Marcus Tullius Cicero’s Just War Theory (Jus Bellum Justum)

The Major causes of war in Muslim Mindanao

A Term Paper
Presented to
Prof. Alex S. Compas
University of the Visayas

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for
Pol Sci 7: Modern Political Theories

By: Al-Mahdooz S. Amil

November 2019
Theory: Just War Theory provides a useful framework for individuals and political groups to use
for their discussions of possible wars. The theory is not intended to justify wars but to prevent
them, by showing that going to war except in certain limited circumstances is wrong, and thus
motivate states to find other ways of resolving conflicts. The Moro conflict was an insurgency in
the Mindanao region of the Philippines, which lasted between 1969 and 2019. Due to
marginalization produced by continuous Resettlement Policy sustained at start of Mindanao and
Sulu inclusion to the Philippine Commonwealth territory of 1935, by 1969, political tensions and
open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and Moro Muslim rebel
groups. The developing Moro Insurgency was ultimately triggered by the Jabidah massacre,
which saw the killing of 60 Filipino Muslim commandos on a planned operation to reclaim the
eastern part of the Malaysian state of Sabah. The Moro Insurgency is rooted in a long history of
resistance by the Bangsamoro people against foreign rule, dating back to the American
annexation of the Philippines in 1898 even as they are not part of Spain's Act of War. Since then,
Moro resistance has persisted against the Philippine government. This paper discussed the major
cause of War in Muslim Mindanao in view to the Cicero’s Doctrine on Just War Theory.

I. Introduction
A. Just War Theory in different views
a. Definition
b. Seven Criteria
B. Cicero’s Just War Theory
C. Scope of the Paper

II. Content of the Paper

A. History of the war in Muslim Mindanao
B. Pacifist vis-à-vis Just War Theory
C. Implication of Just War Theory in the cause of War in Muslim Mindanao
D. War in Muslim Mindanao; Just or Unjust?

III. Conclusion
A. Philippines present Administration Perspectives
 The just war theory is a largely Christian philosophy that attempts to reconcile three

things: First, taking human life is seriously wrong; Second, states have a duty to defend their

citizens, and defend justice; and Third, protecting innocent human life and defending important

moral values sometimes requires willingness to use force and violence. The theory specifies

conditions for judging if it is just to go to war, and conditions for how the war should be fought.

Although it was extensively developed by Christian theologians, it can be used by people

of every faith and none.

The aim of Just War Theory is to provide a guide to the right way for states to act in

potential conflict situations. It only applies to states, and not to individuals (although an

individual can use the theory to help them decide whether it is morally right to take part in a

particular war).

Just War Theory provides a useful framework for individuals and political groups to use

for their discussions of possible wars.

The theory is not intended to justify wars but to prevent them, by showing that going to

war except in certain limited circumstances is wrong, and thus motivate states to find other ways

of resolving conflicts.

The doctrine of the Just War can deceive a person into thinking that because a war is just,

it's actually a good thing. But behind contemporary war theory lays the idea that war is always

bad. A just war is permissible because it's a lesser evil, but it's still an evil.

The principles of a Just War originated with classical Greek and Roman philosophers like

Plato and Cicero and were added to by Christian theologians like Augustine and Thomas

Aquinas.
 There are two parts to Just War theory, both with Latin names: Jus ad bellum or the

conditions under which the use of military force is justified; and Jus in bello or how to conduct a

war in an ethical manner. A war is only a Just War if it is both justified, and carried out in the

right way. Some wars fought for noble causes have been rendered unjust because of the way in

which they were fought.

The Just War Doctrine, first enunciated by St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD),

addresses two questions. First in Jus Ad Bellum, in what circumstances is going to war right,

moral, and just? Under what circumstances is it morally possible for Christians to participate?

Second in Jus in Bello, what conduct is right during wartime? Once war has begun, what is

allowable and what is not?

St. Augustine is noted in history as the founder of the just war theory. To counter the

popular theory during those times that “might is right”, an earlier philosophical statement by

Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, he says: “justice is in the interest of the stronger”.

Augustine lived in an era when Rome was losing control of the world, and was quickly

falling to the other powers. The questions of moral values in war were immanent. He then

identified two aspects of war that require moral justification:

1. The right to go to war (Jus Ad Bellum)

2. The right conduct in war (Jus In Bello)

There are seven criteria or standards for a just war. First, Just Cause refers to a real and

certain injustice must exist. Some aggressor must be endangering innocent lives and other basic

human rights. The just war theory rules out preemptive strikes in so-called preventative war. The

real goal must be the protection of human rights, and the restoration of justice and peace.
 Second, Right intention refers to the true intention is peace and must be the desired

outcome. The just defense theory rules out common reasons why nations go to war: gaining and

maintaining control over another nation’s territory or resources, revenge, humiliation, genocide,

intimidation, and protecting investments.

Third, Legitimate Authority refers to the king, the president, or even the congress in some

countries. (By the way, this criteria raises the issue that since no war is just unless declared by a

legitimate authority, can there ever be a just revolution? If so, who then is the legitimate

authority to declare such a war?)

Fourth, Last Resort refers to no war is just unless it is the last resort. Non-violent means

must be tried and proven ineffective. This goes after the following have failed: negotiation,

mediation, legal action, blockade, non-cooperation, and civil disobedience. If all fails, only the

minimum violence required to restore justice is permissible.

Fifth, Reasonable Chance of Success refers to there must be good and sound reasons why

violence, killing, and war will achieve the desired goal.

Sixth, Proportionality refers to the good achieved must outweigh the harm done. For

example is it not morally just to kill 1,000 people to save 100 lives. A war becomes

disproportionate and unjust when the evil effects outweigh the good to be achieved. (This raises

an issue that St. Augustine never could have imagined: can the use of chemical, nuclear, and

biological weapons ever be moral?)

Lastly, Non-combatant Community this criterion demands that the non-combatants must

never be targeted or attacked. This also forbids destruction of the enemy’s infrastructure: water

& sanitation system, power plants, hospitals and medicine factories, and crops and food reserves

among others.
 This criteria is supported by Vatican Council II Gaudium et Spes (80): “Any act of war

aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities of extensive areas along with their

population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating

condemnation.”

The Moro conflict was an insurgency in the Mindanao region of the Philippines, which

lasted between 1969 and 2019.

Due to marginalisation produced by continuous Resettlement Policy sustained at start of

Mindanao and Sulu inclusion to the Philippine Commonwealth territory of 1935, by 1969,

political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and

Moro Muslim rebel groups. The developing Moro Insurgency was ultimately triggered by the

Jabidah massacre, which saw the killing of 60 Filipino Muslim commandos on a planned

operation to reclaim the eastern part of the Malaysian state of Sabah. In response, the University

of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari established the Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF), an armed insurgent group that was committed to establishing an independent entity

composed of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. Over the successive years, the MNLF has splintered

into several different groups including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which wanted

to establish an Islamic state within the Philippines. The Moro Insurgency is rooted in a long

history of resistance by the Bangsamoro people against foreign rule, dating back to the American

annexation of the Philippines in 1898 even as they are not part of Spain's Act of War. Since then,

Moro resistance has persisted against the Philippine government.

Casualty statistics vary for the conflict; however, the conservative estimates of the

Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicate that at least 6,015 people were killed in armed conflict
between the Government of Philippines and ASG, BIFM, MILF, and MNLF factions between

1989 and 2012.

The Moros had a history of resistance against Spanish, American, and Japanese rule for

400 years. During the Spanish–Moro conflict, Spain repeatedly tried to conquer the

Moro Sultanate of Sulu, Sultanate of Maguindanao, and the Confederation of sultanates in

Lanao. The armed struggle against the Japanese, Spanish, Americans and Christian Filipinos is

considered by current Moro Muslim leaders to be part of a four-century-long "national liberation

movement" of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation).

The root of the conflict originates in the Spanish and American wars against the Moros.

Following the Spanish–American War in 1898, another conflict sparked in

southern Philippines between the revolutionary Muslims in the Philippines and the United States

military that took place between 1899 and 1913. Filipinos opposed foreign rule from the United

States, which claimed the Philippines as its territory. On 14 August 1898, after defeating Spanish

forces, the United States had established a military government in the Philippines under

General Wesley Merritt as Military Governor. American forces took control from the Spanish

government in Jolo on 18 May 1899, and at Zamboanga in December 1899. Brigadier

General John C. Bates was sent to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II.

Kiram was disappointed by the American takeover, as he expected to regain sovereignty after the

defeat of Spanish forces in the archipelago. Bates' main goal was to guarantee Moro neutrality in

the Philippine–American War, and to establish order in the southern Philippines. After some

negotiation, the Bates Treaty was signed which was based on an earlier Spanish treaty. The Bates

Treaty did ensure the neutrality of the Muslims in the south, but it was actually set up to buy time
for the Americans until the war in the north ended. After the war, in 1915, the Americans

imposed the Carpenter Treaty on Sulu.

On 20 March 1900, General Bates was replaced by Brigadier General William August

Kobbé and the District of Mindanao-Jolo was upgraded to a full department. American forces in

Mindanao were reinforced and hostilities with the Moro people lessened, although there are

reports of Americans and other civilians being attacked and slain by Moros.

The American invasion began in 1904 and ended at the term of Major General John J. Pershing,

the third and final military governor of Moro Province, although major resistance continued

in Bud Dajo and Mount Bagsak in Jolo. The United States military killed hundreds of Moro in

the Moro Crater massacre.

Repeated rebellions by the Moros against American rule continued to break out even

after the main Moro Rebellion ended, right up to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines

during World War II. During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the Moros waged an

insurgency against the Japanese on Mindanao and Sulu until Japan surrendered in 1945.

Moro Juramentados attacked the Spanish, Americans, Philippine Constabulary and the Japanese.

The war that begins as a just war may not remain just. Civilians and the infrastructures

that sustain their lives must be protected and not subject to attack. And the damage done to both

sides must remain proportionate. Just cause alone doesn’t make a war just. St. Augustine himself

never claimed that any war could ever meet all the seven criteria.

When is it then morally justifiable to use violence, killing, and war against those unjust

aggressors? Of course Catholics and Christians in the pacifists’ side say never. While Catholics

and Christians who adhere to the just war tradition say only when all seven criteria are met.
 According to the teachings of the just defense tradition, war is at best a regrettable but

necessary evil. Most of us are somewhere in between the two extremes, the pacifist on one side

and absolute militarism on the other.

At this point, it may easy to conclude that the unended war on Muslim Mindanao is

unjust. But I find it much easier to defend the war on Muslim Mindanao based on the principles

being advocated by the pacifist view vis-à-vis the just war tradition. All seven conditions of a

just war can be met and defended: just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, last resort,

reasonable chance of success, proportionality, and non-combatant community.

According to Michael Walzer (a prominent political theorist and public intellectual), the

just war theory is an argument on what justifications makes sense. What are the plausible

justifications? And that we citizens judge what they do when governments go to war. There are

many arguments about when to fight and how to fight. There are biblical and Islamic arguments;

there were arguments among the Greek on how to fight. The debate on what is morally right

continues until today. Walzer further asserts that the just war theory as a doctrine comes out of

Catholic moral theology.

Collin Donovan, vice president for Theology at EWTN, says: “Over the centuries it was

taught by Doctors of the Church, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, and formally embraced by the

Magisterium, which has also adapted it to the situation of modern warfare. The following

explanation of Just War Doctrine follows the schema given in the Catechism.” Donovan further

professes, “The responsibility for determining whether these conditions are met belongs to “the

prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.” The Church’s role

consists in enunciating clearly the principles, in forming the consciences of men and in insisting

on the moral exercise of just war.”

 The pronouncements of Collin Donovan was recently supported by Peter Kreeft, who

also contends that, “Church doctrine does not pronounce in a final and authoritative way on all

moral questions, leaving many up to prudential human judgment.” It has been my assertion for

quite some time that the Church should stick to matters of faith and morals. This includes

condemning what they find to be unjust killings, all unjust killings. It’s like there’s a just war

against drugs, but some of the soldiers capture their enemies and instead of treating them as they

do in a just war, they seem to be “executing” them. Instead of rehabilitation, it seems the police

are shooting them unjustly in a war that’s supposed to be just.

It is my view that the war on Muslim Mindanao is supposed to be a just war. But the

unjust killings by some scalawags in police and military personalities make the war on Muslim

Mindanao unjust. Arresting suspects, following due process, and rule of law must still prevail.

It is my conclusion, which it is morally just for a president to use violence, killings, and

war to achieve a higher purpose of peace that outweighs the possible problems they may

encounter in the process. The legitimate authorities whose belief that this war is the last resort in

curtailing the proliferation of the violence and extremism, establishing peace and order in society

in the long run. There are also glaring reasons to justify its success as shown by the figures of the

Military Forces of the Philippines — number of arrests, those who surrendered, the unrelenting

pursuit of terrorists, and cases filed against the perpetrators. The proportionality of the losses of

lives against those future losses of lives to be inflicted by unjust aggressors is justified.

The immunity of non-combatant can be argued as a reason that cannot be met to justify a

just war, knowing it is impossible to have zero non-combatant casualties during military

encounters with the unjust aggressors such as narco-politicians, terrorists and other criminals.
 They decry the declaration of martial law as a violation of human rights. Ridiculous as it

may seem, they want to return to a pacifist stance that failed and, worse, became the cause of the

staggering rise in the proliferation of illegal drugs.

Why insist on returning to the precursor of the problem? Perhaps those against the just

war tradition, and critics of the current administration war on Muslim Mindanao, have much to

lose in the eventual decline in the enlarging number of terrorists in the country.

Out of 7 criteria for a just war, the most difficult really is no. 5: “reasonable chance of

success”. Some countries like Singapore and Malaysia have succeeded, by making the

punishment very harsh, but effective. I think this is what the current administration is doing:

sowing fear in possible users and actual pushers. How to deal with the collateral damage from

other reasons (like that son of the OFW who was killed by the police after his neighbor, with

whom he had an altercation, invented an accusation that the poor kid was a terrorists; I think

those who do that should be prosecuted using the full extent of the law, so they don’t do it

again).
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