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FIRST DIVISION

BEETHOVEN QUIJANO,* G.R. No. 202151

Petitioner,

Present:

PERALTA, CJ.,
- versus - CAGUIOA,
CARANDANG,
ZALAMEDA, and
GAERLAN,JJ

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x------------

DECISION

GAERLAN, J.:

The Constitution mandates that an accused enjoys the right to be

presumed innocent until his/her guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
When a person's life and liberty are at stake, the courts must exercise utmost
circumspection and ensure that each and every element of the crime is
established. Notably, to support a conviction for frustrated murder, the
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim's wound
would have been fatal without timely medical intervention. Without this
crucial fact, the accused may only be convicted of attempted murder.

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Beethoven Quijano (Quijano) praying
for the reversal of the August 27, 2010 Decision2 and May 10, 2012

Spelled in the rol/o cover as "Quiajano".

Rollo, pp. 3-25.
2
Id. at 30-37; penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon, with Associate Justices Portia A.
Hormachuelos and Socorro B. Inting, concurring.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 202151

Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 00494.

The CA affirmed the April 26, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 23, which convicted Quijano of frustrated
murder.

Antecedents

In an Information dated September 2, 1997, Quijano was charged with

frustrated murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of June 1997, at about 3:30 o'clock
dawn in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a handgun, with deliberate
intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, did then
and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one Atilano Andong by shooting him with said
handgun hitting him at the right portion of his shoulder, thereby causing
physical injuries which injuries would ordinarily caused the death of said
Atilano Andong, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein
accused, that is, by the timely medical assistance given to said Atilano
Andong which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

On September 6, 1999, Quijano pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6

The antecedent facts reveal that at 3:30 o'clock in the morning of June
21, 1997, Atilano Andong (Andong) was sleeping at home with his common-
law wife Marilou Gamboa (Gamboa) and their child. Suddenly, Quijano
started banging on their door and shouting Andong's name. When Andong
rose from the bed, he was surprised to see Quijano standing 60 centimeters
away from him, beaming a flashlight at him. Then, Quijano suddenly shot
Andong on his right shoulder. Gamboa pleaded for Quijano to stop. 7

Meanwhile, Andong's neighbors Chana Baguio (Baguio) and

Rosemarie Barrellano (Barrellano) heard a gunshot. They went outside of
their house and saw Quijano holding a hand gun. 8 Frightened, they rushed

Id. at 39-40; penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L.
Hernando (now a Member of this Court) and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, concurring.
4 Records, pp. 32-37; rendered by Judge Generosa G. Labra.
Id. at 1-2.
6
Id. at 32.
7
Rollo, pp. 48-50; 66
Records, p. 33. I

I
I

~!
I
Decision 3 G.R. No. 202151

back inside and hid. Thereafter, they saw Andong blood-stained and with a
wound on his right shoulder. 9

Subsequently, Andong was rushed to the Vicente Sotto Memorial

Hospital where he underwent an operation. He was treated by Dr. Prudencio
10
Manubag (Dr. Manubag) and was confined for more than two weeks.

During the trial, Dr. Arnold Richime submitted Andong's medical

records and testified that Dr. Manubag is no longer connected with the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Hospital. 11 Later on, the prosecution presented an expert
witness, Dr. Roque Anthony Paradela (Dr. Paradela) who testified that
Andong's injury could have been fatal if not for timely medical intervention,
including the application of a close tube or CPT.

On the other hand, Quijano vehemently denied the charge leveled

against him. He claimed that in the evening prior to the incident, he was at
home drinking with his co-workers. He did not leave his house. He further
related that he slept at past 1 o'clock in the morning of June 21, 1997 and
woke up at around 10 o'clock.

Ruling of the RTC

On April 26, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision 12 convicting Quijano

of frustrated murder. The RTC held that the prosecution proved Quijano's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Quijano shot Andong in a sudden and
unexpected manner, thereby depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself.

Likewise, the RTC rejected Quijano's defenses of denial and alibi. It

explained that it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime, considering that his house is just walking distance to
Andong's residence. 13

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused

BEETHOVEN QUIJANO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER, for which he is hereby sentenced to suffer an

9
Id.
io Id.
11
Rollo, p. 44.
12
CA rol/o, pp. 32-37
13
Id. at 36-37.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 202151

indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(I) DAY as MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS,
and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as MAXIMUM.

SO ORDERED. 14

Aggrieved, Quijano filed a notice of appeal. 15

Ruling of the CA

On August 27, 2010, the CA 16 affirmed the RTC's judgment. The CA

held that the prosecution proved Quijano' s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. According
to the CA, their positive identification of Quijano as the assailant prevails over
the latter's defenses of denial and alibi. 17

Moreover, the CA declared that the testimony of Dr. Paradela may be

admitted as the opinion of an expert witness, which thereby serves as an
exception to the hearsay rule.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,

Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-45614, finding appellant Beethoven
Quijano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder
is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED. 18

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Quijano filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its May 10, 2012
Resolution. 19

Undeterred, Quijano filed the instant Petition for Review on

Certiorari. 20

14
Id. at 37.
15
Id.at 139-140.
16
Rollo, pp. 30-37
17
Id. at 36.
18
Id. at 37.
19
Id. at 39-40.
20
Id. at 3-25.
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 202151

Issues

Seeking exoneration from the charge, Quijano claims that the

prosecution failed to prove his guilt for frustrated murder beyond reasonable
doubt.

First, he asserts that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are

incredible and riddled with irreconcilable inconsistencies. 21 Particularly, he
points out that Gamboa and Andong varied on whether he had companions
and ifhe uttered menacing words before shooting Andong. Likewise, Quijano
alleges that it was impossible for Baguio and Barellano to have seen him shoot
Andong considering that their houses are located at the back of Andong's
house. 22 Quijano further claims that Baguio and Barrellano changed their
story during the trial by saying that they saw Quijano because they went
outside of their house after they heard gunfire. 23 Quijano contends that Baguio
and Barellano have an axe to grind against him because they have an ongoing
dispute with his family. 24

Second, Quijano avers that Dr. Paradela did not treat Andong. Thus, his
testimony is hearsay evidence. 25

Third, Quijano claims that the prosecution failed to prove evident

premeditation and treachery. 26 There was no proof that he deliberately chose
to attack Andong at 3 o'clock in the morning under the cover of darkness to
prevent detection and ensure the success of his criminal enterprise. 27
Moreover, his attack could not have been sudden and unexpected if it was
preceded by banging on the door and calling Andong's name. Added to this,
no less than Andong related that they quarreled the day prior to the shooting
incident. By all means, Andong was forewarned of the impending attack
against his life. 28

Finally, Quijano alternatively pleads that should he be found guilty of

shooting Andong, he may only be held liable for attempted homicide or
frustrated homicide in view of the prosecution's failure to establish the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. 29

21
Id. at 10.
22
Id. at 17.
23
Id. at 18.
24
ld.atl9.
25
Id. at 20-21.
26
Id. at 21.
27
Id. at 15.
2B Id.
29
Id. at 25.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 202151

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) points out that the instant petition must be dismissed outright
as it raises mixed questions of fact and law. The issues pertaining to the
credibility of the witnesses, as well as the circumstances surrounding the
crime, are matters that involve a review of the evidence.

Moreover, the OSG avers that the only question of law raised was
whether or not the testimony of Dr. Paradela should be barred as hearsay
evidence. The OSG explains that Dr. Paradela was introduced as an expert
witness, whose testimony constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule. The
OSG further points out that Quijano is barred from belatedly questioning Dr.
Paradela's testimony, considering that he stipulated on the doctor's expertise
and even cross-examined him. 30

Ruling of the Court

Upon a scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court finds that
Quijano is guilty of attempted murder.

Parameters of judicial review under

Rule 45 and the exceptions thereto

It must be noted at the outset that issues pertaining to the credibility of

the witnesses and the re-evaluation of the evidence involve factual questions.
As a general rule, factual matters are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari, 31 as it is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence
which has been considered in the proceedings below. 32 Nevertheless, a review
of the factual findings is justified under the following circumstances:

(i) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or

conjectures; (ii) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (iii) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (iv) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (v) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; (vi) when in making its findings[,] the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (vii) when the
findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (viii) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(ix) when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent;' (x) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; [or] (xi) when the Court of Appeals

30
Id. at 146-151.
31
Miro v. Vda. De Erederos, et al., 721 Phil. 772 (2013).
32
Id.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 202151

manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,

which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 33

The fourth exception obtains in the instant case. The trial court and
the CA misapprehended certain facts, which upon re-evaluation, warrant a
different conclusion.

Quijano's attack against Andong

reeks of treachery

Quijano was indicted for frustrated murder qualified by treachery and

evident premeditation. Essentially, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) defines the crime of murder as follows:

Article 248. Murder. -Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxxx

5. With evident premeditation.

xxxx

Significantly, there is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits

any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which
tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 34 For treachery
to be appreciated, the following requisites must be proven: (i) the employment
of means, method, or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of
the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (ii)
the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender. 35

A scrutiny of the records reveals that Quijano attacked Andong in an

unexpected and rapid manner. Quijano banged the door of Andong's home

33
De Leon v. Maun/ad Trans Inc., et al., 805 Phil. 531 (2017)
34
People v. Bugarin, 807 Phil. 588, 598-599 (2017).
35
Id. at 600.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 202151

and shouted the latter's name. This sudden intrusion occurred at the dead of
night, while Andong and his family were asleep. In fact, Quijano swiftly shot
Andong immediately after the latter rose from the bed. The onslaught was so
sudden and swift that Andong had no chance to mount a defense. He had no
inkling that an attack was forthcoming and was completely unaware of the
imminent peril. In turn, the deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly
diminished the risk to Quijano that may be caused by Andong's retaliation.

Furthermore, Quijano deliberately and consciously adopted such

vicious mode of attack. He used a firearm to easily neutralize Andong and
fired from a position of relative safety. Moreover, he had a flashlight to ensure
the success of his attack. Thus, there can be no denying that Quijano's assault
reeks of treachery. 36

In his defense, Quijano claims that his alleged act of banging on the
door and calling Andong's name sufficiently forewarned the latter of the
onslaught. Likewise, the purported altercation between him and Andong
served as a sufficient warning, thereby negating treachery.

Quijano's arguments fail to persuade.

In a long line of cases, the Court clarified that treachery shall still be
appreciated even if the victim was forewarned of the attack. The decisive
factor is that despite the warning, the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The same holds true
if the prior warning did not diminish the suddenness of the attack. 37

Notably, in People v. Ortiz, Jr., 38 it was stressed that even if the victim
was aware of the threat to his life and of the accused's grudge against him,
treachery still exists because the victim had no inkling that he would actually
be attacked on that fateful night. What is decisive is that the attack was
executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to
retaliate. 39

In the same vein, in People v. Abendan,40 it was held that treachery

exists even if the victim sensed that his life was in danger. After all, the
warning did not diminish the suddenness of the attack, and the victim

36
People v. Las Pinas, et al., 739 Phil. 502, 525 (2014).
37
People v. Pu/go, 813 Phil. 205,217 (2017), citing People v. Pidoy, 453 Phil. 221,230 (2003); People v.
Malara, 406 Phil. 462 (2001), People v. Gutierrez, 429 Phil. 124, 137 (2002), citing People v. Ariza/a,
375 Phil. 666,680 (1999), People v Ortiz, Jr., 638 Phil. 521,526 (2010).
38 Id.
39
Id. at 526.
40
395 Phil. 619 (2000).
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 202151

remained helpless and was deprived of the slightest opportunity to defend

himself 41

Moreover, in People v. PFC Malejana, 42 treachery was appreciated

even if the accused fired a warning shot prior to attacking the victim. The
Court explained that the "the swift unfolding of events placed the victim in a
position where he could not effectively defend himself from the assault on his
person." Likewise, the Court declared that the interval of time between the
alleged warning and the subsequent fatal shots was not sufficient to put the
victim on guard. 43

Interestingly, in People v. Juanito Aquino,44 the fact that the accused

previously knocked on the door before attacking the victim did not negate
treachery because the assailant still suddenly fired successive shots at the
victim. 45

As applied to the case at bar, even assuming that Andong was

forewarned of the attack through Quijano's banging and shouting, the former
was still caught off-guard and defenseless. Worse, the events transpired in a
rapid and successive sequence that deprived Andong of any chance to
retaliate, defend himself, or at the very least, escape from the onslaught.

In the same regard, the existing animosity between the parties does not
negate treachery. It has been ruled that treachery is not dispelled by a prior
grudge between the parties if the victim had no inkling that an attack was
forthcoming, 46 or was not in a position to defend himself 47

The prosecution failed to prove

evident premeditation

Although the attack against Andong was fraught with treachery, there
was a dearth of evidence proving evident premeditation

In People v. Rodolfo Grabador, Jr., et al., 48 this Court enumerated the

requisites to establish evident premeditation:

41
Id. at 640.
42
515 Phil. 584 (2006).
43
Id. at 599.
44
People v. Aquino, 348 Phil. 395 (I 998).
45
Id. at 398.
46
People v. Ortiz, Jr., supra note 37 at 526.
47
People v. Sebastian, 428 Phil. 622, 626-627 (2002).
48
G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 202151

Accordingly, in order to establish the existence of evident

premeditation, the following requisites must be proven during the trial: (i)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (ii) an act
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (iii) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act, and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. Evident premeditation cannot be
presumed in the absence of evidence showing when and how the accused
planned, and prepared for the crime, and that a sufficient amount of time
had lapsed between his determination and execution. It bears stressing that
absent any clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences
of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, shall be
deemed insufficient. 49 (Citations omitted)

In the instant case, the prosecution failed to identify the time when
Quijano decided to shoot Andong. Without this crucial data, it is impossible
to conclude that indeed, there was a sufficient period of time that passed
between the former's determination to kill and his actual execution, which
allowed him to meditate and reflect on his plans.

Although Andong claimed that Quijano mauled him a day prior to the
shooting incident, this allegation was not sufficiently proven. The alleged
mauling was not witnessed by any other person. There was no police blotter
or barangay incident report that would support Andong's allegation. In fact,
during the trial, Andong admitted that he cannot produce a barangay incident
°
report. 5 Certainly, these lingering doubts must be resolved in favor of
Quijano.

Quijano is guilty of attempted murder

Quijano's intent to kill Andong is evident from the treacherous manner

of his assault. It is likewise glaring from his choice of weapon, and his conduct
at the time of the attack. In addition, he hitAndong at a vital spot in his body.
Thus, the next matter to be discussed is the proper stage of the execution of
the crime.

Article 6 of the RPC defines the stages in the commission of felonies:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -

Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted,
are punishable.

49
Id.
50
See TSN dated July 22, 2022, pp. 4-5.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 202151

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its

execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission

of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The distinction between a frustrated and attempted felony was

elucidated in People v. Labiaga: 51

(i) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted
felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.

(ii) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the

crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other
hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime
is a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous
desistance. 52

In addition to the main distinctions, it is important to note that in

frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound inflicted
would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. 53

In fact, in Serrano v. People, 54 the Court cautioned that the accused may
not be convicted of frustrated homicide in the absence of clear evidence
establishing that the injury would have been fatal if not medically attended to.
Particularly, the evidence required to confirm the fatal nature of the injury was
the testimony of the physician who issued the victim's medical certificate, to
wit:

The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of

factors: the extent of the injury, the form of the wound, the region of the
body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of
disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and
constitution of the person injured, and the opportunities for administering
proper surgical treatment.

51
714 Phil. 77 (2013).
52
Id. at 87, citing Serrano 1c People, 637Phil.319, 335 (2010).
53
Id., citing People v. Costales, 424 Phil. 321 (2002), citing People v. Dela Cruz, 353 Phil. 362 (1998)
and People v. Zaragosa, 58 O.G. 4519.
54
Supra.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 202151

When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be

fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters
the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack
of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime
committed should be attempted, not frustrated, homicide.

Under these standards, we agree with the CA's conclusion. From

all accounts, although the stab wound could have been fatal since the
victim testified that he saw his intestines showed, no exact evidence
exists to prove the gravity of the wound; hence, we cannot consider the
stab wound as sufficient to cause death. As correctly observed by the CA,
the victim's attending physician did not testify on the gravity of the
wound inflicted on the victim. We consider, too, the CA's observation that
the medical certifications issued by the East Avenue Medical Center merely
stated the location of the wound. There was also no proof that without
timely medical intervention, the victim would have died. This paucity of
proof must necessarily favor the petitioner. 55 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)

Similar to the afore-cited case, the evidence fails to prove with moral
certainty that Andong would have died from the gunshot wound without
timely medical intervention. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to present
Dr. Manubag, the physician who treated Andong and administered the alleged
life-saving procedure. The Medical Certificate alone, without the testimony
of Dr. Manubag is inadequate proof of the nature and extent of Andong's
injury. This lacuna may not be filled with the testimony of the expert witness
Dr. Paradela, who merely testified as follows:

Q - A while ago, you have said that you are a surgeon. Would you kindly
explain to this Honorable court what this medical term mean [sic]?
A- This GSW is gunshot wound and the point of entry is above the clavicle
and then it coursed through. It exited just at the back near the scapular
area of the back. I do not know when [sic] is the layman's term of
scapula but near the shoulder blade and the result of that gun-shot
wound, there was air and blood inside your chest.

Q - In your expert opinion doctor, would you classify this kind of wound?
Would this be fatal or not?
A - This wound is fatal.

Q - Why would this be fatal doctor?

A - Because this kind of wound would kill the patient if no medical
intervention like close tube or a CPT is applied." 56

The foregoing testimony clearly shows that the lone reason given by
Dr. Paradela in concluding that Andong's wound would have been fatal
without timely medical intervention was simply - "because this kind of wound

55
Id. at 336-337.
56
See TSN dated November I 8, 2002, p. 6.
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 202151

would kill the patient if no medical intervention like close tube or CPT is
applied." 57 Such a general and vague statement is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Andong's wound would have been fatal without timely
medical intervention. Likewise, the conclusion that the wound would have
been mortal, was merely based on the fact that Dr. Manubag applied CPT.
Worse, Dr. Paradela did not elaborate what a close tube or CPT is, how this
type of procedure saved Andong's life, or Andong's condition prior to and
during the operation.

Moreover, a scrutiny of Dr. Paradela' s entire testimony fails to reveal

any other statement regarding the fatal nature of Andong's wound. During Dr.
Paradela's direct and re-direct examination, the prosecution merely asked
incidental questions, such as, where he is currently connected, how long he
has been working therein, his relation to Dr. Manubag, the subpoena issued
by the court, the admitting chart, the general description of the wound, the
number of days Andong was treated, his familiarity with the signature of Dr.
Manubag, and whether Dr. Manubag is still connected with the Vicente Sotto
Memorial Hospital. 58 Strangely, the inquiry about the fatal nature of Andong's
wound simply consisted of one question and the lone inadequate answer given
in response thereto. This is unfortunate considering that the character of the
wound was a critical piece of evidence.

While it is true that the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the
qualification of Dr. Paradela, this stipulation does not in any way mean that
the Court must accord probative value and weight to his testimony. The
stipulation solely pertained to the physician's qualification "as an expert
witness being a medical doctor". 59 It did not dispense with the prosecution's
burden to prove the elements of the offense.

Significantly, the Court has a wide latitude in assigning weight to the

opinion of an expert witness. Section 5, Rule 133 of the New Rules on
Evidence states:

Rule 133 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Section 5. Weight to be given opinion of expert witness, how

determined. - In any case where the opinion of an expert witness is received
in evidence, the court has a wide latitude of discretion in determining the
weight to be given such opinion, and for that purpose may consider the
following:

57
Id.
58
Id.at4-7;9-10.
59
Id. at 4.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 202151

(a) Whether the opinion is based upon sufficient facts or data;

(b) Whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods;

(c) Whether the wi1ness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case; and

(d) Such other factors as the court may deem helpful to make such
determination. 60

Dr. Paradela's statement was so curt and wanting in essential details

that he failed to furnish sufficient facts and data relevant to the charge.
Moreover, the fact that the RTC and the CA gave probative value to Dr.
Paradela' s expert opinion does not in any way bind this Court to blindly adopt
the same finding, especially in light of facts warranting a different conclusion.

Furthermore, a juxtaposition of the standards painstakingly enumerated

in Serrano 61 vis-a-vis Dr. Paradela's testimony, patently shows that the latter's
statement that the wound would have been fatal if not for the application of
close tube or CPT, is definitely lacking. There was a dearth in evidence
regarding the extent of the injury, the form of the wound, the blood vessels,
nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing bacteria or other
organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the person injured, and
the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment, 62 which are
crucial factors in ascertaining the fatal nature of the injury.

It further bears stressing that in Serrano; 63 Epifania v. People; 64 People

v. Lacaden; 65 Etino v. People; 66 and Gemenez v. People, 67 the Court stressed
that without the testimony of the attending physician as to the fatal nature of
the victim's wounds, an accused may not be convicted of frustrated homicide
or murder.

As stringently held in Lacaden: 68

With respect to the crime committed against Jay, accused-

appellant is charged with Frustrated Murder. For failure of the
prosecution to present the testimony of the doctor who treated him to
testify regarding the natnre of the injury sustained by the latter, the

60
NEW RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Section 5.
61
Supra note 52.
62
ld. at 336.
63
Id.
64
552 Phil. 620 (2007).
65
620 Phil. 807 (2009).
66
826 Phil. 32 (2018).
67
G.R. No. 241518, March 4, 2020
68
Supra.
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 202151

Court cannot determine whether the injury would have produced death
if not for the timely medical attention. However, accused-appellant is
responsible for committing Attempted Murder. 69

Similarly, in Etino, 70 the Court warned that the medical certificate alone
is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of the injury. Accordingly, any
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused:

It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that

the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the
wound is doubtful," and such doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence

to prove that the victim would have died from his wound without timely
medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate alone, absent the
testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any
physician for that matter, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent
of his injury. This is especially true, given that said Medical Certificate
merely stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital, the location
of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing.

Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the
victim sustained enters the realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily
resolve in favor ofpetitioner. 71 (Citations omitted)

Interestingly, in Etino 72 the Court intimated that the testimony of any

physician might suffice, unfortunately in this case, Dr. Paradela's inadequate
testimony was insufficient to prove the fatal nature of the injury.

Remarkably, in Gemenez, 73 the accused was convicted of attempted

homicide due to the absence of the testimony of the attending physician on
the nature and extent of the victim's injury. Quite similar to the instant case,
in Gemenez,74 the medical certificate was considered insufficient because the
physician who treated the victim's fatal wounds did not testify in court.
Rather, the physician who testified was the one who treated the victim's non-
fatal wounds. Interestingly, the latter physician's testimony was deemed
inadequate:

While the Medico-Legal Certificate - which shows the extent of

Jerry's injuries - was correctly admitted into evidence as it was
authenticated by Dr. Angelo Leano (Dr. Leano ), the same was not sufficient

69
Id. at 826.
70
Supra.
71
Id. at 43.
72
Id.
73
Supra note 67.
74
Id.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 202151

to establish that Jerry would have died from the injuries he sustained if not
for the timely medical assistance.

According to the prosecution, two doctors attended to Jerry, namely

Dr. Leano and Dr. Vienna Encila (Dr. Encila). Dr. Encila was the surgeon
who attended to the gunshot wounds in the chest and arm that Jerry
sustained, while Dr. Leano worked on the injury to Jerry's thumb only. So
while Dr. Leano was qualified to authenticate the Medico-Legal Certificate
as he actually attended to Jerry, his personal knowledge, and consequently
his testimony was, however, limited only the extent of the injuries to Jerry's
thumb.

xxxx

Because Dr. Encila did not testify, there is nothing in the records
therefore that explains the full extent of Jerry's injuries. The Medico-
Legal Certificate only states that:

In the opinion of the doctor who attended to the patient, under

normal conditions without subsequent complications and/or deeper
involvement that may be present but not clinically apparent at the time of
examination, the said physical injury/injuries will require medical
attendance for a period of A and B - more than thirty (30) days.

xxxx

At this juncture, the Court deems it fit to emphasize that the

prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each
element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own
evidence. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.

As there is doubt as to the existence of the second element of

Frustrated Homicide - that the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but
did not die because of timely medical assistance - Gemenez's conviction
must thus be modified to Attempted Homicide. 75 (Emphasis supplied)

Similar to Gemenez, 76 the prosecution, through Dr. Paradela's

testimony, failed to prove that Andong indeed sustained fatal or mortal
wounds and did not die because of timely medical assistance. It was further
underscored therein that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own
evidence. 77 Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused. 78 Accordingly,
Quijano may not be convicted of frustrated murder in the absence of credible
proofthatAndong suffered a fatal wound but was saved due to timely medical
assistance.

75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id., citing Moster v. People, 569 Phil. 616, 628 (2008).
78
Id., id.
 Decision 17 G.R. No. 202151

Quijano was positively identified as

the malefactor. His defenses ofdenial
and alibi are weak and self-serving

In a bleak attempt to overturn his conviction, Quijano attacks the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as incredible and riddled with
inconsistencies.

Contrary to Quijano's allegation, the trial court and the CA regarded

the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as truthful. It is settled that the
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Indeed,
these factors are crucial in evaluating their sincerity and in unearthing the
truth. Hence, the trial court's assessment will not be disturbed on appeal unless
some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked or misinterpreted. 79
This exception does not obtain in the instant case.

Besides, the purported inconsistencies pertain to collateral and trivial

matters that the witnesses adequately clarified during the trial. In addition,
they were subjected to a grueling cross-examination which they sufficiently
and convincingly passed. More importantly, they consistently testified on the
occurrence of the crime, and the identity of Quijano as the perpetrator.

In this regard, Quijano's defenses of denial and alibi falter against the
witnesses' positive identification of him as the perpetrator. It bears stressing
that it was not physically impossible for Quijano to have been at the scene of
tlie crime. By his own admission, his house is only witliin walking distance to
Andong's home.

Penalty and pecuniary liability for

attempted murder

Article 51 of the RPC states that "[a] penalty lower by two degrees than
that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principals in an attempt to commit a felony." 80 Relatedly, Article 248 of tlie
RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, prescribes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Thus, the penalty for
attempted murder is prision mayor, which is two (2) degrees lower from
reclusion perpetua to death for consummated murder. 81

79
People v. Macaspac, 806 Phil. 285,290 (2017).
80
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 51.
81
People v. Bugarin, supra note 34 at 601-602.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 202151

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence

shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending
circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the RPC. 82 Accordingly, Quijano shall be
sentenced to six (6) years ofprision correccional maximum as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum.

In addition, Quijano shall be liable to pay Andong (i) P25,000.00 as

civil indemnity; (ii) P25,000.00 as moral damages; and (iii) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The amounts shall earn a legal interest of six percent
( 6%) per annum from the finality of the Court's ruling until full satisfaction. 83

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 27, 2010 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 00494 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

Petitioner Beethoven Quijano is hereby declared GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of attempted murder and is ORDERED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years ofprision correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as maximum.

He is further ORDERED to pay the victim Atilano Andong (i)

r'25,000.00 as civil indemnity; (ii) P25,000.00 as moral damages; and (iii)
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEist~
Associate Justice

82
Fantastico, et al. v. Malicse, Sr., et al., 750 Phil. 120, 139-140 (2015).
83 People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
Decision 19 G.R. No. 202151

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO
Chief

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.