FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division) et.al. respondents.

G.R. No. 91391

January 24, 1991

TOPIC/S: Liability of Public Officials/Corporate Powers of the LGU

PRINCIPLE/S: The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.

FACTS:

On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. The
petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the
Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the
petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile’s counterclaim in the same civil case
and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the
petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged
"harassment suit" against him.

The motion was granted in a resolution. Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed
their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to
this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

According to the defendant, Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that
Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered,
authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint against
Defendant. He further alleged that Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or
cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this harassment suit against
Defendant.

On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counterclaim can be filed
against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the
Republic. The petitioner further argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case,
exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution
of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a
counterclaim in the same case.

ISSUE/S:

1.) Whether or not the Solicitor General may invoke immunity from suit.

2.) Whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the
case filed against him

RULING/S:

1.) The Court ruled that the Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly
observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public
office. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Moreover, the petitioner’s
argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also
extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not
ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.

Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith,
or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG
commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently
baseless suit in derogation of the latter’s constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p.
417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him.
High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not
the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right.
2.) The Court ruled that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit
with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To
vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for
damages against the Solicitor General.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a
consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action
as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the
private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case,
the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself. To
allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is
merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would
lead to mischievous consequences.

When a lawyer acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a

counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any
claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely
separate and distinct civil action.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of

the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against
the petitioner.
PERCIVAL MODAY, et.al. petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al. respondents.

G.R. No. 107916

February 20, 1997

TOPIC/S: Local Eminent Domain

PRINCIPLE/S: Power of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan to review ordinances,

resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the Municipal Mayors; declaration of
invalidity must be on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sanggunian
Bayan or Mayor to issue the resolution, ordinance or order under review

FACTS:

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. The Sangguniang

Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
“Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1)
Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities.” The same was approved by the Mayor Bustillo but was disapproved by
Sangguniang Panlalawigan citing, “expropriation is unnecessary considering that there
are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center.” The
Municipality petitioned for eminent domain in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). They
were allowed to take possession of the land despite owner Percival Moday’s opposition.
Moday filed motion for reconsideration and was denied by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Hence the current petition to reverse the decision and to declare the resolution null and
void. They contend that the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No.
43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other
municipal properties available for the purpose.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Municipal of Bunawan has authority to exercise eminent

domain on the ground of disapproval of Sangguniang Panlalawigan ?

RULING/S:

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. The
Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local
Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section
9 of said law states:

Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

It is the government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to

the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the
national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there
must be just compensation. The petitioners in the case at hand questioned the lack of
authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89
is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the
power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a
similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's
pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are
applicable to the case at bar. "The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution,
ordinance, or order is 'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president
making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal
question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance,
or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or
order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board
passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or
president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority."

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove

Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power
to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337.
Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as
lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday, et al. v.
Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, petitioner, vs. HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE,
Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, et.al.,
respondent.

G.R. No. 108072

December 12, 1995.

TOPIC/S: Disciplinary Actions

PRINCIPLE/S: Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost
parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63
of the precursor Local Government Code of 1983, under the heading of "Suspension and
Removal." The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time
entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the
Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and
24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the
modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local
Government by the Office of the President.

FACTS:
The Mayor, his council, and all public officials of Mandaue City with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, were charged with having violated R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, 5 Articles 1706 and 1717 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No.
6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in
conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by
increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00
without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. A day after the
filing of the complaints, Hon. Juan M. Hagad, petitioner ordered respondents, including
Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer
Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order.

Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive suspension of

respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case. Aside from
opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August
1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman
supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case
filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as
well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President.

Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not
have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all
public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local
officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the
motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials,
except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have
been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. 10 Respondent officials were formally placed
under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order 11 of 21
September 1992.

Hon. Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hon. Gozo-Dadole ruled that, it is
the finding of this Court that since the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so
general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose
administrative sanctions against a responsible public official or employee while that of
Section 60 of the New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and
specific grounds upon which a local elective official can be subjected to administrative
disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an exception
to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct
administrative investigation against local elective officials is already lodged before the
offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Local Government Code repealed the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
regarding the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations
over local elective officials?

RULING/S:

No, the general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13

(1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution.

While his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in

Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could
be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentality es and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A.
No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly
has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee
under investigation by it. The Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code
of 1991 as having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President
(and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He
posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman
theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate. In
passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy that should
have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court
rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman
Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well
settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts
must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought
into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.

WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992

is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE - 14 is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No costs.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MATEO, ISABELA, et.al., petitioners, vs. SMART
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 219506.

June 23, 2021

TOPIC/S: Local Taxation/Local Police Power

PRINCIPLE/S:

If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least one of the real and
substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly classified as an exercise of the power
to tax. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed an
exercise of police power in the form of a fee, even though revenue is incidentally
generated. Simply stated, if generation of revenue is the primary purpose, the
imposition is a tax, but if regulation is the primary purpose, the imposition is properly
categorized as a regulatory fee.

The presumption of constitutionality, in its most basic sense, only means that
courts, in passing upon the validity of a law, will afford some deference to the statute
and charge the party assailing it with the burden of showing that the act is incompatible
with the constitution.

FACTS:

Municipality of San Mateo, Isabela (petitioner) enacted Ordinance entitled, "An

Ordinance Imposing Regulatory Fee known as Annual Antenna/Tower Fee for the
Operation if All Citizens Ban (CB), Very High Frequency (VHF), Ultra High Frequency
(UHF) and Cellular Sites/Relay Stations within the Municipality" which imposes an
annual fee for the operation of antenna cell sites/relay stations, which include: (1)
antenna tower base for citizen's band radio (Php10,000.00); (2) antenna mast base/tower
for ultra high frequency/very high frequency discs for transmitters and receivers
(Php50,000.000); n and (3) tower sites for cell site/relay station (Php200,000.00).

After the subject Ordinance came into effect, Notices of Assessment were sent to
SCI and other affected businesses in the municipality. SCI was required to pay the
tower fee of Php200,000.00 per year. Despite the receipt of said notices, SCI failed to pay
the assessed fees. SCI was then sent demand letters dated 14 July 2010, 31 July 2010 and
23 February 2011 for the collection of the unpaid fees. The SCI, however, filed a Petition
for Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC-Branch 19 on 13 July 2011 assailing the validity
of the subject ordinance.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the annual fee is a tax or a fee
2) Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance is unjust, excessive, and confiscatory

RULING/S:

1) The Supreme Court ruled for the petitioners. The fees imposed under
Ordinance No. 2005-491 are not taxes.

Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[e]ach local

government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government." Consistent with this
constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each local government
unit. Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes,
fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC provides for
the scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalities while Section 147
26 of the same law provides for the fees and charges that may be imposed by
municipalities on business and occupation.

The term "taxes" has been defined by case law as "the enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property levied by the state for the support of
government and for all public needs." While, under the LGC, a "fee" is defined as "any
charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
activity."

From the foregoing jurisprudential and statutory definitions, it can be gleaned

that the purpose of an imposition will determine its nature as either a tax or a fee. If the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly classified as an exercise of the power to tax. On
the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed an exercise of
police power in the form of a fee, even though revenue is incidentally generated. Simply
stated, if generation of revenue is the primary purpose, the imposition is a tax, but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the imposition is properly categorized as a
regulatory fee.

2) The Court has consistently ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned local government unit to
enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
Moreover, substantively, the ordinance: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. On the other hand, settled is the rule
that every law, including ordinances, is presumed valid. This presumption may be set
aside when invalidity or unreasonableness: (1) appears on the face of the ordinance, or
(2) is established by proper evidence.

Given the foregoing, the alleged invalidity of the subject ordinance is not
apparent on its face. SCI has not shown that the subject Ordinance contravenes any
constitutional or statutory provision or settled public policy, or is per se unreasonable,
oppressive, discriminatory or in restraint of trade.

The ordinance was never shown to be violative of the rule that fees must be
commensurate with the cost of regulation, inspection and licensing. A judicious perusal
of the records fails to reveal anything definitively showing the ordinance's
unreasonable, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory nature; therefore, because it enjoys
the presumption of validity, this Court is constrained to reverse the decision of the CA.

The presumption of constitutionality, in its most basic sense, only means that
courts, in passing upon the validity of a law, will afford some deference to the statute
and charge the party assailing it with the burden of showing that the act is incompatible
with the constitution. The doctrine comes into operation when a party comes to court
praying that a law be set aside for being unconstitutional. In effect, it places a heavy
burden on the act's assailant to prove invalidity beyond reasonable doubt; it commands
the clearest showing of a constitutional infraction. Accordingly, before a law may be
struck down as unconstitutional, courts must be certain that there exists a clear and
unequivocal breach of the constitution, and not one that is speculative or
argumentative.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 13

February 2015 and the Resolution dated 18 June 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 136173 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance No. 2005-491
is hereby declared valid and constitutional.