FACTS

All company factory workers of Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., manufacturer of automotive tires, tubes and
other rubber products, in Marikina including members of private respondent union, Sime Darby
Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30-minute paid
on-call lunch break.

On August 14, 1992, the petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its
monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant a change in work schedule. The new schedule
extends to 9 hours with two 10-minute paid coffee break and 1-hour unpaid and undisturbed lunch
break. The Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, are excluded from this
change in work schedule.

Private respondent, which is an association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina
factory, filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,
discrimination and evasion of liability.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the
elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of
management prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did not
have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not
exceed eight (8) hours.

NLRC sustained the decision of Labor Arbiter but upon motion for reconsideration by private
respondent, the NLRC, having two new commissioners, reversed its earlier decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and eliminating
their paid lunch break constitutes unfair labor practice?

HELD

The Court held that the employer has the right to exercise its management prerogatives. Management is
free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers
and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Management retains the prerogative, whenever
exigencies of the service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such
prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.

In this case, the new work schedule set by the employer fully complies with the daily work period of
eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. Although the old work schedule included a 30-minute
paid lunch break, the employees were on call and could be called upon to do jobs during lunch break.
With the new schedule, they can take one-hour lunch break without any interruption from their
employer.

Moreover, this act was not discriminatory as the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory
similarly situated whether they are union members or not.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a complaint filed against private respondent Stanfilco for assembly time, moral
damages and attorney’s fees, with the Regional Arbitration- Davao City. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent STANFILCO, holding that:

“We cannot but agree with respondent that the pronouncement in that earlier case, i.e. the thirty-
minute assembly time long practiced cannot be considered waiting time or work time and, therefore,
not compensable, has become the law of the case which can no longer be disturbed without doing
violence to the time-honored principle of resjudicata.”

NLRC uphold the Labor Arbiters’ decision and declared that:

“Surely, the customary functions referred to in the above-quoted provision of the agreement includes
the long-standing practice and institutionalized non-compensable assembly time. This, in effect,
estopped complainants from pursuing this case.

MR was denied hence this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend that the preliminary
activities as workers of respondents STANFILCO in the assembly area is compensable as working time
(from 5:30am to 6:00 am) since these preliminary activities are necessarily and primarily for private
respondent’s benefit. These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows-.

(a) First there is the roll call. Followed by getting their individual work assignments from the foreman.

(b) Then, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment Report during
which they are often made to explain about their reported accomplishment the following day.

(c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment.

(d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and materials.

All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish.

.Respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new because it is the very same claim they brought
against respondent by the same group of rank and file employees in the case of Arica vs. National Labor
Relations Commission which was filed before in a different case. The said case involved a claim for
“waiting time”, as the complainants purportedly were required to assemble.

In the previous case, the 30-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual
consent of the parties under their CBA cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of
Section 5, Rule 1, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor.

ISSUE:

WON the “assembly time” is compensable.

RULING:

The 30-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings
attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to
other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require the company to deliver long briefings
regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the area where the
farms are located, such that after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the personal presence,
they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the absolute
control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would
justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The evidence of the case demonstrates that the
30-minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately
for the employees to indicate their availability or non-availability for work during every working day.

Herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very same claim which they filed in Arica vs NLRC and
which records show had already long been considered terminated and closed by this Court. Therefore,
the NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners’ claim is already barred by res judicata.

FACTS

Petitioner entered in a contract of employment which stipulated that his term of employment as Chief
Cook was for ten months beginning October 9, 1992 with a basic monthly salary of US$450.00 with 44
hours weekly as minimum number of hours worked with a fixed overtime pay (OT) of $185.00 and three
(3) days leave with pay every month.

For several months in 1992 and January 1993, petitioner was asked by the Shipmaster to prepare
victualling cost statement for months of October, November, and December 1992. Petitioner, after
learning that such preparation involves mathematical skills, as it would require estimation of food cost,
value of stocks, intimated that he did not know how to do such work as it was not part of the duties of a
chief cook. He was told that it was not a difficult job and that he only needed to copy the previous
forms. After much reluctance, petitioner nonetheless prepared the statements in deference to the
Shipmaster.
When petitioner finally deferred from performing said tasks, a committee was formed headed by the
Shipmaster himself with the Chief Officer, Chief Engineer and Bosun as members and informed
petitioner, in meeting held for that purpose, that he was dismissed.

The next day, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines through the assistance of the Philippine
Consulate.

Upon arrival or on February 16, 1993, petitioner filed with the POEA a complaint for illegal dismissal
against private respondents. He sought the payment of his salary corresponding to the unexpired
portion of his contract, unpaid overtime pay, leave pay, salary differential and damages.

POEA promulgated a decision finding that there was just cause for petitioner’s dismissal.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the Commission affirmed in toto the
POEA decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the payment of the overtime pay should be allowed.

NO.

Seamen are required to stay on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for this
reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters and
subsistence allowances when required to be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to
require their employers to pay them overtime even when they are not actually working; otherwise,
every sailor on board a vessel would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each a day, even if he
spent all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of duty. The correct criterion
in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were
on board and can not leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they
actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours.

FACTS:

Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned to SCIIs different
clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaintsfor
underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and
13th month pays.

Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and other
benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum wage and the
rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for
security guards; that their holiday pay were already included in the computation of their monthly
salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic salary whenever they
were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on holidays; and, that Canoy
and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999. In addition,
respondents contended that Canoys and Pigcaulans monetary claims should only be limited to the past
three years of employment pursuant to the rule on prescription of claims.
Giving credence to the itemized computations and representative daily time records submitted by Canoy
and Pigcaulan, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion awarded them their monetary claims.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal and held that the evidence show
underpayment of salaries as well as non-payment of service incentive leave benefit.

The CA set aside the rulings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC after noting that there were no
factual and legal bases mentioned in the questioned rulings to support the conclusions made.
Consequently, it dismissed all the monetary claims of Canoy and Pigcaulan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pigcaulan and Canoy are entitled to their money claims?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.

LABOR LAW

Article 94 of the Labor Code provides that:

ART. 94.RIGHT TO HOLIDAY PAY. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

xxxx

While Article 95 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 95.RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE. (a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of
service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive of five days with pay.

xxxx

Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if he does not work.
Likewise, express provision of the law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he rendered
service for more than a year already. Furthermore, under Presidential Decree No. 851,he should be paid
his 13th month pay. As employer, SCII has the burden of proving that it has paid these benefits to its
employees.
Since SCII failed to provide convincing proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be
paid his holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13thmonth pay for the year
2000.

Consistent with the rule that all money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship shall be
filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued,Pigcaulan can only demand the
amounts due him for the period within three years preceding the filing of the complaint in 2000.
Furthermore, since the records are insufficient to use as bases to properly compute Pigcaulans claims,
the case should be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for a detailed computation of the monetary benefits
due to him.

FACTS:

Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her complaint for illegal suspension, illegal
dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay in the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VII of the NLRC in Cebu City.

On April 21, 2003, Labor Arbiter Violeta Ortiz-Bantug rendered her decision finding that Villa had not
been dismissed from employment.

Although ordering Villa's reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter denied her claim for backwages and overtime
pay because she had not adduced evidence of the overtime work actually performed. The Labor Arbiter
declared that Villa was entitled to service incentive leave pay for the period of the last three years
counted from the filing of her complaint because the petitioner did not refute her claim thereon.

On February 23, 2005, the NLRC rendered its judgment dismissing the appeal by the petitioner but
granting that of Villa.

The decision of the Labor Arbiter is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED declaring
complainant to have been illegally dismissed. Consequently, respondents are hereby directed to
immediately reinstate complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision and to pay complainant Overtime Pay.
According to the NLRC, the petitioner's appeal was fatally defective and was being dismissed outright
because it lacked the proper verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.

On September 27, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that petitioner Lily Ngochua should not be
held liable with petitioner corporation.

The petitioner posits that the CA erroneously affirmed the giving of overtime pay and service incentive
leave pay to Villa; that she did not adduce proof of her having rendered actual overtime work; that she
had not been authorized to render overtime work; and that her availment of vacation and sick leaves
that had been paid precluded her claiming the service incentive leave pay.

ISSUE 1:

Whether or not the burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay rests on the employer?

ISSUE 2:

Whether or not any employee could render overtime work without prior authorization by the
management?

HELD

No. The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay rests on the employee.

No. Any employee can render overtime work only when there was a prior authorization by the
management.

We partly agree with the petitioner's position.

And, secondly, the NLRC's reliance on the daily time records (DTRs) showing that Villa had stayed in the
company's premises beyond eight hours was misplaced. The DTRs did not substantially prove the actual
performance of overtime work. The petitioner correctly points out that any employee could render
overtime work only when there was a prior authorization therefor by the management. Without the
prior authorization, therefore, Villa could not validly claim having performed work beyond the normal
hours of work. Moreover, Section 4(c), Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code relevantly states as follows:

Section 4. Principles in determining hours worked. – The following general principles shall govern in
determining whether the time spent by an employee is considered hours worked for purposes of this
Rule:

(a)

x x x.

(b)

x x x.

(c)

If the work performed was necessary, or it benefited the employer, or the employee could not
abandon his work at the end of his normal working hours because he had no replacement, all time spent
for such work shall be considered as hours worked, if the work was with the knowledge of his employer
or immediate supervisor.