City of Jackson Brief Opposing HB1020
City of Jackson Brief Opposing HB1020
City of Jackson Brief Opposing HB1020
NO. 2023-CA-00584-SCT
________________________________
Appellants,
v.
Appellees.
______________________________________________________________________
Jonathan B. Miller*
Michael Adame*
Cristian Torres*
Public Rights Project
490 43rd Street, #115
Oakland, CA 94609
*pro hac vice application forthcoming Counsel for Amicus City of Jackson
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................3
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................11
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Araujo v. Bryant,
283 So. 3d 73 (Miss. 2019) ..............................................................................3, 4
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) .............................................................................................5
Burgess v. City of Gulfport,
814 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 2002) ............................................................................3, 4
Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380 (1991) .............................................................................................5
City of Jackson v. Greene,
869 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 2004) ..............................................................................3
Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) .............................................................................................5
Initiative Measure No. 65: Mayor Butler v. Watson,
338 So. 3d 599 (Miss. 2021) ................................................................................6
Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997 (1994) .............................................................................................5
Moore v. Grillis,
39 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 1949) ..................................................................................6
Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) .............................................................................................5
Riley v. Kennedy,
553 U.S. 406 (2008) .............................................................................................5
SASS Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto Cnty.,
170 So. 3d 441 (Miss. 2015) ................................................................................4
State ex rel. Collins v. Jones,
64 So. 241 (1914) .................................................................................................7
Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986) ...............................................................................................5
STATUTES
Miss. Code § 9-7-3(3) ..............................................................................................8
Miss. Code § 9-7-3(4) ..............................................................................................8
ii
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Miss. Const. art. I, § 1 ..............................................................................................6
Miss. Const. art. III, § 5 ...........................................................................................6
Miss. Const. art. VI, § 144 .......................................................................................6
Miss. Const. art. VI, § 152 .......................................................................................8
Miss. Const. art. VI, § 153 ...................................................................................7, 8
Miss. Const. art. XII, § 241 ......................................................................................4
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Brittany Kauffman, Pilot Projects, Rule Changes, and Other Innovations
in State Courts Around the Country, National Center for State Courts
(Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/25681/ncsc-cji-
appen dices-d.pdf. ................................................................................................9
Charles G. Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection and Their Impact on
Judicial Independence, Articles by Maurer Faculty. 54 (2008),
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/54?
utm_source=www.repository.law.indiana.edu%2Ffacpub%2F54&utm
_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages ..............................................7
Corina D. Gerety & Logan Cornett, Momentum for Change: The Impact
of the Colorado Civil Access Pilot Project, Rule One Initiative (Oct.
2014), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/publications/momentum_for_change_capp_fi
nal_report.pdf .......................................................................................................9
Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg Reveals 21% Reduction of
Case Backlog, Harris County District Attorney Office (Apr. 12, 2023)
https://www.harriscountyda.com/harris_
county_district_attorney_kim_ogg_reveals_21_reduction_of_case_ba
cklog ...................................................................................................................10
Hinds County, MS Profile, Census Reporter, https://censusreporter.
org/profiles/05000US28049-hinds-county-ms/ ....................................................5
Joana Weill et al., Felony Case Delay: Lessons From a Pilot Project in
Brooklyn, Center for Justice Innovation at 36 (Mar. 2021),
https://www.innovatingjustice.org/sites/default/files/media/
document/2021/Brooklyn_Project_Evaluation.3.29.2021.pdf ...........................10
iii
Lydia Hamblin & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Evaluation of the Civil Justice
Initiative Pilot Project, National Center for State Courts (Apr. 2019),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0013/26230/cjipp-final-evaluation-report.pdf ........................................9
Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr, The Role of Special Masters in the
Judicial System: Special Masters in State Court Complex Litigation:
An Available and Underused Case Management Tool, 31 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 1299 (2005) ...............................................................................9
Prosecutor Backlog: Causes, Data, and Solutions, Prosecutor’s Center
for Excellence (Jan. 13, 2021), https://pceinc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/20210113-Backlog-Causes-and-Solutions
-List-PCE-updated.pdf .......................................................................................10
iv
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The City of Jackson files this brief in support of Plaintiffs. Jackson has significant interest
in the outcome of this case. Enacted just this past legislative session, House Bill 1020 (“HB 1020”)
has a substantial impact on law enforcement and the administration of justice within and
immediately around Jackson. Among other things, HB 1020 attempts to significantly expand the
purview (and jurisdiction) of state police operating as part of the Capitol Complex Improvement
District (“CCID”). In addition, HB 1020 creates four new judges for Hinds County, all to be
appointed by the Chief Justice of this Court, instead of being elected directly by the community as
are all other similarly situated judges throughout the state. These dramatic changes have
considerable effects on the ways that law enforcement performs its job, how justice is
administered, and the responsiveness of both the police and the courts to the local electorate.
The City of Jackson repeatedly finds itself the target of action by the Mississippi
Legislature and the Governor. In many instances, these actions seek to undermine the city’s
authority and ability to serve its community. They are often part of a vicious cycle: the city is
accused of not being able to fulfill its obligations and then resources are withdrawn and directed
to entities outside of the city, making it difficult if not impossible to serve its community. Time
and time again, the authority of the city and its community members is undercut. With respect to
HB 1020, the state is imposing a police force and a justice system that is neither accountable nor
Jackson has great interest in effective law enforcement that keeps our community safe.
Jackson also has a strong interest in a justice system that is efficient and disposes of cases in a
meaningful and fair way. But HB 1020 removes power from the people of Jackson, and the people
of Hinds County, and improperly undermines the vitality of local democracy. Jackson wants safe
1
communities and a smoothly run criminal justice system. However, taking power directly away
from local communities is not the correct—or lawful—means of furthering these goals, nor is it
the most efficient. For these reasons, and for what is set forth below, the judgment of the lower
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The City of Jackson agrees with Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. The creation of appointed
judges in Hinds County violates the plain language of the state constitution. The Mississippi
Constitution does not permit the Chief Justice to expand the judicial roster by appointing Circuit
Court judges to, what is effectively, full terms and dilute the vote and will of the people.
Jackson writes separately here to emphasize two separate points. First, Plaintiffs clearly
have standing to bring this action. The Chancery Court reached the correct conclusion, and the
decision on standing should be affirmed. Plaintiffs have, in fact, three different claims of standing.
They have standing as taxpayers whose funds are utilized for an unlawful program. They have
standing as voters whose voting power has been diluted by the appointment of unelected judges.
Second, while some of the purported goals of HB 1020 are laudable, they were approached
in the wrong manner. The Legislature had many means to achieve its goals of judicial efficiency
other than the appointment of Circuit Court judges to effectively a full term. In fact, state law
already provides mechanisms for handling backlogs. Moreover, court reform around the country
demonstrates that the Legislature (as well as the courts themselves) has many viable avenues to
address any purported backlogs within the confines of the Mississippi Constitution. HB 1020,
however, is not permissible under any fair reading of the Mississippi Constitution and serves only
to strip power away from the people of Jackson (and Hinds County).
2
ARGUMENT
The Chancery Court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs “should be permitted to challenge
the governmental actions that directly affect them.” Op. at 15. In so doing, the Chancery Court
relied on Plaintiffs’ status as taxpayers in Hinds County for their standing. This analysis is correct
and should be affirmed. In addition, Plaintiffs’ standing is supported by at least two other bases
for their interests in the subject matter of the litigation. Araujo v. Bryant, 283 So. 3d 73, 78 (Miss.
2019). Plaintiffs have an interest both in maintaining their voting power and in the integrity of
their local democracy. The appointment of unelected judges dilutes Plaintiffs’ voting power, and
local democracy becomes less responsive to political will through these appointments. Because
Mississippi standing law is less rigorous than federal law (and these are the types of interests
recognized under federal law), Plaintiffs have standing under these separate theories as well. City
In Mississippi state court, “parties have standing to sue when they assert a colorable interest
in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the
defendant, or as otherwise provided by law.” Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So. 2d 149, 152–53
(Miss. 2002) (quoting State v. Quitman Cnty., 807 So. 2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001)). Generalized
grievance undifferentiated from other members of the public is not enough, but community
members who are specifically impacted by governmental action can pursue litigation against the
state (or a subdivision thereof). Araujo, 283 So. 3d at 78 (“Plaintiffs are not simply general
establish standing on grounds of experiencing an adverse effect from the conduct of the
3
defendant/appellee, the adverse effect experienced must be different from the adverse effect
experienced by the general public.” SASS Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto Cnty., 170 So. 3d 441, 446
(Miss. 2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hall v. City of
Here, Plaintiffs allege that they are residents of Hinds County, are registered voters, and
pay both property and sales taxes based on transactions within the county. See, e.g., Am. Compl.
¶¶ 10-14. This direct nexus to the challenged action results from their status as taxpayers and
property owners. Their harms are not undifferentiated because they pay funds to directly support
the challenged action and are directly impacted by it. Two prior decisions by this Court relating to
the interests of residents make this point clear. In Burgess, residents of the City of Gulfport sought
to challenge a land-use decision by the city based on their status as residents only, but “do not own
the property in question. Neither have they alleged that they own the land around the property in
question, or that the land has been affected in an adverse manner.” 814 So. 2d at 153. Moreover,
state law provided an alternative remedy to challenge the city’s decision. By contrast, in Araujo,
the plaintiffs had standing because “Plaintiffs are ad valorem taxpayers alleging that governmental
entities are spending ad valorem tax revenue in direct violation of Article 8, Section 206, of the
Mississippi Constitution.” 283 So. 3d at 78. Plaintiffs in this case have a clear and direct nexus to
As Plaintiffs set forth in their amended complaint, residents and voters of Hinds County
are now differently situated than those living in other Mississippi counties. See, e.g., Am. Compl.
¶¶ 2-6. Some of their judges are elected, while others are now appointed for nearly a four-year
term. The right to vote is enshrined in the Mississippi Constitution. Miss. Const. art. XII, § 241.
4
Yet that right now has different purchase for the residents of Hinds County. Plaintiffs and their
fellow Hinds County residents are represented differently than all other state residents when it
comes to the makeup of the local judiciary. This is disproportionate representation—a claim long
recognized under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962)
(“[C]itizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially
recognized as a right secured by the Constitution…”). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, when
voting power is “debased and diluted,” parties present “a justiciable controversy subject to
adjudication…” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964). To put it another way, once a
geographic system for representation by elected officials is chosen—here, for the election of local
The diminution of voting power, particularly along racial lines, is similarly protected by
federal law. Hinds County is composed of voters who are nearly 75% Black. 1 It is the only county
in Mississippi with more than 100,000 people and a majority Black population. Yet it has been
singled out by this legislation. Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (the “VRA”), the Supreme
Court has long instructed lower courts to examine a change to methods of representation as a
potential violation of voting rights. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In fact, the
transition from elected to appointed positions was considered “undisputed” to trigger preclearance
review under Section 5 of the VRA when that provision was in effect. Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S.
406, 420 (2008); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994) (explaining that
1
Hinds County, MS Profile, Census Reporter (last visited June 6, 2023), https://censusreporter.
org/profiles/05000US28049-hinds-county-ms/.
5
limiting the power of elected officials, such as through the “creation or elimination of elective
Currently within the Seventh Circuit Judicial District, there are four subdistricts, each of
which encompasses part of the City of Jackson, has a majority-Black population, and has an elected
permanent judge. All four elected Seventh Circuit judges, like most of their constituents, are Black.
Now Black voters in the capital county of Hinds have lost their voting power over their local
judiciary: HB 1020 improperly imposes unelected judges on the county, rather than correctly
allowing county residents to vote for them and applies this diluting change exclusively and
unequally to Hinds County. This harm to Plaintiffs’ power as voters is a clearly cognizable interest
Plaintiffs also have standing because of their unlawful loss of political power, which
includes the ability to directly determine judges in the Circuit Courts. “Mississippi’s government
can only validly act in ways in which it has been given power to act by the people of Mississippi.”
Initiative Measure No. 65: Mayor Butler v. Watson, 338 So. 3d 599, 606 (Miss. 2021) (citing Miss.
Const. art. III, §§ 5–6). Mississippi has long recognized the authority of the people to select
officials, including judges. Miss. Const. art. III, § 5 (“All political power is vested in, and derived
from, the people.”). Here, the people have denied the state the authority to appoint judges. Moore
v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So. 2d 505, 509 (1949) (“It is necessary to bear in mind a State
Constitution does not grant specific legislative powers, but limits them.”) (citation omitted).
2
The Supreme Court has held that the VRA applies to judicial districts where a state chooses to
elect judges. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 (1991).
6
The Mississippi Constitution divides the power of the state government into three distinct
departments: legislative, judicial, and executive. Miss. Const. art. I, § 1. Judicial power is vested
in a Supreme Court and other courts that the Mississippi Constitution provides for. Miss. Const.
art. VI, § 144. In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to adopt popular elections of judges after
a partisan election movement impelled by a desire to promote judicial independence from the
political branches.3 Thereafter, a 1910 amendment to Section 153 changed the selection of the
judges of the circuit and chancery courts from appointment by the Governor to election by the
people. See State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 106 Miss. 522, 64 So. 241, 241-42 (1914). The authority
of the people to select their officials, including judges, remains protected by the Mississippi
Constitution. Accordingly, any infringement of that power, as asserted by Plaintiffs in this case,
The City of Jackson agrees with Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding HB 1020. Article VI,
Section 153 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that Circuit and Chancery Court judges “shall
be elected by the people.” In so doing, the state constitution expressly denies the legislature the
power to authorize the selection of judges to those courts by appointment or any method other than
The state constitution also includes a narrow exception in which appointment of judges is
permitted. The existence of this specific exception within the text further underscores the problems
3
Charles G. Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection and Their Impact on Judicial Independence,
Articles by Maurer Faculty. 54, 88 (2008), https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/54?
utm_source=www.repository.law.indiana.edu%2Ffacpub%2F54&utm_medium=PDF&utm_cam
paign=PDFCoverPages.
7
with HB 1020. Article VI, Section 165 permits “the Governor” to appoint a judge to serve “in the
place of” one of the elected circuit court judges in the narrow circumstance when the elected judge
is “unable or disqualified” to preside, and only “during such disability or disqualification.” None
of those requirements has been fulfilled here. The challenged appointments are not the result of
any elected circuit court judge being disabled or disqualified from serving. The challenged
appointments call for the unelected judges to serve in addition to, not in the place of, elected judges.
And the challenged statutes authorize the Chief Justice, rather than the Governor, to make
appointments. Thus, this mechanism for appointment falls well outside of Section 165’s narrow
exception to the general rule that circuit court judges “shall be elected by the people.” Miss. Const.
Existing state law already provides a mechanism to address the purported concerns of the
Legislature regarding potential court backlogs. To regulate the size of the Circuit Courts and
Chancery Courts, the Mississippi Constitution requires that “[t]he Legislature shall, by statute,
establish certain criteria by which the number of judges in each district shall be determined, such
criteria to be based on population, the number of cases filed and other appropriate data.” Miss.
Const. art. VI, § 152. Accordingly, Mississippi law establishes that “[t]he number of judges in each
circuit court district shall be determined” based on “[t]he population of the district; [t]he number
of cases filed in the district; [t]the caseload of each judge in the district; [t]he geographic area of
the district; [a]n analysis of the needs of the district by the court personnel of the district; and [a]ny
other appropriate criteria.” Miss. Code § 9-7-3(3). That law assigns to the Judicial College of the
University of Mississippi Law Center and the Administrative Office of Courts responsibility for
determining the appropriate data to be collected “as a basis for applying the above criteria.” Miss.
8
Code § 9-7-3(4). There is no reason that this mechanism should and could not be used to handle
issues of backlog or delay. In fact, between 2000 and 2020, the total number of elected Circuit
But even assuming that is not enough, the experience of other jurisdictions shows that the
Legislature had many other available options that do not require a violation of the state
constitution. To address judicial efficiency, the Legislature could have proposed and funded
initiatives that streamline case management. Numerous jurisdictions have found success in
implementing civil case management programs which expedite jury trials and shorten the timelines
of pleadings, discovery, and motions.5 California, Colorado, Minnesota and other states have
successfully addressed civil backlog through such programs, shortening time to resolution and
The legislature has the authority to appoint special masters and reallocate responsibilities
to lower courts to address backlogs, as the Plaintiffs’ brief highlights. Br. at 28-29 (citing Miss.
Code Ann. § 9-9-35 and Miss. Const. art. VI, § 172). Special masters ease judicial caseload burden
by facilitating discovery and settlement in complex civil litigation. 7 Ensuring courts have sufficient
administrative staff also improves judicial efficiency. Miami-Dade County’s Civil Justice
Initiative Pilot Project, which created four-person teams of a judge, bailiff, judicial assistant, and
4
See Annual Reports of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, https://courts.ms.gov/research/
reports/reports.php.
5
Brittany Kauffman, Pilot Projects, Rule Changes, and Other Innovations in State Courts Around
the Country, National Center for State Courts (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/25681/ncsc-cji-appen dices-d.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Corina D. Gerety & Logan Cornett, Momentum for Change: The Impact of the Colorado
Civil Access Pilot Project, Rule One Initiative (Oct. 2014), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/publications/momentum_for_change_capp_final_report.pdf.
7
Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr, The Role of Special Masters in the Judicial System: Special
Masters in State Court Complex Litigation: An Available and Underused Case Management Tool,
31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1299 (2005).
9
case manager, improved case closures by 16% and shortened the average duration of civil litigation
by nearly 50%.8 In addition, several states have successfully created specialized courts that
improve judicial efficiency. For example, in Arizona, the Maricopa County Commercial Court
only handles complex business litigation, reducing the burden on the county court system. 9
alleviated criminal court backlogs.10 In a pilot program, Brooklyn (Kings County, New York)
increased felony case resolutions at six months by 11% through implementing truncated timelines
of court appearances and requiring case conferences between attorneys. 11 Harris County recently
announced a 21% decrease in its felony backlog since June 2021, accomplished through a triage
These reforms across the country demonstrate that the Legislature has opportunities to
alleviate court docket backlog without violating the Mississippi Constitution. To echo the
Plaintiffs’ brief: there are abundant, tested options to improve judicial efficiency that would still
allow residents of Hinds County to elect their own judges in conformity with the state constitution.
8
Lydia Hamblin & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Evaluation of the Civil Justice Initiative Pilot Project,
National Center for State Courts (Apr. 2019), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0013/26230/cjipp-final-evaluation-report.pdf.
9
Kauffman, supra note 5 at 4.
10
Prosecutor Backlog: Causes, Data, and Solutions, Prosecutor’s Center for Excellence (Jan. 13,
2021), https://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/20210113-Backlog-Causes-and-Solutions
-List-PCE-updated.pdf.
11
Joana Weill et al., Felony Case Delay: Lessons From a Pilot Project in Brooklyn, Center for
Justice Innovation at 36 (Mar. 2021), https://www.innovatingjustice.org/sites/default/files/media/
document/2021/Brooklyn_Project_Evaluation.3.29.2021.pdf.
12
Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg Reveals 21% Reduction of Case Backlog, Harris
County District Attorney Office (Apr. 12, 2023) https://www.harriscountyda.com/harris_
county_district_attorney_kim_ogg_reveals_21_reduction_of_case_backlog.
10
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons provided by Plaintiffs, this Court should
REVERSE the decision below and DECLARE that the provisions of HB 1020 and Section 9-1-
105(2) of the Mississippi Code calling for the appointment of judges and the creation of the CCID
Respectfully submitted,
Jonathan B. Miller*
Michael Adame*
Cristian Torres*
Public Rights Project
490 43rd Street, #115
Oakland, CA 94609
11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned attorney, do hereby certify that I have on this day caused the foregoing
to be filed using the MEC system, which sent notice to all counsel of record.
12