JAMES AKOYO ABISAI

REG. NO. AM17/0251/12

TERM PAPER TOPIC: DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA

SUBMITTED TO: DR.OSAMBA

23RD NOVEMBER 2012

DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
Professor Ben O. Nwabueze 's book, Democratization (Nwabueze 1993),
is the best place to begin for a wide-ranging and textured
examination of democratization in African societies. "Democratization
is not only a concept, nor is it synonymous with multi-partyism,"
Nwabueze writes, "it is also concerned with certain conditions of
things, conditions such as a virile civil society, a democratic
society, a free society, a just society, equal treatment of all
citizens by the state, an ordered, stable society, a society infused
with the spirit of liberty, democracy, justice and equality." The
stated thesis of Nwabueze 's book is that democratization, "in the
fullest sense of the term, requires that the society, the economy,
politics, the constitution of the state, the electoral system and the
practice of government be democratized"
Africa’s contemporary democratization experience is a story of
divergence. After decades of static autocratic dominance, the region
shifted sharply toward representative government after the end of the
Cold War. Led by Benin, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, and Mali some
30 African countries have taken steps toward democracy over the past
two decades. In 1989, only three African countries could claim
democratic governments. This swing has been accompanied by an upsurge
in the number of civil society organizations, independent media, and
opportunities for political expression. Moreover, reflecting a
maturity that scholars long deemed unrealistic in low-income
countries, popular support for democracy in Africa remains strong,
despite ongoing challenges.
Democratic progress in Africa is far from universal, however. A dozen
autocratic governments remain firmly in place maintaining a monopoly
on power and repressive practices little changed from the 1960s-1980s
era of impunity. An equal number of others have adopted features of
democracy, though power remains concentrated in the hands of a single
political actor. While opposition parties, civil society
organizations, and elections are allowed, these bodies are heavily
constrained and there is little genuine oversight of the ruling
leadership.
The spectrum of governance types in Africa parallels other critical
challenges the region faces. Economic stagnation, underdevelopment,
financial volatility, humanitarian catastrophes, susceptibility to
Islamic extremism, and conflict are all closely linked to closed and
unaccountable political systems. Put succinctly, a country’s
political institutions define the “operating system” or incentive
structure under which that society functions. Establishing
constructive and responsive political processes in Africa is
indispensable to addressing the many other difficulties the region is
facing.
Despite Africa’s remarkable democratic advances, the future
trajectory of Africa’s governance norms remains uncertain. The
expanded transparency, accountability, and rules-based processes
accompanying Africa’s budding democracies are countered by
personalistic regimes that stubbornly cling to long-accepted norms of
control, coercion, and patronage. These practices, moreover, are
increasingly bolstered by disparate sources of external support that
benefit from seeing these “strongmen” stay in power.
History of democracy in Africa
  There are two schools of thought on the history of democracy in
Africa.  One school holds that a series of internal protest and
prodemocracy movements from within Africa have resulted in more and
more countries embracing multi-party elections, at least, since the
year 2000.  Another school tends to see Africa 's democratization as
part of what Samuel Huntington (1993) calls the third wave of
democracy, which apparently began in the 1970s in Europe and spread
to Africa in the 1990s.  A middle ground is, of course, possible,
since Africa could very well have been influenced by events in Europe
(like the fall of communism) as well as embraced democracy on its own
as part of a long struggle for freedom.  Along these lines, it is
customary, following Salih (2001), to give name to some historical
periods of democraticization in Africa:  the "first wave" (1950s and
1960s), involving the struggles for independence from colonial rule;
the "second wave" (1980s and 1990s), involving coming to grips with
post-colonial misrule; and the "third wave" (2000-present), involving
new ideas of civil society relationships, structures of governance,
and norms of citizenship.
    A problem is that in many places there is no democraticization
in progress.  There are even signs of democratic reversal.  This
may also be because of internal and external factors.  Africa may
simply be too poor for democracy, since in many places, the minimal
conditions for economic development do not exist.  Externally,
countries like China have made the decision to not play the game,
like the West does, in demanding democratic transition as a condition
of monetary aid.  China and India have chosen to do business in
Africa through the private sector, getting into agriculture, for
example, with the intent of growing food for consumption back in
China and India (almost like some new kind of colonialism), and they
use imported Chinese or Indian labor, with no concern for domestic
policies or internal political matters.  In short, they do not let
stuff like human rights and governance get in the way.  Many
Africans and African leaders are comfortable with such arrangements,
and that is probably because of the powerful appeal of "self-
determinism" or (shall one dare say) stubborn determination to do
things their own way.
    The growth of democraticization in Africa is paradoxical. 
There are failures where all the opportunities are right for success,
and there are successes where one would least expect them.  In many
ways, Africa is a victim of its own history when it fails (and it
never fails to fail).  Some of its failings are self-induced. and
some of its failings can be blamed on the rest of the world, but the
main problem may be that the average African citizen does NOT seem to
show outrage at all the violent or illegal political change that
comes about.  Criminal acts, especially political criminal acts,
seem to be the accepted norm.  Further, the international community,
as well as the AU, do NOT seem to have much political will to
intervene when they ought to intervene.  A countless number of
times, the U.N., the U.S., the AU (and indeed the whole world) have
only issued banal statements or engaged in political posturing like
"we strongly condemn ..." [... the latest illegal political act in
Africa], or "we urge all parties to ..." [find a peaceful and
amicable resolution].  How long can the world remain docile and
helpless?

The Democracy before Democracy in Africa

Since the dawn of African independence from colonialism in the early
1960s, African liberation leaders and founding fathers qua dictators,
military junta and “new breed” leaders have sought to justify the
one-man, one-party state — and avoid genuine multiparty democracy —
by fabricating a blend of self-serving arguments which converge on
the notion that in Africa there is a democracy before democracy. The
core argument can be restated in different ways: Before Africa can
have political democracy, it must have economic democracy. Africans
are more concerned about meeting their economic needs than having
abstract political rights. Economic development necessarily requires
sacrifices in political rights. African democracy is a different
species of democracy which has roots in African culture and history.
African societies are plagued by ethnic, tribal and religious
conflicts which can be solved not by Western-style liberal democracy
but within the framework of the traditional African institutions of
consensus-building, elder mediation and conciliation. Western-style
democracy is unworkable, alien and inappropriate to Africans because
the necessary preconditions for such a system are not present.
Widespread poverty, low per capita incomes, a tiny middle class and
the absence of a democratic civic culture render such a system
incongruous with African realities. Liberal democracy could come to
Africa only after significant economic development has been achieved.
Any premature introduction or misguided imposition of it by the West
could actually harm Africans by destroying their budding faith in
democracy itself.
Stripped of rhetorical flourish, such self-serving arguments exploit
manifest contradictions and deficits in African societies for the
purposes of justifying the consolidation and fortification of the
powers of the one-man, one-party state, and preventing the
institutionalization of a competitive multiparty democratic process
with electoral and constitutional accountability. The claim of
primacy of “economic democracy” is based on an impressionistic (not
empirically substantiated) assumption that the masses of poor,
illiterate, hungry and sick Africans are too dumb to appreciate
“political democracy”. In other words, the African masses are
interested in the politics of the belly and not the politics of
democracy and political rights. Africans live for and by bread alone.
Elections, legal rights and liberties are meaningless to the poor and
hungry masses. This assumption is pure nonsense as various well
designed and executed empirical studies of democratic attitudes in
Africa have shown. The claim of ethnic conflict to justify the one-
man, one-party system is internally self-contradictory. If indeed the
communalism and the institutions of traditional, pre-colonial African
societies are the most effective means for dispute resolution and
consensus-building, it is illogical to insist on investing a single
leader and his party with sweeping and expansive powers.
All the layered sophistry and paralogism of African dictators is
intended to mask their insatiable hunger for power and produce one
set of self-serving axiomatic conclusions: Africa is not yet ready
for genuine multiparty democracy. The one-man, one-party system is
the only means to save Africa from itself, and from complete social,
economic and political implosion. The one-man, one-party system will
evolve into a genuine multiparty democracy at some undetermined time
in the future. In the meantime, the one-man, one-party show must go
on.
Post-independence African history is instructive in understanding the
scourge of the one-man, and the curse of one-party rule in Africa.
Ghana’s independence from colonialism as the first sub-Saharan
African country in 1957, and the role played by its first prime
minister and later president Kwame Nkrumah is central to
understanding the pervasive problem of civilian and military
dictatorships in Africa. Ghana was undoubtedly the most economically
and socially advanced country in sub-Saharan Africa with an advanced
educational system and relatively well-developed infrastructures when
it gained its independence. Nkrumah was a role model for the dozens
of leaders of African countries that achieved independence in the
1960s and 1970s. Despite Nkrumah’s status as the unrivalled champion
of Pan-Africanism and strong advocacy for a united Africa, he was
also the single individual most responsible for casting the mold for
the one-man, one-party dictatorship in post-independence Africa.
Barely a year into his administration, the once fiery anti-colonial
advocate of political rights and democracy had transformed himself
into a power-hungry despot. He enacted a law making labor strikes
illegal. He declared it was unpatriotic to strike. Paranoid about his
opposition, he enacted a preventive detention act which gave him
sweeping powers to arrest and detain any person suspected of treason
without due process of law. He even dismissed the chief justice of
Ghanaian Supreme Court, Sir Arku Korsah, when a three-judge panel
Korsah headed acquitted suspects accused of plotting a coup. Nkrumah
amended the constitution making his party, the Convention People’s
Party, the only legal party in the country. He capped his political
career by having himself declared president-for-life.
Other African leaders followed in Nkrumah’s footsteps. Julius
Nyerere became the first president of Tanganyika (Tanzania) in 1962
and announced his brand of African socialism built around rural folks
and their traditional values in ujamaa (extended family) system.
Millions of villagers were forced into collectivized agriculture. He
modeled his constitution after Ghana’s and followed Nkrumah’s
script. Nyerere established a one-man, one-party state around his
Tanganyika African National Union, outlawed strikes, nationalized
private banks and industries, duplicated Nkrumah’s preventive
detention act to go after his opponents and greatly increased his
personal power.
With the exception of a few countries, Africa had been incurably
infected by Nkrumah’s one-man, one-party virus before the end of the
1960s. Most of the leaders of the newly independent African countries
followed Nkrumah’s political formula by declaring states of
emergency, suspending their constitutions, conferring unlimited
executive powers upon themselves, and enacting oppressive laws which
enabled them to arrest, detain and persecute their rivals,
dissenters, and others they considered threats at will.
The economic and political outcomes of the one-man, one-party
dictatorships by the end of the 1960s were dismal. Nkrumah’s program
of rapid industrialization by reducing Ghana’s dependence on foreign
capital and imports had a devastating effect on its important cocoa
export sector. Many of the socialist economic development projects he
launched failed. By the time he was overthrown in a military coup in
1966, Ghana had fallen from one of the richest African countries to
one of the poorest. Similarly, Tanzania nose-dived from the largest
exporter of agricultural products in Africa to the largest importer
of agricultural products. The one-man, one-party state also proved to
be ineffective in reducing ethnic tensions and preventing conflict.
Civil wars, genocides, low level ethnic conflicts and corruption
spread throughout the continent like wildfire.
Waiting in the wings were Africa’s soldiers. Accusing the civilian
governments of corruption, incompetence and mismanagement of the
economy and claiming a patriotic duty to rescue their countries from
collapse, military officers knocked off these governments one by one.
Gen. Joseph Mobutu seized power in the Congo (Zaire) following a
protracted political struggle between Patrice Lumumba and Joseph
Kasavubu. Col. Houari Boumedienne overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella in
Algeria. A group of army officers overthrew the monarchy in Burundi.
In the Central African Republic, Col. Bokassa (later Emperor Jean
Bedel Bokassa) overthrew David Dacko. Gen. Idi Amin overthrew Milton
Obote in Uganda. Nigeria flipped two coups, one by Gen. Johnson
Ironsi who was overthrown by Gen. Yakubu Gowon. Many other African
countries suffered similar fates.
There is overwhelming evidence to show that the one-man, one-party
state has been a total failure in Africa over the past one-half
century. Under these dictatorships, African countries have faced
civil and border wars and ethnic and religious strife. Famine,
malnutrition and insufficient food production have caused the deaths
of millions of Africans. The poverty and unemployment rates continue
to rise despite billions in foreign aid and loans. Infant mortality
is nearly 100 per thousand (compared to 5 in the United States).
Africans have the lowest life expectancies in the world. After fifty
years of independence per capita income in much of Africa had
declined so much that President Obama had to artfully remind Africans
in his speech in Ghana: “Countries like Kenya, which had a per
capita economy larger than South Korea’s when I was born, have been
badly outpaced.” Politically, the one-man, one-party dictatorships
have brought neither ethnic harmony nor good governance; and they
have failed to forge a common national identity for their people.
Today we still hear the same rubbish about a democracy before
democracy recycled by a “new breed” of silver-tongued African
leaders. Meles Zenawi, the chief architect of the one-man, one-party
state in Ethiopia says:
Establishing democracy in Africa is bound to take a long time and
that elections alone will not produce democracy and do not
necessarily bring about democratic culture or guarantee a democratic
exercise of rule. Creating a democracy in poverty-ridden and
illiterate societies that have not yet fully embraced democratic
values and are not yet familiar with democratic concepts, rules and
procedures is bound to take a long time and to exact huge costs.
Similar arguments are made by Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame
of Rwanda; and even the wily old coyote, Robert Mugabe, pulls the
same stunt at age 85 to justify clinging to power.
The “new breed” dictators are trying to sell the same old snake oil
in a new bottle to Africans. But no one is fooled by the sweet-
talking, iron-fisted new breed dictators who try to put a kinder and
gentler face on their dictatorship, brutality and corruption. They
should spare us their empty promises and hypocritical moral
pontifications. For one-half century, Africans have been told
democracy requires sacrifices and pain; and they must look inwards to
their village communities, traditional elders and consensus dialogue
to find the answers. Africans don’t want to hear that “democracy”
takes time and they must wait, and wait and wait as the new breed of
dictators pick the continent clean right down to the bare bones.
Africans want Africa to no longer be the world’s cesspool of
corruption, criminality and cruelty.
The fact of the matter is that there is no such thing as democracy
before democracy. There could be either democracy or one-man, one-
party dictatorships in Africa. We all know exactly what the latter
means. The only question is how best to implement constitutional
multiparty systems in Africa. On this question, there may be an
ironic twist of history. As Ghana was the original model of the one-
man, one-party state in Africa, Ghana today could be the model of
constitutional multiparty democracy in Africa.
Today Ghana has a functioning competitive multiparty political system
guided by its Constitution. Article 55 guarantees “Every citizen of
Ghana of voting age has the right to join a political party.”
Political parties are free to organize and “disseminate information
on political ideas, social and economic programmes of a national
character.” BUT TRIBAL AND ETHNIC PARTIES ARE ILLEGAL IN GHANA under
Article 55 (4). That is the key to Ghana’s political success. The
Ghanaians also have an independent Electoral Commission which ensures
the integrity of the electoral process and under Article 46 is an
institution “not subject to the direction or control of any person
or authority.” Ghanaians enjoy many a panoply of political civil,
economic, social and cultural rights. In 2008, Ghana (population 23
million) ranked 31 out of 173 countries worldwide on World Press
Freedom Index (Ethiopia- population 80 million ranked 142/173). There
are more than 133 private newspapers, 110 FM radio stations and 2
state-owned dailies. Ghanaians express their opinions without fear of
government retaliation. The rule of law is upheld and the government
follows and respects the Constitution. Ghana has an independent
judiciary which is vital to the observance of the rule of law and
protection of civil liberties. Political leaders and public officials
abide by the rulings and decisions of the courts and other fact-
finding inquiry commissions. Ghana is certainly not a utopia, but it
is proof positive that multiparty constitutional democracy can and
will work in Africa.
Africa’s and Ethiopia’s future in the 21st Brave New Globalized
Century lie in genuine multiparty democracy, not in recycled one-man,
one-party, pie-in-the-sky-promising dictatorships. Poverty, ethnic
conflict, illiteracy and all of the other social ills will continue
to haunt Africa for decades to come. Dealing effectively with these
issues can not be left to failed-beyond-a-shadow-of-doubt, one-man,
one-party dictatorships. If Africa is to be saved from total
collapse, its ordinary people must be fully empowered in an open,
pluralistic and competitive multiparty political process.

NOTE
Full Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens
have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. It allows
eligible citizens to participate equally—either directly or through
elected representatives—in the proposal, development, and creation
of laws. It encompasses social, economic and cultural conditions that
enable the free and equal practice of political self-determination.
Hybrid regimes –They combine elements of representative democracy
and direct democracy.
Flawed democracies: These countries have free and fair elections and
even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom),
basic civil liberties will be respected. However, there are
significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including
problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low
levels of political participation.
A failed state has a central government that is so weak or
ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its
territory; non-provision of public services; widespread corruption
and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations;
and sharp economic decline.
Authoritarian regime: is a government that concentrates political
power in an authority not responsible to the people. |
|
|

Challenges facing democracy in Africa

| |
Lack of credible opposition | Absence of a strong opposition parties
that can challenge the policies and programmes of the ruling party;
absence of alternative policy programmed choices required by
electorate; zero-sum struggle for power. |
Weak civil society | Lack of strong, dense and vibrant civic groups
who will act as a counterbalance to state hegemony; such groups are
expected to resist cooptation by state but, instead, provide a
permanent independent check on state power; the weakness of civil
society is often as a result of a lack of strong middle class with
its own class interest and stake in society. |
Weak economies | Productive economy needed to allow state to supply
goods and service to electorate; scarce resources could persuade,
even force, electorates to abandon democratic processes. At worse,
citizens can be “bought” to vote for wrong choices. |
No separation between state and ruling party | Ruling party dominate
and manipulate the political process; constitutions are regularly
amended to retain power; state resources are ostensibly used to
advance the interest of the ruling party; state security forces are
used to coerce citizens and opposition groups |
Ethnicity, religion & nepotism | Politics and governance are
mitigated by divisive sectarian tendencies; democratic process
(voting etc) is held hostage by the sectarian sentiments and
loyalties of political actors and voters; state policies are
influenced by sectarian fragmentation and sentiments. |
Potentials of military intervention | There is high chance of
military intervention as a result of any confusion created by
political deadlock between parties. |
Weak democratic political culture | Ruling elites do not respect
democratic values such as rule of law and human rights; opposition
parties and pressure groups are forced or induced into abandoning
their role checking the excesses of state officials; weak democratic
structures and values such as participation, civil liberties, voting
etc. |
Lack of regime change (incumbency continuum) | A sustained tradition
of limited political change; regime continuity; oppression of
dissent. |
Conclusion
Although many African countries are termed ‘emerging democracies,’
the absurdity of “democracy” in Africa is that the majority,
including “democratically elected” leaders, do not really
understand how democracy works. In Africa, democracy is generally
equated to the right to vote. This is where the misconception begins.
The election process that is often confused to personify and signify
democracy is routinely compromised by factors such as negative
ethnicity, violence, bribery, rigging and illiteracy. Isn’t this
really a problem of our bad politics as opposed to the un-workability
of democracy in Africa? The fact that citizens don’t fully
comprehend their role in the period between elections has not made
things better. The citizens often disengage from public affairs,
complain passively and wait for another election time.
Democracy doesn’t work unless it is worked. Democracy works at the
initiative of citizens. Therefore, citizen disengagement leads to
irresponsive leadership. When the citizens don’t get the fruits of
democracy which include among others good governance, development and
security, they attribute the failure to “Western democracy.”To use
opportunistic dysfunctions resulting from the misunderstanding of the
working of democracy to disparage democracy as a western concept that
has failed in Africa is unfortunate, preposterous and unacceptable.
To use selective and limited information on Chinese economic
successes to swallow the anti-democracy misinformation is laziness.
In my view, while democracy as practiced in the West has evolved over
many centuries, in Africa, it is in its infancy.
To contextualize the significance of understanding how democracy
works, let us examine the connection between political and civil
rights, which are aspects of democracy on one hand, and the
prevention of major disasters such as famine that characterize Africa
on the other. Political and civil rights are essential in mobilizing
citizens around their general needs to forcefully demand appropriate
government action. Anywhere in the world, a government’s response to
the acute suffering of people often depends on the active pressure
that is put on it. This is where rights such as criticizing, open
debates, participation in politics and protesting, among others, make
a difference. As a matter of fact, no substantial famine has ever
occurred in a country with a functional democracy, a robust
opposition and a relatively free press. In case of disaster,
respective governments respond swiftly to ensure that the affected
have adequate relief and can resume normal life.  
The leadership responds quickly because they know that delayed action
or faltering response can quickly turn the disaster into a protest
and referendum on the leadership. In my opinion, this type of active
and forceful citizen engagement with the leadership is lacking in
Africa’s emerging democracies. Democracy does not serve as an
automatic remedy of ailment as quinine works to remedy malaria.
Democracy should become an everyday instrument for our people to
engage each other and their leaders. It provides opportunity that
citizens must take advantage of in order to achieve the desired
effect. This is the right perspective for emerging democracies in
Africa. More important, for democracy to work as it should, African
citizens must take on a new attitude, become more responsible, be
informed and get involved in public affairs. Africans must reclaim
the culture of coming together regularly to discuss community
welfare. They must shun criminal activities that cheat democracy such
as election manipulations, voter bribery, tribalism and election
related violence. 
There is power in people coming together and organizing around their
felt collective issues. The rulers have incentive to listen to what
people want if they have to face their criticism and seek their
support in elections. Initiatives such as public debates can work
wonders in assessing a leader’s competence in articulation of
issues, vision and clear policies. Open discussion, debate, criticism
and dissent are essential to generating informed and reflected
choices. This makes politics issue-based, eases voters’ decision on
who to vote for and spurs accountability. Once we get it right with
our politics and work on democracy, there is no doubt that we shall
experience the fruit of democracy - development. Of course to get a
transparent and responsive government, citizens’ consciousness must
be backed up by attendant reforms in institutions such as judiciary,
parliament, police and electoral system. It is time we put our
democracy train on the rail.

References

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