Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17

DEMOSTHENES, SPEECHES 117
Trevett-final.indb i 10/5/11 11:02:47 AM

THE OR ATORY OF CL ASSICA L GR EECE
Translated with Notes ◆ Michael Gagarin, Series Editor
volume 14
Trevett-final.indb ii 10/5/11 11:02:48 AM

DE MOS T H E N E S ,
SPE E C H E S 1 17
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
Translated with introduction and notes by

Jeremy Trevett
university of tex as press, austin
Trevett-final.indb iii 10/5/11 11:02:49 AM

This book has been supported by an endowment dedicated
to classics and the ancient world and funded by the Areté
Foundation; the Gladys Krieble Delmas Foundation; the
Dougherty Foundation; the James R. Dougherty, Jr. Foundation;
the Rachael and Ben Vaughan Foundation; and the National
Endowment for the Humanities.
Copyright © 2011 by the University of Texas Press

All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First edition, 2011
Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be

sent to:
Permissions
University of Texas Press
P.O. Box 7819
Austin, TX 78713-7819
www.utexas.edu/utpress/about/bpermission.html
○
∞ The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of
ansi/niso z39.48-1992 (r1997) (Permanence of Paper).
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Demosthenes.
[Selections. English. 2011]
Demosthenes, speeches 1–17 / translated with introduction and notes
by Jeremy Trevett. — 1st ed.
p. cm. — (The oratory of classical Greece ; v. 14) Includes
bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-292-72677-2 (cloth : alk. paper) —
isbn 978-0-292-72909-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) —
isbn 978-0-292-73550-7 (e-book)
1. Demosthenes—Translations into English. 2. Speeches,
addresses, etc., Greek—Translations into English. 3. Athens
(Greece)—Politics and government—Early works to 1800.
I. Trevett, Jeremy. II. Title. III. Title: Speeches 1–17.
pa3951.e5 2011b
885′.01—dc23
2011022824
Trevett-final.indb iv 10/5/11 11:02:49 AM

For Karin, Oliver, and Alice
Trevett-final.indb v 10/5/11 11:02:50 AM

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
CONTENTS
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
Series Editor’s Preface (Michael Gagarin) ix

Translator’s Preface (Jeremy Trevett) xi
Series Introduction (Michael Gagarin) xiii
Oratory in Classical Athens xiii
The Orators xvi
The Works of the Orators xix
Government and Law in Classical Athens xxii
The Translation of Greek Oratory xxix
Abbreviations xxx
Note on Currency xxx
Bibliography of Works Cited xxxi
Introduction to Demosthenes (Michael Gagarin) 1
Life 1
Works 3
Style 4
Significance 5
Introduction to This Volume (Jeremy Trevett) 6
Political Life in Fourth-Century Athens 6
Athens in the Middle of the Fourth Century 8
Philip of Macedon 10
Demosthenes’ Policies 13
Composition, Delivery, and Publication 18
Ancient Commentators on Demosthenes 22
List of Works in This Volume 24
Chronology 25
Trevett-final.indb vii 10/5/11 11:02:51 AM

viii demosthenes, speeches 1–17
DEMOSTHENES (Jeremy Trevett)

1. First Olynthiac 27
2. Second Olynthiac 41
3. Third Olynthiac 53
4. First Philippic 68
5. On the Peace 88
6. Second Philippic 100
7. On Halonnesus 113
8. On the Chersonese 129
9. Third Philippic 152
10. Fourth Philippic 177
11. Response to the Letter of Philip 201
12. Letter of Philip 211
13. On Organization 224
14. On the Symmories 240
15. On the Freedom of the Rhodians 257
16. For the Megalopolitans 274
17. On the Agreement with Alexander 286
Bibliography for This Volume 301
Index 309
Trevett-final.indb viii 10/5/11 11:02:51 AM

SER IES EDITOR’S PR EFACE
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
This is the fourteenth volume in a series of translations of The Or-

atory of Classical Greece. The aim of the series is to make available
primarily for those who do not read Greek up-to-date, accurate,
and readable translations with introductions and explanatory
notes of all the surviving works and major fragments of the At-
tic orators of the classical period (ca. 420–320 bc): Aeschines, An-
docides, Antiphon, Demosthenes, Dinarchus, Hyperides, Isaeus,
Isocrates, Lycurgus, and Lysias. This volume contains sixteen
speeches, two of them almost certainly not by Demosthenes, that
were purportedly written for delivery in the assembly, together
with a letter from Philip of Macedon that is traditionally included
among the speeches of Demosthenes. They include the highly po-
lemical Olynthiacs and Philippics and other speeches that pro-
vide considerable information about Athenian politics and public
finance in the middle of the fourth century.
This volume, like the others in the series, has benefited greatly
from the careful attention of many at the University of Texas Press,
including Director Joanna Hitchcock, Humanities Editor Jim
Burr, manuscript editor Lynne Chapman, and copy editor Nancy
Moore. As always, they have been a pleasure to work with.
—m.g.
Trevett-final.indb ix 10/5/11 11:02:52 AM

TR A NSL ATOR’S PR EFACE
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
I should like to thank Alan Boegehold, who read the manuscript

for the Press and made a number of helpful suggestions; Jim Burr
and Lynne Chapman of the University of Texas Press, and Nancy
Moore, my copy editor, for their extremely professional editorial
guidance; and Brian Turner of the Ancient World Mapping Cen-
ter at UNC Chapel Hill for creating the maps. Above all, I owe a
deep debt of gratitude to Michael Gagarin, first for his invitation
to contribute to this series, then for his patient encouragement in
the face of my slow progress, and above all for the numerous im-
provements that he has made to the book. Needless to say, all re-
maining errors are my own.
—j.t.
Trevett-final.indb xi 10/5/11 11:02:53 AM

Greece. Map © 2011, Ancient World Mapping Center (www.unc.edu/
awmc). Used by permission.
Attica and surrounding region. Map © 2011, Ancient World Mapping

Center (www.unc.edu/awmc). Used by permission.
Trevett-final.indb xii 10/5/11 11:02:53 AM

SER IES INTRODUC TION
Greek Oratory
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
By Michael Gagarin
or atory in cl assical athens

From as early as Homer (and undoubtedly much earlier) the
Greeks placed a high value on effective speaking. Even Achilles,
whose greatness was primarily established on the battlefield, was
brought up to be “a speaker of words and a doer of deeds” (Il-
iad 9.443); and Athenian leaders of the sixth and fifth centuries,¹
such as Solon, Themistocles, and Pericles, were all accomplished
orators. Most Greek literary genres—notably epic, tragedy, and
history—underscore the importance of oratory by their inclusion
of set speeches. The formal pleadings of the envoys to Achilles in
the Iliad, the messenger speeches in tragedy reporting events like
the battle of Salamis in Aeschylus’ Persians or the gruesome death
of Pentheus in Euripides’ Bacchae, and the powerful political or-
atory of Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides are but a few of
the most notable examples of the Greeks’ never-ending fascina-
tion with formal public speaking, which was to reach its height in
the public oratory of the fourth century.
In early times, oratory was not a specialized subject of study
but was learned by practice and example. The formal study of
rhetoric as an “art” (technē) began, we are told, in the middle of
the fifth century in Sicily with the work of Corax and his pu-
pil Tisias.² These two are scarcely more than names to us, but
¹ All dates in this volume are bc unless the contrary is either indicated
or obvious.
² See Kennedy 1963: 26–51. Cole 1991 has challenged this traditional pic-
ture, arguing that the term “rhetoric” was coined by Plato to designate and
denigrate an activity he strongly opposed. Cole’s own reconstruction is not
Trevett-final.indb xiii 10/5/11 11:02:54 AM

xiv demosthenes, speeches 1–17
another famous Sicilian, Gorgias of Leontini (ca. 490–390), de-

veloped a new style of argument and is reported to have dazzled
the Athenians with a speech delivered when he visited Athens in
427. Gorgias initiated the practice, which continued into the early
fourth century, of composing speeches for mythical or imaginary
occasions. The surviving examples reveal a lively intellectual cli-
mate in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, in which ora-
tory served to display new ideas, new forms of expression, and
new methods of argument.³ This tradition of “intellectual” ora-
tory was continued by the fourth-century educator Isocrates and
played a large role in later Greek and Roman education.
In addition to this intellectual oratory, at about the same time
the practice also began of writing speeches for real occasions in
public life, which we may designate “practical” oratory. For cen-
turies Athenians had been delivering speeches in public settings
(primarily the courts and the Assembly), but these had always
been composed and delivered impromptu, without being written
down and thus without being preserved. The practice of writing
speeches began in the courts and then expanded to include the
Assembly and other settings. Athens was one of the leading cities
of Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries, and its political and
legal systems depended on direct participation by a large number
of citizens; all important decisions were made by these large bod-
ies, and the primary means of influencing these decisions was ora-
tory.⁴ Thus, it is not surprising that oratory flourished in Athens,⁵
but it may not be immediately obvious why it should be writ-
ten down.
without problems, but he does well to remind us how thoroughly the tradi-
tional view of rhetoric depends on one of its most ardent opponents.
³ Of these only Antiphon’s Tetralogies are included in this series. Gor-
gias’ Helen and Palamedes, Alcidamas’ Odysseus, and Antisthenes’ Ajax and
Odysseus are translated in Gagarin and Woodruff 1995.
⁴ Yunis 1996 has a good treatment of political oratory from Pericles to
Demosthenes.
⁵ All our evidence for practical oratory comes from Athens, with the ex-
ception of Isocrates 19, written for a trial in Aegina. Many speeches were
undoubtedly delivered in courts and political forums in other Greek cities,
but it may be that such speeches were written down only in Athens.
Trevett-final.indb xiv 10/5/11 11:02:55 AM

series introduction xv
The pivotal figure in this development was Antiphon, one of

the fifth-century intellectuals who are often grouped together un-
der the name “Sophists.”⁶ Like some of the other sophists he con-
tributed to the intellectual oratory of the period, but he also had
a strong practical interest in law. At the same time, Antiphon had
an aversion to public speaking and did not directly involve him-
self in legal or political affairs (Thucydides 8.68). However, he be-
gan giving general advice to other citizens who were engaged in
litigation and were thus expected to address the court themselves.
As this practice grew, Antiphon went further, and around 430 he
began writing out whole speeches for others to memorize and de-
liver. Thus began the practice of “logography,” which continued
through the next century and beyond.⁷ Logography particularly
appealed to men like Lysias, who were metics, or noncitizen resi-
dents of Athens. Since they were not Athenian citizens, they were
barred from direct participation in public life, but they could con-
tribute by writing speeches for others.
Antiphon was also the first (to our knowledge) to write down
a speech he would himself deliver, writing the speech for his own
defense at his trial for treason in 411. His motive was probably to
publicize and preserve his views, and others continued this prac-
tice of writing down speeches they would themselves deliver in
the courts and (more rarely) the Assembly.⁸ Finally, one other
type of practical oratory was the special tribute delivered on cer-
tain important public occasions, the best known of which is the
funeral oration. It is convenient to designate these three types of
⁶ The term “sophist” was loosely used through the fifth and fourth cen-
turies to designate various intellectuals and orators, but under the influ-
ence of Plato, who attacked certain figures under this name, the term is now
used of a specific group of thinkers; see Kerferd 1981.
⁷ For Antiphon as the first to write speeches, see Photius, Bibliotheca
486a7–11 and [Plut.], Moralia 832c– d. The latest extant speech can be dated
to 320, but we know that at least one orator, Dinarchus, continued the prac-
tice after that date.
⁸ Unlike forensic speeches, speeches for delivery in the Assembly were
usually not composed beforehand in writing, since the speaker could not
know exactly when or in what context he would be speaking; see further
Trevett 1996.
Trevett-final.indb xv 10/5/11 11:02:56 AM

xvi demosthenes, speeches 1–17
oratory by the terms Aristotle later uses: forensic (for the courts),
deliberative (for the Assembly), and epideictic (for display).⁹
the or ators
In the century from about 420 to 320, dozens—perhaps even
hundreds—of now unknown orators and logographers must have
composed speeches that are now lost, but only ten of these men
were selected for preservation and study by ancient scholars, and
only works collected under the names of these ten have been pre-
served. Some of these works are undoubtedly spurious, though
in most cases they are fourth-century works by a different author
rather than later “forgeries.” Indeed, modern scholars suspect that
as many as seven of the speeches attributed to Demosthenes may
have been written by Apollodorus, son of Pasion, who is some-
times called “the eleventh orator.”¹⁰ Including these speeches
among the works of Demosthenes may have been an honest mis-
take, or perhaps a bookseller felt he could sell more copies of these
speeches if they were attributed to a more famous orator.
In alphabetical order the Ten Orators are as follows:¹¹
◆ aeschines (ca. 390– ca. 322) rose from obscure origins to be-
come an important Athenian political figure, first an ally, then
a bitter enemy of Demosthenes. His three speeches all concern
major public issues. The best known of these (Aes. 3) was deliv-
ered at the trial in 330, when Demosthenes responded with On
the Crown (Dem. 18). Aeschines lost the case and was forced to
leave Athens and live the rest of his life in exile.
⁹ Rhetoric 1.3. Intellectual orations, like Gorgias’ Helen, do not easily fit

into Aristotle’s classification. For a fuller (but still brief) introduction to At-
tic oratory and the orators, see Edwards 1994.
¹⁰ See Trevett 1992.
¹¹ The Loeb volumes of Minor Attic Orators also include the prominent
Athenian political figure Demades (ca. 385–319), who was not one of the
Ten; but the only speech that has come down to us under his name is a later
forgery. It is possible that Demades and other fourth-century politicians
who had a high reputation for public speaking did not put any speeches in
writing, especially if they rarely spoke in the courts (see above n. 8).
Trevett-final.indb xvi 10/5/11 11:02:56 AM

xvi demosthenes, speeches 1–17
oratory by the terms Aristotle later uses: forensic (for the courts),
deliberative (for the Assembly), and epideictic (for display).⁹
the or ators
In the century from about 420 to 320, dozens—perhaps even
hundreds—of now unknown orators and logographers must have
composed speeches that are now lost, but only ten of these men
were selected for preservation and study by ancient scholars, and
only works collected under the names of these ten have been pre-
served. Some of these works are undoubtedly spurious, though
in most cases they are fourth-century works by a different author
rather than later “forgeries.” Indeed, modern scholars suspect that
as many as seven of the speeches attributed to Demosthenes may
have been written by Apollodorus, son of Pasion, who is some-
times called “the eleventh orator.”¹⁰ Including these speeches
among the works of Demosthenes may have been an honest mis-
take, or perhaps a bookseller felt he could sell more copies of these
speeches if they were attributed to a more famous orator.
In alphabetical order the Ten Orators are as follows:¹¹
◆ aeschines (ca. 390– ca. 322) rose from obscure origins to be-
come an important Athenian political figure, first an ally, then
a bitter enemy of Demosthenes. His three speeches all concern
major public issues. The best known of these (Aes. 3) was deliv-
ered at the trial in 330, when Demosthenes responded with On
the Crown (Dem. 18). Aeschines lost the case and was forced to
leave Athens and live the rest of his life in exile.
⁹ Rhetoric 1.3. Intellectual orations, like Gorgias’ Helen, do not easily fit

into Aristotle’s classification. For a fuller (but still brief) introduction to At-
tic oratory and the orators, see Edwards 1994.
¹⁰ See Trevett 1992.
¹¹ The Loeb volumes of Minor Attic Orators also include the prominent
Athenian political figure Demades (ca. 385–319), who was not one of the
Ten; but the only speech that has come down to us under his name is a later
forgery. It is possible that Demades and other fourth-century politicians
who had a high reputation for public speaking did not put any speeches in
writing, especially if they rarely spoke in the courts (see above n. 8).
Trevett-final.indb xvi 10/5/11 11:02:56 AM

series introduction xvii
◆ andocides (ca. 440– ca. 390) is best known for his role in the
scandal of 415, when just before the departure of the fateful
Athenian expedition to Sicily during the Peloponnesian War
(431–404), a band of young men mutilated statues of Hermes,
and at the same time information was revealed about the se-
cret rites of Demeter. Andocides was exiled but later returned.
Two of the four speeches in his name give us a contemporary
view of the scandal: one pleads for his return, the other argues
against a second period of exile.
◆ antiphon (ca. 480–411), as already noted, wrote forensic
speeches for others and only once spoke himself. In 411 he par-
ticipated in an oligarchic coup by a group of 400, and when
the democrats regained power he was tried for treason and ex-
ecuted. His six surviving speeches include three for delivery in
court and the three Tetralogies—imaginary intellectual exer-
cises for display or teaching that consist of four speeches each,
two on each side. All six of Antiphon’s speeches concern homi-
cide, probably because these stood at the beginning of the col-
lection of his works. Fragments of some thirty other speeches
cover many different topics.
◆ demosthenes (384–322) is generally considered the best of the
Attic orators. Although his nationalistic message is less highly
regarded today, his powerful mastery of and ability to combine
many different rhetorical styles continue to impress readers.
Demosthenes was still a child when his wealthy father died.
The trustees of the estate apparently misappropriated much of
it, and when he came of age, he sued them in a series of cases
(27–31), regaining some of his fortune and making a name as
a powerful speaker. He then wrote speeches for others in a va-
riety of cases, public and private, and for his own use in court
(where many cases involved major public issues), and in the
Assembly, where he opposed the growing power of Philip of
Macedon. The triumph of Philip and his son Alexander the
Great eventually put an end to Demosthenes’ career. Some
sixty speeches have come down under his name, about a third
of them of questionable authenticity.
◆ dinarchus (ca. 360– ca. 290) was born in Corinth but spent
much of his life in Athens as a metic (a noncitizen resident).
Trevett-final.indb xvii 10/5/11 11:02:57 AM

xviii demosthenes, speeches 1–17
His public fame came primarily from writing speeches for the
prosecutions surrounding the Harpalus affair in 324, when
several prominent figures (including Demosthenes) were ac-
cused of bribery. After 322 he had a profitable career as a
logographer.
◆ hyperides (389/8–322) was a political leader and logographer
of so many different talents that he was called the pentath-
lete of orators. He was a leader of the Athenian resistance to
Philip and Alexander and (like Demosthenes) was condemned
to death after Athens’ final surrender. One speech and sub-
stantial fragments of five others have been recovered from pa-
pyrus remains; otherwise, only fragments survive.
◆ isaeus (ca. 415– ca. 340) wrote speeches on a wide range of top-
ics, but the eleven complete speeches that survive, dating from
ca. 390 to ca. 344, all concern inheritance. As with Antiphon,
the survival of these particular speeches may have been the re-
sult of the later ordering of his speeches by subject; we have
part of a twelfth speech and fragments and titles of some forty
other works. Isaeus is said to have been a pupil of Isocrates and
the teacher of Demosthenes.
◆ isocrates (436–338) considered himself a philosopher and ed-
ucator, not an orator or rhetorician. He came from a wealthy
Athenian family but lost most of his property in the Pelopon-
nesian War, and in 403 he took up logography. About 390 he
abandoned this practice and turned to writing and teaching,
setting forth his educational, philosophical, and political views
in essays that took the form of speeches but were not meant
for oral delivery. He favored accommodation with the growing
power of Philip of Macedon and panhellenic unity. His school
was based on a broad concept of rhetoric and applied philoso-
phy; it attracted pupils from the entire Greek world (including
Isaeus, Lycurgus, and Hyperides) and became the main rival
of Plato’s Academy. Isocrates greatly influenced education and
rhetoric in the Hellenistic, Roman, and modern periods until
the eighteenth century.
◆ lycurgus (ca. 390– ca. 324) was a leading public official who
restored the financial condition of Athens after 338 and played
Trevett-final.indb xviii 10/5/11 11:02:57 AM

series introduction xix
a large role in the city for the next dozen years. He brought
charges of corruption or treason against many other officials,
usually with success. Only one speech survives.
◆ lysias (ca. 445– ca. 380) was a metic—an official resident of
Athens but not a citizen. Much of his property was seized by
the Thirty during their short-lived oligarchic coup in 404–403.
Perhaps as a result he turned to logography. More than thirty
speeches survive in whole or in part, though the authenticity
of some is doubted. We also have fragments or know the ti-
tles of more than a hundred others. The speeches cover a wide
range of cases, and he may have delivered one himself (Lys. 12),
on the death of his brother at the hands of the Thirty. Lysias
is particularly known for his vivid narratives, his ēthopoiïa, or
“creation of character,” and his prose style, which became a
model of clarity and vividness.
the wor ks of the or ators

As soon as speeches began to be written down, they could be
preserved. We know little about the conditions of book “publica-
tion” (i.e., making copies for distribution) in the fourth century,
but there was an active market for books in Athens, and some of
the speeches may have achieved wide circulation.¹² An orator (or
his family) may have preserved his own speeches, perhaps to ad-
vertise his ability or demonstrate his success, or booksellers may
have collected and copied them in order to make money.
We do not know how closely the preserved text of these
speeches corresponded to the version actually delivered in court
or in the Assembly. Speakers undoubtedly extemporized or varied
from their text on occasion, but there is no good evidence that de-
liberative speeches were substantially revised for publication.¹³ In
forensic oratory a logographer’s reputation would derive first and
¹² Dover’s discussion (1968) of the preservation and transmission of the

works of Lysias (and perhaps others under his name) is useful not just for
Lysias but for the other orators too. His theory of shared authorship be-
tween logographer and litigant, however, is unconvincing (see Usher 1976).
¹³ See further Trevett 1996: 437–439.
Trevett-final.indb xix 10/5/11 11:02:58 AM

series introduction xix
a large role in the city for the next dozen years. He brought
charges of corruption or treason against many other officials,
usually with success. Only one speech survives.
◆ lysias (ca. 445– ca. 380) was a metic—an official resident of
Athens but not a citizen. Much of his property was seized by
the Thirty during their short-lived oligarchic coup in 404–403.
Perhaps as a result he turned to logography. More than thirty
speeches survive in whole or in part, though the authenticity
of some is doubted. We also have fragments or know the ti-
tles of more than a hundred others. The speeches cover a wide
range of cases, and he may have delivered one himself (Lys. 12),
on the death of his brother at the hands of the Thirty. Lysias
is particularly known for his vivid narratives, his ēthopoiïa, or
“creation of character,” and his prose style, which became a
model of clarity and vividness.
the wor ks of the or ators

As soon as speeches began to be written down, they could be
preserved. We know little about the conditions of book “publica-
tion” (i.e., making copies for distribution) in the fourth century,
but there was an active market for books in Athens, and some of
the speeches may have achieved wide circulation.¹² An orator (or
his family) may have preserved his own speeches, perhaps to ad-
vertise his ability or demonstrate his success, or booksellers may
have collected and copied them in order to make money.
We do not know how closely the preserved text of these
speeches corresponded to the version actually delivered in court
or in the Assembly. Speakers undoubtedly extemporized or varied
from their text on occasion, but there is no good evidence that de-
liberative speeches were substantially revised for publication.¹³ In
forensic oratory a logographer’s reputation would derive first and
¹² Dover’s discussion (1968) of the preservation and transmission of the

works of Lysias (and perhaps others under his name) is useful not just for
Lysias but for the other orators too. His theory of shared authorship be-
tween logographer and litigant, however, is unconvincing (see Usher 1976).
¹³ See further Trevett 1996: 437–439.
Trevett-final.indb xix 10/5/11 11:02:58 AM

xx demosthenes, speeches 1–17
foremost from his success with jurors. If a forensic speech was vic-
torious, there would be no reason to alter it for publication, and
if it lost, alteration would probably not deceive potential clients.
Thus, the published texts of forensic speeches were probably quite
faithful to the texts that were provided to clients, and we have lit-
tle reason to suspect substantial alteration in the century or so be-
fore they were collected by scholars in Alexandria (see below).
In addition to the speaker’s text, most forensic speeches have
breaks for the inclusion of documents. The logographer inserted
a notation in his text—such as nomos (“law”) or martyria (“testi-
mony”)—and the speaker would pause while the clerk read out
the text of a law or the testimony of witnesses. Many speeches
survive with only a notation that a nomos or martyria was read
at that point, but in some cases the text of the document is in-
cluded. It used to be thought that these documents were all cre-
ations of later scholars, but many (though not all) are now ac-
cepted as genuine.¹⁴
With the foundation of the famous library in Alexandria early
in the third century, scholars began to collect and catalogue texts
of the orators, along with many other classical authors. Only the
best orators were preserved in the library, many of them repre-
sented by over 100 speeches each (some undoubtedly spurious).
Only some of these works survived in manuscript form to the
modern era; more recently a few others have been discovered on
ancient sheets of papyrus, so that today the corpus of Attic Ora-
tory consists of about 150 speeches, together with a few letters and
other works. The subject matter ranges from important public is-
sues and serious crimes to business affairs, lovers’ quarrels, inheri-
tance disputes, and other personal or family matters.
In the centuries after these works were collected, ancient
scholars gathered biographical facts about their authors, pro-
duced grammatical and lexicographic notes, and used some of the
speeches as evidence for Athenian political history. But the an-
cient scholars who were most interested in the orators were those
who studied prose style, the most notable of these being Diony-
¹⁴ See MacDowell 1990: 43–47; Todd 1993: 44–45.
Trevett-final.indb xx 10/5/11 11:02:58 AM

series introduction xxi
sius of Halicarnassus (first century bc), who wrote treatises on

several of the orators,¹⁵ and Hermogenes of Tarsus (second cen-
tury ad), who wrote several literary studies, including On Types of
Style.¹⁶ But relative to epic or tragedy, oratory was little studied;
and even scholars of rhetoric whose interests were broader than
style, like Cicero and Quintilian, paid little attention to the ora-
tors, except for the acknowledged master, Demosthenes.
Most modern scholars until the second half of the twentieth
century continued to treat the orators primarily as prose stylists.¹⁷
The reevaluation of Athenian democracy by George Grote and
others in the nineteenth century stimulated renewed interest in
Greek oratory among historians; and increasing interest in Athe-
nian law during that century led a few legal scholars to read the
orators. But in comparison with the interest shown in the other
literary genres—epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, and even history—
Attic oratory has been relatively neglected until the last third of
the twentieth century. More recently, however, scholars have dis-
covered the value of the orators for the broader study of Athe-
nian culture and society. Since Dover’s ground-breaking works
on popular morality and homosexuality,¹⁸ interest in the orators
has been increasing rapidly, and they are now seen as primary
representatives of Athenian moral and social values, and as evi-
dence for social and economic conditions, political and social ide-
¹⁵ Dionysius’ literary studies are collected and translated in Usher

1974–1985.
¹⁶ Wooten 1987. Stylistic considerations probably also influenced the se-
lection of the “canon” of ten orators; see Worthington 1994.
¹⁷ For example, the most popular and influential book ever written on
the orators, Jebb’s The Attic Orators (1875), was presented as an “attempt
to aid in giving Attic Oratory its due place in the history of Attic Prose”
(I.xiii). This modern focus on prose style can plausibly be connected to the
large role played by prose composition (the translation of English prose into
Greek, usually in imitation of specific authors or styles) in the Classics cur-
riculum, especially in Britain.
¹⁸ Dover (1974, 1978). Dover recently commented (1994: 157), “When I
began to mine the riches of Attic forensic oratory I was astonished to dis-
cover that the mine had never been exploited.”
Trevett-final.indb xxi 10/5/11 11:02:59 AM

xxii demosthenes, speeches 1–17
ology, and in general those aspects of Athenian culture that in the

past were commonly ignored by historians of ancient Greece but
are of increasing interest and importance today, including women
and the family, slavery, and the economy.
gover nment and l aw in cl assical athens

The hallmark of the Athenian political and legal systems was
its amateurism. Most public officials, including those who super-
vised the courts, were selected by lot and held office for a lim-
ited period, typically a year. Thus a great many citizens held pub-
lic office at some point in their lives, but almost none served for
an extended period of time or developed the experience or ex-
pertise that would make them professionals. All significant pol-
icy decisions were debated and voted on in the Assembly, where
the quorum was 6,000 citizens, and all significant legal cases were
judged by bodies of 200 to 500 jurors or more. Public prominence
was not achieved by election (or selection) to public office but de-
pended rather on a man’s ability to sway the majority of citizens
in the Assembly or jurors in court to vote in favor of a proposed
course of action or for one of the litigants in a trial. Success was
never permanent, and a victory on one policy issue or a verdict in
one case could be quickly reversed in another.¹⁹ In such a system
the value of public oratory is obvious, and in the fourth century,
oratory became the most important cultural institution in Ath-
ens, replacing drama as the forum where major ideological con-
cerns were displayed and debated.
Several recent books give good detailed accounts of Athenian
government and law,²⁰ and so a brief sketch can suffice here. The
¹⁹ In the Assembly this could be accomplished by a reconsideration of

the question, as in the famous Mytilenean debate (Thuc. 3.36–50); in court
a verdict was final, but its practical effects could be thwarted or reversed by
later litigation on a related issue.
²⁰ For government, see Sinclair 1988, Hansen 1991; for law, MacDowell
1978, Todd 1993, and Boegehold 1995 (Bonner 1927 is still helpful). Much
of our information about the legal and political systems comes from a work
attributed to Aristotle but perhaps written by a pupil of his, The Athenian
Trevett-final.indb xxii 10/5/11 11:02:59 AM

xxii demosthenes, speeches 1–17
ology, and in general those aspects of Athenian culture that in the

past were commonly ignored by historians of ancient Greece but
are of increasing interest and importance today, including women
and the family, slavery, and the economy.
gover nment and l aw in cl assical athens

The hallmark of the Athenian political and legal systems was
its amateurism. Most public officials, including those who super-
vised the courts, were selected by lot and held office for a lim-
ited period, typically a year. Thus a great many citizens held pub-
lic office at some point in their lives, but almost none served for
an extended period of time or developed the experience or ex-
pertise that would make them professionals. All significant pol-
icy decisions were debated and voted on in the Assembly, where
the quorum was 6,000 citizens, and all significant legal cases were
judged by bodies of 200 to 500 jurors or more. Public prominence
was not achieved by election (or selection) to public office but de-
pended rather on a man’s ability to sway the majority of citizens
in the Assembly or jurors in court to vote in favor of a proposed
course of action or for one of the litigants in a trial. Success was
never permanent, and a victory on one policy issue or a verdict in
one case could be quickly reversed in another.¹⁹ In such a system
the value of public oratory is obvious, and in the fourth century,
oratory became the most important cultural institution in Ath-
ens, replacing drama as the forum where major ideological con-
cerns were displayed and debated.
Several recent books give good detailed accounts of Athenian
government and law,²⁰ and so a brief sketch can suffice here. The
¹⁹ In the Assembly this could be accomplished by a reconsideration of

the question, as in the famous Mytilenean debate (Thuc. 3.36–50); in court
a verdict was final, but its practical effects could be thwarted or reversed by
later litigation on a related issue.
²⁰ For government, see Sinclair 1988, Hansen 1991; for law, MacDowell
1978, Todd 1993, and Boegehold 1995 (Bonner 1927 is still helpful). Much
of our information about the legal and political systems comes from a work
attributed to Aristotle but perhaps written by a pupil of his, The Athenian
Trevett-final.indb xxii 10/5/11 11:02:59 AM

series introduction xxiii
main policy-making body was the Assembly, open to all adult

male citizens; a small payment for attendance enabled at least
some of the poor to attend along with the leisured rich. In ad-
dition, a Council of 500 citizens, selected each year by lot with
no one allowed to serve more than two years, prepared mate-
rial for and made recommendations to the Assembly; a rotating
subgroup of this Council served as an executive committee, the
Prytaneis. Finally, numerous officials, most of them selected by
lot for one-year terms, supervised different areas of administra-
tion and finance. The most important of these were the nine Ar-
chons (lit. “rulers”): the eponymous Archon after whom the year
was named, the Basileus (“king”),²¹ the Polemarch, and the six
Thesmothetae. Councilors and almost all these officials under-
went a preliminary examination (dokimasia) before taking office,
and officials submitted to a final accounting (euthynai) upon leav-
ing; at these times any citizen who wished could challenge a per-
son’s fitness for his new position or his performance in his recent
position.
There was no general taxation of Athenian citizens. Sources of
public funding included the annual tax levied on metics, various
fees and import duties, and (in the fifth century) tribute from al-
lied cities; but the source that figures most prominently in the or-
ators is the Athenian system of liturgies (leitourgiai), by which in a
regular rotation the rich provided funding for certain special pub-
lic needs. The main liturgies were the chorēgia, in which a sponsor
(chorēgos) supervised and paid for the training and performance
of a chorus which sang and danced at a public festival,²² and the
trierarchy, in which a sponsor (trierarch) paid to equip and usu-
ally commanded a trireme, or warship, for a year. Some of these
liturgies required substantial expenditures, but even so, some men
Constitution (Ath. Pol.—conveniently translated with notes by Rhodes

1984). The discovery of this work on a papyrus in Egypt in 1890 caused a
major resurgence of interest in Athenian government.
²¹ Modern scholars often use the term archōn basileus or “king archon,”
but Athenian sources (e.g., Ath. Pol. 57) simply call him the basileus.
²² These included the productions of tragedy and comedy, for which the
main expense was for the chorus.
Trevett-final.indb xxiii 10/5/11 11:03:00 AM

xxiv demosthenes, speeches 1–17
spent far more than required in order to promote themselves and

their public careers, and litigants often tried to impress the ju-
rors by referring to liturgies they had undertaken (see, e.g., Lys.
21.1–5). A further twist on this system was that if a man thought
he had been assigned a liturgy that should have gone to some-
one else who was richer than he, he could propose an exchange of
property (antidosis), giving the other man a choice of either tak-
ing over the liturgy or exchanging property with him. Finally, the
rich were also subject to special taxes (eisphorai) levied as a per-
centage of their property in times of need.
The Athenian legal system remained similarly resistant to pro-
fessionalization. Trials and the procedures leading up to them
were supervised by officials, primarily the nine Archons, but their
role was purely administrative, and they were in no way equiva-
lent to modern judges. All significant questions about what we
would call points of law were presented to the jurors, who consid-
ered them together with all other issues when they delivered their
verdict at the end of the trial.²³ Trials were “contests” (agōnes) be-
tween two litigants, each of whom presented his own case to the
jurors in a speech, plaintiff first, then defendant; in some cases
each party then spoke again, probably in rebuttal. Since a liti-
gant had only one or two speeches in which to present his en-
tire case, and no issue was decided separately by a judge, all the
necessary factual information and every important argument on
substance or procedure, fact or law, had to be presented together.
A single speech might thus combine narrative, argument, emo-
tional appeal, and various digressions, all with the goal of ob-
taining a favorable verdict. Even more than today, a litigant’s pri-
mary task was to control the issue—to determine which issues
the jurors would consider most important and which questions
they would have in their minds as they cast their votes. We only
²³ Certain religious “interpreters” (exēgētai) were occasionally asked to

give their opinion on a legal matter that had a religious dimension (such
as the prosecution of a homicide), but although these opinions could be re-
ported in court (e.g., Dem. 47.68– 73), they had no official legal standing.
The most significant administrative decision we hear of is the refusal of the
Basileus to accept the case in Antiphon 6 (see 6.37–46).
Trevett-final.indb xxiv 10/5/11 11:03:01 AM

series introduction xxv
rarely have both speeches from a trial,²⁴ and we usually have little
or no external evidence for the facts of a case or the verdict. We
must thus infer both the facts and the opponent’s strategy from
the speech we have, and any assessment of the overall effective-
ness of a speech and of the logographer’s strategy is to some ex-
tent speculative.
Before a trial there were usually several preliminary hearings
for presenting evidence; arbitration, public and private, was avail-
able and sometimes required. These hearings and arbitration ses-
sions allowed each side to become familiar with the other side’s
case, so that discussions of “what my opponent will say” could be
included in one’s speech. Normally a litigant presented his own
case, but he was often assisted by family or friends. If he wished
(and could afford it), he could enlist the services of a logogra-
pher, who presumably gave strategic advice in addition to writ-
ing a speech. The speeches were timed to ensure an equal hearing
for both sides,²⁵ and all trials were completed within a day. Two
hundred or more jurors decided each case in the popular courts,
which met in the Agora.²⁶ Homicide cases and certain other reli-
gious trials (e.g., Lys. 7) were heard by the Council of the Areop-
agus or an associated group of fifty-one Ephetae. The Areopagus
was composed of all former Archons—perhaps 150–200 mem-
bers at most times. It met on a hill called the Areopagus (“rock of
Ares”) near the Acropolis.
Jurors for the regular courts were selected by lot from those
citizens who registered each year and who appeared for duty that
day; as with the Assembly, a small payment allowed the poor to
serve. After the speakers had finished, the jurors voted imme-
diately without any formal discussion. The side with the major-
ity won; a tie vote decided the case for the defendant. In some
cases where the penalty was not fi xed, after a conviction the ju-
²⁴ The exceptions are Demosthenes 19 and Aeschines 2, Aeschines 3 and

Demosthenes 18, and Lysias 6 (one of several prosecution speeches) and An-
docides 1; all were written for major public cases.
²⁵ Timing was done by means of a water clock, which in most cases was
stopped during the reading of documents.
²⁶ See Boegehold 1995.
Trevett-final.indb xxv 10/5/11 11:03:01 AM

xxvi demosthenes, speeches 1–17
rors voted again on the penalty, choosing between penalties pro-

posed by each side. Even when we know the verdict, we cannot
know which of the speaker’s arguments contributed most to his
success or failure. However, a logographer could probably learn
from jurors which points had or had not been successful, so that
arguments that are found repeatedly in speeches probably were
known to be effective in most cases.
The first written laws in Athens were enacted by Draco (ca.
620) and Solon (ca. 590), and new laws were regularly added. At
the end of the fifth century the existing laws were reorganized,
and a new procedure for enacting laws was instituted; thereafter
a group of Law-Givers (nomothetai) had to certify that a proposed
law did not conflict with any existing laws. There was no attempt,
however, to organize legislation systematically, and although
Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers wrote various works on
law and law-giving, these were either theoretical or descriptive
and had no apparent influence on legislation. Written statutes
generally used ordinary language rather than precise legal defini-
tions in designating offenses, and questions concerning precisely
what constituted a specific offense or what was the correct inter-
pretation of a written statute were decided (together with other is-
sues) by the jurors in each case. A litigant might, of course, assert
a certain definition or interpretation as “something you all know”
or “what the lawgiver intended,” but such remarks are evidently
tendentious and cannot be taken as authoritative.
The result of these procedural and substantive features was
that the verdict depended largely on each litigant’s speech (or
speeches). As one speaker puts it (Ant. 6.18), “When there are
no witnesses, you (jurors) are forced to reach a verdict about the
case on the basis of the prosecutor’s and defendant’s words alone;
you must be suspicious and examine their accounts in detail, and
your vote will necessarily be cast on the basis of likelihood rather
than clear knowledge.” Even the testimony of witnesses (usually
on both sides) is rarely decisive. On the other hand, most speak-
ers make a considerable effort to establish facts and provide legit-
imate arguments in conformity with established law. Plato’s view
of rhetoric as a clever technique for persuading an ignorant crowd
that the false is true is not borne out by the speeches, and the le-
Trevett-final.indb xxvi 10/5/11 11:03:02 AM

series introduction xxvii
gal system does not appear to have produced many arbitrary or

clearly unjust results.
The main form of legal procedure was a dikē (“suit”) in which
the injured party (or his relatives in a case of homicide) brought
suit against the offender. Suits for injuries to slaves would be
brought by the slave’s master, and injuries to women would be
prosecuted by a male relative. Strictly speaking, a dikē was a pri-
vate matter between individuals, though like all cases, dikai of-
ten had public dimensions. The other major form of procedure
was a graphē (“writing” or “indictment”) in which “anyone who
wished” (i.e., any citizen) could bring a prosecution for wrongdo-
ing. Graphai were instituted by Solon, probably in order to allow
prosecution of offenses where the victim was unable or unlikely
to bring suit himself, such as selling a dependent into slavery; but
the number of areas covered by graphai increased to cover many
types of public offenses as well as some apparently private crimes,
such as hybris.
The system of prosecution by “anyone who wished” also ex-
tended to several other more specialized forms of prosecution,
like eisangelia (“impeachment”), used in cases of treason. Another
specialized prosecution was apagōgē (“summary arrest”), in which
someone could arrest a common criminal (kakourgos, lit. “evil-
doer”), or have him arrested, on the spot. The reliance on private
initiative meant that Athenians never developed a system of pub-
lic prosecution; rather, they presumed that everyone would keep
an eye on the behavior of his political enemies and bring suit as
soon as he suspected a crime, both to harm his opponents and to
advance his own career. In this way all public officials would be
watched by someone. There was no disgrace in admitting that a
prosecution was motivated by private enmity.
By the end of the fifth century the system of prosecution by
“anyone who wished” was apparently being abused by so-called
sykophants (sykophantai), who allegedly brought or threatened to
bring false suits against rich men, either to gain part of the fine
that would be levied or to induce an out-of-court settlement in
which the accused would pay to have the matter dropped. We
cannot gauge the true extent of this problem, since speakers usu-
ally provide little evidence to support their claims that their oppo-
Trevett-final.indb xxvii 10/5/11 11:03:02 AM

xxviii demosthenes, speeches 1–17
nents are sykophants, but the Athenians did make sykophancy a

crime. They also specified that in many public procedures a plain-
tiff who either dropped the case or failed to obtain one-fifth of
the votes would have to pay a heavy fine of 1,000 drachmas. De-
spite this, it appears that litigation was common in Athens and
was seen by some as excessive.
Over the course of time, the Athenian legal and political sys-
tems have more often been judged negatively than positively. Phi-
losophers and political theorists have generally followed the lead
of Plato (427–347), who lived and worked in Athens his entire life
while severely criticizing its system of government as well as many
other aspects of its culture. For Plato, democracy amounted to the
tyranny of the masses over the educated elite and was destined to
collapse from its own instability. The legal system was capricious
and depended entirely on the rhetorical ability of litigants with
no regard for truth or justice. These criticisms have often been
echoed by modern scholars, who particularly complain that law
was much too closely interwoven with politics and did not have
the autonomous status it achieved in Roman law and continues to
have, at least in theory, in modern legal systems.
Plato’s judgments are valid if one accepts the underlying pre-
suppositions, that the aim of law is absolute truth and abstract jus-
tice and that achieving the highest good of the state requires thor-
ough and systematic organization. Most Athenians do not seem
to have subscribed to either the criticisms or the presuppositions,
and most scholars now accept the long-ignored fact that despite
major external disruptions in the form of wars and two short-
lived coups brought about by one of these wars, the Athenian le-
gal and political systems remained remarkably stable for almost
two hundred years (508–320). Moreover, like all other Greek cit-
ies at the time, whatever their form of government, Athenian de-
mocracy was brought to an end not by internal forces but by the
external power of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander. The
legal system never became autonomous, and the rich sometimes
complained that they were victims of unscrupulous litigants, but
there is no indication that the people wanted to yield control of
the legal process to a professional class, as Plato recommended.
For most Athenians—Plato being an exception in this and many
Trevett-final.indb xxviii 10/5/11 11:03:03 AM

series introduction xxix
other matters—one purpose of the legal system was to give every-

one the opportunity to have his case heard by other citizens and
have it heard quickly and cheaply; and in this it clearly succeeded.
Indeed, the Athenian legal system also served the interests of
the rich, even the very rich, as well as the common people, in
that it provided a forum for the competition that since Homer
had been an important part of aristocratic life. In this competi-
tion, the rich used the courts as battlegrounds, though their main
weapon was the rhetoric of popular ideology, which hailed the
rule of law and promoted the ideal of moderation and restraint.²⁷
But those who aspired to political leadership and the honor and
status that accompanied it repeatedly entered the legal arena,
bringing suit against their political enemies whenever possible
and defending themselves against suits brought by others when-
ever necessary. The ultimate judges of these public competitions
were the common people, who seem to have relished the dramatic
clash of individuals and ideologies. In this respect fourth-century
oratory was the cultural heir of fifth-century drama and was sim-
ilarly appreciated by the citizens. Despite the disapproval of intel-
lectuals like Plato, most Athenians legitimately considered their
legal system a hallmark of their democracy and a vital presence in
their culture.
the tr ansl ation of gr eek or atory

The purpose of this series is to provide students and scholars in
all fields with accurate, readable translations of all surviving clas-
sical Attic oratory, including speeches whose authenticity is dis-
puted, as well as the substantial surviving fragments. In keeping
with the originals, the language is for the most part nontechni-
cal. Names of persons and places are given in the (generally more
familiar) Latinized forms, and names of officials or legal proce-
dures have been translated into English equivalents, where pos-
sible. Notes are intended to provide the necessary historical and
cultural background; scholarly controversies are generally not dis-
²⁷ Ober 1989 is fundamental; see also Cohen 1995.
Trevett-final.indb xxix 10/5/11 11:03:03 AM

series introduction xxix
other matters—one purpose of the legal system was to give every-

one the opportunity to have his case heard by other citizens and
have it heard quickly and cheaply; and in this it clearly succeeded.
Indeed, the Athenian legal system also served the interests of
the rich, even the very rich, as well as the common people, in
that it provided a forum for the competition that since Homer
had been an important part of aristocratic life. In this competi-
tion, the rich used the courts as battlegrounds, though their main
weapon was the rhetoric of popular ideology, which hailed the
rule of law and promoted the ideal of moderation and restraint.²⁷
But those who aspired to political leadership and the honor and
status that accompanied it repeatedly entered the legal arena,
bringing suit against their political enemies whenever possible
and defending themselves against suits brought by others when-
ever necessary. The ultimate judges of these public competitions
were the common people, who seem to have relished the dramatic
clash of individuals and ideologies. In this respect fourth-century
oratory was the cultural heir of fifth-century drama and was sim-
ilarly appreciated by the citizens. Despite the disapproval of intel-
lectuals like Plato, most Athenians legitimately considered their
legal system a hallmark of their democracy and a vital presence in
their culture.
the tr ansl ation of gr eek or atory

The purpose of this series is to provide students and scholars in
all fields with accurate, readable translations of all surviving clas-
sical Attic oratory, including speeches whose authenticity is dis-
puted, as well as the substantial surviving fragments. In keeping
with the originals, the language is for the most part nontechni-
cal. Names of persons and places are given in the (generally more
familiar) Latinized forms, and names of officials or legal proce-
dures have been translated into English equivalents, where pos-
sible. Notes are intended to provide the necessary historical and
cultural background; scholarly controversies are generally not dis-
²⁷ Ober 1989 is fundamental; see also Cohen 1995.
Trevett-final.indb xxix 10/5/11 11:03:03 AM

xxx demosthenes, speeches 1–17
cussed. The notes and introductions refer to scholarly treatments

in addition to those listed below, which the reader may consult
for further information.
Cross-references to other speeches follow the standard num-
bering system, which is now well established except in the case
of Hyperides (for whom the numbering of the Oxford Classical
Text is used).²⁸ References are by work and section (e.g., Dem.
24.73); spurious works are not specially marked; when no author
is named (e.g., 24.73), the reference is to the same author as the
annotated passage.
a bbr ev i ations
Aes. = Aeschines
And. = Andocides
Ant. = Antiphon
Arist. = Aristotle
Aristoph. = Aristophanes
Ath. Pol. = The Athenian Constitution
Dem. = Demosthenes
Din. = Dinarchus
Herod. = Herodotus
Hyp. = Hyperides
Is. = Isaeus
Isoc. = Isocrates
Lyc. = Lycurgus
Lys. = Lysias
Plut. = Plutarch
Thuc. = Thucydides
Xen. = Xenophon
note on currency: The main unit of Athenian currency was
the drachma; this was divided into obols and larger amounts were
designated minas and talents.
²⁸ For a listing of all the orators and their works, with classifications (fo-
rensic, deliberative, epideictic) and rough dates, see Edwards 1994: 74– 79.
Trevett-final.indb xxx 10/5/11 11:03:03 AM


annotated passage.
a bbr ev i ations
Aes. = Aeschines
And. = Andocides
Ant. = Antiphon
Arist. = Aristotle
Dem. = Demosthenes
Din. = Dinarchus
Herod. = Herodotus
Hyp. = Hyperides
Is. = Isaeus
Isoc. = Isocrates
Lyc. = Lycurgus
Lys. = Lysias
Plut. = Plutarch
Thuc. = Thucydides
Xen. = Xenophon


annotated passage.
a bbr ev i ations
Aes. = Aeschines
And. = Andocides
Ant. = Antiphon
Arist. = Aristotle
Dem. = Demosthenes
Din. = Dinarchus
Herod. = Herodotus
Hyp. = Hyperides
Is. = Isaeus
Isoc. = Isocrates
Lyc. = Lycurgus
Lys. = Lysias
Plut. = Plutarch
Thuc. = Thucydides
Xen. = Xenophon

series introduction xxxi
1 drachma = 6 obols
1 mina = 100 drachmas
1 talent = 60 minas (6,000 drachmas)
It is impossible to give an accurate equivalence in terms of mod-
ern currency, but it may be helpful to remember that the daily
wage of some skilled workers was a drachma in the mid-fifth cen-
tury and 2–2½ drachmas in the later fourth century. Thus it may
not be too misleading to think of a drachma as worth about $50 or
33 and a talent as about $300,000 or 200,000 in 1997 currency.
bibliogr aphy of wor ks cited

Boegehold, Alan L., 1995: The Lawcourts at Athens: Sites, Build-
ings, Equipment, Procedure, and Testimonia. Princeton.
Bonner, Robert J., 1927: Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens.
Chicago.
Carey, Christopher, 1997: Trials from Classical Athens. London.
Cohen, David, 1995: Law, Violence and Community in Classical
Athens. Cambridge.
Cole, Thomas, 1991: The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.
Baltimore.
Dover, Kenneth J., 1968: Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum.
Berkeley.
———, 1974: Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Ar-
istotle. Oxford.
———, 1978: Greek Homosexuality. London.
———, 1994: Marginal Comment. London.
Edwards, Michael, 1994: The Attic Orators. London.
Gagarin, Michael, and Paul Woodruff, 1995: Early Greek Political
Thought from Homer to the Sophists. Cambridge.
Hansen, Mogens Herman, 1991: The Athenian Democracy in the
Age of Demosthenes. Oxford.
Jebb, Richard, 1875: The Attic Orators, 2 vols. London.
Kennedy, George A., 1963: The Art of Persuasion in Greece.
Princeton.
Kerferd, G. B., 1981: The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge.
Trevett-final.indb xxxi 10/5/11 11:03:04 AM

series introduction xxxi
1 drachma = 6 obols
1 mina = 100 drachmas
1 talent = 60 minas (6,000 drachmas)
It is impossible to give an accurate equivalence in terms of mod-
ern currency, but it may be helpful to remember that the daily
wage of some skilled workers was a drachma in the mid-fifth cen-
tury and 2–2½ drachmas in the later fourth century. Thus it may
not be too misleading to think of a drachma as worth about $50 or
33 and a talent as about $300,000 or 200,000 in 1997 currency.
bibliogr aphy of wor ks cited

Boegehold, Alan L., 1995: The Lawcourts at Athens: Sites, Build-
ings, Equipment, Procedure, and Testimonia. Princeton.
Bonner, Robert J., 1927: Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens.
Chicago.
Carey, Christopher, 1997: Trials from Classical Athens. London.
Cohen, David, 1995: Law, Violence and Community in Classical
Athens. Cambridge.
Cole, Thomas, 1991: The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.
Baltimore.
Dover, Kenneth J., 1968: Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum.
Berkeley.
———, 1974: Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Ar-
istotle. Oxford.
———, 1978: Greek Homosexuality. London.
———, 1994: Marginal Comment. London.
Edwards, Michael, 1994: The Attic Orators. London.
Gagarin, Michael, and Paul Woodruff, 1995: Early Greek Political
Thought from Homer to the Sophists. Cambridge.
Hansen, Mogens Herman, 1991: The Athenian Democracy in the
Age of Demosthenes. Oxford.
Jebb, Richard, 1875: The Attic Orators, 2 vols. London.
Kennedy, George A., 1963: The Art of Persuasion in Greece.
Princeton.
Kerferd, G. B., 1981: The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge.
Trevett-final.indb xxxi 10/5/11 11:03:04 AM

xxxii demosthenes, speeches 1–17
MacDowell, Douglas M., 1978: The Law in Classical Athens.

London.
———, ed. 1990: Demosthenes, Against Meidias. Oxford.
Ober, Josiah, 1989: Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens.
Princeton.
Rhodes, P. J., trans., 1984: Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution.
Penguin Books.
Sinclair, R. K., 1988: Democracy and Participation in Athens.
Cambridge.
Todd, Stephen, 1993: The Shape of Athenian Law. Oxford.
Trevett, Jeremy, 1992: Apollodoros the Son of Pasion. Oxford.
———, 1996: “Did Demosthenes Publish His Deliberative
Speeches?” Hermes 124: 425–441.
Usher, Stephen, 1976: “Lysias and His Clients,” Greek, Roman and
Byzantine Studies 17: 31–40.
———, trans., 1974–1985: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Critical Es-
says. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA.
———, 1999: Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality. Oxford.
Wooten, Cecil W., trans., 1987: Hermogenes’ On Types of Style.
Chapel Hill, NC.
Worthington, Ian, 1994: “The Canon of the Ten Attic Orators,”
in Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. Ian Worthington.
London: 244–263.
Yunis, Harvey, 1996: Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rheto-
ric in Classical Athens. Ithaca, NY.
Trevett-final.indb xxxii 10/5/11 11:03:04 AM

DEMOSTHENES, SPEECHES 117
Trevett-final.indb xxxiii 10/5/11 11:03:05 AM

INTRODUCTION TO DEMOSTHENES
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
By Michael Gagarin
Since antiquity Demosthenes (384–322 bc) has usually been

judged the greatest of the Attic orators. Although the patriotic
and nationalistic tenor of his message has been more highly re-
garded in some periods of history than in others, he is unique in
his mastery of so many different rhetorical styles and his ability to
blend them into a powerful ensemble.
life
Demosthenes was born into an old wealthy Athenian fam-
ily. His father Demosthenes owned workshops that made swords
and furniture. His maternal grandfather, Gylon, had been exiled
from Athens and lived in the Crimea, where his mother Cleobule
was born (perhaps to a Scythian mother). When Demosthenes
was seven, his father died leaving his estate in the trust of several
guardians. According to Demosthenes’ own account, the guard-
ians mismanaged and defrauded the estate to the point that when
he turned eighteen, the age of majority, he received almost noth-
ing. He devoted the next several years to recovering his property,
first studying forensic pleading and then bringing a series of suits
against the guardians to recover his patrimony (speeches 27–31).
He won the first case (27, Against Aphobus I), but then had to
bring several more suits in order to collect the amount awarded
him by the court. In the course of these trials he gained a repu-
tation as a successful speaker, became sought after by others, and
began to write speeches for a wide range of private suits, includ-
ing inheritance, shipping loans, assault, and trespass. His clients
included one of the richest men in Athens, the banker Phormio;
Trevett-final.indb 1 10/5/11 11:03:05 AM

INTRODUCTION TO DEMOSTHENES
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
By Michael Gagarin
Since antiquity Demosthenes (384–322 bc) has usually been

judged the greatest of the Attic orators. Although the patriotic
and nationalistic tenor of his message has been more highly re-
garded in some periods of history than in others, he is unique in
his mastery of so many different rhetorical styles and his ability to
blend them into a powerful ensemble.
life
Demosthenes was born into an old wealthy Athenian fam-
ily. His father Demosthenes owned workshops that made swords
and furniture. His maternal grandfather, Gylon, had been exiled
from Athens and lived in the Crimea, where his mother Cleobule
was born (perhaps to a Scythian mother). When Demosthenes
was seven, his father died leaving his estate in the trust of several
guardians. According to Demosthenes’ own account, the guard-
ians mismanaged and defrauded the estate to the point that when
he turned eighteen, the age of majority, he received almost noth-
ing. He devoted the next several years to recovering his property,
first studying forensic pleading and then bringing a series of suits
against the guardians to recover his patrimony (speeches 27–31).
He won the first case (27, Against Aphobus I), but then had to
bring several more suits in order to collect the amount awarded
him by the court. In the course of these trials he gained a repu-
tation as a successful speaker, became sought after by others, and
began to write speeches for a wide range of private suits, includ-
ing inheritance, shipping loans, assault, and trespass. His clients
included one of the richest men in Athens, the banker Phormio;

2 demosthenes, speeches 1–17
the speech For Phormio (36) involves a dispute over twenty talents
(equivalent to several million dollars today). Demosthenes’ vivid
characterization of the honest, hard-working Phormio and his
malicious and extravagant opponent proved so convincing that
the jurors reportedly refused to listen to the other side and took
the highly unusual step of voting immediately for Phormio.
In 355 Demosthenes became involved in his first major public
case (22, Against Androtion). By this time it was common for am-
bitious or influential citizens to bring legal charges against their
political opponents on matters of public interest. Charges of pro-
posing an illegal decree (the graphē paranomōn) were particularly
common; these involved the indictment of the proposer of a de-
cree on the ground that it conflicted with existing law.¹ Although
these speeches addressed the specific issue of a conflict between
laws, it was generally accepted that the merits of the decree, and
of its proposer, were also relevant factors, and these cases formed
a major arena for the ongoing political struggles between leading
figures in the city.
About the same time Demosthenes also began to publish
speeches on public issues which he delivered in the Assembly,
and after 350, although he continued from time to time to write
speeches for private disputes, he turned his attention primarily to
public policy, especially relations between Athens and the grow-
ing power of Macedon under King Philip. Demosthenes’ strat-
egy throughout was to increase Athens’ military readiness, to op-
pose Philip’s expansion and to support other Greek cities in their
resistance to it. Most notable in support of these objectives were
the three Olynthiacs (1–3) in 349 unsuccessfully urging support
for the city of Olynthus (which soon afterwards fell to Philip) and
the four Philippics (4, 6, 9, 10) in 351–341 urging greater opposition
to Philip. But Philip continued to extend his power into Greece,
and in 338 he defeated a combined Greek force (including Athens)
¹ One might compare the U.S. procedure of challenging the constitu-

tionality of a law in court. Differences include the fact that today no charge
is brought against the proposer of the law and that the case is heard by
a small panel of professional judges, not the hundreds of untrained jurors
who would have heard the case in Athens.

introduction to demosthenes 3
at the battle of Chaeronea in Boeotia, north of Attica. This battle

is usually taken to mark the end of the Greek cities’ struggle to re-
main independent.
After Chaeronea Demosthenes continued to urge resistance to
Philip, but his efforts were largely ineffectual and his successes
and failures are more a matter of internal Athenian politics. His
most prominent opponent during this period was Aeschines, who
had been acquitted earlier (343) when Demosthenes brought a suit
against him in connection with a delegation to Philip on which
both men had served (19, cf. Aeschines 2). After Chaeronea, when
a minor ally of Demosthenes named Ctesiphon proposed a de-
cree awarding a crown to Demosthenes in recognition of his ser-
vice to the city, Aeschines brought a graphē paranomōn against
Ctesiphon (Aeschines 3). The suit, which was not tried until 330,
raised legal objections to the proposed decree but also attacked
the person and career of Demosthenes at considerable length. De-
mosthenes responded with his most famous speech On the Crown
(18), often known by its Latin name De Corona. The verdict was
so one-sided that Aeschines was fined for not receiving one-fifth
of the votes and went into exile. This was Demosthenes’ greatest
triumph. The last years of his life, however, resulted in notable de-
feats, first in the rather shadowy Harpalus affair (324–323), from
which no speech of his survives (but see Dinarchus 1). Shortly af-
terwards he was condemned to death at the instigation of pro-
Macedonian forces and committed suicide.
wor ks
Sixty-one speeches and some miscellaneous works, including a
collection of letters, have come down to us under Demosthenes’
name. The authenticity of many of these has been challenged, of-
ten because of the allegedly poor quality of the work; but this rea-
son is less often accepted today, and most of the public speeches
and many of the private speeches are now thought to be authen-
tic. Among the main exceptions are a group of private speeches
(45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 59 and possibly 47 and 51) that were de-
livered by Apollodorus and are now commonly thought to have
been composed by him (Trevett 1992).

at the battle of Chaeronea in Boeotia, north of Attica. This battle

is usually taken to mark the end of the Greek cities’ struggle to re-
main independent.
After Chaeronea Demosthenes continued to urge resistance to
Philip, but his efforts were largely ineffectual and his successes
and failures are more a matter of internal Athenian politics. His
most prominent opponent during this period was Aeschines, who
had been acquitted earlier (343) when Demosthenes brought a suit
against him in connection with a delegation to Philip on which
both men had served (19, cf. Aeschines 2). After Chaeronea, when
a minor ally of Demosthenes named Ctesiphon proposed a de-
cree awarding a crown to Demosthenes in recognition of his ser-
vice to the city, Aeschines brought a graphē paranomōn against
Ctesiphon (Aeschines 3). The suit, which was not tried until 330,
raised legal objections to the proposed decree but also attacked
the person and career of Demosthenes at considerable length. De-
mosthenes responded with his most famous speech On the Crown
(18), often known by its Latin name De Corona. The verdict was
so one-sided that Aeschines was fined for not receiving one-fifth
of the votes and went into exile. This was Demosthenes’ greatest
triumph. The last years of his life, however, resulted in notable de-
feats, first in the rather shadowy Harpalus affair (324–323), from
which no speech of his survives (but see Dinarchus 1). Shortly af-
terwards he was condemned to death at the instigation of pro-
Macedonian forces and committed suicide.
wor ks
Sixty-one speeches and some miscellaneous works, including a
collection of letters, have come down to us under Demosthenes’
name. The authenticity of many of these has been challenged, of-
ten because of the allegedly poor quality of the work; but this rea-
son is less often accepted today, and most of the public speeches
and many of the private speeches are now thought to be authen-
tic. Among the main exceptions are a group of private speeches
(45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 59 and possibly 47 and 51) that were de-
livered by Apollodorus and are now commonly thought to have
been composed by him (Trevett 1992).

Apart from a funeral oration (60) and collections of proems

and letters, Demosthenes’ works fall into two groups, the Assem-
bly speeches (1–17) and the court speeches (18–59); the latter can
be further divided into public and private speeches, though these
are not formal legal categories. Notable among the public forensic
speeches are Against Meidias (21), which has recently drawn atten-
tion for its pronouncements on Athenian public values, and his
last surviving speech, On the Crown (18), generally recognized as
his masterpiece. In this speech he uses his entire repertory of rhe-
torical strategies to defend his life and political career. He treats
the legal issues of the case briefly, as being of minor concern, and
then defends his conduct during the past three decades of Athe-
nian history, arguing that even when his policy did not succeed,
on each occasion it was the best policy for the city, in contrast to
Aeschines’ policies, which, when he ventured to propose any, were
disastrous. Demosthenes’ extensive personal attack on Aeschines’
life and family may be too harsh for modern taste, but the blend-
ing of facts, innuendoes, sarcasm, rhetorical questions, and other
devices is undeniably effective.
Demosthenes’ private speeches have recently begun to attract
more interest from scholars, who draw from them insight into
Athenian social, political, and economic life. Only the speeches
concerned with recovering his inheritance (27–31) were delivered
by Demosthenes himself; the rest were written for delivery by
other litigants. We have already noted For Phormio, which is one
of several having to do with banking. Against Conon (54) alleges
an assault by several young rowdies spurred on by their father,
and Against Neaera (59), delivered and probably written by Apol-
lodorus, recounts the life of a former slave woman and her affairs
with different Athenian men.
st y le
Demosthenes is a master of Greek prose style; he paid careful
attention to style, and to the oral delivery of his speeches. His Ro-
man counterpart, Cicero, modeled his oratorical style (and some
other features of his work) in part on Demosthenes’ Greek. Al-
though Demosthenes’ style varied considerably over the course of

Apart from a funeral oration (60) and collections of proems

and letters, Demosthenes’ works fall into two groups, the Assem-
bly speeches (1–17) and the court speeches (18–59); the latter can
be further divided into public and private speeches, though these
are not formal legal categories. Notable among the public forensic
speeches are Against Meidias (21), which has recently drawn atten-
tion for its pronouncements on Athenian public values, and his
last surviving speech, On the Crown (18), generally recognized as
his masterpiece. In this speech he uses his entire repertory of rhe-
torical strategies to defend his life and political career. He treats
the legal issues of the case briefly, as being of minor concern, and
then defends his conduct during the past three decades of Athe-
nian history, arguing that even when his policy did not succeed,
on each occasion it was the best policy for the city, in contrast to
Aeschines’ policies, which, when he ventured to propose any, were
disastrous. Demosthenes’ extensive personal attack on Aeschines’
life and family may be too harsh for modern taste, but the blend-
ing of facts, innuendoes, sarcasm, rhetorical questions, and other
devices is undeniably effective.
Demosthenes’ private speeches have recently begun to attract
more interest from scholars, who draw from them insight into
Athenian social, political, and economic life. Only the speeches
concerned with recovering his inheritance (27–31) were delivered
by Demosthenes himself; the rest were written for delivery by
other litigants. We have already noted For Phormio, which is one
of several having to do with banking. Against Conon (54) alleges
an assault by several young rowdies spurred on by their father,
and Against Neaera (59), delivered and probably written by Apol-
lodorus, recounts the life of a former slave woman and her affairs
with different Athenian men.
st y le
Demosthenes is a master of Greek prose style; he paid careful
attention to style, and to the oral delivery of his speeches. His Ro-
man counterpart, Cicero, modeled his oratorical style (and some
other features of his work) in part on Demosthenes’ Greek. Al-
though Demosthenes’ style varied considerably over the course of

time and among the different types of speeches, later assessments

of his style are based primarily on the public forensic speeches,
and especially the last of these, On the Crown. Long and some-
times elaborate sentences are one feature of his style, but Demos-
thenes’ true greatness is his ability to write in many styles and
to vary his style, mixing different features together both to suit
the topic and to give variety and vigor to his speeches. The fi-
nal product required great skill and practice to deliver effectively,
and the stories about Demosthenes’ rigorous training in delivery
(see in general Plutarch, Life of Demosthenes 6–7), even if not liter-
ally true, accurately reflect his priorities. Indeed, only by reading
aloud sections of On the Crown in Greek can one truly appreciate
the power and authority of his prose.
significance
Demosthenes played a vital role in Athenian public affairs for
some thirty years. His advocacy of the vigilant defense of Greece
against foreign invaders, though ultimately unsuccessful in pre-
serving Greek freedom, inspired his fellow Athenians with patri-
otic loyalty, and has similarly inspired many others in later times.
In recent times political rhetoric has not been so widely admired
as in the past, and Demosthenes is less read today than he used to
be. But he still represents the greatest achievement of Greek ora-
tory and stands as one of the greatest orators of any age.

time and among the different types of speeches, later assessments

of his style are based primarily on the public forensic speeches,
and especially the last of these, On the Crown. Long and some-
times elaborate sentences are one feature of his style, but Demos-
thenes’ true greatness is his ability to write in many styles and
to vary his style, mixing different features together both to suit
the topic and to give variety and vigor to his speeches. The fi-
nal product required great skill and practice to deliver effectively,
and the stories about Demosthenes’ rigorous training in delivery
(see in general Plutarch, Life of Demosthenes 6–7), even if not liter-
ally true, accurately reflect his priorities. Indeed, only by reading
aloud sections of On the Crown in Greek can one truly appreciate
the power and authority of his prose.
significance
Demosthenes played a vital role in Athenian public affairs for
some thirty years. His advocacy of the vigilant defense of Greece
against foreign invaders, though ultimately unsuccessful in pre-
serving Greek freedom, inspired his fellow Athenians with patri-
otic loyalty, and has similarly inspired many others in later times.
In recent times political rhetoric has not been so widely admired
as in the past, and Demosthenes is less read today than he used to
be. But he still represents the greatest achievement of Greek ora-
tory and stands as one of the greatest orators of any age.

INTRODUC TION TO THIS VOLUME
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
By Jeremy Trevett
This volume contains translations of all the surviving delibera-

tive speeches of Demosthenes, including several whose authentic-
ity has been questioned (Dem. 7, 10, 11, 13, 17), as well as the text
of a letter of Philip of Macedon to the Athenians (Dem. 12). Col-
lectively these form the first seventeen “speeches” of the corpus of
Demosthenes’ works. All the speeches were, or at least purported
to be, written to be delivered to the Athenian Assembly and are in
fact almost the only examples in Attic oratory of the genre of de-
liberative oratory.
political life in fourth-century athens

The sovereign decision-making body of democratic Athens
was the Assembly (ekklēsia), a public meeting, held approximately
forty times a year, that was open to all adult Athenian citizens.¹
Attendance varied, but on occasions over six thousand citizens,
perhaps a quarter of the citizen body, will have been present. The
agenda was prepared in advance by the Council (boulē), which for
each item on the agenda might either make a definite proposal
or simply put the matter forward for discussion. When the her-
ald asked “who wishes to speak?” it was open to any Athenian to
come forward, ascend the speaker’s platform (bēma), and address
¹ Hansen 1991 is an accessible account of the institutions of Athens’

fourth-century democracy. Rhodes 1986 provides a useful, brief introduc-
tion to the practice of politics at Athens. On political participation of vari-
ous kinds, see Sinclair 1988.

introduction to this volume 7
his fellow-citizens, either speaking for or against the proposal al-

ready before the Assembly or making a new proposal himself.
This prospect must have been daunting for many Athenians,
and in practice the speakers tended to come from a relatively small
number of citizens, who are referred to variously as “the speakers”
(hoi rhētores) or “those who engage in politics” (hoi politeuomenoi).
These “politicians,” as it is convenient to describe them, were gen-
erally wealthy enough to be able to devote much of their time to
political activity without the need to work for a living. In addi-
tion to speaking in the Assembly and proposing decrees, they are
also found serving on embassies and engaging in politically mo-
tivated litigation. Some, but by no means all, also put themselves
forward for election to hold the military post of general (stratēgos),
although this was less common in the fourth century than in the
fifth.²
Classical Athens wholly lacked the political parties of modern
parliamentary democracies. In theory its political leaders needed
no organization behind them, and Demosthenes often gives the
impression that he is quite alone in addressing the Athenian As-
sembly. In practice, however, politicians did cooperate with each
other, either on the basis of personal ties or because they agreed
on matters of policy, although such alliances were often imperma-
nent and ad hoc. Demosthenes indeed complains that the Athe-
nians conduct their politics “by symmories,” that is, by means
of “parties,” each dominated by a politician and a general (2.29).
In one passage, he refers to the proposal that “we” have devised
(4.30), offering a fleeting glimpse of those others who shared his
views and collaborated with him. Political associates might co-
operate in other areas, for example, on embassies (see 9.72) or in
court. Moreover, it is in the 340s that we find a clear polarization
on the issue of relations with Macedon, with Demosthenes the
leading figure in what may fairly be called an anti-Macedonian
party, together with men such as Hyperides and Hegesippus. De-
mosthenes often alleges that rival politicians are conspiring to-
gether to advance Philip’s interests. These men are almost never
² Demosthenes himself never held military command.

named in his speeches to the Assembly (cf. 10.70–74), but the iden-
tity of several of them, such as Eubulus and Aeschines, is known.
athens in the middle of the fourth century

Although Athens was the richest and most powerful city of
mainland Greece, its prospects at the time when Demosthenes de-
livered his first deliberative speech (Dem. 14 of 354/3) were uncer-
tain.³ The central issues with which Demosthenes was concerned
were foreign policy and public finance. Athens’ external interests
and commitments were many and complex. First, it had hege-
monic ambitions in the Aegean and was the leader of an (orig-
inally anti-Spartan) league known by modern historians as the
Second Athenian Confederacy, which consisted of many Greek
cities of the Aegean and beyond.⁴ But the Athenians had recently
suffered a humiliating reverse in the Social War (357–355) at the
hands of several leading members of the league, who had become
disenchanted with Athenian leadership and had forcibly seceded
from it.⁵
Second, Athens had long-standing strategic interests in the
north Aegean, with a particular wish to regain Amphipolis and
control the Chersonese. Amphipolis, a city on the river Strymon
in Thrace, was founded by Athens in the fifth century but had
been lost during the Peloponnesian War; its recovery became
an idée fixe.⁶ The Chersonese (modern Gallipoli peninsula) con-
trols the Hellespont, the straits connecting the Sea of Marmara
and the Aegean Sea, and it was vital for Athens’ ability to import
from the Black Sea region the wheat on which it depended to feed
its population.
³ Developments in the earlier part of the fourth century are surveyed by

Sealey 1993; see also the relevant chapters of Hornblower 2002 and Rhodes
2006.
⁴ On the Second Athenian Confederacy, see Cargill 1981.
⁵ See the Introduction to Dem. 15. On defections from the league, see
Cargill 1981: 161–188.
⁶ On Athenian imperialism in this period, see Badian 1995 and Hard-
ing 1995.

Third, Athens had strained relations with the Persian Empire,

in part because of the involvement of the satrap (i.e., Persian pro-
vincial governor) Mausolus in the Social War against Athens (see
Dem. 15) and in part because of the recent assistance provided
by the Athenian general Chares to the rebel satrap Artabazus.⁷
Fourth, Athens had interests in mainland Greece. There the long-
standing rivalry between the three leading states—Athens, Sparta
and Thebes—had been upset first by Sparta’s rapid decline after
its defeat by Thebes at the battle of Leuctra in 371, and then by
Thebes’ involvement in a draining war with its northern neighbor
Phocis in the Third Sacred War of 356–346.⁸ As a result, there de-
veloped a power vacuum in Greece.⁹
A major constraint on Athens’ foreign policy in this period was
the weakness of its public finances. Athens in the fourth century
was no longer buoyed by tribute from its empire, as it had been
in the fifth, and it was chronically short of money. Demosthenes’
claim (made in 341) that in the recent past Athens’ total annual
revenues had amounted to no more than 130 talents (10.37) prob-
ably refers to the 350s. Money was in short supply for naval cam-
paigning, and Athenian generals were often forced to scrounge
resources where they could: hence their harassment of Athens’ al-
lies for money, which was a precipitating cause of the Social War,
and Chares’ taking service with Artabazus (see above). As a re-
sult, the cost of waging war fell more directly on the rich: in ad-
dition to their role in financing Athens’ navy through the system
of trierarchies and symmories (see Dem. 14), they were also liable
to pay the wealth tax (eisphora), which was levied on the assets of
richer Athenians. Demosthenes complains that this led many rich
men to conceal the extent of their wealth. A particular source of
contention was the theoric (“festival”) fund. This fund had been
established earlier in the century to allow poorer citizens to at-
tend performances of plays staged as part of religious festivals. By
the 350s the theoric fund was being used for other nonmilitary
⁷ See the Introduction to Dem. 14.

⁸ On the Third Sacred War, see the detailed study of Buckler 1989.
⁹ See the Introduction to Dem. 16.

expenditure as well, and was fenced around by laws that made it

difficult, and dangerous, to propose that the money be used for
other purposes. Although the total amount of money handled by
the theoric fund may not have been large in absolute terms, the
use of that money for civilian expenditure came to be a matter of
dispute, with Demosthenes and his supporters seeking to have it
used to pay for military activity against Philip of Macedon.¹⁰
philip of m acedon
The majority of Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches are con-
cerned with Athens’ relations with Philip of Macedon, the ruler
of a large kingdom to the north of Greece, which had previously
played only a peripheral role in Greek history.¹¹
Although populous and agriculturally rich, Macedonia¹² suf-
fered from chronic dynastic and internal instability and was also
regularly under threat from its non-Greek tribal neighbors to the
west, north and east (Illyrians, Paeonians, and Thracians respec-
tively). Moreover, it had long been subject to intervention on the
part of the Greeks, and in particular the Athenians, who were
drawn above all by access to the ship-building timber of which
the region had an abundant supply. In addition to the numerous
Greek cities of the Chalcidic peninsula to its east, there were also
Greek settlements on the coast of Macedonia itself. Greek writ-
ers of the time generally describe the Macedonians as non-Greek,
though often such statements are marked by anti-Macedonian
prejudice, and the “Greekness” of the Macedonians remains an
open question.¹³ What is clear is that both politically and cul-
turally Macedonia was unlike Greek cities such as Athens. At the
same time the Macedonian court was strongly Hellenized: Greek
¹⁰ On the theoric fund, see Sealey 1993: 256–258; Harris 1996.

¹¹ The fullest study of Philip’s reign is Hammond and Griffith 1979. See
also Ellis 1976; Cawkwell 1978; Worthington 2008. On earlier Macedonian
history, see Borza 1990.
¹² The kingdom is properly called Macedonia, but Philip is traditionally
identified (in English) as Philip of Macedon.
¹³ See 9.31n; Badian 1982.

artists and writers were patronized, and Philip himself was well
versed in Greek (see Dem. 12).
Philip succeeded to the throne of Macedonia in 359, after the
death of the previous king in a disastrous military defeat at the
hands of the Illyrians. The early years of his reign were largely
devoted to securing his kingdom, both internally and against its
non-Greek neighbors. He also started to annex nearby Greek cit-
ies: Amphipolis and Pydna in 357; Potideia in 356; and Methone
probably in 354. The seizure of Amphipolis, which was origi-
nally an Athenian possession (see above), impelled the Athe-
nians to declare war, but, distracted by the Social War and appar-
ently deceived by Philip, they were unable to prevent his seizure
of cities that they had recently controlled or that they claimed for
themselves.
In the same period, Philip extended his influence eastwards
into Thrace and southwards into northern Greece, where he inter-
vened on behalf of his Thessalian allies against the Phocians. De-
feated by the Phocian army in 353, he secured a crushing revenge
at the battle of the Crocus Field in 352 and marched towards the
strategically vital pass of Thermopylae, which controlled the pas-
sage to southern Greece. Here, however, he was thwarted by the
dispatch of an Athenian expeditionary force, which blocked the
pass against him. Philip followed this with continued campaign-
ing in Thrace (see the Introduction to Dem. 4). In the late 350s
his relations with the neighboring Greek cities of the Chalcidic
League, headed by Olynthus, started to deteriorate, even though
they were allied to him (see the Introduction to Dem. 1–3), and
in 349 he invaded its territory. The Olynthians appealed to Ath-
ens for help, and the Athenians eventually sent three separate re-
lief forces. But the effort was in vain: Philip captured Olynthus
in 348, razed the city to the ground, and acquired a substantial
number of Athenian prisoners in the process.
After the fall of Olynthus, the Athenians, unable to persuade
any of the other Greeks to join them in further resistance to
Philip, had little choice but to accept his offer to negotiate peace
terms. The resulting peace, known as the Peace of Philocrates af-
ter its chief Athenian negotiator, was concluded in summer 346,
on the basis of each side keeping what it possessed. The members

of Athens’ league were included, but the Phocians and the inde-
pendent Thracian king Cersobleptes were (despite Athenian pro-
tests) excluded. Over the same summer, Philip marched south,
took control of Thermopylae, and brought an end to the Sacred
War in favor of his ally Thebes, by destroying the cities of the
Phocians. Demosthenes, who participated in the Athenian embas-
sies to Philip to negotiate the peace, claimed that Philip tricked
the Athenians into believing that Phocis would be saved and (less
plausibly) that he thereby prevented them occupying Thermopy-
lae as they had done in 352.
The following years saw Philip extend his influence over
Greece. Demosthenes alleges that there was (usually indirect)
Macedonian intervention in the Peloponnese in support of anti-
Spartan states such as Elis, Argos, and Messenia and in central
Greece at Megara and on the island of Euboea. Moreover, from
342 Philip resumed campaigning against Cersobleptes in east-
ern Thrace. None of this activity directly involved Athens, but all
of it could be—and was—construed by anti-Macedonian politi-
cians as threatening its interests: Sparta was Athens’ ally; Megara
and Euboea were its neighbors; and Philip’s Thracian campaign
brought his army close to both Byzantium and the Chersonese—
the two places that controlled Athens’ economic lifeline to the
Black Sea. Public opinion at Athens became polarized between
those who thought that the city had no realistic choice but to
keep the peace and try to maintain good relations with Philip,¹⁴
and those who argued that Philip was plotting Athens’ ruin un-
der cover of the peace and that the Athenians needed to take ac-
tion against him. Philip offered to renegotiate the peace in 344/3,
but his offer was rebuffed (see Dem. 6 and 7), and in 341 fight-
ing broke out between Athenian forces in the Chersonese and the
neighboring Greek city of Cardia, which was allied to Philip (see
Dem. 8). As the threat of war loomed, Athens tried to build sup-
port in Greece (see Dem. 9). The events that precipitated war were
Philip’s siege first of the Greek city of Perinthus, on the Sea of
¹⁴ Demosthenes’ main political opponents in this period were Eubulus

(see Cawkwell 1963a and OCD³ s.v. Eubulus) and Aeschines, on whom see
Carey 2000 in this series.

Marmara, and then of Byzantium itself (see Dem. 10). Assistance

was sent to Byzantium both by Athens and by the Persians, who
feared that Philip’s territorial ambitions now extended to the Per-
sian Empire itself. Philip retaliated by seizing a fleet of grain ships
bound for Athens. The Athenians interpreted these actions as acts
of war and renounced the peace.
Although Athens succeeded in detaching Thebes from its al-
liance with Philip, the resulting coalition was no match for the
Macedonians, and in 338 Philip won a decisive victory over the
Greeks at the battle of Chaeronea in Boeotia. As a result, all of
Greece fell under Macedonian rule, and Greek independence was
at an end.¹⁵
demosthenes’ policies
Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches fall into two groups: those
delivered before he identified Philip as an overriding threat to
Athens (Dem. 13–16) and those that are concerned with Philip
(what ancient critics called the “Philippics”: Dem. 1–11).¹⁶ The
earlier speeches lack focus, at least by comparison, as Demosthe-
nes addresses a number of topical issues. The first, On the Sym-
mories (Dem. 14), uses perhaps exaggerated rumors of a planned
Persian campaign against Athens to propose a number of reforms
to the Athenian system for funding the operation of the navy.
An interest in institutional reform appears also in the speech On
Organization (Dem. 13), in which Demosthenes advocates a sys-
tem whereby Athenian citizens will be paid for undertaking pub-
lic services of various kinds and will no longer receive money for
doing nothing (an early swipe at theoric payments: see below).
In the speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians (Dem. 15), he ar-
¹⁵ For subsequent events, see the Introduction to Dem. 17 (a speech dat-

ing to the reign of Philip’s son Alexander).
¹⁶ On Demosthenes’ political career, see Pickard-Cambridge 1914; Mont-
gomery 1983; Carlier 1990 (in French; the most balanced biography); Sealey
1993. Also influential are a series of articles by G. L. Cawkwell, some of
which are cited in the bibliography. MacDowell 2009 is an excellent survey
of all the speeches of Demosthenes.

gues that the Athenians should accept a request from exiled dem-
ocrats from the island of Rhodes to support the restoration of de-
mocracy there. Demosthenes asserts that it is in Athens’ inter-
est to support democracy everywhere in Greece, but in seeking to
persuade the Athenians to help the Rhodians, he faced an uphill
task, since Rhodes had recently participated in the Social War
against Athens. Moreover, his attempt to explain how such an in-
tervention would not antagonize the satrap of Caria, who sup-
ported the oligarchs on Rhodes, or the Persian King, who was
campaigning nearby against Egypt, seem unconvincing. The re-
maining early speech, For the Megalopolitans (Dem. 16), argues in
favor of accepting a request from the central Peloponnesian city
of Megalopolis for an alliance, in the face of the threat of Spartan
attack. In this speech Demosthenes shows a keen awareness of the
principle of the balance of power, and he uses complex arguments
to argue that Athens’ paramount strategic goal was to prevent the
resurgence of Spartan power in the Peloponnese. The speech is
contrarian, since Athens and Sparta were firm allies at this time,
and it is not surprising that it, like the other early speeches, failed
to persuade its audience.
These speeches, which have tended to be criticized as oppor-
tunistic and immature, certainly make blithe assumptions about
the likely behavior of others (e.g., the Spartans in Dem. 16, Ar-
temisia in Dem. 15), but they also show Demosthenes to be a se-
rious student of foreign policy, capable of independent thought,
and seeking in a sense to redeem Athens as an active and princi-
pled participant in the affairs of Greece after the fiasco of the So-
cial War. Even at this early stage we see his concern for institu-
tional reform and still more for a change of attitude on the part of
the Athenians towards public service.
The First Philippic (Dem. 4) marks a turning point in Demos-
thenes’ political career. In this speech, delivered only a year or
so later than those discussed above, he focuses exclusively on the
threat that Philip poses to Athens. Philip’s decisive victory at the
battle of the Crocus Field in 352, his march south on Thermopy-
lae, and his subsequent campaigning in eastern Thrace all con-
vinced Demosthenes that Athens’ strategic situation had changed,
radically and for the worse. To deal with the threat posed by

Philip, Demosthenes makes specific military proposals: for the

creation of a rapid-response force based in Athens and a perma-
nent raiding force to be stationed in the north Aegean. He also
encourages the Athenians not to despair, while criticizing them
for their laxness and demanding that they show greater willing-
ness to serve in person. The three Olynthiacs, Dem. 1–3, were de-
livered during Philip’s campaign against the cities of the Chal-
cidic League. In them Demosthenes advocates that Athens send
help to the beleaguered city of Olynthus. He argues that Philip’s
unprovoked attack on the league is a heaven-sent opportunity for
Athens (Dem. 1), and he belittles Philip as being much weaker
than he appears (Dem. 2). By the time of the last speech of the se-
ries (Dem. 3), Olynthus’ military situation seems to have deteri-
orated, and Demosthenes’ tone is less optimistic. In this speech
too he states bluntly what he had only alluded to earlier: that the
Athenians should divert money from the theoric fund to pay for
the war.
The remaining deliberative speeches all belong to the period
between the making of the Peace of Philocrates in 346 and the
outbreak of war between Athens and Philip in 340.¹⁷ On the Peace
(Dem. 5) was delivered shortly after the peace was ratified, and
it reverts to the cautious attitude of Dem. 14. Demosthenes ar-
gues that, although the peace is a bad deal for Athens, it would
be foolish to oppose Philip in his desire to participate in the Del-
phic Amphictyony, a religious organization based at Delphi, and
thereby risk his organizing a broadly based coalition against Ath-
ens. By the time of the Second Philippic (Dem. 6) of 344/3, Demos-
thenes’ approach is more aggressive. This speech was apparently
delivered in response to an overture from Philip to the Athenians
to renegotiate those terms of the Peace of Philocrates with which
they were dissatisfied. Demosthenes largely passes over this of-
fer and uses the speech to denounce both Philip and his Greek al-
lies. Philip, he claims, has violated the terms of the peace and is
plotting against Athens. At the same time, he sharply attacks un-
¹⁷ Dem. 17 dates to the reign of Philip’s son Alexander, but it is probably

not a genuine speech of Demosthenes.

named Athenian politicians who, he alleges, have been bribed by

Philip to advance his interests.
The remaining three major speeches¹⁸ belong closely together
in time, when the likelihood of war had sharply increased. In the
first of them, On the Chersonese (Dem. 8), Demosthenes argues
that the Athenians need to support Diopeithes, their general in
the Chersonese, who is conducting an aggressive policy against
Philip’s interests in the region. The Third Philippic (Dem. 9) ad-
dresses the state of Greece as a whole. In it Demosthenes criticizes
Philip for a series of interventions in various cities of southern and
central Greece, and the rest of the Greeks for their abandonment
of the love of liberty that had characterized Greece in the fifth
century. Demosthenes argues that the Greeks should unite against
Philip, whom he vilifies as a wretched foreigner. In the Fourth
Philippic (Dem. 10) he addresses many of the same themes—there
is considerable recycling of material from Dem. 8 in particular—
but also discusses the possibility of Persia joining Athens against
Philip. Prompted in part by the prospect of Persian financial aid,
Demosthenes withdraws his opposition to the use of the theoric
fund for nonmilitary expenditure and asks rich and poor Athe-
nians to stop squabbling over public finances.
The “Philippic” speeches of Demosthenes were delivered over
the course of an eleven-year period, and each responds to the cir-
cumstances of the time. Thus, in On the Peace (Dem. 5) he seeks
to defuse pressure to go to war with Philip, and in the Fourth Phi-
lippic (Dem. 10) he changes his earlier views about the theoric
fund. Nevertheless there is considerable thematic unity over the
speeches as a whole—a unity that is reinforced by the frequent
repetition of material from one speech to another. Demosthenes
argues strongly that Philip is an inveterate enemy to Athens: his
actions are all ultimately directed against the city, and his protes-
¹⁸ Dem. 8–10. Of the others, Dem. 11 is short and derivative of Demos-

thenes’ earlier speeches. It is also generally regarded as not by Demosthenes,
though see the Speech Introduction for a recent defense of its authenticity.
Dem. 7 is generally taken to be a work of another Athenian politician, He-
gesippus. It is a belligerent response to Philip’s diplomatic overtures and
represents a cruder version of Demosthenes’ policy at the time.

tations of goodwill are deceitful. The Athenians should not fear

him too much, but they must recognize the danger, be prepared
to raise taxes, and undertake military service in person. Demos-
thenes also alleges that many politicians (i.e., those who disagree
with him) have been bribed by Philip. He consistently represents
himself as the one speaker who discerns the danger posed by
Philip and advocates the correct policies to deal with him. In po-
larizing the issues in such a way, and in attacking the moral fail-
ures of the Athenians and their leaders, he avoids seriously ad-
dressing the views of his opponents, who presumably disagreed
(with equal sincerity) with his analysis of Philip’s intentions and
over the policies that Athens should adopt towards him.¹⁹
Whether Demosthenes was right to pursue such strongly anti-
Macedonian policies is much debated. Against older views that
accepted his allegations, both about Philip and about some of his
fellow political leaders, at face value and that saw him as fighting a
lone patriotic hand against Athens’ deadly enemy, it has more re-
cently been argued that his repeated allegations of bribery are un-
founded; that some of his complaints of Macedonian interference
in the affairs of Greek cities are tendentious at best, mendacious
at worst; and that his entire strategy was based on a false view of
Philip as ill disposed towards Athens. The result, it is argued, was
to provoke a war that Athens had no chance of winning.²⁰ There
¹⁹ Demosthenes maintains that the appropriate policies are clear but that
what is lacking is the will to carry them out. He very rarely seeks to counter
the actual arguments of rival speakers. The techniques by which he seeks to
manipulate Athenian opinion to support his policies are examined in a se-
ries of recent articles by G. Mader (e.g., 2005, 2006).
²⁰ The former view is represented by older works such as Pickard-
Cambridge 1914 and Jaeger 1938. The chief architect of the revisionist view
is G. L. Cawkwell, in a series of influential articles. In particular, Cawkwell
1962a argues that Demosthenes’ policy of sending troops to defend Olyn-
thus and fight Philip in the north (see Dem. 1–4) was misguided; Cawk-
well 1963b argues that Demosthenes exaggerates (esp. in Dem. 6) the ex-
tent of Philip’s interference in the affairs of Greek cities in the second half
of the 340s. Harding 1987 provides a useful survey of Demosthenes’ fluctu-
ating reputation.

is some plausibility in this view, but the reaction against previ-

ous adulation of Demosthenes has gone too far. Philip’s motives
were inherently unclear, but the fact of his growing domination
of Greece was undeniable. Even if Demosthenes’ political oppo-
nents at Athens were not bribed by Philip, they might well be re-
garded as his dupes.
Demosthenes clearly does exaggerate at times, but it would be
naïve to brand him a liar (and there were surely limits to how far
any politician could safely misrepresent current events to the As-
sembly); rather, such exaggeration was a rhetorical strategy in the
service of his overriding goal, which was to persuade the Athe-
nians of the reality of the danger that Philip posed. If different
policies had been followed, Athens might indeed have avoided
war. But in a Greece dominated by Macedonia, it would inevi-
tably have been reduced to the level of a vassal state, its security
wholly in Philip’s hands. For the majority of Athenians, as even-
tually for the Thebans too, such a prospect was intolerable.
composition, delivery, and publication

The set of deliberative speeches attributed to Demosthenes in
the manuscripts (Dem. 1–17) is a somewhat miscellaneous collec-
tion, since it contains one work that is obviously neither a speech
nor by Demosthenes (Dem. 12, the Letter of Philip) and two
speeches (Dem. 7 and 17) that were rightly judged in antiquity to
be dissimilar in style to the genuine speeches of Demosthenes. Of
the other speeches, doubts have been raised about the authenticity
of Dem. 10, 11, and 13. It has also been proposed that Dem. 17 is
not a genuine speech of Alexander’s reign but a later composition.
Many of the doubts that have been raised about these speeches
are the product of a hypercritical attitude prevalent in nineteenth-
century scholarship, and it is now generally, though not uni-
versally, agreed that Dem. 10 and 13 are genuine; even Dem. 11
may be by Demosthenes, it has recently been suggested. In addi-
tion, there is no reason to deny that Dem. 12 is a genuine letter of
Philip (whether or not he wrote it himself), and the view is taken
in this volume that Dem. 17, although not written by Demosthe-
nes, is the work of a contemporary anti-Macedonian politician.

How, when, and by whom these works were collected is un-

clear. It presumably happened after Demosthenes’ lifetime, and
a likely candidate is his nephew Demochares, in the early third
century. It seems plausible that he, or whoever the compiler was,
bundled in with the genuine speeches some works—perhaps
found among Demosthenes’ papers—that related to the speeches
(i.e., Dem. 12) or that were written by his supporters and were
taken to reflect his views (Dem. 7 and 17). Also included were a
set of Prologues (prooimia in Greek) to deliberative speeches: sev-
eral of these correspond to the prologues of surviving speeches,
and they are best regarded as written by Demosthenes to form the
basis for largely improvised speeches.²¹
Deliberative oratory seems not to have lent itself to written
composition,²² and it is striking that these speeches are almost
the only examples of the genre from classical Athens.²³ More-
over, literary scholars of antiquity mention almost no other (now
lost) written deliberative speeches, and so their small number is
not an accident of survival.²⁴ Most speeches to the Assembly will
have been made extemporaneously; almost by definition politi-
cians had to be capable public speakers, who could participate in
a debate without being tied to a prepared text.²⁵ Demosthenes
may have been unusual if not unique in writing his speeches out
²¹ Prologues 3, 7, 8, and 27 correspond to Dem. 1, 14, 16, and 15 respec-

tively. For translations of the Prologues, see Worthington 2006 in this series.
The Prologues are helpfully discussed by Yunis 1996: 247–257.
²² See Hudson-Williams 1951; Tuplin 1998: 292–295.
²³ The only other surviving deliberative speech is Andocides 3, though
its authenticity has been doubted (see Harris 2000). In addition, two of the
works in this volume, Dem. 7 and 17, are (or purport to be) genuine delib-
erative speeches to the Athenian Assembly and are almost certainly not the
work of Demosthenes.
²⁴ Thus Hansen 1984: 60– 66; cf. Yunis 1996: 243 n. 14.
²⁵ Cf. p. 7 above on politicians as “the speakers.” By contrast, lawcourt
speeches could be written out in advance and delivered from memory with-
out significant interruption (though see Bers 1985 for heckling in court) and
within a set period of time. It is therefore not surprising that many more
lawcourt speeches have survived from classical Athens.

in advance.²⁶ In this regard it is significant that the biographical

tradition about him, especially as transmitted by Plutarch in his
Life of Demosthenes, emphasizes his use of writing: Demosthenes’
speeches, his opponents sneered, “smelled of the lamp” (Plut. De-
mosthenes 8). It seems likely therefore that the texts we have were
written, at least in the first instance, as drafts of the speeches that
Demosthenes intended to make to the Assembly.²⁷
Given our ignorance of what Demosthenes said on any occa-
sion, the precise relationship between the texts we have and the
speeches that he delivered is largely unknowable. In Dem. 15 he
refers (6) to his having previously delivered a speech that is pre-
sumably identical, or very similar, to Dem. 14. If he wrote out his
speeches in advance (see above), we cannot know whether he de-
livered any individual speech as written (or indeed whether he de-
livered it at all). Presumably at a minimum there was a certain
amount of extemporizing, for example, to respond to points made
by other speakers. On the whole, however, it is probably safe to
suppose that the surviving speeches represent more or less what
Demosthenes intended to say on a particular occasion, although
dating them is a difficult matter.²⁸
Whether Demosthenes published the texts of his deliberative
speeches, and whether he revised them before doing so, are two
separate though related questions, since he is likely to have revised
a speech after its delivery only if he intended to publish it, that is,
to make copies to be circulated among his friends and support-
²⁶ Yunis 1996: 242 suggests that he may have been the first politician to
do so, in part because of his background as a writer of lawcourt speeches
(see previous note). This background may indeed be relevant, but there is no
evidence, as Yunis implies, that other politicians followed his example.
²⁷ On Demosthenes’ nervousness as a public speaker, see Aes. 2.34; Plut.
Demosthenes 11; and MacDowell 2009: 6. It is possible that the lack of As-
sembly speeches from the period after 340 is due to his increased confidence
as a speaker, which meant that he did not feel the need to write out his
speeches in advance.
²⁸ See pp. 23–24 below on the dates provided by the ancient critic Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus.

ers, either in Athens or elsewhere.²⁹ Earlier scholars were overly

inclined to find evidence of revision in Demosthenes’ speeches,
on the assumption that (like the Roman orator Cicero) he care-
fully revised his speeches before publishing them. An example is
the reference to Philip’s raid on the territory of Olynthus in Dem.
4, delivered in 351, which was once wrongly believed to be an in-
terpolated reference to the war of 349/8, rather than a contempo-
rary reference to an earlier incursion.³⁰ In fact, the evidence for
revision is very limited.³¹ It has been argued that Dem. 8 is a re-
vised speech that includes material originally written for the later
Dem. 10, although this is uncertain.³² Revision has also been pro-
posed to explain why some medieval manuscripts of Demosthe-
nes’ speeches contain a slightly longer version of Dem. 9 and oth-
ers, a shorter one. If the material found only in the longer text is
genuine, as it seems to be, then it is possible that the speech was
edited by Demosthenes himself, to distribute it outside Athens. In
my view, however, a different explanation is more likely.³³
Whether or not the surviving deliberative speeches show signs
of revision, it is commonly believed that Demosthenes himself
published them.³⁴ His purpose in doing so is unlikely to have
been to influence public policy at Athens, since as an active pol-
itician he could achieve that end much more effectively by ad-
dressing the Assembly. It is conceivable that he published some
of his speeches to influence opinion elsewhere in Greece, though
it can be objected that this aim would have been better served
²⁹ Since all copies of a text had to be made by hand, there was no equiv-
alent in the ancient world to modern publication, and the total number of
copies of even “published” speeches must have been small.
³⁰ See 4.17n.
³¹ See in general Trevett 1996.
³² See the Introduction to Dem. 10 for discussion.
³³ The issue has recently been discussed by Wooten 2008: 167–173, who
argues this case. For doubts, see MacDowell 2009: 353. See more fully the
Introduction to Dem. 9.
³⁴ See Hansen 1984: 60– 66; Sealey 1993: 221–229; Yunis 1996: 241–247;
Tuplin 1998.

by speeches, whether circulated in writing or delivered in person,

that were composed for the purpose and that addressed their in-
tended audience directly.³⁵ It seems most likely, therefore, that if
he published his speeches, he did so to vindicate himself, in the
eyes both of his contemporaries and of posterity, and in the face
of heated criticism from his political rivals,³⁶ as a farsighted and
honest adviser of the people, and a significant political thinker.³⁷
It is not certain, however, that Demosthenes did publish his
speeches at all. An alternative, and in my view more likely, expla-
nation is that the texts of his speeches are simply drafts of what he
intended to say to the Assembly, were for the most part filed away
once they had served their purpose, and remained substantially
unpublished until after his death.³⁸
ancient commentators on demosthenes

The speeches of Demosthenes were much read, studied, and
written about in antiquity, and since the ancient commentators
are important sources of information about their date, content,
and authorship, and are frequently referred to in this volume, it
³⁵ In any case, some of the speeches, especially the pre-Philippic speeches

Dem. 14–16, are unlikely to have been of much political interest outside
Athens.
³⁶ The trial “on the crown” of 330, in which Aeschines prosecuted De-
mosthenes’ supporter Ctesiphon, was concerned largely with the assessment
of Demosthenes’ political record: see Aes. 3; Dem. 18.
³⁷ The strongest argument that some of the speeches were distributed
in Demosthenes’ lifetime is an anecdote that suggests that a contemporary
of his named Aesion had read them (Plut. Demosthenes 11.4: “the speeches
of Demosthenes, when read out, were far superior . . .”). Tuplin 1998 ar-
gues that the corpus of deliberative speeches that in his view were published
(Dem. 1– 6, 8, 9, 14–16) demonstrates various patterns that are “consciously
informed by considerations of a literary and paradigmatic nature” (p. 319),
i.e., that Demosthenes carefully selected and arranged the speeches. I find
this implausible.
³⁸ Thus, Trevett 1996. See too MacDowell 2009: 8, “In the majority of
cases I think it likely that Demosthenes did not revise or distribute the texts
of his speeches but simply kept them at home.”

may be useful to make some general remarks about them.³⁹ The

manuscripts of Dem. 1–17 contain introductions (hypotheseis in
Greek) to each of the speeches written by the fourth-century ad
scholar Libanius of Antioch, as well as anonymous commentar-
ies on them (scholia in Greek, referred to as ancient commentary
or commentator in this volume). These commentaries deal mostly
with rhetorical matters, but they also contain discussion of histor-
ical questions.⁴⁰
One very important commentary, partially preserved on papy-
rus, was discovered in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century.
It is the work of Didymus, a scholar of the first century nicknamed
“brass guts” because of his prodigious industriousness.⁴¹ It covers
Dem. 9 (the end only), 10, 12 and the beginning of 13: presum-
ably the complete work dealt with all the deliberative speeches.
Didymus is particularly important because he argues for his views
and cites excerpts from the (otherwise lost) works of fourth- and
third-century historians that covered the period. Of these, the
two most important are Theopompus of Chios, whose substan-
tial contemporary Philippic History covered Greek history during
the years of Philip’s reign (359–336), and Philochorus of Athens,
who wrote an annalistic Atthis (i.e., a year-by-year history of Ath-
ens) that covered the same period in great detail.⁴² Last, the first-
century rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in the course of
a work (the First Letter to Ammaeus) in which he seeks to prove
that Aristotle’s Rhetoric was a later work than any of Demosthe-
nes’ deliberative speeches, provides dates for all the speeches (ex-
³⁹ See in general Dickey 2007: 51–53; Gibson 2002.

⁴⁰ These are cited by page and line numbers from the Greek text of Dilts
1983.
⁴¹ Harding 2006 provides a very useful translation of and commentary
on Didymus’ text. Didymus is cited by column and line number from the
papyrus roll.
⁴² Translations of the surviving fragments of Theopompus can be found
in Shrimpton 1991; of Philochorus, in Harding 2008. The only surviving
narrative history that covers this period is the Library of History of Diodorus
Siculus, a Greek historian of the first century bc, which lacks detail and is
unreliable on matters of chronology.

cept Dem. 13). It seems likely that Dionysius took over these dates
from another source, and it is a matter of debate how much confi-
dence should be put in them.⁴³
list of wor ks in this volume

For discussion of questions of date and authorship, see the in-
troductions to the individual speeches.
1. First Olynthiac, 349/8.
2. Second Olynthiac, 349/8.
3. Third Olynthiac, 349/8.
4. First Philippic, 351.
5. On the Peace, 346.
6. Second Philippic, 344/3.
7. On Halonnesus, 343/2 (by Hegesippus, not Demosthenes).
8. On the Chersonese, 341.
9. Third Philippic, 341.
10. Fourth Philippic, 341.
11. Response to the Letter of Philip, 340 (perhaps spurious).
12. Letter of Philip, 340 (probably a genuine letter from Philip).
13. On Organization, Late 350s.
14. On the Symmories, 354/3.
15. On the Freedom of the Rhodians, Late 350s.
16. For the Megalopolitans, 353/2.
17. On the Agreement with Alexander, 331? (not by Demosthenes).
⁴³ See Sealey 1955; Lane Fox 1997; Lewis 1997: 230–251. The dates of indi-
vidual speeches are discussed in the speech introductions.

chronology
359 Accession of Philip as king of Macedonia.
357 Philip captures Amphipolis and Pydna. Athens de-
clares war on Philip.
357–355 Social War between Athens and several of its disaf-
fected allies.
356–346 Third Sacred War between Thebes and Phocis.
356 Philip captures Potidaea.
354 Philip captures Methone.
354/3 On the Symmories (Dem. 14).
353/2 For the Megalopolitans (Dem. 16).
352 Philip defeats Phocian army at the battle of Crocus
Field in Thessaly. Athenian army occupies the pass
of Thermopylae.
352–350 Philip campaigns in Thrace; On the Freedom of
the Rhodians (Dem. 15); On Organization
(Dem. 13).
351 First Philippic (Dem. 4).
349/8 Philip attacks Chalcidic League and besieges
Olynthus. Athens sends relief forces to Olynthus.
First, Second, Third Olynthiacs (Dem. 1–3).
348 Fall of Olynthus.
346 Peace of Philocrates between Philip and Athens.
End of the Third Sacred War and defeat of Phocis.
Philip gains control of Thermopylae. On the Peace
(Dem. 5).
344/3 Persian embassy to Athens. Philip offers to revise
the Peace of Philocrates. Second Philippic (Dem. 6).
343 On the Dishonest Embassy (Dem. 19).
343/2 On Halonnesus (Dem. 7).
342–340 Philip campaigns in Thrace and defeats
Cersobleptes.
341 Hostilities between the Athenian force in the
Chersonese and Philip’s ally Cardia. On the Cher-
sonese (Dem. 8); Third Philippic (Dem. 9); Fourth
Philippic (Dem. 10).

340 Philip besieges Perinthus and Byzantium. Out-

break of war between Philip and Athens. Letter
of Philip (Dem. 12); Response to the Letter of Philip
(Dem. 11).
339 Alliance between Thebes and Athens.
338 Philip defeats the Greek army at the battle of
Chaeronea.
337 Establishment of the League of Corinth.
336 Murder of Philip; accession of Alexander as king
of Macedonia. Initial Macedonian invasion of Asia
Minor.
335 Revolt and sack of Thebes.
334 Launch of the major Macedonian invasion of the
Persian Empire.
331 Spartan revolt against Macedonian rule led by
King Agis. Possible date of On the Agreement with
Alexander (Dem. 17).
330 On the Crown (Dem. 18).

1. FIR ST OLY NTHI AC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction to demosthenes 1– 3
Olynthus was a city in the Chalcidic peninsula and the head
of the Chalcidic League, the only significant Greek power in the
north Aegean.¹ The league had made an alliance with Philip of
Macedon in 357, when he offered to recover for them the nearby
city of Potidaea, which was controlled by Athens and had a garri-
son of Athenian “cleruchs,” that is, settlers.² Philip and his new al-
lies proceeded to lay siege to Potidaea, probably in early 356 (Dio-
dorus 16.8.5). Demosthenes states that the Athenians voted to send
a relief expedition, but that nothing came of it (4.35), no doubt in
part because Athens at the time was embroiled in the Social War
against some of its allies who were in revolt. When Potidaea fell,
the Athenian settlers were sent home, but the Potidaeans them-
selves were sold into slavery, and their city and land were handed
over to the Chalcidic League. Philip also gave it Anthemous, a
city that had previously been a bone of contention between Mace-
donia and Olynthus (Libanius Introduction to Dem. 1 2).
Nevertheless, relations between Philip and Olynthus started to
deteriorate in the late 350s. Philip’s growing power alarmed the
Olynthians, who started to turn towards Athens instead. Demos-
thenes claimed in a speech of 352 (Dem. 23.107–109) that after the
¹ This general introduction deals with the background to the three Olyn-
thiacs, which have a common subject matter and were all delivered within
a short period. Each speech also has a shorter individual introduction. On
these speeches, see MacDowell 2009: 229–239.
² See Dem. 23.107–109; Diodorus 16.8.3–4; Tod 1948: no. 158.

28 demosthenes
Olynthians started to be alarmed by Philip’s strength, “they have

made friendship with you [the Athenians] and say that they will
make alliance.” In the First Philippic (probably of 351) he refers
to Philip’s “sudden campaigns from his own land against Ther-
mopylae and the Chersonese and Olynthus and anywhere else he
wishes” (4.17). Since he mentions Olynthus only in passing, some
less serious incident than outright war was evidently involved.³
In addition, the historian Theopompus, in a passage describing
events of 351/0 (FGH 115 fragment 127), reports that Philip told
the Chalcidians a fable, that War follows close on the heels of Ar-
rogance (hybris).
Taken together, these passages suggest that Philip was angered
by the Olynthians’ recent rapprochement with Athens and staged
a show of force to try to coerce them back into line. The latter
were evidently divided on this issue. Before Philip declared war
on them, the pro-Athenian Apollonides was exiled (Dem. 59.91),
and two supporters of Macedonia, Lasthenes and Euthycrates,
were appointed as cavalry commanders (9.56– 66; Dem. 19.265).
Nevertheless, according to a later speech of Demosthenes (9.11),
Philip told the Olynthians bluntly that either they must stop liv-
ing in Olynthus or he, in Macedonia. Finally, in autumn 349, he
invaded their territory, intimidating and forcing some of their cit-
ies into submission. Torone and Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus,
were captured by treachery, the league’s army was defeated, and
the city of Olynthus was put under siege (Diodorus 16.52.9, 53.2).
In the face of this crisis the Olynthians turned to Athens for
help. The main narrative source for the Athenian response is the
historian Philochorus, who in his history of Athens recorded, un-
der the year 349/8, first an alliance between Athens and Olyn-
thus (the first entry for the year, and so probably in late summer
349) and then three separate expeditionary forces sent out from
Athens (the last of which was too late to help).⁴ These comprised
respectively:
³ See the Introduction to Dem. 4 for the chronology.

⁴ FGH 328 fragments 49–51 = Harding 1985: no. 80. Demosthenes’ pol-
icy of fighting Philip in the north and reinforcing Olynthus is the subject of
a sharp, and influential, critique by Cawkwell (1962a).

1. first oly nthiac 29
◆ 2,000 [mercenary] peltasts (i.e., light infantry) and 38 ships;
◆ 4,000 peltasts, 150 cavalry, and 18 triremes under the com-
mand of Charidemus, which engaged in joint operations with
the Olynthians at Pellene and Bottiaea (places in the Chalcidic
peninsula);
◆ 2,000 citizen hoplites, 300 cavalry, and 17 triremes.
But Athens’ intervention did not save Olynthus, which was be-
trayed to Philip by his partisans Euthycrates and Lasthenes (on
whom see above; Diodorus 16.53.2). Demosthenes later claimed
that in the course of a single year the Olynthians lost every city
in the Chalcidic peninsula by treachery and that five hundred
cavalry were betrayed by their officers, presumably the men just
named (Dem. 19.265–267). Most of the inhabitants were killed or
sold into slavery, and the cities of the league were destroyed (9.26).
Refugees are attested at Athens and on the Athenian-controlled
island of Lemnos.⁵ The site of the destroyed city of Olynthus,
which was never resettled, is ironically now the most complete ex-
cavated classical Greek city.⁶
All three Olynthiacs belong to the year of Philip’s campaign
against Olynthus (349/8), but it is not clear in what order they
were delivered or what intervals there were between them.⁷ The is-
sue was debated already in antiquity: the traditional arrangement
(1–2–3) reflects the order of the speeches in one of the medieval
manuscripts of Demosthenes, which the Roman critic Caecilius
had also argued for; another scholar, Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
ordered them 2–3–1, on what (if any) authority we do not know.⁸
This latter sequence is unlikely to be correct, and it is generally
⁵ Athens: Tod 1948: no. 166; Lemnos: IG XII.8.4 = Harding 1985: no. 81.
⁶ On the excavations at Olynthus, see Cahill 2002.
⁷ For the date, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, First Letter to Ammaeus 4.
The Athenian year ran from roughly mid summer to mid summer, and so
does not correspond to our calendar year. Here 349/8 was the year in which
Callimachus was archōn (magistrate) at Athens and ran from summer 349
to summer 348.
⁸ See the ancient commentary on Dem. 2.1 (Dilts 1983: 49.4) for Caeci-
lius; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, First Letter to Ammaeus 4.

30 demosthenes
agreed that Dem. 3 is the latest, both because its tone is mark-
edly more pessimistic than that of the other two speeches and be-
cause in it Demosthenes speaks directly about the need to divert
money from the theoric fund, whereas in Dem. 1 his remarks on
this topic are guarded (1.19), and in Dem. 2 he does not mention
it at all. The order of the other two speeches is unclear, although
it has plausibly been argued, from a comparison of the accounts
of affairs in Thessaly in the two speeches, that Dem. 2 is the ear-
lier.⁹ At any rate, Dem. 1 and 2 appear to have been delivered
close in time to each other, and they, if not all three speeches,
seem to predate the first of the three Athenian expeditions to re-
lieve Olynthus.¹⁰
introduction
In the First Olynthiac Demosthenes proposes that the Athe-
nians send a relief force to Olynthus (2). He goes on to argue that
they should in fact send two forces to the north: one to relieve
Olynthus and another to raid Philip’s territory (17–18). The idea
of creating two separate forces is found in a different form in a
slightly earlier speech, Dem. 4, where he proposes both a rapid-
response force and a force permanently stationed in the north Ae-
gean. Demosthenes suggests that the Athenians already have the
money to pay for these, but that they choose to distribute it in
other ways. His allusion is to the theoric fund (ta theōrika), a fund
of public money whose primary purpose was to subsidize Athe-
nian citizens’ attendance at the theater but which had grown to
cover other civilian expenditure as well. It was politically risky,
and may indeed have been illegal, to propose that this money be
used for military purposes, and Demosthenes pointedly refuses to
do so (18–19).¹¹
Instead, as in the speech On Organization (Dem. 13), Demos-
⁹ Ellis 1967: see 1.22n.

¹⁰ The issue is discussed in detail by Tuplin 1998: 276–291. He is skeptical
of previous attempts to determine their “historical order,” i.e., the order in
which they were actually given, but on the basis of a literary analysis detects
a “rising tone of alarm” in the sequence 1–2–3.
¹¹ See, more fully, the Introduction to Dem. 3.

thenes argues for the introduction of a single system of state pay

that would be limited to citizens who served in person, in what-
ever capacity was required. He also urges the Athenians to be will-
ing to pay the wealth-tax (eisphora). This was an occasional tax,
levied as a fi xed proportion of the assessed wealth of the richest
Athenians.¹² Since Athens had no other means of raising money
in a hurry, and since its public finances were overstretched, the
wealth-tax became a regular means to fund military activity. It
tended to be unpopular with the rich, who often sought to con-
ceal the true extent of their wealth and who also had a financial
interest in avoiding war.
The tone of the speech is optimistic, emphasizing the heaven-
sent opportunity of joining the Olynthians in fighting Philip (7)
at a safe distance from Athens. Demosthenes argues that Philip is
not invincible: his reputation as a rogue and a liar makes him un-
trustworthy to any free state (3–5), and he is not succeeding as he
would wish (21–23). He claims that Philip’s successes are due in
large part to Athenian laxness (11); on the other hand, if the Athe-
nians fail to take vigorous action, Philip’s record shows that he
will not stop at Olynthus (12–14). If the Athenians do not defeat
him in the north, they may find themselves having to repel him
from Attica itself (15, 26–27). Therefore, he argues, they must take
advantage of Philip’s ill-judged attack on Olynthus, and be will-
ing to pay taxes and campaign in person to deal with him (6).
There are texts of this speech with commentary by Sandys 1910

and McQueen 1986 and a translation with commentary by Ellis
and Milns 1970.
1. first oly nthi ac

[1] I imagine that you would give much, men of Athens, to
know what will benefit the city in the matter we are considering.
¹² This tax was collected through a system of contribution groups called

symmories (symmoriai), among which wealthy Athenians were distributed.
Each symmory was required to raise a fi xed proportion of the total needed.
See further 2.29n and (for the extension of the symmory system to the fund-
ing of the navy) the Introduction to Dem. 14.

32 demosthenes
Since this is the case, you should listen attentively to those who
wish to offer you advice. If a speaker comes forward with a useful
proposal already prepared,¹³ you should listen to his advice and
accept it; but in addition I regard it as a sign of your good fortune
that it may occur to some speakers to say much that is needed on
the spur of the moment, so that from all that is said you will eas-
ily be able to choose what is to your advantage.
[2] The present situation,¹⁴ men of Athens, all but takes voice
and says that you must take control of the Olynthians’ affairs, if
indeed you are concerned about their preservation—though I find
it difficult to describe our attitude towards them. In my opinion,
you should vote for an immediate relief force, and make prep-
arations as quickly as possible to send help from here, to avoid
suffering a recurrence of what happened previously, and should
send an embassy to announce these decisions and observe what
is happening. [3] My particular fear is that, since he¹⁵ is a rogue
and a clever manipulator of events, sometimes making conces-
sions, whenever it is in his interest, sometimes making threats,
which might reasonably be regarded as credible, sometimes slan-
dering us and our failure to intervene, he may turn around and
snatch some advantage from this whole situation. [4] However,
men of Athens, one might say that the hardest thing about Philip
to fight against is the best for you: the fact that he, as an indi-
vidual, controls every thing, both what is public and what is se-
cret, and is simultaneously general and ruler and paymaster, and
is present everywhere with his army. As a result, he has a consid-
erable advantage for the rapid and timely conduct of war,¹⁶ but
the opposite is the case as regards the agreements that he would
like to make with the Olynthians.¹⁷ [5] For the Olynthians now
¹³ Demosthenes distinguishes between speakers such as himself (see the

Introduction to this volume, pp. 19–20) who prepare their speeches in ad-
vance and those who speak off the cuff.
¹⁴ I.e., Philip’s attack on Olynthus: see the Introduction to Dem. 1–3.
¹⁵ Philip.
¹⁶ On Philip’s military superiority on land, see also 9.47–50.
¹⁷ Demosthenes here presumably refers to the possibility of the negoti-
ated surrender of Olynthus.

see clearly that they are fighting not for glory or over the division
of land but to prevent the destruction and enslavement of their
country, and they know how he treated those Amphipolitans¹⁸
who handed over their city to him, and those Pydnans who let
him into their city.¹⁹ Free states, I believe, have no trust in tyr-
anny, especially if they share a common border with it.²⁰ [6] And
so, men of Athens, if you acknowledge these facts and keep in
mind everything else that you should, I urge you to be resolute
and aroused to action and to apply yourselves to the war as never
before, willingly contributing money²¹ and going on campaign in
person and neglecting nothing. For there is no reason or excuse
left for you to refuse to do what is needed. [7] Now what everyone
was chattering about recently—that we must induce the Olyn-
thians to go to war with Philip—has come about of its own ac-
cord and in a way that may prove most advantageous to you. For
if they had been persuaded by you to go to war, they would be
unreliable allies and might only partially acknowledge that they
were at war; but since they hate him on account of their own
grievances,²² their hatred of him will probably be assured because
of what they fear and of what they have suffered. [8] You must not
¹⁸ Philip captured the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace in 357: see

4.12n. According to the ancient commentary on this passage (Dilts 1983:
26.3–10), Philip had the Amphipolitans who had betrayed the city to him
put to death first, saying that he feared they would show the same disloyalty
to him as they had to their own citizens.
¹⁹ The Greek city of Pydna on the west coast of the Thermaic Gulf in
Macedonia had been seized by the Athenian general Timotheus in 364 (see
3.28n) and was captured by Philip in 357 (Diodorus 16.8.2–3). On its be-
trayal, see also Dem. 20.63. The ancient commentary (Dilts 1983: 26.13–
19) says that the traitors fled to the shrine of Philip’s father Amyntas when
they learned they would not be spared, but that Philip falsely promised they
would come to no harm if they left it and then had them killed.
²⁰ Philip controlled the territory to the north of the Chalcidic peninsula
and so shared a land border with the Chalcidic League.
²¹ Demosthenes refers to the wealth-tax (eisphora): see the Speech Intro-
duction.
²² There was growing tension between Philip and Olynthus in the period
before the outbreak of war in 349: see the Introduction to Dem. 1–3.

34 demosthenes
pass up such an opportunity, men of Athens, when it has fallen

into your lap, nor suffer the same fate as you have suffered many
times already. For if, when we had returned from helping the Eu-
boeans,²³ and the Amphipolitans Hierax and Stratocles²⁴ were
here on this very platform urging us to sail and take possession
of their city, we had shown the same concern for our own inter-
ests as we had for the security of the Euboeans, we would have
held on to Amphipolis then and would have avoided all our sub-
sequent troubles. [9] Again, when it was announced that Pydna,
Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae,²⁵ and the other places—I do not
wish to waste time talking about them individually—were being
besieged, if we had energetically dispatched an appropriate relief
force to the first of these, we would now be dealing with a more
tractable and much weaker Philip. But as things are, men of Ath-
ens, we always abandon any opportunity that presents itself and
hope that the future will turn out well of its own accord, and as a
result we have made Philip stronger and more powerful than any
previous king of Macedonia. But now indeed in the case of Olyn-
thus, as great an opportunity has come to us of its own accord as
any of those previous ones. [10] And it seems to me at any rate,
²³ On the Athenian expedition to Euboea in 357, see 8.74n.

²⁴ On the fall of Amphipolis, see 5n above. It is unclear whether these
men came to Athens as official ambassadors or as unofficial representatives
of a pro-Athenian faction.
²⁵ Demosthenes lists the four sieges in chronological order. On Pydna,
see 5n above. The Greek city of Potidaea, on the narrow isthmus separat-
ing the peninsula of Pallene from the Chalcidice, had been captured by the
Athenian general Timotheus in 364 and settled with Athenians: see 3.28n.
Philip successfully besieged it in 356 (Diodorus 16.8.5). The Greek city of
Methone on the Thermaic Gulf just to the north of Pydna had also been
won by Timotheus in 364 (see 3.28n) and was captured by Philip proba-
bly in 354 (Diodorus 16.31.6 records it under the year 354/3). Pagasae was the
port of Pherae in southern Thessaly. It was captured by Philip, most proba-
bly in 352, in the course of his intervention in the Third Sacred War against
Pherae (see Diodorus 16.37.3, 38.1). Diodorus elsewhere records Philip’s cap-
ture of an unknown place called “Pagae” under the year 354/3 (16.31.6), and
some scholars emend this to “Pagasae,” but there is no other evidence that
Philip campaigned in Thessaly in this year.

men of Athens, that if someone were appointed to give a fair ap-

praisal of your treatment at the hands of the gods, although many
things are not as they should be, he would nevertheless be very
grateful to them, and with good reason. For the fact that we have
suffered many reverses in the war might justly be attributed to
our carelessness, whereas the fact that we did not suffer these re-
verses long ago, and that to counterbalance them an alliance has
been presented to us, if we are willing to take advantage of it, I
would regard as a beneficial result of their goodwill. [11] And yet
we conduct ourselves, I believe, like those who have acquired a
sum of money: if someone keeps all the money that he acquires,
he is very grateful to Fortune; but if it slips through his fingers,
he forgets his gratitude too. Similarly in public affairs, those who
misuse their opportunities forget whatever benefit they have re-
ceived from the gods, since every previous benefit is judged ac-
cording to its eventual outcome. For this reason, men of Athens,
you must give full thought for the future, so that by making these
corrections, you may wipe away the dishonor you have incurred
for your past conduct. [12] But if we also abandon these men,
men of Athens, and he then captures Olynthus, will someone tell
me what is to prevent him marching wherever he wishes? Does
any of you observe or reflect on the means by which Philip, who
was weak, has become strong? First, he took Amphipolis, then
Pydna, and then Potidaea, next Methone, and then he attacked
Thessaly, [13] and after that, Pherae, Pagasae, and Magnesia.²⁶ Af-
ter winning over the whole country²⁷ in the way he wanted, he
invaded Thrace.²⁸ Then, after expelling some of the kings there
²⁶ On these places, see 8– 9nn above. Magnesia is a region in the east of

Thessaly.
²⁷ The “whole country” refers to Thessaly, of which Philip was elected
chief magistrate (archōn) for life after his decisive victory over the Phocians
at the battle of the Crocus Field in 352: see Justin Epitome 7.3.2.
²⁸ Thrace was the large region extending east of Macedonia as far as the
Black Sea. In this period it was ruled by several independent kings. Philip
began campaigning in Thrace in late 352, perhaps in response to Athens’ oc-
cupation of the Chersonese and negotiations with the Thracian king Cerso-
bleptes (see Diodorus 16.34.3–4). See further 3.4–5.

36 demosthenes
and installing others, he fell sick.²⁹ When he recovered his health,

he did not sink into idleness but immediately made an attempt on
the Olynthians.³⁰ And I pass over his campaigns against the Il-
lyrians and Paeonians and Arybbas and wherever else one might
mention.³¹
[14] But why, it might be asked, are you telling us this now?
My purpose is to make you understand, men of Athens, both the
harm done by our continual neglect of our affairs, one after an-
other, and Philip’s habitual meddlesomeness, which prevents him
from being content with what he has achieved and remaining at
peace. If he is always determined to surpass his existing achieve-
ments, while we refuse to apply ourselves robustly to any situa-
tion, how can matters be expected to end? [15] By the gods, who
of you is so foolish as to be unaware that the war will move from
there to here, if we neglect it? And if that happens, men of Ath-
ens, I fear that, like those who thoughtlessly borrow at high rates
of interest and prosper for a short while but later lose even their
principal, so we may be seen to have paid a high price for our ne-
glect and, in our constant search to do what brings pleasure, may
later be forced to do many hard things against our will, and our
very homeland may be at risk.
[16] Perhaps it will be said that criticism is easy and open to all
but that the duty of the adviser is to reveal what should be done
in the present situation. I am well aware, men of Athens, that you
are often angry not at those who are at fault but at the most re-
cent speakers about the political situation, if anything turns out
²⁹ On rumors of Philip’s illness or death, see 4.11, delivered in 351.

³⁰ This “attempt” refers to an earlier incursion (see 7n above) rather than
the current war: see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 298 n. 3.
³¹ These campaigns against various non-Greek peoples to the north and
west of Macedonia probably took place in 351/0, after Philip’s operations in
Thrace. The Illyrians to the west had been defeated by Philip at the start of
his reign: this later campaign is also mentioned (as a rumor) at 4.48. The
Paeonians were a tribe to the north of Macedonia. Arybbas was king of the
Molossians of Epirus, to the southwest of Macedonia, and uncle of Philip’s
wife Olympias: see also 7.32n. These campaigns are discussed by Hammond
and Griffith 1979: 304–308.

contrary to your expectation. But I certainly do not think that

out of concern for one’s personal safety one should refrain from
saying what is to your advantage. [17] I say that you should re-
lieve the situation in two ways: both by rescuing the cities of the
Olynthians and sending the soldiers to do so and by ravaging his
territory with triremes and other soldiers. If you neglect either of
these, I fear that the campaign may be in vain. [18] For if, while
you are ravaging his territory, he submits to this attack and re-
duces Olynthus, he will easily return to his own land and defend
it.³² But if you send help only to Olynthus, he will see that there
is no danger at home, will keep a careful watch, and will eventu-
ally take the city by siege. It is therefore necessary that the relief
force be large and be divided into two parts.
[19] That is my opinion about the relief force. As for the pro-
vision of money, you have money, men of Athens, you have more
than anyone else: this money you receive in the form you wish.³³
If we hand it over to those who are on campaign, you will need no
further source of money. But if you do not, you will need a further
source, or rather, you will be in need of the whole amount. “What
is this?” someone may say, “Do you propose that this money be
transferred to the military fund?” No, by God, I do not propose
that.³⁴ [20] But I do believe that soldiers must be provided, and
that there should be a military fund,³⁵ and a single system for re-
ceiving pay and for performing one’s duty, whereas you think that
somehow you should receive this money for attending festivals in
³² I.e., Demosthenes predicts that if Athens attacks the coast of Mace-

donia Philip will remain in the territory of Olynthus until he has reduced
the city, and will then return to Macedonia to deal with the Athenian at-
tacks there.
³³ Demosthenes refers in guarded terms to payments from the theoric
fund, on which see 3.11–13 and the Introduction to Dem. 3.
³⁴ Demosthenes is afraid of being prosecuted if he should make such
an unpopular, and perhaps also illegal, proposal: see the Introduction to
Dem. 3 on the precise nature of the danger.
³⁵ The military fund (to stratiōtikon) was almost certainly already in ex-
istence by this date, although almost nothing is known of its operation: see
Cawkwell 1962b.

38 demosthenes
much the same way as you do now, without any trouble.³⁶ The
only course left, I believe, is for everyone to pay taxes,³⁷ much if
much is needed, a little if little is needed. But we do need money,
and without it we can do none of the things that we need. Other
men speak about certain other sources of revenue: choose which-
ever you think is advantageous and take control of the situation
while the opportunity is here.
[21] It is worthwhile to consider and evaluate how Philip’s af-
fairs now stand. His present situation is not one of readiness,
even though it appears to be and a careless observer might so de-
scribe it, nor is it as satisfactory as it could be, nor would he ever
have started this war if he thought that he would actually have
to fight, but he expected that as soon as he attacked, he would
carry off every thing. But he was mistaken. This indeed is the first
thing that has turned out contrary to his plan, and it rattles him
and causes him great distress. And then there is the situation in
Thessaly. [22] The Thessalians are always naturally untrustworthy
to everybody, as you know, and are behaving towards him ex-
actly as they have in the past.³⁸ For indeed they have voted to de-
mand that he return Pagasae to them, and they have prevented
him from fortifying Magnesia.³⁹ And I have heard some people
say that they will no longer even allow him to derive profit from
their harbors and marketplaces, on the ground that these reve-
nues should be used to manage the common affairs of the Thes-
salians, not be taken by Philip.⁴⁰ If he is deprived of these funds,
³⁶ The original purpose of the theoric fund was to subsidize Athenian cit-
izens’ attendance at theater performances, for which there was an admis-
sion charge.
³⁷ Demosthenes seeks to scare the Athenians with the threat that liability
to pay the eisphora may need to be extended from the rich to all citizens.
³⁸ On the Thessalians’ reputation for unreliability, see also Dem. 24.112.
It probably arose in the main from the factionalism and instability of Thes-
salian politics, on which see (for the fourth century) Westlake 1935.
³⁹ On Pagasae and Magnesia, see 13n above.
⁴⁰ Philip enjoyed effective control of Thessaly, but the Thessalians are re-
ported to object to his treating Pagasae and Magnesia as his personal pos-
sessions, as well as to his handling of the public finances of the country.

he will be hard pressed to provide supplies for his mercenaries.

[23] Moreover, it must be supposed that the Paeonians and the Il-
lyrians and, in general, all these people would rather be free and
autonomous than slaves.⁴¹ For they are not accustomed to take
orders from anybody, and the fellow is said to be overbearing.
And, by Zeus, that is perhaps quite credible, since undeserved
success leads the foolish to make poor judgments. As a result, it
often seems more difficult to preserve one’s wealth than it was to
acquire it. [24] Therefore, men of Athens, you ought to consider
his difficulty as your opportunity, and readily share the burdens,
and send ambassadors for what is needed, and campaign in per-
son, and spur on everyone else. Consider: if Philip were to seize
such an opportunity against us, and war were to come against
our land, how readily do you think that he would attack us? Are
you not then ashamed if you will not dare, when you have the
chance, to do to him the very things that he would do to you, if
he could?
[25] Moreover, men of Athens, you should not forget that now
is the moment that will decide whether you are to wage war there
or he is to do so here. If Olynthus holds out, you will be wag-
ing war there and ravaging his territory, while enjoying your own
land without fear. But if Philip takes Olynthus, who will pre-
vent him from marching here? [26] The Thebans? I fear it may be
rather harsh to say so, but they will readily join in attacking us.⁴²
The Phocians then? But they are unable to defend their own terri-
tory without your help.⁴³ Or some other city? But, my dear sir, no
one will be willing. It would be the height of absurdity if, when
he can, he should fail to do the very thing that he now rants about
doing, at the risk of seeming foolish. [27] Nothing more, I think,
needs be said about the great difference between fighting here and
⁴¹ On these non-Greek allies of Philip, see 13n above.

⁴² On the generally poor relations between Athens and Thebes in this pe-
riod, see Dem. 16 and the Introduction to this volume.
⁴³ Demosthenes is referring to an Athenian expedition to Thermopylae
in 352, in the aftermath of Philip’s defeat of the Phocian army at the battle
of the Crocus Field, which prevented Philip from securing this strategically
vital pass: see Diodorus 16.37.3, 38.2.

40 demosthenes
fighting there. For if you had to take the field in person for only
thirty days, and to draw the supplies that you needed from our
territory—when there was no war in it, I mean—I think that the
damage the farmers among you would suffer would exceed all you
have spent on the previous war in its entirety. But if war comes,
how much damage must you suppose they will suffer? There is
also the insult and the shame that you would feel at the situa-
tion—for decent men, there is no greater punishment than this.
[28] Since you know all this, you all must help push war away
from here to there: the well-off so that, by spending a little of
their wealth for the sake of the many things that they possess in
their prosperity, they may enjoy the rest without fear; those in
their prime, so that, by acquiring experience of war in Philip’s ter-
ritory, they may become fearsome guardians of their own land
and keep it inviolate; and the public speakers, so that their politi-
cal conduct may stand up to scrutiny,⁴⁴ since you will judge their
actions according to how events turn out. May the results then be
excellent, for all our sakes!
⁴⁴ All Athenian public officials underwent an official scrutiny (euthynai)

at the end of their term in office. Public speakers were not liable to this scru-
tiny unless they had held some official position such as ambassador.

2. SECOND OLY NTHI AC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
This speech was delivered in 349/8 (see the Introduction to
Dem. 1–3), apparently before the Athenians had sent any assis-
tance to Olynthus, since at 12 Demosthenes calls for them to take
action. As in the First Olynthiac, he represents the Olynthian ap-
peal to Athens as a marvelous opportunity that must be taken (1–
2). He proposes that the Athenians send help to Olynthus and
also send an embassy to Thessaly, which has grown restive under
Macedonian rule (11).
The bulk of the speech is devoted to belittling Philip and seek-
ing to persuade the Athenians that he is far from invincible. Many
of Philip’s successes are attributed to deception (6–8), and his ap-
parent power is said to be insecurely based (10–11). Macedonia is
militarily useful only as a supplement to others, not in its own
right (14). It is also disunited, since ordinary Macedonians do not
share their king’s ambition and are exhausted by continuous war
(15–16). The infantry are mediocre (17); those Macedonians who
are competent are pushed aside by the king out of jealousy, while
any who are morally upright are repulsed by the moral laxity of
the court (18–19). Philip’s success obscures the underlying weak-
ness of his position (20–21); he has been lucky, but the gods are
more likely to support Athens (22). Yet the Athenians are idle,
while Philip is at least energetic (23). This is surprising both in
light of Athens’ history and because the Athenians are now fight-
ing for their own property (24). They procrastinate but must be
willing to serve in person (25–27). The generals are neither com-
mitted to the war (28) nor held to account, while the Athenian

42 demosthenes
people are disunited (29). They must be willing to cooperate and

serve in person (30–31).
Demosthenes’ complaints about the Athenians’ inactivity and
the need for them to serve in person are regular features of his
deliberative oratory. More striking are his critical remarks about
Philip and the Macedonians. Demosthenes attributes his infor-
mation about the poor quality of the Macedonian infantry, the
jealousy of the king, and the degeneracy of the Macedonian court
to “someone who has been in that country, and who is incapable
of lying” (17). Many Greeks visited the Macedonian court, and it
is not unlikely that Demosthenes had informants with first-hand
knowledge of it. The nature and tone of these remarks resemble
those of his contemporary, the historian Theopompus of Chios,
whose Philippic History (of which only fragments survive) was a
detailed history of Greece during the years of Philip’s reign. Theo-
pompus was familiar with life in Macedonia, and in surviving
fragments he makes very sharp criticism of the moral laxity of
Philip’s court: the king’s favoritism, drunkenness, and homosex-
ual liaisons. Although there is no evidence, or even likelihood,
that Theopompus was Demosthenes’ informant, the similarity of
their views indicates the currency among at least some educated
Greeks of a scornful attitude toward Philip and his entourage.
There is some measure of truth to the picture of Macedonia
that Demosthenes paints, and the heavy drinking and factional-
ism of the court are familiar from the better-documented reign
of Philip’s son Alexander. But Demosthenes presents a funda-
mentally misleading picture of the strengths and weaknesses of
Philip’s position. First, he downplays Macedonian military capa-
bilities. The strength of the army lay in its cavalry, but the infan-
try of the phalanx, armed with the distinctive long pike (sarissa),
was more than a match for Greek hoplites. Demosthenes’ claim
that the Macedonian army made a contribution only in an aux-
iliary capacity (14) was wholly untrue, at least as regards Philip’s
reign. Second, his assertion that Philip’s control of his kingdom
was insecure amounts to wishful thinking, since although Mace-
donia had a history of dynastic instability, there were no plausi-
ble rivals to Philip for the throne. Moreover, Philip’s unparalleled
successes made his position virtually unchallengeable. Demosthe-

2. second olynthiac 43
nes’ claim that ordinary Macedonians were war weary was almost
certainly unfounded. Finally, although life at the Macedonian
court was, by southern Greek standards, raucous and at times un-
couth, there is no evidence that its hard-drinking culture was a
source of weakness. Demosthenes understandably wished to con-
vince the Athenians that they had a chance to defeat Philip, but
the claims that he makes in this section are half-truths at best.
There are texts with commentary of this speech by Sandys 1910

and Milns 1970.
2. second oly nthi ac

[1] On many occasions, it seems to me, men of Athens, the
gods have clearly revealed their goodwill to the city, and not least
in the present situation. For the appearance of people who will
wage war on Philip,¹ whose territory borders on his and who have
a considerable force and, most important of all, whose attitude to-
wards the war is such that they regard their agreement² with him
as untrustworthy and leading to the destruction of their coun-
try—this situation seems to have come about by some miraculous
and altogether divine benefaction. [2] We, men of Athens, must
now avoid giving the impression that we treat ourselves worse
than the present situation treats us, since it would be shameful—
indeed most shameful—to be seen to have given up not only the
cities and places that we once controlled but also the allies and
the opportunities that Fortune has provided.
[3] It is in my opinion a mistake, men of Athens, to seek to
persuade you to do your duty by recounting Philip’s strength to
you. Why? Because all the facts that one might mention seem
to me to bring credit to him but to be blunders on our part. The
¹ I.e., the Olynthians.

² Philip made an alliance with the Chalcidic League headed by Olynthus
in 357/6: see Dem. 23.107–109; Diodorus 16.8.3–4; Rhodes and Osborne
2003: no. 50. In the years preceding the outbreak of war relations between
Philip and Olynthus had deteriorated: see the Introduction to Dem. 1–3.

44 demosthenes
more he has achieved beyond what he deserves, the more amazing

he seems to everybody; but as for you, the worse your handling of
the situation, the greater the shame you have incurred. [4] These
matters, then, I shall leave to one side. For indeed, men of Ath-
ens, if one were to examine the matter carefully, one would see
that Philip’s rise to greatness is due to us, not him. Nor do I think
that now is the time to talk about the activities of those who en-
gage in politics on his behalf, for which he owes them a debt of
gratitude and for which you should punish them. I shall, how-
ever, undertake to talk about other matters, which it will be more
advantageous for you to hear and which, men of Athens, anyone
who is willing to examine the matter correctly will see are greatly
to his discredit.
[5] To call him a liar and a perjurer without showing what he
has done might be called empty abuse, and rightly so. But to re-
count all his actions so far, and to convict him on all of these
counts, fortunately requires only a short speech. It also serves,
I think, two useful purposes: both to make him appear worth-
less—which he is—and to show those who are overly impressed
by Philip and think him invincible that all the sources of his pre-
vious duplicitous rise to greatness are now gone and that his af-
fairs have come to a dead end. [6] I, too, men of Athens, would be
convinced that Philip is fearsome and remarkable if I saw that he
had risen to power as a result of acting with justice. As it is, by ob-
servation and examination I see that at the outset, when certain
men sought to drive away the Olynthians who wished to reach an
agreement with you,³ he got the better of us in our innocence by
saying that he would hand over Amphipolis to us and by devis-
ing that once much talked about secret.⁴ [7] And subsequently he
³ Olynthus sent an embassy to Athens in 357/6 in the context of com-

petition between Athens and Philip to secure the support of the Chalcidic
League (Diodorus 16.8.4, and see above, 1n, on the alliance between Olyn-
thus and Philip).
⁴ In 357 Philip allegedly offered to hand over the Greek city of Amphi-
polis in Thrace to Athens. According to the fourth-century historian Theo-
pompus (FGH 115 fragment 30), two Athenian ambassadors to Philip had
proposed ceding to him the nearby city of Pydna in return for it. Despite

won the friendship of the Olynthians by seizing Potidaea, which

belonged to you, and did his former allies⁵ an injustice by hand-
ing it over to them,⁶ and now finally he has won over the Thes-
salians by promising that he will give them Magnesia and by un-
dertaking to conduct the war against Phocis on their behalf.⁷ In
short, there is no associate of his whom he has not cheated, since
it is by deceiving and winning over all of those who are ignorant
of him, one after another, that he has grown in power. [8] And so,
just as it was through these people⁸ that he has reached this high-
point, when each of them thought that he would do something
to their advantage, so it is through these same people that he is
bound to be destroyed, when it has been demonstrated that all
his actions were for his own benefit. This is the critical pass, men
of Athens, to which Philip’s affairs have come. Or else let some-
one come forward and show me, or rather show you, that I am
not telling the truth, that those whom he deceived at the start will
the doubts of de Ste. Croix (1963), who argued that the political institu-
tions of democratic Athens prevented the city from engaging in secret di-
plomacy, it is likely that Theopompus is broadly correct. Certainly it was
in Athens’ interest to keep any such negotiations secret from the Pydnans.
See also 7.27.
⁵ The ancient commentary on this passage (Dilts 1983: 61.21) states that
by “former allies” Demosthenes means the Potidaeans, and the Athenian
politician Hegesippus claims (Dem. 7.10) that Potidaea was an ally of Philip
when he attacked it in 356. The word “you” (i.e., “you, his former allies”) ap-
pears in the manuscripts but is generally deleted by editors as a later (and in-
correct) insertion. Philip made peace with the Athenians soon after his ac-
cession in 359 (Diodorus 16.4.1) and offered them an alliance (Dem. 23.121),
but almost certainly no alliance was made.
⁶ Philip captured the Athenian-controlled city of Potidaea in the Chal-
cidic peninsula in 356 (see 1.9n). When he was making his alliance with
the Chalcidic League (1n), he promised to secure Potidaea for it: see Dio-
dorus 16.8.5.
⁷ On Thessalian opposition to Philip’s control of the region of Magne-
sia, see 11 below; 1.13, 22. The “war against Phocis” is the Third Sacred War,
in which much of Thessaly was fighting on the side of the Thebans against
the Phocians.
⁸ I.e., the Olynthians and the Thessalians.

46 demosthenes
trust him in the future, or that those whom he has wrongly en-
slaved would not now be glad to be freed.
[9] If any of you accepts that this is true, but thinks that Philip
will retain control by force, since he has already seized the towns
and harbors and the like, he is wrong. For whenever affairs are
organized in a spirit of goodwill, and all the participants in a
war share a common interest, then men are willing to work to-
gether and endure setbacks and stand fast; but whenever someone
like Philip grows strong as a result of greed and villainy, the first
excuse and a small stumble overturns and destroys everything.
[10] It is impossible, quite impossible, men of Athens, that a crim-
inal and perjurer and liar should acquire power that is securely
based; rather, such things last for a moment or a short time, and
flourish on the basis of hopes if they are lucky, but in time are
found out and fall apart. Just as the lower parts of a house, I be-
lieve, or of a ship or similar structure must be the strongest, so the
beginning and basic conception of any action must be true and
just. But this is now impossible in the case of Philip’s actions.
[11] I say that we should help the Olynthians, and I support
the best and quickest way of doing so that anyone might pro-
pose; and we should send an embassy to the Thessalians to in-
form some of them about these matters and to spur on the rest,
since they have now voted to demand the return of Pagasae and
to open negotiations about Magnesia.⁹ [12] You should see to it,
men of Athens, that our ambassadors not only make speeches but
are also able to demonstrate some achievement on our part—that
we have marched out in a manner worthy of our city and are en-
gaged in action, since all speech, if it is not accompanied by ac-
tion, seems vain and empty, especially in the case of our city. For
the more we are ready to make speeches, the more everyone dis-
trusts them. [13] You must demonstrate that your conduct has un-
dergone a substantial change for the better—by raising taxes, and
campaigning, and doing everything energetically—if you want
people to pay attention to you. And if you are willing to do these
things as you should, men of Athens, not only will Philip’s alli-
⁹ On Pagasae and Magnesia, see 1.22n.

ances be shown to be weak and unreliable but his very kingdom

and power will be proved to be in a parlous state.
[14] For, on the whole, the power and empire of Macedonia are
of some value as a supplementary force, as was the case at the time
of Timotheus’ campaign against Olynthus;¹⁰ and again it proved
to be of some use in combination with the Olynthians against
Potidaea;¹¹ and just recently it helped¹² the Thessalians, who
were weak and disordered, against the family of tyrants.¹³ And
in general, I think, even a small force is very helpful wherever it
is brought to bear, but on its own it is weak and riddled with de-
ficiencies. [15] All the things that one might suppose would make
him great—his wars and expeditions—have in fact made his
kingdom less secure than it naturally is. For you should not sup-
pose, men of Athens, that Philip and his subjects take pleasure
in the same things. Rather, he desires and strives for glory, and
chooses to be active and take risks, and to suffer whatever may
befall, preferring the glory of achieving more than any previous
Macedonian king to a life of security.
[16] But his subjects do not share in the glory of his achieve-
ments; instead, they are always being pounded by this to-and-
fro campaigning, and are distressed and endure constant hard-
ship, and are not allowed to spend time at their work or their
private affairs; nor are they able to dispose of the little that they
produce, since the markets have been closed on account of the
¹⁰ The Athenian general Timotheus campaigned successfully in 364/3

against the Chalcidic League, with the assistance of the Macedonian king
Perdiccas III. See Nepos Timotheus 1.2; Polyaenus Stratagems 3.10.7 and 14.
¹¹ On Philip’s capture of Potidaea, see 7n. Demosthenes’ claim that this
was an achievement of the Olynthians, with help from Philip, is wholly mis-
leading: it was Philip’s Macedonian forces that captured the city.
¹² The word “helped” (eboēthēsen) is deleted by Dilts as an interpolation,
though the meaning is not significantly affected.
¹³ In 353 and 352 Philip intervened in Thessaly in support of the Thes-
salian League against the rulers of Pherae in southern Thessaly, who were
allies of the Phocians. After defeating the Phocian army at the battle of the
Crocus Field in 352, he captured Pherae and its port Pagasae and installed a
pro-Macedonian regime there: see 1.9, 12–13; Diodorus 16.38.1.

48 demosthenes
war.¹⁴ [17] The attitude of most Macedonians to Philip can eas-

ily be gathered from these facts: the mercenaries and Foot Com-
panions¹⁵ in his entourage have the reputation of being wonder-
ful and disciplined fighters, but I have heard from someone who
has been in that country, and who is incapable of lying, that they
are no better than anyone else. [18] For, he says, any of them who
are experienced in war and battle are removed by Philip out of
jealousy, since he wishes to give the impression that every achieve-
ment is his alone—in addition to everything else, he reports that
Philip’s jealousy is unsurpassable. And if anyone is sober or gen-
erally upright, and is unable to tolerate the constant loose living
and drunkenness¹⁶ and lewd dancing,¹⁷ such a man is pushed
aside and treated as a nobody. [19] The rest of his company, he
says, are brigands and flatterers and men whose drunken dancing
is so vile that I shrink from describing it to you. And this is clearly
true: for those men whom everyone drove away¹⁸ from here for
being far more disgusting than conjurers,¹⁹ that public slave Cal-
¹⁴ The majority of Macedonian overseas trade was probably in the hands

either of Athenians or of cities of the Chalcidic League, both of whom were
now enemies of Macedon. In any case, Athens’ naval superiority will have
made any Macedonian seaborne trade very precarious.
¹⁵ The identity of the “Foot Companions” (pezhetairoi) under Philip is
uncertain. According to Theopompus (FGH 115 fragment 348), they were an
elite Royal Guard, but in the reign of Philip’s son Alexander III, this title
was applied to all the infantrymen of the Macedonian phalanx. The histo-
rian Anaximenes attributes the creation of the Foot Companions to Alexan-
der, but it is unclear to which of the three Macedonian kings of that name
he is referring (FGH 72 fragment 4). See further Hammond and Griffith
1979: 705– 709.
¹⁶ The Macedonians were regarded by the Greeks as heavy drinkers, and
Greek authors record several drunken parties in the courts of both Philip
and his son Alexander: see, e.g., Diodorus 16.55, 87; Theopompus FGH 115
fragments 27 and 282 (on Theopompus, see 19n below).
¹⁷ The reference is to a sexually suggestive dance called the kordax.
¹⁸ The Greek word used here (apēlaunon) indicates that these men were
shunned, not formally exiled.
¹⁹ Lit. “wonder workers,” i.e., public entertainers of low status, such as
conjurers and magicians.

lias and men of his stamp,²⁰ pantomime actors²¹ of the ridicu-

lous and poets of shameful songs, which they compose for their
associates in order to raise a laugh—these are the men he loves
and keeps about himself.²² [20] Such things, men of Athens, even
if they seem relatively unimportant, provide thoughtful observ-
ers with clear proof of his disgusting nature. But at the moment,
I think, his success obscures them. Success is good at conceal-
ing such disgraces; but if someone stumbles, then these aspects of
his life are exposed to intense scrutiny. And in my opinion, men
of Athens, Philip will be exposed quite soon, if the gods are will-
ing, and if you desire it. [21] For just as in our bodies, so long as
a person is strong things go unnoticed, but when some weakness
befalls him, be it a fracture or a sprain or some other underlying
problem, every thing is disturbed; so in the case of cities and ty-
rants: as long as they wage war abroad their troubles are invisi-
ble to most people, but when they are entangled in a war on their
own borders, everything is exposed.
[22] If any of you, men of Athens, sees Philip’s success and con-
cludes that he is a formidable enemy, he is thinking like a sensi-
ble man. For fortune is a vital element—rather it is everything—
in all human affairs. Nevertheless, if I were given the choice, I
would personally choose the fortune of our city, so long as you
are willing to do your duty in person, even to a limited degree,
rather than his, since I observe that you have many more avenues
than he has for gaining the favor of the gods. [23] And yet we
seem to sit around doing nothing. But an idler cannot call on his
²⁰ Nothing further is known of this Callias. Publicly owned slaves were

employed at Athens to assist various office holders in their duties, e.g., as
clerks. See also 8.47n.
²¹ Mimos was a genre of dramatic performance, often depicting scenes
from everyday life in a humorous fashion. It somewhat resembled modern
pantomime and was thus quite different from modern mime.
²² The historian Theopompus of Chios (FGH 115), who spent time at
Philip’s court, wrote in similarly disapproving terms about the dissolute
conduct at it, including the prevalence of drunkenness and Philip’s taste for
low company. See the Speech Introduction; Shrimpton 1977 and 1991: 157–
180; Flower 1997: 98–115.

50 demosthenes
friends to act on his behalf, still less on the gods! Indeed, it is no

wonder that Philip, who goes on campaign and engages in hard
work and attends to everything, and who leaves aside no opportu-
nity or season, gets the better of us who delay and take votes and
hold enquiries. Nor do I find this surprising. Indeed, the oppo-
site would have been amazing: if we, who do none of the things
that those who are at war must do, were to get the better of one
who does every thing. [24] But I am amazed at this: that in the
past you rose up against the Spartans in the cause of justice for
the Greeks, and refused many opportunities to make large pri-
vate gains, but instead spent your own money by raising taxes and
were the first to risk your lives on campaign,²³ so that the major-
ity of the Greeks should get justice, whereas now you shrink from
marching out and put off paying taxes, even to protect your own
possessions! Indeed, I am amazed that you, who have often res-
cued the other Greeks, both collectively and individually, now sit
about, even when you have been deprived of your own property.
[25] These things amaze me, but it amazes me even more, men
of Athens, that none of you is able to reckon how long you have
been at war with Philip²⁴ and what you have been doing during
that period. Surely you realize that you have spent the whole time
procrastinating, hoping others will act, blaming each other, hold-
ing trials, hoping again, doing pretty much the same as you are
doing now! [26] Are you so senseless, men of Athens, that you
hope to improve our city’s situation by following the very same
policies that led to its decline? This would be unreasonable and
contrary to nature, since it is much easier to keep what you have
than to acquire anything. In our case, as a result of the war, we no
longer have any of our previous possessions to defend, but must
reacquire them.²⁵ This is now the task that we face. [27] I tell you,
²³ In 395 Athens joined Thebes, Corinth and Argos in launching the Co-
rinthian War against Sparta.
²⁴ Athens had been at war with Philip since his capture of Amphipolis in
357 (see 1.5n), which was treated by the Athenians as an act of war (see Aes.
2.70; Isoc. 5.2).
²⁵ Demosthenes refers both to Amphipolis and to the coastal cities in
Thrace and Macedonia—Pydna, Potidaea, and Methone—that the Athe-
nian general Timotheus had captured in 364: see 1.9n, 3.28n.

we must raise funds, eagerly march out in person, blame no one

until you have gained control of the situation, and then, on the
basis of the facts alone, honor those who deserve praise and pun-
ish those who do wrong, and get rid of the excuses and omis-
sions on your part. For it is not possible to make a strict examina-
tion of what others have done, if you have not first done your own
duty. [28] Why, men of Athens, do you suppose that all the gen-
erals that you dispatch avoid this war, and find private ones,²⁶ if I
must speak truthfully even about the generals? The reason is that
in the war against Philip, the prizes for which the war is being
fought belong to you—if Amphipolis is captured, it will imme-
diately revert to you²⁷—but the risks belong exclusively to your
commanders, and there is no pay available to them. Elsewhere,
however, the dangers are fewer, and there are profits to be made
by the commanders and their troops—Lampsacus, Sigeum, the
ships that they can plunder.²⁸ Each of the generals seeks his own
profit. [29] When you notice the disastrous state of your affairs,
you put the commanders on trial; but then, when you allow them
to speak, you hear about these constraints and let them go. The
result is that you dispute and quarrel with each other—some have
one opinion, others another, and our collective interest suffers.
Previously, men of Athens, you paid taxes by symmory, but now
you engage in public life by symmory: a politician is the leader of
each group, with a general beneath him and three hundred assis-
tants. The rest of you are assigned, some to one group and others to
²⁶ Most notably, the Athenian general Chares had recently taken service
with the rebel satrap Artabazus: see 4.24n.
²⁷ On Amphipolis in Thrace, see 1.5n. Originally founded by Athens, the
Athenians still regarded it as theirs even though they had not controlled it
at any point in the fourth century.
²⁸ Lampsacus and Sigeum were Greek cities of northwestern Asia Mi-
nor, at the northern and southern ends of the Hellespont respectively.
Both were in the Persian Empire. Demosthenes in a later speech refers to
Athenian generals demanding “goodwill payments” from Aegean islanders
and (Persian ruled) Asian cities (8.24). For Athenian privateering, see also
Dem. 21.173, 24.12, 51.13; Aes. 2.71. Such activity was almost inevitable be-
cause the Athenians failed to provide adequate financial support to their
generals.

52 demosthenes
another.²⁹ [30] You must put such conduct aside and even now re-
cover your self-control, and join together in deliberating, speak-
ing, and taking action for the common good. But if you grant
some citizens the right to give orders as if in a tyranny, compel
others to serve as trierarchs, to pay the wealth-tax, and to cam-
paign, and allow others still to do nothing but vote against them
and make no other contribution to the collective effort, you will
fail to accomplish any of the things you need to do in a timely
fashion. For whichever part of the citizenry feels it has been
wronged will always be remiss, and you will have the opportunity
to punish these men, but not the enemy! [31] I say, in summary,
that you should all contribute equitably according to your means;
you should all go on campaign in turn until everyone has served;
you should give a hearing to all who come forward to speak; and
you should choose the best proposals that you hear, rather than
whatever this man or that should say. If you do these things, you
will be able to congratulate not only the speaker at the time but
also yourselves later, when your whole situation has improved.
²⁹ Demosthenes should not be taken to mean that the symmory system

(on which, see 14.26n) was no longer in operation; his point is that in the
past symmories had been used only for tax collection, whereas now they
also form the (metaphorical) basis for Athens’ political organization. In
each symmory the man who contributed the most was called the “leader”
(see Dem. 28.4). A feature of Athenian public life in the fourth century (by
contrast with earlier periods) was the tendency for different men to serve
as political and military leaders and for individual (civilian) politicians
and generals to collaborate with each other: see Isoc. 8.54–55; Hansen 1991:
268–277.

3. THIR D OLY NTHI AC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
This is probably the third in order of writing of the three
speeches that Demosthenes delivered in 349/8, arguing that Ath-
ens should send help to the northern Greek city of Olynthus,
which was under attack from Philip of Macedon (see the Intro-
duction to Dem. 1–3).
The military situation had apparently deteriorated since De-
mosthenes delivered the first two Olynthiacs. Now the Athenians
cannot effectively retaliate against Philip and are reduced to de-
fending themselves and their allies (1–2), and their affairs are in
an “utterly wretched state” (3). Although it is impossible to deter-
mine exactly when the speech was delivered, its solemn and anx-
ious tone suggests that Philip’s campaign against Olynthus was
well advanced. Whether the first Athenian relief force had yet
sailed is unclear, but on balance it is unlikely; certainly Demos-
thenes makes no mention of it. The Athenians have let slip one
opportunity (in the late 350s) (5) and cannot afford to do so again
(6). Moreover, the situation in central Greece is now so disad-
vantageous to Athens that if Olynthus should be allowed to fall,
there will be nothing to prevent Philip penetrating further into
Greece (8; cf. similar fears at 1.12, 25).
In addition to his familiar appeals for action, Demosthenes’
response to Athens’ situation in this speech is twofold. For the
first theme, he argues forthrightly for the repeal of some of the
laws regulating the theoric fund (11), with a view to transferring
money from civilian to military use. In the First Olynthiac he had
already touched on this subject (1.19), but in that speech he denies

54 demosthenes
that he is proposing the transfer of money to the military fund.

Now, he claims that there is no alternative source of money (19).
The theoric fund (ta theōrika) took its name from theōria, the
Greek word for observing, and by extension for attendance as a
spectator at a religious festival. The original purpose of the fund
was to subsidize the attendance of poorer Athenian citizens at the-
atrical performances at the Dionysia and Lenaea festivals. It was
instituted probably in the first half of the fourth century, although
the evidence is contradictory.¹ By the middle of the century, how-
ever, the theoric fund was being used for other civilian purposes
as well. The amount of money spent each year is unknown, but
the fund had considerable ideological significance. For some, it
was the “glue” that held Athenian democracy together.² For De-
mosthenes and his supporters, who advocated a vigorous and in-
evitably expensive military response to Philip, the theoric fund
was a symbol of what was wrong with Athens: money that could
have been used to help pay for the war was being squandered.³ It
appears that the theoric fund was itself funded partly from an an-
nual allocation and partly, during wartime, from the surplus of
the city’s annual budget (see Dem. 59.4, which is, however, not
entirely coherent). The administration of the theoric fund was reg-
ulated by one or more laws, which could be altered or overturned
only by the establishment of a panel of Lawgivers (Nomothetai):
see 10. Anyone who attempted to do so by other means would be
immediately liable to prosecution by a graphē paranomōn (a public
suit for making an illegal proposal).
Libanius in his introduction to Dem. 1 claims that there was a
clause imposing the death penalty on anyone who sought to di-
vert money from the theoric to the military fund, and that this
is why Demosthenes is so circumspect in that speech (1.19), and
why here he tells the Athenians not to expect any politician to
risk destruction (12).⁴ Such harsh penalty clauses are attested in
¹ See Harding 1985: no. 75 for the evidence.

² The metaphor is attributed to the Athenian politician Demades by Plu-
tarch (Moralia 1011b).
³ In 29 Demosthenes scornfully dismisses the spending of money on
public works.
⁴ See Libanius Introduction to Dem. 1 5.

3. third olynthiac 55
fourth-century Athens,⁵ but it may be that Libanius drew an er-

roneous inference from this passage and that the destruction De-
mosthenes fears at the hands of the Athenians is political ruin
rather than death—what we might call political suicide. By pro-
posing that those politicians who were responsible for the pass-
ing of the law should also propose its repeal, he is offering a gen-
tleman’s agreement that he and his supporters will not prosecute
them for doing so.⁶
Demosthenes (as usual in his deliberative speeches; 10.70 is the
one exception) does not name his opponents, but it is generally
agreed that he is referring primarily to Eubulus and his support-
ers. Eubulus was a leading politician of the period and was instru-
mental in reforming Athens’ public finances. He served as com-
missioner of the theoric fund in the 350s and apparently resisted
what he regarded as the waste of public money on overambitious
military campaigns.⁷ Demosthenes advocates in place of the the-
oric distributions a new system of payment, according to which
Athenian citizens would receive public money for doing differ-
ent tasks, depending on their age and on whether Athens was at
war or peace (34–35). This system had already been sketched out
in Dem. 13.
The second main theme of the speech is the contrast between
Athens in its fifth-century heyday and in its present state (21–31),
a section that is substantially taken over from the earlier speech
Dem. 13.⁸ Demosthenes’ mood is downbeat: Athens’ leaders in the
past put the public interest ahead of their own, whereas present-
day politicians flatter the people (21–22); its fifth-century lead-
ers caused Athens to flourish abroad and at home but themselves
lived modestly (23–26), whereas its present-day leaders have failed
to take advantage of the decline of Sparta and Thebes and have
presided over a series of foreign policy disasters and the squander-
ing of large sums of public money (27–28). Their domestic expen-
⁵ Lewis 1974.
⁶ On Demosthenes and the theoric fund, see Sealey 1993: 256–258; Har-
ris 1996.
⁷ On Eubulus’ career, see Cawkwell 1963a and (in brief) OCD³ s.v. Eubu-
lus; on his financial office holding, see Lewis 1997: 212–229.
⁸ Cf. 13.25–31 and see the Introduction to Dem. 13.

56 demosthenes
diture is wasteful and unnecessary, and they have lined their own
pockets (29). In the past, politicians were servants of the people
(30); now, they are their masters (31).
There are texts of this speech with commentaries by Sandys 1910

and Milns 1970.
3. thir d oly nthi ac

[1] I find myself facing quite different opinions, men of Athens,
when I look at our situation and when I reflect on the speeches
that I hear. For the speeches deal with how to punish Philip, but
our situation has deteriorated so badly that we are reduced to ex-
amining how to prevent him from harming us first. As a result, I
believe that those who deliver speeches of this nature are simply
mistaken and have set before you an untrue basis for deliberation.
[2] I know very well that there was a time when the city could
be secure and could punish Philip, for in my own lifetime not so
long ago both were possible. Now, however, I am convinced that
it is enough for us to secure as our primary goal the protection
of our allies. Only if we achieve this will we be able to consider
whom to punish and how. But before we have made a sound be-
ginning, I think it pointless to say anything about the end.
[3] The present situation, more than any previous one, requires
much thought and deliberation, but I do not consider it partic-
ularly difficult to advise you what to do in our current circum-
stances. I am, however, at a loss, men of Athens, as to the manner
in which I should speak to you about them. For I am convinced,
both from personal experience and from what I have heard, that
we have lost control of the situation more because of our un-
willingness to do our duty than from any lack of intelligence on
our part. I ask you, if I speak freely, to bear with me and to see
whether I am telling the truth and am aiming to bring about
some improvement in the future, since you see that it is as a result
of the speeches that certain men address to you in the Assembly
in order to gain your approval that our affairs have reached an ut-
terly wretched state.
[4] I suppose that I should first summarize for you in a few

words what has happened. You remember, men of Athens, that

it was announced to you two or three years ago that Philip was
in Thrace besieging Fort Heraeum.⁹ That was in the month of
Maimacterion.¹⁰ Many speeches were made on that occasion
and there was a great uproar, and you voted to launch forty tri-
remes and man them with those up to forty-five years old¹¹ and
to levy a wealth-tax of sixty talents.¹² [5] After that, the rest of the
year passed and then the months Hecatombaion, Metageitnion,
and Boedromion.¹³ In that month, shortly after the Mysteries,¹⁴
you dispatched Charidemus¹⁵ with ten empty ships and five tal-
ents of silver.¹⁶ For when it was announced that Philip was sick
⁹ Fort Heraeum (Heraion Teichos) was a site in eastern Thrace near both
the Sea of Marmara and the Chersonese. On the date of its siege, see the fol-
lowing note.
¹⁰ Maimacterion was the fifth month of the Athenian year, which started
in midsummer: the approximate date is November 352. This is the Thracian
campaign referred to at 1.13.
¹¹ Athenians were liable for military service from the ages of 18 to 59 and
were called up by age classes.
¹² The wealth-tax (eisphora) was levied as a variable percentage of the
total available wealth of the richest Athenians (which at this period was
6,000 talents: see 14.27n); hence, 60 talents represented an eisphora of one
percent.
¹³ Boedromion was the third month (of the following year, 351/0), i.e.,
roughly September 351.
¹⁴ The Mysteries were a very important initiation ceremony, forming part
of the cult of the two goddesses Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis in west-
ern Attica. The “Greater” Mysteries took place in the month Boedromion
and lasted for ten days. See in general Parker 2005: 327–368.
¹⁵ Charidemus was one of the ten generals for 351/0. Originally from
Oreus in Euboea, he served Athens as a mercenary commander and was
granted Athenian citizenship at some point before the delivery of Dem. 23
in 353/2 (Dem. 23.149–151; Osborne 1983: T51). In that year the Athenian
politician Aristocrates proposed a grant of special legal protection for him;
this was challenged by a graphē paranomōn for which Demosthenes wrote
the speech (= Dem. 23).
¹⁶ An “empty” ship was one for which the commander rather than the
city was responsible for finding rowers (see Gabrielsen 1994: 108). Demos-
thenes treats the Athenians’ failure to provide rowers, together with the

58 demosthenes
or dead—both were reported—you thought that you no longer

needed to send a relief force and disbanded the expedition.¹⁷ But
this was the moment of opportunity: if on that occasion we had
enthusiastically sent a relief force there, as we had voted, Philip,
even if he survived, would not now be bothering us.
[6] What was done at that time cannot be undone. But now a
further opportunity for war has come, and this is why I have re-
minded you of that occasion, so that you do not suffer the same
fate as before. How then shall we make use of this opportunity,
men of Athens? For if you fail to send help “at full strength to the
best of your ability,”¹⁸ observe how you will have been acting in
every respect to Philip’s advantage. [7] The Olynthians possessed
considerable force, and the situation was that Philip had no con-
fidence in them, nor they in him. We made peace with them.¹⁹
This was an obstacle and annoyance to Philip, that a great city
should be reconciled with us and be lying in wait for any opportu-
nities he might provide. We thought we should involve these peo-
ple²⁰ in war by whatever means we could, and what everyone was
chattering about then has now somehow or other come to pass.
[8] What remains then for us to do, men of Athens, but to send
help resolutely and enthusiastically? I see no other option. For
apart from the shame that would envelop us, if we were to surren-
der any of our interests, the danger in doing so would in my opin-
ion be considerable, in view of the Thebans’ attitude towards us,
small size of the squadron and the inadequate funds voted for it, as an indi-
cation that they did not take the expedition seriously. See also 4.43, where
the reference to empty ships has the same rhetorical purpose.
¹⁷ These rumors are reported as recent at 4.10–11 (delivered probably in
351); Philip’s illness is also mentioned at 1.13.
¹⁸ These words are identified by Sandys (1910) in his commentary as a
formula of diplomacy, commonly found in alliances where one party prom-
ises to aid the other.
¹⁹ On this peace, see Dem. 23.107–109; Libanius Introduction to Dem. 1
2. Its date is uncertain, but the claim by Libanius that it was made when
Philip was away might suggest the period while he was in Thessaly, in 352.
See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 298–299.
²⁰ The Olynthians.

and the fact that the Phocians have exhausted their money,²¹ and
that there is nothing to stop Philip, after he has subdued what is
before him, from turning against us here. [9] If any of you wishes
to put off doing his duty until that time, then he is choosing to
see suffering close at hand when he could be hearing of it hap-
pening elsewhere, and wishes to be forced to look for people who
will help him when he could now be helping others. For I imag-
ine that we are all well aware that this is how things will turn out,
if we discard the present opportunity.
[10] Perhaps someone may say: “We all recognize that we must
help, and help we shall, but tell us how.” Do not be amazed, men
of Athens, if I say something that most of you will find unex-
pected. You should appoint lawmakers. Use these lawmakers not
to pass a law—you have enough of them—but to repeal those
laws that are presently harming your interests.²² [11] I am refer-
ring directly to the laws relating to the theoric fund and to cer-
tain of the laws relating to those who go on campaign. Some of
these laws distribute military funds as theoric payments to those
who stay at home; others let those who shirk military service get
off scot-free and make even those who wish to do their duty more
despondent. When you have repealed these laws and made it safe
to offer the best advice, only then should you look for someone
to propose the measures that you all know to be beneficial.²³
[12] Until that is done, do not expect anyone to be willing to give
you the best advice and then be destroyed by you.²⁴ You will not
find anyone, especially when the only likely result is that whoever
speaks and makes these proposals will be unjustly punished and,
far from improving the situation, will make people even more
²¹ Thebes was hostile to Athens: see 1.26n. The Phocians depended for
money on the resources of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, which they
had appropriated early in their war with the Thebans.
²² In fourth-century Athens, laws could be passed or repealed only by
specially chosen panels of citizens called Nomothetai (Law-Givers): see
Rhodes 1985.
²³ I.e., to use the theoric fund for military purposes.
²⁴ On the sense in which the giver of such advice would be “destroyed,”
see the Speech Introduction.

60 demosthenes
afraid to give good advice than they already are. Moreover, men
of Athens, we should ask the same men to propose the repeal of
these laws as passed them.²⁵ [13] For it is not right that those who
at that time passed laws that damaged the whole city should be
popular for having done so, whereas anyone who now gives the
best advice, which will result in all of us faring better, should be
punished with your hatred for doing so. Before you set this mat-
ter right, men of Athens, you should certainly not suppose that
anyone is so prominent as to be able to break these laws with im-
punity, or so foolish as to throw himself into obvious trouble.
[14] You must also know, men of Athens, that a decree is
worthless if it is not accompanied by the will to carry out the
decision with enthusiasm. For if decrees alone had the power ei-
ther to compel you to do your duty or to accomplish the goals
for which they were proposed, you would not find yourselves vot-
ing for many things but accomplishing few if any of them; nor
would Philip have been insulting you for such a long time, since,
to judge by your decrees at any rate, he would long ago have been
punished. [15] But that is not the case. For although action comes
after speaking and voting in time, it precedes them in effective-
ness and is more powerful than them. Action, then, is what you
must add, since you have the other things already. You have men
who can tell you your duty, men of Athens, and you are your-
selves the smartest of people at understanding what has been said;
and you will be able to act now, if you do what is right. [16] What
occasion or opportunity, men of Athens, do you seek that will be
better than the present one? When will you do your duty, if not
now? Has this man not taken all our territories? If he becomes
master of this land,²⁶ shall we not suffer the utmost ignominy?
Are those people, whom we promised to support if they were to
go to war, not now at war with him? Is he not our enemy? Does
he not possess what is ours? Is he not a foreigner (barbaros)?²⁷ Can
²⁵ According to the ancient commentary on this passage (Dilts 1983:

92.12–13), the reference is to the leading politician Eubulus, on whom see
the Speech Introduction.
²⁶ I.e., the territory of the Olynthians.
²⁷ The primary meaning of the Greek word barbaros is one who does
not speak Greek, but by this period it had acquired pejorative connota-

anyone find words to describe him? [17] But, by the gods, after
we have neglected everything and all but helped him in his prep-
arations, are we now to inquire who was responsible for this state
of affairs? For we shall not admit that we are responsible—that I
know for certain! Even in the dangers of war no deserter accuses
himself but instead blames the general and his neighbors and
everyone else, even though (as you know) it is because of all the
deserters that they are defeated. For the man who blames other
people could have held his position; and if each man had done
this, they would have been victorious. [18] So too now. Suppose
someone does not give the best advice: let someone else stand up
and speak, but without accusing the former. If someone makes a
better speech, do what he proposes, and good luck to you. If his
proposals are unpleasant, it is not the fault of the speaker, unless
he omits to pray when he should.²⁸ Prayer is easy, men of Ath-
ens, for a speaker who has collected together into a short compass
every thing that one might wish to hear. To make a choice, how-
ever, when serious matters are under discussion, is not so easy, but
one must choose what is best over what is pleasant, if one cannot
have both.
[19] But if someone is able to leave the theoric fund to one side
and identify other sources of money for military spending, is this
not preferable, it might be asked. I agree, men of Athens, if this
is really possible. But I would be amazed if it has ever happened
to anybody, or ever will happen, that after spending what he has
on things that he does not need, he should be able to afford the
things that he does need from the money that he no longer has.
Each man’s wishes, I believe, contribute greatly to such propos-
als, and that is why it is the easiest thing in the world to deceive
oneself. What each man wishes, this he also believes to be true,
although the facts are often not so. [20] So, men of Athens, you
should examine what is possible in our situation and how you will
tions and had some of the implications of the English word “barbarian”
which derives from it. The Macedonian royal house regarded itself as Greek,
but this was denied by anti-Macedonian politicians such as Demosthenes.
See 9.31n.
²⁸ Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches often end with prayers for Ath-
ens’ success.

62 demosthenes
be able to go on campaign and receive pay.²⁹ Prudent and hon-

orable men do not neglect their military responsibilities for want
of money or take the resulting criticism lightly; nor, after taking
up arms against the Corinthians or Megarians,³⁰ do they permit
Philip to enslave Greek cities for want of subsistence money for
those who are on campaign.
[21] I have chosen to say these things not with the senseless aim
of making myself an object of hatred to some of you. For I am not
so foolish or perverse as to wish to be hated, when I do not think
that I am doing any good. But I judge it to be the mark of a good
citizen to put the safety of the community before his own pop-
ularity as a speaker. For, I have heard, as perhaps you have too,
that the public speakers in the time of our ancestors—men whom
all the speakers praise, even though they do not imitate them at
all—adopted this manner of political conduct: the famous Aris-
tides, Nicias, my namesake, and Pericles.³¹ [22] But ever since the
²⁹ The provision of pay for military service was a recurring problem for
Athens in the fourth century. See further Dem. 8, on the general Diopei-
thes’ financial troubles; Pritchett 1971–1991: 1.3–29.
³⁰ Demosthenes distinguishes between land campaigns against nearby
cities, such as Corinth and Megara, whose territory could easily be reached
by the Athenian army, and naval expeditions to the northern Aegean.
He fails to address the obvious objection that land operations of the for-
mer kind were much cheaper for Athens. For very recent friction between
Megara and Athens over an area of borderland called the Hiera Orgas (“Sa-
cred Land”), see 13.32n and more generally the Introduction to Dem. 13.
³¹ Aristides was an important political leader of the period after the Per-
sian Wars; Nicias and Demosthenes were Athenian leaders during the Pelo-
ponnesian War; Pericles was a prominent figure from the 460s onwards and
dominated Athenian politics from the mid 440s until his death in 429. It
is possible to see why Demosthenes chose three of the four to illustrate his
argument: Aristides was famously upright and was nicknamed “the just”;
Nicias unsuccessfully sought to persuade the Athenians to reject the popu-
lar proposal to send a naval expedition to Sicily in 415; Pericles is described
by Thucydides as leading the Athenian people rather than being led by
them (2.65.8). Demosthenes was linked to Nicias by their being the two
final commanders of the disastrous Sicilian Expedition; he may also have
been chosen to link the speaker to a famous figure of the past, though the
two men were not related (see MacDowell 2009: 237 n. 93).

appearance of these politicians who ask you “What do you want?

What shall I propose? What favor can I do you?” the affairs of
the city have been pledged in exchange for immediate gratifica-
tion, and this is the result: all their affairs prosper, while yours are
in a shameful state. [23] Consider, men of Athens, how one might
summarize the achievements of your ancestors’ time and those of
your own time. My account will be brief and well-known to you,
since it is by using examples from home rather than from else-
where, men of Athens, that you will be able to prosper. [24] Our
ancestors, whom the speakers of the day neither indulged nor
loved, as these men now do you, ruled the Greeks as willing sub-
jects for forty-five years,³² carried up more than ten thousand tal-
ents to the Acropolis,³³ and had the king who possesses this land
as their subject,³⁴ which is the proper relationship between a for-
eigner³⁵ and Greeks, and erected many fine trophies, fighting in
person both on land and at sea, and alone among men left be-
hind glorious achievements that are beyond the reach of envy.³⁶
³² This is a round number: the period to which Demosthenes refers ran

from the establishment of the Delian League in 478/7 to the outbreak of the
Peloponnesian War in 431. His claim that the Greek cities of Athens’ fifth-
century empire were willing subjects is wishful thinking, as is clear from
the number of cities that tried to revolt from it, from Thucydides’ blunt
characterization of it as a tyranny, and from the list of fifth-century abuses
that the Athenians promised not to repeat when they established the Sec-
ond Athenian Confederacy in 377.
³³ According to Thucydides (2.13.3), Athens’ financial reserve during the
period in question had been as high as 9,700 talents.
³⁴ At no time in the fifth century was a Macedonian king subject to Ath-
ens, but almost all the cities of the north Aegean coast, including some in
Macedonian territory, were tribute-paying members of the Athenian em-
pire. There is a possibility that Philip’s father Amyntas was a (contribution-
paying) member of the Second Athenian Confederacy: thus Cargill 1981:
85–87. Arrian (Anabasis 7.9.4) writing in the second century ad makes the
same claim. See further Harding 2006: 232.
³⁵ On the Macedonian royal family as non-Greek (barbaros), see 16n;
9.31n.
³⁶ Trophies (tropaia) were monuments created out of captured armor and
weapons that were erected on the battlefield by the victors, as symbols of
their victory. See Pritchett 1971–1991: 2.246–275.

64 demosthenes
[25] This is how they acted in the affairs of Greece. Now examine
how they conducted themselves as regards the city, both in public
and in private matters. In public they created buildings and ob-
jects of beauty of such kind and size—temples and the offerings
in them—that none of their descendants could surpass them. In
private they were so restrained and so true to the nature of their
constitution³⁷ [26] that if any of you knows which is the house
of Aristides or of Miltiades or of the distinguished men of that
time, he sees that it is no grander than that of its neighbor.³⁸ For
they did not conduct the affairs of the city with a view to their
own profit, but each of them thought it right to make the com-
monwealth more prosperous. Because they managed the affairs
of Greece honestly, and matters relating to the gods piously, and
their own affairs in a spirit of equality, they rightly enjoyed great
good fortune.
[27] Such was our fortune then, under the leadership of the
men whom I have named. How do we fare nowadays, under the
leadership of these men who are now deemed admirable? Do we
fare the same, or nearly so? I pass over other matters—although
I have much that I could say—but you all see how much free-
dom we have to act, since the Spartans have been ruined, the The-
bans are preoccupied, and none of the others is sufficiently prom-
inent to rival us for supremacy;³⁹ but when we could both keep
a firm grip on our own possessions and arbitrate over the rights
of others, [28] we have been deprived of our own territory⁴⁰ and
³⁷ I.e., they conducted themselves in an appropriately democratic

manner.
³⁸ On Aristides, see 21n. Miltiades was an important Athenian political
and military leader of the early fifth century: see also 13.21n. In the paral-
lel passage at 13.29, Demosthenes gives a slightly different selection of fifth-
century leaders. Private houses in Greece were not at all large in either the
fifth or fourth centuries.
³⁹ Following its defeat by Thebes at the battle of Leuctra in 371 and its
subsequent loss of Messenia, Sparta was much reduced in power and influ-
ence. Thebes had meanwhile become bogged down in the lengthy Third Sa-
cred War against Phocis. See the Introduction to this volume.
⁴⁰ The Athenians regarded Amphipolis in Thrace as their own posses-
sion, because it was originally an Athenian settlement (albeit on land that

have spent more than fifteen hundred talents in vain,⁴¹ these men
have destroyed the allies whom we secured in the war,⁴² and we
have trained a great enemy against ourselves. Or does someone
wish to come forward and tell me how Philip has grown strong
other than through our own actions? [29] “But, my dear sir, even
if these things are unsatisfactory, the city itself is now in a better
state.” Why, what improvement can you name? The battlements
we plaster, the roads we repair, the fountains, and similar rub-
bish? Look at the politicians who are responsible for these things.
Some of them were beggars and are now rich; others were ob-
scure and are now prominent. Some have built private houses that
are grander than our public buildings. The more our city has de-
clined, the more these men have flourished.
[30] What is the reason for this? Why is it that everything was
fine in the past, but is in a wretched state now? Because then the
people had the courage to act and campaign in person, and were
the masters of the politicians, and controlled all good things, and
each of the others⁴³ was content to receive a share of honor or of-
fice or any other benefit from the hands of the people. [31] But
now the opposite is the case: the politicians control the good
things, and everything is done through them, and you the peo-
ple are hamstrung.⁴⁴ Deprived of money and allies, you now play
the part of a servant and an extra, content if these men give you
had been taken from the Thracians): see 2.28n. For later wrangling between
anti-Macedonian politicians at Athens and Philip, see 7.23–29 (Hegesippus’
complaints) and 12.20–23 (Philip’s retort).
⁴¹ The ancient commentary on this passage (Dilts 1983: 98.25) claims that
the money was spent on (campaigns to recover) Amphipolis, and Aeschines
complains about the money the general Chares had wasted on campaign in
the north (2.71). In the parallel passage in Dem. 13, it is claimed that this
sum was squandered on the poor (13.27); this probably refers to mercenaries,
who were often believed to have enlisted to escape extreme poverty. How
this figure was calculated is not known.
⁴² Demosthenes refers to the cities of the north Aegean coast (Potidaea,
Methone, and Pydna) that were won over by the Athenian general Timo-
theus in 364 but taken by Philip during the 350s. See 1.9n.
⁴³ I.e., the politicians.
⁴⁴ Lit. “have had your sinews cut.”

66 demosthenes
a share of the theoric fund⁴⁵ or dispatch the procession at the

Boedromia,⁴⁶ and, bravest of all, you even thank them for your
own possessions! They have confined you to the city and entice
you to these things and tame you, turning you into docile pets.
[32] It is never possible, I think, for those whose actions are small
and trivial to adopt a strong and vigorous spirit: whatever men’s
habits are, so must their spirit be too. By Demeter, I would not
be surprised if I were to suffer greater harm at your hands for say-
ing these things than do those men who are responsible for them,
since you do not always grant freedom of speech on every subject,
and I am amazed that you have granted it now.
[33] If then, even now, you abandon these habits and are will-
ing to go on campaign and to act in a way that is worthy of your-
selves, and to use these domestic surpluses⁴⁷ as a starting point
for external success, perhaps, men of Athens, perhaps you may ac-
quire some great and lasting benefit and rid yourself of such pay-
ments, which are like the foods that doctors prescribe: they nei-
ther build strength nor allow the patient to die. In the same way,
these sums that you now distribute among yourselves are not large
enough to have any lasting benefit, nor would renouncing them
allow you to do anything else, but they serve to make each of you
more idle. [34] “Do you mean military pay?” someone will ask.
Yes I do, and I mean the same system for everyone, men of Ath-
ens, in order that each man, in taking his share of public funds,
⁴⁵ On payments from the theoric fund, see 11n and the Speech Intro-
duction.
⁴⁶ The Boedromia was a festival in honor of Apollo, held in the month
Boedromion. It is not clear why Demosthenes singles out this particular fes-
tival. An alternative manuscript reading, boidia (“little cattle”), is perhaps
to be preferred. In this case, the reference would be to a procession of cat-
tle to be sacrificed, after which the meat would be distributed to the people.
See MacDowell 2009: 237 n. 94.
⁴⁷ I.e., theoric payments. Demosthenes apparently refers to them as “sur-
pluses” in the sense that in his opinion the payments are unnecessary, and
the money could be used for other purposes; he is not referring to the vexed
question of how the annual budget surplus (if any) should be allocated, on
which see 1.19n.

should play whatever role the city requires. Suppose we are able
to keep the peace: in that case, he is better off staying at home,
freed from the pressure to do something shameful out of poverty.
Suppose the situation is much as it is now: in that case, he serves
as a soldier and draws pay from these same funds, doing his pa-
triotic duty as he should. If any of you is no longer in his prime,
he is better off receiving the money, which he now receives un-
der no system and with no benefit to the city, in return for super-
vising and managing whatever needs to be done.⁴⁸ [35] In short,
without subtracting or adding anything, except for small sums, I
have eliminated the existing confusion and brought order to the
city, with a uniform system for receiving pay, going on campaign,
serving as jurors, and doing what is appropriate to each man’s age
and to our situation. I emphatically deny that money should be
taken from those who are active and distributed to those who do
nothing, or that you should be idle and have leisure and not know
what to do, or that you should learn that so-and-so’s mercenaries
have won a victory—which is what happens now. [36] I am not
blaming anyone who is doing his duty on your behalf, but I do
urge you to do for yourselves the things for which you honor oth-
ers, and not withdraw from the position of virtue that was left to
you, men of Athens, by your ancestors, who acquired it by under-
going many glorious dangers.
I have told you almost everything I think you should hear.
May you choose what will benefit both the city and all of you!
⁴⁸ The same system is proposed at 13.4.

4. FIR ST PHILIPPIC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The First Philippic marks a turning point in Demosthenes’ po-
litical career: although he had made a glancing reference to Philip
in an (arguably) earlier speech (15.24), this is the first speech in
which he directly addresses the danger to Athens arising from the
growth of Macedonian power. From now on, all his surviving de-
liberative speeches are characterized by ancient critics as “Philip-
pics,” that is, as speeches concerned with policy towards Philip.¹
Dionysius of Halicarnassus dates the speech to 352/1, but his
testimony is not entirely straightforward,² and the question of its
¹ See Harding 2006: 244: Demosthenes “became a one-issue politician

in 351 with the First Philippic” (at any rate, so far as the surviving speeches
are concerned). We know four of the deliberative speeches (Dem. 4, 6, 9,
and 10) as Philippics, but ancient critics also regarded Dem. 1–3, 5, [7], 8, and
11 as “Philippic.”
² Dionysius (First Letter to Ammaeus 4) identifies the speech not by its ti-
tle or opening words, as is his usual practice, but by its content (“a speech
before the people on the dispatch of the mercenary force and the squadron
of ten triremes of exiles [generally emended to “ten swift triremes] to Mace-
donia”). Later in the same work, however, he mentions a speech, which he
calls the “fifth Philippic,” on “the protection of the islanders and the cities
of the Hellespont,” and gives as its opening words the first words of 30. Th is
latter speech he dates to 347/6 (10). It appears therefore that he regarded 4.1–
29 as a separate speech, delivered in 352/1. His division of the single speech
that we know as the First Philippic into two shorter speeches is not found
elsewhere and is regarded by scholars as mistaken.

4. first philippic 69
date continues to be debated.³ One important passage for dat-

ing the speech is 17, where Demosthenes refers to Philip’s “sud-
den campaigns to Thermopylae and the Chersonese and Olyn-
thus” (cf. 41). The events to which he refers are as follows. First is
Philip’s march southwards in summer 352, after his victory over
the Phocians at the battle of the Crocus Field, towards the stra-
tegically vital pass of Thermopylae, where he was thwarted by an
Athenian expeditionary force that had occupied the site.⁴ Second
is his expedition to eastern Thrace in autumn 352 (though some
scholars have argued that this occurred in 351: see 3.4n).⁵ Third
is an early incursion into the territory of the Chalcidic League
in northern Greece, perhaps on his return from Thrace.⁶ Other
references in the speech—to Philip’s raids on Athenian territory
and shipping (34), to his letter to the Euboeans (37), and to his
operations in Illyria (48)—are not closely dateable, although the
Illyrian campaign probably occurred in early 351 (see 1.13n). The
speech also refers to rumors that Philip is ill or dead (11); it is clear
from the sequence of events reported at Dem. 3.4–5 that these
rumors were circulating at some point before the dispatch from
Athens of a force commanded by Charidemus in September 351.
In short, a date in late 352/1, that is, summer 351, is possible, but
we cannot exclude the possibility that Dionysius is mistaken and
that the speech belongs in the following Athenian year, 351/0.⁷
³ See most recently MacDowell 2009: 211–213.

⁴ Demosthenes describes this as taking place “recently” or “the other
day” (prōēn; 17), but this adverb is too imprecise in its range of meaning to
allow any conclusions to be drawn about the date of this speech.
⁵ In the Third Olynthiac of 349/8 Demosthenes refers to Philip’s seizure of
a place in Thrace in November “two or three years ago” (3.4), which would
be consistent with either date.
⁶ The suggestion that the reference is to the campaign of 349/8, and has
been interpolated into a speech of 352/1, is now rightly rejected. At the same
time, the casualness of the reference to Olynthus at 17 rules out the possi-
bility that the speech as a whole belongs as late as 349/8, when that city was
at war with Philip. See the Introduction to Dem. 1–3 for relations between
Philip and Olynthus in the late 350s.
⁷ See Lane Fox 1997: 195–199.

70 demosthenes
If the exact circumstances that gave rise to the speech are de-
batable, its general context is abundantly clear. Although Philip
had been at war with Athens since his seizure of Amphipolis in
357, and had wrested control of a number of cities on the north
Aegean coast to which Athens laid claim, two events opened De-
mosthenes’ eyes to the threat that he posed to Athens. The first
was his victory at the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 and his
subsequent thrust southwards towards the pass of Thermopylae.
The second was his campaign in Thrace in 352/1 and specifically
his advance as far east as Fort Heraeum. This brought him dan-
gerously close to the Chersonese and the Hellespont and to the
sea route between the Aegean and the Black Sea on which Athens
depended for much of its food imports.
The core of this speech is a detailed proposal for military prep-
arations that will allow Athens to deal effectively with Philip.
Demosthenes argues for the creation of two separate forces. The
first is to be a standing force of fifty triremes, crewed by citizens,
which will be able to respond rapidly to any new campaign by
Philip (16–18). The second is a permanent force, mainly of merce-
naries but with a citizen component, and with only ten triremes,
to engage continuously with Philip in the north Aegean (19–22).
Demosthenes also discusses the funding of this second force (28–
29). It is a clear indication of Athens’ financial weakness that he
proposes to provide only subsistence money, with no pay, and ex-
pects the troops to make good the shortfall from plunder (but
without harming any of Athens’ allies!).
The early part of the speech encourages the Athenians not to
despair at Philip’s apparent strength but to match the resolution
that he has shown. After setting out his proposal, Demosthenes
turns to criticize the Athenians for their laxness in the waging of
war: they take more care for the smooth running of religious fes-
tivals than for taking prompt military action (35–37), and they re-
act to Philip’s actions rather than take the initiative, and do so
too slowly (38–41). A recurrent demand, repeated in several of his
later speeches, is that the Athenians must serve in person, to keep
an eye on their generals and ensure that the war is prosecuted en-
ergetically, rather than rely on mercenaries (24–25, 44–47). De-
mosthenes, here as elsewhere, attributes Athens’ lack of success

against Philip to a failure of will on the part of its citizens, rather

than a pragmatic reluctance to expend their limited resources on
military operations that were unlikely to substantially weaken
Philip’s power.
There are texts of this speech with commentaries by Sandys 1910

and (very fully) Wooten 2008 and a translation with commentary
by Ellis and Milns 1970.
4. first philippic
[1] If some new matter were the topic of discussion, men of
Athens, I would have waited until most of the regular speakers
had given their opinion, and if anything they said pleased me, I
would have kept quiet; only if it did not would I have ventured to
state my own opinion.⁸ But since we are dealing with matters that
these men have often addressed on previous occasions, I think
that I can reasonably be forgiven for standing up to speak first.
For if they had given the necessary advice in the past, there would
be no need for you to be deliberating now.
[2] First, men of Athens, you must not despair at the present
situation, even if it seems dreadful. For its worst aspect in the past
holds out our best hope for the future. What am I referring to?
To the fact, men of Athens, that our situation has deteriorated so
badly while you have been doing none of the things you needed
to do. For if our situation were so poor when you had been doing
all that you should, there would be no hope of improving mat-
ters. [3] Next, you must consider, whether you hear it from oth-
ers or remember it from personal knowledge, how powerful the
Spartans once were, not long ago, and how well and appropri-
ately you acted, in keeping with the reputation of the city, and en-
dured war against them for the sake of justice.⁹ Why do I men-
tion this? To make you see, men of Athens, and understand that
⁸ It was conventional for more senior politicians to speak first in the

Assembly.
⁹ Athens fought Sparta both in the Corinthian War of 395–386 and in
collaboration with Thebes in the 370s.

72 demosthenes
nothing frightens you when you are on your guard, but that if
you are contemptuous, nothing is as you might wish, using as
my examples the Spartans’ strength then, which you defeated by
applying your intelligence to the situation, and this man’s arro-
gance now, which alarms us because we fail to attend to any of
the things that we should. [4] And if any of you, men of Athens,
thinks that Philip is hard to wage war against, considering the
size of the forces at his disposal and our city’s loss of all its pos-
sessions, he is quite correct. But let him consider this. Once, men
of Athens, Pydna and Potidaea and Methone and the whole sur-
rounding region were on good terms with us,¹⁰ and many of the
peoples that are now on his side were autonomous and free and
preferred to be on good terms with us more than with him.¹¹
[5] But if Philip at that time had decided that it would be difficult
for him to wage war on the Athenians, since they had such strong
outposts in his own territory, whereas he was without allies, he
would not have achieved any of the things that he has, nor would
he have acquired so much power. But he knew very well, men of
Athens, that all these places lie in the open as the prizes of war,
and that it is natural for those who are present to take the posses-
sions of those who are absent, and for those who are willing to toil
and face danger to get the possessions of those who are negligent.
[6] In consequence, and with this resolve, he has conquered and
now possesses places everywhere, some as one would possess them
after taking them in war, others after making them his allies and
well disposed towards him: for they are all willing to ally them-
selves to and obey anyone whom they see to be well prepared and
willing to do what is needed. [7] If, men of Athens, you too are
prepared to adopt such a resolve now, since indeed you were not
previously, and each of you is willing to drop all pretence and take
¹⁰ These places had belonged to Athens’ fifth-century empire, but De-

mosthenes is presumably thinking about their capture in 364 by the Athe-
nian general Timotheus: see 1.9n, 3.28n.
¹¹ By “peoples” (ethnē) Demosthenes means those whose political orga-
nization is not based on the city-state (polis). These were chiefly such non-
Greek people as the Thracians, Paeonians, and Illyrians, but he may also
have in mind the Thessalians (see 9.26n on their enslavement “by ethnos”).

action wherever it is needed and wherever he may be able to bene-

fit the city, those with money by paying taxes, those in the prime
of life by going on campaign, in short if you are simply willing to
get a grip on yourselves, and stop each hoping that you can get
away with doing nothing, while your neighbor does everything
on your behalf, you will recover what is yours, god willing, and
will regain what has been negligently lost, and will punish that
man. [8] Do not imagine that he has fi xed the present situation
immutably, as if he were a god. Rather, someone hates and fears
him, men of Athens, and envies him, even from among those who
now seem to be on very good terms with him; and one must sup-
pose that his supporters have the same feelings as any other peo-
ple would. All these feelings are now repressed, since they have
no outlet because of your slowness and apathy—of which, I say,
you must immediately rid yourselves. [9] You see the situation,
men of Athens: how insolent that man is, who does not even al-
low you to choose between taking action and living quietly, but
threatens and makes arrogant speeches (so it is reported) and is
unable to be content with possession of the places that he has al-
ready conquered, but is always bringing something more under
his power, and surrounds us on all sides as if with nets,¹² while
we sit and wait. [10] When, men of Athens, when will you do
what is needed? What are you waiting for? For some necessity to
arise, by Zeus? What, then, should we call the present develop-
ments? For, I believe, the strongest necessity for free men is shame
at their situation. Or, tell me, do you wish to go around asking
each other, “Is there any news?” What could be graver news than
that a Macedonian is waging war on Athens and is in control of
the affairs of Greece? [11] “Is Philip dead?” “No, by Zeus, but he is
sick.”¹³ What difference does it make to you? Even if something
were to happen to him,¹⁴ you would soon create another Philip, if
this is how you apply yourselves to the situation, since even he has
¹² The simile is taken from the hunting of animals with nets.

¹³ Rumors about Philip’s health circulated in 352/1 while he was on cam-
paign in Thrace (3.5) and would therefore have been recent if this speech
was delivered in 351 (see the Speech Introduction for discussion of its date).
¹⁴ This is a euphemism for “if he dies.”

74 demosthenes
not prospered by reason of his own strength as much as because

of our neglect. [12] Moreover, if Fortune, which always takes bet-
ter care of us than we do of ourselves, should arrange for some-
thing to happen to him, you know that if you were on the scene,
you might step in and in the general state of confusion arrange
matters as you wish. But as you are now, even if the opportunity
were to present itself, you would be unable to take Amphipolis,¹⁵
since you are disunited in your preparations and in your resolve.
[13] I shall now stop urging you all to be ready and willing to
do your duty, since you acknowledge it and are persuaded to do
so. But the kind of force that, in my view, would rid us of the se-
rious troubles we have, and its size, and the sources of money for
it, and the other steps that I think would lead to the creation of
the most effective force as quickly as possible—these I shall at-
tempt to tell you, men of Athens. In doing so, I make the follow-
ing request of you. [14] Make your decision only after you have
heard all that I have to say; do not prejudge the matter. If any-
one thinks that I am describing an entirely new kind of force, he
should not suppose that I am prevaricating. It is not those who
say “quickly” and “tomorrow” who best address our needs—send-
ing a relief force now will not allow us to prevent what has already
happened. [15] Rather, it is whoever can show what kind of force,
of what size and funded from what sources, will be able to resist
until either we agree to bring the war to an end or we defeat the
enemy. Only in this way will we put an end to the harm we are
suffering. I believe that I can tell you what needs to be done, but
I will not stand in the way of anyone else who has advice to of-
fer. This is the extent of the promise I make; events will give the
proof, and you shall be the judges.
[16] First of all, men of Athens, I say that you should prepare
fifty triremes. Then you must be resolved, if the need should arise,
to embark and sail on them in person. In addition, you should
make ready horse-transporting triremes and enough supply ships
¹⁵ The strategically important city of Amphipolis on the river Strymon in

Thrace was founded by Athens in the fifth century, lost during the Pelopon-
nesian War, and captured by Philip in 357. Its recovery was a central element
of Athenian foreign policy.

for half the cavalrymen.¹⁶ [17] These, in my view, are needed to

counter his sudden campaigns from his own land to Thermopylae
and the Chersonese and Olynthus and anywhere else he wishes.¹⁷
For we must plant the expectation in his mind that you will shake
off your excessive lethargy and hurry out, as you did to Euboea
and on a previous occasion, it is said, to Haliartus and recently to
Thermopylae.¹⁸ [18] Such a force would not be easy for him to de-
spise utterly, even if you do not do as I say you should. Its purpose
is either to keep him quiet out of fear, in the knowledge that you
are prepared—for he will know it, since there are those of us—
yes, there are, more than there should be—who report everything
to him; or, if he should despise it, to take him off guard, since
there will be nothing to prevent your sailing against his territory
if he should give you the opportunity. [19] These are the resolu-
tions that are in my view called for and the preparations that need
to be made. But before these, men of Athens, I urge you to mobi-
lize a force to wage war continuously and to damage his interests.
None of your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries¹⁹ for me, nor
¹⁶ Demosthenes proposes the creation of a substantial rapid-response

force. A trireme (triērēs, the standard Greek warship of the period) regularly
had 170 rowers (out of a total crew of 200), and so the number of those in-
volved could be in excess of 9,000. The regular number of Athenian cavalry
was 1,000 (see 14.13n).
¹⁷ On the importance of this passage for dating the speech, see the
Speech Introduction. Philip marched on Thermopylae after his victory over
the Phocian army in 352 (see the next note) and threatened the Chersonese
by his campaign in Thrace in autumn of that year (see 3.4n). His military
threat to Olynthus, which is distinct from and predates the outbreak of war,
occurred probably in early 351.
¹⁸ Demosthenes refers to Athens’ intervention on the island of Euboea in
357 (see 8.74– 75), its contribution to the coalition that fought the Spartans
at Haliartus in Boeotia during the Corinthian War in 395, and its occupa-
tion of Thermopylae in 352 to prevent Philip marching against Phocis (see
also below, 41).
¹⁹ Ten thousand (a “myriad”) was regularly used by the Greeks to denote
a very large number. In fact, Athens is never known to have employed any-
thing like this many mercenaries. See below, 24n, for the ancient commen-
tary on this passage.

76 demosthenes
these paper forces, but one that will belong to the city and that,
whether you elect one man or many or this man or that as its gen-
eral, will follow and obey him. I also urge you to provide supplies
for it. [20] What kind of force do I mean, and of what size, and
where will it get its supplies from, and how will it be motivated
to take these actions? I shall tell you, dealing with each of these
points separately. I am talking about mercenaries—and please be-
ware of the attitude that has often harmed you before: you think
that everything is on too small a scale and so in your decrees you
choose the most grandiose options, but when it comes to action,
you fail to take even small measures. Instead, you should take
small measures, and provide for them, and then add to them if
they seem inadequate. [21] What I propose is that there be two
thousand soldiers in all, of whom five hundred should be Athe-
nian, of whatever age you decide, and that they should campaign
for a set period, not for a long time as they do now but for as long
as you think appropriate, taking turns; the rest should be merce-
naries. There should also be two hundred cavalrymen, of whom at
least fifty should be Athenian, serving on the same basis as the in-
fantry, and horse-transport ships for them.²⁰ [22] Very well, what
else? Ten fast triremes.²¹ Since he has a fleet,²² we too need fast
triremes to allow our force to sail in safety. How are these to be
supplied? I shall tell you, after I have explained why I think so
small a force is sufficient, and why I insist that those who go on
campaign be citizens.
[23] The reason for a force of this size, men of Athens, is that
we cannot now provide one that is capable of meeting him in bat-
tle but must act as raiders and wage this kind of war at first. The
²⁰ Athenians were liable to serve in the army from the ages of 18 to 59,
and their army was mobilized by age groups (see, e.g., 3.4, where all those
up to the age of 45 are to be called up).
²¹ Athenian triremes were divided into classes according to their sailing
qualities: see 14.18n. Demosthenes is probably calling for ships of either the
“select” or “first” class.
²² The Macedonian fleet was doubtless small, if Demosthenes thought
that ten triremes were sufficient to deal with it, but it was capable of caus-
ing trouble to Athens: see 34 below. See in general Hammond and Griffith
1979: 310–312.

force should not be excessively large, since there is no money and

no supplies, but neither should it be utterly weak. [24] The reason
why I say that citizens should participate and sail with the force is
that in the past, I am told, the city supported a mercenary force at
Corinth, led by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and cer-
tain others, and you yourselves joined in the campaign.²³ And I
know from what I have heard that these mercenaries, drawn up
alongside you against the Spartans, and you alongside them, were
victorious.²⁴ But ever since your mercenaries have campaigned
on their own, they have defeated our friends and allies, while
our enemies have grown stronger than they should. They give a
passing glance to the war that the city is waging and then sail
off to Artabazus and anywhere else instead, and the general fol-
lows them. And this is reasonable enough, since it is impossible
for someone who does not provide pay to exercise command.²⁵
[25] What then do I propose? That you prevent the general and
his troops from making excuses by providing them with pay and
by stationing your own soldiers alongside them, like supervi-
sors of his actions, because the way we handle things at present
is laughable. If anyone were to ask you, “Are you at peace, Athe-
nians?” you would say, “By Zeus, we are not; we are at war with
²³ During the Corinthian War against Sparta, the Athenian general

Iphicrates commanded a force of light-armed mercenary soldiers of a type
known as “peltasts” (see OCD³ s.v. peltasts). This force was based at Corinth
and famously defeated a regiment of the Spartan army at Lechaeum in 390:
see 13.22. Iphicrates was succeeded as commander by Chabrias. Both men
were prominent military leaders until the mid 350s: see 13.20n on the statues
erected in the Agora in their honor. Polystratus is not otherwise known, but
he may be the man mentioned at Dem. 20.84.
²⁴ The victory is that of Lechaeum (see the previous note).
²⁵ According to the ancient commentary on this speech (commenting on
19: Dilts 1983: 116.20–117.2), in 355 the Athenian general Chares augmented
his mercenary force with approximately 1,000 mercenaries who had previ-
ously served in the satrapal armies of the western Persian Empire. Since he
was unable to support these troops, he took service with the rebel satrap
Artabazus and defeated a larger Persian army in a battle that he boastfully
described to the Athenians as a “second Marathon,” i.e., as a great triumph
(on the original battle of Marathon, see 13.21n).

78 demosthenes
Philip.”²⁶ [26] Have you not elected from among yourselves ten
taxiarchs and generals and phylarchs and two hipparchs?²⁷ What
do these men do? Except for whichever individual commander
you dispatch to the war, the rest marshal your ceremonial pro-
cessions alongside the priests.²⁸ Just like the makers of clay figu-
rines, you elect the taxiarchs and phylarchs for the marketplace,
not for war.²⁹ [27] But shouldn’t the taxiarchs be chosen from
among you, men of Athens, and the hipparch, and shouldn’t the
office holders be from among you, if the force is to be truly Athe-
nian? But your hipparch has to sail to Lemnos,³⁰ while it is Mene-
laus who commands the cavalry that is fighting for the city’s pos-
sessions.³¹ I do not mean any criticism of the individual, but the
man, whoever he is, should have been elected by you.³²
[28] Perhaps you think that this is well said, but what you most
²⁶ A state of war existed between Athens and Philip after the latter’s cap-
ture of Amphipolis in 357: see 2.25n.
²⁷ The ten generals had overall command of Athens’ armed forces on
land and at sea. The taxiarchs each commanded one of the ten tribal con-
tingents (taxeis) of the Athenian army. The cavalry was commanded by two
hipparchs, with a phylarch leading each of the ten tribal cavalry contin-
gents. On the election of these military officials, see Ath. Pol. 61.
²⁸ The cavalry often took part in religious processions (Xen. Hipparchi-
cus 3.1), and the hoplites participated in the Panathenaic procession. In ad-
dition, the generals poured libations at the City Dionysia (see Plut. Cimon
8; IG II² 1496). Demosthenes’ complaint is that Athens’ military leaders are
underemployed.
²⁹ Demosthenes appears to be thinking of clay figurines of soldiers which
would be sold in the marketplace (agora). The Agora was also an important
venue for religious processions.
³⁰ Lemnos was an island in the northern Aegean that belonged to Athens
and was occupied by Athenian settlers. The Athenians elected a hipparch
(distinct from the two cavalry commanders mentioned in 26) to command
the cavalry stationed there: see Ath. Pol. 61.6.
³¹ Menelaus, clearly originally a foreigner, is possibly to be identified with
the man of that name from Pelagonia in Upper Macedonia who is praised in
an Athenian decree of 362 (IG II² 110 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 38);
he may be the Menelaus son of Arrhabaeus of Athens mentioned in a decree
of the city of Ilion (Tod 1948: no. 148). See Osborne 1983: T56.
³² The circumstances of Menelaus’ appointment are unknown.

wish to hear is how much money is needed and where it will come
from. This I shall also do. As for the money, the maintenance—
subsistence only—of this force will cost a little more than ninety
talents: for ten fast ships, forty talents, at twenty minas per ship
per month; for two thousand soldiers, the same amount again,
with each soldier receiving ten drachmas a month for main-
tenance; and for the two hundred cavalrymen, if each receives
thirty drachmas a month, twelve talents.³³ [29] If anyone thinks
that this is scant provision—for those on campaign to receive
maintenance money only—he is wrong. I am sure that if this pro-
posal is accepted the army itself will make good the rest from the
war, without wronging any of the Greeks or our allies, and as a
result will receive full pay.³⁴ I am willing to join the expedition
myself as a volunteer³⁵ and suffer any punishment, if this is not
the case. Where will the money that I am urging you to provide
come from? I shall now tell you.³⁶
[statement of financi al r esources]

[30] This, men of Athens, is what we have been able to come up
with.³⁷ When you vote to make your decision, if this plan pleases
³³ See 22 on the ships. In the Athenian monetary system, one talent =

60 minas = 6,000 drachmas. Demosthenes’ calculations are as follows.
Cost of squadron: 10 ships × 12 months × 20 minas = 2,400 minas =
40 talents. Maintenance: 2,000 soldiers × 10 drachmas × 12 months =
240,000 drachmas = 40 talents. Cavalry: 200 cavalry × 30 drachmas
× 12 months = 72,000 drachmas = 12 talents. The exact total is 92 tal-
ents. The crew of each trireme is assumed to number 200, and the monthly
cost for the maintenance of the crew of an individual ship (20 minas =
2,000 drachmas) implies that maintenance for each crew member will be
10 drachmas per month (which is the same as the amount for the soldiers).
³⁴ On rates of military pay and subsistence money, see Pritchett 1971–
1991: 1.14–23.
³⁵ On volunteering for military service, see Pritchett 1971–1991:
2.110–112.
³⁶ The document that Demosthenes read out at this point, like the letter
in 37, was not preserved in the manuscripts of the speech.
³⁷The ancient critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus mistakenly believed that
this is the start of a new speech: see the Speech Introduction. Demosthenes’

80 demosthenes
you, you will be voting to wage war on Philip not only by your
decrees and letters but also by your actions.
[31] It seems to me, men of Athens, that your deliberation
about the war and your general armaments would be improved
if you were to bear in mind the nature of the place against which
you are waging war, and observe that Philip often achieves his
aims by getting a head start on us, by means of the winds and the
seasons of the year; and that he launches his attacks after waiting
for the Etesian winds or for winter,³⁸ whenever we are unable to
get there. [32] We need to bear these things in mind and to wage
war not by means of relief forces—since if we do so we will be too
late for everything—but by means of a permanent standing force.
As winter quarters for this force we can use Lemnos and Thasos
and Sciathos and the islands in the region,³⁹ where there are har-
bors and food and everything that an army needs. During the
campaigning season, when it is easy to put in to land and when
the winds are safe, it will be easy to put in to the mainland and
the entrances of the trading ports.
[33] How and when to employ the force is a decision to be
taken at the appropriate time by the commander you appoint;
it is what you must provide that I have written down.⁴⁰ If you
make these provisions, men of Athens, organizing first the sum
of money that I specify and then the rest, you will legally com-
pel the soldiers, triremes, cavalrymen, in short the entire force, to
stick with the war. As regards money, you will be your own trea-
surers and providers; and as regards action, you will hold the gen-
use of the first-person plural offers a rare glimpse (in these speeches) of the
collaboration that undoubtedly took place between politicians.
³⁸ The Etesian (i.e., “summer”) winds (modern Greek “meltemi”) are
strong north winds of the Aegean Sea that blow up suddenly during the
summer months. Their appearance could delay Athenian naval expeditions
to the northern Aegean. See also 8.14.
³⁹ On Lemnos, see 27 above. The large island of Thasos off the northern
coast of the Aegean and the island of Sciathos to the north of Euboea were
both allies of Athens by virtue of their membership in the Second Athenian
Confederacy.
⁴⁰ Demosthenes here refers to the decree that he has drafted.

eral accountable and will stop constantly deliberating about the

same things but doing nothing further. [34] Furthermore, men of
Athens, you will deprive Philip of his greatest financial resource.
What is this? The fact that he wages war against you from your
own allies, by plundering those who sail the sea. What else? You
will no longer suffer harm, unlike in the past when he attacked
Lemnos and Imbros and carried off your citizens as prisoners,⁴¹
and captured the cargo ships off Geraestus and levied an incal-
culable sum from them,⁴² and lastly disembarked at Marathon⁴³
and seized the sacred trireme⁴⁴ from there, and you are able nei-
ther to prevent such things nor to send assistance at the times
that you have set. [35] Why is it, men of Athens, that the fes-
tivals of the Panathenaea and the Dionysia always take place at
the appointed time, whether experts or amateurs are selected⁴⁵
to administer them, when as much money is spent on them as
⁴¹ The neighboring islands of Lemnos (cf. 27 and 32 above) and Imbros

in the northern Aegean were Athenian possessions, settled by citizens sent
from Athens. This and the following examples show that Philip certainly
had some naval capability: see 22n above.
⁴² Geraestus was at the southern tip of the island of Euboea. The cargo
ships mentioned were probably carrying wheat bound for Athens’ port of
Piraeus.
⁴³ Marathon was a coastal town of northeastern Attica and the site of a
famous battle in 490 in which a Persian expeditionary force was defeated by
the Athenian army. See 13.21, 14.30.
⁴⁴ There were two so-called sacred triremes in the Athenian fleet, the
Paralus and the Salaminia, which were used on diplomatic and religious
missions (on the former, see 8.29n). Each year Athens sent a delegation to
participate in a religious festival (the “lesser” Delia) on the island of Delos,
which stopped en route to sacrifice at the shrine of Delian Apollo at Mara-
thon. This provides a possible context for Philip’s action.
⁴⁵ The Greek word lachōsin implies selection by lot, though it is known
that until at least 349/8 the managers of the Dionysia were elected. Mac-
Dowell 2009: 213 n. 23 correctly rejects an older theory that this is evidence
that the speech was revised after delivery, and he argues that the reference
is to other magistrates, the archōn and the board of athlothētai, who had
responsibility for the processions at the Dionysia and Panathenaea respec-
tively and who were selected by lot.

82 demosthenes
on any single naval expedition, and they involve as much bus-

tle and preparation as any other occasion I know of,⁴⁶ whereas
your naval expeditions all miss their opportunities—the ones to
Methone, to Pagasae, and to Potidaea?⁴⁷ [36] The reason is that
the festivals are all regulated by law,⁴⁸ and each of you knows far
in advance who will be the chorus master or gymnasiarch⁴⁹ of
the tribe, and what he must do and when, and what he should re-
ceive from whom, and nothing is overlooked or left unclear out of
neglect. But none of our military preparations are organized, or
kept up to date, or properly defined. As a result, as soon as we re-
ceive some news, we appoint trierarchs,⁵⁰ and make exchanges of
property for them,⁵¹ and look into the provision of money, and
after this we decide to embark the metics⁵² and the slaves who
⁴⁶ The Panathenaea in honor of Athena and the City Dionysia in honor

of Dionysus were the two most important religious festivals in the Athe-
nian calendar.
⁴⁷ See 1.9n.
⁴⁸ For the text of such a law, see Dem. 21.10.
⁴⁹ These two positions were both liturgies, i.e., public duties that wealthy
individuals were required to finance out of their pocket. A chorus master
(chorēgos) was responsible for the training of a dramatic chorus (see OCD³
s.v. chorēgia); a gymnasiarch was responsible for his tribe’s runners in the
torchraces that were part of several religious festivals: see Dem. 20.21.
⁵⁰ Trierarchs were wealthy Athenians who were appointed to perform the
liturgy (see the previous note) of commanding a ship of the Athenian navy.
They were expected to use their own money to defray the costs of equip-
ping and maintaining the ship. On the trierarchic system, see the Introduc-
tion to Dem. 14.
⁵¹ Liability for the performance of liturgies was based on wealth. To en-
sure that wealthy citizens did not evade their responsibilities, the Athenians
devised a legal procedure called antidosis (“exchange”). Any Athenian who
was chosen to perform a liturgy could challenge another to do it in his stead
if he believed the other to be wealthier. The person challenged could either
agree to take over the liturgy (thereby acknowledging that he was richer) or
exchange properties with the challenger (if he thought that he was in fact
poorer). See Christ 1990.
⁵² Metics (metoikoi) were non-Athenians resident in Attica. They lacked
political rights but were obliged to serve in Athens’ armed forces.

live apart from their masters,⁵³ then ourselves, then we change

the crew again, [37] and during all this delay we lose the object
of our expedition before we have begun. We spend the time for
action on preparation, but the opportunities offered by circum-
stance do not wait on our slowness and dissimulation.⁵⁴ In the
meantime, the forces we think we have are shown to be unable to
do anything even when opportunities do arise. And that man has
reached such a pitch of arrogance that he has already sent letters
like this to the Euboeans.⁵⁵
[r e ading of letter]
[38] Most of what has been read out, men of Athens, is true—
would that it were not—though it is perhaps unpleasant to hear.⁵⁶
If everything a speaker passes over, in order not to cause dis-
tress, is also passed over by events, it would be right to speak with
a view to pleasing the audience. But since pleasant speeches—
if they are inappropriate—lead to disastrous consequences, it is
shameful to deceive ourselves and, by putting off everything that
is disagreeable, be too late in all that we do, [39] and be unable to
learn even this lesson—that those who wage war properly must
anticipate events rather than follow them; and, just as one would
expect a general to lead his army, so those who deliberate should
lead events, so that all their decisions lead to action and they are
not forced to chase after events. [40] But you, men of Athens,
⁵³ Some particularly trusted slaves were permitted by their owners to live

and work independently, on condition that they pay them a part of their
earnings.
⁵⁴ Demosthenes’ point is that behind all their bustle, the Athenians have
no real intention of getting ready for war.
⁵⁵ The ancient commentary on the passage (Dilts 1983: 118.5– 7) claims
that the letter advised the Euboeans not to put their hopes on alliance with
the Athenians, since the latter were unable even to save themselves. There
were four separate cities on Euboea (Chalcis, Eretria, Carystus, and Oreus):
perhaps Philip sent the same letter to all of them (see MacDowell 2009: 217
n. 38). For Athenian military intervention in Euboea in early 348, see 5.5n.
⁵⁶ The text of the letter is not included in the manuscripts of this speech.

84 demosthenes
who possess greater forces than anyone else—triremes, hoplites,

cavalry, revenues—have never yet, to the present day, used any
of them as you should, but instead you wage war on Philip in the
same way that a foreigner boxes.⁵⁷ For when one of them is struck,
he always moves his hands to that spot, and if he is struck on the
other side, his hands go to that place: he has neither the knowl-
edge nor the will to put up his guard or watch for the next blow.
[41] It is the same with you. If you hear that Philip is in the Cher-
sonese, you vote to send a relief force there, and likewise if you
hear that he is at Thermopylae.⁵⁸ And if you hear that he is some-
where else, you run up and down at his heels and are at his com-
mand; you have no plan to turn the war to your advantage, and
fail to anticipate any eventuality until you learn that it has hap-
pened or is happening. This was perhaps inherent in previous sit-
uations, but now things have reached the point that it is no longer
supportable. [42] It seems to me, men of Athens, that some god is
ashamed at what is being done in the name of our city and is put-
ting this restlessness in Philip. If Philip were willing to be quiet,
keeping the places he has defeated and seized before we could act
but doing nothing further, I think some of you would be satisfied
with this—although we would get a collective reputation for dis-
honor and cowardice and all the most shameful things. But now,
by his constant attacks on people and his grasping for more, per-
haps he may summon you forth—if indeed you have not entirely
given up. [43] I am amazed if none of you, men of Athens, is con-
cerned or angry when he considers that when the war began, our
object was to punish Philip, but now that it is coming to an end,
it is to avoid suffering harm at his hands. Yet it is clear that he will
not stand still, unless he is stopped. Should we just wait for this to
happen? Or, if you were to dispatch empty ships⁵⁹ and hopes in-
spired by so-and-so, do you suppose that everything would be all
right? [44] Shall we not embark? Shall we not go out now, even if
⁵⁷ Demosthenes both assumes that foreigners (barbaroi: cf. 3.16n) would

be unfamiliar with the Greek sport of boxing and reflects the Greek preju-
dice that foreigners were by nature inferior to Greeks.
⁵⁸ For these two episodes, see 17n above.
⁵⁹ On the meaning of “empty ships,” see 3.4n.

we did not do so previously, with at least a part of our own forces?

Shall we not sail against his territory? “Where shall we find an-
chorage?” someone may ask. The war itself, men of Athens, will
find out the rotten parts of his affairs, if we set to work. But if we
sit at home, listening to speakers abuse and blame each other, I
fear that we will never achieve any of the things that we need to.
[45] For, I believe, wherever a part or even all of the city’s forces
are dispatched, the gods are kindly and fortune fights on our side;
but wherever you send out a general and an empty decree and
hopes from the speaker’s platform, you achieve nothing that you
should, while your enemies laugh at such expeditions, and your
allies die of fear.⁶⁰ [46] One man on his own can never, never, I
say, do everything that you wish: but he can make promises and
speeches and blame this man or that and, as a result, your af-
fairs lie in ruins. For when our general is leading wretched unpaid
mercenaries, and these men here are smoothly lying to you about
what Philip is doing, and you are voting at random on the basis of
whatever you hear, what can you expect?
[47] How then will this state of affairs be brought to an end?
As soon as you, men of Athens, appoint the same men to be both
soldiers and witnesses of the general’s conduct and, once they
have returned home, judges at the examinations into the conduct
of the magistrates,⁶¹ so that you not only hear about your affairs
but also observe them in person. As it is, things are so shame-
ful that each general is tried by you two or three times on a capi-
tal charge,⁶² but none of them dares to engage even once in a life-
⁶⁰ I.e., fear of Athenian abuses, on which see 24 above.

⁶¹ On the scrutiny (euthynai) that all magistrates had to undergo at the
end of their year in office, see 1.28. Demosthenes means if the soldiers are
Athenian citizens, they can later be witnesses and judges at the general’s
scrutiny.
⁶² Generals and politicians were particularly liable to impeachment
(eisangelia) on a charge of treason; often such prosecutions were prompted
by frustration at their lack of success rather than any real evidence of cor-
ruption. See Pritchett 1971–1991: 2.4–33; Hansen 1975; Hamel 1998: 122–157.
See also 8.28 on the possibility of recalling the general Diopeithes from the
Chersonese under this procedure.

86 demosthenes
and-death struggle with the enemy. Instead, they prefer the death
of kidnappers and clothes-stealers⁶³ to a fitting end, since a crim-
inal dies after he is tried and convicted, but a general dies fight-
ing the enemy.⁶⁴ [48] We go around, some of us saying that Philip
is working with the Spartans to ruin Thebes⁶⁵ and is overturning
constitutions, others claiming that he has sent ambassadors to the
King,⁶⁶ or that he is fortifying cities in Illyria,⁶⁷ or just fabricating
speeches on their own. [49] By the gods, men of Athens, I think
that Philip is drunk⁶⁸ at the scale of his achievements and dreams
of doing many similar things, when he sees that there is no one
to prevent him, and is elated by what he has accomplished. But,
by Zeus, I do not suppose that he chooses to act in such a way
that even the stupidest of us will know what he intends to do—
for the makers of speeches are the most stupid. [50] But if we put
aside such behavior and recognize that he is our enemy and is de-
priving us of our possessions and has for a long time been insult-
ing us, and that everything we ever hoped someone would do for
us is found to have been done against us, and that the future is in
our own hands, and if we are not now willing to wage war on him
there we shall perhaps be compelled to do so here—if we recog-
nize these things, we will have recognized what is needed and will
have rid ourselves of empty rhetoric. What we need to do is not to
⁶³ Under Athenian law kidnappers (andrapodistai) and clothes-stealers

(lōpodytai) could be either seized and dragged off to one of the board of
magistrates called the Eleven or reported to one of them. In either case,
if they were caught red-handed and admitted their guilt, they were put to
death without trial. See MacDowell 1978: 148–149.
⁶⁴ Hamel 1998: 204–209 catalogues and discusses the deaths of Athenian
generals on campaign.
⁶⁵ Philip and Sparta were on opposite sides of the Third Sacred War: he
was allied to Thebes, and Sparta supported Phocis. If Philip was intending
to collaborate with Sparta against Thebes, this would represent a complete
reversal of policy on his part.
⁶⁶ There is no other evidence for a Macedonian embassy to Persia at this
date, although it is quite possible that one was sent.
⁶⁷ On Philip’s campaign against the Illyrians, see 1.13n.
⁶⁸ Demosthenes refers to metaphorical drunkenness, but the Greeks re-
garded the Macedonians as conspicuously heavy drinkers: see 2.18n.

contemplate what may possibly happen but to realize that the fu-
ture will be miserable unless you attend to your obligations and
are willing to do your duty.
[51] I have never yet tried to win your favor by saying any-
thing that I did not believe to be to your advantage, and now I
have shared everything I know with you candidly, holding noth-
ing back. Just as I know that it is in your interest to hear the best
advice, so I wish I knew that the giving of such advice would ben-
efit the man who composed the best speech—I would be much
happier if that were the case. As it is, although the consequences
for me are unclear, nevertheless I choose to speak in the firm con-
viction that you will benefit from agreeing to this policy—so long
as you put it into practice. May what will benefit all win out.

5. ON THE PE ACE
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
Demosthenes’ speech On the Peace was delivered in the after-
math of the making of the Peace of Philocrates between Athens
and Philip in summer 346.¹ It is correctly dated 346/5 by Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus² and was probably delivered in autumn 346.
Philip’s capture of Olynthus in 348 (see the Introduction to
Dem. 1–3) meant the failure of Athens’ attempt to resist him in the
north, and he also now held many Athenians as prisoners of war.
Athens tried to organize other states in Greece to unite against
him, but without success. The city was isolated, war weary, and
keen to secure the return of the prisoners. Meanwhile Philip in-
dicated that he wished to put an end to the state of war with Ath-
ens that had existed since 357, and the Athenians agreed to enter
negotiations.
In the background to these negotiations were the long-running
war (the Third Sacred War) between Thebes and Phocis, allies of
Philip and Athens respectively, and control of the strategically vi-
tal pass of Thermopylae in northern Greece. Already in 352 Philip
had marched south towards Thermopylae but had been prevented
from gaining control of it by the dispatch of an expeditionary
force from Athens. Among the Phocian generals some wished to
hand the pass over to Athens and Sparta, but others inclined to-
wards Philip. As a result, the Athenians could not be sure that
¹ The peace takes its name from the most prominent negotiator on the
Athenian side.
² First Letter to Ammaeus 10.

5. on the peace 89
Thermopylae would remain in friendly hands, and they feared

that Philip would gain control of it and then march his army
south against them. They therefore had little choice but to make
peace with him.
The negotiation of the Peace of Philocrates involved a series of
embassies between Athens and Philip in the first half of 346. The
main sources for what happened are two long lawcourt speeches,
Dem. 19 and Aes. 2, delivered in 343 in the course of a prosecu-
tion brought by Demosthenes against his political rival Aeschines.
Both men were part of the delegations in 346 that negotiated the
peace and then witnessed Philip’s swearing to accept it; but by
343 the peace had become unpopular at Athens, and each sought
to shift responsibility for it onto the other. Demosthenes prose-
cuted Aeschines on a charge of misconduct as an ambassador, al-
leging that he had been bribed by Philip, but failed to secure his
conviction. They returned to the issue in 330 in the trial “on the
Crown,” from which again both very long speeches have survived
(Dem. 18 and Aes. 3). In these four speeches the two men go into
great detail about what happened in 346, but they often contra-
dict each other on matters of fact.³
Already in the autumn of 346 many Athenians felt that the
peace had not turned out as they had hoped and that Philip had
tricked them. Two aspects of the peace were regarded as partic-
ularly hard to accept. The first was Philip’s insistence that only
those allies of Athens who were members of the Second Athe-
nian Confederacy should be included in the peace, whereas the
Athenians had wanted to extend its protection to both the Thra-
cian king Cersobleptes and the Thessalian city of Halus. Philip
would not agree to this, and in the summer of 346 he continued
operations in Thrace and also captured Halus. The second Athe-
nian grievance arose from the way in which Philip had brought
the Sacred War between Thebes and Phocis to an end. Aeschines
and Philocrates were apparently led to believe by Philip, and an-
³ There is disagreement about many aspects of the negotiation of the

Peace of Philocrates. See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 329–347; Sealey
1993: 143–159; MacDowell 2009: 314–342. See also on these four speeches
Carey 2000 and Yunis 2005 in this series.

90 demosthenes
nounced to the Athenians, that Philip would (contrary to his pre-

vious policy) turn against his ally Thebes and save Phocis, whereas
in fact he continued to support Thebes and destroyed the cities of
the Phocians (9–10). Aeschines was accused by Demosthenes of
taking bribes from Philip to persuade the Athenians of this (see
above; cf. 12), but it is not necessary to believe that he was guilty
of anything worse than self-deception. These tricks of Philip are
staple complaints in Demosthenes’ speeches of the second half of
the 340s.⁴
The specific issue that this speech addresses is the transfer of
two of the twenty-four seats on the council of the Delphic Am-
phictyony from Phocis to Philip. The Delphic Amphictyony was
a long-established organization comprising the various peoples
who “lived around” the sanctuary of the god Apollo at Delphi
in central Greece, each of whom sent representatives to the Am-
phictyonic council. The council administered the sanctuary and
could impose penalties for offenses against it, including the dec-
laration of a sacred war, that is, a war in the name of Apollo.
The Third Sacred War (356–346) had been declared against the
Phocians because they had occupied the sanctuary at Delphi and
used its wealth to pay for mercenaries. In bringing this war to
an end and punishing the Phocians, Philip represented himself as
the champion of Delphi. As ruler of Thessaly, he already had con-
siderable influence over the Amphictyonic council, since many of
the members were Thessalian (see 23), but the transfer of the two
Phocian seats to him would cement his control of it, as well as be-
ing a potent symbol of his power in Greece.
Demosthenes later claimed that a joint Thessalian and Mace-
donian embassy came to Athens requesting that the Athenians
support Philip’s membership of the Amphictyonic council (i.e.,
the transfer of the Phocian seats to him) and that Aeschines was
the only man to support this request (19.111–113, delivered in 343).
Be that as it may,⁵ Demosthenes argues in this speech that the
⁴ On the mistreatment of the Phocians, see already 10 of this speech.

⁵ Libanius argues in his Introduction to this speech (3) that it was not de-
livered, because in it Demosthenes advises the Athenians to agree to Philip’s
request, whereas in Dem. 19 he criticizes the defendant, Aeschines, for the

5. on the peace 91
Athenians have no choice but to agree to the request, whether or

not they like it (19). His main concern is that the Athenians, if
they are intransigent on this point, may precipitate united Am-
phictyonic action (i.e., a sacred war) against themselves, involving
not only Philip but also Thessaly, Thebes, and much of the Pelo-
ponnese (14, 17). Each of these states, he argues, has its individual
quarrel with Athens (18–19) and might be persuaded to go along
with Philip for its own advantage, just as happened in 346 when
an unholy alliance of Thebes and Thessaly supported his destruc-
tion of Phocis (19–23). Demosthenes frankly criticizes the peace
(13: its terms are bad and unworthy of the city) but insists that
the Athenians cannot afford to break it: since they have already
had to endure numerous wrongs at the hands of others, it would
be absurd to risk a potentially disastrous war over “the shadow at
Delphi,” that is, over a purely symbolic addition to Philip’s stand-
ing at the sanctuary (24–25). This line of argument, reminiscent
in some respects of his attempt in Dem. 14 to rein in the aggres-
sive impulses of some Athenians towards the Persian empire, was
under the circumstances eminently sensible.
There is a text of this speech with commentary by Sandys 1900

and a translation with commentary by Ellis and Milns 1970.
5. on the pe ace
[1] I see, men of Athens, that our present predicament is giving
rise to great difficulty and confusion not only because it is point-
less to make fine speeches about everything that has been squan-
dered but also because there is absolutely no agreement about
where our future interest lies, but some take one view and oth-
ers another. [2] Deliberation is inherently difficult and irksome,
but you, men of Athens, have made it considerably harder. For all
other people are in the habit of deliberating before they act, but
you do so afterwards! As a result, for as long as I can remember,
anyone who criticizes those things that might lead you into trou-
very same thing. This weak argument is rightly rejected by MacDowell

2000: 251.

92 demosthenes
ble wins a good reputation and is thought to speak well, but the
actual situation about which you are deliberating gets away from
you. [3] Nevertheless I stand before you convinced that if you are
willing to listen, without making a disturbance or showing ill
will, as is appropriate for those who are deliberating on behalf of
the city about matters of such importance, I will be able to speak
and to advise you how the present situation may be improved and
how what has been squandered may be regained.
[4] Although I am well aware, men of Athens, that it is always
very profitable for a speaker to talk to you about himself and his
previous speeches, if he has the nerve to do so, I consider it to be
such a tiresome and tedious practice that I shrink from doing so
myself, even when I see the need for it. But I do think it will help
you to judge what I am about to say now if I remind you briefly
of what I said on previous occasions. [5] First, men of Athens, at
a time when affairs in Euboea were in disarray, and certain peo-
ple were trying to persuade you to help Plutarchus and undertake
an inglorious and costly war,⁶ I was the first, indeed the only one
to come forward and oppose it,⁷ and I was virtually torn apart by
those who were trying to persuade you, for the sake of small prof-
its, to commit many great errors. And a short time later, when we
had incurred a further burden of shame, and had suffered such
things as no men have ever suffered at the hands of those whom
they had helped, you all realized that the men who had then per-
suaded you of that course of action were worthless and that what
I had said was best. [6] Again, men of Athens, when I saw that
Neoptolemus the actor was free to go about as he pleased, shielded
by his profession,⁸ and was doing the greatest harm to our city,
⁶ In early 348 Athens intervened on the island of Euboea in response to

an appeal from Plutarchus, the ruler of Eretria. During this campaign Plu-
tarchus was expelled from the island by Phocion, the Athenian commander,
but later seized and held to ransom a number of Athenian soldiers (ancient
commentary on this passage = Dilts 1983: 122.27–33; Plut. Phocion 12–14.1).
⁷ Presumably Demosthenes argued that intervention in the affairs of Eu-
boea would be a distraction from the war for Olynthus.
⁸ The tragic actor Neoptolemus of Scyros had a successful career at Ath-
ens and also enjoyed the favor of Philip, with whom he advocated that Ath-

5. on the peace 93
and was managing and controlling your affairs for the benefit of
Philip, I came forward and addressed you, not out of any private
enmity or maliciousness, as has become clear from subsequent
events. [7] In that case, the people I criticize are not those who
spoke on Neoptolemus’ behalf, since not a single person did so,
but you! For even if you had been watching tragedies in the The-
ater of Dionysus,⁹ rather than a debate about the safety of the
city, you would not have listened to him with so much favor or to
me with so much hostility. [8] And yet I think that you all now
recognize this at least, that after he had arrived at that time in the
enemy’s country, wishing (so he said) to bring a sum of money
that was owed to him there back here to pay for the performance
of a liturgy,¹⁰ and after he had made extensive use of the argu-
ment that it was terrible for anyone to criticize those who were
bringing wealth from Macedonia to Athens, when the peace pro-
vided him with immunity from prosecution, he turned the visible
assets¹¹ that he had acquired here into cash and went off to Philip.
[9] These two predictions that I made prove that my speeches
were right and just and truthful. The third, men of Athens—and
as soon as I have said just this one thing I will return to the things
I have passed over—relates to the occasion when we ambassadors
had returned after accepting the oaths relating to the peace.¹²
ens make peace. As an actor he was evidently free to travel without arous-
ing suspicion.
⁹ The Theater of Dionysus at the foot of the Acropolis formed part of the
sanctuary of Dionysus and was the venue for the production of plays at the
City Dionysia. In a theatrical performance it was only to be expected that
an actor would outshine a politician.
¹⁰ Liturgies were obligations imposed on wealthy men to perform certain
tasks for the state using their own money. See 4.36n.
¹¹ Visible assets (phanera ousia) were assets such as land, property, or
slaves that could not be easily concealed, as opposed to cash, bank deposits,
and loans. See 14.25n on “invisible wealth.”
¹² Demosthenes refers to the making of the Peace of Philocrates in
summer 346 and specifically to the second Athenian embassy to Philip
that was sent to witness his swearing to accept the peace. See the Speech
Introduction.

94 demosthenes
[10] At that time some men¹³ were promising that Thespiae and
Plataea would be restored,¹⁴ and that Philip would preserve the
Phocians, if he got control of them, and would disperse the city
of Thebes into villages,¹⁵ and that Oropus would be given to us,¹⁶
and that Euboea would be surrendered in return for Amphipo-
lis,¹⁷ and were offering such hopes and deceiving you with prom-
ises, by which you were induced, neither to your advantage nor
perhaps to your credit, to abandon the Phocians.¹⁸ But I shall
show that I did not deceive you and was not silent about any of
these matters but declared to you, as I am sure you remember,
that I neither knew nor expected that any of these things would
happen, and that I thought the speaker was talking nonsense.
[11] If I have been more successful than others in predicting
the future in all these matters, I do not attribute this to my clev-
erness or to any talent I might boast of, nor do I claim any other
reasons for my special understanding and perception than these
two. The first, men of Athens, is good luck, which, I observe, is
more powerful than any human cleverness or wisdom. [12] The
second is that I judge and calculate matters without being paid to
do so, and no one can point to any profit that attaches to my po-
litical actions and speeches. As a result, our advantage is revealed
to me directly from the facts themselves. But whenever you add
¹³ Aeschines and Philocrates, whom Demosthenes accuses of misleading

the Athenians by asserting that Philip would settle the Third Sacred War to
the benefit of Athens’ ally Phocis.
¹⁴ The Boeotian cities of Thespiae and Plataea had been destroyed in the
370s by Thebes, the largest city of the region, which consistently sought to
dominate the other cities of Boeotia. See also 16.4n, and 18 below on the re-
ception of Plataean exiles at Athens.
¹⁵ On dioikismos, the practice of destroying a defeated city and forcibly
resettling its population into villages, see 16.30n.
¹⁶ Athens and Thebes had a long-running dispute over the border town
of Oropus, which was at the time in Theban hands.
¹⁷ On Amphipolis, see 4.12n. Philip’s offer was apparently to give Athens
free rein in Euboea in return for an acknowledgement of his claim to Am-
phipolis (cf. 6.30).
¹⁸ On Athens’ failure to protect Phocis, see the Speech Introduction.

5. on the peace 95
money to either side, as if to a pair of scales, it drops down and

drags judgment with it, and whoever does so will no longer offer a
straight or sound opinion about any matter.
[13] Now then, I say that one condition should hold, that if
anyone wishes to provide allies or financial contributions¹⁹ or
anything else for our city, he should do so without breaking the
existing peace—not because the peace is wonderful or worthy of
you but because, whatever its character, it would be better for us
that it had never been made than that we should break it now
that it has been made. For we have squandered many things, the
possession of which would have made war easier and safer for us
then than it is now. [14] Second, men of Athens, we must see that
we do not provide these people who have come together and now
claim to be Amphictyons with the need or excuse for a common
war against us.²⁰ For if war should break out between Philip and
us over Amphipolis²¹ or some similar private grievance in which
the Thessalians and Argives and Thebans are not involved, I do
not imagine that any of these would go to war with us, [15] and
least of all—and let no one interrupt me before he hears what I
have to say—the Thebans,²² not because they are well disposed
to us or because they would not wish to do Philip a favor but
because they know perfectly well—however much they are de-
scribed as stupid²³—that if war should break out between them
and you, they will incur all the losses, but someone else will be
¹⁹ “Contributions” (syntaxeis) was the term used to describe the sums of

money that the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy paid to help
defray the costs of its operations; it was intended to be less opprobrious than
the word phoros (“tribute”) used in Athens’ fifth-century empire. See Car-
gill 1981: 124–127.
²⁰ The council of the Delphic Amphictyony could declare a sacred war
against any state that it found guilty of sacrilege against the god Apollo. See
²¹ See 10n above.
²² Demosthenes anticipates heckling from those members of the Assem-
bly who are convinced that Thebes is Athens’ inveterate enemy.
²³ The Athenians routinely characterized the Thebans as dull and stupid
and referred to them as “Boeotian swine.”

96 demosthenes
ready to reap the benefits.²⁴ They will not therefore give them-
selves up to this, unless the war is jointly declared and has a com-
mon cause. [16] Nor, on the other hand, do I think that we would
suffer any harm if we were to go to war with the Thebans over
Oropus or some other private dispute,²⁵ since I believe that peo-
ple would come to help either us or them, if anyone were to in-
vade our territory,²⁶ but would not join either city in making war.
Every worthwhile alliance is of this kind, and the result is natu-
rally as follows. [17] No individual is so well disposed towards ei-
ther us or the Thebans as to wish either of us both to be safe and
to dominate others; rather, they would all wish us to be safe for
their own sake, but none of them wishes either of us to defeat the
other and thereby become their masters. What then do I find a
frightening prospect, and what is it that you must guard against?
It is that the coming war may offer everybody a common pretext
and a shared ground of complaint against us. [18] For if the Ar-
gives and Messenians and Megalopolitans, and those other Pelo-
ponnesians who agree with them, are going to be hostile to us be-
cause of our embassy to Sparta,²⁷ and because they think that
we are in some way supporting Spartan actions,²⁸ and if the The-
bans are ill disposed to us, as people say they are, and will be even
more hostile because we are harboring those who are in flight
from them and because in every way we display our enmity to-
²⁴ Demosthenes envisages a war on land in which the Theban army

would bear the brunt of the fighting, and Thebes’ territory would be in dan-
ger of Athenian invasion. The beneficiary of such a war would be Philip.
²⁵ On Oropus, see 10n above.
²⁶ Greek alliances were generally defensive: i.e., they required one ally to
come to the aid of the other if it was attacked but not to join it in a war of
aggression.
²⁷ These three Peloponnesian states were all hostile to Sparta. This em-
bassy is not recorded elsewhere, but Philip’s support for the enemies of
Sparta, and negotiations between Athens and Sparta, are a central concern
of Demosthenes’ Second Philippic (Dem. 6) of the following year.
²⁸ The Spartans were seeking to reestablish their traditional hegemony
over the Peloponnese by regaining control of Messenia and Arcadia.

5. on the peace 97
wards them,²⁹ [19] and if the Thessalians are hostile because we

are harboring the exiles from Phocis,³⁰ and if Philip is hostile
to us because we are trying to prevent him joining the Amphic-
tyony,³¹ then my fear is that all of these, each angry about their
own individual grievances, may launch a joint war against us, us-
ing the decrees of the Amphictyons as a pretext, and as a result
may be drawn in beyond what is to their own advantage, just as
happened in the case of Phocis.³² [20] For surely you know that
the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians all acted in concert,
although each had different aims. For example, the Thebans were
unable to prevent Philip from passing through and seizing the
pass or from coming at the last minute and taking for himself
the glory of their own labors.³³ [21] Now in terms of the recov-
ery of their land, the Thebans have achieved some success, but in
terms of honor and reputation, the result has brought great shame
on them. For if Philip had not passed through,³⁴ they knew that
they would have gained nothing. These results were not what
they desired, but since they wished to capture Orchomenus and
Coroneia but were unable to do so, they put up with them all.³⁵
[22] And yet some men dare to assert that Philip did not in fact
wish to hand over Orchomenus and Coroneia to the Thebans but
was forced to do so. Let them think so. I know that these things
were of less concern to him than his wish to take the pass of Ther-
²⁹ Athens accepted refugees from the cities of Boeotia that had been de-
stroyed by the Thebans in the 370s, and it granted Athenian citizenship to
those from Plataea (see 16.4n).
³⁰ After the destruction of their cities, many Phocians sought refuge in
Athens.
³¹ I.e., to prevent Philip receiving the two seats on the Amphictyonic
council that had belonged to Phocis. See the Speech Introduction.
³² Earlier in 346, when Philip and his allies dealt with the Phocians.
³³ Thebes had fought Phocis for ten years (355–346); the war was rapidly
ended as a result of Philip’s intervention in 346.
³⁴ I.e., through the pass of Thermopylae.
³⁵ The Boeotian cities of Coroneia and Orchomenus had been seized by
the Phocians in the course of the Third Sacred War.

98 demosthenes
mopylae and the glory of claiming responsibility for bringing the

war to an end and the presidency of the Pythian festival—these
were what he aimed for.³⁶ [23] But the Thessalians did not want
either Thebes or Philip to become great, since they thought that
all this was directed against themselves; what they wanted was
to secure two assets: the Pylaea³⁷ and Delphi. It was their desire
for these that induced them to collaborate in what was done. You
will find that each party was induced by private concerns to do
much that it did not wish to do. This, this, is what we must guard
against.
[24] “Must we then do as we are told, for fear of these conse-
quences? Is this what you are telling us to do?” Far from it. Rather,
I think that we should not act in any way that is unworthy of our-
selves, or so as to bring about war, but should let everyone see that
we are sensible and that what we say is just. That is what I think
we should do. Those who rashly think that we should expose our-
selves to any danger whatsoever, and who do not foresee the na-
ture of such a war, I would invite to consider the following. We
allow the Thebans to keep Oropus: if anyone should ask us why
we do so, insisting that we tell the truth, we should reply “in order
to avoid war.” [25] And now we have ceded Amphipolis to Philip
in accordance with the treaty,³⁸ and we allow the Cardians to be
treated as separate from the other inhabitants of the Chersonese,³⁹
³⁶ Philip’s possession of Thermopylae meant that the Greeks could no

longer block the passage of his army into central Greece, as the Athenians
had done in 352 (see 1.26n). The Panhellenic Pythian festival was held every
fourth year at Delphi in honor of Pythian Apollo. By a vote of the Amphic-
tyonic council Philip was chosen to preside over the festival of late summer
346 (Diodorus 16.60.2).
³⁷ The Pylaea was the council meeting of the Delphic Amphictyony. The
Amphictyony was now dominated by the Thessalians, since they controlled
a majority of the seats on the council.
³⁸ The Peace of Philocrates was made on the basis of each party retaining
what it possessed, and therefore Philip kept control of Amphipolis.
³⁹ Cardia, a city at the northern end of the Chersonese, retained its inde-
pendence when the rest of the peninsula was occupied by Athens in 352 and
was now an ally of Philip: see Dem. 19.174. For subsequent Athenian deal-
ings with Cardia, see Dem. 8, delivered in 341.

5. on the peace 99
and the Carian⁴⁰ to seize the islands—Chios, Cos, and Rhodes—

and the Byzantines to detain ships,⁴¹ clearly believing that the
tranquility resulting from the peace benefits us more than aggres-
sion and contentiousness about these issues. It would therefore be
foolish and quite shocking for us, who are acting in this way to-
wards each party individually about our own vital interests, to go
to war now against all of them over that shadow at Delphi.⁴²
⁴⁰ Idrieus, brother of Mausolus and Artemisia, who succeeded his sister

as satrap (Persian-appointed governor) of Caria in southwestern Asia Mi-
nor in 351. He is identified as “the Carian” because his family were native
Carians, not Persians. Earlier Carian encroachment on nearby Greek is-
lands, especially Rhodes, is addressed in Dem. 15, a speech of the late 350s.
⁴¹ The city of Byzantium (modern Istanbul) on the Bosporus controlled
passage between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. The Byzantines
were presumably motivated by a shortage of food to force passing grain
ships en route to Athens to sell their cargo to them instead. In response
to similar action by Byzantium and other cities in 362, the Athenians dis-
patched a naval squadron to escort the grain ships: see Dem. 50.6, 17–19.
⁴² Demosthenes adapts the proverb “to fight over the shadow of an ass,”
i.e., to fight over nothing.

6. SECOND PHILIPPIC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The Second Philippic is dated to 344/3, according to Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus, who adds the information that it was de-
livered in reply to an embassy “from the Peloponnese.”¹ This was
a year of important diplomatic activity for Athens. First, the Per-
sian King sent ambassadors to the city, as well as to others, asking
for friendship and alliance, in the hope of securing Greek help for
his attempt to reconquer Egypt.² Second, there was at least one
embassy from Philip that offered to renegotiate those terms of the
Peace of Philocrates with which the Athenians were unhappy.³
This diplomatic overture is referred to by a number of sources:
1. Didymus writes of an embassy from Philip about peace in 344/3
coinciding with the Persian appeal noted above (col. 8.8).
2. Libanius, in his Introduction to this speech, relates it to an em-
bassy to Athens of Macedonians, Messenians, and Argives
(i.e., from Philip and some of his Peloponnesian allies) that he
found recorded in “the Philippic histories,” by which he proba-
bly means the Philippic History of Theopompus.
3. Philip, in his letter to the Athenians of 340, refers to an em-
bassy that he had previously sent them, containing representa-
¹ First Letter to Ammaeus 10. This date is generally accepted as correct.

² Philochorus FGH 328 fragment 157; Diodorus 16.44.
³ The Peace of Philocrates was negotiated between Athens and Philip
in 346.

6. second philippic 101
tives “from the whole alliance,” to which they had refused to

listen (Dem. 12.18).
4. The author of the speech On Halonnesus, attributed to De-
mosthenes (probably by the Athenian politician Hegesippus:
see the Introduction to Dem. 7), refers in 343/2 to an embassy
from Philip to Athens that offered to negotiate changes to the
Peace of Philocrates, one of whose members was the orator Py-
thon of Byzantium (7.18–23).
5. Demosthenes boasted in 330 of having taken this opportunity
to accuse Philip of acting unjustly “when Philip dispatched Py-
thon of Byzantium together with delegates from all his other
allies to humiliate the city and prove that we were at fault”
(18.136).
It is likely that all these sources refer to the same Macedonian
embassy, led by Python of Byzantium, accompanied by represen-
tatives from Philip’s allies, and offering to renegotiate the peace,
probably in spring 343.⁴ It is also likely that this is the embassy
that prompted Demosthenes to write the present speech (28 im-
plies the presence in Athens of ambassadors from somewhere).
An alternative suggestion, that the ambassadors referred to in the
speech were in fact from the Peloponnesian city of Sparta, which
was hostile to Philip, has not generally found favor.⁵
In this speech Demosthenes accuses Philip of violating the
Peace of Philocrates (1–2) and of plotting (18) against the whole of
Greece, and in particular against Athens, which is now his only ri-
val (17). The Athenians need to realize that his massive, and grow-
ing, power is directed against them (6). Demosthenes refers to
Philip’s dealings with Messenia and Argos, which were both en-
emies of Athens’ ally Sparta: he not only is sending them merce-
naries and money but is expected in person with a large force (15,
cf. 9), and is ordering the Spartans to leave Messenia alone (13).
Demosthenes also summarizes a speech that he had previously
given as an Athenian ambassador to the Messenian Assembly, in
⁴ See Cawkwell 1963b: 123–126.

⁵ The proposal is that of Calhoun 1933.

102 demosthenes
which he reminded his audience of Philip’s deceitfulness and en-

couraged them to distrust him, although he failed to persuade
them to change their allegiance (20–26).
The speech is notably chauvinistic in tone. Demosthenes re-
peatedly contrasts Athens with two of the other leading (pro-
Macedonian) states in Greece: Thebes and Argos. Athens, he
claims, is the only Greek state that is concerned for Greece as a
whole (10): it resisted the Persian king Xerxes in the fifth century,
whereas Thebes, Argos, and Macedonia either collaborated or
stayed neutral (11). Philip naturally sides with Thebes and Argos,
since these states are selfish and have no concern for the Greeks
as a whole (12). In 346 Philip chose to side with the self-centered
Thebans against the Phocians (9); the Messenians and other Pelo-
ponnesians are stupidly acting against their own interest, whereas
the Athenians are intelligent (27).
Demosthenes is sharply critical of those Athenian politicians
who, he claims, made untrue promises in 346 about Philip’s in-
tentions, on the basis of which the Athenians were persuaded to
accept the peace, and who disparaged him when he warned them
of Philip’s true intentions (28–35). He refers to unnamed Athe-
nian ambassadors who took bribes (34) and to men who de-
serve to suffer the death penalty (37). As usual in his deliberative
speeches, Demosthenes does not name his political enemies, but
it is obvious that one of the men he is referring to is Aeschines,
and it should be recalled that this speech was in the same year
that Demosthenes prosecuted Aeschines for misconduct as an am-
bassador to Philip in 346 (Dem. 19).⁶ Clearly, feelings were run-
ning high.
If the speech is correctly associated with Python’s embassy to
Athens in 344/3, it might seem surprising that it makes no men-
tion of the subject of that embassy: Philip’s offer to negotiate
changes to the Peace of Philocrates. One possibility is that in the
debate this issue was addressed by Demosthenes’ political collab-
orators, men such as Hyperides and Hegesippus,⁷ whereas he used
⁶ See Dem. 19.12, 19–24 for the names of some of the others.
⁷ In a speech delivered in the summer of 343, Demosthenes refers to an
Athenian embassy to Philip, which included the virulently anti-Macedonian

his own speech to stir up feeling against Philip and his Greek al-
lies.⁸ Another is that at the time he wrote the speech, Demosthe-
nes did not know what proposals Python would make, and so he
would have had to extemporize his response to them.⁹ A third
possibility is that his failure even to address the issue of revision
of the peace, combined with his pointed criticism of several of the
Greek states that had sent ambassadors to Athens, and who were
in the audience (28), was its own reply: Philip’s offer was not even
worth discussing.
There is a text of this speech with commentary by Sandys 1900.
6. second philippic
[1] Whenever, men of Athens, we discuss Philip’s actions and
his violent breaches of the peace, I always observe that the speeches
on our side are manifestly just and considerate, and those who ac-
cuse Philip always seem to say what needs to be said, but virtu-
ally no necessary action is taken, which would make the speeches
worth hearing. [2] But our entire situation has already reached
the point that the more fully and clearly Philip is convicted of
breaking the peace with you and of plotting against all of Greece,
the more difficult it is to advise you what to do. [3] The blame be-
longs to all of us, men of Athens. At a time when those who are
greedy and ambitious should be punished by deeds and actions,
not by words, first we speakers shrink from making proposals and
offering advice, fearing that we will incur your enmity, but we
go on about how terrible his behavior is and the like; then you
who sit there are better prepared than Philip to make and listen
to speeches that are just, but you are utterly idle when it comes to
preventing him from carrying out his current plans. [4] The re-
Hegesippus, who spoke his mind and irritated Philip (Dem. 19.331). On He-
gesippus, see further Introduction to Dem. 7; on Hyperides, see OCD³ s.v.
Hyperides; Worthington, Cooper, and Harris 2001 in this series.
⁸ Hegesippus (the probable author of Dem. 7) refers back to this debate
at 7.18–25.
⁹ This suggestion is made by MacDowell 2009: 331–332.

104 demosthenes
sult is inevitable, I suppose, and perhaps even reasonable—each

of you surpasses the other in the things that you spend time on
and that you take seriously—he in action, and you in words. If,
even now, you are content to speak with more justice than he, it
is easy for you to do so, and no additional effort is required from
you. [5] But if we must examine how to correct the present situ-
ation, and to prevent matters going even further without our no-
ticing them, and the establishment against us of a massive and
irresistible power, we must change our previous manner of delib-
eration, and all of us, speakers and audience, must choose those
policies that are the best and will save us, instead of those that are
easiest and most agreeable.
[6] First, men of Athens, if anyone is confident when he sees
how great Philip is and how much he controls, and thinks that
this carries no danger to our city, and that these preparations of
his are not all directed against us, I am amazed and wish to ask
all of you to listen briefly to the reasons why I expect the oppo-
site result and judge Philip to be our enemy, so that you may be
persuaded by me, if you think that I show better foresight; but if
you think that those who confidently put their trust in him show
more foresight, you may side with them. [7] For my part, men of
Athens, I reckon as follows. Which places did Philip first get con-
trol of after the making of the peace? Thermopylae and Phocis.¹⁰
Well then, how did he treat them? He chose to act in the The-
bans’ interest, not in ours.¹¹ Why did he do this? I think that
he examined his options with a view to his greed and to bring-
ing everything under his control, not to peace or quiet or jus-
tice. [8] And he saw correctly that our city and our national char-
acter are such that nothing he could offer or do would induce us
to abandon any of the other Greeks to him for our own benefit,
but that you would take account of justice, shun the infamy as-
sociated with betrayal, make all necessary plans, and resist him,
¹⁰ In 346 Philip got control of the pass of Thermopylae in central Greece

and brought the Third Sacred War between Thebes and Phocis to an end.
¹¹ Contrary to the hopes of many Athenians, Philip treated the Phocians
harshly and rewarded his allies the Thebans by giving them a free hand in
Boeotia.

if he tried to do anything of this kind, just as if you were at war.

[9] But he thought, correctly as it turned out, that the Thebans,
in return for his treatment of them, would allow him to do as
he wished in other respects, and not only would not hinder or
oppose him but would campaign with him, if he told them to.
So too now he is conferring benefits on the Messenians and Ar-
gives, in the same belief.¹² And in doing so, he is paying you the
highest compliment, men of Athens. [10] For these developments
show that he judges you to be the only people who will not aban-
don the common rights of the Greeks in return for any profit and
will not trade your goodwill towards the Greeks for any benefit
or advantage. And he naturally took this view of you, and the op-
posite view of the Argives and Thebans, in the light not only of
present circumstances but also of past history. [11] For he finds
it recorded, I think, and hears it said that your ancestors, when
they had the chance to rule the rest of Greece on condition that
they obey the King, not only rejected this proposal, when Alexan-
der, the ancestor of these people, came as a herald on this matter,
but chose to abandon their land and endured suffering anything
at all, and subsequently did things that everyone longs to tell but
no one has been able to recount worthily, which is why I too will
omit them, and rightly so—for their deeds are greater than any-
one could do justice to in words¹³—whereas the Thebans’ ances-
tors campaigned with the foreigner (barbaros),¹⁴ and the Argives
¹² Messenia in the southwestern Peloponnese had been subject to Sparta,

and its people had been treated as public slaves (heilōtai, “helots”) of the
Spartans, until it was liberated by the Theban general Epaminondas in 370.
Thereafter it was an independent state. Argos in the northeastern Pelopon-
nese had been consistently hostile to Sparta ever since the archaic period (cf.
15.23 for the Argives standing up to the Spartans).
¹³ When the Persian king Xerxes (“the King”) invaded Greece in 480,
the Athenians evacuated Attica, and Athens itself was sacked and occupied
by the Persians. For the mission of the Macedonian king Alexander to the
Athenians, and their response, see Herod. 8.136, 140–143.
¹⁴ On the term barbaros, see 3.16n. The Thebans notoriously gave the
Persian king symbolic gifts of earth and water as tokens of their surrender
(Herod. 7.132).

106 demosthenes
did not resist.¹⁵ [12] He knows, therefore, that each of these cit-
ies will be content with their private advantage and will not look
to the common good of Greece. He reckons that if he were to
choose you, he would be choosing friends on the principle of jus-
tice, but if he were to side with them, he would have accomplices
in his own greed. For these reasons he chose them instead of you,
both then and now. It is surely not that he sees that they have
more ships than you,¹⁶ nor has he found some empire in the inte-
rior and thus renounced rule over coastal sites and harbors;¹⁷ nor
does he forget the speeches and promises on the basis of which he
secured the peace.
[13] “But, by Zeus,” someone might say, pretending to know all
about the matter, “he acted at that time not out of greed or for the
reasons that you allege but because the Thebans’ claim was more
just than yours.”¹⁸ But this is the one claim that he cannot now
make. How could he, who is ordering the Spartans to leave Mes-
senia alone,¹⁹ claim that he previously handed over Orchomenus
and Coroneia²⁰ to the Thebans on the ground that their claim to
them was just?²¹
[14] “But, by Zeus, he was forced to do so” (for that is the only
¹⁵ Argos refused to join the Greek alliance against Persia because of its
hatred of Sparta (see 9n; Herod. 7.148–152).
¹⁶ Neither Thebes nor Argos had a significant navy, whereas Athens had
over 300 triremes.
¹⁷ Demosthenes discounts the possibility that Philip is rejecting Athens
because his imperial ambitions are now directed towards expansion into
the non-Greek territories bordering Macedonia to the west and north, for
which Athens’ naval power would be of no use to him.
¹⁸ Demosthenes addresses the argument that Thebes had a right to rule
all Boeotia. Although the cities of Boeotia shared common religious cults
and had a history of federalism, they were also independent cities and in
many cases suspicious of the Thebans’ desire for regional hegemony, as is
clear from Thebes’ forcible unification of the region in the 370s and 360s.
¹⁹ In this period the Spartans tried, without success, to regain control of
Messenia. See the Introduction to Dem. 16.
²⁰ See 5.21n.
²¹ If Philip was seriously concerned for the autonomy of smaller cities, he
would not be backing Thebes against the other cities of Boeotia.

remaining alternative), “and made these concessions against his

wishes, since he was trapped between the Thessalian cavalry and
the Theban hoplites.”²² Fine! Consequently they say that he in-
tends to regard Thebes with suspicion,²³ and certain men are go-
ing around pronouncing that he will fortify Elateia.²⁴ [15] He in-
tends these things, and in my view will go on intending them;²⁵
but he is not intending to help the Messenians and Argives against
the Spartans—he is actually sending them mercenaries and
money and is expected in person with a large army.²⁶ Is he de-
stroying the Spartans, the existing enemies of the Thebans, while
at the same time rescuing the Phocians, whom he previously ru-
ined? Who could believe that? [16] For my part, I do not believe
that Philip, even if he acted at first under compulsion and against
his will, or if he were now renouncing the Thebans, would be so
unremittingly opposed to their enemies.²⁷ But from his present
conduct it is clear that he did those things deliberately; and from
his every action, if one looks at them correctly, it is evident that
he is directing all his efforts against our city. [17] And this is, now
at least, in a sense inevitable. Think about it: he wishes to rule
and regards you as his only rivals in this. He has been acting un-
justly for a long time now and is himself fully conscious of do-
²² The Thessalian cavalry was numerous and strong (see Herod. 7.196),
and Thebes had the strongest hoplite army in Greece. In view of the mili-
tary strength of Macedonia, it is unlikely that either the Thessalians (who
were in any case ruled by Philip) or the Thebans (who were his allies) were
in a position to threaten Philip.
²³ According to Demosthenes, some Athenian politicians claimed in 346
that Philip would turn against his Theban allies and settle the Third Sacred
War in favor of the Phocians. See the Introduction to Dem. 5.
²⁴ Elateia was a town in Phocis that controlled the road south into Boeo-
tia. Its fortifications were destroyed by Philip in 346; rebuilding them would
have been viewed by the Thebans as a threat to them (as indeed happened in
339: see Dem. 18.152, 168; Aes. 3.140; Diodorus 16.84).
²⁵ That is to say, he will never actually do them.
²⁶ Philip did not in fact campaign in person in support of either city.
²⁷ I.e., to the Thebans’ enemies. Demosthenes’ point is that Philip’s con-
sistent hostility to cities such as Sparta gives the lie to the claim that he
wishes to turn against Thebes.

108 demosthenes
ing so, since his secure control of everything else depends on his
keeping hold of your possessions. He thinks that if he were to
abandon Amphipolis and Potidaea,²⁸ he would not even be safe
at home. [18] He is therefore deliberately plotting against you and
knows that you are aware of this. He believes that you are intelli-
gent, and that you justifiably hate him, and is spurred on by the
expectation that he will suffer some reverse at your hands, if you
seize the opportunity to do so, unless he anticipates you by act-
ing first. [19] For these reasons, he is alert; he stands against you;
he courts certain people—the Thebans and those of the Pelopon-
nesians²⁹ who agree with them—who he thinks will be satisfied
with the present situation because of their greed, and will foresee
none of the consequences because of their stupidity.³⁰ And yet to
even moderately thoughtful men there are clear signs to be seen;
I had occasion to talk about them to the Messenians and Argives,
but they are perhaps better related to you.³¹
[20] “How much irritation, Messenians,” I said, “do you sup-
pose the Olynthians felt when they heard anyone say anything
against Philip at the time when he had ceded to them Anthe-
mous, a place to which all previous Macedonian kings had laid
claim, and was giving them Potidaea and driving out the Athe-
nian settlers from there, and had incurred our hatred, while giv-
ing them the land to enjoy?³² Do you suppose that they expected
²⁸ Philip seized Amphipolis in Thrace in 357, and Potidaea in the Chal-

cidic peninsula in 356 (see also 20n below). The Athenians claimed both
these strategically important cities and had held Potidaea from 364 to 356.
See 1.9n (Potidaea) and 4.12n (Amphipolis).
²⁹ During the 360s Thebes had sought to prevent a revival of Sparta’s
power by supporting its enemies in the Peloponnese—primarily Messene,
Megalopolis, and Argos. Although during the period of the Third Sacred
War (356–346) Thebes was distracted by its war with Phocis, it neverthe-
less retained influence in the Peloponnese. See Dem. 16 for Athens’ dealings
with Megalopolis in this period.
³⁰ Cf. 5.15, also referring to Theban stupidity.
³¹ Demosthenes was sent as an ambassador to the Peloponnese in 344 to
try to counter Philip’s influence over the enemies of Sparta: see Dem. 18.79.
³² In 356. On Philip’s offer to give Potidaea to the Olynthians, see 1.9n,
2.7n.

to suffer such things or would have believed anyone who told

them that they would? [21] Despite all this,” I said, “after enjoy-
ing other people’s land for a short time, they have now been de-
prived by him for a long time³³ of their own land, and have been
shamefully exiled, and have been not only defeated but also be-
trayed by each other and sold. Becoming too closely associated
with tyrants is dangerous for constitutionally governed states.
[22] What about the Thessalians?” I asked. “Do you suppose that
they expected to have the Ten-man Council that has now been
established,³⁴ at the time when Philip was expelling their tyrants
and was giving them Nicaea and Magnesia?³⁵ Or that the same
man who gave them the presidency of the Delphic Amphictyony
would deprive them of their private revenues? Of course not! And
yet this is what has happened, and it is a matter of public knowl-
edge.³⁶ [23] You,” I said, “watch Philip dispensing gifts and prom-
ises. Yet if you are prudent, you should pray that you do not find
yourselves being tricked and deceived by him. By Zeus,” I said,
“cities have all kind of resources for their security and safety, such
as palisades and walls and ditches and the like, [24] all of which
require labor and expense. But there is one safeguard with which
³³ Although Olynthus had been razed to the ground by Philip, Demos-

thenes holds out the possibility that it may be rebuilt. In fact the site was
never resettled.
³⁴ Demosthenes refers to the establishment of an oligarchy, but he uses
the term (dekadarchia, lit. “rule of ten men”) that had been applied to the
oligarchies (of whatever size) set up throughout the cities of Athens’ em-
pire, including Athens itself, by the Spartan general Lysander in 405–404.
This would have had particular resonance with the strongly anti-Spartan
Messenians. The suggestion that the Greek word dekadarchia should be
emended to tetrarchia (tetrarchy, “rule of four”), with reference to the well-
attested division of Thessaly into four regional administrative units (see
9.26n), is generally rejected.
³⁵ Philip replaced the rulers of the Thessalian city of Pherae in 352 (1.13n,
2.14n; Diodorus 16.37.3, 38.1). On his promise to return Magnesia to the
Thessalians, see 2.7n. Nicaea in eastern Locris was one of the sites that con-
trolled access to the pass of Thermopylae: see 11.4n.
³⁶ On Thessalian domination of the Delphic Amphictyony after 346, see
5.23n. Demosthenes had reported in 351 that the Thessalians were unhappy
about Philip’s appropriation of their revenues (1.22).

110 demosthenes
all right-thinking people are naturally endowed, and which is a

benefit and a source of salvation for everybody, but particularly
for democracies in their dealings with tyrants. What is this? Mis-
trust. Guard it; hold onto it. If you keep it, you will avoid disaster.
[25] What do you seek?” I said. “Freedom? Then do you not see
that Philip’s very titles are inimical to this? Every king and tyrant
is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law. You should be on
your guard,” I said, “lest, in seeking to escape war, you find your-
selves saddled with a master.”
[26] But after hearing both this speech—and they shouted out
that I was right—and many others from the ambassadors, both
when I was there and subsequently, they are apparently no more
willing to reject Philip’s friendship and promises. [27] Now, it is
not strange that the Messenians and some of the other Pelopon-
nesians are acting against what they know to be their own inter-
est. But you, who are intelligent and listen to us speakers tell-
ing you how you are being plotted against and ensnared, if you
do not act promptly, will find, I think, that without realizing it,
you have submitted to everything—so much stronger are imme-
diate gratification and idleness than any consideration of future
benefit. [28] You may deliberate later by yourselves about what we
need to do, if you are sensible: but now I shall tell you what re-
sponse you should vote for.³⁷
It would have been just, men of Athens, to summon those men
who conveyed the promises, on the strength of which you were
persuaded to make the peace.³⁸ [29] For I would not have re-
mained as an ambassador, nor (I know) would you have stopped
waging war, if you had thought that Philip would act as he did
after he had secured peace.³⁹ But what was said then was quite
contrary to these actions of his. And again, there are others who
should be summoned. Who? Those who spoke on the occasion
after the making of the peace when I, on my return from the
³⁷ At this point Demosthenes may have extemporized a response to Py-

thon’s proposal: see the Speech Introduction.
³⁸ The men are named as Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, and Ctesiphon
(among others) at Dem. 19.12.
³⁹ Demosthenes was a member both of the embassy to Philip to negotiate
terms and of the later embassy to administer the oaths to him.

later embassy relating to the oaths, saw that the city was being de-
ceived by false hopes, and warned and protested and tried to pre-
vent the loss of Thermopylae and of the Phocians.⁴⁰ [30] They
said that I drink water and so am naturally an intractable and dis-
agreeable fellow,⁴¹ whereas Philip would answer your prayers, if
he should pass through Thermopylae, and would rebuild Thes-
piae and Plataea, and put an end to Thebes’ arrogance, and dig
through the Chersonese at his own expense, and would give you
Euboea and Oropus in return for Amphipolis.⁴² I know you re-
call all these claims being made from the speaker’s platform, al-
though you are not good at remembering those who injure you.
[31] And, most shameful of all, you voted on the basis of these
hopes that this same peace should apply to his and our descen-
dants too,⁴³ so completely were you led on. Why am I speaking
about these matters now, and urging you to summon these men?
I shall tell you the truth frankly, by the gods, concealing noth-
ing. [32] My purpose is neither to permit myself, by descending
to abuse, to speak before you on the same level as my opponents,
and thereby provide those who have clashed with me from the be-
ginning a further excuse to take something more from Philip, nor
to babble in vain. On the contrary, I think that Philip’s actions
will harm you more in the future than they do now. [33] For I
see trouble coming, and although I hope I am wrong, I fear that
it is already all too close at hand. When you can no longer ignore
what is happening, and when you no longer hear that these activ-
⁴⁰ Demosthenes means Aeschines and Philocrates: see 5.10n. He makes

the same claim at 19.18. If Demosthenes seriously argued for a last-minute
attempt to seize Thermopylae, he was undoubtedly too late, since the Pho-
cian commanders had already surrendered the pass to Philip.
⁴¹ This remark was made by Philocrates (see Dem. 19.46). Drinking wa-
ter meant avoiding the company of his fellow ambassadors, who would
be drinking wine, and was thus interpreted as a sign of his antisocial
character.
⁴² To the similar list at 5.10 (see the note), Demosthenes here adds the
proposal to cut a canal across the neck of the Chersonese peninsula to pro-
tect the Athenian settlers there from Thracian attacks (see also 7.39). The
neck was already protected by a wall.
⁴³ See Dem. 19.48, 55–56.

112 demosthenes
ities are directed against you from me or from someone else, but
all see it for yourselves and know it for a fact, then I think you
will be angry and resentful. [34] And I am afraid that, since the
ambassadors⁴⁴ are silent about those matters for which they know
they were bribed, your anger may be directed against those of us
who are trying to repair some of the damage caused by their ac-
tions. For I see that in most cases, people vent their anger not on
those who are guilty but on those who are most under their con-
trol. [35] While the trouble is still in the future and is only gather-
ing, and we are still listening to each other, I want each of you—
even though you know the answer perfectly well—nevertheless
to remind yourselves who it was that persuaded you to abandon
the Phocians and Thermopylae,⁴⁵ the possession of which gives
Philip control of the roads to Attica and the Peloponnese, and has
caused you to be deliberating not about your rights or your over-
seas interests but about the inhabitants of your land and about a
war against Attica, which will hurt each of you, when it arrives,
but which started on that day. [36] If you had not been deceived
then, there would be no danger to our city, since surely Philip
would never be able to attack Attica either with a fleet, by defeat-
ing you at sea, or with an army, by marching through Thermopy-
lae and Phocis,⁴⁶ but either he would be acting justly and keeping
quiet, upholding the peace, or he would immediately find him-
self in a war similar to the one which led him at that time to de-
sire peace.⁴⁷ [37] Enough has now been said by way of reminding
you. As to a strict test of my fears, may that not come about, all
you gods! For I would not wish anyone to be punished, even if he
deserves to die, if it involves danger and punishment for all.
⁴⁴ I.e., the (other) Athenian ambassadors to Philip.

⁴⁵ See 29n for the identity of these men.
⁴⁶ Philip did not possess a fleet remotely large enough to challenge Ath-
ens at sea (see 4.22n), and if Thermopylae had remained in friendly hands,
the Athenians would have been able to block the pass with their army, as
they did in 352 (see 1.26n, 4.17n).
⁴⁷ Demosthenes’ claim that Philip had been embroiled in war when he
opened negotiations with Athens after the fall of Olynthus is misleading.
On the contrary, his capture of the city left him in a dominant position in
Greece.

7. ON H A LON NESUS
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The authorship of the speech On Halonnesus was debated in
antiquity. Dionysius of Halicarnassus accepts it as the work of
Demosthenes without discussion,¹ but Libanius denies this attri-
bution on the ground that some of its vocabulary is too vulgar to
have been used by Demosthenes (see 45n) and reports the view of
previous scholars that it was the work of a contemporary of De-
mosthenes named Hegesippus. This attribution was based partly
on the speech’s style and partly on the speaker’s claim to have
prosecuted a man named Callippus (43), since it was known that
Hegesippus, and not Demosthenes, had prosecuted him. Analysis
of the prose rhythm of the speech also suggests that it is not the
work of Demosthenes.² Although we have no speech of Hegesip-
pus with which to compare it, the modern consensus is that he is
its author, and this view is accepted here.
Hegesippus son of Hegesias was a prominent anti-Macedonian
politician of the 340s and a political ally of Demosthenes. He was
nicknamed “Top-knot” because of his distinctively old-fashioned
hairstyle. Hegesippus’ earliest political activity dates to the 360s
(Diogenes Laertius 3.24), but he was most prominent in the years
after the making of the Peace of Philocrates. He took the lead
in resisting Philip’s diplomatic overtures in 346³ and joined De-
mosthenes in defending their political ally Timarchus when
¹ First Letter to Ammaeus 10.

² McCabe 1981.
³ See the ancient commentary on Dem. 19.72.

114 demosthenes
he was prosecuted in 345 (Aes. 1.71). He was also active in anti-

Macedonian diplomacy: in a speech of 343 Demosthenes says that
on an embassy to Macedonia, Hegesippus irritated Philip by his
blunt speaking (19.331), and he refers in 341 to embassies that he
and Hegesippus had undertaken to the Peloponnese, where they
tried to stir up anti-Macedonian sentiment (9.72). Hegesippus
also played a leading role in the establishment of an alliance of
Greek states opposed to Philip in 340 (Plut. Demosthenes 17). He
was still alive in 325/4 (IG II² 1623 line 185, 1629 line 543). What we
know of Hegesippus’ strongly anti-Macedonian views and forth-
right manner is certainly consistent with his authorship of this
speech.
The speech is dated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus to 343/2 (see
p. 113 n. 1) and probably belongs in the first half of 342 since Phil-
ip’s campaign in Ambracia, referred to in 32, took place early in
that year. It was delivered to the Assembly in response both to a
letter from Philip to Athens and to the speeches of the ambassa-
dors who brought the letter (1, 46).⁴
In his letter Philip evidently addressed a number of Athenian
complaints and made proposals to try to resolve them. The first
issue (in the order that Hegesippus addresses them, if not in im-
portance) was the ownership of Halonnesus, a small island off
the coast of Thessaly between the two larger, Athenian-owned, is-
lands of Lemnos and Scyros.⁵ Halonnesus too had once belonged
to Athens but had been occupied at an unknown date by pirates.
Philip drove the pirates out, perhaps in the course of his cam-
paign in central Greece in 346, but retained control of the island.
When the Athenians demanded that it be given back to them
(implying by their choice of words that it belonged to them),
Philip offered in the letter either to give it to them (implicitly de-
nying their claim to prior ownership) (2) or to submit the matter
to arbitration (7).⁶
⁴ This was a different letter from the one preserved as Dem. 12, which be-
longs to the year 340.
⁵ It is debatable whether ancient Halonnesus is the same as the island
now called Alonnisos: see MacDowell 2009: 343 n. 1.
⁶ The issue was less petty than it might appear, since although Halonne-
sus itself was unimportant, the principle that Philip should give places back

7. on halonnesus 115
Philip also proposed the establishment of bilateral judicial

agreements between Macedonia and Athens (9–13) and suggested
that he and the Athenians should undertake joint action to sup-
press piracy in the Aegean (14–15). He repeated the offer made by
his envoy Python in 344/3 to negotiate a revision of the terms of
the Peace of Philocrates (18–32),⁷ made general protestations of
goodwill towards Athens (33), and promised great benefits if the
Athenians would trust him (34). He also undertook to refer ter-
ritorial disputes to arbitration (36) and specifically addressed the
disagreement about the location of the border between Athenian
and Cardian territory in the Chersonese (39–44), promising to
compel the Cardians to submit the dispute to arbitration.⁸
The speech does not include the reply to Philip that Hegesip-
pus proposes to draft (46), but the likely nature of that reply is
clear from the intransigent tone of the entire speech. Hegesippus
rejects every overture that Philip makes and invariably attributes
to him the most malign intentions towards Athens. For exam-
ple, Philip is willing to give the island of Halonnesus to the Athe-
nians only on terms that are humiliating to them (6); his offer to
establish judicial agreements—usually an indication of amicable
commercial relations—is intended to force the Athenians to ad-
mit that they have no quarrel with him over their former posses-
sion Potidaea (13). Hegesippus accuses Philip of backtracking on
his offer to renegotiate the Peace of Philocrates to Athens’ sat-
isfaction, and he rejects any offer of arbitration as either insult-
ing (7) or unnecessary, since the facts of the matter are clear (36).
Philip’s offer to force his ally Cardia to accept arbitration is also
interpreted as an insult to the Athenians, since it implies that they
are too weak to compel the Cardians themselves (44).
The tone of the speech is relentlessly scornful, with frequent
use of irony and sarcasm: Philip’s promised benefits will exist
only in some new world, not the real world (35); he “truly” wishes
the Greeks to be free and autonomous (35); even as he is build-
ing a fleet, he has no naval ambitions (16); his offer to force the
to the Athenians, implying that they belonged to Athens, could be applied

to more important cities under his control such as Amphipolis.
⁷ On this embassy, see the Introduction to Dem. 6.
⁸ On relations between Athens and Cardia, see especially Dem. 8.

116 demosthenes
Cardians to enter into arbitration is a great favor to Athens (44);

the Athenians should punish traitors among their leaders “if you
carry your brains in your temples and not trampled down in your
heels” (45).
Hegesippus clearly took the view that Philip was fundamen-
tally ill disposed to Athens and that his various offers to improve
relations were insincere. Whether or not this was the case, the
truculent and intransigent tone of this response contributed to the
continued deterioration of relations between Athens and Philip in
the later 340s.
7. on h alonnesus
[1] There is no way, men of Athens, that Philip’s accusations
against those of us who speak up for your rights will prevent us
from advising you where your interests lie. For it would be mon-
strous if the letters that he sends were to strip the speaker’s plat-
form of its freedom of speech. First, men of Athens, I wish to re-
view the letters that Philip has sent; after that, we will address the
speeches of his ambassadors.⁹
[2] Philip starts by saying that he is giving you Halonnesus,
which is his, and that you are wrong to ask for its return.¹⁰ For,
he says, it was not yours when he took it, nor is it yours now that
he possesses it. And when we went on an embassy to him, he told
us that he had acquired the island by taking it from pirates and
that it rightfully belongs to him.¹¹ [3] It is not difficult to refute
this argument of his, since it is unjust. All pirates seize places
that belong to other people; they fortify them and use them as
bases from which to harm others. But it would surely be unrea-
sonable for him to claim that just because he defeated and pun-
ished the pirates he is now the owner of property that belongs to
others, of which the pirates had unjustly taken possession. [4] For
if you agree with this argument, then if pirates should take some
⁹ Ambassadors from Philip had both brought letters from him and ad-
dressed the Athenians.
¹⁰ On Halonnesus, see the Speech Introduction. Little is known of its
earlier history, and no city is attested on it in this period.
¹¹ This shows that the speaker was an ambassador to Philip in 343.

place in Attica, or in Lemnos or Imbros or Scyros,¹² and some-

one should expel those pirates, what is to prevent the place where
the pirates had been and which belongs to us from immediately
becoming the property of those who had punished the pirates?
[5] Philip is perfectly aware that what he says is unjust—he knows
it as well as anyone—but he thinks that you have been led astray
by those who have promised to manage things here in accordance
with his wishes, and who are now doing just that. And indeed he
is well aware that whichever term you use—whether you take it or
take it back—you will get the island. [6] So, what difference does
it make to him not to “return” it to you (to use the right word)
but to “give” it as a gift (to use the wrong word)? He insists on
this term not to gain credit for doing you a favor, since it would
be a ridiculous favor, but to demonstrate to all of Greece that the
Athenians are happy to receive places on the coast from the hands
of a Macedonian.¹³ This, men of Athens, you must not do.
[7] Whenever he says that he wishes to submit these mat-
ters to arbitration,¹⁴ he is simply mocking you, first in suppos-
ing that you, who are Athenians, should go to law with him, the
man from Pella,¹⁵ over the islands, to determine whether they are
yours or his. For when your power, which liberated the Greeks, is
unable to preserve your maritime possessions, and so you entrust
the dispute to judges, who are masters of the ballot, who will pre-
serve them for you, unless Philip bribes them, [8] if you follow
this policy, how will it not amount to an admission on your part
that you have abandoned the entire mainland of Greece,¹⁶ and a
¹² The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros in the northern Aegean

were Athenian possessions, settled by Athenian cleruchs (clērouchoi, lit. “al-
lotment holders”). Thus, an attack on any of them was tantamount to an at-
tack on Attica itself.
¹³ On the real significance of the distinction between giving and giving
back, see the Speech Introduction.
¹⁴ It was common for interstate disputes to be referred by mutual agree-
ment of the two parties to arbitration by a third party.
¹⁵ Pella was the capital of the Macedonian kingdom.
¹⁶ Hegesippus advances an a fortiori argument: if the Athenians will not
dispute with Philip over islands such as Halonnesus, they are even less likely
to do so over places on the mainland.

118 demosthenes
demonstration to everyone that you will not fight him for a single
thing—if indeed you do not fight for the places on the sea, where
you claim to be strong, but go to law instead?
[9] He also says that men have been sent to you to make judi-
cial agreements, and that these will be valid, not when they are
validated in your courts as the law requires but when they have
been referred to him, which would make any judgment passed
by you open to appeal to him.¹⁷ For he wishes to get the advan-
tage of you and establish it as agreed in the judicial agreements
that you do not accuse him of wrongdoing as regards any of the
wrongs he did at Potidaea, and that you confirm that he took it,
and now possesses it, justly.¹⁸ [10] And yet the Athenians who
were living in Potidaea, at a time when there was no state of war
between them and Philip, but rather an alliance, and when oaths
had been sworn by Philip to the inhabitants of Potidaea, were de-
prived by him of their possessions. These are the unjust actions
that he wishes you to ratify outright, by stating that you nei-
ther accuse him nor believe that he is wronging you.¹⁹ [11] The
Macedonians have no need of judicial agreements with the Athe-
nians, as history shows: for neither Amyntas the father of Philip
nor the other kings ever made judicial agreements with our city.²⁰
[12] And yet our dealings with each other were more numerous
¹⁷ Judicial agreements (symbola) between states provided the citizens of

each state with access to the courts of the other. The exact nature of Hege-
sippus’ complaint is unclear.
¹⁸ Philip captured the Athenian-controlled city of Potidaea in the Chal-
cidic peninsula in 356 and expelled the Athenian settlers there (see 1.9n).
¹⁹ The connection between judicial agreements and the status of Poti-
daea is not explained. Perhaps Hegesippus’ point is that a judicial agree-
ment would be made only if there were no outstanding matters of dis-
pute between the two parties (cf. 12.22, where Philip argues that when
the Athenians made peace with him, they implicitly accepted his claim to
Amphipolis).
²⁰ Amyntas III was king of Macedonia from ca. 393 to 370. In the 370s
he made an alliance with Athens (Tod 1948: no. 129) and supplied the city
with timber for shipbuilding. The claim that there were no previous judicial
agreements between Athens and Macedonia is probably correct.

then than they are now. For Macedonia was under our control
and paid us tribute,²¹ and we made greater use of their markets
and they of ours than is the case now, and there were no commer-
cial suits every month as there are now, strict ones, which mean
that people who are so distant from each other have no need of ju-
dicial agreements.²² [13] Nevertheless, since there was no one like
Philip then, there was no benefit in establishing judicial agree-
ments, either for them sailing from Macedonia to Athens to re-
ceive judgment or for us sailing to Macedonia, but parties from
each place received judgment, we in accordance with their laws,
and they with ours.²³ So you must realize that the reason why
these judicial agreements are being created is to force you to ad-
mit that you no longer have any legitimate claim to Potidaea.
[14] As for the pirates, he says that it is right for you and him
to share in guarding against criminals at sea, but his sole purpose
is for you to set him up as a sea power and to admit that without
Philip, you are unable even to police the sea; [15] and, further, that
he is free to sail around and launch attacks on the islands, on the
pretext of guarding against pirates, and to destroy the islanders
and detach them from you, and not only to have used your gener-
als to convey the exiles to Thasos²⁴ but also to win over the other
islands, sending men to accompany your generals on their voy-
ages, on the ground that he is sharing in the policing of the sea.
²¹ The kingdom of Macedonia never paid tribute to Athens, although

many of the coastal cities of the region were tributary members of the fifth-
century Athenian empire. See 3.24n for discussion of this untrue claim.
²² Monthly suits (dikai emmēnoi) were introduced at Athens in the fourth
century to expedite the handling of commercial disputes and thereby en-
courage trade. In what sense they were monthly is disputed: see Ath. Pol.
52.2, with the commentary of Rhodes 1981; Cohen 1973: 9–59.
²³ The proposed agreement would have required cases to be handled by
the courts of the state to which the defendant belonged.
²⁴ According to the ancient commentary on the speech (Dilts 1983:
130.28–31), these were supporters of Philip who had been exiled from Thasos
and were returned there at his request by the Athenian general Chares. The
island of Thasos was a strategically important Athenian ally in the northern
Aegean: see 4.32.

120 demosthenes
And yet some people deny that he has naval ambitions! [16] But
this man who has no naval ambitions is building triremes, and
constructing docks, and wishes to send out naval squadrons, and
to incur considerable expense with regard to the dangers of the
sea—in which he supposedly takes no interest.²⁵
[17] Do you imagine, men of Athens, that Philip would expect
you to make these concessions to him, if he did not despise you,
and did not have confidence in those here whom he has chosen
to make his friends? These men are not ashamed to live for Philip
rather than for their own country, and when they receive gifts
from him they think that they are bringing them home, when in
reality it is their own homes that they are betraying.
[18] As for the revision of the peace,²⁶ which the ambassadors
he sent offered to revise, and we proposed a revision—which is
agreed by all mankind to be just—to the effect that each party
should have what belongs to it,²⁷ he disputes that he made this
offer or that his ambassadors said this to you, being quite simply
persuaded by these men here, whom he treats as his friends, that
you do not recall what was said in the Assembly.²⁸ [19] But this is
one thing that you cannot forget, since it was at one and the same
meeting of the Assembly that his ambassadors addressed you and
the decree was proposed. Since the reading of the decree followed
immediately after the speeches, it is impossible that you voted for
a resolution that gave the lie to the ambassadors.²⁹ So it is not
²⁵ On Philip’s generally small-scale naval ambitions, see 4.34n.

²⁶ Philip sent an embassy to Athens in 344/3, led by the orator Python of
Byzantium (20), offering to negotiate revisions to the Peace of Philocrates.
See the Introduction to Dem. 6, a speech that was probably delivered in re-
sponse to this embassy.
²⁷ There is an important distinction between each side having what it
holds (i.e., maintaining the status quo), which was the basis of the Peace of
Philocrates, and the Athenians’ wish that each side should have what belongs
to it, which was intended to reopen their claim to such places as Amphipo-
lis and Potidaea.
²⁸ It is not credible that Philip promised to accept any revision whatso-
ever that the Athenians might propose.
²⁹ Hegesippus argues (surely misleadingly) that the Athenian decree—to
demand that each party have what belongs to it—must have been in con-

against me but against you that he has directed this allegation—

that you sent off your decision in response to something that you
had not even heard! [20] The ambassadors themselves, to whom
the decree gave the lie, when you read out your answer to them
and invited them to enjoy our hospitality,³⁰ did not dare to come
forward and say, “You are telling lies about us, men of Athens,
and are accusing us of saying something that we did not say.” In-
stead, they went off in silence and departed. I want to remind
you, men of Athens, of the speeches made by Python, who was an
ambassador on that occasion and who was popular with you be-
cause of them.³¹ I know that you remember them. [21] They were
very similar to the content of the letters that Philip has recently
sent. Python found fault with those of us who slander Philip and
also blamed you, claiming that Philip had set out to treat you
well and had chosen to make you more than any of the Greeks
his friends but that you were preventing this, and paying heed to
bringers of baseless accusations (sykophantai),³² men who accuse
him of bribery and slander him; for (he says) when he hears it
said that he has a bad reputation, and that you endorse this view,
such reports cause him to change his policy, since he is distrusted
by those whom he has chosen to benefit. [22] He therefore urged
those who speak in the Assembly not to find fault with the peace,
saying that it is wrong to do away with a peace. But (he said)
formance with what Philip’s ambassadors had just offered. See the previ-
ous note.
³⁰ Foreign ambassadors to Athens were offered hospitality in the Tholos,
a public building in the agora that also housed those fifty members of the
Council (the prytaneis) who served in an executive capacity for one tenth of
the year.
³¹ Python of Byzantium was a famous orator, employed by Philip as a
diplomatic agent. See the Introduction to Dem. 6; Dem. 18.136.
³² Sykophantēs was a term used to describe someone who made a habit
of bringing prosecutions for financial gain, either from the rewards that
were given to successful prosecutors or by threatening to prosecute wealthy
men unless they paid him: see OCD³ s.v. sycophants. It is used here to de-
scribe those Athenian politicians who make accusations against (rather than
prosecute) Philip. Its meaning is therefore different from the English word
sycophant.

122 demosthenes
if any clause of it had been badly drafted, it should be revised,

and he would do whatever you might vote.³³ Yet if any speak-
ers should slander him, and make proposals that would fail to re-
sult in the preservation of the peace and an end to your mistrust
of Philip, no attention should be paid to such men. [23] When
you heard these words, you welcomed them and said that Py-
thon spoke justly. And so he did. He spoke as he did not in order
to remove from the peace those terms that were advantageous to
Philip, and for which Philip had spent a lot of money, but as a re-
sult of the briefing he had received from his instructors here, who
thought that no one would make a proposal contrary to the de-
cree of Philocrates, the one that lost Amphipolis.³⁴ [24] I did not
dare to make an illegal proposal, men of Athens, but it was not
illegal to make a proposal contrary to the decree of Philocrates,
as I shall show. For the decree of Philocrates, by which you were
deprived of Amphipolis, was itself contrary to the previous de-
crees by which you acquired this land.³⁵ [25] This decree—the
one of Philocrates—was illegal, and the proposer of a lawful de-
cree could not have proposed the same thing as an illegal decree.
But I proposed the same decree as those previous decrees that are
lawful and that preserve your land, a lawful decree, and convicted
Philip of deceiving you and of wishing not to revise the peace but
to undermine the credibility of those who speak in your interest.
[26] You all know that he granted this revision but now denies it.
He claims that Amphipolis is his, since you voted that it was his
³³ Although Philip may have promised to consider any Athenian pro-

posal, it is inconceivable that he honestly bound himself in advance to agree
to any amendment that the Athenians might propose. He may, however,
have deceitfully said something to this effect.
³⁴ Philocrates is represented as being responsible for the “loss” of Amphi-
polis because of the peace of 346 that bore his name, which effectively ceded
the city to Philip.
³⁵ Hegesippus is presumably referring to the fifth-century decree(s) that
established Amphipolis as an Athenian settlement. He argues unconvinc-
ingly that Philocrates’ decree moving the making of peace with Philip, and
thereby ceding Amphipolis to him, was in conflict with those earlier decrees
and therefore illegal.

when you voted that he should keep what he possesses.³⁶ You did
indeed pass this decree, but you did not resolve that Amphipolis
was his. For it is possible to possess things that belong to some-
one else, and not everyone who possesses something possesses his
own property, since many people have acquired things that be-
long to someone else. So this clever argument of his is in fact stu-
pid. [27] Moreover, he remembers the decree of Philocrates but
has forgotten about the letter he sent you when he was besieging
Amphipolis, in which he admitted that Amphipolis is yours. For
he said that when he captured it he would return it to you, since
it belonged to you rather than to those who were then in posses-
sion of it.³⁷ [28] And apparently the people who formerly lived in
Amphipolis, before Philip took it, were in possession of Athenian
territory; but now that he has taken it, it is not Athenian terri-
tory that he possesses but his own. Nor does he possess Olynthus
or Apollonia or Pallene on the basis that they belong to someone
else but on the basis that these too are part of his own territory.³⁸
[29] Do you think that he has carefully composed his whole let-
ter to you so as to give the impression that he is doing and saying
what everybody agrees to be just? Has he not rather completely
despised you in claiming that the land, which the Greeks and the
Persian King voted and agreed was yours, belongs to him rather
than to you?³⁹
[30] Concerning the other revision that you made to the peace,
³⁶ See 18n above. Cf. 5.25, where Demosthenes acknowledges in 346 that
Athens has ceded Amphipolis to Philip.
³⁷ For Philip’s alleged offer, see 2.6n. Whether or not Philip offered to
give the city to Athens in 357, it is unlikely that he acknowledged Athens’
right to it, as Hegesippus claims.
³⁸ These places were destroyed in 348. On Apollonia, see 9.26. Pallene is
the westernmost of the three peninsulas of the Chalcidice, and contained a
number of Greek cities that were sacked by Philip at the same time.
³⁹ It was believed by Athenian politicians that Athens’ claim to Amphi-
polis had at some point been accepted by the Greeks and the Persian King
(see also Dem. 19.253; Aes. 2.32); when this might have happened is unclear:
perhaps the peace conference of 370/69 (thus Hammond and Griffith 1979:
232–233).

124 demosthenes
that the rest of the Greeks, who do not share in the peace, should
be free and autonomous, and that, if anyone marches against
them, the participants in the peace should help them, [31] you
thought it both just and considerate that the peace should not
be restricted to us and our allies and Philip and his allies, which
would expose those who are neither our allies nor his to lie in the
middle and be wronged by any who are stronger than they, but
that they too should enjoy security on account of your peace, and
that we should lay down our weapons and keep the peace in ear-
nest.⁴⁰ [32] Although he agreed in his letter, as you have heard,
that this revision was just and that he accepted it, he has deprived
the Pheraeans of their city and installed a garrison on their cita-
del,⁴¹ in order no doubt that they may be autonomous, and he is
marching against Ambracia, and has ravaged the land of the three
cities in Cassopia—Pandosia and Bouches and Elateia, colonies
of Elis—and has taken the cities by force and handed them over
to Alexander his kinsman into slavery.⁴² He certainly does want
the Greeks to be free and autonomous, as his actions show!
[33] As regards the promises that he continues to make, that he
will grant you great benefits, he says that I am lying and slander-
ing him before the Greeks, since he claims that he has never yet
promised you anything. That’s how shameful he is: he has written
in the letter that is now in the Council Chamber⁴³ that he would
⁴⁰ I.e., the Athenians proposed that the Peace of Philocrates be converted

into a Common Peace to which all the Greeks could sign up. Even if Philip
did accept that this revision was just, it was never enacted.
⁴¹ On Philip’s treatment of Pherae in Thessaly, see 8.65n.
⁴² In early 342 Philip marched on Epirus, deposed its king Arybbas, and
replaced him with his (Arybbas’) nephew Alexander, whose sister Olym-
pias was a wife of Philip and the mother of his son Alexander (the Great):
see Diodorus 16.72.1. Arybbas fled to Athens, where he was granted asylum
(see IG II² 226 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 70). Cassopia is a region
in western Greece to the north of the Gulf of Ambracia. The three cities
named were not places of great importance.
⁴³ The Athenian archives were at this period housed in a building in the
Agora dedicated to the Mother Goddess (the Mētrōon). This building had

grant you as many benefits as would stop the mouths of those of

us who speak against him, if peace should be made, and that he
would already have put them in writing if he knew that peace
would be made—as if the benefits, which we were to enjoy once
peace was made, were ready to hand. [34] But once peace was
made, all the benefits that we were going to enjoy vanished, while
a destruction of the Greeks has taken place on such a scale as you
all know about. In the present letter he promises that if you trust
his friends who speak on his behalf, and punish us who slander
him to you, he will grant you great benefits. [35] The benefits will
be as follows: he will not give you your possessions back—for he
says that they belong to him—nor will the gifts exist in the in-
habited world, to avoid his getting a bad name with the Greeks,⁴⁴
but some other territory and place, it seems, will appear, where
these gifts will be given to you.
[36] As for the places that you possessed and that he seized
during a time of peace, in breach of the treaty and the peace,⁴⁵
since he has nothing to say but is clearly guilty of wrongdoing,
he says that he is willing to refer the disputes over these places to
a fair and public court. But concerning these places there is no
need of referral, since a counting of the days is decisive. For we
all know in which month and on what day the peace was made.
[37] And just as we know that, so we know in which month and
on what day Fort Serrium and Ergisce and the Sacred Mountain
were taken.⁴⁶ Actions like these are certainly not invisible or in
previously been used as the Council Chamber, and it may be that Hegesip-
pus is referring to it by its former name. It is hard to see why a letter of 346
or earlier should have been kept in the new Council Chamber.
⁴⁴ The gifts, i.e., places, would in this case come from some other city’s
territory, which would give Philip a bad name.
⁴⁵ These are not separate agreements: the Peace of Philocrates was both a
peace and a treaty.
⁴⁶ Hegesippus complains about Philip’s seizure of various places in
Thrace in the period before he ratified the Peace of Philocrates: see 9.15n. In
a later speech, Aeschines (3.82) mocks the obscurity of the places in Thrace
about which Demosthenes and his supporters complained.

126 demosthenes
need of a court decision: everybody knows which month came

first—the one in which the peace was made or the one in which
these places were seized.⁴⁷
[38] He claims that he gave back all our prisoners who had
been taken during the war⁴⁸—he who was so eager to do you a fa-
vor that the Carystian, the honorary consul of our city, on whose
behalf you sent three envoys to ask for his return, he put to death
and did not even permit his body to be taken away for burial.⁴⁹
[39] As regards the Chersonese, what he writes to you deserves
to be examined, and you should be aware of what he is doing.
He has given the whole region beyond Agora⁵⁰ to Apollonides of
Cardia to enjoy, on the ground that it is his and has nothing to
do with you.⁵¹ And yet the boundary of the Chersonese is not
Agora but the altar of Zeus of Boundaries, which is between Pte-
leum and Leuce Acte,⁵² where the cutting through of the Cher-
⁴⁷ Hegesippus does not provide dates, and his argument that “everyone
knows” invites suspicion that he is lying. In fact, the Athenians agreed to
the peace in the month Elaphebolion (March/April 346), but Philip did not
swear to it until he had returned to Pella from his Thracian campaign, i.e.,
after the capture of these places. In any case, Hegesippus does not prove
that any of these places belonged to Athens.
⁴⁸ Presumably the Athenian soldiers captured in the fall of Olynthus in
348 (Aes. 2.15).
⁴⁹ The Greek is ambiguous: either “the man from Carystus” (a city in
Euboea) or a man called Carystius. An honorary consul (proxenos) was ap-
pointed by a foreign state to look after the interests of its citizens in his city.
This episode is otherwise unknown.
⁵⁰ Agora (“Marketplace”) lay slightly to the southwest of Cardia.
⁵¹ Apollonides was presumably a prominent figure at Cardia, but noth-
ing further is known of him. In speaking about the territory “beyond
Agora,” Hegesippus adopts the point of view of the Athenian settlers in the
south of the peninsula, for whom the territory “beyond Agora” was to the
north of it.
⁵² Pteleum and Leuce Acte (“White Beach”) were on the western and
eastern coasts respectively, to the northeast of Cardia, at the narrow point
of the peninsula. Hegesippus’ point is that Philip has supported a Cardian
encroachment into land that belongs to Athens. The Cardians presumably

sonese was going to be,⁵³ [40] as the epigram on the altar of Zeus
of Boundaries shows. It reads as follows:
They established this very beautiful altar to the god,
placing it as a boundary at the midpoint between Leuce and
Pteleum,
the inhabitants, a sign of a place, that shares a border.
The lord of the blest ones himself is in the middle, the son of
Cronus.⁵⁴
[41] Yet of this land, whose extent most of you know, he treats
one part as his own property, and has given away another part
as gifts to others, and is bringing all your possessions under his
control. And not only is he alienating the land beyond Agora
but in the present letter he tells you to go to arbitration with
the Cardians who live on this side of Agora—with the Cardians
who live in your territory—if you have any dispute with them.⁵⁵
[42] But they are in dispute with you—and see if it is over a small
matter. They say that the land that they live on is their own, not
yours, and that your holdings do not belong to you, since they are
in others’ land, whereas their possessions belong to them, since
they are in their own land. And they say that a fellow-citizen of
yours wrote this in a decree: Callippus of Paeania.⁵⁶ [43] About
this at any rate they are telling the truth: he did write it. And
argued that this was their own land. It is not known where the borders of
Cardian territory in fact lay.
⁵³ Philip had proposed cutting a canal across the Chersonese to provide
security for the Athenian settlers there from Thracian incursion: see 6.30n.
⁵⁴ The text of the third line of this epigram is corrupt. The son of Cro-
nus in the fourth line refers to Zeus, the king of the gods. The text of
the epigram may mean that the altar marked the midpoint between Pte-
leum and Leuce Acte rather than, as Hegesippus claims, the border of the
Chersonese.
⁵⁵ Clearly the Cardians laid claim to some land to the southwest of Agora
that was currently in Athenian hands.
⁵⁶ This Athenian politician is not otherwise known. Hegesippus puts a
brave face on Athens’ acceptance of Cardia’s claim to this land.

128 demosthenes
when I prosecuted him on a charge of proposing an illegal de-

cree, you acquitted him.⁵⁷ As a result, he has made your owner-
ship of the place open to dispute. When you venture to go to arbi-
tration with the Cardians over whether the land is yours or theirs,
why will the same right not also exist with regard to the other in-
habitants of the Chersonese? [44] And Philip has treated you so
insultingly that he says that if the Cardians refuse to go to ar-
bitration, he will compel them, as if you would be quite unable
to compel them to do so; since you are unable, he says that he
will compel them: does he not seem to be doing you a great fa-
vor? [45] Some people say that this letter is well written: people
whom you should hate even more than you hate Philip. He at any
rate is acting against you in every way, after he has won for him-
self a good reputation and many assets. But all those Athenians
who show goodwill not to their own country but to Philip are vil-
lains, and deserve to be destroyed most vilely by you—if, that is,
you carry your brains in your temples and not trampled down in
your heels.⁵⁸
[46] It remains for me to draft a reply to this fine letter and to
the speeches of the ambassadors, one which I think to be both
just and advantageous to you.⁵⁹
⁵⁷ Libanius reports that Hegesippus, not Demosthenes, prosecuted Cal-

lippus: see the Speech Introduction.
⁵⁸ This striking expression was regarded by Libanius as vulgar, and
a sign that the speech is not the work of Demosthenes. See the Speech
Introduction.
⁵⁹ Hegesippus’ proposal is not preserved, but there is no doubt that it
would have been intransigent.

8. ON THE CHER SONESE
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
This speech, which is dated 342/1 by Dionysius of Halicarnas-
sus, was delivered in spring 341.¹ Demosthenes’ statement in it
that Philip has been campaigning in Thrace for ten months (2) is
consistent with this date, assuming that he started his campaign
in summer 342, and the Etesian winds of summer for which Philip
may wait (14) are therefore those of 341. At the time of the speech
Philip was on campaign in the interior of Thrace: he is said to be
in the Hellespont region with a large army (3, cf. 14) and to be
currently capturing a number of obscure places in Thrace (44).
The Chersonese (modern Gallipoli) is a long peninsula run-
ning down the western side of the Hellespont (modern Darda-
nelles), the narrow straits separating Europe from Asia, and con-
necting the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara. The Athenians
had a long-standing interest in the Chersonese, because it con-
trolled the sea route to the Black Sea region from which they im-
ported large quantities of grain.² Already in the sixth century the
Athenian aristocrat Miltiades established an Athenian settlement
there, which was later recovered by his son of the same name
(Herod. 6.34–41). Athens controlled the Chersonese in the fifth
century but had lost it by the end of the Peloponnesian War. In
¹ First Letter to Ammaeus 10. The theory that this speech was revised
by Demosthenes to incorporate material from the later Fourth Philippic
(Dem. 10) is discussed in the Introduction to that speech.
² For Athens’ dependence on grain from southern Russia, see, in detail,
Moreno 2007.

130 demosthenes
353/2 the Athenian general Chares sailed to the Hellespont, cap-

tured the city of Sestos in the Chersonese, and entered into ne-
gotiations with Cersobleptes, who was ruler of the eastern part
of Thrace. Wishing to gain Athens’ support against Philip, Cer-
sobleptes renounced his claim to the Chersonese, except for the
city of Cardia at its northern end, whereupon Athenian cleruchs
(clērouchoi, settlers) were sent out there (Diodorus 16.34.3; IG II²
1613 lines 297–298). The Cardians, however, refused to admit the
Athenian settlers into their city (Diodorus 16.34.4).
Philip had ambitions to gain control of all Thrace, the large re-
gion extending eastwards from Macedonia to the western coast
of the Black Sea. In 356 he had defeated Cetriporis, the ruler of
western Thrace (Diodorus 16.22.3), and in the autumn of 352 he
launched a campaign, apparently with the support of Amado-
cus, the ruler of central Thrace, against Cersobleptes.³ During
this campaign he besieged Fort Heraeum near Perinthus (3.4) and
“evicted some kings and installed others” (1.13). In response to
this threat, Athens prepared to send a large force to the north, but
it was delayed and in the end called off on rumors that Philip was
either ill or had died (3.4–5).
It was perhaps at this time that Philip made alliances with By-
zantium (9.34; Dem. 18.87, 93) and Cardia (5.25; cf. 12.11). In the
summer of 346 Philip was once more campaigning against Cer-
sobleptes and rejected the Athenian attempt to bring him under
the protection of the Peace of Philocrates. Philip finally dealt with
Cersobleptes in 342–340, allegedly acting in defense of the Greek
cities of the Hellespont. According to Diodorus (16.71.1–2), he
defeated the Thracians, imposed a tithe on them, and “founded
great cities” at key sites in the region.
Philip’s military operations in eastern Thrace were viewed with
alarm by the Athenians, who by 343/2⁴ had sent additional cle-
ruchs to the Chersonese led by the general Diopeithes (8.6, 9.15).⁵
³ See Theopompus FGH 115 fragment 101 for Amadocus’ support for
Philip.
⁴ The date is given by Philochorus FGH 328 fragment 158.
⁵ The sources relating to his operations there are collected by Pritchett
1971–1991: 2.92– 93.

8. on the chersonese 131
There he acted aggressively to strengthen Athenian control of

the peninsula.⁶ In particular, he sought to impose Athenian set-
tlers on Cardia; when the Cardians refused to accept them, he at-
tacked their territory. The Cardians in turn appealed to their ally
Philip, who wrote to Athens demanding that Diopeithes cease his
activities and then sent a force of mercenaries to support Cardia.
Meanwhile Diopeithes had raised his own mercenaries and was
ravaging territory and forcing ships to put to land (see 9), as well
as raiding places on the Thracian coast that belonged to Philip.
As hostilities continued, Philip wrote again to the Athenians to
complain of Diopeithes’ actions; it was in response to this letter
that Demosthenes delivered the speech On the Chersonese.
Demosthenes repeatedly insists in this speech that by his ac-
tions Philip has already broken the Peace of Philocrates and is at
a state of (undeclared) war with Athens. He tells the Athenians
that they “must fully acknowledge that Philip is at war with our
city and has broken the peace” (39) and that Philip’s aim is to de-
stroy Athens (60). He is at war because he has seized many places
claimed by Athens in breach of the peace (6). Of particular con-
cern to Demosthenes is the campaign that Philip is waging in
eastern Thrace, since both the Chersonese and Byzantium are un-
der threat (14–17).
Consequently Demosthenes argues that Diopeithes, who is
short of money and the object of criticism at Athens, should be
supported both politically and with further resources. Diopeithes’
shortage of funds was not unusual for Athenian generals in this
period, and it forced him to take various measures of dubious le-
gality: ravaging farmland, forcing cargo ships to put in to land,
and extorting money from Athens’ allies and others. Demosthe-
nes concedes that Diopeithes should be recalled if his actions are
in fact illegal (28–29), but he argues that Athens needs to main-
tain a standing force in the north (17–18), rather than rely on ex-
peditionary forces sent from Athens (17, 47), and that this force
needs to be funded somehow (21–27). He insists that criticism of
⁶ The following narrative is provided by Libanius’ Introduction to this

speech, 2–3.

132 demosthenes
Diopeithes merely distracts from the real issue, which is Philip’s

aggression towards Athens (2–3).
The dominant tone of the speech is anger. Demosthenes is
sharply critical of the policies and attitudes of the Athenians and
their political leaders. The former refuse to pay taxes or campaign
in person (21) and are more willing to hear criticism of their own
leaders than of Philip (30). The latter have been in some cases
bribed by Philip (61) and have enriched themselves at the city’s
expense (66); they are more interested in finding fault, with
Diopeithes and with their political rivals, and winning popular-
ity than in proposing effective measures. As a result, Athens has
lost the moral authority to ask the rest of Greece to join it in re-
sisting Philip (34–37). Demosthenes contrasts the corruption and
incompetence of his political opponents with his own principled
and patriotic leadership.
A substantial section of this speech is also found with some
differences in the slightly later Fourth Philippic (38–51 ≈ 10.11–27,
52– 67 ≈ 10.55–70). The implications of this are discussed in the
8. on the chersonese
[1] Every speaker, men of Athens, ought to speak neither out of
enmity nor to curry favor but to declare what he thinks is the best
policy, especially in view of the great public interest of the mat-
ters you are discussing. But since there are some who are being
induced to speak either out of rivalry or for some other reason,
you the majority, men of Athens, must discount everything else,
and vote and act in accordance with what you judge to be the in-
terest of the city. [2] The trouble we face relates to events in the
Chersonese and the campaign that Philip has been conducting
for more than ten months in Thrace,⁷ but most of the speeches
⁷ Lit. “for the eleventh month.” Philip began campaigning in summer

342 in eastern Thrace.

that have been made deal with what Diopeithes is doing and is
going to do.⁸ Yet I think that you already have the power to in-
vestigate whatever accusations have been directed against any of
these men⁹—whom you can punish according to the laws when-
ever you want, either now if you wish or later—and there is ab-
solutely no need for me or anyone else to speak at length about
them. [3] But all the places that an established enemy of our city,
who is in the Hellespontine region¹⁰ accompanied by a large mil-
itary force, is trying to seize before we can stop him, and which,
if we are too late, we will no longer be able to save—about these
I think that it is profitable for us to deliberate and to make our
preparations as soon as possible and not to run away from them as
a result of these irrelevant and rancorous accusations.¹¹
[4] I am amazed by many of the things that are regularly said to
you, men of Athens, but I was astonished most of all at what I re-
cently heard someone say in the Council,¹² that any advisor must
advise you either to wage war openly or to keep the peace. [5] But
the fact is, if Philip keeps quiet and neither possesses anything of
ours in breach of the peace nor organizes everybody against us,
there is no further need for speeches: all we have to do is keep the
peace, and on your side I see that you are quite ready to do so. But
if the texts of our oaths and the terms on which we made peace
are available for inspection,¹³ [6] and it is evident that from the
start, before the departure of Diopeithes and the cleruchs whom
they now accuse of having caused war, Philip has illegally seized
⁸ Diopeithes had been sent out as leader of Athenian cleruchs to the

Chersonese in or before 343/2: see the Speech Introduction.
⁹ Diopeithes and those under his command.
¹⁰ Demosthenes implies that Philip’s campaigning in Th race is directed
specifically at gaining control of the Hellespont.
¹¹ I.e., the accusations against Diopeithes.
¹² The Council (boulē) of Athens had important executive and judicial
powers and also prepared business for the Assembly. Demosthenes’ words
do not imply that he was a member of the Council in 342/1.
¹³ The terms of the Peace of Philocrates were inscribed on a stone pil-
lar (stēlē) and set up in a public place in Athens; copies will also have been
available in the city’s archive (on which see 7.33n).

134 demosthenes
many of our possessions, about which you complain in these de-

crees that remain in force,¹⁴ and continues to seize the posses-
sions of Greeks and foreigners alike, and is mobilizing against us,
what do they mean by saying that we must either wage war or re-
main at peace? [7] We have no choice in the matter: all that is
left for us is to take the most just and necessary course of action,
which these men are happy to pass over. What is this action? To
oppose the man who has started a war against us—unless indeed,
by Zeus, they claim that so long as Philip keeps away from Attica
and Piraeus, he is neither wronging the city nor waging war on
it! [8] But if they define justice in these terms, and consider this
to be peace, you can presumably all see that what they are saying
is impious, intolerable, and dangerous for you. Moreover, their
statements are logically inconsistent with the allegations that they
direct against Diopeithes. Why on earth should we give Philip li-
cense to do whatever he wants so long as he keeps away from At-
tica, but not permit Diopeithes even to help the Thracians¹⁵ with-
out our claiming that he is waging war? [9] But, by Zeus, it might
be said, although these men are wrong on this point, our merce-
naries are wrong to ravage places in the Hellespont, and Diopei-
thes is acting unjustly in forcing ships to land, and we should
not leave matters to him.¹⁶ All right; so be it; I make no protest.
[10] Yet if they are really offering this advice in good faith, I think
that just as they are seeking to disband our city’s existing force by
slandering the man who commands it and provides money for it,
they should likewise show how Philip’s power will be broken if
¹⁴ The texts of these decrees have not been preserved.

¹⁵ Demosthenes here puts a favorable gloss on Diopeithes’ raids on places
on the coast of Thrace that now belong to Philip (see Libanius’ Introduc-
tion 3). Philip complains about Diopeithes’ activities in his letter to the
Athenians of 340 (12.3–4).
¹⁶ In addition to the Athenian cleruchs, Diopeithes evidently also had a
force of mercenaries. Like most Athenian generals of the period, he received
little money from the city (see 21–26 below) and was presumably forcing
merchant ships to put in to land in order to confiscate or forcibly purchase
their cargoes to feed his troops. Some of these ships may have been sailing
from Macedonian-controlled ports.

you follow their advice. Otherwise, observe how they are simply
directing the city towards the same behavior that caused the pres-
ent disaster. [11] For you know, I suppose, that the most impor-
tant way in which Philip has got control of everything is by being
the first to take action. He has a standing army always with him
and knows in advance what he wishes to do, and strikes suddenly
against whomever he chooses; whereas we, whenever we hear that
something is happening, are thrown into confusion and only then
start to make our preparations. [12] The result, it seems to me, is
that he gets possession of any place he is attacking with great ease,
whereas we are too late, and all our expenditure is in vain, and we
make a show of our hostility and of our desire to hinder him, but
in acting too late we succeed only in incurring shame.¹⁷
[13] Please realize, men of Athens, that even now the rest¹⁸ is
just words and pretexts, but that Philip’s actions and prepara-
tions have this as their aim—that while you remain at home and
our city has no force abroad, he can make all his arrangements
completely unhindered. First, look at what is going on at pres-
ent. [14] Philip is currently spending his time with a large force
in Thrace and is summoning many reinforcements from Macedo-
nia and Thessaly,¹⁹ according to eyewitnesses. If he waits for the
Etesian winds,²⁰ marches against Byzantium and lays siege to it,
do you suppose that the Byzantines will continue with the same
folly that they show now and will decide neither to call for your
help nor to help themselves?²¹ [15] I do not think so, and imagine
¹⁷ I.e., the Athenians look foolish in the eyes of the other Greeks. On
shame as a motivating factor, see 51n. For the imagined criticism of Athens
by the other Greeks, see 34–37.
¹⁸ I.e., the decrees that the Athenians pass.
¹⁹ As ruler of Thessaly (see 1.13n), Philip was able to exploit the military
resources of the region, especially the strong Thessalian cavalry (on which
see 6.14n).
²⁰ On the importance of the Etesian winds, i.e., the north winds of sum-
mer, see 4.31n.
²¹ Byzantium had been a leader of the anti-Athenian revolt in the Social
War of 357–355 (Diodorus 16.7.3); its “folly” consists of its continued hostil-
ity to Athens in the face of Philip’s nearby campaigns in eastern Thrace. De-

136 demosthenes
that they would rather bring into their city even those whom they
distrust more than us than hand it over to Philip, if he does not
seize it first. Thus, if we are unable to put to sea from here, and
there is no help at hand there, nothing will prevent their destruc-
tion. [16] “But, by Zeus, those people are possessed by an evil
spirit and are exceedingly foolish.” True indeed, but they must
nevertheless be saved, since it is in our city’s interest.²² Indeed,
it is not clear to us even that he will not attack the Chersonese,
since according to the letter he sent you, he claims to be defend-
ing himself against those who are in the Chersonese.²³ [17] If the
army that has already been formed remains in existence,²⁴ it will
be able both to assist that place²⁵ and to damage some of his in-
terests. But if it is ever disbanded, what will we do if he attacks
the Chersonese? “We will put Diopeithes on trial, by Zeus.” And
how will that help? “We can provide a relief force ourselves from
here.” What if we are prevented by the winds?²⁶ “By Zeus, he
will not attack.” But who will guarantee this? [18] Are you aware,
men of Athens, and do you take account of the coming season,²⁷
which some people think will force you to abandon the Helles-
pont and surrender it to Philip? What if he leaves Thrace and
attacks neither the Chersonese nor Byzantium but (this too is
something you should consider) advances against Chalcis²⁸ and
mosthenes provides no evidence in this speech of a breakdown of relations

between Philip and Byzantium, but in the following year Philip in his letter
to the Athenians (12.2) complains that their ally Thasos was providing assis-
tance to Byzantium by admitting Byzantine warships into its harbor.
²² Byzantium’s site on the Bosporus meant that whoever possessed it
would be able to control the grain trade from the Black Sea on which Ath-
ens depended.
²³ This letter has not survived, but in his slightly later Letter (12.16),
Philip makes a similar claim: that the Athenian cleruchs in the Chersonese
are waging war on him.
²⁴ I.e., the force under Diopeithes’ command.
²⁵ The Chersonese.
²⁶ On the Etesian winds, see 14 above; 4.31n.
²⁷ I.e., the summer of 341, with reference to the Etesian winds.
²⁸ Chalcis on the west coast of Euboea and Megara (see next note) were
neighbors of Athens. Chalcis had seceded from Athens in 348 but, under

Megara,²⁹ just as he recently did against Oreus:³⁰ is it better to re-

sist him here and allow war to enter Attica, or to cause difficulties
for him over there? The latter, I think.
[19] Since we all know this and base our deliberations on it,
we must not, by Zeus, disparage or attempt to disband the force
that Diopeithes is trying to organize for the city, but must pre-
pare a further force ourselves, supplying him with money and in
other respects joining the struggle as friends. [20] For if some-
one were to ask Philip, “Tell me, would you rather that these sol-
diers whom Diopeithes now commands, however poor they are,”
(I do not dispute it) “succeed and be held in high regard by the
Athenians and be increased in number, and that the city of Ath-
ens join in the struggle, or that they be disbanded and destroyed,
as a result of the slanders and accusations that certain men have
brought against them?” I think that he would choose the lat-
ter option. But aren’t some of us here doing the very things that
Philip would pray to the gods that we do? And do you still ask
how the affairs of our city have been totally ruined?
[21] I wish to provide a candid appraisal of our city’s present
predicament and to examine what we are currently doing to ad-
dress it. We are not willing to raise taxes,³¹ or to campaign in
person, or to keep our hands off public funds,³² nor do we pro-
vide Diopeithes with financial contributions, [22] or approve of
the provisions that he makes for himself, but we disparage him
and investigate the source of his funds and his intentions and the
like; nor—for such is our nature—are we willing to mind our
the leadership of Callias, turned to Athens in 341 in fear of Macedonian and

Theban intervention. See Aes. 3.85–105 for a long and hostile survey of Cal-
lias’ dealings with Athens and with Demosthenes, especially 91– 93 on the
embassy from Chalcis of 341 and the alliance that resulted from it.
²⁹ Megara suffered from political upheaval in 343, and the oligarchs there
turned to Philip for support. See 9.27n.
³⁰ For Macedonian intervention in Oreus, a city in northern Euboea, see
9.59– 61.
³¹ Demosthenes refers here to the wealth-tax (eisphora), an occasional tax
levied on the rich. See further 14.26n.
³² The reference is to distributions to Athenian citizens from the theoric
fund, on which see the Introduction to Dem. 3.

138 demosthenes
own business, but in our speeches we praise those who speak wor-
thily of the city, whereas in our actions we join with their op-
ponents. [23] You are accustomed on each occasion to ask the
speaker, “What are we to do?” but I want to ask you “What are
we to say?” For if you will not raise taxes, or campaign in person,
or keep away from public money, or provide allowances, or let
him provide for himself, and refuse to take care of your own af-
fairs, I have nothing to say. You already give so much freedom to
those who wish to blame and slander that you listen to them ac-
cusing someone in advance for things that they say he is going to
say—what can anyone say to you?
[24] Some of you need to be told what the consequence of this
can be. I will speak candidly; I can do nothing else. All your gen-
erals who have ever set sail—and if I am wrong, I condemn my-
self to suffer any punishment at all—take money from the Chians
and the Erythraeans and anyone else they can (I mean of those
who live in Asia).³³ [25] Those with one or two ships take less;
those with a larger force take more. And those who give to them,
whether it is a small or a large sum, do so not for nothing—they
are not so crazy as to do that—but to buy protection from ill
treatment and plundering for the merchants who sail from their
cities, and for the convoying of their own ships, and the like.
They say that they are giving “goodwill payments,” as these tak-
ings are called. [26] Now too it is quite clear that all these cities
will give Diopeithes money, since he has an army. How else do
you suppose that one who has received nothing from you, and
has no other source of funds with which to pay wages, can sup-
ply his troops? From the sky? No: he lives off what he collects and
begs and borrows. [27] Those who accuse him before you are sim-
ply announcing to everyone³⁴ that they should not give him any-
³³ The island of Chios in the eastern Aegean had been a member of the
Second Athenian Confederacy and had played a prominent part in the re-
volt of 357 that precipitated the Social War. Erythrae, a Greek city on the
coast of Asia Minor directly opposite Chios, remained a part of the Persian
Empire, as did all other Greek cities in Asia Minor. Any Athenian interfer-
ence in such cities was certain to antagonize the Persian King.
³⁴ I.e., to any city from which Diopeithes might try to get help.

thing, on the ground that he will be punished for what he is go-

ing to do, though he has not done or achieved anything. This
is the meaning of their statements that “he is planning a siege”
or “he is sacrificing the Greeks.” Do any of these men care for
the Greeks who live in Asia? If they do, they obviously care more
for other people than they do for their own country!³⁵ [28] And
this is the implication of sending another general to the Helles-
pont.³⁶ If Diopeithes is acting terribly and forcing ships to put in
to land,³⁷ a small tablet, men of Athens, just a small one, could
put a stop to all this—and the laws tell us to impeach those who
commit crimes of this nature, not to keep watch on our own peo-
ple at such expense and with so many triremes.³⁸ That would be
the height of madness. [29] Against our enemies, who cannot be
arrested under the laws, we have no choice but to maintain troops
and send out ships and raise taxes; but against our own people, it
is decrees, impeachment, and the Paralus that are effective.³⁹ This
is how intelligent men behave, but these men act to disparage and
destroy our affairs. [30] And yet, terrible though it is that some
of these men are behaving like this, this is not the really terri-
ble thing. Rather, you who sit here are already so disposed that if
someone were to come forward and say that it is Diopeithes who
³⁵ Demosthenes criticizes his opponents for making sweeping and un-

founded allegations about Diopeithes’ intentions and denies that they have
any real concern for the Greeks (of Asia Minor). His claim that they show
more concern for other cities than for their own is sarcastic.
³⁶ I.e., the purpose of sending another general to the region would be
to restrain Diopeithes rather than to augment his force and cooperate
with him.
³⁷ Cf. 9 above.
³⁸ I.e., a writing tablet, containing the text of an impeachment. This
would force Diopeithes to return to Athens to stand trial. Demosthenes
suggests that it is cheaper and more effective to recall him to stand trial
for misconduct than to send a second general to supervise him. On the im-
peachment (eisangelia) of generals, see 4.47n.
³⁹ The Paralus was a special ship of the Athenian navy used on diplo-
matic missions and to carry official messages, in this case, the text of a de-
cree indicting Diopeithes. See 4.34n.

140 demosthenes
is responsible for all our troubles, or Chares,⁴⁰ or Aristophon,⁴¹

or whichever citizen one might care to mention, you immediately
agree and cry out that he is speaking the truth. [31] But if some-
one should come forward and tell the truth, that “you are deluded,
Athenians: it is Philip who is responsible for all these evil circum-
stances, since if he were keeping quiet, our city would be in no
trouble,” you are unable to refute this claim, but you seem to be
distressed, as if you think something of yours is being destroyed.
[32] The reason for this is as follows—and, by the gods, please
allow me to speak freely for your benefit! Some public speakers
have prepared you to be fearsome and severe in your Assembly
meetings, but lax and contemptible in your preparation for war.
If you are told that the man who is responsible is one whom you
know you can arrest from among your own number, you agree
and are willing to do so; but if you are told that he is one whom
you can punish only after you have defeated him in war, you do
not know what to do, I think, and your bewilderment makes you
angry. [33] Contrary to your present practice, men of Athens, the
public speakers should all have trained you to be mild and con-
siderate in the Assembly, since it is there that you discuss your
rights and those of your allies, but to show yourselves fearsome
and severe in your preparations for war, since there the struggle
is against your enemies and rivals. [34] Instead, acting as dema-
gogues towards you⁴² and currying favor with you to an excessive
⁴⁰ Chares was a leading Athenian general, active from the 360s to the
330s. His aggressive conduct (see 4.24n, 13.6n) made him a plausible object
of such criticism. On his career, see Pritchett 1971–1991: 2.77–85.
⁴¹ Aristophon was a prominent and long-lived Athenian politician, whose
earliest known political activity was in the fifth century. After the Social
War, he prosecuted Chares’ fellow-generals Iphicrates and Timotheus for
treason in their conduct of the war (Arist. Rhetoric 1398a4– 7; Din. 1.14;
3.17), and in 354 he supported a law proposed by Leptines (Dem. 20.147–
149). If Demosthenes has any particular action of his in mind, it may be this
prosecution of two of Athens’ most experienced generals, of whom Timo-
theus was forced into exile.
⁴² The Greek word dēmagōgos (lit. “leader of the people”) was originally
a neutral term, but it came to have negative connotations, especially when
applied to populist politicians of the late fifth century who were accused by
their critics of pandering to the Athenian lower class.

degree, they have made it so that in meetings of the Assembly,

you are spoiled and easily flattered, listening to everything with
an ear to your own pleasure, but your public affairs have come to
the point that you are in deadly danger. Come now, by Zeus, if
the Greeks were to ask you to give an account of the opportuni-
ties you have squandered due to your indolence, and if they were
to ask of you: [35] “Athenians, do you not send us ambassadors on
every occasion,⁴³ and say that Philip is plotting against us and all
the Greeks, and that we must guard ourselves against the fellow,
and the like?”—and we must agree and admit that this is what we
do—“Then, you most useless of people, when that man had been
absent for ten months and was prevented by disease and winter
and wars from returning home, [36] you failed to liberate Euboea
or recover any of your own possessions.⁴⁴ But while you stayed at
home, in good health—if indeed those who behave like this can
be said to enjoy good health—he set up two tyrants in Euboea,
planting one like a fortress opposite Attica, the other over against
Sciathos.⁴⁵ [37] Yet you did not rid yourselves even of these—if
that was the limit of your ambitions—but permitted them, did
you not? You have evidently given way before him and have made
it clear that you will not stir yourselves one whit more, even if he
dies ten times over. Why then do you come as ambassadors and
make accusations and cause trouble for us?” If they ask this, what
answer shall we give, Athenians, or what shall we have to say? I do
not see what we can say.
[38] There are some men who think that they confute a speaker
when they ask him, “So, what must we do?”⁴⁶ To them I give this
most just and truthful answer: you must stop behaving as you
do. But I will also address each point in detail and hope that they
⁴³ On Athenian embassies to the Peloponnese in this period, see 9.72n.

⁴⁴ The reference is primarily to Amphipolis in Thrace, on which see
4.12n.
⁴⁵ The two Euboean tyrants were respectively Clitarchus of Eretria (see
9.57–58) and Philistides of Oreus (see 9.59– 62). Oreus, a city on the north-
ern coast of Euboea, faced the small Athenian-controlled island of Sciathos,
on which see 4.32n.
⁴⁶ 38–51 is substantially repeated at 10.11–27. For discussion, see the In-
troduction to Dem. 10.

142 demosthenes
may be as eager to act as they are to ask questions. [39] First, men
of Athens, you must fully acknowledge that Philip is at war with
our city and has broken the peace—and please stop accusing each
other about this—and is malignly hostile to the entire city down
to its very foundation, [40] and, I should add, to all its inhabi-
tants, including those who most think that they are doing him a
favor. And if they do not believe me, let them consider the Olyn-
thians Euthycrates and Lasthenes,⁴⁷ who seemed to be on terms
of intimacy with him, but who, after they betrayed their city, suf-
fered a worse fate than anyone. But it is against our constitution
that he is most at war, and towards its overthrow that his plots
and policies are above all directed. [41] And in a sense it is rea-
sonable for him to do so. For he is well aware that even if he gets
control of everyone else, he will be unable to possess anything se-
curely, so long as you are a democracy; and if ever some slip oc-
curs—and there are many slips that may befall a man—all those
places that he has now forced into union will come and seek ref-
uge with you. [42] You are not yourselves well suited to acquire
or possess an empire. Rather, you are good at preventing another
from taking places, and at recovering them from one who has
got hold of them, and at generally obstructing those who wish
to rule, and at liberating people. He does not wish freedom at
your hands to be lying in wait on any moment of crisis for him—
quite the contrary—and his calculation is sound and to the point.
[43] First, you must understand that he is an inveterate enemy
of our democratic constitution. If you are not fully convinced of
this, you will not be willing to treat the situation seriously. Sec-
ond, you must recognize clearly that all his policies and machina-
tions are directed against our city, and that wherever anyone re-
sists him, he does so on our behalf. [44] For there is no one so
naive as to suppose that Philip has a positive desire for the evils
of Thrace—what else can one call Drongilus and Cabyle and
Mastira⁴⁸ and the places that he is now taking?—or that seizing
⁴⁷ These men were pro-Macedonian politicians at Olynthus. At 9.66 Las-

thenes is identified as cavalry commander (hipparchos).
⁴⁸ These are all places in Thrace, no doubt chosen by Demosthenes for
their obscurity.

these places is the reason why he endures toil and winters and the
utmost dangers, [45] or to suppose that he has no desire for Ath-
ens’ harbors and docks and triremes⁴⁹ and silver works⁵⁰ and vast
revenues, but will allow you to keep these, and is spending the
winter in the pit⁵¹ for the sake of the millet and wheat⁵² in the
grain pits of Thrace. On the contrary, all his activities in Thrace
and elsewhere are directed towards getting control of our posses-
sions. [46] What then should sensible people do? They should un-
derstand and acknowledge the situation, and should put aside this
excessive and incurable negligence of ours, and should raise taxes
and require our allies to do so too,⁵³ and their policies and actions
should be directed towards ensuring that this army that has been
raised remains together, in order that, just as Philip has a force
prepared to mistreat and enslave all of Greece, so you may have a
force ready to save and provide assistance to everybody. [47] For
you can never achieve anything that you need to by sending relief
forces.⁵⁴ Instead, we must equip a force, and provide supplies for
it and financial officers⁵⁵ and public clerks,⁵⁶ and take measures
to ensure that the money is very closely guarded. Once we have
done this, we should hold these men responsible for the money,
⁴⁹ The Athenian navy, based in the harbor town of Piraeus, was by far
the largest in Greece. See Dem. 14.
⁵⁰ The extensive silver mines of the southern tip of Attica were an impor-
tant source of revenue for Athens in the fifth century. Mining was seriously
interrupted by the Peloponnesian War and seems to have resumed on a sub-
stantial scale only in the middle of the fourth century.
⁵¹ At Athens the pit (barathron) was a chasm into which convicted crimi-
nals were thrown to their deaths. It is not clear whether the reference here is
to this, but the general sense of being in an unpleasant place is clear.
⁵² For the identification of the Greek word olura as emmer wheat, see
Sallares 1991: 365–367.
⁵³ On the financial contributions of Athens’ allies in the Second Athe-
nian Confederacy, see 5.13n, 13.4n.
⁵⁴ The same complaint is made at 4.32.
⁵⁵ Financial officers (tamiai) regularly accompanied generals on cam-
paign to assist them in keeping their accounts: see Dem. 49.10; Aes. 1.56;
Pritchett 1971–1991: 2.38–39.
⁵⁶ Lit. “public men”: publicly owned slaves who assisted the financial offi-
cers in a clerical capacity. See also 2.19n.

144 demosthenes
and the general responsible for his actions. If you take these mea-
sures, and are truly willing to pursue this policy, you will either
force Philip to keep the peace as he should and to remain in his
own territory—which would be the most beneficial outcome—or
you will be waging war against him on an equal footing.
[48] If anyone thinks that these plans involve great expense
and much toil and trouble, he is absolutely right; but if he reck-
ons what will happen to the city if it refuses to take these mea-
sures, he will find that it is in our interest for us to do our duty
with enthusiasm. [49] If you had some divine guarantor—since
no human would suffice for a matter of such importance—that if
you keep quiet and give up everything, Philip will not in the end
advance against you, it would be shameful, by Zeus and all the
gods, and unworthy of you and of what the city has and of your
ancestors’ achievements, to sacrifice all the other Greeks into slav-
ery for the sake of your own indolence, and I at any rate would
rather die than advocate this course. Nevertheless, if someone else
speaks and persuades you otherwise, so be it: do not resist, throw
everything away. [50] But if no one takes that view, but on the
contrary we all already know that the more places we allow him
to control, the more dangerous and the stronger an enemy we will
have, where can we retreat to? Why do we delay? When, men of
Athens, will we be willing to do our duty? [51] “By Zeus, when
we are compelled to.” But if we are speaking of the compulsion
placed on a free man, that has already arrived, and indeed has
long passed us by; and we can only pray never to suffer that of a
slave. How do they differ? For a free man, the greatest compul-
sion is a sense of shame at what is happening—I do not think that
anyone could imagine any greater compulsion than that⁵⁷—but
for a slave it consists of blows and outrage to the body. May that
never happen to us! Indeed, one should not even talk about it.⁵⁸
⁵⁷ The desire to avoid humiliation was an important motivating factor in

the “shame culture” of ancient Greece.
⁵⁸ Slaves had no legal rights in Greece and could routinely be beaten, or
threatened with beatings, by their owners. The prospect of the Athenians
suffering enslavement is so terrible that it should not even be spoken. On
the concept of hybris (here translated “outrage”), see 62n.

[52] I would gladly tell you about all the rest,⁵⁹ and show how
certain men are ruining you by their policies, but I shall pass over
other matters and say only this: that whenever any matter relat-
ing to Philip arises, someone immediately stands up and says how
fine it is to keep the peace, and how difficult it is to maintain a
large military force, and that certain people wish to plunder pub-
lic funds,⁶⁰ and other remarks of this kind, and as a result, they
put you off and give him time to act as he wishes. [53] In conse-
quence, you are idle and do nothing at the right time—and I fear
that you may later come to realize how much this has cost you—
while they secure favors from Philip and payment for their ser-
vices. I think that it is not you who need to be persuaded to keep
the peace, since you sit there already believing it, but the one who
is waging war. If he were to be persuaded, your side is quite ready
to do so.⁶¹ [54] The real difficulty, you should realize, is not what
we may have to spend to ensure our safety but what we will suffer
if we do not take these actions, and you should prevent the money
being stolen by announcing the establishment of a guard to en-
sure its safety, not by refusing to do your duty. [55] I am also an-
gry, men of Athens, that some of you are distressed at the pros-
pect of public money being seized, when you have the power both
to guard it and to punish those who break the law, but are not
distressed that Philip is seizing all of Greece city by city, as he is
doing, and moreover his actions are directed against you.
[56] What possible reason is there, men of Athens, why none
of these men will admit that Philip is at war, when he is so openly
campaigning and acting illegally and seizing cities, but they ac-
cuse those of us who are advising you to stand firm and not
abandon these places of planning to go to war? Let me explain.
[57] They wish to turn the anger that you reasonably feel if you
suffer any reverse in war against those who are giving you the best
advice, in order that you may put them on trial rather than re-
⁵⁹ The wording at 52– 67 is reused with minor changes in the slightly

later Fourth Philippic (10.55– 70). For discussion, see the Introduction to
Dem. 10.
⁶⁰ Demosthenes’ opponents represent his policy of using public money to
wage war on Philip as one of looting the treasury.
⁶¹ Compare 5 above for the same thought.

146 demosthenes
sist Philip, and that they themselves may act as the accusers of
these men rather than pay the penalty for their own actions. This
is what they mean when they say that certain people here wish to
bring about war, and this is what this dispute is about. [58] But I
know for certain that, without any Athenian having yet made a
proposal of war, Philip holds many of our city’s possessions and
has now sent help to Cardia.⁶² If we are willing to pretend that
he is not waging war on us, he would be an utter fool to refute us.
[59] But when he marches against us, what shall we say then? He
will deny that he is at war, as he did to the people of Oreus when
his soldiers were in their territory,⁶³ as he did before that to the
Pheraeans even as he attacked their walls,⁶⁴ and as he did at the
outset to the Olynthians, until he was in their territory with an
army!⁶⁵ At that point shall we say that those who are telling you
to defend yourselves are warmongers? The only remaining option
is slavery—nothing else is possible if we do not defend ourselves
and are not allowed to live at peace. [60] Indeed, you do not face
the same danger as others do, since Philip’s aim is not to subject
your city but to destroy it utterly. He is well aware that you will
not willingly be slaves, nor, if you were willing, would you know
how to do so, since you are accustomed to rule, but you will be
able to cause more trouble for him, if you take the opportunity to
do so, than any other people can.
[61] And so you should recognize that the struggle will be for
our very existence, and should hate and cudgel to death⁶⁶ those
who have sold themselves to him. For it is impossible, impossi-
⁶² On Philip’s support of Cardia, see the Speech Introduction.

⁶³ On Macedonian intervention in the Euboean city of Oreus in 342, see
36 above; 9.12, 59– 62.
⁶⁴ Pherae was the leading city of southern Thessaly. Philip intervened
there in 344/3 in his role as ruler (see 1.13n) of Thessaly: see 65n below, 7.32,
9.12; Dem. 19.260; Diodorus 16.69.8.
⁶⁵ Philip had been allied to Olynthus, but relations deteriorated in the
years leading up to the outbreak of war in 349: see the Introduction to
Dem. 1–3.
⁶⁶ Demosthenes refers to a gruesome form of capital punishment (apo-
tympanismos) that was used against traitors and slaves: see Todd 2001.

ble I say, to defeat your enemies outside the city until you have
punished your enemies in the city itself. [62] Why do you sup-
pose that he is treating you with contempt—for this is exactly
what I think he is doing?⁶⁷ And why does he deceive others by
doing them favors but threatens you outright? For example, he
gave the Thessalians many benefits before he led them into their
present slavery;⁶⁸ nor would anyone be able to say how much he
deceived the wretched Olynthians, after he had previously given
them Potidaea and much else besides;⁶⁹ [63] and he is now lead-
ing on the Thebans, after handing Boeotia over to them and re-
lieving them of a long and difficult war.⁷⁰ After each of these cit-
ies enjoyed some benefit, some of them have already suffered a
fate that is well known to everyone; the others will suffer at some
time in the future. As for you, to say nothing of all the places you
have recently been deprived of, how much were you tricked out of
during the actual making of the peace?⁷¹ [64] Phocis, Thermopy-
lae,⁷² the coast of Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium,⁷³ Cersobleptes him-
⁶⁷ Demosthenes accuses Philip of treating the Athenians with violent

contempt (hybris). Such conduct was commonly attributed to the rich and
powerful in their dealings with those poorer or weaker than themselves,
and hybris was treated as a serious offense under Athenian law: see in gen-
eral OCD³ s.v. hubris; Fisher 1992.
⁶⁸ See 59 above on Philip’s treatment of the Thessalian city of Pherae. De-
mosthenes uses the emotive language of slavery to describe the Macedonian
domination of Thessaly.
⁶⁹ See 59 above. Philip made an alliance with Olynthus in 357/6 (see 2.1n)
and handed over the city of Potidaea to it (see 2.7n, 6.20n).
⁷⁰ After the Third Sacred War was brought to an end in 346, Thebes’
domination of the other cities of Boeotia was confirmed.
⁷¹ Demosthenes refers to the making of the Peace of Philocrates between
Athens and Philip in 346. For the episodes complained about here see the
Introduction to Dem. 5. The manuscripts follow this question with “and of
how much were you deprived?,” but these words were probably inserted by
a later copyist.
⁷² Philip ended the war in 346 by gaining control of Thermopylae and
destroying the cities of Phocis.
⁷³ Doriscus and Serrium, towns on the coast of Thrace, were captured by
Philip in 346 before the peace was ratified. See also 9.15; 10.8, 65.

148 demosthenes
self?⁷⁴ Does he not now admit that he possesses Cardia?⁷⁵ Why

then does he deal in this way with everyone else but not with you?
Because only in your city are men allowed to speak on behalf of
the enemy with impunity, and it is safe for a man who has re-
ceived bribes to address you even though you have been deprived
of what is yours. [65] It would not have been safe to plead Philip’s
cause in Olynthus, if the majority of the Olynthians had not prof-
ited from the enjoyment of Potidaea.⁷⁶ It would not have been
safe to do so in Thessaly, if the majority of the Thessalians had not
benefited from Philip expelling their tyrants⁷⁷ and handing the
Pylaea over to them.⁷⁸ Nor was it safe to do so in Thebes, until
he handed over Boeotia and destroyed Phocis.⁷⁹ [66] But at Ath-
ens, after Philip has not only deprived you of Amphipolis⁸⁰ and
the territory of the Cardians⁸¹ but is also establishing Euboea⁸² as
a fortress against you and is now advancing against Byzantium,⁸³
it is safe to speak on his behalf. Indeed, some of those who do
⁷⁴ Cersobleptes was the ruler of eastern Thrace. Since he was not a mem-
ber of Athens’ league, he was not protected by the Peace of Philocrates, and
Philip was free to wage war on him. See further 12.8n.
⁷⁵ See the Speech Introduction for Philip’s support for the city of Cardia
in the Chersonese, with which he was allied.
⁷⁶ On Olynthus and Potidaea, see 62 above.
⁷⁷ Philip intervened in some of the cities of Thessaly in 344/3 (see 59n
above). The “tyrants” whom he expelled were the rulers of Pherae in the
south and perhaps also of Larissa in the north. See further Hammond and
Griffith 1979: 523–526.
⁷⁸ The Pylaea was the council of the Delphic Amphictyony, which was
now dominated by the Thessalians: see 5.23.
⁷⁹ See 63n.
⁸⁰ On Amphipolis, see 4.12n.
⁸¹ The Athenians claimed Cardia as part of their more general claim to
the Chersonese. See 58n and the Speech Introduction.
⁸² On Philip’s establishment of a power base in some of the cities of Eu-
boea, see 36 above.
⁸³ Demosthenes does not elaborate on his (untrue) claim that Philip is
marching against Byzantium. At 14 he merely raises the possibility of Philip
attacking the city.

so were once poor but are now rapidly becoming rich, and were
once without name or reputation but are now reputable and well
known, whereas you suffer the reverse process: you used to have
a good reputation but are now disreputable; you were rich but are
now in need. For I think that the wealth of a city consists of its
allies, and the trust and goodwill that it inspires—all of which
you now lack. [67] Because you despised these advantages and
allowed them to be carried off, Philip is wealthy and powerful
and an object of fear to all, Greeks and foreigners, whereas you
are abandoned and brought low, glorying in the abundant goods
for sale in the marketplace, but a laughingstock when it comes to
making appropriate preparations. I see some speakers taking one
view about you and another about themselves: they say that you
must keep quiet, even if someone wrongs you, but they are un-
able to keep quiet in your presence, even though no one is wrong-
ing them.
[68] Then someone or other of them comes forward and says
to me: “Well, but you won’t make a proposal, or take any risk,
but are cowardly and soft.” I am not arrogant or disgusting or
shameless, and hope I may never become so, and I consider my-
self braver than the numerous men who participate so irrespon-
sibly in public life. [69] For, men of Athens, anyone who brings
prosecutions, who confiscates people’s property and then gives it
away, and who makes accusations, without regard to the city’s in-
terest, does not do these things out of bravery, but can be rash
with impunity, since his safety is guaranteed by the fact that in
speaking and taking part in public life he curries your favor. But
anyone who frequently opposes your wishes for the sake of what is
best, and who always speaks not to gain favor but to give the best
advice, and who chooses a policy that owes more to chance than
to calculation, yet accepts responsibility for both of these—[70] it
is this man who is brave, and a useful citizen, not those who have
destroyed our city’s greatest assets for the sake of a short-lived
popularity. I am so far from envying them or thinking them good
citizens that, if anyone were to ask me, “Tell me, what good have
you done our city?,” although, men of Athens, I could mention
the command of triremes and the sponsoring of choral produc-

150 demosthenes
tions and financial contributions and the ransoming of prisoners

and other such acts of generosity,⁸⁴ I would not mention any of
them. [71] Instead, I would say that my conduct of public affairs
has nothing in common with theirs; and that, although I perhaps
could, as others can, make accusations and do favors and confis-
cate property and do the other things that these men do, I have
never yet taken up any of these positions, nor have I been moti-
vated by profit or ambition, but I continue to say things which
make me a lesser man than many in your eyes, but will make you
greater, if you are persuaded by me—this much, perhaps, it is not
invidious for me to say. [72] Nor do I think that I would be acting
as a good citizen if I were to devise policies that will make me the
first among you, but you the last among all people. Rather, the
city must prosper through the policies proposed by its good cit-
izens, and everyone must always advocate what is best, not what
is easiest. Nature will move towards the latter of its own accord;
towards the former, the good citizen must lead the way, teaching
through his words.
[73] In the past I have heard it said that I always say what is
best but that I produce nothing but words, whereas what the
city needs is deeds and action. I shall tell you frankly my atti-
tude towards these complaints: I think that the only action that
is required of one who advises you is to say what is for the best,
and I think that I can easily show that this is the case. [74] You
doubtless know that the famous Timotheus once made a speech
before you saying that you should assist and go to the res-
cue of the Euboeans when the Thebans were trying to enslave
⁸⁴ On the liturgical service imposed on wealthy Athenians to equip and

command a ship of the Athenian navy, or sponsor a choral performance, see
4.36n. The financial contributions to which Demosthenes refers are the pay-
ment of the wealth-tax (eisphora): see 14.26n. Although these responsibili-
ties were all obligatory, citizens were encouraged to show their patriotism by
lavishly performing liturgies and by paying the wealth-tax promptly and in
full: see Whitehead 1983. It was also regarded as public-spirited to ransom a
fellow-citizen who had been captured by the enemy. Demosthenes’ own ex-
penditure on behalf of the city is analyzed by Davies 1971: 135–138.

them,⁸⁵ and that he said something like this: “Tell me, when you
have the Thebans on an island, are you deliberating about how to
treat them and what to do? Will you not fill the sea, men of Ath-
ens, with triremes? Will you not leap to your feet and proceed to
Piraeus? Will you not launch your ships?” [75] Timotheus spoke
these words, and you acted, but the success arose from these two
things together: his words and your action. If he had given the
best possible advice, as he did, but you had remained idle and
paid no attention, would any of the things that then benefited the
city have happened? They could not have. So too with what I say:
you should seek action from yourselves, but the best advice from
the man who steps up to speak.⁸⁶
[76] I wish to summarize my proposal and then step down. I
say that we must raise money, keep together our existing force,
correcting any fault that is detected but not disbanding the whole
because of any details that are open to criticism; we must send out
ambassadors in every direction to instruct, warn, and act; and in
addition we must punish those who are taking bribes in connec-
tion with public affairs and show our utter hatred of them, so that
those who are moderate and upright may be seen, by themselves
and others, to have given the right advice. [77] If you handle mat-
ters in this way and stop belittling everything, perhaps, perhaps
even now our situation may yet improve. But if you remain in
your seats, serious only about heckling or cheering, but shrinking
back if anything needs to be done, I do not see how any speech
will be able to save the city, if you refuse to do your duty.
⁸⁵ In 357. See also 1.8, 4.17; Dem. 21.174; Aes. 3.85; Diodorus 16.7.2.
Aeschines reports that within thirty days, Athens had taken control of the
island. The inscription recording the subsequent alliance between Athens
and the Euboean city of Carystus has been preserved: IG II²124 = Rhodes
and Osborne 2003: no. 48. On Timotheus, see 13.22n.
⁸⁶ The Greek text is corrupt, but the meaning is clear.

9. THIR D PHILIPPIC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The Third Philippic was delivered in spring 341, at about the
same time as Dem. 8.¹ Certainly the two speeches paint a similar
picture of the situation in Thrace and the Chersonese. In the pres-
ent speech, Demosthenes claims that Philip has set out against
the Hellespont (27), is marching on Byzantium (34), and has sent
mercenaries into the Chersonese, that is, to support his ally Car-
dia (16). Both Byzantium and the Chersonese are in such grave
danger that the Athenians must take immediate action (19) and
send funds to those in the Chersonese (73), by which he means
the Athenian force there commanded by Diopeithes.²
This speech differs from Dem. 8, however, in being concerned
with the rest of Greece as much as with Athens. Demosthenes
accuses Philip of intervening in the affairs of numerous Greek
states (Megara, Elis, Pherae, Ambracia, and the Euboean cities
of Eretria and Oreus), of seizing Echinus in central Greece, and
of threatening Byzantium and the Chersonese. He also has much
to say about the reaction of the Greeks: they have given Philip
more freedom to dominate Greece than they ever allowed Ath-
ens or Sparta (22–25); they are demoralized and disunited (28);
their love of liberty, shown in their resistance to the Persian inva-
¹ It is dated 342/1 by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (First Letter to Am-

maeus 10).
² On Diopeithes and the Chersonese in the late 340s, see the Introduc-
tion to Dem. 8.

9. third philippic 153
sion of Greece in 480–479, has now vanished (36–40). Demosthe-

nes introduces a historical example: the Athenian decision in the
fifth century to outlaw Arthmius of Zeleia, an agent of the Per-
sian King, as proof of the concern that the Athenians of that time
showed for the welfare of Greece as a whole (41–45).
By contrast, he attacks Philip in a famous passage as a bar-
baros (i.e., non-Greek, but with implications of barbarity; 30–32):
he is “a wretched Macedonian, from a land from which you could
not previously have bought even a decent slave” (31), and it is dis-
graceful that such an interloper should “administer the Pythian
festival [at Delphi], the shared competition of the Greeks” (32).
This xenophobic attack on Philip is of a piece with the Panhel-
lenic³ tone of the speech as a whole. Demosthenes argues that the
cities of Greece need to unite to resist Philip: he criticizes their
failure to communicate with each other by means of ambassadors
(28), praises an Athenian embassy to the Peloponnese of which he
had been a member (72), and demands that the Athenians send
out further embassies in every direction (71). Athens must take
the lead (74) but cannot defeat Philip alone.
A central purpose of this speech is to convince the Athenians
that a state of undeclared war with Philip already exists. Demos-
thenes insists repeatedly that although the Peace of Philocrates
(negotiated between Athens and Philip in 346) is still nominally
in force, in practice Philip is at war with Athens and indeed has
been ever since the destruction of Phocis in 346 (19). He argues
that Philip, who claims to wish to remain at peace with Ath-
ens, must be judged by his actions rather than by his words, and
that he acts as if he is already at war with Athens (15). But it is in
Philip’s interest to pretend to be keeping the peace, since the ex-
ample of other Greek cities (Olynthus and Phocis: 11) shows that
he uses such claims to lull his victims into a false sense of secu-
rity. Demosthenes lists a series of Philip’s alleged interventions in
the affairs of other Greek cities that, he argues, are breaches of
³ Panhellenism was the belief that the Greeks should set aside their dif-
ferences and unite against a common external foe (typically the Persians).
See in general Flower 2002; Mitchell 2007.

154 demosthenes
the Peace of Philocrates and thus acts of war against Athens (17).
The Athenians must learn from the fates of others and wake up
to the deadly threat of Philip.
Demosthenes’ other main theme is that the Athenians are pre-
vented from recognizing that Philip is at war with them, or from
taking effective action against him, by the influence of certain
politicians who have, he alleges, been bribed by Philip. These men
(whom he does not name) seek to persuade the Athenians that
they should keep the peace and that Philip’s intentions towards
them are friendly, and they accuse patriotic leaders such as him-
self of warmongering (53–55). He provides examples from else-
where in Greece of cities that have been deceived by politicians in
the pay of Philip and have in consequence now lost their freedom
(56– 68) and argues that Athens risks suffering the same fate.
Demosthenes’ specific policy proposals are to support Byzan-
tium (19) and the Athenian force in the Chersonese (19, 73), to
conduct the war in the north with vigor to keep Philip at a safe
distance from Athens (51), to engage him in a naval campaign
rather than risk pitched battle with his powerful army (52), to
make appropriate military preparations (70), and to try to rally
support from the rest of Greece (71).
Two slightly different versions of this speech are found in the
manuscripts of Demosthenes, one longer and one shorter.⁴ The
longer version contains a number of brief passages, ranging in
length from a few words to several sentences, which do not ap-
pear in the shorter one. These passages, which are italicized in
this translation, appear to have been written by Demosthenes and
are not later interpolations. On the other hand, it is difficult to
see why anyone involved in the later transmission of the speech
would have excised these passages to create a slightly shorter text,
and it therefore seems likely that two different versions in some
way go back to Demosthenes’ time. One possible explanation is
that Demosthenes edited the longer version of the speech after he
⁴ The shorter version is found in the oldest medieval manuscript of De-

mosthenes, conventionally labeled S (= Paris Bibliothèque Nationale de
France ms. Gr. 2934). See Dilts 2002: xvi.

had spoken it, removing material that was more suited to delivery
or was likely to appeal only to an Athenian audience, with a view
to circulating it elsewhere in Greece.⁵ An alternative, and in my
view more likely, explanation is that Demosthenes crossed these
passages out in his text of his speech and that whoever first pub-
lished the speech after his death was uncertain whether or not to
include them.⁶
9. thir d philippic
[1] Many speeches are made, men of Athens, at almost every
meeting of the Assembly, about the wrongs that Philip has been
doing, from the moment that he concluded the Peace,⁷ not only
against you but also against the others, and I am sure that every-
one would say—even if they do not act accordingly—that all our
words and actions should have as their aim to put an end to his
arrogance and make him pay the penalty; but I see that all our
advantages have been so undermined and thrown away that—I
fear it is ill omened to say, but it is true—if all the regular speak-
ers wished to speak, and you wished to vote, in such a way as to
make your situation as bad as possible, I do not think that things
could be any worse than they are now. [2] There are no doubt
many reasons for this, and matters did not reach their present
state from one or two causes only. But most of all, if you exam-
ine the matter closely, you will find that it is due to those men
who choose to curry favor rather than to give the best advice—
some of whom, men of Athens, cherish the things that give them
⁵ Thus, most recently, Wooten 2008: 167–173. It should be noted, how-

ever, that the editor of the text that is followed in this translation (Dilts
2002) regards the omission of the longest such passage (6– 7) from manu-
script S as due to a copyist’s error (see 6n). I am in any case not convinced
that the shorter version is significantly better suited for publication than the
longer one.
⁶ Thus, MacDowell 2009: 353.
⁷ I.e., the Peace of Philocrates between Athens and Philip of 346.

156 demosthenes
a good reputation and power, and take no thought for the future,
and do not think that you need do so either; others blame and slan-
der those who participate in public life and do nothing other than
cause the city to be preoccupied with punishing itself, whereas
Philip is able to speak and act as he wishes. [3] Such policies are
habitual to you and are the cause of your troubles. I ask you, men
of Athens, not to be at all angry with me if I speak freely in tell-
ing the truth. Look at it like this: You believe so strongly that in
other areas freedom of speech should be granted to all inhabitants
of the city that you have allowed foreigners and slaves to share in
it,⁸ and many slaves here can be seen saying whatever they like
with greater freedom than is enjoyed by the citizens of some other
states, but you have entirely banished freedom of speech when
it comes to the giving of advice. [4] The result is that in meet-
ings of the Assembly, you are spoiled and easily flattered, and lis-
ten to everything with an ear to your own pleasure, but in your
public policy and in the reality of the situation, you are already in
deadly danger. If this is your disposition even now, there is noth-
ing I can say to you. But if you wish to hear what is to your ad-
vantage, without any flattery, I am ready to speak. Even if our
situation is desperate and much has been squandered, neverthe-
less it is still possible to set matters right, if you are willing to do
what is needed. [5] What I am about to say to you may be para-
doxical, but it is the truth: the worst aspect of what has happened
holds out the best hope for the future. What do I refer to? To the
fact that your affairs are in a bad state even though you are doing
none of the things, small or large, that you should be doing; for,
if things were as they are, and you were doing all that you should,
there would be no hope of improvement.⁹ As it is, Philip has got
⁸ There was no absolute right to free speech in Athens (see MacDowell

1978: 126–129 on the laws relating to slander), and it is very unlikely that
the foreigners and slaves had any legally defined rights in this area, but, in
general, restrictions on public speech were few. For the comparative free-
dom of slaves at Athens, see the complaints of Pseudo-Xen. Athenian Con-
stitution 1.10.
⁹ The section “the worst aspect . . . improvement” is taken over almost
word for word from 4.2.

the better of your idleness and negligence, but he has not got the
better of the city. You have not been defeated: you have not even
been aroused!
[6] If we were all in agreement that Philip is at war with our
city and is breaking the peace, anyone who comes forward to
speak would need to advise us only how to resist him most se-
curely and most easily.¹⁰ But in fact some men have such an ab-
surd attitude that, at a time when Philip is seizing cities and pos-
sesses many places that belong to you and is wronging everybody,
they tolerate certain people repeatedly saying in the Assembly that
it is some of us¹¹ who are making war; since this is the case we
must be on our guard and must correct the situation. [7] For there
is a danger that anyone who proposes and advises that we defend
ourselves will be accused of warmongering. I assert this princi-
ple first of all: that it is up to us to determine whether we should
keep the peace or go to war. [8] If, then, it is possible for our city
to remain at peace, and if this is in our hands—to start from this
point—I say that we must indeed keep the peace, and I think that
anyone who agrees should make proposals and take action to that
effect and not try to deceive us. Yet if someone who has weapons
in his hands and a great army around him offers you the name of
peace but by his actions is waging war, what is left for us to do
but to defend ourselves? But if you wish to say that he is keeping
the peace, as he claims, I have no quarrel. [9] If anyone regards
as peace a situation in which Philip, after he has captured every
other place, will then attack us, first of all, he is insane; and sec-
¹⁰ Sections 6 and 7 are omitted in manuscript S. This manuscript con-

tains a text of this speech that omits a number of short passages that are to
be found in other manuscripts (see the Speech Introduction). Dilts 2002,
whose Greek text is followed in this translation, regards the omission of 6–
7 as accidental. He notes that 6 and 8 both start with the same three words
in Greek (ei men oun), and he suggests that a scribe’s eye mistakenly jumped
from the beginning of 6 to the beginning of 8, causing him to leave out the
intervening text.
¹¹ This was directed primarily at anti-Macedonian politicians such as
Demosthenes, but also at Diopeithes and the Athenian settlers in the Cher-
sonese (see Dem. 8).

158 demosthenes
ond, what he describes is your being at peace with him, not his
being at peace with you. This is what Philip has bought with all
his lavish expenditure: that he is at war with you, but you are not
at war with him!
[10] If we wait until he admits that he is at war with us, we will
be utter fools. For even if he marches against Attica itself and Pi-
raeus, he will not admit that he is doing so, to judge from his treat-
ment of others. [11] This is what he said to the Olynthians, when
he was forty stades¹² from their city: that there were two alter-
natives—either they should stop living in Olynthus or he should
stop living in Macedonia—although for the whole time up un-
til then he got angry and sent ambassadors to defend himself, if
anyone should accuse him of having any such intention.¹³ And he
marched to Phocis as if towards an ally, and was accompanied by
Phocian ambassadors as he went, and most speakers here insisted
that his arrival would not benefit the Thebans.¹⁴ [12] Moreover,
he has recently seized and is now in possession of Pherae, after en-
tering Thessaly as a friend and ally.¹⁵ And last, he offered these
wretched men of Oreus the pretext that the troops had been sent
as friendly observers.¹⁶ For, he said, he saw that they were suffer-
¹² About eight kilometers (five miles). A stade was the length of the sta-
dion footrace, 200 yards.
¹³ Demosthenes is wrong to imply that relations between Philip and
Olynthus had been friendly up to the outbreak of war in 349. In fact,
they had been deteriorating since 352 (see the Introduction to Dem. 1–3
and 1.7n).
¹⁴ In 346 Philip marched south into central Greece to bring an end to the
war between Thebes and Phocis, accompanied by ambassadors from many
Greek cities, not just Phocis. The speakers referred to are Aeschines and
Philocrates: see 5.10n.
¹⁵ On Philip’s expulsion of the rulers of the Thessalian city of Pherae in
344/3, see 8.59n. Philip was not merely an ally of the Thessalians but had
previously been elected chief magistrate (archōn) of Thessaly: see 1.13n. Pre-
sumably his intervention in the affairs of Pherae was in fact sanctioned by
the Thessalian League, the body that nominally governed the country.
¹⁶ On Macedonian involvement in the affairs of Oreus on Euboea, see
33, 59– 62 below.

ing from factionalism, and it is the duty of allies and true friends
to assist in such situations. [13] Do you suppose that he chose to
deceive these people, who would have done him no wrong, al-
though they would perhaps have defended themselves from at-
tack, rather than declare war on them, but that he will go to war
with you only after declaring it, so long as you are willing to be
deceived? [14] Of course not. Philip would be a complete fool if,
when you make no complaint about the harm he is doing you but
instead blame some of your own citizens, he were to put an end
to your internal strife and rivalry, and announce that you should
direct them against him instead, and deprive those who are in
his pay of the argument by means of which they put you off: that
Philip is not at war with the city.
[15] Is there anyone, by Zeus, in his right mind who would de-
cide who was at peace with him and who at war by their words
rather than by their actions? Of course not. Yet Philip, from
the start, as soon as the peace had been made, at a time when
Diopeithes was not yet a general and those who are now in the
Chersonese had not yet been sent out,¹⁷ set about seizing Serrium
and Doriscus¹⁸ and expelling from Fort Serrium and the Sacred
Mountain the troops whom your general had stationed there.¹⁹
[16] In taking these actions, what was he doing? It was peace he
had sworn! And let no one say, “What are these places?” or “How
does this concern the city?” For whether these places were small,
or whether any of them concerned you, are different matters. Piety
and justice are equally important, whether someone transgresses
over a small or a large matter. Very well then, when he sends mer-
cenaries into the Chersonese,²⁰ which the King and all the Greeks
¹⁷ The Athenian general Diopeithes was sent out with a force of Athenian
settlers to the Chersonese in or before 343/2: see 8.2n.
¹⁸ See also 8.64. These places in Thrace were captured by Philip in 346.
¹⁹ Fort Serrium (Serriou Teichos) and the Sacred Mountain (Hieron
Oros) were sites in Thrace on the north shore of the Sea of Marmara: see
7.37n. They are also mentioned by Aeschines (3.82), who mocks their insig-
nificance. These activities also date to 346.
²⁰ Demosthenes here refers to Philip sending troops to aid his ally Car-
dia, a city in the north of the Chersonese, against the Athenian settlers in

160 demosthenes
have recognized as yours,²¹ and admits that he is providing help

and sends a letter to this effect,²² what is he doing? [17] He says
that he is not at war. But I so completely disagree that, by these
actions, he is keeping the peace with you, that I make this asser-
tion: by seizing Megara for himself and establishing a tyranny in
Euboea and now entering Thrace and intriguing in the Pelopon-
nese and doing all that he is doing by force, he is in breach of the
peace and is at war with you²³—unless you will claim that even
those who have set up siege engines are keeping the peace, un-
til they bring them up to the city walls! But you will not say this,
since anyone whose actions and preparations are aimed at seizing
me is at war with me, even if he has not yet started throwing mis-
siles or shooting at me. [18] What dangers would you face, if war
should break out? The loss of the Hellespont, your enemy gaining
control of Megara and Euboea, the Peloponnesians going over to
his side.²⁴ Am I then supposed to say that the man who has set up
this engine against our city is at peace with you? [19] Absolutely
not! I define him as having been at war with us from the day he
destroyed Phocis.²⁵ And I say that if you are sensible, you will de-
the south of the peninsula. The Athenians claimed ownership of the entire
Chersonese. See the Introduction to Dem. 8.
²¹ When this happened is unknown: perhaps in the negotiation of a
Common Peace in 366/5 (see Cawkwell 1961b: 80–82). Cf. 7.29n for the par-
allel assertion that the Greeks and the King had at some point recognized
Athens’ claim to Amphipolis. Demosthenes clearly wishes the Athenians to
suppose that the Persians and other Greeks had expressly recognized Ath-
ens’ claim to the Chersonese, but this may not have been the case.
²² Philip admits sending help to Cardia in his later letter to the Athe-
nians, preserved as Dem. 12 (12.11), but he claims that he was perfectly enti-
tled to do so, since Cardia was his ally.
²³ Philip intervened in the affairs of Megara in 343: see 8.18n. Events on
the island of Euboea are narrated in 57– 62 below. On Philip’s Thracian cam-
paign of 342–340, see 8.44–45; Diodorus 16.71– 72; Hammond and Griffith
1979: 554–566. On his intriguing in the Peloponnese, see 6.9 and 15 (Argos
and Messene) and 27 below (Elis).
²⁴ The Hellespont was a vital stage of the grain route from the Black Sea
to Athens; Megara and Euboea were Athens’ immediate neighbors to the
west and east respectively.
²⁵ In 346.

fend yourselves; but if you give him free rein, you will not be able
to do even this when you wish to. I see the situation so differently
than your other advisors, men of Athens, that at this point I think
you shouldn’t be deliberating about even the Chersonese or By-
zantium;²⁶ [20] instead, you should be assisting their inhabitants
and on your guard to ensure that they do not suffer any harm,
and should be taking counsel on behalf of all the Greeks, since
they are in such great danger. I wish to tell you why the situation
alarms me, in order that, if my assessment is correct, you may
share it and take precautions for yourselves at least, even if you re-
fuse to do so for the other Greeks. But if you think that I am talk-
ing nonsense and have been struck senseless, you should conclude
that I am not in my right mind and pay no attention to me, either
now or in the future.
[21] That Philip has grown great from small and humble be-
ginnings, and that the Greeks are distrustful and quarrelsome to-
wards each other, and that it was much more surprising that he
should have become so great from his previous condition than
that now, when he has taken so many places already, he should
be bringing the rest under his control as well, and all such topics
that I could discuss, I shall leave to one side. [22] But I see that
everyone, starting with you, has conceded to him the one thing
that has been the cause of every single previous Greek war. What
is this? It is the right to do what he wants, and to plunder and rob
each of the Greeks in turn, and to attack and enslave their cit-
ies. [23] And yet you were the leaders of Greece for seventy-three
years,²⁷ and the Spartans were leaders for twenty-nine.²⁸ The The-
²⁶ Demosthenes’ point is that these two places are already directly

threatened by Philip and that there is no point in the Athenians discussing
whether they are in danger.
²⁷ Demosthenes appears to be counting inclusively from 476 to 404,
the year of Athens’ defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. The Delian
League, the anti-Persian alliance led by Athens, was in fact founded in win-
ter 478/7.
²⁸ Apparently counting from the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404
(see the previous note) to Sparta’s defeat by Athens in the sea battle of Naxos
in 376. Sparta’s domination of Greece is more generally reckoned to have
ended with its defeat by Thebes at the battle of Leuctra in 371.

162 demosthenes
bans also became quite powerful in recent times, after the battle
at Leuctra.²⁹ Nevertheless, men of Athens, the Greeks have never
yet conceded to you or the Thebans or the Spartans the right to
do whatever you wish—far from it! [24] But first, since you—or
rather the Athenians of the time—were thought to be treating
some people unfairly, everyone, even those who had no complaint
to make of them, thought that they had to go to war with them in
support of those who had been wronged.³⁰ Again, after the Spar-
tans had become the masters and attained the same supremacy as
yours, when they tried to encroach and were disturbing the status
quo beyond what was reasonable everyone declared war on them,
even those who had no complaint against them.³¹ [25] What need
is there to speak of the others? Both we and the Spartans, al-
though at first we had virtually no wrongs to complain of at each
other’s hands, nevertheless felt driven to go to war because of the
injustice that we saw others suffering.³² And yet all the wrongs
that were done by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our
²⁹ The Theban “hegemony” of Greece is generally held to have lasted

from the battle of Leuctra in 371 (see the previous note) to the indecisive
battle of Mantinea in 362, at which the leading Theban general Epaminon-
das was killed.
³⁰ Demosthenes sees the history of Greece in the fifth and early fourth
centuries through distinctly rose-tinted glasses. Although in starting the
Peloponnesian war in 431 Sparta claimed to be liberating the subject cities
of Athens’ empire (Thuc. 2.8.4), the war was fundamentally caused by the
rising alarm felt by Sparta and its allies at the growth of Athenian power,
as Thucydides makes clear (most explicitly at 1.23.6), and was waged exclu-
sively by the cities of Sparta’s Peloponnesian League.
³¹ Demosthenes refers to the Corinthian War of 395–386, fought by an
anti-Spartan alliance consisting of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos.
All four cities in fact had their own complaints against Sparta: Athens had
been stripped of its empire by Sparta and had been forced to accept an oli-
garchy and the destruction of its walls; Argos was an inveterate enemy of
Sparta; Thebes thought that its contribution to the defeat of Athens was in-
sufficiently appreciated by Sparta and feared the growth of Spartan power;
Corinth, whose motivation is not entirely clear, was perhaps concerned by
Spartan involvement in Sicily (see Hornblower 2002: 215–217).
³² This is the opposite of the truth. See previous notes.

ancestors in seventy, are fewer, men of Athens, than the wrongs

that Philip has done to Greece in the fewer than thirteen years
since he emerged from obscurity.³³ Or rather, they are scarcely
a fraction of them. [26] And this is easily shown from a brief ac-
count.³⁴ I say nothing about Olynthus and Methone and Apollo-
nia and the thirty-two cities on the coast of Thrace, all of which
he destroyed with such cruelty that it would be hard for a visitor
to tell whether they had ever been inhabited.³⁵ I also pass over in
silence the destruction of the Phocian nation, which was so pop-
ulous.³⁶ But what of Thessaly? Did he not remove their constitu-
tions and cities and establish tetrarchies, so that they might be
slaves not only by city but also by region?³⁷ [27] Are not tyrants
now in control of the cities of Euboea, an island that is close to
both Thebes and Athens?³⁸ Does he not expressly write in his let-
ters: “I am at peace with those who wish to give heed to me”? Nor
does he fail to put what he has written into effect. For he has set
out against the Hellespont,³⁹ previously he marched against Am-
³³ Philip became king in 359. Thirteen years (counting inclusively) before

the date of this speech is 353, the year in which he first campaigned in Thes-
saly against the Phocians (Diodorus 16.35.1–2). Demosthenes presumably
thought that this campaign marked Philip’s entry onto the Greek stage, al-
though he had been at war with Athens since 357.
³⁴ This and other italicized passages are omitted in some manuscripts; see
³⁵ Methone was captured by Philip in 354 (see 1.9n). Apollonia, a city in
the Chalcidic peninsula, was sacked in 349 or 348; in the same campaign
Olynthus and the thirty-two cities of the Chalcidic League were razed to
the ground.
³⁶ In 346; see 19n. The Phocians were resettled in villages, and some went
into exile.
³⁷ In 344 Philip reinstated, in name at least, an earlier regional system of
political organization, with four magistrates called tetrarchs administering
the four regions of Thessaly. One of the tetrarchs, Thrasydaeus, is described
by Theopompus as a tyrant (FGH 115 fragment 209), but an inscription gives
him the official title “tetrarch of the Thessalians” (SIG³ 274.VIII).
³⁸ On events in Euboea in the late 340s, see 57– 62 below.
³⁹ Philip’s campaign in eastern Thrace brought him within striking dis-
tance of the Hellespont, for the strategic significance of which see 18n.

164 demosthenes
bracia,⁴⁰ he possesses a city as great as Elis in the Peloponnese,⁴¹

and he has recently plotted against Megara.⁴² Neither Greece nor
the rest of the world can contain the man’s greed. [28] We Greeks
all see and hear these things happening, but we do not send am-
bassadors about them to each other and get angry; we are in such
poor condition and are so entrenched in our separate cities that
right up to the present day, we have been unable to take any ad-
vantageous or necessary step, or to unite, or to form an associa-
tion for mutual aid and friendship. [29] We overlook his growing
power, and though each of us recognizes that Philip profits from
the opportunities that others squander, or so it seems to me, none
of us deliberates or acts to save Greece. Yet we all know that, like
the periodic return or the sudden onset of a fever or some other
evil, he visits even those who seem to have kept far away from
him. [30] You also know that all the wrongs that the Greeks suf-
fered at the hands of the Spartans or of ourselves were injustices
committed by genuine Greeks at least, and one should treat this
in the same way as if a legitimate son, after coming into a great
fortune, manages it badly and unjustly: such a person deserves
blame and censure for his actions, but it cannot be denied that
despite his behavior, he is still a kinsman and heir. [31] But if a
slave or a changeling⁴³ wasted and spoiled what did not belong to
him, by Heracles, how much more terrible and deserving of anger
would everyone have said this was. And yet they do not take this
⁴⁰ See 72n below.

⁴¹ Elis was a city of the northwestern Peloponnese. In 343 its democratic
constitution was overthrown and an oligarchy set up. Demosthenes claims
that Philip was involved in this coup: see 10.10; Dem. 19.260, 294; Pausa-
nias 4.28.4, 5.4.9.
⁴² In a speech delivered in 343 (Dem. 19), Demosthenes refers to recent
unrest in Athens’ western neighbor Megara: 19.204, 294–295, 326, 334. Its
leaders were two pro-Macedonians, Ptoeodorus and Perillas, of whom the
latter is said to have brought soldiers from Philip (19.295). Demosthenes’ re-
marks indicate that Megara was threatened (19.204) and nearly came under
foreign control (19.334).
⁴³ Demosthenes refers to a boy who has been substituted as a baby for a
legitimate son.

attitude towards Philip and his actions—he who is not only not
Greek and in no way related to the Greeks, nor even a foreigner
from a land to which it is honorable to say that one belongs, but
a wretched Macedonian, from a land from which in the past you
could not even have bought a decent slave.⁴⁴
[32] How is this not the height of insolence? In addition to his
destruction of the cities, does he not administer the Pythian festi-
val, the shared competition of the Greeks, and, if he himself is ab-
sent, does he not send his slaves to preside at the games?⁴⁵ Is he not
master of Thermopylae and the entranceways into Greece, and does
he not occupy these places with garrisons and mercenaries?⁴⁶ Does he
not have the right of pre-audience at the oracle, thrusting us aside to-
gether with the Thessalians and the Dorians and the other Amphic-
tyons—a right that not even every Greek enjoys?⁴⁷ [33] Does he not
⁴⁴ The ethnic identity of the Macedonians has been disputed since antiq-
uity. Greek writers of the classical period generally draw a distinction be-
tween the Macedonian kings and people. Herodotus records a story that the
royal family came originally from Argos in Greece (8.137.1; see also Thuc.
2.99), and the contemporary rhetorician Isocrates, in a speech that seeks
to flatter Philip, describes him as a Greek ruling over barbarians (5.107–
108). This tradition of a separate origin for the ruling family is, however,
implausible. Greek sources also mention a Macedonian language that was
not comprehensible to Greeks (Plut. Alexander 51.6). Personal names within
the Macedonian elite are often obviously Greek (e.g., Philip, Alexander), al-
though it is hard to know how far this is the result of their deliberate adop-
tion of aspects of Greek culture (see OCD³ s.v. Hellenism, Hellenization).
On Greek attitudes towards the Macedonians, see Badian 1982.
⁴⁵ The Pythian Festival was celebrated at Delphi every four years in
honor of the god Apollo. It was a Panhellenic festival (i.e., one that was
open to all Greeks) and included athletic, musical and poetic competitions.
Demosthenes affects to view all the subjects of Philip, including the un-
doubtedly high-ranking deputy who presided over the festival in 342 when
the king was absent on campaign in Thrace, as his “slaves”; cf. 43 on Arth-
mius of Zeleia as a “slave” of the King of Persia.
⁴⁶ Philip gained control of the strategically vital pass of Thermopylae,
which controls passage between northern and central Greece, in 346.
⁴⁷ Philip was granted the privilege of being allowed to consult the Del-
phic oracle before others. The Delphic Amphictyony comprised twelve “peo-

166 demosthenes
write to the Thessalians telling them what form of political orga-

nization to have?⁴⁸ Is he not sending out mercenaries—some to
Porthmus to expel the Eretrian people, others to Oreus to estab-
lish Philistides as tyrant?⁴⁹ But even though they see these things,
the Greeks put up with them. They seem to me to watch them
happening in the same way as one might watch a hailstorm, each
praying that it does not strike him, but none trying to avoid it.
[34] No one retaliates for his insults towards Greece, or even for
the wrongs that he does to each individually. The worst is already
here. Has he not advanced against Corinthian Ambracia and Leu-
cas?⁵⁰ Has he not sworn to hand over Achaean Naupactus to the
Aetolians?⁵¹ Has he not deprived the Thebans of Echinus?⁵² Is he
not now marching against his allies the Byzantines?⁵³ [35] As for
our own possessions—leaving aside those of others—does he not
hold Cardia, the greatest city of the Chersonese?⁵⁴ This is how
we are treated, yet we all delay, and are weak, and cast suspicious
ples,” each of which sent two representatives to the Amphictyonic council.

The Thessalians and the Dorians each formed one “people,” while Athens
contributed one of the two representatives from the Ionian “people.” Mem-
bers of the Amphictyony were permitted to consult the oracle before other
Greeks. See Dem. 5 on Philip’s control of Delphi.
⁴⁸ See 26n above.
⁴⁹ On Macedonian intervention in the Euboean cities of Eretria and
Oreus, see 57– 62 below.
⁵⁰ On Ambracia in western Greece, see 72n below. The island of Leucas
off the western coast of Greece was an ally of Athens, against Philip, in 338:
see Dem. 18.237.
⁵¹ Naupactus, on the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, had been ac-
quired by the Achaeans of the Peloponnese by 367 (Diodorus 15.75.2). The
Aetolians, who bordered Naupactus to the north, had longstanding designs
on the city (see Xen. Hellenica 4.6.14).
⁵² Echinus was a small city in Malis in central Greece. Nothing further
is known of its history in this period.
⁵³ The Greek does not specify whose ally Byzantium was, and it is pos-
sible that it should be translated “their [i.e., the Thebans’] ally.” In a later
speech, however, Demosthenes identifies the Byzantines as allies of Philip
(Dem. 18.87).
⁵⁴ On Cardia, see 16n above and in general Dem. 8.

glances at our neighbors, distrusting each other rather than the

man who is wronging us all. But when he treats us collectively
with such brutality, what do you suppose he will do when he be-
comes master of each of us separately?
[36] What is the explanation for this state of affairs? It is not
without reason or just cause that the Greeks were so enthusias-
tic for liberty in the past, but for slavery now. There was some-
thing then, there really was, men of Athens, in the spirit of the
people, which is now absent, which overcame the wealth of Persia
and led Greece to freedom, and was undefeated in battle on sea
and land—but now it has been lost, ruining everything and turn-
ing Greece upside down. [37] What was this thing? It was the fact
that everyone hated any person who took money from those who
were seeking to dominate or destroy Greece: it was most dreadful
to be convicted of taking bribes, and such a man was punished
with the severest penalty. [38] Neither the crucial opportunity in
each situation—an opportunity that fortune often grants even to
the careless against the attentive—nor the mutual concord that
existed, nor the distrust of tyrants and barbarians, nor in brief
any such thing could be bought from the politicians and generals.
[39] But now all these things are exported as if from the market-
place, and in exchange we import things that cause Greece’s sick-
ness and ruin. What are these? Envy of anyone who has taken a
bribe; laughter, if he admits it; pity, for those who are convicted; ha-
tred of anyone who rebukes this conduct; and everything else re-
lating to the taking of bribes. [40] Now we possess triremes and
men and money and abundant military equipment, and what-
ever else serves to demonstrate the strength of a city, in far greater
quantities than we did then, but these are rendered useless, inef-
fectual, and unprofitable by those who are selling us out.
[41] That this is the case at present you see for yourselves, I pre-
sume, and have no need of me as a further witness. Yet in previ-
ous times the opposite was the case, as I shall show not in my own
words but from a document of your ancestors that they inscribed
on a bronze pillar and deposited on the Acropolis—not because it
would be useful to them, since even without it they had a strong sense
of duty, but to leave you reminders and examples of how seriously
such off enses should be treated. [42] What then does the document

168 demosthenes
say? It reads: “Arthmius the son of Pythonax of Zeleia is to be an

outlaw and enemy of the Athenian people and its allies, himself
and his descendants.” After that is written the explanation: “be-
cause he brought the gold from the Medes into the Peloponnese.”
This is the document.⁵⁵ [43] Consider, by the gods, what was the
purpose and resolve of the Athenians of that time in taking this
action. They wrote that a man of Zeleia, Arthmius, a slave of the
King (for Zeleia is in Asia), because in the service of his mas-
ter he had brought money to the Peloponnese—not to Athens—
should be declared their and their allies’ enemy, himself and his
descendants, and that they should be outlaws. [44] And this is
not the form of outlawry that people commonly speak of—for
what would it matter to a Zeleian to be forbidden to participate in
Athenian public life?⁵⁶ But that is not what its means; rather, it is
written in the laws of homicide, with regard to cases where pros-
ecutions for homicide may not be brought, but one may kill with-
out pollution: “and let the outlaw be killed.” This law means that
anyone who has killed such a man shall be free from pollution.⁵⁷
[45] These men thus thought it their duty to ensure the safety of
all of Greece. For they would not have been concerned if someone
⁵⁵ The decree outlawing Arthmius of Zeleia, a city in northwestern Asia

Minor, is referred to in several texts of this period (Dem. 19.271; Aes. 3.258;
Din. 2.24–25). Meiggs (1972: 508–512) discusses the decree in detail, and
suggests that it dates to the early 460s, and may have been proposed by the
leading politician and general Cimon (on whom see 13.29n). The Greeks
commonly conflated the Persians and the Medes (i.e., inhabitants of Media,
in northern Iran), the two peoples who together formed the ruling class of
the Persian Empire.
⁵⁶ In the sixth and early fifth centuries the Greek word atimos meant
“outlaw” in Athenian law, but by the fourth century it came to have the
meaning of “disfranchised.” Such disfranchisement was imposed on citi-
zens as a legal penalty for various offenses and involved the loss of some of
the rights of a citizen to participate in the public life of the city. See Mac-
Dowell 1978: 73– 75.
⁵⁷ On Athenian homicide law, see MacDowell 1978: 109–122. Pollution
(miasma) was thought by some to spread from a killer to the community
at large unless he was brought to justice, but a justifiable homicide did not
give rise to it.

was bribing and corrupting other people in the Peloponnese, un-

less they held this opinion; they sought to punish and take ven-
geance on those whom they detected, and thus they posted their
names on a pillar. As a result, it is not surprising that the Greeks
inspired fear in the foreigner, rather than the other way round.
But this is not the case now, since you do not have the same atti-
tude either towards such offenses or towards others. What then is
your attitude? [46] You know for yourselves—what need is there to
criticize you over every detail? And all the other Greeks have a simi-
lar attitude and are no better than you. As a result, I assert that the
present situation requires great energy and good counsel. What is my
advice? Do you ask me to speak? And do you promise not to be
angry with me?⁵⁸
[47] There is a foolish argument put about by those who wish
to reassure the city, which goes as follows: “Philip is not yet as
strong as the Spartans once were, when they ruled the sea and all
the land, and had the Persian King as their ally, and were irre-
sistible.⁵⁹ Nevertheless our city resisted them and was not swept
away.” But in my opinion, although virtually all aspects of life
have advanced considerably, and everything nowadays is quite
different from how it was in the past, nothing has changed or pro-
gressed as much as the conduct of war. [48] First, I am told that
at that time both the Spartans and everyone else would invade
and ravage their enemies’ land for four or five months, during
the summer, with hoplites and citizen armies, and then withdraw
back home—so old fashioned were they, or rather so like true cit-
izens, that they did not buy anything from anybody, but war was
fought according to custom and in the open. [49] Now, however,
I dare say you see how most places are destroyed by traitors and
how nothing results from the drawing up of armies in pitched
⁵⁸ At this point the text notes that a document was read, but this is prob-
ably a mistake. Some description of Athenian behavior may have dropped
out.
⁵⁹ Demosthenes refers either to the immediate aftermath of the Pelopon-
nesian War at the end of the fifth century or to the years following the
King’s Peace of 386. In both periods Sparta enjoyed Persian support and
dominated Greece.

170 demosthenes
battle; and you hear how Philip goes wherever he wishes not by
leading a phalanx of hoplites but by providing himself with light
infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and other similar troops.⁶⁰
[50] In addition to these advantages, he attacks those who are sick
from internal dissension, and no one is willing to go out to de-
fend their territory on account of their mutual distrust, and so he
sets up his siege engines and lays siege to them—to say nothing of
the fact that he makes no distinction between summer and winter
and that there is no off season, when he leaves off fighting. [51] In
full knowledge of these factors and taking due account of them,
we must all prevent war from approaching our land, and must
avoid being thrown to the ground through contemplation of the
simplicity of our previous war against the Spartans. Instead, we
must defend ourselves from as great a distance as possible, by our
actions and by our preparations, and be on watch in case he stirs
from his home, and must avoid grappling with him in a decisive
engagement. [52] We have many natural advantages, men of Ath-
ens, for waging war—so long as we are willing to do our duty: the
nature of his territory, much of which can be ravaged and dam-
aged, and a host of others, but he is better suited than we are to
the fighting of battles.⁶¹
[53] We must not only acknowledge this, and resist him
through acts of war, but we must also make it our policy and be
resolved to detest those who speak to you on his behalf, keeping
in mind that it is not possible to defeat our city’s enemies until
⁶⁰ The contrast between Philip’s army and Greek armies of the fifth cen-
tury is exaggerated. The Macedonian army contained numerous infantry
who fought in a phalanx formation similar to that of Greek hoplites, al-
though they differed in being less well protected and in being armed with
a long pike (sarissa) rather than the shorter hoplite spear. Moreover, Greek
armies of the fifth century certainly included both light infantry and cav-
alry. This passage is discussed by van Wees (2004: 115–117), who concludes
that “Demosthenes was peddling a nostalgic myth” (115). On the Macedo-
nian army, see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 405–449.
⁶¹ In an earlier speech (14.9–10), Demosthenes makes precisely the oppo-
site point about the Persians: they are superior to the Athenians in waging
war but inferior in battle.

you punish those in the city itself who are their servants. [54] But
this, by Zeus and the other gods, is something that you will be
unable to do, since you have reached such a state of foolishness or
madness or I do not know what to call it—I have often come to
fear that some demon is driving our affairs—that out of a spirit of
quarrelsomeness or envy, or for a joke, or for any other reason that
might occur to you, you urge hired men to speak, some of whom
would not even deny that they are hired, and you laugh if anyone
attacks them. [55] And this is not the really terrible thing, terri-
ble though it is. For you have also permitted these men to partic-
ipate in public life with more security than you give to those who
speak in your interest. But observe how many disasters arise from
a willingness to listen to such men. I shall tell you about events
that will be familiar to you all.
[56] Of those who took part in public life at Olynthus, some
supported Philip and served him in all things, whereas others de-
sired what was best for their city and acted to prevent the en-
slavement of their fellow-citizens. Which of these destroyed their
native land? Which of them betrayed the cavalry, leading to the
destruction of Olynthus?⁶² It was the men who supported Philip,
who, while the city was still in existence, slandered and brought
malicious prosecutions against those who were offering the best
advice, as a result of which the Olynthian people were persuaded
to exile Apollonides.⁶³
[57] Nor is it the case that this habit of mind caused all sorts
of evils only for these people and had no effect anywhere else. On
the contrary, in Eretria, after Plutarchus and his mercenaries had
been expelled, and the people held both the city and Porthmus,
some of them wished to side with you and others with Philip.⁶⁴
The wretched and unfortunate Eretrians listened to the latter
for the most part, or rather entirely, and were finally persuaded
⁶² The fall of Olynthus is narrated at Diodorus 16.52.2–3. See the Intro-

duction to Dem. 1–3.
⁶³ Apollonides was the leader of the pro-Athenian party at Olynthus. Af-
ter his exile, probably in 351, he fled to Athens, where he received a (short-
lived) grant of Athenian citizenship: see Dem. 59.91; Osborne 1983: T61.
⁶⁴ Plutarchus was expelled by the Athenians in 348: see 5.5n.

172 demosthenes
to exile those who were speaking in their interests. [58] For in

fact their ally Philip, after sending Hipponicus with a thousand
mercenaries, demolished the walls of Porthmus and set up three
men as tyrants: Hipparchus, Automedon and Clitarchus.⁶⁵ Since
then he has twice already exiled from the territory of Eretria peo-
ple who wanted to be saved, first by sending the mercenaries under
Eurylochus, and then by sending those under Parmenion.⁶⁶
[59] What need is there to speak at length? At Oreus Philis-
tides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus acted for Philip;⁶⁷
these men now possess the city, as everyone knew they would, but
a man named Euphraeus, who once lived here among us, acted
to try to ensure that they would be free and slaves to nobody.⁶⁸
[60] This man—and much could be said about the other ways
in which he was insulted and treated with contempt by the peo-
ple—in the year before the city fell charged⁶⁹ Philistides and his
supporters with treason, since he saw what they were up to. But
many men banded together, with Philip as paymaster and con-
⁶⁵ Porthmus was the harbor of Eretria. Hipponicus’ mission probably

took place in 343, since in a speech of that year Demosthenes claims (19.204)
that Philip has troops in Euboea (see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 502–
503). A number of slingshots bearing the name Hipponicus that were found
in the excavations of Olynthus suggest that he was involved in the siege of
the city in 348.
⁶⁶ These two Macedonian interventions occurred in 342. Eurylochus and
Parmenion were prominent Macedonians: both men served (with Antipater)
as ambassadors to Athens in 346, and Parmenion was Philip’s most trusted
general and a leading figure in the reign of his son Alexander. See Heckel
2005, s.v. Eurylochus [1] and Parmenion.
⁶⁷ Oreus was a city in northern Euboea. This passage is the principal ac-
count of Macedonian intervention there. See also 8.18, 59; 10.9, 61. On the
volatile history of Euboea in this period, the details of which are much de-
bated, see Brunt 1969; Sealey 1993: 259–264.
⁶⁸ Euphraeus of Oreus had been a pupil of the philosopher Plato and
spent some time at the court of Philip’s predecessor Perdiccas III in the sec-
ond half of the 360s.
⁶⁹ Demosthenes refers to the legal procedure of endeixis, literally the
“pointing out” of an alleged wrongdoer to the magistrates so that they can
arrest him.

troller, and took Euphraeus off to prison, claiming that he was

throwing the city into disorder. [61] When they saw this, the peo-
ple of Oreus, instead of helping the one and cudgeling the others
to death,⁷⁰ did not get angry with them, but said that Euphraeus
deserved his suffering, and were glad about it. Later one party be-
gan to act with perfect freedom to ensure that the city would be
seized, and started to arrange the deed; and any member of the
majority who noticed what was happening kept silent and was in-
timidated, recalling what kinds of things Euphraeus had suffered.
They were in such a wretched condition that no one dared speak
out, as such an evil drew near, until their enemies had equipped
themselves and approached the city walls. At that point some re-
sisted, but others turned traitor. [62] After the city was captured
in this shameful and evil way, the one group has been ruling it as
tyrants, after exiling some and killing others of the men who at
that time had been prepared to protect them and to do all man-
ner of harm to Euphraeus, while the admirable Euphraeus killed
himself, thereby demonstrating that he had resisted Philip, acting
with justice and honesty, on behalf of his fellow-citizens.
[63] Perhaps you are wondering what possible reason induced
the people of Olynthus and Eretria and Oreus to pay more at-
tention to those who were speaking in Philip’s interest than to
those who were speaking in their own. This is the case with you
too: those who advocate the best policy are not always able to
win your favor, even if they want to, since they are obliged to ex-
amine affairs of state and how to provide security; whereas the
others are collaborating with Philip through the very things by
which they win your favor. [64] The one group urged them to
raise taxes, others said there was no need; one group told them
to wage war and be on their guard, others told them to keep the
peace—until they were ensnared. I think that other matters all
went the same way, so I will not mention every instance. One
group said what would make themselves popular; the other said
what would lead to safety. But many things, including the last,
were approved by the majority not so much as a favor or out of ig-
⁷⁰ On this brutal form of capital punishment, see 8.61n.

174 demosthenes
norance but out of resignation, since they believed that they were
being utterly defeated. [65] This, by Zeus and Apollo, is just what
I fear may happen to you, if when you consider the matter, you
conclude that there is nothing left for you to do. I pray, men of
Athens, that our affairs never reach that state! But in any event
it is better to die ten thousand times than to do anything out
of flattery of Philip, or to abandon any of those who speak in your
interest.⁷¹ It is a fine return that the majority at Oreus have re-
ceived, for entrusting themselves to the friends of Philip and ex-
iling Euphraeus! [66] Equally fine is the return for the people of
Eretria, who drove away your ambassadors and entrusted them-
selves to Clitarchus: now they are slaves, subject to whippings
and killings! How nobly did Philip spare the Olynthians who
elected Lasthenes cavalry commander and exiled Apollonides!⁷²
[67] It was folly and wickedness to cherish such hopes, as it is for
those who follow bad advice and are utterly unwilling to do their
duty, but pay attention to those who speak in their enemies’ in-
terests, to imagine that the city they inhabit is so great that it can-
not suffer any disaster at all. [68] This at any rate is shameful, to
say after the event: “Who would have thought that such things
could happen? We should have done this thing or that, and not
the other.” The Olynthians could tell you many things now: if
they had known them at the time, they would not have been de-
stroyed. There are many things too that the people of Oreus could
tell you, and the Phocians, and the people of every city that has
been destroyed. [69] But what good is this to them now? While
the boat can still be saved, whether it is a large or a small one,
that is the time for the sailor and the steersman and everyone on
board to be energetic, and to be on their guard to prevent anyone,
wittingly or unwittingly, from capsizing it. Once the sea over-
whelms it, their effort is useless. [70] In the same way, what are
we to do, men of Athens, while we are still safe and have a very
⁷¹ The italicized words, which appear in the longer version of the speech
(see the Speech Introduction), are deleted by Dilts 2002 in his edition as a
later intrusion.
⁷² On Lasthenes, see also 8.40; on Apollonides, see 56n above.

great city, with many assets and an excellent reputation? Perhaps

someone who has long been sitting here would like to ask that
question. By Zeus, I will tell you, and I shall propose a resolution
on which you will be able to vote, if you so desire. First, I say, we
must defend ourselves and make our preparations in person, with
triremes and money and troops. Even if everyone else submits to
be enslaved, we at least must fight for liberty! [71] After making
all these preparations in person and in the open, let us then call
upon the others, and send out ambassadors to instruct people in
every direction—to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, and to the
King, since it is in his interest not to allow this man to overturn ev-
erything⁷³—so that if you succeed in persuading them you will
have people to share both the risks and the costs, if you need any-
thing; and even if you do not succeed, you may at any rate delay
his plans. [72] Since this war is against a man rather than a strong
and united city, even this initiative is useful, as were those recent
embassies around the Peloponnese⁷⁴ and the accusations that I
and that excellent man Polyeuctus⁷⁵ and Hegesippus⁷⁶ and the
other ambassadors went around making, as a result of which we
forced Philip to stop and prevented him from attacking Ambracia
⁷³ On Athenian embassies to the Peloponnese, see 72n below; for diplo-

matic contact with the Persian King, see 10.31–34. It is odd that Demosthe-
nes should advocate sending embassies to Chios and Rhodes if, as is gener-
ally believed, they were both still ruled by Carian-backed oligarchies (see
Dem. 15 on Rhodes, 15.19 on Chios).
⁷⁴ The ancient commentary on Aes. 3.83 refers to Athenian embassies to
the Peloponnese in 343/2 that resulted in the securing of several alliances.
For an earlier Athenian embassy to Messenia and Argos in the Peloponnese,
see 6.19–26.
⁷⁵ Polyeuctus was an anti-Macedonian Athenian politician.
⁷⁶ On Hegesippus, see the Introduction to Dem. 7. Some manuscripts
of the speech add after Hegesippus the names Clitomachus and Lycurgus.
The former is otherwise unknown, but Lycurgus was an important politi-
cian who dominated Athenian politics during the period after the battle of
Chaeronea in 338. Pseudo-Plut., Lives of the Ten Orators 841e, also claims
that Lycurgus went on an embassy to the Peloponnese with Demosthenes
and Polyeuctus.

176 demosthenes
or invading the Peloponnese.⁷⁷ [73] I do not urge you to summon

others, when you are unwilling to take any necessary steps your-
selves, since it would be foolish to claim to care for other people’s
affairs when you neglect your own; or to overlook your present
predicament and worry about what others may do in the future.
That is not what I urge. But I do say that you should send funds
to those who are in the Chersonese⁷⁸ and should do whatever else
they ask, and make your own preparations, and summon, gather,
inform, and warn the other Greeks: this is the duty of a city with
as great a reputation as ours. [74] But if you think that the Chal-
cideans will rescue Greece, or the Megarians, while you run away
from the situation, you are mistaken.⁷⁹ Each of these cities will be
content if they are saved themselves. It is up to you to act: your
ancestors won this prize, having faced many great dangers in do-
ing so, and bequeathed it to you. [75] But if every one of you sits
around following his own desires and trying to avoid having to
do anything himself, first he will never find anyone who will take
action, and then I fear that we may be forced to take every kind
of undesirable measure, all at the same time.
[76] This then is my speech; these are my proposals. If they are
put into effect, I believe that even now our fortunes may be re-
stored. If anyone has anything better to say, let him speak and of-
fer his advice. But whatever you decide—all you gods!—may it be
to our advantage!
⁷⁷ In early 342 Philip threatened the Corinthian colony of Ambracia in

northwestern Greece: see 34, 7.32, 10.10. In response Athens sent troops
to nearby Acarnania: see Dem. 48.24–26, which dates this expedition to
343/2.
⁷⁸ On the Athenian force in the Chersonese, see Dem. 8.
⁷⁹ Chalcis on the island of Euboea and Megara were neighbors of Athens
to the east and west respectively. Both were very much smaller cites than
Athens.

10. FOURTH PHILIPPIC
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The authenticity of the Fourth Philippic has in the past been
denied, but it is now generally accepted as a genuine speech of
Demosthenes. Scholars in antiquity expressed no doubts on this
score: Dionysius of Halicarnassus treats it as genuine,¹ and Liba-
nius makes no mention of its authorship. Moreover, the Helle-
nistic scholar Didymus included it in his commentary on De-
mosthenes’ deliberative speeches, without any discussion of its
authorship, which strongly suggests that he and his contempo-
raries did not regard it as a matter of controversy.²
The speech’s authenticity came to be doubted in the nine-
teenth century, before the discovery of Didymus’ commentary,
on a number of grounds. First, two long passages of it are also to
be found with minor differences in Dem. 8 (10.11–27 ≈ 8.38–51
and 10.55–70 ≈ 8.52– 67). Since the latter speech is universally ac-
cepted as genuine, and since it was thought unlikely that Demos-
thenes would have published or even delivered the same material
twice, it was concluded that Dem. 10 is probably a later pastiche.
As a result of the discovery of Didymus’ commentary, however, it
has generally been accepted that Dem. 10 is by Demosthenes, and
the overlap with Dem. 8 must therefore be explained differently
(see below).³

² On Didymus, see Harding 2006.
³ The speech’s authenticity is defended by Hajdú 2002. See too Mac-
Dowell 2009: 354–355.

178 demosthenes
The second argument against the speech’s authenticity is that

Demosthenes’ attitude in it to the theoric fund, which earlier had
been very critical (see 3.10–11, 19), is here much milder (36). But
this is only a problem if we believe that Demosthenes cannot have
changed his mind over the course of almost a decade or altered his
policies to respond to changing circumstances.⁴ This seems more
likely than that a forger should have attributed to Demosthenes a
statement that went against his previous policy on this issue.
The third argument relates to the attack on the politician Aris-
tomedes at 70–74. This passage is unique in Demosthenes’ delib-
erative speeches, where his regular practice is to refer to his rivals
and opponents anonymously. Since Plutarch claims that the Phi-
lippics contain no personal abuse (Moralia 810d), its presence here
has been taken as an indication that he regarded the speech as
spurious. This argument is weak, since Plutarch may easily have
forgotten about this passage and made a remark that is otherwise
true.
It remains to consider the relationship of this speech to Dem. 8
(see above). The fullest discussion of this issue is by Daitz (1957),
who argues that the common passages fit better in, and were writ-
ten for, Dem. 10 (which is a later speech than Dem. 8). To explain
this paradox, he proposes that Demosthenes delivered Dem. 10 to
the Assembly but did not circulate it. He then incorporated cer-
tain passages into the text of an earlier speech on the Chersonese,
which he published as Dem. 8. This solution cannot be disproved,
but simpler (and in my view more plausible) ones can be proposed.
First, it is not impossible that both speeches were delivered as they
stand and that the repetition was not regarded as troubling. An-
other possibility is that Dem. 8 was written but (for whatever rea-
son) not delivered, and so the common material was heard for the
first time when Demosthenes delivered Dem. 10. In either case,
if these passages do indeed fit better in Dem. 10, it does not fol-
low that they must have been written for it: they could have been
⁴ Both the increase in Athens’ revenues and the prospect of support from
Persia were significant changes. It has also been argued that Demosthenes
and his supporters had by now gotten control of the theoric commission:
see Cawkwell 1963b: 135–136.

10. fourth philippic 179
used first in Dem. 8, and then reused—and better integrated—

in Dem. 10.⁵
The speech was delivered in 341, although scholars in antiq-
uity disagreed about whether to place it in the Athenian archon
year 342/1 or 341/0.⁶ Dionysius of Halicarnassus dates it to 341/0.⁷
In his commentary Didymus gives the same date (col. 1.30) but
reports that other scholars place it a year earlier (col. 2.2–3). It
is probably the last of the triad Dem. 8, 9, and 10, as the tradi-
tional order suggests. Certainly, comparison of the parallel pas-
sages 8.44 (where it is reported that Philip is now taking various
obscure places in Thrace) and 10.15 (where he is said now to pos-
sess them) suggests that it is later than Dem. 8. The speech twice
refers to Philip’s gaining control of the Euboean city of Oreus (9,
61), without noting its recapture by Athens in the last month of
342/1.⁸ This has been taken to indicate that the speech must have
been delivered before that event, that is, in 342/1. It is certainly
possible that Dionysius dated the speech a year too late, but these
passages do not in my view prove it, since Demosthenes’ concern
in them is with the fact and manner of Philip’s seizure of Oreus,
not its current status.⁹
The general situation that the speech addresses is similar to
that of the slightly earlier speeches Dem. 8 and 9: Philip is still
on campaign in eastern Thrace (15–17), and both Byzantium and
the Hellespont are in danger. One significant new element is the
emergence of the Persian King as a potential ally for Athens (31–
34). In his earlier deliberative speeches, Demosthenes regarded
Persia as a threat (Dem. 14 and 15), but here he relates two new,
⁵ Hajdú 2002 discusses the matter in detail, and finds it hard to reach a
firm conclusion. See too MacDowell 2009: 354–355.
⁶ If the speech was delivered around the end of the year, i.e., midsummer,
it was probably very difficult for ancient scholars to determine to which year
it should be assigned.
⁷ First Letter to Ammaeus 10.
⁸ The recapture of Oreus is referred to and dated by Philochorus FGH
328 fragment 159, cited by Didymus, col. 1.13–18.
⁹ Thus, Cawkwell (1963b: 134–135), who also regards the evidence insuffi-
cient to choose between these two years.

180 demosthenes
and welcome, developments. The first is that the King’s trusted

“benefactors” are now at war with Philip (31); the second is the ar-
rest by the Persians of an agent of Philip who is privy to Philip’s
plans against the Persian King (32). Demosthenes is referring here
to Persian military support to the cities of Perinthus and Byzan-
tium and to the seizure of Hermias, the dynast of Atarneus in
western Asia Minor (see notes ad loc.). Evidently the Persians had
come to regard Philip’s campaign in Thrace as a threat to their
interests and security.¹⁰ Demosthenes, seeing this as a heaven-
sent opportunity to join forces with the powerful Persian Empire
against Philip, urges the Athenians to put aside their existing hos-
tility to the King and send an embassy to him (33–34).
Much of the speech recycles, often with little alteration (see
above), themes that are familiar from Demosthenes’ earlier
speeches, especially Dem. 8 and 9. The Athenians, he says, must
wake up to the reality of the danger that Philip poses (in a memo-
rable simile, 6, he likens them to people who are drugged). Philip
is in reality already at war with Athens, and all his actions are
directed towards its overthrow. Demosthenes criticizes the Athe-
nians for their idleness and irresponsibility and directs sharp
words at his fellow politicians, who are corrupt and self-seeking,
singling out a certain Aristomedes for particular blame (70–74).
A new element is the lengthy discussion of the payments made
to poorer Athenians from the theoric fund (35–45). Demosthenes’
earlier view had been that these payments were a waste of money
and that the money could better be used to fund military oper-
ations against Philip (see Dem. 3). Here, however, he argues that
the rich should not begrudge the poor the handouts on which
they depend, and in return the poor should not resent or seek to
expropriate the private wealth of the rich. This apparent change of
policy is explained in part by an improvement in Athens’ public
finances: Demosthenes claims that the city’s annual revenue has
risen in recent years, for reasons that are not entirely clear to us,
from 130 to 400 talents (37–38). He no doubt also hoped that the
¹⁰ It is likely that by 341 Philip already had plans to attack the Persian
Empire (which he did in 337), though this cannot be proved.

anticipated rapprochement between Athens and Persia (see above)

would soon put an end to Athenian financial concerns. But it was
not simply a matter of money: Demosthenes is seeking to heal a
rift within Athenian society between rich and poor and to create
a spirit of civic unity—under the leadership of men such as him-
self—in the face of the threat posed by Philip.
There is a detailed commentary on this speech in German by

Hajdú 2002.¹¹
10. fourth philippic

[1] In my opinion, men of Athens, the matters under discus-
sion are both serious and of vital importance to the city, and I
will try to tell you what measures you can usefully take. Quite a
number of errors have been committed over a period of time, and
as a result our situation is bad. And yet none of these errors, men
of Athens, is more distressing for the present than your giving up
your resolve for action and your paying attention only so long as
you are seated listening, or when some piece of news is being an-
nounced. After that, each of you goes away and not only gives no
thought to the issues but does not even remember them. [2] The
wanton violence and greed with which Philip acts towards every-
one are as great as you have been told. You all know, I imagine,
from reports or from speeches in the Assembly, that he is unable
to refrain from such conduct. And if anyone is unable to under-
stand this in any other way, let him think about it like this: when-
ever we have been required to speak about justice, we have never
yet been beaten or seemed to be in the wrong, but we defeat all
comers and win the argument. [3] And yet has this resulted in
the deterioration of his situation and the improvement of ours?
Far from it. For when he takes up arms and marches out, will-
ing to risk all that he has, while we are seated—some after deliv-
ering speeches about justice, others after listening to them—it is
¹¹ Hajdú’s commentary is helpfully reviewed by D. M. MacDowell, Clas-

sical Review 53 (2003): 301–302.

182 demosthenes
quite natural, I suppose, that actions outstrip words, and that ev-
eryone pays attention not to the righteous speeches that we made
in the past, or could make now, but to our actions. Yet these can-
not save any of the victims of injustice, and it is pointless to say
anything more about them. [4] Accordingly, at a time when the
inhabitants of the cities of Greece are divided into two groups—
those who wish neither to rule anybody else by force nor to be en-
slaved to another but to manage their city in peace and in accor-
dance with the laws, on terms of equality, and those who desire
to rule over their fellow-citizens, submitting to anyone who they
imagine will allow them to do so—those who are of his persua-
sion, men who desire tyrannies and dictatorships, are everywhere
victorious, and I cannot think of a single securely democratic city
apart from our own.¹² [5] And those who allow him to control
their government are successful by means of all the things that
get things done: first and foremost by having someone who will
give money on their behalf to those who are willing to take it; and
second—though no less important—by the existence of a power
that can subdue their opponents whenever they ask. [6] Nor is it
only in these ways that we are being left behind, men of Athens:
we cannot even wake ourselves up but are like people who have
drunk mandrake juice¹³ or some other such drug. And then, I
think—for in my view one should speak the truth—we have con-
sequently been so slandered and despised that of those who are in
real danger, some dispute with us about leadership, others quarrel
about where we should hold our Council meetings,¹⁴ and others
yet have decided to defend themselves on their own rather than
with us.
¹² Despite Philip’s general support for oligarchies, there certainly were

other democracies in Greece, though perhaps none of them was as securely
democratic as Athens: see, e.g., 17.10 on the democratic cities of Achaea in
the 330s. Demosthenes made a similar claim, that virtually every city is an
oligarchy, at 15.19.
¹³ Mandrake (Mandragora officinarum) is a poisonous plant of the night-
shade family. It was used in antiquity as a narcotic.
¹⁴ The reference here is probably to meetings of the Council (synhedrion)
of the Second Athenian Confederacy, on which see Cargill 1981: 115–128.

[7] Why am I going into detail about these matters? It is not,

by Zeus and all the gods, that I want to make myself an object of
hatred to you. My aim is rather to make all of you, men of Athens,
understand that just as in our private lives, so in the case of cities,
day-to-day nonchalance and slackness are not immediately de-
tectable in the individual details that are being neglected but are
seen in the overall situation. [8] Look at Serrium and Doriscus. In
the immediate aftermath of the peace, these places, which many
of you have perhaps not even heard of, were regarded as unim-
portant. But later, after they had been left alone and disregarded,
they brought about the destruction of Thrace and of your ally
Cersobleptes.¹⁵ Next, seeing that they were being neglected and
were receiving no assistance from you, Philip demolished Porth-
mus and planted a tyranny in Euboea against you, like a fortress
opposite Attica.¹⁶ [9] And while you were paying no attention to
this, Megara was almost taken.¹⁷ You paid no thought or atten-
tion to any of these places, nor did you show that you would pre-
vent him from acting in this way, and so he bought up Antrones
and soon afterwards took control of affairs in Oreus.¹⁸ [10] There
are many places that I pass over—Pherae, the route to Ambracia,
the massacres in Elis¹⁹—and countless others! I have recounted
these events not in order to enumerate how many people have suf-
fered violence and injustice at the hands of Philip but to demon-
¹⁵ Serrium and Doriscus were places in Thrace that were captured by

Philip in 346: see 8.64n. Cersobleptes was the ruler of eastern Thrace; an
ally of Athens, he was excluded from the Peace of Philocrates in 346 and de-
feated by Philip in the late 340s.
¹⁶ On Porthmus, the harbor of Eretria on Euboea, see 9.57–58nn; cf. 8.36
and 66.
¹⁷ On Philip’s involvement in the affairs of Athens’ neighbor Megara in
343, see 8.18n.
¹⁸ Antrones (also called Antron) was a small city in Phthiotic Achaea in
central Greece. On Macedonian interference in the northern Euboean city
of Oreus, see 9.59– 62nn.
¹⁹ Philip captured the city of Pherae in southern Thessaly in 344: see
8.59n. On his threat to Ambracia in western Greece in 342, see 9.72n; on
events in Elis, see 9.27n.

184 demosthenes
strate to you that he will continue to wrong everybody, and bring

everything under his control, unless someone stops him.
[11] There are those who, even before they listen to speeches
about our affairs, immediately ask, “What then must we do?”²⁰
Their aim is not to listen first and then take action—which would
make them the most useful of all citizens—but to be rid of the
speaker. Nevertheless, it is necessary to tell you what you should
do. First, men of Athens, you must clearly acknowledge that
Philip is waging war on our city and has broken the peace, and is
ill disposed and hostile to our city down to its very foundations,
and to the gods of the city as well—may they destroy him! He is
quite frankly waging war and plotting against our constitution,
and his overriding aim is to dissolve it.²¹ [12] And it is in a sense
inevitable that he is doing this now. Think about it: he wishes to
rule and has formed the view that you are the only people who
will oppose his doing this. For a long time now he has been act-
ing unjustly, and he knows very well that it is through his posses-
sion of the places that belong to you that all his other acquisitions
are secure, since if he were to abandon Amphipolis and Potidaea,
he would not be secure even in Macedonia.²² [13] He is quite de-
liberately plotting against you and knows that you know it. And
on the assumption that you have your wits about you, he believes
that you hate him. Besides these important considerations, he is
well aware that even if he gets control of everything, he will be
unable to possess any of it securely so long as you govern your-
selves democratically. For if ever any slip should befall him—and
many things can happen to a man—all the places that he has
taken by force will come and seek refuge with you. [14] You are
not yourselves well suited to acquire or possess an empire. Rather,
you are good at preventing another from taking places, and at re-
covering them from one who has got hold of them, and at gener-
²⁰ Sections 11–27 are very similar to 8.38–51: see the Speech Intro-
duction.
²¹ Philip and Athens were still formally at peace at the time of the speech.
When Philip defeated the Greek alliance in 338 he did not in fact overthrow
Athens’ democracy: see 62n below.
²² Section 12 is almost identical to 6.17.

ally obstructing those who wish to rule, and at liberating people.

He does not wish freedom at your hands to be lying in wait on
any moment of crisis for him—and his calculation is sound and
to the point. [15] First, then, you must accept that Philip is an ir-
reconcilable enemy of constitutional government and democracy.
Second, you must acknowledge that all his plans and machina-
tions are directed against our city. For none of you is so naive as
to suppose that Philip is desirous of the evils of Thrace—for what
else would one call Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira and the
places he is now said to possess?²³—or that seizing these places is
the reason why he endures toil and winters and the utmost dan-
gers, [16] or to suppose that he has no desire for Athens’ harbors
and docks and triremes, or our territory and reputation—may
neither he nor anyone else get the better of our city and become
master of them!—or that he will allow you to keep these, but
passes the winter in the pit for the sake of the millet and wheat
in the grain silos of Thrace.²⁴ [17] On the contrary, all his activi-
ties in Thrace and elsewhere are directed towards getting control
of our possessions.
Although every one of you should appreciate and understand
these arguments, you should not, by Zeus, urge one who is giv-
ing the best and most just advice²⁵ to propose that we declare
war. That would be the act of people who are looking for some-
one to go to war with instead of benefiting the city! [18] Look:
if as a result of Philip’s first breach of the peace, or his second
or third—for there is a whole series of them—someone had pro-
posed that we declare war on him, and he, just as he is doing now
when none of you is proposing to declare war, had assisted the
Cardians, would the proposer not have been ruined, and would
everyone not have accused him of being responsible for the sup-
port that Philip was giving to the Cardians? [19] So do not look
for someone else to hate for Philip’s wrongdoings, nor hand that
person over to be torn apart by those who have been bribed by
²³ On these obscure places in Thrace, see 8.44n.

²⁴ On “in the pit” and “wheat,” see 8.45nn.
²⁵ I.e., Demosthenes and his supporters.

186 demosthenes
Philip; and do not vote for war and then fight among yourselves
over whether or not you did the right thing. Instead, you should
imitate the way in which he makes war: by providing money and
whatever else is needed to those who are already resisting him,
and by raising taxes, men of Athens, and by preparing an army,
fast triremes,²⁶ cavalry, horse transports, and everything else that
is needed for war. [20] People now laugh at the way we manage
our affairs and, by the gods, I think that you are doing exactly
what Philip would pray for you to do: you are too late, you waste
money, you look for others to entrust your affairs to, you com-
plain, you blame each other. But I shall explain to you both how
this situation came about and how to put a stop to it.
[21] From the beginning, men of Athens, you have never once
entered upon or prepared for any undertaking properly, but you
always react to events, and when you are late, you stop. Then if
something else should happen, you make your preparations and
are thrown into uproar. [22] This is wrong. You can never do any-
thing that you need to do by means of relief forces. Instead, you
must equip a force and provide it with supplies and financial of-
ficers and public slaves, and make sure to keep a very close guard
of the money; and require these men to provide an account of the
money, and the general to provide an account of his actions, and
leave him no excuse for sailing elsewhere or doing something else.
[23] If you do this really wholeheartedly, you will either compel
Philip to keep the peace in accordance with justice and to remain
where he is or you will be at war with him on terms of equality.
And maybe, just maybe, just as now you learn by hearsay what
Philip is doing and where he is marching to, so he may come to
worry about where the city’s forces are sailing for and where they
will appear.
[24] If anyone thinks that these proposals require substantial
expenditure and much toil and upheaval, he is quite right. But if
he calculates what the consequence will be for the city, if it is un-
²⁶ Athenian triremes were divided into classes according to their sailing

qualities: see 14.18n. Demosthenes is probably calling for ships of either the
“select” or “first” class.

willing to take action, he will find that it is in our interest to do

what is needed with a good will. For even if some god were to
guarantee—and no human would serve for a matter of this im-
portance—that if you keep quiet and give up everything, Philip
will not in the end attack you, [25] it would be shameful, by Zeus
and all the gods, and unworthy of you and the city and the deeds
of your ancestors, to sacrifice the rest of the Greeks into slavery
for the sake of our private comfort, and I for one would rather
die than make such a proposal. [26] Nevertheless, if some other
speaker persuades you differently, so be it: do not resist; throw ev-
erything away. But if no one takes such a view, but on the con-
trary we all already know that the more we allow him to get con-
trol of, the more dangerous and the stronger an enemy we shall
have, where do we shrink back to? Why do we delay? When, men
of Athens, will we be willing to do our duty? [27] “Whenever, by
Zeus, we are compelled to.” But if we are speaking of the compul-
sion placed on free men, that has already arrived and indeed has
long passed us by; the compulsion for slaves we must surely hope
to avoid. How do they differ? For a free man the greatest com-
pulsion is a sense of shame at what is happening—I do not know
what compulsion could be greater than that—but for a slave it
consists of blows and outrage to the body. May that never happen
to us! Indeed, one should not even talk about it.
[28] Your reluctance, men of Athens, to undertake the public
services that each of you should perform, both in person and by
means of his wealth, is quite wrong, but nevertheless some excuse
can be made for it, whereas your refusal even to listen to what you
ought to hear and deliberate about deserves every kind of criti-
cism. [29] You habitually fail either to pay attention until, as now,
events are upon you, or to deliberate about any matter when you
have the time to do so. Whenever he makes his preparations, you
fail to follow suit and prepare yourselves in return, and are lazy,
and, if anyone says anything about this, you eject him. It is only
when you learn that some place has been destroyed or is being be-
sieged that you pay attention and make preparations. [30] The
time for listening and deliberating was in the past, but you were
unwilling to do so then; now, when you are listening, is the time
when you should be taking action and making use of the prepara-

188 demosthenes
tions that you made previously. As a result of such habits, you be-
have in the opposite way to anyone else in the world: other peo-
ple are in the habit of deliberating before they act, but you do so
afterwards.
[31] What is left for us to do, and has long been necessary, and
even now is not too late, I shall explain to you. What our city
needs more than anything for the coming troubles is money, and
there have occurred some strokes of good fortune, which, if we
use them well, may bring about what is needed. In the first place,
the men whom the King trusts and considers his Benefactors hate
Philip and are at war with him.²⁷ [32] Second, the agent who is
privy to all of Philip’s preparations against the King has been ar-
rested,²⁸ and the King will hear everything that has been done
not from accusations laid by us—whom he would suppose to be
speaking with a view to our own advantage—but from the agent
and manager himself, so that he will believe them, and our am-
bassadors will only have to make a speech that the King will be
²⁷ King’s Benefactor was an honorific title within the Persian Empire

(see Briant 2002: 303–304). The reference here is to the satraps of western
Asia Minor who were operating in support of Perinthus and to Mentor of
Rhodes (see the next note). Th is sentence is discussed by Didymus (col. 4.1–
15, with Harding 2006: 117–123).
²⁸ The reference is to Hermias, the ruler of the two cities of Atarneus and
Assus in northwestern Asia Minor. Hermias combined political ambition
with philosophical interests. A pupil of Plato’s Academy, he welcomed phi-
losophers to his kingdom, most notably Aristotle, who married his niece.
Hermias kept his kingdom independent of the Persians until 341, when the
King’s general Mentor of Rhodes captured Atarneus and arrested him. This
passage is the subject of a long note by Didymus (cols. 4.59– 6.62, on which
see Harding 2006: 124–162). Demosthenes implies both that Philip is al-
ready planning to attack the Persian Empire and that Hermias had been co-
operating with him, and some historians believe that he wished to use Her-
mias’ kingdom as a bridgehead for an invasion of Asia. Be this as it may,
Hermias’ independence from Persian rule will have been sufficient reason
for the Persians to seek to have him suppressed; it should not be assumed
that Demosthenes had reliable information about the relationship between
Hermias and Philip.

delighted to hear.²⁹ [33] They should say to him that we ought to

join in punishing the man who is harming both of us, and that
Philip will be much more frightening to the King if he attacks
us first, since if we are abandoned and defeated Philip will move
against him with impunity. I think that you should send an em-
bassy to hold discussions with the King about all these matters³⁰
and should abandon that fatuous slogan, which has often proved
damaging to you, “the foreigner, and common enemy of all,”³¹
and the like. [34] For whenever I see anyone who is afraid of the
man in Susa and Ecbatana³² and claims that he is ill disposed
to our city, although he previously helped to restore our affairs³³
and recently has offered to do so again³⁴—and it is not his fault
²⁹ It is not clear why Demosthenes does not name Hermias or Men-

tor. Perhaps, as MacDowell suggests (2009: 356), this was very recent news
about which most Athenians would already be aware.
³⁰ Athens and Persia did cooperate in 340 in helping Perinthus and By-
zantium: see 11.5– 6, 12.6.
³¹ This phrase was applied to the Persian King (on the word barbaros,
“foreigner,” see 3.16n). It was the central tenet of Panhellenism (see the In-
troduction to Dem. 9) that the Greeks should set aside their diff erences and
unite to wage a war of both revenge and territorial conquest against the Per-
sian Empire. It is instructive to compare Demosthenes’ earlier statement in
a speech of the mid 350s (14.3): “I believe that the King is the common en-
emy of all the Greeks.”
³² The Persian court moved between a number of cities, including Susa
in Persia and Ecbatana in Media.
³³ Having fallen out with the Spartans over their support for his brother
Cyrus (see 15.24n), in 395 the Persian king Artaxerxes supported an anti-
Spartan Greek alliance that included Athens. A Persian fleet commanded
by the exiled Athenian general Conon defeated the Spartans in the sea bat-
tle of Cnidos in 394 and then restored the walls of Athens that the Spartans
had demolished after their victory in the Peloponnesian War. See Didymus
cols. 6.67–8.2.
³⁴ According to Didymus (col. 8.2–32, with Harding 2006: 185–192), this
refers to a Persian embassy to Athens in 344/3 asking for the continuation
of friendly relations. The context was probably the Persian campaign to re-
capture Egypt. Didymus quotes the historian Philochorus (FGH 328 frag-

190 demosthenes
that you did not accept this offer but voted against it—but who
says something quite different about the man at our gates, close at
hand as he is, and growing powerful in the midst of Greece, the
brigand of the Greeks—I am amazed, and I for one fear such a
man, whoever he may be, since he does not fear Philip.
[35] There is also another matter that gives rise to unjust cal-
umny and unhelpful speeches, and damages our city and gives an
excuse to those who are reluctant to pursue any policy that is cor-
rect; and you will find that the blame for all our deficiencies—
since they must have some cause—is referred to it. This matter
causes me very great anxiety, but nevertheless I shall address it,³⁵
[36] in the belief that I can say what is just and in the public in-
terest, speaking both to the well-off on behalf of the poor and to
the needy on behalf of the rich. We could make no greater im-
provement to our affairs than to do away both with the unfair
criticisms that certain men make of the theoric fund and with the
fear that stopping it³⁶ will have disastrous consequences, nor is
there anything that would more strengthen the entire city collec-
tively. [37] Look at it like this: First, I shall speak from the point
of view of those who are clearly in need. There was a time, not
long ago, when the city’s annual revenues were no more than one
hundred and thirty talents,³⁷ and yet none of those who were able
ment 157) for the date and the sharp tone of the Athenian reply: “The King
would continue to have their friendship, so long as he not attack the cities
of Greece.”
³⁵ For Demosthenes’ earlier reluctance to speak frankly about the the-
oric fund, see 1.19n.
³⁶ I.e., that payments will stop being made for such purposes as festival
attendance.
³⁷ This and the following figure are discussed by Didymus (cols. 8.44–
9.9, with Harding 2006: 194–197). He guesses that the (annual) figure of
130 talents relates to the final years of the Peloponnesian War, but the refer-
ence is more likely to be to the recent financial crisis of the mid 350s, in the
aftermath of the Social War. The figure of 400 talents is supported by a frag-
ment of Theopompus (FGH 115 fragment 166) in which the Athenian poli-
tician Aristophon (see 8.30n) is quoted as claiming in a speech, whose dra-
matic date is probably 346, that Athens has revenues of almost 400 talents.

to serve as trierarchs or pay the wealth-tax thought that he should

not do his duty in person, on the ground that there was a short-
age of money, but instead triremes sailed and money was found
and we all did what was required. [38] Subsequently, fortune has
smiled on us and increased our collective revenues, and our in-
come is now four hundred talents instead of one hundred,³⁸ with-
out a single one of the rich being fined³⁹—indeed, they also re-
ceive something, since the well-off all have a share of this wealth
and are doing well. [39] Why then do we reproach each other
over this and use it as an excuse for doing nothing, unless we be-
grudge the assistance that fortune has provided to the destitute? I
certainly would not blame these people or approve of anyone else
blaming them. [40] Even in private homes I do not see any man
in the prime of life who is so ill disposed towards his elders, or so
senseless or idiotic, as to refuse to lift a finger because they do not
do as much as he does.⁴⁰ Indeed, such conduct would make him
liable for prosecution under the laws of ill treatment.⁴¹ For in my
opinion it is only proper that we take on and willingly discharge
for our parents a debt of gratitude, which is doubly required, both
by nature and by law.⁴² [41] Just as each one of us has a parent,
so we should think of all the citizens as the collective parents of
the whole city. Far from depriving them of whatever the city gives
³⁸ Demosthenes gives a lower figure for Athens’ previous revenues here

than he does at 37, presumably to exaggerate the improvement in Athenian
finances.
³⁹ I.e., the increase in revenue is not the result of public prosecutions
(graphai) being brought against the rich, who if convicted would have to
pay substantial fines into the public treasury.
⁴⁰ Just as in a family, Athenians should contribute according to their
means and not expect the same contribution from everybody.
⁴¹ Under Athenian law, a son could be prosecuted for maltreatment of
his parents (kakōsis goneōn), including failure to provide them with food and
shelter. See MacDowell 1978: 92.
⁴² The Greek word translated as debt of gratitude (eranos) means an in-
terest-free loan raised by contributions. Demosthenes’ point is that the care
that young children freely receive from their parents is like an eranos, which
they should repay by looking after them when they are old.

192 demosthenes
them, we should consider, if they receive nothing, what other

sources we can use to ensure that they have whatever they need.
[42] I think that if the wealthy take this view, they will be
doing both what is just and what is to their advantage, since to
deprive anyone of the necessities of life will produce in people a
common sense of discontent. At the same time, I would advise
the needy to get rid of the thing that causes the rich distress and
about which they rightly complain. [43] I shall now examine the
matter, in the same way as before, from the point of view of the
well-off, and I shall not shrink from telling the truth. For it seems
to me that no Athenian, at any rate, is so miserably hard-hearted
as to be distressed at the sight of those who are poor and in need
of the necessities of life receiving these payments. [44] Why then
are people irritated and annoyed? It is when they see certain peo-
ple transferring an attitude towards public money to the treat-
ment of private wealth,⁴³ and when they see a speaker being re-
garded by you as great, indeed as immortal because of the security
that he enjoys,⁴⁴ and when they see that the votes cast in secret
differ from what people had indicated in public by their clamor-
ing.⁴⁵ [45] These things cause distrust and anger, men of Athens,
since we must share the commonwealth with each other in an eq-
uitable manner. The wealthy should be confident that their pos-
sessions are safe, and not be afraid for them; but when danger
threatens, they should share their wealth for the sake of our col-
lective security. The rest⁴⁶ should take the view that what is pub-
⁴³ This section is unclear: Demosthenes is alluding to behavior of which

his audience would presumably be aware. Here he may be suggesting that
the Athenians’ tight control over public money has led to the malign prac-
tice of prosecuting wealthy Athenians to raise revenues through the imposi-
tion of fines: see 38n.
⁴⁴ The security that such politicians enjoy is provided not by bodyguards
but by their popularity, which allows them to speak freely without fear of
prosecution, since they feel confident that they will not be convicted by
a jury.
⁴⁵ Demosthenes’ point is apparently that the Athenians publicly express
their solidarity with the rich in the Assembly, but as jurors cast their (secret)
ballot to convict them when they are put on trial.
⁴⁶ I.e., the poor.

lic is public, and should have their fair share of it; but they must
understand that each man’s private property belongs to its owner.
This is how a small state becomes great, and a great state is secure.
As far as describing what is required on each side, these remarks
are perhaps sufficient; but putting them into practice requires reg-
ulation by law.⁴⁷
[46] The present disordered state of our affairs has many long-
standing causes, which I am prepared to explain to you if you are
willing to listen. Men of Athens, you have abandoned the pol-
icy you inherited from your ancestors, and have been persuaded
by speakers who think it an unnecessary and pointless expense
to champion the Greeks and use a well-organized force to help
all who are victims of injustice. You supposed that living a quiet
life and neglecting your duty, but instead abandoning every place
one after another and allowing others to take them, provided you
with wonderful happiness and great security. [47] As a result, an-
other man⁴⁸ has come forward to the post that you should have
occupied and has become wealthy and powerful and the ruler of
many. And this is quite understandable, since something great
and honorable and glorious,⁴⁹ over which all the leading states
have for a very long time disputed among themselves, has, as a re-
sult of Sparta’s misfortune⁵⁰ and Thebes’ involvement in the war
with Phocis⁵¹ and our neglect, been carried off by this man by de-
fault. [48] As a result, he has emerged as an object of fear to oth-
ers, in possession of many allies and a great army, whereas the
Greeks are now surrounded by so many serious problems that it is
difficult even to offer advice about what to do.
[49] The present situation, in my judgment, is alarming to
⁴⁷ For the need to appoint Law-Givers to change the laws relating to the
theoric fund, see 3.10–11nn.
⁴⁸ Philip.
⁴⁹ Demosthenes here refers to the somewhat nebulous concept of the
leadership of Greece. See also 52n below and 9.23.
⁵⁰ The battle of Leuctra in 371, at which Sparta was decisively defeated by
Thebes. As a result, it was stripped of Messenia and lost its ability to domi-
nate even the Peloponnese.
⁵¹ The Third Sacred War of 356–346. Thebes’ resources were sapped by
this long-running war against Phocis.

194 demosthenes
everyone, men of Athens, but no one is in greater danger than

you, not only because it is against you in particular that Philip
is plotting but also because you are the idlest people of all. If the
sight of numerous goods for sale and the wealth of the market-
place has beguiled you into believing that the city’s plight is not
serious, your judgment of the situation is inappropriate and incor-
rect. [50] That might be a sound basis for determining whether
or not a market or a festival is well organized,⁵² but the one city
that anyone who wishes to rule Greece understands will oppose
him single-handedly and will be a champion of freedom for all,
such a city must be evaluated not, by Zeus, on the basis of what
is for sale there but on whether it enjoys the goodwill of allies
and is militarily strong—these are the aspects of the city that one
must examine, and in your case these things are all precarious
and wholly unsound. [51] It may help you to understand the situ-
ation by looking at it in this way: At what time have the affairs of
Greece been in the greatest confusion? Everyone would agree that
it is right now, since previously all Greece was divided between
two sides, the Spartans and us,⁵³ with some of the other Greeks
loyal to us and others to them. The King in himself was viewed
with equal distrust by both sides, but, by taking the side of those
who were getting the worse of the war, he was trusted by them
until he made them the equals of the others, whereupon those
whom he had saved came to hate him just as much as did those
who were his enemies at the outset.⁵⁴ [52] But now, first of all, the
King is on friendly terms with all the Greeks, though least of all
⁵² The Athenians closely supervised commercial activity in the market-

place: see Ath. Pol. 51, with the commentary of Rhodes 1981. On the efficient
organization of Athens’ religious festivals, see 4.35–36.
⁵³ This statement is true of much of the fifth century, and of the fourth
century until the battle of Leuctra. Thereafter Athens aligned itself with
Sparta against Thebes.
⁵⁴ Persian policy towards the Greeks was driven largely by the desire to
prevent the emergence of a dominant power in Greece that might threaten
its interests, in particular its control of Asia Minor. Demosthenes’ point is
most clearly illustrated by the switches in Persian support (for Sparta, then
Athens, then Sparta again) in the period 411–386.

with us, unless we bring about some improvement in our relations

with him.⁵⁵ Next, many forms of domination are coming into ex-
istence, and everyone lays claim to the primacy of Greece,⁵⁶ al-
though in practice they have abandoned it, and envy and distrust
each other, rather than those whom they should, and everyone
is isolated—the Argives, the Thebans, the Spartans, the Corin-
thians, the Arcadians, and us. [53] Nevertheless, at a time when
Greece is split into so many factions and tyrannies, the candid
truth is that there is no city whose magistrates’ office and Council
Chamber take less interest in the affairs of Greece than ours—as
indeed one might expect, since no one is motivated by affection
or trust or fear to speak to us. [54] There is no single explanation
for this situation, men of Athens—if there were, it would be easy
for you to change it—but numerous errors of various kinds have
been made over a long period. Passing over their individual de-
tails, I shall tell you where they are heading—and I ask you not to
be annoyed with me if I speak the truth frankly. Whenever an op-
portunity has arisen, our advantage has been sold, and you have
accepted in return leisure and tranquility, which bewitch you so
that you do not feel bitter toward those who are injuring you, and
others take the honors. [55] There is no point examining other
matters now;⁵⁷ but whenever Philip attacks anywhere, someone
immediately stands up and says that no one should talk nonsense
or make a proposal of war, adding immediately that it is good to
keep the peace, and that it is difficult to maintain a large force,
⁵⁵ The Persian King is described as well disposed towards the Greeks be-
cause he has been seeking their assistance in his bid to regain Egypt (see 34n
above; Isoc. 12.160; Diodorus 16.44). Demosthenes claims that he is least
well disposed towards Athens in part because the Athenians were most in-
clined to interfere in Asia Minor (see 8.24n on Erythrae; 4.24n on Chares
and Artabazus), and in part because of their response to his recent embassy
(see 34n above).
⁵⁶ Demosthenes exaggerates the number of cities that had a realistic
claim to the leadership of Greece: only Athens and Thebes (and arguably
Sparta) were major powers.
⁵⁷ Sections 55– 70 are very similar to 8.52– 67: see the Speech Intro-
duction.

196 demosthenes
and that certain people wish to steal our money, and they pro-
vide other reasons that are as close to the truth as they can get.⁵⁸
[56] It is not you who need to be persuaded to keep the peace,
since you sit there already persuaded, but rather the man who is
waging war. If he should be persuaded to keep the peace, you are
already quite prepared to do so. You must understand that the
hardship for us is not the amount of money we will have to spend
to ensure our safety but what we will suffer if we refuse to take
these measures; and you should prevent money being stolen⁵⁹ by
creating a guard to protect it, not by abandoning our interests.
[57] This too makes me angry: the fact that some of you are upset
at the prospect of our money being plundered, when you are able
to guard it and to punish any wrongdoers,⁶⁰ but are not upset at
Philip plundering all of Greece, one city after another, as he is do-
ing, especially since his plundering is directed against you.
[58] Why, men of Athens, has none of these men yet admit-
ted that Philip, whose seizing of cities is so clearly unjust, is act-
ing illegally and is at war, but instead they say that those who ad-
vise you not to give way and not to abandon these places want to
be at war? Because they wish to pass the blame for the unpleas-
ant consequences of the war—for many distressing things inevi-
tably, yes, inevitably happen in war—on to those who regularly
give you the best advice. [59] They believe that if you all agree to
resist Philip with one mind, you will defeat him, and they will
no longer be able to work for hire; but if from the first alarm you
are diverted towards bringing charges against certain men⁶¹ and
putting them on trial, they, by accusing these men, will have it
both ways, winning your esteem and receiving money from him,
while you will inflict on those who have spoken in your interests
the punishments that should be inflicted on them. [60] These are
their hopes, and this is why they contrive to accuse some people
of warmongering. But I know very well that without any Athe-
⁵⁸ That is to say, they are completely untrue.

⁵⁹ Demosthenes refers to the allegations of his opponents that money al-
located to military operations will be misappropriated. See also 8.52–54.
⁶⁰ Specifically, anyone who attempts to steal the money.
⁶¹ Anti-Macedonian politicians such as Demosthenes.

nian proposing a declaration of war, Philip holds many of our

possessions and now has sent help to Cardia.⁶² If we are willing to
pretend that he is not waging war on us, he would be an utter fool
to refute us: for when the victims deny they are being wronged,
why should the wrongdoer be concerned? [61] But when he at-
tacks us, what shall we say then? For he will deny that he is at
war, as he did to the people of Oreus when his soldiers were in the
place, as he did previously to the Pheraeans as he attacked their
walls, and as he did at the outset to the Olynthians, until he was
actually present in their territory with an army.⁶³ Or shall we say,
even then, that those who are urging you to defend yourselves are
warmongering? It remains then for us to be slaves—there is no
alternative.
[62] Indeed, the danger is greater for you than for anyone else,
since what Philip wishes is not to make your city subject to him,
no, but wholly to destroy it. For he knows well that you will re-
fuse to be slaves, and, even if you do not refuse, you will not
know how to be slaves, since you are accustomed to rule, but you
will be able to cause more trouble for him, if you get the oppor-
tunity, than any other people. For these reasons he will not spare
you, if he gets control of you.⁶⁴ [63] You should recognize that the
struggle will be for our very existence, and you should publicly
cudgel to death⁶⁵ those who have sold themselves to him. For it
is impossible, yes, impossible, to defeat your enemies abroad un-
til you have punished your enemies within the city; but if you
⁶² On Philip’s assistance to Cardia at the northern end of the Chersonese,

see 8.58n.
⁶³ See 8.59nn.
⁶⁴ In fact, Philip treated Athens mildly after his victory over the Greeks
at the battle of Chaeronea in 338. The reason was twofold. First, he wished
to be able to represent himself as the champion of Greece in his planned
war against the Persians (Athens had been a leader of the Greek resistance
to Persia in the fifth century and had indeed been sacked by the Persian
army in 480). Second, he planned to use Athens’ powerful navy to take on
the Persians at sea.
⁶⁵ On the brutal form of capital punishment called apotympanismos,
see 8.61n.

198 demosthenes
trip up against the barrier posed by the latter, you will inevitably
be too late to deal with the former. [64] Why do you think that
he is outraging⁶⁶ you—for this is exactly what he seems to me
to be doing—and, though he deceives the rest by at least doing
them favors, threatens you outright? For example, he gave many
things to the Thessalians before he led them into their present
slavery, nor would anyone be able to say how much he deceived
the wretched Olynthians, after previously giving them Potidaea
and many other places; and he is now leading the Thebans down
after handing Boeotia over to them and relieving them of a long
and difficult war.⁶⁷ [65] As a result, of all these cities that have en-
joyed some benefit from him, some have already suffered as they
have; the rest will do so at some point in the future. As for you,
I say nothing about the places of which you have been deprived,
but how often were you deceived in the very making of peace,
and how much was taken from you! Have you not lost Phocis?
Thermopylae? The Thracian coast? Doriscus? Serrium? Cerso-
bleptes himself? Does he not now admit that he holds Cardia?⁶⁸
[66] Why then does he treat the others in this way, but treats you
differently? Because in your city, alone of all the cities, it is pos-
sible to speak on behalf of the enemy with impunity, and it is
safe for a man who has been bribed to address you, even if you
have been deprived of what is yours. [67] It would not have been
safe to plead Philip’s cause in Olynthus, if the Olynthian major-
ity had not profited from their enjoyment of Potidaea. It would
not have been safe to speak for him in Thessaly, if the majority of
the Thessalians had not benefited from Philip’s expulsion of the
tyrants and his handing over the Pylaea to them. It would not
have been safe to do so in Thebes, before he handed over Boeotia
and destroyed Phocis.⁶⁹ [68] But at Athens, when Philip has not
only deprived you of Amphipolis and the territory of the Cardi-
ans but is also establishing Euboea as a fortress against you and is
now advancing against Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip’s
behalf. Indeed, some of those who do so are rapidly becoming
⁶⁶ On the concept of outrage (Greek hybris), see 8.62n.

⁶⁷ See 8.62nn.
⁶⁸ See 8.64nn for this list of Philip’s wrongdoings.
⁶⁹ See 8.65nn.

rich, after being poor, and reputable and well known, after be-
ing without name or reputation, whereas you suffer the reverse:
you were reputable and now are disreputable; you were rich and
are now poor.⁷⁰ [69] For I believe that the wealth of a city con-
sists of its allies, and the trust and goodwill that it inspires—in all
of which you are deficient. Because you despise these things and
have allowed them to be carried off in this manner, he is wealthy
and powerful and an object of fear to all, Greeks and foreigners
alike, whereas you are abandoned and brought low, glorying in
the prosperity of the marketplace, but laughable when it comes to
making appropriate preparations.
[70] I see that some speakers do not themselves follow the ad-
vice that they give you, since they say that you must keep quiet,
even if someone wrongs you, but they are unable to keep quiet in
your presence, even though no one is wronging them. And yet, if
anyone should ask politely, “Tell me, Aristomedes⁷¹ (for no one is
ignorant of these matters),⁷² why exactly, when the life of a pri-
vate citizen is safe and free from trouble and risk, whereas the
life of a politician is exposed to criticism and full of daily strug-
gles and perils, do you choose the dangerous rather than the quiet
life?” how would you reply? [71] If you were able to give the most
creditable reply, we would accept that you are telling the truth in
claiming to do all these things out of love of honor and glory; but
I wonder why you think that you must toil and run risks in order
to do all these things, but advise the city to abandon them in idle-
ness. You would surely not claim that you ought to be seen as a
person of note in the city but that our city need not be worth any-
thing among the Greeks! [72] Indeed, I do not see how the city
⁷⁰ Compare 38, where Demosthenes speaks about Athens’ improved pub-

lic finances.
⁷¹ The identity of this opponent of Demosthenes is discussed by Didy-
mus (cols. 9.38–10.11, with the commentary of Harding 2006: 199–208),
who identifies him as an Athenian politician nicknamed “the Brazen” (sig-
nifying either cheapness or toughness) and satirized on the comic stage as a
thief. This is the only place in his deliberative speeches where Demosthenes
names a rival politician: see the Speech Introduction.
⁷² I.e., Aristomedes’ (alleged) misconduct is a matter of public knowl-
edge.

200 demosthenes
will be safe if it keeps to itself, or how you will be in danger if you

are no busier than anyone else. On the contrary, the greatest dan-
gers for you arise from your activities and officiousness, whereas
for the city they arise from idleness. [73] But, by Zeus, perhaps
you have inherited a good reputation from your grandfather and
father, which it would be shameful for you to squander, whereas
the deeds of our city’s ancestors are obscure and trivial? But that
is not the case. Your father was a thief, if he was like you, whereas
our city’s ancestors, as all the Greeks know, saved them from the
greatest dangers.⁷³ [74] Indeed, there are certain men here who
do not engage in political life for themselves in the same way that
they do for the city, or as befits a citizen. For how is it reasonable
for some of them, who have come from the prison, to forget their
former selves,⁷⁴ whereas our city, which recently was the leader
of Greece and held a position of primacy, is now utterly humbled
and has lost its good name?
[75] Although I have much more to say on many topics, I shall
stop, since it is not lack of words, either now or at any other time,
that in my view has caused our fortunes to deteriorate. Rather,
it is when you have heard everything that is required, and agree
that it was well said, but then sit listening with equal attention to
those who wish to defile and distort these things, not out of igno-
rance—for as soon as you see them you know well who is speak-
ing for hire and takes part in public life in Philip’s interest, and
who is truly speaking for the best—but in order that by accusing
the latter and reducing the matter to ridicule and abuse, you may
avoid doing any of the things that you need to do. [76] That is the
candid truth. I have offered the best advice in a spirit of goodwill,
instead of a flattering speech full of harm and deception, which
will make money for its speaker but will surrender the affairs of
the city to our enemies. Either you must abandon these habits or
you will have no one to blame but yourselves for our utter failure.
⁷³ The reference is to Athens’ role in defending Greece during the Persian

Wars of 490–479.
⁷⁴ Athens’ prison contained men who had been arrested and were await-
ing trial, men who had been convicted and awaited execution (a famous ex-
ample is the philosopher Socrates), and public debtors. It is unknown to
whom (if anyone) Demosthenes is specifically referring.

11. R ESPONSE TO THE
LET TER OF PHILIP
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The authenticity of this short speech¹ is open to doubt, and
the majority opinion among scholars is that it is spurious, even
though ancient critics generally accepted it as genuine.² Dionysius
of Halicarnassus regards it as authentic, “the last of the speeches
against Philip.”³ It is also included by Didymus in his commen-
tary on the deliberative speeches of Demosthenes (cols. 10.13–
13.12). He apparently accepts it as genuine, though he writes
that it is “cobbled together” from some of Demosthenes’ previ-
ous speeches on the same issues (col. 11.7–10). This statement is
clearly true, since part of the speech is closely adapted from the
Second Olynthiac (8–17 ≈ 2.14–23), and there are echoes of other
speeches too.⁴
¹ As MacDowell (2009: 360) has correctly pointed out, it is misleading to

translate the title of the speech (literally To the Letter of Philip) as Answer or
Reply to Philip’s letter, since the speech is directed not to Philip but to the
Athenian Assembly.
² Sealey (1993: 239) denies that it is a work of Demosthenes, and Ham-
mond and Griffith (1979: 714) are skeptical of its authenticity. On the other
hand, Harding (2006: 217) is open to the possibility that it is authentic, and
MacDowell (2009: 360–363) is inclined to accept it as genuine.
³ First Letter to Ammaeus 10.
⁴ The speech clearly purports to be by Demosthenes and is thus differ-
ent from Dem. 7 and 17, which are genuine speeches of the period misat-
tributed to him.

202 demosthenes
Didymus also addresses two other matters relating to the

speech’s authorship. First, he reports the view of unnamed schol-
ars that it was the work of the fourth-century bc historian Anaxi-
menes of Lampsacus and was to be found in almost the same
words in the seventh book of the latter’s Philippic History
(col. 11.10–14).⁵ He does not comment on the actual degree of
similarity between this speech and the one in Anaximenes’ (now
lost) history. But even if the two speeches were very similar, it
does not follow that Dem. 11 was written by Anaximenes and then
wrongly inserted into the collection of Demosthenes’ speeches,
since Anaximenes may equally well have taken a speech of De-
mosthenes and inserted it, perhaps after some adaptation, into his
history.
Second, Didymus records the view of some ancient critics
that elements of the speech’s vocabulary are not Demosthenic
(col. 11.14–26). The particular word singled out for criticism is
orrōdein (“to shudder in fear”: see 2), which was thought to be vul-
gar and unworthy of Demosthenes. Didymus discusses the mean-
ing and use of this word, but he does not directly offer an opinion
about its propriety. In fact, the word is not stylistically inappro-
priate and was regularly used by fourth-century writers.⁶ On the
other hand, technical analysis of the speech’s prose rhythm sug-
gests that it is of doubtful authenticity.⁷
Most scholars have judged that the speech’s lack of detail and
borrowings from earlier works of Demosthenes make it more
likely to be a later pastiche than a genuine work.⁸ But these ar-
guments are subjective, and the most recent discussions of the
speech have concluded that there is no compelling reason to deny
that Demosthenes wrote it. In particular, since Demosthenes of-
ten reworks material from his earlier speeches, the reuse of mate-
⁵ The Greek text of Didymus is damaged at this point, and there is some
doubt about what exactly he is saying.
⁶ See Harding 2006: 221–224.
⁷ McCabe 1981: 170–171.
⁸ As noted above (p. 201 n. 4), it cannot be a genuine speech of the period
misattributed to Demosthenes.

11. r esponse to the letter of philip 203
rial from Dem. 2 in this speech constitutes a very weak argument

against its authenticity.⁹ I am therefore inclined to agree that the
speech is quite likely genuine.
The date (dramatic or actual) of the speech is summer or au-
tumn 340. Dionysius of Halicarnassus dates it 340/339, after the
outbreak of war with Philip.¹⁰ Its date and context are also dis-
cussed by Didymus, who agrees that “war had obviously already
broken out” (col. 10.20–21). Certainly 11 seems to indicate that
war has just been declared or is at any rate imminent.
There are various accounts of the sequence of events leading
to the outbreak of war between Athens and Philip. Dionysius of
Halicarnassus quotes the historian Philochorus (relating events in
early 340/339) to the effect that after he had laid siege to Perinthus
and Byzantium, Philip wrote a letter to the Athenians making a
series of complaints against them, and that in response to this let-
ter, Demosthenes persuaded the Athenians to declare war, and
that as a result, they tore down the pillar recording the Peace of
Philocrates and prepared for war.¹¹
Didymus gives a different account. He quotes Philochorus
and Theopompus in support of the view that war broke out be-
cause of Philip’s seizure of a fleet of grain ships bound for Ath-
ens that was anchored at Hieron, on the Asiatic side of the Bos-
porus.¹² This is consistent with Demosthenes’ later claim (in 330)
that it was the seizure of the ships that broke the peace (18.73). The
ancient commentary on Dem. 11.1 adds more detail: Philip al-
leged that these ships were being sent to relieve the city of Selym-
bria, which he was besieging, and sent a letter of complaint to the
⁹ Thus Harding 2006: 217–218. See too MacDowell (2009: 360–363),

who correctly points out the material has been reworked to fit the context
(as Demosthenes does on other occasions).
¹⁰ See p. 201 n. 3 above. Dionysius evidently placed it later than Dem. 10.
¹¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, First Letter to Ammaeus 11 quoting Philo-
chorus FGH 328 fragments 53–55a. See too Diodorus 16.77.2. For tearing
down the pillar on which a treaty is recorded as a public repudiation of it,
see 16.27n.
¹² Didymus cols. 10.34–11.5, quoting Philochorus FGH 328 fragment 162
and Theopompus FGH 115 fragment 292.

204 demosthenes
Athenians, accusing them of breaking the peace.¹³ It was in re-

sponse to this letter, the commentator claims, that this speech was
delivered.
Turning to the speech itself, the speaker claims that Philip’s
letter acknowledges the reality of the claim (of anti-Macedonian
politicians at Athens) that he has been waging war on Athens for
a long time (1); that he wishes to attack Perinthus and Byzan-
tium (3); that Persian support to Perinthus has prevented its cap-
ture; and that the Persians will be in great danger if Byzantium
is defeated (5). If the speech is genuine, it probably does belong
to the debate that led to the declaration of war, although it is cu-
rious in that case that Demosthenes neither states explicitly that
Byzantium is already under siege nor mentions Philip’s seizure of
the grain ships. Perhaps he did not need to because these events
were all too familiar to the Athenians. If this is the case, then this
speech may have been delivered in response to the letter of Philip
preserved as Dem. 12, if (as some scholars believe) that is the let-
ter that led the Athenians to declare war (see the Introduction
to Dem. 12). If, on the other hand, the speech is spurious, its au-
thor may not have known (or cared) about the precise sequence of
events of that summer.
The speech argues that Philip’s position is not as strong as it
might appear. His deceitful conduct has made him an object of
suspicion in Greece, even to his allies (3–4); the Persians are now
acting against him (5– 6); Macedonia is not united behind him
(8–14). Philip prospers because he is active (17) and has bribed
some of the politicians (18). The Athenians have been disgrace-
fully idle but must now take action (19–23).
11. r esponse to the letter of philip

[1] It is now clear to all of you, men of Athens, that Philip
did not make peace with you¹⁴ but merely postponed war. For by
¹³ Dilts 1983: 158.3–11. The siege of Selymbria (on the city see 15.26n) is
not mentioned by any contemporary source, but its historicity is argued for
in detail by Hammond and Griffith 1979: 574 n. 2.
¹⁴ The Peace of Philocrates of 346.

handing Halus over to the Thessalians¹⁵ and administering the

affairs of the Phocians¹⁶ and overturning all of Thrace,¹⁷ fabricat-
ing nonexistent reasons and discovering unjust excuses, he has in
reality been waging war against our city for a long time, and now
he acknowledges it in the letter he has sent.¹⁸ [2] I shall try to ex-
plain to you why you should neither shudder at¹⁹ his power nor
face him in an ignoble fashion, but should set out for the war with
your persons and money and ships and—to speak simply—with-
out sparing anything. For, first, it is reasonable to suppose that
you have as allies and helpers the supreme gods, since he over-
looked his pledges and transgressed his oaths to them when he un-
justly broke the peace.²⁰ [3] Next, the means by which in the past
he grew strong, always cheating someone and announcing that
he would do them great benefits, have all now been exhausted,
and the Perinthians and the Byzantines and their allies all recog-
nize that he wishes to attack them just as he previously attacked
the Olynthians.²¹ [4] He is known by the Thessalians to be a des-
pot and not the elected leader of an alliance.²² He is an object of
¹⁵ The city of Halus in Phthiotic Achaea in northern Greece was cap-

tured by Philip’s general Parmenion in 346 (Dem. 19.163) and its territory
handed over to the Thessalian city of Pharsalus (Dem. 19.36). The Athenians
had tried unsuccessfully to save Halus in the negotiations leading to the
Peace of Philocrates by having it included among their allies.
¹⁶ On the harshness of Philip’s settlement of Phocis after the end of the
Third Sacred War in 346, see Diodorus 16.60.1–2.
¹⁷ Philip’s campaign against Cersobleptes and Teres in eastern Thrace
from 342 to 340 brought him into conflict with the Greek cities Perinthus
and Byzantium and eventually with Athens.
¹⁸ The only surviving letter of Philip to the Athenians is preserved as
Dem. 12: on its date and authorship, see the Introduction to Dem. 12.
¹⁹ See the Speech Introduction on the use of this word.
²⁰ The gods were regularly invoked as guarantors of treaties.
²¹ The important cities of Perinthus on the northern coast of the Sea of
Marmara and Byzantium on the Bosporus were threatened by Philip’s cam-
paign in eastern Thrace. Olynthus had been besieged and captured by him
in 348 (see the Introduction to Dem. 1–3).
²² Philip had been elected by the Thessalians as chief magistrate (archōn)
for life: see 1.13n. For his heavy-handed treatment of Thessaly in the later
340s, see 6.22 and 9.12, 26.

206 demosthenes
suspicion to the Thebans since he holds Nicaea²³ with a garri-

son, and has wormed his way into the Amphictyony,²⁴ and leads
the embassies from the Peloponnese to himself and detaches them
from their alliance.²⁵ Consequently some of his former friends are
now irreconcilably at war with him, others are no longer willing
accomplices, and all are treated with suspicion and slandered by
him. [5] Furthermore—and this is no small matter—those who
have been appointed as satraps in Asia have recently sent merce-
naries and prevented Perinthus being taken by siege.²⁶ Now that
their hatred is implacable and the danger to them is close at hand,
if Byzantium should be defeated,²⁷ not only will they eagerly join
in the war [6] but they will urge the King, who is richer than any-
one else, to supply us with money.²⁸ He has such power to influ-
²³ On Nicaea in eastern Locris, see 6.22n. See also Didymus col. 11.26–
52, with Harding 2006: 224–228.
²⁴ In 346 Philip received the two seats on the Amphictyonic council that
had belonged to Phocis, and as ruler of Thessaly, he effectively controlled a
majority of the votes on it. See further the Introduction to Dem. 5.
²⁵ Several anti-Spartan states of the Peloponnese (Argos, Messenia, Arca-
dia in particular) received support from Philip during the second half of the
340s. The alliance from which they were being detached was with Thebes,
which had been responsible for breaking Spartan control of the Pelopon-
nese in the aftermath of the battle of Leuctra in 371. (On Thebes’ alliance
with the Arcadian city Megalopolis, see Dem. 16.) Events in the Pelopon-
nese in this period form much of the subject matter of Dem. 6.
²⁶ Philip laid siege to Perinthus in or about July 340 (narrated by Dio-
dorus 16.74.2– 76.3). The Persians had by now realized the threat that Philip
represented to them, and they sent support to the city: see Diodorus 16.75.1–
2, claiming plausibly that the order came from the Persian King. See also
Pausanias 1.29.10; Arrian Anabasis 2.14.5. Cf. 10.34–35 for Demosthenes’
hope (in 341) that Persia would join the anti-Macedonian cause; also 12.6– 7
for Philip’s complaints about Athens’ diplomatic contact with Persia.
²⁷ Byzantium was of obvious strategic importance, both for its control of
the Bosporus and as a place from which to invade Asia Minor. Philip laid
siege to the city in ca. September 340.
²⁸ The Greeks believed (correctly) that the Persian King was enormously
wealthy. The Persians more commonly intervened in Greek affairs in the
fourth century by financial than by military means.

ence events in Greece that previously, when we were at war with

Sparta, he caused whichever side he supported to prevail over the
other.²⁹ So now, if he joins us, he will easily defeat the power of
Philip.
[7] Despite these weighty advantages, I shall not deny that he
has used the peace to deprive us of many places and harbors and
other assets that are useful for war,³⁰ but I see that whenever all
the participants in a war are held together by goodwill and a com-
mon interest, they remain securely united; but when they are held
down by plotting and greed, as a result of deception and violence,
as they are now by this man, a small pretext and a chance slip will
swiftly shake them up and dissolve them.³¹ [8] And often, men of
Athens, when I consider the matter I find not only that Philip’s
alliances have declined into suspicion and hostility but that even
his own kingdom is neither cohesive nor friendly to him nor as
people imagine it to be. For, all in all, the power of Macedonia
has a certain influence and value as a supplement, but on its own
it is weak and contemptible in relation to so great a mass of af-
fairs. [9] Moreover, his wars and expeditions, and all the things
by which one might think him great, have made his kingdom less
secure for him. For you should not suppose, men of Athens, that
Philip and his subjects take pleasure in the same things. Instead,
you should realize that he desires glory, whereas they want secu-
rity, and that he cannot get glory without risk, whereas they have
no wish to leave their children, parents, and wives at home and to
be destroyed and to take daily risks on his account. [10] From these
considerations it can be seen how the majority of the Macedo-
nians feel about Philip: you will find that both the Companions³²
²⁹ The speaker refers to the period from 411 to 386. During the final stage
of the Peloponnesian War (411–404), Persia supported Sparta against Ath-
ens, and in the early years of the Corinthian War (395–386), it backed Ath-
ens and its allies against Sparta.
³⁰ The following section (8–17) is closely adapted from the Second Olyn-
thiac of 349/8: cf. 2.14–23. See the Speech Introduction for discussion of the
implications of this borrowing for this speech’s authorship.
³¹ This sentence is adapted from 2.9.
³² On the Companions, see 2.10n.

208 demosthenes
who accompany him and his mercenary commanders have a rep-

utation for bravery but in fact live in greater fear than those who
live in obscurity. For the latter face only the risk of fighting the
enemy, whereas the former are more frightened of the flatterers
and slanderers than they are of battle. [11] The people fight along-
side everyone else against their enemies, but the Companions not
only have a substantial share of the evils of war but also individ-
ually are in fear of the moods of the king. Moreover, if one of
the people does something wrong, he is punished as he deserves;
but whenever the Companions are most successful, then most of
all they are treated with contempt and are undeservedly trampled
down.³³ [12] Nor would any sensible person find these things un-
believable; for according to those who have spent time with him,
Philip is so ambitious that he claims every great achievement for
himself and is more distressed at those generals and leaders who
have done something praiseworthy than at those who have utterly
failed. [13] Why then, if all this is true, have these men remained
loyally by his side for so long? Because at present, men of Athens,
his success obscures all such concerns. For success is good at hid-
ing or obscuring men’s errors. But if he stumbles at all, all these
problems will be clearly uncovered. It is the same with our bod-
ies: [14] whenever a man is strong, he notices no individual weak-
ness, but when he is unwell, everything comes out, whether it be
a break or a sprain or some other existing condition that is not
completely healthy. So in the case of kingdoms and tyrannies, for
as long as they are successful in war, their weaknesses are invisible
to most people, but when they suffer some reverse, such as that
man is now likely to suffer, by taking too heavy a burden upon
himself, all his difficulties become evident to everyone.
[15] If any of you, men of Athens, is led by the sight of Philip’s
good fortune to think him fearsome and hard to fight against,
he shows good sense. For fortune has great influence, or rather
is everything, in all the affairs of men: yet in many ways our for-
tune is preferable to his. [16] We have inherited from our ances-
tors over a considerable period of time not only his fortune but,
³³ See also 2.18 on Philip’s temperamental nature.

in short, that of every king of Macedonia, since they paid trib-

ute to Athens,³⁴ whereas our city has not yet paid tribute to any
of them. Furthermore, because we continue to act with greater pi-
ety and justice than he does, we have greater access to the good-
will of the gods. [17] Why then was he more successful than us
in the previous war? Because, men of Athens, (for I shall speak
freely to you) he campaigns in person and endures hardships and
is present when there is danger, and neither lets any opportu-
nity pass nor leaves any season of the year aside, whereas we, if
the truth be told, sit around here doing nothing, always delay-
ing and taking votes and asking in the marketplace if there is any
news. And yet what could be bigger news than that a Macedo-
nian despises the Athenians and dares to send letters such as you
heard a while ago?³⁵ [18] He possesses hired men: both soldiers
and also—by god!—some of your politicians, who think it right
to take home gifts from him, and shamelessly live for Philip, and
fail to realize that they are selling both their city and themselves
for a small sum. And yet we fail to prepare ourselves to throw his
affairs into disorder, and are unwilling to hire mercenaries, and
lack the courage to go on campaign. [19] What is strange, then, is
not that he has gained some advantage over us during the previ-
ous war but that we imagine that we, even though we do none of
the things that men who are at war should do, will defeat some-
one who does everything that a man who means to get the upper
hand has to do.
[20] If we recognize this, men of Athens, and accept that it
is not open to us to say that we are keeping the peace—for he
has already declared war in advance and has demonstrated it by
his actions—we must spare nothing either in public or in private,
and must go on campaign, if the occasion arises, all of us will-
ingly, and must employ better generals than previously. [21] Let
none of you suppose that the same things that caused our situa-
tion to deteriorate will also lead to its recovery and improvement.
Nor should you suppose that while you are remiss, as you were
³⁴ This claim is untrue: see 3.24n.

³⁵ This sentence is modeled on 4.10.

210 demosthenes
before, others will struggle on your behalf. Instead you should re-
flect that it is shameful that your fathers endured much toil and
great dangers when they were at war with Sparta, [22] but you
are unwilling to offer vigorous resistance even for the things that
they rightfully acquired and handed on to you. Instead, whereas
the man who is setting out from Macedonia so loves danger that
he has suffered wounds³⁶ over his whole body while fighting his
enemies in order to increase the size of his empire, the Athenians,
whose ancestral custom is to obey no one else and to be univer-
sally victorious in war, because of their idleness or softness are
abandoning both the achievements of their ancestors and their
country’s advantage.
[23] Not to speak at length, I say that we must prepare our-
selves for war and must summon the Greeks to an alliance with
us, not by words but by deeds, since all words are pointless if they
are not accompanied by action, and this applies most of all to us,
since we seem more ready than the other Greeks to use them.
³⁶ On this passage see Didymus cols. 12.37–13.12, with Harding 2006:

233–242. Philip was shot in the eye during the siege of Methone, and also
suffered wounds to his collarbone and thigh.

12. LET TER OF PHILIP
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The Letter of Philip to the Athenians, whether genuine or not,
clearly does not properly belong in a collection of Demosthenes’
deliberative speeches, but ancient editors presumably included it
because they believed (perhaps correctly) that it was the letter to
which Dem. 11 responds.
The Letter is found in only some of the manuscripts of De-
mosthenes (FY, not SA) and is not discussed by the ancient com-
mentators. Didymus, however, quotes (col. 10.24–30) the closing
sentences from a “letter of Philip” that are very close to, and in
some cases identical with, the closing words of this letter. It is un-
clear whether he is quoting this letter from memory, referring to
a different letter of Philip whose conclusion was nevertheless very
similar, or confusing two different letters. The fact that Didymus
elsewhere (col. 9.45–47) reports that in “the letter to the Athe-
nians” Philip writes about a mercenary commander named Aris-
tomedes of Pherae, whom he does not mention in this letter, per-
haps suggests that he knew only one, different, letter of Philip.
But the matter is unclear.
There is no doubt that Philip communicated on more than one
occasion with the Athenians by letter, as he did with other states.
In addition to the letter(s) referred to by Didymus, and the let-
ter to which Dem. 11 responds, there are references to letters at
Dem. 7.1 (a letter of 342), 8.16 (a letter in which Philip claimed to
be defending himself against the Athenians in the Chersonese),
9.16 (a letter in which he admits that he has sent soldiers into
the Chersonese), and 9.27 (letters in which he states that he is at
peace with those who are willing to heed him). How many differ-

212 demosthenes
ent letters are involved is hard to assess, and there may well have
been others of which we know nothing. All such letters would
have been preserved in the Athenian archives and accessible to
interested parties. It is thus not implausible that a genuine let-
ter of Philip should have been preserved among the speeches of
Demosthenes.
The date of the letter has to be determined on internal grounds.
It is clearly earlier than the outbreak of war between Athens and
Macedon in late summer 340 (5). There is continued friction over
the Chersonese (at 11 Philip admits to helping Cardia), and Philip
is still on campaign in Thrace (at 8 he complains that the Athe-
nians are ordering him to allow Cersobleptes and Teres to rule).
Specific new points are:
1. The Athenian general Callias is seizing cities in the Gulf of
Pherae (5).
2. An Athenian embassy has been sent to the Persian King (6) to
persuade him to wage war on Philip.
3. A very recent incident has taken place relating to the island of
Peparethos (12).
4. The Macedonians have made an incursion into the Cher-
sonese, prompted by Philip’s desire to send ships to the Helles-
pont (16).
Of these, the first and third cannot be dated. The fourth prob-
ably relates to Philip’s desire to move ships into the Sea of Mar-
mara to blockade Perinthus, the siege of which began in summer
340. Athenian overtures to Persia also belong to the same period,
since we know that the Persians sent help to Perinthus and co-
operated with Athenian forces on the spot. All of this points to a
date in summer or perhaps autumn 340. On the relationship be-
tween this letter and Dem. 11, see below.
The letter seems well informed about the situation in Greece
and about relations between Athens and Macedonia, and it con-
tains details not found elsewhere. The one apparent error is at 9,
where two different Thracian rulers seem to be confused (see the
note). The arguments are vigorously expressed and strong, espe-
cially over the disputed city of Amphipolis, to which Philip con-

12. letter of philip 213
tends that the Athenian claim is weaker than his (20–23). He

makes numerous complaints against the Athenians, both about
specific actions and about their relentlessly hostile attitude to him
(1). He accuses them of seizing a herald and an ambassador, of
raiding his and his allies’ territory, of negotiating with the Per-
sian King against him, and of refusing to accept his offers either
to put their disputes to arbitration or to renegotiate the Peace of
Philocrates. He also defends himself against Athenian allegations
that he has been sending help to Cardia and that he illegally sent
troops into the Athenian-controlled Chersonese. Many of these
complaints appear, from a different point of view, in the speeches
of the late 340s of Demosthenes and Hegesippus (Dem. 6–10).
The language and style of the letter are consistent with a
fourth-century date, and there seems no good reason to deny that
it is a genuine letter sent by Philip to the Athenians. Whether it
was written by Philip himself is impossible to say, since we have
no genuine writings of his with which to compare it. In any case,
we do not know whether he wrote official letters in person or re-
lied on Greek writers to do so for him. Certain rather undiplo-
matically blunt features of the letter have been thought more
likely the work of Philip himself than of a Greek. These include
the ominously vague final sentence, the poor taste of his criticism
of Athens’ democracy, and the tactless boast that he could buy up
those Athenian politicians who opposed him if he chose (20). But
absolute certainty is impossible.
It remains to consider the relationship of this letter to the
Athenian declaration of war against Philip in 340 and to Dem. 11.
We know (see the Introduction to Dem. 11) that the Athenians
declared war against Philip in response to a letter from him that
made a series of complaints against them and that in some way
acknowledged that a state of war existed between him and them.
Although this letter is generally dated somewhat earlier in 340,
it is possible that it is in fact the same letter.¹ In particular, its
¹ The matter is well discussed by MacDowell (2009: 363–366), who tenta-

tively concludes that this is the letter that precipitated war. Other scholars,
however, believe that this letter was sent earlier in the summer of 340 and
that the letter that led to war has not survived: see, e.g., Sealey 1993: 187.

214 demosthenes
peremptory and threatening final words—“I will defend myself

with justice . . . and will deal with your case”—could have been
interpreted at Athens as tantamount to a declaration of war.
The letter is helpfully discussed by Hammond and Griffith 1979:

714–716.
12. letter of philip

[1] Philip, to the Athenian Council and People, greetings.
Since you have paid no attention to the many ambassadors I have
sent to you to ensure that we abide by our oaths and agreements,
I thought it necessary to send you a letter about the wrongs that
I believe you are doing me. Do not be surprised by the length of
the letter: I have many complaints, and it is necessary to give a
clear demonstration of all of them.
[2] First, when Nicias the herald was snatched from my terri-
tory, not only did you fail to punish the culprits but you detained
the victim for ten months, and you read out from the speaker’s
platform the letters from us that he was carrying.² Then, when
the Thasians were admitting the Byzantine triremes and any pi-
rate who wished to land there, you took no notice of it, although
the agreement expressly states that those who do this are to be en-
emies.³ [3] Moreover, at about the same time, Diopeithes,⁴ after
² Heralds were by convention regarded as inviolable: see, e.g., Rhodes

and Osborne 2003: no. 35 (an Athenian protest of the 360s against the arrest
of Athenian heralds by the Aetolians).
³ The Peace of Philocrates contained a clause forbidding either party or
its allies to harbor pirates (see also 7.14). Thasos in the northern Aegean
was an ally of Athens and as such bound by the terms of the peace (cf. 4.32,
7.15). Philip’s complaint as regards Byzantium would be justifiable, since he
and Byzantium were by now at war with each other. It is also possible that
Byzantium had, as earlier, been forcing merchant ships to put in to land
(see 5.25n) and that Philip chose to interpret this as piratical behavior. As
de Souza notes (1999: 36), in this period “the difference between legitimate
warfare and piracy was often only a matter of opinion and interpretation.”
⁴ Diopeithes was the commander of the Athenian settlers in the Cher-
sonese: see the Introduction to Dem. 8.

attacking my territory, enslaved Crobyle and Tiristasis, ravaged

the adjoining part of Thrace,⁵ and finally went so far in lawless-
ness that he arrested Amphilochus who had come as an ambassa-
dor about the prisoners, and, after subjecting him to the harshest
of constraints, ransomed him for nine talents: and he did these
things with the approval of the Athenian people.⁶ [4] Yet the il-
legal treatment of a herald and of ambassadors is viewed as impi-
ous by everyone else—and most of all by you! At any rate, when
the Megarians killed Anthemocritus,⁷ your people went so far as
to bar them from the Mysteries, and set up a statue before the
gates as a memorial of this act of injustice.⁸ Yet is it not strange
that you are now openly doing the very things for which, when
you suffered them, you so hated the perpetrators? [5] Moreover,
your general Callias⁹ seized all the inhabited cities on the Gulf of
⁵ Crobyle and Tiristasis were towns in eastern Thrace. They had previ-
ously belonged to the Thracian king Cersobleptes but were now subject to
Philip.
⁶ Philip’s ambassador Amphilochus is not otherwise known.
⁷ The killing of the Athenian ambassador Anthemocritus probably oc-
curred in 432/1, during the period of tension between Megara and Athens
preceding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (see de Ste. Croix 1972:
246–251). An alternative view places his death much later, in the context of
the dispute over the area of sacred land called the Hiera Orgas on the bor-
der between Athens and Megara in ca. 350: see Connor 1962. On the latter
episode, see also 13.32n.
⁸ The Mysteries were a religious ceremony celebrated at Eleusis in Attica
in honor of the two goddesses Demeter and Persephone: see 3.5n. A decree
proposed by one Charinus banned the Megarians from setting foot in At-
tica on pain of death and arranged for Anthemocritus’ burial near Athens’
Dipylon Gate (Plut. Pericles 30.3).
⁹ This man is generally identified as Callias of the Euboean city Chal-
cis, who was by now collaborating with Demosthenes in his opposition to
Philip and to whose career Aeschines devotes a lengthy passage of his speech
Against Ctesiphon of 330 (3.85–104). On Demosthenes’ proposal, he was
granted Athenian citizenship, though the date of this grant is uncertain: see
Osborne 1983: T73. If he was in fact serving as one of Athens’ ten generals
in 341/0, he must have already received Athenian citizenship, though Philip
may simply mean that he is commanding a force fighting on Athens’ side.
On relations between Chalcis and Athens in this period, see 8.18n.

216 demosthenes
Pagasae, which were bound by oath to you but allied to me,¹⁰ and
sold into slavery all those who were sailing to Macedonia, judging
them to be your enemies. And you praised him in your decrees
for these actions! Consequently I cannot say that it would be any-
thing new if you were to admit that you are at war with me: for
indeed, at the time when we were openly at war with each other,
you sent out privateers, sold those who were sailing to us into slav-
ery, gave help to my enemies, and did damage to my territory.¹¹
[6] Besides, you have reached such a degree of lawlessness and
hostility that you have even sent ambassadors to the Persian King
to persuade him to wage war on me.¹² This in particular might
be thought extraordinary, since before his conquest of Egypt and
Phoenicia, you voted to summon me and all the other Greeks
alike against him, if he should stir up any trouble.¹³ [7] But now
your hatred of me is so excessive that you are holding talks with
him about a defensive alliance. And yet long ago your ancestors,
I learn, censured the sons of Peisistratus for inviting the Persian
against the Greeks, but you feel no shame in doing the very things
for which you always found fault with the tyrants!¹⁴
¹⁰ It has been thought surprising that Callias should have been able to
capture all these cities, including Pagasae, without meeting effective Mace-
donian opposition. It is possible either that the text is corrupt or that Philip
is exaggerating and that in either case Callias only attacked the cities. On
this point, see the discussion of Hammond and Griffith 1979: 553–554. The
nature of the oaths between these cities and Athens is unknown.
¹¹ This refers to the period before the Peace of Philocrates of 346.
¹² On Athenian diplomatic contact with Persia, see 10.34–35, 11.5– 6. By
summer 340 the Persians had come to see Philip as a threat to themselves
and had joined Athens in sending help to the besieged cities of Perinthus
and Byzantium.
¹³ The context may be the sharp reply that Athens gave to the Persian
King in 344/3 (see 10.34n). For earlier Athenian fear of Persia, see Dem. 14.
Philip here implicitly identifies himself as Greek: see 9.31n.
¹⁴ On the sons of Peisistratus, see 17.3n. Hippias and Hipparchus ruled
Athens as tyrants after the death of their father in 528/7. Hipparchus died
in 514, and Hippias was exiled in 510. In 490 the Persian King Darius at-
tempted to restore Hippias as pro-Persian ruler of Athens, but the Persian
invasion of Attica was defeated at the battle of Marathon. The Athenians

[8] On top of everything else, you order me in your decrees to

allow Teres and Cersobleptes to rule Thrace, on the ground that
they are Athenian citizens.¹⁵ But I know that these men neither
shared with you in the agreements about the peace¹⁶ nor are re-
corded in the pillars¹⁷ nor are Athenian; rather, Teres marches
with me against you, and Cersobleptes told my ambassadors in
private that he had been keen to swear the oaths but was pre-
vented by your generals who declared him to be an enemy of Ath-
ens.¹⁸ [9] And yet how is it fair or just for you to say that Cerso-
bleptes is your enemy when it suits you, but to declare that he is
an Athenian citizen whenever you wish to make malicious allega-
tions against me? Or, straight after the death of Sitalces, to whom
you gave citizenship, for you to grant friendship to his killer, and
to choose to go to war against us on Cersobleptes’ behalf?¹⁹ And
thus had no opportunity to censure the one surviving Peisistratid, Hippias,

who probably died soon thereafter.
¹⁵ Teres and Cersobleptes were rulers in central and eastern Thrace re-
spectively and had been driven out of their kingdoms by Philip in 342
(Diodorus 16.71.1–2). The Athenians often made grants of citizenship to for-
eign rulers whom they wished to cultivate. See Osborne 1983: T54 (Cerso-
bleptes) and T65 (Teres).
¹⁶ I.e., the Peace of Philocrates.
¹⁷ Treaties were published at Athens by being inscribed on stone pillars
(stēlai).
¹⁸ Cersobleptes was not included among Athens’ allies to be protected
by the terms of the Peace of Philocrates. Demosthenes and Aeschines later
wrangled about which of them was responsible for this (Dem. 19.174, 334–
335; Aes. 2.81– 93, 3.73– 75), but his inclusion would in any case have been
unacceptable to Philip, who was on campaign against him in Thrace at
the time.
¹⁹ The allusion here is uncertain. Sitalces was a Th racian king of the fifth
century, but he is not known to have received Athenian citizenship and in
any case died in battle. Also, the context shows that more recent events are
meant. It has been proposed that Sitalces is a slip for the fourth-century
Thracian king Cotys, who had been an ally of Athens and was murdered
in 358 by two Greeks from Aenus, who were honored for their action by the
Athenians. But the letter refers to one killer, and we are told that these men
received Athenian citizenship rather than “friendship” (Dem. 23.119, 127),

218 demosthenes
you act like this even though you know very well that nobody
who receives such gifts from you pays any attention to your laws
or decrees! [10] Nevertheless, to leave everything else to one side
and speak briefly, you made grants of citizenship to Evagoras of
Cyprus²⁰ and Dionysius of Syracuse²¹ and their descendants. If
you can persuade those who exiled each of these men to give the
exile his kingdom back, then you may recover from me as much
of Thrace as Teres and Cersobleptes ruled. But if you do not see
fit to offer even a mild reproach to those who defeated these men,
and yet get angry with me, how is it wrong for me to defend my-
self against you?
[11] I have many more just claims to make about these matters,
but I choose to pass over them. As for the Cardians, I admit that
I am helping them, since I became their ally before the peace, but
you are unwilling to submit the matter to judgment, although I
have often requested it, as have they on a number of occasions.²²
a term that in any case suggests a relationship with a foreign ruler rather
than with private citizens. Alternatively, an otherwise unknown Thracian
ruler named Sitalces may be meant. See Osborne 1983: T36 (Cotys), T52 and
T53 (the killers), and X3 (Sitalces). The suggestion that this (apparent) error
means that this cannot be a genuine letter of Philip is baseless.
²⁰ Evagoras was the ruler of the Cypriote city of Salamis in the late fifth
and early fourth century. He was granted Athenian citizenship at an uncer-
tain date (see Isoc. 9.54; Osborne 1983: D3). He is only known to have been
exiled in his youth, i.e., before he became ruler.
²¹ Dionysius I of Syracuse ruled much of Sicily from 405 to 367. He and
his descendants were granted Athenian citizenship in 368 (see IG II² 103 =
Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 33; Osborne 1983: D10). It was his son, Dio-
nysius II, who was (twice) exiled, and ended his life at Corinth. In both this
and the previous case, the author’s grasp of earlier fourth-century Greek
history seems to be somewhat inexact.
²² The independent city of Cardia in the northern Chersonese, which in
340 was in conflict with Athens, had become an ally of Philip by 346, the
year of the Peace of Philocrates. The Athenians claimed Cardia for them-
selves, on the ground that it formed part of the Chersonese (for the recog-
nition by the Greeks and the Persian King of Athens’ claim to which, see
9.16n), but this is not a matter that either the Cardians or Philip would have
considered negotiable. The dispute to which Philip refers is presumably that

Would it not be despicable of me to desert my allies and take

more thought for you, who criticize every aspect of my behavior,
than for those who have always remained my staunch friends?
[12] Since I must address this matter too, you have become so
overbearing that whereas previously you merely criticized me for
the things mentioned above, most recently, when the Peparethi-
ans were claiming to have suffered terribly, you ordered your gen-
eral to punish me on their behalf, although I had punished them
less than they deserved.²³ And the Peparethians, at a time when
there was peace, seized Halonnesus and refused to surrender either
the place or its garrison, though I often sent ambassadors about
them.²⁴ [13] You failed to denounce a single one of the wrongs
that the Peparethians did to me but instead criticized my punish-
ment of them, even though you knew the details of the case. And
yet it was neither they nor you from whom I took the island, but
the pirate Sostratus.²⁵ So if you claim that you had handed it over
to Sostratus, you are admitting that you dispatched pirates; but
if he controlled it against your wishes, what terrible loss have you
suffered as a result of my taking it and making the place safe for
sailors? [14] Although I was showing such concern for your city,
and offering you the island, the politicians did not allow you to
take it; they wanted you to take it back, thereby admitting that
I possessed an island that belonged to someone else; or else, if I
did not surrender the place, I would become an object of suspi-
over the location of the border between Cardian and Athenian territory in
the Chersonese, on which see 7.39–44. On Cardia and the Chersonese, see
in general Dem. 8.
²³ The Aegean island of Peparethus was a member of the Second Athe-
nian Confederacy. In response to the Peparethians seizing the island of Ha-
lonnesus from him, probably in 341, Philip sacked their city in 340: see
Dem. 18.70. The general mentioned is probably Chares, on whom see 8.30n.
²⁴ On the earlier diplomatic wrangling between Philip and Athens over
Halonnesus, see Dem. 7: evidently Philip’s offer to give the island to Ath-
ens on that occasion had been rejected, since the Peparethians subsequently
took it from him (see also 15 below).
²⁵ The leader of the pirates who had seized Halonnesus and from whom
Philip had in turn taken it. He is not named in Dem. 7.

220 demosthenes
cion to the people.²⁶ Recognizing this, I challenged you to sub-

mit these matters to arbitration, in order that if it was determined
to be mine, I would give the place to you, but if it was determined
to be yours, then I would give it back to the Athenian people.²⁷
[15] I made these requests often, but you paid no attention, and
then the Peparethians seized the island. What was I supposed to
do? Fail to punish those who had broken their oaths? Or fail to
avenge myself on those who were behaving with such brazen ar-
rogance? For indeed if the island belonged to the Peparethians,
what business was it of you Athenians to demand it back? But if it
was yours, why are you not angry with them for taking what was
not theirs?
[16] Our hostility toward each other has gone so far that when
I wished to get through to the Hellespont with ships, I was com-
pelled to send them by way of the Chersonese with my army, since
the cleruchs were waging war on me in accordance with the de-
cree of Polycrates, and you were voting similar measures, and the
general was summoning the people of Byzantium and announc-
ing to everyone that you were ordering him to wage war if the
occasion should arise.²⁸ Although I was suffering such wrongs, I
nevertheless left your city and ships and territory alone, though I
could have taken most or all of them, and have continued to in-
vite you to submit the allegations that we make against each other
to judgment. [17] Yet consider whether it is nobler to resolve a dis-
pute by fighting or by talking, whether we are our own arbitra-
tors or persuade others to do so; and consider how absurd it is for
you Athenians to compel the people of Thasos and Maroneia to
²⁶ These speakers included Hegesippus, whose speech on Halonnesus

(= Dem. 7) makes precisely this argument.
²⁷ The referral of an interstate dispute to a third party for arbitration re-
quired the agreement of both parties. See 7.7n.
²⁸ Philip claims that he sent troops into the Chersonese only to protect
the passage of his ships through the Hellespont into the Sea of Marmara,
where he presumably intended to use them against Perinthus and Byzan-
tium. The general he refers to is Chares, who commanded an Athenian fleet
operating in the region. See Hammond and Griffith (1979: 570–571), whose
reconstruction of the episode is here followed.

resolve their dispute over Stryme by negotiation²⁹ but to refuse to

resolve your disputes with me in the same way, especially when
you know that if you lose, you will give up nothing, while if you
win, you will take for yourselves what is now in my hands.
[18] The most unreasonable thing of all, in my opinion, is that
when I sent ambassadors from my whole alliance, in order to have
witnesses, and tried to reach a fair agreement with you for the
sake of the Greeks, you did not even listen to what my ambas-
sadors had to say about these matters, when it was possible for
you either to allay the fears of those who suspected foul play on
our part or to convict me openly of being the most worthless of
men.³⁰ [19] This course of action was in the interest of your peo-
ple but was unprofitable to the speakers. For those who have ex-
perience of your form of government say that to them peace is
war, and war is peace: whether by cooperating with the gener-
als or by bringing malicious prosecutions against them, they al-
ways take something from them; moreover, by abusing the most
distinguished citizens and the most esteemed foreigners from the
speakers’ platform, they gain the reputation in the eyes of the ma-
jority of being friends of the people.³¹
[20] It is easy for me to put a stop to their abuse by paying
them a tiny sum of money, and make them utter panegyrics of us
instead.³² But I would be ashamed to be seen to buy your good-
will from these men, who on top of everything else are so impu-
²⁹ Stryme was an outpost of Thasos on the northern coast of the Aegean

close to the territory of Maroneia and had been a bone of contention be-
tween the two cities since the seventh century. See Dem. 50.20–22 for Athe-
nian intervention in their dispute in 361/0.
³⁰ See the Introduction to Dem. 6 on Philip’s embassy to Athens in 344/3
offering to renegotiate the Peace of Philocrates. Cf. 7.18–32 for a repeat of
this offer in the following year.
³¹ Ironically, Philip’s accusation is similar to Demosthenes’ recurring
complaint that his fellow Athenian politicians curry favor with the people.
See Dem. 7 for Hegesippus’ intransigent response to Philip’s overtures.
³² Demosthenes regularly accuses Philip of bribing politicians in Athens
and elsewhere. Philip counters that he could, if he wished, easily bribe vio-
lently anti-Macedonian politicians to change their tune.

222 demosthenes
dent as to try to wrangle with us over Amphipolis³³—a place to

which I think I have a much stronger claim than anyone else.
[21] For if it belongs to those who originally conquered it, how
can it be wrong for us to possess it, since it was our ancestor Al-
exander who first held the place, and from it he set up a gold
statue at Delphi as first fruit for the Median prisoners?³⁴ If any-
one wishes to dispute this, and thinks that it should belong to
those who acquired it later, here too justice is on my side: for I be-
sieged those who had expelled you and had been settled there by
the Spartans, and took the place.³⁵ [22] The cities that we all in-
habit have been either inherited from our ancestors or acquired
in war. Yet you lay claim to Amphipolis, although you were not
the first to acquire it, do not now possess it, and spent the short-
est time in it. What is more, you have added a decisive proof on
my behalf: for I often wrote about it in my letters to you, and you
recognized that we possess it justly, at one point making peace
while I held the city, and later making an alliance on the same
terms.³⁶ [23] But how could any possession be more firmly based
than this—of a city that was originally acquired for us by our an-
cestors, that later became mine in war, and that has been con-
ceded by you, who are accustomed to dispute even about things
that do not belong to you?
These are my complaints against you. Since you are the ag-
³³ Athens had effectively ceded their former colony of Amphipolis in

Thrace to Philip in 346 (cf. 5.25), but some Athenian politicians wished to
re-open the question: see esp. 7.23–29.
³⁴ Alexander I was king of Macedonia at the time of the Persian King
Xerxes’ invasion of Greece in 480: see also 6.11n, 13.25n. Greek writers com-
monly used Median (from the Iranian region of Media) as a synonym for
Persian: see 9.42n. The reference here is to prisoners taken from the retreat-
ing Persian armies in the region of Amphipolis in either 480 or 479. The
gold statue of Alexander at Delphi is mentioned by Herodotus (8.121).
³⁵ Amphipolis was won over by the Spartan general Brasidas in winter
424/3 (Thuc. 4.102–106) and captured by Philip in 357.
³⁶ Philip had told the Athenians in 348/7 that he wanted to make peace:
see Aes. 2.12–15. The Peace of Philocrates of 346 was both a peace and an
alliance.

gressors and are taking advantage of my caution to attack my in-

terests and do as much harm as you can, I will defend myself
with justice, and, making the gods my witnesses, I will deal with
your case.³⁷
³⁷ Philip’s leaving it unclear how exactly he will deal with the Athenians
makes his threat all the more menacing. On the difficulty of translating the
final words of the letter, see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 715 n.2. See the
Speech Introduction for the possibility that the Athenians interpreted
the letter as tantamount to a declaration of war.

13. ON ORG A NIZ ATION
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The date and authorship of this speech are both disputed. It
was accepted as genuine both by Libanius in his Introduction to it
and by Didymus, who included it in his commentary on the de-
liberative speeches of Demosthenes (cols. 13.14–15.10). It is, how-
ever, uniquely among the surviving deliberative speeches, not
included among the speeches for which Dionysius of Halicarnas-
sus provides dates.¹ This, among other arguments, has prompted
some scholars to deny its authenticity.² In my view, the speech is
in fact genuine, for the following reasons.³
First, Dionysius’ omission of the speech does not prove that
he judged it to be spurious; he may simply have been uncertain
about its date and excluded it for that reason.⁴ It is worth noting
in this regard both that Didymus was aware of two different dates
that had been proposed for the speech and that the author of the
ancient commentary on the speech writes that it does not have a
¹ Dates for Demosthenes’ earlier deliberative speeches are given at First

Letter to Ammaeus 4.
² See Sealey 1967, 1993: 235–237.
³ See more fully Trevett 1994; also MacDowell 2009: 226–227.
⁴ It is important to appreciate that Dionysius gives the dates of the
speeches not for their own sake (in which case the omission of this speech
would be significant) but to prove that Aristotle’s Rhetoric was written later
than Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches. The omission of a single, rela-
tively early, speech would not materially affect his argument. It is also possi-
ble that Dionysius omitted to mention the speech by mistake.

13. on organization 225
clear date, and so evidently its dating was a matter of debate in

antiquity (see further below).
Other arguments that the speech is spurious are not cogent.
For example, there are two lengthy passages towards the end of
the speech that are very similar to passages in other speeches
(13.21–24 ≈ 23.196–200; 13.25–31 ≈ 3.23–32). This does not in it-
self show that the speech is spurious, since a similar reuse of ma-
terial can also be observed in the two genuine speeches Dem. 8
and 10 and elsewhere in Demosthenes’ oratory. It has, however,
been argued that differences of detail between the parallel pas-
sages indicate that Demosthenes cannot have written both and
that therefore Dem. 13 is spurious.⁵ Yet it is hard to see why a
forger would have wished to introduce minor changes into pas-
sages that he otherwise copied out almost word for word.
Demosthenes, by contrast, certainly did have a motive to make
changes: to make his historical examples fit his argument. This
may strike modern readers as a dubious procedure, but it is not
uncommon for Attic orators to rework historical examples in this
way.⁶ It has also been found suspicious that only in this speech
does Demosthenes refer to himself by name (12).⁷ But there is no
compelling reason to see this as a sign of spuriousness, and in any
case Demosthenes clearly alludes to his own name in a speech
that is certainly genuine (3.21). In addition, technical analysis of
the prose rhythm of the speech shows that it is fully consistent
with Demosthenic authorship.⁸
The date of the speech was debated even in antiquity. The au-
thor of the ancient commentary found it hard to determine and
guessed that the speech preceded the “Philippics” (i.e., the se-
⁵ See 23n and 24n for the details.

⁶ Thus Harding 1987: 34, noting that the audience was unlikely to know
(or greatly care) whether such examples were correct, and was in any case
unable to check them: “An orator could . . . distort a reference to suit his
point, sometimes even invent one altogether. As long as it sounded reason-
able, it was likely to be accepted.”
⁷ The suggestion is that a forger introduced Demosthenes’ name to make
it clear who the supposed author was.
⁸ See McCabe 1981.

226 demosthenes
quence of speeches dealing with Philip starting with Dem. 4).⁹

Didymus discusses the matter at some length and proposes 349/8,
on the basis of the reference at 32 to an Athenian vote to march
out against Megara, since he knew of conflict between the two
cities in 350/49 (cols. 13.40–14.2). But he wrongly assumes that the
speech came after the conflict, whereas it probably preceded it.¹⁰
Insofar as the speech makes no mention of Philip,¹¹ it has been
argued that it belongs before Dem. 4 (see above), which was writ-
ten most probably in 351.¹² But the matter is uncertain, and it is
difficult to give a more precise date than the end of the 350s.¹³
The subject matter of the speech is Athenian public finances,
which in this period were in a parlous state. The key text is 10.37
(of 340), where Demosthenes claims that “not long ago,” Ath-
ens’ annual revenue amounted to no more than one hundred and
thirty talents. This claim is generally taken to relate to the after-
math of the Social War, that is, approximately the time of the
present speech (see note ad loc.). The effects of this shortage of
money are felt throughout Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches,
for example, in the reforms to naval finances proposed in Dem.
14 or the obvious problems he has explaining in Dem. 4 how
a permanent naval force in the North Aegean will be paid for.
In his desire to find money for military operations, Demosthe-
nes looked towards the theoric fund (on which see the Introduc-
tion to Dem. 3). This fund was used in the first instance to sub-
sidize citizens’ attendance at theatrical performances but came to
⁹ Dilts 1983: 163.2– 7.

¹⁰ Note, however, that Lewis (1997: 245–246) is reluctant to reject the
testimony of Didymus on this point.
¹¹ Ancient critics debated whether the speech should be characterized
as a “Philippic” (see Didymus col. 13.16–25; Libanius’ Introduction). Since
Philip’s absence from the speech is obvious, the point at issue was probably
one of chronology, i.e., whether the speech belongs within the sequence that
begins with Dem. 4.
¹² Thus, Lane Fox 1997: 191–195. In terms of subject matter (i.e., mili-
tary and financial reform), it is close to Dem. 14, which was probably deliv-
ered in 354/3.
¹³ The speech’s date is fully discussed by MacDowell (2009: 227–229),
who argues for 350 as the approximately correct date.

be used for other nonmilitary expenditure as well. The use of this

fund was hotly disputed: anti-Macedonian politicians such as De-
mosthenes wished it to be transferred to the military fund; those
who opposed war with Philip wished it to remain in the theoric
fund.
In this speech Demosthenes claims to be neutral on the issue
of the theoric fund (2), and indeed he does not directly refer to
it (although the reference to festivals in 2 makes it clear what he
means), but he criticizes the expectation that citizens will receive
public money for doing nothing. In its place he argues for a new
system under which they will be paid only for service to the state,
either as soldiers or as administrators (4). He wishes the Athe-
nians to serve on expeditions in person, rather than use mercenar-
ies (5), and alludes to a previous speech that he gave on the subject
of army reform (9). That speech was ill received, and apparently
it was the issue of two-obol payments (presumably a proposal to
abolish some such daily payment to civilians, although the details
are unclear: see 10n) that proved unpalatable to the Athenians.
Demosthenes argues that his new system will have several bene-
fits: the allies will be better treated (6), and the armed forces will
be able to mobilize more quickly (11).
Beyond this rather sketchy proposal, Demosthenes uses the
speech to survey many of Athens’ deficiencies. The Athenians, he
claims, are badly advised by their political leaders, who dispar-
age Demosthenes, subvert the democracy, and deal in empty cli-
chés (12–16); they are also ill led by their generals, who are driven
by greed and ambition (19). Between them, the politicians and
generals are exploiting the current system for their own advan-
tage, at the expense of the people (20, 31). As a result, the Athe-
nians squander money on civilian expenditure (30) but are culpa-
bly negligent in their foreign policy (32–33). Demosthenes draws
a contrast with Athens’ heyday in the fifth century, when its lead-
ers were personally modest but oversaw a period of great success
(21–31).
13. on organiz ation

[1] Regarding the money that is at issue and the reasons for
this assembly, men of Athens, it seems to me easy either to criti-

228 demosthenes
cize those who distribute and pay out public money, and thereby
win the approval of those who think that such payments harm
the city, or to argue in support of these payments, and thereby
win the favor of those who are most in need of receiving them.
Each side praises or criticizes the institution not with a view to
the interests of the city but depending on whether they them-
selves are needy or well off.¹⁴ [2] I would neither argue in favor
of people receiving payments nor oppose them as being unneces-
sary. I do advise you, however, to look and see that the amount
of money under discussion is trivial but that the habit of mind
that goes with it is not.¹⁵ If you are prepared to combine the re-
ceipt of public money with doing your duty, you will not only do
no harm but will in fact perform the greatest benefit both to the
city and to yourselves. But if every single festival serves as an ex-
cuse for taking money,¹⁶ and you refuse even to listen to discus-
sions about what else you must do, you should beware lest you
later come to judge that the practice of which you now approve
was gravely mistaken. [3] In my opinion—and do not heckle me
for what I am going to say, but listen and then make up your
minds—just as we are devoting an assembly to the receipt of pub-
lic money, so we should devote one to organization and military
preparation, and each of us should be prepared not only to listen
willingly but also to take action, men of Athens, in order that you
may hold your hopes of success in your own hands, rather than
inquiring what this or that man is doing.¹⁷ [4] Of all the city’s in-
¹⁴ Demosthenes represents the rich as being opposed to theoric distribu-

tions and the poor as in favor of them. Insofar as only rich Athenians paid
the wealth-tax (eisphora), whereas payments were made to the poor, this is
a plausible claim. See also 10.35–45. On the theoric fund, see the Introduc-
tion to Dem. 3.
¹⁵ It is not known how much money was paid out as theoric distribu-
tions.
¹⁶ Money from the theoric fund was used in the first instance to sub-
sidize the attendance of poorer citizens at theatrical performances put
on at religious festivals; it is unlikely that payments were made for every
festival.
¹⁷ Demosthenes here refers to Athens’ generals.

come, both what you now squander to no purpose from your own
funds and all that comes from the allies,¹⁸ I say that you should
each take an equal share—those in the prime of life as military
pay, those who are too old for military service¹⁹ as auditors’ pay²⁰
or whatever else one might call it—and should campaign in per-
son and not leave this task to someone else. [5] Our city’s armed
forces should be our own, equipped from these sources, so that
you can both be prosperous and do your duty;²¹ and the general
should command these forces, men of Athens, so as to prevent
what happens now. For whenever you put the generals on trial,²²
the only result is that “So-and-so son of so-and-so impeached so-
and-so,” and nothing else.²³ [6] What then should you do? First,
your allies should be made well disposed to you not by the im-
position of garrisons but by the existence of common interests.²⁴
Next, the generals should stop using mercenaries to ravage the
¹⁸ Athens’ allies in the Second Athenian Confederacy paid “contribu-

tions” (syntaxeis) to help defray the cost of its operations, but very little is
known about how much they contributed. See Cargill 1981: 124–127.
¹⁹ Lit. “those over [the age to be included in] the list.” Athenian citizens
were liable for military service up to the age of 59, and a list (katalogos) was
kept of those who could be called on to serve as hoplites (heavy infantry).
On the conscription of hoplites, see Christ 2001.
²⁰ Auditors (exetastai) are mentioned twice by Aeschines (1.113, 2.177),
but they do not appear in documentary texts of the period. They clearly had
some financial role in military matters.
²¹ That is to say, individual Athenians will be to some degree prosperous
as a result of drawing state pay.
²² Athenian generals on campaign were liable to impeachment (eisange-
lia), which would result in their being recalled to stand trial: see 4.47n.
²³ Demosthenes’ point is not that these prosecutions never result in con-
victions (which they often did) but that even successful prosecutions will do
nothing to correct the underlying problem.
²⁴ When the Second Athenian Confederacy was established Athens un-
dertook not to impose garrisons on member-states, which had been one of
the abuses of its fifth-century empire: see IG II² 43 (= Rhodes and Osborne
2003: no. 22) lines 21–22. Such garrisons are, however, securely attested in
the 350s: see IG XII.7.5 (= Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 51) and IG II² 123
(= Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 52); Cargill 1981: 150–160.

230 demosthenes
territory of our allies,²⁵ without even laying eyes on our enemies,

with the result that they keep the profits for themselves, but the
city as a whole incurs the ill will and accusations that this behav-
ior gives rise to. Instead, they should be accompanied by citizens
and should do to our enemies what they are now doing to our
friends. [7] Apart from these, many other matters require your at-
tention. Leaving aside the fact that it is to your advantage to use
your own forces against your own enemies, it is also necessary for
you to do so, for other reasons. If you were content to be at peace
and not meddle in the affairs in Greece, it would be a different
story; [8] but as things are, you aspire to be in first place and to
provide justice to others, yet you have not yet organized, nor are
now organizing, a force that is capable of overseeing and secur-
ing these aspirations. You were enjoying your leisure and isolation
when the democracy of Mytilene was overthrown.²⁶ You were
also at leisure when the democracy of Rhodes was overthrown.²⁷
“But the latter at any rate were your enemies,” someone might
say.²⁸ But you, men of Athens, ought to be more opposed to oli-
garchies for their choice of constitution than to democracies for
any reason whatsoever. [9] To return to my subject, I say that you
should get yourselves organized²⁹ and have a single system both
for getting paid and for doing your duty. I spoke to you about this
on a previous occasion, when I set out how you might organize
yourselves—hoplites and cavalry and others—and how we might
²⁵ By way of example, Diodorus records that in 361/0 the Athenian gen-

eral Chares precipitated a violent civil war on the allied island of Corcyra
and that his actions brought discredit on Athens (15.95.3).
²⁶ On the overthrow of democracy at Mytilene on the island of Lesbos at
some point in the second half of the 350s, see 15.19n.
²⁷ Rhodes’ democracy was also overthrown, probably at about the same
time, and replaced by an oligarchy with the involvement of Mausolus, the
satrap (i.e., governor) of Caria, a province of the Persian Empire in south-
western Asia Minor. See the Introduction to Dem. 15.
²⁸ Rhodes had been one of the leaders of the allied revolt from Athens in
357 that precipitated the Social War: see Diodorus 16.7.3 and the Introduc-
tion to Dem. 15.
²⁹ It is from this passage that the speech gets it title.

all enjoy a measure of prosperity.³⁰ [10] Let me tell you candidly

what depressed me most of all: it is that no one remembers any-
thing about these many excellent and ambitious plans except “the
two obols”—that you all remember.³¹ And yet two obols can only
ever be worth two obols, whereas the other things that I spoke
of are worth the entire fortune of the King,³² namely, that a city
that has so many hoplites and triremes and cavalrymen and so
great an income should be organized and well prepared.
[11] Why do I mention this now? Since some of you are op-
posed to universal public pay, but you all reckon that it is useful
to be well organized and prepared, I insist that we start with this
matter and allow anyone who wishes to make a proposal to do so.
The crux of the matter is as follows. If you are persuaded that now
is the time to organize your armed forces, they will be in a state of
readiness whenever you need them; but if you think that now is
the wrong time and do nothing, you will find that you still need
to organize yourselves whenever you do need to use them.
[12] But perhaps someone has already spoken like this, men
of Athens—not one of you the majority, but one of those who
burst with anger at the prospect of these plans being put into ef-
fect: “What good have the speeches of Demosthenes done us? He
comes forward whenever he likes, fills our ears with words, dis-
parages the present situation and praises our ancestors, and af-
ter inflating your hopes and puffing you up, steps down from the
platform.” [13] As for me, if I could persuade you of any of my ar-
guments, I would think that I was doing the city such great ser-
³⁰ The speech to which Demosthenes refers was probably similar in

theme and close in date to the surviving speech On the Symmories (Dem.
14), which is concerned with the navy rather than the army.
³¹ A payment of two obols (the diōbelia) had been introduced in 410,
probably as a dole to poorer Athenians, at the instigation of the politician
Cleophon: see Ath. Pol. 28.3, with the commentary of Rhodes 1981. This
was, however, almost certainly a temporary measure, and so Demosthenes
must have been referring to a different payment. Probably he proposed can-
celing or curtailing this payment, which may have been related to (or iden-
tical with) the theoric distributions that he elsewhere criticizes (see 3.10–11).
³² Here as elsewhere, the Persian King is meant.

232 demosthenes
vices that if I were to try to describe them, many people would

reject them as being exaggerated. Nevertheless, I think that it
would be a considerable benefit to you if I were simply to accus-
tom you to hearing the best advice. For, men of Athens, anyone
who wants to benefit our city must first heal your ears, which have
been ruined, so accustomed have you become to hearing lies and
indeed anything but the best advice. [14] To give an example—
and please do not interrupt me before I have finished—apparently
some men recently broke into the Opisthodomos.³³ All those who
came forward to speak about it said that democracy had been un-
dermined, and that the laws were no longer in force, and the like.
And yet, men of Athens—and see whether I speak the truth—al-
though the perpetrators’ actions deserved death, they did not lead
to the undermining of the democracy. Or again, someone stole
some oars.³⁴ All those who spoke called for whippings and tor-
tures and said that democracy was being undermined. What do I
say? That the man who stole the oars did something that deserves
death, as did the men whom I recently mentioned, but this does
not undermine the democracy. [15] And yet our democracy is be-
ing undermined, although this is a matter about which no one
talks freely. But I shall tell you. It is undermined whenever you,
men of Athens, are badly led, many of you without resources or
weapons, and are at cross-purposes, and no general or anyone else
pays attention to your votes, and no one is willing to address these
matters or correct them, or acts to prevent them happening—and
they now always do happen. [16] And by Zeus, men of Athens,
there are other mendacious claims that have slipped by you and
that do much harm to the constitution, such as that “your salva-
tion lies in the courts” and that “you must guard the constitution
³³ The Opisthodomos was the rear room of the chamber of the Parthe-
non, the main temple to Athena on the Acropolis of Athens, and was used
as a treasury. In another speech, Demosthenes refers to an allegation that
the Treasurers of Athena had burned down the Opisthodomos in an at-
tempt to conceal their misappropriation of money from it (see Dem. 24.136,
with the ancient commentary on the passage).
³⁴ Oars and other equipment for the triremes of the Athenian navy were
public property. Cf. 14.21n. See Gabrielsen 1994: 146–169.

with your vote.” I know that the courts have authority in disputes
between ourselves, but it is by force of arms that we must defeat
our enemies, and in our armed forces that the safety of the consti-
tution lies. [17] For voting will not bring victory to men who are
under arms. Rather, it is those who have defeated the enemy by
force of arms who will enable you to vote or to do anything else
you like without fear. We should be formidable when we are un-
der arms but benevolent when we are in court.³⁵
[18] If anyone thinks that I am making speeches that are be-
yond my capacity, he is quite right. Any speech about so great a
city and about matters of such importance must always seem be-
yond the capacity of any individual speaker; such speeches should
aspire to your level of distinction rather than to that of the speaker.
I shall now explain why none of the men whom you honor speaks
in this way. [19] Those who come forward to speak with an eye on
the election of magistrates³⁶ and the holding of office go around
as slaves of your favor, which they need in order to be elected,
each one eager to be initiated³⁷ as general but unwilling to do
any part of a man’s work. As things are now, if anyone is capable
of achieving anything, he takes the reputation and good name of
the city as his capital, profits from the lack of anyone to oppose
him, holds out to you nothing but hopes, and thinks that he will
inherit all your wealth, which is indeed what happens. But if you
do every individual thing yourselves, such a man will have to take
his fair share along with the others both of the toil and of its re-
wards. [20] The politicians, and those who concern themselves
with political matters, have stopped looking out for your interests
and have gone over to these men.³⁸ Previously you paid taxes by
symmory, but now you engage in politics by symmory, each with
a speaker as leader, a general beneath him, and three hundred as-
³⁵ Demosthenes’ desire for antithesis results in the curious claim that

Athenian lawcourts are characterized by benevolence (philanthrōpia).
³⁶ Most magistrates were chosen by lot (from those citizens who put their
names forward), but the ten generals were elected.
³⁷ Demosthenes makes metaphorical use of the language of initiatory
cults such as the Mysteries at Eleusis: see 3.5n.
³⁸ The generals mentioned above.

234 demosthenes
sistants; the rest of you are assigned, some to one group and some
to another.³⁹ As a result, one man receives a bronze statue,⁴⁰ one
or two others get rich at the city’s expense, while the rest of you
sit around witnessing their good fortune, handing over your own
considerable good fortune to them by your daily idleness.
[21] But consider how things were in the time of your ances-
tors, so that you may learn, by means of examples from here rather
than from elsewhere, what you should be doing.⁴¹ Your ancestors
did not set up bronze statues of Themistocles, who was general at
the sea battle of Salamis,⁴² or of Miltiades, who led them at Mar-
athon,⁴³ or of the many others whose exploits were greater than
those of our present-day generals. Instead they honored them as
being in no way superior to themselves. [22] As a result, men of
Athens, they deprived themselves of none of the credit for their
exploits at that time, and everyone would agree that it was the
Athenians who won the sea battle of Salamis, not Themistocles,
and that the city won the battle of Marathon, not Miltiades. But
now many people say that Timotheus captured Corcyra and that
Iphicrates cut the Spartan regiment to pieces and that Chabrias
won the sea battle off Naxos.⁴⁴ You seem to have renounced your
claim to these achievements, to judge by the extravagant honors
you have given to each of these men for them.⁴⁵ [23] And so your
³⁹ This simile is also used at 2.29: see the note there.

⁴⁰ Bronze statues were erected in the Athenian Agora in honor of the
fourth-century Athenian generals Conon (Dem. 20.70), Timotheus, Iphi-
crates, and Chabrias (Aes. 3.243). On the last three, see 22n below.
⁴¹ Sections 21–24 are very similar to Dem. 23.196–200.
⁴² Themistocles, an Athenian general, led the Athenian contingent at the
sea battle of Salamis in 480 (see 14.29n).
⁴³ Miltiades, an Athenian general, was prominently involved in the Athe-
nian victory at the battle of Marathon in 490.
⁴⁴ All three men were important fourth-century Athenian generals. Timo-
theus, the son of Conon (see n. 40 above), captured the island of Corcyra in
spring 375 in the course of naval operations against the Spartans. Iphicrates
commanded a force of light-armed peltasts in the Corinthian War and de-
feated a Spartan regiment at Lechaeum, the port of Corinth, in 390. Cha-
brias defeated the Spartans in a sea battle off the island of Naxos in 376/5.
⁴⁵ See 20n on statues erected in honor of these three generals.

ancestors rewarded their own citizens appropriately, but you do

not. What about foreigners? Menon of Pharsalus, who gave twelve
talents of silver for the war for Eion near Amphipolis, and contrib-
uted two hundred of his own serfs as cavalrymen, was rewarded
not with citizenship but merely with immunity from taxation.⁴⁶
[24] And earlier, in the case of Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia
at the time of the barbarian invasion, who destroyed the barbar-
ians who were retreating after the defeat at Plataea and brought
about the King’s final defeat, they voted to grant him only immu-
nity from taxation, not citizenship, in the belief that their own
native land was too great and valuable and sacred to permit such
a gift.⁴⁷ But now, men of Athens, you make citizens of pestilential
⁴⁶ Eion on the river Strymon in Thrace was captured from the Persians by
the Athenians and their allies in 476/5 (Thuc. 1.98.1; Herod. 7.107); Amphi-
polis was a later Athenian settlement nearby, but at the time of this speech,
it was in the hands of Philip of Macedon. Menon belonged to an aristo-
cratic family from the city of Pharsalus in Thessaly in northern Greece: a
man of the same name, probably his grandson, led a Pharsalian force allied
to Athens in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.22.3). The serfs (penestai) of
Thessaly were nonchattel, dependent workers, comparable in some respects
to the helots of Messenia and Laconia who were dependent on the Spartans.
This passage is almost identical to Dem. 23.199; in the latter passage, how-
ever, it is claimed that the number of serfs Menon contributed was 300 and
that he was granted Athenian citizenship. See further Osborne 1983: T1. See
the Speech Introduction for a rejection of the view that this discrepancy
shows that this speech is not the work of Demosthenes.
⁴⁷ It is clear that rather than Perdiccas II (king of Macedonia ca. 454–
413), it is his predecessor Alexander I who is meant. The latter was king at
the time of the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 and had been honored by
Athens at some time in the 480s, perhaps for making Macedonian timber
available for shipbuilding (see Herod. 8.136.1). Alexander in fact fought on
the Persian side (cf. 6.11), although it is reported that he offered secret sup-
port to the Greeks. After the battle at Plataea in 479 the Persian army re-
treated overland back to Asia and had heavy casualties inflicted on it. On
this episode, see 12.21 (Philip writes that “our ancestor Alexander . . . first
held the place [Amphipolis], and from it he set up a gold statue at Delphi as
first fruit for the Median [i.e., Persian] prisoners”); cf. Herod. 8.99, though
he names the Thracians not the Macedonians. This passage is almost iden-
tical to Dem. 23.200, where, however, it is claimed, perhaps correctly, that

236 demosthenes
fellows, slaves born of slave parents, taking a price as you would

for any other goods for sale.⁴⁸ [25] You do these things not be-
cause you are naturally inferior to your ancestors but because they
happened to have a high opinion of themselves, whereas you, men
of Athens, have been stripped of this quality.⁴⁹ In my view, it is
never possible for those whose actions are small and trivial to have
a great and vigorous spirit, just as those whose actions are glorious
and fine cannot have petty or humble thoughts. For men’s spirits
must conform to their habitual behavior.
[26] Look at how the situation might be summarized, listen-
ing to an account both of their achievements and of yours, to see
whether you are perhaps capable of improving yourselves, from
their example if not from your own. They ruled the Greeks as
willing subjects for forty-five years, carried up more than ten
thousand talents to the Acropolis, and after fighting on both land
and sea, erected many fine trophies, on which even now we pride
ourselves.⁵⁰ And yet you should consider that they erected them
not for us to gaze on in admiration but for us to imitate the vir-
tues of the men who set them up. [27] This is what they achieved,
but we—and you can all see how much of a free hand we have—
do we behave in a similar way? Have we not spent more than fif-
teen hundred talents in vain on the poor of Greece,⁵¹ and have we
“Perdiccas” (i.e., Alexander) was granted citizenship. See Osborne 1983:

PT124; and see the previous note.
⁴⁸ Slaves were not permitted to become citizens, but a small number of
former slaves are known to have received grants of Athenian citizenship
in the fourth century. Of these, the best known are the bankers Pasion
(Dem. 59.2) and Phormion (Dem. 46.13). In the case of Pasion, we know
that he donated military equipment to the city (Dem. 45.85), a contribution
that could have been misrepresented by a hostile observer as buying citizen-
ship. But since Pasion was the father of Demosthenes’ political supporter
Apollodorus, it is unlikely that a reference to him is meant here. On the
family, see Trevett 1992.
⁴⁹ Sections 25–31 are very similar to 3.23–32. See the Speech Intro-
duction.
⁵⁰ These claims are also made at 3.24: see the notes there.
⁵¹ The reference is to the hiring of mercenaries, who were often regarded
as enlisting to escape extreme poverty. See 3.28n, 14.31n.

not exhausted the resources of every private house and the com-
mon funds of the city and the money from the allies, whom we
acquired during the war, and whom these men have lost during
the peace?⁵² [28] “But by god,” it might be objected, “these are
the only things that were better then than now; everything else
was worse.” This is far from the truth, but let us examine what-
ever point you want. As regards buildings and the adornment of
the city, they left so many and such splendid shrines and harbors
and the like that none of their successors can surpass them—I re-
fer to the Propylaea, the docks, the colonnades,⁵³ and the other
buildings, with which they adorned the city and handed it on
to us. [29] But the private houses of those who were in power
were so moderate and so in conformance with the name of the
constitution⁵⁴ that if any of you knows the house of Themisto-
cles or Cimon or Aristides or other men of distinction of that
time,⁵⁵ he sees that it is no grander than its neighbor. [30] But
now, men of Athens, in public our city is happy to build roads
⁵² Athens’ allies were mostly acquired during war with Sparta in the
370s, when the Second Athenian Confederacy was set up. Its members paid
financial “contributions” (syntaxeis) to Athens: see 4n above. Several of the
most important of these broke away from Athens in 357 in the Social War:
see the Introduction to Dem. 15.
⁵³ The Propylaea was the massive ceremonial gateway to the Acropolis,
built between 436 and 422 as part of Pericles’ building program. The dock-
yards of Piraeus were built in the fifth century to accommodate Athens’
navy, which was based there. Colonnades (stoas) such as the Royal Stoa and
the Painted Stoa were built around the Agora in the same period. In addi-
tion, many other civic and religious buildings were erected in the fifth cen-
tury, both in Athens and elsewhere in Attica. It is striking to the modern
reader that Demosthenes names the Propylaea but not the Parthenon, the
temple of Athena that was built on the Acropolis in the same period.
⁵⁴ Demosthenes suggests that in a democracy housing should be egali-
tarian.
⁵⁵ The same idea is expressed, with a slightly different list of fifth-century
Athenians, at 3.26. On Aristides, see 3.26n. On Themistocles, see 21 above.
Cimon, the son of Miltiades (on whom see 3.26n), was a prominent political
and military leader in the period after the Persian Wars: he was one of the
architects of Athens’ fifth-century empire, but his pro-Spartan policies re-
sulted in his ostracism (i.e., temporary exile) in 461. See 9.42n.

238 demosthenes
and fountains and apply whitewash and such nonsense—and I

put the blame not on the proposers of this expenditure, far from
it, but on you, if you think that this is good enough. But in pri-
vate some of those who hold positions of public responsibility
have made their houses not only more extravagant than most oth-
ers but also grander than public buildings, while others have pur-
chased more farmland than they ever dreamed of.⁵⁶ [31] The rea-
son for all these differences is that in the past the people were lord
and master of all, and each leader⁵⁷ was happy to receive honors
and magistracies and other benefits from them, but now the op-
posite is true. These men control every benefit, and all business is
conducted through them, while the people play the part of ser-
vant and appendage, and you are grateful to receive whatever they
offer you. [32] As a result, the city is in such a bad way that no
one who reads your resolutions and reviews your actions would
believe that both are the work of the same people. For example,
when the accursed Megarians were ravaging the Orgas, you voted
to march out, to prevent them, and not to give in.⁵⁸ And when the
Phliasians were recently exiled, you voted to help them, to stand
up to the murderers, and to summon volunteers from the Pelo-
ponnese.⁵⁹ [33] All this, men of Athens, was noble and just and
⁵⁶ For the same thought, see 3.29. Demosthenes’ claim that some politi-
cians have bought up large areas of farmland is probably a substantial exag-
geration, since there was limited land available in Attica, and even the rich-
est Athenians seem not to have owned large estates.
⁵⁷ Lit. “each of the others,” drawing a contrast between the masses and
the political elite.
⁵⁸ Megara was a Greek city whose territory bordered Attica to the west.
The Megarians and the Athenians were often in dispute over the Hiera Or-
gas (“Sacred Land”), a strip of border territory sacred to the two goddesses,
Demeter and Persephone, who were worshipped at nearby Eleusis in south-
western Attica: see also 12.4n. The Megarians are called “accursed” because
of their encroachment on this sacred land. Demosthenes here refers to very
recent events: see Didymus cols. 13.40–15.10, with Harding 2006: 245–255;
IG II² 204* = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 58 with full commentary. See
the Speech Introduction for the relevance of this reference to the dating of
the speech.
⁵⁹ Phlius was a city of the Argolid in the northern Peloponnese. Along
with Arcadia, Achaea, and Elis, it made an alliance with Athens in 362/1

worthy of the city, but your subsequent actions achieved noth-

ing. And so you incur hatred because of your decisions but fail to
accomplish anything. You pass decrees on the basis of our city’s
good reputation but lack the force that would correspond to your
votes. [34] I would advise you—and please do not get angry with
me—either to lower your ambitions and be content to mind your
own affairs or to organize a larger force. If I knew you to be Siph-
nians or Cythnians or some other such people,⁶⁰ I would advise
you to lower your ambitions. But since you are Athenians, my
advice to you is to make military preparations. For it would be
shameful, men of Athens, truly shameful, to abandon the resolute
spirit that your ancestors handed down to you. [35] Moreover, it is
not possible for you, even if you wish to, to withdraw from the af-
fairs of Greece. You have achieved many things throughout your
history, and it is shameful to sacrifice your existing friends, and
impossible to trust your existing enemies and allow them to be-
come great. In short, you are faced with the same fate as your po-
litical leaders, who cannot stop whenever they want.⁶¹ For you are
the political leaders of Greece. [36] To sum up everything I have
said, men of Athens: the speakers never make you bad or good; it
is you who make them so, according to your wishes. You do not
aim at what they want; they aim at what they think you desire.
And so you should desire whatever is best, and if you do so all
will be well. For in that case, either no speaker will say anything
ignoble, or, if any of them does, he will get nowhere, since no one
will listen to him.
(IG II² 112 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 41). It emerges from the text of
the alliance (line 30) that at that time Phlius was a democracy.
⁶⁰ Siphnos and Cythnos are islands in the Aegean. In the sixth century,
Siphnos had prospered from the mining of gold and silver, but by the fourth
century both islands were evidently regarded as utterly insignificant.
⁶¹ Demosthenes’ point appears to be, if his analogy holds, that a sense of
responsibility makes it impossible for politicians to abandon political life,
though he may be thinking that their personal ambition or pressure from
their supporters makes them reluctant to do so.

14. ON THE SY MMOR IES
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
On the Symmories is the earliest surviving deliberative speech
of Demosthenes. It is dated 354/3 by Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
and this date has been generally accepted.¹ According to Liba-
nius’ Introduction, the occasion of the speech was a rumor that
the Persian King was planning to attack Greece. Apparently some
politicians at Athens had argued for an aggressive response (1),
but Demosthenes advocates restraint: the Athenians should resist
if they are attacked but not provoke war with Persia. At the same
time, he argues that they should improve their readiness for war
by reforming the financial organization of their navy.
Demosthenes refers back to this speech a year or two later, in
his speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15.6), a passage that
makes it clear that this speech was actually delivered:
I imagine that some of you recall that at the time when you
were deliberating about relations with the King, I came for-
¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus First Letter to Ammaeus 4. See in general

Lane Fox 1997: 177–181. The speech discusses the possibility that the The-
bans will help the Persians (33), but it shows no awareness of the help that
the Theban general Pammenes provided the rebel satrap Artabazus (on
whom see below) against the forces of the Persian King. This is dated 353/2
by Diodorus (16.34.1), after the withdrawal of the Athenian commander
Chares (see the next note). This speech is probably therefore earlier than
Pammenes’ expedition. See also MacDowell (2009: 142–143), who is agnos-
tic on the date.

14. on the symmories 241
ward and was the first to advise you—I think that I spoke
alone, or perhaps there was one other—and said that it was
not sensible to use your hatred of him as an excuse for mil-
itary preparation, but that you should prepare yourselves to
fight your existing enemies, and defend yourselves against him
only if he tried to wrong you. Nor did you think that I spoke
wrongly, but on the contrary my advice was pleasing to you.
In the years after the King’s Peace of 386, Persian policy to-
wards Greece was directed towards deterring Greek, and in par-
ticular Athenian, interference on the mainland of Asia Minor, ter-
ritory that the King claimed as his own and that had been ceded
to him by the peace. The main means by which this was achieved
was diplomacy: there was substantial Persian involvement in the
series of peace conferences of the 370s and 360s. The Persian pri-
ority in the West (from their perspective) was not Greece but the
recovery of the rich province of Egypt, which had been in revolt
since the end of the fifth century. The Persian Empire was also
destabilized by a series of satrapal revolts (i.e., revolts by provin-
cial governors) in the middle years of the century, though Arta-
xerxes III Ochus, who came to the throne in 358, did much to re-
store stability.
There had, however, been recent friction between Athens and
Persia, in addition to the support that Mausolus, satrap of Caria,
gave to the anti-Athenian rebels in the Social War of 357–355 (see
Dem. 15). In 355 the Athenian general Chares, who was short of
money for prosecuting the Social War, had taken service with the
rebel satrap Artabazus and had (on his own account) defeated a
Persian army.² Artaxerxes reacted by demanding that the Athe-
nians recall Chares, under threat of sending a large fleet to assist
their enemies (Diodorus 16.22), and the Athenians backed down.
The present speech makes no mention of Chares, Artabazus, or
the Social War and was probably therefore delivered later than
this crisis (see above).
Why then were there rumors of a planned Persian attack not
just on Athens but apparently on Greece as a whole (see esp. 7)?
² For other sources, see Harding 1985: no. 72.

242 demosthenes
Part of the explanation is probably Athenian nervousness after the

threats that Artaxerxes made against them in 355. But it may also
be that the large fleet being built in such places as Cyprus and
Phoenicia for the planned Persian invasion of Egypt (Diodorus
16.40.3, 44) was misinterpreted in Greece. In any case, the rumors
were unfounded, since Persian policy was focused on Egypt (see
31 for the collection of Greek and other mercenaries for the same
campaign). If there really was pressure at Athens to declare war—
and Demosthenes may be exaggerating it—he was surely right to
resist it.³
Demosthenes’ specific advice is that since the Greeks are dis-
united, it would be the height of folly for the Athenians to go to
war alone against Persia and risk much of Greece taking the Per-
sian side against them. It would be better to wait on events: if the
rumors are well founded, and the Persians do attack, the rest of
Greece can be expected to rally to their side (3–14).
Demosthenes later described this speech as a contribution to
the debate about relations with the Persian King (15.6, quoted
above). But as the title it was given in antiquity suggests,⁴ it is
largely concerned with the symmory system, that is, with the sys-
tem for funding the operations of Athens’ navy. The Athenian
navy was a large and complex organization, which was paid for
in part with public money and in part by wealthy citizens, who
were required to contribute to the equipping and operation of its
ships. In the fifth century, rich Athenians were selected for an-
nual performance of the trierarchy, that is, service as a trierarch
(triērarchos, trireme commander).⁵ Each trierarch was responsi-
ble for a single ship, and the system encouraged him to spend
his own money freely and thereby be seen to be doing his patri-
otic duty. Later in the century the financial burden of taking re-
sponsibility for a whole ship became too much for many individ-
³ Cf. 15.5, referring to those politicians at Athens who “advise the city to
oppose the King for the sake of the Egyptians.”
⁴ There is no reason to believe that any of the speeches were given their
traditional titles by Demosthenes himself.
⁵ This form of service, whereby a rich man was required to spend his own
money to perform a specified task for the benefit of the city, was called a lit-
urgy (leitourgeia): on the term, see 4.36n.

uals to bear, and trierarchies started to be shared. In time this too

became too onerous a burden, and under a law proposed by Peri-
andros (see Dem. 47.21), probably in 358/7, the Athenians intro-
duced a new system that transferred the expense to a much larger
pool of wealthier Athenians (the “Twelve Hundred”), who were
distributed into twenty contribution groups, each called a sym-
mory (symmoria; see further the notes on 16–21).⁶
In this speech Demosthenes proposes further reforms to the
system. He wishes to increase the number of those liable to contri-
bution from twelve hundred to two thousand, to take account of
exemptions (16). Although the number of symmories is to stay the
same, they are to be subdivided into sections, with a fi xed num-
ber of ships assigned to each section (17–18). The taxable value of
Athens (its taxation base) is to be distributed over the symmories
in such a way that each has roughly the same total worth (19–20).
Demosthenes next discusses the provision of naval equipment (21)
and the recruiting of rowers (22–23). He also addresses the prob-
lem of the rich evading their responsibilities by concealing the ex-
tent of their wealth, and he concludes that it is best to do nothing
about this until some real crisis occurs, when (he optimistically
predicts) a sense of self-preservation will make them willing to
contribute (24–28).
Why Demosthenes proposed tinkering with Periandros’ sys-
tem so soon after it was established is not entirely clear. It may be
that the new system had simply not worked well in its first few
years of operation: the details of his proposal suggest specifically
that the number of exemptions was causing problems (16). More-
over, Athens’ military failure in the Social War, together with the
lack of resources that drove Chares to enlist with Artabazus, may
have convinced some Athenians that the system needed to be re-
formed again.⁷
⁶ This system was modeled on, and may in fact have been identical with,
the system of symmories established in 378/7 for the payment of the wealth-
tax (eisphora), although the details are controversial. See MacDowell 1986;
Gabrielsen 1994: 182–199 (and passim on the financing of Athens’ fleet). The
title of this speech is sometimes translated as On the Navy Boards.
⁷ Contemporary sources, Demosthenes included, complain about vari-
ous inefficiencies in the operation of the navy, some of which are attribut-

244 demosthenes
Although the speech may have received a favorable reception

(thus 15.6, quoted above, but we only have Demosthenes’ word for
it), and although the attack on warmongering against Persia was
effective, the specific reforms were not accepted. Demosthenes,
however, had an abiding interest in organizational reform (see
also Dem. 13, and the speech on army reform mentioned at 13.9)
and successfully introduced reform of naval finances in 340/339
(Dem. 18.102–108).
14. on the sy mmor ies

[1] Those who praise your ancestors,⁸ men of Athens, seem to
me to have chosen to deliver speeches that will find favor with you
but do no benefit to those whom they praise. For in seeking to
speak about achievements to which no one could do justice, they
win for themselves the reputation of being able speakers but leave
their audience with a lesser opinion of those men’s excellence. In
my opinion, the highest praise of your ancestors is conferred by
the passage of time. For, although much time has passed, no one
has yet been able to surpass their achievements. [2] I, by contrast,
will seek to explain how I think you can best prepare yourselves.
The situation is as follows: Even if all of us who wish to address
you were to show ourselves to be skilled speakers, I am certain
that this would not lead to any improvement in your affairs. But
if every one, whoever he is, who comes up to speak can tell you
convincingly what kind of preparation will benefit our city, and
on what scale it should be and how it should be paid for, the cur-
rent panic would be wholly defused. This is what I shall try to do,
if I can, after I have briefly told you what I think about our rela-
tions with the King.⁹
able to Athens’ lack of money to fund the system, and part to the city being
a democracy: in particular, there were problems with getting ships ready on
time and with equipping them. Some of these complaints were probably ex-
aggerated: see Cawkwell 1984.
⁸ Demosthenes is referring to Athens’ heyday in the first half of the fifth
century: the time of the Persian Wars and of the acquisition of Athens’
empire.
⁹ I.e., the king of Persia.

[3] Although I believe that the King is the common enemy of

all the Greeks,¹⁰ I would certainly not advise you on that account
to wage war against him on your own, independently of the oth-
ers. For I see that the Greeks are not even all on good terms with
each other, and indeed some of them put more trust in the King
than they do in certain of their fellow Greeks. For such reasons I
think that it is in your interest to ensure that any war that breaks
out is on equal terms and just, and to make all the appropriate
preparations, and for this to be the basis of your policy. [4] In
my opinion, men of Athens, if it becomes absolutely clear that
the King is attacking them, the Greeks will form an alliance and
will be most grateful to those who are resisting him on their be-
half and by their side. But if we go to war before this is clear, men
of Athens, I fear that we may be forced to fight not only against
the King but also against those very Greeks whose interests we
are seeking to protect. [5] For in that event he will stop what he
has started, if indeed he has decided to attack the Greeks, and
will offer some of them money and friendship; and they, in their
determination to win their own wars,¹¹ will disregard the collec-
tive security of Greece. I advise you not to plunge our city into
such confusion and madness. [6] Moreover, I observe that you do
not make your decisions about the King on the same basis as do
the other Greeks. Many of them, I think, may pursue their pri-
vate interests and neglect the rest of Greece, whereas you, even
if you have suffered some wrong,¹² consider it ignoble to pun-
¹⁰ Demosthenes here seeks to avoid any suspicion that he is pro-Persian.

For similar concern that politicians should not be partisan supporters of an-
other state, see 15.15, 16.1–2. It is interesting to contrast this passage with
Demosthenes’ later rejection of such anti-Persian slogans (10.33), at a time
when Athens and Persia were cooperating against Philip.
¹¹ Demosthenes presumably has two conflicts in mind: the Th ird Sacred
War between Thebes and Phocis and fighting in the Peloponnese between
Sparta and its enemies, on which see Diodorus 16.34.3 (war between Sparta
and Argos, dated to 353/2) and 16.39.1– 7 (war between Sparta and an alli-
ance of Megalopolis, Argos, Messene, Sicyon, and Thebes, dated to 352/1).
¹² I.e., if the Athenians are wronged by fellow Greeks. Th is claim is wish-
ful thinking: Athens had been quite prepared to accept Persian support in
the Corinthian War against Sparta earlier in the fourth century.

246 demosthenes
ish your wrongdoers if that would result in their subjection to

the foreigner (barbaros).¹³ [7] Since this is the case, we must con-
sider how to ensure both that we are not at a disadvantage in any
war and that the man¹⁴ whom we suspect of plotting against the
Greeks does not get credit for his apparent friendship with them.
How can we achieve this? By making it clear to everybody that
we have reviewed our armed forces and are well prepared and that
our policies are based upon the principle of justice.
[8] To those speakers who are overconfident and who too read-
ily encourage you to go to war, I have this to say: It is not hard to
get the reputation for being brave when deliberation is called for
or to seem a clever speaker when danger is at hand. What is hard
is also our duty: to show bravery when faced with danger but to
offer the most sensible advice when engaged in deliberation. [9] In
my opinion, men of Athens, it would be hard for our city to wage
war on the King, but the actual fighting that a war would involve
would be easy. How is this so? Because, I believe, any war inevi-
tably requires ships and money and the control of strategic posi-
tions, all of which I see that he has in greater quantity than we
do. Fighting, on the other hand, requires brave men more than
anything else, and I am confident that we and those who share
the danger with us have more of these. [10] I therefore advise you
on no account to start a war but to make appropriate preparations
to fight. If fighting against Greeks and fighting against foreign-
ers called for different types of force, we might perhaps reason-
ably show ourselves to be making our preparations against him;¹⁵
[11] but since all military preparation takes the same form, and
every force has the same basic purpose—to be able to resist one’s
enemies, to help one’s allies, and to preserve one’s existing as-
sets—why, when we have acknowledged enemies,¹⁶ should we go
¹³ On the connotation of the Greek word barbaros, see 3.16n.

¹⁴ The Persian King. For the nature of his suspected plotting, see the
Speech Introduction.
¹⁵ I.e., if the Athenians had to choose to prepare for war either against
their enemies in Greece or against the King, it would be reasonable for
them to choose the latter.
¹⁶ Athens’ list of enemies included Thebes, whose enemy Phocis enjoyed
Athenian support; some of its former allies, who had revolted in the Social

looking for others? So, let us make our preparations against our
existing enemies and defend ourselves against the King, if he tries
to wrong us. [12] You are now calling on the Greeks to join you.
But if you do not do as they bid,¹⁷ how can you expect any of
them, some of whom are not well disposed towards you, to com-
ply? “Because, by Zeus, we will tell them that the King is plotting
against them.” But in Zeus’ name, do you suppose that they do
not see this for themselves? I am sure that they do, but their fear
of him does not yet outweigh their disagreements both with you
and, in the case of some of them, with one another. If we do that,
our ambassadors will simply go round giving empty recitations.¹⁸
[13] Later, however, if our current expectation is well founded, I
do not suppose that any of the Greeks is so confident in his own
power that he will not come begging to you at the sight of your
thousand cavalrymen, as many hoplites as anyone might want,
and your three hundred ships,¹⁹ in the belief that these will guar-
antee his survival. Consequently, if you call on the Greeks now,
you will do so as suppliants, and if you are unsuccessful, you will
have failed outright. But if you make your preparations and then
wait, you will be able to save them when they ask, and you may
be certain that they will all come to you for help.
War (see 15.3n); Mausolus the satrap of Caria (see 15.3n); and Philip of Mace-
don (see 15.24n).
¹⁷ The reference is unclear, and Demosthenes may not have anything
specific in mind beyond the general difficulty of getting all the Greeks to
cooperate with each other.
¹⁸ The allusion is to rhapsodes, who gave professional recitations of (espe-
cially epic) poetry and whose performances were intended to entertain their
audience rather than persuade them to take action.
¹⁹ One thousand was the nominal strength of the Athenian cavalry
throughout the classical period (see Thuc. 2.13.8). Demosthenes is vague
about the number of hoplites, and in fact the number of Athenians who
were liable for hoplite service varied over time. He gives a round figure for
the number of ships in the Athenian navy: inscribed naval accounts indicate
that Athens had more than 300 ships in this period (349 in 353/2: IG II² 1613,
lines 284–292), although not all were serviceable. In any case, the Athenians
would have found it impossible to put all their ships to sea at once. See Ga-
brielsen 1994: 126–129.

248 demosthenes
[14] For these and similar reasons, men of Athens, I have tried
to make my speech neither rash nor longer than it need be, but I
have taken great pains to work out how we can make our prepa-
rations as quickly and effectively as possible.²⁰ I request that you
listen to my proposal and, if it pleases you, vote in favor of it. The
first and biggest step, men of Athens, in making our preparations
is for you to resolve that you will be ready and willing to do what-
ever is required in person. [15] For as you know, men of Athens,
whenever you have all set your heart on anything, and as a result
have each felt obliged to take action, you have always achieved
your aim. But whenever you have formed some desire, but have
then looked to one another, each refusing to do anything him-
self but expecting his neighbor to act, you have never yet accom-
plished anything. [16] If you do have such a keen and resolute
attitude, I say that you should increase the Twelve Hundred to
two thousand, by assigning an additional eight hundred peo-
ple.²¹ For if you designate this number, once heiresses, orphans,
the property of cleruchs and associations, and invalids have been
removed, you will have twelve hundred remaining.²² [17] From
²⁰ Demosthenes contrasts his summary analysis of relations with Persia

with his detailed financial proposals.
²¹ At this time the number of wealthy Athenians liable to contribute
financially to the running of the navy was fi xed at 1,200 (see the Speech
Introduction).
²² Various categories of property owners were exempt from active service
as trierarch (commander of a trireme): heiresses, orphans (i.e., boys whose
fathers had died), and invalids were all deemed to be incapable of holding
military command. Cleruchs were Athenian citizens who lived in Athenian
settlements overseas, and who would have been unavailable by reason of ab-
sence. By associations are meant corporate bodies such as demes and phra-
tries. Demosthenes wishes the 1,200 to consist entirely of men capable of
active service. The interpretation of the Greek word here translated as “in-
valid” (adynatos, lit. “unable”) is disputed. Alternative views are that De-
mosthenes is referring to men who were too poor (i.e., financially unable)
to contribute, or to those who were exempt because they were already per-
forming, or had recently performed, another liturgy. See in general Gabri-
elsen 1994: 85–102 (though I disagree with his proposal that these exemp-
tions were granted by the Athenian state as privileges).

these I suggest that you create twenty symmories, as there are

currently, each containing sixty members, and that you divide
each symmory into five sections of twelve, in each case includ-
ing the poorest to match the richest. This is how I think the per-
sonnel should be organized; I will explain my reasons after you
have heard about the system as a whole. [18] What about the tri-
remes? My proposal is that you designate a total of three hundred
ships, and from these create twenty squadrons of fifteen ships, as-
signing to each squadron five of the first hundred, five of the sec-
ond hundred, and five of the third hundred; then that you allot a
squadron of fifteen ships to each symmory, and three triremes to
each section of a symmory.²³ [19] Once these arrangements have
been made, I make the following proposal for the reorganization
of your finances. Since the taxable value of our land is six thou-
sand talents,²⁴ you should divide this sum into one hundred lots
of sixty talents, and then allot five lots of sixty talents to each of
the twenty large symmories,²⁵ and each symmory should assign
one lot of sixty talents to each of its sections. [20] As a result, if
you need one hundred ships, sixty talents of property value will
be taxed to provide the sum needed for each ship,²⁶ which will
²³ The ships are divided into three groups, each of 100, according to their
age and sailing quality. At this period ships in the Athenian navy were rated
as “first,” “second,” “third,” or “select,” the last being particularly fast ships.
See Gabrielsen 1994: 129–131.
²⁴ The figure of 6,000 talents probably represents the most recent valu-
ation of the total wealth of those liable for paying the wealth-tax (eisphora)
(on which see 26n), rather than the total wealth of all Athenians: see 27 be-
low, where Demosthenes uses the same figure of 6,000 talents to calculate
how much money could be raised from the eisphora. In 378/7 the compara-
ble figure (in the context of the eisphora) was 5,750 talents, according to the
Hellenistic historian Polybius (2.62.6– 7). On the process of self-assessment
by which the rich probably declared their wealth, see Christ 2007.
²⁵ Demosthenes refers to the 100 proposed sections as (small) symmories,
from which the symmories as such need to be distinguished.
²⁶ Demosthenes’ words have been expanded a little in the translation to
make his point clear. If the Athenians need 100 ships, each section (consti-
tuting 1 percent of the 1,200 and worth 1 percent of the tax base) will pro-
vide one ship, and so on.

250 demosthenes
have twelve trierarchs.²⁷ If you need two hundred ships, thirty

talents will provide the sum needed for each ship, which will have
six trierarchs. And if you need three hundred ships, twenty tal-
ents will provide the sum needed, and four people will be trier-
archs. [21] In the same way, I propose that you value the naval
equipment that is currently on loan according to the inventory²⁸
and divide this sum into twenty parts, and that you allot one
share of the debt to each of the large symmories;²⁹ and each sym-
mory should allot an equal share to each of its sections; and the
twelve men in each section should recover what is owed, and each
should put the triremes that are assigned to them into a state of
readiness. [22] This, I think, is the best way for the money and
the ships and the trierarchs and the collection of equipment to be
funded and organized. Next, I shall describe a clear and straight-
forward system for providing crews for the ships. I propose that
the generals³⁰ should divide the docks³¹ into ten areas, after they
have considered how to organize the berths into sets of thirty,
as close as possible to each other.³² In doing so, they should as-
sign two symmories and thirty triremes to each of these areas and
²⁷ Here the 1,200 symmory members are all described as trierarchs, al-
though in practice no more than one or two of them will have commanded
each of the ships for which they were collectively responsible.
²⁸ The equipment (masts, oars, ropes, and other gear) for Athens’ tri-
remes belonged to the city and was lent to the trierarchs for the duration
of their service. In practice, much of this equipment was not returned, as
is clear from the partially surviving records kept by the Superintendents of
the Dockyards (IG II² 1604–1632). This caused problems for incoming tri-
erarchs (as, e.g., the speaker of Dem. 47). See in general Gabrielsen 1994:
146–169.
²⁹ The redundant reference to the symmories as “large” reinforces the
distinction between them and the sections into which they were divided
(cf. 19n).
³⁰ The board of ten annually elected generals were responsible for Athens’
navy as well as its army.
³¹ In Piraeus. On the “naval zone” of Piraeus, see briefly Garland 2001:
95–100.
³² I.e., all thirty berths within each set are to be close to each other, so
that there is a defined area for the ships assigned to each set.

then distribute the tribes³³ among the areas by lot. [23] Each taxi-
arch³⁴ should divide the part of the docks that is allocated to his
tribe into three areas, and the ships likewise, and then distrib-
ute the Thirds³⁵ by lot, so that each tribe has one part of the en-
tire docks, and each Third has a third of each part. And so if you
need anything, you will know where each tribe has been assigned,
and each Third, and which trierarchs and triremes there are. If
you start in this way, then if we omit anything now—and it is un-
deniably hard to think of everything—the system will find it out
for itself, and there will be a single system both for the navy as a
whole and for its constituent parts.
[24] As regards the source of funds, what I am about to say is
paradoxical, I admit, but I shall say it nevertheless. For I am con-
fident that on a correct assessment of the matter, I alone will be
seen to have spoken the truth and to have anticipated what will
happen in the future. I say that we do not need to talk about
money now, since you have a source of funds, if you need it, that
is great and fine and honorable. But if we look for it now, we shall
reach the conclusion that it will not exist for us even in the fu-
ture—so far short will we fall of making provision for the pres-
ent. If on the other hand we leave it alone now, it will be there for
us later. What is it that does not exist now but will exist in the fu-
ture? It is like a riddle—which I shall now explain. [25] Look at
this whole city of ours, men of Athens. It contains wealth that
is almost equal to that of all other cities. But the owners of this
³³ The Athenian citizen body was divided for various civic and military
purposes into ten units called “tribes” (phylai), of roughly equal size. Spe-
cifically, the heavy infantry (hoplites) of the Athenian army were organized
into ten regiments (taxeis), one from each tribe.
³⁴ The ten annually elected taxiarchs (taxiarchoi) were military com-
manders, each of whom commanded the hoplite regiment (taxis: see the
previous note) of his own tribe: see 4.26n.
³⁵ There were three “Thirds” (trittyes, singular trittys) in each tribe. Each
Third was made up of a number of demes (communities) from one of the
three regions into which Attica was arbitrarily divided, thus ensuring that
the tribes were geographically diverse in their composition. See (briefly)
Hansen 1991: 46–49.

252 demosthenes
wealth are so minded that if all the speakers were to raise the alarm
that the King is coming, that he is here, that it cannot possibly be
otherwise, and if together with the speakers an equal number of
men were to deliver oracles to the same effect,³⁶ they would not
only not contribute but they would not even reveal their wealth
or give the appearance of being rich.³⁷ [26] But if they were to
see the things that they are now frightened to hear about actu-
ally taking place, none of them is so stupid that he would with-
hold his money and not be the first to pay the wealth-tax.³⁸ For
who would rather lose his life and his possessions than contrib-
ute a share of his wealth to save both himself and the rest of his
property? And so I declare that the money will be available when
it is really needed but not before. Consequently I do not advise
you even to look for it now, since what you could provide now,
if you choose to look for it, would provoke more laughter than if
you were to provide nothing at all. [27] Look, what would happen
if someone were to propose a wealth-tax of one hundredth? We
would raise sixty talents.³⁹ What about one fiftieth, double that?
We would raise one hundred and twenty talents. What is this
against the twelve hundred camels that, so these men say, trans-
port the King’s money? Even if you wanted us to pay a wealth-tax
of one twelfth, raising five hundred talents—you would not tol-
erate it nor, even if you did pay it, would the money be enough
³⁶ Oracle mongers, who peddled the texts of prophecies and oracular re-
sponses, were particularly active at times of crisis such as when war threat-
ened. See Flower 2008: 60– 65.
³⁷ Demosthenes alludes here to “invisible wealth,” i.e., wealth held in
forms such as cash, bank deposits or loans, that were not easily detectable,
as opposed to visible wealth such as land, property, and slaves. Some rich
Athenians sought to keep much of their wealth “invisible” to evade taxes
and liturgies. See Gabrielsen 1986; Christ 1990.
³⁸ The wealth-tax (eisphora) was an occasional tax on wealth, levied by a
vote of the Assembly as a proportion (see 27) of the assessed wealth of those
rich enough to be liable to pay it. It was the main way in which the Athe-
nians could raise extra money for military expenditure. The symmory sys-
tem was also used for collecting eisphora: see the Speech Introduction.
³⁹ Demosthenes here uses, in the context of the eisphora, the same figure
for the total value of Attica (6,000 talents) that he earlier used in the context
of the naval symmories (see 19). Evidently there was only one valuation.

for the conduct of the war. [28] You must then prepare yourselves
in other respects but allow those who have money to keep it for
the present—and there is no finer city in which to keep it! But if
ever the opportunity arises, you should take it, and they will will-
ingly contribute. This course of action is both feasible, men of
Athens, and honorable and expedient; it also sends the King an
appropriate message about you, which would cause him no little
concern. [29] He knows that with two hundred ships, of which
we provided one hundred, our ancestors destroyed one thousand
of his,⁴⁰ and he will hear that we ourselves now have three hun-
dred ships prepared. So he would not think it at all a light matter,
even if he were utterly mad, to make our city his enemy. But if he
should think to pride himself on his wealth, he will find that here
too his capital is less substantial than yours. [30] He is bringing
much gold, they say. But if he distributes this, he will have to seek
more. For fountains and wells must fail, if much is drawn from
them at one time, whereas he will learn that the value of our ter-
ritory is our capital. And we defend it against invaders, as those of
his ancestors who were at Marathon would know best.⁴¹ So long
as we are victorious it is, I believe, impossible for our wealth to
run out.⁴²
[31] What some people fear, that he will use his money to col-
lect a large force of mercenaries, seems to me implausible. For I
think that although many Greeks would be willing to take pay
from him to fight against Egypt⁴³ or Orontes⁴⁴ or some other for-
⁴⁰ Demosthenes refers to the battle of Salamis in 480. In a later speech

(18.238) he claims that Athens contributed 200 out of a total of 300 ships,
which is closer to the figures provided by Herodotus (8.42–48: 180 out of
366 ships were Athenian).
⁴¹ On the battle of Marathon in northeastern Attica in 490, see 13.21n.
⁴² Demosthenes is perhaps thinking here that the Athenians will be able
to levy the eisphora indefinitely on the land of Attica.
⁴³ Egypt revolted from Persian rule at the start of the fourth century, and
the Persians made several attempts to regain it before they finally succeeded
in 343/2. Greek mercenaries were employed in large numbers on both sides
of the conflict. See Parke 1933: 165–169.
⁴⁴ Orontes, the satrap (i.e., Persian governor) of Mysia in northwestern
Asia Minor, was a leader of a revolt involving several of the western satraps

254 demosthenes
eigner, not out of a desire to help him capture any of them but
each hoping to achieve a measure of individual prosperity and
thereby escape his existing poverty,⁴⁵ I do not think that any
Greek would march against Greece—where would he turn to af-
terwards? Will he go to be a slave in Phrygia?⁴⁶ [32] Since war
against foreigners is about nothing less than the preservation of
our territory and lives and customs and freedom and the like, who
is so misguided as to wish to sacrifice himself, his parents, fam-
ily tombs, and fatherland for the sake of a short-lived profit? No
one, surely. Nor indeed is it in the King’s interest to conquer the
Greeks with mercenaries. For once they have defeated us, they in
turn will be stronger than him, and he does not want to destroy
you only to be in the power of others. What he would like best is
to rule everyone; but if he cannot do that, to rule the slaves⁴⁷ that
he already has.
[33] If anyone imagines that the Thebans will join him,⁴⁸ it is
difficult to speak to you about them, since your hatred of them
makes you unwilling to hear anything good about them, even if
it is true.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, those who are deliberating about mat-
against the Persian King in the 360s and 350s. On this revolt, see Briant
2002: 656– 675.
⁴⁵ It was assumed by Greek writers of the period that most mercenaries
had enlisted to escape poverty at home. Others will have been political ex-
iles, and some perhaps became mercenaries out of a desire for adventure.
⁴⁶ Phrygia was a Persian satrapy of western central Asia Minor and also a
significant source of slaves for Greek cities such as Athens.
⁴⁷ Demosthenes uses the word slave to refer pejoratively to any subject of
the Persian King: see 15.23n.
⁴⁸ The Thebans had (albeit reluctantly) joined the Persians during their
invasion of Greece in 480, and thereafter it was easy for Athenians and
others who were ill disposed to them to impute pro-Persian sympathies to
them. More recently, at a peace conference held at Susa in 367, the Persian
King had supported Thebes, to the disgust of the contemporary Athenian
historian Xenophon (Hellenica 7.1.33–40).
⁴⁹ Athens and Thebes were rivals for the hegemony of Greece. In the 360s
they had clashed in the Peloponnese, where Athens supported Sparta; in
northern Greece; and in the Aegean, where Thebes made overtures to some
of Athens’ disaffected allies. At the time of the speech, Athens was also pro-
viding (mainly moral) support to Phocis in its war against Thebes.

ters of importance must not neglect any calculation that is to our

advantage, for any reason. My view is that the Thebans are so far
from ever joining him against the Greeks [34] that they would
pay a lot of money, if they had it to give, for the chance to redeem
their previous crimes against Greece.⁵⁰ But if anyone thinks that
the Thebans are by nature utterly unregenerate, I imagine that
you all realize this—that if they side with the King, their enemies
must take the side of the Greeks.
[35] I think that justice is on our side and that those who are on
it will be stronger than the traitors and the foreigner⁵¹ in any situ-
ation. And so I say that we should not be afraid without good rea-
son nor be induced to start a war. Indeed, I do not think that any
of the other Greeks could reasonably dread such a war. [36] For
who of them is unaware that so long as they accepted that he⁵²
was their common enemy, they were in accord with one another
and were secure in their prosperity, but when they thought that
he was their supporter in their disagreements with each other,
they suffered more evils than could be devised by someone put-
ting a curse on them? Are we then to fear the man whom for-
tune and the god show to be a useless friend but a useful enemy?
Certainly not! But let us not act unjustly, both for our own sake
and because of the disturbed condition and unreliability of the
rest of Greece. [37] If we unanimously agreed to attack him, I
would not consider it wrong for us to wrong him. But since that
is not the case, I say that we should be on our guard not to offer
the King any excuse to seek justice on behalf of the other Greeks.
For if you remain at peace, such an action would make him sus-
pect; but if you go to war, he could reasonably represent himself,
because of their hatred for you, as a friend of the others. [38] Do
not then put the evils of Greece to the test, by summoning the
Greeks when they will refuse to come and by fighting a war that
you will be unable to win. Instead, you should remain at peace,
be confident and prepare yourselves, and hope that it is reported
⁵⁰ I.e., their going over to the Persians in 480: see 33n.

⁵¹ Referring to the Thebans, as traitors to Greece in 480, and the Persian
King respectively.
⁵² The Persian King.

256 demosthenes
about you to the King, not by Zeus that you are all confused or
alarmed or in a state of uproar—far from it—[39] but that if ly-
ing and perjury were not as shameful to the Greeks as they are
admirable to him, you would long ago have marched against him.
As things are, you would not take this action on your own ac-
count, but should pray to all the gods that the same madness may
overtake him as once overtook his ancestors. And if it occurs to
him to think about this, he will realize that your plans are not to
be scorned. [40] He knows that it was from the wars against his
ancestors that this city became rich and powerful, whereas from
the peace that it once kept⁵³ it surpassed none of the Greek cit-
ies by as much as it does now. Indeed, he sees that the Greeks are
in need of someone who will, wittingly or unwittingly, reconcile
them to each other, and knows that he would be doing exactly
that, if he were to stir up war. And so the news that he will receive
will be both familiar to him and credible.
[41] I do not wish to irritate you, men of Athens, by speak-
ing at too great a length, and so I shall summarize my advice and
then depart. I recommend that you make preparations against
your existing enemies, and I declare that you should resist the
King and anyone else if they try to wrong you, with this same
force, but should not take the first step in either speaking or act-
ing unjustly; and you should consider how our actions, not the
speeches from this platform, may be worthy of our ancestors. If
you do this, you will be doing what is in the interest both of your-
selves and of those who are trying to persuade you of the oppo-
site course, since you will not get angry with them later because
of any mistake you make now!
⁵³ Demosthenes is referring to the period before the Persian Wars, when

Athens was not (as he implies) always at peace but was indeed not yet a
dominant power in Greece.

15. ON THE FR EEDOM
OF THE R HODI A NS
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
The date of this speech is open to some doubt. Dionysius of
Halicarnassus places it in 351/0, although we do not know how he
or his source arrived at this date.¹ It was clearly delivered after the
death of Mausolus, ruler of Caria, and during the rule of his sister
and widow Artemisia (e.g., 27). Mausolus died in 353/2 (Diodorus
16.36.2), and Artemisia died in 351/0 (Diodorus 16.45.7), and so the
speech must belong within those years. Demosthenes reports ru-
mors that the Persian campaign to regain Egypt is failing (12), but
the dates of this campaign are not exactly known.²
A possible obstacle to accepting Dionysius’ date lies in the pas-
sage (24) in which Demosthenes claims that some Athenians de-
spise Philip of Macedon as being of no consequence. Since in
summer 352 Philip had secured a decisive victory over the Pho-
cians at the battle of the Crocus Field and thereby gained control
of all Thessaly, and in winter 352/1 was campaigning successfully
in Thrace, it is unlikely that many Athenians regarded him as in-
consequential in 351/0. It is also hard to believe that Demosthenes

² Diodorus’ confused account of the eventual Persian conquest of Egypt
(in the 340s, but misdated by him) refers in vague terms to earlier failures
(16.40.3–5; cf. 16.44.1 and 48.1). Isocrates (5.101) also refers in 346 to an em-
barrassing Persian failure. There seems no evidence that Artaxerxes’ failed
campaign started as late as 351/0, as it is often dated, except for the desire
to synchronize it with the presumed date of this speech. See Lane Fox 1997:
187–191.

258 demosthenes
advocated sending a force to the southeastern corner of the Ae-

gean at the same time as, or even after, he delivered the First Phi-
lippic (Dem. 4), in which he argued that Philip posed a very seri-
ous threat to Athens. From this point of view, a more likely date
would be 353/2, shortly after the death of Mausolus, whenever in
the year that occurred, and after the defeat of Philip by the Pho-
cian army in summer 353 (Diodorus 16.35.2), an event that may
have led observers at Athens to regard his threat as exaggerated.³
On the other hand, 24 may relate to the rumors that Philip was
ill (or even dead) at the time of his Thracian campaign of 352/1
(see 4.10), which might explain why some Athenians had started
to discount him as a threat.⁴ On this view, Dionysius’ date could
be correct.
The context of the speech is an appeal to Athens by the ex-
iled democrats of Rhodes for help in restoring them to their city.
The island of Rhodes in the southeastern Aegean was a founding
member of the Second Athenian Confederacy (as it is generally
called) or League.⁵ This was created in the early 370s under Ath-
ens’ leadership as an anti-Spartan alliance. Its constitution sought
to prevent many of the abuses that had made Athens’ fifth-century
empire unpopular with its subjects, and it was initially very suc-
cessful in recruiting members. Over time, however, a number of
allies became increasingly disaffected. They resented Athens’ im-
perialistic policies of the 360s and early 350s, such as the establish-
ment of an Athenian cleruchy (i.e., settlement) on the Aegean is-
land of Samos (see 9n) and the diversion of the league’s resources
to attempts to recover Athens’ former possessions in the north Ae-
gean, especially Amphipolis and the Chersonese.
They also resented Athens’ breaches of the league’s constitu-
³ See Lane Fox (see the previous note).

⁴ The text of 24 contains a particle (ara) that has the sense “after all,” i.e.,
that Philip is after all of no consequence. This might indicate that some spe-
cific event had happened to cause people to downplay the threat he posed
to Athens.
⁵ IG II² 43 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 22 (an inscription record-
ing the establishment of the confederacy and listing its members), line 82.
See in general Cargill 1981.

15. on the fr eedom of the rhodians 259
tion, such as the imposition of garrisons and demands for money,

and its failure to adequately police the Aegean.⁶ This culminated
in 357 when a number of prominent members of the league—
Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium—led a revolt against Athens (3n).
The resulting war (known as the Social War)⁷ was a disaster for
the Athenians: their fleet was defeated by the rebels, and they were
forced to acquiesce in their secession. The mood at Athens in the
aftermath of the war was understandably gloomy: its foreign pol-
icy had failed, public finances were weak, and the navy had suf-
fered a humiliating reverse (for Demosthenes’ concern with naval
reform, see Dem. 14).
According to Demosthenes in this speech, the catalyst for the
revolt of Rhodes was Mausolus, the satrap (i.e., Persian-appointed
governor) of Caria, a province of the Persian Empire in south-
western Asia Minor (3n).⁸ Mausolus, who was a native Carian,
ruled his homeland from 377/6 to 353/2. Although appointed by
the Persian King, he took advantage of the remote location of
Caria, and of a degree of political disorder within the Persian Em-
pire, to act in a quasi-autonomous manner, especially in his for-
eign policy. The King’s Peace of 386 had limited Persian territo-
rial claims to the mainland of Asia Minor, but Mausolus sought
to extend his authority over several of the offshore Greek islands
of the southeastern Aegean (see 27, naming Cos). In particular, he
had supported the Rhodian oligarchs, who overthrew the democ-
racy on Rhodes and exiled their democratic opponents (14–15).
After his death the oligarchs continued to enjoy the support of his
successor Artemisia. Many of the exiled democrats came to Ath-
ens, where they lobbied for the Athenians to restore them and re-
establish democracy.
In speaking in support of their appeal, Demosthenes tries to
persuade the Athenians that it is both right and in Athens’ inter-
⁶ See Dem. 50.4 and Diodorus 15.95 for raids on the territory of Athens
and its allies by Alexander, ruler of the Thessalian city of Pherae, in the late
360s.
⁷ I.e., a war between or against allies, from the Latin word socius, “ally.”
⁸ On Mausolus, see the detailed treatment of Hornblower 1982; more
briefly the same author’s entry “Mausolus” in OCD³.

260 demosthenes
est to try to restore democracy on Rhodes. The opposing view was

clearly that the Rhodians deserved no help, because of their role
in the Social War, and that it was dangerous for Athens to risk
hostilities with Artemisia, especially because this might also lead
to conflict with her master, the Persian King (6). As regards the
Rhodians, Demosthenes admits that they do not deserve Athens’
help, but he argues that it is in Athens’ interest to help them nev-
ertheless: both because they will be chastened and therefore loyal
in the future (15–16) and because it will signal Athens’ policy of
supporting democracy throughout Greece (4). He claims that oli-
garchy is the inveterate enemy of democracy and that it is in Ath-
ens’ interest to support those who are on the same side of this ide-
ological divide (17–21).
Demosthenes addresses the likely reaction of Artemisia and
the Persian King to an Athenian-backed restoration of democracy
on Rhodes as follows: The King did nothing when the Athenians
previously expelled a Persian garrison from the island of Samos
(9–10), and hence he is unlikely to do anything different in the
case of Rhodes, although Demosthenes is aware that any Persian
claim to the island would alter the situation (13). Moreover, Arte-
misia would rather that Athens control Rhodes than that it fall
into the hands of the King, if he should fail to conquer Egypt,
since in that eventuality he would use the island against her (11–
12). If the Athenians were to try to restore democracy, any inter-
vention on her part would be half-hearted at best (12). Demos-
thenes seems to believe—not wholly implausibly—that relations
between Caria and Persia are tense, and he wishes to take oppor-
tunistic advantage of it.
A further aspect to the speech is a desire that Athens redeem
itself after the dark years that culminated in the outbreak of the
Social War. There is a tension in it between the cynicism of 28—
since no one else’s actions are motivated by justice, it would be
naïve of the Athenians to do otherwise—and the prominent as-
sertion that they need to dispel the slanders to which their actions
have given rise (2). For Demosthenes, the support of freedom and
democracy was Athens’ duty.
Demosthenes failed to persuade the Athenians on this occa-

sion.⁹ His idealistic approach was probably regarded by many

Athenians as foolish, especially his belief that Artemisia would
not strenuously oppose Athenian interference on an island that
she controlled. In view of Athenian fear of Persia in this period
(see Dem. 14), Demosthenes’ lack of concern about the possibility
of Persian retaliation may have seemed reckless; others may have
taken the view that Athens lacked the financial resources to en-
gage in such adventurism, which would bring with it few tangi-
ble benefits.¹⁰
There is a detailed German commentary on this speech by Ra-

dicke 1995.
15. on the fr eedom of the r hodi ans

[1] In my opinion, men of Athens, those who are deliberating
about matters of such importance should allow each of their ad-
visors to speak freely. And until now my difficulty has never been
to advise you what is the best policy to pursue—to tell the truth,
I think that you all already know what it is—but to persuade you
to do so. For whenever a policy is approved and voted on, you re-
main as far from taking action as you were before. [2] There is,
however, one thing for which I think you owe a debt of gratitude
to the gods: the fact that the only hope of rescue for those who,
through their own arrogance, recently went to war with you¹¹
now lies in your hands. You ought to be delighted by the pres-
ent opportunity, since if you make the right decision, you will
dispel the slanders of those who criticize the city and will also
win for yourselves a glorious reputation. [3] The Chians, Byzan-
⁹ Prologue 24 apparently belongs to the same affair, and is interpreted by

MacDowell (2009: 222–223) as being written in response to a subsequent
embassy to Athens from the Rhodian oligarchs.
¹⁰ The Athenian politician most closely associated with this cautious
view was Eubulus, on whom see the Introduction to Dem. 3.
¹¹ The Rhodians, who had taken a leading part in the Social War against
Athens of 357–355 (see the Speech Introduction).

262 demosthenes
tines, and Rhodians accused us of plotting against them, and as

a result combined against us in this most recent war,¹² but it will
emerge that the man who engineered this and persuaded them
was Mausolus, who claimed to be the Rhodians’ friend, but in-
stead deprived them of their freedom.¹³ The Chians and Byz-
antines declared themselves their allies but provided no help to
them in their misfortune. [4] You, however, whom they used to
fear, will now be single-handedly responsible for rescuing them.
If you make this clear to everybody, you will cause the majority
in every city to regard friendship with you as a guarantee of their
own freedom.¹⁴ There is no greater benefit you could secure than
the willing and trusting goodwill of all.
[5] I am amazed to see that the same men advise the city to
oppose the King¹⁵ for the sake of the Egyptians,¹⁶ but are too
frightened of him to take action on behalf of the Rhodian people.
And yet everyone knows that the latter are Greek, whereas the
former are part of his empire.¹⁷ [6] I imagine some of you recall
that at the time when you were deliberating about relations with
the King, I came forward and was the first to advise you—I think
that I spoke alone, or perhaps there was one other—and said that
¹² The mention of Athenian plotting possibly refers to the actions of the

Athenian general Chares, who was notorious for taking a hard line with the
allies: see 8.30n.
¹³ On Mausolus, see the Speech Introduction. Demosthenes alleges that
he was responsible for Rhodes’ revolt from Athens. There may be some truth
in this, but Demosthenes, who is seeking to persuade the Athenians to help
their recent enemies the Rhodians, has a clear motive to transfer the blame
for the secession of Rhodes as far as possible from them to Mausolus.
¹⁴ The majority (hoi polloi) in every city are the poorer citizens, who nat-
urally support the constitution that gives them a share in political power
(i.e., democracy), and thus have an affinity with democratic Athens.
¹⁵ I.e., the Persian King.
¹⁶ Egypt was in revolt from Persian rule throughout the first half of the
fourth century. During this period the native Egyptians received help from
various Greek cities, including Athens. In the late 350s Artaxerxes III made
an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Egypt (see the Speech Introduction).
¹⁷ Egypt was annexed by the Persian King Cambyses in the late sixth
century, when it became part of the Persian Empire.

it was not sensible to use your hatred of him as an excuse for mil-
itary preparation, but that you should prepare yourselves to fight
your existing enemies, and defend yourselves against him only if
he tried to wrong you. Nor did you think that I spoke wrongly,
but on the contrary my advice was pleasing to you.¹⁸ [7] My pres-
ent speech follows on from what I said on that occasion. For my
part, if the King were to summon me to his side as his advisor, I
would give him the same advice that I give you—to fight for his
own possessions if any of the Greeks should oppose him but to
make no claim to rule what does not belong to him.¹⁹ [8] If you
have made up your minds, men of Athens, to cede to the King ev-
ery place that he has acquired by stealing a march or by deceiving
some of its inhabitants, in my opinion you are wrong. But if you
are resolved even to go to war in the cause of justice, if need be,
and to suffer whatever you believe you must, then the more you
are resolved to resist, the less you will need to fight, and in addi-
tion your policy will be acknowledged to be the correct one.
[9] To show that I am saying nothing new now in encouraging
you to liberate the Rhodians, and that you will be doing nothing
new if you follow my advice, I shall remind you of some events
that proved advantageous to you. Men of Athens, you once sent
Timotheus to help Ariobarzanes, adding to the decree the condi-
tion that he was not to break the treaty with the King.²⁰ When
¹⁸ Demosthenes here refers to his earlier speech On the Symmories

(Dem. 14). The claim that his advice was pleasing to the Athenians does not
imply that his proposal to reform the financing of the navy was approved by
the Assembly (it was not). The speech did, however, succeed in dissuading
the Athenians from taking military action against the King.
¹⁹ By “his own possessions” Demosthenes means the mainland of Asia
Minor, to which the Persians laid claim in accordance with the King’s Peace
of 386. The Persians had no rightful claim to any of the other offshore is-
lands, including Rhodes.
²⁰ Demosthenes refers to events of 366/5. Ariobarzanes, satrap of Helles-
pontine Phrygia in northwestern Asia Minor, refused an order from the Per-
sian King to surrender his satrapy and called on Sparta and Athens for help.
The Athenians sent their general Timotheus with orders to assist him, so
long as he did not breach the King’s Peace.

264 demosthenes
Timotheus saw that Ariobarzanes was clearly in revolt from the

King,²¹ but that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, who had
been appointed by the King’s hyparch Tigranes, he decided not
to help Ariobarzanes but instead went to the assistance of Samos,
laid siege to it, and liberated it.²² [10] And this has not yet up to
the present day resulted in the outbreak of war. For no one would
go to war for the sake of making a profit in the same way as he
would for the sake of his own property, but everyone fights as
hard as he can to hold onto things that someone else is trying to
deprive him of. When it comes to making a profit, the situation is
quite different: men aim at it, if they have the chance; but if they
are prevented, they do not think that their opponents have done
them an injustice.
[11] I do not believe that even Artemisia would be opposed to
our taking this action, if the city is fully committed to it.²³ As
for my reasoning, listen for a moment and judge whether or not
it is correct. In my view, if the King were being quite as success-
ful in Egypt as he hopes to be, Artemisia would have tried very
hard to make Rhodes over to him, not out of goodwill towards
the King but from a wish to do him a considerable favor, since he
is in the vicinity, in order to induce him to treat her as amicably
as possible.²⁴ [12] But if he is doing as is rumored, and has failed
²¹ Ariobarzanes was prominently involved in the so-called Great Satraps’

Revolt of the late 360s, on which see Diodorus 15.90– 92; Briant 2002:
656– 675.
²² Neither Athens nor Persia had any claim to the island of Samos, but
Timotheus took advantage of the disorder in the western Persian Empire to
expel a Persian garrison that had been installed there. Demosthenes implies
that Tigranes (an Armenian by name) was acting as an agent of the King,
but the circumstances in which the island had come under Persian control
are obscure. After a ten-month siege (see Isoc. 15.111) Samos was captured,
but its “liberation” consisted of the expulsion of the native Samians and the
establishment of an Athenian cleruchy (i.e., settlement). The exiled Samians
received refuge in various Greek cities, and Athens’ action was a source of
considerable resentment and anxiety to its allies (see 3n).
²³ Artemisia succeeded her husband (and brother) Mausolus as satrap of
Caria on the latter’s death in 353/2.
²⁴ Demosthenes refers to the Persian campaign to reconquer Egypt, led
by the new King Artaxerxes III. Wherever exactly Artaxerxes was based—

in his undertaking, she thinks that this island, as is the case, has
no other use to the King at present than as an obstacle to pre-
vent her making any move at all.²⁵ And so in my view she would
rather that you have it, as long as she does not surrender it to
you publicly, than that he take it.²⁶ I do not even think that she
would help; but if she did, she would do so in a cursory and inef-
fective way.²⁷ [13] As regards the King, I certainly cannot confi-
dently predict what he will do, but I do maintain that it is in the
city’s interest to clarify whether or not he will lay claim to the city
of the Rhodians. For if he does lay claim to it, we will be obliged
to take counsel not only for the Rhodians but also for ourselves
and for the rest of Greece.
[14] Nor indeed would I have advised you to support those
Rhodians who now occupy the city, even if they held it without
assistance from others or promised to do everything for you.²⁸
For I observe that at first they recruited some of their fellow-
citizens to overthrow the democracy, but when they had achieved
their goal, they turned around and exiled them. I do not see how
men who have acted in bad faith towards both parties could be
reliable allies of yours.²⁹ [15] Nor would I have ever spoken as I
perhaps in Phoenicia—he was much nearer to Caria than he would have

been at court in Persia. On the role of benefactions in the Persian court, see
10.31n.
²⁵ This Persian expedition did in fact fail (Isoc. 5.101), although Egypt
was recovered in the 340s. Demosthenes argues that direct Persian control
of Rhodes would limit the hegemonic ambitions of the satrap of Caria.
²⁶ Persia had no claim to Rhodes (see 7n above), but the King might in-
terpret the handing over of the island to Athens as a rebellious, or at any
rate unfriendly, action on the part of Artemisia. Although Demosthenes is
arguing for the liberation of Rhodes, it is revealing that he speaks of Athens
“having” it (see MacDowell 2009: 220).
²⁷ The Greek text provides no object for the verb “help.” The object to be
supplied is either the Persian King (if he should try to annex Rhodes) or the
Rhodian oligarchs (if Athens should try to liberate the island).
²⁸ Demosthenes here refers to the Rhodian oligarchs.
²⁹ These people were presumably (on the model of the oligarchic coup
at Athens in 411) “moderate” oligarchs whose support was needed to over-
throw the democratic constitution but who were promptly discarded when
a narrowly based oligarchy was set up in its place. The two parties to whom

266 demosthenes
have if I thought that I was doing so only in the interest of the

Rhodian people. For I am not their honorary consul nor is any
of them a personal guest-friend of mine.³⁰ But even if both these
were the case, I would certainly not have spoken as I did unless I
thought it to be in your interest, since as regards the Rhodians—
if it is possible for one who is advising their rescue to say so—I re-
joice at what has happened to them. For by grudging you the re-
covery of your possessions, they have lost their own liberty.³¹ And
although they had the chance of being allied on equal terms with
Greeks and with their superiors,³² they have become the slaves
of foreigners and slaves, whom they admitted into their citadels.
[16] I might almost go so far as to say that if you are willing to
help them, this affair will have done them good. For if they had
prospered, I do not know whether they would ever have come to
their senses, since they are Rhodians;³³ but now that they have
learned by experience that folly is the cause of much misfortune
the oligarchs showed bad faith were thus these men and the mass of the
people.
³⁰ An honorary consul (proxenos) was a man appointed by a foreign city
to look after the interests of its citizens in his own city. This was a posi-
tion of considerable prestige, especially in the case of the larger cities. De-
mosthenes implies that a proxenos might not give impartial advice concern-
ing the city that he represented, and it is known that sometimes they were
appointed for reasons of political sympathy. A guest-friend (xenos) was a
foreigner with whom personal ties of hospitality and friendship had been
established. On the need for Athens’ political leaders to avoid partiality to-
wards other states, see 16.1–2.
³¹ The possessions to which Demosthenes refers are primarily Amphipo-
lis and the Chersonese, which Athens had sought to regain during the 360s.
Athens’ allies had resented being required to serve on campaigns that ben-
efited only the Athenians, and this proved a contributory factor to the out-
break of the Social War.
³² The manuscripts add the word “you,” making Demosthenes’ point ex-
plicit. It is deleted by Dilts 2002.
³³ Demosthenes represents the Rhodian people’s revolt from their alli-
ance with Athens as an act of folly; it has taken the overthrow of democ-
racy and foreign invasion to bring them back to their senses. He depicts the
Rhodians as congenitally inferior to the Athenians (cf. 15).

for many people, they are likely to be more sensible in the fu-
ture, if they win your help. This I consider to be no small benefit
to them. I therefore declare that we ought to try to rescue them,
and not bear a grudge against them, bearing in mind that you too
have been greatly deceived by men who plotted against you—and
you would not say that you ought to be punished for what hap-
pened then.³⁴
[17] Consider too, men of Athens, that you have fought many
wars against both democracies and oligarchies. That much you
know, but perhaps none of you has thought about what you were
fighting for in each case. For what, then? Against democracies
you were fighting either over private claims, which you could not
resolve in public, or over the division of land or border disputes
or out of rivalry or over leadership. But against oligarchies you
fought not over any of these things but for a form of government
and for freedom.³⁵ [18] And so I would say, without hesitation,
that in my opinion it would be better for all the Greeks to be at
war with you, so long as they are democrats, than for them to be
friendly to you and oligarchs. For I believe that you would have
no difficulty in making peace with free men, whenever you wish,
but with oligarchs I do not think that even friendship can be se-
cure, since there is no way that the few can be well disposed to the
many, or that those who seek to rule others can be well disposed
to those who have chosen to live on terms of political equality.
[19] I am surprised if none of you sees that, with Chios and
Mytilene ruled by oligarchies,³⁶ and now Rhodes and almost the
³⁴ The reference is probably to the oligarchic revolution of 411, when the

Athenians were persuaded to suspend their democratic constitution, and
perhaps also to the establishment of the oligarchic “Thirty Tyrants” in 404
(on whom see 22n).
³⁵ This sweeping claim reflects Demosthenes’ view of interstate relations
but has no basis in fact.
³⁶ On Chios, see 3 and 27. It is possible that Mausolus had some role in
its change to oligarchy, the date of which is uncertain. Mytilene, the largest
city on the island of Lesbos, was a democracy in the first half of the fourth
century and a founding member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, but
it had complained in the early 360s about the direction of Athenian foreign

268 demosthenes
whole world reduced to this form of slavery, our own constitution

is also at some risk; or that if oligarchies are set up everywhere
else, they will surely not allow us to retain our democracy. For
they know that no one but us will act to restore freedom, and so
they will wish to destroy the one place that they expect to cause
them trouble. [20] Other wrongdoers should be deemed to be the
enemies only of those whom they have wronged, but I urge you
to regard anyone who overthrows constitutional forms of govern-
ment and changes them to oligarchy to be the common enemy
of all who desire freedom.³⁷ [21] And so it is right, men of Ath-
ens, that you who are democrats should be seen to adopt a similar
attitude towards democrats who are in trouble as you would ex-
pect others to adopt towards you, if ever—may it never happen—
you should suffer something similar yourselves. Indeed if anyone
were to say that the Rhodians have got their just desserts, this is
not the moment to gloat. Those who enjoy good fortune must al-
ways be seen to look after those in trouble, since the future is un-
certain for all men.
[22] I often hear it said here in the Assembly that when our de-
mocracy was in trouble, certain men made plans to rescue it; of
these, I shall confine myself to reminding you briefly about the
Argives. For I would not want you, who have the reputation of al-
ways rescuing those who are in trouble, to appear inferior to the
Argives in this respect. These men, who are the Spartans’ neigh-
bors and saw them ruling on land and sea, showed no fear or hes-
itation in demonstrating their support for you; and when envoys
came from Sparta, it is said, demanding the surrender of some of
your exiles, they voted to treat the envoys as enemies, unless they
policy (see IG II² 107 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 31). On the estab-
lishment of an oligarchy in the 350s, see 13.8; Isoc. Letter 8 (a letter of advice
to the new oligarchic rulers of the city). Shortly after the delivery of this
speech, the city was ruled by a tyrant named Cammys (Dem. 40.37), but by
346 democracy had been restored: see IG II² 213, an Athenian decree renew-
ing Athens’ alliance with the Mytilenean people (i.e., with the democratic
government of Mytilene).
³⁷ In Demosthenes’ view only democracy counts as constitutional gov-
ernment. For democrats’ desire for and affinity with freedom, see 18 above.

left by nightfall.³⁸ [23] Is it not disgraceful, men of Athens, that

in the past the Argive people did not fear the imperial might of
Sparta, but that you, who are Athenian, are now afraid of a for-
eigner—and a woman at that?³⁹ Moreover, the Argives could ad-
duce that they had often been defeated by the Spartans,⁴⁰ whereas
you have often been victorious over the King and have never been
defeated either by his slaves⁴¹ or by the man himself. For if in any
way the King has got the better of our city, he has only done so by
bribing the most despicable Greek traitors.⁴² [24] Even this, how-
ever, did him no good, since you will find that even as he was us-
ing the Spartans to weaken our city, he was in danger of losing
his own kingdom to Clearchus and Cyrus.⁴³ And so he has never
openly defeated us, nor has it benefited him to plot against us. I
³⁸ After the installation of the “Thirty Tyrants” in 404 Athenian dem-

ocratic exiles were harbored by various cities, including democratic Argos
(Diodorus 14.6.2).
³⁹ Artemisia.
⁴⁰ Most notably, the Argives suffered a shattering defeat at the hands of
the Spartans at the battle of Sepeia in 494 (Herod. 6.77–80).
⁴¹ The men whom Demosthenes refers to as slaves were (in fact) high-
ranking Persian generals, whom the Greeks nevertheless liked to describe as
the slaves of the King.
⁴² Demosthenes is alluding to Sparta’s victory over Athens in the Pelo-
ponnesian War, which was made possible by Persian financial support.
Although he does not name the men he has in mind, the chief “traitor”
will presumably have been the Spartan general Lysander, who was respon-
sible for liaising with Sparta’s Persian paymasters. By “the King” Demos-
thenes means not just the current King (Artaxerxes III) but any of his
predecessors.
⁴³ The Persian prince Cyrus unsuccessfully contested the Persian
throne with his brother Artaxerxes (II) in 401, after the death of their fa-
ther Da rius II. He raised a Greek mercenary force in Asia Minor, of which
Clearchus the Spartan was the leading general, and marched into the heart
of the Persian Empire. At the battle of Cunaxa near Babylon, Cyrus was
killed, and shortly afterwards the mercenaries’ commanders, including
Clearchus, were treacherously seized by the Persians and put to death. An
eyewitness account of this campaign is provided by the Athenian writer Xe-
nophon in his Anabasis.

270 demosthenes
see that some of you frequently despise Philip as being of no con-

sequence⁴⁴ but are afraid of the King on the ground that he is a
formidable enemy to whomever he chooses. But if we are to take
no measures against the former on the ground that he is insignif-
icant, and are to yield in every respect to the latter on the ground
that he is formidable, against whom, men of Athens, are we to
take the field?
[25] There are some men here, men of Athens, who are very
clever at telling you the rights of others with respect to you. I
would give them just one piece of advice: they should seek to tell
you your rights with respect to others, if they wish to be seen to
be doing the right thing, since it is absurd for anyone to lecture
you about justice who is not himself acting justly, and it is wrong
for a citizen to have considered the arguments against you but not
those for you.⁴⁵ [26] In the name of the gods, consider why there
is no one at Byzantium to forbid the Byzantines to seize Chalce-
don, which belongs to the King, was once yours, and has noth-
ing to do with them.⁴⁶ Or to forbid them to make Selymbria, a
⁴⁴ It is, to say the least, striking that this oblique allusion is the only
mention of Philip of Macedon in Demosthenes’ three earliest deliberative
speeches (Dem. 14–16), even though by the time of the present speech Philip
had annexed many places on the north Aegean littoral that were claimed by
Athens and had already started to intervene in central Greece. Demosthe-
nes certainly does not endorse the view that Philip is no danger to Athens,
but his proposing an expeditionary force to the southeastern Aegean shows
that he had not yet come to believe that Philip was a uniquely serious threat
to Athens (as he soon saw him to be). See the Speech Introduction.
⁴⁵ In the aftermath of the Social War there were those at Athens who re-
garded their city’s aggressive self-interest (e.g., towards its allies, in the es-
tablishing of a cleruchy on Samos) as the root cause of the disaster. For ex-
ample, sharp criticism of Athenian imperialism is to be found in Isocrates’
work On the Peace of 355. Demosthenes probably also has in mind Eubu-
lus, whose policy of avoiding expensive campaigning abroad could be repre-
sented as one of abandoning Athens’ strategic interests. On Eubulus, see the
⁴⁶ Byzantium controlled passage from the Sea of Marmara into the Black
Sea. Chalcedon, on the mainland of Asia Minor opposite it, belonged to
Persia by virtue of the King’s Peace of 386 and had previously been a mem-

city that was once allied to you, pay contributions to them.⁴⁷ Or

to forbid them to redefine the land of the Selymbrians as belong-
ing to Byzantium in breach of the oaths and treaty, in which it is
written that the cities should be autonomous.⁴⁸ [27] Nor was there
anyone to forbid Mausolus while he was alive, or Artemisia after
his death, to seize Cos⁴⁹ and Rhodes and various other Greek cit-
ies, of which his master the King had deprived the Greeks in the
treaty, and for whose sake the Greeks in those days faced many
dangers and engaged in glorious struggles.⁵⁰ Even if there is some-
one to forbid either of them, it seems that they are not minded to
obey. [28] I believe that it is right to restore the Rhodian people.
But even if it were not, whenever I see what these men⁵¹ are do-
ing I think it right to advise you to restore them. Why? Because,
men of Athens, if everyone were set on acting justly, it would in
my view be shameful for us to be the only ones to refuse to do so;
but when everyone else is preparing to do wrong, I consider it not
justice but cowardice for us alone to offer justice without getting
anything in return. For I see everyone claiming their just desserts
ber of Athens’ fifth-century empire. Demosthenes’ point is that, when other

states pursue their own interest unapologetically, the Athenians are handi-
capping themselves if they do not do likewise.
⁴⁷ Selymbria, on the north shore of the Sea of Marmara to the west of
Byzantium, had also been a member of Athens’ fifth-century empire.
⁴⁸ The King’s Peace was the first of a series of “common peaces” (koinai
eirēnai) that guaranteed the freedom and autonomy of participating cities.
⁴⁹ On Mausolus and Artemisia, see 12n. It is unclear how Mausolus got
control of Cos, an island of the southeastern Aegean. Demosthenes implies
forcible seizure, but it is possible that the Coans turned to him in fear of
Athens after the establishment of the Athenian settlement on Samos in 365
(on which see 9).
⁵⁰ Demosthenes refers to the situation of the Greek cities on the main-
land of Asia, which by the terms of the King’s Peace were agreed to form
part of the Persian Empire. He does not name the cities of which Mauso-
lus got control (see the discussion of Hornblower 1982: 107–137). The “glo-
rious struggles” of the past were the military operations in the eastern Ae-
gean conducted, on the whole successfully, by Athens and its allies against
the Persians in the middle years of the fifth century.
⁵¹ His Athenian political opponents.

272 demosthenes
in accordance with their present strength. [29] I can provide an

example of this that will be familiar to all of you. There are two
treaties between the Greeks and the King, the one which your
city made, of which everyone approves,⁵² and the later one which
the Spartans made, which they criticize.⁵³ In these the two par-
ties have unequal rights. For as regards individual justice in con-
stitutionally governed states, the laws give an equal share to the
weak and the strong alike, but in disputes between the states of
Greece, the strong lay down the law to the weak.
[30] Since you have decided to do what is right,⁵⁴ we must de-
termine how you will be able to achieve this. You will do so by
undertaking to be the champions of freedom for all. It seems to
me that there is a good reason why you find it very difficult to
do what you should. For all other people face a single struggle,
against their declared enemies: if they defeat them, there is noth-
ing to prevent them getting control of their assets. [31] You, how-
ever, men of Athens, face two struggles, both the one that oth-
ers face, and another that is prior to and greater than it. For when
you deliberate, you must overcome those among you who have
chosen to act against the interests of the city.⁵⁵ So, whenever they
⁵² Demosthenes refers to the Peace of Callias of the early 440s between

Athens and the Persian King. Athens and its allies had remained at war
with the Persians after the repulse of the Persian invasion of Greece in 479.
The peace, which takes its name from the main Athenian negotiator, rep-
resented a backing down by the Persians. Some historians believe that the
Peace of Callias is a fourth-century fabrication, on the ground that it is not
mentioned by any fifth-century source, but see Badian 1987, who argues
convincingly for its historical reality. At any rate, Demosthenes believed in
its historicity.
⁵³ The King’s Peace, also known as the Peace of Antalcidas after its Spar-
tan negotiator. Although it was a “common peace,” and guaranteed auton-
omy to states that signed up to it, it was in reality used as a tool for the Spar-
tans to dominate Greece with Persian backing.
⁵⁴ MacDowell 2009: 219 observes that this seems to show that the Athe-
nians have already agreed in principle to help the Rhodians.
⁵⁵ See 25n on the identity of these men.

make it difficult to take any necessary measure, you naturally

miss many opportunities. [32] Although perhaps the main rea-
son why many men get away with such behavior is the help that
they receive from their pay masters,⁵⁶ you too deserve some of the
blame. For, men of Athens, you should have the same attitude to-
wards constitutional discipline as you have towards military dis-
cipline. What do I mean? You think that a man who deserts the
position assigned to him by the general should be deprived of his
civic rights and allowed no share in the community.⁵⁷ [33] In the
same way, those who desert the constitutional position handed
down to them by their ancestors, and whose political conduct is
oligarchic, should be deprived of the civic right to offer you ad-
vice. As it is, you consider those of your allies who have sworn
to have the same enemies and friends as you to be best disposed
to you, but of the politicians it is those whom you know to have
committed themselves to the enemies of our city in whom you
put the greatest trust.
[34] It is not difficult to find allegations with which to charge
these men, or to rebuke you. But to find the right kind of words
or action to set right what is now awry—that is a task indeed.
Perhaps the present moment is not the right time to address every
issue. But if you are able to confirm the decision that you take by
some beneficial action, then these other things too may gradually
improve. [35] You must apply yourselves vigorously to the present
situation and act in a manner that is worthy of the city, keeping
in mind the delight you feel whenever anyone praises your ances-
tors and recounts their achievements and praises their victory tro-
phies.⁵⁸ You should reflect that your ancestors erected these tro-
phies not for you to gaze on in admiration but to encourage you
to imitate the virtues of the men who set them up.
⁵⁶ Here, as often, Demosthenes treats those politicians who disagree with

him as traitors in the pay of a foreign power.
⁵⁷ Demosthenes refers to the offense of desertion (lipotaxion), on which
see briefly MacDowell 1978: 160.
⁵⁸ This passage is repeated almost word for word at 13.26. On trophies,
see 3.24n.

16. FOR THE MEG A LOPOLITA NS
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that this speech was deliv-
ered in 353/2.¹ This date is consistent with the recording by the
historian Diodorus Siculus (16.39) of a Spartan attack on Mega-
lopolis in the following year, 352/1, although Diodorus’ chronol-
ogy is often faulty and cannot be relied on.
By the middle of the fourth century the three major pow-
ers of mainland Greece—Sparta, Thebes, and Athens—were all
in a considerably weakened state. Sparta, which had dominated
Greece since the end of the Peloponnesian War, had been deci-
sively defeated by Thebes at the battle of Leuctra in 371. As a result
of Theban intervention in the Peloponnese, Sparta lost its grip on
the peninsula. The Thebans liberated Messenia, which had been
a Spartan possession since the seventh century and whose inhabi-
tants had been reduced to the status of publicly owned slaves (“hel-
ots”) of the Spartans. A new city of Messene was founded there,
and an independent and staunchly anti-Spartan Messenian state
created. Also in the early 360s Megalopolis (literally “great city”)
was founded in Arcadia in the central Peloponnese; it became the
leader of a new Arcadian Confederation, which looked to Thebes
to protect it against Sparta. The Spartans resented both of these
developments, and during the 360s and 350s they sought, with lit-
tle success, to regain their former hegemony of the Peloponnese.
¹ First Letter to Ammaeus 4. Dionysius gives the speech a slightly different

title: On Aid for the Megalopolitans. None of the traditional titles of Demos-
thenes’ speeches are original.

16. for the megalopolitans 275
Thebes had in turn dominated the years after Leuctra, and re-
mained the most powerful land power in Greece. But it found
it increasingly difficult in the 360s to retain control of its allies
in the Peloponnese and became overstretched by involvements in
central and northern Greece and in the Aegean region. Then in
356 it got dragged into a draining war (the Third Sacred War)
with its neighbor Phocis. The Phocians seized the wealthy sanc-
tuary of Delphi, from which the war took its name, and used its
treasures to pay for large numbers of mercenaries.
Athens had been an ally of Sparta since 370, when the two
states were united in fear of the growing power of Thebes. But
Athenian foreign policy was directed mainly towards the mainte-
nance of its naval alliance, to the recovery of its former possessions
in the north (Amphipolis and the Chersonese above all), and to
the security of its grain route from the Black Sea. Moreover, the
Athenians had recently suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands
of disaffected allies, in the Social War of 357–355, and were ham-
pered by a lack of money to pay for military operations.²
In 353/2 Sparta sought to take advantage of Thebes’ entangle-
ment in the Sacred War to reassert itself in the Peloponnese. Its
initial aggression was directed against Arcadia and Megalopo-
lis. Megalopolis was allied to Thebes, but it could expect little
help from that quarter and so appealed to Athens for support.
The Spartans also sent ambassadors to Athens (see 1), either to
ask for Athenian support, as Libanius states in his Introduction to
the speech, although Sparta’s alliance with Athens was a defensive
one only, or to ask them not to get involved.
Demosthenes argues in this speech that the Athenians should
accept the appeal of the Megalopolitans, on condition that they
repudiate their alliance with Thebes (28). In doing so, he is seek-
ing to persuade the Athenians to alter their established policy of
support for Sparta and opposition to Thebes. His central claim is
that it is in Athens’ interest for Megalopolis to remain indepen-
dent, since if the Spartans conquer it, they will next move against
Messene and thereby regain control of the Peloponnese. This, he
² See the Introductions to Dem. 14 and 15.

276 demosthenes
argues, would make Sparta dangerously powerful; he even sug-

gests that Athens and Thebes would be in danger (20–21). He
denies that accepting the Megalopolitan appeal will provoke a
showdown with the Spartans, on the ground that the latter are
still allies of the Athenians, and also owe them a debt of gratitude
for their support against the Thebans in the 360s.
Athenian policy towards Thebes was directed in general to-
wards reducing its power (4–5). Specifically, Athens sought to
regain the border town of Oropus, control of which it disputed
with Thebes, and to secure the restoration of a number of cit-
ies of Boeotia, above all Plataea, that the Thebans had destroyed
(4). Against the argument that the Athenians need Spartan sup-
port to press their claim to Oropus, Demosthenes first denies that
the Spartans will withdraw their support (13) and then asserts that
the freedom of the Peloponnese is more important to Athens than
control of Oropus (18). As regards the cities of Boeotia, he pro-
poses nothing more concrete than encouraging others to help se-
cure their restoration (25).
This clever speech makes interesting use of the concept of the
balance of power, but Demosthenes does not convincingly ex-
plain how his policy will avoid creating a rift with Sparta while
doing nothing to improve relations with Thebes. It is also clear
from hindsight that he exaggerates the residual power of Sparta,
which proved wholly unable to regain control of the Peloponnese.
It is not surprising, therefore, that his advice was rejected by the
Assembly. The Spartans went on to attack the Megalopolitans,
who appealed to their allies and received help both from various
Peloponnesian states and from Thebes (Diodorus 16.39; cf. Pausa-
nias 8.27.9–10).
16. for the megalopolitans

[1] Both groups—those speaking in support of the Arcadians
and those speaking in support of the Spartans—seem to me to be
wrong, men of Athens. For they accuse and slander each other,
as if they had come here from one or other of these cities, rather
than being your fellow-citizens and the recipients of these em-
bassies. Their behavior would be appropriate if they were foreign-

ers; but those who propose to offer you advice should be discuss-
ing the situation impartially and considering in an amicable spirit
what is best for you. [2] As it is, if I did not know these men
and if they were not speaking Attic,³ I think that many people
would suppose some of them to be Arcadian and the others, Spar-
tan. For my part, I certainly see that it is difficult to give you the
best advice, since at a time when you have all been deceived, with
some people wanting one thing and others another, if any speaker
tries to offer a compromise, but you refuse to stay and learn from
him, he will win the favor of neither side but will be slandered by
both. [3] Nevertheless, I would rather be thought to be talking
nonsense, if indeed such is my fate, than allow certain men to de-
ceive you, against what I believe are the city’s interests. I will talk
about the other matters later, if you wish, but will start from what
is generally agreed, since in my opinion this is the best way to of-
fer advice.
[4] Not a single person, I take it, would deny that it is in our
interest for both the Spartans and these Thebans here to be weak.⁴
Yet the situation at the moment is as follows, to judge from the
speeches that are often made to you: the Thebans will be weak-
ened if Orchomenus and Thespiae and Plataea are resettled,⁵ and
³ There were various regional dialects of Greek, and both Spartans and
Arcadians would have spoken with a Doric dialect, as opposed to the Attic
dialect of the Athenians.
⁴ Demosthenes refers to “these Thebans here” because Boeotia, the region
of which Thebes was the leading city, was Athens’ neighbor to the north. It
is also possible that Theban ambassadors were present in Athens.
⁵ These three Boeotian cities had been destroyed by Thebes in the course
of establishing its control of the rest of Boeotia: Plataea and Thespiae in 373
(Diodorus 15.46.6; Pausanias 9.1.4–8); Orchomenus in 364 following a re-
volt (Diodorus 15.79.3– 6). The Athenians supported their restoration (see
also 5.10; 6.30). Athens had particularly close ties with Plataea, which was
the only city to fight alongside the Athenians at the battle of Marathon
in 490 (on which see 13.21–22, 14.30n), and which had been a loyal ally in
the Peloponnesian War. When the city was captured after a long siege in
427, Plataean refugees in Athens were given Athenian citizenship (Dem.
59.104). After its destruction in 373, the Plataeans were again given refuge in

278 demosthenes
the Spartans will recover their power if they make the Arcadians
their subjects and destroy Megalopolis. [5] We must therefore en-
sure that we do not allow Sparta to become fearsome and power-
ful until Thebes is weakened, nor allow Spartan power to grow
so much, without our noticing, that it outweighs the reduction
in Theban power that our interest demands.⁶ For we would not
claim to wish to exchange the Spartans for the Thebans as our en-
emies, nor is that our intention. Rather, our aim is to ensure that
neither city is able to do us any harm, since in this way we would
have least ground for fear.
[6] And yet, by Zeus, we may agree that this is how things
should be, but we will also say that it is terrible to choose as al-
lies those against whom we fought at the battle of Mantinea, and
to help them against those who shared the danger with us on that
occasion.⁷ I agree, but only on condition that the others⁸ are will-
ing to do what is right. [7] So if everyone is willing to keep the
peace, we shall not help the Megalopolitans, since there will be
no need for us to do so. And as a result, we will have absolutely
no quarrel with those who fought beside us. One party is already
allied to us, so they say, and the other will shortly become so:⁹
what more could we wish for? [8] But suppose that the Spartans
act unjustly and decide to go to war. In that case, if all we had to
decide was whether or not to let them have Megalopolis, I con-
cede that we should abandon it, even though it is wrong to do so,
and not oppose our former comrades-in-arms. But since you all
realize that if the Spartans take Megalopolis, they will next at-
tack Messene, will someone who now takes a hard line towards
Athens (cf. 5.18) and the earlier grant of citizenship was revived (Diodorus
15.46.6). For Athenian support for the restoration of Plataea, see also Isoc.
14 Plataicus.
⁶ The thought is a little convoluted. Demosthenes claims that it is in Ath-
ens’ interest for Theban power to decline somewhat, but not at the cost of a
major increase in Spartan power.
⁷ At the inconclusive battle of Mantinea in 362, the Athenians fought
alongside the Spartans against the Arcadians and Thebans.
⁸ I.e., the Spartans.
⁹ The Spartans and Megalopolitans respectively. On the alliance with
Sparta, see 12n.

Megalopolis tell me what he will advise us to do in that eventu-

ality? No one will have anything to say. [9] Indeed, you are all
aware, whether these men advise it or not, that we are bound to
help the Messenians, both because of the oaths that we swore to
them and because it is in our interest for their city to be saved.¹⁰
Ask yourselves, is it better and more honorable for us to begin our
resistance to Spartan wrongdoing by supporting Megalopolis or
by supporting Messene? [10] In the former case, you will be seen
both to be helping the Arcadians and to be intent on maintaining
the peace, for which you risked battle.¹¹ But in the latter case, ev-
erybody will see that you desire the survival of Messene not from
a sense of justice but out of fear of Sparta. You should always de-
termine what is right and do it—but at the same time you should
ensure that this coincides with your own interests!
[11] Those who speak on the other side, however, say some-
thing like this: that we must try to recover Oropus and that if we
make enemies of those who might now help us to do so, we will
be bereft of allies.¹² I agree that we should try to recover Oropus.
And yet, the claim that the Spartans will become our enemies, if
we make allies of those Arcadians who want to be our friends, is
one that those who persuaded us to help the Spartans when they
were in danger have absolutely no right to make. [12] For this is
not what they said when they persuaded you, at a time when all
the Peloponnesians had come to you and demanded that you at-
tack Sparta, to turn them away—so that they had no choice but
to turn to the Thebans—and to contribute money and risk your
lives for the safety of the Spartans.¹³ I presume that you would
¹⁰ According to Pausanias, Athens promised to help Messene if it was at-

tacked by Sparta (4.28.2). He dates this alliance to the time of the Third Sa-
cred War (i.e., in or after 356).
¹¹ Demosthenes refers again to the battle of Mantinea in 362 (see 6n).
¹² On Oropus, see the Speech Introduction. Demosthenes addresses the
argument that Athens needs to maintain friendly relations with Sparta to
ensure its support in regaining Oropus. Although Athens had other allies,
most of these were islanders, and it would have needed Spartan help to take
on the powerful Theban army.
¹³ In 370 the Arcadians, together with their allies in the Peloponnese,
appealed to Athens for help against Sparta. The Athenians turned them

280 demosthenes
not have been willing to save the Spartans if they had told you be-
forehand that once they had been rescued, if you did not allow
them to do as they pleased once more and to act unjustly, they
would have no gratitude to you for rescuing them. [13] And even
if an alliance between us and the Arcadians is wholly contrary to
the Spartans’ plans, I imagine that their gratitude to us for saving
them in their hour of greatest danger should outweigh their an-
ger with us at stopping them acting unjustly now. How then can
they fail to help us over Oropus, when the alternative is to reveal
themselves to be the most despicable of men? By the gods, I do
not see how they can.
[14] I am, however, surprised by those who claim that if we
make an alliance with the Arcadians and then act in accordance
with it, we will give the impression that we are changing course
and are wholly unreliable. I take the opposite view, men of Ath-
ens. Why? Because I do not think that anyone would deny that
when our city rescued the Spartans, and before that the Thebans,
and most recently the Euboeans, it always had one and the same
purpose in doing so.¹⁴ [15] What was that purpose? It was to save
those who were being wronged. Since that is the case, it would
not be we who are changing course but those who are unwill-
ing to abide by what is just. And it will be clear that although the
course of affairs is always being altered by those who seek to get
more for themselves, our city does not change.
[16] The Spartans seem to me to be engaging in sharp prac-
down, since they did not wish to oppose Sparta, and as a result the Arca-
dians turned to Thebes (Diodorus 15.62.3; Xen. Hellenica 6.5.19). Athens in
turn allied itself with Sparta in 369 (see 7n). The expense and risk that the
Athenians incurred relate to their military support for Sparta in the Man-
tinea campaign of 362 (see 6).
¹⁴ Demosthenes’ first reference is to Athens’ alliance with Sparta in 369
(see 7n); the second is to Athens’ consistent support for Thebes against
Sparta from the 390s to the 370s. Specifically, the Athenians gave sanctuary
to Theban exiles after the Spartan seizure of the citadel of Thebes in 382 and
also contributed to the liberation of the city in winter 379/8. The third is to
Athenian intervention on the island of Euboea in 357 to counter Theban ac-
tivity there, on which see 8.74n.

tice, since the reason why they now say that the Eleans should
recover part of Triphylia, and the Phliasians should recover Tri-
caranon, and some other Arcadians should regain their own land,
and we should recover Oropus is not so that they can see each of
us in possession of our own territory.¹⁵ Far from it—it is too late
for them to become so charitable! [17] Rather, their purpose is to
give everyone the impression that they are being cooperative in
allowing each of these cities to recover the territory to which it
lays claim, in order that when they in turn move against Messene,
these others will all march with them and be eager to help them,
rather than be seen to wrong those who had supported them over
the places to which each of them laid claim, if they should fail to
return the favor. [18] But I think that whether or not some of the
Arcadians are subjected by the Spartans, our city can recover Oro-
pus, with the help both of the Spartans, if they are prepared to act
justly, and of those other cities that oppose the Thebans’ posses-
sion of other people’s territory.¹⁶ But if it were to become clear
to you that we cannot take Oropus unless we allow the Spartans
to conquer the Peloponnese, I think that it would be preferable,
if I may say so, to leave Oropus alone than to abandon the Mes-
senians and the Peloponnese to the Spartans. For I do not sup-
pose that our reckoning with them would be over this alone—I
shall pass over what I was going to say, but I think that we would
be in all sorts of danger.¹⁷
[19] And yet it is absurd to direct recriminations against the
¹⁵ Triphylia, the central coastal region of the western Peloponnese be-

tween Elis to the north and Messenia to the south, had revolted from Elis
and joined the Arcadian League in the early 360s (Xen. Hellenica 7.1.26).
Control of Tricaranon in the central-eastern Peloponnese was disputed by
Phlius and Argos (Xen. Hellenica 7.4.11). In each case, Sparta was support-
ing the territorial claim of its enemy’s enemy. On Oropus, see 11n.
¹⁶ It is not clear whether Demosthenes has any particular cities in mind.
If he does, he is perhaps thinking of Phocis, which was already at war with
Thebes.
¹⁷ Demosthenes is reluctant to express openly the possibility that Athens
itself would be in danger if the Spartans were to succeed in conquering Ar-
cadia and Messene.

282 demosthenes
Megalopolitans for their previous support of Thebes against you,

now that they want to become our friends and help us instead, or
to find fault and think of ways to prevent this alliance, and not to
recognize that the more loyal these men¹⁸ show the Megalopoli-
tans to have been towards Thebes, the more anger you should feel
towards them for depriving the city of such allies, when the Ar-
cadians approached you before they approached the Thebans.¹⁹
[20] This, I think, is the behavior of men whose aim is to make
the Megalopolitans the allies of others for a second time. I know,
as far as one can calculate the future—and I think that most of
you would agree—that if the Spartans capture Megalopolis, Mes-
sene will be in danger; and if they capture Messene, I predict that
we will find ourselves allied to Thebes.²⁰ [21] It is both much more
honorable, and more to our advantage, to take over the Thebans’
alliance ourselves and resist Spartan greed than to shrink from
helping Thebes’ allies and abandon them, and later be forced to
rescue the Thebans, as well as putting ourselves in danger. [22] For
I believe that we would not be unconcerned if the Spartans were
to capture Megalopolis and become great again. I see that even
now they choose to make war not to avoid some evil but to re-
cover their former power. The extent of their ambitions when they
had that power you perhaps know better than I, and you would
be right to be alarmed about it.²¹
¹⁸ Those Athenian politicians who argued against helping the Megalo-

politans in part on the ground that they were still bound by their alliance
with (Athens’ enemy) Thebes.
¹⁹ In 370: see 12n.
²⁰ Demosthenes predicts that a revival in Spartan power will drive Ath-
ens and Thebes into each other’s arms, as happened in the aftermath of the
Peloponnesian War. Such a rapprochement in fact occurred in different cir-
cumstances in 339, when Athens and Thebes laid aside their differences and
made an alliance to oppose Philip of Macedon.
²¹ This refers to the period of the Spartan domination of Greece, 404–
371. Specific Spartan outrages included the overthrow of democracy and
the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens in 404, the seizure of the cita-
del of Thebes in 382 (above, 14n), and a planned raid on Athens’ port of Pi-
raeus in 378. Many in the audience would be old enough to recall some of
these events.

[23] I would like to hear from those speakers who claim to hate
the Thebans or the Spartans, whether they hate them out of con-
cern for you and your interests or whether they hate the Thebans
out of concern for Sparta, and the Spartans out of concern for
Thebes. If the latter is the case, you should listen to neither group,
since they are both insane. But if they say that they hate one of
these cities out of concern for you, why do they unduly elevate the
other?²² [24] For it is possible, it really is, to humble Thebes with-
out making Sparta strong—and much easier. How? I shall try to
explain. We all know that everyone is ashamed not to do what is
right, at least up to a point, even if they do so reluctantly, and that
they are openly opposed to those who act unjustly, especially if it
results in people being harmed. And we will find that what ru-
ins everything and is the root of all evils is simply the reluctance
to behave justly. [25] Thus, to prevent this alliance from obstruct-
ing the reduction of Theban power, let us declare that Thespiae
and Orchomenus and Plataea must be restored, and let us collab-
orate with them, and let us encourage others to help, for it is no-
ble and just to prevent the destruction of long-established cities.²³
But let us not sacrifice Megalopolis and Messene to those who are
engaged in wrongdoing, nor use Plataea and Thespiae as an ex-
cuse to allow existing cities, which are still inhabited, to be de-
stroyed.²⁴ [26] If this policy is made clear, everybody will wish to
prevent the Thebans possessing what does not belong to them.²⁵
But if we do otherwise, these people²⁶ will oppose our plans—
and reasonably so, considering that the resettlement of the cities
of Boeotia will bring ruin on them, and we will have endless trou-
bles. For in truth how will it ever end if we keep on allowing ex-
isting cities to be destroyed and demanding that ruined cities be
resettled?
²² I.e., he asks why the Athenian opponents of Thebes support Sparta so

strongly, and vice versa.
²³ On these three cities, see 4 above. Demosthenes encourages the Athe-
nians to collaborate with their exiled inhabitants, of whom the Plataeans
had received sanctuary at Athens.
²⁴ I.e., Megalopolis and Messene.
²⁵ Oropus and the Boeotian cities that Thebes had destroyed.
²⁶ The Thebans.

284 demosthenes
[27] Those who seem to speak with most justice say that the
Megalopolitans should take down the inscribed pillars relating to
Thebes, if they are to be our firm allies.²⁷ The Megalopolitans,
however, express the view that it is not inscribed pillars but mu-
tual advantage that make friendship, and they think that those
who help them are their allies. If that is their opinion, here is
mine. I say that they should decide to take down the pillars and
that at the same time the Spartans should keep the peace. And
if either side refuses, then we should immediately take the side
of those who are willing to do so. [28] For if, while remaining
at peace, the Megalopolitans retain their alliance with Thebes, it
will be clear to everybody that they prefer Theban greed to the
claims of justice. But if they make an honest alliance with us, and
the Spartans refuse to keep the peace, I presume that it will be
clear to everybody that the Spartans are exerting themselves not
to secure the resettlement of Thespiae²⁸ but in order to subject the
Peloponnese to themselves, at a time when the Thebans are en-
gaged in war.²⁹ [29] I am surprised that some people are afraid to
see the enemies of Sparta become allies of Thebes, but think there
is nothing to be feared in the destruction of those same cities by
the Spartans, considering that we know from experience that the
Thebans always use them as allies against the Spartans,³⁰ whereas
the Spartans, when they had them, used them against us.³¹
²⁷ The texts of alliances were commonly inscribed on stone or bronze pil-

lars (stēlai) and erected in public places. Taking down the pillars recording
their alliance with Thebes would demonstrate that the Megalopolitans had
repudiated it.
²⁸ Thespiae is perhaps singled out for the sake of example, although it
may be that Sparta demanded its restoration in particular: elsewhere in the
speech Demosthenes regards its situation as comparable to that of Orcho-
menus and Plataea (see §4 and 25).
²⁹ The Third Sacred War (356–346) against Phocis; see the Speech
Introduction.
³⁰ During the 360s Thebes had sought to use the Arcadians as a counter-
weight to Sparta in the Peloponnese (see 4n).
³¹ During the fifth and early fourth centuries most of the cities of Arca-
dia were allied to Sparta and contributed troops to the Spartan army. Al-

[30] I think that you should also consider what will happen
if you reject the Megalopolitans. If they are defeated and forced
to live in villages,³² the Spartans will immediately have grown
stronger, whereas if they are saved, as has unexpectedly happened
to some extent already, they will rightly become firm allies of the
Thebans. But if you do accept them, they will owe their salvation
directly to you. As for the consequences of doing so, let us exam-
ine them by assessing the risks for the Thebans and the Spartans.
[31] If the Thebans are defeated, as they deserve,³³ the Spartans
will be no greater than they should be, since to balance this they
will have these Arcadians, their neighbors, as opponents. But if in
fact the Thebans recover and are saved, they will nevertheless be
weaker, since these people³⁴ will have become our allies and will
owe their salvation to us. So from every point of view, it is in our
interest that we do not abandon the Megalopolitans and that they
are seen to owe their survival, if indeed they survive, not to their
own efforts or to others but to you.
[32] By the gods, men of Athens, I have spoken not because of
any private friendship for or dislike of either party, but from my
assessment of what is to your advantage. My advice to you is not
to give up the Megalopolitans, nor, in general, to abandon any
weaker state to a stronger one.
though in the fifth century, Sparta had indeed used its allies against Athens,
during the fourth century, and especially in the 370s, its campaigning on
land was directed primarily against Thebes rather than against Athens.
³² Demosthenes refers to the practice of dioecism (dioikismos), used in
particular by Sparta to subjugate and control a defeated enemy. This in-
volved the destruction of an enemy’s towns and the dispersal of its popula-
tion into unfortified villages. For the Spartans’ use of it against Mantinea in
385, see Xen. Hellenica 5.2.1– 7.
³³ I.e., in the Third Sacred War against Phocis (see 28n). It was politic for
Demosthenes to tell his Athenian audience that the Thebans should be de-
feated in the war because Athens supported their enemy Phocis, albeit with-
out much direct involvement.
³⁴ The Megalopolitans.

17. ON THE AGR EEMENT
W ITH A LE X A NDER
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
introduction
This speech is certainly later than any of the other speeches
in this volume, since it belongs to the reign of Philip’s son Al-
exander. After the defeat of an anti-Macedonian Greek coali-
tion, led by Athens and Thebes, at the battle of Chaeronea in 338,
Greece fell under Macedonian domination. Philip imposed on
the Greeks a common peace and established an alliance known
by modern historians as the League of Corinth (from the Greek
city where its Council met).¹ The league served both as an in-
strument of Macedonian domination and as a legitimization of
Philip’s leadership of Greece in the planned war against the Per-
sians. Its Greek members sent representatives to the Council (syn-
hedrion), and Philip was appointed its leader (hēgemōn). After the
assassination of Philip in 336, his son Alexander succeeded him
both as king of Macedon and as leader of the league.
Our knowledge of the league’s constitution derives from two
main sources. The first is a fragmentary inscription from Athens
(IG II² 236 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 76) containing part
of the oath that the Greek members of the league swore to Philip.
The second is this speech, which alludes to a number of clauses
in the agreement that, the speaker alleges, the Macedonians have
breached.
¹ On common peaces, see OCD³ s.v. Common Peace. On Philip’s diplo-

matic dealings with the Greeks and the setting up of the League of Corinth,
see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 604– 646.

17. on the agr eement with alex ander 287
Although Demosthenes was politically active during Alexan-

der’s reign, this speech is almost certainly not his work.² Analy-
sis has shown that in its handling of prose rhythm, it differs from
the genuine speeches of Demosthenes,³ and its overall style is also
quite different. Its authenticity was also generally denied in antiq-
uity: Dionysius of Halicarnassus regarded it as spurious (Demos-
thenes 57), and Libanius in his Introduction to the speech suggests
that it is closer in character to those of Demosthenes’ contempo-
rary and political ally Hyperides. Some scholars are in fact in-
clined to attribute the speech to Hyperides, but this is uncer-
tain.⁴ Other scholars in antiquity⁵ attributed the speech to the
anti-Macedonian politician Hegesippus, who is generally agreed
to be the author of the speech On Halonnesus, wrongly attributed
to Demosthenes (Dem. 7). Certainly the two speeches share a le-
galistic attitude and extreme belligerence towards Macedon. On
the available evidence, however, all that can safely be said is that
this speech, if a genuine product of Alexander’s reign (see below),
was written by an Athenian politician who was strongly opposed
to the Macedonian domination of Greece.
It has been argued that the speech is not in fact a genuine
work of Alexander’s reign, on the ground that it focuses so nar-
rowly on Alexander’s alleged breaches of his agreement with the
Greeks (see below) and is silent about matters that one might ex-
pect to find in a speech advocating that Athens declare war. In-
stead, it is suggested, it was written in the early third century, per-
² MacDowell 2009: 380–381 concludes that it cannot be proved that De-

mosthenes did not write it but that it is more likely to be by someone else.
³ McCabe 1981.
⁴ Libanius singles out two words in the speech (see 11n, 23n) as more
characteristic of Hyperides than of Demosthenes. The attribution to Hype-
rides is accepted by Bosworth (1988: 190), even though Libanius does not di-
rectly suggest that the speech is by him. It has also been observed that the
bellicose tone of the speech does not accord with an ancient description of
the style of Hyperides’ deliberative speeches as colorless, though this is not a
particularly strong argument: see Whitehead 2001: 7 n. 26.
⁵ The ancient commentary reports that “some people” attribute it to He-
gesippus (Dilts 1983: 195.2– 7).

288 demosthenes
haps by Demosthenes’ nephew Demochares, who is believed to

have played a role in the compilation and publication of his un-
cle’s speeches.⁶ This view has attracted some support⁷ but is in my
opinion implausible.⁸
No ancient scholar discusses the date or context of the speech,
and so we must rely on internal evidence.⁹ The speaker lists a se-
ries of alleged Macedonian breaches of the constitution of the
League of Corinth but gives no information about the specific
circumstances that prompted its delivery. It seems likely that the
speech, with its invitation to the Athenians to declare war on Al-
exander (30), was spoken at a time of crisis, when the possibility
of war was in the air. At the same time the reference to the expul-
sion of the tyrants of Eresus on the island of Lesbos (see 7n) sug-
gests that the speech was written no earlier than 332. The most
likely context is the anti-Macedonian revolt of Sparta, led by its
King Agis III, in 331, but certainty is impossible.¹⁰
Although Philip had generally supported the smaller cities of
the Peloponnese against the threat of Spartan aggrandizement,
Sparta had not participated in the anti-Macedonian Greek alli-
ance that was defeated at the battle of Chaeronea, nor did it be-
come a member of the League of Corinth. Nevertheless it too re-
sented the Macedonian domination of Greece, and, after several
years of disaffection and increasing collaboration with the Per-
sian generals operating in the Aegean, Sparta went to war in the
first half of 331.¹¹ Its revolt was joined by “most of the Pelopon-
⁶ Thus Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 159–183. On Demochares, see the Intro-

duction to this volume, p. 19.
⁷ E.g., by Ehrhard 2001.
⁸ The speech’s narrow focus may be due to a division of labor among the
advocates of war, with other speakers in the debate concentrating on other
aspects.
⁹ The ancient commentary states in its introduction to the speech, with-
out any discussion (or likelihood of being correct), that it belongs “at the be-
ginning of Alexander’s reign” (Dilts 1983: 196.18).
¹⁰ See Cawkwell 1961a. Cf. Will 1982, arguing for 333.
¹¹ Alexander heard of trouble in the Peloponnese while he was at Tyre in
Phoenicia in early summer 331 (Arrian Anabasis 3.6.3).

nesians and some of the northern Greeks” (Diodorus 17.62.7), and

overtures were made to Athens, the only other significant military
power in Greece (Thebes had been sacked in 335). There was a vig-
orous debate at Athens over whether to join the Spartans, and it is
to this debate that the current speech was perhaps a contribution.
The Athenians, mindful of the fate of Thebes and with a number
of their citizens held prisoner by Alexander (Diodorus 17.22.3), de-
cided not to intervene. The revolt was eventually crushed by Anti-
pater, Alexander’s governor in Greece, and Agis was killed.¹²
The speech consists of a series of complaints about Macedo-
nian breaches of the agreement with the Greeks. Some of these re-
late to Athens: the forcing of grain ships en route from the Black
Sea to Athens to put in to land (19–22) and the sailing of a Mace-
donian warship into Athens’ harbor of Piraeus (26–28). Others
relate to other cities in Greece: the restoration of the sons of Phi-
liadas to power at Messene (4–7); the overthrow of democracy at
Pellene (10–11); and the return of exiles to various places, includ-
ing Sicyon (15–16). The speaker argues that the terms of the agree-
ment not only permit but require the Athenians to react to these
(alleged) breaches, and the speech ends with an abrupt proposal
that they declare war against the transgressor.
It is likely that the clauses of the agreement are reasonably ac-
curately reported, but the speaker’s interpretation of Macedonian
actions is probably tendentious. For example, it has been argued
that the grain ships may have been forced to put in to land as a se-
curity measure, in view of intense Persian naval activity in the Ae-
gean.¹³ Again, the word “tyrant” (tyrannos), applied to the sons of
Philiadas, was often bandied about in this period and meant lit-
tle more than an oligarchic leader. It is also unlikely that individ-
ual cities such as Athens had the right to take action against al-
leged infractions without involving the league’s Council. Other
complaints, such as the sailing of a single ship into Piraeus, were
relatively trivial. This is not to say that the Macedonians always
¹² On the revolt, see Diodorus 16.62– 63; Curtius Rufus 6.1; Badian 1967;
Bosworth 1988: 198–204.
¹³ See Cawkwell 1961a.

290 demosthenes
followed the letter of the agreement or showed sensitivity for

Greek feelings, but the sum total of complaints that the speaker
can muster are not very impressive. Although many Athenians re-
sented Macedonian domination, as is shown by their attempt to
regain their freedom after the death of Alexander, they also en-
joyed a striking measure of renewed prosperity in this period and
were doubtless deterred by the example of Thebes from taking
premature military action against Macedonia. If it was in fact de-
livered, the speech clearly failed to persuade its audience.
17. on the agr eement w ith ale x ander

[1] It is absolutely right, men of Athens, to agree with those
who urge you to abide by your oaths and agreements¹⁴—so long
as they mean what they say!¹⁵ For in my view nothing is more ap-
propriate for those who live in a democracy than to have a seri-
ous concern for fairness and justice. But those who go too far in
exhorting you in that direction should stop making a nuisance of
themselves with their speeches while their actions are anything
but just, and should now face the test, and either convince you
of their arguments, or step aside and allow you to be advised by
speakers who know more about justice, [2] in order that you may
either willingly endure being wronged, as a favor to the man who
is wronging you, or choose to set most store by what is right and,
without reproaching anyone, consult your own interest with no
further delay. From the actual agreements and oaths relating to
the Common Peace, it is possible for anyone who examines them
to see who are the transgressors. Although these are matters of
great importance, I shall speak briefly.
[3] If anyone were to ask, men of Athens, what you would be
most angry to be forced to tolerate, I think that if the sons of Pei-
¹⁴ The speaker refers to the oaths and agreements that were first sworn in
making the common peace of 338/7 (the League of Corinth: see the Speech
Introduction) and renewed with Alexander.
¹⁵ The speaker’s point is that strict adherence to the oaths and agree-
ments will (in his opinion) require the Athenians not to keep the peace, as
these men argue, but to go to war.

sistratus¹⁶ were alive today and someone were trying to restore

them by force, you would snatch up your arms and endure any
danger rather than accept them. For if you were persuaded to do
so, you would be just as much slaves as those who are bought,
especially since no one would deliberately kill his own slave,¹⁷
whereas we see those who live under a tyranny being executed
without trial and their children and wives assaulted.¹⁸ [4] Did Al-
exander¹⁹ give any thought to justice when he restored the sons of
Philiadas to Messene²⁰ as tyrants contrary to the oaths and agree-
ments recorded in the Common Peace, or did he follow his own
tyrannical nature and give scant thought to you or to the com-
mon agreement? [5] You ought not get angry if someone treats
you with such violence, yet fail to prevent such things happening
elsewhere in breach of the oaths that were sworn to you; and cer-
tain men here ought not tell us to abide by the oaths, while giving
license to others who have so conspicuously broken them. [6] But
¹⁶ I.e., Hipparchus and Hippias, the sons of the sixth-century Athenian

tyrant Peisistratus, who succeeded their father after his death in 527. Hip-
parchus was murdered in 514, and thereafter Hippias ruled alone until he
was forced into exile in 510. Subsequently both the Spartans and later the
Persians tried to reinstate Hippias to rule Athens in their interests. Cf. 12.7.
¹⁷ Since slaves were valuable assets, it was against their owner’s economic
interest to kill them. Although in Athenian law it may have been illegal for
an owner to kill his own slave, it is difficult to see who would have prose-
cuted him for doing so. See MacDowell 1963: 21–22.
¹⁸ Such abusive behavior formed part of the standard Greek characteriza-
tion of the tyrant. See, e.g., Herodotus’ portrait of the sixth-century Corin-
thian tyrant Periander (5.92).
¹⁹ Alexander III, “the Great,” king of Macedonia and leader of the
League of Corinth. See the Speech Introduction.
²⁰ On Messene in the southwestern Peloponnese, see 16.8n. As the bitter
enemy of Sparta, it had looked towards Philip of Macedon for protection
from Spartan aggression in the 340s: see 6.9, 15. Neon and Thrasybulus, the
sons of Philiadas, appear in a list of Greek “traitors” in a later speech of De-
mosthenes (Dem. 18.295); Neon is described by the historian Theopompus
as a friend of Philip (FGH 115 fragment 41). The Hellenistic historian Poly-
bius defends the brothers’ integrity (18.41), arguing that they had acted in
what they perceived to be the interests of their city.

292 demosthenes
this cannot be the case, if you are willing to do what is right. For
it is further written in the agreement that anyone who does what
Alexander is doing shall, himself and his city, be the enemy of
all the participants in the peace and that everyone should march
against him. So if we are to act in accordance with the agreement,
we should treat the one who restored the tyrants as an enemy.²¹
[7] These supporters of tyranny might argue that the sons of Phi-
liadas were tyrants of Messene before the agreement was made,²²
and that this is why Alexander restored them. But it is ridiculous
to claim that he expelled the tyrants from Lesbos—from Antissa
and Eresus—men who were tyrants before the agreement was
made, on the ground that the form of government is unjust,²³ but
to suppose that in Messenia, where the same harsh conduct exists,
it is a matter of indifference. [8] Next, the agreement states right
²¹ The agreement stipulated that cities be governed by the form of consti-

tution in effect at the time that they swore to accept it (see also IG II² 236 =
Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 76: fragment a, lines 12–14). On the face of
it, the speaker’s complaint about Alexander’s intervention in the affairs of
Messene is justified. It is, however, unlikely that individual cities were al-
lowed to take the law into their own hands if they believed the agreement
had been breached, without referring the matter to the Council (on which
see 15n).
²² I.e., that they held power at the time that the agreement was made. If
this was the case, their restoration was in accord with the agreement. It is
not known when or under what circumstances the “tyrants” (a rhetorically
loaded term: see the Speech Introduction) were expelled from Messene.
²³ Antissa and Eresus were cities on the large eastern Aegean island of
Lesbos. The complex political history of Eresus in this period is illuminated
by a dossier of inscriptions that deal with the various tyrants who ruled the
city during the reigns of Philip and Alexander (IG XII.2.526 = Rhodes and
Osborne 2003: no. 83). The tyrants referred to here were probably Eurysilaus
and Agonippus, who were installed as pro-Persian rulers of Eresus in the
course of the Persian naval counter-attack in the Aegean in 333; upon the re-
covery of the island by the Macedonians in 332 they were tried and executed
by the new democracy. If this is correct, the tyrants who were executed were
not in power at the time the agreement was made; in any case, they had
forfeited any rights they might have had by their support for the Persians.
Nothing further is known about events in Antissa.

at its start that the Greeks are to be free and autonomous.²⁴ How
then is it not the height of absurdity, when the clause about free-
dom and autonomy heads the agreement, that you do not think
that one who has enslaved people has acted in breach of the com-
mon agreement? We are therefore obliged, men of Athens, if we
are to abide by the agreement and the oaths and do what is right,
to do as the oaths bid you and take up arms and march against
those who have transgressed them, together with whoever is will-
ing to join you.²⁵ [9] Or do you suppose that opportunity is some-
times strong enough to lead people to do what is in their interest
even if it is wrong, but that now, when justice and opportunity
and self-interest coincide, we should wait for some different occa-
sion to seize our freedom and that of the other Greeks?
[10] I turn now to another rightful claim, in accordance with
the agreement in which it is written that any people who over-
throw whatever form of government was in force in a state at the
time when it swore the oaths about the peace are to be the ene-
mies of all who share in the peace. But consider, men of Athens:
the Achaeans in the Peloponnese were democrats, but the democ-
racy in Pellene has been abolished by the Macedonian, who ex-
pelled most of the citizens, gave their property to their slaves, and
installed Chaeron the wrestler as tyrant.²⁶ [11] Yet we are partici-
²⁴ Freedom and autonomy were paired as standard elements in Greek po-

litical thought and in the various common peaces of the fourth century. In-
sofar as there was a significant distinction between them, freedom relates to
the conduct of an independent foreign policy and autonomy relates to inter-
nal self-government.
²⁵ On the speaker’s confident (but almost certainly mistaken) belief that
the Athenians had the right to act on their own initiative against alleged
breaches of the agreement, without referring their complaint to the Coun-
cil, see 6n.
²⁶ The region of Achaea is in the northern Peloponnese, along the coast
of the Gulf of Corinth. Nothing is known of the history of Pellene in the
period before the installation of Chaeron as its pro-Macedonian ruler. As
a wrestler, Chaeron was twice a winner at the Isthmian Games and four
times a winner at the Olympic Games (Pausanias 7.27.7). See also Cawk-
well 1961a: 76– 77.

294 demosthenes
pants in the peace, which stipulates that those who do such things
are to be treated as enemies. Since this is the case, are we to obey
the common ordinances and treat these people as enemies, or will
someone make the disgusting claim²⁷ that we should not—one of
these men who take bribes from the Macedonian, and who have
enriched themselves at your expense? [12] None of these things
has escaped their notice. Instead, they have reached such a height
of insolence that, escorted by the tyrant’s army,²⁸ they tell you
to abide by oaths that have already been broken, as if that man
has “full powers”²⁹ to perjure himself too, but force you to re-
peal your own laws, and have released those who have been con-
victed in your courts,³⁰ and violently break the law in many other
similar ways. [13] And yet it is reasonable for them to do so, since
men who have sold themselves to oppose their country’s interests
are incapable of being concerned about laws or oaths: they pay lip
service to the words, and deceive those whose attendance at meet-
ings of the Assembly here is cursory and uncritical, and who think
that the securing of a quiet life now will never lead to catastrophic
trouble in the future. [14] But I do urge you, as I said at the be-
ginning, to obey these men when they say that we should abide
by the common agreements—unless they suppose that when they
tell us to abide by the oaths, those oaths do not forbid wrongdo-
ing; or unless they think that no one will notice that tyrannies are
being set up in place of democracies, and constitutional govern-
ments are being overthrown!
[15] And here is something even more ridiculous: the treaty
states that the members of the Council³¹ and those who are in
²⁷ The Greek word bdelureusetai (“will be disgusting”) is regarded by

Libanius as unworthy of Demosthenes: see the Speech Introduction.
²⁸ The Greek supporters of Alexander (“the tyrant”) are represented
as requiring armed protection because of their unpopularity with their
fellow-citizens.
²⁹ The speaker makes ironic allusion to Alexander’s appointment by the
League of Corinth as “general with full powers” (stratēgos autokratōr) for the
war against Persia (Diodorus 17.4.9).
³⁰ It is not known what event(s) are alluded to here.
³¹ The League of Corinth had a Council (synhedrion) to which its Greek
members sent delegates, apparently in accordance with a system of propor-

charge of collective security³² should ensure that in those cities

that share in the peace no one is to be killed or exiled contrary
to the city’s existing laws, nor is any property to be confiscated,
or land redistributed, or debts cancelled, or slaves set free with a
view to revolution.³³ Yet they are so far from preventing any of
these things that they actually help to organize them! How do
they not deserve to be put to death, these men who devise disas-
ters of such magnitude in the cities—disasters that they them-
selves, in all their greatness, are under orders to investigate be-
cause of their gravity!
[16] I shall now demonstrate yet another breach of the treaty.
For it is written in it that exiles are not permitted to set out from
cities that share in the peace, bearing arms with a view to war,
against any city that shares in the peace. If they do so, the city
from which they set out is to be expelled from the agreement.³⁴
But the Macedonian was so eager to be under arms that he never
once put them down, and he still goes around armed as much
as he can, now even more than before, insofar as he has used an
edict to restore different people to different places, including the
physical trainer to Sicyon.³⁵ [17] If then we are obliged to abide
tional representation, since the inscription from Athens containing the text
of the oath sworn by the Greeks (IG II² 236 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003:
no. 76) also includes, as fragment b, a partial list of members each followed
by a numeral.
³² The role and identity of these officials is unclear, but they were prob-
ably responsible for the maintenance of security in Greece during the ab-
sence of the league’s leader, i.e., Alexander, who at the time of the speech
was on campaign in Asia. See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 639– 646.
³³ All these prohibitions were intended to ensure the political stability of
the Greek cities of the league. Cancellation of debt and the redistribution of
land were common demands of the poor against the rich and (in an oligar-
chy) were elements of a democratic revolutionary program. Slaves could be
offered their freedom, or even citizenship, in return for their active support
in overthrowing the existing constitution.
³⁴ In the factionalism (stasis) between oligarchs and democrats that was
widespread in Greece in this period, an exiled faction often sought to recap-
ture its own city and establish itself in power.
³⁵ Sicyon was a city of the northeastern Peloponnese, and in the late 350s
it had been at war with Sparta (see 14.5n). Like other Peloponnesian ene-

296 demosthenes
by the common agreements, as these men say, then the cities that
have acted in these ways are in breach of their treaty with us. If
we must conceal the truth, we must avoid mentioning that the
cities are Macedonian.³⁶ But if those who serve the Macedonian
against your interests keep on telling you to obey the common
agreements, let us do so, since what they say is right, and, just as
the oath requires, let us declare them to be in breach of the agree-
ment, and let us deliberate about how to treat those who behave
in a tyrannical and insolent manner, and who are always plot-
ting here, and giving orders there, and laughing at the Common
Peace. [18] What objection will these men make to this conclu-
sion? Will they treat any agreement that is against the interest of
our city as binding, but reject one that saves it? Is this just? And
will they always insist that any item in the sworn agreement is
valid if it favors our enemies and is against the interest of the city,
but think it their duty to be unremittingly opposed if in any re-
spect justice and advantage are on our side against them?
[19] To make it clearer to you that no Greeks will ever reproach
you for breaching any of the common agreements, but will in-
stead be grateful that you alone convicted those who are doing
so, I shall touch on a few of the many points that might be made.
It says in the agreement, I believe, that those who participate in
the peace are to be permitted to sail the seas, and no one is to
prevent them or force a ship belonging to any of them to put in
to land; and if anyone breaks this agreement, he is to be treated
as an enemy by all who participate in the peace.³⁷ [20] You have
very clearly seen, men of Athens, that this is just what the Mace-
mies of Sparta in this period, it looked to Macedonia for support: see 4n on

Messene. Demosthenes in a speech of 330 includes Aristratus and Epicha-
res of Sicyon in a lengthy list of “traitors” to Greece (Dem. 18.295; cf. 18.48,
where Aristratus alone is named): i.e., they were pro-Macedonian rulers of
the city. The identity of the man dismissively identified only by his humble
occupation as a physical trainer (paidotribēs) is unknown (Cawkwell 1961a:
76 n. 19 presumes that it is Aristratus).
³⁶ I.e., if we are obliged to tell the truth, we must say that these cities are
Macedonian (in the sense that they are effectively controlled by Alexander).
³⁷ For examples of states forcing merchant ships to put in to land, see
5.25n; Dem. 50.6, 17–19.

donians have done. They have reached such a height of insolence

that they forced all the ships from the Black Sea to put in at Tene-
dos, and did not stop this villainous behavior until you voted to
man one hundred triremes and launch them right away, and ap-
pointed Menestheus as general in charge of them.³⁸ [21] Is it not
absurd that so many great wrongs have been committed by oth-
ers, and yet their friends here do not deter the transgressors, but
instead advise you to abide by an agreement that they so despise?
It is as if a clause has been added to the effect that some peo-
ple are allowed to offend, but others cannot even defend them-
selves! [22] How were these men not simultaneously breaking the
law and acting stupidly, when they broke an oath of such impor-
tance that they came very close to being rightly stripped of their
command of the sea?³⁹ And now they have indisputably handed
us the right to do so, whenever we wish to act. For the fact that
they have stopped doing wrong does not make their breach of
the common agreement any less serious. [23] But they are fortu-
nate, because they take advantage of your indolence—you who
do not even choose to enjoy your rights. What is most insolent is
this: that although the other Greeks and non-Greeks are all afraid
of incurring your hatred, these nouveaux riches⁴⁰ alone compel
you to despise yourselves, sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by
³⁸ Merchant ships transported grain from the Black Sea to the cities of
Greece, in particular to Athens. The island of Tenedos lies off the coast
of Asia Minor to the south of the Hellespont and was on the grain route
south. Menestheus was the son of the famous Athenian general Iphicrates,
on whom see 4.24n, 8.30n, 13.20n. The sending of such a large squadron in-
dicates how seriously the Athenians took this incident. Cawkwell (1961a)
discusses this episode and dates it to 332. He argues that the writer has mis-
represented the issue and that the Macedonians probably required Athens
to provide an escort for its grain ships, since the activities of Persian naval
forces in the Aegean and the lack of Macedonian naval capacity made them
vulnerable to attack without adequate protection.
³⁹ I.e., by Athens, on whose naval superiority, see 25n below.
⁴⁰ The speaker turns rather abruptly from the Macedonians to those
Athenian politicians whom he accuses of having been bribed by them (cf.
11). The Greek word translated as nouveaux riches, neoploutoi, is regarded by
Libanius as untypical of Demosthenes: see the Speech Introduction.

298 demosthenes
force, as if they were dealing with men of Abdera or Maroneia,⁴¹

not Athens. [24] Moreover, at the same time as they weaken you
and strengthen your enemies, they unwittingly admit that your
country is invincible, since they unjustly order you to abide by
what is just, as though if you chose instead to look to your own
advantage you could easily defeat your enemies! [25] And it is rea-
sonable for them to do so, since as long as we are able even on
our own to have undisputed naval superiority,⁴² we will be able
to find ourselves other stronger defenses on land in addition to
our existing forces, especially since fortune has put a stop to those
men who went around escorted by the tyrant’s troops—some of
whom have been destroyed, and others shown to be worthless.⁴³
[26] In addition to the points I have already made about ship-
ping, the Macedonian has also committed a major breach of the
peace. For the most arrogant and contemptuous action of the
Macedonians took place recently: they dared to sail into Piraeus
contrary to the common agreements that we have with them.⁴⁴
This, men of Athens, must be interpreted not as a trivial mat-
ter, on the ground that it was a single trireme, but as a trial—
to see if we would overlook it—to allow them to do it with more
ships, and as proof that they paid no more heed to the common
decisions than they paid to those I have previously mentioned.
[27] That this was an encroachment by degrees and an attempt to
⁴¹ Abdera and Maroneia were two cities on the northern coast of the Ae-
gean, both at this time subject to Macedonian rule. On Maroneia, cf. 12.17.
For a similar thought (naming two different cities), see 13.34.
⁴² By the middle of the fourth century the total number of ships in Ath-
ens’ navy was over 300 (see 14.13n), which was considerably more than ei-
ther Macedonia or any other Greek city possessed. Moreover, during the pe-
riod of the Macedonian ascendancy Athenian public finances had revived
to a remarkable extent, and under the leadership of Lycurgus, Athens in-
vested heavily in its armed forces, including the construction of new ship-
sheds. See Bosworth 1988: 204–211.
⁴³ See 10n.
⁴⁴ As Cawkwell (1961a: 75– 76) has observed, if this relatively trivial
breach of the agreement was really “the most arrogant and contemptuous
action,” the speaker does not have much of a case against Alexander.

make us used to tolerating such incursions is clear from the fol-

lowing considerations. Does not the fact that the captain of the
ship—whom you should have immediately done away with along
with his ship—asked permission to build small boats in your har-
bors make it clear that rather than sailing in, they were plotting
directly to be inside the harbor?⁴⁵ And if we accept light vessels, a
little later it will be triremes. And if at first we admit a few, soon
afterwards it will be many. [28] For it cannot be claimed that
Athens has a plentiful supply of timber for shipbuilding, when
it is imported with difficulty and from far away, but that there is
a shortage of it in Macedonia, which has arranged a very cheap
supply even for others who want it.⁴⁶ But they thought that at the
same time they would build ships here and crew them in our har-
bor, although it is stated in the common agreements that nothing
of the kind is permitted, and would be able to continue to do so
to an ever greater extent. [29] So in every way they treat the city
with contempt, thanks to their teachers here who tell them what
to do. With their help they have discovered that our city suffers
from some indescribable feebleness and slackness, that it takes no
thought for the future, and that it pays no attention to the way in
which the tyrant is treating the common agreements.
[30] I urge you to abide by these agreements, men of Athens, in
the way that I instructed you to, and I would claim, with all the
authority of my age, that in doing so we will at the same time be
⁴⁵ The speaker’s point seems to be that the specific request to build boats
in Piraeus shows that the Macedonian ship put in there with this inten-
tion, rather than by chance (e.g., because it was damaged or to escape bad
weather).
⁴⁶ The mountains of Macedonia were a very important source for the fir
trees that were needed to build triremes, particularly for Athens, which had
a very large navy and no suitable timber of its own, and Macedonian kings
had for a long time used access to this timber as a diplomatic tool: see 7.11n
on Amyntas III; 13.24n on “Perdiccas” (probably a slip for Alexander I).
Access to timber also contributed to Athenian imperial ambitions on the
Macedonian and Thracian coasts, most notably the fifth-century founda-
tion of Amphipolis (on which see Thuc. 4.108.1, referring to access to ship-
building timber).

300 demosthenes
doing what is right, without exposing ourselves to criticism, and

be making use of the opportunities that work to our advantage,
without incurring danger. For the agreement also includes the
clause “if we wish to share in the common peace.” The words “if
we wish” also imply their opposite,⁴⁷ or else we must never stop
following others disgracefully, but . . .⁴⁸ nor recall with any sense
of ambition those qualities that from ancient times we have pos-
sessed in much greater quantity than any other people. And so, if
you bid me do so, men of Athens, I shall move a proposal, just as
the agreement requires, that we wage war on the transgressors.
⁴⁷ I.e., the Athenians can choose whether or not they wish to participate
in the peace.
⁴⁸ The syntax of this sentence is debated, and Dilts 2002 in his edition
accepts the suggestion that some words have dropped out of the Greek text.

BIBLIOGR A PH Y FOR THIS VOLUME
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
a bbr ev i ations
FGH = F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.

Leiden. 1923–.
IG = Inscriptiones Graecae. Berlin. 1873–.
OCD³ = S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.), The Oxford
Classical Dictionary. 3rd ed. Oxford. 1996.
SIG³ = W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum. 3rd
ed. Leipzig. 1915–1924.
Badian, E., 1967: “Agis III,” Hermes 95: 170–192.

Badian, E., 1982: “Greeks and Macedonians,” in B. Barr-Sharrar
and E. Borza (ed.), Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and
Early Hellenistic Times. Washington, DC: 33–51.
Badian, E., 1987: “The Peace of Callias,” Journal of Hellenic Stud-
ies 107: 1–39.
Badian, E., 1995: “The Ghost of Empire: Reflections on Athe-
nian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century bc,” in W. Eder
(ed.), Die Athenische Demokratie im 4. Jhdt. v. Chr. Stuttgart:
79–106.
Bers, V., 1985: “Dikastic Thorubos,” in P. Cartledge and D. Har-
vey (eds.), Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G. E. M.
de Ste. Croix. London: 1–15.
Borza, E. N., 1990: In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of
Macedon. Princeton.
Bosworth, A. B., 1988: Conquest and Empire. Cambridge.
Briant, P., 2002: From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian
Empire, tr. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN.

302 bibliogr aphy for this volume
Brunt, P. A., 1969: “Euboea in the Time of Philip II,” Classical

Quarterly 19: 245–265.
Buckler, J., 1989: Philip II and the Sacred War. Leiden.
Cahill, N., 2002: Household and City Organization at Olynthus.
New Haven.
Calhoun, G. M., 1933: “Demosthenes’ Second Philippic,” Trans-
actions of the American Philological Association 64: 1–17.
Carey, C., 2000: Aeschines (The Oratory of Classical Greece,
vol. 3). Austin.
Cargill, J., 1981: The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alli-
ance? Berkeley.
Carlier, P., 1990: Démosthène. Paris.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1961a: “A Note on Ps. Demosthenes 17.20,”
Phoenix 15: 74–78.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1961b: “Notes on the Common Peace of 366–
365 bc,” Classical Quarterly 11: 80–86.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1962a: “The Defence of Olynthus,” Classical
Quarterly 12: 122–140.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1962b: “Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund,”
Mnemosyne, 4th ser. 15: 377–383.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1963a: “Eubulus,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 83:
47– 67.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1963b: “Demosthenes’ Policy after the Peace of
Philocrates,” Classical Quarterly 13: 120–138, 200–213.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1978: Philip of Macedon. London.
Cawkwell, G. L., 1984: “Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth
Century,” Classical Quarterly 34: 334–345.
Christ, M. R., 1990: “Liturgical Avoidance and the Antidosis in
Classical Athens,” Transactions of the American Philological As-
sociation 120: 13–28.
Christ, M. R., 2001: “Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Ath-
ens,” Classical Quarterly 51: 398–422.
Christ, M. R., 2007: “The Evolution of the eisphora in Classical
Athens,” Classical Quarterly 57: 53– 69.
Cohen, E., 1973: Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts. Princeton.
Connor, W. R., 1962: “Charinus’ Megarian Decree,” American
Journal of Philology 83: 236–237.
Culasso Gastaldi, E., 1984: Sul trattato con Alessandro: Polis, mo-
narchia macedone e memoria demostenica. Padua.

bibliogr aphy for this volume 303
Daitz, S. G., 1957: “The Relationship of the De Chersoneso and

the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes,” Classical Philology 52:
145–162.
Davies, J. K., 1971: Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 bc.
Oxford.
de Ste. Croix, G. E. M., 1963: “The Alleged Secret Pact between
Athens and Philip II concerning Amphipolis and Pydna,”
Classical Quarterly 13: 110–119.
de Ste. Croix, G. E. M., 1972: The Origins of the Peloponnesian
War. London.
de Souza, P., 1999: Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World. Cam-
bridge.
Dickey, E., 2007: Ancient Greek Scholarship. Oxford.
Dilts, M. R., 1983: Scholia Demosthenica, vol. 1. Leipzig.
Dilts, M. R., 2002: Demosthenis Orationes, vol. 1. Oxford.
Ehrhardt, C., 2001: Review of C. W. Blackwell, In the Absence of
Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority.
Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2001.05.21. http://bmcr.brynmawr
.edu/2001/2001-05-21.html.
Ellis, J. R., 1967: “The Order of the Olynthiacs,” Historia 16:
108–111.
Ellis, J. R., 1976: Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism. London.
Ellis, J. R., and R. D. Milns, 1970: The Spectre of Philip. Sydney.
Fisher, N. R. E., 1992: Hybris: A Study of the Values of Honour and
Shame in Ancient Greece. Warminster.
Flower, M. A., 1997: Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in
the Fourth Century bc. Oxford.
Flower, M. A., 2002: “Alexander the Great and Panhellenism,” in
A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (eds.), Alexander the Great
in Fact and Fiction. Oxford: 96–135.
Flower, M. A., 2008: The Seer in Ancient Greece. Berkeley.
Gabrielsen, V., 1986: “Phanera and aphanes ousia in Classical Ath-
ens,” Classica et Mediaevalia 36: 99–114.
Gabrielsen, V., 1994: Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation
and Social Relations. Baltimore.
Garland, R., 2001: The Piraeus from the Fifth to the First Century
bc ². London.
Gibson, C. A., 2002: Interpreting a Classic: Demosthenes and His
Ancient Commentators. Berkeley.

Hajdú, I., 2002: Kommentar zur 4. Philippischen Rede des Demos-

thenes. Berlin.
Hamel, D., 1998: Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the
Classical Period. Leiden.
Hammond, N. G. L., and G. T. Griffith, 1979: A History of Mace-
donia, vol. 2. Oxford.
Hansen, M. H., 1975: Eisangelia. Odense.
Hansen, M. H., 1984: “Two Notes on Demosthenes’ Symbouleu-
tic Speeches,” Classica et Mediaevalia 35: 57–70 [reprinted with
addenda in M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Ecclesia II (Copenha-
gen, 1989): 283–297].
Hansen, M. H., 1991: The Athenian Democracy in the Age of De-
mosthenes, tr. J. Crook. Oxford.
Harding, P., 1985: From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the
Battle of Ipsus = Translated Documents of Greece and Rome 2.
Cambridge.
Harding, P., 1987: “Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth-century Ath-
ens,” Phoenix 41: 25–39.
Harding, P., 1995: “Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Cen-
tury,” Klio 77: 105–125.
Harding, P., 2006: Didymos: On Demosthenes. Oxford.
Harding, P., 2008: The Story of Athens: The Fragments of the Local
Chronicles of Attika. Abingdon.
Harris, E. M., 1996: “Demosthenes and the Theoric Fund,” in
R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds.), Transitions to Empire:
Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 bc in Honor of E. Ba-
dian. Norman, OK: 57–76.
Harris, E. M., 2000: “The Authenticity of Andocides De Pace: A
Subversive Essay,” in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. Nielsen, and L. Ru-
binstein (eds.), Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek His-
tory. Copenhagen: 479–506.
Heckel, W., 2005: Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great.
Oxford.
Hornblower, S., 1982: Mausolus. Oxford.
Hornblower, S., 2002: The Greek World 479–323 bc ³. London.
Hudson-Williams, H. L., 1951: “Political Speeches in Athens,”
Classical Quarterly 1: 68–73.
Jaeger, W., 1938: Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Pol-
icy. Berkeley.

Lane Fox, R., 1997: “Demosthenes, Dionysius and the Dating of

Six Early Speeches,” Classica et Mediaevalia 48: 167–203.
Lewis, D. M., 1974: “Entrenchment-clauses in Attic Decrees,” in
D. W. Bradeen and M. F. McGregor (eds.), PHOROS: Tribute
to Benjamin Dean Meritt. Locust Valley, NY: 81–89.
Lewis, D. M., 1997: Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern His-
tory. Cambridge.
MacDowell, D. M., 1963: Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the
Orators. Manchester.
MacDowell, D. M., 1978: The Law in Classical Athens. London.
MacDowell, D. M., 1986: “The Law of Periandros about Symmo-
ries” Classical Quarterly 36: 438–449.
MacDowell, D. M., 2000: Demosthenes On the False Embassy
(Oration 19). Oxford.
MacDowell, D. M., 2009: Demosthenes the Orator. Oxford.
Mader, G., 2005: “Pax duello mixta: Demosthenes and the Rheto-
ric of War and Peace,” Classical Journal 101: 11–35.
Mader, G., 2006: “Fighting Philip with Decrees: Demosthenes
and the Syndrome of Symbolic Action,” American Journal of
Philology 127: 367–386.
McCabe, D. F., 1981: The Prose-Rhythm of Demosthenes. New
York.
McQueen, E. I., 1986: Demosthenes: Olynthiacs. London.
Meiggs, R., 1972: The Athenian Empire. Oxford.
Mitchell, L., 2007: Panhellenism and the Barbarian in Archaic and
Classical Greece. Swansea.
Montgomery, H., 1983: The Way to Chaeronea: Foreign Policy, De-
cision Making and Political Influence in Demosthenes’ Speeches.
Bergen.
Moreno, A., 2007: Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain
Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries bc. Oxford.
Osborne, M., 1983: Naturalization in Athens. Brussels.
Parke, H. W., 1933: Greek Mercenary Soldiers. Oxford.
Parker R., 2005: Polytheism and Society in Ancient Athens.
Oxford.
Pickard-Cambridge, A. W., 1914: Demosthenes and the Last Days
of Greek Freedom. London.
Pritchett, W. K., 1971–1991: The Greek State at War, 5 vols.
Berkeley.

Radicke, J., 1995: Die Rede des Demosthenes für die Freiheit der
Rhodier (or. 15). Stuttgart.
Rhodes, P. J., 1981: A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion
Politeia. Oxford.
Rhodes, P. J., 1985: “Nomothesia in Fourth-century Athens,” Clas-
sical Quarterly 35: 55– 60.
Rhodes, P. J., 1986: “Political Activity in Classical Athens,” Jour-
nal of Hellenic Studies 106: 132–144.
Rhodes, P. J., 2006: A History of the Classical Greek World 478–
323 bc. Oxford.
Rhodes, P. J., and R. Osborne, 2003: Greek Historical Inscriptions
404–323 BC. Oxford.
Sallares, R., 1991: The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World.
London.
Sandys, J. E., 1900: Demosthenes On the Peace, Second Philippic,
On the Chersonesus and Third Philippic. London.
Sandys, J. E., 1910: The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of De-
mosthenes². London.
Sealey, R., 1955: “Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demos-
thenic Dates,” Revue des Études Grecques 68: 77–120.
Sealey, R., 1967: “Pseudo-Demosthenes XIII and XXV,” Revue des
Études Grecques 80: 250–255.
Sealey, R., 1993: Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat.
Oxford.
Shrimpton, G., 1977: “Theopompus’ Treatment of Philip in the
Philippica” Phoenix 31: 123–144.
Shrimpton, G., 1991: Theopompus the Historian. Montreal.
Sinclair, R. K., 1988: Democracy and Participation in Athens.
Cambridge.
Tod, M. N., 1948: Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, vol. 2.
Oxford.
Todd, S. C., 2001: “How to Execute People in Fourth-century
Athens,” in J. Edmondson and V. Hunter (eds.), Law and So-
cial Status in Classical Athens. Oxford: 31–51.
Trevett, J. C., 1992: Apollodoros the Son of Pasion. Oxford.
Trevett, J. C., 1994: “Demosthenes’ Speech On Organiza-
tion (Dem. XIII),” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 35:
179–193.

Trevett, J. C., 1996: “Did Demosthenes Publish His Deliberative

Speeches?” Hermes 124: 425–441.
Tuplin, C., 1998: “Demosthenes ‘Olynthiacs’ and the Character of
the Demegoric Corpus,” Historia 47: 276–320.
van Wees, H., 2004: Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities. London.
Westlake, H. D., 1935: Thessaly in the Fourth Century. Man-
chester.
Whitehead, D., 1983: “Competitive Outlay and Community
Profit: philotimia in Democratic Athens,” Classica et Mediae-
valia 34: 55–74.
Whitehead, D., 2001: Hypereides: The Forensic Speeches. Oxford.
Will, E., 1982: “Zur Datierung der Rede Ps.-Demosthenes XVII,”
Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 125: 202–213.
Wooten, C., 2008: A Commentary on Demosthenes’ Philippic I.
Oxford.
Worthington, I., 2006: Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 61, Prologues,
Letters (The Oratory of Classical Greece, vol. 10). Austin.
Worthington, I., 2008: Philip II of Macedonia. New Haven.
Worthington, I., C. Cooper, and E. Harris, 2001: Dinarchus, Hy-
perides, and Lycurgus (The Oratory of Classical Greece, vol. 5).
Austin.
Yunis, H., 1996: Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in
Classical Athens. Ithaca, NY.
Yunis, H., 2005: Demosthenes, Speeches 18 and 19 (The Oratory of
Classical Greece, vol. 9). Austin.

INDE X
⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠⣠
Abdera, 298 Ambracia, 114, 124, 152, 163, 166,

Achaea, 166, 182, 238, 293 175, 183
Acropolis, Athenian, 63, 93, 167, Amphilochus (Macedonian en-
232, 236, 237 voy), 215
Aenus, 217 Amphipolis, 8, 11, 33–35, 44,
Aeschines (Athenian politician), 50nn24,25, 51, 64n40, 65n41,
xvi, xxv, 3–4, 8, 12n14, 22n36, 70, 74, 78n26, 94– 95, 97– 98,
65n41, 89, 90, 94n13, 102, 108, 111, 115n6, 118n19, 120n27,
111n40, 125n46, 151n85, 158n14, 122–123, 141n44, 148, 160n21,
159n19, 215n9, 217n18, 229n20 184, 198, 212, 222, 235, 258,
Aetolia, 166, 214n2 266n31, 275, 299n46
Agapaeus (Oreite politician), 172 Amyntas III, king of Macedonia,
Agis III (Spartan king), 288–289 33n19, 63n34, 118, 299n46
Agonippus (ruler of Eresus), Anaximenes of Lampsacus (histo-
292n23 rian), 48n15, 202
Agora (town in Chersonese), Andocides (Athenian politician),
126–127 xvii, 19n23
Agora, Athenian, xxv, 77n23, Antalcidas, Peace of. See King’s
78n29, 121n30, 124n43, 234n40, Peace
237n53 Anthemocritus (Athenian her-
Alexander (Molossian king), 124 ald), 215
Alexander (ruler of Pherae), 259n6 Anthemous, 27, 108
Alexander I (fifth-century king of Antipater (Macedonian general),
Macedonia), 105, 222, 235n47 172n66, 289
Alexander III (“the Great”— Antissa, 292
king of Macedonia), xvii–xviii, Antrones, 183
xxviii, 42, 48n15, 172n66, 286– Apollodoros (Athenian politi-
296, 298n44 cian), xvi, 3, 236n48
Amadocus (Thracian king), 130 Apollonia, 123, 163

310 index
Apollonides (Cardian leader), 126 Arthmius of Zeleia (fifth-century

Apollonides (Olynthian politi- Persian envoy), 153, 165n45, 168
cian), 28, 171, 174 Arybbas (Molossian king), 36,
apotympanismos, 146, 197 124n42
arbitration, interstate, 64, 115–117, Assembly, Athenian, xiv–xvii, xix,
127, 213, 220 xxii–xxiii, xxv, 2, 6–8, 19–22,
Arcadia, 96n28, 195, 206, 238n59, 71n8, 114, 120–121, 133n12, 140–
274–285 141, 155–157, 178, 181, 192n45,
Argos, Argive, 12, 50n23, 95– 201n1, 227–228, 252n38, 263n18,
96, 100–102, 105–108, 160n23, 268, 294
162n31, 165n44, 175n74, 195, Attica, 112, 117, 134, 137, 141, 158,
206n25, 245n11, 268–269, 183, 215n8
281n15 auditors (exetastai), 229
Ariobarzanes (satrap of Helles- Automedon (ruler of Eretria), 172
pontine Phrygia), 263–264
Aristides (fifth-century Athenian barbaros. See foreigner
politician), 62, 64, 237 Black Sea, 8, 12, 297
Aristodemus (Athenian politi- Boedromia, 66
cian), 110n38 Boeotia, 94n19, 95n23, 97, 104n11,
Aristomedes (Athenian politi- 106, 107n24, 147–148, 198, 276–
cian), 178, 180, 199 277, 283
Aristomedes (Pheraean mercenary Bouches, 124
commander), 211 Brasidas (fifth-century Spartan
Aristophon (Athenian politician), general), 222n35
140, 190n37 bribery, xviii, 16–18, 89– 90, 102,
Aristotle (philosopher from Sta- 112, 117, 121, 132, 148, 151, 154,
gira), xvi, xxvi, 23, 188n28, 167, 185, 198, 204, 221, 294,
224n4 297n40
Aristratus (Sicyonian leader), Byzantium, 12–13, 99, 130–131,
296n35 135–136, 148, 152, 154, 161, 166,
Artabazus (Persian satrap), 9, 179–180, 189n30, 198, 203–
51n26, 77, 195n55, 240n1, 241, 206, 214, 216n12, 220, 259–262,
243 270–271
Artaxerxes II (Persian king),
189n33, 269n43 Cabyle, 142, 185
Artaxerxes III (Persian king), Caecilius (Roman critic), 29
241–242, 257n2, 262n16, Callias (Chalcidian/Athenian
264n24, 269n42 general), 137n28, 212, 215,
Artemisia (satrap of Caria), 14, 216n10
99n40, 257, 259–260, 264, Callias (public slave at Athens), 48
265n26, 269n39, 271 Callias, Peace of, 272n52

index 311
Callippus (Athenian politician), Clearchus (Spartan mercenary),

127–128 269
Cammys (tyrant of Mytiline), cleruchs (clērouchoi), 27, 117n12,
268n36 130, 133, 134n16, 136n23, 220,
Cardia, 12, 98, 115–116, 126–128, 248, 258, 264n22, 270n45
130–131, 146, 148, 152, 159n20, Clitarchus (ruler of Eretria), 172
160n22, 166, 185, 197–198, 212– Cnidos, battle of, 189n33
213, 218 Common Peace (koinē eirēnē),
Caria, 14, 99, 175n73, 230n27, 241, 124n40, 160n21, 271n48,
247n16, 257, 259–260, 264n23, 272n53, 286, 290–291, 293n24,
265nn24,25 296, 300
Carystus, 83n55, 126, 151n85 companions, Macedonian,
Cassopia, 124 207–208
Cersobleptes (Thracian king), 12, Conon (Athenian general),
89, 130, 147, 183, 198, 205n17, 189n33, 230nn40,44
212, 215n5, 217–218 contributions (syntaxeis), 95n19,
Cetriporis (Thracian king), 130 229n18, 237n52
Chabrias (Athenian general), 77, Corax (Sicilian rhetorician), xiii
234 Corcyra, 230n25, 234
Chaeron (ruler of Pellene), 293 Corinth, xvii, 50n23, 62, 77, 166,
Chaeronea, battle of, 3, 13, 175n76, 176n77, 195, 218n21, 234n44
197n64, 286, 288 Corinth, League of, 286, 288,
Chalcedon, 270 290n14, 291n19, 294nn29,31
Chalcidic League. See Olynthus Coroneia, 97, 106
Chares (Athenian general), 9, Cos, 99, 259, 271
51n26, 65n41, 77n25, 119n24, Cotys (Thracian king), 217n19
130, 140, 195n55, 219n23, Council, Athenian, xxiii, 6,
220n28, 230n25, 240n1, 241, 121n30, 124, 133, 195, 214
243, 262n12 Council (synhedrion) of the
Charidemus (Athenian general), League of Corinth, 286,
29, 55, 69 293n25, 294
Chersonese, 8, 12, 16, 28, 35n28, Council (synhedrion) of the Sec-
69– 70, 75, 84, 85n62, 98, 111, ond Athenian Confederacy, 182
115, 126–133, 136, 148n81, 152, Crobyle, 215
154, 157n11, 159–161, 166, 176, Crocus Field, battle of, 11, 14,
178, 197n62, 211–213, 218n22, 35n27, 39n43, 47n13, 69– 70, 257
220, 258, 266n31, 275 Ctesiphon (Athenian politician),
Chios, 99, 138, 175, 259, 261–262, 110n38
267 Cunaxa, battle of, 269n43
Cimon (fifth-century Athenian Cyprothemis (Persian general),
leader), 168n55, 237 264

312 index
Cyprus, 218, 242 62n29, 85n62, 130–134, 136–139,

Cyrus (Persian prince), 189n33, 152, 157n11, 159, 214
269 Dorians, 165
Cythnos, 239 Doriscus, 147, 159, 183, 198
Drongilos, 142, 185
Delian League, 63n32, 161n27
Delos, 81n44 Ecbatana, 189
Delphi, Delphic Amphictyony, 15, Echinus, 152, 166
59n21, 90– 91, 95, 97– 99, 109, Egypt, 14, 23, 100, 189n34, 195n55,
148n78, 153, 165, 222, 235n47, 216, 241–242, 253, 257, 260,
275 262, 264, 265n25
Demades (Athenian politician), Eion, 235
xvin11, 54n2 eisphora. See wealth-tax
Demochares (nephew of Demos- Elateia (city in Cassopia), 124
thenes), 19, 288 Elateia (city in Phocis), 107
democracy, 6–8, 14, 45n4, 64n37, Elis, 12, 124, 152, 164, 183, 238n59,
110, 142, 182, 184–185, 230, 232, 281
237n54, 258–260, 262n14, 267– empty ships, 57, 84
268, 290, 293–295 Epaminondas (Theban general),
Demosthenes (fifth-century Athe- 105n12, 162n29
nian general), 62 Epichares (Sicyonian leader),
desertion, military, 61, 273 296n35
Didymus (commentator on De- Eresus, 288, 292
mosthenes), 23, 100, 177, 179, Eretria, 83n55, 92n6, 141n45, 152,
188–190, 199n71, 201–203, 166, 171–174, 183n16
206n23, 210n36, 211, 224, 226, Ergisce, 125
238n58 Erythrae, 138, 195n55
Dinarchus (Athenian speech- Etesian winds, 80, 129, 135–136
writer), ix, xv n7, xvii–xviii, 3 Euboea, 12, 34, 69, 75, 81n42, 83,
Dionysia, 54, 78n28, 81, 82n46, 92, 94, 111, 126n49, 136–137,
93n9 141, 148, 150–152, 160, 163, 172,
Dionysius I and II (rulers of Syra- 179, 183, 198, 280
cuse), 218 Eubulus (Athenian politician),
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (liter- 8, 12n14, 55, 60n25, 261n10,
ary critic), xx–xxi, 23–24, 270n45
29, 68– 69, 79n37, 88, 100, 113– Euphraeus (Oreite leader),
114, 129, 152n1, 177, 179, 201, 172–174
203, 224, 240, 257–258, 274, Eurylochus (Macedonian com-
287 mander), 172
Dionysus, Theater of, 93 Eurysaleus (ruler of Eresus),
Diopeithes (Athenian general), 16, 292n23

index 313
Euthycrates (Olynthian politi- Hyperides (Athenian politician),

cian), 28–29, 142 xviii, 7, 102, 287
euthynai, 40, 85n61
Evagoras (ruler of Salamis in Cy- Idrieus (satrap of Caria), 99n40
prus), 218 Illyria, 10–11, 36, 39, 69, 72n11,
86
foot-companions (pezhetairoi), 48 Imbros, 81, 117
foreigner (barbaros), 60, 63, 84, impeachment (eisangelia), xxvii,
105, 153, 165n44, 189, 235, 246 85n62, 139, 229
Fort Heraeum (Heraion Teichos), “invisible wealth” (aphanēs ousia),
57, 70, 130 93, 252n37
Fort Serrium (Serriou Teichos), Iphicrates (Athenian general), 77,
125, 159 140n41, 234, 297n38
Isocrates (Athenian rhetorician),
Geraestus, 81 ix, xiv, xviii, 165n44, 257n2,
graphē paranomōn, 2–3, 54, 57n15 270n45
Haliartus, 75 judicial agreements (symbola), 118

Halonnesus, 101, 113–117, 219–
220, 287 king. See Persia, king of
Halus, 89, 205 King’s Peace, 169n59, 241, 259,
Hegesippus (Athenian politician), 263nn19,20, 270–272
7, 45n5, 65n40, 101–103, 113–128,
175, 213, 220n26, 221n31, 287 Lampsacus, 51
Hellespont, 8, 28n51, 68n2, 70, Larissa, 148n77
129–130, 133–134, 136, 139, 152, Lasthenes (Olynthian politician),
160, 163, 179, 220, 297n38 28–29, 142, 174
Hermias (ruler of Atarneus), 180, law-givers (nomothetai), xxvi, 54,
188n28, 189n29 59, 193n47
Hiera Orgas. See Orgas Lechaeum, battle of, 77n23,
Hierax (Amphipolitan envoy), 34 234n44
Hipparchus (Eretrian leader), Lemnos, 29, 78, 80–81, 114, 117
172 Lenaea (Athenian festival), 54
Hippias (sixth-century tyrant of Leptines (Athenian politician),
Athens), 216n14, 291n16 140n41
Hipponicus (Macedonian gen- Lesbos, 230n26, 267n35, 288, 292
eral), 172 Leucas, 166
honorary consul (proxenos), 126, Leuce Acte, 126–127
266 Leuctra, battle of, 64n39, 161n28,
hybris, xxvii, 28, 144n58, 147n67, 162, 193n50, 194n53, 206n25,
198n66 274–275

314 index
Libanius of Antioch (literary Menestheus (Athenian politi-

critic), 23, 54–55, 58n19, 90n5, cian), 297
100, 113, 128n57, 131n6, 177, 224, Menippus (Oreite politician), 172
226n11, 240, 275, 287, 294n27, Menon (Pharsalian leader), 235
297n40 Mentor of Rhodes (mercenary
liturgies (leitourgiai), xxiii–xxiv, general), 188–189
82, 93, 150, 248n22, 252n37 Messene, Messenia, 12, 64n39,
Lycurgus (Athenian politician), 100–102, 105–110, 160n23,
xviii, 175n76, 298n42 175n74, 193n50, 206n25, 235n46,
Lysander (fifth-century Spartan 245n11, 274–275, 278–279, 281–
general), 109n34, 269n42 283, 289, 291–292, 296n35
Methone, 11, 34–35, 50n25, 65n42,
Macedonia, earlier history of, 72, 82, 163, 210n36
63, 105, 108, 118–119, 209, 222, military fund (to stratiōtikon), 37
235 Miltiades (fifth-century Athenian
Macedonian army, 42, 47–48, leader), 64, 129, 234, 237n55
169–170 Mysteries, 57, 215, 233n37
Macedonian navy, 76, 112, 119– Mytilene, 230, 267
120, 297n38
Macedonians, Greekness of, 10, Naupactus, 166
60– 61, 63, 165 Naxos, battle of, 161n28, 234
Magnesia, 35, 38, 45–46, 109 Neon (ruler of Messene), 291n20
Mantinea, battle of, 162n29, 278, Neoptolemus (Athenian politi-
279n11, 280n13 cian), 110n38
Marathon, 81 Neoptolemus (Scyrian actor),
Marathon, battle of, 77n25, 92– 93
216n14, 234, 253, 277n5 Nicaea, 109, 206
Maroneia, 220, 298 Nicias (fifth-century Athenian
Mastira, 142, 185 leader), 62
Mausolus (satrap of Caria), 9, Nicias (Macedonian herald), 214
99n40, 230n27, 241, 247n16,
257–259, 262, 264n23, 267n36, Olympias (wife of Philip of Mace-
271 don), 36n31, 124n42
Mecyberna, 28 Olynthus, 2, 11, 15, 17n20, 21, 27–
Media, 168 37, 39, 41, 43–47, 53, 58, 69, 75,
Megalopolis, 96, 108n29, 206n25, 88, 92n7, 108–109, 112n47, 123,
245n11, 274–285 126n48, 142, 146–148, 153, 158,
Megara, 12, 62, 137, 152, 160, 164, 163, 171–174, 197–198, 205
176, 183, 215, 226, 238 Opisthodomos, 232
Menelaus (Athenian com- Orchomenus, 97, 106, 277, 283,
mander), 78 284n28

index 315
Oreus, Oreite, 57n34, 83n55, 137, 188–189, 194, 206, 212–213, 216,
141n45, 146, 152, 158, 166, 172– 218n22, 222n34, 231, 235, 240–
174, 179, 183, 197 242, 244–247, 252–256, 259–
Orgas, 62, 215n7, 238 260, 262–265, 269–272
Orontes (satrap of Mysia), 253 Pharsalus, 205n15, 235
Oropus, 94, 96, 98, 111, 276, 279– Pherae, 34n25, 35, 47n13, 109n35,
281, 283 124, 146–148, 152, 158, 183, 197,
211–212, 259n6
Paeonia, 10, 36, 39, 72n4 Philiadas (father of Messenian ty-
Pagasae, 34–35, 38, 46, 47n13, 82, rants), 289, 291–292
216 Philip II (king of Macedonia),
Pallene, 34n25, 123 passim
Panathenaea, 81 Philistides (Oreite leader), 141n45,
Pandosia, 124 166, 172
panhellenism, xviii, 153, 189n31 Philochorus (Athenian historian),
pantomime actors (mimoi), 49 23, 28, 100n2, 130n4, 179n8,
Paralus, 81n44, 139 189n34, 203
Parmenion (Macedonian general), Philocrates (Athenian politician),
172, 205n15 89, 94n13, 111nn40,41, 122–123,
Parthenon, 232n33 158n14
Pasion (Athenian banker), 236n48 Philocrates, Peace of, 11, 15, 88–89,
Peisistratus (sixth-century Athe- 93, 98, 100–102, 113, 115, 120,
nian tyrant), 216, 290 124–125, 130–131, 133, 147–148,
Pella, 117, 126n47 153–155, 183n15, 203–205, 213,
Pellene, 289, 293 216–218, 221n30, 222
Peparethos, 212, 219–220 Phlius, 238, 281
Perdiccas II (king of Macedonia), Phocion (Athenian general), 92n6
235, 299n46 Phocis, 9, 11–12, 35n27, 39, 45,
Perdiccas III (king of Macedo- 47n13, 59, 69, 75nn17,18, 86n95,
nia), 47n10, 172n68 88– 91, 94, 97, 102, 104, 107,
Periandros (Athenian politician), 108n29, 111–112, 147–148, 153,
243 158, 160, 163, 174, 193, 198,
Pericles (fifth-century Athenian 205, 206n24, 245n11, 246n16,
leader), xiii, 62, 237n53 254n49, 257–258, 275, 281n16,
Perillas (Megarian leader), 164n42 285n33
Perinthus, 12, 130, 180, 188n27, Phoenicia, 216, 242, 265n15,
189n30, 203–206, 212, 216n12, 288n11
220n28 Phormion (Athenian banker),
Persia, king of, 14, 86, 100, 102, 236n48
105, 123, 138n33, 153, 159, 160n21, Phrygia, 254, 263n20
165n45, 168–169, 175, 179–180, Phthiotic Achaea, 183, 205

316 index
pillars (stēlai), 133n13, 167, 169, Sacred Mountain (Hieron Oros),

203, 217, 284 125, 159
piracy, 114–117, 214n3, 219 Sacred War, Third, 9, 12, 34n25,
Piraeus, 81n42, 134, 143n49, 151, 45n7, 64n39, 86n65, 88– 91,
158, 237n53, 250n31, 282n21, 289, 94n13, 95n20, 97n35, 104n10,
298–299 107n23, 108n29, 147n70, 193n51,
Plataea, 94, 97n29, 111, 276–278, 205n16, 245n11, 275, 279n10,
283, 284n28 284n29, 285n33
Plataea, battle of, 235 Salaminia, 81n44
Plato (Athenian philosopher), Salamis, battle of, xiii, 234,
172n68, 188n28 253n40
Plutarchus (Eretrian ruler), 92, Samos, 258, 260, 264, 270n45,
171 271n49
Polycrates (Athenian politician), satrap (Persian governor), 9, 14,
220 51n26, 77n25, 99n40, 188n27,
Polyeuctus (Athenian politician), 206, 230n27, 240–241, 247n16,
175 253n44, 254n46, 259, 263n20,
Polystratus (Athenian general), 264nn21,23, 265n25
77 Sciathos, 80, 141
Porthmus, 166, 171–172, 183 Scyros, 92n8, 114, 117
Potidaea, 11, 27, 34–35, 45, 47, Second Athenian Confeder-
50n25, 65n42, 72, 82, 108, 115, acy, 8, 63n32, 80n39, 89, 95n19,
118–119, 120n27, 147–148, 184, 138n33, 143n53, 182n14, 219n23,
198 229nn18,24, 237n52, 258,
Propylaea, 237 267n36
proxenos. See honorary consul Selymbria, 203, 270–271
Pteleum, 126–127 Serrium, 147, 159, 183, 198
Ptoeodorus (Megarian leader), Sestos, 130
164n42 Sicyon, 245n11, 289, 295
publication of speeches, xix–xx, Sigeum, 51
18–21, 154–155, 288 Siphnos, 239
Pydna, 11, 33–35, 44n4, 50n25, Sitalces (Thracian king), 217
65n42, 72 Social War, 8– 9, 11, 14, 27, 135n21,
Pylaea, 98, 148, 198 138n33, 140n41, 190n37, 226,
Pythian Festival, 98, 153, 165 230n28, 237n52, 241, 243,
Python of Byzantium (Mace- 246n16, 259–261, 266n31,
donian envoy), 101–103, 115, 270n45, 275
120n26, 121–122 Socrates (Oreite politician), 172
Solon (sixth-century Athenian
Rhodes, 13–14, 99, 175, 230, 240, politician), xxiii, xxvi–xxvii
257–273 Sostratus (pirate), 219

index 317
Sparta, 8– 9, 12, 14, 50, 55, 64, 71– 98n36, 104, 109n35, 111–112, 147,
72, 75n18, 77, 86, 88, 96, 101, 165, 198
105–109, 152, 161–162, 164, 169– Thespiae, 94, 111, 277, 283–284
170, 189n33, 193–195, 206n25, Thessaly, 11, 30, 34n25, 35, 38, 41,
207, 210, 222, 234, 235n46, 45–47, 58n19, 72n11, 89– 91, 95,
237n55, 245nn11,12, 254n49, 97– 98, 107, 109, 114, 124n41,
258, 263n20, 268–270, 272n53, 135, 146n64, 147–148, 158,
274–285, 288–289, 291nn16,20, 163, 165–166, 183n19, 198, 205,
295n35 206n24, 235n46, 257
Stratocles (Amphipolitan leader), “Thirds” (trittyes), 251
34 “Thirty Tyrants” (Athenian oli-
Stryme, 221 garchs), xix, 267n34, 269n38
Susa, 189, 254n48 Thoas (Oreite politician), 172
symmories (symmoriai), 7, 9, Thrace, 8, 10–12, 14, 35–36, 50n25,
31n12, 51–52, 233, 242–243, 57, 69– 70, 72n11, 73n13, 89,
249–252 111n42, 125n46, 126n47, 127n53,
129–132, 134–136, 142–143,
taxiarch (taxiarchos), 78, 251n34 147, 152, 159n18, 160, 163, 179–
Tenedos, 297 180, 183, 185, 198, 205, 212, 215,
Teres (Thracian king), 205n17, 217–218, 235nn46,47, 257–258,
212, 217–218 299n46
Thasos, 80, 119, 214, 220, 221n29 Thrasybulus (ruler of Messene),
Thebes, 9, 11–13, 39, 41n7, 50n23, 291n20
58–59, 64, 86, 88– 91, 94– Thrasydaeus (tetrarch of Thes-
98, 102, 104–108, 111, 136n28, saly), 163n37
147–148, 150–151, 158, 161–163, Tigranes (Persian commander),
166, 193–195, 198, 206, 240n1, 264
245n11, 246n16, 254–255, 274– Timarchus (Athenian politician),
286, 289–290. 113
Themistocles (fifth-century Athe- Timotheus (Athenian general),
nian leader), xiii, 234, 237 33n19, 34n25,47, 50n25, 65n42,
Theopompus of Chios (historian), 72n10, 140n41, 150–151, 234,
23, 28, 42, 44n4, 48nn15,16, 263–264
49n22, 100, 130n3, 163n37, Tiristasis, 215
190n37, 203, 291n20 Tisias (Sicilian rhetorician), xiii
theoric fund (ta theōrika), 9–10, Tricaranon, 281
13, 15–16, 30, 37n33, 38n36, 53– Trierarch (triērarchos), xxiii, 9,
55, 59, 61, 66, 137n32, 178, 180, 52, 82, 191, 242–243, 248n22,
190, 193n47, 226–228, 231n31 250–251
Thermopylae, 11–12, 14, 28, 39n43, Triphylia, 281
69– 70, 75, 84, 88–89, 97, Trophies (tropaia), 63, 236, 273

318 index
“Twelve Hundred, the,” 243, 248 visible wealth. see “invisible

tyrant, tyranny, 47, 52, 63n32, wealth”
109–110, 141, 148, 160, 163, 166–
167, 172–173, 182–183, 195, 198, wealth-tax (eisphora), xxiv, 9, 31,
208, 216, 268n36, 288–289, 291– 33n21, 52, 57, 137n31, 150n84,
294, 296, 298–299 191, 228n14, 243n6, 249n24, 252

Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEMOSTHENES, SPEECHES 117

Trevett-final.indb i 10/5/11 11:02:47 AM

Trevett-final.indb ii 10/5/11 11:02:48 AM

Translated with introduction and notes by

university of tex as press, austin

Trevett-final.indb iii 10/5/11 11:02:49 AM

Copyright © 2011 by the University of Texas Press

Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Trevett-final.indb iv 10/5/11 11:02:49 AM

Trevett-final.indb v 10/5/11 11:02:50 AM

Series Editor’s Preface (Michael Gagarin) ix

Trevett-final.indb vii 10/5/11 11:02:51 AM

DEMOSTHENES (Jeremy Trevett)

Trevett-final.indb viii 10/5/11 11:02:51 AM

This is the fourteenth volume in a series of translations of The Or-

Trevett-final.indb ix 10/5/11 11:02:52 AM

I should like to thank Alan Boegehold, who read the manuscript

Trevett-final.indb xi 10/5/11 11:02:53 AM

Attica and surrounding region. Map © 2011, Ancient World Mapping

Trevett-final.indb xii 10/5/11 11:02:53 AM

or atory in cl assical athens

Trevett-final.indb xiii 10/5/11 11:02:54 AM

another famous Sicilian, Gorgias of Leontini (ca. 490–390), de-

Trevett-final.indb xiv 10/5/11 11:02:55 AM

The pivotal ﬁgure in this development was Antiphon, one of

Trevett-final.indb xv 10/5/11 11:02:56 AM

⁹ Rhetoric 1.3. Intellectual orations, like Gorgias’ Helen, do not easily ﬁt

Trevett-final.indb xvi 10/5/11 11:02:56 AM

⁹ Rhetoric 1.3. Intellectual orations, like Gorgias’ Helen, do not easily ﬁt

Trevett-final.indb xvi 10/5/11 11:02:56 AM

Trevett-final.indb xvii 10/5/11 11:02:57 AM

Trevett-final.indb xviii 10/5/11 11:02:57 AM

the wor ks of the or ators

¹² Dover’s discussion (1968) of the preservation and transmission of the

Trevett-final.indb xix 10/5/11 11:02:58 AM

the wor ks of the or ators

¹² Dover’s discussion (1968) of the preservation and transmission of the

Trevett-final.indb xix 10/5/11 11:02:58 AM

¹⁴ See MacDowell 1990: 43–47; Todd 1993: 44–45.

Trevett-final.indb xx 10/5/11 11:02:58 AM

sius of Halicarnassus (ﬁrst century bc), who wrote treatises on

¹⁵ Dionysius’ literary studies are collected and translated in Usher

Trevett-final.indb xxi 10/5/11 11:02:59 AM

ology, and in general those aspects of Athenian culture that in the

gover nment and l aw in cl assical athens

¹⁹ In the Assembly this could be accomplished by a reconsideration of

Trevett-final.indb xxii 10/5/11 11:02:59 AM

ology, and in general those aspects of Athenian culture that in the

gover nment and l aw in cl assical athens

¹⁹ In the Assembly this could be accomplished by a reconsideration of

Trevett-final.indb xxii 10/5/11 11:02:59 AM

main policy-making body was the Assembly, open to all adult

Constitution (Ath. Pol.—conveniently translated with notes by Rhodes

Trevett-final.indb xxiii 10/5/11 11:03:00 AM

spent far more than required in order to promote themselves and

²³ Certain religious “interpreters” (exēgētai) were occasionally asked to

Trevett-final.indb xxiv 10/5/11 11:03:01 AM

²⁴ The exceptions are Demosthenes 19 and Aeschines 2, Aeschines 3 and

Trevett-final.indb xxv 10/5/11 11:03:01 AM