Roth y Metha 2002
Roth y Metha 2002
Roth y Metha 2002
patible as research strategies and ways of understanding the world. This article argues
that not only may versions of positivism and interpretivism be combined in the analysis
of contested events, but this combination can further the goals of both approaches by
contributing information that may have been missed by adopting only one perspective.
The authors illustrate this using two case studies of lethal school shootings near Pad-
ucah, Kentucky, and Jonesboro, Arkansas, and introduce methodological strategies to
manage potential biases that may lead to contradictory testimony. However, these same
contradictions act as distinct data points from the interpretivist perspective, offering
insight into the cultural understandings of a community. The authors develop new forms
of triangulation that are tailored to these research goals and illustrate how, just as
positivist analysis may be used to aid interpretivism, an interpretive understanding of
a community may be necessary to develop causal theories of contested events such as
school shootings.
INTRODUCTION
AUTHORS’ NOTE: This research was funded by grants from the National Academy
of Sciences and the William T. Grant Foundation (Katherine Newman, principal inves-
tigator), by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, and by a
National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship
Grant (98070661). We thank Katherine Newman, David Harding, Cybelle Fox, and two
anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions and comments. The authors can be con-
tacted at the Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland St, Cambridge,
MA 02138; e-mail: wroth@wjh.harvard.edu or jmehta@fas.harvard.edu.
131
132 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
the truth and whether a single “truth” really exists. The film makes
clear that there are different truths for these characters, for they are
not simply lying to protect themselves (in fact, the version of each
main party to the crime implicates the teller for the murder); rather,
they have deceived themselves into believing the version they have
told. These same questions about truth might be asked about contested
events in social research. When multiple sources relate different and
sometimes conflicting accounts of an episode, how do we decide who
is “right”? Is it possible that they all are right?
These questions may appear fundamentally incompatible, for they
imply different perspectives about the meaning of truth and objective
reality. These two perspectives, and the concordant forms of analysis
they imply, have traditionally divided social scientists in several fields.
The positivist approach maintains that a true explanation or cause of an
event or social pattern can be found and tested by scientific standards
of verification. The interpretivist approach does not seek an objective
truth so much as to unravel patterns of subjective understanding. The
latter assumes that all versions of the truth are shaped by the view-
ers’ perceptions and understanding of their world. In the case of a
contested event with many different versions, the analyst’s job is to
uncover what these versions reveal about the people who tell them,
their positions in the social structure of their communities, and their
cultural understandings.
In this article, we argue that the positivist and interpretivist appro-
aches, as we define them, are not fundamentally at odds with one
another but simply require different analytical lenses for the same
data. Questions about the causes of events may be answered using
research methods that permit replicability and allow causal theories to
be tested with additional cases. We may also use the same data but treat
the multiple and conflicting explanations of the event as data points,
evaluating what the nature of the dispute over an event reveals about
underlying social forces in a community.
We illustrate the combination of positivist and interpretivist research
goals using two case studies of lethal school shootings near Paducah,
Kentucky, and Jonesboro, Arkansas. The analysis is shaped by two
distinct research questions: (1) Why do school shootings occur? and
(2) How do people in these communities understand these school
shootings, and what do their interpretations tell us about them? These
Roth, Mehta / THE RASHOMON EFFECT 133
Positivism Interpretivism
Farrer (1984, p.274) agreed that data can be understood from a “prod-
uct perspective based upon cause and effect or stimulus and response”
or from a “processual orientation” that focuses on context, interpre-
tation, and the process of developing meaning but claimed that we
can “allow both product and process orientations” simultaneously in
research. This perspective maintains that subjective interpretations of
reality and objective phenomena may be simultaneously sought and
that it is furthermore important to understand the connection between
the two.4 The very fact that subjective understanding differs depending
on the context reveals that objective contextual conditions may influ-
ence subjective meanings (Shankman 1984b). Thus, compatibility can
be found between positivism and this understanding of interpretivism,
which focuses on why and how individuals come to understand events
as they do, yet recognizes that those understandings may be influ-
enced by an objective reality that, while difficult to discern, is poten-
tially knowable. Under this framework, it is possible to simultaneously
accept that there is both a single objective truth of factual events
and multiple subjective views of the truth that reveal much about the
worldviews and perspectives of those who hold them. The objective for
positivist analysis, as we discuss below, is therefore to come as close to
this objective truth about the causes of events as possible by managing
various forms of bias or distortion that may arise from the context or
the respondent’s interpretive understanding of events. The objective
for interpretive research, by contrast, is to understand how individuals
understand that context and how the multiple subjective “truths” they
construct provide insight into their cultural understandings. We argue
that each approach is important in its own right and that combining
the two has even greater analytic value.
138 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
that “breaches” social norms can also serve as a window into otherwise
hidden viewpoints. Deeper cultural understandings or social cleavages
may reveal themselves in those explanations about the events’ causes.
Conversely, interpretivist analysis can inform positivist analysis by
providing a more complete understanding of the social milieu in which
the shooters lived. Subjective perspectives of actors can point to direct
causes. For instance, how the shooters understood their plight at school
and why they saw the shooting as a means of resolving it may best be
revealed through an interpretive approach. More indirect causes, such
as why other kids thought it was appropriate to bully or why teachers
did not intervene, are also conducive to an interpretive analysis. These
are actions that are guided by socially constructed understandings of
meaning, and it is these systems of meaning that interpretivist analysis
helps us to clarify.
temper that landed him in some trouble at school. Despite his occa-
sional outbursts, Johnson was generally known by the adults at his
school as an exceptionally polite boy, who did whatever he could
to please adults. Golden’s family had lived in the Westside area for
several generations, and his parents worked for the post office. He
was not considered a discipline problem at school but was known to
neighbors as a menace, a boy who rode around on his bicycle with a
sheathed hunting knife strapped to his leg. He was taught to hunt at
a young age and was an expert marksman. Some residents claimed
he tortured and killed cats. Too young for adult court, both boys were
sentenced to juvenile detention until they turn 21, at which point they
will be released.
Memory Problems
From this interview, it appears that the respondent was badly upset by
the shooting in general, but it is not clear why he preferred not to sleep
in his room. Later, after talking to an adult who was close to him, we
found out that this respondent had been diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder and had repressed painful and difficult memories. Only
after a long period of therapy did it come out that Mitchell Johnson
had been over at his house a few days before the shooting and had
told him of his plan while sitting on his bed. This was the reason he
had felt unsafe sleeping there and had had nightmares, but it took him
many months to remember this fact, and even after remembering, its
painful recollection was enough to prevent him from relating it again to
researchers. Knowing that one of the shooters had leaked his intentions
a few days before may be an important puzzle piece in adjudicating
between theories that account for the shooting. But the traumatic nature
of the event and memories associated with it may hinder the research
process.
Vested Interests
careful to emphasize the view that the family was not an appropriate
sphere for governmental intervention:
If [something] happens at home, how is the school going to know?
They’re model students at school, but in the community they’re not. . . .
School does not mean to be intrusive into the homes unless we’re
asked to. We’re not big brother. The home life is home life. It isn’t, the
government should not be sitting in the living room with them. . . . How
are you going to assess the needs in schools, the needs of the student,
when . . . this all started with . . . the home life.
There is very little evidence that this is a relevant issue in these specific
schools or for these specific students. However, knowing the potential
audience of the report, this respondent ties testing to school violence
without any real knowledge of whether this is empirically supportable
in an effort to mobilize public sentiment against testing.
Roth, Mehta / THE RASHOMON EFFECT 147
Mistaken Judgments
More difficult still were cases where respondents thought that they
knew something but were mistaken. One way that judgments were
mistaken was when respondents were repeating second- or third-hand
information that stemmed from an initially erroneous source. On a
number of occasions, respondents substituted what they had read in
the media or heard around town for what they actually knew, often
without acknowledging as much. For instance, in Jonesboro, some of
our respondents told us that there was a third shooter involved in the
shooting, a fact that was not supported by any police or media account
but that had spread quickly through the rumor mill. The shootings were
focal events in the lives of these small communities, and stories and
speculation about them circulated widely. Differentiating what people
actually knew from what they had heard or read became a central
problem in the research.
A second form of mistaken judgment occurred when respondents
made faulty inferences based on incomplete information. Psycholo-
gists have identified a variety of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that
individuals use to make judgments under conditions of uncertainty
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). While heuristics can be an efficient
way of simplifying a complex world, they can also lead to cognitive
errors when individuals attempt to reach conclusions about what they
do not know on the basis of what they do know (Bazerman 1998).9 For
example, in our research, some respondents attributed a greater causal
role to the factors or individuals they were knowledgeable about. In
Jonesboro, where there were two shooters, some respondents ascribed
the primary role to the shooter that they personally knew better. One
student who knew Mitchell Johnson well but did not know Andrew
Golden at all claimed that Johnson was the instigator and he got
Golden involved because of his access to guns. To accurately assess the
probability of who was the more likely instigator, information about
one boy needs to be balanced against information about the other. But
in this case, the respondent’s knowledge of one of the shooters but
not the other may partly weight his judgment of the probability of the
shooter he knew taking the more prominent role.10
Another example of how the use of heuristics can lead to erroneous
conclusions was when one student at Westside claimed that Andrew
148 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
Golden was taking the drug Ritalin, and that this probably affected his
behavior during the shooting. It became clear during the course of the
interview, however, that alerting the public about the negative effects
of this drug was the cause célèbre of the student’s mother, as well
as some of their family friends. The students’ willingness to assume
that Andrew the school shooter must have also been a Ritalin taker
is shaped by the students’ prior beliefs that Ritalin usage is highly
associated with negative outcomes.
There are no magical solutions to the problems raised here. The first
and most crucial step is simply awareness of the various reasons
why respondents may give incomplete, inaccurate, or contradictory
information. If this awareness infuses the research design, the field-
work itself, and the analysis of the data, some of these problems
can be minimized, and more accurate information can be obtained.
Of course, part of this process is to construct factual questions that
limit people’s abilities to pontificate or state opinions instead of facts.
But since subjective views and vested interests will inevitably shape
some of those responses, we need to consider how to manage the
bias that does occur. We focus here on two complementary strategies
to improve the quality of factual data: (1) contextualizing individual
respondents’ comments in light of everything known about the source
of their knowledge, their personal or political agendas, and their social
position; and (2) triangulating among various respondents and sources
of data based on this specific contextual knowledge (see Table 2). These
strategies can be combined or tailored to the specific nature of the data
problem.
Contextualizing Responses
Proposed Approaches
Contextually Informed
Contextualizing Responses Triangulation
Biases Found in the Field (Data Gathering) (Data Analysis)
Memory problems
• Inadequate memory of Collect multiple sources of Discover whether memory
past event data, particularly written problems exist through
• Memory altered by impact documentation or accounts comparing interview and
of contested event given immediately after the noninterview data. Give
• Memory affected by post- fact (e.g., police greater weight to non-
traumatic stress disorder investigation reports, media interview data in areas
accounts). where memory is likely an
issue.
Vested interest problems
• Importance of protecting Probe respondents to Using contextual informa-
reputation of self and discover personal beliefs, tion about respondents’place
others interests, and relationship to in the social structure, rela-
• Attempts to influence topic of research. Stratify tionship to event at hand,
content of study to reflect sample not demographically and other salient motivations
political beliefs but theoretically so that it or interests that may affect
• Psychological interests in contains respondents with data, give lesser weight to
maintaining self-esteem, different vested interests. accounts that are motivated
self-importance, and so by vested interests.
forth.
Mistaken judgment problems
• Secondhand or thirdhand Do not accept information Look for similarities bet-
information stemming or inferences at face value. ween different interviews
from erroneous initial Probe to ascertain how and between interview and
source respondents know what they media accounts. Privilege
• Incorrect inferences know. Trace secondhand data not by its frequency but
through use of various information to its source. by reliability of its source.
heuristics
helps the researcher determine the best course of action to analyze the
data collected.
An important task for assessing the quality of positivist data is to
find out not only what the respondent knows but also how he or she
knows it. Often, this may be accomplished by including questions
about the source of the knowledge in the in-depth interview.11 For
instance, in the case of the respondent who ascribed part of Andrew’s
problems to the taking of Ritalin, further questions demonstrated that
150 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
the respondent did not really know whether Andrew was using the
drug:
Interviewer: How did you hear that Andrew was on [Ritalin]?
Respondent: I just knew because I was in his class. And I knew that he was
really hyper. . . .
Interviewer: Was he always hyperactive?
Respondent: Always, yeah. I’m pretty sure he was on it because I know
they would call him down to the office and he would take
some medicine. I’m pretty sure that’s what it was, but I’m not
totally sure.
This knowledge helps the researchers recognize whether this version
of events is based on circumstantial evidence rather than concrete
knowledge and determine how much weight to give it until it can be
confirmed or rejected.
When nothing in the interview itself reveals the source of knowledge
for a given fact or set of facts, the researcher should also be aware
of how closely the respondent’s comments correspond to accounts
in the media or from those of others in the community. On numer-
ous occasions, respondents related details that were almost verbatim
from media accounts, and therefore the fact that these accounts were
reported by multiple responses did not make a stronger case for this
version of events. This pattern may also occur as a consequence of
rumors, especially when numerous respondents had talked to one key
respondent, and thus details that seemed to be supported by multiple
“observations” are more properly considered multiple manifestations
of a single observation. One example was the story that there was a third
shooter involved in the Jonesboro case; although not reported by the
media, this story spread quickly throughout the community. We traced
its source to the police investigation immediately after the shooting,
where numerous children reported this account. This questioning took
place after the traumatized students had spent several hours huddled
together in the school gymnasium. During this time, some students
revealed to teachers and each other that Mitchell Johnson had pre-
viously made threats that “something big was going to happen” and
that he, Andrew Golden, and a third person were planning something.
Those who were specifically asked if they had heard this report of a
third accomplice directly from one of the shooters mostly revealed that
they had not. But many people in the community remain convinced that
Roth, Mehta / THE RASHOMON EFFECT 151
a third shooter was involved. A teacher who was with the children in the
school gymnasium immediately after the shooting stated emphatically,
The boys hadn’t been arrested at that time. [All the kids in the gym]
were crying and they knew [who had done it]. Actually they said it
was Mitchell Johnson, another person, and Andrew Golden. They said
there was a third person who to this day and [as long as I live], I will
believe there was a third person.
Respondent: Well, I always thought that too. Drew may be, but I never talk
about Drew because I didn’t know Drew.
Adult : You didn’t know him. OK.
Respondent: So I shouldn’t talk about him.
Interviewer: Part of what I wanted to ask you is just about what life was
like at school, at Westside . . . what it was like before all this
happened, if you can remember back then?
Respondent: Okay. I remember life was good. Mitchell, one of the people
that did this, was one of my best friends. We talked all the
time. It was . . . OK, Spring break, me and him and a few of
my other friends, we were out at the railroad tracks at [Bono],
we carried this little BB gun pistol with us . . . and it was like,
“Well. . . I love this gun.” And [Mitchell] pointed [the gun]
at us and stuff, messing around. It didn’t, it wasn’t filled with
nothing anyway, but still, we were just messing around. And he
was like, he had this death list he wrote out of who he wanted
to kill. That’s where like messing around with me and stuff,
made me mad.
Roth, Mehta / THE RASHOMON EFFECT 153
history, the accounts of other students and teachers who do not have
similar personal stakes in the issue, and written documentation. There
are clearly practical limitations to these approaches: Some of these
avenues may be confidential or unavailable. But contextually informed
triangulation allows for an appropriate weighting of the information
that is available from different sources.
Developing a contextualized understanding of respondents and the
information they give and using that knowledge to shape triangulation
in a way that balances potential sources of bias are important tech-
niques for managing poor data “quality” from the positivist perspective
of seeking objective facts. In the case of a highly contested rare event
such as a school shooting, considerations such as these are necessary
before researchers can go on to distinguish causal patterns and develop
explanatory theories that, held against additional cases, may gain status
as hypotheses.
[John Carneal’s] folks were raised here. He was baptized here. His
parents still go to church here, his brother and his family still goes to
church here. And they started going to church after they got married.
They were even married at the church.
Popularity, first thing, at Heath is based on how long your family has
been in the community. That’s pretty—and how much money you
have—but it really was an issue [of], like how long did your great-
grandparents go to Heath? And then you’re popular. And if they didn’t,
then you’re probably not.
At Westside as well, students who had been in the community for many
generations were well known within the school and were more often
popular.
Roth, Mehta / THE RASHOMON EFFECT 159
Yet our research showed a more specific way that positivism can
inform interpretivism: Using conflicting responses to factual ques-
tions can help uncover previously hidden social structures and value
systems. Thus far, we have treated inconsistencies in the accounts
of our various respondents as underbrush that needs to be cleared
away to get onto the real work of answering important questions
in a positivist framework. But from the interpretivist vantage point,
many of these inconsistencies reflect differences in the community
that are themselves of central analytic interest. What were problems
of data quality become data points of their own right when we don the
interpretivist hat. What is important is not whether the information is
objectively true but rather whether there is a way to make meaning of
the subjective truths that respondents present.18
Consider the rather specific question that we asked of most of
our respondents in Jonesboro: Who was primarily responsible for the
shooting—Mitchell Johnson or Andrew Golden—and what evidence
would support that conclusion? In response to what we had intended
as a factual query,19 we often received some of the most revealing
statements about how our respondents understood their communities.
Consider this lengthy response from a third-generation Westsider and
teacher at the school about which boy was more responsible:
I’ll tell you what my perspective of it is. You know the Oklahoma
bombing? . . . You know, of course that woke up America and shocked
America.And I’m just like anybody else. When I first heard it, I thought,
“Okay. This has got to be somebody from another country. It couldn’t be
an American. It couldn’t be.” And when they started saying, you know,
that day, the next day that they were looking at Americans, charging,
I was just in shock. I thought there is no way. I couldn’t accept that
someone from America, where we’re from, [could do] that.
And that’s kind of the way it is with the shooting because when
it happened, it was like, “Okay. Someone didn’t like Westside.” You
know, “There’s something, some foreign person from another school
or whatever must have done this.” And then when they started talking
about someone from Westside doing it, I was, it’s like the Oklahoma
thing. I just thought this can’t be. You know, I just thought this can’t be
somebody from Westside because we’re all like a family.You know, we
all help each other. We’re, everybody from Westside is a person from
Westside, you know.
And I mean, I don’t know, and I don’t want to say anything against
anybody, but that Mitchell Johnson, you know, he, I consider him to be
Roth, Mehta / THE RASHOMON EFFECT 161
an outsider, I now say. And maybe I shouldn’t even think of it like that,
but I do. I can’t help it. And Andrew, . . . I mean, I went to school with
his [uncle], you know, thought they were good people and everything.
And I, in my mind, I guess, I feel like that Mitchell Johnson was the
one that thought it up and maybe influenced the other one. I mean, I
know he’s got a troubled background with his family and everything.
And I just think he’s the instigator. I mean, not that Andrew, I mean of
course he did some of the shooting too, but I still can’t rationalize that
someone from Westside, you know, thought of doing that.
Example: Asks all respondents Weighs information Seeks responses from both
Which for information about from respondents based “insiders” and “outsiders,”
Jones- which boy was the on their knowledge of after this is revealed to
boro instigator and favors the shooters, their be an important dividing
shooter the account with more social position and line in the community that
was the support. Seeks external vested interests in a influences respondents’
leader of sources of data (e.g., particular interpretation, interpretations of events;
the pair? police reports, school how they learned the weighs responses based on
records, the shooters’ information they report knowledge of respondents’
writings) to give an about the shooters and social positions or their
indication of which how reliable it is or how cultural understanding of
individual had greater much it conforms to the positions of insiders
leadership qualities, media reports or rumor, versus outsiders;
history of deviance, or and their stake in the specifically, factual
motivation and uses interview situation. For information from insiders
this information to example, information suggesting the outsider
increase confidence in that Andrew was the shooter was the instigator
an interpretation. leader that comes from would be held to higher
members of Mitchell’s standards of confirmation
church is viewed as from noninsider sources.
potentially subject to a
vested interests bias,
and information to
confirm or deny is
sought from others with
a different relationship
to the shooters.
164 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
options to his dilemma, such as telling his parents and getting help.
In a community that prized belonging and insider membership very
highly, Michael was at the fringes of every group he tried to join (see
Harding, Mehta, et al. 2002 for details; Newman et al. forthcoming).
He had attempted to find a niche for himself in several different social
groups, but each attempt was rebuffed. He even tried to buy his way
into membership in a social clique by giving gifts and other favors, with
limited success. Michael had difficulty forming close relationships and
as a result had very contingent social ties when everyone else around
him had incredibly strong ties. To make matters worse, Michael came
from a family of insiders. By right, he should have belonged in this
community, and the constant reminder in every interaction that he was
not accepted despite his family’s position and his own generational
status made his quest for acceptance close to an obsession. Several
psychological reports confirm that Michael saw the shooting as a way
of impressing people and gaining acceptance and admission into a
social group at school.
Michael also believed that telling his parents about his fears, the
psychological reactions that he recognized as abnormal, or the extre-
me anguish he suffered from his treatment at school was not an
option. Michael’s psychologist from the period after the shooting
explained how Michael had recognized he was having problems but
tried to hide them because of his concern for his family’s status in the
community.
Respondent: One of the reasons he didn’t ask for help was the fact that
people thought that they were this perfect family, and if he let
people know that he was struggling and needed help, then that
would blow that away.
Interviewer: I’d like to hear more about that . . . that there’s this public
perfect family, but inside . . .
Respondent: And I don’t think [there was] a lot of turmoil going [on] inside
the family.
Interviewer: Just that Michael is not perfect?
Respondent: Yeah, and Michael was very aware that he wasn’t perfect. But
I think he didn’t want other people to know he was messing
up that perfection.
Michael did not alert others to the fact that something was wrong
because he felt compelled not to ruin the myth of his idyllic family in
168 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
this idyllic community. The family’s position at the top of the hierarchy
based on generational status was a large part of that myth.
Without an understanding of the importance of maintaining one’s
reputation within the community, particularly among longtime resi-
dents, it would be very difficult to make sense of why admitting his
problems to his mother, with whom he was very close, did not seem to
be an option. This is simply one example of a more general point, that if
the goal is to understand social action, particularly action that is heav-
ily dependent on individuals’ subjective perceptions, an interpretivist
understanding of these social meanings is central to any understanding
of a causal theory or process. Locating the school shooter in his cultural
or symbolic milieu helps us understand the positivist causes of the
event as well as their interpretivist meaning.
CONCLUSION
NOTES
1. Fabian (1984) pointed out that Geertz is often incorrectly identified as the founding father
of interpretivism. The development of this approach should be traced back at least as far as Franz
Boas.
2. While Geertz (1973) was insistent that an interpretivist analysis should apply only to
its own time and place, many sociological studies tend to choose their cases as microcosms of
broader phenomena. In Rieder’s (1985) case, the broader phenomena was the turn of “Middle
America” against the Democratic party, and while he notes that there are lots of subpieces of
Middle America, his work is in part intended to provide an explanation of this large shift.
3. For example, Lin (1998), a political scientist who explicitly calls for an integration of pos-
itivist and interpretivist approaches, adopted a different understanding of these two frameworks.
While she defined positivist analysis as determining a causal relationship that can be tested or
identified in other cases, she viewed interpretivist analysis as producing “detailed examinations
of the causal mechanisms in the specific case” (p. 163). Using her example, positivist analysis
might be used to discover a positive relationship between previous work experience and current
employment, while interpretivist analysis would be used to discover the causal mechanism in
this relationship—that employers believe those with previous experience will be better workers.
While determining the causal mechanism can indeed be an important aim of qualitative research,
Lin’s concern with how to explain a causal association between two factors need not delve into
the webs of significance that are central to Geertz’s definition of interpretivism. The example she
selected illustrates this point; employers’ logic that applicants with previous work experience
would make better employees could be based on little more than the latest industry reports
about worker efficiency. No deeper cultural perspective is necessarily implied. Research of this
kind that focuses on establishing generalizable causal arguments is still basically positivist;
incorporating mechanisms into the causal theorizing makes for better research (Hedstrom and
Sweberg 1998) but does not necessarily make it any more interpretivist.
4. Many writers in the interpretivist tradition in sociology implicitly take this position
and treat objective facts and events as potential influences on interpretive understanding (e.g.,
Hochschild 1997, 1989; Newman 1988, 1993; Rieder 1985).
5. We do not seek to contribute here to the extensive debate about the meaning of the word
culture or the role that culture plays in social action. See Kuper (1999) for a good introductory
overview of theorizing on culture over the past century. We use culture, subjective understand-
ings, and social meaning interchangeably as a way of talking about how our respondents made
sense of the social lives of their communities.
6. In this article, we focus on methodological problems confronting positivist analysis rather
than the analysis itself, which may be found in Newman et al. (forthcoming).
7. This is not an exhaustive list. However, it does represent the three most common sets of
problems in our fieldwork.
170 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH
more interested in providing a coherent account of how a variety of actors understood a single
contested event.
19. In this case, it is not the respondents’ views about which boy was the leader in the duo that
is taken as a factual query (as our discussion of contextually informed triangulation should make
clear) but rather the specific details they could provide about their experiences with each boy or
their firsthand knowledge of the shooters’ past actions that would contribute to an understanding
of what role each played in the shooting.
20. Good interpretivist researchers might ask such factual or causal questions without con-
sciously intending to combine these two analytical approaches. When this occurs, interpretivist
research is implicitly combined with positivist analysis to aid interpretivist goals. Increased
awareness of this process, as well as the benefits to incorporating a positivist approach, should
improve the quality of interpretivist work.
21. This “worldview bias” does have some similarities to the problem of heuristics, discussed
above. The salient difference is that heuristics are more focused on individuals’ limitations in
making accurate inferences, whereas here we are more concerned with how collectively held
understandings can systematically affect inferences.
22. Solomon (1981) argued that the final account of the rape and murder, related by the person
who was not a party to the crime but simply an observer, is meant to indicate the objective truth in
the director’s view. This is indicated by his use of sophisticated film techniques that distinguish
this account from the other versions of the events.
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Wendy D. Roth is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology and social policy at Harvard University
and a doctoral fellow of the Harvard Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality and Social
Policy. She has formerly worked at the National Centre for Social Research in London on
youth offending and welfare-to-work policy evaluations. Her current research focuses
on the racialization of Latino immigrants and the socialization of multiracial children.
Jal D. Mehta is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology and social policy at Harvard University
and a doctoral fellow in the Harvard Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality and
Social Policy. A National Science Foundation graduate fellow, his previous work focused
on the role of social-psychological mechanisms in perpetuating social stratification
and sponsoring social mobility and on racial differences in achievement. His research
interests include combining normative political theory on justice with empirical research
on poverty and inequality.