07 121929-2006-Arceo Jr. v. People20210424-12-48oa77
07 121929-2006-Arceo Jr. v. People20210424-12-48oa77
07 121929-2006-Arceo Jr. v. People20210424-12-48oa77
DECISION
CORONA, J : p
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision 1
and March 27, 2000 resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19601 affirming the trial court's judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo,
Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known as the
"Bouncing Checks Law."
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court
of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private
complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the amount of P100,000.00. Several
weeks thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00
from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the
Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991,
for P150,000.00, at Cenizal's house located at 70 Panay Avenue,
Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the
check immediately because [petitioner] promised [] that he would
replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven
(7) times. When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the check to
the bank for encashment. The head office of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed [Cenizal]
that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
despite the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during
the trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor of
the check because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided under
the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement
was not complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five
banking days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already
paid his obligation to Cenizal.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon,
for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
I n Wong v. Court of Appeals , 4 the Court ruled that the 90-day period
provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge
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petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable time from the date indicated in the check. According to current
banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the
drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer
is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay.
Thus, Cenizal's presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days
(four months) after its issue was still within the allowable period. Petitioner was
freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor
from liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.
APPLICABILITY OF THE
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Petitioner's insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a
condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors
his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as
the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or
existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. 5
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless
check. 6 Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of
the check, not its content. THCSEA
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently
established. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check, the
return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the
preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against
petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based
on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the
documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on
September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due
execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of
loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
PRESENCE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
The trial court found that, contrary to petitioner's claim, Cenizal's counsel
had informed petitioner in writing of the check's dishonor and demanded
payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor
and demand for payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking
days from receipt of notice of dishonor within which to pay the amount of the
check. 9 While petitioner may have been given only three days to pay the value
of the check, the trial court found that the amount due thereon remained
unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor.
This negated his claim that he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore
be relieved of any liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999 decision
and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (retired) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of the Supreme
Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) of the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals; rollo, pp. 17-24.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in
by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of the
Supreme Court) and Marina L. Buzon of the Former Third Division of the Court
of Appeals; rollo, p. 26.