CAGUIOA NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

By: Dean Festin

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Aberratio ictus in Homicide (ART. 4)

Cruz y Basco v. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Accused Cardo, a policeman was charged with both the crime of Homicide, for the
death of Boyet, a 9 -year-old minor, and frustrated homicide for the injury sustained
by Lolong.
• Cardo fired shots against Lolong with whom he had altercations after the latter’s
vehicle was overtaken by the victim while driving along the road. Lolong sustained
injuries and survived. On the other hand, at that time, victim Boyet was flying his kite
nearby, when unfortunately, he was hit in the head by one of the bullets fired by
accused Cardo.
• Prosecuted for his acts, accused Cardo argues that he is not criminally liable for
Boyet’s death because he was merely acting in self-defense and in the performance
of his duty as a police officer.

ISSUE: Is accused Cardo criminally liable for the death of Boyet?

SC RULING:

Yes, under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended."

Accordingly, the author of the felony shall be criminally liable for the direct, natural and
logical consequence thereof, whether intended or not. For this provision to apply, it must be
shown, however, (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
committed by the offender.

Here, there is an intentional felony on the multiple gun shots fired by Cardo. The death of
the Boyet, who was hit by one of those bullets intended for Lolong, is a direct, natural, and
logical consequence of said intentional felony. The death of Boyet is an example of aberratio
ictus.

1|Page
 Frustrated and Attempted Felony (ART. 6)
Question: Discuss the concepts of Frustrated and Attempted Felonies.

Answer: It is FRUSTRATED when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an ATTEMPT when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

In FRUSTRATED FELONY, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in ATTEMPTED FELONY, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.

In FRUSTRATED FELONY, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some
cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in ATTEMPTED FELONY,
the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the
offender's own spontaneous desistance.

It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder or
Homicide, as the case may be, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide. The
crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by
independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim's death
without timely medical intervention.

Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically
attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not
frustrated murder. (Oliveros, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 242552, March 3, 2021, Caguioa, J.)

Conspiracy (Art. 8)
1. Question: Explain the concept of conspiracy.

Answer: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by
the performance of an overt act which produces the crime. In proving conspiracy, direct
evidence is not indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the

2|Page
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. (People v. Fernandez, G.R.
No. 220761, October 3, 2016, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Is conspiracy as a means of incurring liability applicable in administrative

cases?

Answer: No. Conspiracy as a means of incurring liability is strictly confined to criminal

cases.

Even assuming that the records indicate the existence of a felonious scheme, the
administrative liability of a person allegedly involved in such scheme cannot be established
through conspiracy, considering that one's administrative liability is separate and distinct
from penal liability. (Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
v. Villafuerte, G.R. Nos. 219771 and 219773, September 18, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

3. Question: Is direct evidence of an explicit agreement to commit a crime always necessary

to establish the existence of conspiracy?

Answer: No. It is true that the elements of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind of
proof — proof beyond reasonable doubt — necessary to establish the physical acts
constituting the crime itself.

However, this is not to say that direct proof of such conspiracy is always required. The
existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct evidence; nor is it
necessary to prove prior agreement between the accused to commit the crime charged.

Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely proved by direct evidence of an explicit agreement to

commit the crime. Thus, the rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such
conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design. (People v. Pilpa y
Dipaz, G.R. No. 225336, September 5, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

Conspiracy To Commit Murder

4. People v. Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Pingpong, neighbor of victim Ciso, stated in his testimony that he saw Mengy hugging
Ciso while Bengbeng was stabbing him.

3|Page
 • Upon seeing Pingpong, Bengbeng uttered the words: “Ikaw gusto mo?”, which led
him to run away and in the process, bumped Ciso’s wife Lingling.

• Lingling testified that she was inside when the commotion happened. When she
came out to check what the commotion was about, she bumped into Pingpong, who
informed her that her husband was stabbed.

• Upon reaching the place of the incident, she saw her husband Ciso’s lifeless and
bloodied body slumped to the ground, with Bengbeng on top of him while strangling
him.

• When she attempted to help her husband, Bengbeng shoved her away. The Barangay
authorities came thereafter. During trial, it was proven that victim Ciso was taken
to Ever Help Hospital and unfortunately, was pronounced dead on arrival. The
Medico-Legal Officer testified that the cause of death was a “stab wound”.

• Per the testimony of Mengy’s wife, Chinky, she was present when the commotion
happened, and that the aggression came from victim Ciso himself who attacked
Mengy by using a long object which appears to be an umbrella, and continued to box
Mengy after falling down.

• The latter shouted for help which prompted Bengbeng, his cousin, to help. She added
that Mengy tried to join the group who brought Ciso to the hospital, but he was
already arrested.

• The RTC found Mengy and Bengbeng guilty beyond reasonable of Murder qualified by
treachery since it was deliberately sought by the two (2) accused and consciously
adopted the same as their mode of attack. The victim was rendered helpless and
defenseless, as when he was hugged by accused Mengy while being stabbed to death
by co-accused Bengbeng, both accused acted in concert towards a common criminal
goal.

• The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, holding that the prosecution was able to prove
all the elements of Murder qualified by treachery since Pingpong positively identified
accused-appellant Mengy as the person who embraced and locked the victim while
being stabbed by Bengbeng. In so doing, the victim was completely deprived of the
chance to defend himself. Such method employed by both the accused insured the
execution of their plan to kill the victim. Thus, treachery clearly attended the killing
of the victim.

ISSUE: Was there a conspiracy to commit murder in this case?

SC RULING: No, there is none. In the instant case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy between accused appellant
Mengy and his co-accused Bengbeng in the killing of Ciso.

4|Page
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the
crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The records are also wanting of any indication of conspiracy. To determine if Mengy
conspired with Bengbeng, the Court must examine the overt acts of accused-appellant
before, during, and after the stabbing incident and the totality of the circumstances. The
inception and location of the stabbing incident must also be considered.

In People v. Jesalva, the Court ruled:

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts
of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from
which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime. It is
not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and simultaneous for
simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of
action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. It is
necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Conspiracy may be proven by direct evidence or deduced from the manner in which
the offense was committed, as when the accused acted in concert to achieve the
same objective. x x x

Furthermore, after the stabbing incident, Mengy did not flee and abandon the supposed
victim, unlike Bengbeng who immediately escaped and remains at-large. While non-flight is
not necessarily an indication of innocence, this Court has recognized that taken together
with other circumstances, it may bolster the innocence of the accused. In the case of
Buenaventura v. People, the Court held:

xxx Non-flight may not necessarily indicate innocence, but under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, the Court recognizes the fact that while the guilty flees
even as no one pursues him, the innocent remains as brave and steadfast as a lion.
xxx

Mengy can neither be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation or an accomplice.

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered
that cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed.

Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant
Mengy, the Court cannot uphold the RTC and CA's finding of guilt. Mengy’s guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

5|Page
 JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 11)

A. Self-Defense
1. Question: What must be established to appreciate the justifying circumstance of self-
defense?

Answer: A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime;
accordingly, the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified
— failure to discharge which renders the act punishable. Thus, to exonerate himself, the
accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; (ii) that the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (iii) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.

Of the three, unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated. (People v. Raytos, G.R. No.
225623, June 7, 2017, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Cite an instance where the claim of self-defense was not appreciated.

Answer: The nature and number of wounds suffered by the victim "logically indicated that
the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined aggression on the part of
the accused-appellant." (People of the Philippines v. Edgar Gayon y Ferreras, G.R. No.
230221, April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

No Implied Conspiracy

3. People v. Siega, G.R. No. 213273 (Resolution), June 27, 2018, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE: AAA and BBB were on their way home when suddenly, CCC
approached them and asked who would dare challenge him. AAA replied that no one would
dare challenge him. Suddenly, CCC asked AAA whether he was a tough guy and stabbed the
latter with a long bolo on the left part of his chest.

Surprised by the incident, AAA tried to flee but CCC ran after him and continued his assault.
CCC continue to hack AAA even if the latter was already lying on the ground.

Prosecuted for his acts, accused CCC averred that it was the victim AAA who first attempted
to draw the bolo that was wrapped on his waist. Scared by AAA’s actions, CCC claimed that
he immediately hacked AAA in the act of self-defense.

6|Page
ISSUES:

1st Issue: Can accused CCC invoke self-defense?

2nd Issue: Is treachery attendant in the case at hand?

SC RULING: 1st Issue- Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least
a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person."

Victim AAA did not carry any weapon at that time, nor did he employ any actual physical
assault or at least threaten to inflict injury upon the accused CCC. As a matter of fact, AAA
was merely walking when CCC stabbed him on his chest. CCC failed to establish unlawful
aggression on the part of AAA.

2nd Issue- Yes. The frontal attack employed by CCC does not rule out the existence of
treachery because it was so sudden and unexpected that AAA, unarmed and had no chance
to defend himself, was struck down by CCC's repeated hacking blows.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack against an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim, who has no chance of defending himself.

4. Question: Does the one who resort to self-defense have the right to kill or even to wound
the former aggressor when unlawful aggression that has begun has already ceased to exist?

Answer: No. Time and again, this Court has held that when an unlawful aggression that has
begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even
to wound the former aggressor.

Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one’s
self.

Here, Raytos admitted that after obtaining possession of the weapon, he no longer had any
reason to stab Araza as in fact, there was no showing that the latter persisted in his alleged
purpose of wanting to hurt Raytos. Thus, based on his own statements, accused Raytos
overstepped the acceptable boundaries of self-preservation when he deliberately inflicted
fatal injuries on Araza, even when the purported aggression had already ceased.

By killing Araza, accused Raytos was no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation
against the former. (People v. Raytos, G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017, Caguioa, J.)

7|Page
Self-Defense, Treachery, and Homicide (ART. 11/ART.14)

5. People of the Philippines v. Armando Bagabay, G.R. No. 236297,

October 17, 2018, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Victim Alfredo M. Guevarra, Jr. unloaded his passengers in front of Dr. Ramon De
Santos National High School on September 7, 2010, at around 7:00 a.m.

• He was handing out change money to his passengers when accused Armando,
carrying a kitchen knife, suddenly grabbed him and repeatedly stabbed him close to
the heart. The victim tried to flee but the accused followed him.

• When the former collapsed on the road, the accused took this as an opportunity to
stab the former again and thereafter left.

ISSUES:

1st Issue: Can Armando successfully assert self-defense?

2nd Issue: Is the crime committed murder (qualified by treachery) or a mere homicide?

SC RULING:

1st Issue:

No. An accused who pleads self-defense admits to the commission of the crime
charged. He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing
was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting
to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is indispensable. Unlawful
aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

First, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful
aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal
safety. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of the three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material
attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. None of the elements of unlawful
aggression was proven by the defense. Guevarra's act of pointing or cursing at

8|Page
 Armando, not followed by other acts, is insufficient to constitute unlawful
aggression.

Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the second
requisite of self-defense could not have been present. Records show that Guevarra
was unarmed and it was Armando who approached the former armed with a knife.
Assuming that Guevarra had indeed shouted and cursed at him and drew out a knife,
it was still not reasonably necessary for Armando to stab the victim. Furthermore,
Armando stabbed the victim three times, the last wound inflicted when Guevarra was
already on the ground asking for help.

Lastly, the third requisite requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably
blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into
launching an assault. In this case, records show that it was actually Armando who
sought out and approached the victim with a knife. It was Armando who initiated the
assault.

2nd Issue:

The crime is homicide. With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
the crime is therefore Homicide and not Murder. The penalty for Homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.

There is no treachery. To appreciate treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the

following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms
in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.

In this case, although the attack was sudden and unexpected, the prosecution did not
prove that Armando deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly
ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising
from the defense that the victim might offer. As testified to by the witnesses of the
prosecution, the incident happened in broad daylight outside Dr. Ramon De Santos
National High School, a public place where there were plenty of other people present
who could have offered their help. If Armando wanted to make certain that no risk
would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim.

9|Page
 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 13)

a. Insanity
People v. Bacolot y Idlisan, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• AAA claimed an exemption from criminal liability due to his allegation of insanity
existing immediately prior to, during and immediately after hacking to death Junjun
sometime on August 1, 2005.

• To prove his alleged insanity, he presented as witness Dr. Morty who diagnosed him
to be suffering from psychosis and Schizophrenia.

• It was revealed, however, during the testimony of Dr. Morty, that the evidence he
presented refers to the time he was examined both in 2002, that is, three years prior
the incident, and in November 2005, that is, three months after the commission of
the crime.

ISSUE: Will the defense of insanity as an exempting circumstances under Article 12 (1) of the
RPC prosper?

SC RULING: No. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is
sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence.

For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal

liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged.

In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of
insanity, he must successfully show that:

(1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and

(2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or

immediately before the commission of the offense.

The Court cannot second guess whether the accused-appellant was insane at the time the
crime was committed.

The evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of execution.

10 | P a g e
Thus, AAA’s claim is without merit for having failed to prove that he was insane at the time
or immediately before the commission of the offense.

b. Minority
Presumption of Discernment by a Minor

Question: Can a minor who is above 15 but below 17 be presumed to act with discernment
when such minor is a principal in a mauling incident and wanted to kill the victim?

Answer: No. When a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged
with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment.

During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the
minor committed the alleged crime with discernment.

Discernment cannot be presumed even if accused minor intended to do away with the victim.
Discernment is different from intent. (CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019,
Caguioa, J.)

c. Voluntary Surrender
1. Question: What are the requisites of voluntary surrender?

Answer: For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the

defense must prove that: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority; (c) the surrender was spontaneous and
voluntary.

A surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused spontaneously and made
in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Such intention was absent in
the case at bar. (People v. Fruelda y Anulao, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, Caguioa,
J.)

2. Question: Is acknowledgment of guilt a condition sine qua non of the mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Acknowledgment of guilt is not a condition sine qua non of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. It is sufficient that the accused spontaneously submits himself to the
authorities because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for his

11 | P a g e
search and capture. (People v. Fruelda y Anulao, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020,
Caguioa, J.)

d. Sufficient Provocation
1. Question: When can one invoke sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance?

Answer: Under Article 13, paragraph 4, of the RPC, the criminal liability of the accused shall
be mitigated if "x x x sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act" of the accused.

Sufficient provocation refers to "any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim
adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate
in gravity."

In order to be mitigating, provocation on the part of the victim must be sufficient and should
immediately precede the act of the offender. (Cruz y Basco v. People, G.R. No. 216642,
September 8, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Does the firing of a gun which was preceded by a short verbal altercation
amount to sufficient provocation?

Answer: Case law provides that firing of a gun which was preceded by a short verbal
altercation does not amount to sufficient provocation. The short exchange of words between
the accused and the victim, though heated, is not adequate to elicit such grave reaction as
the firing of a gun. (Cruz y Basco v. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 14)

a. Treachery
1. Question: What are the elements of treachery?

Answer: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing the means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specifically ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. The following conditions must exist:

12 | P a g e
 a. The assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act
which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate;

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on

the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.

b. Said means, methods, or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously

adopted by the assailant. (People v. Guro, G.R. No. 230619, April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)
The latter condition is immediately negated by the fact that the meeting between the
appellant and Tapales was by chance. (People v. Bulutano y Alvarez, G.R. No. 232649,
November 28, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: How is Treachery proved?

Answer: As the Court held in People v. Santos, "treachery, just like any other element of the
crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to
establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for
granted from a mere statement that "the attack was sudden"[;] there must be a clear
showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be "sudden".

Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present, where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that
they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose
without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.
Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.

In People v. Tugbo, Jr., the Court held that treachery was not present because the attack
was frontal, and hence, the victim had opportunity to defend himself.

While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of treachery, when the same
is considered along with the other circumstances as previously discussed, it already creates
a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. (People v. Pilpa y Dipaz,
G.R. No. 225336, September 5, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

3. Question: AAA, a 5-year-old minor, was killed by D by drowning him in water causing her
instantaneous death. Is Treachery present in this case?

Answer: Yes. Treachery or Alevosia is present in the killing of children who, by reason of
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.

In People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168 (1999), the Court held that the killing of an eleven (11)-year-
old was deemed ipso facto qualified by treachery by reason of the child’s “inherent

13 | P a g e
defenselessness. (People v. Pentecostes y Cronico, G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017,
Caguioa, J.)

4. Question: Would the fact that there were other people who could have helped the victim
remove the circumstance of Treachery?

Answer: No. In one case, the Supreme Court stated:

“To stress, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were unwavering as to the
manner of killing — that Raytos suddenly stabbed Araza from the back while holding the
latter’s shoulder.

Further, that there were other people around that could have lent their help to Araza is
inconsequential as treachery considers only the victim’s means of defense at the time of the
attack. Thus, so long as the accused deliberately employed means to ensure the commission
of the crime without risk to himself from retaliation by the victim, treachery can be properly
appreciated.

Alevosia is characterized by a deliberate, sudden and unexpected assault from behind,

without warning and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself or repel the assault
and without risk to the assailant. (People v. Raytos, G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017, Caguioa,
J.)

5. Question: Can Treachery be appreciated from the mere fact that the attack was sudden
and unexpected?

Answer: No. Treachery cannot be appreciated from the mere fact that the attack was sudden
and unexpected.

The Court has held that "the circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected on the
person assaulted did not constitute the element of Alevosia necessary to raise homicide to
murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack
to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.

Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the
deceased in such manner as to ensure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible
or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself. (People of the Philippines
v. Rodel Magbuhos y Diola, G.R. No. 227865, November 7, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

14 | P a g e
6. Question: Can treachery be appreciated when aid was easily available to the victim, such
as when there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, including the victim's family?

No, the Court has also ruled that when aid was easily available to the victim, such as when
the attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses to the incident,
including the victim's family, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused
indeed consciously adopted means to ensure the facilitation of the crime, he could have
chosen another place or time.

In this case, the prosecution in this case also failed to prove that Rodel intentionally sought
Enrique for the purpose of killing him or that Rodel carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in a manner that would ensure his safety and success. To be sure, the testimonies of
Angelito and Michael reveal that Rodel attacked the victim in the place familiar to the latter
and in the presence of at least four other people, two of whom are related to the victim.

Under these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to agree with the CA that Rodel
deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the
criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might
offer. To reiterate, the victim was with at least four (4) other people, two of whom are his
relatives, who could have helped him repel the attack. Thus, the Court fails to see how the
mode of attack chosen by Rodel, who stabbed Enrique once on the chest, in a place familiar
to the victim and in the presence of the latter's relatives, supposedly guaranteed the
execution of the criminal act without risk on his end.

The Court further notes that the attack against Enrique was frontal. In People v. Tugbo, the
Court held that treachery was not present because the attack was frontal, and hence, the
victim had opportunity to defend himself.

While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of treachery, when the same
is considered along with the other circumstances as previously discussed, it already creates
a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. As earlier stated,
treachery must be proven as fully and convincingly as the crime itself; and any doubt as to
existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. (People of the Philippines v. Rodel
Magbuhos y Diola, G.R. No. 227865, November 7, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

7. Question: Is there treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation or heated

exchange of words?

Answer: There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation between the
accused and the victim.

Each of them is forewarned of an impending attack by either of them. Thus, in one case, the
Court held, "[t]here is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of
words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of
the assailant towards the former." (People of the Philippines v. Romeo Aseniero, G.R. No.
218209, April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)
15 | P a g e
8. Question: Is a sudden attack enough to constitute alevosia?

Answer: No. The suddenness of an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of
alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made suddenly and the
victim's helpless position was accidental. (People v. Bacolot y Idlisan, G.R. No. 233193,
October 10, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

Answer 1: No, it is not enough that the attack was sudden, unexpected, and without any
warning or provocation for a crime to qualify to Murder.

To qualify the crime to Murder, the both the following elements of treachery must be proven:
(a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend or retaliate; and (b) said means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. (People v. Menil y Bongkit, G.R. No. 233205, June 26, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

Answer 2: In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough
that the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation."

There must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to
insure such execution, without risk to himself. (People v. Vega y Ramil, G.R. No. 216018,
March 27, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

9. Question: Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was
made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, can it
be established from suppositions drawn from circumstances prior to the very moment of
the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery?

Answer: No. In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that treachery cannot be
appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but
not the manner of how the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim’s
death unfolded. In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the
aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed.

Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or
how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be
established from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior to the very moment of
the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.

Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the
commencement of the assault. (People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019,
Caguioa, J.)

16 | P a g e
10. Question: What is the quantum of evidence required in establishing a qualifying
circumstance?

Answer: Proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is established that qualifying circumstances

must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, for Rolando to be convicted of Murder, the prosecution must not
only establish that he killed Delfin; it must also be proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that
the killing of Delfin was attended by treachery. (People v. Aguila y Rosales, G.R. No. 238455,
December 9, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

11. People v. Lumahang y Talisay, G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• AA suddenly stabbing BB from behind. Fortunately, the latter managed to run for
safety. Accused, thereafter, turned his attention against CC, who, beforehand, saw
the commotion between the two, but was not able to react in time rom the initial
attack of the accused. He was and stabbed four (4) times in the body causing his
demise.
• The prosecution argued that the act of the accused was qualified with treachery
because it was a frontal attack, sudden and unexpected.

ISSUE: Is the prosecution’s argument correct?

SC RULING: No, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present, where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he
thereby knowingly intended to ensure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without
any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer.

The fact that the victim was unable to defend himself, would not automatically mean that the
killing was attended by treachery if the prosecution failed to show that the means used by
the accused was consciously or deliberately adopted to ensure the execution of the crime
without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer.

In the case at bar, AA had already made an attack against BB who, after being stabbed, was
able to successfully run away towards safety. CC was already apprised that there was
danger nearby as he saw the commotion between AA and BB.

17 | P a g e
 b. Evident Premeditation
1. Question: When does evident premeditation occur?

Answer: There is evident premeditation when the following elements concur:

(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;

(2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit
the crime; and

(3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Moreover, in People v. Agramon, the Court held that:

x x x Also, the mere fact that the accused was armed at the beginning of the altercation does
not unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder the victim.

To qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be
"evident premeditation." Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning
the crime, mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable,
would not be enough. (People of the Philippines v. Edgar Gayon y Ferreras, G.R. No. 230221,
April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: What must appear to warrant a finding of evident premeditation?

Answer: To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the
accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution, but also that such
decision was the result of “meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.” (People
v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 220761, October 3, 2016, Caguioa, J.)

3. Question: Are mere presumptions and inferences thereon, be enough to appreciate

evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance to the crime of murder?

Answer: For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act.

In other words, the prosecution must be able to show concrete evidence on how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.

18 | P a g e
In this case, evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's evidence
was limited to what transpired between 12:00 o'clock noon to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of October 6, 2002, when Rodel arrived in the billiard hall and stabbed Enrique. The
prosecution, however, did not present any proof showing when and how Rodel planned and
prepared to kill Enrique and the sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow Rodel to reflect upon the circumstance of his act. The fact that Rodel
approached and stabbed the victim does not unequivocally establish that Rodel earlier
devised a deliberate plot to murder Enrique.

To qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be
"evident premeditation." Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning
the crime, mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable,
would not be enough. (People of the Philippines v. Rodel Magbuhos y Diola, G.R. No. 227865,
November 7, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

Jurisprudence on Treachery and Evident Premeditation

4. People v. Agramon, G.R. No. 212156, June 20, 2018, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• AAA, who was drunk, entered the dwelling of his brother BBB and CCC while
shouting “I will kill you all”. AAA delivered a stab thrust against BBB who was able
to hold the weapon with his hand causing him to sustain wounds. CCC tried to cover
BBB. But AAA stabbed CCC on her left breast which caused her death. BBB ran and
sought for help from the barangay officials. AAA was later on arrested.

• The RTC found that both qualifying circumstances of Treachery and Evident
premeditation are present. It held that the number and location of the wounds of the
victims as compared to the unscathed accused was indicative of the treacherous
execution of the crime, with the victims having no opportunity to defend themselves.

• Further, that evident premeditation was apparent from the fact that the accused was
armed with two (2) scythes at the time of the incident and several hours had already
lapsed from morning to 6:00 in the evening for him to reflect on his intentions to
commit the crime. While the CA found that only the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation was established. It held that treachery cannot be appreciated
because AAA and CCC were aware of the imminent danger to their lives.

ISSUE: Was the killing attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation?

SC RULING: No. There is no treachery.

19 | P a g e
In treachery, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.

The existence of a struggle before the attack on the victim clearly shows that she was
forewarned of the impending attack, and that she was afforded the opportunity to put up a
defense.

There is likewise no evident premeditation.

Evident premeditation was not established because the evidence was limited to what
transpired on the event itself. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is
indispensable to show concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Hence, with absence of the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the crime committed is Homicide and
not Murder.

c. Abuse of Superior Strength

Question: What should be considered to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength?

Answer: To appreciate the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what is to

be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order
to consummate the offense, e.g., that excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the victim was used.

In the case at bar, the records disclose that during the commission of the offense, Nicanor
Vallecera was hogtied by three (3) of the perpetrators, while Erlinda Vallecera, a woman,
was successively and fatally injured using a samurai sword and a long knife. Clearly, the
means employed by the culprits were patently excessive, there being no indication of
retaliation from the spouses Vallecera as their means of defense were greatly, if not
absolutely, diminished. In this regard, the aggravating circumstance of “superior strength”
is properly cognizable. (People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 220761, October 3, 2016, Caguioa, J.)

20 | P a g e
 PART II.
BOOK TWO OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

a. Direct Bribery
1. Question: What are the elements of Direct Bribery?

The elements of direct bribery is as follows:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise;

(3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission
of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which is his official duty to do; and

(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
(Catubao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 227371, October 2, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Is the act of the prosecutor in receiving a "balato" from a party litigant
punishable as Direct Bribery?

Answer: Direct Bribery requires that the gift be in consideration of his commission of some
crime, or to refrain doing something which is his official duty to do. This element is not
present in this case. There are inconsistencies on the testimonies of prosecution’s
witnesses as to the particular date, time and place of communication between the
prosecution’s witnesses and the accused where the latter allegedly asked for money.

While a prosecutor's receipt of a "balato" from a party litigant may indeed be reprehensible
from the lens of public service, such act, at the end of the day, is not punishable as Direct
Bribery. (Catubao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 227371, October 2, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

b. Murder
1. Question: What are the elements of Murder?

Answer: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when:

(1) a person was killed;

(2) the accused killed him;

21 | P a g e
 (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated in Article 248; and

(4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.

All elements of the crime of murder have been established in this case beyond reasonable
doubt. (People v. Dayaday y Dagooc, G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, Caguioa, J.)

Determining Intent to kill

2. Question: What are the several ways by which the existence of intent to kill may be
determined?

Answer: The court pointed out that there are several ways by which courts may determine
the existence of intent to kill, namely:

(1) the means used by the malefactors;

(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;

(3) the conduct of the malefactors before; during, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; and

(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives
of the accused [as well as] the motive of the offender and the words he uttered
at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. (Rolando Gemenez Y Parame
v. People, G.R. No. 241518, March 4, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

c. Theft vis-à-vis Robbery

Edwin Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 235739, July 22, 2019, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• A and B boarded a passenger jeepney where X was a passenger.

• When A noticed that X was wearing a gold necklace, he gave a signal to B where the
latter responded by snatching the necklace from X’s neck and thereafter, run away.

• During the trial, both A and B were convicted of robbery by the trial court.

ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in ruling that A and B are guilty of robbery and not theft?

22 | P a g e
SC RULING: No, the trial court is not correct in finding them guilty of robbery. The elements
of robbery are:

(1) there is a taking of personal property;

(2) the personal property belongs to another;

(3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and

(4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.

Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take the personal property of another without the latter's consent.

Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of
violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element
is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.

The testimonies of the witnesses reveal that the snatching of the necklace was without
violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. In the case of People
v. Concepcion, the Court ruled that when the complainant herself merely testified that the
offender snatched her shoulder bag, without saying that such offender used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag, the snatching of the shoulder bag
constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.

In the strikingly similar case of Ablaza v. People, the Court clarified that "for the requisite of
violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery." The Court added
that the fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not automatically mean that force attended
the taking. Applying the foregoing in the case at bar, the crime committed by Edwin is thus
clearly only theft, instead of robbery.

d. Robbery with Homicide

1. Question: Can the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation be appreciated in
the complex crime of robbery with homicide?

Answer: Yes. While the Supreme Court has previously ruled that the circumstance of
evident premeditation is inherent in Robbery, it may be considered in the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides stealing. Here, the
evidence clearly established how and when Charito and his co-conspirators hatched their
malevolent plan to rob the spouses Vallecera and likewise “kill [Dionesia Lasconia’s]
master.”

23 | P a g e
In this case, the first attempt of the malefactors to carry out their scheme was foiled and it
was only on their second attempt that they were able to consummate the conspiracy. Hence,
that there were persistent attempts made by the accused sufficiently demonstrate how
determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite the sufficient lapse of time.
Moreover, that Charito and his cohorts went to great lengths to hire Joseph to ferry them
back and forth to the scene of the crime shows the sobriety and circumspection surrounding
their decision. Such circumstances therefore show that the crime committed was a product
of intent and coordination among the accused. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation is present in this case. (People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 220761, October
3, 2016, Caguioa, J.)

e. Estafa
1. Question: X was charged of ten counts of Estafa. X, in his defense, claimed that in all these
instances, what were involved are merely unfulfilled promises, not attended by any deceit
or misrepresentation. He stated that there was no fraud in his act, but only a non-
compliance of the supposed promise. Is X guilty of Estafa?

Answer: Yes. X is guilty of Estafa. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud.

In this situational context, the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means used by accused-appellant Bautista and sustained
damages as a result thereof.

Here, X’s unfulfilled promises that he will be able to arrange for their placements in jobs in
South Korea, but despite payments in jobs of varying amounts of fees and the processing of
the supposedly required documents, they were unable to leave the country to work abroad
as they were assured, and as a consequence, all of the private complainants suffered
injuries. These fall within the ambit of Estafa. These are series of deceitful acts that are
precisely within the contemplation of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC.
(People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Will possession by a bank’s branch manager of bank deposits or funds received
from third persons paid to the bank, considered as juridical possession such that, he can be
made liable for estafa?

Answer: No, the branch manager was a mere employee, and not an agent of the business.
The Court explained the distinction between material possession and juridical possession in
this wise:

24 | P a g e
There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds
received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of
sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal.

In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to

the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds
received and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the
same as against the bank.

An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own
principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods
received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for
damages suffered without his fault.

There are no evidence pointing to an existence of agency between the branch manager and
the owner of the business. The branch manager did not have juridical possession of the
goods delivered to her. The first element of Estafa is therefore absent. (Layson Vda. de
Manjares v. People, G.R. No. 207249, May 14, 2021, Caguioa, J.)

Illegal Recruitment and Estafa

3. Question: Does a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code bar a conviction
for another crime of estafa?

Answer: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may
be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and Estafa
under par. 2 of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while Estafa is malum in se where the criminal
intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for
Estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.

It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of Estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal
of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and vice versa. In the same manner, a
conviction for illegal recruitment does not automatically result to a conviction for Estafa.
(People v. Rios y Catagbui, G.R. No. 226140, February 26, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

25 | P a g e
Double Jeopardy in Estafa and Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

4. Question: Two separate information were filed against X. One for 10 counts of Estafa, and
the other for illegal recruitment in large scale. Can X invoke his constitutional right against
double jeopardy?

Answer: No. An illegal recruiter may be held liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and Estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, for as long
as the accused has been so charged under separate Informations. (People v. Bautista, G.R.
No. 218582, September 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

f. Rape
1. Question: What are the elements of rape?

Answer: Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) *When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (People v. Martinez, G.R.
No. 248016, December 2, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

*Amended.

2. Question: Is delay in reporting a rape an indication that rape did not occur?

a. Answer: No. In one case, the Supreme Court said: We do not believe that delay in reporting
a rape should directly and immediately translate to the conclusion that the reported rape
did not take place; there can be no hard and fast rule to determine when a delay in reporting
a rape can have the effect of affecting the victim's credibility.

The heavy psychological and social toll alone that a rape accusation exacts on the rape
victim already speaks against the view that a delay puts the veracity of a charge of rape in
doubt. The effects of threats and the fear that they induce must also be factored in.

At least one study shows that the decisive factor for non-reporting and the failure to
prosecute a rape is the lack of support — familial, institutional and societal — for the rape
victim, given the unfavorable socio-cultural and policy environment.” (People v. XXX, G.R.
No. 225059, July 23, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

26 | P a g e
b. Answer: No. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of fabrication and
does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. This is because the
victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of
public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit
the complainant (People v. Lastrollo, G.R. No. 212631, November 7, 2016, Caguioa, J.)

3. Question: Does force need to be irresistible in order to constitute as an element of rape?

Answer: No. In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the private complainant to
prove resistance. The degree of force and resistance is relative, depending on the
circumstances of each case and on the physical capabilities of each party.

It is well settled that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; when applied,
it need not be overpowering or irresistible. When force is an element of the crime of rape, it
need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired
result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
(People v. Bongbonga y Nalos, G.R. No. 214771, August 9, 2017, Caguioa, J.)

4. Question: Is silence on the part of the rape victim during the commission of the said crime
equates to consent?

Answer: No. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the
rapist is not tantamount to consent.

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear.

Physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its
absence does not denigrate the victim’s claim that the offender consummated his bestial
act. (People v. Dechoso y Divina, G.R. No. 248530, March 3, 2021, Caguioa, J.)

Absence of Physical Resistance in Rape Cases

5. Question: XXX was charged for the rape AAA. In his defense, XXX raised an issue alleging
the improbability of AAA’s testimony for the reason that AAA testified that she did not resist,
thus the element of force or intimidation was failed to established. Will XXX’s defense
prosper?

Answer: No, XXX’s defense is without merit. It is important to stress that the gravamen of
the crime of rape under Art. 266-A is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.

27 | P a g e
 The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not
tantamount to consent. Physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a
woman voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform
reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not
denigrate AAA's claim that the accused-appellant consummated his bestial act. (People v.
Allan Nievera, G.R. No. 242830, August 28, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

6. Question: Is the date or time of the commission of rape a material ingredient of such
crime?

Answer: No. Time and again, the Court has held that the date or time of the commission of
rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy;
where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction
may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was
not committed at the precise time alleged.

It is well to stress that variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of
diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.

Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal
elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the same. (People v. Gerola y Amar, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, Caguioa, J.)

7. Question: In rape cases, can the court conclusively establish the victim’s mental
retardation if the following pieces of evidence were offered: (1) the testimony of the victim’s
mother that the victim has had mental retardation since birth; (2) the Barangay Captain’s
testimony that he has known the victim to have mental retardation and that the victim went
to a special school; (3) a Rural Health Physician’s testimony that the victim “probably” has
Down Syndrome?

Answer: No. The Court, in People v. Cartuano, Jr., 255 SCRA 403 (1996), reminds: “trial courts
should put prosecution evidence under severe testing. Every circumstance or doubt favoring
the innocence of the accused should be taken into consideration.”

In making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough evaluation based on history, physical

and laboratory examination made by a clinician is necessary. The reason for this universal
requirement is well-explained in both the medical and clinical psychology literature: mental
retardation is a recognized clinical syndrome usually traceable to an organic cause, which
determinants are complex and multifactorial.

As the boundaries between normality and retardation are difficult to delineate, proper
identification requires competent clinical evaluation of psychometric parameters in

28 | P a g e
conjunction with medical and laboratory tests. (People v. Bermas y Asis, G.R. No. 234947,
June 19, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

Rape: ‘sweetheart’ defense

8. Question: F was charged with sexual assault and rape. He claims that the alleged acts
were all consensual as he and M, the complainant were in a relationship. He presented X
and Y who testified that they often saw F and M flirting with each other. Must F be acquitted?

Answer: For the Court to even consider giving credence to such a defense, it must be proven
by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of
the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required — such as tokens,
mementos, and photographs.

This is called the sweetheart theory/defense. The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative

defense often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. When an accused
in a rape case claims, as in the case at bar, that he is in a relationship with the complainant,
the burden of proof shifts to him to prove the existence of the relationship and that the victim
consented to the sexual act.

In rape, the 'sweetheart' defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first, that the
accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual
relations.

The second is as important as the first, because this Court has held often enough that love
is not a license for lust. In the case at bar, absent independent proof of F’s alleged
relationship with M, F’s self-serving testimony and the speculative testimonies of his
witnesses fall short of substantiating his sweetheart defense. (People v. Fruelda y Anulao,
G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

29 | P a g e
 PART III.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

a. Illegal Recruitment
1. Question: What are the elements of illegal recruitment?

Answer: To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown, namely:

(1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any
of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and

(2) said person does not have a license or authority to do so. (People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
218582, September 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Is the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees per se a punishable
act in illegal recruitment?

Answer:

No, in one case, the Supreme Court said that contrary to accused-appellant's mistaken
notion, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case
for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority. (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020,
Caguioa, J.)

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

3. Question: What are the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale?

Answer: To establish that the offense of illegal recruitment was conducted in a large scale,
it must be proven that:

(1) the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under
Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit
and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and

30 | P a g e
(3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as
a group. (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

b. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

b.1 SECTION (E)

1. Question: What are the elements under Section 3 (E) of RA 3019?

Answer: To sustain a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

3. That his action gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or

predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.

"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.

"Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 197142, October 9, 2019,
Caguioa, J.)

Evident Bad Faith

2. Question: What is the concept of evident bad faith?

Answer: Evident bad faith "does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.” but of
having a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind

31 | P a g e
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or
for ulterior purposes.” Simply put, it partakes of the nature of fraud.

The presence of evident bad faith requires that the accused acted with a malicious motive
or intent, or ill will. It is not enough that the accused violated a provision of law or that the
provision of law violated is clear, unmistakable, and elementary. To constitute evident bad
faith, it must be proven that the accused acted with fraudulent intent. Thus, it must be shown
that the accused was “spurred by any corrupt motive.” Mistakes, no matter how patently
clear, committed by a public officer are not actionable “absent any clear showing that they
were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.” (Martel v. People,
G.R. Nos. 224720-23 and 224765-68, February 2, 2021, Caguioa

3. Macairan v. People, G.R. Nos. 215104, 215120, 215147, 215212, 215354-55, 215377,

215923 and 215541, March 18, 2021, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• In a consolidated case, the DOH-NCR purchased 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol

Suspension 60ml, 125mg/5ml and 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250mg with Vitamin
B Complex and Folic Acid.

• Few days after, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous letter informing
the office that the transaction mentioned involved irregularities. It implicated
implicated four pharmaceutical companies and consequently charged AA, BB, CC, DD.
EE, FF and GG of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for having overpriced the bottles
of Paracetamol Suspension.
• Except for DD and GG, the others, as well as HH were also charged of having bought
the Ferrous Sulfate bottles without any public bidding and in favor of one of the
implicated pharmaceutical companies despite having another supplier offer it at a
lower price, prejudicing the government’s interest.

• The Sandiganbayan held all of the accused, except BB, guilty of said violation. BB’s
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• For the transaction involving Ferrous Sulfate, all of the accused were held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that they acted with evident bad faith when
they allowed the purchase, without public bidding, of 1,500 bottles of overpriced
Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid from one of the companies,
which was owned by HH.

• According to the Sandiganbayan, their actions gave HH’s company unwarranted

benefits and caused undue damage to the government in the amount of P219,945.00.

32 | P a g e
 • The Sandiganbayan explained that FF, as the supply officer; EE, who certified on the
availability of funds; BB, who admitted placing her initials on the PO; and AA, who
approved the same, ought to have known that there was no justification for not
conducting the public bidding; and that the Ferrous Sulfate purchased from HH’s
company was overpriced.

• The Sandiganbayan further held that petitioners' respective signatures on the PO’s
and the DV’s, which made possible the payment to HH’s company despite the
irregularity in the supporting documents, indicate a conspiracy to disburse public
fund to pay HH’s company the overpriced amount.

ISSUE: Was there a conspiracy in the transaction among all the accused to commit the
alleged violation of Section 3(E), R.A. 3019?

SC RULING: No, there is none. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While direct proof
is not necessary to establish conspiracy, it is vital for the prosecution to show, at the very
least, with the same degree of proof required to establish the crime - proof beyond
reasonable doubt, that all participants performed overt acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.

The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself
or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
conspiracy.

The Court further emphasizes that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, mere presence
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and mere companionship, are
insufficient to constitute one as part to a conspiracy.

Thus, in a catena of cases decided by the Court, it has been consistently ruled that a mere
signature or approval appearing on a document does not meet the required quantum of
proof to establish the existence of conspiracy.

To stress anew, not every person who signs documents required in standard operating
procedures automatically becomes a conspirator in a crime. There must be other positive
and clear evidence showing each of the accused's conscious and intentional participation in
the planning, preparation and execution of crime charged.

Apart from failing to establish conspiracy among petitioners, the prosecution also failed to
discharge its burden to prove the elements of the unlawful act covered by of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.

33 | P a g e
 b.2 SECTION 3(G)
1. Question: How can one establish the culpability of the offender in violation of Section 3 (G)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

Answer: To determine the culpability of private respondents under Section 3 (g) of RA 3019,
it must be established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. (Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 195962 (Resolution), April 18, 2018, Caguioa,
J.)

2. Question: What is the consequence of the mayor's inaction on the complainant's

application for a mayor's permit after the required documents were submitted and
assessment fees were paid?

Answer: It is a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In an application for a
mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or city, the procedure is fairly
standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required documents and the
payment of the assessed business taxes and fees.

In case of failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be

disapproved. If the application is compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An
inaction or refusal to act is a course of action anathema to public service with utmost
responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an
application for mayor's permit is motivated by personal conflicts and political
considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Constitution mandates that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." Thus,
"[they] are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in
acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the [public] continue on to
the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a
standstill the administrative process and the [public] is left in the darkness of uncertainty."
(Lacap v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017, Caguioa, J.)

34 | P a g e
 c. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
Question: Can acts under Section 5 of RA 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
be qualified?

Answer: No, it cannot be qualified. Section 6 of RA 9208 provides that only violations of
Section 4 shall be considered as qualified trafficking. Acts punishable under Section 5,
therefore, cannot be qualified as the law does not expressly provide for it. (People v. Sayo,
G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

d. Child Abuse Law

Debasement

Question: Can laying of hands against a child be an act of child abuse?

Answer: A specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of a child as a
human being is required for conviction under Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 about Section 3(b)(2).
This is especially true if the acts allegedly constituting child abuse were done in the spur of
the moment, out of emotional outrage.

"Debasement" is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something;
"degradation," on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality
while "demean" means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character.

Laying of hands against a child, when done at the spur of the moment and in anger, cannot
be deemed as an act of child abuse under Section 10(a), as the essential element of intent
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
is not present. (Briñas y Del Fierro v. People, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, Caguioa, J.)

e. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act

R.A. 9165 as amended

e.1 ILLEGAL SALE

1. Question: What are the elements of ”Illegal Sale” of Dangerous Drugs ?

35 | P a g e
Answer: Well-settled in jurisprudence is the principle that in all prosecutions for illegal sale
of illicit drugs under R.A. 9165, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt:

(1) proof that the transaction took place; and

(2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The
existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal
sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.

What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the
crime and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed. (People v. Serad y
Ravilles, G.R. No. 224894, October 10, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: In the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, one of the requisites is that
there must be proof that the transaction took place. How do you prove that indeed the
transaction took place?

Answer: Basic is the rule that, for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
to stand, the prosecution should have proven the following elements beyond reasonable
doubt:

(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment.

The prosecution has the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the transaction
actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the prohibited or
regulated drug or the corpus delicti. (People v. Otico, G.R. No. 231133, June 6, 2018, Caguioa,
J.)

3. Question: What is the significance of the drugs confiscated?

Answer: The confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral certainty. The
prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the
accused is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to
the chain of custody must be accounted for. (People v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 228881, February
6, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

36 | P a g e
4. Question: Can the crime of iIlegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs be established even if the
prosecution’s evidence is based on sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an alleged
poseur-buyer?

Answer: No. It is a well-settled principle that sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an
alleged poseur-buyer fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

In the case of People v. Ordiz, G.R. No. 206767, September 11, 2019, the prosecution relied on
the testimonies of its three witnesses, i.e., SPO1 Ursal, Jr., PO2 Capangpangan, and SPO1
Cerna.

A closer look at the testimonies of the two police officers reveal that they did not actually
see firsthand the alleged sale of illegal drugs between the accused- appellant and the
alleged poseur-buyer, another police officer. They were positioned at some considerable
distance away from the area where he purportedly transacted with the accused-appellant.

The prosecution’s case hinged mostly on the uncorroborated testimony of the supposed
poseur- buyer, whose testimony on direct examination was found by the RTC to be unclear
and lacking in detail.

For this reason alone, as there is reasonable doubt as to the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, accused- appellant Ordiz’ acquittal is warranted.

Consequence if there is no prior surveillance

5. Question: In a buy-bust operation upon the information given by a confidential informant,

AAA was apprehended for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. During the trial, AAA questioned
the irregularity of the operation because no surveillance was done prior, and it proceeded
merely on the information given by the informant. Is the argument tenable?

Answer: No. The absence of a prior surveillance does not affect the validity of a buy-bust
operation. There is no textbook method in conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has
left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. (People of the Philippines v. Peter Lopez y Canlas, G.R. No. 247974, June 13, 2020,
Caguioa, J.)

Application of the Variance Doctrine

6. People v. Buniag y Mercadera, G.R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019, Caguioa, J.

• Ferdinand Buniag was charged with violation of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The RTC found Buniag guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense.

37 | P a g e
 • The CA affirmed Buniag’s conviction but ruled that Buniag should have been convicted
for violation of Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 or attempted illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as the prosecution was able to establish that there was an attempt
to sell marijuana only because when PO1 Alfaro, upon confirming that Buniag had
with him the marijuana, made a "miss-call" to PO2 Pimentel, their pre-arranged
signal, and the rest of the team rushed to the area and placed Buniag under arrest,
which aborted the sale. Is Buniag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
26(b) of RA 9165?

Answer: No. The CA is correct in ruling that Buniag should have been convicted of the offense
of attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Applying the rule on variance, while Buniag cannot be convicted of the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs because the sale was never consummated, he may be convicted for the
attempt to sell as it is necessarily included in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. A crime
is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution, which should produce the felony, by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Nevertheless, Buniag may still not be convicted of attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
It is important for the Court to point out that for a successful prosecution of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, which necessarily includes attempted sale
of illegal drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or sale took
place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer
and the seller were identified.

In this case, even if the Court were to believe as true the version of the prosecution, due to
the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with the requirements laid down under
Section 21 of RA 9165 or the chain custody rule, the second element to convict Buniag of the
crime charged is still absent since the prosecution failed to establish the corpus
delicti beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Buniag y Mercadera, G.R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019,
Caguioa, J.

e. 2 CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

Concepts

1. Question: Define Chain of Custody.

Answer: Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said

38 | P a g e
drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding
of guilt. (People v. Malana, G.R. No. 233747, December 5, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: Discuss the significance of the Chain of Custody Rule.

Answer: The prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.

In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation
in court for destruction.

The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered
from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity
of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a
finding of guilt. (People of the Philippines v. Evangeline Garcia y Suing, G.R. No. 215344, June
10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

3. Question: What does the Chain of Custody Rule require in drug cases?

Answer: In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of
the law. Therefore, in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in
establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be.

This would include testimony on every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

39 | P a g e
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.

As applied in illegal drugs cases, chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court until destruction. (People v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 229046, September 11, 2019, Caguioa,
J.)

Four links of Chain of Custody

4. Question: What are the four links that should be established in the chain of custody of the
confiscated item?

Answer: The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be
established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. (De Villa v. People, G.R.
No. 224039, September 11, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

5. Question: Is compliance with the chain of custody rule crucial in any prosecution that
follows any drug buy-bust operation?

Answer: Yes, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that
follows any drug buy-bust operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt. (People v. Dumanjug y
Loreña, G.R. No. 235468, July 1, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

e. 3 Section 21 of R.A. 9165

1. Question: What does Section 21 of R.A. 9165 require?

Answer: Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended, lays down the procedure that
police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as
evidence.

40 | P a g e
The said provision requires that:

(1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed at the place of seizure or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable;

(2) *the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of

(a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel,

(b) an elected public official, and

(c) a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media;

and

(3) the accused or his/her representative and all of the aforesaid witnesses shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The strict observance of the aforesaid requirements is a necessity because, with "the very
nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can
be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great."

The Court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of
the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence is mandatory, and that the law
imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose.

Concededly, Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, provides that "noncompliance of these

requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." (People v. Rasos, Jr. y Padollo,
G.R. No. 243639, September 18, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: What are the elements under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 for a valid seizure of illicit
drugs?

Answer: Sec. 21 of RA 9165 must have the following elements for it to be a valid seizure:

(i) Presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the

41 | P a g e
 Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

(ii) Physical Inventory and Photographing

Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant

sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors, and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.

(iii) Presence of the accused during the marking, physical inventory and photographing of
the seized items

A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours
after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial
laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities
of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however,
That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination
on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours. (People v. De Vera y Medina, G.R. No.
218914, July 30, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

3. Under R.A. 10640 amending RA 9165, who are the persons required to be present during
the operation?

Answer:

Section 1. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

"(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative

42 | P a g e
 of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided,
finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.

4. Question: Under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, what is the meaning of the phrase “
immediately after the seizure and confiscation”?

Answer: The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" has been held by the Court
to mean that the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items should be done
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension; only if this is not practicable does the
IRR authorize the inventory and photographing at the nearest police station or the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team.

Significantly, the rule is not the same with respect to the three (3) witnesses specified in
Section, who are all required to be present at the time or near the place of apprehension.
Their presence at the earliest point of contact with the corpus delicti is indispensable in
order to foreclose - or at the very least, minimize - the possibility of abuse or planting of
evidence. Only when there are disinterested persons present can the courts be certain that
the operation conducted was insulated from impropriety.

It therefore becomes imperative that all police officers strictly comply with the requirements
laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR. In case of any deviation with the mandatory
procedure, however, a conviction may still be secured if the following requisites are
established by the prosecution: (1) the existence of "justifiable grounds;" and (2) that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Thus, once it becomes evident that lapses in procedure occurred, the
prosecution bears the onus to recognize such lapses and accordingly justify the same.
Without such justification, there would be no occasion to apply the saving mechanism.
(People v. Willian Cepeda y Dultra and Loren Dy y Sero, G.R. No. 229833, July 29, 2019,
Caguioa, J.)

5. Question: What is the consequence if there are conflicting testimonies of the police
officers in the conduct of inventory?

Answer: If the members of the buy-bust team have markedly different versions of what
transpired after the seizure of the items, the Court cannot rely on their testimonies on the
conduct of the inventory and photographing.

43 | P a g e
 The prosecution failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. In this regard, the CA pointedly
observed that the testimonies of the police officers were conflicting as to whether the
purported inventory was conducted, whether at the barangay office or at the police station.
SPO1 Regato testified that the inventory was done in the barangay hall while PO1 Hega
testified that the documentation after accused’ arrest was done in the police station. (People
v. Sood y Amatondin, G.R. No. 227394, June 6, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

6. Question: What is the effect if no laboratory examination of the bottles and syringes
confirming traces of illegal substances was conducted?

Answer: Without a laboratory examination of the bottles and syringes confirming traces of
illegal substances, there exists sufficient and reasonable ground to believe, consistent with
the presumption of innocence, that the confiscated items were possessed for lawful
purposes.

Non-compliance with Section 21 is tantamount to a failure to establish an essential element

of the crime and will therefore engender the acquittal of the accused. Strict compliance with
the foregoing requirements is necessary in protecting the integrity and identity of the corpus
delicti, without which the crime of the illegal sale, or illegal possession of dangerous drugs
or drug paraphernalia cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (Cuico v. People, G.R. No.
232293, December 9, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

7. Question: Must the required elected public official be the incumbent public official of the
place where the seizure of drug items takes place?"

Answer: No. The Guidelines on the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Section 21 of RA
9165 as amended by RA 10640 likewise state that "the elected public official is any incumbent
public official regardless of the place where he/she is elected."

Hence, the authorities are not limited to seeking assistance from the local barangay captain.
Therefore, if the barangay captain would not agree to witness the inventory and
photographing at the place of seizure, then the apprehending team could have secured the
presence of any other public official. (People of the Philippines v. Jeffrey Fayo y Rubio, G.R.
No. 239887, October 2, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

8. Question: When do we need the presence of the three witnesses in relation to the
confiscated drugs?

Answer: The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory
but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest.

44 | P a g e
 It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source,
identity, and integrity of the seized drug.

If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses
would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to
testify that the buy bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their
presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165. (People v. Ilagan y Baña G.R. No. 227021,
December 5, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

9. Distinguish the elements of crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and the illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.

Answer: In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 the prosecution is required to prove the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 has the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which
is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. (People v. Narvas y
Bolasoc, G.R. No. 241254, July 08, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

10. Question: Can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused in case of violation of the chain of
custody in illegal drugs cases?

Answer: No, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot apply
where there is a clear violation of Section 21. In such a case, the innocence of the accused,
as presumed, must be upheld.

The presumption that regular duty was performed by the arresting officers simply cannot
prevail over the presumption of innocence granted to the accused by the Constitution. It is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the accused is indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and overcome his presumed innocence. (Abilla v. People, G.R. No. 227676,
April 3, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

11. Question: What is the consequence of unjustified lapses on the part of the police officers?

In the present case, the police lapsed by (1) failing to inventory and photograph the
confiscated drugs in the place of apprehension and (2) the were no witnesses present.

45 | P a g e
Further, the prosecution was unable to justify these lapses. Therefore, AAA should not be
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Tubera, G.R. No 216941, June 10, 2019,
Caguioa, J.)

12. Question: A police officer admitted that he placed the plastic sachet seized from the
accused appellant inside his right pocket for an indefinite period before handing it over to
another police officer for marking and inventory. Will the case prosper?

Answer: No, the belated marking adversely affected the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drug subject of the sale. (People v. Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, Caguioa,
J.)

13. Question: What is the consequence of the unjustified departures from the chain of
custody?

Answer: The unjustified departures from the chain of custody, particularly the undertaking
of the inventory elsewhere than in the place of arrest and the absence of the insulating
witnesses at the time of seizure, should lead to the acquittal of the accused.

Jurisprudence provides that the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means
that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs must be at the place of
apprehension and/or seizure.

Here, PO2 BBB failed to comply with these two requirements during the conduct of the buy-
bust operation. (Tañamor y Acibo v. People, G.R. No. 228132, March 11, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

14. Question: The accused was charged for violations of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165
as otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Conspicuously absent in the narration of facts by the prosecution is the part where the buy-
bust team sought the attendance of the three required witnesses. From the time they
received the tip at 4:30 p.m. up to the time they went to the target area at around 9:15 p.m.,
there was a span of around five (5) hours where they could have easily contacted the
required witnesses, but there was no hint that they made any effort to do so. Can the accused
be guilty for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 ?

Answer: No. Here, the buy-bust team miserably failed to comply with these requirements.
A perusal of the records and the evidence presented by the prosecution would show that,
even believing its version of a buy-bust operation, the buy-bust team made no effort at all
to secure the three required witnesses. (People v. Quilatan, G.R. No. 218107, September 9,
2019, Caguioa, J.)

46 | P a g e
 Exceptions:

1. Question: Would failure to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void?

No, the Court, however, has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void. However, this is with the
caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that:

(a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and

(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. It
has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court that the prosecution has the positive
duty to explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without any justifiable
explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is
unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt
has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Nelson
Flores y Fonbuena, G.R. No. 220464, June 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: What are the requirements laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR to be
excusable?

Answer: The grounds for the requirements laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR to
be excusable are the following, to wit:

(1) that there exist "justifiable grounds"; and

(2) that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team. (People v. Cañete y Fernandez, G.R. No.
242018, July 3, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

Decided Cases:

a. Acquittal of the Accused

1. People v. De Castro, G.R. No. 243386, September 2, 2019, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• XXX was charged for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165, particularly Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.

47 | P a g e
 • However, none of the three required witnesses were present at the time of XXX’s
arrest nor during the inventory of the seized drugs.

ISSUE: Is the guilt of XXX for violation of the aforementioned crimes proven beyond
reasonable doubt?

SC RULING: No. The guilt of XXX was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the police
officers blatantly disregarded the requirements in Section 21 of RA 9165 regarding the chain
of custody of the seized evidence and the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved.

The following facts must be proven to prove the elements of the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs: the identity of the buyer, the seller, the object and the consideration, and the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment.

Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the state
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence warrants
an acquittal. The same breaches of procedure in the handling of the illegal drug subject to
the sale apply equally to the illegal drug subject of the illegal possession charge.

2. People v. Escaran y Tariman, G.R. No. 212170, June 19, 2019, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Two separate pieces of information were filed against Sehun in violation of Section 5
and 11 of RA 9165. He was arrested for selling during a buy-bust operation and there
were several packets taken from his possession.

• Upon the testimonies of the Drug Enforcement Unit, before they conducted the buy-
bust operation, surveillance was made upon a tip received from an informant, and
upon ascertaining the identity of a certain Sehun, they proceeded with the operation.

• The operation was a success and Sehun was arrested. The RTC and CA found Sehun
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.

• However, accused Sehun contends that the drugs seized were not marked in his
presence and that no witnesses were present who can testify that the seized drugs
were marked with his name. And therefore, he should be acquitted of the crime.

ISSUE: Is accused Sehun’s contention correct?

SC RULING: Yes. As the seized drugs themselves are the corpus delicti of the crime charged,
it is of utmost importance that there be no doubt or uncertainty as to their identity and
integrity. The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses in the
procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the
explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable.

48 | P a g e
3. People v. Havib Galuken, G.R. No. 216754, July 17, 2019, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• A and B are police officers. Upon receiving a tip that a certain Mr. X is selling shabu
at a Gas Station, they proceeded to conduct a buy-bust operation.

• Upon the conclusion of the sale, A and B proceeded to arrest X seizing two (2) sachets
containing crystalline substance.

• They then immediately proceed to the police station and conduct the inventory and
marking of the evidence in the presence of a barangay kagawad and a representative
from the media.

ISSUE: Can X be convicted for violation of RA 9165 as amended?

SC RULING: In the case at bar, the police officers completely disregarded the requirements
of Section 21.

First, none of the required witnesses was present at the place of arrest. The police officers
merely called-in a Barangay Kagawad and media representative when they were already at
the police station to sign the inventory receipt which they had already prepared prior to the
arrival of said witnesses. Thus, it is clear that they failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of the law.

Second, the police officers did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the
seized items at the place of arrest. Their explanation that the crowd became
uncontrollable is hardly plausible considering that they conducted the buy-bust operation
at a Caltex Station and it is highly unbelievable that there would be a crowd in the said
area that would pose a danger to their lives. Their excuse for non-compliance is
unconvincing.

b. Conviction of the Accused is sustained

Identification of the Size of the Seized Item

1. Question: The accused-appellant alleges that the prosecution did not adduce evidence as
to how the alleged seized drugs were handled, stored, and safeguarded pending their offer
in court; and that the last link in the chain of custody is broken because he was not presented
in court. Will the case against the accused still prosper?

Answer: Yes, it is not necessary to present all persons who came into contact with the seized
drug to testify in court. As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly

49 | P a g e
established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the
drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession
of the drugs should take the witness stand.

The non-presentation as witness of the evidence custodian is not a crucial point against the
prosecution since it has the discretion as to how to present its case and the right to choose
whom it wishes to present as witnesses. (People v. Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021,
Caguioa, J.)

2. Question: The accused argued that there is conflicting identification as to the size of the
alleged dangerous drug. On one hand, the apprehending officer who confiscated the
dangerous drug from the accused allegedly brought from him, testified that it was a “small-
sized” sachet. However, in the Inventory/Confiscation Receipt, Chain of Custody Form, and
Request for Laboratory Examination, it was indicated that the seized item was “medium” in
size. Will the argument of the accused prosper?

Answer: The accused’s argument must fail. The characterization of the size of the seized
item does not negate the established fact that the item sized from the accused was identified
as the exact same item that was marked, inventoried, photographed, tested, and finally
presented in court under the rule on chain of custody. (People of the Philippines v. Peter
Lopez y Canlas, G.R. No. 247974, June 13, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

Justified departure from the Chain of Custody Rule

Question: Will compliance still be upheld even if two of the three witnesses required by the
rule were only present at the time of seizure, apprehension, and the conduct of the
inventory?

Answer:

In the present case, however, only two of the three required witnesses – the elected official
and the representative from the media – were present at the time of seizure, apprehension,
and the conduct of the inventory.

Nevertheless, the Court notes, based on the evidence, that the absence of the DOJ
representative could be explained by the urgency with which the operation needed to be
conducted. As the testimony of Agent Esmin reveals, there was only a two-hour period from
the time they received the information from their confidential informant to the time that they
needed to conduct the buy-bust operation.

It should be recognized that, with the limited time they had to prepare for the operation, the
apprehending team was still able to secure the attendance of two of the three required
witnesses: the elected official and the media representative. This fact alone fortifies, in the

50 | P a g e
eyes of the Court, the testimony of Agent Esmin that they really did attempt to secure the
attendance of a DOJ representative but that there was no one available.

The absence of a DOJ representative was thus attributable to factors beyond their control.
The officers in this case thus showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure; they showed that they did their duties bearing in mind the requirements of the
law. It would therefore be error for the Court not to reward their efforts towards compliance.
(People of the Philippines v. Bobby Pacnisen y Bumacas, G.R. No. 234821, November 7, 2018,
Caguioa, J.)

e. 4 ILLEGAL POSSESSION
1. Questions: What are the essential elements of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs under Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165? Is the compliance with the Chain of Custody crucial
in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?

Answer: In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following
elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 has the following elements:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a

prohibited or regulated drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

The chain of custody rule is crucial, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that
the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required
to make a finding of guilt. (People v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 243190, August 28, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

Application of Concept of Possession

2. Question: Does the “concept of possession” contemplated in Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165
applies to a mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen?

51 | P a g e
Answer: No. The concept of possession contemplated under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 goes
beyond mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise, an
unsuspecting person who is victimized by the planting of evidence will be unjustly
prosecuted based on the sheer fact that illegal drugs were found to be in his possession. It
must be proven that the person in whose possession the drug specimen was found knew
that he/she was possessing illegal drugs. (Luna vPeople, G.R. No. 231902, June 30, 2021,
Caguioa, J.)

3. Question: Differentiate actual possession from constructive possession.

Answer: Jurisprudence holds that possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it
is found. (People v. Baer, G.R. No. 228958, August 14, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

4. Question: X convicted for illegal possession of drugs. The drug specimens were not found
in his actual possession. It was also not established that the locked steel box containing the
shabu was owned by him; he could not even open it nor did he have the key to open it. The
key that was used to open the box came from the authorities. Is X liable for actual or
constructive possession?

Answer: None. He should be acquitted. In the instant case, it is not disputed whatsoever that
the alleged seized drug specimens were neither actually nor constructively possessed by
accused-appellant Baer. (People v. Baer, G.R. No. 228958, August 14, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

5. Question: Is criminal intent an essential element for the crime of illegal possession of
drugs?

Answer: No. In People v. Tira, the Court explained the concept of possession of illegal
drugs, to wit:

x x x This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-
exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.

52 | P a g e
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the
place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be
presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugs [are] in the house or place over which the
accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation. (Santos y Comprado v. People, G.R. No. 242656, August 14, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

6. Question: AAA is being charged for the crime of use and possession of illegal drugs. There
was no inventory and photographing of the evidence in the presence of the required
witnesses either at the scene of the buy bust operation of even when AAA was brought to
the police station.

Is AAA guilty of the crime of use and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165?

Answer: No. Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation.

Applying the foregoing in the instant case, no inventory and photographing, of the evidence
were conducted whatsoever in the presence of the required witnesses either at the scene
of the purported buy-bust operation or even when the accused was brought to the police
station thereafter.

Here, there was no evidence presented by the prosecution whatsoever showing that an
inventory of the allegedly seized drugs was even conducted by the police. Concededly,
Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that “noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.”

For this provision to be effective, however, the prosecution must first (1) recognize any
lapses on the part of the police officers and (2) be able to justify the same. In this case, the
prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its deviations from the procedure
contained in Section 21, RA 9165. (People v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 225503, June 26, 2019, Caguioa,
J.)

7. People v. Cristobal y Ambrosio, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019, Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Eunhyuk was driving his motorcycle without a helmet when he was flagged down by
PO1 Shindong. When he was asked by PO1 Shindong to show the necessary

53 | P a g e
 documents to verify that he is the legitimate owner of the motorcycle, Eunhyuk failed
to do so.

• While PO1 Shindong was preparing to issue the traffic violation ticket, he ran away
but he was quickly apprehended by another police officer. When he was brought back
to the checkpoint where PO1 Shindong was in-charged, he noticed that something
was bulging out of Eunhyuk’s jacket. He ordered him to pull out the contents of his
jacket which they found nine (9) sachets containing white crystalline substance which
he suspected as shabu.

• Upon arraignment, Eunhyuk pleaded not guilty to the charge of violating Section 11 of
RA 9165 as it was not a valid “stop and frisk” search. Should Eunhyuk be acquitted
since he did not violate Section 11 of RA 9165?

Answer: Yes. Eunhyuk should be acquitted. His violations consisted of (1) not wearing a
helmet while driving a motorcycle, and (2) being unable to show the original receipt (OR)
and certificate of registration (CR) of the motorcycle he was riding. Cristobal's first violation
- failure to wear a helmet while riding a motorcycle - is punishable by RA 10054, or the
Motorcycle Helmet Act of 2009.

A violation of the law requiring the use of helmets while driving a motorcycle is only
punishable by fine. Meanwhile, the second violation - failure to furnish the OR and CR of the
motorcycle - is likewise punishable only by fine. Stated simply, the police officers involved
in this case conducted an illegal search when they frisked the accused on the basis of the
foregoing violations. It was not, as it could not have been, even believing the story of the
police officers, a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no, as there could not
have been any, lawful arrest to speak of.

8. Question: AAA was arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs pursuant to an
anti-illegal drug operation conducted by the PNP. AAA claims that he was framed up and
that he should be released on the grounds that the procedure outlined in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 was not complied with due to the absences of required witnesses during the
conduct of the inventory of the confiscated drugs allegedly taken from AAA.

However, the police officers and the prosecution countered that non-compliance with the
procedure outlined in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 did not automatically render the arrest
illegal, or the items seized from him inadmissible. Was the arrest proper?

Answer: No. Here, only a representative from the media was present in the conduct of the
inventory. In a settled case, the SC emphasized that the presence of the required witnesses
at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement
because their presence serves an essential purpose, i.e., to protect against the possibility
of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug.

54 | P a g e
Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is
miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.
(Casilag y Arceo v. People, G.R. No. 213523, March 18, 2021, Caguioa, J.)

e.5 Illegal Use of Dangerous Drugs

Two Distinct Drug Tests

Question: The accused was charged with illegal use of dangerous drugs. During the trial, the
forensic chemist testified that he conducted two tests on the urine of the accused, whereby
the latter test involves a Thin Layer Chromatography or TLC. If both tests yielded positive
result, can the accused be convicted of illegal use of dangerous drugs?

Answer: No. The law provides that two distinct drug tests are required: a screening test,
which involves a rapid test to determine presumptive positive result; and a confirmatory
test, which an analytical test using devices more specific to validate and confirm the result
of the screening test.

In the present case, the second test conducted on the accused, which was TLC, is a screening
test. Considering that the report merely contains results of the screening test conduct, the
same cannot be valid before any court of law absent the required confirmatory test report.
Thus, the accused cannot be held criminally liable for the illegal use of dangerous drugs.
(People of the Philippines v. Peter Lopez y Canlas, G.R. No. 247974, June 13, 2020, Caguioa,
J.)

e.6 Illegal Transportation of Dangerous Drugs

Question: When shall an act be considered as illegal transportation of dangerous drugs?

Answer: There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When
the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of
transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.
The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support the finding that the act of
transporting was committed. (People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth Nyambura Runana and
Grace Lacson y Navarro, G.R. No. 229055, July 15, 2020, Caguioa, J.)

55 | P a g e
 f. Illegal Possession of Firearms

1. Ramon Picardal y Baluyot v. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 235749, June 19, 2019,
Caguioa, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• AAA was allegedly urinating against the wall when the police officers approached
and then arrested him.

• The police officers frisked AAA and found a handle made of wood that contained 5
live ammunition.

• AAA, on his part, denied the charges against him, and in his defense, stated that he
was just buying a viand when the police got mad and frisked him on the spot. He was
surprised that he was charged with illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms?

SC RULING: In this case, the firearm that was seized from AAA after he was frisked by the
police officers for allegedly urinating is inadmissible in evidence against him since the
search and seizure conducted on him is unreasonable. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made.

The act violated is under MMDA Regulation No. 96-009. As the name implies, it is only a
regulation, and not a law or an ordinance, where the penalty is fine. Therefore, even if it
were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place, the police officers
involved in this case still conducted an illegal search incidental to a lawful arrest as there
could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.

Chain Of Custody applied in Illegal Possession of Firearms

2. Question: Velasco had no license or permit to possess a fragmentation hand grenade but
the prosecution failed to establish in court that the MK-2 fragmentation hand grenade
identified and admitted into evidence during the trial was the same object allegedly retrieved
from the person of accused-appellant Velasco. Should his conviction be sustained?

Answer: No. The prosecution was unsuccessful in establishing an unbroken chain of custody
of the allegedly confiscated fragmentation hand grenade, creating serious doubt as to the
corpus delicti of the crime charged.

Jurisprudence explains that the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is

56 | P a g e
what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.

In this case, the prosecution was completely silent as to how the investigator handled and
stored the evidence, and the precautions are taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item. No inventory was conducted, and there was not even a
confiscation or seizure receipt. (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 231787, August 19, 2019, Caguioa,
J.)

-END-

57 | P a g e