VOL.

182, FEBRUARY 26, 1990 729

Lacson vs. Reyes

*
G.R. No. 86250. February 26, 1990.

ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F. LACSON, ROMEO F.

LACSON and ZENA F. VELASCO, petitioners, vs. HON.
LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as presiding judge of
Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 22,
and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and EPHRAIM J.
SERQUINA, respondents.

Civil Procedure; Attorneys; Docket Fees; Courts; Jurisdiction;

“Motion for attorney’s fees” is in the nature of an action filed by a
lawyer against his clients, hence docket fees should have been
priorly paid before the court could lawfully act on it.—Anent
docket fees, it has been held that the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Although the rule has since been tempered, that is, there must be
a clear showing that the party had intended to evade payment
and to cheat the courts, it does not excuse him from paying docket
fees as soon as it becomes apparent that docket fees are indeed
payable. In the case at bar, the “motion for attorney’s fees” was
clearly in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against
his clients for attorney’s fees. The very decision of the court
states: This case is an out-growth from SP. Proc. No. 127-87 of
same Court which was long decided (sic). It resulted from the
filing of a petition for attorney’s fees by the lawyer of the
petitioner’s heirs in the case against the latter. Upon the filing of
the petition for attorney’s fees, the heir-respondents (sic) were
accordingly summoned to answer the petition as if it were a
complaint against said heirs who retained the petitioner as their
lawyer in the said case. In that event, the parties should have
known, the respondent court in particular, that docket fees should
have been priorly paid before the court could lawfully act on the
case, and decide it. It may be true that the claim for attorney’s
fees was but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape
valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions,
whether separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the
payment of docket fees is mandatory. Assuming, therefore, ex
gratia argumenti, that Atty. Serquina’s demand for attorney’s fees
in the sum of P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have
paid the fees in question before the respondent court could validly
try his “motion”.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

730

730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lacson vs. Reyes

Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Fees of executor or

administrator; Attorney’s fees; An administrator or executor may
be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred but he
may not recover attorney’s fees from the estate.—The rule is
therefore clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed
fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he
may not recover attorney’s fees from the estate. His compensation
is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of
executor’s or administrator’s commissions, and never as attorney’s
fees. In one case, we held that “a greater sum [other than that
established by the rule] may be allowed ‘in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended
with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator.’ ” It is also left to the
sound discretion of the court. With respect to attorney’s fees, the
rule, as we have seen, disallows them. Accordingly, to the extent
that the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr.
Ser-quina’s attorney’s fees, to operate as a “lien on the subject
properties,” the trial judge must be said to have gravely abused
its discretion (apart from the fact that it never acquired
jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said Mr. Serquina’s
“motion for attorney’s fees”).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the administrator is himself
the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay attorney’s
fees.—The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders
attorney’s fees? We have held that a lawyer of an administrator or
executor may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his
client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself the
counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards for payment of
attorney’s fees.—In that connection, attorney’s fees are in the
nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved. They are
also subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be
reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the
importance of the subject matter in controversy; (2) the extent of
the services rendered; and (3) the professional standing of the
lawyer. In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial
and not on the bare word of the parties. And always, they are
subject to the moderating hand of the courts.

PETITION to review the judgment of the Regional Trial

Court of Imus, Cavite, Br. 22.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Victor H. Volfango for petitioners.

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VOL. 182, FEBRUARY 26, 1990 731

Lacson vs. Reyes

          Ephraim J. Serquina for and his own behalf as

respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

On August 26, 1987, the private respondent, Ephraim Ser-

quina, petitioned the respondent court for the probate of
the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin. His
petition was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of the
respondent court, entitled “In Re Testate Estate of
Carmelita S. Farlin, Ephraim J. Serquina, Petitioner.” He
also petitioned the court in his capacity as counsel for the
heirs, the herein petitioners, and as executor under the
will.
The petition was not opposed and hence, on November
17, 1987, the
1
respondent court issued a “certificate of
allowance,” the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, the Court hereby renders

certification that subject will and testament is accordingly
allowed in accordance with Sec. 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court. 2
SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 1988,3 Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a “motion

for attorney’s fees” against the petitioners, alleging that
the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services
rendered, the sum of P68,000.00.
Thereafter summonses were served upon4
the heirs “as if
it were a complaint against said heirs” directing them to
answer the motion.
Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the
claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed upon
was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.
After pre-trial, the respondent court rendered judgment
and disposed as follows:

_______________

1 Rollo, 3.
2 Id.
3 Id., 4.
4 Id., 20.

732

732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lacson vs. Reyes

In the light of the foregoing, considering the extent of the legal

services rendered to the clients, the value of the properties gained
by the clients out of said services, the petition for attorney’s fees is
granted. Judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent
heirs to pay their lawyer the sum of P65,000.00 as true and
reasonable attorney’s fees which shall be a lien on the subject
properties. Cost against
5
the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

On October 21, 1988, 6

eleven days after the heirs received a
copy of the decision, the latter filed a notice of appeal.
On November 7, 1988, the respondent court issued 7an
order directing the heirs to amend their notice of appeal.
On October 27, 1988, the respondent court issued an
order “noting” the notice on appeal “appellants [the heirs]
having failed to correct or complete the8 same within the
reglementary period to effect an appeal.”
On November 24, 1988, the respondent court issued yet
another order denying the notice 9
of appeal for failure of the
heirs to file a record on appeal.
Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution.
On December 5, 1988,10 the respondent court issued an
order granting execution.
The petitioners submit that the decision, dated October
26, 1988, and the orders, dated October 27, 1988,
November 24, 1988, and December 5, 1988, respectively,
are null and void for the following reasons: (1) the
respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over the
“motion for attorney’s fees” for failure on the part of the
movant, Ephraim Serquina, to pay docket fees; (2) the
respondent court gravely abused its discretion in denying
the heirs’ notice of appeal for their failure to file a record on
appeal; and (3) the respondent court also gravely abused its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees contrary to the
provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.

_______________

5 Id., 22.
6 Id., 5.
7 Id., 26.
8 Id., 25.
9 Id., 27.
10 Id., 28.

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Lacson vs. Reyes

Atty. Serquina now defends the challenged acts of the

respondent court: (1) his motion was a mere incident to the
main proceedings; (2) the respondent court rightly denied
the notice of appeal in question for failure of the heirs to
submit a record on appeal; and (3) in collecting attorney’s
fees, he was not acting as executor of Carmelita Farlin’s
last will and testament because no letters testamentary
had in fact been issued.
We take these up seriatim.

I.
11
Anent docket fees, it has been held that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. 12
Although the rule has since been tempered, that is,
there must be a clear showing that the party had intended
to evade payment and to cheat the courts, it does not
excuse him from paying docket fees as soon as it becomes
apparent that docket fees are indeed payable.
In the case at bar, the “motion for attorney’s fees” was
clearly in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer
against his clients for attorney’s fees. The very decision of
the court states:

This case is an out-growth from Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of same

Court which was long decided (sic). It resulted from the filing of a
petition for attorney’s fees by the lawyer of the petitioner’s heirs
in the case against the latter.
Upon the filing of the petition for attorney’s fees, the heir-
respon-dents (sic) were accordingly summoned to answer the
petition as if it were a complaint against said13 heirs who retained
the petitioner as their lawyer in the said case.

In that event, the parties should have known, the

respondent court in particular, that docket fees should
have been priorly paid before the court could lawfully act
on the case, and decide

_______________

11 Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, No.

75919, May 27, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.
12 See e.g., Gregorio v. Angeles, G.R. No. 85847, December 21, 1989.
13 Rollo, id., 20.

734

734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lacson vs. Reyes

it.
It may be true that the claim for attorney’s fees was but
an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape valve
from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions,
whether separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding,
the payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty.
Ser-quina’s demand for attorney’s fees in the sum of
P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid
the fees in question before the respondent court could
validly try his “motion”.

II.

With respect to the second issue, it has been held that in

appeals arising from an incident in a special proceeding, a
record on appeal
14
is necessary, otherwise, the appeal faces a
dismissal. It has likewise been held, however, that in the
interest of justice, an appeal, brought without a record on
appeal, may be reinstated under exceptional
circumstances. Thus:

xxx      xxx      xxx

It is noted, however, that the question presented in this case is
one of first impression; that the petitioner acted in honest, if
mistaken, interpretation of the applicable law; that the probate
court itself believed that the record on appeal was unnecessary;
and that the private respondent herself apparently thought so,
too, for she did not move to dismiss the appeal and instead
impliedly recognized its validity by filing the appellee’s brief.
In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice,
the Court feels that the petitioner should be given an opportunity
to comply with the above-discussed rules by submitting the
required record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the
appeal. The issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed
and, in the light of the briefs already filed
15
by the parties, resolved
on the merits by the respondent court.

_______________

14 Gonzales-Orense v. Court of Appeals, No. 80526, July 18, 1988, 163

SCRA 477.
15 Supra, 481.

735

VOL. 182, FEBRUARY 26, 1990 735

Lacson vs. Reyes

In the instant case, the Court notes the apparent

impression by the parties at the outset, that a record on
appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by: (1) the very
holding of the respondent court that “[i]t is now easy to
appeal as there is no more need for a record on appeal . . .
[b]y merely filing a notice of appeal,
16
the appellant can
already institute his appeal . . .;” (2) in its order to amend
notice of appeal, it did not require the appellants to submit
a record on appeal; and (3) Atty. Serquina interposed no
objection to the appeal on that ground.
In any event, since we are annulling the decision
appealed from, the matter is a dead issue.

III.

As we have indicated, we are granting certiorari and are

annulling the decision appealed from, but there seems to be
no reason why we can not dispose of the heirs’ appeal in a
single proceeding.
It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an
executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney’s fees
from the estate. The Rule is specifically as follows:
SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator.
Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by
will controls unless renounced.—An executor or administrator
shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management
and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per
day for the time actually and necessarily employed, or a
commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into
his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the payment of
debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to
heirs or devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand
pesos of such value, one per centum of so much of such value as
exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand
pesos, one-half per centum of so much of such value as exceeds
thirty thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand
pesos, and one-quarter per centum of so much of such value as
exceeds one hundred thousand pesos. But in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended
with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may
be allowed. If

_______________

16 Rollo, id., 24.

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736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lacson vs. Reyes

objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be

reexamined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the
compensation shall be apportioned among them by the court
according to the services actually rendered by them respectively.
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not
charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him.
When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the
compensation of his executor, that provision shall be a full
satisfaction for his services unless by a written instrument filed in
the court17 he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by
the will.

The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or

executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he
has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney’s
fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule
but such a compensation is in the nature of executor’s or
administrator’s
18
commissions, and never as attorney’s fees.
In one case, we held that “a greater sum [other than that
established by the rule] may be allowed ‘in any special
case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been
attended with great difficulty, and has required a high
degree of capacity19
on the part of the executor or
administrator.’
20
” It is also left to the sound discretion of
the court. With respect to attorney’s fees, the rule, as we
have seen, disallows them. Accordingly, to the extent that
the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and for
Mr. Serquina’s attorney’s
21
fees, to operate as a “lien on the
subject properties,” the trial judge must be said to have
gravely abused its discretion (apart from the fact that it
never acquired jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said
Mr. Serquina’s “motion for attor-ney’s fees”).
The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders
attorney’s fees? We have held that a lawyer of an
administrator or execu-tor may not charge the estate for
his fees, but rather, his

_______________

17 RULES OF COURT, Rule 85, sec. 7.

18 Rodriguez v. Silva, 90 Phil. 752 (1952).
19 Supra, 754-755.
20 Supra, 755.
21 Rollo, id., 22.

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VOL. 182, FEBRUARY 26, 1990 737

Lacson vs. Reyes

22
client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is
himself the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must
pay therefor.
In that connection, attorney’s fees are in23 the nature of
actual damages, which must be duly proved. They are also
subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be
reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the
importance of the subject matter in controversy; (2) the
extent of the services rendered;
24
and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer. In all cases, they must be
addressed in25a full-blown trial and not on the bare word of
the parties. And always, they are subject to the
moderating hand of the courts.
The records show that Atty. Ephraim Serquina, as
counsel for the heirs, performed the following:
xxx      xxx      xxx
5. That after the order of allowance for probate of the will, the
undersigned counsel assisted the heirs to transfer immediately
the above-mentioned real estate in their respective names, from
(sic) the payment of estate taxes in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of the titles, in
order for the heirs to sell the foregoing real estate of 10,683 sq. m.
(which was also the subject of sale prior to the death of the
testator) to settle testator’s obligations and day-to-day subsistence
being (sic) that the heirs, except 26 Zena F. Velasco, are not
employed neither doing any busi-ness;

The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty.
Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed by him
(P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court
(P65,000.00). The Court observes that these are acts
performed routinely since they form part of what any
lawyer worth his salt is expected to do. The will was
furthermore not contested. They are not, so Justice Pedro
Tuason wrote, “a case [where] the administrator was able
to stop what appeared to be an improvident disbursement
of a

_______________

22 Gonzales-Orense, supra.
23 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2199, in relation to Art. 2208.
24 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 86102-03, January 23, 1990, per Regalado, J.
25 Supra.
26 Rollo, id., 72.

738

738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lacson vs. Reyes

substantial amount without having to employ 27

outside legal
help at an additional expense to the estate,” to entitle him
to a bigger compensation. He did not exactly achieve
anything out of the ordinary.
The records also reveal that Atty.
28
Serquina has already
been paid the sum of P6,000.00. It is our considered
opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his
efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the
heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered: (1) GRANTING the petition and making the
 temporary restraining order issued on January 16, 1989
PERMANENT; and (2) ORDERING the petitioners to PAY
the private respondent, Atty. Ephraim Serquina, attorney’s
fees in the sum of P9,000.00. The said fees shall not be
recovered from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and

Regalado, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Notes.—Attorney’s fees made subject of a contract are

in the nature of liquidated damages and stipulated
payment thereof in case of breach is aptly called a penal
clause. (Social Security Commission vs. Almeda, 168 SCRA
474).
The claim for attorney’s fees of Atty. J. Gomez is not
properly cognizable in SP Proc. 6824, which is for the
settlement of the estate of Don A. Castellvi. Representation
and transportation expenses erroneously disbursed to Atty.
J. Gomez should be returned to the estate. (Quirino vs.
Grospe, 160 SCRA 787).

——o0o——

_______________

27 Rodriguez, supra, 755-756. This factor was considered, however, in

assessing the administrator’s commissions and not attorney’s fees.
28 Rollo, id. The heirs put the figure, however, at P7,000.00, Rollo, id.,
4.

739

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