186. Nitto Enterprises v.

NLRC, September 29, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Nito Enterprises hired Capili as an apprentice machinist under an apprenticeship agreement for
six months for a daily wage, which was 75% of applicable minimum wage. However, shortly 2 months
after he started work, Capili was asked to resign for the reason that he had been causing accidents, that he
has been doing certain things beyond the scope of his duty, and that he had even injured himself in
handling one of the machines, to the financial prejudice of the company as his medication would be
shouldered by Nito Enterprises.
 
Capili later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. This decision was
reversed by the NLRC, holding that Capili was a regular employee. With this, Nito came to the Supreme
Court. Nito Enterprises assails the NLRC decision on the ground that no apprenticeship program had yet
been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed.
 
ISSUE:
Is Capili a regular employee or an apprentice?
 
RULING:
 
Capili is a regular employee. Apprenticeship needs DOLE’s prior approval, or apprentice becomes
regular employee.
 
Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements
entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship
program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is,
therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
 
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-
apprentice relationship.
 
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and
effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s
assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”)
deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by
Article 280 of the Labor Code and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare.

Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC, September 29, 1995

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1 rendered by
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired
Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced
by an apprenticeship agreement2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990
with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was
working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby
hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises
which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority
and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the
medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:
August 2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and
"TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at
nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop
na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang
kanyang sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang
kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng
siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang
comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.
 
Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi
pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.) Roberto Capili
Roberto Capili

On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in
consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration
Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary
benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent
as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims
dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED.5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was
valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when
he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker.
Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment
particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training. 6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate
complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld
up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear
complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED.7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement
filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as
basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990.
Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor
Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article
XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant to
Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div.,
Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we
cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed.
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's
representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are
hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at
No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties
are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the
option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the
dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition — for certiorari.

The issues raised before us are the following:

I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE
EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.

We find no merit in the petition.

Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered
an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement
was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an
employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. — Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of
apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of
apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below
the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum
wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister
of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship.
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was
executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care
maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to
the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on
June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is,
therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-
apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program
through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to
establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into
existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a
condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the
DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and
effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's
assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves
credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of
the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature
and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:  Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process,
substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists.  Without which, the
dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply
means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with
the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written
notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV,
Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the
requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which,
any judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498
[1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after
he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or
"pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter
and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway,
he did not have a choice. 
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's
alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of
both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
 187. Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, August 17, 1992

FACTS:
Kapunan, Sr. an 82 year old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney owned by Filamer Christian Institute
and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. Kapunan was hospitalized for 20 days. He thus instituted a
criminal case against Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.
Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan instituted a civil case for damages against Funtecha and
Filamer and its president. The RTC and the CA found Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this
petition.
 
Filamer contends that it is not civilly liable because Funtecha was not its employee, as he was only a
working scholar assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each
school day. Filamer anchors its contention on Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code,, which
excludes working scholars from the employment coverage as far as substantive labor provisions on
working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned.
 
ISSUE:
Is Funtecha an employee of Filamer?
 
RULING:
YES. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the
school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan’s house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a
“frolic of his own” but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors
its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly,
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall
be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion
of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court,
thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive
law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a
working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged
employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by
the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance
on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.   

Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, August 17, 1992

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision
rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA
477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship
between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for
the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts
the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar
who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is
not considered an employee of the petitioner.
The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private
respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as
well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in
furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school
jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate court, the
Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned by the late Justice
Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying
Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision which ordered the payment of
the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages,
P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school
premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take
over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the
place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is
also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian
Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp
dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to
Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the
right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He
further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home
at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is
an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the
school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also
had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving
lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a
"frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
(See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of
Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore,
the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one
done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their
assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done
by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if
somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
(Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors
its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly,
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall
be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion
of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court,
thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive
law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a
working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged
employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by
the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance
on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from
the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal
fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's
position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the
fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The
petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and
Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would
prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the
school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its
employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by
which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]). In the
absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran
Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331
[1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is,
under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant
in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian,
plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and
presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left
to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor
doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering damages
under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were
able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner
Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in
furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has
thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is
REINSTATED.
 189. Atlanta Industries v. Sebolino, January 26, 2011

FACTS:
Complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, et al., filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization,
underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and
Chief Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
steel pipes.
The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig, but were later
transferred to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.
The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta
for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the
company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their
money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship
program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular
positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did
not appear in the list of employees (Master List)prior to their engagement as apprentices.

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On April 24, 2006, Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to dela Cruz, Magalang,
Zaño and Chiong, but found the termination of service of the remaining nine to be illegal.Consequently,
the arbiter awarded the dismissed workers backwages, wage differentials, holiday pay and service
incentive leave pay amounting to P1,389,044.57 in the aggregate.
         Atlanta appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the meantime, or on
October 10, 2006, Ramos, Alegria, Villagomez, Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into a
compromise agreement with Atlanta. The agreement provided that except for Ramos, Atlanta agreed to
pay the workers a specified amount as settlement, and to acknowledge them at the same time as regular
employees.
         On December 29, 2006,the NLRC rendered a decision, on appeal, modifying the ruling of the
labor arbiter, as follows: (1) withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding with respect to Sagun, Mabanag,
Sebolino and Pedregoza; (2) affirming the dismissal of the complaints of dela Cruz, Zaño, Magalang and
Chiong; (3) approving the compromise agreement entered into by Costales, Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite
and Alegria, and (4) denying all other claims.
         Sebolino, Costales, Almoite and Sagun  moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the
NLRC denied the motion in its March 30, 2007[9] resolution. The four then sought relief from the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They charged that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) failing to recognize their prior employment with Atlanta;
(2) declaring the second apprenticeship agreement valid; (3) holding that the dismissal of Sagun,
Mabanag, Sebolino and Melvin Pedregoza is legal; and (4) upholding the compromise agreement
involving Costales, Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria.
The CA Decision
The CA granted the petition.
Atlanta and Chan moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in a resolution rendered on
March 25, 2009.[15] Hence, the present petition.
The Petition
Atlanta seeks a reversal of the CA decision, contending that the appellate court erred in (1) concluding
that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as
apprentices; (2) ruling that a second apprenticeship agreement is invalid; (3) declaring that the
respondents were illegally dismissed; and (4) disregarding the compromise agreement executed by
Costales and Almoite
The Court’s Ruling
The merits of the case
         We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the
NLRC decision and in affirming the labor arbiter’s ruling, as it applies to Costales, Almoite,
Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed
because (1) they were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and
(2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
         The following considerations support the CA ruling.
         First. Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and
Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees before they were made to undergo
apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents’ status through relevant operational
records – in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 2003 which the
NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to 12,
2005 cited by the CA.
         Under the CPS monthly report, Atlanta assigned Costales and Almoite to the first shift (7:00 a.m. to
3:00 p.m.) of the Section’s work. The Production and Work Schedules, in addition to the one noted by the
CA, showed that Sebolino and Sagun were scheduled on different shifts vis-à-vis the production and work
of the company’s PE/Spiral Section for the periods July 5-10, 2004; October 25-31, 2004; November 8-
14, 2004; November 16-22, 2004; January 3-9, 2005;January 10-15, 2005; March 7-12, 2005 and March
17-23, 2005.
         We  stress  that  the  CA  correctly  recognized  the  authenticity  of the  operational  documents,  for
the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these  documents  before  the  labor  arbiter, the NLRC
and the CA itself. The  appellate  court,  thus,  found the said  documents  sufficient  to establish the
employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.
         Second. The Master List (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their
position that the respondents were not Atlanta’s employees, at the time they were engaged as apprentices,
is unreliable and does not inspire belief.
         The list, consisting of several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to sort out the
names of the employees listed, as well as the other data contained in the list. For this reason alone, the list
deserves little or no consideration. As the respondents also pointed out, the list itself contradicts a lot of
Atlanta’s claims and allegations, thus: it lists only the names of inactive employees; even the names of
those the NLRC found to have been employed by Atlanta, like Costales and Almoite, and those who even
Atlanta claims attained regular status on January 11, 2006, do not appear in the list when it was supposed
to account for all  employees “as of May 6, 2006.”  Despite the “May 6, 2006” cut off date, the list
contains no entries of employees who were hired or who resigned in 2005 and 2006. We note that the list
contains the names of employees from 1999 to 2004.
         We cannot fault the CA for ignoring the Master List even if Bernardo, its head office accountant,
swore to its correctness and authenticity. Its substantive unreliability gives it very minimal probative
value. Atlanta would have been better served, in terms of reliable evidence, if true copies of the payroll
(on which the list was based, among others, as Bernardo claimed in her affidavit) were presented instead.
         Third. The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the
company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the
apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the
CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder
operator – tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.  Thus, when they were dismissed without just or
authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal
under the law.
        Even if we recognize the company’s need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we can only
consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and
the retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their
training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship
agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation of the
Labor Code’s implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the least. This
we cannot allow.
         Fourth. The compromise agreement allegedly entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with
Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, purportedly in settlement of the case before the NLRC, is not binding on
Costales and Almoite because they did not sign it. The company itself admitted that while Costales and
Almoite were initially intended to be a part of the agreement, it did not pursue their inclusion “due to their
regularization as early as January 11, 2006.”
         WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner Atlanta Industries, Inc.

Atlanta Industries v. Sebolino, January 26, 2011

The facts are summarized below.
In the months of February and March 2005, complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V. Costales, Alvin
V. Almoite, Joseph S. Sagun, Agosto D. Zaño, Domingo S. Alegria, Jr., Ronie Ramos, Edgar
Villagomez, Melvin Pedregoza, Teofanes B. Chiong, Jr., Leonardo L. dela Cruz, Arnold A. Magalang,
and Saturnino M. Mabanag filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment,
nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the petitioners Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief
Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel
pipes.

The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig, but were later
transferred to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.

The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta
for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the
company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.

In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their
money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship
program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular
positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did
not appear in the list of employees (Master List) [5] prior to their engagement as apprentices.

On May 24, 2005, dela Cruz, Magalang, Zaño and Chiong executed a Pagtalikod at Pagwawalang
Saysay before Labor Arbiter Cajilig.
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On April 24, 2006, Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to dela Cruz, Magalang,
Zaño and Chiong, but found the termination of service of the remaining nine to be illegal.
[6]
 Consequently, the arbiter awarded the dismissed workers backwages, wage differentials, holiday pay
and service incentive leave pay amounting to P1,389,044.57 in the aggregate.
Atlanta appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the meantime, or on October
10, 2006, Ramos, Alegria, Villagomez, Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into a compromise
agreement with Atlanta.[7] The agreement provided that except for Ramos, Atlanta agreed to pay the
workers a specified amount as settlement, and to acknowledge them at the same time as regular
employees.
On December 29, 2006,[8] the NLRC rendered a decision, on appeal, modifying the ruling of the labor
arbiter, as follows: (1) withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding with respect to Sagun, Mabanag,
Sebolino and Pedregoza; (2) affirming the dismissal of the complaints of dela Cruz, Zaño, Magalang
and Chiong; (3) approving the compromise agreement entered into by Costales, Ramos, Villagomez,
Almoite and Alegria, and (4) denying all other claims.

Sebolino, Costales, Almoite and Sagun  moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC
denied the motion in its March 30, 2007[9] resolution. The four then sought relief from the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They charged that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in: (1) failing to recognize their prior employment with Atlanta; (2) declaring the
second apprenticeship agreement valid; (3) holding that the dismissal of Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and
Melvin Pedregoza is legal; and (4) upholding the compromise agreement involving Costales, Ramos,
Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria.

The CA Decision

The CA granted the petition based on the following findings: [10]

1. The respondents were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and second
apprenticeship agreements - Almoite and Costales were employed as early as December 2003 and,
subsequently, entered into a first apprenticeship agreement from May 13, 2004 to October 12, 2004;
before this first agreement expired, a second apprenticeship agreement, from October 9, 2004 to March 8,
2005 was executed. The same is true with Sebolino and Sagun, who were employed by Atlanta as early as
March 3, 2004. Sebolino entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with the company from March
20, 2004 to August 19, 2004, and his second apprenticeship agreement from August 20, 2004 to January
19, 2005. Sagun, on the other hand, entered into his first agreement from May 28, 2004 to October 8,
2004, and the second agreement from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005.

2. The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were executed in violation of
the law and the rules.[11] The agreements did not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice
would be trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA).

3. The positions occupied by the respondents - machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman - are
usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials, the company's main
business. Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals
were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.

4. The compromise agreement entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with Ramos, Villagomez
and Alegria, was not binding on Costales and Almoite because they did not sign the agreement.

The petitioners themselves admitted that Costales and Almoite were initially planned to be a part of the
compromise agreement, but their employment has been regularized as early as January 11, 2006; hence,
the company did not pursue their inclusion in the compromise agreement. [12]

The CA faulted the NLRC for failing to appreciate the evidence regarding the respondents' prior
employment with Atlanta. The NLRC recognized the prior employment of Costales and Almoite on
Atlanta's monthly report for December 2003 for the CPS Department/Section dated January 6, 2004.
[13]
 This record shows that Costales and Almoite were assigned to the company's first shift from 7:00 a.m.
to 3:00 p.m. The NLRC ignored Sebolino and Sagun's prior employment under the company's Production
and Work Schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 dated March 3, 2004, [14]  as they had been Atlanta's
employees as early as March 3, 2004, with Sebolino scheduled to work on March 7-12, 2005 at 7:00 a.m.
to 7:00 p.m., while Sagun was scheduled to work for the same period but from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. The
CA noted that Atlanta failed to challenge the authenticity of the two documents before it and the labor
authorities.

Atlanta and Chan moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in a resolution rendered on
March 25, 2009.[15] Hence, the present petition.

The Petition

Atlanta seeks a reversal of the CA decision, contending that the appellate court erred in (1) concluding
that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as
apprentices; (2) ruling that a second apprenticeship agreement is invalid; (3) declaring that the
respondents were illegally dismissed; and (4) disregarding the compromise agreement executed by
Costales and Almoite. It submits the following arguments:

First. The CA's conclusion that the respondent workers were company employees before they were
engaged as apprentices was primarily based on the Monthly Report [16] and the Production and Work
Schedule for March 7-12, 2005,[17] in total disregard of the Master List[18] prepared by the company
accountant, Emelita M. Bernardo. The names of Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun do not appear as
employees in the Master List which "contained the names of all the persons who were employed by and at
petitioner."[19]

Atlanta faults the CA for relying on the Production and Work Schedule and the Monthly Report which
were not sworn to, and in disregarding the Master List whose veracity was sworn to by Bernardo and by
Alex Go who headed the company's accounting division. It maintains that the CA should have given more
credence to the Master List.

Second. In declaring invalid the apprenticeship agreements it entered into with the respondent workers,
the CA failed to recognize the rationale behind the law on apprenticeship. It submits that under the law,
[20]
 apprenticeship agreements are valid, provided they do not exceed six (6) months and the apprentices
are paid the appropriate wages of at least 75% of the applicable minimum wage.

The respondents initially executed a five-month apprenticeship program with Atlanta, at the end of which,
they "voluntarily and willingly entered into another apprenticeship agreement with the petitioner for the
training of a second skill"[21] for five months; thus, the petitioners committed no violation of the
apprenticeship period laid down by the law.
Further, the apprenticeship agreements, entered into by the parties, complied with the requisites under
Article 62 of the Labor Code; the company's authorized representative and the respondents signed the
agreements and these were ratified by the company's apprenticeship committee. The apprenticeship
program itself was approved and certified by the TESDA. [22] The CA, thus, erred in overturning the
NLRC's finding that the apprenticeship agreements were valid.

Third. There was no illegal dismissal as the respondent workers' tenure ended with the expiration of the
apprenticeship agreement they entered into. There was, therefore, no regular employer-employee
relationship between Atlanta and the respondent workers.

The Case for Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun

In a Comment filed on August 6, 2009,[23] Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun pray for a denial of the
petition for being procedurally defective and for lack of merit.

The respondent workers contend that the petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which requires that the petition be accompanied by supporting material portions of the records. The
petitioners failed to attach to the petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule despite their
submission that the CA relied heavily on the document in finding the respondent workers' prior
employment with Atlanta. They also did not attach a copy of the compromise agreement purportedly
executed by Costales and Almoite. For this reason, the respondent workers submit that the petition should
be dismissed.

The respondents posit that the CA committed no error in holding that they were already Atlanta's
employees before they were engaged as apprentices, as confirmed by the company's Production and Work
Schedule.[24] They maintain that the Production and Work Schedule meets the requirement of substantial
evidence as the petitioners failed to question its authenticity. They  point out that the schedule was
prepared by Rose A. Quirit and approved by Adolfo R. Lope, head of the company's PE/Spiral Section.
They argue that it was highly unlikely that the head of a production section of the company would prepare
and assign work to the complainants if the latter had not been company employees.

The respondent workers reiterate their mistrust of the Master List [25] as evidence that they were not
employees of the company at the time they became apprentices. They label the Master List as "self-
serving, dubious and even if considered as authentic, its content contradicts a lot of petitioner's claim and
allegations,"[26] thus -

1. Aside from the fact that the Master List is not legible, it contains only the names of inactive employees.
Even those found by the NLRC to have been employed in the company (such as Almoite, Costales and
Sagun) do not appear in the list. If Costales and Almoite had been employed with Atlanta since January
11, 2006, as the company claimed,[27] their names would have been in the list, considering that the Master
List accounts for all employees "as of May 2006" - the notation carried on top of each page of the
document.

2. There were no entries of employees hired or resigned in the years 2005 and 2006 despite the "as of
May 2006" notation; several pages making up the Master List contain names of employees for the years
1999 - 2004.

3. The fact that Atlanta presented the purported Master List instead of the payroll raised serious doubts on
the authenticity of the list.
In sum, the respondent workers posit that the presentation of the Master List revealed the "intention of the
herein petitioner[s] to perpetually hide the fact of [their] prior employment." [28]

On the supposed apprenticeship agreements they entered into, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun
refuse to accept the agreements' validity, contending that the company's apprenticeship program is merely
a ploy "to continually deprive [them] of their rightful wages and benefits which are due them as regular
employees."[29] They submit the following "indubitable facts and ratiocinations:" [30]

1. The apprenticeship agreements were submitted to TESDA only in 2005 (with dates of receipt on
"1/4/05" & "2/22/05"[31]), when the agreements were supposed to have been executed in April or May
2004. Thus, the submission was made long after the starting date of the workers' apprenticeship or even
beyond the agreement's completion/termination date, in violation of Section 23, Rule VI, Book II of the
Labor Code.

2. The respondent workers were made to undergo apprenticeship for occupations different from those
allegedly approved by TESDA. TESDA approved Atlanta's apprenticeship program on "Plastic
Molder"[32] and not for extrusion molding process, engineering, pelletizing process and mixing process.

3. The respondents were already skilled workers prior to the apprenticeship program as they had been
employed and made to work in the different job positions where they had undergone training. Sagun and
Sebolino, together with Mabanag, Pedregoza, dela Cruz, Chiong, Magalang and Alegria were even given
production assignments and work schedule at the PE/Spiral Section from May 11, 2004 to March 23,
2005, and some of them were even assigned to the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. and graveyard shifts (11:00
p.m. - 7:00 a.m.) during the period.[33]

4. The respondent workers were required to continue as apprentices beyond six months. The TESDA
certificate of completion indicates that the workers' apprenticeship had been completed after six months.
Yet, they were suffered to work as apprentices beyond that period.

Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun resolutely maintain that they were illegally dismissed, as the
reason for the termination of their employment - notice of the completion of the second apprenticeship
agreement - did not constitute either a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor
Code.

Finally, Costales and Almoite refuse to be bound by the compromise agreement [34] that Atlanta presented
to defeat the two workers' cause of action. They claim that the supposed agreement is invalid as against
them, principally because they did not sign it.

The Court's Ruling

The procedural issue

The respondent workers ask that the petition be dismissed outright for the petitioners' failure to attach to
the petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule and a copy of the compromise agreement
Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into -- material portions of the record that should accompany and
support the petition, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In Mariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. v. Arturo J. Garchitorena [35] where the Court
addressed essentially the same issue arising from Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, [36] we held
that the phrase "of the pleadings and other material portions of the record xxx as would support the
allegation of the petition clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the
selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. The crucial issue to consider then is
whether or not the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently supported the allegations therein." [37]

As in Mariners, we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently support the petitioners'
allegations. The accompanying CA decision[38] and resolution,[39] as well as those of the labor
arbiter[40] and the NLRC,[41] referred to the parties' position papers and even to their replies and rejoinders.
Significantly, the CA decision narrates the factual antecedents, defines the complainants' cause of action,
and cites the arguments, including the evidence the parties adduced.  If any, the defect in the petition lies
in the petitioners' failure to provide legible copies of some of the material documents mentioned,
especially several pages in the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the NLRC. This defect, however, is
not fatal as the challenged CA decision clearly summarized the labor tribunal's rulings.  We, thus, find no
procedural obstacle in resolving the petition on the merits.

The merits of the case

We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC
decision[42] and in affirming the labor arbiter's ruling,[43] as it applies to Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and
Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed because (1) they were
already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements
were invalid.

The following considerations support the CA ruling.

First. Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and
Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees before they were made to undergo
apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents' status through relevant operational
records - in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 2003 [44] which the
NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to 12,
2005[45] cited by the CA.

Under the CPS monthly report, Atlanta assigned Costales and Almoite to the first shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00
p.m.) of the Section's work. The Production and Work Schedules, in addition to the one noted by the CA,
showed that Sebolino and Sagun were scheduled on different shifts vis-Ã -vis the production and work of
the company's PE/Spiral Section for the periods July 5-10, 2004; [46] October 25-31, 2004;[47] November 8-
14, 2004;[48] November 16-22, 2004;[49] January 3-9, 2005;[50] January 10-15, 2005;[51] March 7-12,
2005[52] and March 17-23, 2005.[53]

We  stress  that the  CA  correctly recognized  the  authenticity of the  operational  documents,  for the
failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these  documents  before  the labor  arbiter, the NLRC and
the CA itself. The  appellate  court,  thus, found the said  documents  sufficient  to establish the
employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.

Second. The Master List[54] (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their position
that the respondents were not Atlanta's employees, at the time they were engaged as apprentices, is
unreliable and does not inspire belief.

The list, consisting of several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to sort out the names of
the employees listed, as well as the other data contained in the list. For this reason alone, the list deserves
little or no consideration. As the respondents also pointed out, the list itself contradicts a lot of Atlanta's
claims and allegations, thus: it lists only the names of inactive employees; even the names of those the
NLRC found to have been employed by Atlanta, like Costales and Almoite, and those who even Atlanta
claims attained regular status on January 11, 2006, [55] do not appear in the list when it was supposed to
account for all  employees "as of May 6, 2006."  Despite the "May 6, 2006" cut off date, the list contains
no entries of employees who were hired or who resigned in 2005 and 2006. We note that the list contains
the names of employees from 1999 to 2004.

We cannot fault the CA for ignoring the Master List even if Bernardo, its head office accountant, swore to
its correctness and authenticity.[56] Its substantive unreliability gives it very minimal probative value.
Atlanta would have been better served, in terms of reliable evidence, if true copies of the payroll (on
which the list was based, among others, as Bernardo claimed in her affidavit) were presented instead.

Third. The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the
company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the
apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the
CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder
operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlanta's usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. [57] These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.  Thus, when they were dismissed without just or
authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal
under the law.[58]

Even if we recognize the company's need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we can only
consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and
the retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their
training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship
agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, [59] is a violation of the
Labor Code's implementing rules[60] and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the least. This
we cannot allow.

Fourth. The compromise agreement[61] allegedly entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with
Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, purportedly in settlement of the case before the NLRC, is not binding on
Costales and Almoite because they did not sign it. The company itself admitted [62] that while Costales and
Almoite were initially intended to be a part of the agreement, it did not pursue their inclusion "due to their
regularization as early as January 11, 2006."[63]cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The assailed

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner Atlanta
Industries, Inc.
Darvin v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125044 July 13, 1998

Facts:
Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed
from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to
recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this
promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

Ruling:
No.
Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the
Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be
shown:
(1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and
(2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private
respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private
respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-
appellant P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more,
can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is
nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant
probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of
evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the
accused’s authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s
right, to proclaim his innocence.
Appellant Darvin is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt