LESSON MANUSCRIPT (14th Week, Crim Law 1, Book I, RPC)

PROFESSOR: J/DIR. ROMEO L. OGOY, TLPE (Ret.)

Lesson Topic: Persons Criminally Liable under Article 16, RPC; Degree of Participation under Article 17,
18, 19, RPC; Accessories Exempt from Criminal Liability, RPC, Book 1; and Obstruction of Justice under
P.D. No. 1829

I. Prayer then Recapitulation of the previous topic of week 13 and entertain some clarificatory
questions.

II. Persons Criminally Liable:

a. For Grave or Less Grave Felonies:

i. Principals;

ii. Accomplices; and

iii. Accessories;

b. For Light Felonies:

i. Principals;

ii. Accomplices;

Accessories are not liable for Light Felonies;

III. Kinds of Conspiracy:

Conspiracy as a mode of incurring collective criminal liability is either direct or implied. (People
vs. Pepino, G.R. No. 174771, January 12, 2016);

a. Express Conspiracy:

Conspiracy proven by direct evidence is called Express Conspiracy. But direct proof of conspiracy is
rarely found; for criminals don not write down their lawless plans and plots. (Angeles vs. CA, G.R. No.
101442, March 28, 2001);

b. Implied Conspiracy:

Conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence. This is called Implied Conspiracy;

Implied Conspiracy may be proven through the collective acts of the accused, before, during and after
the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing one part and
another performing another for attainment of the same criminal objective. (People vs. Agudez, G.R. Nos.
138386-87, May 20, 2004);

i. Simultaneous Attacks – Simultaneity in attacking the victim is indicative of Implied

Conspiracy. (People vs. Lindo, G.R. No. 134506, December 27, 2002). However, there is no Implied
Conspiracy if the simultaneity of the attacks by several accused was just a “reflex response” or
“spontaneous reaction:
 1) To sudden discovery of cheating in a gambling by the victim; or

2) To shooting of the companion of the accused by the victim; or

3) To commission of Robbery by the victim;

ii. Non-arming – Accused had no guns and passively witnessed the shooting during a
pre-wedding celebration without intervening in the killing in any way or shielding the killer;

However, they are friends of the killer and they went together with the killer to the celebration; and
they left at the same time with the killer after the shooting;

There is no Implied Conspiracy. The mere passive presence of a person at the scene of the crime does
not make him a con-conspirator. (People vs. Silvestre and Atienza, G.R. No. L-35748, December 14,
1931);

Conspiracy transcends companionship. Relationship or Association alone is not a badge of conspiracy.

(People vs. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004);

Failure to get a weapon before the attack negates the presence of implied conspiracy. If accused had
really conspired with the co-accused to kill the deceased, he should have provided himself with a
weapon. (People vs. Vistido, G.R. No. L-31582, October 26, 1977);

IV. Community of Design:

Community of design means that the accomplice (or principal by indispensable cooperation)
knows of, and concurs with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. (People vs.
Maliao, G.R. No. 170858, July 31, 2009);

Knowledge and concurrence in the criminal mind of the Chief Actor are the elements of Community of
Design;

a. Conspirators and Accomplice:

Conspirators and Accomplices are distinguished as follows:

i. Conspirators agreed and decided to commit the crime; in sum, their collective
responsibility is based on Conspiracy;

Accomplices acquire knowledge and concur with the criminal design of the conspirators after the latter
reached a decision; in sum, their quasi-collective responsibility is based on Community of Design;

ii. Conspirators to be held liable on the basis of collective responsibility must perform an
act in furtherance of conspiracy such as:

1) providing active participation; or

2) moral assistance; or

3) exerting moral ascendancy;

Accomplices must supply:

1) material aid in an efficacious way; or

2) moral aid in an efficacious way;

iii. The nature and time of participation of Conspirators is not important;

The participation of the Accomplices must be previous or simultaneous to the commission of the crime
but it must not be indispensable to the commission thereof;

Otherwise, they are liable as principal by indispensable cooperation;

b. Concurrence After the Conspirators Decided to Commit a Crime:

In People vs. Salvador, G.R. NO. 201443, April 10, 2013, Conspirators and Accomplices have one thing in
common:

i. they know and agree with the criminal design;

Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
course of action;

Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do
they agree to cooperate in its execution;

Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed;

Accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed;
they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment;

Conspirators are the authors of a crime;

Accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the
offense;

In People vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999, accused know that the Chief Actor had
intended to kill the victim at the time, and he cooperated in the killing by acting as a lookout;

But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill victim; that the decision was made by the Chief
Actor and the others;

He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there
because “Nagkahiyaan Na”;

Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further that
he alone was unarmed that afternoon. He is liable as an Accomplice;

c. Concurrence While the Crime Is in Progress:

Conspiracy must be hatched prior to the commission of the crime. If a person acquires knowledge of or
concurs in the criminal design of the Chief Actor while the commission of the crime is in progress, there
is no conspiracy, express or implied;
One cannot conspire with the Chief Actor to commit a crime in the middle of its commission. If the
accused joins the criminal design of the Chief Actor while the latter is already committing a crime, the
basis of the criminal liability of the former is Community of Design and not Conspiracy;

Accused who demanded (People vs. Bacungay, G.R. No. 125017, March 12, 2002) or received the
ransom money (People vs. Octa, G.R. No. 195196, July 13, 2015) indicates the “Commonality of Purpose”
of his acts together with those abducted and detained the victim;

Hence, he is liable as principal by direct participation for kidnapping for ransom and not merely as an
Accomplice;

In sum, the participation of the abductors and the accused, who demanded or received ransom, are
circumstantial evidence that they agreed and decided beforehand to commit kidnapping for ransom;

Accused discovered the commission of the crime only after they heard a gunshot. The abductor (Chief
Actor) instructed the accused to get the ransom money;

There is no implied conspiracy. Accused and the abductor did not agree and decide beforehand to
commit kidnapping for ransom. The abductor already commenced the commission of the crime when
the accused discovered it;

However, accused despite knowledge of the commission of the crime, concurred with the criminal
design of the abductor by agreeing to get the ransom payment;

In sum, there is community of design. His participation is not indispensable to the commission of
kidnapping for ransom since obtaining ransom money is not an element thereof;

What is important in this crime is abducting the victim for purpose of ransom. Since obtaining ransom is
not indispensable to the commission of the crime, accused is merely liable as an accomplice. (People vs.
Castro, G.R. No. 132726, July 23, 2002);

A, B, and C agreed and decided to kidnap the victim. Executing their criminal design, they seized thee
victim and loaded him in a taxi driven by X;

They told X they will only teach the victim a lesson in Christian humility. X drove them to a fishpond
where the victim was detained. A, B, C are Conspirators while X is an Accomplice in the crime of Illegal
Detention;

X did not take part in the original conspiracy to commit the crime of Robbery. He merely concurred with
their criminal design at the time that the victim was already abducted by furnishing the means of
transporting him to the place where he will be detained. (People vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August
18, 1999);

However, the accused can conspire to commit a crime “immediately” before the commission thereof.
Conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, “expressly or impliedly”, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to commit it. (People vs. Peralta, G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968);

In People vs. Paragas, G.R. No. 146308, July 18, 2002, while in the passenger jeepney, the Chief Actor
glanced at accused and the two nodded at each other before the former stabbed the victim;
Accused immediately and successfully prevented the dother passengers from pursuing the Chief Actor
by volunteering to go after him (killer) instead;

Accused was held equally liable with the Chief Actor by reason of conspiracy;

d. Non-Concurrence:

In People vs. Manansala, Jr., G.R. No. 23514, February 17, 1970, accused embraced the victim to stop
him from further hitting the Chief Actor with his fists. He did not embrace the victim because of an
agreement to kill the victim;

The Chief Actor suddenly stabbed thee victim. After the first knife thrust had been delivered, accused
did not try to stop the Chief Actor, either by word or overt act;

Instead, accused continued to hold the victim, even forced him down on the bamboo bed with the Chief
Actor still pressing the attack;

Implied Conspiracy was not established. There is no showing that the killing was agreed upon between
them beforehand. However, “community of design” was established;

Despite knowledge of the Chief Actor’s criminal design to kill when he stabbed thee victim, the accused
concurred with that criminal design and participated by continuously holding the victim. Hence, he is
liable as an Accomplice;

In People vs. Abina, G.R. No. 129891, October 27, 1998, accused held the victim to insure his immobility.
When the Chief Actor stabbed the victim, the accused were stunned, forthwith released their hold on
the victim, retreated to a distance of around three meters;

Accused desisted from joining the Chief Actor who went on to pursue the wounded victim. The accused
are not liable as Principals or Accomplice because neither implied conspiracy nor community of design
was established;

Accused, who held the victim without knowledge that his companion intended to stab him, is not liable
as Principal for the sudden and unexpected stabbing of the victim because of the absence of implied
conspiracy. (People vs. Ibanez, G.R. No. L-178, November 29, 1946);

Neither “community of design” is present since without prior knowledge of the attack, the accused
could not concur with the criminal design of the Chief Actor. (People vs. Cajandab, G.R. No. L- 29598,
July 26, 1973);

After murdering a Child. A, the murder, asked B, her friend, to demand ransom from parents of the
victim. Not aware that the Child is already dead, B demanded ransom;

A is liable for murder. (People vs. Lora, G.R. No. L-49430, March 30, 1982);

B is not liable for murder since both his criminal mind and participation pertains to kidnapping for
ransom. Without knowledge of the murder, B can neither conspire with A nor concur with her criminal
resolution to commit murder;
V. Degree of Participation:

1. Principals – The following are considered principals:

a. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act. (Article 17, para 1, RPC);

They are principals by direct participation which include:

i. Chief Actor; and

ii. Conspirator;

Chief Actor:

The one who committed the act constituting a crime such as the person who stabbed and killed the
victim;

With or without conspiracy, the Chief Actor is liable as Principal by Direct Participation. (People vs.
Tampis, G.R. No. 148725, July 31, 2003);

A fatally wounded X. B, X’s brother, hearing of the fight, came rushing and, finding the dying man
sprawled on the ground, stabbed X in the leg inflicting a minor wound. X thereafter died;

B is liable as an Accomplice since he concurred in the criminal design of A by supplying material aid in an
efficacious way;

However, if B stabbed X in the throat instead of the leg and thereby hastened his death, B is liable as
Principal in the crime of homicide;

Even though there is no conspiracy, A and B are liable for homicide since both of them are Chief Actors
for they committed acts that constitute the crime of homicide;

Conspirator:

One who performed an act in furtherance of conspiracy, is liable as Principal by Direct Participation;

A Conspirator, who acted as a lookout, is liable as Principal by Direct Participation. (People vs. Delim,
G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003);

In furtherance of conspiracy, the act of the Chief Actor in stabbing the victim is the act of the lookout. In
conspiracy, the act constituting the crime by the Chief Actor is the act of all Conspirators because of
collective responsibility principle;

In People vs. David, G.R. No. 197539, June 2, 2014, when conspiracy has been established, the act of one
would be the act of all;

In Conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim
(People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010); or

To determine who inflicted the fatal wounds because the act of one conspirator is the acts of all. (People
vs. Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, February 17, 2000);

In sum, the acts of inflicting mortal wounds by the Chief Actor are the acts of all the Conspirator;
If there is no Conspiracy, those who inflicted mortal wounds are liable for homicide or murder;

The others, who inflicted non-mortal wounds, are liable for Physical Injuries. (Siton vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 94065, December 2, 1991);

To hold an accused guilty as a Co-Principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have

performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. (Zapanta va. People, G.R. Nos.
192698-99, April 22, 2015);

A proposed to B that they rob a certain store, to which B agreed. Later, however, B undertook the
robbery alone and made off with P2,000 cash;

The following day, after making some shallow explanation, B apologized to A and gave the latter P500,
which A somewhat grudgingly accepted;

A is not liable as principal by direct participation because he did not perform an act in furtherance of
conspiracy. However, he is liable either as accessory to the crime of robbery for profiting from the
effects of the crime;

Or as Principal in the crime of Fencing under P.D. 1612;

The OVERT ACT in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of:

i. “Active Participation” in the actual commission of the crime itself; or

Holding the victim to render him immobile while his co-conspirator inflicted mortal wounds on him is an
active participation made in furtherance of conspiracy. (People vs. Duetes, G.R. No.144598, February 6,
2004);

ii. It may consist of “Moral Assistance” to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the
commission of the crime;

Accused was lending moral assistance to his co-conspirator, the Chief Actor, by being armed with a
lethal weapon and present at the time when the latter killed the victim. (People vs. Esponilla, G.R. No.
122766, Jun 20, 2003);

iii. By exerting “Moral ascendancy” over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan. (People vs. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004);

Accused exerted moral ascendancy over his nephew by ordering him to kill a priest. However, in this
situation, he would b held liable not as a Principal by Direct Participation but as Principal by Inducement.
(U.S. vs. Gamao, G.R. No. L-6942, August 30, 1912);

b. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it. (Article 17, para 2, RPC);

They are Principals by Inducement who:

i. Directly Forcing Another – one, who directly forced another to commit a

crime, is a Principal by Inducement;

He compels another whether by using irresistible force or by causing uncontrollable fear to commit a
crime;
However, the Chief Actor, who was forced to commit the crime, is exempt from criminal liability. Only
the Principal by Inducement is liable;

ii. Directly Inducing Another – one, who directly induces another to commit a crime, is a
Principal by Inducement;

If there is “cause and effect” relationship between the stabbing by the accused and death of the victim,
the former is liable as Principal by Direct Participation;

If there is a “cause and effect” relationship between the inducement by the accused and the commission
of the crime by the Chief Actor, the former is liable as Principal by Inducement;

To be held liable as Principal by Inducement, it is important that the “inducement is made directly with
the intention of procuring the commission of the crime”;

A person who advised a married woman, whose husband was very stingy and treated her badly that the
only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the crime of Robbery by Inducement, for
reason that an imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient. (U.S. vs. Indanan, G.R. No. 8187,
January 29, 1913);

A father, who simply said “Hit him, Hit him” to his son, who was at the time engaged in combat with
another, was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given. (U.S. vs. Indanan,
ibid). Even without such statement, his son will hit the victim;

Moreover, it is also required that the inducement is the determining cause of the commission of the
crime;

Inducement is either:

a) by command; or

b) for a consideration; or

c) by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime.
(U.S. vs. Indanan, ibid);

1) Consideration – A person, who gave, offered or promised to the Chief Actor a valuable
consideration, which was the determining cause of the commission of the crime, is liable as Principal by
Inducement;

This is so because without such offer or promise, the criminal act would never have been committed.
The person, who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration, or reward, is
liable as Principal by Direct Participation;

The liability of both the induced and the inducer is aggravated by the circumstance of reward, promise
or consideration;

This circumstance is qualifying in murder and ordinary aggravating circumstance in other crime such as
arson;
A for consideration induced B to kill X. Instead of killing X, B induced C to kill X for a consideration. C
killed X;

C is liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of consideration as Principal by Direct Participation;
while B is liable as Principal by Inducement;

However, A is not liable as Principal by Inducement because C killed X not because of the inducement of
A, but by reason of the inducement of B;

Neither is A liable for proposal to commit murder since there is no penalty prescribed by law for its
commission;

2) Word of Command – To make a word of command as the determining ccause of the

commission of the crime, which will make the accused liable as Principal by Inducement, it must be
established that:

i. the inducer by word of command must have an ascendancy over the Chief Actor;

ii. the word of command must be so direct, so efficacious and so powerful amounting to
physical or moral coercion;

iii. the word of command must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime; and

iv. the Chief Actor has no personal reason to commit the crime;

In U.S. vs. Gamao, G.R. No. L-6942, August 30, 1912, the Chief Actor was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and
more or less dependent upon his undle for subsistence;

On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was a man of great influence, a local political leader, and has
several relatives in the government. Gamao ordered the Chief Actor to kill the priest;

Immediately after murdering the priest, the Chief Actor returned to the house of his uncle and reported
the fact. Gamao is liable as Principal by Inducement;

c. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished. (Article 17, para 3, RPC). They are Principals by Indispensable Cooperation;

To be a Principal by Indispensable Cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a

“conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose (community of design)” and cooperation in the commission of
the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. (People vs.
Abina, G.R. No. 129891, October 27, 1998);

In sum, whether the accused conspired with the Chief Actor or concurred with his criminal design, he is
liable as Principal by Indispensable Cooperation as long as without his participation, the Chief Actor
could not have accomplished the crime;

i. Conspiracy:
If there is conspiracy, the accused who cooperated with the Chief Actor in the commission of he offense
by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished, is liable either as
Principal by Direct Participation because the act constituting the crime of the Chief Actor is also his act,
or as Principal by Indispensable Cooperation;

A Conspirator, who held the victim to immobilize him/her while his co-conspirator inflicted mortal
wound upon him while he was raping her, was considered as “Principal by Direct Participation (People
vs. Bulan, G.R. No. 143404, June 8, 2005); or Principal by Indispensable Cooperation. (People vs. Quinola,
G.R. No. 126148, May 5, 1999);

ii. Community of Design:

If there is “community of design”, thee accused who cooperated with the Chief Actor in the commission
of thee offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished, is liable
as “Principal by Indispensable Cooperation”;

2. Accomplices (Article 18, RPC):

Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts;

This means that those who, not being Principals, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts;

To hold a person liable as an Accomplice, three elements must concur:

a) community of design, which means that the Accomplice knows of and concurs with, the
criminal design of the Principal by Direct Participation;

b) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime. (People vs. Maliao, G.R. No. 178058, July 31, 2009); and

c) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as an Accomplice. (Saldua vs. People, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018);

i. Conspiracy:

If there is conspiracy, the accused who cooperated with the Chief Actor in the commission of the
offense, can be held liable as Principal by Direct Participation or Principal by Indispensable Cooperation
but not as an Accomplice;

Conspirators are liable as Principals regardless of the extent of participation. (People vs. Siongco, G.R.
No. 186472, July 5, 2010);

ii. Community of Design:

If there is “community of design”, accused, who cooperated with the Chief Actor in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts, is liable as an Accomplice or Principal by Indispensable
Cooperation depending upon the extend of participation;

In People vs. Amodia, G.R. No. 173791, April 7, 2009, it is required, in order to be liable either as a
Principal by Indispensable Cooperation or as an Accomplice, that the accused must unite with the
criminal design of the Principal by Direct Participation;

Adan and Eve were lovers but their relationship turned sour. Adan tried to win back Eve but to no avail.
Almost hopeless, Adan went to see two of his friends, Bruno and Cora;

Adan asked the two to accompany him to the house of Eve. He told the two: “This is my last attempt of
reconciliation. I must succeed even if I have to rape Eve”;

The trio proceeded to the house of Eve using the car owned and driven by Bruno. When they reached
the house, Adan went up, Cora stayed near the gate as lookout and Bruno remained in the car;

Adan failed to win back Eve and true to his threat, raped her. He went down the house, informed Bruno
and Cora about the incident and they thereafter went to a Disco Club and danced the night away;

Bruno and Cora are liable as Accomplices in the crime of rape. They are aware of the criminal design of
Adan. They concurred in his criminal design to rape the victim by supplying material aid in an efficacious
way;

In case of doubt, whether there is conspiracy or community of design, it should be resolved in favor of
the accused. Hence, the accused will be convicted as an Accomplice on the basis of community of
design;

In People vs. Eusebio, G.R. No. 182152, February 25, 2013, the line that separates a conspirator by
concerted action from an Accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is indeed slight;

Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; but they assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment;

The solution in case of doubt is that such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. When there
is doubt as to whether accused is guilty as Principal or Accomplice, it should be resolved in favor of the
“milder form of responsibility”;

He should be given the benefit of the doubt and be regarded only as an Accomplice;

3. Accessories (Article 19, RPC):

Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as Principals or Accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any
of the following manners:

a. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
 b. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery;

c. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the Principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with:

1) acts with abuse of his public functions; or

2) whenever the author of the crime is guilty of:

i. treason;

ii. parricide;

iii. murder; or

iv. attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive; or

v. is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime;

It is not necessary that the Principal should be first declared guilty before an Accessory can be made
liable as such. (People vs. Billon, CA, 48 O.G. 1391);

One can be held liable as an Accessory even if the Chief actor or Principal was not convicted because:

a. The Principal is at large (People vs Inovera, 65 O.G 3168);

b. The Principal died;

c. The Principal is unidentified, or was acquitted due to technicality (Vino vs. People,
G.R. No. 84163, October 19, 1989);

In the old ruling, People vs. Barlam, (CA) 59 O.G. 2474, the Court of Appleals ruled that the accused
cannot be held as an Accessory under Article 19, para 3, if the Principal charged with murder died before
trial;

But, since the case of Vino is a Supreme Court decision, the Barlam case enunciated by the Court of
Appeals is considered as an abandoned principle;

Independent Responsibility Principle:

The corresponding responsibilities of thee Principal, Accomplice, and Accessory are distinct from each
other;

As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the Accomplice or Accessory can proceed independently of that of the Principal. (People vs.
Bayabaos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015;

One can be convicted as an Accesory to a felony although the Principal was not convicted because the
latter is at large, or unidentified or died. (Vino vs. People, supra);

Knowledge of the Commission of the Crime:

The liability of the Principal by Direct Participation may be based on an Actual Commission of the Crime
or Conspiracy;

The liability of a Principal by Inducement is based on Inducement and Conspiracy;

The liability of a Principal by Indispensable Cooperation is based on Conspiracy or Community of Design;

The liability of an Accomplice is based on Community of Design;

The liability of an Accessory is based on Knowledge;

Profiting:

There are two (2) views as to the meaning of profiting:

a. Under the first view, to profit means tto materially benefit from the act or to improve his
economic condition;

Thus, riding in a stolen vehicle is “not profiting” since it does not improve his economic position.
Profiting is not synonymous to intent to gain as an element of theft. (Morales, CA 71 O.G. 529);

But one, who regularly used a carabao in farming with knowledge that it was stolen, is liable as an
Accessory. The regularity in the use of the stolen property improves the economic position of the user;

He is liable as an Accessory since he materially benefits from the crime of theft. (Taer vs CA, G.R. 85204,
June 18, 1990);

b. under the second view, deriving benefit from something is profiting. Improving economic
condition is not required. Hence, eating a stolen meat will make one liable as an Accessory;

Preventing the Discovery of the Crime:

Body of the crime is the same as “corpus delicti”. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or
substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been
committed;

Destroying or concealing the “corpus delicti” means doing something that would make it appear that no
crime was committed;

In murder or homicide, the fact of death is the “corpus delicti”. Showing the dead body of the victim will
establish the fact of death;

Thus, burning the dead body of the murdered victim into ashes or throwing it into the river is destroying
the body of crime. (People vs. Devara, G.R. Nos. 100938-39, December 15, 1993);

The mere act of a person of carrying the cadaver of one unlawfully killed, when it was buried to prevent
the discovery of the crime, is sufficient to make him responsible as an Accessory. (People vs. Galleto,
G.R. No. L-1095, July 31, 1947);
 Assisting the Principal to Escape:

In assisting Principal to escape, the crimes committed by the Principal are not only limited to: treason,
parricide, murder, or attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive;

It may include other crimes, where an Accessory acts with abuse of his public position/function; or the
Principal author of the other crimes is a Habitual Delinquent;

Assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime of murder, while will make one liable as an
Accessory, is not just refraining from reporting an offense to the proper authorities. (U.S. vs Callapag,
G.R. No. 7041, January 23, 1912);

But, it involves a positive act such as:

a. enjoining a witness not to reveal what he knew about the crime (People vs. Talingdan, G.R.
No. L-321226, July 6, 1978); or

b. providing false information which tended affirmatively to deceive the prosecuting authorities
and thus to prevent the detection of the guilty parties and to aid them in escaping, preventing discovery
and arrest. (U.S. vs Romulo, G.R. No. 5502, March 7, 1910);

However, a Filipino citizen, who failed to report conspiracy to commit treason, is liable for “misprision of
treason”;

In U.S vs. Yacat, G.R. No. 110, October 24, 1902, abusing his public office, a Municipal Mayor refused to
prosecute the crime of homicide and thus made it possible for Principals to escape;

This fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the record, and he has been unable to explain his conduct in
refusing to make an investigation of this serious occurrence, of which complaint was made to him.
Consequently, he is liable as an Accessory after the fact.

VI. Accessories Who are Exempt from Criminal Liability (Article 20, RPC):

The penalties prescribed fro Accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their:

1. Spouses;

2. Ascendants;

3. Descendants;

4. Legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters; or

5. Relatives by affinity within the same degree;

With single exception of Accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding
Article;
This refers to: para 1, Article 19, RPC: “1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime”; This is so because the consideration there is not based on relationship
anymore but based on material and economic benefits;

VII. Obstruction of Justice (P.D. 1829):

The punishable ats under P.D. 1829 are found in Section 1, paras “a to i” thereof. However, the first
paragraph of Section 1 provides penalty for any person who knowingly or willfully “obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases”; This is the general element of all crimes of obstruction of justice punishable under P.D. 1829;

In sum, in crimes of obstruction of justice, the accused is obstructing police investigation, preliminary
investigation, and criminal proceeding;

For example, using fictitious name to obstruct the implementation of decision in a civil case iss not
obstruction of justice under Section 1, P.D. No. 1829, but using of fictitious name under Article 178, RPC;

The following are the specific acts punishable under P.D. 1829 or Obstruction of Justice, to wit:

a. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of any offender by means of bribery, misrepresentation,
deceit, intimidation, force or threats; (Preventing Testimony or Report)

b. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with
intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases; (Suppression of Evidence)

c. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent
his arrest prosecution and conviction; (Assisting Criminal to Escape)

d. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or
execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same
purpose or purposes; (Using Fictitious Name in criminal case)

e. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court
orders or disturbing proceedings the fiscal’s office, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts; (Delaying Criminal
Prosecution)

f. Making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its
falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases; (Using False Evidence)

g. soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from,

discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender; (Obstruction of Prosecution for
Consideration)
 h. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person,
honor, or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such
person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation
of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases; (Threatening a Witness)

i. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies
from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim, or fabricating
information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of
background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the
investigator or to the court; (False Information)

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher
penalty shall be imposed.

END OF MANUSCRIPT FOR WEEK 14, CRIM LAW 1

PROFESSOR: J/DIRECTOR ROMEO L. OGOY, TLPE (Ret.)