Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan

[2009] 6 MLJ Malaysia & Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 863

A Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan

Malaysia & Ors

B
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO B-01–90 OF
2004
LOW HOP BING, KN SEGARA AND AHMAD MAAROP JJCA
25 JUNE 2009

C
Civil Procedure — Originating summons — Striking out — Declaration on
interpretations concerning constitutionality of federal and state legislations —
Whether abuse of process under O 18 r 19(1)(d) of the Rules of the High Court
1980 — Whether originating summons obviously unsustainable
D
Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Right to religious freedom —
Plaintiff sought declarations on interpretations concerning constitutionality of
federal and state legislations — Whether art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution
E taken away jurisdiction of civil courts to interpret written laws of state enacted for
administration of Muslim Law

The first plaintiff, a Malaysian of Indian descent, was born to parents who
F were Malaysians, of Indian descent. The first plaintiff submitted that
throughout his formative years, his parents, who were also Malaysians of
Indian descent, followed a Hindu way of life and brought him up as a Hindu.
However, the identity cards of the first plaintiff ’s parents showed that they
were Muslims. The first plaintiff by a deed poll dated 16 March 1973 adopted
G a new Hindu name. The first plaintiff was the natural and lawful father of the
second to fourth plaintiffs and they were all under the age of majority. The
marriage of the first plaintiff to his Hindu wife was registered under the Law
Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. The first plaintiff by the
originating summons (‘OS’) sought the following declarations, inter alia; (i)
H that an interpretation of the words ‘his religion’ in art 11(1) of the Federal
Constitution meant the religion which a person chooses to profess and
practice as his religion; (ii) that the phrase ‘person(s) professing the religion
of Islam’ in various provisions of the Federal Constitution are to be
interpreted to mean ‘a person who acknowledges himself to be a believer of
I the religion of Islam’; (iii) that the definition of a person as a ‘Muslim’ in s
2 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Selangor) Enactment 1989 is null
and void; (iv) that any requirement that the plaintiffs should obtain
permission from the Syariah Court before Islamic law ceases to apply to them
be considered null and void; and (v) that the first plaintiff had the right to
864 Malayan Law Journal [2009] 6 MLJ

determine the religion of his children. Collectively, the first to the third A
defendants via the Government of Malaysia contended that the plaintiffs’
filing of the OS constituted an abuse of the process of the court as provided
under O 18 r 19(1)(d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’).
However, it was argued by the fourth plaintiff that the OS was not an abuse
of process as the plaintiffs were asking the High Court to declare certain B
statutes unconstitutional but nevertheless, the OS was struck out. Hence, the
plaintiffs’ appeal.

C
Held, allowing the appeal with costs here and below:
(1) The declarations sought by the plaintiffs in the OS revolved around the
interpretation concerning the constitutionality of legislation enacted by
the Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly of Selangor Darul
Ehsan. Although, art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution effective D
from 10 June 1988 had taken away the jurisdiction of the civil courts
in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, it
does not take away the jurisdiction of the civil courts to interpret
written laws of the state enacted for administration of Muslim law;
Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam E
& Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 referred (see para 11).
(2) Under O 18 r 19(3) of the RHC the OS is treated as if it were a
pleading for the purposes of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC. The court has
an inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process; Raja Zainal F
Abidin bin Raja Hj Tachik & Ors v British-American Life & General
Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16 referred (see para 13).
(3) The categories of abuse of process are never closed and will certainly
proliferate pursuant to the myriad of circumstances available from the
G
factual matrix found in each particular case; Indah Desa Saujana Corp
Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya &
Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11 referred (see para 16).
(4) The governing principles are trite. In seeking to strike out the OS on
grounds of abuse of process under O 18 r 19(1)(d) of the RHC, the H
first, second and third defendants must satisfy the test of proving that
the OS was obviously unsustainable (see para 18).
(5) Where a litigant brings an action to protect his rights, the use of the
remedies afforded to him by the law cannot be an abuse of the court’s I
process; Gasing Heights Sdn Bhd v Aloyah bte Abdul Rahman & Ors
[1996] 3 MLJ 259 referred (see para 19).
(6) The plaintiffs who were seeking recourse by requesting the civil courts
to interpret the constitutionality of written laws enacted in Parliament
 Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan
[2009] 6 MLJ Malaysia & Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 865

A and the State Legislative Assembly certainly could not constitute an

abuse of process. Hence, the OS was not unsustainable. It must be
heard and determined on merits. The learned judicial commissioner
had erred in striking out the OS. The plaintiffs’ appeal and the order of
the High Court was set aside. The OS was reinstated and remitted to
B the High Court for hearing on merits (see paras 20–21).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pertama, berketurunan India Malaysia, dilahirkan oleh ibubapa yang

C merupakan warganegara Malaysia berketurunan India. Plaintif menghujah
bahawa sejak kecil lagi, ibu bapanya, yang juga merupakan keturunan India
Malaysia, mengikut cara hidup Hindu dan membesarkannya sebagai seorang
Hindu. Walau bagaimanapun, kad pengenalan ibubapa plaintif pertama
menunjukkan bahawa mereka beragama Islam. Melalui surat ikatan pol
D bertarikh 16 Mac 1973, plaintif pertama menggunakan nama Hindu yang
baru. Plaintif pertama merupakan bapa kandung yang sah kepada plaintif
kedua hingga keempat dan mereka semuanya di bawah umur majoriti.
Perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan isteri Hindunya didaftarkan di bawah
Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976.
Melalui saman pemula (‘SP’), plaintif pertama menuntut deklarasi-deklarasi
E seperti berikut, iaitu; (i) bahawa tafsiran perkataan agamanya dalam perkara
11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan bermaksud agama yang dipilih untuk
dianuti dan dipraktis sebagai agamanya; (ii) bahawa frasa orang yang
menganuti agama Islam dalam pelbagai peruntukan Perlembagaan
Persekutuan ditafsirkan sebagai ‘a person who acknowledges himself to be a
F believer of the religion of Islam’; (iii) bahawa definisi sebagai seorang ‘Muslim’
dalam s 2 Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Selangor) 1989
batal dan tak sah; (iv) keperluan bahawa plaintif-plaintif perlu mendapatkan
kebenaran daripada Mahkamah Syariah di bawah Undang-Undang Islam
dianggap batal dan tak sah; dan (v) bahawa plaintif pertama mempunyai hak
G untuk menentukan agama anak-anaknya. Secara kolektifnya, defendan
pertama hingga ketiga melalui Kerajaan Malaysia menghujah bahawa
pemfailan SP oleh plaintif-plaintif merupakan penyalahgunaan proses
mahkamah sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(d)
Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Walau bagaimanapun,
H ianya dipertikaikan oleh plaintif keempat bahawa SP bukan merupakan
penyalahgunaan proses memandangkan plaintif-plaintif memohon
Mahkamah Tinggi untuk membuat deklarasi bahawa beberapa statut tidak
mengikut perlembagaan, namun begitu, SP dibatalkan. Maka, rayuan oleh
plaintif-plaintif.
I

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos di mahkamah ini dan

Mahkamah Tinggi:
(1) Deklarasi-deklarasi yang dituntut oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam SP ialah
866 Malayan Law Journal [2009] 6 MLJ

berkenaan tafsiran keperlembagaan perundangan yang digubal oleh A

Parlimen dan Dewan Undangan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan.
Walaupun perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang berkuat
kuasa sebelum 10 Jun 1988 telah mengambil bidang kuasa mahkamah
sivil berkenaan bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah, ia tidak mengambil
bidang kuasa mahkamah sivil untuk mentafsirkan undang-undang B
bertulis negeri yang digubal untuk pentadbiran undang-undang Islam;
Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam
& Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 dirujuk (lihat perenggan 11).
(2) Di bawah A 18 k 19(3) KMT, SP adalah seperti pliding bagi C
tujuan-tujuan A 18 k 19(1) KMT. Mahkamah mempunyai bidang
kuasa kuasa sedia ada untuk menghalang penyalahgunaan prosesnya;
Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors v British-American Life
& General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16 dirujuk (lihat perenggan 13).
(3) Kategori-kategori penyalahgunaan proses tidak terhad dan berkembang D
menurut pelbagai keadaan daripada fakta matriks yang didapati dalam
setiap kes; Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng
Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11 dirujuk (lihat
perenggan 16).
E
(4) Prinsip-prinsip yang mentadbirkan adalah tetap. Dalam menuntut
untuk membatalkan SP atas dasar penyalahgunaan proses di bawah A
18 k 19(1)(d) KMT, defendan pertama, kedua dan ketiga perlu
memenuhi ujian bagi membuktikan bahawa SP tidak boleh dikekalkan
(lihat perenggan 18). F
(5) Apabila litigan memulakan tindakan untuk melindungi haknya,
penggunaan remedi-remedi yang diberikan kepadanya oleh
undang-undang bukanlah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah; Gasing
Heights Sdn Bhd v Aloyah bte Abdul Rahman & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 259
G
dirujuk (lihat perenggan 19).
(6) Plaintif-plaintif yang mencari jalan keluar dengan meminta mahkamah
sivil untuk mentafsirkan keperlembagaan undang-undang bertulis yang
digubal di Parlimen dan Dewan Undangan Negeri bukanlah satu
penyalahgunaan proses. Oleh itu, SP dikekalkan. Ia perlu dibicarakan H
dan ditentukan atas merit. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana telah
khilaf dalam membatalkan SP. Rayuan plaintif-plaintif dan arahan
Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan. SP dikembalikan dan diremit ke
Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perbicaraan atas merit (lihat perenggan
20–21).] I

Notes
For cases on right to religious freedom, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006
Reissue) paras 2178–2182.
 Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan
[2009] 6 MLJ Malaysia & Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 867

A For cases on striking out, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras
4906–4912.

Cases referred to
Abdul Kahar bin Ahmad v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (Kerajaan Malaysia,
B intervener) & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 617; [2008] 4 CLJ 309, FC (refd)
Ansa Teknik (M) Sdn Bhd v Cygal Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 423, HC (refd)
Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd
[1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 2 AMR 1969, SC (refd)
Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam &
C Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1, SC (refd)
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (A Firm) [2002] 2 AC 1, HL (refd)
Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin & Ors [1998] 1 SLR
374, CA (refd)
Gasing Heights Sdn Bhd v Aloyah bte Abdul Rahman & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 259,
D HC (refd)
Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212 (refd)
Hadi bin Hassan v Suria Records Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 MLJ 522; [2005]
5 AMR 235, HC (refd)
Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge,
E High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11; [2008] 2 AMR 6, CA (refd)
Lai Kim Loi v Dato’ Lai Fook Kim & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 290, SC (refd)
Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101;
[2007] 5 CLJ 253, FC (refd)
Manson v Vooght [1999] BPIR 376, CA (refd)
F
Mohamad Ghazali bin Shuib & 8 Ors v Amalan Tepat Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008]
3 AMR 149, HC (refd)
Penang Port Commission v Kanawagi s/o Seperumaniam [2008] 6 MLJ 686;
[2008] 6 AMR 250, CA (refd)
G Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hj Tachik & Ors v British-American Life &
General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16; [1993] 2 AMR 2073, SC (refd)
Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM)
Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489, FC (refd)
Stamford Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 607;
H [1998] 2 AMR 997; [1998] 1 CLJ 960, CA (refd)

Legislation referred to
Administration of Islamic Law (Selangor) Enactment 1989 s 2
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 14
Federal Constitution arts 11(1), 121(1A), 160
I Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976
National Registration Regulations 1990 regs 5, 14, Schedule
Rules of Court 1996 [SG] O 18 r 19(1)(d)
Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 rr 19, 19(1), (1)(d), (3), O 15 r 16,
O 92 r 4
868 Malayan Law Journal [2009] 6 MLJ

Appeal from: Originating Summons No 21–31 of 2002 (MT4) (High A

Court, Shah Alam)
Fahri Azzat (K Shanmuga with him) (Kanesalingam & Co) for the appellants.
Azizah Nawawi (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the
first respondent. B
Zauyah Be Loth Khan (Md Azhari Abu Hanit with her) (State Legal Advisor,
Selangor) for the second respondent.
Siti Rahimah Khalil (Aishah Kama & Sabri) for the third respondent.
Edmund Bon Tai Soon (Chan Yat Hee & Associates) for the fourth respondent.
C
Low Hop Bing JCA (delivering judgment of the court):

APPEAL

[1] This appeal is lodged by the appellants (‘the plaintiffs’) against the D
decision of the Shah Alam High Court in striking out the plaintiffs’
originating summons (‘the OS’).

[2] For brevity and convenience, a reference hereinafter to an order and a

rule, and to an article, is a reference respectively to that order and rule in the E
Rules of the High Court 1980, and the article in the Federal Constitution.

PRAYERS FOR DECLARATION

F
[3] Pursuant to O 18 r 19, O 15 r 16 and O 92 r 4, the OS seeks the
following declarations:
(a) An interpretation that the words ‘his religion’ in art 11(1) means the
religion which a person chooses to profess and practise as his religion G
(para 1 of the OS) and the phrase ‘person(s) professing the religion of
Islam’ in various provisions of the Federal Constitution are to be
interpreted to mean ‘a person who acknowledges himself to be a believer
of the religion of Islam’ (para 2);
H
(b) The definition of a person as a ‘Muslim’ in s 2 of the Administration of
Islamic Law (Selangor) Enactment 1989 is null and void (para 3);
(c) Any requirement that the plaintiffs should obtain permission from the
Syariah Court before Islamic law ceases to apply to them be considered
null and void (para 4); I
(d) The plaintiffs are no longer muslims (para 5);
(e) The first plaintiff has the right to determine the religion of his children
(who are the other plaintiffs herein) (para 6);
 Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan
[2009] 6 MLJ Malaysia & Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 869

A (f ) Any arrest and/or detention of the plaintiffs by the second defendant

pursuant to state Islamic law (para 7) and the issuance of threat or
issuance of any document that requires the plaintiffs to do or omit to
do any act is contrary to law (para 8);

B (g) Any treatment of the plaintiffs as Muslims (para 9) and any compulsion
on the plaintiffs to undergo acts which relate to Islam are contrary to
law (para 10);
(h) Regulations 5 and 14, and the Schedule to the National Registration
Regulations 1990 are inconsistent with the Federal Constitution (para
C 11);
(i) The plaintiffs shall in all respects of public and private life be recognised
by their new names (para 12) and as being Hindus (para 13);
(j) The first defendant shall cause the educational institutions, in which
D
the second to fourth plaintiffs were enrolled, not to compel or require
them to undergo any instruction in Islam (para 14); and
(k) The plaintiffs are not to be considered as Malays within the meaning of
art 160 (para 15).
E
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[4] The first plaintiff is a Malaysian of Indian origin, born of parents who
are also Malaysians of Indian origin but are shown in their identity
F documents as Muslims. The first plaintiff says that throughout his formative
years, his parents followed a Hindu way of life and brought him up as a
Hindu.

G [5] The first plaintiff by a deed poll dated 16 March 1973 (Gazette GN No
1686 of 1973 dated 24 May 1973) adopted a new Hindu name.

[6] The first plaintiff is the natural and lawful father of the second to fourth
plaintiffs who, at the time the OS was filed, were all under the age of majority.
H The marriage of the first plaintiff to his Hindu wife, ie the mother of the
second to fourth plaintiffs, was registered under the Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act 1976.

ABUSE OF PROCESS
I
[7] The first to third defendants viz the Government of Malaysia through
learned senior federal counsel Hajah Azizah Hj Nawawi, the Government of
Selangor Darul Ehsan through learned legal adviser Datin Paduka Zauyah Be
bt Loth Khan (assisted by Mr Md Azhari bin Abu Hanit); and the Majlis
870 Malayan Law Journal [2009] 6 MLJ

Agama Islam Selangor through learned counsel Ms Siti Rahimah Kalil A

collectively contended that the plaintiffs’ filing of the OS constitutes an abuse
of the process of the court under O 18 r 19(1)(d).

[8] It was argued by learned counsel Mr Edmund Bon Tai Soon for the
fourth defendant; and Mr Fahri Azzat (Mr K Shanmuga with him) for the B
plaintiffs that the OS is not an abuse of process as the plaintiffs are asking the
High Court to declare certain statutes unconstitutional.

[9] The collective contention presented for the first to third defendants was
sustained by the High Court, as a result of which the OS was struck out. C

[10] In our view, the question raised for consideration by this court may be
formulated as follows:
Does the plaintiffs’ filing of the OS, to seek the assistance of the High Court in D
relation to the declarations prayed for in the OS, constitute an abuse of the process
of the court so as to warrant the OS to be struck out?

[11] It is abundantly clear to us that the declarations sought by the E

plaintiffs in the OS revolve around the interpretation concerning the
constitutionality of legislation enacted by Parliament and the State Legislative
Assembly of Selangor Darul Ehsan. While art 121(1A), effective from 10 June
1988, has taken away the jurisdiction of the civil courts in respect of matters
within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts, it does not take away the F
jurisdiction of the civil courts to interpret written laws of the state enacted for
the administration of muslim law: per Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ (Malaya) (as
he then was) in Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit
Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 (SC). Our civil courts are entrusted with
the responsibility of determining the issue of constitutionality of legislation: G
per Dzaiddin SCJ (later CJ (Malaya)) in Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v
Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1
MLJ 489 (FC). Interpretation of the Federal Constitution vis-à-vis other
written laws is a matter for the civil courts: per Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ
(later Chief Justice) in Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor H
[2007] 5 MLJ 101 at p 123 para [76]; [2007] 5 CLJ 253 (FC) at p 288 para
[76], and also in Abdul Kahar bin Ahmad v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor
(Kerajaan Malaysia, intervener) & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 617; [2008] 4 CLJ 309
(FC).
I
[12] The concept of abuse of process relied on by the first to third
defendants deserves to be put in proper perspective.
 Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan
[2009] 6 MLJ Malaysia & Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 871

A [13] In civil litigation, abuse of process constitutes a ground empowering

the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike out or amend any pleading
or endorsement of any writ in the action under O 18 r 19(1)(d), or under the
court’s inherent jurisdiction housed in O 92 r 4: see Malaysian Court Practice
MLJ 2007 Desk Edition at p 247 para 18.19.7. Under O 18 r 19(3), the OS
B is treated as if it were a pleading for the purposes of O 18 r 19(1). The court
has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process: Raja Zainal
Abidin bin Raja Hj Tachik & Ors v British-American Life & General Insurance
Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16; [1993] 2 AMR 2073 (SC).
C
[14] The term ‘an abuse of the process of the court’ under O 18 r 19(1)(d)
(Singapore), which is in pari materia with our O 18 r 19(1)(d), has been
given a wide interpretation by the courts and includes considerations of
public policy and the interests of justice. It signifies that the process of the
D court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused: Gabriel
Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin & Ors [1998] 1 SLR 374
at p 384 (CA) Singapore.

[15] In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (A Firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) at p 29,

E Lord Bingham of Cornhill referred to Manson v Vooght [1999] BPIR 376
(CA) at pp 388–389, where May LJ lamented, inter alia, that ‘Abuse of
process is a concept that defies precise definition in the abstract’.

F
[16] The categories of abuse of process are never closed and will certainly
proliferate pursuant to the myriad of circumstances available from the factual
matrix found in each particular case: Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors
v James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ
11; [2008] 2 AMR 6 (CA).
G
[17] Illustrations of abuse of process include the following:
(a) The plaintiff knowing that he never had a cause of action in the first
place, and yet proceeded with his action in order to extort a relief he was
H never entitled to: Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212 at p 271B-C;
(b) Multiplicity of actions: Lai Kim Loi v Dato’ Lai Fook Kim & Anor
[1989] 2 MLJ 290 (SC);
(c) Where the court has held that there was a triable issue in the plaintiff ’s
I writ action, the subsequent filing of an originating summons by the
same plaintiff, thereby obtaining summary judgment on the originating
summons based on affidavits only, in the absence of a trial: Penang Port
Commission v Kanawagi s/o Seperumaniam [2008] 6 MLJ 686; [2008] 6
AMR 250 (CA);
872 Malayan Law Journal [2009] 6 MLJ

(d) Resorting to a process with an intention to embarrass the defendant: A

Ansa Teknik (M) Sdn Bhd v Cygal Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 423;
(e) Where the process of the court has not been used in a bone fide manner
and has been abused: Hadi bin Hassan v Suria Records Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2005] 3 MLJ 522; [2005] 5 AMR 235; and B
(f ) Commencing an action against a judge of the High Court contrary to
the judicial immunity expressly conferred on the judge under s 14 of
the Courts of Judicature Act 1964: Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd.
C
[18] With specific reference to the instant appeal, in seeking to summarily
strike out the OS on grounds of abuse of process under O 18 r 19(1)(d), the
first, second and third defendants must satisfy the test of proving that the OS
is obviously unsustainable. The governing principles are trite. The locus
classicus is to be found in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan D
Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 2 AMR
1969 (SC) where the then Supreme Court speaking through Mohamed
Dzaiddin SCJ (later CJ (Malaya)) explained, in essence, as follows:
(1) It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the
E
summary process under this rule and summary procedure can only be
adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer is on the face
of it ‘obviously unsustainable’; and
(2) So long as the pleading discloses some cause of action or raises some
question fit to be decided by the judge, the mere fact that the case was F
weak and not likely to succeed at the trial was no ground for the
pleading to be struck out.
(See also: Stamford Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Ors [1998]
1 MLJ 607; [1998] 2 AMR 997; [1998] 1 CLJ 960 (CA); Mohamad Ghazali G
bin Shuib & 8 Ors v Amalan Tepat Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 3 AMR 149 (HC)
at pp 155 and 156).

[19] Where a litigant brings an action to protect his rights, the use of
remedies afforded to him by the law cannot be an abuse of the court’s process: H
Gasing Heights Sdn Bhd v Aloyah bte Abdul Rahman & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 259
(HC) per Mahadev Shankar J (later JCA) at p 271.

[20] A substantially similar situation arises in the instant appeal. Here, the
I
plaintiffs are actually seeking recourse by requesting the civil courts to
interpret the constitutionality of written laws enacted in Parliament and the
State Legislative Assembly. This certainly cannot constitute an abuse of
process. Hence, the OS is not obviously unsustainable. It must be heard and
 Zaina Abidin bin Hamid @ S Maniam & Ors v Kerajaan
[2009] 6 MLJ Malaysia & Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 873

A determined on merits.

CONCLUSION

[21] The answer to the above question is in the negative. The learned
B judicial commissioner has erred in striking out the OS. The plaintiffs’ appeal
is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside. The OS is reinstated and
remitted to the High Court for hearing on merits. It is now fixed for mention
in the Shah Alam High Court on Monday 29 June 2009. Costs of RM3,000
here and in the court below to be jointly paid by the first, second and third
C defendants to the plaintiffs. Deposit to be refunded to the plaintiffs.

Appeal allowed with costs here and below.

D Reported by Mashrifah Ravendran