CANONICAL

DOCTRINES IN
REMEDIAL LAW
Judge MYRA B. QUIAMBAO
ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction over a complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage?
RULING: RTC because it is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
• Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides RTC with
exclusive, original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation."
• To determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought
must first be established. Where the money claim is only a consequence
of the remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. [Lapitan v. Scandia]
• An action for cancellation of mortgage has a subject that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
[Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation; FIRST SARMIENTO
PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC. v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 202836, 19 June 2018, (Leonen, J.)]
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the SC an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus seeking to nullify a city ordinance on the ground that
respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke the
SC’s original jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in
view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they have raised.
ISSUE:
Did petitioners comply with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts and
exhaustion of administrative remedy?
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court denied the Petition for serious procedural errors.
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to
restrain parties from directly resorting to the SC when relief may be obtained
before the lower courts.
• As expressly provided in the Constitution, the SC has original jurisdiction
"over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus." However, the SC has emphasized that the power to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not exclusively
pertain to the SC.
• It is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts.
Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties
unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy
of courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for
extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot randomly select the
court or forum to which their actions will be directed.
• There is another reason why the SC enjoins strict adherence to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. The doctrine that requires respect for the
hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner."
[CRISANTO M. AALA, et al. v. HON. REY T. UY, etc., G.R. No. 202781, 10 January 2017, (Leonen, J.)]
• The following are the well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts:
• (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately;
• (2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
• (3) when the case is novel;
• (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
• (5) when time is of the essence;
• (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
• (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law;
• (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice;
• (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
• (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.[CRISANTO M.
AALA, et al. v. HON. REY T. UY, etc., G.R. No. 202781, 10 January 2017, (Leonen, J.)]
• The Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
• Noncompliance with this requirement renders a case dismissible on
the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue, which refers to “a
plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party.”
• Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no
separate juridical personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own
name.
[Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners’ Association, Inc. vs. Quezon City Government, G.R.
No. 230651, September 18, 2018]
ISSUE: Does the Court of Tax Appeals have jurisdiction to determine
the constitutionality or validity of tax laws, rules and regulations, and
other administrative issuances of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
RULING: YES
• While there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the
CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
• The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon
the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation when
raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or contesting an
assessment or claiming a refund.
• It is only in the lawful exercise of its power to pass upon all maters
brought before it, as sanctioned by Section 7 of Republic Act No.
1125, as amended.
• The Supreme Court, however, declares that the Court of Tax Appeals
may likewise take cognizance of cases directly challenging the
constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or
administrative issuance (revenue orders, revenue memorandum
circulars, rulings).
• Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that,
except for local taxes, appeals from the decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of
Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must be
brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals.
• In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court
of Tax Appeals to have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax
problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts and
omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should, thus, be filed
before the Court of Tax Appeals.
• Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides an exception to the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts over actions questioning the constitutionality or
validity of tax laws or regulations.
• Except for local tax cases, actions directly challenging the
constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or
administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax
Appeals.

[BANCO DE ORO, et al. v. REPUBLIC et al., G.R. No. 198756, 16 August 2016, (Leonen, J.)]
ISSUE:
• Do the acts of a party in filing the notice of appeal (ex abundante
cautelam) before the CA and the petition for certiorari before the SC
assailing the same trial court decision amount to forum shopping?
• RULING
• YES. The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in
one case amounts to res judicata in another.
• There is no question that the party committed forum shopping when he
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari
before the SC assailing the same trial court decision. This is true even if the
party’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of
Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case).”
[ANTONIO M. GARCIA v. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., G.R. No. 220054, 27 March 2017, (Leonen, J.)]
• The SC emphasized in Altres v. Empleo, that it has consistently applied the
substantial compliance rule when it comes to a supposedly defective
verification and certification against forum shopping attached to a
petition.
• The purpose of a verification was to assure that a petition contains
allegations that are true, and that it was filed in good faith. Thus, the
signing of the verification by some petitioners already served the
purpose contemplated by the verification.
• However, when it comes to the certification against forum shopping, the
non-signing petitioners shall be dropped from the petition.
• Nonetheless, there is an exception: when all petitioners share a common
interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in the certification against
forum shopping is enough to satisfy the substantial compliance rule.
[CORDILLERA GLOBAL NETWORK, et al. v. SECRETARY RAMON J.P. PAJE, et al., G.R. NO. 215988, 10
April 2019, (Leonen, J.)]
ISSUE: Is the requirement of certification against forum shopping applicable
to administrative/quasi-judicial bodies like the Intellectual Property Office?
RULING
• While Sec. 4(e) of the Intellectual Property Office's Uniform Rules on
Appeal indeed requires that the appeal memorandum must contain a
certification of non-forum shopping, the rigid application of this procedural
rule is unwarranted.
• Under the regulations of the IPO on Inter Partes Proceedings (which
governs petitions for cancellations of a mark, patent, utility model,
industrial design, opposition to registration of a mark and compulsory
licensing, and which were in effect when respondent filed its appeal), it
was provided that the IPO shall not be bound by the strict technical rules
of procedure and evidence. This rule is in keeping with the general
principle that administrative bodies are not strictly bound by technical
rules of procedure.
• The rule on certification against forum shopping is intended to prevent the actual
filing of multiple petitions/complaints involving identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues in other tribunals as a form of forum shopping.
• This is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is detrimental to
orderly judicial procedure. Although not jurisdictional, the requirement of a
certification of non-forum shopping is mandatory.
• However, such rule is applied only in judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
proceeding, such as the proceeding in this case, is unfettered by the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before
them.
• In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. [DIVINA PALAO v. FLORENTINO III INTL INC, G.R. No.
186967, 18 January 2017, (Leonen, J.)]
• The initial order granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or
final order contemplated under this rule. This order pertained to the
issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18.
• Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper
remedy at this time.
• The order is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that
temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and
inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court
upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.
[SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, et al. v. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA,G.R. No. 204528, 19
February 2013, (Leonen, J.)]
• A claim based on a future right does not ripen into an adverse claim
as defined in Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
• A right still subject to negotiations cannot be enforced against a title
holder or against one that has a legitimate title to the property based
on possession, ownership, lien or any valid deed of transfer.
• In the case, respondent's claim was not based on any of those. Its
claim was based on a deal with the CLOA farmer- beneficiaries, which
did not materialize.
[CATHAY METAL CORP. v. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. NO.
172204, 2 JULY 2014, (LEONEN, J.)]
• Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or her or a bondsman, to guarantee his or her
appearance before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified.
• Based on this definition, the accused must be in custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty to be able to post bail.
• Generally, bail is filed before the court where the case is pending.
• However, if bail cannot be filed before the court where the case is
pending as when the judge handling the case is absent or unavailable,
or if the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other
than where the case is pending, Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules
of Court shows that there is an order of preference with respect to
where bail may be filed.
• In the absence or unavailability of the judge where the case is
pending, the accused must first go to a judge in the province, city, or
municipality where the case is pending.
• A judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant bail only
if the accused has been arrested in a province, city, or municipality
other than where the case is pending.
• A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the
case is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an
accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
• Rule 114, Section 17(a) is clear that for purposes of determining
whether or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode
required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of
another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application.

[PROSECUTOR IVY A. TEJANO v. PRESIDING JUDGE ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN et al., A.M. No. RTJ-17-
2492, September 26, 2017, (Leonen, J.)]
• An allegation that the petitioner’s constitutional right to due process or
equal protection had been violated by the trial court which had awarded to
other landowners a higher valuation of their property despite the belated
filing of their petitions may be considered grave abuse of discretion, which
may be taken cognizance of by the Supreme Court.
Requisites for certiorari to prosper:
• (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
• (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and
• (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
• Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority.
• There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority
• Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power - is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
[Limkaichong v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et.al., G.R. No. 158464, 2 August 2016]
• The petition for a writ of amparo, which covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof, is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
• For this purpose, substantial evidence shall be required to establish
the allegations of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant
granting the privilege of the writ of amparo.
• Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• In a petition for issuance of the writ of amparo, the respondent who
is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty. He cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to
evade the responsibility or liability.
• In a petition for issuance of the writ of amparo, there is no
requirement to state the probable whereabouts of the victim.
• The issuance of the writ of amparo does not impair the
respondent’s right to the presumption of innocence, as the
proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin
or similar to those in criminal prosecutions.
• In amparo, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not
determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings
only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies
against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security.
• This does not however preclude the grant of reliefs in addition to the
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo, which includes the
identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in
the death or disappearance, and bringing of the suspected offenders
before a competent court.
[Republic of the Philippines v. Regina Cayanan and Rolando Pascua, G.R. No. 181796, 7 November
2017]
• The petition for a writ of amparo, which covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof, is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
• To be entitled to the privilege of the writ, it must be proven by
substantial evidence that one’s rights to life, liberty and security are
being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
• As such, the privilege of the writ of amparo cannot be granted based
upon an alleged trespass on the petitioners’ ampalaya farm, which
would merely be a violation of their property rights.
[Spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador, and Rey Pador v. Bernabe Arcayan, et.al., G.R. No. 183460, 12
March 2013]
A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the
occurrence of a supervening event, it ceases to present any justiciable
controversy; hence, as a rule, it is dismissible.
Nevertheless, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if:
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;
3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements
are met:
• (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
• (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement
of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
• (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
• (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
• (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
• The instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance,
involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty,
allegedly neglected, by the Commission on Audit (COA).
• Hence, the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal
standing to file the mandamus petition.

[Dennis Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office and the Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
193462, 4 February 2014]
• As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. Except:
• (1) when the issue raised is purely of law,
• (2) when public interest is involved, or
• (3) in case of urgency.
• (4) when the questions raised are the same as those that have already
been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower
court.
• The question of prospective application of judicial decisions upon their
finality is purely a question of law. Hence, an exception to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration.
[Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 205837, 21
November 2017]
• The writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
• It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger
protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a
speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends
political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially
exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.
• At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated
under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC) satisfies at
least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when
direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare.
• There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents
the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of
the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is
personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Requisites for a writ of kalikasan to issue:
• 1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
• 2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity; and
• 3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
• A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or
would be violated.
• Failure to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act
or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a
balanced and healthful ecology would result in the denial of the
petition for issuance of the writ of kalikasan.
• A writ of continuing mandamus may be issued when any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of
such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
• In such cases, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until
the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
• The petition shall fail if the petitioners fail to prove direct or personal
injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents. Further, mandamus lies to compel the performance of
duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to
act but not to act one way or the other.
• Continuing mandamus cannot be granted when the relief prayed for
seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or
regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive
as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating
to the environment is best implemented.
• Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the executive
in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive
policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion.
• Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the
general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via a petition
for continuing mandamus.
[Victoria Segovia, et. al. v. Climate Change Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 211010, 7 March 2017]
• While the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and
in the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted
in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative, since the formulation
of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now
assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's
constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the
JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
• As such, the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition filed in view
of the foregoing, are proper.
• An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance.
• The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.
• The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and
not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.
• A petition seeking judicial declaration that the petitioner has the
right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to
meet JBC's five-year requirement policy, is not an appropriate
subject of an action for declaratory relief.
• The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege,
and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed
by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of
the incidents of such appointment, is likewise not a legally
enforceable right.
[Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015]
• Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be
eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not
difficult to comply with.
• Human rights are not a monopoly of private complainants in a
criminal case. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights.
• The conformity of the Public Prosecutor to the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is not a mere "superfluity."
• In criminal cases, the People is the real party in interest, which means
allowing a private complainant to pursue a criminal action on his own
is a rare exception, such as when there is a denial of due process.
[Marilou Laude, et. al. v. Hon. Roline Ginez-Jabalde, et. al., G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015]
• Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that
all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
• While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the
conviction of the accused, those charged with a capital offense is
granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong.
• Bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there is a
strong presumption of guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination,
and the court may deny admission to bail even when there is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
• Thus, the prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the
evidence against the accused shows evident proof of guilt or a great
presumption of guilt.
• "Proof evident" or "Evident proof” has been held to mean clear,
strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment
to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged,
that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished
capitally if the law is administered.
• "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are
such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is
strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes
all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.
• Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if
on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that
accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.
[Janet Lim Napoles v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 224162, 7 November 2017]
• The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
• The writ of amparo shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
• “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" is the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or
to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
• “extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. [RA No.
9851, Section 3(g)]
Elements constituting enforced disappearance:
• (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
• (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
• (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
• (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
[Lorie Marie Tomas Callo v. Commissioner Jaime H. Morente, et. al., G.R. No. 230324, 19 September
2017]
The links in the chain of custody that must be established in drugs
cases (Section 21, RA 9165) are:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer;
(2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer;
(3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
(4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic
chemist to the court.
Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of
illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to
planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.
The following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing
officers must state their compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or
explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order
to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/
confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the
sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not
immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must
refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the
court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a
commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright
for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112,
Rules of Court. [People v. Romy Lim, G.R. No. 231989. September 4, 2018]
Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environment
Cases, the following requisites must be present to avail of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of kalikasan:
• (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
• (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity; and
• (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

[Monico Abogado, et. al. v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et. al., G.R. No.
246209, 3 September 2019, J. Leonen]
The power of judicial review is the power of the Courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution.
Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of
the Constitution.
Requisites for a court to exercise judicial review power:
• (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
• (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
• (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and
• (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
• Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness.
• A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. The mere
passage of the law does not per se absolutely determine the
justiciability of a particular case attacking the law's constitutionality.
• The petitioners were allowed to seek direct relief to the SC because of the
existence of two of the exceptions:
• (1) that this case is of first impression; and
• (2) that present issue involves public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice.
• The assailed law concerns the welfare of OFWs, the modern-day Filipino
heroes, and the grant of social protection in their favor.
• For the first time, the social security membership and contributions of
OFWs, specifically, the seafarers, are mandated by law.
• Indeed, the SC must ensure that this social security must be for the welfare
of the seafarers and, at the same time, not unduly oppressive to other
stakeholders, such as the manning agencies and foreign ship owners.
[Joint Ship Manning Group, Inc., et. al. v. Social Security System and the Social Security Commission,
G.R. No. 247471, 7 July 2020, J. Leonen]
• The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that
provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.
• It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
• Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates
the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.
• Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
• As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy –
especially the right to informational privacy– the proceedings for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal,
civil or administrative culpability.
• If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence,
then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b)
enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information
contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.
[In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel Rodriguez v.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al., G.R. Nos. 191805 and 193160, 15 November 2011]
Facts:
• Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the
legality of Service Contract No. 46 awarded to Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX), where the latter was
allowed to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait.
• One of the petitions was brought on behalf of resident
marine mammals by 2 individuals acting as legal guardians
and stewards of the marine mammals.
Issue: Whether marine mammals, through their stewards,
have legal standing to pursue the case?
• Ruling: The SC declined to extend the principle of standing to inanimate
objects or beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it
recognized the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence moving towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases.
• Instead, the SC explained, “the need to give the resident marine
mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws.”
• Thus, it is essentially a citizen’s suit under the Rules on Environmental
Cases, that allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minor generation yet
unborn.
• It is a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in
interest to institute action on behalf of real parties in interest. [Resident
Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Sec. Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21,
2015]
• It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as
the Civil Service Commission are generally accorded respect and even
finality by the SC, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition
of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.
• As defined in the landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, all that is needed to support an administrative finding of
fact is substantial evidence, which is defined as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion."
• Where the findings of fact of a quasi-judicial body are supported by
substantial evidence, these findings are conclusive and binding on
the appellate court.
[Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014]
• Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station.
• It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled.
• For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a
ministerial act or duty.
• An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of the tribunal or
corporation's own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done."
• The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no
choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to
decide how or when to perform the duty.
• In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted.
• The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that "courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience,
should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities, who
are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been
given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged
errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum."
• In a typical case involving a decision by military authorities, the
plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before
appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve
the balance between military and civilian authorities and to conserve
judicial resources.
[Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015]
• The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
• The writ is available against an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity.
• The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the
burden to prove the
• (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened
to be violated;
• (2) act or omission complained of; and
• (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
• Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases states that the magnitude of environmental damage is a
condition sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.
[LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. v. Agham Party List, G.R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016]
• For the defense of alibi, for it to prosper, it must be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible
for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere
else.
• Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it
was committed, as well as the facility of the access between the two
places.
• Denial and alibi do not prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the State's witnesses who are categorical and consistent
and bereft of ill motive towards the accused.
• Denial, unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
undeserving of weight in law for being negative and self-serving.
Moreover, denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.
[People v. Oandasan, Jr., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016]
• The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified
in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
• When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the SC may
sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance
warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.
• This is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of
law are acted upon by the Court en banc.
• The passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 x x x which accordingly
reduced the penalties of certain crimes under the RPC is an example
of such exceptional circumstance.
• As held by the SC in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, the passage of RA No.
10951 is an exceptional circumstance which warrants not only the
reopening of an already terminated case, but also the recall of an
Entry of Judgment for purposes of modifying the penalty to be
served.
• Thus, in Hernan, the SC re-opened the case even if accused is already
serving sentence at the NBP for the sole purpose of re-computing the
proper sentence to be imposed in accordance with RA No. 10951.

[In Re: Elbanbuena y Marfil, G.R. No. 237721, Juy 31, 2018]
• There are instances when the Supreme Court, in its discretion, waives
the requirements of locus standi, citing the transcendental
importance of the cases before it as well as their far-reaching
implications.
• The SC has held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise
of its discretion.
• The SC has ruled that locus standi is a matter of procedure, and it has
allowed some cases to be brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest.
[Ang Nars Party List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019]
• Suffice it to state that technical rules of procedure do not strictly
apply to administrative cases.
• The parties therein should be given the amplest opportunity to fully
ventilate their claims and defenses, brushing aside technicalities in
order to truly ascertain the relevant facts and justly resolve the case
on the merits.
• After all, procedural rules are intended to secure, not override,
substantial justice.
[Tetangco, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244806, September 17, 2019]
• A private person can be charged in conspiracy with a public officer
before the Sandiganbayan.
• The death of the public officer even before the filing of the
Information will not affect the court’s jurisdiction. Such death did
not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy.
• Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived
either expressly or impliedly.
• When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not
to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he
shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction.
• The act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
[People of the Philippines vs. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539]
ISSUE:
Whether a re-computation in the course of execution of the labor
arbiter's original computation of the awards made, pegged as of the
time the decision was rendered and confirmed with modification by a
final CA decision, violates immutability of judgment.
RULING: NO
The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon
execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or
amendment of the final decision being implemented.
If the illegal dismissal ruling stands, only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of
the principle of immutability of final judgments.
[Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013]
• In the case of natural persons, the rule requires the parties
themselves to sign the certification against forum shopping. The
reason for such requirement is that the petitioner himself knows
better than anyone else whether a separate case has been filed or
pending which involves substantially the same issues.
• The certification against forum shopping was signed by Montawal, the
mayor of the Municipality of Montawal, Maguindanao.
• The mayor’s bare statement that she was the petitioners' duly
constituted attorney-in-fact in filing the petition before the COA can
hardly constitute as compliance with the rules. She did not even
append a Special Power of Attorney executed by the affected
landowners.
• Evidently, the petitioners failed to comply with the certification
against forum shopping requirement absent any compelling reason as
to warrant an exception based on the circumstances of the case.
[Buisan, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 212376, 31 January 2017]
• As provided in Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed
against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
• The Central Bank-Monetary Board (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-
MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to the
establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit
institutions, and branches and agencies thereof.
• It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
• Certainly, the issuance of the assailed CB Circular No. 905 was done in
the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the
instant case.
[Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and Eduardo B. Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary
Board, G.R. No. 192986 15 January 2013]
• The trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint for declaratory relief on
the ground that the Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, was not impleaded in this case.
• In dismissing the action, the trial court cited Rule 63, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, in that the Solicitor General was required to be impleaded in all
actions where the validity of a statute was in question:
SECTION 3. Notice on Solicitor General. — In any action which
involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or
any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be
notified by the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be
heard upon such question.
• The Rules, however, only require that notice be given to the Solicitor
General. They do not state that if the Solicitor General fails to participate
in the action, the action would be dismissed.
• In this case, the trial court sent a copy of the Complaint to the Office
of the Solicitor General. The Office of the Solicitor General, however,
did not participate in the case.
• The failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to participate,
however, should not prejudice a litigant's cause.
[Zomer Development Company, Inc. v. Special Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City,
and Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194461, 07 January 2020, J. Leonen]
• A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal and a
true review that involves “digging into the merits and unearthing
errors of judgment.”
• However, despite the repeated use of the word “review” in Rule 64,
the remedy is principally one for certiorari that “deals exclusively
with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the
decision is otherwise erroneous.”
• That the remedy against an adverse decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Audit is a petition for certiorari, not review or
appeal, is based on Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
• Although petitioners erroneously denominated their Petition as a
“Petition for Review on Certiorari”
• Except for the designation, the allegations in the Petition show that it
was filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court given that the Petition
refers to Rule 64 and was filed within 30 days from notice of the
Resolution of the Commission on Audit.
• Therefore, the SC resolved the Petition in the exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
[Adelaido Oriondo, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211293, 04 June 2019, J. Leonen]
• The petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy to
challenge the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014
(Speed Limit Ordinance).
• For the Ordinance has already been enforced and the penalty for its
violation imposed against respondent.
• An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no
actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder.
• The appropriate remedy in the premises is certiorari and prohibition.
• The power of judicial review includes determining whether there has
been grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, which includes the legislative
assembly of a local government unit.
[Municipality of Tupi, represented by its Municipal Mayor Reynaldo S. Tamayo, Jr. v. Herminio B.
Faustino, G.R. No. 231896, 20 August 2019]
• The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that
a party must first avail himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her before he or she is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court.
• The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action.
• However, the doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which is when the
issue involved is a purely legal question.
[Mangune v. Ermita, G.R. No. 182604, 27 September 2016]
• The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be questioned in a
special civil action for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
• Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal which is available only after a judgment or order on the
merits has been rendered.
• Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari be justified.
[Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188492, 28 August 2018]
• A petition for prohibition will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is manifested. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be grave.
• The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
[CAAP-Employees' Union v. Civil Aviation Authority of the Phils., G.R. No. 190120, 11 November
2014]
• Suits that affect the personal status of a person are in the nature of
proceedings in rem. Divorce suits fall under this category, and divorce
decrees are considered judgments in rem.
• Final judgments in rem bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and anyone in the world who has a right to be heard on
the strength of alleged facts which, if true, show an inconsistent
interest. Simply put, a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole
world.
• As a rule, a judgment could not be collaterally impeached or called
in question if rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction, but
must be properly attacked in a direct action.
• A collateral attack is defined as an attack, made as an incident in
another action, whose purpose is to obtain a different relief. This is
proper only when the judgment, on its face, is null and void, as
where it is patent that the court which rendered said judgment has
no jurisdiction.
• But “[w]here a court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter, its judgment, x x x is conclusive, as long as it remains
unreversed and in force, and cannot be impeached collaterally.”
• The reason for the general rule against a collateral attack on a
judgment of a court having jurisdiction is that public policy forbids an
indirect collateral contradiction or impeachment of such a
judgment. It is not a mere technicality, but is a rule of fundamental
and substantial justice which should be followed by all courts.
• The proscription against collateral attacks similarly applies to
matters involving the civil status of persons. Thus, collateral attacks
against the legitimacy and filiation of children, adoption, and the
validity of marriages (except void marriages) are not allowed.
[Pacasum, Sr. v. Zamoranos, G.R. No. 193719, 21 March 2017]
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, otherwise known as
"preclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel":
• Conclusiveness of judgment is a specie of res judicata and it
applies where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but there is no identity of causes of action.
• Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before
a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same.
 • Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment between
the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit.
• Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity
of issue.
Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation of particular facts
or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
[Pacasum, Sr. v. Zamoranos, G.R. No. 193719, 21 March 2017]
• As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
• The reason for the rule is to give the accused the necessary
knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense.
• Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion
to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.
• When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.

[People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016]

• It is settled that the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as special agrarian
courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination of the value of just compensation.
• Nonetheless, the Department of Agrarian Reform still exercises
primary jurisdiction to preliminarily determine this value. This is
different from determining the validity of property transfer to the
farmer-beneficiaries and, consequently, the validity of the certificates
of title issued to them.
• When the issue in a case hinges on whether a beneficiary has made
insufficient or no payments for the land awarded to him or her,
primary administrative jurisdiction is under the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
[Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of Abucay, G.R. Nos. 186432 & 186964, 12
March 2019, J. Leonen]
 Vicarious appeal
• In Unsay v. Palma, the SC allowed the appeal of one defendant to
benefit his non-appealing co-defendants where the defense upon
which the reversal of the trial court's judgment was based was not
personal to any or some of the defendants but applied to all.
[Lim-Bungcaras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 209415-17 & 210002, 15 November 2016]
• That the assailed laws and executive issuances did not involve the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial function is of no moment.
• Contrary to the Solicitor General’s assertion, it has long been judicially
settled that under the Supreme Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the
writs of certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, any act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
[Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 and 218465, 9
October 2018]
• A class suit is a specie of a representative suit insofar as the persons
who institute it represent the entire class of persons who have the
same interest or who suffered the same injury. However, unlike
representative suits, the persons instituting a class suit are
themselves real parties in interest and are not suing merely as
representatives.
• A class suit can prosper only:
• (a) when the subject matter of the controversy is of common or
general interest to many persons;
• (b) when such persons are so numerous that it is impracticable
to join them all as parties; and
• (c) when such persons are sufficiently numerous as to represent
and protect fully the interests of all concerned.
[J. Leonen’s concurring opinion in Segovia v. Climate Change Commission]
• While Petitions may involve one (1) particular act of legislation,
petitioners may raise different constitutional issues, the rulings of
which involve different resolutions.
• Petitioners in these cases raise questions on justiciability, equal
protection, police power, non-self-executing provisions, and state
policies on labor, education, and language.
• The practice of the SC Court of consolidating the issues under the
same law results in cases being tackled based on the subject matter,
instead of based on the issues involved.
• This leads to a shotgun approach in addressing constitutional issues
which actually warrant a more in-depth discussion by this Court so
as not to compromise the interpretation of principles laid out in
laws and jurisprudence.
• The consolidation of Petitions should only be done in case the
matter involves the same constitutional issues.
• Defining constitutional issues must be more narrowly tailored so
that the decisions of this Court are not to be a catch-all ruling on the
validity of the law, but rather an in-depth ruling on the validity of
the provisions of the law.
• This is likewise consistent with the presumption of constitutionality of
acts of legislation.
• [J. Leonen concurring opinion, Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123
and 218465, 9 October 2018]
• Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
“Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy.”
• Since the accused moved for the judicial determination of probable
cause and the Sandiganbayan dismissed the criminal cases before
they were arraigned, the prohibition against an appeal from a
dismissal of a criminal case when the accused will be twice put in
jeopardy does not apply.
• Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable
to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari raising
pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
• The proper remedy therefore from the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions
dismissing the criminal cases is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
and not under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
• The executive determination of probable cause is not to be confused
with the judicial determination of probable cause.
• In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two
stages:
First, the executive level where probable cause is determined by
the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation and
before the filing of the criminal information; and
Second, the judicial level where probable cause is determined by
the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
• While the Ombudsman retains full discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
Sandiganbayan gains full control as soon as the case has been filed
before it.
• When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the case and the concomitant authority to determine whether
or not the case should be dismissed being the "best and sole judge"
thereof.
• When the court judicially determines probable cause, it is tasked to
determine the probability of the guilt of the accused by personally
reviewing the prosecutor’s initial determination and seeing if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
• In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
• The purpose of requiring the courts to determine probable cause is to
insulate from the very beginning those falsely charged with crimes
from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
[People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 219824-25, 12 February 2019]
• According to the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and
matters determined in the former suit.
• Two concepts:
(1) bar by prior judgment and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment.
• Bar by prior judgment exists "when, as between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.
• Conclusiveness of judgment finds application "when a fact or
question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and
adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. This
principle only needs identity of parties and issues to apply.
• The general rule precluding re-litigation of issues extends to questions
implied necessarily in the final judgment and all matters essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation, although no
specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and
although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and
were not actually or formally presented.
• In res judicata, the primacy given to the first case is related to the
principle of immutability of final judgments. Generally, the later case
is the one abated.
• However, there are limitations to this rule such as when the other
case is the more appropriate action.
[Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172302, 28 February 2014, J. Leonen]
• Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless
the trial court determines upon proper showing that the child's
mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts
truthfully.
• The testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to
perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the
absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify. Once it is
established that the child fully understands the character and
nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence.
• In this case, since the defense did not persuasively discredit the
child’s worthiness and competence as a witness, the trial court
correctly considered and relied on the child’s recollection.
[People of the Philippines v. Edison C. Magbitang, G.R. No. 175592, 14 June 2016]
• Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
review that does not comply with the required certification against forum
shopping is a ground for its dismissal.
• This certification must be executed by the petitioner, not by counsel. It is
the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services
have been retained only for a particular case, who is in the best position to
know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that
case.
• Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective
certification. It is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement
under Section 4, Rule 45 and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
petition.
• When the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) acts as a government
agency’s counsel of record, it is necessary for the petitioning government
agency or its authorized representatives to certify against forum
shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to
know if another case is pending before another court.
• If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading
in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the
courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the
Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification.
• Thus, when the associate solicitor merely stated that she has prepared and
filed the petition in her capacity as the petition’s handling lawyer, and no
explanation was given why the signatures of the government agency’s
authorized representatives could not be secured, the petition is defective.
[Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela, G.R. No. 194368, 2 April 2013]
• Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that when a law specifically provides a venue, then the
criminal action shall be instituted in such place.
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —
Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.
• Section 2 of R.A. No. 10660 (Sandiganbayan law) clearly provides that
the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction when the information
either:
(a) does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or
(b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from
the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount
not exceeding One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
• Moreover, such cases falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC shall be
tried in a judicial region other than the place where the accused
official holds office.
• The applicability of R.A. No. 10660 is not conditioned upon the
promulgation of rules by the Supreme Court. Otherwise, the letter of
the law would be rendered nugatory by the mere expediency of the
Court's non-issuance of such rules.
• Where the Information did not allege bribery or any amount of
damage to the government, the RTC Pasig clearly has no jurisdiction
over the case.
[Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 251177, 8 September 2020]
• As a general rule, the findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies that have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
• Thus, the factual findings of the arbitrators of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC), being final and conclusive, are not
reviewable by the Supreme Court, except when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the arbitrators.
• When the appeal raises issues that call for the calibration of evidence and
mathematical re-computation of the monetary awards, while factual in
nature, the Supreme Court has to embark upon a review in view of the
contrary findings by the CA and the Arbitral Tribunal, resulting in the
variance of their monetary awards. Such review has to be made in order to
settle once and for all the issues between the parties.
[Shangri-La Properties, Inc. v. BF Corporation, G.R. Nos. 187552-53 and G.R. Nos.
187608-09, 15 October 2019]
• The joinder of causes of action is allowed under Section 5, Rule 2 of the
1997 Rules of Court; but if there are multiple parties, the joinder is made
subject to the rules on joinder of parties under Section 6, Rule 3.
• Before causes of action and parties can be joined in a complaint involving
multiple parties:
• (1) the right to relief must arise out of the same transaction or series
of transactions and
• (2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all the parties.
• The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and its Monetary Board (MB) are
different from the Central Bank and its MB. Since there are multiple
parties involved, the two requirements mentioned in the previous
paragraph must be present before the causes of action and parties can be
joined.
• Neither of the two requirements for the joinder of causes of action and
parties was met.
[Central Bank Board of Liquidators vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
G.R. No. 173399, 21 February 2017]
• Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice
on a given question.
• In private suits, standing is governed by the “real parties-in-interest”
rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
• Such concept of real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2, Rule VI
of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
• Pursuant to Section 66 of the Indigenous People’s Rights Act, the National
Commission for Indigenous People shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
• When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do
not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or
where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP.
• In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe,
respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
• Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be
located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the
NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this
case. [Loloy Unduran et.al. vs. Ramon Aberasturi et.al., G.R. No. 181284, 20 October 2015]
Appellate jurisdiction in Shari’a cases.
• It has been recognized that decades after the 1989 enactment of the
law creating the Shari’a Appellate Court and after the Court
authorized its creation in 1999, it has yet to be organized.
• Pending the organization of the Shari’a Appellate Court, appeals or
petitions from final orders or decisions of the ShDC shall be filed
with the CA and referred to a Special Division to be organized in any
of the CA stations preferably to be composed of Muslim CA Justices.
• For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution and Section 2 of Rule 41 of
the Rules.
• The Shari’a Circuit Court (ShCC) has exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions between parties who have been married in
accordance with the Muslim law, involving disputes relating to
divorce under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083.
• The ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to resolve
the issue of custody, it being a related issue to the main cause of
action.
[Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614, 12 January 2016]
• The Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the permissible scope
of inquiry in petitions under Rules 64 and 65 to errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion. There is grave abuse of discretion when
there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism.
• Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the Commission
on Audit’s (COA) simple errors of judgment cannot be reviewed even
by the SC. Rather, the general policy has been to accord weight and
respect to the decisions of the COA.
• The limitation of the SC’s power of review over the COA’s rulings
merely complements its nature as an independent constitutional
body that is tasked to safeguard the proper use of government (and,
ultimately, the people’s) property by vesting it with the power to:
(1) determine whether government entities comply with the law
and the rules in disbursing public funds; and
(2) disallow illegal disbursements of these funds.
• The deference is also based on the doctrine of separation of powers
and the COA’s presumed expertise in the laws it is entrusted to
enforce.
• A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is
not done, or that which should not have been done is done.
• A party’s right of action accrues only when the confluence of the
following elements is established: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b)
an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and (c)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff.
• It is only when the last element occurs or takes place can it be said in
law that a cause of action has arisen. More, the aggrieved party must
have either actual or presumptive knowledge of the violation by the
guilty party of his rights either by an act or omission.
[Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213716, 10 October 2017]
• The doctrine of hierarchy of courts requires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court.
• The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this
jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [CA] and the [Regional Trial
Courts], a direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially
set out in the petition[.]”
• This Supreme Court is tasked to resolve “the issue of constitutionality of a
law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance
and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of
the people,” as in this case. Hence, petitioners’ direct resort to the SC is
justified.
[Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City et al, G.R. No. 225442, 08 August
2017]
• A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order
or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder.
• It must be filed before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or
contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action.
• Thus, "the only issue that may be raised in such an action is the
question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute.
[Commission on Audit vs. Hon. Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr, G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060, and
189333, 30 June 2020]
• Republic Act No. 8975 prohibits issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction by trial courts against national
government infrastructure projects.
• The prohibition does NOT cover local government infrastructure
project.
• For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts
may issue provisional injunctive reliefs against government
infrastructure projects only when:
• (1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional violations;
• (2) there clearly exists a right in esse;
• (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries;
• (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive
relief; and
• (5) when there are public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining
the project while the action is pending that far outweighs (a) the
inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded
and (b) the public benefits that will result from the completion of the
project.
• The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders
issued by trial courts should be strictly followed.
• No preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support
the injunctive relief is clear and convincing.
[Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr.,
et. al., G.R. No. 174202, 07 April 2015, J. Leonen]
• Procedural laws have retroactive application.
• As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain
recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in
nature.
• It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled
exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. [Zulueta v. Asia
Brewery (406 Phil 543 [2001])]
• On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating
to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes. [LRTA v. Aurora A. Salvaña, G.R. No. 182074, 10
June 2014, J. Leonen]
• The Supreme Court does not have administrative supervision over
administrative agencies, nor is it an entity engaged in making
business decisions. The Supreme Court cannot interfere in purely
administrative matters nor substitute administrative policies and
business decisions with its own. This would amount to judicial
overreach.
• The Supreme Court’s only concern is the legality, not the wisdom, of
an agency's actions. Policy matters should be left to policy makers.
• As such, the Supreme Court did not interfere with PhilHealth’s
decision to increase annual premium rates when it justified the
increase with the enhanced benefits and the expanded coverage of
medical conditions. [KMU v. Hon. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, and PhiHealth, G.R. No.
210761, 28 June 2016]
• All cases questioning the constitutionality of a law does not require
that Congress be impleaded for their resolution. The requisites of a
judicial inquiry are elementary:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself.
[Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. The court of Appeals, et. al.,
G.R. No. 216914, 06 December 2016]
Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the
following requirements for the reopening a case:
• (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgement of
conviction;
• (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon
motion;
• (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
• (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
• (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should
be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.
• The Supreme Court found that it is too late for the petitioner to move
for the reopening of the case since the decision already attained
finality, and that petitioner’s motion are practically second and third
motions for reconsideration of the Decision, which are already
prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
• However, the Supreme Court agreed to reopen the case to avoid
injustice as well as possible multiplicity of suits due to the passage
of a law that reduces the penalty imposed on the judgment.
[Ophelia Hernan v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2017]
• The Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
• 1) certiorari;
• 2) prohibition
both are governed by Rule 65.
• A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
• The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even
if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
[Maria Carolina P. Araullo v. Aquino]
• Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings, keeping in mind that the determination of probable
cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s
accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of
testimonies presented.
• In Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Supreme Court declared that since a
preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and
obligations of parties, probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.
• Under both Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section
4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, a
respondent to a preliminary investigation proceeding is only
entitled to the evidence submitted by complainants, and not to
those submitted by a co-respondent.
• Thus, petitioners’ claim that she was not afforded the right to due
process when she was not provided with copies of the affidavit of her
co-respondent, as well as transcripts of the clarificatory hearings
conducted by Ombudsman with her co-respondent was untenable.
[Jessica Lucila G. Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, 15 March 2016]
• Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.
• Probable cause is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so.
• The term does not mean “actual or positive cause”; nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
• Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.
[Bureau of Customs vs. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, 08 September 2015]
Search and Seizure (moving vehicles) [Saluday v. People]
Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution, reads:

• SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
• Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it
operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only.
• Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable
search depends on whether the person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
• The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems
from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State
intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society
regards as reasonable, is the right against unreasonable search
triggered.
• Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy
or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the
alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
• A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential
reasoning:
1. People v. Johnson, the SC declared airport searches as outside the
protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an
expectation of privacy that society will regard as reasonable.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel.
2. Dela Cruz v. People,33 the SC described seaport searches as
reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling
public overrides a person's right to privacy
3. People v. Breis,35 the Court also justified a bus search owing to the
reduced expectation of privacy of the riding public.
• The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The
expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a
person's dwelling.
• The SC held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the
safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their
baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal
detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed
without violating the passenger's constitutional rights."
• Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all
private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from
entering.
• At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible
to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive
security measures and filter those going in.
• The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and
the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under
Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of
police power for the promotion of public safety.
• Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he
or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.
• The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right, which may be waived.
• However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion.45
• Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b)
whether he or she was in a public or secluded location; (c) whether
he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her
education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;47 (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting.
However, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus
terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search.
1. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must
uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if
not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation
or ridicule.
2. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances,
the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities,
children and other similar groups should be protected.
3. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public
safety.
4. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be
convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no
evidence was planted against the accused.
• To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars.
Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private
or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or
a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged
down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from
the vehicle. [Saluday v. People, APRIL 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305]
GOD BLESS!