Sex Roles, Vol. 43, Nos.

7/8, 2000

Definitions of Gender and Sex:

The Subtleties of Meaning
Jayde Pryzgoda and Joan C. Chrisler1
Connecticut College

Definitions of the word “gender” were collected from 137 participants, who
also completed questionnaires designed to determine aspects of the usage of
the words “gender” and “sex.” The majority of participants were European
American (86.9%), followed by Latino/a (3.6%), Asian/Asian American
(2.9%), African American (2.2%), Native American (1.5%), and West Indian
(1.5%). Most participants (70.9%) had attended at least some college and oc-
cupations included students (43%), professionals (27.8%), health care work-
ers (4.3%), technical workers (5%), sales and service workers (9.4%), main-
tenance workers (1.4%), and business owners (1.4%). Data were examined
to see which common themes emerged from the free form “define gender”
question, the amount of interchangeability of “sex” and “gender” in a sen-
tence completion task, and the varieties of beliefs about the relation between
the terms “gender” and “sex.” Results indicate a variety of understandings
and beliefs about gender that range from the common response that “gender”
is the same as “sex” to some less common responses that associate gender
with females or discrimination. Implications of the ambiguous meaning of
“gender” are discussed with an emphasis on the responsibility of researchers
to clarify their own understanding of the terms when they discuss gender or
sex in their research and publications.

The words “sex” and “gender” are deceptive. They appear to be sim-
ple, straightforward descriptors of some of the most basic characteristics of
humans. People use the words and accept the constructs they stand for on a
daily basis without much effort. Questionnaires, medical forms, and all sorts
of official paperwork request us to fill in our appropriate sex or gender. Pub-
lic restrooms are assigned to be used by “sex.” The first thing people want
1 Towhom correspondence should be addressed at Department of Psychology, Connecticut
College, New London, Connecticut 06320.

553
c 2000 Plenum Publishing Corporation
0360-0025/00/1000-0553$18.00/0 °
554 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

to know about a newborn baby is if “it” is a girl or a boy. When people are
asked to identify their own sex, perhaps on one of those “official” forms, they
are expected to check either the male or female box. Similarly, if they are
asked about their gender, they are usually given the same two choices: male
or female. So sex and gender must be synonyms in the English language. But
do they really mean the same thing? Some psychologists appear to think so.
For several decades, psychologists have taken the opportunity to write
about sex and gender when studying males and females and women and
men (Deaux & Kite, 1987). Many studies have focused on sex or gender
differences or both. Some of these studies have referred to “sex differences”
(e.g., Edwards, Honeycutt, & Zagacki, 1989), and others have referred to
“gender differences” (e.g., Blier & Blier-Wilson, 1989). Still other studies
can be found with the word “gender” in their titles and only a discussion
of sex differences in the bodies of the papers (e.g., Eagly, 1983; Eagly &
Crowley, 1986; Eagly & Steffan, 1986). Fairly recently, researchers studying
brain processes have discussed their findings in terms of the gender of rats
(e.g., Devaud, Fritschy, & Morrow, 1998; Sershen, Hashim, & Lajtha, 1998).
For the most part, the authors of these studies have not conscientiously
defined the terms sex and gender in their writing. Instead, the words have
been used interchangeably, presumably to make a standard and general
differentiation between “men” and “women,” “boys” and “girls,” and even
“male” and “female” rats.
Despite the inconsistency, psychologists who focus on the psychology
of gender have struggled with the nuances of the terminology. “Sex” has
come to refer to the biological aspects of being male and female. “Gender”
typically refers only to behavioral, social, and psychological characteristics
of men and women. Even these definitions may be too simple. Scholars
have been refining and reworking various definitions of gender for years
(Archer & Lloyd, 1985; Nicholson, 1994; Unger 1979; West & Zimmerman,
1991). More recently, research on intersexed infants has brought into ques-
tion the meaning of “sex” categories (Strickland, Noelle, Henderson, &
Bornstein, 1999), and theoretical analyses based on the experiences of inter-
sexed and transgendered people are appearing more frequently (Bornstein,
1995; Golden, 2000; Kessler, 1998). Despite the ongoing controversies, peo-
ple who study and think about sex and gender would probably agree that
they are not synonyms.
To people who study it, gender indicates something about socialized be-
havior patterns. So when we read about gender differences, we may assume
that the authors are focusing on social behaviors and psychological aspects of
their participants. But when people are grouped into gender categories based
on their sex, the study is just as likely to be about sex differences—perhaps
more likely. It is not that the researchers are deciding to measure biological
Definitions of Gender 555

aspects of behavior. Yet, when the measurement of gender is equated with

sex, the sex of the participant is all that is known. Still, it is often called gen-
der. “Gender” sounds better to people. Using “gender” allows researchers to
believe that they have realized that not all differences between males and fe-
males are determined by biology. But the measurement of gender by way of
sex doesn’t acknowledge the multitude of individual responses to being born
a particular sex. In this situation, there is no thorough assessment of gender.
It might even be argued that simply replacing the term “sex” with the
term “gender” is misleading. By discussing all research in terms of gender,
“gender” becomes just another way of saying “sex.” Even if “gender” is used
to convey the idea that all of the differences between men and women are
the product of social meanings (Kessler & McKenna, 1978), it is possible that
the biological distinctions communicated by the word “sex” are still being
communicated by the word “gender.” To the uncritical eye, “gender” may
become simply an indication that male/female difference is being discussed.
And if psychologists want “gender” to convey meaning different from or
without “sex,” then it is important that “gender” is not forever paired with
“sex” in people’s minds. The meanings people glean from words are bound
to influence both their understanding and their subsequent communication.2
Although psychology has not directly addressed the issue of language
use and beliefs about sex and gender, researchers have attempted to gain an
understanding of how language use affects thoughts and beliefs. Research
and theory on the influence of language and word use suggest that the way in
which people listen to and speak about a particular topic can influence their
thoughts and beliefs about that topic. For example, Hamilton (1988, 1991)
conducted a series of studies designed to assess the influence of masculine
generic pronouns on sex attribution and mental imagery. She (Hamilton,
1991) found that after listening to stories in which either masculine pro-
nouns, neutral pronouns, or masculine and feminine pronouns were used
to describe a group of people, participants who’d heard the masculine pro-
nouns reported more mental images of male than female story characters. In
another study, Hamilton (1988) found that participants who were induced
to complete sentence fragments with masculine generics were more likely
to imagine the subject of the sentence to be a male than were those partici-
pants who had been induced to use unbiased neutral words. Hamilton (1988)
argued that both hearing and using masculine generics creates male bias in
people’s impressions and images of the subject under discussion.
How does any of this relate to the study of sex and gender? It sug-
gests that if the language of some topics has been shown to be important

2 McHugh, Koeske, and Frieze (1986) suggested one possible solution to this problem—the use
of the term “sex-related differences.”
556 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

to people’s understanding and mental images, it is likely that the language

of other topics wields influence as well. Gendered word choices have been
shown to influence comprehension, memory (Crawford & English, 1984;
Harrison, 1975), and attitudes toward women (Crawford, Stark & Renner,
1998; Dion, 1987; Dion & Cota, 1991). Over the years, volumes (e.g., Lakoff,
1975; Miller & Swift, 1980) of feminist work on language, sex, and mascu-
line generics have paved the way for a new way of speaking and writing in
business settings, news media, and schools. Change takes time, but it appears
that academic research and feminist writing can have large-scale influence on
the general public. It is therefore important to assess from time to time how
ideas discussed by psychologists come to be understood by people outside
of the field of psychology.
To pursue this end, we ask the question: How do nonpsychologists define
“gender,” think about gender, and use the word “gender”? The availability
of nonacademic writing on sex and gender issues suggests that at least some
nonpsychologists think a great deal about these issues. Recently, the Utne
Reader (Blum, 1998; Harris, 1998; Raymond, 1998; Spayde, 1998; Steiner,
1998; Turkle, 1998), a magazine that compiles the “best of the alternative me-
dia,” printed several articles that discussed the controversial issue of radical
gender defiance and challenged traditional ideas about a biological basis for
gender. There are also many internet web pages and chat rooms dedicated to
a broad range of “gender” issues (Carter, 1996). Amidst the information, dis-
cussion, and philosophical meanderings posted on these pages, there seems
to be an effort to explain the difference between “sex” and “gender” and to
use the words in accordance with the specific definitions. But, these may be
isolated examples of a small sample of people who spend time focused on
the topic of gender and are therefore invested in accurately describing their
viewpoints. It is evident that some people do think about the language of
sex and gender, however, there may be just as many, if not more, who don’t.
And just as psychologists who study behavior but focus on topics other than
gender often inaccurately describe gender differences as sex differences and
vice versa, it is probable that nonpsychologists who aren’t concerned with
gender theory confuse the terms as well.
A number of psychologists have written about gender origins and gen-
der definitions, but it does not appear that any psychological research has
been done on people’s usage of the word “gender” or their definitions of
gender. Aspects of gender roles, stereotypes, sex and gender differences,
gender and sexuality, gender and power, gender and groups, and gender
and cognition have been studied again and again (Deaux & Lafrance, 1998).
Much of the research on sex and gender has focused either on what people
believe about the behavior of men and women or on the actual behavioral
differences between men and women. The purpose of the present study is
Definitions of Gender 557

to focus on what people believe about gender and sex in general. How do
people define “gender”? Where do people think gender comes from? How
do people relate “sex” to “gender”?
Because no one has ever asked research participants to define “gen-
der” or to use the word “sex” and “gender” in sentences, our major intent
was simply to gather information to find out how people define gender and
sex and how they use the words in their everyday lives. In addition, it was
hypothesized that:
1. most participants would use the words “sex” and “gender” inter-
changeably in a structured sentence completion task;
2. when asked what they thought of when they saw the word “gender,”
many participants would respond with “sex”;
3. participants who had not had much exposure to gender theory
(through college classes in women’s studies or psychology) would
confuse the terms more often than people who had had some expo-
sure to gender theory.

METHOD

Participants

Two hundred and fifty people were recruited on the campus of a liberal
arts college and at various community gathering places in New England
towns, including a train station and coffee shops. A large percentage (54.8%)
of the surveys were returned. Most of the surveys returned were complete.
One respondent did not complete the first section of the survey; therefore,
the total number of collected definitions was 136. Several other respondents
left various questions unanswered. Total responses to particular questions
are noted in the Results section where applicable. The final sample consisted
of 137 people (96 females, 40 males, and one unidentified participant).
The majority of the participants were young adults (median age = 24),
but the ages ranged from 18 to 70 years. Most of the participants were
European American (86.9%); others were Latino/a (3.6%), Asian/Asian
American (2.9%), African American (2.2%), Native American (1.5%), and
West Indian (1.5%). Two participants (1.5%) did not disclose their ethnic-
ity. Participants identified themselves as heterosexual (82.5%), homosex-
ual (11.7%), or bisexual (2.2%). A small number of participants did not
respond to the question about sexual orientation or responded that they
did not fit into the categories listed (3.7%). On average, participants rated
themselves as “neither masculine nor feminine” on the Sexual Identity
Scale. Participants were well educated; 70.9% had attended at least some
558 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

college. Occupations of the participants included students (43%), profes-

sionals (27.8%), health care workers (4.3%), technical workers (5%), sales
and service workers (9.4%), maintenance workers (1.4%), and business own-
ers (1.4%). Psychology students made up 44.5% of the participants. Only
24.1% of the participants had ever taken a women’s studies course.

Measures

Gender Definition Survey

This survey was developed specifically for use in this study. It consisted
of three written tasks on three pages. The first page requested participants
to respond to the following two statements: (1) “Please write the first thing
you think of when you see the word ‘gender’ ”; (2) “In your own words,
define ‘gender’.” Participants were invited to be as brief or as detailed as
they wished.
The second page consisted of 13 sentence completion questions for
which participants were asked to encircle the word that best fit the sentence.
Nine of the questions asked participants to choose between using the word
“sex” or the word “gender.” Two of the questions presented a choice between
“male” and “masculine,” and two presented a choice between “female” and
“feminine.” Each sentence gave either a biological or social/psychological
cue that a participant might presumably use to decide which word best
completed the sentence (e.g., “The sex of the boy is . Male/Masculine”;
“The girl’s gender is . Female/Feminine”; “The of the cat is male.
Sex/gender”) (Appendix A provides a full listing of the 13 items).
The third and final page asked participants to rate their level of agree-
ment, using a 5-point Likert scale (with “1” signifying strong disagreement
and “5” signifying strong agreement), with 11 items about gender. Each item
presented a statement about gender, which dealt with either the origin of
gender, the relatedness of sex and gender, the malleability of gender, or the
appropriateness of nontraditional gender identifications (e.g., “Aspects of
gender (such as behaviors, viewpoints, and attitudes) may change according
to a person’s experiences”; “There is something wrong or unhealthy with a
male who does not possess a masculine gender.”). (Appendix B contains a
complete listing of these statements.)

Sexual Identity Scale

This scale was used to assess an individual’s self-evaluation of his or her

own primary masculinity/femininity identification (Stern, Barak, & Gould,
1987). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was reported to be .964 for the total
Definitions of Gender 559

sample, .850 for women, and .873 for men. It consisted of four statements
asking participants to describe their feelings, appearance, behaviors, and
interests with one of five gender descriptors (very masculine, masculine,
neither masculine nor feminine, feminine, and very feminine). The purpose
of using this scale was to gain an understanding of how the participants
consciously labeled themselves. A more “objective” femininity/masculinity
scale was not used because we were not interested in where people fell on a
predefined scale of masculinity and femininity. Rather, the purpose was to
examine how each individual perceived her or himself and how each person
thought about the concept of gender.

Demographics Page

This section asked 12 questions about the participants’ sex, ethnicity,

age, marital status, sexual orientation, education, spirituality, and work life.

Procedure

Participants were approached by the first author on the campus, at the

local train station, and at local coffee shops, and asked to participate in the
study. Faculty and staff were recruited through a campus mailing that in-
vited them to complete the enclosed survey. Students from an introductory
psychology course and students from a research methods course in psychol-
ogy were also recruited. Prospective participants were told that this was a
study about people’s beliefs about gender and about the words “sex” and
“gender.” Participants who handed the completed survey back in person
were informed about the hypotheses and the reasons for studying people’s
beliefs and definitions of gender. Participants were also given the oppor-
tunity to receive the results of the study if they wished. Participants who
returned the survey by mail were given the opportunity to receive more in-
formation and study results by mail if they indicated their address on the
consent form.

RESULTS

Of the 137 participants, 136 responded to the request to “write down the
first thing you think when you see the word ‘gender’.” Of these, 43.4% of par-
ticipants reported thinking of “male/female” when they see the word gender.
Another 11.7% reported thinking either “boy/girl” or “man/woman,” and
11.7% reported thinking sex. Other respondents wrote that they thought
of gender or sex roles (9.6%), equality and women’s rights (5.8%),
560 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

Table I. Unclassifiable Responses to “the First Thing You Think When You See
the Word ‘Gender’”
Response
“A woman and man in nice clothes”
“anatomy”
“Biological distinction by chromosomes”
“Controversial stuff . . . do they really mean ‘gender’ or are they really thinking
about . . . biological sex.”
“differentiating”
“female”
“female issues”
“garish clothing”
“gender discrimination”
“gender studies”
“I rarely associate the word ‘gender’ with men.”
“Learned when young, not always accepted, forced upon”
“male”
“Male and female and what is expected from the different gender. How unfair
gender role(s) are.”
“nouns”
“Shortchanged”
“Similar to sexual identity . . .”
“Skirts, and the man and woman restroom signs”
“Women’s studies class”

masculinity/femininity (5.8%), or women (4.4%). A portion of the responses

(22.8%) reflected ideas that could not be grouped categorically because they
consisted of unique comments about what “gender” brings to mind. Table I
shows a listing of such responses.
When participants were asked to give their definitions of gender, 135
responded. These definitions were grouped by common themes and then by
categories of gender origin and gender function. For a definition to be consid-
ered to describe the origins of gender, the respondent must have described
more than “what gender is.” Definitions in these categories describe gender
as being “based on, emerged from, or caused by” something. These def-
initions explain how gender comes into existence. Definitions grouped in
gender function categories explain how people use the concept of gender.
For example, some of these definitions included a reference to classifica-
tion, identity formation, or the imposition of behavior. None of the cate-
gories for the gender definitions were considered to be mutually exclusive.
Each definition was analyzed for references to both origin and function.
Categories of origin and function overlap as it was also possible for defini-
tions to be placed in more than one of the categories subsumed under these
themes.
The most common, general themes to emerge from the definitions were
references to “male/female” (34.8%) and “sex” (34.1%). References to
Definitions of Gender 561

“masculinity/femininity” were included in 11.9% of the definitions. State-

ments about “behavior” and “roles” each accounted for 9.6% of the def-
initions. Other categories of reference included “society/socially defined”
(9.6%), “characteristics” (7.4%), “difference” (6.7%), “biology” (6.7%),
“anatomy” (5.9%), “sexuality” (2.9%), and “stereotypes” (2.9%). Singular
definitions mentioned “psychology,” “politics,” “emotion,” and “culture.”
Origins of gender were described in 42.3% of the 135 definitions. Of
these, the most common explanations for the emergence of gender were psy-
chological factors/behavior (36.2%) and society/socialization (34.5%). Self-
choice/self-perception was mentioned as an origin of gender in 18.9% of the
definitions. A combination of biology and culture was indicated as a cause of
gender in 17.2% of the responses. Other origins of gender mentioned were bi-
ology (17.24%), physical appearance (12.1%), anatomy/genitalia (8.6%), per-
ception of others (3.4%), and DNA (3.4%). Psychology students ( f = 35/61)
were more likely than nonpsychology participants ( f = 23/74) to offer ex-
planations for the origin of gender, χ 2 (1, N = 120) = 7.68, p < .01. Yet, def-
initions from psychology students were varied and did not to fall into any
particular definition category.
Functions of gender were described in 39.4% of the 135 definitions. Of
these, 50% mentioned gender functions as a key part of personal identity
and characteristics. Another 44.4% of participants wrote that gender is used
for classification of humans. The other functions of gender mentioned were
to define people (20.4%) or impose behavior/identity (5.6%). Gender is not
useful was a comment made by 3.7% of participants. Participants who of-
fered ideas about the function of gender did not come from any particular
subgroup of this sample; they were women and men, psychology students
and nonpsychology students, and members of the larger community.
The responses to the sentence completion section show that, contrary
to our predictions, a significant majority of participants did follow the sen-
tence cues; they chose the words “gender,” “masculine,” and “feminine” in
response to social–psychological cues and the words “sex,” “male,” and “fe-
male” in response to biological cues. Table II displays the results of chi square
analyses for each of the 13 fill-in sentences. Two exceptions to this finding
were the responses on Items 2 and 11. On Item 2, a significant number of
participants chose the word “female” to complete the sentence “The girl’s
gender is . . .” On item 11, an equal number of participants chose “male” and
“masculine” to complete the sentence “The boy’s gender is . . .” No typical
response was found for participants who were psychology students or who
had ever taken a women’s studies course. But, participants who thought of
“male/female” when they saw the word “gender” were more likely to answer
“female” to item 2, χ 2 (1, N = 136) = 14.72, p < .01. Also, those who wrote
that they immediately thought “boy/girl” when they saw the word “gender”
562 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

Table II. Chi Square Analyses of Sentence Completion Section

Question % X2 df p
Male/masculine 97.1 120.47 1 <.01
Female/feminine 63.2 9.53 1 <.01
Sex/gender 76.3 118.29 2 <.01
Sex/gender 80.9 54.38 1 <.01
Sex/gender 75 111.63 2 <.01
Sex/gender 73.5 36.03 1 <.01
Sex/gender 62.7 69.86 2 <.01
Sex/gender 66.2 81.94 2 <.01
Sex/gender 90.4 88.97 1 <.01
Sex/gender 82.4 156.37 2 <.01
Male/masculine 49.3 0.118 1 .732
Female/feminine 91.9 205.87 1 <.01
Sex/gender 82.2 138.99 2 <.01
Note: Italics indicate the majority response and the percentage of
participants giving this response is reported. See Appendix A for
a list of items.

were more likely than those who didn’t think “boy/girl” to answer “male”
on item 11, χ 2 (1, N = 136) = 6.4, p < .05; f = 13/69 and 3/67 respectively.
Means were calculated for the answers to the statements about gender.
Table III displays the mean responses for each item (“1” indicates strong dis-
agreement, and “5” indicates strong agreement). The strongest agreement
was given to the item that suggested that aspects of gender may change
(x̄ = 4.04) and to the item that stated that one’s sex need not match gender
stereotypes (x̄ = 4.19). Low agreement scores were given to two items that
suggest that males and females who don’t adhere to stereotypically appro-
priate genders are unhealthy (x̄ = 1.82, x̄ = 1.87). Mean answers to items
that dealt with the use of the words “sex” and “gender,” the dichotomous
nature of gender, and the stability of gender (items 1, 2, 8, and 10) fell near
the middle of the scale.

Table III. Mean Responses to Gender Belief Statements

Item number N x̄ SD
1 137 2.99 1.3
2 137 2.84 1.32
3 135 3.92 1.17
4 133 4.19 1.02
5 136 1.87 1.09
6 132 3.36 1.15
7 134 3.93 1.1
8 136 2.59 1.27
9 136 1.82 1.07
10 137 2.58 1.13
11 136 4.04 1.07
Note: See Appendix B for a complete list of items.
Definitions of Gender 563

Table IV. Correlations Between Sexual Identity Scale Scores

and Gender Belief Ratings
Item 4 5 6 9 11
SIS .234 −.21 .203 −.303 .26
p <.05 <.05 <.05 <.001 <.01
N 117 120 117 120 120
Note : Appendix B displays the gender belief items; SIS =
Sexual Identity Scale.

One-way ANOVAs were used to determine if there was a difference

in mean ratings between psychology students (n = 49) and nonpsychology
participants (n = 88). No significant differences in mean ratings were found.
Mean ratings were also compared between first year psychology students
(n = 30), advanced psychology students (n = 19), and nonpsychology par-
ticipants (n = 88). Again, no significant differences were found among the
groups. Comparisons of mean ratings between participants who had ever
taken a women’s studies course (n = 33) and those who had not (n = 103)
were also made. A difference in mean rating was found for item 1, with
participants who had taken a women’s studies course (x̄ = 2.57) disagreeing
more than those who had not (x̄ = 3.15) that the word gender could be used
as a synonym for the word “sex,” F(1, 134) = 4.92, p < .05, ω2 = .028. Re-
sponses to item 5 revealed that students who had taken women studies classes
disagreed more (x̄ = 1.52) than those who had not taken a women’s studies
course (x̄ = 1.99) with the statement that there is something wrong with a
male who does not possess a masculine gender, F(1, 133) = 4.82, p < .05,
ω2 = .028.
Several correlations were found between participants’ Sexual Identity
Scores (SIS) and their answers on items 4, 5, 6, 9, and 11. Table IV displays
the correlations for these items. The SIS scale creates a masculine/feminine
continuum, so scores on the low end (100) are considered very masculine
and scores on the high end (500) are considered very feminine. The more
feminine participants rated themselves on the scale, the more they agreed
that sex is not required to match stereotypic gender (r = .23, p < .05), that
gender is formed through social interpretation of bodies (r = .20, p < .05),
and that aspects of gender may change with a person’s experiences (r =
.26, p < .01). The more masculine participants rated themselves, the more
they agreed that there is something wrong with males who aren’t “masculine”
and females who aren’t “feminine” (r = −.21, p < .05; r = −.30, p < .001).
Table IV displays these correlations.
SIS scores were also grouped by participant sex and correlated with the
gender belief items. The more feminine females rated themselves, the more
they agreed that aspects of gender may change (item 11; r = .22, p < .05).
564 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

Table V. Correlations Between Sexual Identity Scale Scores and

Gender Belief Ratings, Grouped by Participant Sex
Item 2 5 9 11
SIS females .221
N 95
SIS males −.414 −.398 −.447
N 40 40 40
p< .05 .05 .05 .05
Note: Appendix B displays the gender belief items; SIS = Sexual
Identity Scale.

The more masculine males rated themselves, the more they agreed that it
is always correct to use the word gender when describing someone as male
or female (item 2; r = −.41, p < .05) and that there is something wrong
with males and females who are not appropriately masculine or feminine
(item 5, r = −.398, p < .05; item 9, r = −.45, p < .05). Table V displays
these correlations.

DISCUSSION

Contrary to the prediction that many participants would use “sex” and
“gender” interchangeably, the majority used “gender” only to complete so-
cially/psychologically cued sentences and “sex” only to complete biologically
cued sentences. This may be because the sentences were fairly straightfor-
ward and participants were aware that they had to choose either “sex” or
“gender.” This presented choice may have alerted participants to the fact that
for the purposes of the task the meanings of the two words were thought to
be different.
Yet, even with the possibility of such awareness, there was an interest-
ing discrepancy between responses on item 2 and 3 and items 11 and 13. In
response to item 2, most participants chose female over feminine to complete
“The girl’s gender is . . .” But then in item 3, most responded that “Feminine
is an adjective that best describes a person’s gender.” Similarly, most partici-
pants responded that “Masculine is an adjective that best describes a person’s
gender.” Yet when asked to choose between male and masculine to complete
“The boy’s gender is . . . ,” one-half chose male and one-half chose masculine.
It is possible that the word “gender” suggested both an anatomical and
a behavioral meaning for participants. Perhaps “gender” and “sex” are seen
as interchangeable when describing the physicality of sex, but “gender” is
viewed as the best descriptor of masculinity and femininity. Alternatively,
the design of the sentence completion items may have forced participants
toward the answers they chose. Items 2 and 11 gave clues about sex by
labeling the main character as a “girl” or “boy.”
Definitions of Gender 565

The rest of the sentence only implied that these characters have gender,
but it did not give any information about that gender. As they looked at the
response choices, participants then saw that they could only choose female
or feminine to complete the girl’s sentence and only male or masculine to
complete the boy’s sentence. It is possible that participants believed that
they had been given more information about the character’s sex than gender,
and therefore were more likely to interpret “gender” as signifying sex. Once
“gender” was interpreted as signifying sex, these participants may have been
more inclined to choose male and female to complete the sentences.
Yet, it is just as likely that participants didn’t need any help in inter-
preting “gender” as meaning sex. Looking at the free responses participants
gave when asked what they thought when they saw “gender,” it appears
that many thought of “sex.” Although only a small percentage of people
responded that they actually thought “sex,” more than half reported that
they thought “male/female, boy/girl, or man/woman.” It could be argued
that these participants, although not using the word “sex,” were referring
to sex and thinking about the sex of people when they encountered the
word “gender.” One reason participants may not have responded that they
thought “sex” when they saw “gender” is that they may have felt the word
“sex” was too ambiguous to convey the meaning “male/female,” as it could
also be interpreted to mean “sexual intercourse.” In addition, it was the par-
ticipants who thought “male/female” and “boy/girl” who, when presented
with the word “gender,” were most likely to respond that “The girl’s gender
is female.”
Participants who did not contribute to the majority of common free
responses had some very interesting thoughts and ideas about gender. Their
answers and definitions represented a wide variety of notions and reactions
to gender. These unique responses contrast with the vague, common refer-
ences to “sex” given by about half of the participants. It appears that those
who see “gender” as similar to “sex” are fairly united in their descriptions
and conceptualizations of gender. But those who strayed from the common
themes used very different language and expressed a variety of ideas that
make it clear how complicated talking about gender can be.
Overall, participants’ responses to the gender belief items indicate that
they see themselves as holding “nontraditional” views of gender. The mean
ratings show that the average participant views gender as a flexible phe-
nomenon, which may change in accordance with a person’s experiences and
is not determined by biological sex. Yet, participants indicated some uncer-
tainty about the correct use of terminology when talking about “sex” and
“gender.” This uncertainty is consistent with the responses to the sentence
completion task and the high number of participants who in some way re-
ferred to “sex” when responding to the word “gender.” Although the mean
566 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

ratings for psychology students and participants who had taken women’s
studies courses were slightly different from the rest of the sample, this dif-
ference was only seen on a few items, and it did not indicate any extreme
difference in beliefs. Perhaps if the sample had contained people from a
greater diversity of employment situations, educational backgrounds, and
cultures these differences would have been larger.
One of the problems with the gender belief statements was their word-
ing. Most participants responded to each statement, but some made com-
ments that suggested that the items were confusing. The items were designed
to find out about participants’ conceptualizations of gender, rather than their
beliefs about appropriate behavior for males and females. Conceptual state-
ments tend to be less concrete than behavioral statements, and this may have
caused some frustration and confusion among the participants. In particular,
phrases like “social interpretation” and “stable personality trait” seemed to
cause the most trouble. It is not clear that all participants interpreted the
statements in the same way.
Other parts of the questionnaire were problematic for participants as
well. Although several small correlations were found between self-ratings
of masculinity/femininity and gender belief items, the information gathered
from the Sexual Identity Scale (SIS) may be questionable. These correla-
tions were rather weak, accounting for only 4–6% of the variance. Several
participants (n = 16) did not complete the scale, and they expressed con-
cern that the scale was not representative of them and was frustrating to
use. It seemed that many participants did not like to describe themselves
in terms of masculinity and femininity. Others did not want to be forced
to choose between two extremes of masculine and feminine, even using a
5-point scale. The scale does contain an inappropriate assumption that mas-
culinity and femininity fall along the same continuum and that the concepts
are anchored on opposite poles of that continuum.
Despite the numerous difficulties involved in collecting and interpreting
many different conceptions of gender, participants’ basic, initial responses
to the “definition task” seem to have provided a great deal of information
about how they think about gender. The variety of responses indicate that
some people hold simple and straightforward views of gender, whereas oth-
ers see it as a complex part of the human experience. It is also evident that
because participants differentiate between “sex” and “gender” in predeter-
mined sentences it does not necessarily follow that they see any significant
difference between “sex” and “gender” when asked to write their own def-
initions. “Gender” and “sex” are both different and the same depending
upon whom one asks and how one asks them.
This difference in understanding makes the work of psychologists more
difficult and, we hope, more careful. When psychologists describe something
Definitions of Gender 567

as gendered or talk about gender differences, there is about a 50% chance

that readers will assume that they are referring to sex and about a 50%
chance that readers will question what they mean. In many cases, it might be
accurate for people to assume that “gender” is referring to sex—especially
if the determination of gender was made by having participants check either
the male or the female box on a questionnaire. The argument over what is
“sex” and what is “gender” remains and will continue for some time. But
when choosing to describe something in terms of “gender,” authors who take
the time to elaborate on what “gender” means to them will have achieved
at least some clarity.

APPENDIX A: SENTENCE COMPLETION ITEMS

1. The sex of the boy is . male masculine

2. The girl’s gender is . female feminine
3. “Feminine” is an adjective that best describes a person’s .
sex gender
4. The of the cat is male. sex gender
5. The woman decided to change her with surgery.
sex gender
6. The man decided to wear makeup, an evening gown, and high heels
to the dinner. In doing so, he was able to convince people that he was
a woman and in effect changed his . sex gender
7. differences in the blood pressure readings of heart disease
patients. sex gender
8. Youth and aggression: A study of differences.
sex gender
9. The first few days after she gave birth, relatives and friends wanted
to know the of the baby. sex gender
10. is biologically determined. sex gender
11. The boy’s gender is . male masculine
12. The sex of the girl is . female feminine
13. “Masculine” is an adjective that best describes a person’s .
sex gender

APPENDIX B: GENDER BELIEF ITEMS

1. The word “gender” can be used as a synonym for the word “sex.”
2. It is always correct to use the word gender when describing a person
as male or female.
3. Each person has a sex and a gender.
568 Pryzgoda and Chrisler

4. A person’s sex does not necessarily match stereotypic gender as-

signment.
5. There is something wrong or unhealthy with a male who does not
possess a masculine gender.
6. Gender is formed through the social interpretation of people’s bod-
ies.
7. Psychological gender is not equal to biological sex.
8. Gender is dichotomous—a person may only have one of two gender
orientations.
9. There is something wrong or unhealthy with a female who does not
possess a feminine gender.
10. Gender is a stable personality trait.
11. Aspects of gender (such as behaviors, viewpoints, and attitudes)
may change according to a person’s experiences.

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