validi ty, it claims the as ent of all subjects, exactly as it would
would force a judgment of taste upon anyone. do if it were an objective judgment resting on grounds of
Still less, in the second place, can an a priori proof determine knowledge that could be established by a proof.
accoriling to definite rules a judgment about beauty. If a man
reads me a poem of his or brings me to a play which does not § 34 . THERE IS 0 OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF TASTE POS IBLE
on the whole suit my taste, he may bring forward in proof of the By a principle of taste I mean a principle under the condition
beauty of his poem Batteux 26 or Lessing, or still more ancient of which we could sub ume the concept of an object and thus
and famous critics of taste, and all the rules laid down by them. infer, b means of a syllogism, that the object is beautiful. But
Certain passages which displea e me may agree very well with that is absolutely impossible. For I must immediately feel
rules of beauty (as they have been put forth by these writers and pleasure in the representation of the object, an onha I can
are universally recognized); but I stop my ears, I will listen to be persuaded by no grounds of proof whatever. Although, as
no arguments and no reasoning; and I will rather assume that Hume says, 27 all cri tics can reason more plausibly than cooks,
these ru1es of the critics are false, or at least that they do not yet the same fate awaits them. They cannot expect the deter-
apply to the case in question, than admit that my judgment mining ground of their judgment [ to be derived] from the force
should be determined by grounds of proof a priori. For it is to be of the proofs, but only from the reflection of the subject upon
a judgment of taste, and not of understanding or rea on. 17
[Essay XVIII , "The Sceptic": "Critics can reason and dispute more
It seems that this is one of the chief reasons why this aestheti- plausibly than cooks or perfumers. We may observe, however, that this
ca1 faculty of judgment has been given the name of "taste." uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there is a considerable
For though a man enumerate to me all the ingredients of a dish diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and that education, cus-
and remark that each is separately pleasant to me, and urther tom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently vary our taste of this
extol with justice the wholesomeness· of this particular food, kind . . . . Beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature, and consist
in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in a particular mind,
yet am I deaf to all these rea ons; I try the dish wit,h my L ngue according to the peculiar structure and constitution of that mind." (In
"[Charles Batteux (1713-1780), author of Les Beaux A rts redutl d un Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Aiken, "Hafner Library of
m.2me principe.] Classics" #3, 1948, pp. 338 ff.- Ed.)]
124 <.:RITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME ' T [ 32] [§ 33] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 125

judgment should be pronounce2_ a priori, and not be a mere a priori from common sources) which would not give rise to
imitation, because the thing actually gives univer al pleasure. faulty attempts if every subject had always to begin anew from
However, we ought to think that an a priori judgment must the rude basis of his natural state and if others had not preceded
contain a concept of the object for the cognition of which it him with their attempts. Not that these make mere imitators of
contains the principle, but the judgment of taste is not based those who come after them, but rather by thei r procedure they
upon concepts at all and is in general, not a cognitive, but an put others on the track of seeking in t hemselves principles and
aesthetical judgment. so of pursuing their own course, often a better one. Even in
Thus a young poet does not permit himself to be dissuaded religion-where certainly everyone has to derive t he rule of hi
out of his conviction that his poem is beautiful, by the judgment conduct from himself, because he remains responsible for it and
of the public or of his friends; and if he gives ear to t hem he cannot shift the blame of his transgressions upon others, whe-
does. so, not because he now judges differently, but because, ther his teachers or his predecessors- there is never as much
although (in regard to him) the whole public has false taste, in accompljshed by means of universal precepts, either obtained
his desire for applause he finds rea on for accommodating him- from priests or philosophers or gotten from oneself as by means
self to the common error (even against his judgment). It is of an example of virtue or holiness which, exllibited in history,
only at a later time, when his judgment has been sharpened by does not dispense with the autonomy of virtue based on the
exercise, that he voluntarily departs from his former judgments , proper and original idea of morality (a priori) or change it into
just as he proceeds with those of his judgments which rest upon a mechanical imitation . Following, involving something prece-
reason . Taste [merely] 24 claims autonomy I T make the judg- dent , not ''imitation," is the right expression for all influence
ments of others the determining grounds of his own would be that the products of anemplary author' may have upon others.
heteronomy . And this only means that we draw from the same sources as our
.._ That we, and rightly, recommend the works of the ancients predecessor dirl and learn from him only the way to avail our-
as model~ and call their authors cla sical, thus forming amo~g selves of them. But of all faculties and talents, taste, because its
writers a kind of noble class who give laws to the people by the1r judgment is not determinable by concepts and precepts, is just
example, seems to indicate a posteriori sources of taste and to that one which most needs examples of what has in the progress { f 1

contradict the autonomy of ta te in every subj ect. But we of culture received the longest approval, that it may not become S
might just as well say that the old mathematicians-who are again uncivilized and return to the crudeness of its first - -
regarded up to the present day as supplying models not easily essays.
to be dispensed with for the supreme profundity and elegance of
their synthetical methods-prove that our reason is only imita- § 33. SECOND PECULIARITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE
tive and that we have not the faculty of producing from it, in The judgment of taste is not determinable by grounds of
combination with intuition, rigid proofs by means of the con- ,pr.oof, just as if it were mer"lly sUbjective.
struction of concepts. 25 There is no use of our powers, however If a man, in the first place, does no t find a building, a prospect,
free, no use of reason itsetf (whi ch must create all its judgments or a poem beautiful, a hundred voices all highly praising it will
" [Second edition.] not force his inmost agreement. He may indeed feign that it
u [Cf. Cr-itique of Pu.re Reason, "Methodology," Cb. I, § 1. "The con- pleases him, in order that he may not be regarded as devoid of
struction of a concept is the a priori presentation of the corresponding taste; he may even begin to doubt whether he has formed his
intuition."]
 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 35] [§ 35] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 129
128
its own proper state (of pleasure or pain), all precepts and rules under any concept; because otherwise the necessary universal
agreement [in these judgment ] would be capable of being

-
being rejected.
But although critics can and ought to pursue their reasonings compelled by proofs. Nevertheless it is like the latter in this
so that our judgments of taste may be corrected and extended, that, it claims universality and ecessity though not accordi ng
it is not with a view to set forth the d~termining ground of this to concepts of the object, and consequentl:y a merely subjective
kind of aesthetical judgments in a universally applicable necessity. ow because the concepts in a judgment constitute
formul a, which is impossible; but rather. to investigate the cog- its content (what belongs to the cogn ition of the object), but
nitive faculti es and their exercise in these judgments, and to the judgment of taste is not determinable by concepts, it is
explain by examples) the reciprocal subj ecti v~ pur?osiveness, based only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in
t he form of wnich, as has been shown above, Ill a gwen repre- general. The subjective condi tion of all judgments is faculty "/'
sentation, constitutes the beauty of the obj ect . Therefore the of judgment itself. This, when used with reference to a repre-
. critique of taste is only subj ective as regards the representation sentation by which an object is given, requires the accordance
t ough which an object is given to us, viz . it is the art or of two representative powers, viz. imagination (for the intuition
science of reducing to rules t he reciprocal relation between the and comprehension of the manifold) and understanding (for the
understanding and the imagination in the given representation concept as a representation of the unity of t his comprehension).
(~vitliout reference to any preceding sensation or concept). Now because no concept of the object lies here at t he basis of
That is, it is the art or science of reducing to rules their accord- the judgment, it can only consist in the subsumption of the
ance or disc'Ordance, and of determining the conditions of this . imagination itself (in t he case of a representation by which an
n is an art, if it only shows this by examples; it is a science if object is given) , under the conditions that the understanding
it derives the po sibility of such judgment from the nature of requires to pass from intuition to concepts. That is, because
these faculties, as cognitive facul ties in general. We have here, the freedom of the imagination consi ts in the fact that it
in Transcendenta l Critique, only to do with the latter. It should schematizes without any concept, the judgment of taste must /
develop and justify the subj ective principle of taste, as an a rest on a mere sensation of the.re9proear activity of the imagina- " _/
priori principle of the judgment . This critique, as an art, tioriln its freedom and the understanding with its conformity / /
merely seeks to apply, in t he judging of objects, t he phy io- to law. It must therefore rest n a feeling , which makes us
logicai (here psychological), and therefore empirical, rules judge the object by the purposiv ness of the representation (by
according to which taste actually proceeds (without taking any which an object is given) in re pect of th furtherance )of the
account of their possibili ty); and it criticizes the products of cognitive faculty in its free play. T aste, then, as subj ective
beautiful art just as, regarded as a science, it criticizes t he judgment, contains a prinC!p1e o subsumption , not of intuitions
faculty by which they are judged . under concepts, but of the facultyofint ui tions or presentations
(i.e. the imagination) un er the aculty of the concepts (i.e . the
understanding) , so far as the former in its fr eedom harmonizes
§ 35 . ~ THE PRI CIPL OF TASTE I S THE SUBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE
with the l11.tter in its conformity to law.
OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL
In order to discover this ground of legitimacy by a deduction
The judgment of taste is distinguished from a logical judg- of the judgments of taste, we can only take as a clue the formal
ment in this that the latter subsumes a representation under peculiarities of this kind of judgments, and consequently can
the concept of the object, while the former does not subsume it only consider their logical form .
,~ 1-t f. .~..,ttj )"··u r i',<J.f, '.)
130 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME:-11' [' 36] [§ 37] A ALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 131

ment po sible in which merely from our own feeling of pleasure

§ 36. OF THE PROBLEM OF A DEDUCTION OF JUDGMENTS in an object, indep ndently of its concept, we judge that thi -
OF TA ~ TE
pleasure attaches to the representation of the same object in
The concept of an object in general can immediately be com- every other subject, and that a priori without waiting for the
bin d with the perception of an object, containing it empirical accordance of others?
predicat s, so as to form a cognitive judgment; and it i thus It is easy to see that judgments of taste are synthetical, be-
that a judgment of exp rience is produced. 28 At the ba is of cause they go beyond the concept and even beyond the intuition
thi lie a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of the object, and add to that intuition as predicate something
of intuition, by which the manifold i thought as the deter- that is not a cognition , viz . a fe ling of pleasure (or pain).
mination of an object. The concept (the categories) require Although the predicate (of the personal pleasure bound up with
a deduction, which is given in the Critique of Pure R eason; and the representation) is empirical, nevertheless, as concerns the
by it we can get the solution of the problem: how are ynthetical required assent of everyone t he judgments are a priori, or desire
a priori cognitive judgments pos ible? This problem concerns to be regarded as such; and this is already involved in the expres-
then the a priori principle of the pure under Landing and its sions of this claim. Thus this problem of the Critique of J udg-
t heoretical judgments. ment belongs to the general problem of t ranscendental phil-
But with a perc ption there can also be combined a feelin g of osophy: how are synt hetical a priori judgmen t possible?
pleasure (or pain) and a satisfaction, hat accompanies the ..,.... , In., .
representation of the obj ct and serve in tead of its pr dicate; § 37. WHAT I S PROPERLY ASSERTED A PRI ORI OF AN OBJ ECT
thus t here can result an aesthetical noncognitive judgmen t. I N A JUDGMENT OF TASTE
At t he basis of such a judgment- if it is not a mere judgment of
sensation but a forma l judgment of reflection, which imputes That the representation of an object is immediately bound
the same sati faction necessarily to everyone--mu t lie some up with pleasure can only be internally perceived; and if we did
a priori principle, \rh ich may be merely subjecti\·e (if an ob- no wish to indicate anything more than t his, it would give a
jective one should prove impos ible fo r judgment of this kind ) , merely empirical judgmen t . For I cannot comb ine a definite
but also as such may need a deduction , that we may thereby feeling (of pleasure or pain) with any representation , except
com rehend how an aesthetical judgmen t can lay claim to where there is at bottom an a priori principle in the reason
necessity . n this i founded the problem with which we are determining the will . In th at case t he pleasure (in the moral
now occupied: how are judgments of taste possible? This prob- feeling) is the consequence of the principle, bu t cannot be com-
lem, tpen , has to do with the a priori principles of the pur pared with the pleasure in taste, because it requires a definite
faculty of judgment in aesthetical judgment , i.e . judgments in concept of a law; and the latter pleasure, on the contrary, must
which it has not (as in theoretical ones) merely to subsume be bound up with the mere act of judging , prior to all concepts .
under objective concepts of un derstanding and in wh ich it is H ence also all judgments of taste are singular judgments,
subject to a law, but in which it is itself, subjectively, b th because t hey donot combine their predicate of satisfaction with
object and law. a concept, but with a given individual empirical representation .
This prob lem then may be thus repre ente : how is a judg- And so it isn ot the p1easure, but the41.11.~l,..validi.lif of this "
leasure, perceived as mentally bound up with t he m ere judg-
28 [For the distinction- an important one in Ka nt- between judgm nts

of experience and judgments of perception, see his P rolegomena , § 18.] ment upon an obj ect , hich is represented a priori in a judgment
 (V; <., p(lt"/. flo.HS tiA/./1.•/.
,
t /, (
1
f
f./, I-~ .JL

132 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTIIETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 3 J [§ 39] A ALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 133

of taste as a .univer al rule for the judgment and valid for ev ry- Remark
one. It is an empirical judgment [to say] that I perceive and
judge an object with plea ure. But it is an a priori judgment, This d duction i thus easy, b cause it has no need to justify
[ to say J that I find it beautiful, i.e. I attribute this satisfaction the objective reality of any concept, for beauty is not a concept
necessarily to everyone . of the object and the judgment of taste is not cogni ive . It only
maintains that we are justified in presupposing universally in
every man those subjective conditions of the judgment which t.. ~·~· ,vzl'
§ 38. DEDUCTIO OF J UDGMENTS OF TASTE we find in ourselves; and further , that we have rightly subsumed _ , ,.. 1
If it be admitted that, in a pure judgment of taste, the satis- the given object under these condit ions . The latter has indeed
faction in the object is combined with the mere act of judging its unavoidable difficulties which do not beset t he logical judgment.
form, it is nothing else than its subjective purposiveness for the There we subsume under concepts, but in the aesthetical judg-
1 (Is •1 judgment which we feel to be mentally combined with the ment under a merely n · le relation between the imagination ' 7f.- -
repre entation of the object. The judgment, as regards the and understanding mutually harmonizing in the representation P
formal rules of its action, apart from all matter (whether sensa- of the form of the object-in which case the subsumption may I
tion or concept), can only be directed to the subjective condi- easily be deceptive . Yet the legitimacy of the claim of the
tions of its employment in general (it is appli ed 29 neither to a judgment in counting upon universal assent is not thus annulled;
par ticular mode of cnse nor to a particular concept of the it reduces itself merely to judging as valid for everyone the
understanding), and consequently to that subjective [element] correctness of the principle from subjec tive grounds. For as to
which we can pre uppose in a11 men (as requisite for po sible the difficulty or doubt concerning the correctness of the sub-
cognition in general). Thus the agreement of a representation sumption under that principle, it makes the legitimacy of the
with these conditions of the judgment must be capable of being claim of an aesthetical judgment in general to such validity and
assumed as valid a priori for everyone . That is, we may rightly the principle of the same as little doubtful as the alike (though
impute to everyone the pleasure or the subj ective purposivene s neither so commonly nor readily) faulty subsumption of the
of the representation for the relation between the cognitive logical judgment under its principle can make the latter, an
faculties in the act of judging a sensible object in general.3° objective principle, doubtful . But iii the question were to be, 1!,
a
"How is it possible to assume nature priori to be a complex
•G [First edition has "limited ." ] of objects of taste?" this problem has reference to teleology,
10 In order to be justified in claim ing universal assent for an aesthetical because it must be regarded as a purpose of nature essentially
judgment that rests merely on subjective groun ds, it is sufficient to assume : belonging to its concept to exhibit forms that are purposive for
(1) That the subjective conditions of the judgment, as regards the relat ion our judgment . But the correctness of this latter assumption is
of t e cogn itive powers thus pu mto activity to a cogn ition in general are very doubtful, whereas the efficacy of natural beauties is patent
the same in a ll men. This must be true, because otherwise men would..not
be ab le to co=un icate their representat io ns 1or even their knowledge.
to experience .
r (2)' ·JJdgment must merely have reference to this relatiQn (consequently
to the formal condition of the judgment) and be pure, i.e. not mingled either
§ 39. OF THE COMMUNICABILITY OF A SENSATION
with.concepts of the object or with sensations, as determining gro unds . If
there has been any mistake -as regards this latter condition, then there is If sensation, as the real in perception, is related to knowledge,
only an inacc urate app lication of the privilege, which a law gives us, to a
it is called sensation of the senses; and its specific quality may
particular case; but that does not destroy the privilege itseU in general.
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134 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 39] [§ 40] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME
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be repres nted as generally communicable in a uniform way, if Without having as rule any purpose or fundamenta op ition, ,',..,.,(~~
we assume that everyone has senses like our O\vn. But this this pl asure accompanies he ordinary ap reb nsio fan object '
cannot at all be presuppo ed of any single sensation. To a man by the imagination, as faculty of intuition, in rela ion with the
who is deficient in the sense of smell, this kind of s nsation can- understanding, as faculty of concepts, by means of a procedure
not be communicated; and even if it is not wholly deficient, we of the judgment which it mu t also exercise on behalf of the
cannot be certain that he gets exactly the same sen ation from common st expenence; only that in the latter ca e it is in order
a flower that we have. But even more must we represent men to perceive an mpirical objective concept, in the former case
as differing in respect of the pleasantness or unpleasantness (in aesthetical judgments) merely to perceive the accordance of
involved in the sensation from the same object of sen e; and it the repr entation with the harmonious (subjectively purposive) ~
is absolutely not to be required that every man shou ld take activity of both cognitive faculti sin their fr dom, i.e. to feel
pleasure in the same objects. Pleasure of this kind, bccn.u e it with plP.a ure the mental state produced by the representation.
comes into the mind through the senses, in respect of which This pleasure must nece sari ly d pend for everyone on th same
therefore we are passive , we may call the plea ure of enjoyment.
(111 conditions, for they are subj ctive condition of the po sibility l
_§atisfac wn in an action because of its moral charac er is, on of a cognition in gen ral; and the proportion b twe n these
the other hand, not the pleasure of enjoyment, but of jspon- cognitive facultie r quisit for taste is also r quisite for that 1 ~ •• '...- ~-t
taneity and its accordance with the idea of its destination. But ordinary sound under tanding wnicb we have to presuppose in j
this feeling, called moral, requires concepts and presents, not everyone. Therefore h e who judges with taste (if only he does I
free purposiveness, but purposiveness that is conformable to not go astray in this act of consciousne s and mistake matter
law; it therefore admits of being universally communicated only for form or charm for beauty) may impute to everyone sub-
by means of reason and, if the plea ure is to be homogeneous jective purposiven , i.e. his satisfaction in the object, and
for everyone, by very definite practical concepts of reason. may as ume his feeling to be universally communicable and
Pleasure in the sublime in nature, regarded as a pleasure of that without the media Jon of concepts .
rational contemplation, a lso makes claim to univer a! participa-
tion, but it presupposes, besides, a different feeling, viz. that § 40. OF TASTE AS A KIND OF SENSUS ~OMMUNIS
of our supersensible destination, which, however obscurely, has
a moral foundation. But that other men will take account of We often give to the judgment, if we are considering the
it and will find a satisfaction in the consideration of the wild result rather than the act of its reflection, the name of a sense,
greatness of nature (that certainly cannot be ascribed to its and we speak of a sense of truth, or of a sen e of decorum, of
aspect, which is rather terrifying) I am not absolutely ju tified justice, etc. And yet we know, or at least we ought to know,
in supposing. Nevertheless, in consideration of the fact that that these concepts cannot have their place in sense, and
on every suitable occasion regard should be had to these. moral further, that sense has not the least capacity for expressing
dispo ition , I can imp~te such satisfaction to every man, but universal rules; but that no representation of truth, fitness,
only by means of the moral law, which on its side again is based beauty, or justice, and so forth could come into our thoughts
on concepts of reason. if we could not ri e beyond sense to higher faculti es of cognition.
On the contrary, pleasure in the bea11tiful is neither a pleasure The common unde standing of men, which, as the mere healthy
1 (not yet cultivat d) understanding, we regard as the least to
of enjoyment nor of a law-abiding activity, nor even of rational
contemplation in accordance with ideas, but of mere reflection. be expected from anyon,e claiming the name of man, has there-
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136 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL J UDGME T [§ 40] [ 40] A ALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 137

fore the doubt ul honor of being given the name of "common

'common" (n t merely in our language, where the word actually

h - a double ignification, but in many others), we understand
----
ense" (sensus communi s); and in such a way that, by the name
prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is to represent nature
as not subject to the rules that the understanding places at its
basis by means of its own essential law, i.e. is superstition.
Deliverance from superstition is called enlightenment, 32 because,
lgar," th t which is everywhere met with, the possession of although this name belongs to deliverance 1rom preJudjces in
/ -W
l
- ..-Jc..--indic tes absolutely no merit or superiority.
But und the sensus communis we must include the idea of
general, yet superstitjon specially (in sensu eminenti) deserves
to be called a prejudice. For the blindness in which superstition
/ a sensa :urrtcrail, i.e. of a faculty of judgment which, in its places us, which it even imposes on us as an obligation, makes
reflection, takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation the need of being guided by others, and the consequent passive
of all other men~n thoughs.(in order, as it were, to compare its (' 1 ~ k state of ou7reason, pecuEarly noticeable. As regards the second·
4
judgment with the collective reason of humanity and thus to ,.,_ maxim of the mind, we are otherwise wont to call him limited
escape the illusion arising from the private conditions that 1 <• #l (borne, the opposite of enlarged) whose talents attain to no great
could be so easily taken for objective, which would injuriously Jt. .,.,/: use (especially as regards intensity). But here we are not peak- ;J_. ~ .k. .,
affect the judgment. This is done by comparing our judgment ing of the faculty of cognition ~ut of the mode of thought hich o. ~ I- J

with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others, makes a purposive use thereof However small may be the area

~I and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man, by

abstracting from the limitations which contingently attach to
our own judgmen.f] This again is brought about by leaving II
or the degree to which a man's natural gifts reach , yet it indi-
cates a man of} enlarged thought if he disregards the subjective / /
private conditions of his own judgment, by which so many
aside as much as possible the matter of our representative state, others are confined, and reflects upon it from a-tmi.ver al, stand- "', , .., i·~.c
i .e. sensation, and simply having respect to the formal eculiari- point (which he can only determine_by placrng himself at the
ties of our representation or representative state . Now this standpoint of others). The third maxim, viz. that of~ n · v s '~
operation of reflectio seems perhaps too artificial to e attrib- thought, is the most dlfficult to attain, and can onlybe attained
u e o the faculty called common sense, but it only appears so by the combination of both the former and after the constant
when expressed in abstract formulae. In itself there is nothing observance of them has grown into a habit. We may say that
more natural than to abstract from charm or emotion if we are the first of these maxims is the maxim of understanding, the
seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule. second of judgment, and the third of reason.
- The following maxims oi common human understan ing do I take up again the threads interrupted by this igression
not properly come in here, asparts of the Critique of Taste, but and I say that taste can be called sensus communis with more
et they may serve to elucidate its funJamental propositions.
12 We soon see that, although enlightenment
They are: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to put ourselves in thought is easy in thesi, yet in
hypothesi it is difficult and slow of accomplishment. For not to be passive
in the place of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently . !IB regards reason , but to be always self-legislative, is m eed quite e!IBy for
The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought; the second of tlie man who wishes only to be in accordance with his essential purpose and
enlarged thought; the thira of ~utiv6 thought. 31 The first does not desire to know what is beyond his understanding. But since we
is the maxim of a never passive reason. The tendency to such can hardly avoid seeking this, and there are never wanting others who
passivity, and therefore to heteronomy of the reason, is called promise with much confidence that they nre able to satisfy our curiosity, / /..
it mu.st be very hard to maintain in or restore to the mind (especially the $
11 [Kant lays down these three maxima in his Introduction to Logic, mind of the public) that bare negative which properly constitutes enlight- /. 7
~ 7, !IB "general rules and conditions of the avoidance of error."] enment.
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\ 3 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [§ 41] [§ 41] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 139

ustice than sound understandin_g can, and that the aesthetical can be combined with it. Tills combination, however, can only
pudgment rather than the intellectual may bear the name of a be indirect, i .e. taste must first of all be represented as combined
~~ al-1, 33 if we are willing to use the word "sense" with something else, in order that we may unite with the sati -
o an effect of mere reflection upon the mind, fo r then we under- action of mere reflection upon an object pleasure in its exist-
stand by sense the f eling of pleasure. We could even define ence (as that wherein all interest con ists) For here also in
_/ 1 taste] as the faculty of judging ~£ that which makes universally aestbetical judgments what we say in cognitive judgments (of
~ communicable, without the mediation of a conceP't,Our feeling things in general) is valid; a posse ad esse non valet consequentia.
in a given representation. This something else may be empirical, viz. an inclination proper
t:Jth'/,_.a- The akiH ~ at men have in communicati ng their thoughts to human nature, or intellectual, as the property of the will of
I requires also a relation between t he im agin ation and £be unaer- being capable of a priori determination by reason. Both these
standing in order to associate int ui tions with concepts, and involve a satisfaction in the of an object, and so can t ~u t'(.
oncepts again wit those concepts, which then combine in a lay the found ation for an interest in what has by itself pleased ____..,
cogn ition . But in that case the agreement of the two mental without reference to any interest whatever.
powers is according to law, und er the constrain t of definite con- Empiricall the beautiful interests only in society. / If we
cepts. _Only where the imagination in its freedom awakens the admit the impulse to society as natural o man, an"'lifs fitness
understanding and is put by it into regular play, without the for it, and ills propension toward it, i.e. sociability, as a requisite
'./ aid of concepts ,\does the representation communicate itself, for man as a being destined for society, an so as a property
not as a t hought, b ut as an mternal feeling of a purposive state belonging to humanity, we cannot escape from regarding taste ) ,.. .....,.. tl ,
of the mind . , as a faculty for ju ging everything in respect of which we can ',L..
:=-T aste is then the faculty of judging a priori o the communi- communicate our f eP.ling to all other men, and so as a means of
..g_ability of feelings t hat are bound up with a given representation.1J furthermg t hat which everyone's natural inclination desires .
( ·thout the mediation of a concept) ·1.· f , ~ A man abandoned by himself on a desert island would adorn
If we could assume that the mere 'tlniversal communicability neit er his hut nor his p rson; nor would he seek for flowers,
_,....-: of a feeling must carry in itself an interest for us with i (whi ch , still less would he grow plants, in order to adorn himself t here-
/ h owever, "·e are not justifi ed in concluding from the character with. It is only in society that it occurs to rum to be, not merely
of a merely reflective judgment), ~ve should be able to explain a man , but a refined man after his kind (the beginning of civili-
why the feeling in t he judgment o taste comes to be impu ted zation). For such do we judge him to be who is both inclined
to everyone, so to speak, as a duty'l and apt to communicate ills pleasure to others and who is not
:___}
contented with an object if he cannot feel satisfaction in it in
§ 41. OF THE EMPIRICA~ I NTEREST) N THE BEAUTIFUL
common mth others. Again, everyone expects and requires
from everyone lse t his reference to universal communication
/
That the judgment of taste by which something is declared [of pleasure], as it were from an original compact dictated by
beautiful must have no interest as its determining ground has humanity itself. Thus , doub tless, in the beginning only t hose
been sufficiently established above. But it does not follow that, t ing·s w1lich attracted the senses, e.g. colors for painting one-
after it has been given as a pure aesthetical judgment, no interest self (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iro-
"We may designate taste as sensus communis aestheticus, co=on qu ois) , flowers, mussel shells, beautiful feathers, etc.-but in
understanding as sensus communis logicus. time beautiful forms also (e.g. in their canoes, and clothes,
 ~~

14 l 1 TRODUCTION IXTROD UCTION 15

faculty of knowledge the understanding is alone legislative, if this concept has a place) i alone a priori legi lative. ow /
(as must ~appen when it is considered by it elf without con- betw en the facultie of knowledge an desire- there is the
fu ion wit,h the faculty of de ire) this faculty is referred to feeling of plea ur , just a the judgment mediates between the
nature as t he faculty of theoretical knowledge; for in respect of understanding and the rca on. We may £her fore suppo e pro-
nature (as phenomenon) it is alone po sible for us to give laws visionally that the judgment li kewi e contains in itself an a
by means of natural cone pt a priori, i.e. by pure concept of priori principle. And a pleasur or pain is necessarily combined
understanding. For the facul ty of de ire, as a suprem facu l y with the faculty of de ire ( ith r preceding this principle, as in
4 according to the concept of freedom, the rea on (in which alone the lower desir s, or following it, as in the higher, when the
been found fault with, viz., that it is [the being's]jaculty of becoming , by
desire is determined by the moral law), we may also suppose
meam of its representatiom, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these that the judgment will bring about a tran ition from the pure
representatiom; for the desires might be mere -'nfl , and by means of /1 ~1.5 faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural concepts, to the
these alone everyone is convinced the object cannot be produced. But realm of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it
this proves nothing more than that there are desires in man, by wh ich he is ~akes possible the tran ition from understanding to reason.
in contradiction with himself. For here he strives for the production of the
object by means of the representation alone, from which he can expect no
Although, then, phil o ophy can be divided only into two main
result , because he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I m ay so call parts, the theoretical and the practical, and although all that we
those which are not psychological), wh ich must be determined by th at may be able to say of the special principles of judgment must be
representation to bring about the object (mediate ly), are either not compe- counted a belonging in it to the theoretical part, i .e. to rational
tent or even tend toward wh at is impossible, e .g. to reverse the past (0 cognition in accorda nce with natm al concepts, yet the critique
mihi praetenws ... etc.) or to annihilate in the impatience of expectation
the interval before the wished for moment. Although in such fantastic
of pure rea on , whi ch must decide all this, as regards the possi-
desires we are conscious of the inadequacy (or even the unsuitab ility) of bility of the system before undertaking it, consists of three
our representations for being causes of their objects, yet their reference as part :the critique of pur understanding , of ure judgment, and
causes, and consequently the representation of their causality, is contained Of pure rea on, which facultie a re called pure because they are
in eve ry wish; and this is peculiarly evident if the wish is an affection or legi lative a priori.
lon,ginq . For these [longings] , by their dilatation and contraction of the
heart and consequent exhaustion of powers , prove that these powers are
con tinually kept on the stretch by representations , but that they perpetu- IV. OF JU DGME T AS A FACU LTY LEGISLATI ' G A PRIORI
ally let the mind, having regard to the impossibility [of the desire], fall
back in exhaustion. Even prayers [offered up] to avert great and (as far Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular
as one can see) unavoidable e\ ils, and many superstitious means for attain- as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule ,
ing in a natural way impossible purposes, point to the casual reference of
representations to their objects, a reference which cannot at all be checked
the principle, the law) be given, t he judgment which subsumes
by the consciousness of the inadequacy of the effort to produce the effect. the particular under it (even if, as transcendental judgment, it
All to why there should be in our nature this propensity to desires which are furnishes, a priori, the conditions in conformity with which sub-
consciously vain that is an anthropologico-teleological problem. It see!D8 sumption under that universal is alone possible) is determinant .
that, if we were not determined to the application of our powers before we Bu t if only the part icular be given for which the universal has to
were assured of the adequacy of our faculties to produce an object, these
powers would remain in great part unused. For we co=only learn to
be found, the judgment is merely re clive.
know our powers only by first making trial of them. This de·c eption in the The determinant judgment only subsumes under universal
case of vain wishes is then only the consequence of a benevolent ordinance transcendental laws given by the -understanding; the law is
in our nature. [This note was added by Kant in the Second Edition .] ~rked out for it, a priori , and it has therefore no need to .t>eek: v" r vi &
 140 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [ 42] [§ 42] ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 141

etc.), which bring with them no gratification or sati faction of moral character. But it is not without reason that they have
enjoyment- were important in society and were combined with b en contradicted by others who rely on experience; for this
great interest. Until at last civilization, having reached its shows that connoisseurs in taste not only often, but generally ,
highest point, makes out of this almost the main business of are given up to idle, capricious, and mischievous passions, and
refined inclination, and sensations are only regarded as of worth tha they could perhaps make less claim than others to any
in so far as they can be universally communicated. Here, al- superiority of attachment to moral principles. Thus it would
though the pleasure which everyone has in such an object is seem that the feeling for the beautiful is not only (as actually is
inconsiderable and in itself without any marked interest, yet the case) specifically different from the moral feeling, but that
the idea of its universal communicabilit y increases its worth in the interest which can be bound up with it is hardly compatible
an almost infinite degree. with moral interest, and certainly has no inner affinity therewith.
But ~ interest that indirectly attaches to the beautiful Now I admit at once t hat the interest in the beautiful of art
through our inclination to society, and consequently is empirical, (und er which I include the artificial use of natural beauties for
is of no importance for us now, becau:;e we have only to look to adornment and so for vanity) furnishes no proof whatever of a
what may have a reference, although only indirectly, to the disposition attached to the morally good or even inclined there-
judgment of taste a priori. For if an interest should also be to. But on the other handt..!._maintain that to take an immediate
detected as bound up with thi~, taste would detect for our interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in
faculty of judging a means of passing from sense enjoyment to - judging it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, when thi s
moral feeling ; and so not only would we be the better guided interest is habitual, it at least indicates a frame of mind favor-
in employing taste purposively, but there would be thus re- able to the moral feeling if it is voluntarily bound up with the
_.......-.: sented link in the chain of the human facul ties a priori on contemplation of nature. It is to be remembered, however, that
which all legislation must depend. We can only say this much I here speak strictly of the beautiful forms of nature, and I set
about the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste aside the charms that she is wont to combine so abundantly with
itself. ince it is subservient to inclination, however refined the them, because, t hough the interest in the latter is indeed im-
latter may be, it may easily be confounded with all the inclina- medi ate, it is only empirical.
tions and passions which attain their greatest variety and H e who by himself (and without any design of communicating
highest degree in society; and the interest in the beautiful, if it h1s observations t o others) regards the beautiful figure of a wild
is grounded thereon, can only furnish a very ambigu ous transi- flower, a bird , an insect, etc., with admiration and love; who
tion from t he pleasant to the good. But whether this can or ViOUld not willingly mi s it in nature although it may bring him
cannot be furthered by taste, taken in its purity, is what we some damage; who still less wants any advantage from it- he
now have to investigate. takes an immediate and also an intellectual interest in the
beauty of nature. That is, it is not merely the form of the pro-
duct of nature which pleases him, but its very p.t'618eftee pleases p,:'l~ .-tt"r'
§ 42. OF THE INTELLECTUAL I TERES'II IN THE BEAUTIFUL him, the charms of sense having no share in this pleasure and
I----
With the best intentions, t hose persons who refer all activities no purpose whatever being combined with it.
to which their inner natural dispositions impel men to the final But it is notewort hy that if we secretly deceived this lover
purpose of humanity, viz. the morally good, have regarded the of the beautiful by planting in the ground artificial flowers
taking an interest in the beautiful in general as a mark of good (which can be manufactured exactly like natural ones) or by
 (

[ 42] [' 42] ANALYTIC OF T E SUBLIME 143

142 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME T

placing artificially carved birds on the bough of t rees, and he into a law for everyone, with t our judgment b ing ba ed on
discover d the deceit, the immecliate interest that he previously any intere t whatever, thou in this case it produces such an
took in them would clisappear at once1 though perhaps a differ- interest. The pleasure or.pajlt in the former judgment is called
ent interest, viz. the interest of vanity in adorning his chamber that of taste, in the latter that of moral feeling.
with them for the eyes of others, would take its place. This But it also interest reason that the idea (for which in moral
thought then must accompany our intuition and reflection on feeling it arouses an immediate inter st) should have objective
eauty, viz. that nature has produced it; and on this alone is reali ty, i.e. that nature should at lea t show a trace or give an
based the immediate interest that we take in it. Otherwise there indication that it contains in itself a ground for assuming a
remains a mere judgment of taste, either devoid of all in terest, regular agreement of its products with our entirely disinterested
or bound up with a mediate interest, viz. in that it has reference ·atisfaction (which we recognize a priori as a law for everyone,
to society, which latter [interest] furnishes no certain indica- without being able to ba e it upon proofs). H ence reason must
tions of a morally good disposition . take an interest in every expre sion on t he part of natur of an
This superiority of natural to artificial beauty in t hat it alone agreement of this kind. Consequen tly , the mind cannot ponder
arouses an immediate interest, although as regards form the upon the beauty of natu re without finding it elf at the same
former may be surpassed by the latter, harmonizes with the time interested therein. But ~ intere ~ i~kin to moral, and
refined and thorough mental attitude of all men who have he who takes such an interest in the beauties of nature can do so
cultivated their moral feeling. If a man who has taste enough only in o far as he previously has firmly establi hed his interest
to judge of the products of beautiful art with the greatest accu- in the morally good. If , therefore, the beauty of nature interests
racy and refinement willingly leaves a chamber where are to be a man immed iately, we have reason for attributing to him at
found those beauties that minister to vanity or to any social joys least a basis for a good moral disposition.
and turns to the beautiful in nature in order to find, as it were, It will be aid t hat thi account of aesthetical judgment 1 as
delight for his spirit in a train of thought that he can never com- akin to the moral feeling, seems far too studi ed to be regarded
pletely evolve, we will regard this choice of his with veneration as the true inte rpretation of that cipher through which nat ure
and attribute to him a beau tiful soul , to which no connoisseur speaks to us figuratively in her beauti u forms. However, in the
or lover [of art] can lay claim on account of the interest he first place, thi immediate in terest in the beautiful is actuall y
takes in his [artistic] objects. What now is the clifference in not common, but is peculi ar to those whose mental disposition
our estimation of these two clifferent kinds of objects, which in either has already been cultivated in the direction of the good or
the judgment of mere taste it is hard to compare in point of is eminently susceptible of such cultivation . In that case the
superiority ? analogy between the pure judgment of taste which, independ-
We have a faculty of mere aesthetical judgment by which we ently of any interest, causes us to feel a satisfactio n and also
judge forms without the aid of concepts and find a satisfactio n represents it a priori as suitable to humanity in general, and
in this mere act of judgment; this we make into a rule for every- the moral judgment that does the same thing from concepts
one, without this judgment either being based on or producing without any clear, subtle, and premedita ted reflection- ibis
any interest. On the other hand, we have also a faculty of analogy leads to a similar immecliate interest in the objects of
intellectua l judgment which determines an a priori satisfaction t he former as in those of the latter ; only that in the one case
for the mere forms of practical maxims (so far as they are in the int re t is free, in the other it i based on obj ective laws.
themselves qualified for universal legjslation); this we make To this is to be added our admiration for nature, which displays
144 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 42] [§ 43] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 145

beautiful products as art, not merely by chance, but

itself in its....__ pret nature, whether it have this de ign or not. But the interest
as it were designedly, in accordance with a regular arrangement which we here take in beauty has only to do with the beauty of
and as purposiveness without purpose. This latter, as we never nature; it vanishes altogether as soon as we notice that we are
meet with it outside ourselves, we naturally seek in ourselves deceived and that it is only art- vanishes so completely that
and, in fact , in that which constitutes t~ultimate purpose of taste can no longer find the thing beautiful or sight find it
our being, viz. our moral destination. (Of this question as to the charming. What is more highly praised by poets than the
ground of the possibility of such natural purposiveness we shall bewitching and beautiful note of the nightingale in a lonely
first speak in t he teleology.) copse on a still summer evening by the soft light of the moon?
It is easy to explain why the satisfaction in the pure aesthetical And yet we have instances of a merry host, where no such
judgment in the case of beautiful art is not combined with an songster was to be found, deceivin to their great contentment
immediate interest, as it is in the case of oeautiful nature. For the guests who were staying with him to enjoy the country air
the ormer is either such an imitation of the latter that it reaches by hiding in a bush a mischievous boy who knew how to produce
the point of deception and then produces the same effect as this sound exactly like nature (by means of a reed or a tube in
natural beauty (for which it is taken), or it is an art obviously his mouth). But as soon as we are aware that it is a cheat, no
directed designedly to our satisfaction. In the latter case the one will remain long listenin g to the song which before was
satisfaction in the product would, it is true, be brought about counted so charming. And it is just the same with the songs of
immediately by taste, but it would be only a mediate interest all other birds. It must be nature or be regarded as nature if
in the cause lying at its root, viz. an art that can only interest we are to take an immediate interest in the beautiful as such,
by means of its purpose and never in itself . It will, perhaps, be and still more is this the case if we can require that other should
said that this is also the case if an object of nature interests us take an interest in it too. This happens as a matter of fact when
by its beauty only so far as it is associated with a moral idea. we regard as coarse and ignoble the mental attitude of those
But it is not the object itself which immediately interests us, persons who have no f eeling for beautiful nature (for thus we
but its character in virtue of which it is qualified for such asso- describe a susceptibility to interest in its contemplation), and
ciation, which therefore essentially belongs to it. who confine themselves to eating and drinking- to the mere
The charms in beautiful nature, which are so often found, as enjoyments of sense.
it were, fused with beautiful forms, may be referred to modifica-
tions either of light (colors) or of sound (tones). For these are § 43. OF ART IN GENERAL
the only sensations that imply, not merely a aensible feeling, but
also reflection upon the form of these modifications of sense; (1) Art is distingui hed froll). nature as doing acere) is
and thus they involve in themselves as it were a language by distinguished from acting or working generally (agere), and as
which nature speaks to us, which thus seems to have a higher the product or result of the former is distinguished as work
sense. Thus the white color of lilies seems to determine t.he (opus) from the workin (effectus) of the latter.
mind to ideas of innocence; and the seven colors 1 in order from By right we ought only to escribe as art, production through
the red to the violet, seem to suggest the ideas of {1) sublimity, freedom , i .e. through a will that places reason at the basis of
(2) intrepidity, (3) candor, (4) friendliness , (5) modesty, (6) its actions. For although we like to call the product of bees
constancy, (7) tenderness . The song of birds proclaims glad- (regularly built cells of wax) a work of art , this is only by way
someness and contentment with existence. At least so we inter- of analogy; as soon as we feel that this work of theirs is based
148 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL J DGMENT [§ 44] [' 45] Al'<ALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 149

(rhetoric and poetry), have come to be called beautiful sciences in it very concept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment,
by a transposition of words. from mere sensation, but mu t be derived from reflection; and
If art which is adequate to the cognition of a possible object thus aesthetical art, as the art of beauty, has for standard the
performs the actions requisite therefor merely in order to make reflective judgment and not sensation .
it actual, it is mechanical art; but if it has for its immediate
design the feeling of pleasure, it is called aesthetical art. This is § 45. BEAUTIFUL ART IS AN ART IN SO FAR AS IT SEEMS
again either pleasant or beautiful. It is the first if its purpose is LIKE ATURE
that the pleasure should accompany the representations [of the
object] regarded as mere sensations; it is the second if they are In a product of beautiful art, we must become conscious that
regarded as modes of cognition. it is art and not nature; but yet the purposiveness in its form
Pleasant arts are those that are directed merely to enjoyment . must seem to be as free from all constraint of arbitrary rule as
0 this class are all those charming arts that can gratify a com- if it were a product of mere nature. On this feeling of freed~m
pany at table, e.g. the art of telling stories in an entertaining in the play of our cognitive faculties, which must at the same
way, of starting the company in frank and lively conversation, time be purposive, rests that pleasure which alone is universally
of raising them by jest and laugh to a certain pitch of merri- communicable, without being based on concepts. Nature is
ment;86 when, as people say, there may be a great deal of gossip beautiful because it looks like art, and art can only be called
at the feast, but no one will be answerable for what he says, beautiful if we are conscious of it as art whi le yet it looks like
because they are only concerned with momentary entertain- nature .
ment, and not with any permanent material for reflection or For whether we are dealing with natural or with artificial
subsequent discussion. (Among these are also to be reckoned beauty, we can say generally: That is beautiful which plea es in
the way of arranging the table for enjoyment and, at great the mere act of judging it (not in tbe sensation of it or by mean
feasts, the management of the mu ic. This latter is a wonderful of a concept). Now art has always a definite design of producing
thing. It is meant to dispose to gaiety the minds of the guests, something. But if this something were bare sensation (some-
regarded solely as a pleasant noise, without anyone paying the thing merely subjective), which is to be accompanied with
least attention to its composition; and it favors the free con- pleasure, the product would please in the act of judgment only
versation of each with his neighbor.) Again, to this class belong by mediation of sensible feeling. And again, if the design were
all games which bring with them no further interest than that directed toward the production of a definite object, then, if
of making the time pass imperceptibly . this were attained by art, the object would only please by means
On the other hand bea~ art is a mode of representation of concepts . But in both cases the art would not please in the
which is purposive for itself and which, although devoid of mere act of judging, i.e. it would not please as beautiful but as
[definite] purpose, yet furthers the culture of the mental powers mechanical .
in reference to social communication. Hence the purposiveness in the product of beautiful art,
The universal communicability of a pleasure carries with it although it is designed, must not seem to be designed, i.e .
beautiful art must look like nature, although we are conscious
ae [Kant wa.s accustomed to say that the talk at a dinner table should
of it as art . But a product of art appears like nature when,
always pa.ss through these three stages: narrative, discussion, and jest; and
punctilious in this, as in all else, he is said to have directed the conversation although its agreement with the rules, according to which alone
at his own table accordingly (Wallace's Kant, p. 39) .] the product can become what it ought to be, is punctiliously
 [§ 44] ANALYTIC OF THE ' UBLIME 147
require another point of view from which to judge than that
which we are here taking up, viz. [we hould have to consider]
the proportion of talents which mu t be as umed requisite in
these several occupations. Whether or not, again, under the so-
called seven free arts, some may be included which ought to be
classed as sciences and many that are akin rather to handi craft
I shall not here discuss. But it is not inexp dient to recall that,
in all free arts, there is yet requisite something compul ory or,
as it is called, mechanism , without which the spirit, which must
be free in art and which alone inspires the work, would have no
body and would evaporate altogether ; e.g. in poetry there must
be an accuracy and wealth of language , and also prosody and
measure. [It is no t inexped ient, I say, to recall this], for many
modem educators believe that the best way to produce a free
art is to remo ve it from all constraint , and t hus to change it
from work into mere play.

§ 44. OF BEAUTIFUL ART

There is no science of the beautiful , but only a critique of it;

and there is no such thing as beautiful science, but only beau-
tiful art. For as regards the first point, if it could be decided
scientifically, i .e . by proofs , whether a thing was to be regarded
as beautiful or not, the judgment upon beauty would belong
to science and would not be a judgment of taste. And as far as
the second poin t is concerned, a cience which should be beauti-
ful as such i a nonentity . For if in such a science we were to
ask for grounds and proofs, we would be put off with tasteful
phrase (bon-mots). The source of the common expre sion,
beautiful science, is without doub t nothing el e than this, as it
has been rightly remarked, t hat for beautiful art in its entire
completeness much science i requisite, e.g. a knowledge of
ancient languages, a learned familiari ty with classical authors,
history, a knowledge of antiquities, etc. And hence these his-
torical sciences, because they form the necessary preparatio n
and basis for beautiful art , and also partly because under them
is included the knowledge of the products of beautiful art
150 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETI CAL J UDGM E:\'T [' 46] [§ 47] A ALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 151
observed, yet thi is not painfully apparent; [the form of the consequently ought not to spring from imitation, but must
schools does not obt rude itself] 37- it shows no trace of the rule serve as a standard or rule of judgment for other . (3) It can-
having been before the eye of the arLi t and having fettered not describe or indicate scien tifically how it brings about its
his men tal power . products, bu t it gives t he rule just as nature does. H ence t he
aut hor of a product for which he is indebted to his genius does
not know himself how he has come by his ideas; and he has not
§ 46. BEAUTI FUL ART IS THE ART OF GENIUS
the power t o devise the like at pleasure or in accordance with
Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to a plan , and to communicate it to others in precep ts that will
ar . ince taTen t, as the innate produ ctive facul ty of the artist, enable them t o produce similar products. (H ence it is probable
belongs itself to nature, we may ex pres the matter t hus: t hat t he word "genius" is derived from genius, that pecu liar
Genius is The innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which guiding and guardian spiri t gi ven t o a man at hi birth , from
nature gi ves t he rule t o art . whose suggestion these original ideas proceed .) (4) ature, by lf.,.,,..,J {,
Whatever may be t hough t of this defini tion , whether it is tb-e-me&iurrr of genius, does not prescribe rules to science but to
merely arbi t rary or whether it i adequate to the concep t that art , and t o it only in so far as it is to be beau tiful a rt.
we are accustomed to combine wi th the word genius (which is
to be examined in the following paragraphs), we can prove
§ 47 . E L UCIDATION AND CO FIRMATIO OF THE ABOVE
already beforehand that, according t o t he signi fication of the
EXPL ANATION OF GENIUS
word here adop ted , beau tiful arts must neces arily be con-
sidered as ar ts of genius. Everyone is agreed t hat genius is entirely oppo ed to t he
For every art presuppo es ru les by means of which in the spirit of imitation. ow since learning is nothing bu t imi tation ,
first instance a product, if it is to be called ar tistic, is represen ted it follo ws that the greatest abili ty and teachableness (capacity)
as possible . But t he concept of beau tiful a rt doe not permit regarded qua teachableness cannot avail for genius . Even if a
the judgment upon the beauty of a product to be derived from man t hinks or composes for himself and does no t merely take
any rule whi ch has a concept as its determining ground, and in what others have taught, even if he discovers many t hings in
therefore has at its basis a concept of the way in whi ch the art and science , t his is not the right ground for calling such a
product is possible . Therefore beau tiful art cannot itself devise (perhaps great) head a genius (as opposed to him who, because
the rule according to which it can bring about its produ ct . Bu t he can only learn and imi tate, i called a shallowpate) . For even 7/, ~t
since at the same time a product can never be called art without these things could be learned ; they lie in t.he natural path of
some precedent rule, nature in the subj ect must (by t he har- him who investigates and reflect according to rule , and t hey do
mony of its facul ties} give the rule to ar t; i.e . beautiful art is no t differ specifically from what can be acquired by industry
only possible as a product of genius. through imi tation. Thus we can readily learn all t hat ewton
We t hus see (1) that genius is a talent for producing that for has set forth in his immortal work on the P rinciples of Natural
whi ch no defini te rule can be gi ven ; it is ot a mer ap titude for Philosophy, however great a head was required to discover it,
what can be learned by a rule . Hence riginality must be its but we cannot learn to wri te spiri ted poetry, however express
first property. (2) But since it also can produce original non- may be the precepts of the art and however excellen t its models .
sense, its producLs must be models, i.e. exemplary , and they The reason is tha t ewton could make all his steps, from the
11 [Second edition .] first elements of geometry to his own great and profound dis-
 f

152 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHET ICAL JUDGMEN T [§ 47] [§ 48] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 153

coveries, intuitive ly plain and definite as regards consequence, Although mechanical and beautiful art are very different,
not only to himself but to everyone else. But a Homer or a the first being a mere art of industry and learning and the
Wieland cannot show how his ideas, so rich in fancy and yet so second of genius, yet there is no beautiful art in which there is
full of thought, come together in his head, simply because he not a mechanical element that can be comprehended by rules
does not know and therefore cannot teach others. In science, and followed accordingly, and in which therefore there must be
then, the greatest discoverer only differs in degree from his something scholastic as an essential condition. For [in every art]
laborious imitator and pupil, but he differs specifically from some purpose must be conceived; otherwise we could not ascribe
him whom nature has gifted for beautiful art. And in this there the product to art at all; it would be a mere product of chance.
is no depreciation of those great men to whom the human race But in order to accomplish a purpose, definite rules from which
owes so much gratitude , as compared with nature's favorites in we cannot dispense ourselves are requisite. Now since the
respect of the talent for beautiful art. For in the fact that the originality of the talent constitut es an essential (though not the
former talent is directed to the ever advancing greater perfection only) element in the character of genius, shallow heads believe
of knowledge and every advantag e depending on it, and at the that they cannot better show themse ves to be full-blown
same time to the impartin g this same knowledge to others-i n geniuses than by throwing off the constrain t of all rules; they
this it has a great superiori ty over [the talent of] those who believe, in effect, that one could make a braver show on the
deserve the honor of being called geniuses. For~ stands still back of a wild horse than on the back of a trained animal.
at a certain point; a boundary is set to it beyond which it cannot Genius can only furnish rich material for products of beautiful
go, which presumably has been reached long ago and cannot art; its execution and its form require talent cultivate d in the
be extended further. Again, artistic skill cannot be communi- schools, in order to make such a use of this material as will stand
cated; it is imparted to every artist immediately by the hand examination by the judgmen t. But it is quite ridiculous for a
of nature; and so it dies with him, until nature endows another man to speak and decide like a genius inthings which require
in the same way, so that he only needs an example in order to put the most careful investigation by reason. One does not know
in operation ina similar fashion the talent of which he is conscious. whether to laugh more at the impostor who spreads such a mist
If now it is a natural gift which must prescribe its rule to art round him that we cannot clearly use our judgmen t, and so use
(as beautiful art), of what kind is this rule? It cannot be reduced our imaginat ion the more, or at the public which naively
to a formula and serve as a precept, for then the judgmen t upon imagines that his inability to cognize clearly and to comprehend
the beautiful would be determin able according to concepts; the masterpiece before him arises from new truths crowding in
but the rule must be abstracte d from the fact, i.e. from the on him in such abundan ce that details (duly weighed definitions
product, on wh.ich others may try their own talent by using it and accurate examination of fundamental propositions) seem
as a model, not to be copied but to be imitated. How this is but clumsy work.
·possible is hard to explain. The ideas of the artist excite like
ideas in his pupils if nature has endowed them with a like pro- § 48. OF THE RELATION OF GENIUS TO TASTE
portion of their mental powers. Hence models of beautiful art
are the only means of handing down these ideas to posterity . For judging of beautiful objects as such, taste is requisite;
This cannot be done by mere descriptions, especially not in the but for beautiful art, i.e. for the production of such objects,
genius is requisite.
case of the arts of speech; and in this latter classical models are
only to be had in the old dead languages, now preserved only as If we consider genius as the talent for beautiful art (which
"the learned language s." the special meaning of the word implies) and in this point of
 [§ 48] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 155
beautiful things which may be in nature ugly or displeasing. as
The Furies, diseases, the devastati ons of war, etc., may [even
regarded as calamito us] 89 be described as very beautiful , as
they are represented in a picture. There is only one kind of
ugliness which cannot be represented in accordance with nature
without destroying all aesthetical satisfaction, and consequently
artificial beauty, viz. that which excites disgust. For in this
singular sensation, which rests on mere imagination, the object
is represented as it were obtrudin g itself for our enjoyme nt,
while we strive against it with all our might. And the artistic
represen tation of the object is no longer distinguished from the
nature of the object itself in our sensation, and thus it is im-
possible that it can be regarded as beautiful. The art of sculp-
ture again, because in its products art is almost interchangeable
with nature, excludes from its creations the immedia te repre-
sentation of ugly objects; e.g. it represents death by a beautiful
genius, the warlike spirit by Mars, and permits [all such things]
to be represented only by an allegory or attribute 40 that has a
pleasing effect, and thus only indirectly by the aid of the inter-
pretation of reason, and not for the mere aesthetical judgmen t.
So much for the beautiful represen tation of an object, which
is properly only the form of the presentat ion of a concept, by
means of which this latter is communicated universally. But
to give this form to the product of beautiful art, mere taste is
requisite. By taste the artist estimates his work after he has
exercised and corrected it by manifold examples from art or
nature, and after many, often toilsome, attempts to content
himself he finds that form which satisfies him. Hence this form
u [Cf. Aristotle Poetics iv. 1448b: 8. yaQ a\rta 'A.unwiii~ 6Qiii!LEv,
,;omrov ,;a~ el.x6va~ ,;a~ J.L6.Al.O'ta i)XQL6ro!lkva~ x:a.£Qol!ev ite(I)QOliv'te~
olav ih')QCo>v ,;e I!OQ<pa~ 'tOOv aV4J.(l't6.'t(I)V xal VEXQOOV. Cf. also Rhetoric i.
11. 1371b; and Burke on the Sublime and Beaul.ijul, Pt. I, § 16. Boileau
L'art poetique, chant 3 makes a similar observatio n:
"ll n'est point de serpent ni de monstre odieux
Qui, par !'art imit6, ne puisse plaire aux yeux.
D'un pinceau d~licat !'artifice agr~able
Du plus affreux objet fait un objet aimable." ]
11 [Second edition.]
•o [Cf. p. 158.]
 51 : I-
156 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 49] [§ 49] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 157

is not, as it were, a thing of inspiration or the result of a free Spirit, in an aesthetical ense, is the name ~iven ~the ani-
swing of the mental powers, but of a slow and even painful mating principle of the mind. But that by means of which
process of improvement, by which be seeks to render it adequate tbis principle animates the soul, the mat 1al which it applies
t~ his thought, without detriment to the freedom of the play of to that [purpose], is what puts the men al powers purposively _
his powers. into swing, i.e. into such a play as maintains itself and strength-
But taste is merely a judging and not a productive faculty ens the mental powers in their exercise.
and what is appropriate to it is therefore not a work of beautiful Now I maintain that this principle is no other than the faculty
art. It can only be a product belonging to useful and mechanical of presenting aesthetical ideas. And by an aesthetical idea I
art or even to science, produced according to definite rules that understand that representation of the imagination which
can be lea:ne~ and ~u~t be exactly followed. But the pleasing occasions much thought, without however any definite thought,
form that Is g1ven to It IS only the vehicle of communication and i.e. any concept, being ca):>able of being adequate to it; it conse-
a mode, as it were, of presenting it, in respect of which we quently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible
remain free to a certain extent, although it is combined with by language. We easily see that it is the counterpart (pendant)
a definite purpose. Thus we desire that table appointments a of a rational idea, which conversely is a concept to which no
moral treati e, even a sermon, should have in themselves this intuition (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate.
form of beautiful art, without it seeming to be sought; but we do The imagination ~as a. productive faculty of cognition) is
not therefore call the ·e things works of beautiful art. Under very powerful in creating another nature, as it were, out of the
the latter class are reckoned a poem, a piece of music, a picture material that actual nature gives it. We entertain ourselves
gallery, etc.; and in some works of this kind asserted to be with it when experience becomes too commonplace, and by it
works of beautiful art we find genius without taste, while in we remold experience, always indeed in accordance with ana-
others we find taste without genius. logical laws, but yet also in accordance with principles which
r( Jl- "' .. ,,_ occupy a higher place in reason (laws, too, which are just as
natural to us as those by which understanding comprehends
§ 49 OF rHE FACULTIES OF THE MlND THAT CONSTITUTE GENIUS
empirical nature). Thus we feel our freedom from the law of
We say of certain products of which we expect that they association (which attaches to the empirical employment of -1-r ~" .s -
should at least in part appear as beautiful art, they are without imagination), so that the material supplied to us by nature in f. j,..,y.,/..
41
spirit, although we find nothing to blame in them on the score accordance with this law can be worked up into something - -
of taste. A poem may be very neat and elegant but without different which surpasses nature.
sp~t. A history may be exact and well arranged: but without Such representations of the imagination we may call ideas,
spmt. A festal discourse may be solid and at the same time partly because they at least strive after something which lies
elaborate, but without spirit . Conversation is often not devoid beyond the bounds of experience and so seek to approximate to
of entertainment, but it is without spirit; even of a woman we a presentation of concepts of reason (intellectual ideas), thus
say that she is pretty, an agreeabl ·talker, and courteous but giving to the latter the appearance of objective reality, but
without spirit. ,What then do we mean by spirit? ' especially because no concept can be fully adequate to them as
•
1
[In English we would rather say "without soul," but I prefer to trans-
internal intuitions. The poet ventures to realize to sense,
late "Geist" consistently by "spirit," to avoid the confusion of it with rational ideas of invisible beings , the kingdom of the blessed,
"Seele."] hell, eternity, creation, etc.; or even if he deals with things of
 158 CRITI QUE OF THE AESTH ETICAL JUDGM
ENT [§ 49] [§ 49] ANAL YTIC OF THE SU1lL IME 159
which there are exam ples in experience -e .g. death
, envy and also get the spirit that anim ates their works simpl
all vices, also love, fame, and the like- -he tries, y from the
by means of aestheti91J.l attrib ute of.the .object, whic~ acc?m pany
imag ination , which emula tes the play of reaso n
in its quest the logi c~!
and stifuulate the imag matw n, so that 1t thmk s more
after a maximum, t o go beyon d the limi ts of exper by t heir
ience and to aid, altho ugh in an undeveloped way, than could
prese nt them to sense with a completen ess of which be comp re-
there is no hended in a conce pt and t herefore in a definite form
exam ple in nature. This is properly speaking the of word s.
art of the For the sake of brevi ty, I must limit myse lf to a
poet, in which the facul ty of aesth etical ideas can manif few exam ples
est itself only .
in its entire strengt h . But t his facul ty , consid ered
in itself, is When the great King 4 ~ in one of his poems expresses
properly only a talen t (of the imagination) . himse lf
If now we place under a concept a representa as follows:
tion of the
imagination belonging to its prese ntatio n, but which Oui finisso ns sans trouble et mour ons sans regrets,
occasions E n iaissant l'univers comble de nos bienfaits.
in itself more t houg ht than can ever be comprehen
ded in a Ainsi l'astr e du jour au bout de sa carrie re,
definite concept and whi ch conse quent ly aesthetical
l enlarges R epand sur !'horizon une douce lumie re;
t e concept itself in an unbo unded fashi on , t he imagi Et les derni ers rayons qu'il darde dans les airs,
nation is
here creat ive, and ·t brings the facult y of intellec tual Sont les derni ers soupirs qu'il donn e a l'univers;
ideas (the
reason) int o movement ; i.e. by a re.(1resenta tion more
thoug ht he quick ens his ration al idea of a cosmopoli tan
(which indeed belon gs t o the conce pt of t he objec t) disposition at
is occas ioned the end of We by an attribute which the imaginatio
than can in it be grasped or made clear. n (in re-
membering all t he pleasu res of a beaut iful summ
Those forms which do not const itute the presentatio er day that
n of a are recall ed at its close by a seren e evening) assoc iates
given conce pt itself but only, as approxima te repre with that
sentations of representa tion , and which excites a numb er of sensa
the imagination , express the conse quenc es bound tions and
up wi th it secondary representa tions for which no expre sion
and its relationship to other concepts , are called is found.
(aesthetical) On the other hand , an intellectua l conce pt may serve
attno utes of an obj ect whose conce pt as a ration conve rsely
al idea canno t as an at t ribute for a representa tion of sense, and so
be adequ ately prese nted . Thus Jupi ter's eagle wi th can quicken
the lightning this latter by means of the idea of the super sensib le,
in its claws is an attrib ute of the migh ty king of heave but only by
n , as the the aesthetical [ element] , t hat su bjectively attac
peacock is of his magnificen t queen. They do not, hes to the
like logi cal conce pt of the latter , being here empl oyed. Thus
attributes, represent what lies in our concepts of , for example ,
the sublim ity a certain poet 43 says, in his description of a beaut
and majes ty of creation, but something differ ent, iful morn ing:
which gives
occasion to the imagination to spread itself over The sun arose
a numb er of
kindr ed representa tions that arouse more thoug ht As calm from virtue springs.
than can be
expressed in a concept determined by words. They The consciousness of virtue , if we 11Ubstit u te it in
furni sh an our thought s
aesthetical idea, which for that ration al idea takes for a virt uous man, diffuses in the mind a multi tude
the place of of sublime
ogical prese ntation; and thus, as their proper office
, they en-
liven the mind by opening out to it the prospect into " [Barni quotes these lines as occurr ing in one of
an illimit- F rench poems: "Epttre au mar~c hal K eith, sur
Frede rick the Great 's
able field of kindred repre senta tions . But beaut les vaines terreu rs de la
iful art does mort et les frayeurs d'une autre vie"; but I have
this not only in the case of paint ing or sculpture not been able to verify
(in which the his reference . Kant here translates them into Germ
term "att ribute " is commonly employed); poetr y an.]
and rhetoric 41 [I have not been able
to identif y thia poet.]

I
1
(Q
 I. I • ~l ... A ..
J /) l l"f$ ...,
i~ .
160 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL J UDGMENT [ 49] 161
t~~- [§ 49] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME

andre tful feelings, and a boundles prospect of a joyful fu ture, properly speaking, what i,g called /~oirit_; for to ex..P~ess the
to wruch no expression that is measured by a definite concept ineffable element in the state of mindimpbed by a certam repre-
completely attains. 44 sentation and to make it universally communicabl whether
In a word, the aesthetical idea is a repre entation of the the expression be in speech or painting or sta uary- thi require
imagination associated with a giv n. concept, wruch is bound up a faculty of seizing the quickly passing play of imaginatio~ ~nd
with such a multiplicity of partial representations in its free of uni!ying it in a concept (which is even on that account ongmal
employment that for it no expre sion marking a definite concept and discloses a new rule that could not have been inferred from
can be found; and such a representation, t herefore, adds to a any preceding principles or examples) that can be communi-
concept much ineffable thought, the feeling of wruch quickens cated without any constraint [of rules]. 45
the cognitive faculties, and with language, wruch is the mere
letter, binds up spirit also.
The mental powers, therefore, whose union (in a certain If after this analysis, we look back to the explanation given
relation) constitutes emus are imagination an understanding. abo~e of what is called genius, we find : first, that it is a talent
In the employment of the imagination for co ition, it submits for art, not for science, m-which clearly known rules must go
to the constraint of t he understanding and is subj ect to the ber'oreh~d an determine the procedure. _!Condly, as an
limitation of being conformable to the concept of the latter. artistic talent it presupposes a definite concept of the product
On the contrary, in an aesthetical point of view it is free to as the purpose, and therefore understandi ng; but it also pre-
furnish unsought, over and above that agreement with a con- supposes a representati on (although an indetermina te one) ~f
ceptt!Lbundance of undevelo.ned material for the understandin g, the material, i.e. of the intuition, for the presentment of this
to which the understanding paid no regar in its concept but concept, and, therefore a relation between the imagination and
which it applies, though not objectively for cognition, yet sub- the understandin g. Thirdly, it shows itself, not so much in the
jectively to qui cken the cognitive powers and therefore also accomplishm ent of the proposed purpose in a presentment of a
indirectly to cognitions. Thus enius properly consists in the definite concept, as in the enunciation or expre sion of aestheti-
happy relation [between these faculties] , which no science can cal ideas which contain abundant material for that very design;
teach and no industry can learn, by which ideas are found for and consequently it represents t he imagination as free from
a given concept; and, on the other hand, we thus find for these all guidance of rules an ye as purposive in reference to the
ideas the expression by means of which the subjective state of presentment of t he given concept. Finally, in t he fourth place,
mind brought about by them, as an accompanim ent of the con- the unsought undesigned subjective purposiveness in the free
cept, can be communicated to others. The latter talent is, accordance of the imagination with the legality of t he under-
" Perhaps nothing more sublime was ever said and no sublimer thought standing presupposes such a _proportion and disposition of these
ever expressed than the famous inscription on the Temple of Isis (Mother
Nature): "I am all that is and that was and that shall be, and no mortal
faculties as
no following of rules, whether of science or of
mechanical imitation, can bring about, but !_Vhich only the
hath lifted my veil ." Segner availed himseU of this idea in a suggestive
nature of the subject can produce.
vignette prefixed to his Natural Philosophy , in order to inspire beforehand
the pupil whom he was about to lead into that temple with a holy awe,
In accordance with these suppositions, genius is the exem-
which should dispose his mind to serious attention. [J. A. de Segner (1704- plary originality of the natural gifts of a subj ect in the free
1777) was Professor of atural Philosophy at Gottingen and the author of employment of his cognitive faculties. In this way the product
several scientific works of repute.] 46 [Second edition.]
 162 CRITIQU E OF THE AESTHE TICAL JUDGME NT
[ § 49] [§50] ANALYT IC OF THE SUBLIM E 163
of a genius (as regards what is to be ascribed to genius and not
singularity and is not made approp riate to the idea itself. The
~o. possible learning or schooling) is an exampl e, not L
Qe ostenta tious (precieux), contort ed, and affected [mann er
umtate d (for then that which in it is geniu and con titu tes the
adopte d] to differentiate oneself from ordinar y persons (though
-- spir.it of the w~rk would be lost), but to be followed y an o her
devoid of spirit) is like the behavior of a man of whom we say
gem us,. who.m It awakens to a fee mg of his own originality and
that he hears himself talk, or who stands and moves about as if
whom It stirs so to exercise his art in freedom from the con-
he were on a stage in order to be stared at; this always betrays
straint of rules, that thereby a new rule is gained for art· and
thus his talent shows itself to be exemplary. But beca~se a a bungler.
genius is a favorite of nature and must be regarded "by us as a
rare phenomenon, his example produces for other good heads a § 50. OF THE COMBIN ATION OF TASTE WITH GENIUS IN
THE
school, i.e. a methodical system of teachin g according to rules PRODUC TS OF BEAUTI FUL ART
so far as t~ese c.a~ be derived from the peculiarities of the pro~
To ask whethe r it is more import ant for the things of beautiful
ducts of his spmt. For such persons beautiful art is so far
art that genius or taste should be displayed is the same as to
imitati on, to which nature throug h the medium of a genius
supplied the rule. ask whethe r in it more depends on imagination or on judgme nt.
Now since in respect of the first an art is rather said to be full
But t~is imitati on becomes a mere aping if the scholar copies
of spirit, but only deserves to be called a ?ea":"tif~l art on accou~t
everyth mg down to the deformities, which the genius must
of the second 1 this latter is at least, as Its mdispensable condi- ,...-
have let pass only because he could not well remove them with- ,...
tion (conditio sine qua non), the meat-im port thin to which "' -.·tf~,t.
out weakening his idea. This mental characteristic is meritorious
one has to look in the judging of art as beautiful art. Abun-
only in the case of a genius. A certain audacity in expres sion-
dance and originality of ideas are less necessary to beauty than
and in general many a departu re from common rules-b ecome s
the accordance of the imagination in its freedom with the
him well, but it is in no way worthy of imitati on· it always
conformity to law of the unders tanding . For all the abunda nce
remain~ a f~ult i~ itself which we must seek to rem;ve , though
of the former produces in lawless freedom nothing but nonsense;
the gemus IS, as 1t were, privileged to commit it because the
on the other hand, the judgme nt is the faculty by which it is
inimitable rush of his spirit would suffer from over~nxious care-
fulness . Manne rism is anothe r kind of aping, viz. of mere adjuste d to the unders tanding .
Taste like the judgme nt in general, is the di cipline (or
p~culiarity (originality) in general, by which a man separat
es tramm~ of genius; it clips its wings, it makes it culture d and
h1mself. as far as possible from imitato rs, withou t however
polished; but, at the rsame time, it gives guidanc~ as to w~ere
pos~essmg ~he talent to be at the same time exemplary. There
and how far it may extend itself i It is o remam purposive.
are mdeed m g~nera~ two ways (mod·t) in which such a man may
And while it brings clearness and order into the multitu de of \
put togethe r his notwns of expressing himself; the one is called
the though ts [of genius], it makes the ideas susceptible of being
a manner (modus aestheticus), the other a method (modus logicus).
perman ently and, at the same time, universally assented to,
They differ in this that the former has no other standa rd than
and capable of being followed by others, and of an ever p~og~es-
the feeling of unity in the presen tment, but the latter follows
definite principles; hence the former alone avails for beautif ul
art. But an ar.ti~tic produc t is said to show manner ism only
sive culture. If, then, in the conflict of these two properties m a
produc t something must be sacrificed, it ~hou:d be rat?er on lj
J
the side of genius; and the judgme nt, which m the thing of
when the expositiOn of the artist's idea is founded on its very
beautiful art gives its decision from its own proper principles,
 164 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHET ICAL JUDGMEN T [§51]
will rather sacrifice the freedom and wealth of the imagination
than permit anything prejudicial to the understa nding.
, cl For beautiful art, therefore, imaginat ion, understanding,
spirit, and taste are requisite. 46

§51. OF THE DIVISION OF TIIE BEAUTIFU L ARTS

We may describe beauty in general (whether natural or

artificial) as the expression of aesthetical ideas; only that in
beautiful art this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the
obj ct, while in beautiful nature the mere reflection upon a given
intuition , without any concept of what the object is to be, is
sufficient for the awakening and communicating of the idea of
which that object is r garded as the expression.
If, then, we wish to make a division of the beautiful arts, we
cannot choose a more convenient principle, at least tentative ly,
than the analogy of art with the mode of expression of which
men avail themselves in speech, in order to communicate to one
another as perfectly as possible not merely their concepts but
also their sensation sY This is done by word, deportment, and
tone (articulation, gesticulation, and modulati on). It is only by
the combination of the e thr e kinds of expre sion that com-
munication between the speaker [and his hearers] can be
complete. For thus thought, intuition , and sensation are trans-
mitted to others simultaneously and conjointly.
There are, therefore, only three kinds of beautiful arts: the
arts of speech, the formative art , and the art of the play of
' 6 The three former faculties are united in the first
instance by means of
the fourth. Hume gives us to un erstand in bis History of England that
altliOUgh the English are inferior in their production s to no people in the
world as regards the evidences they display of the three former properties ,
separately considered, yet they must be put after their neighbors the French
as regards that which unite these properties . [In his Observations on the
Beautiful and Sublime, § 4, sub init. , Kant remarks that the English have
the keener sense of the sublime , the French of the beautiful.]
' 7 The reader is not to judge this scheme for a possible
division of the
beautiful arts as a deliberate theory . It is only one of various attempts
which we may and ought to devise.
[ § 54] ANALYTIC OF THE UB LIME 175

Among the formative art I " ·ould give the palm to painting,
partly becau e a the art of delineation it lies at the root of all
the other formative arts, and parLly becau e it can penetrate
much fur ther into the region of ideas and can extend the field of
intuition in conformi ty with t hem fur ther t han t he others can .

[§ 54.] 52a REMARK

_9
As we have often shown, t here is an essent ial difference 1 -
between~hat sati.§iies simply in the act of judging it and t h
>yhich gratifies (plea es in ensati on) . We cannot cribe t he
latter [kind of satisfaction] t o everyone, as we can the former.
Gratification (the causes of which may even be situate in ideas)
appears always to consist in a feeling of the fu rtherance of the
whole life of the man, and consequently also of his bodily well-
being, i.e. his health, so t hat E picurus, who gave out that all
gratification was at bottom bo ' ly sensation , may perhaps not
have been wrong , but only mi understood him elf , when he
reckoned intellectual and even practical satisfaction under grati-
fi cation . If we have this distinction in view , we can ex_Qlain how
a gratification may dissatisfy t he man who senibly feels it (e. g .
the joy of a needy but well-meaning man at becoming the heir
of an affectionate but penurious father); or how a deep grief
may satisfy t he person experiencing it (the sorrow of a widow
at the death of her excellent hu band); or how gratification
can in addition atisfy (as in the sciences that we pursue) ; or 1( '!I
how a grief (e.g . b atred , envy, revenge) can moreover dissatisfy.
The satisfaction or dis ati faction here dep nd on rea on and
I
noisy (a~d therefore in general phar isaical) devotions, for they force the
neighbors either to sing with them or to abandon their meditations. [Kant
suffered himseli from such annoyances, which may account for the asperity
1
of this note. At one period he as disturbed by the devotional exercises of
the prisoners in the adj oini ng jail . In a letter to t he burgomaster " he
suggested the advantage of clo ng t he windows during t hese hymn-singings,
and added that the warde rs f the prison might probably be directed to
accept less sonorous and neighbor-ann oying chants as evidence of the
penitent spirit of their captive " (Wallace's Kan t , p. 4.2). ]
ua [Added by von H artenstein .- Ed .]
I
I tt I { Lt~
•

176 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL ~UDGMENT [§54] [§54] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 177
is the ame as approbation or disapprobation; but gratification in both cases is merely bodily, although it is excited by ideas
and g ief can on1y rest on the feeling or prospect Of a pos ible of the mind, and that the feeling of health produced by a motion
(on whatever grounds) well-being or its opposite. of the intestines corresponding to the play in question makes up
All changing free play of sensations (that have no design at that whole gratification of a gay party which is regarded as so
their basis) graffies, because it furth.ers the feeling of health. refined and so spiritua1. It is not the jucfgmg the harmony in
In the 'udB,!!!en Qf£flaaon, we may or may not have any satis- tones or sallies of wit, which serves only in combination with
faction in its object or even in this gratification; and this latter their beauty as a necessary vehicle, but the furtherance of the
may rise to the height of an affection, although we take no vital bodily processes, the affection that moves the intestines
interest in the object, at least none that is proportionate to the and the diaphragm-in a word, the feeling of health (which
degree of the gratification. We may subdivide this free play of without such inducements one does not feel) t hat makes up
sensations into the play of fortune [~ames of chance], the play the gratification felt by us, so that we can thus reach t he body
of tone [music], an d the play of thouglit [wit]. The first requires through the soul and use the latter as the physician of the
an interest, whether of vani ty or of selfishness, which however is former.
not nearly so great as t he interest t hat attaches to the way in In music, this play proceeds from bodily sensations to
which we are striving to procure it . The second requires merely aesthetical ideas (the objects of our affections), and t hen from
the change of sensations, all of which have a relation to affection, these back again to the body with redoubled force. In t he case
though they have not the degree of affection, and excite aestheti- of jokes (the art of which , just like music, should rather be
cal ideas. The third springs merely from the change of repre- reckoned as pleasant than beautiful), the play begins with the
sentations in the judgment; by it, indeed, no thought that brings thoughts which together occupy the body, so far as they admit
an interest with it is produced, but yet the mind is animated of sensible expression; and as the understanding stops suddenly
thereby. short at this presentment, in which it does not find what it
How much gratification games must afford , without any expected, we feel the effect of this slackening in the body by
necessity of placing at theirbasis an interested design, all our the oscillation of the organs, which promotes t he restoration of
evening parties show, for hardly any of them can be carried on equilibrium and has a favorable influence upon health.
without a game. But the affections of hope, fear, joy, wrath, In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there
scorn, are put in play by them, alternating every moment ; and must be something absurd (in which the understanding, there-
they are so vivid that, by them, as by a kind of internal motion, fore, can find no satisfaction) . Laughter is an affection arising
all the vital processes of the body seem to be promoted, as is from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into •
sliown y the mental vivacity excited by them, alt hough nothing. This transformation, which is certainly not enjoyable
nothing is gained or learned thereby. But as the beautiful does to the understanding, yet indirectly gives it very active enjoy-
not enter into games of chance, we will here set it aside. On the ment for a moment. Therefore its cause must consist in the
other hand, music and that which excites laughter are two influence of the representation upon the body and the reflex
different kinds of play with aesthetical ideas, or of representa- effect of this upon the mind; not, indeed, through the represen-
tions of the understanding through which ultimately nothing is tation being obj ectively an object of gratification 63 (for how
thought, which can give lively gratification merely by their 63
[The first edition adds: "as in the case of a roan who gets the news of
changes. Thus we recognize pretty clearly t hat the animation a great commercial success."]
[ 54] ANALYTIC OF THE UBLIME 179
not the mere di missal of a liar or a simpleton that arou es our
gratification; for the latter story told with a umed seriousness
would set a whole company in a roar of laughter, while the
former would ordinarily not be regarded as worth attending to.
It is remarkable that, in all such cases, the jest must contain lu "f< 5!
something that is capable of deceiving for a moment. Hence,
when the illusion is dissipated, the mind turns back to try it
once again, and thus through a rapidly alternating tension and
relaxation it is jerked back and put into a state of oscillation.
Thi , because the strain on the cor las it were is suddenly (and
not gradually) relaxed, must occa ion a mental movement, and
an inner bodily movement harmonizing therewith, which con-
tinues involuntarily and fatigues, even while cheering us (the
effects of a motion conducive to health).
For if we ~~t tlia{with all our thoughts is harmonically
combined a movement in the organs of the body, we will easily
comprehendhOW to t ·s su en transposition of the mind,
now to one, now to another standpoint in order to contemplate
its object, may correspond an alternating tension and relaxation
of the elastic portions of our intestines, which communicates
itself to the diaphragm (like that which ticklish people feel).
In connection with this the lung expel the air at rapidly suc-
ceeding intervals, and thus bring about a movement beneficial
to health, which alone, and not what precedes it in the mind, is
the proper cause of the gratification in a thought that at bottom
repre ents nothing. Voltaire said that heaven had given us two
thing to counterbalance the many miseries of life-hope and
sleep. 54 He could have added laughter, if the means of exciting
it in rea onable men were only as easily attainable and the
requisite wit or originali ty of humor were not o rare, as the
talent is common of imagining things which break one's head,
o• [Henriade, Chant 7:
"Du Dieu qui nous crea Ia clcmence infinie:
Pour adoucir les maux de cette courte vie,
A place parmi nous deux ~tres bienfaisants,
De Ia terre a jamais aimables habitants,
Soutiens dans les travaux, tresors dans !'indigence :
L'un est le doux sommeil, et !'autre e t l'esp~rance. "1
 180 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [§54] [§54] ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME 1 1
as mystic dreamers do, or which break one's neck, as your genius is thus a contradictio n, but the repre entation of naivete in a
does, or which break one's heart, as entimental romance writers fictitious personage is quite possible and is a beautiful though a
(and even moralists of the same kidney) do. rare art. Naivete must not be confounded with openhearted
We may therefore, as it seems to me, readily concede to simplicity, which does not artificially spoil nature solely becau e
Epicurus that all gratification, even that which is occasioned it does not under tand the art of social intercour e.
through concepts excited by aesthetical ideas, is animal, i.e. The humorous manner again may be classified as that which,
bodily sensation, without the least prejudice to the spiritual as exhilarating u , is near akin to the gratification that proceeds
feeling of respect for moral ideas, which is not gratification at from laughter, and belongs to the originality of spiri t but not to
all but an esteem for self (for humanity in us), that raises us the talent of beautiful art. Humor, in the good sense, means
above the need of gratification, and even without the slightest the talent of being able voluntarily to put oneself into a certain
prejudice to the less noble [satisfaction s] of taste . mental disposition, in which everything is judged quite differ-
We find a combination of these two last in na'ivete, which is ently from the ordinary method (reversed, in fact), and yet
the breaking out of the sincerity originally natural to humanity in accordance with certain rational principles in such a frame
in opposition to t hat art of dissimulatio n which has become a of mind. He who is involuntarily subject to such mutations is
second nature . We laugh at the simplicity that does not under- called fH'lla n..of...humors [launisch]; but he who can assume them ....... , ........ ')""
stand how to dissemble, and yet we are delighted with the sim- voluntarily and purposively (on behalf of a lively presentment
plicit y of the nat ure which thwarts that art. We look for the brought about by the aid of a contrast that excites a laugh) ,
commonplace manner of artificial utterance devised with fore- he and his exposit ion are called humorous [launig]. This man-
sight to make a fair show, and behold! it is the un poiled inno- ner, however, belongs rather to pleasant t han to beautiful art,
cent nature which we do not expect to find and which he who because the object of the latter must always show proper worth
displays it did not think of disclo ing. That the fair but false in itself, and hence requires a certain seriou ness in the pre-
show which generally has so much influence upon our judgment sentation, as taste does in the act of judging.
is here suddenly transformed into no thing, so that, as it were,
the rogue in us is laid bare, produces a movement of the mind
in two opposite directions, which gives a wholesome shock to
1 the body. But the fact that something infinitely better than all
assumed manner, viz. purity of disposition (or at least the
tendency thereto), is not quite extinguished yet in human
nature, blends seriousness and high esteem with this play of the
judgment. But because it is only a t ransitory phenomenon and
the veil of dissimulation is soon drawn over it again, there is
mingled therewith a compassion which is an emotion of tender-
ness ; this, as play, readily admits of combination with a good-
hearted laugh and ordinarily is actually so combined, and
withal is wont to compensate him who supplies the material
therefor for the embarrassm ent which results from not yet
being wise after the manner of men. An art that is to be na'ive
 [§56] DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T 1 3

§ 56. REPRESENTATIO OF THE ANTI OMY OF TASTE

The first commonplace of taste is contained in the propo i-

tion, with which every tasteless per on propo es to avoid blame:
everyone has his own taste That is a much a to say that the
determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective !)
SECOND DIVISION (gratification or grief), and that the judgment has no right to
the necessary assent of others.
Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment The second commonplace invoked even by those who admit
for judgments of taste the right to speak with validity for every-
one is: there is no disputing about taste. That is as much a o -')
§ 55 say that the determining ground of a judgment of taste may
indeed be objective, but that it cannot be reduced to definite
A faculty of judgment that is to be dialectical must in the
concepts; and that consequently about the judgment itself
first place be rationalizing, i.e. its judgments must claim uni-
nothing can be decided by proofs, although much may rightly
versality1 and that a priori, for it is in the opposition of such
be contested. For contesting [quarreling] and disputing [contro-
judgments that dialectic consists. Hence the incompatibility of
versy] are doubti'essthe same in this, that, by mean of the
aesthetical judgments of sense (about the pleasant and the un-
mutual opposition of judgments they seek to produce their
pleasant) is not dialectical. And again, the conflict between J
accordance, but different in that the latter hop s to bring this
judgments of taste, so far as each man -depends merely -Gn his
about according to definite concepts as determining grounds,
own taste, forms no dialectic of taste, because no one proposes
and consequently assumes objective concepts as grounds of the
to make his own judgment a universal rule . There remains,
judgment. But where this is regarded as impracticable, contro-
therefore, no other concept of a diale tic whic~ has to do with
versy is regarded as alike impracticable.
taste than that of a dialectic of the ritique of taste (not of
We easily see that, between these two commonplaces, there
taste itself) in respect of its principles, for here concepts that
is a proposition wantin"g which, though it has not passed into a
contradict one another (as to the ground of the possibility of
proverb, is yet fami liar to everyone, viz. there may be a-quar:.r-el/ r,;.J
judgments of taste in general) naturally and unavoidably pre-
about taste (although there can be no .controversy). But this
sent themselve . The Transcendental Critique of Taste will
proposition involves tbe contradictory of the former one. For
therefore contain a part which can bear the name of a Dialectic
wherever quarreling is permissible, there must be a hope of
of the Aesthetical Judgment, only if and so far a there is found
mutual reconciliation; and consequently we can count on
an antinomy of the principles of this faculty which renders its
grounds of our judgment that have not merely private validity,
conformity to law, and consequently also its internal possibility,
and therefore are not merely subjective . And to this the propo-
doubtful.
sition, everyone has his own taste, is directly oppo ed.
1 We may describe as a rationalizing judgment (judicium ratiocioons)
There emerges therefore in respect of the principle of taste
one which proclaims itse~rsal 1 for as such it can serve ~he major
premise of a syllogism. On the other hand, we can only speak of a judgment the following antinomy:
as rational (judicium ratiociootum) which is thought as the conclusion of a (1) Thesis. The judgment of taste is not basecl upon con-
syllogism, and consequently as grounded a priori.
1 2
 1 6 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JU DGMENT
[. 57] DIALECTIC OF THE AE TIIETICAL JUDGMENT 187
[§57]

/
.Js natural and unavoidable by human reason, and also why it
is so and remains o, although it cea es to deceive after the
of Practical Riason, the antinomie for~e u against our. will to
look beyonfl. the nsible and t? s.eek m .the supersenstble the {I
1
analysis of the apparent contradictio n, may be thus explained. int of uhion for all our a pnon faculties, because no other
In the two contradictor y judgment we take the concept on po
expecLent is left to make our reason h armomous
· · h 1·tseIf .
Wit
which the universal validity of a,j udgment mu t be based in
the same ense, and yet we app ly to it two oppo ite precLcate .
In the thesi we mean that the judgment of taste i not based R emark I
upon determinate concepts, and in the antithesis that the judo-- As we so often find occasion in transcenden tal philosophy for
ment of taste is based upon a cone pt, but an indetermina7e distingui hing ideas from concepts of the understanding , i~ m~y
one (viz. of the supersensibl e sub trate of phenomena). Between be of use to introduce technical terms to correspond to this dis-
these two there is no contradictio n. tinction. I believe that no one will object if I propo e some.
We can do nothing more than remove this conflict between In the most univer al signification of the word, ideas are repre-
the claims and counterclaims o( taste. It is absolutely im- sentations r ferred to an object, according to a certain (sub-
possible to give a defini te objective principle of taste in accord- jective or objective) principle, but so that they can nev~r be.c~me
ance with which its judgments could be derived examined a cognition of it. They are either referred to an mtut twn ,
and established, for then the judgment would not' be one of' according to a merely subjective principle of the mutual har-
taste at all. The subjective principle, viz. the indefini te idea mony of the cognitive powers (the imagination and the under-
of the supersen ible in us, can only be pu t forward as the sole stancLng), and they are then called aesthetical; or they are
( key to the puzzle of this faculty who e sources are hidd en from
us; it can be made no further intelligible.
referred to a concept according to an objective principle, al-
though they can never furni h a cognition of the object, and
The proper concept of taste, that is of a merely reflective are called rational ideas. In the latter case the concept is a
aesthetical judgment, li es at the ba is of the antinomy here transcendeTifOne, which is cJjfferent from a concept of the under-
exhibited and adjusted. Thus the two apparently contradictor y stancLng, to which an adequately corresponding experience can
principles are reconciled- both can be true, which is sufficient. always be supplied and which therefore is called immanent.
If, on the other hand, we as ume, as orne do , pleasantness as An aesthetical idea cannot become a cognition becau e it i an
the determining ground of ta te (on account of the singularity intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept /
of the representatio n which lies at the basis of t he judgment of can never be found. rational idea can never become a cogni-
taste) or, as others will have it, the principle of perfection (on tion because it involves a concept (of the super ensible) corres-
account of the universali ty of the same), and settle the defini- poncLng to which an intui tion can never be gi~en.. .
tion of taste accordingly, then there ari ses an antinomy which ·· ow I b lieve we might call the aesthet1cal 1dea an tnex-
it is absolutely impo sible to adjust except by showing t hat ponible repre entation of the imagination, and a rational idea
both the contrary (not merely contradictor y) propositions are an indemonstrable concept of reason. It is assumed of both that
false. And this would prove that the concept on which they are they are not generated without grounds, but (accorcLng to the
based is self-contracLctory. Hence we see that the removal of above explanation of an idea in general) in conformity with
the antinomy of the aesthetical judgment takes a course similar certain principles of the cognitive faculties to which they belong
to that pursued by the critique in the solution of t he antinomies (subjective principles in the one case, objective in the other).
of pure theoretical reason. And thus here, as also in the Critique Concepts of the understanding must, as such , always be demon-
 ,,
;: •.J'-l-o t

184 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [§57] [§57] DIALECT! OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT 1 5
I
cepts, for otherwise it would admit of -contreveffly (would be may be regar d quite differently-everyone has his own
deter.nllnable by proofs). taste.
(2) Antithesis. The judgment o taste is based on concepts, Neverthel~s there is undoubtedly ,S.Q!!_tained in the judgment
for otherwise, despite its diversity, we uld not quarrel about of taste ).a wider referenc.!f'of the representation of the object (as
't (we could not claim for our judg!Uent.the necessary assent 'of well as of the subject), whereon we base an extension of judg-
others). ments of this kind as necessary for everyone. At the basis of
this there must necessarily be a concept somewhere, though a
§ 57. SOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMY OF TASTE
concept which cannot be determined through intuition. But
through a concept of this sort we know nothing, and conse-
There is no possibility of removing the conflict between quently it can supply no proof for the judgment of taste. uch
these principles that underlie every judgment of taste (which a concept is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible .
are nothing else than the two peculiarities of the judgment of which underlies the object (and also the subject judging it), -
taste exhibited above in the Analytic), except by showing that regarded as an object of sense and thus as phenomenal. 2 For if
the concept to which we refer the object in this lcind of judgment we do not admit such a reference, the c arm o the judgment of
is not taken in the same sense in both maxims of the aesthetical taste to universal validity would not hold good. If the concept
judgment. This twofold sense or twofold point of view is on which it is based were only a mere confused concept of the
necessary to our transcendental judgment, but also the illusion understanding, like that of perfection, with which we could
which arises from the confusion of one with the other is natural bring the sensible intuition of the beautiful into correspondence,
and unavoidable . it would be at least possible in itself to base the judgment of
The judgment of taste must refer to some concept; otherwise taste on proofs, which contradicts the thesis.
it could make absolutely "IiO claim to be necessarily valid for But all contradiction disappears if I say: the judgment of
everyone. But it is not therefore capable of being proved from taste is based on a concept (viz. the concept of the general
a concept, because a concept may be either deter.nllnable or in ground of the subjective purposiveness lof nature for the judg-
itself undeter.nllned and undeterminable. The concepts of the ment); from which, however, nothing can be known and proved
understanding are of the former kind; they are deter.nllnable in respect of the object, because it is in itself undeterminable
through predicates of sensible intuition which can correspond and useless for knowledge. Yet at the same time and on that
to them. But the transcendental rational concept of the super- very account the judgment has validity for everyone (though,
sensible, which lies at .the basis of all sensible intuition, is of the of course, for each only as a singular judgment immediately
latter lcind, and therefore cannot be theoretically deter.nllned accompanying his intuition), because its determining ground
further. lies perhaps in the concept of that which may be regarded as
Now the judgment of taste is applied to objects of sense, but the supersensible substrate of humanity.
not with a view of determining a concept of them for the under- The solution of an antinomy only depends on the possibility
standing; for it is not a cognitive judgment. It is thus only a of showing that two apparently contradictory propositions do
private judgment, in which a singular representation intui- not contradict each other in fact, but that they may be con-
Ively perceived is referred to the feeling of pleasure, and so far sistent, although the explanation of the possibility of their
would be limited as regards its validity to the individual judg- concept may transcend our cognitive faculties. That this illusion
ing. Th object is for me an object of satisfaction; by others it 2 [Of. p. 191.]
. I
tt .... 1- 1 7 s. (

I r
CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL J UDGMENT ['57] [§57] DIALECTIC OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT 189
strable [if by demon tration we understand, as in anatomy, regards its quality, absolutely nothing corresponding to the
merely presentation]/ i.e. the object corresponding to them former, whereas in the latter ca e no empirical product &.ttains
must always be capable of being given in intuition (pure or to the degree of that causali ty which the rational idea pre cribes
empirical), for thus alone could they become cognitions. The as the rule.
concept of magnitude can be given a priori in the intuition of As in a rational idea t he imagination with its intuitions does
space, e.g. of a right line, etc.; the concept of cause in impene- not attain to t he given concept, so in an aesthetical idea the
trability, in the Gollisi n of bodies, etc. onsequently both understanding by its concepts never attains completely to that
can be authenticated by means of an empirical intui tion, i .e. internal intuition which the imagination binds up with a given
the thought of them can be proved (demonstrated, verified) by representation. Since, now, to reduce a representation of the
an example; and t his must be possible, for otherwise we should imagination to concepts is the same thing as to expound it, the
not be certain that the concept was not empty, i.e. devoid of aesthetical idea may be called an inexponible representation of
any object. the imagination (in its free play). I shall have occasion in the
In logic we ordinarily use the expressions "demonstrable" or sequel to say something more of ideas of this kind; now I only
" indemonstrable" only in respect of propositions, but these note that both kinds of ideas, rational and aesthetical, must
might be better designated by the titles respectively of mediately have their principles and must have t hem in reason- the one
and immediately certain propositions; for pure philosophy has in the objective, the other in the subjective principles of its
also propositions of both kinds, i.e. t rue propositions, some of employment.
which are susceptible of proof and others not . It can, as phi- We can consequently explain genius as the faculty of aestheti-
losophy, prove them on a priori grounds, but it cannot demon- cal ideas, by which at the same time is shown the reason why
strate them, unle s we wish to depart entirely from the proper in the products of genius it is the nature (of the subject), and
meaning of this word, according to which to demonstrate (osten- not a premeditated purpose, that gives the rule to the art (of
dere, exhibere) is equivalent to presenting a concept in intuition the production of the beautiful). For since the beautiful must
(whether in proof or merely in definition) . If the intuition is not be judged by concepts, but by the purposive attuning of
a priori this is called construction; but if it is empirical, then the imagination to agreement with t he faculty of concepts in
the object is displayed by means of which objective reality is general, it cannot be rule and precept which can serve as the
assured to the concept. Thus we say of an anatomist that he subjective standard of that aesthetical but unconditioned pur-
demonstrates the human eye if, by a dissection of this organ, posiveness in beautiful art that can rightly claim to please
he makes intuitively evident the concept which he has previously everyone. It can only be that in the subject which is nature
treated discursively . and cannot be brought under rules of concepts, i.e. the super-
It hence follows that the rational concept of the supersensible sensible substrate of all his faculti es (-oo- which no concept of
substrate of all phenomena in general, or even of that which the understanding-extends), and consequently that with respect
must be placed at the basis of our arbit rary will in respect of to which it is the final purpose given by the intelligible [part]
the moral law, viz. of transcendental freedom, is already, in of our nature to haqnonize all our cognitive faculties. Thus
kind, an indemonstrable concept and a rational idea, while alone is it possible that there should be a priori at the basis of
virtue is so in degree. For there can be given in experience, as this purposiveness, for which we can prescribe no objective
'[Second edition.] principle, a principle subjective and yet of universal validity.

l /1(1 ( " '

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I / ' I I • t·
190 CRITIQU E OF THE AESTHE TICAL J UDGME NT [' 57] [§57] DIALECTI C OF TH E AE THETICAL J UDGME NT 191

Remark II As for the two ant inomies of the theoret ical and practic al
employ ment of the superior cognitive facul ties, we have already
T he following import ant remark occurs here: There are three
hown their unavoidablenes s if judgme nts of this kind are not
kinds of antinom ies of pure reason, which, however, all agree
In this that they compel us to give up the otherwise very natural
~eferred to a supersensible substra te of the given objects as
phenom ena, and also the possibi! ity ~f t~eir solution as soon
hypoth esis that objects of sense are things in themse lves, and
as this is done. And as for the antmomws m the employ ment of
force us to regard them merely a phenom ena and to supply to
the judgment, in conform ity with the require ments of reason
them an intelligible substra te (somet hing supersensible of
and their solutio n, which is here given , there are only two ways
which the concep t is only an idea and supplies no proper knowl-
of avoiding them. \ E ither : 'we must deny that any a priori
edge). Withou t such an tinomies, reason could never decide
principle lies at the basis of the aesthetical judg ~ent of taste;
upon accepting a prin ciple narrowing so much the field of its
we must maintain that all claim to necessa ry uruvers al agree-
specula tion and could never bring itself to sacrifices by which so
ment is a ground less and vain fancy, and t hat a judgment of
many otherwise brillian t hopes must disappear . For even now,
taste only deserves to be regarded as correct because it happens
when by way of compen sation for t hese losses a greater field
that many people agree about it; and this, not because we assume
in a practical aspect opens out before it, it appears not t o be
an a priori princip le behind this agreement , bu t because (as in
able withou t grief to part from those hopes and disenga ge itself
the taste of the palate) of t he contingen t similar organiz ation
from its old attachm ent .
of the differen t subj ects . Or : we must assume that the judg-
That there are t hree kinds of antinomies has it ground in
ment of taste is really a disguised judgment of reason upon the
this that there are three cogni tive faculties- unders tanding,
perfection discove red in a thing and the referen ce of the m~nifold
judgment, and reason- of whi ch each (as a superi or cogni tive
in it to a purpose, and is consequ ently only called aesthetiCal on
faculty ) must have its a priori principles. F or reason, in so far
accoun t of t he confusi on here attaching to our reflection,
as it judges of t hese principles and t heir use, inexorably requires,
althoug h it is at bottom teleological. In the latter case we
in respect of them all , t he unconditioned for t he given condi-
could declare t he solution of t he antinomies by means of tran-
tioned; and this can never be found if we consider t he sensible as
scenden tal ideas t o be needless and withou t point, and t hus
belonging to things in themse lves and do not rather supply t o it,
could harmonize t hese laws of taste wi th obj ects of sense, not
as mere phenom enon , something superse nsible (the intelligible
as mere phenomena but as things in themselves. But we have
substra te of nature both external and interna l) as the lity in shown in several places in the exposit ion of judgments of taste
itself [Sache an sich selb st]. There are then: (1) for the cognitive
how li ttle either of thee expedients will satisfy .
facttlty an an tinomy of reason in respect of the t heoretical em-
H owever, if it be granted that our deduction !'l.t least proceeds
ployment of the unders tanding extend ed to t he uncondi tioned,
by the right meth od , althoug h it be not yet plain enough in all
(2) for the f eeling of pleasure and pain an antinom y of reason in
its parts , three ideas manife st themselves . First , t here is the
respect of the aesthetical empl oymen t of t he judgment , and
idea of the super ensible in general, withou t any further deter-
(3) for the faculty of desire an antin omy in respect of the practical
mination of it , as the su bstrate of nature . econdly , t here is
employment of the self-legislative reason; so far as all t hese
the idea of the same as the princip le of the su jective purposive-
faculties have their superior principles a pri ori , and , in con-
ness of nature for our cogni tive faculty . And thirdly , there is
formity with an inevita ble requirement of reason , must judge
the idea of the same as the principle of the purposes of freedom
and be able to determ ine t heir obj ect, uncond itionally according
and of the agreement of freedom with its purposes in the moral
to those principles .
sphere .
 192 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT [ 58] [§58] DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT 193

§ 58. OF THE IDEALISM OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF BOTH

to particular laws, which shows itseli, without purpose, spon-
NATURE AND ART AS THE UNIQUE PRI CIPLE OF taneously and contingently.
THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT
The beautiful formations in the kingdom of organized nature
speak loudly for the realism of the aesthetical purposiveness of
To begin with, we can either place the principle of taste in nature, since we might assume that behind the production of
the fact that it always judges in accordance with grounds which the beautiful there is an idea of the beautiful in the producing
are empirical, and therefore are only given a posteriori by sense, cause, viz. a purpose in respect of our imagination. Flowers,
or concede that it judge on a priori grounds. The former would blossoms, even the shapes of entire plants; the elegance of animal
be the empiricism of the critique of taste, the latter its rational- formations of alllcinds, unneeded for their proper use but, as it
ism. Accor<ling to the former, the object of our satisfaction were selected for our taste; especially the charming variety so
would not differ from the pleasant; according to the latter, if satisfying to the eye and the harmonious arrangement of colors
the judgment rest on definite concepts, it would not differ from (in the pheasant, in shellfish, in insects, even in the commonest
the good. Thus all beauty would be banished from the world, flowers), which, as it only concerns the surface and not the
and only a particular name, expressing perhaps a certain mingl- figure of these creations (though perhaps requisite in regard of
ing of the two above-named kinds of satisfaction, would remain their internal purp ses), seems to be e · ·el de · X \
in its place. But we have shown that there are also a priori external inspection these things give great weight to that
grounds of sati faction which can subsist along with the principle mo e o explanation which assumes actual purposes of nature
of rationalism, although they cannot be comprehended in for our aesthetical judgment.
definite concepts. On the other hand, not only is reason opposed to this assump-
On the other hand, the rationalism of the principle of taste tion in its maxims, which bid us always avoid as far as possible
is either that of the realism of the purposiveness or of its idealism. unnecessary multiplication of principles, but ~re everywhere
Because a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and shows in its free formations much mechanical tendency to the
beauty is not a characteri tic of the object, considered in itseli, productions of forins which seem, as it were, to be made for the
the rationalism of the principle of taste can never be placed in aesthetical exercise of our judgment, without affording the
the fact that the purposiveness in this judgment is thought as least ground for the supposition that there is need of anything
objective, i.e . that the judgment theoretically, and therefore more than its mechanism, merely as nature, according to which,
also logically (although only in a confused way), refers to the without any idea lying at their root, they can be purposive for
perfection of the object. It only refers aesthetically to the agree- our judgment. But I under. tand by free jormatio"(LS of nature
ment of the representation of the object in the imagination with those whereby, from a fluid at rest, through the volatilization or
the essential principles of judgment in general in the subject. separation of a portion of its constituents (sometimes merely of
Consequently, even according to the principle of rationalism, caloric), the remainder, in becoming solid, assumes a definite
the judgment of taste and the distinction between its realism shape or tissue (figure or texture) which is different according
and idealism can only be settled thus. Either, in the first case, to the specific <lifference of the material, but in the same material
this subjective purposiveness is assumed as an actual (designed) is constant. Here it is always presupposed that we are spealcing
purpose of nature (or art) harmonizing with our judgment, or, of a perfect fluid, i.e. that the material in it is completely dis-
in the second case, as a purposive harmony with the needs of solved and that it is not a mere medley of solid particles in a
judgment, in respect of nature and its forms produced according state of suspension.
 194 CRITI QUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGME T [§58] DIALECTIC OF THE AE TIIETICAL J UDGME T 195
[§58]
Formation, then, takes place by a shooting together, i.e. by a The fluid state is, to all appearance, older than the solid
sudden solidification, not by a gradual transition from the fluid state, and plants a well as animal bodies are fasruoned out of
to the solid state, but all at once by a saltus, which transition fluid nutritive matter, so far as this forms it elf in a state of
is also called crystallization. The commone t example of this re t. This la t, of course, primarily combines and forms itself
kind of formation is the f1 ezing of water, where first icicles in freedom according to a certain original disposition directed
are produced, which combine at angle· of sixty degrees, while toward purpo es (which, as will be shown in Part II , must not
others attach themselves to each vertex, until it all become be judged aesth tically but teleologically, according to the
ice; and so that, while tills is going on, the water does not principle of reali m), but also perhaps in conformity with the
gradually become viscous, but i a perfectly fluid as if its universal law of the affiruty of materials. Again, the watery
temperature were far higher, although it is absolut ly ice-cold. fluids di solved in an atmosphere that is a mixture of different
The matter that disengages itself, which is dissipated suddenly gases, if they s parate from the latter on accoun_t of cooling,
at the moment of solidification , is a considerable quantum of produce snow figures wruch, in correspondence With the c~a:­
caloric, the disappearance of which, as it wa only required for acter of the sp cial mixture of gases, often s em very artistic
preserving fluidity, I aves the new ice not in the least colder and are extremely beautiful. o, without detracting from the
than the water wruch shortly before was fluid. teleological principle by wruch we judge of organization, we
Many salts, and also rocks, of a crystalline figure are pro- may well think that the beauty of flowers, of the plumage of
duced thus from a species of earth di solved in water, we do not bird , or of shellfish, both in shape and color, may be ascribed
exactly know how. Thus are formed the crystalline configura- to nature and its faculty of producing forms in an a sthetically
tions of many minerals, the cubical ulphide of lead, the ruby purpo ive way, in its freedom, ·w ithout particular purpose
silver ore, etc., in all probability in water and by the shooting adapted thereto, according to chemical laws by the arrangement
together of particles, as they become forced by orne cause to of the material requisite for the organization in question.
dispense with this verucle and to uni te in definite external hap s . But what shows the principle of the ideality of the purposive-
But also all kinds of mat.ter, which have been kept in a flwd ness in the beauty of nature, as that which we always place at
state by heat and have become solid by cooling , how internally, the basis of an aesthetical judgm nt, and which allows us to
when fractured, a definite texture. This make us judge that, employ, as a ground of explanation for our rep~ese_ntat!ve
if their own weight or the disturbance of the air had not pre- faculty no realism of purpo e, is the fact that, m Judgmg
vented it, they would also have exllibited on the outer surface beauty: we invariably seek its -g&U~ in ourselves _a priori and
their specifically peculiar shapes. This has been observed in that our a sthetical judgment is itself legislative m respect of
some metals on their inner surface, which have been hardened the judgment whether anything is beautiful or not. _This could
externally by fusion but are flwd in the interior, by the drawing not be, on the assumption of the realism of the purposivenes of
off the internal fluid and the consequent undisturbed crystalliza- nature because in that case we must have learned from nature
tion of the remainder . 'lany of the e mineral crystallizations, what ~e ought o find beautiful, and the aesthetical judgment
such as spars, hematite, arragorute, etc., often present beautiful would be subjected to empirical principles. For in such an act
shapes, the like of which art can only conceive; and the halo in of judging the important point is not what nature is! or even,
the cavern of Antiparos 4 is merely produced by water trickling as a purpose, is in relation to us, but how we take 1t. There
down strata of gypsum. would be an objective purposiveness in nature if it had fasruoned
• [Antiparos is a small island in the Cyclades, remarkable for a splendid its forms for our satisfaction, and not a subjective purposive-
stalactite cavern near the south coast.] ness which depended upon the play of the imagination in its
 196 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [ 59] [§59] DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT 197

freedom, where it is we who receive nature with favor, not objective reality of rational concepts, i.e. of ideas, on behalf of
nature which show u favor. The property of nature that gives theoretical cognition, th n we are asking for something im-
us occasion to perceive the inner purpo ivenes in the relation of possible, because ab olutely no intuition can be given which
our mental faculti s in judging certain of its products-a pur- shall be adequate to them.
posiveness which i to be explained on upersensible grounds as All hypotyposis (presentation, subjectio sub adspectum), or
necessary and universal- cannot be a natural purpose or be sensible illustration, is twofold. It is either schematical, when /
judged by us as such; for otherwise the judgment hereby deter- to a concept compr hended by the understan "ng tlie corres-
mined would not be free, and would have at its basis heter- ponding intuition is given\ or it is symbolical. In the latter case,
onomy and not, as beseems a judgment of taste, autonomy. to a concept only thinkable by the reason, to which no sensible
In beautiful art, the principle of the idealism of purposiveness intuition can be adequate, an intuition is supplied with which
is still clearer. As in the case of the beautiful in nature an accords a procedure of the judgment analogous to what it
aesthetical realism of this purposiveness cannot be perceived observes in schematism, i.e. merely analogous to the rule of this
by sensations (for then the art would be only plea ant not procedure, not to the intuition itself, consequently to the form
beautiful). But that the atisfaction produced by aesth~tical of reflection merely and not to its content.
ideas must not depend on the attainment of definite purposes There is a u e of the word symbolical that has been adopted
(as in mechanically designed art) and that consequently, in the by modern logicians which i misleading and incorrect, i.e. to
very rationalism of the principle, the ideality of the purposes speak of the symbolical mode of representation as if it were
and not their reality must be fundamental, appears from the opposed to the intuitive, for the symbolical is only a mode of the
fact that beautiful art, as such, must not be considered as a intuitive. The latter (the intuitive, that is), may be divided
product of under tanding and science but of genius, and there- into the schematical and the symbolical modes of representation.
fore must get its rule through aesthetical ideas, which are e sen- Both are hypotypose , i.e. pre entations (exhibitiones), not mere
tially different from rational ideas of definite purposes. characterizations or designations of concepts by accompanying
Just as the ideality of the objects of sense as phenomena is sensible signs which contain nothing belonging to the intuition
the only way of explaining the possibility of their forms being of the object and only serve as a means for reproducing the
susceptible of a priori determination, so the idealism of pur- concepts, according to the law of as ociation of the imagination,
posiveness, in judging the beautiful in nature and art, is the and con equently in a subjective point of view. These are either
only hypothesis under which critique can explain the possibility words or visible (algebraical, even mimetical) signs, as mere
of a judgment of taste which demands a priori validity for expre sions for concepts. 5
everyone (without grounding on concepts the purposiveness All intuitions which we supply to concepts a priori are
that is represented in the object). th refore either schemata or symbols, of which the former contain
direct, the latter indirect, presentations of the concept. The
former do this demonstratively; the latter by means of an
§ 59. OF BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY
analogy (for which we avail ourse ves even of empirical intui-
Intuitions are always required to establish the reality of our cions) in which the judgment exercises a double function, first
concepts. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called 'The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive (not to
examples. t ey are pure- concepts of understanding ' the the symbolical). The former is either schematical , by demonstration, or
~. ..
mtmtwns are called schemata. If we desire to establish the symbolical, as a representation in accordance with a mere analogy.
 19 CRITIQUE OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGME T [§59] [§59] DIALECTIC OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT 199

applying the concept to the object of a en ible intuition, and duty) that it give plea ure with a claim for the agreement of
then applying the mere rule of the reflection made upon that everyone el ·e. By thi the mind i made conscious of a certain
intuition to a quite different object of which the fir t i only the ennoblement and elevation above the mere sensibility to pleas-
symbol. Thus a monarchical state is r presented by a living ure received through ense, and the worth of others is estimated
bod if it is governed by national laws, and by a mere machine in accordance with a like maxim of their judgment. That is the
{like a hand mill) if governed by an individual absolute will ; intelligible to which, a point d out in the prec ding pa1'agraph,
but in both cases only symbolically . For between a despotic taste looks, with which our higher cognitive faculties are in
state and a hand mill there is, to be sure, no imilarity; but accord, and without which a downright contradiction would
t here is a similarity in the rules according to which we reflect arise between their nature and the claims made by taste. In
upon these two things and th ir causaMy. This matter ha not this facul£y the judgment doe not see it elf, as in empirical
been sufficient ly analyzed hitherto, for it deserves a deeper judging, subjected to a heteronomy of mpirical laws; it gives
investigation; but this is not the place to ling r over it . ur the law to itself in r spect of the object of so pure a satisfaction,
language [i.e. German] i full of indirect pres ntation of fhi just as th reason do sin re pect of the facul ty of de ire. Hence,
./"\' sort, in which the expre sion doe not contain the proper schema both on account of thi inner po. ibility in the subject and of the
for t he concept, but merely a symbol fo · reflection. Thu the external po sibility of a nature that agrees with it, it finds itself
words ground (support, basis), to depend (to be held up from to be referred to something within t he subject a well as without
above), to flow from something (instead of, to follow), substance him, something which i neith r nature nor freedom, but which
(as Locke expresses it, the upport of accidents), and coun tless yet is connected with the supersen ible ground of the latter.
others are not schematical but symbolical hypotypo es and ex- In t his supersensible ground, therefore, the theoretical faculty
pressions for concepts, not by means of a direct intuition, but is bound together in unity with the practical in a way which ,
onl b analogy with it, i. e. by the transference of reflection though common, is yet unknown . We shall indicate some poin ts
upon an object of intui tion to a quite different cone pt to which of this analogy, whi le at the same time we shall note the dif-
perhaps an intuition can never directly correspond. If we are to ferences.
give the name of "cognition" to a mere mode of repre entation (1) The beautiful plea es immediately (but only in reflective
(which is quite permi sible if the latter is not a principle of the intuition, not, like morali ty, in its concept). (2) It plea es
theoretical determination of what an object is in itself, but of apart from any interest (the morally good is indeed neces arily
the practical determination of what t he idea of it hould be for bound up with an interest, t hough not with one which precedes
us and for its purposive u e), then all our knowledge of God is the judgment upon the satisfaction , but with one whi ch i first
merely symbqlical; and he who regards it ass hematical, along of all produced by it). (3) The freedom of the imagination (and
with the propert ies of understanding, will, etc., which only therefore of the sensibility of our faculty) is represented in
/ establi h t heir obj ective reality in beings of this world, falls into judging the beautiful as harmonious with the conformity to
-<anthropomorphism..} just as h e who gives up every intui tive law of t he understanding (in the moral judgment the freedom
efement falls into deism, by which nothing at all is cogni zed , of the will is thought a the harmony of the latter with itself,
not even in a practical point of view. according to uni versal law of reason). (4) The subj ective
ow I say the beautiful is the symb ol of the morally good, principle in judging the beautiful i represented as universal,
and that it is only in t his respect (a reference which is natural i.e . as valid for every man, though not cognizable through any
to every man and which every man post ulates in others as a universal concept. (The objective principle of morality is also
200 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [ 60] [§ 60] DIALECTIC OF THE AE THETICAL JUDGMENT 201
expounded as universal, i.e. for every subject an d for every he brings his procedure, serve rather for bringing the main
action of the same subject, and thus as cognizable by means of points back to his remembrance when occasion requires than
a universal concept). Hence the moral judgment is not only for prescribing them to him. Nevertheless, regard must be
susceptible of definite constitutive principle , but is pos ible had here to a certain ideal, which art must have before its eyes,
only by grounding its maxims on these in their universali ty . although it cannot be completely attained in practice. It is only
A reference to thi a OJ::d.is usual even with t he common through exciting the imagination of the pupil to accordance
understanding [of men], and we often describe beautiful objects with a given concept, by making him note the inadequacy of
of nature or art by names that seem to put a moral appreciation the expression for the idea, to which the concept itself does not
at their basis . We call buildings or trees majestic and magnifi- attain because it is an aesthetical idea, a11d by severe critique,
cent, landscapes aughing and gay; even colors are called inno- that he can be prevented from taking the examples set before
cent, modest, tender, because they excite sen ations which him as iypes and models for imitation, to be subjected to no {.( ., tf. 1/f.
have something analogous to the consciousness of the state of higher standard or independent judgment . It is thus that
mind brought about by moral judgments . Taste makes possible genius, and with it the freedom of the imagination, is stifled
the transition, without any violent leap, from the charm of by its very conformity to law; and without these no beautiful
sense to habitual moral interest, as it represents t he imagination art, and not even an accurately judging individual taste, is
in its freedom as capable of purposive determination for the possible.
understanding, and so teaches us to find even in objects of The propaedeutic to all beau tiful art, regarded in the highest
sense a free satisfaction apart from any charm of sense. degree of its perfection, seems to lie, not in precepts, but in t he
culture of the mental powers by means of those elements of
knowledge calle humaniora, robably because humanity on the
one side indicates the universal f eeling of sympathy, ttnd on the
other thefac ty of being able to communicate universally our ~
APPENDIX inmost [feelings]. For these properties, taken together, con-
stitute the characteristic social spirit 6 of humanity by which it is ~
distinguished from the limi atwns o animal life . The age and - - - ~
§ 60, OF THE METHOD OF TASTE
peoples, in which the impulse toward a law-abiding ~al life,
The division of a Critique into elementology and methodology, by which a people becomes a permanent community, contended
as preparatory to science, is not applicable to the Critique of with the great difficulties pre ented by the difficult problem of
Taste, because there neither is nor can be a science of the uniting freedom (and equali ty) with compulsion (rather of
beautiful, and the judgment of taste is not determinable by respect and submission from a sen e of duty than of fear)-such
means of principles. As for the scientific element in every art,
which regards truth in the presentation of its object, this is
an age and such a people naturally first found out the art of ..?"/
reciprocal communication of ideas between the cultivated and
indeed the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non) of uncultivated classes, and thus discovered how to harmonize
beautiful art, but not beautiful art itself . There is, therefore, the large-mindedness and refinement of the former with the
for beautiful art only a manner (modus), not a method of teaching natural simplicity and originali ty of the latter . In this way they
(methodus) . .J'he master must show what the pupil is to do and • [I read "Geselligkeit" with Rosenkranz i Hartenstein and Kirchma.nn
how he is to do it; and tbe universal rules, under which at last have " GZU.ckseligkeit. "]
[ ] METHODOL OGY OF TilE TELEOLOG I .\L JUDGME T 305

purpo es in the world, and physical t I ology exhibit th m in

uch abundanc , that if w judge in accordance with rea on, we
have ground for a uming as a principl in the inve iigation of
nature that nothing in natur is without a purpose, but the
final purpo e of natur we eek th r in vain. Thi can and mu t,
therefore, as it idea only lie in rea on, be ought a regard
its objective po ibility only in rational b ing . And the prac-
tical rea on of these latter not only uppli s ihi final purpose,
it al o d termin s this con pt in respect of the conditions under
which alone a final purpo e of reation can be thought by u .
The question is now, whether th objective reali Ly of the
concept of a final purpo e of creation cannot be exhibited
adequately to the th or tical r quirements of pure rca on, if
not apodictically for the determina nt judgment, yet adequat ly
for the maxims of the theor tical refl ctiv judgment. Thi i
th 1 a t one could xp ct from theoretical philo ophy, which
undertake to combine the moral purpo e with natural pur-
po s by mean of th id a of one ingl purpo e, but yet t hi
little i far more than it can accompli h.
ccording to the principle of the theoretical r flective judg-
ment, we hould sa : If we have ground for a uming fo r the
purpo ive products of nature a upr me cau e of nature, whose
causality in re pect of the actuality of creation is of a diff rent
kind from that required for the mechanism of nature, i.e. mu t
be thought a the cau ality of an understand ing, we have al o
sufficient ground for thinking in thi original Being, not merely
the purpo e verywh r in nature, but al o a final purpo .
T his is not indeed a final purpo e by which we can explain the
pre ence of uch a Being, but one of which we may at least
convince our elve (a wa the ca in phy ical teleology) that
we can make the po ibility of such a world conceivable, not
merely according to purpo es, but only through the fact that
we ascribe to its exi tence a final purpo e.
But a final purpo e i merely a concept of our practical rea on
and can be inferred from no data of experi nee for the theor tical
judging of nature, nor can it be appli d o the cognition of
nature. o u e of this cone pt i p ibl except its u e for
202 CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT [§ 60]
first found that mean between the higher culture and simple
nature which furnishes that true standard for taste as a sense
universal to all men whic no general ru1es can upply.
Wi th difficulty will a later age di pense with those models,
because it will be always farther from nature; and in fine, with-
out having permaz:ent xampl s before it, a concept will hardly
be po sible, in one and the same people, of the happy union of
the law-abiding constraint of the highest culture with the force
and truth of free nature which feels its own proper worth.
Now taste is at bottom a facu lty for judging of the sensible
illustration of moral ideas (by means of a certain analogy in-
volved in our reflection upon both these), and it is from this
faculty also and from the greater susceptibilit y grounded
thereon for the feeling arising from the latter (called moral
feeling) that that pleasure is derived which taste regards as
valid for mankind in eneral and not merely for the private
feeling of each. Hen, e it appears pl ain that t he true propae-
deutic for the foundation of taste is the development of moral
ideas and the cultu e of the moral f eling, because it is only
when sensibility is brought into agreement with this that
genuine taste can as ume a definite invariable form .
 330 CRITIQ UE OF THE TELEO LOGIC AL J DGME
NT [S 91]
of proof with his peculiar thorou ghne and lucidity.
But how
doe thi proof acquire uch might y infiu nee upon
the mind,
e p cially in a judgm nt by cold rea on (for ,,. might
r fer to
persua ion the emotion and elevat ion of rea on produ ced
by the
wonders of nature ) upon a calm and resigned a ent?
It is not
the physical purpo whi ch all indi cate in th world cau e an
unfath omab le intellig nee; the e are inade quat th reto
becau e
they do not conte nt th \\'ant of the inquir ing r ason. For
where-
fore (it a ks) are all tho e natura l thing3 that exhib
it art?
Wh refor i man him elf, whom we mu t r gard as the
ultim ate
purpo e of natur e, thinka b le by u ? Wherefore i thi
collective
nature her , and what is the final purpo e of such
great and
manifold art? Rea on canno t be cont nt with en joyme
nt or
with cont mplat ion, ob ervati on, an d admir ation (whic
h, if it
stops there, is only enjoy ment of a partic ular kind)
as the
ul timate final purpos for the creati on of the world and
of man
him elf, for this pr suppo es a p r onal worth , which
man alone
can give him self, as the condition under which alone he
and his
being can be the final purpo e. Failin g thi (which
alone is
su ceptible of a definite conce pt), the purpose of nature
do not
sati factorily answ r our qu tion , e pecially becau
se they
canno t furni h any determinate conce pt of the highe st
Being as
an all-suffici nt (and therefore uniqu e and so prope
rly called
highest) Being and of the laws according to which
an under -
tandin g i cau e of the \\'Orld.
Hence that th phy icotelcologi ·al proof convinc s,
just as
if it were a th ological proof, doe not ari e from
our avai ling
ourselves of the idea of purpo es of natur e a· so many
empir ical
groun ds of proof of a highes t under standi ng. But it
mingles
it elf unnot iced with that moral groun d of proof, which
dwells
in every man and influences him secretly, in the conclu
sion by
which we a cribe to the B ing which manif ests itself
with such
incomprehen ible art in the purpo es of natur e a final
purpo se
and con qu ntly wi dom (witho ut however being justifi
ed in
doing so by the percep tion of the former), and by which
there-
fore we arbitr arily fill up the lacun a of the [desig n] argum
ent.
In fact, it is only the moral groun d of proof which
produces
222 CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGME T [ 66]
reference to reflection upon their external aspect, and conse-
quently only on account of the form of their external surface.
But internal natural perfection, as it belongs to those thing
which are only possible as natural purposes, and are therefore
called organized beings, is not analogous to any phy ical, i.e.
natural, faculty known to us; nay even, regarding ourselves as,
in the widest sense, belonging to nature, it is not even thinkable or
explicable by means of any exactly fitting analogy to human art.
The concept of a t hing as in itself a natural purpo e is there-
fore no constitutive concept of understanding or of reason, but
it can serve as a regulative concept for the reflective judgment,
to guide our investigation about objects of t his kind by a dis-
tant analogy with our own causality according to purposes
generally and in our meditations upon t hei r ultimate ground.
This latter use, however, is not in reference to the knowledge of
nature or of its original ground, but rather to our own practical
faculty of reason, in analogy with which we considered the
cause of t hat purposiveness.
Organized beings are then the only beings in nature which,
considered in theiDSelves and apart from any relation to other
things, can be thought as possible only as purposes of nature.
Hence they first afford objective reality to the concept of a
purpose of nature, as distinguished from a practical purpose,
and so they give to the science of nature the basis for a teleology,
i .e. a mode of judgment about natural objects according to a
special principle which otherwise we should in no way be ju ti-
fied in introducing (because we cannot see a priori the possibili ty
of this kind of causality).

§ 66. OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDGING OF I NTER AL

PURPOSIVENESS IN ORGANIZED BEINGS

This principle, which is at the same time a definition, is as

follows: An organized product of nature is one in which every part
is reciprocally purpose [end] and means. In it nothing is vain,
Without purpose, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of
nature.
[§ 65] ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT 221

nor does it make good what is lacking in a first formation by

the addition of the missing parts, nor if it has gone out of order
does it repair itself-all of which, on the contrary, we may
expect from organized nature. An organized being is then not
a mere machine, for that bas merely moving power, but it
possesses in itself formative power of a elf-propagating kind
which it communicates to its materials tbE>ugh they have it not
of themselves; it organizes them, in fact, and this cannot be
explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion.
We say of nature and its faculty in organized products far
too little if we describe it as an analogon of art, for this suggests
an artificer (a rational being) external to it. Mu h rather does
it organize itself and its organized products in every speci , no
doubt after one general pattern but yet with suitable deviations,
which self-preservation demands according to circumstances.
We perhaps approach nearer to this inscrutable property if we
describe it as an analogon of life, but then we must either endow
matter, as mere matter, with a property which contradicts
its very being (hylozoism) or associate therewith an alien prin-
ciple standing in communion with it (a soul). But in the latter
case we must, if such a product is to be a natural product,
either pr suppose organized matter as the instrument of that
soul, which does not make the soul a whit more comprehen ible,
or regard the soul as artificer of this tructure, and so remove
the product from (corporeal) nature. To speak strictly, then,
the organization of natur has in it nothing analogous to any
causality we know. 4 Beauty in nature can be rightly described
as an analogon of art because it is ascribed to objects only in
• We can conversely throw light upon a certain combination, much
more often met with in idea than in actuality, by means of an analogy to
the so-called immediate natural purposes .lin a recent complete transforma-
tion of a great people into a state the w6rd organization for the regulation
of mAgistracies, etc., and even of the whole body politic, has often been
fitly used. For in such a whole every member should surely be purpose as
well as means, and, while all work together toward the possibility of the
whole, each should be determined as regards place and function by means
of the Idea of the whole. [Kant probably alludes here to the organization
of the United States of America.] J
[§ 67] ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGME 'T 225

internal form is something very different from taking the

existence of that thing to be a purpo e of nature. For the latter
assertion we require, not merely the concept of a po ible pur-
pose, but the knowledge of the final purpo e (scopus) of nature.
But this requires a reference of such kno,...·l dge to something
supersensible far transcending all our tel ological knowledge of
nature, for the purpo e of [the existence of] 6 nature mu t
itself be sought eyon nature. The internal form of a mere
b a e o grass is sufficient to show that, for our human faculty
of judgment, its origin is possible only according to the rule of
purposes. But if we change our point of view and look to the
use which other natural beings make of it, abandon the con-
sideration of its internal organization and only look to its
externally purposive references, we shall arrive at no categorical
purpose; all this purposive reference rests on an ever more dis-
tant condition, which, as unconditioned (the presence of a
thing as final purpose), lies quite out ide t he physico-teleological
view of the world. For example, grass is needful for the ox,
which again is needful for man as a means of exi tence, but then
we do not see why it is necessary that men should exist (a
question this which we shalT not find so easy to an wer if we
sometim s cast our thoughts on t he I ew Hollanders or the
inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego). o conceived, the thing i not
even a natural purpo e, for neither it (nor its whole genus) is 1
to be regarded as a natural product.
H ence it is only so far as matter is organized that it necessarily
carries with it the concept of a natural purpose, because this
its specific form is at t he same time a product of nature. But
this concept leads nece sarily to the idea of collective nature as
a system in accordance with t he rule of purposes, to which idea
all the mechanism of nature must be subordinated according to
principles of reason (at least in order to investigate natural
phenomena in it). The principle of r ason belongs to it only
as a subjective principle or a maxim: viz. everything in the
world is some way good for something; nothing is vain in it. \
6 [These words are inserted by Rosenkranz, but omitted by Hartenstein

and Kirchmann.]
 226 CRITIQU E OF THE TELEOL OGICAL JUDGME T [ 67]
By the example that nature gives us in its orgaruc produc ts we
are justified, nay call d upon, to expect of it and of its laws
nothing that is not purpo ive on the whole .
It is plain that this is not a principle for the determ inant but
only for the refl ctive judgme nt; th11t it is regulative and not
constit utive; and that we derive from it a clue by which we
consider natural things in reference to an already given ground
of determ ination according to a new law-abiding order, and
extend our natural science according to a different principle,
viz. that of final cau es, but yet withou t prejudice to the prin-
ciple of mecharucal cau ality . Furthe rmore, it is in no wise thus
decided whethe r anythin g of which we judge by this principle
is a designed purpose of nature, whether the grass is for the ox
or the sheep, or whether these and the other things of nature
are here for men. It is well also from this side to consider the
things which are unplea sant to us and are contrar y to purpose
in particu lar references. Thus, for example, we can say: The
vermin that tormen t men in their clothes, their hair, or their
beds, may be, according to a wise appoin tment of nature, a
motive to cleanliness which is in itself an import ant means for
the preserv ation of health. Or again the mosquitoes and other
stinging insects that make the wildernesses of America so
· oppressive to the savages may be so many goads to activity for
these primitive men, [induci ng them] to drain the marshes and
bring light into the forests which interce pt every breath of air ,
and in this way, as well as by cultiva ting the soil, to make their
habitat ions more healthy . The same thing, which appear to
men contrad ictory to nature in its inner orgaruzation, if viewed
in this light, giv s an enterta ining, sometimes an instruc tive,
outlook into a teleological order of things, to which, withou t
such a principle, mere physical observation would not lead us
by itself . Thus some persons regard the tapeworm as given to
the men or animals in whom it resides as a kind of set-off for
some defect in their vital organs; now I would ask if dreams
(witho ut which we never sleep, though we seldom remember
them) may not be a purposive ordinance of nature? For during
the relaxation of all the moving powers of the body, they serve
 228 CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL J UDGMENT [ 68]
mechanism of cau es working blindly. For the first idea, as
cone rns its ground, already brings us beyond the world of
sen e, ince the unity of the sup rs n ible principle must be
regarded as valid in this way , not merely for certain species of
natural b ing , but for the whole of nature as a system.

§ 68. OF THE PRI CIPLE OF TELEOLOGY AS INTERNAL

PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL SCIE CE

The principles of a sci nee are either internal to it, and are
th n called "domestic" (principia domestica), or are ba ed on
cone pt t hat can only find t heir place outside it, and so are
"for ign" principles (peregrina). ciences that contain the
latter , place at the ba is of th ir doctrines auxiliary propo itions
(lemmata), i.e. they borrow some concept, and with it a ground
of arrangement, from another sci nee.
Every science i in it elf a system, and it i not enough in it
to build in accordance with principles and thus to employ a
technical procedu re, but we must go to work with it architec-
tonically, as a building subsisti ng for itself; we must not treat
it as an additional wing or part of another building, but as a
whole in itself, although we may sub equently make a passage
from it into that other or conv rsely.
If then we int roduce into the context of natural science the

( concept of God, in order to explai n the purposiveness in nature,

and subsequently u e t his purposivene s to prove that there is
a God, th re is no internal consi tency in eith r sci nee [i.e.
eith r in natural science or theology]; and a delu ive circle
brings t hem both into uncertainty, becau e th y have allowed
their boundaries to overlap.
The expression, a purpo e of nature, already sufficiently
prevents the confu ion of !nixing up natural science and the
occasion t hat it give f r judging teleologically of its objects,
with t he consideration of od, and o of a theological d rivation
of them. We mu t not regard it as in ignificant if one inter-
changes this expr ion with that of a divine purpose in the
ordering of nature or gives out the latter as more suitable and
 SECOND DIV ISI ON
Dialectic of the Teleological Judgment

§ 69. WHAT IS AN ANTI OMY OF THE JUDG

MENT ?
The deter mina nt judgm ent has for itself no princ
iples which
are the foundation of concepts of objects. It bas
no auton omy,
for it subsu mes only unde r given laws or concepts
as principles.
Henc e it is expos d to no dang r of an antin omy
of its own or to
a conflict of its principles. o [we saw that] the
trans cend ental
judgm ent which contains the conditions of subsu
ming under
categories was for it elf not nomothetic, but that
it only indic ated
the conditions of sensuous intui tion unde r whic
h realit y (appli-
cation) can be supplied to a given concept, as
law of the under-
stand ing, whereby the judgm ent could never
fall into discord
with itself (at least as far as its principles are conc
erned).
But the reflective judgm ent must subsume unde
r a law which
is not yet given, and is therefore in fact only
a principle of
reflection upon objects, for which we are objec
tively quite in
want of a law or of a concept of an object that woul
d be adeq uate
as a principle for the cases that occur. ince now
no use of the
cognitive faculties can be perm itted witho ut
principles, the
reflective judgm ent must in such cases serve
as a principle for
itself. This, becau e it is not objective and can
supp ly no ground
of cognition of the object adeq uate for design,
must serve as a
mere subje ctive principle for the purposive empl
oyment of our
cognitive faculties, i.e. for reflecting upon a
class of objects.
Therefore, in reference to such ca es, the reflec
tive judgm ent
has its maxi ms-n ecess ary maxims- on behalf
of the cognition
of natur al laws in experience, in order to attai
n by their means
to cone pts, even concepts of reason, since it bas
absol ute need
of such in order to learn merely to cogni ze natur
e according to
232
 250 CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT [' 76] DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGME T 251
[§ 76]
If our understanding were intuitive, it would have no objects
but tho e which are actual. Concept (which merely ext nd to st1'tu t'10n , but not valid of the object. Nor is it valid
. for every
h
· g being becau c I cannot presuppose m every sue
cond'1t10ns
·
of th e
the possibility of an object) and ensible intuitions (which give k.nOWill
· thought 'and intuition as two d1stmct . .
us something without allowing us to cognize it thus as an object) bemg . d'
·se of its cognitive faculties, and consequently as con 1-
would both disappear. But now the whole of our distinction exer Cl . . d d
tions of the possibility and actual!ty of things. ~ un erstan -
between the merely pos ible and the actual rest on this, that · into which this distinction did not enter m1ght say: All
the former only signifies the po iting of the representation of a mg
objects that I know are, i.e. xist; a~d the poss1'b'l't 1 1 yof some
thing in respect of our con ept and, in general, in respect of which yet do not exist (i.e. the contmgency or the co~trasted
the facu lty of thou"'ht, while the latter signifies the positing of cessity of those which do exist) might never come mto the
the thing in its lf [outside this concept]. 6 The distinction, ~=presentation of such a being a~ all. But what makes it difficult
then, of possible things from actual is one which has merely
f our understanding to treat tts concepts here as reason does
subjective validity for the human understanding, because we isMmerely that, for it, as human understan ding, t.h~t IS . t r~n-
can always have a thing in our thoughts although it is [reallyJ scendent (i.e. impossible for the subjective conditwn~ .of 1ts
nothing, or we can represent a thing as given although we have cognition) which reason makes into a principle app~rtammg to
no concept of it. The propo itions therefore-that things can the object. Here the maxim always holds that all obJeCts whose
be po sible without being actual, and that consequently no 'tion surpasses the faculty of the understanding are thought
conclusion can be drawn as to actuality from mere pos ibility- cogru 0
f
~b us according to the subjective conditions of the exerc1se o
are quite valid for human reason, without thereby proving that ~ that faculty which necessarily attach to our (human) nature.
this distinction lies in things them elves. That this does not If judgments laid down in this way (and there is no other a~ter~a­
follow, and that consequently these propositions, though valid tive in regard to transcendent concepts) cannot be c~nst1tut1:e
of objects (in so far as our cognitive faculty, as ensuously principles determining the object as it is, they. WJll ren:am
conditioned, busies itself with objects of sense), do not hold for regulative principles adapted to the human pomt of v1ew,
things in general, appears from the irrepressible demand of immanent in their exercise and sure.
reason to assume something (the original ground) necessarily Just as reason in the theoretical consideration of nature must
existing as uncon 'tioned, in which possibility and actuality assume the idea of an unconditioned necessity of its original
should no longer be distinguished and for which idea our under- ground, so also it presupposes in the practic~l [ sphere] its O\~
~ding has absolutely no concept; i.e . it can find no way of (in respect of nature) unconditioned causality, or freedom~ m
representing such a thing and its manner of exi tence. For if that it is consciou of its own moral command. Here the obJ~C­
the understanding thinks such a thing (which it may do at tive necessi ty of the act, as a duty , is opposed to that necess1ty
pleasure), the thing is merely represented as po ible. If it is which it would have as an event if its ground lay in nature and
conscious of it as given in intuition, then it is actual; but nothing not in freedom (i.e. in the causality of reason). The morally
as to its po si bility is thus thought. Hence the concept of an absolutely necessary act is regarded as physically quite con-
absolutely nece sary Being is no doubt an indi pen able idea of tingent, since that which ought neces arily to happen ofte.n d?es
reason, but yet it is a problematical concept unattainable by the not happen. It is clear, then, that it is owing to the subJeCtive
human understandi ng. It is indeed valid for the employment of constitution of our practical faculty that the moral laws must
our cognitive faculti es in accordance with their peculiar con- be represented as commands and the actio~ confon:ning to
e [Second edition.] them as duties, and that reason expresses th1s necess1ty, not
 252 CRITIQ UE OF THE TELEO LOGIC AL JUDGM ENT
[§ 76]
by an "i "(hap p ns), but by an "ough t to b ." This
would not
be theca e were rea on con idered a in it cau ality ind
pende nt
of sensibility (as the ubjec tive condition of it applic
ation to
obj ct. of nature ), and so a cau e in an intelligible world
n-
tirely in agreem ent with the moral la.w. For in such a world
there
would b no di tinctio n betw en "ough t to do" and
"do ,"
b tween a practi cal law of that which is po ible throug
h u and
the t heoret ical law of that which is actual throug h u .
T hough ,
therefore, an intelligibl world in which every thing
would be
actua l mer ly becau e (as somethi ng good) it is pos
ible, to-
gether with fr dom as it forma l ond ition , i for u
a tran-
cende nt conce pt, not availa ble a a consti tutive princi
ple to
determ i ne an object and its objec tive reali ty, yet b
cause of
the consti tu tion of our (in part sen uous) natur e and
facult y it
is, so far as we can repre ent it in accord ance with the
consti tu-
tion of our reason , for us and for all ration al being · t hat
have a
conne ction with t he world of sens , a universal
regulative
principle. This principle does not obj ctively determ
ine t he
consti tution of fr edom , a a form of causali ty, but it makes
the
rule of action s ac ording to that id a a command for
everyo ne,
with no less validi ty than if it did so determine it.
In t he same way we may con ede thus mu ch as regard
s t he
case in hand. Between natur al mechanism and t he
techn ique
of natur e, i.e . its purpo ive conne ction , we should find
no dis-
t inction were it not that our under tandin g is of the
kind that
must proceed from the unive rsal to t he part icular . The
judg-
ment, t hen , in respec t of t he p arti cula~ can cogniz
e no pur-
posiveness and , con equen tly, can form no determ inant
judg-
men ts without havin g a unive r allaw under which t o
subsu me
t hat par ticula r. ow t he particular , as such, con tains sGme-
t hing contin gent in respec t of the u niver al , while yet
reason
requires uni ty and conformity to law in t he combi
nation of
part icular laws of natur e . This conformi ty of t he contin
gent t o
law is called " purposiveness" ; and t he deriva tion of
part icular
laws from the unive r al, as regards their contingent eleme
nt, is
impossible a priori t hrough a determination of the conce
pt of
the obj ect. H ence, the conce pt of the purposiveness
of nature
I

25 259
CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL J UDGMENT [ 7 J [§ 7 J DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

whole .of nature as ~ system).. Thus we should judge nature pass it by, becau e wiLhout it no. insigh.t into the nature of
accordU:g to two different kinds of principles without the things can be attained. uppo e 1t admitted that a supreme
me?hamca~ way of explanation being shut out by the teleo- Architect immediately created the forms of na~ure as th y h.ave
log~ cal , as If they contradicted ach other. been from the beginning, or that He predetermmed tho which,
From this. we are ?er~itt d to see what otherwise, though in the comse of nature, continually form themselve on the same
w~ could ~aslly surnnse It, could with difficulty be maintained model. ur knowledge of nature is not thus in the lea t fur-
w1th c~rta1~ty and proved, viz. that the principle of a mechani- thered, because we cannot know the ~ode of ~ct~on of that
cal denvat1?n of purposive natural products is consistent with Being and the ideas which are to contam the prmCiples of t~e
the tel~ologJCal , but in no way enables us to dispense with it. possibility of natural beings, and we ca~ot by th~m expl ~m
!n a th~g that we must judge as a natural purpo e (an organ- nature as from above downward (a priort). And if, startmg
l~ed bemg), we can no doubt try all the known and yet to be from the forms of the objects of experience, from below upward
discovered laws of mechanical produc tion, and even hope to (a posteriori), we wish to explain the pU:posivene s which .we
make good ~rog~e s therewith, but we can never get rid of the believe i met with in experience by appealmg to a cause working
call for a qUJte d1fferent ground of prod uction for the possibility in accordance with purposes, t hen is our explanation quite
of such a product, viz . causality by means of purpo es. Abso- tautological and we are only mocking reason with words. In-
lute!?' no human reason (in fact no finite reason like ours in deed wh n we lose ourselves with thi way of explanation in the
t quab ty, however much it may surpass it in degree) can hope tran cendent, whither natural knowledge cannot follow, reason
to unde:stand the production of even a blade of gra by mere is seduced into poetical extravagance, which it is its peculiar
mechamcal causes . As regards the possibility of such an object destination to avoid.
the teleological c?nnection of causes and effects is quite indis~ On the other hand, it is just as necessary a maxim of reason
pens~ble for the Judgment, even for studying it by the clue of not to pa s by the principle of purposes in the products of
expenence . For external object as phenomena an adequate nature . For although it does not make their mode of origination
~ro.un~ related to purposes cannot be met with; thi , although any more comprehensible, yet it is a heuristic .principle for
It hes m nature, must only be sought in the super en ible ub- inve tigatino- the particular laws of nature , supposmg even that
strate of nature, from all po sible insight in to which we are we wish to make no use of it for explaining nature itself, in
cut off .. H ence it is absolu tely impos ible for u to prod uce from which we still always speak only of natural purposes, although
natu~e .Itself grounds of explanation for purposive com binations, it appar ntly xhibits a designed unity of purpose-i .e. without
and ~ ~ IS necessary by the constitution of the human cognitive seeking the ground of their possibility beyond ~atu~e . . ~ut
f~cul~Ies ~o seek the supreme ground of these purpo ive com- since we must come in the end to t his latter questwn , It IS JUSt
bmatwns m an original understanding a the cause of the world. as neces ary to think for nature a particular kind of causality
which does not pre ent itself in it as the mechanism of natural
causes which does. To t he receptivity of several forms , different
§ 78. OF THE UNION OF THE PRJ CIPLE OF THE U IVERSA L
from those of which matter is susceptible by mechani m , must
MECHANISM OF MATTER WITH THE TELEOLOGICAL be added a spontaneity of a cause (which therefore cannot be
PRINCIPLE I N THE TECHNIQUE OF NATURE
matLer) without which no ground can be assigned for those
. It is infinitely important for reason not to let lip the mechan- forms. o doubt reason , before it takes this step, must proceed
ISm of nature in its product , and in their explanation not to with caution and not try to explain teleologically every tech-
 METHOD OL Y OF
1
THE TELEOLOGI AL JU GMENT

§ 79. WHETHER TELEOLOGY MUST BE TREATED AS IF IT

BELO GED TO THE DOCTRINE OF ATURE

Every science must have its definite po ition in the encyclo-

pedia of all the sciences. If it i a philo ophical science, its
position must be either in the theoretical or practical part. If
again it has its place in the former of th se, it must be eith r in
the doctrine of nature, so far as it concerns t hat which can be an
object of experience (in the doctrine of bodies, the doctrine of
the soul, or the universal science of the world), or in the doctrine
of God (the original ground of the world as the complex of all
objects of experience).
Now the question is : What place i due to teleology? Does it
belong to natural science (properly so called) or to theology?
One of the two it must be; for no science belongs to the transition
from one to t he other, because this transition only marks the
articulation or organization of t he system, and not a place in it.
That it does not belong to theology as a part of it, although
it may be made of the most important use therein, is self-
evident. For it has as its objects natural productions and t heir
cause, and although it refer at the arne time to the latter as
to a ground lying outside of and beyond nature (a Divine
Author), yet it does not do this for the determinant but only
for the reflective judgment in the consideration of nature (in
order to guide our judgment on things in the world by means of
such an idea as a regulative principle, in conformity with t he
human understandin g).
But it appears to belong just as little t o natural science,
1 [This is marked a.s an Appendix in the second edition.]
265
 266 CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICA L JUDGMENT [§ OJ
which needs determinant and not merely reflective principles
in order to supply objective grounds for natural effects. In fact,
nothing i gained for the theory of nature or the mechanical
explanation of it phenomena by means of its effective causes
by considering them as connected according to the relation of
purpo es. Th exhibi tion of the purpo es of nature in its pro-
ducts, so far as they constitute a system according to teleological
concepts, properly belongs only to a description of nature
which is drawn up in accordance with a particular guiding
thread . Here reason, no doubt, accompli hes a noble work,
instructive and practically purposive in many points of view,
but it gives no information as to the origin and the inner possi-
bili ty of these forms, which is the special business of theoretical
natural science. T eleology, therefore, as science, belongs to no
doctrine but only to critique, and to the critique of a special
cognitive faculty , viz. judgment. But so far as it contains
principles a priori, it can and must furnish the method by which
nature must be judged according to the principle of final causes .
H ence its methodology has at least negative influence upon the
procedure in t heoretical natural science and also upon the
relation which this can have in metaphysics to theology as its
propaedeutic.

*80. OF THE ECE SARY SUBORDINAT ION OF THE MECH I CAL

TO THE TELEOLOGICA L PRINCIPLE IN THE EXPLA ATIO
OF A THI G AS A NATURAL PURPOSE

The privilege of aiming at a merely mechanical method of

explanation of all natural products is in itself quite unlimited,
but the faculty of attaining thereto is by the constitution of our
understandin g, so far as it has to do with things as natural
purpo es, not only very much limi ted but also clearly bounded.
For, according to a principle of the judgment, by this process
alone nothing can be accomplished toward an explanation of
these things, and cons quently the judgment upon such products
must always be at the same time subordinated by us to a teleo-
logical principle.
 JUDGME...'TT 279
[§ 83] METH ODOL OGY OF THE TELE OLOG ICAL

ding and our

that we, by the cons tituti on of our unde rstan
of being xcep t according
reason, cann ot conceive it in this kind
effor t, even intre pidit y,
to final causes. The great est po sible
mech anica lly is not only per-
in the attem pt to explain them
by r ason, notw ithsta nding that
mi tted, but we are invit ed to it
particular sp cies
we know from the subjective grounds of t he
rstan ding (not e.g. because the
and limit ation of our unde
woul d contr adict in it If an origin
mech anism of produ ction
that we can neve r attai n there to. F inally,
according to purpose )
th po ibili ty
the comp atibili ty of both ways of representing
of natu re (ex-
of natu re may lie in the supersensible princ iple
of repre entation
terna l to us, as well as in us), while the method
ondition of
according to final causes may be only a subj ctive
s to form a
the use of our rea on, when it not mer ly wishe
es to refer these
judgm ent upon objects as phenomen a but desir
their supe rsen ible
phenomena, toget her with their principles, to
their unity po ible
subst rate, in order to find certa in laws of
t throu gh purp oses (of
which it cann ot represent to itself excep
supe rsens ible).
which the reason also baR such as are

ATUR E AS A
§ 83 . OF THE ULTIM ATE PURP OSE OF
TELE OLOG ICAL SYST EM
h not for t he
We have shown in the preceding that, thoug
tive judgm ent, we have suffi cient
deter mina nt but for the reflec
not mere ly like all organ ized beings
cau e for judging man to be,
t he ultim ate purpo se of natu re here
a natural purpose, but also
all other natu ral thing cons titute
on earth , in refer ence to whom
al propo itions of
a syste m of purposes according to funda ment
elf which is to
reason. If now that must be found in man him
connection with
be furthered as a purpose by means of his
can be satisfied
natur e, t his purp ose mu t eithe r be of a kind that
ude and skill for
by natur e in its beneficence, or it is the aptit
and in terna l)
all kinds of purposes for which natur e (exte rnal
e woul d be man' s
can be used by him. The first purp ose of natur
happiness, the second his culture.
derives by
The concept of happiness is not one that man
 2 0 CRITIQ UE OF THE TELEO LOGICA L JUDGM ENT
[§ 83] [§ 83] METHO DOLOG Y OF THE TELEO LOGIC. \L JUDG!M
.ENT 281
abstra ction from his instinc ts, and so deduces from his anima of setting arbitra ry purpo es before i.tself, he i certain ly
l en-
nature , but it i a mere idea of a state that he wishes to make titled to be the lord of nature , and if 1t be reg~rded a a teleo-
adequ ate to the idea under merely empirical conditions (which · 1 ystem he is by hi de tinatio n, th ultima te purpo e of
is impossibl ) . Thi idea he projects in such different ways 1og1ca s But , ' .. . h .
on this i subjec t to the conditi On of h1s avmg an
na t ure. ·
a.ccount of the complication of his unders tandin g with imagin
a- dersta nding and the will to give to it and to him elf sueh a
tiOn and sense, and changes so often, that nature , even if
it ~:rerence to purpo es as can be self- ufficient indep~ndently of
were entirely subjec ted to hi elective will, could receive abso- nature and, consequently, can be a final purpose, wh1cb howev
er
lutely no determ inate, univer sal and fixed law, so as to harmo must not b sough t in nature itself.
n-
ize with this vacillating concept and thus with the purpos But in order to find out _where in man we have to place that
e
which each man arbitra rily sets before himself. And even if ultimate purpose of nature, we must se k out .what ~ature
we can
reduce this to the true natura l wants as to which our race
is supply to prepar e him for what be must ~o h1mself m order
to
thoroughly agreed or, on the other hand, raise ever so high be a final purpose, and we must separa te 1t from all those pur-
man's skill to accomplish his imagined purposes, yet even thus poses whose possibility depends upon things that one c~n expect
what man unders tands by happiness and what is in fact only from nature . Of the latter kind i earthly happmess,.
his by
proper, ultima te, natura l purpose (not purpose of freedo which i understood the complex of all roan's purpo e po 1?le
m)
would never be attaine d by him. For it is not his nature to throug h nature , wheth er external nature .or ~an's nature.,
rest 1.~.
and be conten ted with the po ession and enjoym ent of anythi
ng the matter of all his earthly purposes, which, ~f. he m.akes 1t
h1
whatever. On the other side, too, there is something wantin whole purpo e, renders him incapable of po 1tmg h1.s own
g. ex-
Natur e has not taken him for her special darling and favore 'stence as a final purpo e and b ing in harmo ny therem th. There
d
him with benefit above all animals. Rathe r, in her destru ctive ~emains therefore of all his purpo e in nature ?nly the form~l
operat ions-plague, hunger, perils of waters, frost, assaults subjective condition, viz. the apti ude of settmg ~urp~ es
of m
other animals, great and small, etc.-i n these things has general before himself and (ind pende nt of nature m his pur-
she
spared him as little as any other animal. Furthe r, the incon- posive determination) of u ing nature , conformabl~ to
sistency of his own natural dispositions drives him into self- maxim of his free purpo es in g neral, a a means .. T~s natm.e
t~e
devi ed tormen ts and also reduces others of his own race can do in regard to the final purpose that lie outs1de 1t, and
to 1t
misery, by the oppression of lordship, the barbar ism of war therefore may be regarded as its ultima te purpo e. The produc
-
and so forth; he hims lf, as far as in him lies, works for
th~ tion of the aptitu de of a ration al being for arbitra rypurp ose
destru ction of his own race, so that, even with the most benefi- in general (consequently in his freedom) is ~lture. Therefore,
cent external nature , its purpose, if it were directed to culture alone can be the ultima t purpo e whJCh we have cau~e
the
happiness of our species, would not be attaine d in an earthl for ascribing to nature in respect to the human race (not ~an
y .s
system , becau e our nature is not susceptible of it. Man is then earthly happiness or the fact that he i the chief instrum ent ?f mstl-
alwa~s o~y a link in the chain of natura l purpos
es, a principle tuting order and harmo ny in irrational nat~re ex~ernal to himsel
f)·
certainly m respect of many purposes, for which nature seems But all culture is not adequ ate to this ult1mate. pu~pose of
to have destined him in her disposition and to which he nature . The culture of skill i inde d the chief . ubJe t1ve con-
sets
hiinself, but also a means for the mainte nance of purposivenes dition of aptitu de for furthering one's puri)O es m gener~l,
in the mechani m of the remaining links. A13 the only being
s ~ut
on ]t i not adequ ate to furthering the will 6 in the determ matwn
earth which has an unders tandin g and, consequently, a faculty e [First edition has "freedo m."]
 282 CRITIQU E OF THE TELEOLO GICAL JUDGME NT [§ 3] [§ 83] METHOD OLOGY OF THE TELEOLO GICAL JUDGME NT 283
and choice of purpo es, which yet essentially belongs to the this and with the obstacles which ambitio n, lust of dominion,
whole extent of an aptitude for purposes. The latter condition and' avarice especially in tho e who have the authori ty in their
of aptitude , wruch we might call the culture of training (disci- hands oppose ' .
even to the possibility of such a scheme, there IS,
pline), is negative, and consists in the freeing of the will from inevit~bly, war (by which sometimes states ubdivide and
the despotism of desires. By the e, tied as we are to certain resolve them elves into smaller states, sometimes a tate an-
natural things, we are rendered mcapable even of choosing, nexes smaller states and strives to form a greater whole).
while we allow those impulses to serve as fetters which nature Though war i an undesigned enterprise of men (stirr d up by
has given us as guiding threads, that we should not neglect or their unbridled passions), yet is it [perhap ] 8 a deep-hidden and
injure the destinat ion of our animal natur we being all the designed enterpri e of supreme wisdom for preparing, if not
time free enough to strain or relax, to extend or dimini h them, for establishing, conformity to law amid the freedom of states,
according as the purposes of reason require. and with this a unity of a morally grounded system of those
Skill cannot be developed in the human race except by means states. In spite of the dreadful afflictions with which it visits
of inequali ty among men; for the great majority provide the the human race, and the perhaps greater afflictions with which
necessities of life, as it were, mechanically, without requiring the con tant prepara tion for it in time of peace oppresses them,
any art in particul ar, for the convenience and leisure of others yet is it (although the hope for a r stful state of popular happi-
who work at the less necessary elements of culture, science and ness is ever further off) a motive for developing all talents
art. In an oppres ed condition, they have hard work and little serviceable for culture to the highest possible pitch. •
enjoym ent, althoug h much of the culture of the rugher classes AB concerns the discipline of the inclinat ions-fo r which our
gradually spreads to them. Yet with the progress of this culture natural capacity in regard of our destination as an animal race is
(the height of which is called luxury, reached when the pro- quite purposive, but which render the development of huma~ity
pensity to what can be done without begins to be injurious to very difficul t-there is manifest in re pect of this second reqwre-
what is indispensable), their calamities increase equally in two ment for culture a purpo ive striving of nature to a cultivation
directions, on the one hand through violence from without , on which makes us receptive of higher purpo s than nature itself
the other hand through internal disconte nt; but still this splendid can supply. We cannot strive against the preponderance of
misery is bound up with the development of the natural capaci- evil which is poured out upon us by the refinement of taste
ties of the human race, and the purpose of nature itself, althoug h pushed to idealization, and even by the luxury of science as
not our purpose, is thus attained . The formal condition under affording food for pride, through the insatiable number of
which nature can alone attain this its final design is that arrange- inclinations thus aroused. But yet we cannot mistake the
ment of men's relations to one another by which lawful authori ty purpose of nature- -ever aiming to win us away from the n:de-
in a whole, which we call a civil commun ity, is opposed to the ness and violence of those inclinations (inclinations to enJOY-
abuse of their conflicting fre doms; only in this can the greatest ment) which belong rather to our animali ty and for the most part
development of natural capacities take place. For this also are opposed to the cultivation of our rugher destiny, and to make
there would be requisite--if men were clever enough to find it way for the development of our humani ty. The beautifu l arts
out and wise enough to submit themselves volunta rily to its
constra int-a cosmopolitan whole i.e. a system of all states that s [Second eclition.]
are in danger of acting injuriously upon one another . 7 Failing • [Cf. The Philosophir,al Theory of Religion, Pt . I, "On the Bad Principle
in Human ature" (III), where Kant remarks that although war "is not so
7
[These views are set forth by Kant more fully in the essay Zum ewigen incurably bad as the deadness of a universal monarch y . . . yet, as an
Frieden (1795) .] ancient observed, it makes more bad men than it takes away."]
 2 4 CRITIQ UE OF THE TELEO LOGICA L JUDGM ENT
[' 4] ENT 2 5
[§ 84] METHO DOLOG Y OF THE TELEO LOGICA L JUDGM

and the science which, by their univer sall Y. commumcab . t

poli h d fin le causality, viz. that of a designedly working cau e, we canno
pleasure, and by the of the world (organ i zed
. .. an re ement of society make man stop at ihe qu stion: Why have things
~~= CIVlbzed, if not morally better, win usthus in lar~e measure beings) this or that form? Why are they placed by nature
in
the tyrann y of sen e propen sions and one anothe r? But once an under tandin g
this or that relation to
for a ?rds~i p in ~vhich rea on alone. sh~ll have aut::r~~;rew
1 ~~: is though t that mu t be regard ed as the cause of the po ibility
' ,
the evils With whiCh we are vi ited part! Y bY na t ure, partly oy of such forms a they ar actually found in t hings, it must
be
the intoler ant lfishne s of '. have determ ined
could
harden the power of the sou:n:~t t~u.::=~ ::r~~!!en, dand
also asked on object ive ground s: Who
this produc tive unders tandin g to an operation of thi kind?
a'ndd so
~alee us feel an aptitude for higher pw·poses which li es' hi en This being is then the final purpo e in reference to which such
m us.1o
things are t here.
e
I have said above that t he final purpose is not a purpos
and to produc e
OF THE FI AL PURPO SE OF THE EXISTE NCE
OF A which nature would be compe tent to bring about
§ 84. i tioned . For
WORLD , I.E. OF CREAT IO I TSELF in conformity with its idea, becaus it is uncond
for
there is nothing in nature (regard ed as a sensible being)
co-:ru~nal oPf ~trpose i_s . t_hat
1 s possib ility .
purpose which needs no other as which t he determining ground presen t in itself would
of
not
extern
be
al
IOn always conditioned, and this holds not merely
ex~ia~:t:r:~~~sha;~sm o_f nature be assumed as the ground of (material) nature but also of intern al (thinki ng) natur e-it
in
thin II we canno t ask: What are
rposivenes ' being, of course, unders tood that I only am considering that
. . gs t h re for? For according to such an idealis tic myself which is nature. But a thing that is to exist necess arily,
It Is only the physic al po ibility of things (to think :~em on accoun t of its objective consti tution, as the final purpo e
of
pu~pose~ wo~d be mere subtle ty withou t any object~ t:at :s
s
an intelligent cause, must be of the kind that, in the order of
un r ~scuss wn; wheth er we refer this form of thing to
c
h
ance purpo es, it is depend ent on no furthe r condit ion than merely
or to blmd necess ·t · 'th be vain.
If h 1 y, m eJ er ca e the questio n would its idea .
to' b owevr , ~e assume the purpos ive combi nation in the world Now we have in the world only one kind of beings who e caus-
of the
•o e rea an ~o be [broug ht about] by a particu lar kind ali ty is teleological, i.e. is direct d to purpo es, and is at
The value of life for us, if it is estimat ed b h .
same time so consti tuted that the law accord ing to which they
we enjoy (by
the natural purpose of the sum of all . r t' Y_ t at whzch
a
decide . It sinks below zero for wh::.: ~o:, L_e .. happme ss)' is easy to have to determine purpo es for themselves is repr sented
and yet
anew under the same conditions? Wh uld dwillmg to enter upon life unconditioned and independen t of nat ural conditions,
new, self-cho sen plan (yet ~ conform ·~ wo_ o so even according to a
as in it elf neces ary. The being of this kind is man, but man
~~ w~th the course of nature) ' if it we
we re merely directed to enjoym ent?
itse~f ave sh?wn _above what value considered as noumenon, the only natural being in which
of what it contain s in a super-
life has in virtue
has a lo 'th ' wdhen ~ved m accorda nce with can recognize, on the side of it peculia r consti tution,
the purpose that nature to-
sensible faculty (freedom) and also the law of cau ality,
ng WI hus an which cons·IS ts m · h
d ( merely what we enjoy) in hi h ' w at we
o not
toward an undetermined final' urw c ;;:·eve r we ~e always
but means gether wi th the object, which this faculty may propo e to itself
the value wh ich we ourselv es gfv e =iife t':re re:at~ as highes t purpo e (the highest good in the world).
then nothing but
oug w at we cannot only
ow of man (and so of every rationa l creatu re in the world)
do but do purpo ively in such . d '
of nature itseU can only be m ependence ~f nature that the existence
...... • . . a purpose under thiS condition. as a moral being it can no longer be ask d why (quem in finem)
he exists. His existence involves the highes t purpo e to which,
11
[First editiOn has " things in the world." ]