RFK Lawsuit Against Biden Regime

Case 3:23-cv-00381-TAD-KDM Document 1 Filed 03/24/23 Page 1 of 120 PageID #: 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR.,

CHILDREN’S HEALTH DEFENSE,
& CONNIE SAMPOGNARO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, No. ________________
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

capacity as President of the United States;
KARINE JEAN-PIERRE, in her official

capacity as White House Press Secretary;
CLASS ACTION
VIVEK H. MURTHY, in his official
Capacity as Surgeon General of the
United States;
XAVIER BECERRA, in his official

capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services;
DR. ANTHONY FAUCI, in his official

capacity as Director of the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and as
Chief Medical Advisor to the President;
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY

AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES;
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

AND PREVENTION;
CAROL Y. CRAWFORD, in her official

capacity as Chief of the Digital Media
Branch of the Division of Public Affairs

within the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention;
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,

a.k.a. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS;
JENNIFER SHOPKORN, in her official

capacity as Senior Advisor for
Communications in the U.S. Census Bureau;
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE;
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his official

capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security;
ROBERT SILVERS, in his official capacity

as Under Secretary of the Office of Strategy,
Policy, and Plans within DHS
SAMANTHA VINOGRAD, in her official

capacity as Senior Counselor for National
Security in the Office of the Secretary
for DHS;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY;
JEN EASTERLY, in her official capacity

as Director of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency;
CYBERSECURITY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY;
GINA McCARTHY, in her official capacity

as White House National Climate Advisor;
NINA JANKOWICZ, in her official capacity

as director of the so-called “Disinformation
Governance Board” within DHS;
ANDREW SLAVITT, in his official capacity

as White House Senior COVID-10 Advisor;
ROB FLAHERTY, in his official capacity as

Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Digital Strategy at the White
House;
COURTNEY ROWE, in her official capacity

as White House Covid-19 Director of
Strategic Communications and Engagement;
CLARKE HUMPHREY, in her official

capacity as White House Digital Director for
the Covid-19 Response Team;
BENJAMIN WAKANA, in his official

capacity as the Deputy Director of Strategic
Communications and Engagement at the
White House COVID-19 Response Team;
DANA REMUS, in her official capacity as

Counsel to the President;
AISHA SHAH, in her official capacity as

White House Partnerships Manager,
LAURA ROSENBERGER, in her official

capacity as Special Assistant to the President,
MINA HSIANG, in her official capacity as

Administrator of the U.S. Digital Service
within the Office of Management and Budget
in the Executive Office of the President,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
LAURA DEHMLOW, in her official capacity

as Section Chief for the FBI’s Foreign
Influence Task Force,
ELVIS M. CHAN, in his official capacity as

Supervisory Special Agent of Squad CY- 1 in
the San Francisco Division of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation,
JAY DEMPSEY, in his official capacity as

Social Media Team Lead, Digital Media
Branch, Division of Public Affairs at the
CDC,
ERIC WALDO, in his official capacity as

Chief Engagement Officer for the Surgeon
General,
YOLANDA BYRD, in her official capacity as

a member of the Digital Engagement Team at
HHS,
CHRISTY CHOI, in her official capacity as

Deputy Director, Office of Communications,
HRSA within HHS;
TERICKA LAMBERT, in her official

capacity as Director of Digital Engagement at
HHS and Deputy Director of the Office of
Digital Strategy at the White House,
JOSHUA PECK, in his official capacity as

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public
Engagement at HHS,
JANELL MUHAMMED, in her official

capacity as Deputy Digital Director at HHS,
MATTHEW MASTERSON, in his official

capacity as Senior Cybersecurity Advisory
within CISA in the Department of Homeland
Security,
LAUREN PROTENTIS, in her official

capacity as an official of CISA,
GEOFFREY HALE, in his official capacity

as an official of CISA,
ALLISON SNELL, in her official capacity as

an official of CISA,
BRIAN SCULLY, in his official capacity as

an official of DHS and CISA,
ZACHARY HENRY SCHWARTZ, in his

official capacity as Division Chief for the
Communications Directorate at the U.S.
Census Bureau,
LORENA MOLINA-IRIZARRY, in her

official capacity as an official of the Census
Bureau,
KRISTIN GALEMORE, in her official

capacity as Deputy Director of the Office of
Faith Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
at the Census Bureau,
ERICA JEFFERSON, in her official capacity

as Associate Commissioner for External
Affairs within the Office of the Commissioner
at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
MICHAEL MURRAY, in his official

capacity as Acquisition Strategy Program
Manager for the Office of Health
Communications and Education at the FDA,
BRAD KIMBERLY, in his official capacity

as Director of Social Media at the FDA,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
SAMARUDDIN K. STEWART, in his

official capacity as Senior Technical Advisor
and/or Senior Advisor for the Global
Engagement Center of the State Department,
DANIEL KIMMAGE, in his official capacity

as Acting Coordinator for the Global
Engagement Center at the State Department,
ALEXIS FRISBIE, in her official capacity as

a member of the Technology Engagement
Team at the Global Engagement Center at the
State Department,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE

COMMISSION,
MARK A. ROBBINS, in his official capacity

as Interim Executive Director of the EAC,
and
KRISTEN MUTHIG, in her official capacity

as Director of Communications for the EAC,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
By and for their complaint herein, on personal knowledge with respect to themselves and
on information and belief with respect to all other allegations, Plaintiffs allege as follows.
INTRODUCTION
1. A half century ago, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed what the Justices called an “axiomatic” principle of constitutional law.
2. The Court set forth this principle categorically, without qualification or dissent.
3. The principle was this: government “may not induce, encourage, or promote private
persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Id. (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
4. The Norwood principle is “axiomatic” because, without it, government actors could
evade nearly every prohibition in the Bill of Rights through the simple expedient of inducing
private parties to do what the Constitution bars the government from doing directly.
“Constitutional limitations on governmental action would be severely undercut if the government
were allowed to actively encourage conduct by ‘private’ persons or entities that is prohibited to
the government itself.” United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973) (federal
government may not constitutionally seek to induce private airlines to conduct searches that would
violate the Fourth Amendment if engaged in by state actors).
5. The Norwood principle fully applies to the First Amendment. As Justice Thomas
recently put it, the government acts unconstitutionally if it “induces [a private entity] to take action
the government itself would not be permitted to do, such as censor expression of a lawful
viewpoint.” Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1226
(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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6. Today, fifty years after Norwood, the federal government has apparently forgotten this
axiomatic principle—or else has decided it isn’t bound by a clear holding of the United States
Supreme Court.
7. Beginning in early 2020 and continuing to the present day, the federal government has
waged a systematic, concerted campaign, astonishing in its breadth and effectiveness, to “induce,
encourage, [and] promote” the nation’s three largest social-media platforms “to accomplish what
[the government] is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish”—namely, the censorship of
constitutionally protected speech.
8. Those three social-media companies—Facebook, 1 Google, 2 and Twitter 3—wield a
power over the content of American public discourse far greater than any entity, private or public,
has ever wielded before. See Knight First Amendment Institute, 141 S. Ct. at 1221 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically unprecedented amounts of
speech. . . Also unprecedented, however, is the concentrated control of so much speech in the
hands of a few private parties.”).
9. Since 2020, an ever-growing army of federal officers, at every level of the government—
from the White House itself to the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, the CDC,
the Office of the Surgeon General, and numerous less-well-known federal entities—has been
engaged in the effort to induce those companies to censor constitutionally protected speech.
10. Through this censorship campaign, federal agents and agencies have encouraged,
promoted, and induced those companies to stifle viewpoints that the government disfavors, to
1
“Facebook” is used throughout this Complaint to refer to the company now calling itself “Meta” that (among other
things) owns a variety of social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram.
2
“Google” refers to Google LLC, which owns (among other things) the Google search engine and the video-based
social-media platform YouTube.
3
“Twitter” refers to Twitter, Inc., which owns and operates the microblogging social-media platform Twitter.
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suppress facts that the government does not want the public to hear, and to silence specific
speakers—in every case critics of federal policy—whom the government has targeted by name.
11. Because of the historically unprecedented power wielded by a handful of behemoth
social-media companies over the content of American public discourse, the federal government’s
systematic campaign to induce these companies to censor speech is among the gravest threats to
free speech this country has ever faced.
12. With virtually every passing week come fresh disclosures of secret communications
between federal officials and social-media platforms working together to suppress constitutionally
protected speech—in the words of one eminent constitutional scholar, “the most massive system
of censorship in the nation’s history.” Phillip Hamburger, Is Social-Media Censorship a Crime?,
Wall St. J. (Dec. 14, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-social-media-censorship-a-crime-
section-241-us-code-government-private-conspiracy-civil-rights-speech-11670934266.
13. This censorship campaign has involved repeated threats made by powerful members of
the federal government, including the President himself, to visit catastrophic consequences on
social-media companies (for example, breaking them up under the antitrust laws) if they fail to
censor more aggressively speech that federal actors disfavor.
14. In addition, federal agents and agencies have repeatedly entered into collusive
partnerships with social-media companies, working closely and jointly with those companies to
decide what speech and what speakers to censor.
15. It is well established that the government violates the Constitution if it uses coercive
threats to induce private parties to censor protected speech or if it engages in collusive joint action
with private parties to violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58 (1963) (threats); Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn., 531
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U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (joint activity).
16. Moreover, the government’s censorship campaign has been relentlessly content-based
and viewpoint-discriminatory.
17. It is “a core postulate of free speech law” that “government may not discriminate against
speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299
(2019). See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (citation omitted) (“the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”).
18. Yet the federal government’s censorship campaign has repeatedly, systematically, and
very successfully targeted constitutionally protected speech on the basis of its content and
viewpoint.
19. To give just three out of countless examples, this censorship campaign:
A. was responsible, just before the presidential election of 2020, for the online
suppression of reporting about a laptop owned by President Biden’s son Hunter
Biden—reporting now known to be accurate—an act of censorship that deprived
Americans of information of the highest public interest and may even have swung
the outcome of that election;
B. was responsible throughout much of 2020 and 2021 for the online suppression of
any reporting, any information, or any expressions of opinion suggesting that
COVID-19 may have originated in a Chinese government laboratory in Wuhan,
again depriving Americans of information and legitimate opinion of the highest
public importance at a critical period of time; and
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C. is responsible even now for the online suppression of facts and opinions about the
COVID vaccines that might lead people to become “hesitant” about COVID
vaccine mandates, again depriving Americans of information and opinion on
matters of the highest public importance.
20. This is a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief (no damages are sought)
brought on behalf of consumers of news on social-media platforms against the federal agencies
and officers participating in this censorship campaign.
21. Over 80% of Americans now access the news from digital devices, and some 80% of
online news traffic is accessed through news aggregators and social-media companies, principally
Facebook, Google (which owns YouTube), and Twitter. As the Supreme Court has put it, social-
media platforms are “the modern public square,” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730,
1737 (2017), and every American who consumes news online has a First Amendment right against
government censorship of protected speech in that public square.
22. Consumers of online news have standing to bring this suit for the same reason
consumers of prescription medicines had standing in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy: because
the First Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but also the “right to ‘receive
information and ideas.’” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976) (citation omitted) (striking down ban on advertising drug prices). See also, e.g.,
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 926 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he First
Amendment protects the . . . right to receive protected speech.”); Kass v. City of New York, 864
F.3d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 2017) (First Amendment “extends not only to the right to speak, but also
to the right to listen and receive information”).
23. Moreover, consumers of online news are the most appropriate parties to challenge the
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federal government’s online censorship campaign. For in a case like this, “it is the right of the
viewers and listeners . . . which is paramount,” since it “is the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” CBS v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
24. Indeed, a nationwide class of online news consumers is the only fully appropriate party
to seek the remedy necessary and warranted here—i.e., a nationwide injunction.
25. Only a nationwide injunction can effectively redress the federal government’s
nationwide effort to censor constitutionally protected online speech, and the most appropriate
party to seek that remedy is not an individual who has been censored, nor even a state Attorney
General, but rather a nationwide class of online news consumers.
26. Apart from the Judiciary, no branch of our Government, and no other institution, can
stop the current Administration’s systematic efforts to suppress speech through the conduit of
social-media companies. Congress can’t, the Executive won’t, and States lack the power to do
so. The fate of American free speech, as it has so often before, lies once again in the hands of
the courts.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
27. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the claims herein arise under the
Constitution of the United States.
28. As to the Defendant federal agencies, subject-matter jurisdiction lies because sovereign
immunity has been expressly waived by the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Bolger v.
District of Columbia, 510 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Federal courts have subject-matter
jurisdiction over [constitutional] suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief because the APA
waives [a] federal agency’s sovereign immunity even when the claim is one directly under the
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Constitution and not under the APA.”).
29. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because substantial events
giving rise to the claim occurred in this District, because named Plaintiffs have significant
connections to Louisiana, because numerous Members of the proposed class reside here, and
because a closely related case is already pending here.
PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs.
30. PLAINTIFF ROBERT F. KENNEDY, Jr., a natural person and citizen of New York, is
a world-renowned attorney and author. Over decades of legal service, he has repeatedly fought
and won major battles against governments and large corporations on behalf of the poor, children,
minorities, and the environment. In 2018, the National Trial Lawyers Association named Kennedy
and his legal team Trial Team of the Year for their work winning a $289 million jury verdict
against Monsanto for selling carcinogenic weed-killer products.
31. Kennedy is also the founder of Plaintiff Children’s Health Defense (CHD).
32. Information, ideas, and analysis published online concerning U.S. elections and COVID-
19 are critically important to Kennedy for his own personal knowledge, for his role as a citizen,
and for the many activities he is engaged in to shed light on and fight against governmental policies
he believes to be inimical to the health and well-being of individuals and this country.
33. Kennedy is also an online news publisher, with hundreds of thousands of followers and
audience members. In producing his news reports, Kennedy draws on information, analysis, and
ideas he gathers from, among other sources, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. When content is
censored on those sites, it is often difficult or impossible for Kennedy to find it elsewhere and to
relay it to his readers.
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34. Both as a news consumer and news publisher, Kennedy has a protected legal interest in
his ability to gain online access to accurate, complete, uncensored information and opinion from
willing speakers about COVID-19 and U.S. politics.
35. PLAINTIFF CHILDREN’S HEALTH DEFENSE (“CHD”) is a nonprofit organization
incorporated in Georgia and headquartered in New Jersey dedicated to informing the public of,
and fighting against, various threats to children’s health.
36. CHD has over seventy thousand members, including numerous members who reside in
Louisiana and in this District.
37. CHD’s members tend to be avid consumers of news concerning COVID-19 and
governmental health policies. To find such news, they often rely—as do countless other
Americans—on what is reported on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. They also tend to be
highly active in local politics on matters related to COVID and other health issues.
38. Information, ideas, and analysis published online and related to COVID-19 and
governmental health policies are critically important to CHD’s members for their own personal
knowledge, for their role as citizens, and for the many activities they are engaged in to change
governmental policies to which they object.
39. CHD is also an online publisher of news viewed by thousands of people. In producing
such news, CHD draws on information, analysis, and ideas it gathers from, among other sources,
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. When content is censored on those sites, it is often difficult or
impossible for CHD and CHD’s members to find it elsewhere.
40. CHD’s members and CHD itself have a protected legal interest in their ability to gain
online access to accurate, complete, uncensored information and opinion from willing speakers
about COVID-19 and U.S. politics.
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41. PLAINTIFF CONNIE SAMPOGNARO is a natural person, a citizen of Louisiana, and
a resident of this District.
42. Sampognaro holds a Master’s Degree in Healthcare Management and has worked as a
health care professional.
43. She is keenly interested in issues of public health care policy and has been since the
beginning of the pandemic a frequent consumer of online news related to COVID-19.
44. Information, ideas, and analysis published online related to COVID-19 are important to
Sampognaro for her own personal health, for role as a citizen, and for her role as a health care
policy advocate in her community.
45. Sampognaro has a protected legal interest in her ability to gain online access to accurate,
complete, and uncensored information and opinions from willing speakers about COVID-19 and
U.S. politics. When viewpoints, information, and ideas related to these matters are censored on the
country’s major social-media sites, it is often difficult or impossible for Sampognaro to find it
elsewhere.
B. Defendants.
46. DEFENDANT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., is President of the United States. He is sued in
his official capacity.
47. DEFENDANT KARINE JEAN-PIERRE is White House Press Secretary. She is sued in
her official capacity; her predecessor in office was former White House Press Secretary Jennifer
Rene Psaki.
48. DEFENDANT VIVEK H. MURTHY is Surgeon General of the United States. He is
sued in his official capacity.
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49. DEFENDANT XAVIER BECERRA is Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services. He is sued in his official capacity.
50. DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) is a
Cabinet-level agency within the Government of the United States.
51. DEFENDANT ANTHONY FAUCI was the Director of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and Chief Medical Advisor to the President and on information
and belief continues to advise the Administration on health matters. He is sued in his official
capacity.
52. DEFENDANT NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS
DISEASES (NIAID) is a federal agency under the Department of Health and Senior Services.
53. DEFENDANT CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) is
a federal agency under the Department of Health and Human Services.
54. DEFENDANT CAROL Y. CRAWFORD is Chief of the Digital Media Branch of the
Division of Public Affairs within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. She is sued
in her official capacity.
55. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, a.k.a. Bureau of the Census
(“Census Bureau”), is an agency of the federal government within the Department of Commerce.
56. DEFENDANT JENNIFER SHOPKORN is Senior Advisor for Communications with
the U.S. Census Bureau. She is sued in her official capacity.
57. DEFENDANT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE is a Cabinet-level agency
within the Government of the United States.
58. DEFENDANT ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS is Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. He is sued in his official capacity.
59. DEFENDANT ROBERT SILVERS is Under Secretary of the Office of Strategy,
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Policy, and Plans, within the Department of Homeland Security. He is sued in his official
capacity.
60. DEFENDANT SAMANTHA VINOGRAD is the Senior Counselor for National
Security within the Office of the Secretary of DHS. She is sued in her official capacity.
61. DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) is a Cabinet-
level agency within the Government of the United States.
62. DEFENDANT JEN EASTERLY is the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency within the Department of Homeland Security. She is sued in her official
capacity.
63. DEFENDANT CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY (CISA) is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security that is charged with
protecting the United States’ cybersecurity and physical infrastructure.
64. DEFENDANT GINA MCCARTHY is the White House National Climate Advisor.
She is sued in her official capacity.
65. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT NINA JANKOWICZ was the
director or intended director of the “Disinformation Governance Board” (for the entirety of its
existence from April 27-August 24, 2022) within the Department of Homeland Security. She is
sued in her official capacity.
66. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT ANDREW SLAVITT is or was the
White House Senior COVID-19 Advisor. He is sued in his official capacity.
67. DEFENDANT ROB FLAHERTY is Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of
Digital Strategy at the White House. He is sued in his official capacity.
68. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT COURTNEY ROWE is or was the
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White House COVID-19 Director of Strategic Communications and Engagement. She is sued
in her official capacity.
69. DEFENDANT CLARKE HUMPHREY is the White House Digital Director for the
COVID-19 Response Team. She is sued in her official capacity.
70. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT BENJAMIN WAKANA is or was
the Deputy Director of Strategic Communications and Engagement at the White House COVID-
19 Response Team. He is sued in his official capacity.
71. DEFENDANT DANA REMUS was, at times relevant to this Complaint, Counsel to the
President, a.k.a. White House Counsel. She is sued in her official capacity.
72. DEFENDANT AISHA SHAH is White House Partnerships Manager. She is sued in
her official capacity.
73. DEFENDANT LAURA ROSENBERGER serves as Special Assistant to the President
at the White House. She has extensive experience in service at the State Department. She is
74. DEFENDANT MINA HSIANG is Administrator of the U.S. Digital Service within the
Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President. She is sued in her
official capacity.
75. DEFENDANT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (“DOJ”) is a Cabinet-level agency
within the Government of the United States.
76. DEFENDANT FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (“FBI”) is an investigative
agency of the federal Government within the U.S. Department of Justice. The Foreign Influence
Task Force (“FITF”) is a task force within the FBI that purportedly investigates and/or addresses
foreign influences within the United States. The FITF’s website states: “The FBI is the lead
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federal agency responsible for investigating foreign influence operations. In the fall of 2017,
Director Christopher Wray established the Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and
counteract malign foreign influence operations targeting the United States.” https://www.fbi.gov/
investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence.
77. DEFENDANT LAURA DEHMLOW is the Section Chief for the FBI’s Foreign
Influence Task Force. She is sued in her official capacity.
78. DEFENDANT ELVIS M. CHAN is Supervisory Special Agent of Squad CY-1 in the
San Francisco Division of the FBI. On information and belief, he has authority over cybersecurity
issues for FBI in that geographical region, which includes the headquarters of major social-media
platforms, and he plays a critical role for FBI and FITF in coordinating with social-media
platforms relating to censorship and suppression of speech on their platforms. He is sued in his
official capacity.
79. DEFENDANT JAY DEMPSEY is Social Media Team Lead, Digital Media Branch,
Division of Public Affairs at the CDC. He is sued in his official capacity.
80. DEFENDANT ERIC WALDO is Chief Engagement Officer for the Surgeon General.
He is sued in his official capacity.
81. DEFENDANT YOLANDA BYRD is a member of the Digital Engagement Team at
HHS. She is sued in her official capacity.
82. DEFENDANT CHRISTY CHOI is Deputy Director, Office of Communications, HRSA
within HHS. She is sued in her official capacity.
83. DEFENDANT TERICKA LAMBERT served Director of Digital Engagement at HHS
and now serves as Deputy Director of the Office of Digital Strategy at the White House. She is
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84. DEFENDANT JOSHUA PECK is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Engagement
at HHS. He is sued in his official capacity.
85. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT JANELL MUHAMMAD is or was
Deputy Digital Director at HHS. She is sued in her official capacity.
86. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT MATTHEW MASTERSON is or
was Senior Cybersecurity Advisory within CISA in the Department of Homeland Security. He
is sued in his official capacity.
87. DEFENDANT LAUREN PROTENTIS is a member of the “Mis, Dis, and Mal-
information (MDM) Team” within CISA at DHS. She is sued in her official capacity.
88. DEFENDANT GEOFFERY HALE is a member of the Mis, Dis, and Mal-information
(MDM) Team within CISA at DHS. He is sued in his official capacity.
89. DEFENDANT ALLISON SNELL is a member of the Mis, Dis, and Mal-information
(MDM) Team within CISA at DHS. She is sued in her official capacity.
90. DEFENDANT BRIAN SCULLY is a member of DHS’s Countering Foreign Influence
Task Force, National Risk Management Center, and the Chief of the Mis-, Dis-, Malinformation
Team at CISA. He is sued in his official capacity.
91. DEFENDANT ZACHARY (“ZACK”) HENRY SCHWARTZ is the Division Chief for
the Communications Directorate at the U.S. Census Bureau. He is sued in his official capacity.
92. DEFENDANT LORENA MOLINA-IRIZARRY served at times relevant to this
Complaint as Director of Operations at Census Open Innovation Labs at the Census Bureau and
Senior Advisor on the American Rescue Plan Team at the White House. She is sued in her
official capacity.
93. DEFENDANT KRISTIN GALEMORE is Deputy Director of the Office of Faith Based
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and Neighborhood Partnerships at the Census Bureau. She is sued in her official capacity.
94. DEFENDANT U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (“FDA”) is a federal
agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
95. DEFENDANT ERICA JEFFERSON is the Associate Commissioner for External
Affairs within the Office of the Commissioner at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. She
is sued in her official capacity.
96. DEFENDANT MICHAEL MURRAY is the Acquisition Strategy Program Manager for
the Office of Health Communications and Education at the FDA. He is sued in his official
capacity.
97. DEFENDANT BRAD KIMBERLY is the Director of Social Media at the FDA. He is
sued in his official capacity.
98. DEFENDANT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (“State Department”) is a Cabinet-
99. DEFENDANT SAMARUDDIN K. STEWART is a Senior Technical Advisor and/or
Senior Advisor for the Global Engagement Center of the State Department. He is sued in his
official capacity.
100. At times relevant to this Complaint, DEFENDANT DANIEL KIMMAGE is or was the
Acting Coordinator for the Global Engagement Center at the State Department. He is sued in
his official capacity.
101. DEFENDANT ALEXIS FRISBIE is a member of the Technology Engagement Team
at the Global Engagement Center at the State Department. She is sued in her official capacity.
102. The State Department operates a “GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER” within the
State Department that conducts counter-“disinformation” activities. According to the State
21
Department’s website, the Global Engagement Center’s mission is “[t]o direct, lead, synchronize,
integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and
counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining
or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States, its allies, and partner
nations.” As alleged further herein, the Global Engagement Center is involved in procuring the
censorship of private speech on social media, including of U.S. citizens. The State Department
also maintains an Office of Cyber Coordinator, a.k.a. Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues,
that has, on information and belief, also been involved in federal social-media censorship
activities.
103. DEFENDANT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (“Treasury”) is a Cabinet-
104. DEFENDANT U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION (“EAC”) is an
independent agency within the Government of the United States. According to its website, the
EAC “was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). The EAC is an
independent, bipartisan commission charged with developing guidance to meet HAVA
requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and serving as a national
clearinghouse of information on election administration.”
105. DEFENDANT MARK A. ROBBINS is the Interim Executive Director of the EAC. He
is sued in his official capacity.
106. DEFENDANT KRISTEN MUTHIG is the Director of Communications for the EAC.
According to the EAC’s website, Muthig “manages media relations, communications strategy
and supports the commissioners and EAC leadership.” She is sued in her official capacity.
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ALLEGATIONS
OVERVIEW
107. Sustained, successful efforts by federal officers to induce social-media platforms to
censor speech appear to have begun in 2020.
108. Throughout that year, officers from a variety of federal agencies worked closely,
although often clandestinely, with Facebook, Google, and Twitter in an effort to induce, encourage
and promote censorship of constitutionally protected speech on those platforms.
109. Because the two most prominent censorship “achievements” of that year—the
suppression of the lab-leak theory of COVID’s origins and of reporting about Hunter Biden’s
laptop—appear to conflict with the interests of and positions taken by then-President Donald
Trump, it is doubtful that the White House was organizing or spearheading these federal censorship
efforts.
110. That changed with the election of President Joe Biden.
111. Immediately after (or perhaps even before) the January 2021 Inauguration, according to
senior White House officials, members of the Biden team initiated “direct engagement” with the
nation’s major social-media companies in an effort to have them “clamp down” on speech the
White House disfavored. Nandita Bose, Exclusive: White House working with Facebook and
Twitter to tackle anti-vaxxers, Reuters (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-
coronavirus-white-house-exclusive-idINKBN2AK0HP.
112. The White House called this disfavored speech “misinformation,” id., but in reality, as
later revelations would prove, the Administration was asking social-media companies to suppress
not only putatively false speech, but also wholly accurate speech as well as expressions of opinion.
23
113. For their part, the social-media platforms tended to be willing participants in this “direct
engagement” censorship campaign. Facebook, for example, stated in early 2020 that it had agreed
to supply the White House with “any assistance we can provide” in achieving the Administration’s
objectives. Id.
114. Over the ensuing years, the Administration’s “direct engagement” efforts with social-
media companies spread from the White House throughout the Executive Branch, metastasizing
into a government-wide campaign to achieve through the intermediation of social-media
companies exactly the kind of content-based and viewpoint-based censorship of dissident political
speech that the First Amendment prohibits.
115. Details of this massive federal censorship campaign have been alleged by the Attorneys
General of Missouri and Louisiana as well as other plaintiffs in a case currently pending before
this Court. See Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM (W.D. La.), ECF No. 84. Many
of the factual details alleged in their complaint are realleged below. Many of the below allegations,
however, do not appear in their complaint.
Federal Inducement of Social Media Censorship

of the Lab-Leak Theory of COVID’s Origins.
116. The lab-leak theory of COVID’s origin postulates that the virus did not originate
naturally in animals, but rather escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a Chinese
government biotech laboratory located in Wuhan, China.
117. The true origins of the virus are not known at this time, but there can be no doubt that the
lab-leak theory was, from the beginning of the pandemic, and still is today not only plausible, but
supported by significant evidence, and in any event well within the ambit of legitimate debate and
opinion.
24
118. Substantial evidence now indicates that, in early 2020, Defendant Dr. Anthony Fauci, a
senior federal government official, coordinated with others in orchestrating an effort to falsely
discredit the lab-leak hypothesis.
119. As director of NIAID, Dr. Fauci had funded risky and possibly unlawful “gain-of-
function” research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology through intermediaries such as EcoHealth
Alliance, headed by Dr. Peter Daszak. The lab-leak theory, therefore, had the potential to implicate
Dr. Fauci (and Dr. Daszak) in the creation of the COVID-19 virus and, indirectly, in the pandemic
that killed millions of people worldwide.
120. In late January and early February 2020, Dr. Fauci received information from colleagues
suggesting that COVID-19 originated in the Wuhan laboratory. Soon thereafter, however, Dr.
Fauci participated in a conference call with scientists and science-funding authorities with the
purpose of discrediting and suppressing the lab-leak theory. After the conference call, influential
individuals signed public statements that were placed in science journals in an attempt to discredit
the lab-leak theory.
121. In the same time frame, Dr. Fauci communicated with Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
directly regarding public messaging and the flow of information on social media about the
government’s COVID-19 response. For example, in a series of emails produced in response to
FOIA requests dated from March 15 to 17, 2020, Zuckerberg invited Fauci to make public
statements to be posted for viewing by all Facebook users regarding COVID-19, and also made
another proposal that is redacted in FOIA-produced versions but was treated as a high priority by
Fauci and National Institutes of Health (NIH) staff.
122. In an email on March 15, 2020, Zuckerberg proposed coordinating with Fauci on
COVID-19 messaging to “make sure people can get authoritative information from reliable
25
sources,” and suggested including a video message from Fauci because “people trust and want to
hear from experts.” Zuckerberg proposed including this content in a “hub” that “we’re going to
put at the top of Facebook” to reach “200+ million Americans, 2.5 billion people worldwide.”
123. In the same email, Zuckerberg made a three-line proposal to Fauci that was redacted by
the federal government before the email was produced in a FOIA request.
124. The next day, NIH’s communications director emailed Fauci and strongly recommended
that he do the videos for Facebook. Regarding the redacted proposal from Zuckerberg, she stated:
“But an even bigger deal is his offer [REDACTED]. The sooner we get that offer up the food-
chain the better.” She also stated that her staff was “standing by to discuss this with HHS and WH
comms,” and requested authority to “determine who the best point of contact would be so the
Administration can take advantage of this officer, soonest.” Fauci responded that “I will write or
call Mark and tell him that I am interested in doing this. I will then tell him that you will get for
him the name of the USG [on information and belief, shorthand for U.S. Government] point of
contact.”
125. Fauci responded by email to Zuckerberg on March 17, 2020, agreeing to the collaboration
that Zuckerberg proposed and describing his redacted proposal as “very exciting.”
126. Around the same time frame as the Zuckerberg-Fauci emails, Facebook and other social-
media companies adopted policies of disallowing on their platforms any claims that COVID-19
might have originated in the Wuhan lab. This included suppressing speech by highly credentialed
and well-respected writers, such as science journalist Nicholas Wade and scientist Alina Chan.
127. Such claims were declared by Facebook and other social-media companies to be “false”
and “debunked,” despite the fact that such claims had not been “debunked” or proven false, and
notwithstanding strong circumstantial evidence favoring the lab-leak theory.
26
128. There had long been substantial and obvious evidence of the plausibility of the lab-leak
theory, including the location of the Wuhan laboratory, the fact that this laboratory was engaging
in gain-of-function bat coronavirus experiments at the time of the outbreak, the disturbing fact that
the Chinese government immediately took steps to silence employees of the laboratory and conceal
the details of the work being performed there, and numerous genetic clues suggesting a laboratory
rather than natural origin. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, The origin of COVID: Did people or nature
open Pandora’s box at Wuhan?, Bull. Atomic Scientists (May 5, 2021),
https://thebulletin.org/2021/05/the-origin-of-covid-did-people-or-nature-open-pandoras-box-at-
wuhan/; Alina Chan, Viral: The Search for the Origin of COVID-19 (2021); House Foreign Affairs
Committee Minority Staff Report, The Origins of COVID-19: An Investigation of the Wuhan
Institute of Virology (Aug. 2021), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/
08/ORIGINS-OF-COVID-19-REPORT.pdf.
129. Indeed the circumstantial evidence of the lab-leak theory was and is so strong on its face
as to call into question the objectivity and disinterestedness of those who, like Fauci, sought to
paint the lab-leak theory as a “debunked” or deranged “conspiracy theory.” Comedian John
Stewart made this point memorably in 2021: “Oh my God, there’s been an outbreak of chocolatey
goodness near Hershey, Pennsylvania. What do you think happened? Like, ‘Oh I don’t know,
maybe a steam shovel mated with a cocoa bean?’ Or it’s the f***ing chocolate factory.” The Late
Show with Stephen Colbert, Jon Stewart On Vaccine Science And The Wuhan Lab Theory,
YouTube (June 15, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSfejgwbDQ8.
130. In any event, the fact that the lab-leak theory was at the very least plausible is evidence
that social-media censorship of that theory was not based on an independent judgment arrived at
by Facebook, Twitter, or Google, but was rather undertaken by those companies in reliance on
27
federal health officials implementing the plan, orchestrated by Fauci and others in early 2020, to
discredit and suppress the lab-leak theory.
131. This conclusion is further supported by Facebook’s admission that its censorship of
COVID-related speech (on supposed grounds of falsity) is based on what “public health experts
have advised us.” Facebook, COVID-19 and Vaccine Policy Updates & Protections,
https://www.facebook.com/help/230764881494641 (emphasis added). On information and belief,
Fauci and CDC officials are included among those “public health experts” who have “advised”
Facebook on what to censor.
132. As Fauci’s role in the funding of the Wuhan laboratory’s gain-of-function experiments
began coming to light, Fauci and other Administration officials were forced to backtrack, and after
a long period of censorship, in May 2021, Facebook and other platforms announced that they
would no longer censor speech making or reporting claims that COVID had originated in the
Wuhan virology lab.
133. As numerous commentators noted at the time, the close temporal connection between the
government’s backtracking on the lab-leak theory and social media companies’ sudden about-face
in their censorship of that theory is further evidence of coordination. See, e.g., Editorial Board,
Facebook’s Lab-Leak About-Face, Wall St. J. (May 27, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/facebooks-lab-leak-about-face-11622154198.
Federal Inducement of Censorship

of the Hunter Biden Laptop Story
134. On August 26, 2022, Mark Zuckerberg appeared on “The Joe Rogan Experience” podcast
and, when asked about Facebook’s censorship of the Hunter Biden laptop story, revealed that
Facebook had acted as a result of communications from the FBI.
28
135. Zuckerberg stated: “The FBI came to us” and told Facebook to be “on high alert,”
asserting to Facebook that there had been “a lot of Russian propaganda” in the 2016 presidential
election, and warning Facebook that “there’s about to be some kind of dump that’s similar to that,
so just be vigilant.” BBC, Zuckerberg tells Rogan FBI warning prompted Biden laptop story
censorship (Aug. 26, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62688532.
136. On information and belief, the FBI’s reference to a “dump” of information was intended
to be a reference to the contents of Hunter Biden’s laptop, which was already in the FBI’s
possession and which the FBI knew would soon be the subject of a story being published in the
New York Post.
137. Zuckerberg’s admission that the FBI induced Facebook’s censorship of the Hunter Biden
laptop story was widely recognized as a bombshell revelation of federal law-enforcement influence
on social-media censorship.
138. Facebook has identified the FBI’s FITF, as supervised by Laura Dehmlow, and FBI San
Francisco Special Agent Elvis Chan as involved in the communications between the FBI and
Facebook that led to Facebook’s suppression of the Hunter Biden laptop story.
139. Dehmlow evidently works with CISA on social-media censorship issues. On March 1,
2022, Dehmlow gave a presentation to CISA’s Protecting Critical Infrastructure from
Misinformation & Disinformation Subcommittee in which Dehmlow indicated that the FBI’s FITF
“engages . . . with appropriate partners for information exchange.” On information and belief, this
“information exchange” includes communications with social-media platforms about censorship
and/or suppression of social-media speech.
140. On information and belief, because major social-media platforms are headquartered in
the geographical area of FBI’s San Francisco Division, and Special Agent Chan is in charge of
29
cyber-related issues for that division, Chan has performed a critical role in communicating with
social-media platforms on behalf of the FBI relating to censorship and suppression of speech on
social media.
141. Chan has openly boasted about his official role on behalf of FBI in coordinating with
social-media companies. In a recent podcast, he stated, “Our field office, FBI San Francisco, was
very involved in helping to protect the US elections in 2020. . . Even though foreign actors were
trying to interfere in our elections, the FBI, the US government working in conjunction with the
private sector, as well as with election officials from every single state and protectorate, we were
really able to do it. . . But completely different from 2016 where we did not. See Get It Started
Podcast, Ep 4—Den Jones speaks with Elvis Chan, FBI, Banyan Security,
https://www.banyansecurity.io/resource/get-it-started-get-it-done/ (emphasis added).
142. Chan’s subsequent comments make clear that “government working in conjunction with
the private sector” includes the FBI working with social-media companies on censorship and
suppression of private speech. Chan indicated that he works closely with Defendant Jen Easterly,
who, as alleged herein, quarterbacks CISA’s extensive federal government-induced social-media
censorship activities.
143. Chan admits to regular, routine coordination about censorship with social-media
platforms, stating of the 2020 election cycle in particular: “we talked with all of these entities I
mentioned regularly, at least on a monthly basis. And right before the election, probably on a
weekly basis. If they were seeing anything unusual, if we were seeing anything unusual, sharing
intelligence with technology companies, with social-media companies, so that they could protect
their own platforms. That’s where the FBI and the US government can actually help companies.”
30
Id. (emphasis added). On information and belief, “social-media companies” “protect[ing] their
own platforms” includes censorship and suppression of speech at the FBI’s behest.
144. Documents produced by LinkedIn show Chan repeatedly organizing meetings with
representatives of LinkedIn from 2020 through the present. Based on the limited agendas
provided, it appears that these meetings included discussions of election-related content and
suppression of election-related speech on social media. On information and belief, Chan organized
similar meetings with other major social-media platforms, as in one instance, he notified LinkedIn
about a particular proposed time slot for a meeting that another company had already taken that
time slot. Dehmlow was routinely included in these meetings as well.
145. Chan bemoaned the fact that there was not a similar level of coordination about
censorship between the federal government and social-media companies during the 2016 election
cycle: “It seems obvious, but I’m not going to lie, in 2016, there was not that same level of
communications between the US government and the private sector.” Id. Chan called on social-
media platforms to be “more mindful” of federal government warnings on such issues: “But where
we in the government are saying, if you are in one of the 17 designated critical infrastructure
sectors, of which information technology is one of them, then you need to be more mindful.” Id.
146. The recently published (and ongoing) “Twitter Files” indicate that private FBI
communications were similarly responsible for Twitter’s decision to censor the Hunter Biden
laptop story.
147. According to journalist Michael Shellenberger, internal Twitter documents reveal
“evidence pointing to an organized effort by representatives of the intelligence community (IC),
aimed at senior executives at news and social-media companies, to discredit leaked information
31
about Hunter Biden before and after it was published.” https://twitter.com/ShellenbergerMD/
status/1604871630613753856.
148. Throughout 2020, when Hunter Biden’s laptop was in the possession of the FBI but was
still being kept secret from the public, FBI San Francisco Special Agent Chan and other federal
officers repeatedly “primed” Twitter executives in emails and at regular meetings to expect
“Russian hack-and-leak” operations in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election. Id.
149. “On August 11, 2020, the FBI’s Chan share[d] information with Twitter’s [then-Head of
Site Integrity Yoel] Roth relating to the Russian hacking organization, APT28, through the FBI’s
secure, one-way communications channel, Teleporter.” Id.
150. Roth was instrumental in Twitter’s decision to censor the Hunter Biden laptop story.
151. At some point in the 2020 meetings with government agents, Roth was told “that there
were rumors that a hack-and-leak operation would involve Hunter Biden.” FBI warned Twitter
during ‘weekly’ meetings of Hunter Biden ‘hack-and-leak operation’ before censoring The Post,
New York Post (Dec. 4, 2022), https://nypost.com/2022/12/04/fbi-warned-twitter-of-hunter-
biden-hack-before-censoring-the-post.
152. At approximately 7:00 pm on October 13, 2020, the Post informed Hunter Biden and a
Biden attorney that the Post was planning to publish a report the next day on the explosive and
incriminating content found on Biden’s laptop.
153. Later that evening, Biden’s attorney began reaching out to third parties concerning the
Post’s forthcoming story.
154. On information and belief, the FBI knew on the evening of October 13th of the Post’s
plan to publish the story the following day.
32
155. At 9:22 pm on October 13, FBI Special Agent Chan sent 10 confidential documents to
Roth through Teleporter.
156. The next morning, October 14, the Post published its explosive story on Hunter Biden’s
laptop.
157. The facts reported in that story were true.
158. “And yet,” as Shellenberger reports, “within hours, Twitter and other social-media
companies censor[ed] the NY Post article, preventing it from spreading and, more importantly,
undermining its credibility in the minds of many Americans.” https://twitter.com/
ShellenbergerMD/status/1604871630613753856.
159. This censorship required deliberate, aggressive action by social-media firms.
160. “Facebook moderators had to manually intervene to suppress a controversial New York
Post story about Hunter Biden, according to leaked moderation guidelines seen by the Guardian.”
Alex Hern, Facebook leak reveals policies on restricting New York Post’s Biden story, The
Guardian (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/oct/30/facebook-leak-
reveals-policies-restricting-new-york-post-biden-story.
161. At the time, Facebook claimed that the censorship of the Hunter Biden laptop story was
“part of our standard process to reduce the spread of misinformation. We temporarily reduce
distribution pending factchecker review.” Id. But this was not true. In fact, Facebook imposed
“special treatment” on the New York Post to suppress the story, which included “manually
overrid[ing]” Facebook’s own guidelines for suppressing so-called “misinformation.” Id.
162. According to journalist Matt Taibbi, Twitter too “took extraordinary steps to suppress
the story, removing links and posting warnings that it may be ‘unsafe.’ They even blocked its
transmission via direct message, a tool hitherto reserved for extreme cases, e.g., child pornography.
33
White House spokeswoman Kaleigh McEnany was locked out of her account for tweeting about
the story, prompting a furious letter from Trump campaign staffer Mike Hahn, who seethed: ‘At
least pretend to care for the next 20 days.’” https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/
1598834882414727168.
163. Twitter’s publicly announced basis for censoring the Post’s story was quickly recognized
within the company to be without basis under Twitter’s own policies.
164. On information and belief, communications between Chan and Roth, potentially
including on the night of October 13, convinced Roth that the Post’s story should be suppressed.
165. Roth has subsequently stated that the FBI’s communications about Russian hacking
operations, together with the FBI’s warnings to expect Russian disinformation in the run-up to the
presidential election, led him to believe that Russia was somehow behind the Post’s Hunter Biden
laptop.
166. According to one survey, sixteen percent of Biden voters polled stated that they would
have changed their votes if they had known about the Hunter Biden laptop story before the election,
potentially changing the outcome of the election.
Other 2020 Viewpoint-Discriminatory

Efforts by Federal Actors to Induce Social Media Censorship
167. Throughout 2020, in addition to their role in inducing censorship of the Hunter Biden
laptop story and the lab-leak theory of COVID’s origins, federal actors met and worked with
social-media companies, often behind closed doors, in an effort to induce those companies to
censor other categories of constitutionally protected speech, especially speech related to the
presidential election and speech related to COVID.
168. In addition, government agents began partnering with third-party entities to send
Facebook, Twitter, and Google yet more censorship requests.
34
169. As with the suppression of the lab-leak theory of COVID’s origins and facts related to
Hunter Biden’s laptop, these efforts were in some cases blatantly viewpoint-discriminatory,
seeking censorship specifically of then-President Trump and his supporters.
170. Starting in January 2020, according to Taibbi, who reviewed voluminous internal Twitter
documents, “Twitter’s contact with the FBI was constant and pervasive, as if it were a
subsidiary. . . Between January 2020 and November 2022, there were over 150 emails between the
FBI and former Twitter Trust and Safety chief Yoel Roth.” Id.
171. In a “surprisingly high number” of these emails, the FBI asked Twitter to censor election-
related posts or accounts. Id.
172. “The FBI’s social media-focused task force, known as FTIF [sic], created in the wake of
the 2016 election, swelled to 80 agents and corresponded with Twitter.” Id.
173. Meetings between social-media companies and government agents were also regularized
in this period and became more frequent in the run-up to the election. Internal Twitter messaging
shows that these meetings between Twitter and government partners were happening “weekly.”
https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/1601364807831425025.
174. In addition to demanding censorship of particular content, federal agents at these
meetings and in these communications were also seeking information form social media
companies about their users.
175. One Twitter executive spoke to concerns about governmental pressure applied to Twitter
during this time, writing in a January 2020 email, “We have seen a sustained (if uncoordinated)
effort by the IC [on information and belief, a reference to Intelligence Community] to push us to
share more information and change our API policies. They are probing and pushing everywhere
they can (including by whispering to congressional staff).” https://twitter.com/ShellenbergerMD/
35
status/1604888429816209409?s=20&t=lYJtarkLVFhr0TuuscvZMg. On information and belief,
“whispering to congressional staff” refers to threats by government officials in the executive and
legislative branches regarding adverse action that could be taken against social-media companies
that did not censor speech the government wished to censor. These threats will be addressed
further below.
176. In July 2020, FBI’s FITF sent a questionnaire to Yoel Roth asking Twitter for
clarification regarding their “[indication that they] had not observed much recent activity from
official propaganda actors on [their] platform.” https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/
1604613308778266627. Roth circulated the questions with other Twitter executives, including
commentary of his concern about the governmental pressure: “I’m not particularly comfortable
with the Bureau (and by extension the IC) demanding written answers here.” Id.
177. In August 2020, social-media firms “met with federal government officials to discuss
how to handle misinformation during this month’s political conventions and election results this
fall.” David Ingram & Kevin Collier, Big Tech met with govt to discuss how to handle election
results, NBC News (Aug. 20, 2022), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/big-tech-met-
gov-t- discuss-how-handle-election-results-n1236555.
178. This meeting was described as “the latest in a series” of meetings between major social-
media companies and government officials about the suppression of election-related
“misinformation”: “‘We held the latest in a series of meetings with government partners today
where we each provided updates on what we’re seeing on our respective platforms and what we
expect to see in the coming months,’ companies including Google, Facebook, Twitter and Reddit
said in a joint statement after the meeting.” Id. “The statement also included Microsoft, Verizon
36
Media, Pinterest, LinkedIn and the Wikimedia Foundation, which operates Wikipedia and other
sites.” Id.
179. The discussion was reported as “one in a series of monthly meetings between the
government and tech companies” and involved “back-and-forth conversation on a variety of
topics.” Id. Neither the “topics” of the “conversation” nor the particular participants on behalf of
the government were disclosed. Id. “According to the industry statement, participants in
Wednesday’s meeting also included representatives from the FBI’s foreign influence task force,
the Justice Department’s national security division, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.” Id. “The companies said
they would continue to meet regularly before the November election.” Id.
180. One email from a Twitter employee documented an ongoing series of payments from the
FBI to Twitter for their compliance with certain FBI requests. https://twitter.com/
ShellenbergerMD/status/1604908670063906817. Twitter collected $3,415,323 from the FBI from
October 2019 through February 2021. Id. Included in the underlying actions justifying these
payments is Twitter’s handling of FBI Emergency Disclosure Requests (EDRs).
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support. A Twitter
executive explained in a 2022 email regarding a phone call with the FBI about an upcoming
meeting that the FBI’s intention for the meeting was “to convince us to produce on more FBI
EDRs” and that “[the FBI] repeatedly emphasized Twitter’s lower level of compliance in
comparison with other platforms.” https://twitter.com/ShellenbergerMD/status/
1604909613568049152. The FBI’s use of EDRs to elicit and pay for user information from
Twitter and other social media companies (information that could then function as a basis for the
FBI’s demanding censorship of certain users or posts) created a symbiotic relationship of close
37
and complex interactions in which the federal government essentially paid social-media companies
to work with the FBI in censoring protected speech.
181. The existence of regular censorship meetings in 2020 between federal agents and social-
media companies is confirmed in the Twitter Files by journalist Taibbi, who reports that these
meetings established a system through which agents “from every corner of government” could
seek to induce those companies to censor content they disfavored. https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/
status/1633830077170618376?s=20.
182. Taibbi explains, “Twitter had so much contact with so many agencies that executives lost
track.” https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/1606701408967090177.
183. Taibbi further reports: “With other tech firms [Twitter] held a regular ‘industry meeting’
with FBI and DHS, and developed a formal system for receiving thousands of content reports from
every corner of government,” such as “HHS, Treasury, [and the] NSA.” https://twitter.com/
mtaibbi/status/1633830077170618376?s=20.
184. “Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds
or thousands of account names for review. Often, these would be deleted soon after.” Id.
185. According to Taibbi, many of these putative “disinfo” reports sought censorship of
content that was not in fact false, but was rather expressive of facts or opinions the government
sought to stifle, such as “anti-Ukraine narratives.” Id.
186. This behavior was occurring across the Intelligence Community. The State Department
reports that “[i]n December 2019, GEC/TET [i.e., State’s Global Engagement Center’s
Technology Engagement Team] established a Silicon Valley location to facilitate public-private
coordination and broker constructive engagements between the U.S. government and the tech
sector, academia, and research. The goal is to increase collaboration that results in identifying,
38
exposing, and defending against foreign adversarial propaganda and disinformation.” On
information and belief, “collaboration that results in . . . defending against . . . disinformation,”
id., includes censorship of protected social-media speech.
187. The GEC publishes “Counter Disinformation Dispatches,” of which the State
Department states: “The Global Engagement Center’s Counter Disinformation Dispatches
summarize lessons learned about disinformation and how to counter it based on the experiences of
frontline counter-disinformation practitioners, for the benefit of those newly engaged in this issue.”
188. The GEC provides, as an online “counter-disinfo resource,” a link to CISA’s website,
stating: “An agency of the Department of Homeland Security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency ‘is responsible for protecting the [United States’] critical infrastructure from
physical and cyber threats,’ including election security.”
189. The State Department—through the GEC—has worked directly with CISA and the FBI
to procure the censorship of specific content on social media. For example, on March 25, 2020,
Alex Dempsey of the State Department forwarded to an FBI agent a report about a video on social
media making ostensibly false allegations about a State Department officer. Brian Scully of CISA
forwarded the report to Facebook personnel, stating, “[S]ee the below reporting from our State
Department Global Engagement Center colleagues about disinformation . . . targeting a Diplomatic
Security Officer.” Facebook responded, “Have flagged for our internal teams. As always, we
really appreciate the outreach and sharing of this information.” Scully also forwarded the State
Department’s report to Twitter and Google/YouTube. In flagging the content for Google, Scully
commented, “It does appear the FBI has been notified, so you may have already heard from them.”
190. CISA also works closely with the Center for Internet Security (CIS), an outside third-
party group, to flag content for censorship on social media, including election-related speech. See
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Joint Statement on Discovery Disputes Ex. 8, Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM
(W.D. La.), ECF No. 71-8. On information and belief, CIS is or was funded by CISA and works
as a joint participant with CISA on federal social-media censorship activities. As early as June
2020, the CIS, working with CISA, was planning a “Reporting Portal” for government officials
seeking to suppress election misinformation that would allow “social-media companies” to
“process reports and provide timely responses, to include the removal of reported misinformation
from the platform where possible.” Id. at 90. CIS and CISA work closely to remove so-called
“misinformation” by flagging content for removal by social-media companies.
191. Documents reveal that CISA’s authority as a national-security agency within DHS led to
prompt responses and swift censorship actions in response to CISA’s actions of “flagging” posts
for censorship. See Id. This included many posts on election integrity issues where CISA acted as
de facto judge of the truthfulness and value of social-media speech.
192. CISA also flagged specific individuals’ and entities’ speech for censorship. For example,
in a “disinformation” conference regarding the 2020 election hosted by CISA, one presenter
identified the Gateway Pundit, a popular conservative-leaning news website, as a “repeat spreader”
of “false or misleading content about the 2020 election.” The presenter stated that the Gateway
Pundit is the second most frequent spreader of election-related disinformation, just above President
Trump and his two sons, Donald Jr. and Eric Trump, who were also described as “prolific spreaders
of disinformation.” Other supposed “repeat spreaders” of disinformation identified at the CISA-
hosted conference included Sean Hannity, Breitbart, James O’Keefe, and Mark Levin. The
presenter emphasized that every account identified as a spreader of disinformation was
“ideologically pro-Trump” in its political orientation. See Mike Benz, Foundation for Freedom
Online, DHS Encouraged Children to Report Family to Facebook for Challenging US Government
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Covid Claims, https://report.foundationforfreedomonline.com/8-29-22.html. “In the same training
session for state and local election officials, DHS’s formal partner group then encouraged the mass
reporting of US social media posts for censorship….” Id.
193. In the Twitter Files, journalist Taibbi further reports that government agents partnered
with government-funded NGOs to bombard social-media companies with huge numbers of
censorship requests, often demonstrating a clear viewpoint-discriminatory bias against then-
President Trump or his political positions.
194. Taibbi found detailed evidence of collaborations between governmental agents and third-
party entities, particularly a consortium called the “Election Integrity Partnership,” as vehicles for
inducing social-media companies to censor constitutionally protected speech. “Perhaps the
ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society organizations is the
Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), whose ‘Election Integrity Partnership’ is among the most
voluminous ‘flaggers’ in the #TwitterFiles.” https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/
1633830077170618376?s=20.
195. The so-called “Election Integrity Partnership” (EIP) is or was a consortium of four
private groups working with numerous federal entities, including DHS and State, to monitor online
election-related speech and induce social-media companies to censor the speech the EIP and its
governmental partners disfavor. Recent, heavily documented reports indicate that both the State
Department and CISA teamed up with this consortium in a close collaboration to achieve social-
media censorship of election-related speech beginning in 2020, and that this collaboration is
continuing to this day.
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196. “EIP research manager Renee DiResta boasted that . . . the EIP succeeded in getting
‘tech partners’ Google, TikTok, Facebook and Twitter to take action on ‘35% of the URLS
flagged’ under ‘remove, reduce, or inform’ policies.” Id.
197. “According to the EIP’s own data, it succeeded in getting nearly 22 million tweets labeled
[i.e., marked to indicate supposed falseness or unreliability] in the runup to the 2020 vote.” Id.
198. “It’s crucial to reiterate,” reports Taibbi, that “EIP was partnered with state entities like
CISA and GEC while seeking elimination of millions of tweets. In the #TwitterFiles, Twitter
execs did not distinguish between [EIP and governmental] organizations, using phrases like
‘According to CIS[A], escalated via EIP.” Id.
199. Pursuant to third-party subpoena, Twitter has identified personnel associated with the
State Department’s GEC, including Alexis Frisbie and Daniel Kimmage, as likely involved in
communications with Twitter about censorship and/or content modulation on issues such as
election integrity, vaccine/COVID misinformation, and related subjects.
200. According to public reports, the EIP is comprised of four member organizations: Stanford
Internet Observatory (SIO), the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public, the
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, and social media analytics firm Graphika.”
Greg Piper & John Solomon, Outsourced censorship: Feds used private entity to target millions
of social posts in 2020, Just the News (Sept. 30, 2022), https://justthenews.com/government/
federal-agencies/biden-administration-rewarded-private-entities-got-2020-election.
201. The EIP “worked with the departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State to censor
massive numbers of social media posts they considered misinformation during the 2020 election,
and its members then got rewarded with millions of federal dollars from the Biden administration
afterwards, according to interviews and documents obtained by [reporters].” Id.
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202. The EIP’s censorship operations, still working hand in hand with federal agencies,
continued after the 2020 election and continue to this day, although the EIP has changed its name
(as detailed below).
203. The EIP “set up a concierge-like service in 2020 that allowed federal agencies like
Homeland’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and State’s Global Engagement
Center to file ‘tickets’ requesting that online story links and social media posts be censored or
flagged by Big Tech.” Id.
204. “Three liberal groups — the Democratic National Committee, Common Cause and the
NAACP — were also empowered like the federal agencies to file tickets seeking censorship of
content. A Homeland [i.e., DHS]-funded collaboration, the Elections Infrastructure Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, also had access.” Id.
205. “In its own after-action report on the 2020 election, the consortium boasted it flagged
more than 4,800 URLs — shared nearly 22 million times on Twitter alone — for social-media
platforms. Their staff worked 12-20 hour shifts from September through mid-November 2020,
with ‘monitoring intensifying significantly’ the week before and after Election Day.” Id.
(alterations omitted).
206. Backed by the authority of the federal government, including DHS, CISA, the State
Department, and State’s Global Engagement Center, the EIP successfully sought and procured
extensive censorship of core political speech by private citizens: “The tickets sought removal,
throttling and labeling of content that raised questions about mail-in ballot integrity . . . and other
election integrity issues of concern to conservatives.” Id.
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207. “The consortium achieved a success rate in 2020 that would be enviable for baseball
batters: Platforms took action on 35% of flagged URLs, with 21% labeled, 13% removed and 1%
soft-blocked, meaning users had to reject a warning to see them.” Id.
208. The consortium’s “[p]articipants were acutely aware that federal agencies’ role in the
effort” raised First Amendment concerns. “For instance, SIO’s Renee DiResta said in a CISA
Cybersecurity Summit video in 2021 that the operation faced ‘unclear legal authorities’ and ‘very
real First Amendment questions.’” Id.
209. One free-speech advocate described the consortium as “the largest federally- sanctioned
censorship operation he had ever seen, a precursor to the now-scrapped Disinformation
Governance Board and one that is likely to grow in future elections.” Id. “‘If you trace the
chronology, you find that there was actually 18 months’ worth of institutional work to create this
very apparatus that we now know played a significant role in the censorship of millions of posts
for the 2020 election and has ambitious sights for 2022 and 2024,’ he said.” Id.
210. A member of Congress “called the[se] revelations ‘stunning’ and said the 2020 operation
amounted to the federal government sanctioning and outsourcing censorship.” Id.
211. “It wasn’t just blogs and individual social media users whose content was targeted for
removal and throttling as ‘repeat spreaders’ of misinformation. News and opinion organizations,
including the New York Post, Fox News, Just the News and SeanHannity.com were also targeted.”
Id.
212. “The partnership’s members published the 292-page public report in March 2021, though
the most recent version is dated June 15, 2021. The launch webinar featured former CISA Director
Christopher Krebs, ‘who led the effort to secure electoral infrastructure and the response to mis-
and disinformation during the election period.’” Id.
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213. “‘I think we were pretty effective in getting platforms to act on things they haven’t acted
on before,’ both by pressuring them to adopt specific censorship policies and then reporting
violations, SIO founder and former Facebook Chief Security Officer Alex Stamos told the launch
webinar.” Id. (emphasis added). “‘Platform interventions’ [i.e., censorship of specific posts or
content] in response to ‘delegitimization of election results,’ for example, went from uniformly
‘non-comprehensive’ in August 2020 to ‘comprehensive’ by Election Day, the report says.” Id.
214. “SIO officially launched the partnership 100 days before the election, ‘in consultation
with CISA and other stakeholders,’ the partnership report says. It attributes the idea to SIO-funded
interns at CISA, noting that censorship by that agency and domestic social media monitoring by
intelligence agencies would likely be illegal.” Id. (citing Center for an Informed Public, Digital
Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet Observatory, The Long Fuse:
Misinformation and the 2020 Election, Stanford Digital Repository: Election Integrity Partnership
V1.3.0 (Mar. 3, 2021) [hereinafter EIP Report], https://purl.stanford.edu/tr171zs0069).
215. The EIP Report’s executive summary states: “Increasingly pervasive mis- and
disinformation, both foreign and domestic, creates an urgent need for collaboration across
government, civil society, media, and social-media platforms.” Id.
216. The consortium was openly biased based on political viewpoint, calling President Trump
“the social media Death Star.” “During the launch webinar, the Atlantic Council’s Emerson
Brooking said they wanted to stop the ‘amplification and legitimation’ of ‘far-right influencers
[who] would be doing all they could to try to catch the eye of a Fox News producer,’ making it
likely that President Trump, ‘the social media Death Star,’ would see their content.” Id.
217. The consortium’s work included the direct involvement of government officials in
censorship decisions. “Government entities were involved in real-time chats with the partnership
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and social-media platforms over specific content under review.” Id. For example, “[a] chat
screenshot in the report shows an unidentified government partner rejecting the Sharpiegate claim
that ‘sharpies aren’t read at all’ by ballot-counting machines, and a platform provider responding
that it was now reviewing those claims.” Id.
218. Notably, consistent with its carrot-and-stick approach to private entities on social-media
censorship, the Biden Administration—including the State Department—has richly rewarded the
private-sector partners in this censorship consortium, lavishing federal largesse upon them. “The
[consortium’s] partners all received federal grants from the Biden administration in the next two
years.” Id. “The National Science Foundation awarded the Stanford and UW projects $3 million
in August 2021 ‘to study ways to apply collaborative, rapid-response research to mitigate online
disinformation.’” Id. “UW’s press release about the award noted their earlier work on the
partnership and praise for the report from ex-CISA director Krebs, who called it ‘the seminal report
on what happened in 2020, not just the election but also through January 6.’” Id. “Graphika, also
known as Octant Data, received its first listed federal grant several weeks after the 2020 election:
nearly $3 million from the Department of Defense for unspecified ‘research on cross-platform
detection to counter malign influence.’ Nearly $2 million more followed in fall 2021 for ‘research
on co-citation network mapping,’ which tracks sources that are cited together.” Id. “The Atlantic
Council … has received $4.7 million in grants since 2021, all but one from the State Department.
That far exceeds the think tank’s federal haul in previous years, which hadn’t approached $1
million in a single year since 2011.” Id.
219. The EIP Report, discussed above, identifies the Election Assistance Commission as a
federal agency working on social-media content issues alongside CISA, identified as “the lead on
domestic vulnerabilities and coordination with state and local election officials.” The same
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paragraph states: “The Election Assistance Commission should remain in an amplifying role,
pushing best practices and critical information out broadly to the election community.” EIP
Report, at 235. On information and belief, the EAC’s “critical information” that is “push[ed] …
out broadly” includes federally induced censorship and/or suppression of social-media speech on
the basis of content and viewpoint.
220. “UW’s project, SIO and Graphika also collaborated on the Virality Project, which tracks
and analyzes purported ‘COVID-19 vaccine misinformation and social media narratives related to
vaccine hesitancy.’” Piper & Solomon, Outsourced censorship: Feds used private entity to target
millions of social posts in 2020, Just the News (Sept. 30, 2022),
https://justthenews.com/government/federal-agencies/biden-administration-rewarded-private-
entities-got-2020-election.
221. Taibbi explains that the Virality Project is simply the “renamed” version of the EIP after
the 2020 election, having since been “on-boarded to Twitter’s JIRA ticketing system.”
222. One Virality Project email included guidance to “take action even against ‘stories of true
vaccine side effects’ and ‘true posts which could fuel hesitancy.’”
223. The collaboration with CISA on the EIP is not the State Department’s only involvement
in federal social-media censorship activities.
224. For example, on February 4, 2020, Samaruddin K. Stewart, then a “Senior Advisor for
the Global Engagement Center of the State Department” reached out to LinkedIn and stated that
he was “tasked with building relationships with technology companies . . . in [Silicon Valley] with
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interests in countering disinformation,” and asked for a meeting. As the email indicates, Stewart
intended to reach out to other social-media platforms as well.
225. On March 9, 2020, Stewart reached out to LinkedIn again, referring back to their earlier
oral meeting, and stated, “I’ll send information [to LinkedIn representatives] about gaining access
to Disinfo Cloud – which is a GEC [i.e., State Department’s Global Engagement Center] funded
platform that offers stakeholders an opportunity to discovery companies, technology, and tools
that can assist with identifying, understanding, and addressing disinformation.” On information
and belief, “addressing disinformation” includes the censorship and suppression of private speech.
On information and belief, Stewart engaged in similar meetings and coordination efforts with other
social-media platforms as well.
226. All of these 2020 viewpoint-discriminatory efforts by federal agents and federally-
partnered entities to induce social-media censorship took place against a backdrop of repeated
demands by powerful Democratic politicians for online censorship coupled with repeated threats
that the government would take adverse action against social-media companies—potentially
catastrophic action, including antitrust break-up and/or repeal of Section 230, the federal statute
immunizing such companies from liability for the third-party content they carry—unless those
companies agreed to censor more aggressively the viewpoints, content, and speakers that these
politicians disfavored.
227. Examples of such demands and threats include, but are by no means limited to, the
following.
228. In April, 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said, “I do think that for the privilege of
230, there has to be a bigger sense of responsibility on it. And it is not out of the question that that
could be removed.” Taylor Hatmaker, Nancy Pelosi warns tech companies that Section 230 is ‘in
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jeopardy’, Tech Crunch (Apr. 12, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/12/nancy-pelosi-
section-230/.
229. “When asked about Section 230, Pelosi referred to the law as a ‘gift’ to tech companies
that have leaned heavily on the law to grow their business…. ‘It is a gift to them and I don’t think
that they are treating it with the respect that they should, and so I think that that could be a question
mark and in jeopardy.” Id.
230. Also in April 2019, “Louisiana Rep. Cedric Richmond warned Facebook and Google that
they had ‘better’ restrict what he and his colleagues saw as harmful content or be held
“accountable” through governmental action: ‘We’re going to make it swift, we’re going to make
it strong, and we’re going to hold them very accountable.’ New York Rep. Jerrold Nadler added:
‘Let’s see what happens by just pressuring them.’” Vivek Ramaswamy & Jed Rubenfeld, Save
the Constitution from Big Tech: Congressional threats and inducements make Twitter and
Facebook censorship a free-speech violation, Wall St. J. (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/save-the-constitution-from-big-tech-11610387105.
231. Throughout 2019 and 2020 (and continuing thereafter), Democratic Congressmen
repeatedly used congressional hearings as forums to demand more aggressive censorship form
social-media companies and to threaten them with adverse legislative or regulatory consequences
if they did not do so.
232. At one such hearing, in October 2020, Senator Mark Warner said, “It saddens me that
some of my colleagues have joined in the Trump Administration’s cynical and concerted effort to
bully platforms into allowing dark money groups, right-wing militias and even the President
himself to continue to exploit social-media platforms to sow disinformation, engage in targeted
harassment, and suppress voter participation. We can and should have a conversation about
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Section 230—and the ways in which it has enabled platforms to turn a blind eye as their platforms
are used to facilitate discrimination and civil rights violations, enable domestic terrorist groups to
organize violence in plain sight, assist in stalking and networked harassment campaigns, and
enable online frauds targeted at vulnerable users….” Statement of U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner on
Section 230 Hearing (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
2020/10/statement-of-sen-mark-r-warner-on-facebook-s-decision-to-finally-ban-qanon-from-its-
platforms.
233. At another such hearing in November 2020, Senator Richard Blumenthal said: “I have
urged, in fact, a breakup of tech giants. Because they’ve misused their bigness and power. . . . And
indeed Section 230 reform, meaningful reform, including even possible repeal in large part because
their immunity is way too broad and victims of their harms deserve a day in court.” Breaking the
News: Censorship, Suppression, and the 2020 Election Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 116th
Cong. at 36:10–15 (2020) (statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal).
234. Prior to being elected President, then-candidate Joe Biden also threatened social-media
companies with adverse government action if they did not censor more aggressively. Indeed his
demands for censorship were among the most vociferous, and among the most clearly linked to
threats to remove those companies’ Section 230 immunities.
235. For example, on January 17, 2020, then-candidate Biden stated, in an interview with the
New York Times editorial board, that Section 230 of the CDA should be “revoked” because social-
media companies like Facebook did not do enough to censor supposedly false information. He
stated: “The idea that it’s a tech company is that Section 230 should be revoked, immediately
should be revoked, number one. For Zuckerberg and other platforms.” He also stated, “It should
be revoked because it is not merely an internet company. It is propagating falsehoods they know
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to be false.... There is no editorial impact at all on Facebook. None. None whatsoever. It’s
irresponsible. It’s totally irresponsible.” Interview by N.Y. Times Editorial Board of Joe Biden,
N.Y. Times, (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-
nytimes-interview.html. These claims were specifically linked to Facebook’s alleged failure to
censor political ads on Facebook criticizing candidate Biden—i.e., core political speech.
236. Candidate Biden also threatened that Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg should be subject
to civil liability and even criminal prosecution for not censoring such core political speech: “He
should be submitted to civil liability and his company to civil liability. . . . Whether he engaged in
something and amounted to collusion that in fact caused harm that would in fact be equal to a
criminal offense, that’s a different issue. That’s possible. That’s possible it could happen.” Id. In
other words, Biden’s message—not long before he became President of the United States—was
that if Facebook did not censor political ads against him, Zuckerberg should be held personally
liable and perhaps jailed.
237. During the presidential campaign, now-Vice President Harris made similar threats
against social-media firms to pressure them to engage in more aggressive censorship of speakers,
content, and viewpoints she disfavors. For example, she stated in 2019: “We will hold social-
media platforms responsible for the hate infiltrating their platforms, because they have a
responsibility to help fight against this threat to our democracy. And if you profit off of hate—if
you act as a megaphone for misinformation or cyberwarfare, if you don’t police your platforms—
we are going to hold you accountable as a community.” Scott Shackford, Kamala Harris Wants
to Be Your Online Censor-in-Chief, Reason (May 7, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/05/07/
kamala-harris-promises-to-pursue-online-censorship-as-president/.
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238. Backed up by these threats, the voluminous efforts by federal agents and federally
partnered entities to induce viewpoint-based social-media censorship in the run-up to the
presidential election of 2020 would reasonably have been perceived by social-media companies as
demands that had to be substantially complied with on pain of potentially catastrophic
consequences such as the loss of Section 230 immunity or an antitrust break-up.
239. The government’s censorship campaign proved highly effective.
240. For example, the censorship achieved through these efforts included suppression of
President Trump’s own speech as well as many expressions of concern by Republicans about
election security as a result of the massive increase in voting by mail during the 2020 general
election.
241. Such censorship by social-media companies was a marked change from the policies
generally followed by those companies prior to 2020. “With all the attention paid to online
misinformation, it’s easy to forget that the big [social-media] platforms generally refused to
remove false content purely because it was false until 2020.” Gilead Edelman, Beware the Never-
Ending Disinformation Emergency, Wired (March 11, 2022), https://www.wired.com/story/
youtube-rigged-election-donald-trump-moderation-misinformation/.
2020 Census Bureau Efforts to Induce Online Censorship
242. Census Bureau officials have openly stated that they too work with social-media
companies to suppress so-called misinformation and disinformation.
243. For example, in 2020, the Census Bureau boasted that Census “has established the
government’s first ever Trust & Safety Team” in order to “prevent the spread of fake, false and
inaccurate information that can negatively influence 2020 Census participation and response.”
Zack Schwartz, Census Partners with Social-Media Platforms, Community Organizations, the
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Public to Stop Spread of False Information, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/02/putting-2020-census-rumors-to-rest.html.
244. Census further stated that it is “[w]orking with social-media platforms such as Facebook,
Microsoft, Nextdoor, Google, and Pinterest to update their policies and terms of service to include
census-specific activities,” and “[c]oordinating with YouTube and Twitter to create processes
enabling us to quickly identify and respond to misinformation and disinformation.” Id. On
information and belief, these activities included government-induced censorship of social-media
speech. Census stated: “These partnerships will help the Census Bureau counter false information
that can lead to an undercount by quickly identifying phony information and respond with factual
content.” Id.
245. In addition, Census invites private citizens to report suspected false information to the
Census Bureau so that Census can arrange for it to be censored. Census directs the public to:
“Report inaccurate, suspicious or fraudulent information to the Census Bureau. If you see or hear
something, tell us: Report suspicious information and tips to rumors@census.gov. Reach out to
us on our verified social media accounts (@USCensusBureau) to ask questions and flag suspicious
information. Call the Census Bureau Customer Service Hotline at 1-800-923-8282 to report
suspicious activity.” Id.
246. Census responds to such reports by seeking to induce social-media companies to censor
speech and content that Census disfavors. For example, YouTube has disclosed that Census
officials have been granted “trusted flagger” status to flag content for censorship on social media
and receive privileged, expedited treatment for such reports.
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247. Defendant Schwartz was the “operations manager for the Trust & Safety Team and
deputy division chief for the Center for New Media and Promotion at the Census Bureau” who
authored this report instructing the public to flag disinformation directly to Census.
248. “Trust & Safety Team” is a euphemism for the individuals working at social-media
platforms charged with monitoring, suppressing, and censoring disfavored speech, speakers, and
content. Census’s creation of a like-named “Trust & Safety Team” amounted to the creation of a
federal censorship agency within Census.
249. On its website, Census boasts that “the U.S. Census Bureau's Trust & Safety Team
protected the 2020 Census from misinformation and disinformation.” Census Bureau, Trust &
Safety Team, https://www.census.gov/about/trust-and-safety.html.
250. This page also notes that the “Trust & Safety Team’s” censorship work continues today
across expanded fronts: “We continue to watch for misinformation being shared online, and we
work to share facts instead to help support communications around the Census Bureau’s
commitment to data quality and transparency around these efforts. The team’s role has expanded
to also support the American Community Survey (ACS), the Economic Census, and other Census
Bureau programs and data products.” Id.
251. The same page continues to instruct the public to report so-called “misinformation” to
Census for censorship: “Help the Census Bureau’s Trust & Safety team by reporting inaccurate,
suspicious, or fraudulent information you read, hear, or spot online, including: A rumor in a
message board or group claiming the information you provided to the Census Bureau will be
publicly disclosed. . . . An advertisement on social media sharing fake 2020 Census websites and
inaccurate information. No matter what you find, let the Census Bureau know by contacting
rumors@census.gov.” Id.
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252. The Trust & Safety Team openly states that it coordinates with social-media platforms
to censor speech: “Trust & Safety Team coordinates and integrates our efforts with external
technology and social-media platforms, partner and stakeholder organizations, and cybersecurity
officials. . . . Leveraging best practices from the public and private sectors, the Trust & Safety
Team monitors all available channels and open platforms for misinformation and disinformation
about the census. Monitoring allows us to respond quickly to combat potential threats to achieving
an accurate count in traditional media, social media and other stakeholder communications. As
we discover misinformation and disinformation, the team will coordinate the responses with
partners and stakeholders.” Ron S. Jarmin, Why the Census Bureau is Establishing a “Trust &
Safety” Team, U.S. Census Bureau (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/
random-samplings/2019/12/why_the_census_burea.html. “Coordinating the responses with
partners and stakeholders,” evidently, means working with social-media platforms to censor
speech.
253. In other Census publications, Schwartz and other officials claim that “harnessing the
capabilities of social-media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram …
enables the Census Bureau to identify and respond to misinformation swiftly before it spreads.”
Zack Schwartz, Census Bureau Teams Up With Tech Giants to Connect With Millennials and
Other Hard-to-Count Population, U.S. Census Bureau (Jul. 16, 2019), https://www.census.gov/
library/stories/2019/07/hey-siri-why-is-2020-census-important.html. “The U.S. Census Bureau is
partnering with tech giants to … respond to disinformation before it spreads.” Census Spotlights:
Tech Companies, U.S. Census Bureau (2020), https://www.census.gov/library/spotlights/2020/
tech.html.
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254. Census also states that it has “partner[ed] with search engines” such as Google to de-
boost government-disfavored private content and promote Census-favored content instead.
Census Spotlights: Nextdoor, U.S. Census Bureau (2020), https://www.census.gov/library/
spotlights/2020/nextdoor.html.
255. Public reports indicate that Census teamed up with “Data & Society’s Disinformation
Action Lab” at the “Center for an Informed Public” at the University of Washington in a “behind-
the-scenes networked response to mis- and disinformation about the 2020 U.S. Census, an effort
that provides a model for future multi-stakeholder collaborations to mitigate the impacts of
communication harms.” CIP honors Data & Society’s Disinformation Action Lab for
collaboration to protect the 2020 U.S. Census from mis- and disinformation, U. Wash. Center for
an Informed Public (May 31, 2022), https://www.cip.uw.edu/2022/05/31/disinformation-action-
lab-data-society-census-misinformation.
256. The director of the Center for an Informed Public (CIP) is Kate Starbird, who also serves
on CISA’s advisory committee that advises CISA’s social-media censorship activities. According
to the CIP, “Beyond the Census Counts Campaign, DAL [i.e., the Disinformation Action Lab]
supported other national civil rights groups, local civil society groups, state and city government
officials, and worked with social-media companies, journalists, and the Census Bureau itself —
all to protect a complete and fair count from mis- and disinformation.” Id. (emphasis added).
257. As alleged further herein, Census officials also participate in censorship activities relating
to so-called COVID-19 misinformation.
258. On information and belief, as further alleged herein, all Defendants have been and are
engaged in federally-induced censorship of private speech on social media, in a manner that
directly interferes with and injures the free-speech rights of Plaintiffs and other Class Members.
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Biden Administration’s Expansion of Executive Department’s

Efforts to Induce Social Media Companies to Censor Speech
259. After the 2020 presidential election, the Biden Administration expanded enormously the
Executive Department’s efforts to induce social-media companies to block or demote speech,
turning those efforts into a hydra-headed, government-wide censorship campaign.
260. On December 2, 2020, Bruce Reed, Biden’s former chief of staff and top technical
advisor, publicly stated that “it’s long past time to hold the social-media companies accountable
for what’s published on their platforms.” Lauren Feiner, Biden Tech Advisor: Hold Social Media
Companies Accountable for What Their Users Post, CNBC (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/12/02/biden-advisor-bruce-reed-hints-that-section-230-needs-reform.html.
261. This comment, made during the transition, specifically referred to the amendment or
repeal of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. See id. Thus, the threat of adverse
legal consequences for social-media companies that did not censor speech the White House
disfavored was at the forefront of the incoming Biden Administration’s public messaging.
262. As stated earlier, immediately after Inauguration, the White House initiated “direct
engagement” with social-media companies to induce them to “clamp down” on speech the new
Administration disfavored.
263. The individually named White House Defendants and other Defendants were directly
involved in this “direct engagement” with social-media platforms about censorship and
suppression of speech on social-media.
264. For example, on or around March 1, 2021, Flaherty, Wakana, Humphrey, and Rowe
participated in a “Twitter // COVID Misinfo” meeting with Twitter.
265. On March 2, 2021, Facebook sent an email assuring Slavitt, Flaherty, and Humphrey that
the company is “[c]ombating vaccine misinformation and de-amplifying content that could
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contribute to vaccine hesitancy” by “improving the effectiveness of our existing enforcement
systems (particularly focusing on entities that repeatedly post vaccine misinformation), mitigating
viral content that could lead to vaccine hesitancy.”
266. A senior Facebook executive repeatedly emailed to Surgeon General Murthy, copying
Slavitt, assuring the Surgeon General and the White House that Facebook was censoring COVID-
19 content in accordance with the White House’s demands. On May 28, 2021, one of these emails
to Slavitt and Murthy reported that Facebook had expanded its censorship policies, evidently to
satisfy federal officials’ demands made at a recent oral meeting. The email stated that a “key
point” was that “We’re expanding penalties for individual Facebook accounts that share
misinformation.”
267. Among other things, the Facebook executive insisted that “[w]e’ve expanded penalties
for individual Facebook accounts that share misinformation.”
268. On September 18, 2021, regarding a story in the Wall Street Journal about COVID-19
“misinformation” circulating on Facebook, Flaherty demanded that Facebook provide an
explanation “as we have long asked for, [of] how big the problem is, what solutions you’re
implementing, and how effective they’ve been.” Needless to say, the “solutions” evidently
referred to policies to censor and suppress more private speech on Facebook’s platforms, and
Facebook promised to “brief” the White House on those.
269. The campaign included public pronouncements by the President, spokespersons for the
President, and a Cabinet Secretary demanding that social-media companies censor COVID-related
speech much more aggressively.
270. They also included the initiation and proliferation of ever-expanding, intensive networks
of regular meetings and secret communications between numerous federal agencies and the major
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social-media companies, with the goal of inducing those companies to censor constitutionally
protected speech.
271. On March 1, 2021, a Twitter employee wrote to Defendants Slavitt, Flaherty, Peck and
Humphrey after a meeting that the company was escalating efforts to remove harmful content
about COVID and introducing a strike system—apparently the outcome of the discussion that had
just occurred. This was following an email exchange in February of 2021 in which the same
employee had sought to update the four about “additional measure[s] Twitter taking regarding
covid [sic].”
272. In response to a third-party subpoena, Twitter has identified Crawford, Flaherty, Frisbie,
Kimmage, Lambert, Murthy, Shopkorn, Slavitt, and Waldo as federal officials “with whom
[Twitter] has had meetings or discussions between January 20, 2021 and August 4, 2022 about
election integrity, vaccine/Covid misinformation, violent extremism, and similar content
moderation issues.”
273. Similar communications were occurring regularly between Facebook and government
officials. On February 19, 2021, Defendant Flaherty, on an email between him, Humphrey,
Defendant Courtney Rowe, and Defendant Joshua Peck, and several Facebook employees as well,
asked to hear from the company about “mis and dis” and later stated that one of his questions was
about “algorithmic productions.” Flaherty also asked if “plans are in the works . . . to replicate the
strategy you deployed around lockdowns – the ‘stay at home’ stickers/promoted Instagram story.”
A meeting was apparently held pursuant to Flaherty’s request shortly thereafter on March 1, with
the subject being “Misinfo & Disinfo.” On February 24, 2021, a Facebook employee wrote to
Defendant Flaherty “Following upon your request for COVID-19 misinfo themes we are seeing,”
“we are removing these claims from our platforms[.]” Those themes were Vaccine Toxicity,”
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“False Claims About Side Effects of Vaccine,” “Comparing the Covid Vaccine to the Flu
Vaccine,” and “Downplaying Severity of Covid-19.” Flaherty responded later that day, asking for
a “sense of volume on these, and some metrics around the scale of removal for each[],” as well as
“misinformation that might be falling outside of your removal policies.” The Facebook employee
replied that she could “go into detail on content that doesn’t violate like below but could contribute
to vaccine hesitancy.” A different Facebook employee wrote to Defendants Slavitt, Flaherty, Peck,
and Humphrey on March 2, 2021, updating the White House on “vaccine intent” and “shar[ing]
survey based data on intent to vaccinate,” and relaying the ways that the company was combatting
“misinformation.” These methods included “improving the effectiveness of our existing
enforcement systems (particularly focusing on entities that repeatedly post vaccine
misinformation)” and “mitigating viral content that could lead to vaccine hesitancy” while
“promoting the vaccine and providing authoritative information.” Upon information and belief,
that means ensuring that posts departing from the government’s messaging on vaccines are
censored and de-amplified through the Facebook algorithm, while those conveying the
government’s message are amplified.
274. In response to a third-party subpoena, Facebook has identified Special Assistant to the
President Laura Rosenberger, White House Partnerships Manager Aisha Shah, White House
Counsel Dana Remus, and White House officials Slavitt, Flaherty, and Humphrey; HHS officials
Waldo, Byrd, Choi, Lambert, Peck, and Muhammed; EAC officials Muthig and Robbins; CDC
officials Crawford and Dempsey; DHS officials Masterson, Protentis, Hale, and Snell; and FDA
officials Thorpe, Jefferson, Murray, and Kimberly, among others, as federal officials who may
have “communicated with Facebook regarding content moderation between January 1, 2020 and
July 19, 2022 as it relates to: (i) COVID-19 misinformation; (ii) the Department of Homeland
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Security’s proposed Disinformation Governance Board; (iii) the New York Post story from
October 14, 2020 about Hunter Biden’s laptop computer; and/or (iv) election security, integrity,
outcomes, and/or public confidence in election outcomes (not to include issues of foreign
interference or related issues).” On information and belief, the FDA has participated in federally-
induced censorship of private speech on social media about questions of vaccine safety and
efficacy, among other subjects.
275. These communications were not just limited to Facebook and Twitter. On May 20, 2021,
Mina Hsiang of the Office of Management and Budget wrote to a Google employee, apparently
following up on a conversation from the previous day that was “critically helpful for the
nationwide vaccination effort.” Hsiang suggested a change to results yielded by a search for “who
can get vaccinated now.” The parties continued to collaborate on the subject, and eventually
arranged a meeting that was apparently held on May 27, 2021 and scheduled by Defendant Joshua
Peck. Defendant Andy Slavitt asked Peck and Hsiang to take his place on the call because he was
“slammed.” Sheila Walsh of HHS exchanged emails with employees at YouTube about combating
vaccine “misinformation” and arranged a meeting as well.
276. In response to a third-party subpoena, YouTube has identified Schwartz, Faught, Molina-
Irizarry, Galemore, Wakana, Flaherty, and Waldo, among others, as federal officials likely to have
“communicated with the YouTube custodians about misinformation about COVID, the census, or
elections.”
277. The State Department’s Global Engagement Center, including Stewart and other State
employees, were also involved in organizing a “misinformation and disinformation” workshop for
African governments in May 2021. Lauren Protentis of CISA and Joe Parentis, Deputy
Coordinator for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, were speakers at the event.
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The event was moderated by Elizabeth Vish of the State Department’s Office of Cyber
Coordinator. The agenda for the event included a presentation by Facebook on “How does
Facebook work with governments to address misinformation and disinformation?” This included
“Fact checking techniques, how to identify disinformation and misinformation” and “Proven
techniques to take down these articles.” Also included were such topics: “The effectiveness of
fake news checkers,” “Steps for stopping already-circulating misinformation,” and “International
takedown requests.” On information and belief, these statements reflected the collective
experience of CISA and the State Department in working to achieve social-media censorship of
domestic speech in America.
278. CISA officials—including Defendants Easterly, Masterson, Protentis, Hale, Scully, and
Snell, among others—have aggressively embraced the role of mediators of federally induced
censorship.
279. CISA states that its mission includes “directly engaging with social-media companies to
flag MDM” and that it is “working with federal partners to mature a whole-of-government
approach to mitigating risks of MDM,” which includes “framing which … interventions are
appropriate to the threats impacting the information environment.” CISA repeatedly and
frequently flags posts for censorship on social-media platforms, and continues to do so on an
ongoing basis.
280. CISA officials have flagged for censorship even obvious parody accounts, such as
accounts parodying the Colorado government that stated in their mock Twitter handles, “[Direct
message] us your weed store location (hoes be mad, but this is a parody account)” and “Smoke
weed erry day.” To such reports, Twitter responded, “We will escalate. Thank you,” and “We
have actioned these account [sic] under our civic integrity policy.”
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281. On May 5, 2021, Defendant Psaki gave a White House press conference at which she
stated that “[t]he President’s view is that the major platforms have a responsibility related to the
health and safety of all Americans to stop amplifying untrustworthy content, disinformation, and
misinformation, especially related to COVID-19, vaccinations, and elections. And we’ve seen that
over the past several months, broadly speaking…. we’ve seen it from a number of sources.” The
White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Secretary of Agriculture Tom
Vilsack, May 5, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/05/05/
press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-secretary-of-agriculture-tom-vilsack-may-5-
2021.
282. Psaki immediately went on to state that President Biden “supports . . . a robust anti-trust
program,” id. (emphasis added), thereby implicitly linking a threat of antitrust enforcement actions
against social-media companies to the demand for more aggressive censorship, stating that the
President’s “view is that there’s more that needs to be done to ensure that this type of
misinformation; disinformation; damaging, sometimes life-threatening information is not going
out to the American public.” Id.
283. At a White House press briefing with Psaki on July 15, 2021, Surgeon General Vivek
Murthy announced that “health misinformation” constitutes an “urgent public health threat,”
stating that he had “issued a Surgeon General’s Advisory on the dangers of health misinformation.
Surgeon General Advisories are reserved for urgent public health threats. And while those threats
have often been related to what we eat, drink, and smoke, today we live in a world where
misinformation poses an imminent and insidious threat to our nation’s health.” The White House,
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Surgeon General Dr. Vivek H. Murthy, July 15,
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2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/07/15/press-briefing- by-
press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-surgeon-general-dr-vivek-h-murthy-july-15-2021/.
284. Surgeon General Murthy stated that “[m]odern technology companies have enabled
misinformation to poison our information environment with little accountability to their users.
They’ve allowed people who intentionally spread misinformation — what we call ‘disinformation’
to have extraordinary reach.” Id. He accused their algorithms of “pulling us deeper and deeper
into a well of misinformation.” Id.
285. Surgeon General Murthy explicitly called for more aggressive censorship of social-
media speech, stating that “we’re saying we expect more from our technology companies. . . .
We’re asking them to monitor misinformation more closely. We’re asking them to consistently
take action against misinformation super-spreaders on their platforms.” Id. He also stated that
“technology companies have a particularly important role” to play in combating “misinformation.”
He stated: “We know that the dramatic increase in the speed and scale of spreading misinformation
has, in part, been enabled by these platforms. So that’s why in this advisory today, we are asking
them to step up. We know they have taken some steps to address misinformation, but much, much
more has to be done. And we can’t wait longer for them to take aggressive action because it’s
costing people their lives.” Id.
286. He also stated: “we are asking technology companies to help lift up the voices of credible
health authorities. . . . [T]hey have to do more to reduce the misinformation that’s out there so that
the true voices of experts can shine through.” Id.
287. At the same press briefing, after the Surgeon General spoke, Defendant Psaki stated:
“[W]e are in regular touch with these social-media platforms, and those engagements typically
happen through members of our senior staff, but also members of our COVID-19 team, given, as
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Dr. Murthy conveyed, this is a big issue of misinformation, specifically on the pandemic.” Id.
(emphasis added). She added, “We’re flagging problematic posts for Facebook that spread
disinformation.” Id. (emphasis added). She stated, “we have recommended—proposed that they
create a robust enforcement strategy,” i.e., a more aggressive censorship program. Id.
288. Psaki called on social-media companies to censor particular disfavored speakers, stating:
“[T]here’s about 12 people who are producing 65 percent of anti-vaccine misinformation on social-
media platforms. All of them remain active on Facebook, despite some even being banned on
other platforms, including Facebook — ones that Facebook owns.” Id.
289. The claim that “12 people” “are producing 65 percent of anti-vaccine misinformation on
social-media platforms,” which has been repeated innumerable times in the media, has no basis in
fact. It was first published by U.K. resident Imran Ahmed in a report that named the specific “12
people” at issue, and Psaki’s reference to “12 people” was intended to, and would have been
understood to, refer to those specific individuals, all of whom were well known to be harsh critics
of the government’s COVID policies.
290. In other words, the Administration was calling on the major social-media companies to
censor and silence specific individual dissidents.
291. Facebook itself has stated that the infamous “disinformation dozen” claim has no factual
support.
292. One of the “12 people” whom Psaki (falsely and defamatorily) accused of “producing
65% of anti-vaccine misinformation on social-media platforms” is Plaintiff Robert F. Kennedy Jr.
293. Psaki further called on Facebook and other social-media companies to censor disfavored
content and disfavored viewpoints: “[I]t’s important to take faster action against harmful posts.
As you all know, information travels quite quickly on social-media platforms; sometimes it’s not
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accurate. And Facebook needs to move more quickly to remove harmful, violative posts — posts
that will be within their policies for removal often remain up for days. That’s too long. The
information spreads too quickly.” Id.
294. She stated that “[w]e engage with them [i.e., social-media companies] regularly and they
certainly understand what our asks are.” Id. (emphasis added). She stated that, “we’ve made a
calculation to push back on misinformation,” and that “we are working to combat misinformation
that’s traveling online.” Id.
295. The same day, the Surgeon General released his advisory regarding “health
misinformation.” It defined “health misinformation” as “information that is false, inaccurate, or
misleading according to the best available evidence at the time. Misinformation has caused
confusion and led people to decline COVID-19 vaccines, reject public health measures such as
masking and physical distancing, and use unproven treatments.” Confronting Health
Misinformation: The U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory on Building a Healthy Information
Environment, (July 15, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-
misinformation-advisory.pdf.
296. The Surgeon General’s advisory called for social-medial companies to “make
meaningful long-term investments to address misinformation, including product changes,” to
“[r]edesign recommendation algorithms to avoid amplifying misinformation,” to “build in
‘frictions’— such as suggestions and warnings—to reduce the sharing of misinformation,” and to
“make it easier for users to report misinformation.” Id. It called on social-media companies to
“[s]trengthen the monitoring of misinformation,” and to censor disfavored speakers swiftly and
aggressively: “Prioritize early detection of misinformation ‘super-spreaders’ and repeat offenders.
Impose clear consequences for accounts that repeatedly violate platform policies.” Id.
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297. Facebook responded by stating that it was, in fact, aggressively censoring “health
misinformation,” and coordinating with the Government to do so. “A Facebook spokesperson said
the company has partnered with government experts, health authorities and researchers to take
‘aggressive action against misinformation about COVID-19 and vaccines to protect public
health.’” White House Slams Facebook as Conduit for COVID-19 Misinformation, Reuters (July
15, 2021) (emphasis added), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-surgeon-general-warns-over-
covid-19- misinformation-2021-07-15/. “‘So far we’ve removed more than 18 million pieces of
COVID misinformation, [and] removed accounts that repeatedly break these rules…,’ the
spokesperson added.” Id.
298. Facebook stated that it “has introduced rules against making certain false claims about
COVID-19 and its vaccines.” Id.
299. The next day, July 16, 2021, a reporter asked President Biden what he thought of COVID
misinformation on social media, and he responded, referring to platforms like Facebook, by
stating: “They’re killing people.” Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Cecilia Kang, They’re Killing People:
Biden Denounces Social Media for Virus Disinformation, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/us/politics/biden-facebook-social-media-covid.html. The
New York Times reported that “this week, White House officials went further and singled out
social-media companies for allowing false information to proliferate. That came after weeks of
failed attempts to get Facebook to turn over information detailing what mechanisms were in place
to combat misinformation about the vaccine, according to a person familiar with the matter.” Id.
300. After these comments from President Biden, a very senior executive at Facebook reached
out to Surgeon General Murthy to engage in damage control and appease the President’s wrath.
Soon thereafter, the same Facebook executive sent a text message to Surgeon General Murthy,
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noting that “it’s not great to be accused of killing people” and expressing that he was “keen to find
a way to deescalate and work together collaboratively.”
301. The same day, July 16, 2021, Psaki explicitly called for social-media companies to
coordinate with each other in censoring disfavored speakers, to ensure that such speakers are
completely muzzled. “You shouldn’t be banned from one platform and not others … for providing
misinformation out there.” The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, July
16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/07/16/press-briefing-
by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-july-16-2021/. On information and belief, social-media companies
have heeded this demand, and they do, in fact, coordinate extensively with each other in censorship
of disfavored speakers, speech, and viewpoints on social media.
302. Psaki also demanded that social-media companies “create robust enforcement
strategies,” “tak[e] faster action against harmful posts,” and “promot[e] quality information
algorithms”—which is a euphemism for algorithms that suppress disfavored messages. Id. When
asked whether Facebook’s already-aggressive censorship—it claimed to have suppressed 18
million pieces of COVID-19-related “misinformation”—was “sufficient,” she responded, “Clearly
not, because we’re talking about additional steps that should be taken.” Id.
303. Four days later, July 20, 2021, the White House explicitly threatened to amend or repeal
the liability protections of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act if social-media companies
did not increase censorship of disfavored speakers and viewpoints. Matthew Brown, ‘They Should
Be Held Accountable’: White House Reviews Platforms’ Misinformation Liability, USA Today
(July 20, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/20/white-house-reviews-
section-230-protections-covid-misinformation/8024210002/. The White House communications
director announced that “[t]he White House is assessing whether social-media platforms are
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legally liable for misinformation spread on their platforms.” Id. “We’re reviewing that, and
certainly, they should be held accountable,” she said. Id.
304. She “specified the White House is examining how misinformation fits into the liability
protections granted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields online
platforms from being responsible for what is posted by third parties on their sites.” Id. Media
reported that, in connection with this threat, “Relations are tense between the Biden administration
and social-media platforms, specifically Facebook, over the spread of misinformation online.”
Brown, ‘They Should Be Held Accountable,’ USA Today (July 20, 2021); see also, e.g., Jessica
Bursztynsky, White House says social media networks should be held accountable for spreading
misinformation, CNBC (July 20, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/20/white-house-social-
networks-should-be-held-accountable-for-spreading-misinfo.html. When asked whether the
President is “open to amending 230 when Facebook and Twitter and other social media outlets
spread false information that cause Americans harm, shouldn’t they be held accountable in a real
way?” White House Communications Director Bedingfield responded, “We’re reviewing that and
certainly they should be held accountable. And I think you heard the president speak very
aggressively about this. He understands that this is an important piece of the ecosystem.” Id.
305. After this series of public statements, responding to “White House pressure,” Facebook
censored the accounts of the 12 specific disfavored speakers (including Plaintiff Kennedy) whom
Psaki accused of spreading health misinformation. Oliver Darcy, Facebook takes action against
‘disinformation dozen’ after White House pressure, CNN (Aug. 18, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/18/tech/facebook-disinformation-dozen/index.html. Psaki had
“hammered the platform in July for allowing the people identified in the report to remain on its
platform.” Id. After they were singled out for censorship by the White House, Facebook “removed
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over three dozen Pages, groups and Facebook or Instagram accounts linked to these 12 people,
including at least one linked to each of the 12 people, for violating our policies.” Id.
306. On the same day, July 20, 2021, Humphrey emailed Facebook asking for the takedown
of an Instagram account parodying Fauci. In less than two minutes, Facebook replied, “Yep, on
it!” Soon thereafter, Facebook reported that the account had been censored.
307. On July 23, 2021, the aforementioned senior Facebook executive sent an email to
Surgeon General Murthy stating, “I wanted to make sure you saw the steps we took just this past
week to adjust policies on what we are removing with respect to misinformation, as well as steps
taken to further address the ‘disinfo dozen’: we removed 17 additional Pages, Groups, and
Instagram accounts tied to the disinfo dozen.” Again, on August 20, 2021, the same Facebook
executive emailed Murthy to assure him that Facebook “will shortly be expanding our COVID
policies to further reduce the spread of potentially harmful content on our platform. These changes
will apply across Facebook and Instagram,” and they included “increasing the strength of our
demotions for COVID and vaccine- related content” and “making it easier to have
Pages/Groups/Accounts demoted for sharing COVID and vaccine-related misinformation.” In
addition, that senior Facebook executive sent a “Facebook bi-weekly covid content report” to
Surgeon General Murthy and to White House official Andrew Slavitt, evidently to reassure these
federal officials that Facebook’s suppression of COVID-19 “misinformation” was aggressive
enough for their preferences.
308. In the same time frame, Twitter permanently suspended the account of prominent
lockdown critic Alex Berenson, despite repeated reassurances from high-level Twitter executives
that his account was safe, just days after Dr. Fauci singled him out as a danger for suggesting
young people might reasonably decline the vaccine.
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309. Berenson disclosed internal Twitter communications revealing that senior “WH”
officials including Andrew Slavitt specifically pressured Twitter to deplatform Berenson, an
influential vaccine critic—which Twitter did. This pressure to deplatform Berenson evidently
occurred on April 21, 2021, when four Twitter employees participated in a Zoom meeting with at
least three White House officials and one HHS official, intending to allow the White House to
“partner” with Twitter in censoring COVID-related “misinfo.” The meeting invitation stated:
“White House Staff will be briefed by Twitter on vaccine misinfo. Twitter to cover trends seen
generally around vaccine misinformation, the tangible effects seen from recent policy changes,
what interventions are currently being implemented in addition to previous policy changes, and
ways the White House (and our COVID experts) can partner in product work.” (Emphasis added).
310. The next day, April 22, Twitter employees noted in internal communications that the
White House officials had posed “tough” questions during this meeting, including “one really
tough question about why Alex Berenson hasn’t been kicked off the platform.” See Alex
Berenson, The White House privately demanded Twitter ban me months before the company did
so, Unreported Truths (Aug. 12, 2022), https://alexberenson.substack.com/p/the-white-house-
privately-demanded. On July 11, 2021, Dr. Fauci publicly described Berenson’s public statements
on vaccines as “horrifying.” Soon thereafter, after President Biden’s subsequent statement that
“They’re killing people” by not censoring vaccine “misinformation,” Twitter caved to federal
pressure and permanently suspended Berenson.
311. On October 29, 2021, the Surgeon General tweeted from his official account (as opposed
to his personal account, which remains active), in a thread: “We must demand Facebook and the
rest of the social media ecosystem take responsibility for stopping health misinformation on their
platforms. The time for excuses and half measures is long past. We need transparency and
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accountability now. The health of our country is at stake.” See https://twitter.com/
Surgeon_General/status/1454181191494606854.
312. In another concerning exchange on October 31, 2021, Deputy Assistant to the President
Rob Flaherty emailed a contact at Facebook with a link to a Washington Post article complaining
about the spread of COVID “misinformation” on Facebook. The email contained only the link to
that story with the subject line, “not even sure what to say at this point.” The Facebook official
defended Facebook’s practices, and assured Mr. Flaherty that Facebook’s internal studies were
intended to “improve our defenses against harmful vaccine misinformation,” and that Facebook
had, in fact, “improved our policies,” i.e., increased censorship of online speech.
313. Defendants’ response to this censorship was to demand still more censorship by social-
media platforms, including but not limited to Facebook. “[A]fter Facebook’s action against the
‘disinformation dozen,’ a White House spokesperson continued to strongly criticize the company.”
Darcy, Facebook takes action against ‘disinformation dozen’ after White House pressure, CNN
(Aug. 18, 2021). “‘In the middle of a pandemic, being honest and transparent about the work that
needs to be done to protect public health is absolutely vital, but Facebook still refuses to be
straightforward about how much misinformation is circulating—and being actively promoted—
on their platform,’ a White House spokesperson told CNN Business. ‘It’s on everyone to get this
right so we can make sure the American people are getting accurate information to protect the
health of themselves and their loved ones—which is why the Administration will continue to push
leaders, media outlets, and leading sources of information like Facebook to meet those basic
expectations,’ the spokesperson added.” Id.
314. On information and belief, active coordination between Facebook and the FBI on
censorship and suppression of speech on social media continues to this day. For example,
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Facebook “now appears to be monitoring private messages and suppressing material related to the
whistleblower complaint of … FBI special agent Steve Friend.” Miranda Devine, Facebook
‘silencing’ activity related to FBI whistleblower Steve Friend, N.Y. Post (Sept. 25, 2022),
https://nypost.com/2022/09/25/facebook-silencing-activity-related-to-fbi-whistleblower-steve-
friend/.
315. After Friend made public allegations critical of political bias at the FBI, the
whistleblower’s “wife’s Facebook account was suspended after she responded to an offer of
support from a local chapter” of a supportive “conservative group that advocates for parental
rights.” Id. The wife responded to the group with a private message from her Facebook account,
stating that “her husband was in the process of obtaining permission from the FBI to speak publicly
and asked them to encourage their members to share his whistleblower story on their personal
social media accounts.” Id. “About 30 minutes later, Mrs. Friend received a notification from
Facebook that her account had been suspended because the ‘account, or activity on it, doesn’t
follow our Community Standards.’” Id. At the receiving end, “Mrs. Friend’s Facebook message
disappeared. In its place was a notification saying, ‘Message unavailable.’” Id. Thus, it now
appears that Facebook is policing private messages sent on Facebook to censor and suppress any
communications that might be critical of the FBI.
316. The State Department has inserted itself in efforts to combat so-called Covid-19
“disinformation.” State provides an online briefing dated January 21, 2022, entitled “COVID-19
Fact Checking: What Journalists Need to Know,” which “provides information about fact-
checking resources available to journalists to counter COVID-19 and vaccine misinformation, and
an overview of counter-misinformation efforts around the world.”
317. Facebook reported to Rowe, Flaherty, and Slavitt that it has “labeled and demoted”
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“vaccine humor posts whose content could discourage vaccination” during January 2022. It also
reported to the White House that it “labeled and demoted” posts “suggesting natural immunity to
COVID-19 infection is superior to immunity by the COVID-19 vaccine.” Likewise, on
November 4, 2021, Facebook reported to Rowe, Flaherty, and other White House officials that
“we updated our misinformation policies for COVID-19 vaccines to make clear that they apply
to claims about children….”
318. On February 1, 2022, Psaki was asked at a White House press conference whether the
Administration was satisfied with Spotify’s decision to affix advisory warnings to Joe Rogan’s
immensely popular podcast, which featured speakers that contradicted the Administration’s
messaging about COVID-19 and vaccines, or whether the government “think[s] that companies
like Spotify should go further than just, you know, putting a label on” disfavored viewpoints and
speakers. Psaki responded by demanding that Spotify and other platforms “do[] more” to block
disfavored speech: “[O]ur hope is that all major tech platforms … be vigilant to ensure the
American people have access to accurate information on something as significant as COVID-19.
So, this disclaimer – it’s a positive step. But we want every platform to continue doing more to
call out … mis- and disinformation while also uplifting accurate information.” She stated that
Spotify’s advisory warnings are “a good step, it’s a positive step, but there’s more that can be
done.” The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, February 1, 2022
(emphases added), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/02/01/press-
briefing- by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-february-1-2022/.
319. On February 17, 2022, Lauren Protentis of CISA emailed contacts at Microsoft and
stated: “The Department of Treasury has asked our team for appropriate POCs [i.e., points of
contact] to discuss social media and influence matters. We’d like to make a connection to
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Microsoft if you’re amenable? This is somewhat time-sensitive, so thanks in advance to your
attention to this matter.” The email was forwarded to recent CISA alumnus, now Microsoft
employee, Matthew Masterson, who exchanged the text messages with Jen Easterly quoted above.
Masterson responded, “Send em to me. I will make sure [the other Microsoft contact] is looped
in.” Separately, Masterson’s colleague at Microsoft responded that “Matt [Masterson] and I can
be the primary POCs for the introduction.” Protentis responded, “We’re going to pass your info
to Treasury. They will reach-out directly and provide more information about the nature of this
request.”
320. On February 17, 2022, Protentis sent a similar email to Yoel Roth of Twitter (Nina
Jankowicz’s contact who was scheduled to attend the April 2022 meeting with Robert Silvers and
senior DHS officials), asking for a Twitter point of contact for Treasury to “discuss social media
and influence matters.” After Roth responded, Protentis stated that “Treasury . . . will reach-out
directly to begin the dialogue and provide more information about the nature of this request.”
321. On February 17, 2022, Protentis reached out to a contact at Google, asking that “[t]he
Department of Treasury has asked our team for appropriate POCs to discuss social media and
influence matters. We’d like to make the connection to Google if you’re amenable?” Protentis
followed up just over an hour later, stating, “Apologies for the second email, this is somewhat
time-sensitive, so thank you for your prompt attention to this request!” When the Google contact
responded, Protentis replied, “We’re going to pass your info to Treasury. They will reach-out
directly and provide more information about the nature of this request.”
322. On February 17, 2022, Protentis reached out to contacts at Facebook and stated, “The
Deputy Secretary at Treasury [Wally Adeyemo] would like to be connected to industry partners to
discuss potential influence operations on social media. We’d like to make the connection to
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Facebook if you’re amenable?” On information and belief, the nearly identically-phrased inquiries
to Twitter and Microsoft that Protentis sent on the same day were also sent at Adeyemo’s request.
323. On information and belief, these messages reflect the participation of Treasury and
Adeyemo in federal censorship activities.
324. On March 3, 2022, the Surgeon General issued a formal “Request for Information” (RFI)
on the “Impact of Health Misinformation” on social media. HHS, Impact of Health
Misinformation in the Digital Information Environment in the United States Throughout the
COVID-19 Pandemic Request for Information, 87 Fed. Reg. 12,712-12,714 (Mar. 2, 2022).
325. In the RFI, “[t]he Office of the Surgeon General requests input from interested parties on
the impact and prevalence of health misinformation in the digital information environment during
the COVID–19 pandemic.” Id. at 12,712. The RFI states that “the speed, scale, and sophistication
with which misinformation has been spread during the COVID-19 pandemic has been
unprecedented,” and it implies that social-media companies are to blame, carrying a clear threat of
future regulation: “This RFI seeks to understand both the impact of health misinformation during
the COVID–19 pandemic and the unique role that technology and social-media platforms play in
the dissemination of critical health information during a public health emergency.” Id. at 12,713.
326. The RFI seeks specific information about health “misinformation” on such social- media
platforms: “Information about how widespread COVID–19 misinformation is on individual
technology platforms including: General search engines, content sharing platforms, social-media
platforms, e-commerce platforms, crowd sourced platforms, and instant messaging systems.” Id.
327. The RFI seeks: “Any aggregate data and analysis on how many users were exposed, were
potentially exposed, or otherwise engaged with COVID–19 misinformation,” where “[e]xposure
is defined as seeing content in newsfeeds, in search results, or algorithmically nominated content,”
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and “[p]otential exposure is the exposure users would have had if they could see all the content
that is eligible to appear within their newsfeeds.” Id. at 12,714. It also seeks “[i]nformation about
COVID–19 misinformation policies on individual technology platforms,” including “[a]ny
aggregate data and analysis of technology platform COVID–19 misinformation policies including
implementation of those policies and evaluations of their effectiveness.” Id.
328. Media reports aptly described Murthy as “demand[ing]” information about the major
sources of COVID-19 misinformation by May 2, 2022. Brad Dress, Surgeon General Demands
Data on COVID-19 Misinformation from Major Tech Firms, The Hill (March 3, 2022),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/596709-surgeon-general-demands-data-on-covid-19-
misinformation-from-major-tech/. “In a formal notice, Murthy requested major tech platforms
submit information about the prevalence and scale of COVID-19 misinformation on their sites,
from social networks, search engines, crowdsourced platforms, e-commerce platforms and instant
messaging systems.” Id. “In his notice to major tech platforms, Murthy is requesting specific
information on demographics affected by misinformation as well as sources of misinformation and
‘exactly how many users saw or may have been exposed to instances of Covid-19
misinformation.’” Id.
CDC and Census Bureau Collusion in and Inducement of

Social Media Censorship of COVID-Related Speech
329. On or around July 27, 2022, a limited number of emails between CDC officials and
representatives of social-media platforms from late 2020 and early months of 2021 became
publicly available, over a year after they had been requested under FOIA. These emails—which
are attached as Exhibit A to First Am. Compl., Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM
(W.D. La.), ECF No. 45-1 [hereinafter CDC Emails]—confirm the allegations of collusion
between HHS officials and social-media platforms to censor disfavored speech, speakers, and
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viewpoints, as alleged herein.
330. These emails indicate that Defendant Carol Y. Crawford of CDC and other CDC officials
frequently communicated and coordinated with social-media platforms, including Facebook,
Twitter, Google/YouTube, and Instagram, regarding the censorship of speech on social-media
platforms, including flagging specific content for censorship. During 2021, Crawford organized
“Be On the Lookout” or “BOLO” meetings on “misinformation” with representatives of social-
media platforms—including Twitter, Facebook, and Google/YouTube—in which she and other
federal officials colluded and/or collude with those platforms about speech to target for
suppression. These meetings include Crawford and other federal officials flagging specific social-
media posts for censorship and providing examples of the types of posts to censor. Crawford
emailed “slides” from the “BOLO” meetings to participants afterwards. These slides included
repeated examples of specific posts on social-media platforms flagged for censorship. The slides
called for “all” social-media platforms to “Be On the Lookout” for such posts. Crawford cautioned
the meeting participants, with respect to these slides, “[p]lease do not share outside your trust and
safety teams.”
331. These efforts go back as far as very early 2020, and they continue through the present
day, as evidenced by Facebook employees writing to high-level officials in HHS and the State
Department informing them of new attempts to “control information and misinformation related
to Corona virus [sic] which includes links to WHO page as well as removal of misinformation.”
332. On April 26, 2020, Defendant Muhammed wrote to Facebook employees and asked them
to take down Facebook pages, and deactivate associated accounts, misrepresenting themselves as
Administration for Children and Families Program (ACF). One of those employees responded,
“Absolutely.” Defendant Christy Choi, Deputy Director in the Office of Communications within
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HHS had exchanges with Facebook asking it to change the name of a Facebook page providing
“misleading information about vaccine” “[g]iven the administration’s focus on getting more
Americans vaccinated.”
333. Officials of the Census Bureau participated and/or participate in these BOLO meetings,
including Defendant Jennifer Shopkorn and Christopher Lewitzke, who is a Senior Digital
Marketing Associate with Reingold, a communications firm that was, on information and belief,
acting on behalf of the Census Bureau. Crawford’s emails indicate that the Census Bureau and its
officials and agents, such as Lewitzke and Shopkorn, play an important, active, and ongoing role in
colluding with social-media platforms to censor disfavored speech. On March 18, 2021, Crawford
emailed Twitter officials and stated that “[w]e are working on a project with Census to leverage
their infrastructure to identify and monitor social media for vaccine misinformation.” She added,
“We would like the opportunity to work with your trust team on a regular basis to discuss what
we are seeing.” She also noted that “I understand that you did this with Census last year as well.”
Twitter responded by stating, “With our CEO testifying before Congress this week is tricky,” but
otherwise agreed to the collusive arrangement. Likewise, in subsequent emails to Twitter (on May
6) and Facebook (on May 10), Crawford noted to the social-media platform officials that “[o]ur
census team,” i.e., Lewitzke and Shopkorn, who were cc’ed on the emails, “has much more info
on it if needed” regarding “some example posts” of “misinfo” that she flagged for censorship.
334. Defendants Crawford and others, including the Census officials and agents Lewitzke
and Shopkorn, took other steps to procure the censorship of disfavored speech on social media.
For example, on May 10, 2021, Crawford emailed Twitter officials to flag “two issues that we are
seeing a great deal of misinfo about,” noting that Lewitzke and Shopkorn “ha[ve] much more
info on it if needed.” The same email included 13 specific Twitter posts as examples of the sort
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of posts to be censored. On May 6, 2021, Crawford sent a similar email to Facebook officials,
also copying Lewitzke and Shophorn and stating that they have “much more info” about the issue;
this email included 16 specific posts from Facebook and Instagram as examples of posts to be
targeted for censorship. On May 12, 2021, Crawford emailed Facebook officials to flag “some
new info on myths your misinfo folks might be interested in,” with links to specific issues of
“misinformation” for Facebook to censor. On April 9, 2021, Crawford agreed with a Twitter
official that CDC would provide “examples of problematic content” posted on Twitter, and the
Twitter official noted that “all examples of misinformation are helpful.” Calendar invites from
early 2021 indicate that Crawford, Jay Dempsey, and other CDC officials participated in
Facebook’s “weekly sync with CDC,” with “CDC to invite other agencies as needed.”
335. Moreover, many of these substantive communications from federal officials flagging
specific posts and content for censorship also appear to occur through alternative channels of
communication. For example, Facebook trained CDC and Census Bureau officials on how to use
a “Facebook misinfo reporting channel.” Twitter offered federal officials a privileged channel for
flagging misinformation through a “Partner Support Portal.” YouTube has disclosed that it granted
“trusted flagger” status to Census Bureau officials, which allows privileged and expedited
consideration of their claims that content should be censored.
336. In another exchange of emails, Crawford agreed with Facebook officials that CDC
would participate in a COVID-19 “misinfo reporting channel,” and arranged for CDC officials to
have training on the use of Facebook’s “misinfo reporting channel.” On information and belief,
Crawford’s “team” at CDC, as well as Shopkorn and Lewitzke from Census, were “onboarded”
onto Facebook’s “misinfo reporting channel.” A calendar invite in May 2021 included Crawford,
Lewitzke, Shopkorn, other CDC officials, and other Reingold employees who were, on
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information and belief, acting on behalf of the Census Bureau, to participate in the “onboarding”
onto Facebook’s “misinfo reporting channel.”
337. Crawford’s communications with Facebook indicate that CDC, the Census Bureau, and
other government agencies collaborate with Facebook to flag speech regarding both COVID- 19
and elections for censorship using “CrowdTangle,” which Facebook describes as “a Facebook
tool that tracks how content spreads online.” An email from a Facebook official to Crawford stated
that, using CrowdTangle, “[w]hen health departments flag potential vaccine misinformation on
Facebook and Instagram, we review and remove the content if it violates our policies… This is
similar to how governments and fact-checkers use CrowdTangle ahead of elections….”
(Emphasis added.)
338. Additional communications between CDC and social-media platforms reflect an
ongoing, close, and continuing collaboration, effectively amounting to a joint enterprise, on
censorship of COVID-19 “misinformation” and related issues. See CDC Emails. For example,
the communications reflect close coordination on creating and publishing content on behalf of
CDC on social-media platforms, and artificially “amplifying” government messaging on social-
media to the suppression of private messaging, including a gift of $15 million in Facebook ad
credits from Facebook to CDC. They also reflect close coordination on amplifying CDC’s content
and other related issues.
DHS Collusion in and Inducement of Censorship of

Election-Related and Other Constitutionally Protected Speech
339. DHS and its officials are actively engaged in the campaign to procure the censorship of
disfavored speakers, content, and viewpoints, particular with respect to speech concerning so-
called “election integrity.”
340. On May 3, 2021, it was reported that DHS intended to “partner with private firms,” i.e.,
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social-media companies, to monitor disfavored speech online. Zachary Cohen & Katie Bo
Williams, Biden team may partner with private firms to monitor extremist chatter online, CNN
(May 3, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/03/politics/dhs-partner-private-firms-surveil-
suspected-domestic-terrorists/index.html.
341. The purpose of these “partnerships” was to evade legal, constitutional, and ethical
problems with DHS’s direct surveillance of online speech: “The Department of Homeland
Security is limited in how it can monitor citizens online without justification and is banned from
activities like assuming false identities to gain access to private messaging apps.” Id. “Instead,
federal authorities can only browse through unprotected information on social media sites like
Twitter and Facebook and other open online platforms.” Id. “The plan being discussed inside
DHS, according to multiple sources, would, in effect, allow the department to circumvent those
limits.” Id. “Outsourcing some information gathering to outside firms would give DHS the benefit
of tactics that it isn’t legally able to do in-house, such as using false personas to gain access to
private groups used by suspected extremists, sources say.” Id.
342. As noted above, on May 5, 2021, Defendant Psaki stated at a White House press
conference that “[t]he President’s view is that the major platforms have a responsibility related to
the health and safety of all Americans to stop amplifying untrustworthy content, disinformation,
and misinformation, especially related to COVID-19, vaccinations, and elections.” The White
House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack,
May 5, 2021 (emphasis added), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/
2021/05/05/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-secretary-of-agriculture-tom-vilsack-
may-5-2021. Psaki immediately went on to state that President Biden “supports better privacy
protections and a robust anti-trust program.” Id. (emphasis added). And she stated that the
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President’s “view is that there’s more that needs to be done to ensure that this type of
misinformation; disinformation; damaging, sometimes life-threatening information is not going
out to the American public.” Id.
343. In the same press conference, Psaki notoriously went on to state, “We’re flagging
problematic posts for Facebook that spread disinformation.” Id. On information and belief,
especially in light of Psaki’s earlier reference to speech about “elections,” this statement about
“flagging problematic posts” referred not just to social-media speech about COVID-19, but also
social-media speech about election integrity. See, e.g., Reuters Staff, White House says social-
media platforms should not amplify ‘untrustworthy’ content, Reuters (May 5, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/ctech-us-trump-facebook-biden-idCAKBN2CM1XU-OCATC
344. In June 2021, the National Security Council released its “National Strategy for
Countering Domestic Terrorism.” See The White House, National Strategy for Countering
Domestic Terrorism (June 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/
06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.
345. The “National Strategy” repeatedly claimed that “disinformation and misinformation”
are important elements of “domestic terrorism.” Id. at 9. It claimed that the “ideologies” of
domestic terrorists “connect and intersect with conspiracy theories and other forms of
disinformation and misinformation.” Id. (emphasis added). It stated that such “elements” of
domestic terrorism “can combine and amplify threats to public safety,” “[e]specially on Internet-
based communications platforms such as social-media.” Id. (emphasis added). It stated that
DHS and others “are currently funding and implementing or planning” programs to “strengthen[]
user resilience to disinformation and misinformation online for domestic audiences.” Id. at 20.
The Strategy memo identified, as its “broader priority,” the task of “enhancing faith in government
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and addressing the extreme polarization, fueled by a crisis of disinformation and misinformation
often channeled through social-media platforms, which can tear Americans apart….” Id. at 29
(emphasis added). And it called for DHS and others to “accelerat[e] work to contend with an
information environment that challenges healthy democratic discourse,” and to “find[] ways to
counter the influence and impact” of online disinformation. Id.
346. On July 26, 2021, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), an
“organization formed by some of the biggest U.S. tech companies including Facebook and
Microsoft,” which includes DHS on its board of advisors, announced that it is “significantly
expanding the types of extremist content shared between firms in a key database,” to move from
images and videos to content-based speech tracking. Reuters, Facebook and tech giants to target
attacker manifestos, far-right militias in database, https://www.reuters.com/technology/
exclusive-facebook-tech-giants-target-manifestos-militias- database-2021-07-26/.
347. “GIFCT … was created in 2017 under pressure from U.S. and European governments,”
and “its database mostly contains digital fingerprints of videos and images related to groups on
the U.N. Security Council’s consolidated sanctions list and a few specific live- streamed attacks.”
Id. “Until now, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s (GIFCT) database has focused
on videos and images from terrorist groups on a United Nations list,” but now the group
announced that it would move into content-based speech tracking. Id. On information and belief,
DHS officials, including Defendants, have access to such database(s) as tools to advance
censorship of online speech.
348. Shortly thereafter, on August 2, 2021, DHS Secretary Mayorkas announced that DHS
was working directly with social-media companies to censor disfavored speech on social- media
platforms. “On [a] broadcast of MSNBC’s ‘Andrea Mitchell Reports,’ DHS Secretary Alejandro
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Mayorkas stated that the department is working with tech companies ‘that are the platform for
much of the disinformation that reaches the American public, how they can better use their terms
of use to really strengthen the legitimate use of their very powerful platforms and prevent harm
from occurring.’” Ian Hanchett, Mayorkas: We’re Working with Platforms on ‘How They Can
Better Use’ Their Terms to ‘Prevent Harm’ from Misinformation, Breitbart News (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2021/08/02/mayorkas-were-workgin-with-platforms-on-how-
they-can-better-use-their-terms-to-prevent-harm-from-misinformation/.
349. Echoing Psaki’s comments at the July 15, 2021, news conference with Surgeon General
Murthy, Mayorkas stated: “So, we’re working together with them. We’re working with the tech
companies that are the platform for much of the disinformation that reaches the American public,
how they can better use their terms of use to really strengthen the legitimate use of their very
powerful platforms and prevent harm from occurring.” Id. On information and belief, the
reference to “us[ing] their terms of use to really strengthen the legitimate use of their very powerful
platforms and prevent harms from occurring” refers to government-induced censorship of
disfavored viewpoints, speakers, and content.
350. Mayorkas added that there was a federal-government-wide effort to police speech on
social media, stating: “[T]he connectivity between speech and violence, the connectivity between
active harm and speech is something that we’re very focused on, and it’s a difficult challenge.
But we’re working on it and meeting that challenge, again, because of the great personnel of the
Department of Homeland Security and across the federal enterprise.” Id. (emphasis added).
351. Soon after Mayorkas’s August 2, 2021 comments, DHS officials began plotting to create
a “Disinformation Governance Board” within DHS. See Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213-
TAD-KDM (W.D. La.), ECF No. 10-1, at 19-23 (Glenn Decl. Ex. 1, at 6-10). On September 13,
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2021, senior DHS officials Robert Silvers and Samantha Vinograd sent a memorandum to
Secretary Mayorkas recommending the creation of the Disinformation Governance Board. The
opening sentence of the Memorandum noted that the Board’s purpose would be to combat “[t]he
spread of disinformation” regarding “[c]onspiracy theories about the validity and security of
elections,” including “disinformation surrounding the validity of the 2020 election,” and
“[d]isinformation related to the origins and effects of COVID- 19 vaccines or the efficacy of
masks,” which “undercut[] public health efforts to combat the pandemic.” Id. at 19.
352. The same Memorandum noted that CISA was involved in flagging content for
censorship on social-media platforms: “Leading up to the 2020 election, CISA relayed reports of
election disinformation from election officials to social media platform operators.” Id. at 20. The
Memorandum called for the Board to perform “partner engagement” with “private sector entities
[and] tech platforms.” Id. at 22.
353. In a subsequent Memorandum dated January 31, 2022, DHS officials indicated that the
Board’s activities would oversee extensive pre-existing social-media censorship activities by
other federal officials and agencies: “The Board will also support and coordinate … MDM work
with other departments and agencies, the private sector, and non-government actors.” Id. at 24.
This Memorandum attached the Board’s Charter, which stated that its mission was to “guide and
support the Department’s efforts to address mis-, dis-, and mal-information.” Id. at 27. It also
stated that the Board would “harmonize and support coordination with … the private sector.” Id.
The Charter called for the Board to “coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize departmental efforts to
address MDM,” including between “DHS Components” and “interagency partners,” and “serving
as the Department’s internal and external point of contact for coordination with … the private
sector … regarding MDM.” Id. at 28-29.
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354. Under continuous pressure from federal officials, including Defendants herein, social-
media firms have imposed increasingly draconian censorship on core political speech about
election integrity. For example, in March 2022, YouTube imposed a one-week suspension on The
Hill, a well-known political publication covering Congress, for posts that included clips of former
President Trump’s speech at the CPAC conference and interview on Fox News, which included
claims that fraud changed the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. Gilead Edelman, Beware
the Never-Ending Disinformation Emergency, The Wired (Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.wired.
com/story/youtube-rigged-election-donald-trump-moderation-misinformation/.
355. YouTube relied on its “Elections misinformation policy,” under which it censors
“Content that advances false claims that widespread fraud, errors, or glitches changed the outcome
of select past national elections, after final election results are officially certified.” YouTube,
Elections Misinformation Policy (emphasis added), https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
10835034?hl=en.
356. This policy is openly content- and viewpoint-based—it applies only to “select” past
national elections, and “[u]nder the policy, you can only include those claims if you explicitly
debunk or condemn them.” Edelman, supra. On information and belief, this policy is also
selective in application, as it is not applied to censor widespread, false Democratic claims that
supposed “collusion” between the Trump campaign and Russia changed the outcome of the 2016
presidential election. And “by asking news hosts to explicitly denounce any mention of election
fraud, YouTube isn’t just making its own content decisions; it’s injecting itself into the editorial
processes of actual media outlets.” Id.
357. On November 10, 2021, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
an agency within DHS, announced that it was “beefing up its disinformation and misinformation
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team in the wake of a divisive presidential election that saw a proliferation of misleading
information online.” Maggie Miller, Cyber agency beefing up disinformation, misinformation
team, The Hill (Nov. 10, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/580990-cyber-agency-
beefing-up-disinformation-misinformation-team/. “‘I am actually going to grow and strengthen
my misinformation and disinformation team,’ CISA Director Jen Easterly said.” Id. Defendant
Easterly said that so-called “disinformation” and “misinformation” pose “a top threat for CISA,
which is charged with securing critical infrastructure, to confront.” Id.
358. Easterly claimed that social-media speech is a form of “infrastructure,” and that policing
speech online by the federal government falls within her agency’s mission to protect
“infrastructure,” stating that CISA is “in the business of critical infrastructure, and the most
critical infrastructure is our cognitive infrastructure, so building that resilience to misinformation
and disinformation, I think, is incredibly important.” Id.
359. Easterly announced that CISA was working directly with unnamed “partners in the
private sector” and other government agencies to police online speech: “We are going to work
with our partners in the private sector and throughout the rest of the government and at the
department to continue to ensure that the American people have the facts that they need to help
protect our critical infrastructure.” Id.
360. Easterly texted with Matthew Masterson about “trying to get us in a place where Fed can
work with platforms to better understand the mis/dis trends so relevant agencies can try to
prebunk/debunk as useful,” and complained about the Government’s need to overcome the social-
media platforms’ “hesitation” to working with the government: “Platforms have got to get more
comfortable with gov’t. It’s really interesting how hesitant they remain.”
361. With specific reference to hotly disputed election-integrity issues, Easterly stated that
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Americans should not be allowed to “pick [their] own facts” and make their own decisions about
what is true, especially regarding election security: “We now live in a world where people talk
about alternative facts, post-truth, which I think is really, really dangerous if you get to pick your
own facts, and it’s particularly corrosive when you talk about matters of election security.” Id.
Instead, she indicated, federal officials like herself should intervene to help Americans “pick” the
right “facts.” Id.
362. CISA appears to be the focus of many of DHS’s attempts to police the content of speech
and viewpoints on social media. On information and belief, CISA maintains a number of task
forces, working groups, and similar organizations as joint government-private enterprises,
which provide avenues for government officials to push for censorship of disfavored viewpoints
and speakers online. CISA has aggressively embraced its “evolved mission” of screening
complaints of social-media disinformation and then “routing disinformation concerns” to social-
media platforms. CISA routinely receives reports of perceived “disinformation,” often from state
and local government officials, and forwards them to social-media companies for censorship,
placing the considerable weight of its authority as a federal national-security agency behind its
demands for suppression of private speech. CISA, therefore, serves as a government clearinghouse
for expedited censorship of social-media speech disfavored by government officials.
363. In a 2020 document entitled “2020 Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan,”
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_infrastructure_subsector_
specific_plan.pdf, CISA stated that it had partnered to “promote” interaction between election
officials and the Center for Technology and Civic Life, the now-notorious nonprofit funded by
Mark Zuckerberg that engaged in egregious election interference by injecting hundreds of millions
of private dollars and personnel into local election offices in heavily Democratic-favoring areas.
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364. CISA routinely expands the definitions of “misinformation” and “disinformation” to
include “malinformation,” i.e., truthful information that the government believes is presented out
of context to contradict left-wing political narratives. CISA defines “malinformation” as
information that is “based on fact, but used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.” See,
e.g., CISA, We’re in This Together. Disinformation Stops with You. (last visited May 5, 2022),
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/SLTTCOVIDToolkit_FINAL_508.pdf.
365. CISA’s same publication decries the spreading of “false treatment and prevention
measures [for COVID-19], unsubstantiated rumors regarding the origin of the virus, and more.”
Id. (emphasis added). On information and belief, “unsubstantiated rumors regarding the origin
of the [COVID-19] virus” refers to the lab-leak theory of COVID-19’s origins, which (as noted
above) is supported by compelling circumstantial evidence, both scientific and historical.
366. CISA’s “Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation [MDM] Planning and Incident Response
Guide for Election Officials,” https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mdm-
incident-response-guide_508.pdf, calls for constant policing of speech regarding election integrity,
stating that “election infrastructure related MDM occurs year-round,” and “[f]alse narratives erode
trust and pose a threat to democratic transitions, especially, but not limited to, narratives around
election processes and the validity of election outcomes.” Id. The Guide defines MDM to include
“[n]arratives or content that delegitimizes election results or sows distrust in the integrity of the
process based on false or misleading claims.” Id.
367. On February 7, 2022, DHS issued a National Terrorism Advisory Bulletin,
https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-february-07-
2022. It begins by stating: “The United States remains in a heightened threat environment fueled
by several factors, including an online environment filled with false or misleading narratives and
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conspiracy theories, and other forms of mis- dis- and mal-information (MDM).” Id. The first
critical “factor” contributing to a “heightened threat environment,” according to the Bulletin, is
“(1) the proliferation of false or misleading narratives, which sow discord or undermine public
trust in U.S. government institutions.” Id. Again, the first “[k]ey factor contributing to the current
heightened threat environment” identified in the Bulletin is “[t]he proliferation of false or
misleading narratives, which sow discord or undermine public trust in U.S. government
institutions: For example, there is widespread online proliferation of false or misleading
narratives regarding unsubstantiated widespread election fraud and COVID-19. Grievances
associated with these themes inspired violent extremist attacks during 2021.” Id. (emphasis
added). The Bulletin stated that DHS is directly coordinating with social-media platforms to
address so-called “MDM”: “DHS is working with public and private sector partners, as well as
foreign counterparts, to identify and evaluate MDM, including false or misleading narratives and
conspiracy theories spread on social media and other online platforms that endorse or could
inspire violence.” Id. And it specifically stated that CISA likewise “works with public and private
sector partners … [to] increase nationwide cybersecurity resilience.” Id.
368. This February 7, 2022 Bulletin echoed statements from prior bulletins indicating that
so-called COVID-19 “misinformation” and election-related “misinformation” are domestic
terror threats. For example, DHS’s January 27, 2021 National Terrorism Advisory System
Bulletin, https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-
january-27-2021, stated that “Domestic Violent Extremists” are “motivated by a range of issues,
including anger over COVID-19 restrictions [and] the 2020 election results….” Id. Similarly,
DHS’s August 13, 2021 National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin,
https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-august-13-2021,
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stated that “violent extremists … may seek to exploit the emergence of COVID-19 variants by
viewing the potential re-establishment of public health restrictions across the United States as a
rationale to conduct attacks.” Id. It stated that “domestic threat actors … continue to introduce,
amplify, and disseminate narratives online that promote violence,” and included therein
“conspiracy theories on perceived election fraud … and responses to anticipated restrictions
relating to the increasing COVID cases.” Id.
369. On April 12, 2022, CISA published another bulletin announcing that it was coordinating
directly with social-media platforms to police “Mis, Dis, Malinformation” (which it calls
“MDM”). CISA, Mis, Dis, Malinformation, https://www.cisa.gov/mdm. The bulletin states that
MDM—which, again, includes factually accurate information—“can evoke a strong emotional
reaction that leads people to share it without first looking into the facts for themselves, polluting
healthy conversations about the issues and increasing societal divisions.” Id. CISA reported that
its Countering Foreign Influence Task Force’s “mission evolved” during the Biden Administration
to address the new “information environment,” which (on information and belief) is codespeak
for ramping up online censorship: “In 2021, the CFITF officially transitioned into CISA’s MDM
team, and the mission evolved to reflect the changing information environment.” Id. CISA stated
that it coordinates directly with social-media firms to address MDM: “The MDM team continues
to work in close coordination with interagency and private sector partners, social-media
companies, academia, and international partners on a variety of projects to build resilience against
malicious information activities.” Id. (emphasis added).
370. The April 12, 2022 CISA bulletin indicates that CISA works directly with social-media
companies to flag content for censorship: “The MDM team serves as a switchboard for routing
disinformation concerns to appropriate social-media platforms….” Id. CISA boasts that it has
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“expanded the breadth of reporting [MDM] to include … more social-media platforms,” and that
“[t]his activity leverages the rapport the MDM team has with the social-media platforms to enable
shared situational awareness.” Id. On information and belief, these statements reflect and express
on ongoing practice by government officials of directly colluding with social-media platforms to
suppress disfavored speech, viewpoints, content, and speakers on social media. Again, these
statements echo Psaki’s statement that the Biden Administration is “flagging problematic posts
for Facebook,” and Mayorkas’s statement that DHS is “working with the tech companies that are
the platform for much of the disinformation that reaches the American public” to address so-
called misinformation and disinformation.
371. The same bulletin suggests that CISA is directly involved in such “flagging” related to
COVID-19 “misinformation.” It states that “COVID-19-related MDM activities seek to
undermine public confidence and sow confusion,” and claims that “the rapid evolution of accurate
information makes older, dated information a potential catalyst of confusion and distrust as well.”
Id. Thus, it claims, “[t]he MDM team supports the interagency and private sector partners’
COVID-19 response efforts via regular reporting and analysis of key pandemic-related MDM
trends.” Id. (emphasis added). On information and belief, these “private sector partners” include
social-media firms, and the “reporting and analysis” includes flagging disfavored content for
censorship.
372. On April 27, 2022, Mayorkas announced that DHS was creating a “Disinformation
Governance Board.” Hannah Nightingale, Biden Administration creates ‘Disinformation
Governance Board’ under DHS to fight ‘misinformation,’ The Post Millenial (Apr. 27, 2022),
https://thepostmillennial.com/breaking-biden-administration-creates-disinformation-
governance-board-under-dhs-to-fight-misinformation. “The Department of Homeland Security
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is setting up a new board designed to counter misinformation related to homeland security, with
a focus specifically on Russia and irregular migration. The board will be called the
‘Disinformation Governance Board,’ and will be headed by executive director Nina Jankowicz.”
Id. During congressional testimony, Mayorkas described the endeavor as a “just recently
constituted Misinformation/Disinformation Governance Board.” Id. (video link at 1:40). He
stated: “The goal is to bring the resources of the Department together to address this threat.” Id.
373. Jankowicz called for more aggressive censorship of election-related speech:
“Considering the long-term damage these lies do to our democracy, I’m dismayed about this
decision [not to censor election-related speech more aggressively]. I say this about foreign
disinformation and it applies to domestic disinfo too: Elections aren’t an end point. They’re an
inflection point. Policies need to reflect that.” Id.
374. On information and belief, DHS’s new “Disinformation Governance Board” was
intended to be used to increase DHS’s efforts to induce and procure the censorship of disfavored
content, viewpoints, and speakers on social-media platforms.
375. From its inception, the DGB was envisioned as an agency for suppressing core political
speech about election security and COVID-19 restrictions. In the internal memo to Secretary
Mayorkas advocating for the DGB’s creation, the very first two topics of “disinformation” to be
targeted were “conspiracies about the validity and security of elections,” and “disinformation
related to the origins and effects of COVID-19 vaccines or the efficacy of masks.”
376. Internal documents of DHS, provided by whistleblowers to U.S. Senators, indicate that
the “Disinformation Governance Board” was formulated to create a stronger bureaucratic
structure to federal social-media censorship policies and activities that were already in full force,
both within DHS and across other federal agencies. The whistleblower documents make clear
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that the DGB’s task was not to establish a censorship program, but to oversee the massive
censorship program against free speech on these topics that already exists—both within DHS,
and across the federal government.
377. On information and belief, Defendants Robert Silvers and Samantha Vinograd played
and play a central role in DHS’s censorship activities, including but not limited to the formulation
and creation of the “Disinformation Governance Board.” The whistleblower documents cited
above strongly support this conclusion. Silvers and Vinograd co-signed the September 13, 2021
“Memorandum for the Secretary” regarding “Organizing DHS Efforts to Counter
Disinformation” that provided an overview of DHS’s disinformation activity and recommended
the creation of the DGB. As noted above, the opening lines of this memo state that “[t]he spread
of disinformation presents serious homeland security risks,” especially “[c]onspiracy theories
about the validity and security of elections” and “[d]isinformation related to the origins and effects
of COVID-19 vaccines or the efficacy of masks.” The memo reflects detailed knowledge and
active oversight of DHS’s “misinformation” and “disinformation” activities. Further, Defendant
Silvers authored the January 31, 2022 memo to the Secretary seeking his “approval of the charter
for the Disinformation Governance Board,” and he authored a separate memorandum to DHS’s
general counsel seeking the same approval. Silvers also is listed as a participant in the April 28,
2022 meeting with Twitter executives Nick Pickles and Yoel Roth organized by Nina Jankowicz,
discussed immediately below.
378. On April 28, 2022, Jankowicz arranged for a meeting between Secretary Mayorkas
and/or other senior DHS officials, including Undersecretary Robert Silvers, and “Twitter
executives Nick Pickles, Head of Policy, and Yoel Roth, Head of Site Integrity,” to discuss
“public-private partnerships, MDM, and countering DVE. The meeting is off the record and closed
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press.” Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM (W.D. La.), ECF No. 10-1, at 31
(Glenn Decl. Ex. 1, at 18). This was to be a cozy meeting: Jankowicz, who drafted the meeting
brief, noted that “Nick and Yoel both know DGB Executive Director Nina Jankowicz.” Id. The
meeting was to be “an opportunity to discuss operationalizing public-private partnerships between
DHS and Twitter.” Id. In the meeting, DHS was to “[p]ropose that Twitter become involved in
Disinformation Governance Board Analytic Exchanges on Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE)
and Irregular Migration,” and to “[t]hank Twitter for its continued participation in the CISA
Analytic Exchange on Election Security.” Id. DHS was also to “[a]sk what types of data or
information would be useful for Twitter to receive in Analytic Exchanges or other ways the
Department could be helpful to Twitter’s counter-MDM efforts.” Id.
White House Threats Following News of

Elon Musk’s Acquisition of Twitter
379. On or around April 25, 2022—two days before DHS announced the creation of its
“Disinformation Governance Board”—it was reported that free-speech advocate Elon Musk would
acquire Twitter and make it a privately held company dedicated to free speech principles. Left-
wing commentators widely decried this news on the ground that it would ground that free speech
on Twitter would allow the spread of so-called “misinformation” and “disinformation.”
380. On April 25, 2022, Psaki was asked at a White House press briefing to respond to the
news that Elon Musk would acquire Twitter, and asked “does the White House have any concern
that this new agreement might have President Trump back on the platform?” The White House,
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, April 25, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/04/25/press-briefing-by-press-
secretary-jen-psaki-april-25-2022/.
381. Psaki responded by reiterating the threats of adverse legal consequences to Twitter and
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other social-media platforms, specifically referencing antitrust enforcement and Section 230
repeal: “No matter who owns or runs Twitter, the President has long been concerned about the
power of large social-media platforms … [and] has long argued that tech platforms must be held
accountable for the harms they cause. He has been a strong supporter of fundamental reforms
to achieve that goal, including reforms to Section 230, enacting antitrust reforms, requiring more
transparency, and more. And he’s encouraged that there’s bipartisan interest in Congress.” Id.
382. At the same press briefing, Psaki was asked: “Are you concerned about the kind of
purveyors of election misinformation, disinformation, health falsehoods, sort of, having more of
an opportunity to speak there on Twitter?” Id. She responded by specifically linking the legal
threats to the social-media platforms’ failure to more aggressively censor free speech: “We’ve long
talked about and the President has long talked about his concerns about the power of social-media
platforms, including Twitter and others, to spread misinformation, disinformation; the need for
these platforms to be held accountable.” Id.
383. Psaki was then asked a question that noted that “the Surgeon General has said that
misinformation about COVID amounts to a public health crisis,” and then queried, “would the
White House be interested in working with Twitter like it has in the past to continue to combat this
kind of misinformation? Or are we in a different part of the pandemic where that kind of
partnership is no longer necessary?” Id.
384. Psaki responded by reaffirming that senior officials within the White House and/or the
Administration are continuing to coordinate directly with social-media platforms to censor
disfavored speakers and content on social media, and directly linking these efforts to the repeated
threat of adverse legal action: “we engage regularly with all social-media platforms about steps
that can be taken that has continued, and I’m sure it will continue. But there are also reforms
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that we think Congress could take and we would support taking, including reforming Section
230, enacting antitrust reforms, requiring more transparency. And the President is encouraged
by the bipartisan support for — or engagement in those efforts.” Id.
Continuing Federal Collusion in and

Inducement of Social Media Censorship
385. Since mid-2022, federal officials, including Defendants herein, have expanded their
social-media censorship activities still further and opened new fronts in their campaign against
the freedom of speech on social media.
386. On June 13, 2022, Flaherty demanded that Facebook continue to produce periodic
“COVID-19 insights reports” to track so-called “misinformation” regarding COVID-19 on
Facebook’s social-media platforms, expressing the specific concern that COVID vaccines for
children under 5 would soon be authorized. Facebook agreed to continue sending its censorship-
tracking report.
387. On June 23, 2022, Facebook assured Flaherty that it was expanding its censorship of
COVID-19 “misinformation” to ensure that speech critical or skeptical of COVID-19 vaccines
for children under 5-years old—a highly controversial topic—would be censored. Such
censorship is particularly egregious given that Pfizer’s own data established that the vaccine does
not stop infection or transmission in this age group. See Apoorva Mandavilli & Noah Weiland,
Pfizer Shot Is Far Less Effective in 5- to 11-Year-Olds Than in Older Kids, New Data Show, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/health/pfizer-vaccine-kids.html.
388. The White House Defendants were involved in many other communications regarding
censorship as well. For example, in June and July of 2022, Flaherty was included in the email
chain with Facebook in which he demanded that Facebook continue providing biweekly
“COVID-19 Insights” reports to ensure adequate censorship of speech on Facebook and
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Instagram “as we start to ramp up under 5 vaccines”—i.e., as vaccination of children under 5 for
COVID-19 began. Wakana and Rowe were also involved in similar communications overseeing
Facebook’s misinformation practices.
389. On June 14, 2022, White House National Climate Advisor Gina McCarthy spoke
at an Axios event titled “A conversation on battling misinformation.” See Alexander Hall,
Biden climate advisor demands tech companies censor ‘disinformation’ to promote ‘benefits
of clean energy’, Fox News (June 14, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/media/biden-climate-
advisor-tech-companies-censor-disinformation-promote-benefits-clean-energy (video of her
comments embedded in link). McCarthy publicly demanded that social-media platforms
engage in censorship and suppression of speech that contradicts federal officials’ preferred
narratives on climate change.
390. During the event, “McCarthy skewered Big Tech companies for ‘allowing’
disinformation and cheered Congress for ‘taking action’ to enact more censorship last Thursday.”
Id. “Axios political reporter Alexi McCammond asked McCarthy how so-called ‘rampant mis-
and-disinformation around climate change online and in other platforms’ has ‘made your job
harder?’” Id. “McCarthy responded by slamming social-media companies: ‘We have to get
tighter, we have to get better at communicating, and frankly, the tech companies have to stop
allowing specific individuals over and over again to spread disinformation.’” Id. (emphasis
added). “She suggested further that ‘we have to be smarter than that and we need the tech
companies to really jump in.’” Id. (emphasis added). “McCammond responded by asking: ‘Isn’t
misinformation and disinfo around climate a threat to public health itself?’ McCarthy asserted that
it ‘absolutely’ is: ‘Oh, absolutely.’” Id.
391. Following the Administration’s now-familiar playbook, McCarthy explicitly tied these
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demands for censorship of climate-change-related speech to threats of adverse legislation:
“McCarthy also praised Congress directly for pushing social-media companies to censor
Americans: ‘We do see Congress taking action on these issues, we do see them trying to tackle
the misinformation that’s out there, trying to hold companies accountable.’” Id.
392. Two days later, the White House announced a new task force to address, among other
things, “gendered disinformation” and “disinformation campaigns targeting women and
LGBTQI+ individuals who are public and political figures, government and civic leaders, activists,
and journalists.” The White House, Memorandum on the Establishment of the White House Task
Force to Address Online Harassment and Abuse (June 16, 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/06/16/memorandum-on-
the-establishment-of-the-white-house-task-force-to-address-online-harassment-and-abuse/.
393. The June 16 Memorandum decries “online harassment and abuse”—vague terms that,
on information and belief, are deliberately adopted to sweep in constitutionally protected speech.
In particular, the Memorandum defines “online harassment and abuse” to include “gendered
disinformation,” a deliberately broad and open-ended term. Id. § 1. The Memorandum
announces plans to target such “gendered disinformation” directed at public officials and public
figures, including “women and LGBTQI+ political leaders, public figures, activists, and
journalists.” Id. The Memorandum creates a Task Force co-chaired by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, which includes the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, among others. Id.
394. The Task Force is charged with “developing programs and policies to address …
disinformation campaigns targeting women and LGBTQI+ individuals who are public and
political figures, government and civic leaders, activists, and journalists in the United States and
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globally.” Id. § 4(a)(iv) (emphasis added). The Memorandum calls for the Task Force to consult
and coordinate with “technology experts” and “industry stakeholders,” i.e., social-media firms, to
achieve “the objectives of this memorandum,” id. § 4(b). Those “objectives” include
suppressing so-called “disinformation campaigns” against “public and political figures.” Id.
§ 4(a)(iv).
395. The Memorandum again threatens social-media platforms with adverse legal
consequences if they do not censor aggressively enough to suit federal officials: “the Task Force
shall … submit periodic recommendations to the President on policies, regulatory actions, and
legislation on technology sector accountability to address systemic harms to people affected by
online harassment and abuse.” Id. § 5(c) (emphasis added).
396. On June 17, 2022, twenty-one Democratic U.S. Senators and Representatives sent a
letter to Sundar Pichai, the CEO of Alphabet Inc., which owns Google, demanding that Google
censor, suppress, and de-boost search results and Google Maps results for pro-life pregnancy
resource centers. Letter of Sen. Mark Warner, et al. (June 17, 2022), https://reason.com/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/26F26BB28841042A7931EEC58AC80E08.anti-abortion-letter-to-
google-final.pdf. The letter’s co-signers included many of the Members of Congress who have
previously made threats of adverse legal consequences if social-media platforms do not increase
censorship—such as Senators Mark Warner, Amy Klobuchar, and Richard Blumenthal. Id. The
letter cited “research by the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH),” id.—the same
organization that Jen Psaki and the White House coordinated with to demand the censorship of
the so-called “Disinformation Dozen.” The letter describes pro-life pregnancy resource centers
as “fake clinics,” and demands that Google proactively censor search results, mapping results,
and advertisements relating to such clinics. Id. The letter demands that Google “limit the
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appearance of anti-abortion fake clinics or so-called ‘crisis pregnancy centers’ in Google search
results, Google Ads, and on Google Maps”; that Google “add user-friendly disclaimers that clearly
indicate whether or not a search result does or does not provide abortions”; and that Google take
“additional steps to ensure that users are receiving accurate information when they search for
health care services like abortion on Google Search and Google Maps.” Id.
397. Defendants swiftly doubled down on this demand for social-media censorship of pro-
life pregnancy resource centers. On July 8, 2022, the President signed an Executive Order
“aimed at protecting abortion rights.” Sandhya Raman, Biden issues executive order responding
to abortion ruling, Roll Call (July 8, 2022), https://rollcall.com/2022/07/08/biden-issues-
executive-order-responding-to-abortion-ruling/. The order directs HHS, DOJ, and the FTC “to
examine ways to … curb the spread of misinformation related to abortion.” Id. The order is
entitled “Executive Order on Protecting Access to Reproductive Healthcare Services,” available
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/07/08/executive-order-
on-protecting-access-to-reproductive-healthcare-services/. Section 4(b)(iv) of the order states:
“The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall, in consultation with the Attorney General and
the Chair of the FTC, consider options to address deceptive or fraudulent practices related to
reproductive healthcare services, including online, and to protect access to accurate information.”
Id.
398. Today, a veritable army of federal bureaucrats is involved in censorship activities
“across the federal enterprise.” There are so many, in fact, that CISA Director Easterly and
Matthew Masterson complained in text messages that “chaos” would result if all federal officials
were “independently” contacting social-media platforms about so-called misinformation: “Not
our mission but was looking to play a coord role so not every D/A is independently reaching out
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to platforms which could cause a lot of chaos.”
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
399. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all the allegations contained above.
400. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf
of the following Class: All persons in the United States who have consumed news related to
COVID-19 or U.S. elections on Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube at any time from January 2020
to the present.
401. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this Class definition if discovery and/or further
investigation reveal that the Classes should be expanded, divided into subclasses, or modified in
any other way.
402. This Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive and declaratory class action is properly maintainable
because it satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule
23(a) and the injunctive remedy requirement of Rule 23(b)(2).
403. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown, the proposed Class
numbers at least in the tens of millions and is therefore so numerous that joinder of all members
would be impracticable.
404. The claims of every Member of the proposed Class are united by a common, dispositive
issue of law: whether the federal government’s systematic, concerted campaign to induce social-
media companies to censor constitutionally protected violates the First Amendment and should
be enjoined.
405. The named Plaintiffs are members of the putative Class, and their claims are typical of
the Class: (A) because, like other Class Members, they have been denied the right to receive
uncensored ideas and information on the social-media platforms that comprise what the Supreme
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Court calls the “modern public square”; and (B) because all Class Members’ claims arise from
the same course of conduct by the Defendants.
406. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class,
because they are passionately dedicated to the freedom of all persons in this country to make
health care and citizenship decisions on the basis of full, accurate information uncensored by the
government. In addition, Plaintiff CHD will zealously represent the interests of the Class because
of its institutional interests in protecting its own members, who are also Class Members. And
Plaintiff Kennedy will be a zealous Class representative because he has himself been the victim
of the Defendants’ massive, unconstitutional censorship campaign.
407. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in both constitutional law
and class action litigation.
408. Certification of the Class is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R.C.P. 23(b)(2) because
Defendants have acted in ways that apply generally to the Class, so that final injunctive relief and
corresponding declaratory relief are appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. The Class
Members’ interests in this case are indivisible and cohesive in that an injunction will at once
redress the violation of every Class Member’s First Amendment rights, apply to all Members
identically, and give to each Class Member (as well as the public more generally) the access to
robust, uncensored expression of facts and opinions in the “modern public square” to which the
Constitution entitles them.
409. No ascertainability requirement applies to this Rule 23(b)(2) class action. See Neese v.
Becerra, 342 F.R.D. 399, 411 (N.D. Tex. 2022); O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., No. H-16-1414, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65444, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017); cf. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co.,
365 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2004).
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INJURY
410. Defendants’ conduct has violated, is violating, and unless enjoined will continue to
violate the named Plaintiffs’ and other Class Members’ right to receive ideas and information
from willing speakers.
411. Because of their dominance in the social-media market and the gatekeeping power that
this dominance gives them, the major social-media platforms exercise a historically
unprecedented power over public discourse in America—a power to control what hundreds of
millions of people in this country can say, see, and hear.
412. When speech is censored on the major social-media platforms, it is very difficult if not
impossible for most people to find it. Indeed most people who consume news on the major social-
media platforms will not even know that such information and ideas have been suppressed (or
“de-boosted,” “shadow-banned,” etc.).
413. When individual speakers are censored on the major social-media platforms, it is very
difficult if not impossible for most people to gain access to their voices. Indeed most people who
consume news on the major social-media platforms will not even know that these voices have
been silenced (or “de-boosted,” “shadow-banned,” etc.).
414. Defendants’ conduct has badly distorted online public discourse, stifled dissent, and
blocked or restricted access to vast quantities of information and ideas that would otherwise have
been easily accessible online, posted by willing speakers.
415. For example, as a direct result of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have achieved
astonishing success in muzzling public criticism of President Biden.
416. A recent review by the Media Research Center identified 646 instances over the last
two years where social-media firms censored public criticism of then-candidate and now-
President Biden. See Joseph Vasquez & Gabriela Pariseau, Protecting the President: Big Tech
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Censors Biden Criticism 646 Times Over Two Years (Apr. 21, 2022), https://censortrack.org/
protecting-president-big-tech-censors-biden-criticism-646-times-over-two-years.
417. “The Media Research Center found more than 640 examples of bans, deleted content
and other speech restrictions placed on those who criticized Biden on social media over the past
two years.” Id. “MRC Free Speech America tallied 646 cases in its CensorTrack database of pro-
Biden censorship between March 10, 2020, and March 10, 2022. The tally included cases from
Biden’s presidential candidacy to the present day.” Id.
418. “The worst cases of censorship involved platforms targeting anyone who dared to speak
about any subject related to the New York Post bombshell Hunter Biden story. . . . Big Tech’s
cancellation of that story helped shift the 2020 election in Biden’s favor. Twitter locked the Post’s
account for 17 days. In addition, Twitter slapped a ‘warning label’ on the GOP House Judiciary
Committee’s website for linking to the Post story.” Id. “CensorTrack logged 140 instances of
users—including lawmakers, organizations, news outlets and media personalities—censored for
sharing anything related to the bombshell Hunter Biden laptop story.” Id.
419. “Twitter was the most aggressive censor when it came to the Biden laptop story.
CensorTrack entries show that users could not tweet the story or pictures of the Post story.”
420. “Big Tech even axed those who blamed the current inflation crisis on Biden. For
example, Facebook censored Heritage Action, the advocacy arm of the conservative Heritage
Foundation, on March 15, simply for posting a video quoting Biden’s embarrassing statements on
energy policy. Facebook placed an interstitial, or filter, over Heritage Action’s video, suppressing
the post’s reach. The video showed Biden and officials in his administration explaining how his
policies would cause gas prices to rise.” Id.
421. “[T]he largest category by far included users who dared to call out Biden’s notoriously
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creepy, touchy-feely behavior around women and children. The 232 cases of comedic memes,
videos, or generic posts about Biden’s conduct composed more than one-third of CensorTrack’s
total instances of users censored for criticizing the president.” Id.
422. “Big Tech even went after posts that quoted Biden’s own words and made him look awful
in retrospect.” Id.
423. “The list of censorship targets included an array of prominent influencers on social
media: Trump; lawmakers like Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and House Minority Leader Kevin
McCarthy (R-CA); news outlets like the New York Post, The Washington Free Beacon and The
Federalist; satire site The Babylon Bee; celebrities like Donald Trump Jr. and James Woods, and
media personalities like Daily Wire host Candace Owens, Salem radio host Sebastian Gorka and
radio host Dana Loesch.” Id.
424. Social media platforms have also censored criticisms of the Biden Administration’s
2022 attempt to redefine the word “recession” in light of news that the U.S. economy had
suffered two consecutive quarters of reduction in GDP. See, e.g., Taylor Penley, Economist
slams Facebook for ‘absolutely Orwellian’ fact-check upholding Biden's recession denial, Fox
News (Aug. 1, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/media/economist-slams-facebook-absolutely-
orwellian-fact-check-upholding-bidens-recession-denial.
425. Defendants also achieved enormous success in stifling and distorting public discourse
surrounding COVID-19.
426. For example, as detailed above, they stifled information and ideas about the lab-leak
theory of COVID’s origins.
427. They also suppressed vast amounts of speech containing information and ideas about
the inefficacy and dangers of the COVID vaccines.
107
428. They also suppressed information and ideas concerning the safety and possible efficacy
of certain medicines—such as Hydroxychloroquine and Ivermectin—believed by many physicians
and scientists all over the world to be potential treatment alternatives.
429. Indeed, Defendants succeeded in inducing major social-media platforms to censor all of
the following COVID-related claims as “misinformation” when in fact these claims were either
entirely accurate or at a minimum well within the ambit of legitimate opinion, speculation, and
reporting:
A. Claims that COVID-19 was manmade; 4
B. Claims that COVID-19 was manufactured or bioengineered; 5
C. Claims that COVID-19 was created by a government or country; 6
D. Claims that “contradict” WHO or U.S. health officials’ guidance on the treatment,
prevention, or transmission of COVID-19; 7
4
But see, e.g., British Med. J., The COVID-19 lab leak hypothesis: did the media fall victim to a
misinformation campaign?, July 8, 2021, https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n1656 (Lab-
leak theory of COVID’s origin was and is supported by substantial evidence “deserv[ing] serious
investigation”).
5
But see, e.g., id. (Substantial evidence supports claim that COVID was manufactured or
bioengineered through laboratory gain-of-function experiments).
6
But see, e.g., Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Science, A call for an independent inquiry into
the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, May 19, 2022,
https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2202769119 (substantial evidence supports claim that
COVID-19 was created at a Chinese government-controlled virology laboratory in Wuhan,
China, with the possible assistance of U.S. governmental funding).
7
Governmental guidance and policy on COVID-19 has repeatedly been in error. See, e.g.,
Scientific American, How the U.S. Pandemic Response Went Wrong—and What Went Right—
during a Year of COVID, Mar. 11, 2021, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-u-
s-pandemic-response-went-wrong-and-what-went-right-during-a-year-of-covid/; New York
Times, The C.D.C. Waited ‘Its Entire Existence for This Moment.’ What Went Wrong?, Aug. 14,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/cdc-coronavirus.html.
108
E. Claims about the COVID vaccines that contradict “expert consensus” from U.S.
health authorities or the WHO; 8
F. Claims that Hydroxychloroquine (“HCQ”) is an effective treatment for COVID; 9
G. Claims that Ivermectin (“IVM”) is an effective treatment for COVID; 10
H. Claims that HCQ or IVM is safe to use as a treatment for COVID; 11
I. Recommendations of the use of HCQ or IVM against COVID; 12
J. Claims that COVID is no more dangerous to some populations than the seasonal
flu. 13
8
The “expert consensus” on COVID has repeatedly been in error. See, e.g., Washington Post,
Beware of ‘expert’ consensus. The covid-19 lab leak theory shows why, May 30, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/30/beware-expert-consensus-covid-19-lab-
leak-theory-shows-why/.
9
But see this peer-reviewed, published 2021 study reporting that in a trial involving over 10,000
ambulatory patients in France, those treated with HCQ suffered a stunningly low .06% mortality
rate, whereas in the control group (no HCQ), the fatality rate was almost nine times higher.
10
But see this peer-reviewed, published meta-analysis of IVM clinical studies finding that IVM
reduced mortality for COVID patients by roughly half or more.
11
Both HCQ and IVM are well known to be extremely safe for human use at well-established
dosages, both have been safely used for decades, and both have been approved for human use by
the FDA. See Opinion of the Attorney General of Nebraska, Prescription of Ivermectin or
Hydroxychloroquine as Off-Label Medicines for the Treatment or Prevention of COVID-19, Oct.
14, 2021 at 17, 38, https://ago.nebraska.gov/sites/ago.nebraska.gov/files/docs/opinions/21-
017_0.pdf.
12
Hundreds of US doctors prescribe and many foreign health authorities have recommended
IVM and/or HCQ for the treatment or prevention of COVID. See id. at 29-30, 47.
13
But see, e.g., NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, In Kids, The Risk of COVID-19 and the Flu Are
Similar, But the Risk Perception Isn’t, May 21, 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/05/21/999241558/in-kids-the-risk-of-covid-19-and-the-flu-are-similar-
but-the-risk-perception-isn.
109
K. Claims that the mortality rate of COVID is for some populations the same or lower
than that of the seasonal flu. 14
L. Claims suggesting that the number of deaths caused by COVID is lower than
official figures assert. 15
M. Claims that face masks or mask mandates do not prevent the spread of COVID. 16
N. Claims that wearing a face mask can make the wearer sick. 17
O. Claims that COVID vaccines have not been approved. 18
14
In fact, for children and indeed all individuals under the age of 45, studies have shown that the
infection mortality rate (“IFR”) of COVID-19 is lower than the widely-reported IFR of the
seasonal flu. See, e.g., A. Levin et al., Assessing the age specificity of infection fatality rates for
COVID-19: systematic review, meta-analysis, and public policy implications, Dec. 8, 2020,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7721859/ (reporting a COVID IFR of .004% for
children and .068% for adults under 45, as compared to the widely-reported IFR of .1% for the
seasonal flu).
15
In fact, official COVID mortality figures frequently failed to distinguish between individuals
who died because of COVID-19 and individuals who died with COVID-19, resulting in
significant overstatements of COVID deaths. See American Association of Medical Colleges,
how are COVID-19 deaths counted? It’s complicated, Feb. 18, 2021,
https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/how-are-covid-19-deaths-counted-it-s-complicated.
16
Numerous studies show that face mask mandates were not effective in preventing the spread of
COVID-19. See New York Times, Why Masks Work, but Mandates Haven’t, May 31, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/briefing/masks-mandates-us-covid.html.
17
But see, e.g., Cleveland Clinic, Do Masks Make You Sick?, Oct. 25, 2021, https://health.
clevelandclinic.org/can-wearing-a-mask-make-you-sick (mask-wearing can cause sore throats,
bacterial skin infections, and anxiety).
18
The COVID-19 vaccines issued under an Emergency Use Authorization were not in fact
approved by the FDA. See FDA, What Is an emergency Use Authorization and How Is It Being
Used To Respond to COVID-19, https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-
response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-frequently-asked-questions (“Under an
EUA, the FDA may allow the use of unapproved medical products, or unapproved uses of
approved medical products in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or life-
threatening diseases or conditions”) (emphasis added).
110
P. Claims that social distancing does not help prevent the spread of COVID. 19
Q. Claims that COVID-19 vaccines can kill or seriously harm people. 20
R. Claims that the immunity from getting COVID is more effective than vaccination.21
S. Claims that the COVID vaccines are not effective in preventing infection; 22
T. Claims that people who have been vaccinated against COVID can still spread the
disease to others; 23
U. Claims that the COVID vaccines are toxic or harmful or contain toxic or harmful
ingredients; 24 and
19
But see, e.g., Studies in Applied Economics, A Literature Review and Meta-Analysis of the
Effects of Lockdowns on Covid-19 Mortality, Jan. 2022, https://sites.krieger.jhu.edu/iae/files/
2022/01/A-Literature-Review-and-Meta-Analysis-of-the-Effects-of-Lockdowns-on-COVID-19-
Mortality.pdf (lockdowns and social distancing mandates were ineffective against mortality).
20
In fact, the COVID-19 vaccines can cause myocarditis, a heart condition capable of leading to
serious harm or death. See, e.g., CDC, Clinical Considerations: Myocarditis and Pericarditis
after Receipt of mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines Among Adolescents and Young Adults, https://www.
cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/clinical-considerations/myocarditis.html#:~:text=In%20April%
202021%2C%20increased%20cases,of%20mRNA%20COVID%2D19%20vaccines. In
addition, the COVID vaccines have been found to increase the risk of serious neurological
disorders and hemorrhagic stroke. See, e.g., Nature, Neurological complications after first dose
of COVID-19 vaccines and SARS-CoV-2 infection, Oct. 25, 2021, https://www.nature.com/
articles/s41591-021-01556-7); Univ. Coll. London, Rise in Guillain-Barré syndrome following
AstraZeneca vaccine, May 30, 2022, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2022/may/rise-guillain-barre-
syndrome-following-astrazeneca-vaccine.
21
In fact, natural immunity from being infected with COVID-19 was and is “much greater” than
the immunity conferred by vaccination. See, e.g., Science, Having SARS-CoV-2 once confers
much greater immunity than a vaccine—but vaccination remains vital, Aug. 26, 2021,
https://www.science.org/content/article/having-sars-cov-2-once-confers-much-greater-immunity-
vaccine-vaccination-remains-vital.
22
The COVID vaccines did not and do not prevent infection. See, e.g., British Med. J., What do
we know about COVID vaccines and preventing transmission?, Feb. 4, 2022, https://www.bmj.
com/content/376/bmj.o298.
23
In fact, vaccinated people can and do spread the disease to others. Id.
24
Many physicians are concerned about the toxicity of the mRNA ingredient of the Pfizer and
111
V. Claims that fetal cells were used in the manufacture or production of any of the
COVID vaccines. 25
430. In addition, Defendants successfully induced the major social media platforms to censor
accounts, regardless of truth or falsity, of individuals who had suffered, or believed they had
suffered, significant injuries from COVID vaccinations, including both first-hand accounts of
such vaccine injuries and news reports of such injuries.
431. The asserted basis for censoring such accounts was that, even if true, or perhaps
especially if true, they could have the effect of increasing “vaccine hesitancy”—i.e., leading
people to question whether the COVID vaccines were safe.
432. The suppression of all the above information and opinion caused legally cognizable
harm to the named Plaintiffs and other Members of the proposed Class.
433. To begin with, all three named Plaintiffs and all other Class Members were thereby
deprived of information and ideas in violation of their First Amendment rights, which itself is a
legally cognizable injury.
434. Moreover, named Plaintiff Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was harmed in his ability to gather
news concerning U.S. elections and COVID—including facts about COVID mortality, facts
about the COVID vaccines, and facts and opinions about alternative COVID treatments—and
Moderna vaccines because it is designed to stimulate production of the COVID virus’s “spike
protein,” the full dangers of which are not yet known. See, e.g., Molecular Biology, Could
SARS-CoV-2 Spike Protein Be Responsible for Long-COVID Syndrome?, Jan. 13, 2022,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12035-021-02696-0 (“[T]here is urgent need to better
understand the neurotoxic effects of the spike protein” that is “expressed in response to mRNA
vaccines”).
25
In fact, fetal cell lines were and are used in the manufacture and production of the Johnson and
Johnson COVID vaccine. Science, Abortion opponents protest COVID-19 vaccines’ use of fetal
cells, Jun. 5, 2020, https://www.science.org/content/article/abortion-opponents-protest-covid-19-
vaccines-use-fetal-cells.
112
report such news to his hundreds of thousands of followers. To take just one of numerous
examples, the above censorship prevented Kennedy from knowing the number and seriousness
of first-hand accounts of vaccine injuries and reporting that information to his followers.
435. In addition, as a result of Defendants’ censorship campaign, Kennedy has also been
directly censored on social media and de-platformed entirely from major platforms. Just recently,
in March 2023, an important public political speech given by Kennedy in New Hampshire was
blocked by YouTube and therefore could not be viewed by most online news consumers.
436. Named Plaintiff Children’s Health Defense suffered a similar injury to its ability to
gather news.
437. Moreover, CHD’s many members were deprived of information and ideas concerning
the safety and efficacy of alternative COVID treatments—information and ideas of the greatest
potential importance to them individually. To take just one example, many of CHD’s members
justifiably believe that they or their friends or family members suffered or may have suffered
vaccine injuries. Because of the above-described censorship, such individuals were prevented
from learning of and communicating with other individuals so situated, forming bonds or
communities with them, and exchanging information with them—a loss that both harmed them
psychologically and deprived them of information that could have helped in obtaining proper
medical treatment.
438. Named Plaintiff Connie Sampognaro was harmed as a citizen and health care policy
advocate by the government’s censorship campaign, which deprived her of COVID-related
information and ideas of the highest public importance.
439. In addition, Sompognaro is potentially immunocompromised and has therefore been
since the beginning of the pandemic acutely in need, for her own health, of complete, accurate
113
information about COVID and the possible treatments therefor; the censorship described above
made it difficult if not impossible for her to find such information.
440. In addition, Defendants’ inducement, encouragement, and promotion of social media
censorship distorted public discourse about COVID, preventing the named Plaintiffs and other
Class Members from knowing the actual state of public opinion on issues related to the COVID
lockdowns and COVID vaccines, diminishing their ability to fight against governmental policies
they disagreed with and in favor policies they believed in.
441. Defendants have not acknowledged any fault or wrongdoing concerning their efforts to
induce social-media censorship of constitutionally protected speech.
442. On the contrary, government agencies and agents have repeatedly defended the
government’s censorship campaign and denied that it implicates any First Amendment concerns.
443. For example, Defendant Mayorkas has defended the DHS’s censorship efforts,
including an endorsement of the Department’s plan to institute a Disinformation Governance
Board. See Kelly Hooper, Mayorkas cites misinformation about Homeland Security’s
disinformation board, Politico (Aug. 5, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/01/
mayorkas-defends-dhs-disinformation-board-00029182. He said, “The fact is that disinformation
that creates a threat to the security of the homeland is our responsibility to address. And this
department has been addressing it for years, throughout the years of the prior administration in
an ongoing basis.” Id.
444. In a public statement provided to Fox News in advance of a December 2022 article, the
FBI defended its actions in communicating with social-media companies, saying, “The
correspondence between the FBI and Twitter show nothing more than examples of our traditional,
longstanding and ongoing federal government and private sector engagements, which involve
114
numerous companies over multiple sectors and industries. As evidenced in the correspondence,
the FBI provides critical information to the private sector in an effort to allow them to protect
themselves and their customers.” Jake Gibson & Adam Sabes, FBI responds to Twitter Files
disclosures, says it didn’t request ‘any action’ on specific tweets, FOX News (Dec. 21, 2022),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/fbi-responds-twitter-files-disclosures-says-didnt-request-
any-action-specific-tweets.
445. In answering a question about governmental involvement with the suppression of the
Hunter Biden laptop story, Defendant Jean-Pierre characterized the reporting as a “distraction
that is so full of old news.” The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-
Pierre, Dec. 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/12/05/
press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-december-5-2022/.
446. In March 2023, it was revealed that in mid-December 2022, after publication of the
initial installment of the Twitter Files, instead of investigating possible violations of the First
Amendment by government actors seeking to induce, encourage, and promote social media
censorship, the Administration commenced an investigation of Twitter and the Twitter Files
journalists. On December 13, 2022, the Federal Trade Commission sent private communications
to Twitter demanding that Twitter disclose its interactions with Twitter Files journalists “Bari
Weiss, Matt Taibbi, [and] Michael Shellenberger” and “[i]dentify all journalists and other
members of the media” with whom Twitter had shared internal documents. U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization
of the Federal Government, The Weaponization of the Federal Trade Commission: An Agency’s
Overreach To Harass Elon Musk’s Twitter, at pp. 5, 7, Mar. 7, 2023, https://judiciary.house.gov/
sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/Weaponization_
115
Select_Subcommittee_Report_on_FTC_Harrassment_of_Twitter_3.7.2023.pdf.
447. Because Defendants have not only refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing in the
federal government’s social media censorship efforts, but have defended those efforts, and
painted them as mere continuations of longstanding agency behavior, it is virtually certain that
the Administration will continue these efforts.
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Against All Defendants
448. All foregoing Paragraphs are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.
449. It is a violation of the First Amendment for government agents to use coercive threats
against private actors to bring about censorship of others’ constitutionally protected speech. See,
e.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
450. As detailed above, since early 2020 Defendants have systematically and repeatedly used
destructive, coercive threats against social-media companies—for example, threats to repeal their
Section 230 immunity or to bring antirust actions against them—in order to cause those
companies to censor others’ protected speech.
451. It is a violation of the First Amendment for government actors to enter into collusive
partnerships with social-media companies working jointly with them to censor protected speech;
such collusion turns the social-media companies’ censorship into unconstitutional state action.
See, e.g., Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn., 531 U.S. 288, 296
(2001) (state action exists when “a private actor operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents’”) (citation omitted).
452. As detailed above, since early 2020 Defendants have systematically and repeatedly
116
entered into collusive partnerships with social-media companies working jointly with them to
censor protected speech.
453. Defendants’ campaign to induce social-media censorship of protected speech has
repeatedly involved not only coercive threats and collusive joint action, but entwinement,
symbiotic relationships, statutory immunity under Section 230, mutual payments of money and
other valuables, and other conduct more than sufficient to turn social-media company censorship
into state action.
454. Because of such conduct, the COVID-related permissible-speech policies adopted at
major social-media platforms (i.e., their policies concerting what speech is to be blocked on
grounds of supposed falsity and what speech, even if true, will still be censored) became instances
of state action, so that every application of those policies to censor protected speech was and is
unconstitutional state action.
455. Governmental conduct sufficient to turn social media censorship into unconstitutional
state action is unquestionably unlawful and enjoinable.
456. But the Norwood principle goes further.
457. Under Norwood, it is also—independently—unconstitutional for government agents
deliberately “to encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what [the government] is
constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465.
458. The Norwood test is not the same as the test for determining whether governmental
conduct has turned a private party’s conduct into state action.
459. Under Norwood, concerted governmental efforts to induce social media companies to
censor protected speech are unconstitutional whether or not they produce state action by those
companies.
117
460. Indeed, government efforts to induce social-media companies to censor protected
speech are unconstitutional and enjoinable even when they fail to achieve their goal. See, e.g.,
Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.) (attempt by government
officials to pressure private companies to shut down constitutionally protected speech “is
actionable and thus can be enjoined even if it turns out to be empty—the victim ignores it, and
the threatener folds his tent”) (emphasis added).
461. Norwood is violated even when the government has not, for example, used threats or
engaged in collusive partnerships.
462. Governmental agents who, through whatever means, “induce, encourage, or promote”
social-media companies to censor constitutionally protected speech are plainly seeking to have
those companies “accomplish what [the government] is constitutionally forbidden to
accomplish,” and are therefore acting in violation of Norwood and hence in violation of the First
Amendment.
463. As described in detail above, since 2020 Defendants have systematically, repeatedly,
and highly successfully been doing exactly that—inducing, encouraging, and promoting social-
media companies to censor protected speech.
464. Thus Defendants’ censorship campaign is unlawful and enjoinable regardless of
whether the governmental conduct involved would or would not have been sufficient to turn the
social media companies into state actors.
465. In addition, Defendants’ campaign to induce social-media censorship of protected
speech conduct also violates the First Amendment for yet another, independent reason.
466. It is “a core postulate of free speech law” that “government may not discriminate against
speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299
118
(2019).
467. As detailed above, Defendants have since early 2020 systematically and repeatedly been
discriminating against and targeting online speech “based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”
468. Thus Defendants’ efforts to induce social media companies to censor protected speech
violate the First Amendment because they are blatantly viewpoint-discriminatory and are
enjoinable for that reason alone, even when those efforts do not involve coercive threats or
collusion, and even when those efforts fail.
469. Through their conduct, as detailed above, Defendants have injured the named Plaintiffs
and other Class Members in violation of the First Amendment by denying them their right receive
ideas and information from willing speakers, by inhibiting them from gathering news, and by
preventing them from having access to uncensored public discourse in the “modern public
square.”
470. As detailed above, Defendants’ censorship campaign is ongoing, and, because
Defendants refuse to acknowledge any constitutional wrongdoing, virtually certain to continue if
not enjoined by this Court.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Therefore Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court certify the proposed Class, enter judgment
in their favor, and grant the following relief:
A. Declare that Defendants’ conduct violates the First Amendment;
B. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants, their officers, officials, agents, servants,
employees, attorneys, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them, from taking any
steps to demand, urge, pressure, or otherwise induce any social-media platform to censor, suppress,
de-platform, suspend, shadow-ban, de-boost, restrict access to constitutionally protected speech,
119
or take any other adverse action against any speaker, protected content or viewpoint expressed on
social media; and
C. Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ G. Shelly Maturin, II

_______________________
G. SHELLY MATURIN, II
(La. Bar # 26994)
Law Office of G. Shelly Maturin, II, L.L.C.
322 Heymann Blvd., Suite 1
Lafayette, LA 70503
Telephone: (337) 362-3514
E-mail: shelly@maturinlaw.com
________-s-______________
JED RUBENFELD
(NY Bar # 2214104)
(pro hac vice forthcoming)
1031 Forest Rd.
New Haven, CT 06515
Telephone: (203) 432-7631
E-mail: jed.rubenfeld@yale.edu
120
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Case 3:23-cv-00381-TAD-KDM Document 1 Filed 03/24/23 Page 1 of 120 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR.,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

KARINE JEAN-PIERRE, in her official

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official

DR. ANTHONY FAUCI, in his official

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

CAROL Y. CRAWFORD, in her official

Branch of the Division of Public Affairs

UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,

JENNIFER SHOPKORN, in her official

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his official

ROBERT SILVERS, in his official capacity

SAMANTHA VINOGRAD, in her official

JEN EASTERLY, in her official capacity

GINA McCARTHY, in her official capacity

NINA JANKOWICZ, in her official capacity

ANDREW SLAVITT, in his official capacity

ROB FLAHERTY, in his official capacity as

COURTNEY ROWE, in her official capacity

CLARKE HUMPHREY, in her official

BENJAMIN WAKANA, in his official

DANA REMUS, in her official capacity as

AISHA SHAH, in her official capacity as

LAURA ROSENBERGER, in her official

MINA HSIANG, in her official capacity as

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

LAURA DEHMLOW, in her official capacity

ELVIS M. CHAN, in his official capacity as

JAY DEMPSEY, in his official capacity as

ERIC WALDO, in his official capacity as

YOLANDA BYRD, in her official capacity as

CHRISTY CHOI, in her official capacity as

TERICKA LAMBERT, in her official

JOSHUA PECK, in his official capacity as

JANELL MUHAMMED, in her official

MATTHEW MASTERSON, in his official

LAUREN PROTENTIS, in her official

GEOFFREY HALE, in his official capacity

ALLISON SNELL, in her official capacity as

BRIAN SCULLY, in his official capacity as

ZACHARY HENRY SCHWARTZ, in his

LORENA MOLINA-IRIZARRY, in her

KRISTIN GALEMORE, in her official

ERICA JEFFERSON, in her official capacity

MICHAEL MURRAY, in his official

BRAD KIMBERLY, in his official capacity

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

SAMARUDDIN K. STEWART, in his

DANIEL KIMMAGE, in his official capacity

ALEXIS FRISBIE, in her official capacity as

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE

MARK A. ROBBINS, in his official capacity

KRISTEN MUTHIG, in her official capacity

persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Id. (citation omitted)

“Constitutional limitations on governmental action would be severely undercut if the government

violate the Fourth Amendment if engaged in by state actors).