A generic foresight process framework

Joseph Voros
Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology,
John Street, Hawthorn, VIC, 3122, Australia
Tel: +61.3.9214-5984; Email:jvoros@swin.edu.au

Version Date: 12 October 2005

Abstract
A generic foresight process framework is outlined, based upon prior independent
work by Mintzberg, Horton and Slaughter. The framework was developed as
part of work carried out by the author during the introduction of foresight into
the formal strategic planning of a public-sector university in Australia. The
framework recognises several distinct phases, leading from the initial gathering
of information, through to the production of outputs intended as input into
the more familiar activities of strategy development and strategic planning. The
framework is also useful as a diagnostic tool for examining how foresight work and
strategy are undertaken, as well as a design aid for customised foresight projects
and processes. Some observations and reflections are made on lessons learned
from a two-and-a-half year engagement as an organisationally-based foresight
practitioner.

Keywords: organisational implementation, generic foresight framework, diag-

nostic tool, design aid

An earlier version of this paper appeared in:

Foresight, vol.5, no.3, pp.10–21, 2003. ISSN: 1463-6689.
doi:10.1108/14636680310698379
where it won a Highly Commended Award from the journal’s international editorial
advisory board for the 2004 Emerald Publishing Literati Club Excellence Awards (see
Foresight vol.6, no.5, 2004).
Published by Emerald: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/fs.htm

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
2 A generic foresight process framework

Contents
1 Introduction 3

2 The organisational context for foresight at Swinburne 3

3 The staged approach to implementing foresight 4

4 On foresight, strategy and planning 5

5 Origins of the foresight framework 7

6 The foresight framework in detail 9

7 Interlude: Types of futures and their utility 12

8 The framework as a diagnostic tool 15

9 The framework as a design tool 17

10 Concluding remarks 19

Acknowledgements 19

Notes 19

References 19

List of Figures
1 The generic foresight process framework, in broad outline form . . . . . . . . 8
2 The foresight framework, in ‘question’ form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 The foresight framework, with some representative methodologies indicated . 11
4 The ‘futures cone’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5 A purely reactive approach to strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 A ‘shallow’ foresight process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7 A ‘shallow/narrow’ foresight process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
1. Introduction 3

1 Introduction
This paper describes a generic foresight process framework developed as part of the in-
troduction and implementation of foresight into an organisation with pre-existing strategy
development and strategic planning activities. It has proven to be very useful as a practical
tool for clarifying to organisational personnel at all levels the important inter-relationships
and distinctions between these three types of activity. In addition, the framework has also
proven to be very useful as a practical tool for diagnosing where and how certain approaches
to foresight and strategy work may need improvement or refinement. It has been useful both
for understanding and evaluating the manner by which different methodologies may be com-
bined, and as a basis for designing new and innovative methodological processes, practices
and interventions tailored to specific organisational circumstances. Reflections and observa-
tions on some key learnings which have stemmed from this work are made throughout.
An underlying objective of this paper is to report back to the foresight practitioner
community on a specific instance of practical foresight implementation. The framework
described here flows from an adaptation of existing theory and methodology, and is designed
to support and stimulate the emergence of new ideas for foresight praxis. As such, this
paper represents an attempt to ‘close the loop’ of action research (Senge & Scharmer 2001),
something which is necessary for the continued growth and health of foresight as a specialised
and professional knowledge discipline. The intention is that this paper will contribute to the
continuing cycle of knowledge creation within foresight work in general, and organisational
implementation of foresight in particular.

2 The organisational context for foresight at

Swinburne
Foresight, Planning and Review (FPR) at Swinburne is located organisationally in the Of-
fice of the Vice-Chancellor, to whom the unit’s Director reports. It was formed in 1999
following a decision by the then Vice Chancellor (together with the then Vice President)
that Swinburne should ‘do foresight.’ Another aspect of this decision was the establishment
at Swinburne of the Australian Foresight Institute (AFI), whose Director and Foundation
Professor is Richard Slaughter, the current president of the World Futures Studies Federa-
tion.
It is frequently a source of some confusion to people that there are two places at Swin-
burne with the word ‘foresight’ in their names. The AFI is a research, teaching and academic
institute with an international focus whose mission, in part, is the training of foresight practi-
tioners, while FPR is an internally-focussed administrative department charged with putting
foresight into practice for the University. Therefore, as far as we have been able to discern,
Swinburne as an organisation is in a unique position with respect to foresight—it is both
taught here as an academic discipline, and the University is engaged in incorporating it ex-
plicitly into continuing strategy development and strategic planning processes at the highest
level. We have had an opportunity to establish foresight at Swinburne as both an area of
academic excellence (via the AFI) and as an area of competitive advantage (via FPR).
My own position with respect to these two centres of foresight at Swinburne is also rather
unique. When I arrived at Swinburne in early 2000 it was to work with Prof. Slaughter at
the AFI as a contractor on a small project. When that short-term contract ended, I applied
for, and was subsequently appointed to, the new ‘strategic foresight analyst’ job which had
only just been created in FPR. From August 2000 until December 2002, I was involved as a
member of a small team in implementing foresight in this real-life, politically conservative
organisation, where the notion of foresight was originally greeted with perplexed scepticism

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4 A generic foresight process framework

at best, and open hostility at worst. During that time, I occasionally taught in the AFI,
providing a practitioner’s view ‘from the trenches’, as it were, to the students undertaking
the AFI’s courses on Strategic Foresight. This practical orientation to foresight, in addition
to the obvious necessity for intellectual rigour provided by the academic structure, is a
hallmark of the AFI’s courses. In January 2003, I returned to the AFI in an academic role,
which has provided the opportunity to teach what I have learned as a practitioner to other
practitioners.
FPR was charged, upon its creation in 1999 (in a slightly different form than at present),
with the mission of developing, implementing and continuously improving the University
Planning Framework in ways that meet the needs of the University community, and with
developing a strong foresight capacity to underpin and inform the University’s strategy
development. This continues to be a major part of the mission of FPR. Most of the Univer-
sity’s planning framework—within which my specific contribution to implementing foresight
at Swinburne has been made—was already in place before my arrival, put there largely
single-handedly by the Director of FPR, Maree Conway.
What follows below is a description of one aspect of my work as a member of FPR—an
easily understandable (or so it was meant to be) foresight process framework I developed
during late 2000 which would guide our approach to communicating the ‘message’ of fore-
sight, while at the same time forming an intellectual and conceptual framework within which
to operate. The diagrams included herein are taken or adapted from actual presentation
slides used during seminars and workshops. They are examples of attempts to ‘de-mystify’
the foresight process in ways that are intended to be easily and quickly grasped. Often,
there were only a very few minutes to get people’s attention and to get the message across,
so the goal was always to present complex ideas as simply as possible. For a detailed descrip-
tion of Swinburne’s early experience in attempting to incorporate foresight into pre-existing
strategic planning, see the paper by Conway (2001).

3 The staged approach to implementing foresight

Foresight is being implemented at Swinburne using what Slaughter (2002, p.232) calls the
pragmatic approach to foresight—addressing the strategic question of how to survive in an
increasingly competitive (in this case, education) environment. While this implementation
of foresight processes is informed by the solid discipline and academic rigour of futures
studies, it must also operate within the confines of the strategic reality of Swinburne needing
to remain viable as an organisation. Maintaining this balance between rigorous intellectual
discipline and practical pragmatic utility is of prime importance in the sceptical and political
environment of the organisation.
While conventional strategic planning is well established in Australian universities, the
introduction of a 10–20-year foresight time horizon which explicitly forced a longer-term
perspective into the existing planning mind-set met, needless to say, with some problems.
There was disbelief, frustration, and even anger at being asked to think beyond the ‘more
realistic’ time frames of one-to-three years out to what were considered lunatic time frames.
Jokes about crystal balls and tea leaves were common, as were derisory remarks about the
usefulness of the activity—and the (mis)perceived cost of doing it. It was abundantly clear
that very few people had any real understanding of what foresight work is all about. It was
also very clear that a good deal of education needed to be done to de-mystify futures and
foresight work before any meaningful introduction of methodologies could be undertaken.
Therefore, the method of implementation was based on a two-phase staged approach—
education first, methodology second—with the following rationale. An initial education
phase ‘prepares the ground’; the second phase then establishes the context for foresight

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4. On foresight, strategy and planning 5

processes and methodology within the organisation in a way that can ‘take’, as it were.
These two phases are not separated in time and are best thought of as overlapping waves;
different parts of the organisation may be at different stages of the overall implementation
process. The introduction of foresight concepts and ideas through an education phase assists
the creation of a shared vocabulary for people to use in daily interactions. When this
effect is widespread and natural, a language for thinking and speaking about the future
is embedded. Only with this foundation in place can foresight processes be meaningfully
introduced into existing planning processes. These foresight processes are gradually adopted
until they too become embedded in the strategic processes of the organisation. When this
state is achieved, the organisation as a whole has a foresight capacity; through widespread
shared understandings, concepts, processes, and what van der Heijden (1996) calls ‘strategic
conversations’, rather than being localised within a few specific individuals—a situation
which is both strategically unsustainable and extremely unwise.
The key goal of the implementation of foresight at Swinburne is simply this: rather than
foresight being a separate, special and merely ‘episodic’ occurrence which shines forth briefly
and then vanishes without trace, the intention was to make it a permanent, continuous and
totally normal part of all planning at all levels of the organisation. One way of normalising
foresight was to get it in front of people at every opportunity. This we did via a variety of
means. In my role as a foresight analyst, I edited frequent email ‘foresight snippets’ as well
as an environmental scanning newsletter, prospect. They were designed to be ‘conversation
starters’ for the strategic conversations mentioned above. The Snippets focussed on the
broader social environment in which the organisation is embedded—items of interesting,
challenging and sometimes weird information which ‘may or may not’ have direct obvious
relevance to the organisation—while prospect provided more obviously ‘serious’ information
about specifically education-related developments which were also related to the five main
strategic ‘themes’ of the university. These publications had the dual role of both raising
awareness of futures-related issues in the organisation as well as becoming a medium for
disseminating strategic intelligence.
The initial wide-scale education phase is largely complete, now focussing on new staff.
The methodology phase has also been operative for some time, using scenario planning as
the first methodology because of its long pedigree and track record—something which was
important for the prevailing mind-set of this organisation—with other methodologies being
introduced as appropriate to particular projects. For example, FPR were commissioned to
run exploratory workshops for the early part of the Student Experience Project in 2002.
For these I chose to use causal layered analysis (Inayatullah 1998a) as the methodology.
The workshops were considered very successful because of the uncovering of ‘deeper’ layers
of understanding around the issue being explored, and because of the novel approaches
and proposed solutions which these understandings engendered. Half- and one-day scenario
workshops were run during 2001 in several administrative and academic units, preparing the
ground for the major Swinburne Scenarios Project undertaken in 2002. The full roll-out of
the Swinburne Scenarios continues in 2003 with the production of a workbook and workshop
designed for use at each level of the organisation: from the academic School or administrative
Unit level to the Division level, and so on up to the University level. Foresight is now well
on the way to becoming a mainstream activity in the organisation.

4 On foresight, strategy and planning

In our daily work in FPR, we often encountered confusion among staff about the relation
between strategic thinking, strategy development and strategic planning. The confusion
between these different activities lies essentially in the mistaken belief that they are all

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6 A generic foresight process framework

the same thing—which of course they are not. They are, in fact, three quite separate but
mutually inter-dependent activities which each have decidedly different foci of interest, and
which each require quite different styles of thinking for their proper execution. We found
ourselves having to explain these differences to people on so many occasions, public and
private, in workshops and in meetings, that we incorporated elements of the text below into
some of our presentation slides, in order to ‘short-circuit’ mistaken beliefs before they could
take hold in an audience beyond any hope of extirpation. Perhaps some of the text and
ideas below may also be useful to you.
Experts on strategic management, such as Mintzberg (1994), or Liedtka (1998), have
characterised the essential difference between strategic planning and strategic thinking. In
essence, says Mintzberg, strategic planning “has always been about analysis—breaking down
a goal or set of intentions into steps, formalising those steps so that they can be implemented
. . . , and articulating the anticipated consequences or results of each step” (Mintzberg 1994,
p.108). This is clearly an activity requiring thinking which is strongly analytical, logical,
deductive and pragmatic, in order to ensure that things stay ‘on track.’ “Strategic thinking,
in contrast,” he says, “is about synthesis. It involves intuition and creativity” (p.108) to
formulate an integrated perspective or vision of where an organisation should be heading. It
is generally intuitive, experimental and disruptive and attempts to go beyond what purely
logical thinking can inform. Because information about potential futures is always incom-
plete, the thinking required for success in this activity needs to be ‘synthetical’ (as it were)
and inductive, rather than analytical and deductive.
Foresight, then, in an organisational context, is an aspect of strategic thinking, which
latter is meant to open up an expanded range of perceptions of the strategic options available,
so that strategy-making is potentially wiser. Foresight (as strategic thinking) is concerned
with exploration (based on limited and patchy information) and options, not with the steps
needed for the implementation of actions, which is the realm of strategic planning. The
former is intuitive, disruptive and ‘what if?’ in nature; the latter is goal-oriented, pragmatic
and ‘make it happen/can do!’ in nature.
The junction between these two activities is the mysterious ‘black box’ of the strategy
development process or strategy-making itself, where a particular goal or objective is actually
set or a decision made. The focus here is on assessing options, examining choices, making
a decision, and/or setting a goal, objective or destination. Mintzberg and collaborators
(Mintzberg et al. 1998) discuss ten major ‘schools’ of strategy and highlight their different
assumptions, approaches and foci. The ‘cognitive’ school is concerned with the ‘mysterious
process’ of the actual creation of strategy.
Thus, in brief; strategic thinking is about exploring options; strategy development is
about making decisions and setting directions, and strategic planning is about implementing
actions. Problems arise when one of these activities is elevated to pre-eminence, rather than
seen as simply a part of a necessary, and much wider, process—all three are needed and
vitally necessary for successfully confronting the strategic environment.
We positioned foresight, therefore, as an element of strategic thinking, which is an input
into strategy-making, which then directs strategic planning and action. We were always
careful to stress that it does not replace strategic planning. Rather, we suggested that fore-
sight work ‘enriches and enhances’ the context within which strategy is developed, planned
and executed. In colloquial terms, foresight and strategic thinking tend to resonate with the
question: ‘what might we need to do?’ In contrast, strategy development asks the question
‘what will we do?’, and strategic planning the question ‘how will we do it?’
Hayward (2004) has used Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) as a basis for
understanding foresight in organisations. The most accessible of Beer’s own writings on the
VSM are found in a companion volume (Beer 1984) to two earlier and much more demanding
volumes. Hayward’s (2004) paper shows where foresight is properly placed in the overall

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5. Origins of the foresight framework 7

complex system which is an organisation, how it may be facilitated, what roles it can and
should take and, most importantly, explains why foresight practitioners and management
are so often in conflict over priorities and concerns.

5 Origins of the foresight framework

The framework emerges from a combination and reworking of ideas found in three main
sources. I will not dwell on the details of these sources, preferring to simply note key
aspects and leave it to readers to follow up as their own interests dictate. Some of this work
was reported in an abridged form in a conference paper at the Foresight conference held
at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland on July 11–13, 2002 (Conway & Voros
2002).
As discussed above, Mintzberg (1994) makes a clear distinction between strategic plan-
ning and strategic thinking. Horton (1999) has laid out a broad, three-phase process for
doing foresight work. Phase One consists of gathering Inputs; Phase Two of Foresight
work itself, and Phase Three of Outputs and Actions. Phases One and Three are relatively
self-explanatory. Phase Two of her process consists of two steps: a Translation step—to
translate the information gathered in Phase One into a form which the organisation can
understand—and an Interpretation step, where the translated knowledge needs to be con-
verted into understanding.
I took the broad structure of Horton’s framework and, using Mintzberg’s notion of the
separation of strategic thinking from strategy-development and strategic planning, separated
Horton’s Phase Three into two distinct elements: the Outputs of the foresight process, and
the Actions taken as a result of it. As I see it, the Actions step is really just the more
usual organisational processes of Strategy Development and Strategic Planning (which will
be called simply ‘Strategy’ below), the concepts of which are already familiar to most people
in organisations.
I also explicitly separated the outputs of Foresight work from Strategy because of the
very real possibility of Foresight becoming a convenient scapegoat for ineffectual action. In
other words, one must be clear that the Foresight process simply provides input into the
consideration of decisions and the implementation of actions, which is the role of traditional
strategy work. If this strategy work is not done, or done badly, it must be clear that
it is a separate activity from the foresight work which preceded it. Because ‘foresight’ is
usually new and unfamiliar (and may have opponents within the organisation who perhaps
see it as a threat to their power base, or simply just don’t ‘get’ it), in real-world political
environments such as organisations, this clarity of the separation of roles and responsibilities
is very important.
Thus, in broad outline, the framework has a four-phase structure: Inputs; Foresight;
Outputs; and Strategy, modelled on Horton’s, but which differs significantly in the details
of the phases, especially the Foresight phase. This broad outline is shown in Figure 1. The
comments on the right hand side of Figure 1 indicate either the type of activity involved, or
the main focus/output of the phase.
The Strategy ‘phase’ as portrayed in a single box is really just an attempt to denote
on a simple diagram the many highly complex and continuing strategic processes which go
on in an organisation, in order to visually suggest that Foresight is an input into Strat-
egy processes. These latter obviously extend their influence beyond the simple box form
portrayed in the diagram and inform several layers of organisational activity below, such
as managerial/allocative and tactical processes, which in turn inform operational processes.
My interest in this paper, however, is merely to show how Foresight interacts with and ‘feeds
into’ Strategy, which latter is well understood and has a huge literature concerning it. For

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
8 A generic foresight process framework

Inputs Strategic Intelligence

Foresight
“Foresight Work”

Expanded Perceptions
Outputs of Strategic Options
Copyright © 2000 Joseph Voros

Strategy Development
Strategy Strategic Planning

Figure 1: The generic foresight process framework, in broad outline form

that reason, ‘Strategy’ is considered a ‘given’ here. One should remain mindful of these
considerations in what follows.
Slaughter (1999, p.287) has discussed the development and application of ‘strategic fore-
sight’ and suggested several methodologies which could be employed. He gives four main
types:
• Input methods;

• Analytic methods;
• Paradigmatic methods; and

• Iterative and Exploratory methods.

In brief, Input methods are used to gather intelligence from a variety of sources. This type
of method maps closely with Horton’s Inputs phase, and with the Inputs step in Figure 1.
Analytic methods are used to analyse and assess factors and their interrelationships, usually
as a first step towards deeper and more detailed work. This is similar to, but not the same
as, Horton’s sub-step of Translation. Paradigmatic methods seek to deepen understanding,
and thus have a similar goal to Horton’s Interpretation sub-step, but again differ somewhat.
Iterative and Exploratory methods are used to explore future states to create the ‘forward
views’, so they are ‘prospective’ in nature.
Combining, in this way, the essential ideas of Mintzberg’s separation of roles and respon-
sibilities of strategic thinking, strategy development and strategic planning; the broad phase
approach of Horton; and the specific methodological suggestions of Slaughter, we arrive at
a generic process framework for foresight work. This framework is designed to be scalable
from individual to workgroup to organisation to higher degrees of human interaction, and
is detailed in the next section.

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6. The foresight framework in detail 9

Inputs look and see what’s happening

Analysis “what seems to be happening?”

Foresight
Interpretation “what’s really happening?”

Prospection “what might happen?”

Outputs “what might we need to do?”

Copyright © 2000 Joseph Voros

“what will we do?”

Strategy “how will we do it?”

Figure 2: The foresight framework, in ‘question’ form

6 The foresight framework in detail

Here the four key elements of the process are described in more detail: Inputs; ‘Foresight’
work; Outputs; and Strategy (i.e. continuing strategic processes). A more detailed diagram
of the generic foresight process is shown in Figure 2. While some terms are used which are
similar to those of Slaughter and Horton, the terms used here have a different meaning here
than those implied in their work. In Figure 2, the comments on the right hand side are
some typical questions which were used in presentations to illustrate the type of activity or
thinking which is undertaken at each step. They are not definitive, but rather attempt to
show the ‘flavour’ of the activity in that step. Feedback from participants suggested that
these were very helpful in understanding the distinct contributions from each step in the
overall process.
Note that while the diagram appears to portray this process as a simple linear one,
conceptually there are very many feedback loops from the later phases to all of the earlier
ones—and therefore also many feed-forward effects as the loop pathways are traversed again,
perhaps more than once. These are omitted for the sake of simplicity to show only the ‘broad
flow’ of the overall process, absent all of the finer details of recursion loops.

• Inputs. This is the gathering of information and scanning for strategic intelligence.
Many methods, techniques and frameworks exist, of which the ‘Delphi’ technique and
‘environmental scanning’ (Choo 1998) are perhaps the best known. The tools and
techniques of ‘competitive intelligence’ are relevant here. It is also where, in workshop
formats, the group are asked for their ideas and insights, such as through brainstorm-
ing ideas or through what Slaughter (1999, p.292) calls ‘constructing the near-future
context’—asking a set of key questions, designed to open out the thinking about the
near future (Slaughter 1996), which have proven very useful in workshop settings.
When the activity of gathering inputs is undertaken at the organisational level (as
opposed to workshop formats), we chose the term ‘strategic intelligence scanning’ (as
shown in Figure 3), or sometimes simply ‘strategic scanning’ (Brown 1999, p.9) in
preference to the somewhat passive term ‘environmental scanning’ or the somewhat

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10 A generic foresight process framework

negative term ‘early warning system’. Most strategic planning involves something
called ‘environmental scanning’ which ‘everyone knows’ how to do. I wanted to dis-
tance our approach to strategic scanning (Voros 2001, 2003) from existing ‘well known’
methods of environmental scanning, so the name chosen was something deliberately
different.
• ‘Foresight Work’. This can be conceived as comprising three broad steps which
follow a logical sequence. The first step is

– Analysis, which is best considered as a preliminary stage to more in-depth work,

rather than as a stand-alone technique itself. The sort of question asked here
is ‘what seems to be happening?’ The goal is to seek a ‘first cut’ at creating
some order out of the bewildering variety of data which the Inputs step usually
generates, so it is similar to Horton’s Translation sub-step. Common tools here
are trend analysis, cross-impact matrices and other such analytical techniques.
The results of the analysis are then fed into a second step,
– Interpretation, which asks the question ‘what’s really happening?’ and seeks
to ‘probe beneath the surface’ (Slaughter 1989) of the analysis to look for deeper
structure and insights. This is the realm of critical futures studies (Slaughter
1999, p.203), causal layered analysis (Inayatullah 1998a), systems thinking, and
other ‘depth’ approaches to futures thinking. I also developed a generalised ap-
proach to layered analysis, based in part on these approaches, which will form
the substance of another article. (Suffice it to say here that it extends from
the well-known ‘systems iceberg’ metaphor—events, patterns and trends, sys-
tem structure—through to the levels of worldviews and myths as found in causal
layered analysis, to the deeper structures of consciousness itself and how these
are influenced by macrohistorical forces.) In practice, most of our work in FPR
extended down to merely the level of system dynamics and drivers, although oc-
casionally it extended to deeper levels in, for example, our work on the Swinburne
Scenarios.
The third sub-step is the actual creation of forward views,
– Prospection. I had to invent the word Prospection to denote, in a form which
could be displayed in a small box on a PowerPoint slide, ‘the activity of pur-
posefully looking forward to create forward views’.1 This step is where various
views of alternative futures are explicitly examined or created. It is where sce-
narios, ‘visioning’ and ‘normative’ methods are located in the broader foresight
process. I tend to locate ‘backcasting’ methods here as well, even though they
tend to be analytical by nature, because they presume the existence of a forward
view. One need not necessarily be bound to use explicitly ‘futures’-type meth-
ods at this step, either. For example, simply evolving a systems map or causal
loop diagram forward in time with different assumptions is also a perfectly valid
prospective technique to examine how different futures may unfold. The ques-
tion asked at this stage depends upon which type of potential futures are under
consideration—possible, plausible, probable or preferable. The one shown in Fig-
ure 2—‘what might happen?’—is for the broadest class of imaginable futures: the
‘possible’. See Section 7 for a more detailed discussion of a taxonomy for types
of futures.

• Outputs. The outputs of foresight work are two-fold: tangible and intangible. Some
tangible outputs would include the actual range of options generated by the work.
Intangible outputs would include the changes in thinking engendered by the whole

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
6. The foresight framework in detail 11

Strategic Intelligence Scanning

Inputs Delphi, Near-Future Context

Emerging Issues, Trends

Analysis

Foresight
Cross-impact Analysis
Systems Thinking
Interpretation Causal Layered Analysis

Prospection Scenarios, Visioning

Normative methods, Backcasts

Reports, Presentations
Outputs
Workshops, Multimedia
Copyright © 2000 Joseph Voros

Strategy Development &

Strategic Planning:
Strategy individual, workgroup,
organisation, society, etc

Figure 3: The foresight framework, with some representative methodologies indicated

process, especially the insights generated in the Interpretation step and by the creation
of forward views in the Prospection step. The intangible output might be somewhat
difficult for some hard-headed, ‘objective’ people to appreciate, or even recognise. But
it is undoubtedly the more important form of output because of the way it alters the
very mechanism of strategy development itself, namely the perceptions of the mind(s)
involved in strategising. The methodologies employed in the Outputs step need not
be specifically futures-related, because the focus of this step is the ‘getting across’ of
insights, and/or the stimulation of thinking about options, prior to and as inputs into
more formalised strategy work. A variety of methodologies could be employed here to
present the Outputs of the foresight work, such as workshops, reports, role-play, film,
multimedia, full-immersion experiential events, etc. Thus, this is a general step which
could use any number of appropriate tools for its execution, from a variety of contexts.
It is intended to generate an expansion of perceptions and perceived options. This
expansion could be attempted directly through overt questioning or similar means, or
indirectly by engineering an experience which provokes such questioning or expansion.
One question which captures some of the essence of this step is ‘what might we need
to do?’
At this point, foresight has done its real job—the generation of (hopefully) an expanded
perception of strategic options available. This output now feeds into
• Strategy. The final part in this framework is that of Strategy, about which very
little will be said here, given the earlier discussion in Section 4 about the relationship
between foresight, strategy processes and planning. Suffice it to say that since foresight
has done its job, it now hands over the output for consideration by decision-makers
in making decisions and directing strategic actions for implementation (i.e. the more
familiar activities and processes of strategy development and strategic planning). The
results of Strategy processes need, of course, to be constantly fed back into the Inputs
of the overall foresight framework, ‘closing the loop’, so that continuous re-assessments
and ‘course corrections’ are possible along the ‘strategic journey’. (Of course, there

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12 A generic foresight process framework

are in reality feedback loops from each step to all those which are prior. These loops
are not shown in the diagrams for reasons of diagrammatic simplicity, rather than
through conceptual omission, and this point should be borne in mind whenever the
framework is being used.) We have made use, in our foresight workshops and seminars,
of Hardin Tibbs’ (2000) metaphor of the ‘strategic landscape’ to encapsulate this notion
of a strategic actor undertaking a strategic journey into the future. When we have
extended that metaphor explicitly with ‘foresight’ as a means of viewing the strategic
landscape, the already-powerful image/metaphor has been strengthened all the more.

A more detailed form of the foresight process can be seen in Figure 3 showing, in par-
ticular, some of the methodologies applicable at each step. The process is designed to be
as general as possible so that it can be applied on any scale, from the individual level to
workgroup to department to branch to organisation to society, etc.

7 Interlude: Types of futures and their utility

The futures literature abounds with mention of (usually) ‘possible, probable and preferable’
futures. I have found it useful to distinguish between five classes of alternative futures:
potential, possible, plausible, probable and preferable, in order to help students, and par-
ticipants of foresight workshops and processes, get clear about what sort of futures they
are thinking about. For example, the types of futures considered in our scenario planning
workshops were usually plausible futures, while in some ‘visioning’ workshops they were
most often preferable futures. The definitions I use for these classes of futures, adapted
from those of many, many others are given below. Elements of this taxonomy go back at
least to Henchey (1978), while of use also was the manner of characterisation of futures used
by Hancock and Bezold (1994), as was their metaphor of the ‘futures cone’, which was a
valuable aid in presentations. An adaptation and extension of this is shown in Figure 4.

Potential futures. When speaking about alternative futures in general without specify-
ing any of the other four classes below, I generally use the term potential futures. This class
contains all of the futures which lie ahead, including those which we cannot even begin to
imagine. This is by far the largest segment, of course, because of the impossibility of ‘discov-
ering’ future facts, and because of what Clarke (2000) has called ‘failures of imagination’.
In presentations, I take the second of Amara’s (1981) three foundational premises of the
futures field (i.e. ‘the future is not pre-determined’) as the primary foundational premise,
for it yields up the consequence of an infinite variety of potential alternative futures.
If we do not accept this premise then the entire futures cone ‘collapses’ into a single
future time-line, all potentialities disappear, and all our futures work becomes simply an
attempt to find more information about this pre-determined but unknown future. ‘The’
future (i.e. singular in this view) thereby becomes merely an information problem, rather
than being undetermined. It remains unpredictable, however, because of the lack of future
facts and/or the difficulty of finding or generating information of arbitrarily high accuracy.
In relativity physics, there is a region outside the so-called ‘light-cone’ which is unknow-
able except at some later time, owing to the finite speed of light. This is also a very useful
reminder and metaphor for our forward views; some futures are beyond—sometimes well
beyond—our power of imagination, and thus beyond the normal boundaries of the conven-
tional futures cone. In this metaphor, the realm of potential futures ahead is an unknown
dark area, while the futures cone is like a car headlight, illuminating the view ahead, as can
be seen in Figure 4. The futures cone is always smaller than the totality of potential futures
which lie ahead.

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
7. Interlude: Types of futures and their utility 13

Time
Now Possible

Potential Plausible

Business As Usual

Probable

Preferable
Potential

Figure 4: The ‘futures cone’. Adapted from Hancock and Bezold (1994).

Possible futures. This class of futures includes all the kinds of futures we can possibly
imagine—those which ‘might happen’—no matter how far-fetched, unlikely or ‘way out’.
They might, as a result, involve the use of knowledge which we do not yet possess (the
‘warp drive’ of Star Trek is a good example), or might even also involve transgressions of
currently-accepted physical laws or principles. I tend to characterise this class of futures
as being reliant on the existence of some future knowledge (i.e. knowledge we do not yet
possess) in order to come about. For instance, the development of a ‘warp drive’ is something
which, while not yet anywhere near becoming feasible, is nevertheless not necessarily ruled
out by our current understanding of physics. It is now the subject of research among some
mathematical physicists.2
In terms of the Prospection step, the question used to prompt for Possible futures is the
one shown in Figure 2: ‘what might happen?’ (i.e. usually based on new knowledge in the
future).

Plausible futures. This class encompasses those futures which ‘could happen’ (i.e. they
are not excluded) according to our current knowledge (as opposed to future knowledge) of
how things work. They stem from our current understanding of e.g. physical laws, processes,
causation, systems of human interaction, ways of knowing, etc., not necessarily from our
knowledge of actual specific facts, but rather from our more general knowledge of ‘how
things work’. In other words, they depend upon what is allowed or considered reasonable
by our current understanding of how the world operates. For example, consider the global
economic system. While many people might often think about replacing it with something
‘better’, to suggest that it be replaced by a new form of exchange based on ‘hugs and
kisses’—rather than the equivalents of ‘dollars and cents’—is to move outside the realm of
what many would consider ‘the way the world really works,’ and thus outside the realm of
what they would consider plausible. Such an economic system is possible (according to the
definition above), but not yet plausible. This class of futures is clearly a smaller subset of
futures than the possible.
In terms of the Prospection step in Figure 2, the prompting question for Plausible futures
is ‘what could happen?’ (i.e. given our current knowledge or understanding of how the world
works).

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14 A generic foresight process framework

Probable futures. This class of futures contains those which are considered ‘likely to
happen’, and stem, in part, from the continuance of current trends. Some probable futures
are considered more likely than others, and the one considered most likely—sometimes called
‘business-as-usual’—is a simple linear extension of the present from the past. However, as
we know, trends are not necessarily continuous over long periods of time, and discontinuities
in the trends may occur. Some trends may fade out suddenly, while new ones may emerge
unexpectedly. Some people think that studying or ‘reading’ trends is the whole game of
foresight or futures work. But it becomes very clear to workshop participants from this
description that merely reading trends gives rise to a much smaller class of futures than the
previous two, and therefore to a dangerously narrow range of forward views.
In terms of the Prospection step in Figure 2, the prompting question for Probable futures
is: ‘what is likely to happen?’ (i.e. based on, for example, current trends).

Preferable futures. The last three classes of futures described above are all largely con-
cerned with informational or cognitive knowledge. This class, Preferable futures, is, by
contrast, concerned with what we ‘want to’ happen; in other words, these futures are more
emotional than cognitive. They derive from value judgements, and are more overtly sub-
jective than the previous three classes. Because values differ so markedly between people,
this class of futures is quite varied. Of course, as anyone knows who has ever facilitated
a ‘visioning’ workshop where participants are constructing a view of their preferred future,
this is the most vexed class of futures. What is preferred depends a very great deal on who
is doing the preferring. Preferable (or preferred) futures can lie in any of the previous three
classes.
In terms of the Prospection step in Figure 2, the question to ask for Preferable futures
is: ‘what do we want to happen?’ (i.e. based on our values and ‘ideas of the good’).
Ogilvy (2002) suggests ‘what ought to happen?’ in his approach to normative scenarios. An
equivalent question might also be ‘what should happen?’

Another useful tool is the concept of

Wildcards. Wildcards are usually defined as low probability events (hence they are out-
side the Probable realm) or even ‘mini-scenarios’ which, if they occurred, would have very
high impact.3 Therefore, they can be Potential, Possible or Plausible, according to the above
definitions. Examples would include an asteroid or cometary impact with Earth (plausible),
or very-high-speed interstellar space travel (possible). Potential wildcards, by contrast, are
waiting for us in that realm (outside the imaginably possible) where our powers of imagi-
nation are presently useless. Wildcards are, in a sense, a boundary-spanning, -crossing or
-smashing tool; they are useful to break through ‘bounded’ thinking into new realms ‘out-
side’ the boundary. Since the creation of forward views depends so intimately upon the
consciousness creating them, and upon the boundaries considered relevant to the defining
of these forward views—not to mention the unconscious boundaries beyond which we do
not think—the use of wildcards to force an expansion of thinking into new territories of the
imagination can be extremely useful. For example, playing with the edge of what people
consider ‘impossible’ is a good way of nudging on the boundary of the possible.

We incorporated wildcards into some of our in-house unit-level scenario workshops. The
idea for this came from a web page by Mark Justman (2000), where he speculated on
how one might use wildcards with four generic types of scenario adapted from Jim Dator’s
four generic images of the future. As a basis for the wildcard deck we used the wildcards
listed in Petersen’s (1997) book, together with a number of others gathered from different
sources. The whole workshop group is divided into several smaller groups, each of which

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
8. The framework as a diagnostic tool 15

fleshes out a particular scenario based around agreed-upon drivers. The small groups each
create a ‘first cut’ scenario and examine some consequences for the focal issue. Then they
are required to draw a wildcard from the deck at random and examine how this wildcard
affects their scenario ‘world’, and their proposed strategy for operating in that world. The
presentation slides introducing wildcards are headed ‘Suddenly, the world changes. . . ’, and
the implications for scenario worlds are sometimes quite profound.
For example, in one such workshop, one of the scenario syndicates decided to move all
their information services off-shore to another continent where labour is cheaper, because
it made good financial sense to them in that scenario world, and to use the international
communications infrastructure to provide the services back to Australia. They then pulled
the wildcard ‘long-term global communication disruption’. The effect on their business
model due to this was devastating—they literally went out of business overnight! The
explicit use of a wildcard had highlighted a potential weakness in their strategy. Thus, they
were forced to consider ways of circumventing such an effect, which led to consideration of
a more diverse set of strategic options, and a subsequent strategy which was more robust
as a result. Another group, pulling a different wildcard, discovered a wonderful opportunity
in their case, while still another was not affected at all. The use of wildcards in scenario
workshops provides an interesting and often highly instructive input, causing the participants
to consider things they might not normally consider. Even the expectation that something
unexpected will occur alters the timbre of the strategising thereafter.
Finally, while on the subject of wildcards, an eerie and telling anecdote is called for.
The workshop mentioned above was held over two days; as it happens, on September 10
and 11, 2001. We had spent the first day (Monday the 10th) running the usual scenario
process, having each of the various small syndicate groups developing their particular sce-
nario world, fleshing it out, and developing a strategy appropriate for it. For the second
day (September 11th), we planned to run the wildcard process as described above. One of
the wildcards present in the original expanded deck was ‘terrorist attack on a major U.S.
city or cities’. When deciding which subset of wildcards to use for the workshop, we had
consciously removed it from the workshop deck, on the grounds of ‘improbability’ and ‘ir-
relevance’ to the focus of the scenarios. . . We have often since speculated on whether anyone
would have drawn that particular wildcard during that particular workshop on that partic-
ular day. Given the events which took place in the USA later that night (Melbourne time)
we learned our lesson: never remove any wildcard from the deck. . .

8 The framework as a diagnostic tool

The process as described and shown in the diagrams is also useful for diagnosing how an
organisation responds to the strategic environment, as well as showing graphically why using
a foresight process is preferable to not.
For example, if, in the full foresight process shown in Figure 3, we remove all the steps
between Inputs and Strategy, so that there is nothing modifying the direct Inputs, no Fore-
sight work and no distinct Outputs from such a foresight capacity, we can characterise the
so-called ‘responsive’ strategy so beloved of some (pre dot-com-bustion) Silicon Valley com-
panies. This reduced process is shown in Figure 5. Something occurring in the environment
is discerned by the scanning system and the organisation reacts to it directly, without any
analysis, interpretation, prospection, or even stopping to consider what options such activi-
ties might uncover (‘no time for such luxuries, we need to be responsive’). This is equivalent
to the ‘instinctive/reactive’ survival ‘strategy’ of animals. Introduced after a complete dis-
cussion of the full foresight framework, this form of diagram unambiguously and un-subtly
illustrates the point that explicit foresight work is needed to inform strategy work, lest we

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
16 A generic foresight process framework

Inputs Events

Copyright © 2000 Joseph Voros

“Strategy” “Strategic” Processes

Figure 5: A purely reactive approach to strategy

simply react to everything going on in the environment and pretend to ourselves that we
are really being ‘highly responsive’.
If we remove only the Interpretation and Prospection steps from Figure 3, we can charac-
terise what we might call a ‘shallow’ foresight process. In this process, there is some analysis
of strategic intelligence which might reveal certain trends, but this produces a fairly thin set
of Outputs based upon the clear and obvious present. We can see this process diagrammed
in Figure 6. Of course, this is how many organisations actually operate—they believe that
understanding ‘the’ future is simply about ‘reading’ the trends. By looking at the char-
acterisations in Figure 2 we can see that this is an approach which undertakes strategic
processes based merely on what seems to be happening in the strategic environment, absent
any attempt to look deeper, or to explicitly examine forward views. The strategic options
so produced are therefore rather suspect.
If we then add the Prospection step (but continue to leave out Interpretation) we never-
theless still have, despite the explicit use of Prospection, another example of the production
of suspect strategic options, albeit via a more sophisticated process of mystification. This
is shown in Figure 7. Some organisations attempt, for example, forecasting based on trend
analysis, extrapolation of the present, ‘visioning’ exercises, or scenario planning using this
form of process—the forward views stem from simple analysis alone, and no attempt is made
to address the question of what is really happening, either inside the organisation or outside
it. In some ways this is an even more risky approach because now there exists the illusion
that the strategic options generated are somehow ‘better’ because of the explicit Prospection
step undertaken. However, there is essentially no difference in the quality of the strategic
options generated by this modification—they are still rather suspect, based as they are on
a narrow set of forward views flowing from a shallow and incomplete foresight process.
With the addition of the Interpretation step there at least exists the possibility of pro-
ducing some more in-depth understanding as an input into the Prospection step. The level of
‘depth’ to which the Interpretation step is taken is also variable. Obviously I am suggesting
that the deeper this interpretation goes, the more profound the insights are likely to be and
thus the more potentially wise the subsequent perceptions of strategic options generated as

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
9. The framework as a design tool 17

Inputs Events

Analysis Trends

Foresight
Suspect Perceptions
Outputs of Strategic Options
Copyright © 2000 Joseph Voros

Strategy Development
Strategy Strategic Planning

Figure 6: A ‘shallow’ foresight process

input into Strategy.

9 The framework as a design tool

Another use for the generic framework described in this paper is in the design of specific
foresight processes, interventions or projects.
In a recent class for second-year post-graduate students at the AFI, I used the generic
framework to analyse some twenty-five or so different methodologies, ranging from com-
petitive intelligence to trend analysis to systems approaches to causal layered analysis to
scenarios to ‘macrohistory’ (Inayatullah 1998b). Some of these are relevant to a single step
in the generic process, while others touch upon more than one. Some methodologies are pro-
cesses in themselves, and are therefore complementary to the one described here. Further,
some techniques and methodologies which are not necessarily futures-related or considered
to be futures techniques per se, could be used within such a broader process depending
on which step is being designed. For example, the Outputs step could make use of any
number of non-futures-related methodologies to ‘get the message across’. I recall hearing
of an instance where practitioners had started to present the outputs of a foresight exercise
to executives in a conventional slide-show form when the venue was ‘invaded’ by dozens of
children who ‘kidnapped’ the executives, bundled them blind-folded into waiting vehicles
and ‘took them to “the future” ’ in a nearby warehouse. Once there, the decision-makers
were then presented with what the practitioners had really wanted them to see and hear
about (set up ahead of time), in a full-immersion experience guided by the youngsters, all
perfectly stage-managed by the practitioners. While a bit extreme, this example neverthe-
less illustrates that there are many more alternatives available to foresight practitioners for
getting their message across than are considered customary.
In this way, it is possible to assess which methodologies (or types of methodology) fit
coherently and synergistically into a generic foresight process, in order to evaluate their
relative contribution to an overall process, and therefore to make decisions about which
methodologies to use in combination in the design of such a process. By a judicious use

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
18 A generic foresight process framework

Inputs Events

Analysis Trends

Foresight
Prospection “Narrow” forward views

Suspect Perceptions
Outputs of Strategic Options
Copyright © 2000 Joseph Voros

Strategy Development
Strategy Strategic Planning

Figure 7: A ‘shallow/narrow’ foresight process

of complementary methodologies, any weaknesses in one may be partially mitigated by the

presence of another, and the overall process so designed is hopefully the better for it. This
approach to design requires that we become familiar with a wide variety of methodologies,
but any specific process should only use a small number of these. As is often said, ‘less is
more’.
In FPR we designed half-, one- and two-day unit-level processes using a workshop for-
mat, with inputs from the group via brainstorming and consideration of the ‘near-future
context’, analysis of trends, then interpretation down to the level of ‘deep system drivers’,
finished off with the simple two-by-two form of scenario matrix for the prospection step.
Further consideration of options leading to strategy development is undertaken in a sepa-
rate strategic implications workshop. For the major Swinburne Scenarios Project, the main
form of Output is a workshop with workbook designed to take people through the think-
ing which informed the creation of the (‘plausible’) scenarios, and to use these scenarios as
starting points for thinking about and designing a ‘preferable’ future for their organisational
unit. The depth of interpretation in that project went well beneath the more usual ‘system
drivers’ to the deeper levels of worldviews, human value systems and to how these are be-
ing shaped by macrohistorical forces. For the Student Experience Project (commissioned
ostensibly as a ‘visioning’ process), the main format was, again, workshop-based, for this
is an important part of the culture here. Using causal layered analysis to take participants
from the superficial level of events, through analysis to deep interpretation at the worldview
and metaphor levels, the purpose was to generate a basis for considering what sort of things
might be present in a class of preferred futures they might wish to begin constructing. The
prospection step was implicit rather than explicit, because we did not seek to create pre-
ferred futures; rather, we sought to elucidate key aspects of what preferable futures would
contain. These distilled aspects (i.e. the Outputs) were then taken up by several teams on
the project and carried forward into a more detailed design phase.
These examples all illustrate the key point: with an overall generic foresight framework,
one may use the concept of ‘flow’ through the general process to design and create specific
instances of the process using methodologies and tools appropriate to the context in which

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.
10. Concluding remarks 19

it will be employed. This is a considerably more flexible approach to foresight praxis than to
simply arrive with a single methodology in hand and be bound to use it (as some consultants
have been known to do). As the old saying goes ‘if you’ve only got a hammer, then everything
looks like a nail’. The generic process framework is designed so as to allow easy customisation
to suit the specific needs of the particular project or foresight commission; it is a template
from which to forge a new tool appropriate to the particular circumstances in which the tool
is to be used.

10 Concluding remarks
This paper has described a generic framework for foresight, designed in such a way that it can
be used for: understanding some of the key steps involved in foresight work; the diagnosis of
existing processes; and the design of new processes. It stems from on-the-ground experience
of implementing foresight in a sceptical and conservative organisation. Key learnings during
our attempts at implementation have been interspersed throughout in order to ground the
theoretical discussion in real-world practical experience.
This has been one example of foresight praxis—many more are needed to grow the
knowledge base of practical know-how in facilitating foresight in organisations. For it is
only in this way that attempts to develop new theories and models of foresight and futures
work can be infused with the fresh insights and deep understandings needed to ensure that
the knowledge discipline of futures/foresight remains relevant. Without a continuous renewal
of theory, methodology and praxis, the knowledge creation required to build the discipline
of futures and foresight will slow, stop and stagnate. If we as futurists are to also remain
relevant—whether as academics, consultants, or those working in organisations—then we
must each be open to the work being done by the others, even if it is outside the perceived
boundaries of what we do. We must all partake in the ‘ecological flow’ of knowledge and
knowledge-creation. It is my hope that this paper will help to ease this flow along.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Peter Hayward, Richard Slaughter and Maree Conway for
comments, feedback and helpful suggestions.

Notes
1. From ‘pro’ = ‘forward’, ‘spect’ = ‘look’, and ‘-tion’ = the noun form of the action; thus, ‘prospection’
(the stress falls on the second syllable). This word also acknowledges the French school of futures work and
their term la prospective, as well as the wider use of the term ‘prospective thinking’.
2. The paper by Miguel Alcubierre (1994) on the subject of ‘warp drive’ first showed the existence of a
solution to the field equations of General Relativity having aspects of this characteristic structure. See the
‘gr-qc’ physics preprint archive located at <xxx.lanl.gov> and do a search on the keywords ‘warp drive’ to
get some idea of the current state of research.
3. There is a discussion of Wildcards at the web site of The Arlington Institute. See <www.arlingtoninstitute.
org/focus_topics/wild_cards.html>

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c 2000–2005 Joseph Voros.