Adbi wp781
Adbi wp781
Adbi wp781
David M. Reeb
No. 781
September 2017
The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series;
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ADB recognizes “China” as the People’s Republic of China; “Hong Kong” as Hong Kong,
China; and “Korea” as the Republic of Korea.
Suggested citation:
Reeb, D. M. 2017. Measuring the Degree of Corporate Innovation. ADBI Working Paper 781.
Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available:
https://www.adb.org/publications/measuring-degree-corporate-innovation
Email: dmreeb@nus.edu.sg
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Abstract
Corporate innovation propels both company performance and economic growth. Yet,
measuring corporate innovation proves to be challenging, leading researchers to rely on a
variety of different signals, such as reported R&D expenditures, patent citations and new
product announcements. I posit that each of these signs of corporate innovation provides a
noisy, biased signal of a firm’s technological progress and capacity. Moreover, relying on
a single indicator of an activity eliminates useful information, suggesting that all of the
observable signals about corporate innovation should be included in measuring it. Using the
annual survey of senior executives by BCG/BusinessWeek to identify the most innovate
companies, I create two composite measures of corporate innovation. Finally, I evaluate how
a common use of these individual, noisy signals of innovation to capture R&D productivity
(patents scaled by R&D) influences studies on innovative efficiency. Simulation analysis
shows that scaling one noisy, biased signal of innovation by another (e.g., R&D productivity)
magnifies the noisy signal problem and leads to biased inferences. Arguably, the composite
measures, based on multiple signals of corporate innovation, provide more reliable
assessments of corporate innovation than any single indicator. Finally, I discuss the use of
composite measures of innovation in empirical research on technological innovation and the
implications for policy makers.
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1
3. INNOVATION DATA.................................................................................................... 6
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 21
ADBI Working Paper 781 D. M. Reeb
1. INTRODUCTION
Researchers commonly view corporate innovation as a key foundation of economic
growth. Scherer (1986) describes how technological progress disrupts industries and
increases the per capita income in industrialized nations. Grossman and Helpman
(1990) observe that successful research improves a firm’s market power and profits.
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) discuss the prevalence and magnitude of R&D
spillovers, suggesting that corporate innovation exerts both direct and indirect influence
on economic growth. More generally, researchers find that corporate innovation
accelerates sales growth and increases a firm’s profitability (Franco 1989). Others
highlight, however, that these benefits and spillovers vary across ownership structures
(Anderson et al. 2017). Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2017) report that firms with cautious
CEOs tend to engage in more innovation, while simultaneously failing to disclose their
company’s innovation activity. As a result, it is difficult to assess the determinants and
impact of innovation because of the difficulty in measuring it. Research on corporate
innovation often relies on firms’ disclosure about their R&D activities. However,
managers face a trade-off in disclosing their spending on innovation activities,
garnering a benefit from sharing it with investors and customers but incurring a cost
from informing competitors (Koh and Reeb 2015).
Academic research on innovation spans various business disciplines and also arises
in economics and sociology. While the concept of innovation remains clear, measuring
corporate innovation proves to be challenging and diverse. Accounting research
regularly focuses on R&D expenditures, while economists and management scholars
typically rely on patents and their citations. Others focus on new product
announcements to capture the technological progress of a firm (Reeb and Zhao 2017).
Unfortunately, none of these signals of corporate innovation fully capture the nature
of innovation and knowledge creation in the firm. Unsurprisingly, these individual
measures, such as R&D spending or patent citations, provide a noisy, imperfect
signal of the technological progress and capacity of the firm. In addition, each of these
signals of innovation depends on managerial disclosures about the company’s
research activities. Material R&D expenditures are a mandatory disclosure, while
patents and new product announcements represent voluntary disclosures to investors
that reinforce property rights and attract customers. Consequently, these noisy signals
of corporate innovation also suffer from a series of selection processes within the firm
and across markets.
These varying signals of innovation provide different snapshots or information about
innovation in Asian markets relative to western economies. Figure 1 shows the
percentage of innovative firms in selected stock exchanges, based on the proportion
that report R&D. Using reported R&D, the stock exchange of Taipei,China (TPEx)
appears to be one of the most innovative markets in the set, while the stock exchange
of the Republic of Korea (KRX) lags behind the markets in Mumbai (NSE) and
Hong Kong, China (HKEX). This metric indicates that over 70% of the firms in the stock
exchange of Taipei,China are engaged in innovative activities. Nevertheless, relying on
patents to signal corporate innovation provides a different view of innovative firms in
these markets. Figure 2 again ranks markets by the proportion of companies engaged
in innovation, using patents to capture or signal corporate innovation. Using this metric,
the stock exchanges of Frankfurt; New York; Taipei,China; Tokyo; and the Republic of
Korea all appear to exhibit similar magnitudes of corporate innovation, with roughly
15% to 25% of firms engaged in innovation. Figure 3 highlights the difference for each
market resulting from measuring corporate innovation, using R&D relative to patents
to signal corporate innovation activity. These separate signals provide the greatest
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that captures the various activities among firms. The spillover literature provides a good
example. The literature discussing the impact of corporate innovation on growth
focuses on both firm-specific and spillover effects from corporate R&D. Griffith,
Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) discover that a firm’s ability to absorb technology
transfers from others is a key determinant of success. Okamuro (2007) reports that
successful innovation depends on the coordination costs of the research project.
Nicholas (2008) finds that the valuation of knowledge capital depends on the quality
of the underlying technological inventions. Thus, the literature on innovation and
growth requires a comprehensive measure of innovation that includes both input and
output measures.
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3. INNOVATION DATA
3.1 R&D Expenditures
R&D spending is arguably the most widely used measure of corporate innovation
activity. This mandatory disclosure provides a quarterly update on how much the firm
invested in R&D over the prior 3 months. Prior to 1974 firms often treated R&D
much like capital expenditures, placing this investment on the balance sheet (Lev and
Sougiannis 1996). However, accounting policy makers argued that R&D, while focusing
on generating future cash flows, is intangible and difficult to verify. Consequently,
corporate R&D began to be expensed under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles. These disclosure regulations, SFAS 2 Accounting for Research and
Development Costs, require managers to report material R&D expenditures, providing
clear guidelines for managerial compliance. Specifically, managers must report all
relevant information and exclude trivial information to limit concerns about shrouding
(Koh, Reeb, and Zhao 2016). The Supreme Court provided guidance in 1976, deciding
that materiality occurs when a “reasonable investor” views the information as price
sensitive (Sauer 2007).
Firms spend a considerable amount on R&D, with the largest 1,000 firms spending
over $638 billion in 2016. Bushee (1998) argues that investments in research and
development constitute an essential factor of a firm’s market value. Kothari, Laguerre,
and Leone (2002) emphasize that both capital expenditures and R&D spending deliver
measurable market value benefits to the firm. R&D spending provides a signal about
the inputs into the innovation process. For questions or concerns about motivating
corporate innovation, this is an especially intuitive signal. Research in industrial
organization often stresses the importance of analyzing inputs in a variety of settings.
Athey and Bagwell (2008) stress that observing the costs of competitors can facilitate
collusion within an industry. Similarly, the competitive strategy emphasizes that
monitoring input prices allows investors and firms to assess the threats that current
and future rivals pose (Miller and Waller 2003). While competitive intelligence may
provide a range of R&D estimates about competitors, reported R&D provides a concise
point estimate.
One of the primary advantages of using R&D spending as a signal of innovation activity
is that a substantial number of firms provide this mandatory disclosure. For instance,
almost two-thirds of S&P 1500 firms report R&D. However, this signal of innovation
contains two sources of noise. First, managers must determine which activities
constitute research and development. An engineer who expends part of her effort on
innovation and part on quality control requires some system or decision about the
relative allocation of her time. Thus, the decision about classifying specific spending
as R&D outside of subunits that specialize in R&D is a discretionary choice of
the manager (Horwitz and Kolodny 1980). Sougiannis (1994) describes the second
concern for investors: does R&D spending today reflect benefits from prior R&D
investments? In other words, does the past success of R&D translate into future
success of today’s R&D spending? Any signal about innovation inputs provides a noisy
signal about future payoffs from this investment. Thus, R&D spending contains two
well-known sources of noise, one stemming from managerial discretion in categorizing
R&D and the other from the potential disconnection between innovation inputs and
innovation outputs.
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The greatest challenge in using R&D to capture corporate innovation, however, arises
from the large number of firms that do not report any information about R&D. R&D
frequently requires specialized machinery, buildings, employees, computers and
assorted other items, suggesting that the classification decision for these expenses can
be subjective. Koh and Reeb (2015) argue that managers exploit this discretion not to
report R&D, resulting in a large number of firms with blank or missing R&D data.
Conceivably, managers consider the strategic response of their competitors to their
reported R&D and therefore choose not to report it to gain a competitive advantage
over them (Scotchmer 1991). This potential failure to report R&D spending creates a
selection bias in using R&D expenditures as a measure of innovation activity.
To assess whether firms without reported R&D actually do engage in innovation
activities, Koh and Reeb (2015) undertake a series of tests. Their first set of tests
compares patent activity between the firms that do not report R&D and those that
report zero R&D, finding that non-reporting R&D firms file 14 times more patents than
their zero R&D counterparts. Koh and Reeb (2015) also document significant
differences in patent characteristics between zero and non-reporting R&D firms. Using
patent citation data, they find that non-reporting R&D firms, relative to zero R&D firms,
receive more influential patents that take longer for competitors to discover. Perhaps a
more informative comparison is to compare patents in firms without reported R&D with
patents in firms that do report R&D. Koh and Reeb (2015) discover that the top 5% of
positive R&D firms receive substantially more patents than firms with missing R&D, yet
they also find that missing R&D firms with patents correspond to the bottom 90th
percentile of the patenting profiles of positive R&D firms. To investigate whether this
reporting choice is deliberate, Koh and Reeb (2015) exploit the forced change in
auditors following the collapse of Arthur Anderson. They find that this exogenous
change in auditors led firms to begin reporting R&D, resulting in these firms disclosing
R&D at the around the 26th percentile of all positive R&D firms.
Extending this line of research, Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2016) assess whether this
missing R&D is material. Focusing on firms that switch from missing to positive R&D,
they find that these firms often report comparative figures for prior years (years that
were previously blank). Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2016) document that the unreported
R&D numbers correspond to about the 55th percentile of their positive R&D peers.
Using stock returns, they also find that missing R&D firms co-move nearly 1,300%
more with positive R&D firms than with zero R&D firms. Turning to financial analysts,
Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2016) report that analysts following missing R&D firms are over
five times more likely to cover a positive R&D firm than zero R&D firms. Moreover, they
report that an exogenous loss in analysts’ coverage leads missing R&D firms to begin
reporting R&D. Perhaps more importantly, Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2016) document
that opportunistic insider trading in missing R&D firms allows managers to obtain
substantial rents relative to those found in positive R&D firms. Thus, withholding R&D
expenditures allows insiders of missing R&D firms to obtain private benefits. In short,
firms without reported R&D often engage in substantial R&D activities with the opacity
from not reporting, benefiting the managers of the firm.
Empirical innovation research typically handles the missing R&D problem in one of
two ways, either classifying these firms as zero R&D or discarding these observations.
If these missing observations simply result from noise, then either of these approaches
has potential merit (Koh et al. 2015). In contrast, if missing R&D represents a selection
bias or disclosure choice of the managers, it could influence the results of tests that
use it as a measure of innovation. Koh et al. (2015) investigate how these treatments
potentially influence research on corporate innovation. They focus on the research in
finance and management that explores how managerial overconfidence influences
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corporate innovation. Specifically, Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer et al.
(2012) document that overconfident managers, relative to their cautious peers, lead
their firms to participate in greater corporate innovation. Koh, Reeb, and Zhao (2017)
show that cautious CEOs are substantially less likely to report their R&D or seek
patents for their corporate innovation due to their concerns that their competitors will
learn from this information. Since cautious CEOs show a lower tendency to report their
R&D expenditures or file patents, the standard approach of excluding missing R&D
firms will lead to biased results. After adjusting for the propensity to disclose corporate
innovation, Koh et al.’s (2017) results suggest that cautious CEO firms are the ones
that engage in more corporate innovation.
R&D spending is an important, mandatory signal about corporate innovation. However,
it suffers from concerns about the noise in the signal and about managers’ potential
selection bias. The noise in this signal arises because it only captures inputs (rather
than outputs) and because of the managers’ discretion in classifying R&D activities.
The bias in this signal stems from the managers’ choice to report or not to report the
R&D, depending on their own assessment of materiality. Recent literature shows that
non-reporting R&D firms often have substantial R&D expenditures. Consequently,
strictly relying on R&D spending to measure or capture the innovation activities of a
firm can lead to biased and misleading results.
3.2 Patents
Recognizing these problems with R&D spending data, empirical research on corporate
innovation often relies on patent data. Griliches (1981), focusing on market value,
argues that patents provide a good measure of the intangible capital or innovation
capabilities of a firm. Jaffe (1986) reports that patents capture the technological
position of the firm. Predicated on the notion that patents provide an indicator of
successful innovation, Pakes and Griliches (1984) investigate the productivity of
innovation across firms (typically researchers compute productivity as patents per
R&D). More generally, researchers consider firms with large numbers of patents,
across a wide spectrum of technological classes, to contain the greatest innovation.
Patents, like academic articles, receive citations, which are also used to capture
corporate innovation. Trajtenberg (1990) advocates the use of patents, weighted by
their citations, to capture the value of a firm’s innovations. Exploiting the citation data
further, two other common measures of innovative capacity based on citations are the
originality and generality of the patent (Koh and Reeb 2015). These measures capture
the heterogeneity of the references in the patent and the width of the future citations
across technological spaces (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001). Conceptually, these
measures build on the notion that patents and their citations represent an output
measure of successful, corporate innovation.
Developing new technologies and knowledge capacity inherently involves spillovers
and mimicking activity. One major stream of literature on innovation highlights the role
of a firm’s ability to protect its knowledge generation. Several firms can use knowledge
simultaneously, which provides benefits to the firms and improves the stock of general
knowledge capital in the region (Romer 1990). To limit these spillovers, firms rely on
both trade secrets and patents. Focusing on the mix of patents and trade secrets,
Mansfield (1986) reports that pharmaceutical firms view patents as an important tool,
while most other firms use them less than 20% of the time. Nevertheless, patents
provide an observable and measurable approach for firms to protect their innovation.
Moser (2005) finds that most inventions remain unpatented, but those that are patented
are some of the most successful. Early literature in the field of economics highlights
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several benefits of using patents to measure innovation. For instance, patents and
their citations allow the researcher to investigate the number of successes, the depth of
the patent citations, the spread of the citations across other industries and the reliance
of the innovation on prior research in the same technological class (Jaffe 1986;
Trajtenberg 1990). Other studies emphasize how patents and their citations provide
an indicator of technological output and knowledge generation (Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg 2005).
One primary challenge in using patents or patent citations to measure innovation is
their relative scarcity. While R&D data may only be available for 58% of the Compustat
universe of firms, patents are even scarcer. Among the Compustat-listed firms, only
23% file patent applications (Koh et al. 2015), suggesting that the non-patenting R&D
firms are failed innovators (Reeb and Zhao 2017). Business research typically treats
these as zero patent firms, while economists simply tend to exclude them from the
analysis. Recent studies emphasize the common view that patents capture innovative
success, documenting that stock market liquidity, institutional ownership and
acquisition activity cause significant reductions in corporate innovation (Atanassov
2013; Fang, Tian, and Tice 2014; Bernstein 2015).
Firms potentially weigh the cost of filing a patent against the expected value of the
property rights protection (Evenson 1984). Of course patents also provide detailed
plans and schematics about the underlying technological innovation, which may benefit
competitors, yet the typical interpretation of this trade-off is that non-patenting firms
possess unimportant innovations. Moser (2012) provides empirical support for this
interpretation based on data from the world’s fairs from 1851 to 1915. She documents
that these inventors more frequently patented the inventions that ultimately proved to
be more valuable. Using a survey of Canadian firms, Hanel (2008) discovers that
patent-reliant firms exhibit higher profits than their non-patenting peers. Others indicate
that non-patenting firms, based on subsequent sales revenues, suffer from inefficient
R&D investments (Hussinger 2006). More generally, the cross-disciplinary literature
on patents and their citations depicts non-patenting R&D firms as failures. Building on
this notion, the previously noted approach to capturing R&D productivity relies on
scaling R&D by patents, which explicitly depicts non-patenting R&D firms as innovation
failures.
In contrast, other researchers highlight that patents help firms to secure their property
rights and that successful innovation is often kept as trade secrets. Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh (2000) argue that firms appear to garner patents for strategic reasons instead
of simply seeking to secure their property rights. More specifically, these authors
suggest that firms seek patents to block competitors or as a way of advertising their
technological prowess. Firms have a choice between patenting their successful
innovations and keeping them as trade secrets (Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski
1985). Survey evidence, across different time periods and locations, suggests that
firms use trade secrets more commonly than patents to protect successful innovation
(Levin et al. 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). A 2008 survey reveals that firms
choose to use trade secrets instead of seeking patent protection roughly two-thirds
of the time. Highlighting the value of trade secrets, Younge and Marx (2012) report
that non-compete agreement changes provide evidence of their widespread appeal
and value.
To investigate this issue, Reeb and Zhao (2017) report that both patenting and
non-patenting firms introduce valuable new products. Their analysis suggests that
innovation in patent-seeking firms focuses on product efficiency while non-patenting
R&D firms tend to concentrate on cost-efficiency improvements. Interestingly, Reeb
and Zhao (2017) document that executives in non-patenting R&D firms participate in
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substantial opportunistic insider trading, which account for the findings in prior studies
of excess insider trading in innovative firms. They suggest that their results indicate
that findings that stock market liquidity, institutional ownership and acquisition activity
influence corporate innovation are misleading. Instead, Reeb and Zhao (2017)
document that intermediary coverage or firm characteristics influence the choice
between patenting and keeping an innovation a trade secret. Citations depend on the
firm filing a patent; therefore, they suffer from the same problems as patent counts
(Lerner and Seru 2015).
Patents and their citations are important signals about corporate innovation.
Nonetheless, they suffer from concerns about the noise in the signal and about
managers’ potential selection bias. The noise in these signals arises because patent
counts and their citations only provide a rough proxy for the innovation occurring in the
firm. Patents are a voluntary disclosure of the firm that potentially secures property
rights. However, these signals of corporate innovation, patents and citations, are
available for a much smaller segment of the population than R&D spending. The bias in
these signals stems from the managers’ choice to seek or not to seek to patent an
innovation, depending on their own assessment of the firm’s ability to keep the
information a trade secret. Recent literature shows that non-patenting firms often make
substantial innovations in cost efficiency relative to product quality. Consequently,
strictly relying on patents or their citations to measure the innovation activities of a firm
can lead to biased and misleading results. Turning to R&D productivity, this formulation
relies on scaling one noisy, biased measure of innovation by another noisy, biased
measure of innovation.
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outcome of corporate innovation activity (e.g. classic stories like Kodak and Xerox or
more recent ones like Tesla and Facebook), they only provide a signal regarding the
product side of corporate innovation. Thus, new product announcements provide a
noisy signal of corporate innovation, failing to capture cost-reducing innovations.
New product announcements are a voluntary disclosure of firms. Management
research indicates that the incentives to make new product announcements differ
depending on the types of goods and customers (Porter 1976). Bayus, Erickson, and
Jacobson (2003) suggest that firms trade off advertising and new product
announcements. Firms with multiple new products in a given period face a choice
between multiple new product announcements and greater paid advertising;
they depend on their assessment of the greatest impact on potential customers
(Hendricks and Singhal 1997; Rabino and Moore 1989). Thus, both firm and industry
characteristics potentially influence the choice between advertising and new product
announcements, suggesting selection issues in new product announcements.
New product announcements are an important, voluntary signal about corporate
innovation. However, they also suffer from concerns about the noise in the signal and
about managers’ potential selection bias. The noise in this signal arises because it only
captures product outputs (rather than cost outputs) and because of the difficulty in
assessing the value of such announcements. The bias in this signal stems from the
managers’ choice regarding whether or not to announce new products, depending on
their own assessment of paid advertising for this market or product. Consequently,
strictly relying on new product announcements to measure the innovation activities of a
firm can lead to biased and misleading results.
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underlying issue. Second, they also face a selection bias, because respondents often
leave some of the questions blank (Kline 2015).
To develop a single scale or measure, with noisy signals that are also influenced by
selection bias, clinical psychology research uses item‒total correlations or a factor
analysis approach to identify the set of signals to incorporate into the measure. Starting
with Nunnally (1978), the item‒total correlation approach investigates how well each of
the signals correlates with the others in assessing corporate innovation. Specifically,
this approach starts with several potential signals about corporate innovation and
identifies the set of signals that best correlates with the total score of the item pool
(Sullivan 1994). Although there is no complete solution to this problem, it is possible to
assess the relative merits of combining several noisy, biased signals in a single
measure of corporate innovation.
The sample for this analysis is based on the BCG/BusinessWeek senior executive
survey regarding the most innovative companies. Starting in 2005, the
BCG/BusinessWeek survey was conducted by the Boston Consulting Group, a
management-consulting firm with offices in 37 countries when it began this initiative.
The survey was conducted in conjunction with BusinessWeek, a weekly business
magazine that began operations in 1929 and was purchased by Bloomberg in 2009.
The first senior executive survey contained a total of 940 executives from 68 countries,
ranking Apple, 3M, GE, Microsoft and Sony as the five most innovative firms
(BCG Survey 2005). Overall, the survey names the most innovative companies each
year, naming 10 for a few years and expanding the number to 50 in 2007. The survey
respondents are primarily CEOs, presidents, strategy executives and brand managers.
By 2010 the survey included 1,590 senior executives, over half of whom were listed as
holding C-Suite positions (BGS Survey 2010). The top five firms in 2004 were Apple,
Google, Microsoft, IBM and Toyota. Both the business press and the mainstream
press generate substantial coverage of these annual reports, including Reuters, The
Telegraph in the UK and The Sydney Morning Herald.
Interestingly, several firms, considered as some of the most innovative, exhibit missing
or limited information in several of the commonly used signals of innovation. For
instance, the 2010 list includes Coca-Cola, a firm that does not report R&D in its
financial statements but has six R&D centers around the world. Wal-Mart is also listed
in the 2010 report and is often described as an innovative leader in supply chain
management because of its use of communication and computer technologies (Brunn
2006). However, Wal-Mart only averaged two patents per year from 2005 to 2009. Of
course, firms like Pfizer, Boeing and Honda also appear on the lists, and these firms
typically have substantial amounts of R&D, patents and new product announcements.
The respondents to the BCG/BusinessWeek survey report that they measure
innovation internally, focusing on profits, idea generation and revenue growth.
Consequently, in addition to the measures noted above (R&D, patents, patent citations
and new product announcements), I consider four firm characteristics in the analysis.
Specifically, I incorporate revenue, revenue growth, advertising and profitability as
potential signals of corporate innovation (BCG Survey 2005; Reeb and Zhao 2017).
I limit the sample to public firms listed in the years 2007‒2010 to capture patents and
their citations. This gives a sample of 63 highly innovative firms during the period 2007
to 2010. The sample comprises large firms from several different countries and
industries. I gather financial data from Global Compustat, patent data and citations
from Noah Stoffman’s website and new product announcements from Reeb and Zhao
(2017). Patents are a simple, annual count measure of patent applications, while
citations capture the number of citations that they receive in a given year. I combine
these items to capture citation-weighted patents, which I compute as the product
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of patents plus one and citations plus one. New products are the number of
announcements about the firm’s new products. R&D spending and advertising are
simply the reported R&D and advertising, scaled by total assets. Sales and sales
growth are also based on annual income statement data. I use the log of sales.
My analysis starts with all seven potential signals (sales, sales growth, weighted
patents, new products, R&D, advertising and profits). Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics and correlations for these seven variables. Weighted patents, profits, R&D
and new product announcements are all highly correlated with each other. For
instance, the correlation between weighted patents and new product announcements is
.32. This preliminary analysis suggests that the three traditional signals of innovation
(R&D, weighted patents and new product announcements) and firm profitability provide
potential signals about corporate innovation.
Item‒total correlation analysis tests the reliability of each of the items against the set of
the other items. I proceed in stages to identify the appropriate set of signals to include
in a composite measure of corporate innovation. In the first stage, I apply item‒total
correlation analysis to all seven potential signals, which shows that these seven items
do not appear to capture the same concept. Consequently, I drop the variable with the
lowest item‒rest correlation. In the first iteration, I drop advertising, as it has the lowest
item‒rest correlation (score of .002). I repeat this analysis and drop growth (item‒rest
correlation = .044) and profits (item‒rest correlation = .099). The remaining signals
(R&D, weighted patents, new products and sales) provide the final set of variables for a
combined measure of corporate innovation.
Based on these results, I construct two composite measures of corporate innovation
using factor analysis and index-ranking analysis to reduce these four signals of
innovation into a single measure. Factor analysis requires the signals to be highly
correlated and load on a single factor (Duru and Reeb 2002). This dovetails nicely with
the requirement from item‒correlation analysis that the signals capture some common,
underlying construct. Table 2 provides the results of the factor analysis, showing that
these innovation signals load on a single factor that explains 75.56% of the cumulative
variance. Weighted patents and R&D spending have the highest factor loadings of
the four potential signals of innovation. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that
factor analysis with the four variables provides a potentially useful measure of
corporate innovation. Table 3 provides the average predicted factor score for each firm
in the analysis. 1
1
To create a factor score centered on 100, I scale each predicted value of factor 1 by the standard
deviation of the factor, multiply it by 10 and add 100. The Stata code for this analysis is available
on request.
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Table 3 continued
Factor Index Factor Index
Company Name Measure Measure Company Name Measure Measure
Genentech 111.1 160.7 TwentyFirst Cent Fox 90.2 45.9
Goldman Sachs 95.4 80.3 Verizon 97.4 114.8
Google 106.6 103.3 Vodafone 92.7 114.8
HP 112.3 172.1 Volkswagen 94.2 103.3
Honda 113.3 126.3 Wal-Mart 94.6 126.2
HSBC 89.8 45.9 Walt Disney 91.3 68.9
Infosystems 92.6 68.8
Intel 119.5 149.2 Correlation .83
IBM 119.9 160.6
2
To create an index score centered on 100, I multiply the raw index scores by 11.475. In a larger sample,
I would use deciles or vigintiles.
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Table 4 continued
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* The vertical line at 1.58 is the true R&D productivity of the population.
Panels A and B of Table 4 also show the results of R&D productivity using the noisy–
biased signals of innovation. These estimates are consistently different from true R&D
productivity. While the nature of the selection bias influences the direction of these
results, the upward bias in R&D productivity occurs across a wide spectrum of potential
modeling choices for selection bias.
Finally, I investigate how these three versions of R&D productivity perform in a
multivariate setting. I simulate firm growth and make two assumptions about it. First, I
assume that smaller firms exhibit higher growth rates than larger firms. Second,
I assume that successful innovation leads to firm growth. Consistent with these
assumptions, the Column 1 results in Panel C of Table 4 show that innovation success
is correlated with firm growth. Column 2 shows that true R&D productivity is also
associated with firm growth.
Columns 3–4 repeat these regressions using the noisy signals of reported R&D and
patents to compute R&D productivity. The noisy signals of R&D and patents give
similar inferences to the true measures in the base regression (comparing columns 1
and 3). However, using R&D productivity with these noisy signals gives a downward-
biased coefficient estimate. R&D productivity does not appear to be a reliable measure
of corporate innovation using the noisy signals of reported R&D and patents. Columns
5–6 repeat these regressions with the noisy–biased signals of innovation. In this setting
the coefficient estimates and standard errors of R&D are biased upwards. Moreover,
the coefficient estimates and standard errors of R&D productivity are also biased.
Figure 5 shows the results of repeating this analysis 5,000 times. Rather than
mitigating the problem of noisy–biased signals of innovation, the use of R&D
productivity appears to magnify or intensify the problem.
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* The vertical line at 0.238 is the true beta coefficient for R&D productivity.
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