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9TH MAHAMANA MALAVIYA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
TC: M-20 (P)
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SAMARIA

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SAMARIA, 1950
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. ____/ 2022
APPEAL NO.____/ 2022
IN THE M ATTER OF
NGO SHAAN & ANR. ……………….... PETITIONERS
VS.
UNION OF SAMARIA & ANR. ………………. RESPONDENTS
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF SAMARIA
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS 1 | PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ I - II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………….………………..……………………..………. III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... IV – XII
[A.] TABLE O F CASES ……………………………..…………...…………..…...……IV - X
➢ INDIAN CASES………………………………………………..………...…..…IV - IX
❖ SUPREME COURT……….…………………………………………….IV - IX
❖ HIGH COURTS …………………………………………………………...…IX
➢ FOREIGN CASES…………………………………………………………….…IX - X
[B.] OTHER AUTHORITIES ……………………………………..……………………...….X
[C.] STATUTORY COMPILATIONS ……………………………………..…………….…..XI
[D.] UNIVERSAL COMPILATIONS ……………………………………...……………...…XI
[E.] BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES …………………………………..……………….…XII
[F.] LEXICONS REFERRED……………………………………..………………...……..XII
[G.] LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED…………………………………..………………..XII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ……………………………..……..……………...…... XIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................... XIV - XV
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .............................................................................................. XVI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................... XVII - XVIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED........................................................................................... 1 - 20
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE INSTANT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE H ON’BLE SUPREME
COURT O F THE SAMARIA IS MAINTAINABLE O R NOT?................................................1-4
(A) THE PIL FILED BY N GO S HAAN IS MAINTAINABLE ......................................................1
(I) THE PETITIONER HAS A LOCUS S TANDI ……………………………………………1
(II) THERE WAS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL R IGHTS AND S UBSTANTIAL
QUESTIONS OF LAW……………………………………………………………………2
(III) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR PETITIONER TO EXHAUST LOCAL R EMEDIES.…2
(A) THE RIGHT UNDER ART. 32 IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL
REMEDIES ……………………………………………………………………………2
(B) THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IS NOT BINDING ON THIS
HON’BLE COURT ……………………………………………………………………..2
(IV) THE HON’BLE C OURT IS A “SENTINEL ON THE QUI VIVE”……..…………………3
(B) THE APPEAL FILED BY MR. RAZA FIRODA IS MAINTAINABLE………………………...3
(I) APPEAL CAN BE FILED WHEN A QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC
IMPORTANCE ARISES ……………………..……………………………………………3
(II) THE MATTER INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW ………………….……4
ISSUE 2: WHETHER T HE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF TELECOM SERVICES (PUBLIC
EMERGENCY OR PUBLIC SAFETY RULES), 2017 UNDER THE TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885 ARE
VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER PART III OF THE
SAMARIAN CONSTITUTION ?......................................................................................4 - 10
(A) MERE APPREHENSION IS NOT SUFFICIENT GROUND TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ...…… 5
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS I | PAGE

(B) DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY IS NOT FULFILLED……………………………........5

(C) THE REVIEW COMMITTEE SHOULD BE IMPARTIAL IN NATURE ……………..…….…...6
(D) ANY ACTION OF STATE MUST NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14………………………..……6
(E) ANY ACTION OF STATE MUST NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 19……………….…………….7
(F) ANY ACTION OF STATE MUST NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 21………………………….....8
(G) LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION NEEDS TO BE FULFILLED………….……………………..9
(H) PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW IS VIOLATED ………………………………...…..9
(I) EFFECT TEST HAS T O BE APPLIED ……………………………………...………….....10
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 144 OF T HE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FOR I NTERNET SHUTDOWN IS JUSTIFIED?..........................................10 - 16
(A) SECTION 144 CAN ONLY BE APPLIED WHEN THERE EXISTS URGENCY AND
APPREHENDED DANGER …………...………................................................…………...11
(B) THE APPLICATION O F SECTION 144 IS OVERBROAD ………………………..…….….11
(C) THE STATE HAS VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ITS
CITIZENS …….……………………………………………………………………...…….12
(D) THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 144 DIDN ’T PASS THE PRISM OF ARTICLE 14 OF
CONSTITUTION ……………………………………………………………………………13
(I) IT IS ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE ………………………..…………………13
(II) IT DIDN’T PASS THE WEDNESBURY TEST ………………………………..………14
(III) IT IS NOT BASED ON DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION …………..……14
(E) THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED U/S 144 CRPC ON ALL CIVILIANS ARE VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLES 19 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION …………………………...……………….15
(I) THE STATE HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY ANY IMMINENT THREAT REQUIRING THE
IMPOSITION OF S. 144 ORDERS THROUGHOUT THE STATE ……………………..……15
(II) IT IS IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW……………...………16
(F) IT IS REDUNDANT A ND OTIOSE ………………………………………………….…...16
ISSUE 4: WHETHER F REEDOM TO ENJOY UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS TO INTERNET
SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?.........................................16 - 20
(A) FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION CONSTITUTE RIGHT TO INTERNET…….…...17
(I) THERE EXISTS RELATION BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION ……………………………………………………………….…………17
(II) INTERNET AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION PLAYS A DECISIVE ROLE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES …………………………………………….………………17
(B) FREEDOM OF TRADE AND COMMERCE CONSTITUTE FREEDOM OF UNINTERRUPTED
INTERNET …………………………………………………………………………….…..18
(C) INTERNET HAS ITS DIFFERENT FACETS ……………………………………...……….18
(I) ECONOMY AND INTERNET ……………………………………………...…………18
(II) EDUCATION AND INTERNET ………………………………………...……………19
(III) HEALTHCARE AND INTERNET ……………………………………………...……19
(D) INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZES RIGHT TO INTERNET ……………………………19
(E) SEVERAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO INTERNET
ACCESS……………………………………………………………………………..…….20
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................... XIX
*NOTE: IT IS BOOKMARKED. CLICK ON ISSUES TO DIRECTLY JUMP TO THE RESPECTIVE PAGE.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS II | PAGE

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR -------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ALL INDIA REPORTER
ANR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- ANOTHER
ART. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- ARTICLE
TN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TAMIL NADU
CJ. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHIEF JUSTICE
COI --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
CONS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONSTITUTION
UP ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ UTTAR PRADESH
LTD. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIMITED
CO. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMPANY
ED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- EDITION
F.R. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
HON’BLE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ HONOURABLE
MP --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MADHYA PRADESH
ORS. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- OTHERS
SC ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- SUPREME COURT
SCC ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUPREME COURT CASES
SCR ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUPREME COURT REPORTER
J&K ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- JAMMU AND KASHMIR
ST. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- STATE
U/A ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- UNDER ARTICLE
UOI -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- UNION OF INDIA
V. / VS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- VERSES
PG. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- PAGE NUMBER
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS III | PAGE

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
[A.] TABLE OF CASES:
INDIAN CASES
SUPREME COURT
1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27……………..………………..10, 13
2. ABSK Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298: (1981) 1 SCC 246....…..2
3. Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta & Ors. v. Commissioner of Police & Anr. (1983)
4 SCC 522, para 16……………………………………………………...……………15
4. Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207.…10
5. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722…………………..…..13, 14
6. Ajoomal Lilaram v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 278……………………………….15
7. Akshay N. Patel v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr., (2022) 379 ELT 3 (SC)……...….6
8. Anuradha Bhasin and another v. Union of India, (2020)..….....5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19
9. Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal, (1952) SCR…………..…….……….13
10. B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka, (1987) 1 SCC 658……………………………12
11. Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 423, para 25…….…...11, 15, 17
12. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1982 SC 1336…………………..……….…….13
13. Balakrishna v. Ramaswami, AIR 1965 SC 195………………………...………………4
14. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI, AIR 1986 SC 802…………….…………..……….1, 4
15. Basheshar Nah v. IT Commissioner, AIR 1959 SC 149………………………………..2
16. Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, AIR 1987 SC 38……………….4
17. Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR
1982 SC 33……………………………………………………....…………………6, 12
18. Bodhisattwa v. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922, 926: 1996 (1) SCC 490…......2
19. Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1321…………………….………….4
20. Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, AIR 2005 SC 2019…………………………..……..…6
21. Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613……………………..………2, 3
22. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118……….………….7, 12
23. Common Cause: A Registered Society v. UOI, AIR 1999 SC at 3020.……..…..……..2
24. CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, (2019) SCC 1561…………..…………………12
25. Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd v. PK Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212………...….…4
26. Daryao v. The State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 1457………………………..……………...2
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS IV | PAGE

27. DAV College v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1731……………………………..…..1

28. DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378………………………………….....1
29. DD Joshi v. Union of India, (1983) ASC 420………………………..………….……13
30. Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, (1989) 2 SCC 145………………...………….…13
31. Dharam Dutt v. UOI, (2004) 1 SCC 712……………………………………………….7
32. District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005 SC 186…………....…….14
33. Dolly Chanda v. Chairman, AIR 2004 SC 5043……………………...……………….13
34. Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520……………………………………….3
35. Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. and
Ors., AIR 1954 SC 119……………………………….………...…………………….10
36. EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3………………..…………...13, 14
37. Federation of Bar Association in Karnatka v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 2544…………….…2
38. Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and
Ors., (2020) 4 ALT 34…………………………………………………………..…….19
39. Ghulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 71…………………....……..16
40. Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of TN, (2010) 10 SCC 96…………….…………….13
41. Gulam Abbas v. State of UP, (1982) 1 SCC 71……………………………………….15
42. Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Dropadi Devi, AIR 2005 SC 1487……....13
43. Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98….…3
44. I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr., (1967) 2 SCR 2 762……….........5
45. Icchu Devi v. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 531……………………….…..…………15
46. In Re Ram Lila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1 para 30, 54………………….……..15
47. Indian Express v. Union of India., (1985) 1 SCC 641……………….………….…7, 17
48. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2019) 11 SCC 1….….7
49. Indibily Creative Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Government of West Bengal, (2019) SCC Online
SC 520………………………………………………………………………………..12
50. IR Colho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1998) 7 SCC 550………………………….…….....2
51. Janshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC
214…………………..………………………………………………………………....3
52. Jitendra Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., Appeal (civil) 5803 of
2007…………………………………………………………..…………………..…..14
53. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4161……...…………….7, 11
54. Kalpana Mehta v. UOI (2018) 7 SCC 1…………………………………..….………..15
55. Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar, (1962) 3 SCR Supl. 369……………………….12
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS V | PAGE

56. Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457………………..………13

57. Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159…………………………3
58. Kasturi Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1980 SC 1992………………….……15
59. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225……………………………2
60. Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295…………………………………...2, 3
61. Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, (1964) 5 SCR 975……………………………..15
62. Kishan Lal Lakhmi Chand v. State of Orissa, (1993) 4 SCC 461……………………..14
63. KK Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725……………………………….2, 3
64. KK Saravana Babu v. State of TN (2008) 9 SCC 89……………………………..……15
65. KR Lakshman v. Karnataka Electricity Board, (2001) 1 SCC 442………………..…..13
66. KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1……………………………….…..12
67. M Janardhan Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 324………1, 2
68. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212……………………………………..12
69. M/S Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., AIR 2009 SC
904…………………………………………………………………………………....14
70. Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, (1970) 3 SCC 746….………5, 11, 15, 17
71. Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. UOI and Anr., AIR 1954 SC
634……………………………………………………………………………...….7, 17
72. Maganbhai v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 783…………………………………….…1
73. Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1………………..14
74. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248…………8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17
75. Manoharlal Sharma v. Narendra Damodardas Modi, (2019) 3 SCC 25…………...….11
76. Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311………………………....14
77. MC Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1086 SC 1987…………………………………..….3
78. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 591……………………………..12
79. Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,
(2016) 7 SCC 353…………………………………………………………….………12
80. Modern Medical Dental College v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 707………...………11
81. Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC 853…………..………12
82. Mohammed Ishaq v. S Kazam Pasha, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 721…………………………3
83. Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745……………………….…………16
84. Nar Singh Pal v. UOI, (2000) 3 SCC 589……………………………………………....2
85. Naraindas v. State of MP, AIR 1974 SC 1232………………………………..……….14
86. Narendra Kumar and Ors. v. UOI and Ors., AIR 1960 SC 430……………….……7, 17
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS VI | PAGE

87. Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666…………...……….4

88. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1………………………...…….13
89. Nazeer Ahmed v. King- Emperor, AIR 1936 SC 253, 257……………………………12
90. Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313……………………………….14
91. Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1960 SC 1993…………………………………3
92. Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana, (1988) 3 SCC 410....17
93. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporaion, AIR 1986 SC 180……………………..2
94. Om Kumar and Ors. v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 3689………………………………….6, 12
95. Om Prakash v. State of J&K, (1981) ASC 1001…………………………………11, 13
96. P N Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1987) 4 SCC 609……………….……3
97. P.P. Enterprises and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 1982 SC 1016……12
98. Parashram Thakur Dass v. Ram Chand, AIR 1982 SC 872……………..…………….15
99. Pratap Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. and another etc. etc. v. Union of India and others., AIR 1997
SC 2648……………………………………...…………………………..……………18
100. Pratap Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. v. UOI, (1997) 5 SCC 87……………………...…………….7
101. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996…………...……………2
102. Premjit Bhat v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1980 SC 738……………………15
103. Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169…………………………………….…………4
104. PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301………………………………………..8, 18
105. PUDR v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 1473………………………………………………….1, 4
106. Punjab Dairy Development Board v. Cepham Milk Specialities Ltd., AIR 2004 SC
4466…………………………...………………………………………………………14
107. Quareshi and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731………………………….20
108. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632………………………………12
109. R.C. Cooper v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 564……………………………………………….10
110. Raichurmatham Prabhakar v. Rawatmal Dugar, AIR 2004 SC 3625…...…………….14
111. Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445……………………………………….13
112. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, 2011 8 SCC 1…………………………………….11
113. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740…………..……….………..15
114. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574…………………..……………….12
115. RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 489…………………….14
116. Re Ramlila Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI & Ors., (2012) 1 Crimes 241 (SC)…..….5
117. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124…………………………2, 3, 5
118. Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503………………………………..…..1
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119. S Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan, (1989) 2 SCC 574……………………………………….12

120. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (1983) 1 SCC
147…………………………………………………………………………………….12
121. Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D Ramarathnam and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1836……....14, 16
122. Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India v. Cricket
Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161…………………………………………..7, 17
123. Shaik Bux v. Kalandi Pati, (1969) SCR 2 563……………………………...…………11
124. Sharma Transport v. Government of AP, (2002) 2 SCC 188………………………….13
125. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1…………………………..…………11
126. Sheela Basse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96…………………….……...1, 4
127. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1………………………………7, 8, 12
128. Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons, Ltd v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co Ltd., AIR
1962 SC 1314……………………………………………………………………...……4
129. Smt Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1…………………………..2
130. SN Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594………………………………….15
131. Soma Chakravorthy v. CBI, (2007) 5 SCC 403……………………………………….13
132. SP Gupta v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 149…………………………………………….…..1, 4
133. SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 2………………………...………………2
134. Sripur Paper Mills v. Commr of Wealth Tax, AIR 1970 SC 1520………...……………4
135. State of Assam v. Barga Dewani, (1970) 3 SCC 236……………………..…………….4
136. State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, (1969) 3 SCC 337 ………………………6, 12, 13
137. State of Bombay v. United motors Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 252…………………………….2
138. State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534……..7, 12
139. State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684……………...…15
140. State of Kerela v. NM Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310……………………………………13
141. State of Madras v. V.G. Row AIR 1952 SC 196……………………………3, 5, 12, 15
142. State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, (1969) 2 SCR 329………..……7
143. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, (1995) 1 SCC 519…………………………..14
144. State of UP v. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59…………………………...…..14
145. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86………………..………..3
146. Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory Chandigarh, AIR 1999 SC 3678……...………13
147. Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, AIR 2016 SC 2728………………………………..……7
148. Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagat Ram and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1331…………………..…….1
149. Sumati Dayal v. CIT, (1995) 214 ITR 801………………………………………….….4
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150. Superintendent. Central Prison, Fatehgarh & Anr. v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960)
2 SCR 821………………………………………………………………………….….15
151. Sushila Saw Mill v. State of Orissa and others., AIR 1995 SC 2484……...……….7, 18
152. Tilokchand Motichand v. HB Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898…………………………...…2
153. TN Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. UOI, WP(C) No 202 of 1995……………………....1
154. Union of India and another v. G Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463……………...……..14
155. Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622…………………………...…….3
156. V Ramana v. AP SRTC and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 338………………………….……14
157. V.C. Mohan v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 365………………………………….…13
158. Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 3 SCC 14………………………………..15
159. Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 308…………………………………………12
160. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362……………………………………...2
161. Zamora Case, (1916) 2 AC 77 (PC)…………………...……………………………...19
HIGH COURTS
1. Dalmia case; SIS Mills Assn v. Union of India, (1972) AAP 75 81-82……………….13
2. Dhirendra Singh Rajpurohit v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Writ No. 10304 of 2018…...…9
3. Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 Ker 35…………………………………..8
4. Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, W.P. Civil No. 19716 of 2019……………………18
5. Indrajit Barua v. The State of Assam and Ors., AIR 1983 Del 513……………………16
6. Kirti Kumar v. Indian Oil Corporation, Ahmedabad, AIR 1983 Guj 235……………..15
7. Manzur Hasan v. Muhammad Zaman, (1921) ILR 43 All 692………………………..11
8. Purnendu Bikash Dhar v. Union of India and Ors., (2000) 3 GLT 19………………..14
9. Sowmya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, Writ Petition No.52731 of 2019……………...11
10. Victoria Purti And Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., (2019) 3 BLJ 757………….…..6
FOREIGN CASES
1. Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, Application 3111/2010…………..…………………..….17

2. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948) 1 KB 223….14
3. Betfair Pty Limited v. Western Australia, (2008) HCA 11……………………………18
4. Cengiz & Ors v Turkey, ECHR, Applications No. 4822 of 2010 & 1427 of
2011…………………………………………………………………………………..17
5. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010)…………………..……...17
6. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, (1923) 262 US 100, 122………………………………….20
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7. Heller v. DOE, (509) US 312……………………………………………………..……3

8. Hooney v. Kolohan 294 US 103………………………………………………………..5
9. Inc. and Interflora British Unit v. Marks and Spencer Plc and Flowers Direct Online
Limited., (2013) EWHC 1291 (Ch)…………………………………………………..18
10. Kwok Wing Hang and Ors. v. Chief Executive in Council, (2019) HKCFI 2820……..12
11. Lord Coke in Egerton v. Lord Derby, (1613) 12 Co Rep 14: 21 ER 940………………..6
12. Mathai v. George, (2010) 3 SCR 533…………………………………………………..4
13. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
2017 P T D 1359……………………………………………………………………...20
14. PT Chandra, Editor, Tribune v. The Crown, ILR 1942 23 Lah 510 at pg 514………....15
15. Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel (1999) 7 BHRC 31……11
16. R v. Goldsmith, (1983) 1 WLR 151, 155……………………………………………...12
17. R. v. Bath Compensation Authority, (1925) 1 KB 635, 719 (CA)……………………...6
18. R. v. Oakes, (1986) 1 SCR 103 (Can) SC…………………………………………..…12
19. R. v. S. (R.D.), (1997) 3 S.C.R. 484……………………………………………………5
20. Times Newspapers Ltd v. United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2) (nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03,
§ 27, ECHR 2009)…………………………………………...………………………..17
21. Urguhar v. Brown 205 US 179………………………………………………………....5
22. Viscount Care, L.C. in Frome United Breweries Co. Ltd. v. Bath Justices, 1926 AC 586
(HL)……………………………………………………………………………………6
[B.] OTHER AUTHORITIES:
1. MR. KUSH KALRA & MR. BHANU TANWAR, “FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
AND THE OBLIGATION OF STATE TO PROTECT RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL ”, BHARATI
LAW REVIEW, JULY – SEPT., 2016, PUBLISHED IN ARTICLES SECTION OF
WWW.MANUPATRA.COM.
2. A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS; JAVIER G ALLEGO, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
VOLUME 18, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2020, PAGES 297-302,
HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1093/ICON/MOAA020, PUBLISHED: 21 MAY 2020.
3. K.D. GAUR, “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF MEDIA IN INDIA”,
JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE, VOL. 36, NO. 4 (OCTOBER -DECEMBER
1994), PP.429-454, HTTPS://WWW.JSTOR.ORG/S TABLE/43952367.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS X | PAGE

4. INTERNET RIGHTS & PRINCIPLES COALITION, THE CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHT AND
PRINCIPLES FOR THE INTERNET , INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM, UNITED NATION.
AVAILABLE AT:
HTTPS ://WWW .OHCHR .ORG/D OCUMENTS /ISSUES /OPINION /COMMUNICATIONS /INTER
NETP RINCIPLES ANDRIGHTSCOALITION .PDF
5. RAJAT KATHURIA AND OTHERS, THE ANATOMY OF AN INTERNET BLACKOUT:

MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN INDIA, INDIAN
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS , APRIL 2018

HTTPS ://ICRIER .ORG/PDF /ANATOMY _OF_AN_INTERNET _BLACKOUT.PDF
6. HEALTH ON THE INTERNET: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH PROMOTION , VOL.21 NO.1
2006, PG 78–86, PUBLICATION 1ST JULY 2005.

7. THE LEGAL DISCONNECT: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S INTERNET SHUTDOWN LAWS BY
NAKUL NAYAK. AVAILABLE AT:
HTTPS ://PAPERS .SSRN .COM/SOL3/PAPERS .CFM?ABSTRACT_ ID=3254857
8. THE RIGHT TO PROTEST: PRINCIPLES ON THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
PROTESTS . AVAILABLE AT:

HTTPS ://WWW .ARTICLE 19.ORG/DATA/FILES /MEDIALIBRARY /38581/R IGHT _TO_PROT
EST_PRINCIPLES _FINAL. PDF
9. COVID-19: EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE COVER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES AND VIOLATIONS – BACHELET, AVAILABLE AT: HTTPS://WWW.OHCHR.ORG

10. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS BY ALAN O. SYKES. A VAILABLE AT :
HTTPS://WWW .JSTOR .ORG/STABLE/1600566
[C.] STATUTORY COMPILATIONS:
1. CONSTITUTION OF SAMARIA, 1950.

2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973.
3. SAMARIA EVIDENCE ACT, 1872.
4. SAMARIA PENAL CODE,1860.
5. THE TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885.
6. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980.
7. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.
[D.] UNIVERSAL COMPILATIONS:
1. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON C IVIL AND POLITICAL R IGHTS, 1976.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XI | PAGE

2. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948.

3. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, 1953.
4. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECTHR).
5. THE EU, THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL R IGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(EUCFR).
6. AMERICAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1978.
[E.] BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES :
1. DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE C ONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (EDN. 9TH

2014, LEXIS NEXIS )
2. JUST. M. MONIR, LAW OF EVIDENCE (UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLICATION CO., 14TH
EDN., 2006).
3. K.D. GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE (LEXIS NEXIS, 7 THEDN., 2020).
4. K.I. VIBHUTE, PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW (LEXIS NEXIS, 14TH EDN., 2019).
5. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (LEXIS NEXIS , 8TH EDN., 2018).
6. R.V. KELKAR, LECTURES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (EBC, 5TH EDN., 2015).
7. RATANLAL & D HIRAJLAL, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (LEXIS NEXIS
BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA NAGPUR, 20TH EDN., 2012).
[F.] LEXICONS REFERRED:
1. ADVANCED LAW LEXICON, 4TH EDITION.

2. COLLIN’S DICTIONARY , 12TH EDITION.
3. SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY, 3RD EDITION.
4. STROUD’S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY, VOLUME IV, 4 TH EDITION.
5. BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY, 6TH EDITION.
6. MERIAM WEBSTER ’S DICTIONARY OF LAW, 1ST EDITION.
[G.] LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED :
1. WWW. HEINONLINE .COM
2. WWW.JSTOR .COM
3. WWW.LEXISNEXIS . COM
4. WWW.MANUPATRA .COM
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XII | PAGE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Samaria by virtue of Article 32 and 132 of the Constitution of Samaria
has decided to hear the petition. Article 32 and 132 states that:
ARTICLE 32. REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS CONFERRED BY PART III

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution.
ARTICLE 132. APPELLATE JURISDICTION O F SUPREME COURT IN APPEALS FROM

HIGH COURTS I N CERTAIN CASES
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a
High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the
High Court certifies under Article 134A that the case involves a substantial question of law
as t the interpretation of this Constitution.
(3) Where such a certificate is given, any party in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court
on the ground that any such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided Explanation For
the purposes of this article, the expression final order includes an order declaring an issue
which, if decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the
case.
THE PETITIONERS HUMBLY SUBMITS TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SAMARIA.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XIII | PAGE

STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND O F THE CASE:
The Republic of Samaria constituted it as a Democratic, Socialist, Sovereign, and Republican

state. In December 2019, a highly contagious novel virus called Zovid-19 resulted in the
outbreak of a global pandemic because of which all the state organs, institutions and public
organizations adopted virtual mode of functioning via internet. This led to increase in nation-
wide consumption of internet and access to internet became an important facet of day to day
lives of the people.
BONE OF CONFLICT :
The Board of Secondary Education, Razakistan conducts an eligibility test known as REET
for direct recruitment of primary and upper primary government school teachers in Razakistan.
In order to conduct the examination, the Divisional Commissioner, Zaipur Division issued an
order dated 24.10.2021 which stated that Internet services would be shut from 9 am to 3 pm on
26.10.2021 to minimize the chances of cheating/copying/leaking of question paper in the
districts where the examination was to be conducted. However, the Internet was suspended
from 8 am and remained suspended till 8:30 pm (i.e., for 12.5 hours) in Zaipur and several
other districts of Razakistan. The internet shutdown for 12.5 hours snapped the only mode of
communication for various people. Mr. Raza Firoda, a resident of such district in which the
internet was snapped had successfully secured a job in a multinational company and had to join
virtually due to Zovid restrictions on or before 26.10.2021 at 5:00 pm IST. Due to prolonged
snapping of internet services, Mr. Firoda could not join the office and had ultimately lost the
job for failing to report the company office.
Binod, Ramesh and Rajesh were three of the students in the state preparing for job in Samarian
Railway, one of such examination was held in 2019 and the result was due still in 2022.
Frustrated by the delay in the result they decided to protest against the government peacefully.
Messages for the peaceful protest were circulated in the group as a result of which state wide
protests against the government were started on 04.01.2022. Due to the state wide internet
shutdown, the studies of the students got hampered and the students preparing for an upcoming
railway examination next week were deprived of the last-minute guidance from their coaching
institutes. Due to state wide application of Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure of
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XIV | PAGE

Samaria, public transport in the state was obstructed and people had to suffer a lot because of
this.
ARREST OF BINOD, RANMESH AND RAJESH:
On 07.01.2022 the protest at Abadh, one of the districts of the State of Mahishmati got violent
and resulted in clashes between students and police, and there were incidents of stone pelting
in the market area as well as burning of buses, trains and other public properties. Following
this incident, in the evening of 07.01.2022 the police arrested Binod, Ramesh and Rajesh for
inciting the riots under Section 153 of the Samarian Penal Code, and Section 66 and Section
66F of the Information Technology Act of Samaria and to prevent the spread of misinformation
and inciting messages on the ChatApp groups of protesting students, the state government
ordered statewide internet shutdown on the same day at 7:30pm for 48 hours and applied
section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure of Samaria until further orders, in the whole state
even in the places where there were peaceful protests or no protests at all.
PETITIONS TO APEX COURT:
Aggrieved by the situation, Mr. Raza Firoda filed an appeal petition in the Supreme Court of
Samaria challenging the order of Razakistan High Court regarding constitutional validity of
the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety Rules),
2017 under the Telegraph Act, 1885. Shaan, an NGO that works for the welfare of the students
and other social issues in the state, filed a PIL in the Supreme Court of Samaria with respect to
imposition of Section 144 of CrPC.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XV | PAGE

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE INSTANT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF THE SAMARIA IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF TELECOM SERVICES

(PUBLIC EMERGENCY OR PUBLIC SAFETY RULES), 2017 UNDER THE
TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885 ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
GUARANTEED UNDER PART III OF THE SAMARIAN CONSTITUTION?
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 144 OF THE CODE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR INTERNET SHUTDOWN IS JUSTIFIED?
ISSUE 4: WHETHER FREEDOM TO ENJOY UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS TO

INTERNET SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XVI | PAGE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[1.] WHETHER THE INSTANT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT
OF THE SAMARIA IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that instant petitions are maintainable. The
Petitioners seeks to establish that; (A) The PIL filed by NGO Shaan is maintainable as (i) The
petitioner has a bona fide interest and hence they have a locus standi, (ii) There was violation
of fundamental rights & there exists substantial questions of law, (iii) There is no requirement
for the Petitioner to exhaust local remedies as (a) The right under Art. 32 is not subject to
exhaustion of local remedies and (b) Rule of exhaustion of local remedies is not binding on
Hon'ble Court and (iv) The Hon’ble Court is “Sentinel on the Qui Vive” and (B) The Appeal
filed by Mr. Raza Firoda is maintainable as (i) Appeal can be filed when a question of law of
general public importance arises and (ii) Matter involves substantial question of law.
[2.] WHETHER THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF TELECOM SERVICES (PUBLIC

EMERGENCY OR PUBLIC SAFETY RULES), 2017 UNDER THE TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885 ARE
VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER PART III OF THE
SAMARIAN CONSTITUTION ?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Temporary Suspension of Telecom
Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 under the Telegraph Act, 1885 are
violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Samarian Constitution. The
petitioner seeks to establish that; (A) Mere Apprehension is not sufficient ground to impose
restrictions; (B) The Doctrine of proportionality is not fulfilled; (C) The Review Committee
should be impartial in nature; (D) Any action of state must not violate Article 14; (E) Any
action of state must not violate Article 19; (F) Any action of state must not violate Article 21;
(G) Legitimate expectation needs to be fulfilled; (H) Procedure established by law is violated;
(I) Effect test has to be applied.
[3.] WHETHER THE A PPLICATION OF SECTION 144 OF T HE CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE FOR INTERNET SHUTDOWN IS JUSTIFIED?
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XVII | PAGE

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the application of Section 144 of CrPC
for internet shutdown is not justified. The Petitioners seeks to establish that; (A) Section 144
can only be applied when there exists urgency and apprehended danger, (B) The Application
of Section 144 is overbroad, (C) The State has violated its duty to protect the Fundamental
Rights of its Citizens, (D) The Application of Section 144 didn’t pass the prism of Article 14
of Constitution as (i) It is arbitrary and unreasonable, (ii) It didn’t pass the Wednesbury test
and (iii) It is not based on Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, (E) The Restrictions imposed
u/s 144 CrPC on all civilians are violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution as (i) The
State has failed to justify any imminent threat requiring the imposition of s. 144 orders
throughout the State and (ii) It is in violation of procedure established by law and (F) It is
Redundant and Otiose.
[4.] WHETHER FREEDOM TO ENJOY UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS TO INTERNET SHOULD BE

RECOGNIZED AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the freedom to enjoy uninterrupted access
to internet should be recognized as a fundamental right. To that effect, the Petitioner seeks to
establish that; (A) Freedom of Speech and Expression constitute right to internet as (i) There
exists relation between Technology and Freedom of Speech and Expression and (ii) Internet as
freedom of speech and expression plays a decisive role in developing countries, (B) Freedom
of Trade And Commerce constitute freedom of uninterrupted internet, (C) Internet has its
different facets, like (i) Economy and Internet, (ii) Education and Internet, (iii) Healthcare and
Internet, (D) International law recognizes right to internet, and (E) Several government
Initiative with respect to internet access.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XVIII | PAGE

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER T HE INSTANT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE H ON’BLE SUPREME COURT

OF THE SAMARIA IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
[¶1] It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that instant petitions are maintainable.
To that effect, the Petitioner seeks to establish that; (A) The PIL by NGO Shaan is maintainable
as (i) The petitioner has a bona fide interest and hence they have a locus standi, (ii) There was
violation of fundamental rights & there exists substantial questions of law, (iii) There is no
requirement for the Petitioner to exhaust local remedies as (a) The right under Art. 32 is not
subject to exhaustion of local remedies and (b) Rule of exhaustion of local remedies is not
binding on Hon'ble Court and (iv) The Hon’ble Court is “Sentinel on the Qui Vive” and (B)
The Appeal filed by Mr. Raza Firoda is maintainable as (i) Appeal can be filed when a question
of law of general public importance arises and (ii) Matter involves substantial question of law.
(A) The PIL filed by NGO Shaan is maintainable
(i) The petitioner has a locus standi
[¶2] “Locus standi” is right of party to appear and be heard on question before any tribunal. In
landmark cases1 Supreme Court has evolved a new rule viz., any member of public, acting bona
fide and having sufficient interest can maintain action for redressal of public wrong or injury
arising from breach of public duty.2 If court finds question raised be of substantial public
interest, issue of locus standi placing relevant facts and materials becomes irrelevant.3
[¶3] The petitioner has sufficient interest to maintain a petition under Art. 32 as because it is
the right to be governed by laws made in accordance with the Constitution.4 The technique of
writ serves to provide an effective remedy to enforce group rights and interest.5 To invoke the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not necessary that the fundamental right must have been
actually infringed- a threat to the same would be sufficient.6 In M Janardhan Rao v. Joint
Commissioner of Income Tax,7 it has been held that the facts and circumstances of case must
contain substantial question of law for a petition to be maintainable. A writ can be filed against
the State for the violation of Fundamental rights8 under Article 32 of the Constitution. Further
1
SP Gupta v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 149; PUDR v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 1473.
2
¶ 10, Moot Compromise.
3
TN Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. UOI, WP(C) No 202 of 1995.
4
DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI, AIR 1986 SC 802.
5
Sheela Basse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96.
6
Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503; Maganbhai v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 783; DAV
College v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1731.
7
M Janardhan Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 324.
8
Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagat Ram and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1331 ¶ 95.

under the well-established doctrine of Parens Patriae, it is obligation of State to protect and
take into custody the rights and the privileges of its citizens for discharging its obligations.9
(ii) There was violation of fundamental rights and Substantial Questions of Law
[¶4] Violation of Fundamental Right is sine qua non of the exercise of the right conferred by
Article 32.10 It is submitted that Part III of the Constitution which deals with “Fundamental
rights” is regarded as the basic structure of the Constitution.11 The doctrine of basic structure
not only applies against the amendments under the exercise of constituent power 12 but also
against exercise of legislative13 and executive power.14 The facts and the circumstances of the
case must disclose a substantial question of law for a petition to be maintainable.15
(iii) There is no requirement for the Petitioner to exhaust local remedies
(a) The right under Art. 32 is not subject to the exhaustion of local remedies
[¶5] Right to access to the Supreme Court under Article 32 is a fundamental Right itself.16
Where there is well-founded allegation that fundamental right has been infringed alternative
remedy is no bar for entertaining writ petition and granting relief.17 In Prem Chand Garg, it
was held that this right is absolute and may not be impaired on any ground.18 The mere
existence of an adequate alternative legal remedy cannot be per se be a good and sufficient
ground for throwing out a petition under Art. 32 if there exist violation of fundamental right.19
Further, unlike in Art. 226, the remedy provided by Art. 32 is a fundamental right and not
merely a discretionary power of the Court.20 Moreover, this Hon’ble Court has on multiple
occasions expressly rejected an argument that called for exhaustion of local remedies. 21 In
ABSK Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India,22 the Supreme Court overruled the objection that an
unrecognized association cannot file a petition under Article 32.23
(b) The rule of exhaustion of local remedies is not binding on this Hon'ble Court
9
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 ¶ 35.
10
Federation of Bar Association in Karnatka v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 2544: (2000) 6 SCC 715.
11
IR Colho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1998) 7 SCC 550.
12
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; Smt Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975)
Supp SCC 1.
13
Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362.
14
SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 2; See also, Basheshar Nah v. IT Commissioner, AIR 1959 SC
149; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporaion, AIR 1986 SC 180; Nar Singh Pal v. UOI, (2000) 3 SCC 589.
15
M Janardhan Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 324.
16
Bodhisattwa v. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922, 926: 1996 (1) SCC 490; Common Cause: A Registered
Society v. UOI, AIR 1999 SC at 3020: (1999) 6 SCC 667.
17
State of Bombay v. United motors Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 252.
18
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.
19
KK Kouchunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725.
20
Daryao v. The State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 1457; Tilokchand Motichand v. HB Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898.
21
Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295; Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
22
ABSK Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298: (1981) 1 SCC 246.
23

[¶6] In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,24 one can approach directly to SC without going
to the High Court first whenever there is violation of fundamental rights as Supreme Court is
“guarantor and protector of Fundamental Rights”. Admittedly, cases such as Paul Manickam,25
Kanubhai,26 and PN Kumar27 require exhaustion of local remedies before approaching the
Court under Art. 32. Hon'ble court must not be constrained by these decisions for following
reasons: First, this self-imposed restraint is merely a rule of convenience and discretion28 and
does not oust jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32.29 Secondly, these cases are per incuriam
as they were rendered in ignorance of previous decisions by higher benches of this Hon'ble
Court that expressly rejected such a rule. Finally, Art. 32(4) specifically provides that this right
may not be suspended except by a constitutional provision. The Constitutional obligation of
this Hon'ble Court as guarantor of fundamental rights has been interpreted broadly30 and as one
that exists independent of any other remedy that may be available.31
(iv) The Hon’ble Court is a “Sentinel on the Qui Vive”
[¶7] This Hon’ble Court has repeatedly assumed the role of the “sentinel on the qui vive”32 to
enforce fundamental rights of the people. In Heller v. DOE,33 Mr. Justice Kennedy speaking
for the U.S. Supreme Court observed: the State has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae
powers in providing care to its citizens. It is humbly submitted that in light of the prevailing
circumstances which are continuously depriving the fundamental rights,34 the Court has the
constitutional duty and obligation35 to entertain this petition.
(B) The Appeal filed by Mr. Raza Firoda is maintainable
(i) Appeal can be filed when a question of law of general public importance arises
[¶8] The principle is that this court would never do injustice36 nor allow injustice being
perpetrated for sake of upholding technicalities.37 Constitution does not fetter or circumscribe
powers exercisable under this Article in any way.38 It is now settled proposition that Supreme
24
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; Reiterated in State of Madras v. VG Row, AIR 1952
SC 196; KK Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725; Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
25
Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622.
26
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159.
27
P N Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1987) 4 SCC 609.
28
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86.
29
Mohammed Ishaq v. S Kazam Pasha, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 721.
30
MC Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1086 SC 1987.
31
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1960 SC 1993.
32
State of Madras v. VG Row, AIR 196 SC 1952.
33
Heller v. DOE, (509) US 312; Upheld in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 (vide para 35).
34
35
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98.
36
37
Janshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214.
38
Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520.

Court will intervene in cases where High Court’s decision is in flagrant violation of the law.39
Appeal would be granted where the judgment raises issue of law of general public
importance.40 In Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh41 it was held “The SC does not interfere
with findings unless they are vitiated by errors of law.”
(ii) The matter involves substantial question of law
[¶9] Where findings are entered without considering relevant materials and without following
proper legal procedure, the interference of the Supreme Court is called for.42 Whether a matter
involves substantial question of law,43 depends on whether it is of general public importance,
which directly or substantially affects the rights of the parties, or it has already been decided
by the highest Court.44 It will depend on facts and circumstance of each case whether a
substantial question of law is involved in case.45 The provision of Appeal uses the wording ‘in
any cause or matter’. This gives widest power to this court to deal with any cause or matter for
satisfying the demands of justice.46 In addition to this, the instant case raises important
questions of law; and laying down law for nation is one of key functions of Hon’ble SC,47 thus
petition that raises a question of law is held to be maintainable.48
Hence, it is humbly submitted that the instant petitions are maintainable.
2. WHETHER T HE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF TELECOM SERVICES (PUBLIC

EMERGENCY OR PUBLIC SAFETY RULES), 2017 UNDER THE TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885
ARE VIOLATIVE OF T HE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER PART III OF
THE SAMARIAN CONSTITUTION?
[¶10] It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that the Temporary Suspension of
Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 under the Telegraph Act,
1885 are violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Samarian
Constitution. To that effect, the petitioners seeks to establish that; (A) Mere Apprehension is
not sufficient ground to impose restrictions; (B) The Doctrine of proportionality is not fulfilled;
(C) The Review Committee should be impartial in nature; (D) Any action of state must not
39
State of Assam v. Barga Dewani, (1970) 3 SCC 236.
40
Balakrishna v. Ramaswami, AIR 1965 SC 195.
41
Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1321.
42
Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd v. PK Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212.
43
44
Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons, Ltd v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314.
45
Sumati Dayal v. CIT, (1995) 214 ITR 801; Sripur Paper Mills v. Commr of Wealth Tax, AIR 1970 SC 1520.
46
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666; Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
47
Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, AIR 1987 SC 38.
48
Mathai v. George, (2010) 3 SCR 533; SP Gupta v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 149; PUDR v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 1473;
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI, AIR 1986 SC 802; Sheela Basse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96.

violate Article 14; (E) Any action of state must not violate Article 19; (F) Any action of state
must not violate Article 21; (G) Legitimate expectation needs to be fulfilled; (H) Procedure
established by law is violated; (I) Effect test has to be applied.
(A) Mere Apprehension is not sufficient ground to impose restrictions
[¶11] In case of mere apprehension, without any material facts to indicate that the apprehension
is imminent and genuine, it may not be proper for the authorities to place such a restriction
upon the rights of the citizen.49 The Constitution requires a line to be drawn in the field of
public order and tranquillity,50 marking off, may be roughly, the boundary between those
serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security
of the State and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance, treating
for this purpose differences in degree as if they were different in kind.51 The triangulation of a
restriction requires the consideration of appropriateness, necessity and the least restrictive
measure before being imposed.52
[¶12] Mere police apprehension is not enough.53 Ordinarily the order would be directed against
a person found acting or likely to act in a particular way.54 A general order is thus justified but
if the action is too general, the order may be questioned by appropriate remedies for which
there is ample provision in the law.55 In this instant case, there was mere apprehension that
there are chances of cheating, copying or leaking of paper and so, internet was shut down.56
(B) Doctrine of proportionality is not fulfilled
[¶13] Section 144 Cr.P.C. can be imposed57 only if there are materials to show: (a) that threat
is immediate and (b) that restrictions are necessary to prevent the immediate threat.58 Further,
the restrictions must be absolutely necessary, and should be as less invasive as possible,
proportionate to the danger.59 It means that if there are less restrictive means to avoid the
danger,60 they should be adopted.61This also means that sweeping orders of prohibition, passed
49
Re Ramlila Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI & Ors., (2012) 1 Crimes 241 (SC); Madhu Limaye v. SDM, AIR
1971 SC 2486; See also, I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr., (1967) 2 SCR 2 762.
50
51
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594, Urguhar v. Brown, 205 US 179; Hooney v. Kolohan, 294
US 103.
52
Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1039 of 2019.
53
R. v. S. (R.D.), (1997) 3 SCR 484.
54
55
Madhu Limaye v. SDM, AIR 1971 SC 2486.
56
57
58
Madhu Limaye v. SDM, AIR 1971 SC 2486.
59
COVID-19: Exceptional measures should not be cover for human rights abuses and violations – Bachelet,
Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25828
60
61
The Least restrictive means by Alan O. Sykes. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1600566

only with the intention of suppressing public protests, are not legally sustainable.62A state
action which is done irrationally, or without adequate determining principle is manifestly
arbitrary.63Under the principle, the court will see that the legislature and the administrative
authority “maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the
administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind
the purpose which they were intended to serve”.64 The legislature and administrative authority
are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice
made infringes rights excessively or not is for court. That is what is meant by proportionality.65
(C) The Review Committee should be impartial in nature
[¶14] As per Section 2(2) of the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public
Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017, any order issued by the competent authority under
sub-rule (1) shall contain reasons66 for such direction and a copy of such order shall be
forwarded to the concerned Review Committee latest by next working day is also important to
note that the Review Committee is composed entirely of members of the Executive.67 This
appears to be a conflict of interest as the competent authority and the members of the Review
Committee are all part of the Executive and it brings up questions about the impartiality of the
review process. As per the principle of natural justice, no man shall be a judge in his own
cause.68 The object is not merely that the scales be held even; it is also that they may not appear
to be inclined.69A bare perusal of personnel listed above makes it clear that authority making
the suspension order70 and committee charged with reviewing the correctness of that order are
both staffed by members of a substantially similar rank and of the same democratic institution
(being of the Executive, unlike, say a Review Committee composed of retired judges).71
(D) Any action of state must not violate Article 14
62
The Right to Protest: Principles on the protection of human rights in protests. Available at:
https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38581/Right_to_protest_principles_final.pdf
63
Victoria Purti And Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., (2019) 3 BLJ 757.
64
Om Kumar and Ors. v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 3689; Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, AIR 2005 SC 2090; Anuradha
Bhasin v. UOI, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1039 of 2019; Akshay N. Patel v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr., (2022)
379 ELT 3 (SC).
65
State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, (1969) 3 SCC 337; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 39.
66
67
Section 2(2) of the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules,
2017.
68
Lord Coke in Egerton v. Lord Derby, (1613) 12 Co Rep 14: 21 ER 940; Viscount Care, L.C. in Frome United
Breweries Co. Ltd. v. Bath Justices, 1926 AC 586 (HL).
69
R. v. Bath Compensation Authority, (1925) 1 KB 635, 719 (CA).
70
71
The Legal Disconnect: An Analysis of India’s Internet Shutdown Laws by Nakul Nayak. Available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254857

[¶15] State must demonstrate five essential features: (a) backing of a ‘law’, (b) legitimacy of
purpose, (c) rational connection of the act and object, (d) necessity of the action, and (e) when
the above four are established, then the test of proportionality.72 While imposing restrictions,
the rights of individuals need to be balanced against the duty of the State.73 While preventing
cheating in exams is a legitimate goal, suspending internet services is a disproportionate
response to achieve it. Such suspension not only affects the candidates but also brings to halt
the day-to-day lives of ordinary citizens. These citizens rely on the internet to earn a livelihood,
access healthcare, seek help in times of crises and to stay abreast with developments in their
surroundings. Penalising these citizens on the mere possibility of misuse is an arbitrary exercise
of power, which as detailed above, cannot be lawfully exercised by your offices. Thus, the
Impugned Orders are disproportionate.
(E) Any action of state must not violate Article 19
[¶16] There is no dispute that freedom of speech and expression includes the right to
disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible.74 Expression
through the internet has gained contemporary relevance and is one of the major means of
information diffusion. Therefore, the freedom of speech and expression through the medium
of internet is an integral part of Art. 19(1)(a) and accordingly, any restriction on the same must
be in accordance with Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.75 The three propositions which emerge
with respect to Art. 19(2) of the Constitution are76: (i) Restriction on free speech and expression
may include cases of prohibition, (ii) There should not be excessive burden on free speech even
if a complete prohibition is imposed, and the government has to justify imposition of such
prohibition and explain as to why lesser alternatives would be inadequate and (iii) Whether a
restriction amounts to a complete prohibition is a question of fact, which is required to be
determined by the Court with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The court laid
down the following directions to determine the validity of Internet Shutdowns as per Article
1977: (i) Proportionality Test: The Supreme Court held before taking such extreme steps, the
72
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4161.
73
Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, AIR 2016 SC 2728; Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala and
Ors., (2019) 11 SCC 1.
74
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal,
(1995) 2 SCC 161; Shreya Singhal v. UOI, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Indian Express v. UOI, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
75
Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. UOI, AIR 1954 SC 634; Narendra Kumar v. UOI, (1960) 2 SCR
375; State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, (1969) 2 SCR 329; Sushila Saw Mills v. State of
Orissa, (1995) 5 SCC 615; Pratap Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. v. UOI, (1997) 5 SCC 87; Dharam Dutt v. UOI, (2004) 1
SCC 712.
76
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti KureshiKassabJamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534; Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.
77

concerned authorities shall determine whether the action taken is proportionate to the purpose
to be met. The government should take the least invasive step., (ii) Publication of Order: They
also asked the concerned authorities to publish all the orders issued for suspension of the
internet with detailed reason for such shutdown so as to ensure transparency and (iii) Only
when extreme circumstances: The government can pass such orders only in cases of extreme
circumstances and in cases of emergency.
(F) Any action of state must not violate Article 21
[¶17] In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,78 the Supreme Court held that Article
21 must be broadly interpreted and those rights must be protected that forms an essential part
of life. In the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,79 the Apex Court considered the internet
as an essential medium to further the right to freedom of speech and expression.
In the year 2019, the Kerela High Court recognized internet access as a ‘Fundamental Right’
in the case of Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerela80. The Temporary Suspension of Telecom
Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 unreasonably restrict the access to
internet, which is an essential tool in today’s inter-connected world to access information about
pandemics like Zovid-1981 and political, economic, social events82as to conduct business.83
[¶18] The suspension of telecommunication services under the Telecom Suspension Rules is
only permissible if there is a public emergency or threat to public safety. In PUCL v. Union of
India,84the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the context of Section 5(2) of the Telegraph
Act, the term public emergency means “the prevailing of a sudden condition or state of affairs
affecting the people at large calling for immediate action” and the term public safety means
“the state or condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large.” The Hon'ble
Supreme Court further noted that “Whether the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest
of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent
to a reasonable person.”
[¶19] The Impugned Orders have been issued by Divisional Commissioners or the District
Magistrate of the relevant divisions/districts under Rule 2(1) of the Telecom Suspension Rules.
These orders state that the power to impose internet shutdowns has been delegated to your
offices by the Home Secretary. While delegation of powers is permissible under Rule 2(1) for
78
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597.
79
Shreya Singhal v. UOI, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
80
Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 Ker 35.
81
82
Art 19(1)(a), Constitution of India.
83
Art 19(1)(g), Constitution of India.
84
PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.

emergency situations, the delegate must not be below the level of a Joint Secretary and any
orders issued by the delegate must be confirmed by the Home Secretary within 24 hours.
Further, the present circumstance is not, and cannot be considered as, an emergency. According
to Section 5(2) of Telegraph Act, 1885, internet suspensions must be issued only in the event
of a public emergency or when there is a threat to public safety. The possibility of cheating in
exams does not meet legal threshold of an emergency, or that of a threat to public safety.
(G) Legitimate expectation needs to be fulfilled
[¶20] The aforesaid doctrine lays down a four pronged test wherein, first, it has to be analysed
as to whether the measure restricting the rights serves a legitimate goal (also called as legitimate
goal test), then it has to be analysed whether the measure is a suitable means of furthering this
goal (the rational connection stage), next it has to be assessed whether there existed an equally
effective but lesser restrictive alternative remedy (the necessity test) and at last, it should be
analysed if such a measure had a disproportionate impact on the rightsholder.85
(H) Procedure established by law is violated
[¶21] The Orders have been issued by Divisional Commissioners or the District Magistrate of
the relevant divisions/districts under Rule 2(1) of the Telecom Suspension Rules. As per the
said rules, the power to impose internet shutdowns can only be delegated to an officer not
below the level of a Joint Secretary for emergency situations. Therefore, the orders are unlawful
and improperly delegated to Divisional Commissioners. Moreover, preventing cheating in the
REET 2021 is not, and cannot be considered as, an emergency situation.
[¶22] According to Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, 1885, internet suspensions must be
issued only in the event of a public emergency or when there is a threat to public safety. The
possibility of cheating in exams does not meet the legal threshold of an emergency, or that of
a threat to public safety. In fact, in Dhirendra Singh Rajpurohit v. State of Rajasthan86, the
Rajasthan Government provided an undertaking before the High Court of Rajasthan that it
would not impose internet shutdowns for the purpose of preventing cheating in examinations
in the future.87 Despite this undertaking, these orders have been issued with the stated purpose
of preventing cheating in REET 2021.While preventing cheating in exams is a legitimate goal,
suspending internet services is a disproportionate response to achieve it. Such suspension not
only affects the candidates but also brings to halt the day-to-day lives of ordinary citizens.
These citizens rely on the internet to earn a livelihood, access healthcare, seek help in times of
85
13 Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).
86
Dhirendra Singh Rajpurohit v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Writ No. 10304 of 2018.
87

crises and to stay abreast with developments in their surroundings. Less restrictive measures
such as ensuring proper invigilation at test centres can prevent cheating without stifling
citizen’s fundamental right to access information on the internet.
(I) Effect test has to be applied
[¶23] The ‘effect’ test has been applied by SC in Maneka Gandhi88 and in several other cases.
For example, in the Bank Nationalization case,89 the Supreme Court has said that it is the direct
operation of the Act upon the rights which form the real test.90 However, earlier, in
the Gopalan case91, the Supreme Court has applied the test of subject matter in order to uphold
validity of Preventive Detention Act against a challenge under Art. 19(1) (a). The effect test
gives a greater protection to Fundamental rights.92 A difference of judicial opinion is possible
on question whether the ‘effect’ of a provision on a Fundamental Right is ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’.
Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Temporary Suspension of
Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 under the Telegraph Act,
1885 are violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Samarian
Constitution.
3. WHETHER T HE APPLICATION OF SECTION 144 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE FOR INTERNET SHUTDOWN IS JUSTIFIED?
[¶24] It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that the application of Section 144 of
CrPC for internet shutdown is not justified. To that effect, the Petitioners seeks to establish
that; (A) Section 144 can only be applied when there exists urgency and apprehended danger,
(B) The Application of Section 144 is overbroad, (C) The State has violated its duty to protect
the Fundamental Rights of its Citizens, (D) The Application of Section 144 didn’t pass the
prism of Article 14 of Constitution as (i) It is arbitrary and unreasonable, (ii) It didn’t pass the
Wednesbury test and (iii) It is not based on Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, (E) The
Restrictions imposed u/s 144 CrPC on all civilians are violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution as (i) The State has failed to justify any imminent threat requiring the imposition
of s. 144 orders throughout the State and (ii) It is in violation of procedure established by law
and (F) It is Redundant and Otiose.
88
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597; Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR
1976 SC 1207.
89
R.C. Cooper v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 564; Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving
Co. Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 119.
90
91
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
92

(A) Section 144 can only be applied when there exists urgency and apprehended danger
[¶25] The principle which must be borne in mind before the application of this situation are
Urgency of situation and use of such power only for preservation of public peace and
tranquillity.93 In the case of Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra,94 the court held that there
should be apprehended danger and reasonable grounds to impose the section. In light of the
prolonged internet restrictions and allegation against the state suppressing dissent, the Supreme
Court in the case of Anuradha Bhasin vs UOI95 held the internet as a part of Article 19 of the
Constitution. In the same case the Court also held that this section is not a tool to suppress
dissenting opinion. Different High Courts have been invalidating various orders of section 144,
which they find violative of the guidelines set by the Supreme Court in previous cases.96 The
Apex court has laid down guidelines on the test of reasonability, when the sections should be
invoked in different cases like Madhu Limaye vs S.D.M97 and Modern Medical Dental College
Vs State of M.P.98 to restrict the discretionary use of power under this section. The State has
been taking shelter in the inherent vagueness of these safeguards to impose serious
restrictions99 on the fundamental rights of the citizens under the camouflage of safeguarding
public peace and tranquility.100
(B) The Application of Section 144 is overbroad
[¶26] The Israeli Supreme Court in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. State of
Israel101 has held that democratic governments cannot use the same destructive and inhumane
means as terrorists even if it means that the state must fight with one hand tied behind its back.
It is respectfully submitted that the Constitution and the jurisprudence of this Hon’ble Court
do not support a lower threshold of review in cases where the State invokes national security
to justify fundamental rights violations.102 The Court will evaluate whether the State has been
able to justify and demonstrate that its action is proportionate, i.e. whether it is in pursuance of
a legitimate aim,103 suitable to achieving the aim in question, necessary (i.e. there are no less
93
Manzur Hasan v. Muhammad Zaman, (1921) ILR 43 All 692; Shaik Bux v. Kalandi Pati, (1969) SCR 2 563.
94
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884.
95
Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 25.
96
Sowmya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, Writ Petition No.52731 of 2019.
97
Madhu Limaye v. Sub-divisional Magistrate, AIR 1971 SC 2486.
98
Modern Medical Dental College v. State of MP, (2012) 4 SCC 707.
99
100
Mayur Kulkarni, Imposition of Restrictions under Section 144 Cr.P.C. and the Test of Proportionality,
CCLSNLUJ (2020).
101
Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, (1999) 7 BHRC 31.
102
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, para 30-32, 36; Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9
SCC 1, para 86; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1, para 147-8, 157
103
Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, 2011 8 SCC 1, para 63, 65, 80, 82, 90; Manoharlal Sharma v. Narendra
Damodardas Modi, (2019) 3 SCC 25, para 26.

restrictive means to achieve the aim), and not disproportionate (i.e. it does not have a
disproportionate impact on the right holder).104
[¶27] In Virendra v. State of Punjab,105 the Hon’ble Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of
Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 because in the absence of a time limit, an order which
prohibited bringing into Punjab any notified publication for an indefinite period could not be
considered a reasonable restriction. A Constitution Bench of this Hon’ble Court held in
Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar,106 that our Constitution does not recognise blanket
restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression to be reasonable; reasonableness
requires that the restrictions be narrow and targeted, and proscribe specific and concrete acts
that bear a proximate relationship with public disorder.107
(C) The State has violated its duty to protect the Fundamental Rights of its Citizens
[¶28] This Hon’ble Court has consistently recognised that fundamental rights have a positive
character that must be given an expansive interpretation.108 The restriction cannot be complete
prohibition109 and it is determined by the Court with regard to the facts and circumstances of
each case.110 The order also doesn’t pass the test of proportionality.111 The nature of the right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent
and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.112
[¶29] In Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor,113 the rule laid was that, “Where a power is given to
do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all, other methods
of performance are necessarily forbidden. Section 144 cannot be used as a tool to prevent the
104
Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 353;
KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1; Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
105
Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 308; Chintaman Rao v. State of MP, (1950) SCR 759.
106
Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar, (1962) 3 SCR Supl. 369, para 16.
107
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, paras 87-94; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6
SCC 632, para 19.
108
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, para 5; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC
212, para 26; S Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan, (1989) 2 SCC 574; Indibily Creative Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Government
of West Bengal, (2019) SCC Online SC 520.
109
110
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of
India, (1980) 2 SCC 591; Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (1983) 1 SCC
147; Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.
111
CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, (2019) SCC 1561; R v. Goldsmith, (1983) 1 WLR 151, 155; Kwok Wing
Hang and Ors. v. Chief Executive in Council, (2019) HKCFI 2820.
112
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196; Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC
853; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, (1969) 3 SCC 3 3 7 ;
Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 39; Modern Dental College &
Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353; R. v. Oakes, (1986) 1 SCR 103 (Can) SC; P.P.
Enterprises v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 33; B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka, (1987) 1 SCC 658.
113
Nazeer Ahmed v. King- Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253, 257.

legitimate expression of opinion or grievance of any democratic rights.114 The Supreme Court
has emphasized in V.C Mohan v. Union of India,115 that the accepted methodology of
government working should always be in tune with concept of fairness and not de hors same.
The Latter part of Section 144(6) of Code of Criminal Procedure id unconstitutional since it
did not provide limitations on the duration of the order.116
(D) The Application of Section 144 didn’t pass the prism of Article 14 of Constitution
[¶30] A 3-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N.117 has
held that: “Para 37. The doctrine of classification under Art. 14 has several facets … Equality
is a comparative concept. A person is treated unequally only if that person is treated worse than
others, and those others (the comparison group) must be those who are “similarly situated” to
the complainant….” The Supreme Court in Dalmia case118and Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union
of India119 points out that reasonable classification must satisfy two conditions; (1) it must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group and (2) differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.120 Reliance may be placed on Kangshari
Haldar v. State of West Bengal wherein Gajendragadkar,J. has held that if either of two criteria
are not satisfied then the act is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. 121 In Royappa v
State of Tamil Nadu122 and Maneka Gandhi v Union of India123 where Courts have held that
Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness124 in state action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.
(i) It is arbitrary and unreasonable
[¶31] Bhagwati J in Bachchan Singh v State of Punjab125, Rule of law which permeates entire
fabric of Indian Constitution exclude arbitrariness. In Rajbala v. State of Haryana,126 it has
rejuvenated debate on content and scope of doctrine of arbitrariness 127 propounded by apex
114
Anuradha Bhasin and another v. Union of India and others, (2020) Indlaw SC 21; See also, A.K. Gopalan v.
State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27; State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, (1969) 3 SCC 337.
115
V.C. Mohan v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 365.
116
State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, (1969) 3 SCC 337.
117
Glanr.ock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of TN, (2010) 10 SCC 96 at page 111.
118
Dalmia case; SIS Mills Assn v. Union of India, (1972) AAP 75 81-82.
119
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1; KR Lakshman v. Karnataka Electricity Board, (2001)
1 SCC 442; State of Kerela v. NM Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310.
120
Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal, (1952) SCR at pp 340-41; Om Prakash v. State of J&K, (1981)
ASC 1001; DD Joshi v. Union of India, (1983) ASC 420; Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, (1989) 2 SCC 145.
121
Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457.
122
EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555.
123
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
124
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1336; Soma Chakravorthy v. CBI, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
125
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory Chandigarh, AIR 1999 SC 3678; Dolly Chanda v. Chairman, AIR 2004
SC 5043; Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Dropadi Devi, AIR 2005 SC 1487.
126
Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445; Sharma Transport v. Government of AP, (2002) 2 SCC 188.
127
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.

court in famous Royappa case.128 It is not necessary that every rational decision is
reasonable,129 it may unreasonable because unreasonable means devoid of satisfactory reasons.
In R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority,130 it was held that reasonableness and
rationality is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness protected by Art. 14.’ The
concept of reasonableness and non- arbitrariness pervades entire constitutional scheme and is
a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution.131 It has been
held in various cases that if there is arbitrariness or unreasonableness in state action court strike
down such action or statute.132 Arbitrariness is the antithesis of Art. 14.133 Equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies.134
(ii) It didn’t pass the Wednesbury test
[¶32] In the case of Associated Provincial Pictures houses ltd v. Wednesbury Corp.,135 it was
clearly stated that to judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion,136
normally Wednesbury test is to be applied. Court would also consider whether decision was
absurd or perverse.137 Wednesbury test states that a policy or an enactment can be stated to be
arbitrary, if it is unreasonable.138
(iii) It is not based on Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation
[¶33] Doctrine is based on right and grounded in rule of law139 principle of non- arbitrariness.140
It is well settled that it is expectation of benefit and while dispensing its largess state should
act in conformity with standards and norms.141 Principle that state cannot act in an arbitrary142
128
EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Naraindas v. State of MP, AIR 1974 SC 1232; District
Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005 SC 186; Punjab Dairy Development Board v. Cepham Milk
Specialities Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 4466; Kishan Lal Lakhmi Chand v. State of Orissa, (1993) 4 SCC 461;
Raichurmatham Prabhakar v. Rawatmal Dugar, AIR 2004 SC 3625.
129
Airo-Farulla ‘Reasonableness Rationality and Proportionality’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds) Australian
Administrative Law: Fundamentals Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press 2007).
130
RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 489; Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
131
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.
132
State of UP v. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, (1995) 1 SCC
519; Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2004) 4 SCC 311.
133
Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313.
134
Russel Hardin Constitutionalism in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Donald A Wittman & Barry
R Weingast Ed 2008) 289; Andreas Limiting Government: Introduction to Constitutionalism (CEUP 1999) 12.
135
Associated Provincial Pictures houses ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948) 1 KB 223; Union of India and another
v. G Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Purnendu Bikash Dhar v. Union of India and Ors., (2000) 3 GLT 19; V
Ramana v. AP SRTC and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 338.
136
137
Union of India and another v. G Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463.
138
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948) 1 KB 223; Satwant Singh Sawhney v.
D Ramarathnam and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1836.
139
Jitendra Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., Appeal (civil) 5803 of 2007.
140
M/S Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 904.
141
Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313.
142

or discriminatory manner in matter of conferring or not conferring benefits on individuals &

that distribution of largess should be reasonable has been applied in a large number of cases.143
(E) The Restrictions imposed u/s 144 CrPC on all civilians are violative of Articles 19
and 21 of the Constitution
[¶34] This Hon’ble Court held that orders passed u/s 144 are amendable to judicial review144
and such orders must satisfy145 the following conditions: (i) Restrictions must be imposed in
pursuance of grounds specifically provided under Article 19146, (ii) It must be issued only in
cases of emergency where that the threat to public order is imminent and genuine and not
merely likely147 and (iii) The orders as a general rule must be issued against the wrongdoer and
not against innocent civilians merely on grounds of convenience and expediency.148 The order
is overbroad. Mere discussion and advocacy cannot be restricted under Article 19(1)(a).149
[¶35] The test of reasonability for the restrictions under Article 19 varies in each case150 which
gives the magistrate his discretion to use wide powers under section 144. 151 It is settled law
that once it is established, prima facie, that fundamental rights have been restricted or infringed,
the burden is on the State to justify their reasonableness under Articles 19 and 21.152 It is
respectfully submitted that the State has miserably failed to discharge its burden153 in the
present case. The recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves excludes chances
of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in process of decision-making.”154 The import
of phrase ‘law and order’ is distinct from ‘public order’ and the two are not interchangeable.155
(i) The State has failed to justify any imminent threat requiring the imposition of s. 144
orders throughout the State
143
Kasturi Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1980 SC 1992; Parashram Thakur Dass v. Ram Chand, AIR
1982 SC 872; Premjit Bhat v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1980 SC 738; Ajoomal Lilaram v. Union of
India, AIR 1983 SC 278; Kirti Kumar v. Indian Oil Corporation, Ahmedabad, AIR 1983 Guj 235.
144
Gulam Abbas v. State of UP, (1982) 1 SCC 71, para 27.
145
146
Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, (1970) 3 SCC 746, para 24; In Re Ram Lila Maidan Incident,
(2012) 5 SCC 1 para 30, 54.
147
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 423, para 25; PT Chandra, Editor, Tribune v. The
Crown, ILR 1942 23 Lah 510 at pg 514; Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta & Ors. v. Commissioner of Police
& Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 522, para 16.
148
Gulam Abbas v. State of UP, (1982) 1 SCC 71, para 27.
149
Superintendent. Central Prison, Fatehgarh & Anr. v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 SCR 821.
150
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196.
151
State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684.
152
Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, (1964) 5 SCR 975, para 35; In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5
SCC 1, para 25; Icchu Devi v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531.
153
154
SN Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 paras 36, 40.
155
KK Saravana Babu v. State of TN, (2008) 9 SCC 89 Paras 17-23; Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984)
3 SCC 14; Kalpana Mehta v. UOI, (2018) 7 SCC 1; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740.

[¶36] In Ghulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh,156 this Hon’ble Court held that “It would not
be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the Executive Magistrate to interfere with the
lawful exercise of the right by a party.
(ii) It is in violation of procedure established by law
[¶37] In Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India157 the SC observed that the procedure prescribed by
law for depriving a person of his life and personal liberty must be “right, just and fair” 158 and
not “arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive”159, otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the
requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.
(F) It is Redundant and Otiose
[¶38] Redundancy refers to the fault of introducing superfluous matter into a legal
instrument.160 It is well recognised that while the letter of the law is the body; the sense and
reason of the law is its soul. It is not words of law but spirit and eternal sense of it that makes
the law meaningful.161 Legislature cannot be allowed to employ indirect methods to defeat the
constitutional provisions.162
Hence, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the application of Section 144 of
CrPC for internet shutdown is not justified.
4. WHETHER FREEDOM TO ENJOY UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS T O INTERNET SHOULD BE

RECOGNIZED AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
[¶39] It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble court that the freedom to enjoy uninterrupted
access to internet should be recognized as a fundamental right. To that effect, the Petitioners
seeks to establish that; (A) Freedom of Speech and Expression constitute right to internet as (i)
There exists relation between Technology and Freedom of Speech and Expression and (ii)
Internet as freedom of speech and expression plays a decisive role in developing countries, (B)
Freedom of Trade And Commerce constitute freedom of uninterrupted internet, (C) Internet
has its different facets, like (i) Economy and Internet, (ii) Education and Internet, (iii)
Healthcare and Internet, (D) International law recognizes right to internet, and (E) Several
government Initiative with respect to internet access.
156
Ghulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 71.
157
Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) SCC 597.
158
Indrajit Barua v. The State of Assam and Ors., AIR 1983 Del 513.
159
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D Ramarathnam Assistant Passport Officer Government of India New Delhi and
Ors., (1967) 3 SCR 525.
160
Henry Campbell Black, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9 th edn., 2009).
161
University of Calcullta v Pritam Rooj, (2009) 1 C.H.N. 795 243.
162
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745.

(A) Freedom of Speech and Expression constitute right to internet

[¶40] In the case of Comcast Corp. v. FCC.,163 the Internet is “arguably the most important
innovation in communications in a generation.” Today's world the internet stands as the most
utilized and accessible medium for exchange of information.164 The development of the
jurisprudence in protecting the medium for expression can be traced to case of Indian Express
v. Union of India.,165 wherein this Court had declared that freedom of print medium is covered
under the freedom of speech and expression. There is a need for procedural justice in cases
relating to restrictions which impact individuals' fundamental rights as was recognized by this
Court.166 In instant case there exists violation of freedom of speech and expression.167
(i) There exists relation between Technology and Freedom of Speech and Expression
[¶41] In a catena of judgments, has recognized free speech as a fundamental right, and, as
technology has evolved, has recognized the freedom of speech and expression over different
media of expression.168 The freedom of speech and expression through the medium of internet
is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly, any restriction on the same must be in
accordance with Article 19(2) of the Constitution.169 In the case of Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey170,
the court held that on the role of the internet as a platform, “48..As regards the importance of
Internet sites in the exercise of freedom of expression, the Court reiterates that, in Times
Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom171 , the Internet plays an important role in enhancing
the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general.”
Furthermore, the same view is reiterated in the case of Cengiz & Ors v Turkey, ECHR,172 in
their different paras of the judgment.
(ii) Internet as freedom of speech and expression plays a decisive role in developing
countries
[¶42] The Internet also offers enormous opportunities for access to information required by
developing countries, in particular scientists and researchers, whose access to printed media
163
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
164
Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308; See also, Babulal Parate v. The State of Bombay and
Anr., AIR 1960 SC 51; Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2486;
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India and others v. Cricket Association of Bengal
and Others., AIR 1995 SC 1236.
165
Indian Express v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
166
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
167
168
Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana, (1988) 3 SCC 410.
169
Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India., AIR 2020 SC 1308; See also, Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v.
UOI and Anr., AIR 1954 SC 634; Narendra Kumar and Ors. v. UOI and Ors., AIR 1960 SC 430.
170
Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey, Application 3111/2010.
171
Times Newspapers Ltd v. United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2) (nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, ECHR 2009).
172
Cengiz & Ors v Turkey, ECHR, Applications No. 4822 of 2010 & 1427 of 2011

may be limited by lack of resources.173 In the case of PUCL v Union of India174 Supreme Court
has long held, fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution also include ancillary
guarantees that make those rights meaningful.175 Access to the internet was judicially
recognized as a fundamental right in a recent decision in Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala176
(B) Freedom of Trade and Commerce constitute freedom of uninterrupted internet
[¶43] The internet is also a very important tool for trade and commerce. The freedom of trade
and commerce through the medium of the internet is also constitutionally protected Under
Article 19(1) (g), subject to the restrictions provided Under Article 19(6).177 The references to
"domestic industry" highlight the practical and conceptual perplexity that arises in
accommodating internet commerce to the notion of protectionism in intrastate trade and
commerce.178 The important position which internet advertising occupies in trade and
commerce.179 The Digital Trade Act180 (bill seeking to have agencies "staffed with experts and
leaders to fulfill the mission of promoting an open, global Internet181 that facilitates commerce
and digital trade"); Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, S. 2029/H.R. 3782
(112th Cong. 2011-2013) (bill proposing amendment of the Tariff Act to formally confer the
ITC with jurisdiction over digital importation).
(C) Internet has its different facets
[¶44] Internet access means access to actionable information best practices, access to finance
and credit facilities, facilitation of entrepreneurship and an enhanced employment market.
The globalization of the Indian economy and the rapid advances in information and technology
have opened up vast business avenues and transformed India as a global IT hub.182
(i) Economy and Internet
[¶45] 16315 hours of Internet shutdown in India cost the economy approximately $3.04 billion
during the period 2012 to 2017 2. 12615 hours of mobile Internet shutdowns in India cost the
economy approximately $2.37 billion during the period 2012 to 2017 3. 3700 hours of mobile
and fixed line Internet shutdowns in India cost the economy approximately $678.4 million
173
Pg-19, Commission on intellectual Property Right.
174
PUCL v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1.
175
176
Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, W.P. Civil No. 19716 of 2019.
177
Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308; Sushila Saw Mill v. State of Orissa and Others, AIR
1995 SC 2484; Pratap Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. and Another etc. v. Union of India and Others., AIR 1997 SC 2648.
178
Betfair Pty Limited v. Western Australia, (2008) HCA 11.
179
Inc. and Interflora British Unit v. Marks and Spencer Plc and Flowers Direct Online Limited, (2013) EWHC
1291 (Ch).
180
Digital Trade Act of 2013, S.1788, 113th Cong. (2013-2014).
181
182

during the period 2012 to 2017.183 The OECD Seoul Ministerial meeting on the Future of the
Internet Economy of June 2008 recognised that the Internet economy provides a key engine for
economic and social development at both the global and national levels.184
(ii) Education and Internet
[¶46] On internet speed directly impacts the students of Jammu and Kashmir to exercise their
right to education185 as they are unable to access to e-learning services such as online video
classes, and other online educational content.186 This not only impacts their continuing
education, but also disadvantages the students of Jammu and Kashmir who are preparing for
national/competitive exams.187 Not only that, the initiatives such as the African Virtual
University (AVU) are showing the potential of the Internet as a tool and resource for distance
learning in the developing world.188 Even primary education in developing nations since
Internet access will be much less expensive than construction and stocking of libraries.189 The
Internet has remarkable potential for development and it is imperative that this is not lost.190
(iii) Healthcare and Internet
[¶47] Today, not only is there an extensive amount of medical information and interactive
services available through the Internet, but also an increasing number of health sites focusing
on ‘healthy lifestyle’ issues. Such general health sites appeal to the public in general. 191 India’s
healthcare industry is becoming more and more digitalized. Hospital history and various patient
registries are held online. Doctors also make use of the Web to contact their colleagues on
certain things, and patients exchange the information with doctors online, particularly when
searching for a second view. According to a study192 by the Pew Internet and American Life
Project, roughly 80% of the health seekers find the information they need.193
(D) International law recognizes Right to Internet
[¶48] The United Nations General Assembly, in a resolution in 2016, asserted that the same
rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression,
183
Rajat Kathuria and others, The Anatomy of an INTERNET BLACKOUT: Measuring the Economic Impact of
Internet Shutdowns in India, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, April 2018
https://icrier.org/pdf/Anatomy_of_an_Internet_Blackout.pdf
184
Pg- 4, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries.
185
186
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308; Zamora Case, (1916) 2 AC 77 (PC).
187
Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors., (2020) 4 ALT 34.
188
189
190
191
Health on the Internet: implications for health promotion, Vol.21 no.1 2006, Pg 78–86, Publication 1st July
2005.
192
Fox and Rainie, 2002, p. 23.
193

which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice, in accordance
with Articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.194 The Charter of the Human Rights and the Principles of
Internet,195 prepared by the Internet Governance Forum of the United Nations, also outlined the
right to access to, and make use of, the Internet as a fundamental right.196 In India, Kerala had
become the first state in 2017 to declare access to Internet “a basic human right”. In the case
of Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon197 The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has established
that Internet transmission is "importation"198 into the United States. Not only that, the purpose
of KPK legislature was to increase revenue.199 This purpose has come at the cost of restricting
the usage of internet which is a lifeline for students and small businesses in the province already
ravaged by terrorism and poverty.200
(E) Several government initiatives have been taken with respect to internet access
[¶49] Internet access helps by facilitating and enabling an enhanced utility value of primary
necessities, 201 internet access can prove a useful accelerator in all social development
objectives and targets of the Sustainable Development Goals. 202 No person could be denied
such right until the Constitution itself prescribes such limitations203. The flagship Digital India
Programme, has nine pillars, of which six are directly related to internet access. There are
also programmes run by the central government for infrastructure creation, like Bharat
Net, and for digital literacy (National Digital Literacy Mission), like PMGDISHA.204 While
the efficacy of these initiatives can be questioned, it definitely shows the state’s intention to
recognize the importance 205 of internet access for citizens. 206
Hence, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the freedom to enjoy
uninterrupted access to internet should be recognized as a fundamental right.
194
195
196
Internet Rights & Principles Coalition, The Charter of Human Right and Principles for the internet, Internet
Governance Forum, United Nation. Available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Communications/InternetPrinciplesAndRightsCoalition.pdf
197
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, (1923) 262 US 100, 122.
198
199
200
Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2017 P T D 1359.
201
202
World Trade Organization Report- 2020.
203
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308; See also, Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and
Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1982 SC 33; P.P. Enterprises and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and
Ors., AIR 1982 SC 1016; Quareshi and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
204
205
206
World Trade Organization Report- 2020.

PRAYER
It is hereinafter humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Samaria that in the light
of issue raised, argument advanced, authorities cited and pleadings made, the Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The instant petitions are maintainable.

2. The Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety)
Rules, 2017 under the Telegraph Act, 1885 are violative of Fundamental Rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Samarian Constitution.
3. The application of Section 144 of CrPC for internet shutdown is not justified.
4. The freedom to enjoy uninterrupted access to internet should be recognized as a
fundamental right.
AND / OTHERWISE
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY
DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS SHALL FOREVER PRAY.
SD/-
(COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS )
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS XIX | PAGE

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9TH MAHAMANA MALAVIYA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

TC: M-20 (P)

9TH MAHAMANA MALAVIYA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SAMARIA

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. ____/ 2022

APPEAL NO.____/ 2022

NGO SHAAN & ANR. ……………….... PETITIONERS

UNION OF SAMARIA & ANR. ………………. RESPONDENTS

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF THE

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS 1 | PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ I - II

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS I | PAGE

(B) DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY IS NOT FULFILLED……………………………........5

*NOTE: IT IS BOOKMARKED. CLICK ON ISSUES TO DIRECTLY JUMP TO THE RESPECTIVE PAGE.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS II | PAGE

AIR -------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ALL INDIA REPORTER

ANR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- ANOTHER

ART. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- ARTICLE

TN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TAMIL NADU

CJ. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHIEF JUSTICE

COI --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

CONS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONSTITUTION

UP ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ UTTAR PRADESH

LTD. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIMITED

CO. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMPANY

ED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- EDITION

F.R. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

HON’BLE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ HONOURABLE

MP --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MADHYA PRADESH

ORS. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- OTHERS

SC ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- SUPREME COURT

SCC ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUPREME COURT CASES

SCR ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUPREME COURT REPORTER

J&K ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- JAMMU AND KASHMIR

ST. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- STATE

U/A ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- UNDER ARTICLE

UOI -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- UNION OF INDIA

PG. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- PAGE NUMBER

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS III | PAGE

[A.] TABLE OF CASES:

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS IV | PAGE

27. DAV College v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1731……………………………..…..1

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS V | PAGE

56. Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457………………..………13

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS VI | PAGE

87. Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666…………...……….4

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS VII | PAGE

119. S Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan, (1989) 2 SCC 574……………………………………….12

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS VIII | PAGE

1. Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, Application 3111/2010…………..…………………..….17

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS IX | PAGE

7. Heller v. DOE, (509) US 312……………………………………………………..……3

[B.] OTHER AUTHORITIES:

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONERS X | PAGE

NETP RINCIPLES ANDRIGHTSCOALITION .PDF

5. RAJAT KATHURIA AND OTHERS, THE ANATOMY OF AN INTERNET BLACKOUT:

COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS , APRIL 2018

6. HEALTH ON THE INTERNET: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH PROMOTION , VOL.21 NO.1

2006, PG 78–86, PUBLICATION 1ST JULY 2005.