aforementioned Civil Case No.

2850 admit­ting the contract of carriage with petitioners but

152 Phil. 353
alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless im­‐
prudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the
FIRST DIVISION oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the op­posite direction ascending the incline at
an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to
[ G.R. No. L-35095. August 31, 1973 ] give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped
the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents
could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, AND ESTER
FRANCISCO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a
FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but with­out the
TRANSIT CO., INC., AND PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules
RESPONDENTS. of Court; and 3) that the defendants (res­pondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver,
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and
DE CIS ION prudence.

The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no
ANTONIO, J.: cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action
for damages, respond­ent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First In­stance of Misamis Mun­icipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of
Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence",
Inesin, et al.) dated Oct­ober 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3
said civil action after conviction of the defend­ants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is
Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise
January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applies
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence
Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of of the driver.
said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and
operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said mo­tion to dismiss alleging that
a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the
conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may
while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilo­meter 21 in produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an
Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party
passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the afore­said
collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained
treatment and hospitalization. the arguments of respondents, Mactan Tran­sit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared
that whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil neg­‐
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the ligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under Amer­ican law" there
accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and "should be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved
imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa
the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or
Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the
Misamis Occidental an ac­tion for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, com­pensatory and exemplary damages,
respond­ents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the pas­senger bus that the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-
figured in the collision, with prayer preliminary attachment. delict."

On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972,
hence this appeal on certiorari. the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. As a result
private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased
operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sus­tained intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil
by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted
the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the crim­inal case has
absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The cir­cumstance that the disappeared.
complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle
"at a fast clip in a reckless, grosssly negligent and imprudent manner in viol­ation of traffic As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the inde­pendent negligence, having always had its own foundation and indivi­duality. Some legal
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the in­jury on petitioners. Certainly delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit
the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is of the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as
inevitable that the aver­ments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso,
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive
damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176- required in the proviso."[4] But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action
2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be
Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). [1] governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation
by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their
which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be
39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely se­parate and distinct made, for the reason that the law itself (Art­icle 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing
criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for
should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Sec­tion 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time respondent court's order of dismissal.
limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, [2] where the reservation
was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside,
had entered his appearance jointly with the pros­ecuting attorney in the course of the and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private
criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to respondents.
the of­fended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation
is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Acting C.J., concurs in the result.
same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses v. Luat[3] that when the
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he
pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter of
damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in
represent­ation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active [1]
intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, "Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
and, therefore, cannot bar a separ­ate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code. only to fault or negligence not pun­ished by law, according to the literal import of art­icle
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal and ap­plication in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has any degree of neg­ligence — even the slightest—would have to be indem­nified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere who employs and utilizes him.') All these observations acquire a peculiar force
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker and significance when it comes to motor ac­cidents, and there is need of
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the stressing and accent­uating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render al­most "Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlap­ping or
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
the Spanish Civil Code. character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
"Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a crim­inal case, proof of guilt beyond arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reason­able doubt, but can nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by
the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to full rigor. It is high time we
cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
"Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safe­guarding of
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for
cumbersome method of obtain­ing relief. True, there is such a remedy under our the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because redress."
the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and [2] G.R. No. L-20865, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 346.
similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to
pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go [3] G.R. No. L-18116, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 454.
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the [4]
pathways of right and justice. Footnote of Justice Capistrano in Corpus v. Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28
SCRA, 1062, 1069. CF. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code,
"At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of Vol. 1, page 142, 1968 Ed.
employers and their pre­sumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who CONCURRING
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct BARREDO, J.:
for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, 'they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their I would like to limit my concurrence.
poor selection and all for their negligence.' And according to Manresa, 'It is
much more equitable and just that such respons­ibility should fall upon the I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and
principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent em­ployee, 2177 of the Civil Code which read as follows:
and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director.' (Vol.
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
employ­er on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus,
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
Oyuelos says in the work al­ready cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons
the employer and employee 'vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
"ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
refundicion de la del depen­diente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza.' (become as
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him
 the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant."

These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of neg­ligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No.
2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by
the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal
case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of Rule 111, it is my
considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and
is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not
substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.

Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation
required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in
order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last
sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible
judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.

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