G.R. No.

159941               August 17, 2011

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely:

EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M.
RETERTA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and
reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion
that can be corrected through certiorari.

The petitioners, whose complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance the RTC had
dismissed, had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that certiorari was not a substitute
for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal. They now appeal that ruling of
the CA promulgated on April 25, 2003.1

Antecedents

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983), 2 averring that
they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez
Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited
the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been
the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father
and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous
possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an
affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had
waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit,
Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by
the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.

On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting

that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the
land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil
Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding:3

Considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of the propriety of the grant of
lot 2938 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the Lands Management
Bureau of the defendant Lorenzo Mores through the use of the forged Affidavit and
Sales Certificate No. V-769 which eventually led to the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-64071
to defendant Lorenzo Mores and wife Virginia Mores, and considering further that the
land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently
Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the
exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the determination
whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate
rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion
that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On the second ground relied
upon by the defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court
deemed not to discuss the same.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let this instant case be dismissed as it is hereby

dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their
motion for reconsideration on February 21, 2002.4

On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for
certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003, holding: 5

Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision, the remedy of the
petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead
they filed the present special civil action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision
of the court a quo has become final.

The Order dismissing the case was issued by the court a quo on 29 October 2001,
which Order was received by the petitioners on November 16, 2001. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration dated November 26, 2001 but the same was denied by the
court a quo on 21 February 2002. The Order denying the motion for reconsideration
was received by the petitioners on 20 March 2002.

Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15, 2002. Certiorari, however cannot
be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, the Supreme Court had the following
to say:
"We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Certiorari cannot be allowed when
a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,
certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.6

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioners submit that:

I.

IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO

DISREGARD THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, RULE 41, SECOND PARAGRAPH,
SUBPARAGRAPH (a), AND SECTION 9, RULE 37, 1997 RULES OF COURT;

II.

IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO

APPLY THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ROSETE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 339
SCRA 193, 199, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE ALREADY TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1997.

III.

IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
NATURE OF THE ACTION, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME.7

Briefly stated, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

1.

Propriety of certiorari as remedy

against dismissal of the action

The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the
order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.
Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being
availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.8

Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their proper
remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure, specifically
pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
("An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the
remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order") prohibited an appeal of a
denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( "No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration") expressly declared that an order denying a
motion for reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances "where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65."

The petitioners’ position has no basis.

For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order
granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order
for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to
do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an
interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,9 viz:

The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or
‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the
Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the
task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights
and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the
Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or,
to use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’

xxx

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is ‘interlocutory,’ e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement,
or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a ‘final’ judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an ‘interlocutory’ order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in the case.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners,
indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents’ motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly:

Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. – An
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy
being an appeal from the judgment or final order.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration

independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for
reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment
or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a)
the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.10 By denying a
motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no
reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the
judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the
course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court – the version in force at the time when the CA
rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 – included an order denying a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or

compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
vitiating consent;

(f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while
the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)

It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has
since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders,
and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to
reverse the CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA
correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed
final order.

2.

RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action

The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is
available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to
and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the
broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the
undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the
order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court has declared that the requirement that
there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if
appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is
inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. 12 A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.13 It is
understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy
remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently
void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.14

Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available
as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look
beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise
supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make
it conformable to law and justice.15 Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue
cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the
court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary
than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control
over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted
whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.16

The petitioners’ complaint – self-styled as being for the "quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate, reconveyance and
damages" – would challenge the efficacy of the respondents’ certificate of title under the
theory that there had been no valid transfer or assignment from the petitioners’
predecessor in interest to the respondents of the rights or interests in the land due to
the affidavit assigning such rights and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.
The petitioners’ cause of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing
upon the manner by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land. According to
Arayata v. Joya,17 in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale
of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer
be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval
and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of
a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a person considered as a
grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon, such transfer must conform
to certain requirements of the law. Under Director of Lands v. Rizal,18 the purchaser in
the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner
of the lot purchased even before the payment of the full payment price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in full the
purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that of a mere lien
holder or mortgagee.19

Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120,20 had grantee Teofilo Reterta perfected
his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken title from him
upon his death. By law, therefore, should the execution of the deed in favor of the
respondents be held invalid, the interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to the
petitioners and the deed should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the
petitioners’ claim was their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession of
the land. Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners’ opposition to the motion to dismiss of
the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the land.21

Given the foregoing, the petitioners’ complaint made out a good case for reconveyance
or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well warrant the
reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the petitioners. It did not matter that
the respondents already held a certificate of title in their names. In essence, an action
for reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks
the transfer of the property to its rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having
been fraudulently or mistakenly registered in another person’s name. There is no
special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the aggrieved party
asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered owner, and
that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.22 On this score, it is also worthy to stress that the title of a piece of a friar land
obtained by a grantee from the Government without conforming with the requirements
set by the law may be assailed and nullified.

Was the petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?

We answer the query in the affirmative.

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,23 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691,24 which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: xxx

xxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxx

Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a

cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the
assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC
having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of
which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.25

The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their
position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction
was without basis. The provisions read:

Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to
sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so
fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands
xxx and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest
the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him
by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act
xxx.

Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.1awphi1

As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the
administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners’ action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in
favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the
petitioners’ showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by
disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and
capriciously.

Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.26 The abuse must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.27

The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners
bereft of any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such,
they would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC’s
dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do
justice to the unjustly aggrieved.28

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari; sets aside the decision the
Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and directs Branch 23 of the Regional
Trial Court in Trece Martires City to resume the proceedings in Civil Case No. TM-983
with dispatch.

The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 28-33; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired),
1

with the concurrence of Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired) and

Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam (deceased).
2
 Id., pp. 96-101
3
 Id., pp. 49-50.
4
 Id., p. 93.
5
 Supra note 1.
6
 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
7
 Id., p. 15.
8
 Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
9
 G.R. No. L-60036, 27 January 1987, 147 SCRA 334, 339-341.
10
 Section 1, paragraph (b), Rule 37, Rules of Court.
11
 G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8, 20.

 Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113
12

SCRA 107, 129.

 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. National Wages and

13

Productivity Commission, G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 346.
14
 Lu Ym v. Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 298, 311.
15
 Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365.
16
 Id.
17
 No. 28067, 51 Phil. 654 (1928).
18
 No. L-292587, 87 Phil. 806 (1950).
19
 Id., p. 814.
20
 The provision pertinently states: "xxx [i]n the event of death of a holder of a
certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to
the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, the interest of the
holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons who
under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been
perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate."
21
 Rollo, p. 124.
22
 Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12,
2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.
23
 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
24
 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa, Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. (Approved on March 25, 1994; effective on April 15, 1994).
25
 Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497,
October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.
26
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6,
2006, 484 SCRA 119; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867,
July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489.
27
 Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18,
2004, 440 SCRA 467; Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4,
2002, 373 SCRA 11.
28
 E.g., Alba v. Nitorrada, G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 753,
("That the petitioner and all other public officials are deprived of a legal recourse
in the event that the Ombudsman or his Deputy `hastily, arbitrarily, if not
oppressively and/or inhumanly, acts to find him administratively liable for an
imagined violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. 6713 x x x" is belied by the fact that the
remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
always available to an aggrieved public official in such a case. The Rules of
Court which apply suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman provides that in the absence of an appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
by any decision rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, may file a
petition for certiorari with this Court"); Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
85723, June 19, 1995, 245 SCRA 150, 152 ("Certiorari is justified in order to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be a
failure of justice.")