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 ~ J 3 l~~~~~~,~~_~~~~__~ ._.__~ . __.__._-
Philosophical Concerns in Critical
Psychology
Thomas Teo

Psychology as a Problematic Science 36 ,•

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Ontological Concerns and Psychology's Subject Matter 38

Epistemological Concerns and Psychology's Methodology 42 •

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Ethical-Political Concerns and Psychology's Praxis 47 ,
•
•
Current Issues for Critical Psychology 50 •
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psychology as a problematic science

An academic field of study is problematic when it does not address, let alone
resolve, basic issues. This has been the case with psychology, which has
excluded or neglected key problems or pretended they do not exist. As
described in this chapter, three interconnected issues make psychology
problematic: (a) a limited understanding of the complexities of psychology's
subject matter and ontology; (b) a preference for a selectively narrow episte-
mology and methodology; and (c) a lack of reflection (critical thinking) on
psychology's ethical-political concerns and praxis.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that these problems reflect only
contemporary concerns. Indeed, from its beginning as an institution and
independent field of study, psychology has had to cope with ongoing
critiques (see Teo, 2005; Woodward & Ash, 1982). One of the most influen-
tial critiques in the eighteenth century was developed by Immanuel Kant,
who argued that the study of the soul- this is what the term psychology origi-
nally meant - could not be natural-scientific because psychology could not
be made into an authentic experimental discipline like physics. Instead, he
recommended that the field limit itself to a description of the soul and focus
on the notion of moral agency, the ability of the person to act intentionally
according to moral principles.
 In the nineteenth century, psychology was transformed from a philosophical
discipline into a natural-scientific discipline. Adopting the principles and
methods of the natural sciences meant that mainstream academic psychology
shunted aside genuine psychological topics such as subjectivity - subjective,
personal experiences and the meanings that human beings attribute to these
experiences. This transformation had intellectual, but more importantly,
sociohistorical origins: when psychology emerged as a discipline and was
struggling for academic respect in terms of money, power, and recognition, it
seemed more promising to align itself with the highly successful natural
sciences rather than with the seemingly ambiguous human sciences such as
history (Ward, 2002). Later it was hoped that the natural sciences would
appreciate psychology if the discipline committed itself to ostensibly objec-
tive topics such as behaviour rather than to notions of the soul or human
experience. This sentiment of establishing psychology as a rigorous discipline
was so strong that even Sigmund Freud intended psychoanalysis as a natural
science (see Habermas, 1968/1972).
This attempt to establish psychology as a natural science like physics led to
many critiques and also to what are known as crisis discussions within
psychology. Indeed, the first systematic book on the crisis of psychology was
published by Willy (1899), who challenged the dominant natural-scientific
oriented research programmes of his time. He identified speculative theory-
building and an inadequate methodology as sources of psychology's crisis.
The crisis literature has been on the rise since the 1920-1930s and again
since the 1960s and 1970s (for an overview, see Goertzen, 2005). A critique
of psychology's lack of ethical-political relevance can also be found in the
nineteenth century when Beneke (1845) suggested that psychology could
help overcome political, social, and religious tumults. He challenged
mainstream psychology's focus on theory rather than practice and he
protested that German psychology refused to deal with social reality.
A relevant question in a book on critical psychology is this: Should all
approaches that provide a critical evaluation of psychology's mainstream be
labelled critical psychologies? A general concept of critical psychology would
include all approaches that critique psychology's subject matter, or methodol-
ogy, or praxis, or a combination of these elements. A specific concept of critical
psychology, on the other hand, would include approaches sceptical of the
mainstream that give primacy to the ethical-political dimensions of praxis. I use
the term praxis in contrast to the term practice to emphasize the political nature
of human activity in any applied area. In addition, it should be mentioned that
while some psychologists use the label critical psychology to address their own
psychological position (see Fox and PrilleltenskYI 1997; Hook, 2004; Sloan,
or
Z(J(J(J; Walkerdine, Z(](]Z], others Who are critical the mainstream do not use
the term (e.g., some feminist or social-constructionist psychologists).
Very prominent in, but not limited to, critical psychology are cultural-
historical (Marxist), feminist, social-constructionist, and more recently,
postcolonial critiques. All have fuelled the critical literature on the

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 37

mainstream's limitations. For example, Marxist approaches could be inter-
ested in the role of insurance companies in the development of diagnostic
manuals; feminist approaches might question generalizations of developmental
models based exclusively on male participants; social-constructionists might
look at the role of persuasion in making psychological theories dominant in a
culture; and postcolonial experts might question the significance of American
and European theories and practices for African contexts. More importantly,
these various critiques provide alternative approaches, some of which
sometimes contradict one another.

ontological concerns and

psychology's subject matter

In philosophy, the term ontology refers to the study of Being (the study of
the fundamental characteristics of reality). In psychology, ontological studies
address the nature of the psychological 'object': What should psychologists
study? What are the specific and defining characteristics of the psychological
subject matter? Ontological discussions include the proper definition of
psychology, its appropriate subject matter, the models for representing
human mental life, metaphors for understanding human subjectivity, theories
of the human mind, theories of human nature, the relationship between
mind and body, and so on.
It is important to keep the following distinctions in mind: the word psychology
refers to a subject matter, a field of topics, a discipline, and a profession. In
Western history the word psychology has been used to refer to the study of
the soul, consciousness, mental life, behaviour, human experience, the mind,
or the brain, depending on the era and cultural context. Psychological topics
have been studied in the Western tradition since the classical Greeks, for
instance, when Aristotle in his pioneering work On the Soul discussed the
topic memory. However, psychology as an independent academic discipline did
not exist before the nineteenth century, and psychology as a profession became
a social reality only in the twentieth century. The term mainstream psychology
refers to an academic field of study as taught and researched in North
American and European institutions such as universities.
A few key issues regarding mainstream psychology's implicit assumptions
about its subject matter are discussed here. Some psychologists consider that
the most important models in psychology are technological ones and that the
history of psychology parallels the development of technology. For instance,
cognitive psychology's model and metaphors of human mental life are based
on the computer, whereas in earlier eras psychology made use of more basic
mechanical devices (e.g., clocks, steam engines, and radios). Machine models
are embedded within a network of ontological assumptions. One of these
assumptions is that a person reacts towards an external stimulus like a
mechanism; the machine model excludes notions of agency, the ability to

38 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
reflect, choose, and act. Other models in psychology include animal metaphors
that, from a critical perspective, often neglect an understanding of how human
mental life differs from various forms of animal mental life.
Thus, psychology's mainstream operates with a mechanistic, and hence an
atomistic and reductionistic, model of human mental life. A mechanistic
concept of human action is also apparent in biological traditions such as
behaviourism. Despite a commitment to an evolutionary perspective by
many behaviourists, the machine model is dominant in behaviourism because
it is assumed that the individual responds to stimuli. Dividing psychological
life into stimulus and response (behaviourism) or into independent and
dependent variables (mainstream psychology) is problematic because it
neglects subjectivity, agency, and meaningful reflection and action in concrete
contexts (Holzkamp, 1992; Tolman and Maiers, 1991).
The selection of variables in the context of focusing on isolated aspects of
human mental life (atomism) does not do justice to the integration of human
mental life in concrete individuals. Instead of looking at the complexity of
human life, which is the source of human subjectivity, the mainstream in
psychology assumes that it is sufficient to study small parts. For instance,
cognition is divided further into attention, thinking, and memory. Memory
is divided further into long-term, short-term, etc. It is reductionistic to
assume that the parts sufficiently explain the complexity of human subjec-
tivity; yet, this is another consequence of the machine-model. In reality
human subjectivity is experienced in its totality. From the perspective of the
subject, cognition, emotion, and will (to use a Western division of mental
life) are usually experienced in their connection in concrete life-situations
and not as isolated parts. The idea that studying the parts of a whole is suffi-
cient and that the parts will fit together into a meaningful whole through
additive processes is based on a limited worldview. Parts do not just add up
when it comes to human mental life. Critics have argued that a psychology
that does justice to human subjectivity should begin with the nexus of
human experiences in order to understand the parts and not vice versa
(Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003).
The machine-model of human mental life has another consequence: because
it conceptualizes the person as individualistic and society as an external
variable, the model sees the individual and society as separate (see also Parker
& Spears, 1996). Seldom do psychologists realize that they base their theories
and research practices regarding the mind on an individualistic concept.
Consider the following: the fact that you speak a particular language, let's say
English, has become part of your self. But of course, if you had been raised in
Denmark with Danish parents, your language would be Danish. The passage
of time also matters: you can produce unique sentences in English, sentences
that have never been expressed before, yet these sentences are only meaning-
ful because they are embedded within a sociohistorical trajectory. Because
language changes, a sentence like 'I am reading a chapter on critical psychol-
ogy that challenges the problematic nature of psychological ideas' would

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 39

have been incomprehensible to English-speaking persons living 500 years
ago. Although language can be unique to an individual, it only makes sense
within a larger community to which one has been socialized, a community
that shares the linguistic properties of communication. Thus, it is insufficient
to conceptualize the sociohistorical reality as a stimulus environment to
which one reacts; the individual is not independent of the environment and
vice versa. For contemporary psychology to be regarded as a scientific disci-
pline it is crucial to represent human subjectivity as embedded in historical
and social contexts.
In terms of alternatives, various forms of critical psychology have moved
away from a mechanistic and individualistic concept of human mental life.
All critical psychologies promote an understanding of the nature of human
beings and of human mental life as active and societal. Cultural-historical
approaches have argued that the environment, culture, and history are not
just other variables. The context is interwoven with the very fabric of
personal identity. For instance, Vygotsky (1978) and his followers have
challenged psychology's individualistic nature. One of his best-known alter-
native concepts is the zone ofproximal development. It is based on the idea that
testing an individual in isolation is limited and that it is more important to
find out what an individual child can learn under the gUidance of, and in
collaboration with, peers and adults. For example, Vygotsky would be less
interested in your individual performance in a multiple-choice test on
research methods than in how you would solve a concrete research problem
under the guidance of a mentor or in collaboration with other students.
Holzkamp attempted to develop basic categories for psychology in order to
understand the specificities of human subjectivity. For him, subjectivity meant
acknowledging the societal nature of human beings. Yet, conceptualizing the
person as part of a larger sociohistorical and economic context did not mean
that the subject should not be taken seriously. Holzkamp (1984) suggested
that subjectivity and a psychology from the standpoint of the subject, which he
conceived as the only viable psychology, should be understood literally. For
example, it is conceivable that for an individual, drinking alcohol is the best
option to deal with problems. If psychologists already know the outcome of a
certain intervention, independent of the context and the individual, then they
already have neglected the Other's subjectivity. Of course, this does not imply
agreeing with everything that the Other suggests and does.
Most feminist approaches recognize the nexus of person and society and
emphasize the concept of subjectivity in context. In addition, they have
suggested that a focus on the mental life means neglecting the body (see also
phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). This means that
embodied theories of subjectivity need to be developed, theories that do not
exclude the body from psychological theorizing on the subject matter of
psychology (Bayer & Malone, 1998). Social-constructionist thinkers have also
provided conceptualizations of an individual that are not independent of his
or her context but are embedded in society and community (Gergen, 1985).

40 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
Some hermeneutic oriented psychologists have emphasized the intentional,
dialogical, and active side of a person (Richardson) Rogers, & McCarroll, 1998).
A postcolonial critique begins with the argument that the psychological
subject matter is part of a wider historical and cultural context and the
theories that try to capture this subject matter are part of Western theoriz-
ing. Thus, it must be understood as Western models of human mental life
rather than universal ones (Teo & Febbraro, 2003). The question is how
concepts developed in Europe and North America can be applied meaning-
fully to different cultural contexts. The task for psychologists from other
countries is to find psychological theories} concepts, and practices that work
in their life-worlds rather than importing or exporting American ideas. For
instance, Freire (1970), who emphasized that learners should be treated as
subjects and not as objects, and Martin-Baro (1994), who applied Freirean
ideas to psychology, have developed categories dealing specifically with
psychological issues in Latin America.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1976) divided the sciences into natural and human
sciences. Following his lead, there has been increased discussion of the nature
of concepts to describe humans and human mental life. Danziger (1997), who
emphasized the social construction of psychological ideas and practices,
addressed whether psychological concepts have a different status from
natural-scientific concepts. He called this the difference between natural kinds
and human kinds. Natural kinds are physicat chemical and biological objects
and events and are arguably different from psychological categories: the study
of water or a rock formation is different from the study of IQ} grie£ or 'race'.
Psychologists need to understand that concepts in psychology are
constructed in a specific cultural context for specific purposes. Mainstream
psychologists often pretend that constructed concepts are natural concepts
because they have empirical support. But empirical support says nothing
about the ontological status of a concept. For instance, the fact that a certain
number of individuals identify themselves as British does not mean that being
British is a natural kind variable. Critical investigations emerged from the
historical fact that certain psychological concepts have become a reality in
social practice but their ontological status is completely problematic (for
instance, 'race' or IQ). But these socially constructed concepts have become
a central part of our identity: once the concept of IQ has been established
and you do well on IQ tests} it becomes a part of your psychological self-
understanding. Yet, at the same time psychological concepts such as IQ can
also be understood as sources of power and oppression (see Foucault)
1966/1970; Rose, 1996).
Once a concept has become a cultural phenomenon, it is important to
challenge the cultural familiarity of a specific concept and the socialization
into this concept that makes many psychological ideas seem self-evident
when, in fact, they are culturally embedded. The process of social construction
is easy to understand when relatively new concepts such as emotional intelli-
gence become part of our cultural self-understanding. Critical psychologists also

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 41

try to analyse whether these culturally embedded concepts used in psychological
theories express a certain worldview and are ideological (that is, they may serve
the interest of power and money). For instance, if we say that a behaviour is
not adaptive instead of this person is alienated we have made a theoretical
choice with consequences for specific persons (change the person or the
environment). It is through its concepts that psychologists perceive sociopsy-
chological reality.

epistemological concerns and

psychology's methodology .

In philosophy the term epistemology refers to the study of knowledge. In

psychology we are interested in the nature of knowledge, the ways of achiev-
ing knowledge, and the meanings of knowledge and truth. Ontology and
epistemology, although divided in this chapter for descriptive purposes, are
in practice intertwined. Certain ontological assumptions and decisions about
what psychologists should study have epistemological as well as method-
ological consequences. A commitment to a specific conceptualization of the
subject matter implies specific methodological commitments and vice versa.
For example, a machine-model of human mental life implies a mechanistic
methodology, and the results based on this methodology seemingly support,
but indeed are implied in, a machine-model (an example from everyday life:
if one has a hammer, then one thinks that everything one sees needs to be
hammered). This relationship between ontology and epistemology is not
acknowledged in mainstream psychology and, thus, it is a problematic issue
for the discipline.
From a critical perspective, one would demand that the specificities of an
object or event (in psychology it would be mental life or subjectivity in
context) demand and necessitate appropriate methodologies. It appears
trivial to suggest that if researchers are interested in the biological basis of
memory, then they are required to use a biological, natural-scientific method-
ology; however, if they are interested in studying the subjective meaningful
content of memory, then they need a methodology that is able to do justice
to this subject matter (for example, henneneutic approaches that emphasize
the understanding of meaning). However, the mainstream promotes the idea
that a natural-scientific methodology can and must be applied unquestion-
ably to all research areas. This assumption has its intellectual roots in
positivism's physicalism, developed in the first half of the twentieth century,
which suggested that everything in the empirical world could be studied with
the concepts and methods of physics.
As taught at most universities in the world and expressed in most
textbooks, psychology is committed to a natural-scientific, experimental-
statistical or empirical-statistical methodology. It operationalizes most
concepts as variables (independent, dependent, moderating, mediating).

42 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
Indeed, traditional psychology is a psychology of variables (Holzkamp, 1991).
From a historical point of view, one can reconstruct a shift from a science that
was interested in the why of psychological phenomena to the exploration of
the functional relationship between variables. For instance, psychologists do
not study the why of unemployment in a person's life, which would include
an analysis of the problem as a sociohistorical issue. Instead mainstream
psychology looks at the relationship between the variable of unemployment
and other variables such as wellbeing, depression, self-esteem, personality,
and so on. This functional relationship is understood in psychology, depend-
ing on the nature of the research design, as causal or correlational.
Typically, within the logic of mainstream psychological research, it has been
suggested that psychologists should formulate hypotheses derived from
theories (they are framed and understood within theoretical arguments); the
hypotheses should be expressed as law-like statements (if- then); theories and
methods should be formalized; hypotheses should be tested using objective,
valid, and reliable observations and measurements; and, based on the results
of hypothesis testing, psychologists can provide deductive-nomological (law-
providing) or statistical models of explanation and prediction. Many
mainstream psychologists consider the experiment to be the best or most
effective means of gaining knowledge in the discipline. Within a quantitative
methodology, psychology has developed a variety of methods (e.g., analysis of
variance, factor analysis, path analysis, etc.).
Yet, as pointed out earlier, psychological topics such as memory can be
studied from a natural-scientific perspective as well as from a human-scientific
perspective. If one looks at memory's physiological basis, its functions, princi-
ples, and divisions, one is not necessarily interested in an individually developed
memory in context, the very content of memory. As clinical psychologists are
well aware, a person's unique memory of past experiences that gives meaning
to a person's identity and action is part of a cultural-historical trajectory and as
such is the topic for a human-scientific perspective. From a disciplinary
perspective one could argue that studying the meaning of memory is as impor-
tant as researching the physiological basis of memory. Yet, the subjective
dimension of human mental life and subjectivity in general have been
neglected in psychology and excluded in the mainstream's ontology and thus
do not find a way back into methodology. Qualitative research that tends to
focus on the content of human subjectivity is still very much marginalized in
mainstream methodology.
Since Kuhn (1962), historians of science have emphasized the difference
between what researchers are supposed to do and what they actually do.
Critics such as Koch (1985) target the idea that psychology provides psycho-
logical laws by arguing that despite the discipline's natural-scientific orientation
for over a hundred years, despite the hundreds of thousands of experiments,
and despite the long accumulation of very technical writings, it would
be difficult to find statements in psychology that could be counted as
natural law in the sense of the natural sciences or in the sense of being

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 43

universally valid. The fact that psychology fails as a law-providing science
should give pause for reflection on whether the prevailing methodology
does justice to the subject matter.
Yet, as pointed out earlier, certain ontological and methodological commit-
ments cannot be resolved by looking at the discipline's internal shortcomings.
Science is also a social enterprise and should be understood in the context of
power, money, and prestige. The discipline that struggled with acceptance in
academia and by the public would rather associate itself with the use of brass
and steel instruments that had mechanical sophistication and were associated
with science, adopt the white coats of scientists in labs, and rely on complex
machines such as computers and tMRI machines. Of course, it was also
important to suggest that psychological measures have the same status as
physical measures. Critics of this approach suggest that the use of natural-
scientific paraphernalia does not really make psychology a science even
though it makes for a good pretence (see also Politzer, 1994).
The focus on methodology rather than on subject matter has led to an
epistemological attitude that I call methodologism (Teo, 2005). This term refers
to a research practice in which the subject matter is secondary but the method
has primacy. Others have used similar terms: methodolatry (Bakan, 1967), the
cult of empiricism (Toulmin & Leary, 1985), and the methodological imperative
(Danziger, 1985). Methodologism means that the experimental-statistical or
empirical-statistical methodology is applied to all research questions. Yet, if a
methodology prescribes what psychologists can study, research is unnecessar-
ily limited. Critical psychologists such as Holzkamp (1991) even argued that
adequacy of the methodology with regard to the subject matter should be a
central scientific criterion: as long as the adequacy of a methodology is not
known, the scientific value and all other objectification criteria are worthless.
To illustrate this point, consider the following: the best thermometer in the
world is worthless for measuring speed.
Psychology's methodologism leads to a methodological theory of knowledge:
instead of asking about the nature of knowledge in psychology, such as
whether studies would be valid in a hundred years and valid in all cultures
(which they should if we found causal relationships that can be generalized
into a natural law), it is assumed that accepting and following the method-
ological and methodical rules outlined by the discipline, handed down and
enhanced by succeeding generations of psychologists, will automatically lead
to psychological knowledge. Such a methodological theory of knowledge also
prevents critical questions about the purpose of research: What are the
personal, social, and political-economic interests involved in executing a
certain study? Who benefits from which results? Critical psychologists do not
think that methodology is independent from the subject matter and
independent from the sociohistorical context from which it emerges.
The methodologism of natural-scientific psychology leads to various
sub-problems. From a critical as well as from a human-scientific perspec-
tive the experiment in psychology has limited value given the nature of

44 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
the psychological subject matter, which includes the agency of persons
embedded in sociohistorical contexts. Even Wilhelm Wundt, still heralded
as the father of modern experimental psychology, was aware of the exper-
iment's limited value. Thus, he called for a psychology that includes the
sociohistorical context and uses what we would call qualitative methods
(see Danziger, 1990).
An experiment can only capture what goes into the theoretical and
methodological framework. For instance, if I stand up as a participant (or
'subject') in an experiment and suggest that the task demanded of me does
not make sense to me, I am excluded from the data as an error. Thus, my
reaction - based on a legitimate concern - is excluded. The experiment needs
the willing and well-behaved participant, but in social reality, humans can
stand up and change the world, or at least, their life-worlds. This cannot be
captured in an experiment. The experiment uses variables and looks at the
functional (causal) relationship of isolated variables, but in the real world, all
the factors that had been excluded in the experiment emerge and playa role
in human action (Holzkamp, 1972). Thus, psychological studies often do not
have practical relevance, let alone emancipatory relevance, which is a core
issue for many critical psychologies. Emancipatory relevance means that
research should contribute to overturning oppressive social situations.
There is a large literature regarding the critique of mainstream psychology's
identity as a science that supposedly provides universal laws, explanations, and
predictions. In addition, some critics have argued that psychology mistakes
reasons for causes and that empirical hypothesis-testing is not a test but an
application of good reasons (is your decision to study critical psychology
caused or do you have reasons for it?) and that if-then-statements have implica-
tive character (for some of these complex issues, see Smedslund, 1988). The
discussion of mistaking reasons of humans for physical causes points to another
important issue: psychology's hermeneutic deficit (see Teo, 2008). Because the
mainstream excludes hermeneutic methods (methods that emphasize an
understanding of human subjectivity), psychologists are often unaware of the
problems that are related to what assumptions go into the establishment and
interpretation of data. Interpretations impart meaning to data and make results
understandable, for the authors themselves, for peers, and for a general
audience and the mass media. Interpretations allow data to be understood
better than they present themselves. The mainstream rhetoric of psychologi-
cal 'facts' suggests that facts speak for themselves even when those 'facts' or
'empirical knowledge' contain data and interpretations.
This hermeneutic deficit becomes clear in the context of the interpretation
of group differences (e.g., gender or 'race' differences). I suggest that episte-
mological violence is committed when the interpretation of data (not data
themselves) leads to statements that construct marginalized groups as inferior,
restrict the opportunities of marginalized groups, and lead to aversive recom-
mendations for marginalized groups. For instance, if a researcher suggests that
a gender difference in faculty positions at elite universities is due to the lower

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 45

ability of women, then this researcher has committed epistemological violence
(because the data do not determine this interpretation, because alternative
interpretations are available, and because this interpretation has negative
consequences for women). Unfortunately, as described in more detail in other
chapters, psychology has a long history of invalid interpretations of group differ-
ences regarding women} ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, people with
disabilities, and people living on low incomes} among others.
In terms of alternatives, critical psychologists continue to use methodologies
that strive to do justice to the subject matter, methodologies that capture
the active, meaning-oriented, intentional nature of human mental life
embedded in sociohistorical contexts. Some critical psychologists have
incorporated psychoanalysis, the best-known approach that does not
exclude subjectivity from research (see Parker, 2003). Critical researchers
also emphasize the transformative potential of research: this means that
research not only addresses the status quo but also provides knowledge on
how to change it.
Although there exists no consistent methodology in the varieties of critical
psychology, one can often find the idea that qualitative methods are more
appropriate for understanding human subjectivity than quantitative
methods. However, it is evident that certain issues should be addressed from
a quantitative point of view, and even more, that quantitative methods can
be critical and can challenge the status quo (see Martin-Baro, 1994). For
example, if someone makes the argument that men interrupt women more
often than vice versa, one can begin with a quantitative method in order to
measure the frequency of interruptions by men and by women. Thus, quanti-
tative methods are not inherently problematiC because the usage of methods
depends on the subject matter, the specific question or the particular issue.
The problem is not the usage of quantitative methods; the problem is giving
primacy to a natural-scientific methodology without looking at the' object'.
The limitations of a quantitative approach for many psychological issues have
become the source of many alternatives.
Feminist researchers have identified the ideology of mainstream scientific
methodology as male biased. In her classical studies, Keller (1985) explored the
association between objectivity and masculinity and defended the thesis that
scientific research was based on masculine discourses, ideals, metaphors, and
practices. She argued that the emphasis on power and control, widespread in
the rhetoric of Western science's history, represented the projection of a male
consciousness. The language of science expressed a preoccupation with
dominance and an adversarial relationship to nature. She pointed out that
science divided reality into two parts, the knower and the known, with an
autonomous knower in control, distanced, and separated from the known.
According to Keller, the masculine separation of scientist and subject matter
opposed the feminine idea of connectedness and at the same time reinforced
beliefs about the naturally masculine character of science. Instead, she
suggested research that emphasizes a connection with the participant and does

46 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
not exclude the participant's authentic experiences. Obviously, qualitative
methods are preferred within such a framework.
In cultural-historical approaches, when it comes to educational psychol-
Ogyj research on assessment, teaching, and learning has been understood as
holistic. For example, in co-teaching models all stakeholders participate in the
design of a curriculum as well as in the actual teaching practices (see Roth
and Lee, 2007). Such a process provides a grounding of theories in praxis - a
method that has been applied to social workers and other professions.
According to German critical psychology, research should be able to capture
the standpoint of the subject. This means, for instance, that in psychotherapy
research how psychotherapy shapes a person is less interesting than how a
person contributes to his or her own change (Dreier, 2007).
Social-constructionist or postmodern thinkers (the label may be problem-
atic) such as Michel Foucault have inaugurated various methods of discourse
analysis. Critical discourse analysis, a method that focuses on the analysis of
written or spoken language, understands language as a social practice that is
infused with biases. This method operates based on the idea that language is
often embedded in ideological, oppressive, or exploitative practices.
Discourse analysis allows, for example, historical reconstructions of how
the multiple personality was made into an object of academic discussion
(Hacking, 1995) as well as the analysis of very specific discourses such as
racist discourses (Van Dijk, 1993). Foucault (1977) also provided suggestions
for an analysis of non-discursive practices: for instance, an analysis of prison
architecture allows an insight into the workings of power in the context of
human subjectivity and interpersonal relations.
In Martin-Baro's (1994) approach, epistemology is intertwined with critical
praxis. He suggests that psychology must base its knowledge production on the
liberation needs of the oppressed people of Latin America. This means that
knowledge must be generated by learning from the oppressed: research should
look at psychOSOCial processes from the perspective of the dominated; educa-
tional psychology should learn from the perspective of the illiterate; industrial
psychology should begin with the perspective of the unemployed; clinical
psychology should be guided by the perspective of the marginalized. What does
mental health mean from the perspective of someone who lives in a town dump?
Martin-Baro suggests an epistemological change from the powerful to the
oppressed and recommends participatory action research (see below). It must be
mentioned that feminist, sociohistorical, postmodem and postcolonial ideas can
be integrated into a meaningful methodology of the oppressed (Sandoval, 2000).

ethical-political concerns and

·-·~"M.·····" .."..·'w.······,..· .. ·,··,,·· psychology's praxi S.,#",w ".0""'" •• >" <>.wO' ." "'.,.. "." " '".>' ..•".. . ..••. ' . .. . . . .. .. .". . . .. "

Psychological practice is interconnected with epistemology and ontology. If

one assumes that humans act like machines, then practice will emphasize

~''''.m.'.'.'."'''''''"'"'~''''''...'''<>'.''''''•• > •• '''''''' PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY .' 47

control, manipulation, and technologies. If one conceptualizes humans as
meaning-making agents embedded in sociopolitical contexts, then practice
will call attention to human action and agency. I will focus here on one issue:
the emphasis on control and adaptation neglects psychology's emancipatory
potential. Psychology has been an extremely successful discipline in Europe
and North America in terms of academic and professional expansion.
However, success does not necessarily imply the ethical-political quality of its
practice. Psychological practice has often involved abuses perpetrated by the
powerful, from intelligence testing as a means to control immigration into the
United States (see Chapter 2 and Gould} 1981) to applying psychological
techniques to extract information from suspected terrorists (see Chapter 23).
Although it is difficult to make generalizations and to identify an underly-
ing tenet} mainstream psychologists in the past and present have emphasized
that fact (what is) and value (what ought to be) are two different domains
that should be kept apart. The problem is that, in any social science, these
two domains are inherently intertwined. Even in natural science, as environ-
mental issues such as global warming show, the effect of human activity on
the environment is not just a fact but something that has implications for
action. Critical psychologists challenge the mainstream idea that one cannot
derive ought from is, and that science should remain neutral on political issues
and concerns. Instead} most ethical-political critical psychologists emphasize
that we should derive ought from is. For instance, if research shows the
negative effects of poverty on mental life, then poverty should be targeted
and in the end abolished; psychologists should participate in its abolition. In
terms of social injustice in general (when it comes to class} ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation, disability, globalization} etc.), critical psychologists take up
issues of inequality and make them a practical research concern.
Of course, in practice the mainstream is ambivalent about ethical-political
issues because the separation of is and ought is not really maintained in
professional organizations, and the public demands an ethical position on
certain issues. The American Psychological Association, the Canadian
Psychological Association, and many other professional organizations have
adopted codes of ethics to which members submit. Obviously, values come
into play when doing psychology (see 1. Prilleltensky, 1994). From a Latin
American point of view, Martin-Bar6 (1994) pointed out that an ethical-
political stance and objectivity do not conflict with each other. For example,
when it comes to torture it would be possible to be ethical (thus rejecting
torture) while at the same time maintaining objectivity (understanding the
objective consequences of torture on human mental life).
Foucault not only wrote about the prison system but also became active in
the prison reform movement. This path relates to Karl Marx's famous notion
of the primacy of praxis over theory: intellectual reflection should not be
about interpreting the world so much as changing it. For Marx} the final goal
of all praxis was changing society's fundamental economic foundations,
which he perceived as the source of inequality. A member of the Frankfurt

48 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
School of critical theory, Max Horkheimer (1992) also pleaded for an end to
the separation of value and research, knowledge and action, and the individ-
ual and society. Instead of denying that values guide research and instead of
hiding interests, Horkheimer specifically laid out values to guide critical
research: an organization of society to meet the needs of the whole commu-
nity and to end social injustice. Critical social research should be gUided
by these ethical-political ideas and should generate knowledge that has
emancipatory relevance.
Two things should be emphasized: mainstream psychology is also guided
by certain values, beginning with the value of value-neutrality; and a lack of
reflection on the values that guide one's research maintains the status quo.
Critical psychologists have analysed psychology's role in maintaining capital-
ism, patriarchy, colonialism, and Western ideology (for instance, see
Weisstein, 1993). In not challenging the mainstream, psychology reinforces
the status quo, which also means performing psychology in the interest of the
powerful. This embeddedness of psychology in the market economy has
made it difficult to promote psychology as an emancipatory science. Even
social psychology, which has a history of contributing to emancipation, has
largely been transformed into a field that produces huge amounts of socially
irrelevant data.
To make this argument about the mainstream's primarily adaptive praxis
more transparent I would like to mention one example from psychotherapy.
A psychologist can work in a therapeutic setting with gays and lesbians to
make their homosexuality (seemingly) disappear. This was considered
adaptive by some people at a particular point in time. On the other hand,
working with such individuals on the transformation of personal attitudes
and societal perspectives, a praxis that may include social action can be
considered emancipatory. Rather than making homosexuality into a problem,
psychotherapy should be about working on problems that homosexuals
encounter in a particular society. An emancipatory praxis does not silence the
needs and concerns of people suffering from societal prejudices.
In terms of alternatives, cultural-historical, Neo-Marxist, and other
critical approaches in the West have acknowledged the primacy of praxis
but have often remained in the comparably safe environment of academia.
Thus, instead of becoming politically active outside the political
mainstream, many critical theorists have suggested that research, if not
emancipatory itself, should at least have an emancipatory intention
(Habermas, 1972). In fact, in critical thought one can find ethical-political
orientations that range from left-liberal progressive to radical. Many ivory
tower critical psychologists also justify theoretical research as a legitimate
option, because the production of knowledge is considered a form of
praxis (as is teaching) that is not inferior to concrete community-based
interventions in the abolition of social injustice.
Although Marxists, feminists, and social constructionists have developed
ideas on the unity of theory and practice, the most obvious consequences

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 49

of praxis can be seen in economically less developed contexts where
theorizing for the sake of theorizing and research for the sake of research
must be considered indulgent practices given that lives and deaths are at
stake. Again, Martin-Baro (1994) argues that it is insufficient to put
ourselves in the shoes of oppressed people. Instead he pleads for a new
praxis, which he defines as an activity that transforms social reality and lets
us know not only about what is but also about what is not, and by which
we may try to orient ourselves toward what ought to be. In consequence, the
psychologist is less a traditional clinician and more a resource for the
community regarding intervention and support in the fields of disability,
mental health, and drug use and also in terms of economic development
and anti-poverty programmes.
For Martin-Baro it is not so much that theory defines the problems but
rather that the problems demand their own theorization. In consequence, he
worked with victims of state oppression, assumed active social roles, and
worked with marginalized groups as a collective. This allowed for an under-
standing of suffering as a shared issue rather than an individualized problem.
His preferential option for the poor was influential in shaping his political-
ethical ideas. The concrete praxis method that he used has been labelled
participatory action research but he also believed it needed to be accompanied
by an analysis of the history and social theory of oppression. Originally, action
research was introduced to psychology by Kurt Lewin (1946) who, motivated
by the unity of theory and praxis, believed in the transformative power of
research in social psychology. This method of praxis allows for studying and
changing a problem at the same time.
Certain fields in psychology lend themselves to practical interventions
based on progressive ethical-political systems. For example, although not all
parts of community psychology are emancipatory, some critical psychologists
are associated with community psychology (see Prilleltensky and Nelson,
2002 and Chapters 8 and 22 in this volume). Concrete critical psychological
praxis has also been addressed in the context of AIDS in Africa (Hook, 2004)
and in Latin America in terms of various forms of liberation psychology
(Montero and Christlieb, 2003).

current issues for critical psychology

Critical reflection and recognition that psychology is a problematic science

should not be understood as a call to abandon psychology. Instead, it is an
argument to transform psychology in a direction that does justice to the
complexity of the subject matter, chooses methodologies for the particularities
of mental life embedded in contexts, and develops ethically responsible
practices and ideas that challenge the status quo. The future of psychology as
well as of critical psychology depends on understanding that the world has
become more interconnected. Despite the negative consequences of economic

50 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
 globalization for many nations, groups, and individuals, opportunities present
themselves for the theory and praxis of the discipline.
This opportunity can be described as internationalization (see Brock, 2006).
It should be noted that this term connotes two opposing strategies: it could
mean the propagation of Americanized psychology around the world; indeed
internationalization traditionally meant the world-wide distribution of
American psychology (or at best, cross-cultural studies based on a Western
ontology and epistemology). But the term could also mean a move away from
an American to a genuine global psychology. A global postcolonial psychol-
ogy involves a process of assimilation, by which mainstream psychology
incorporates non-Western concepts into the discipline, but more importantl~
a process of accommodation, by which the very nature of psychology changes
based on ideas from around the world. If one assumes that any local psychol-
ogy (including American psychology) could learn from other local perspec-
tives, then an international postcolonial psychology requires more than a
process of incorporation.
The notion of internationalization is based on the idea that Western
psychological concepts are neither universally applicable nor superior to
concepts from other cultural contexts. In addition, Western psychology
should pay attention, for instance, to the classical Indian concept of a fourth
state of consciousness (reaching a non-dualistic, undivided, and unchanging
Self through meditation; see Paranjpe, 1998) or to the concept of ubuntu
(personhood is understood in relationship with others) in South African
,
•
,~
psychology (Mkhize, 2004).
f

Indeed, we all, including psychologists, have limited horizons, restricted

i

··,

psychological perspectives within which we develop our research and

practice. Exposure to historically and culturally significant horizons that
transcend our own point of view will allow the development of broader,
deeper, and more sophisticated perspectives that address the significant
problems of the discipline.

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1 The various approaches to critical psychology can be studied along three philo~
sophically distjnctive, but in reality integrated, problem complexes: (a) ontological
discussions include a critique of the subject matter of psychology; (b) epistemo~
logical concerns focus on the methodology of psychology; and (c) ethical-political
frameworks challenge the practice of psychology.

2 These three problem areas are analysed in terms of accepted ideas in

mainstream psychology, the critique of the mainstream, and alternatives devel~
oped in various critical psychologies.

3 Finally, some ideas on the future of critical psychology are presented.

........................ : ::.: : :.. . .

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 51

 glossary

• epistemology: the study of knowledge. Psychologists interested in epistemological

questions discuss the discipline's adequate methodology (a general framework
for studying psychological topics), methods (specific approaches for studying
psychological issues), and their relationship to knowledge.

• ethical-political concerns: the dash emphasizes that ethical concerns are also
political concerns and vice versa. In psychology those concerns influence the
praxis of psychology. The term praxis is used in order to emphasize the ethical-
political nature of all psychological practices.

• ontology: the study of Being in general. In psychology researchers in this area

address the nature of the psychological subject matter (the 'object' of psychol-
ogy), the nature of human mental life, human nature in general, and the nature of
psychological categories.

reading suggestions

For an introductory overview of the various forms of critical psychology, I recom-

mend the following books: Hook's (2004) textbook provides critical psychologi-
cal theory and praxis from an African perspective; Tolman (1994) presents a good
overview on the history and theory of Holzkamp's German critical psychology,
of which not many works have been translated into English; Sloan (2000)
includes the personal voices as well as the ideas of critical psychologists; Teo
(2005) provides a historical and systematic reconstruction of the various
critiques of psychology; Slife, Reber, and Richardson (2005) address critical
thinking in psychology and its areas; and Prilleltensky and Nelson (2002) explore
critical praxis systematically.

internet resources /

• History and Philosophy of Psychology web resources: www.psych.yorku.ca/

orgs/resource/
• History and Theory of Psychology Graduate Program - York University,
Canada: www.yorku.ca/health/psyc/graduate/ht_more_info.htm
• Illuminations: The Critical Theory Project: www.gseis.ucla.edulfacultylkellnerl
illumina%20Folderi
• International Society for Theoretical Psychology (ISTP): psychology.ucalgary.
ca/istp/
• Kritische Psychologie - German critical psychology: www.kritische-
psychologie.de

52 CRITICAL OVERVIEWS
 • Marxist Internet Archive: www.marxists.org/index.htm

• Philosophy Resources on the Internet: www.epistemelinks.com

• Radical Philosophy: www.radicalphilosophy.com

• Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology of the American

Psychological Association: soe.indstate.edu/div241

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: plato.stanford.edu

1 What is the proper subject matter of psychology?

2 How would you conceptualize theoretically and practically the relationship

between the individual and society?

3 Provide examples and, if possible, personal experiences of methodologism.

4 Discuss how ethical-political values influence psychological research and practices.

5 D~scuss how theory and praxis are related.

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PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS IN CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY .

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53
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