SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109410 August 28, 1996

CLARA M. BALATBAT, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses JOSE REPUYAN and AURORA
REPUYAN, respondents.

 TORRES, JR. , J.:p

Petitioner Clara M. Balatbat instituted this petition for review pursuant to Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the decision dated August 12,
1992 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 29994 entitled
"Alexandra Balatbat and Clara Balatbat, plaintiffs-appellants versus Jose Repuyan
and Aurora Repuyan, defendants-appellees", the dispositive portion of which
reads: 1

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the

modification that the awards of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and
P5,000.00 as costs of litigation are deleted.

SO ORDERED.

The records show the following factual antecedents:

It appears that on June 15, 1977, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for partition
docketed as Civil Case No. 109032 against Corazon Roque, Alberto de los Santos,
Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque and Osmundo Roque before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch IX. 2 Defendants therein were declared in default and
plaintiff presented evidence ex-parte. On March 29, 1979, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff Aurelio A. Roque, the pertinent portion of which
reads: 3

From the evidence, it has been clearly established that the lot in
question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51330 was
acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Rogue and Maria Mesina during their
conjugal union and the house constructed thereon was likewise built
during their marital union. Out of their union, plaintiff and Maria
Mesina had four children, who are the defendants in this case. When
Maria Mesina died on August 28, 1966, the only conjugal properties
left are the house and lot above stated of which plaintiff herein, as the
legal spouse, is entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof. With
respect to the one-half share pro-indiviso now forming the estate of
Maria Mesina, plaintiff and the four children, the defendants here, are
each entitled to one-fifth (1/5) share pro-indiviso. The deceased wife
left no debt.
 Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the
properties, subject matter of this case consisting of the house and lot,
in the following manner:

1. Of the house and lot forming the conjugal properties, plaintiff is

entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof while the other half
forms the estate of the deceased Maria Mesina;

2. Of the Estate of deceased Maria Mesina, the same is to be divided

into five (5) shares and plaintiff and his four children are entitled each
to one-fifth share thereof pro-indiviso.

Plaintiff claim for moral, exemplary and actual damages and

attorney's fees not having been established to the satisfaction of the
Court, the same is hereby denied.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

On June 2, 1979, the decision became final and executory. The corresponding
entry of judgment was made on March 29, 1979. 4

On October 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a Transfer Certificate

of Title No. 135671 in the name of the following persons in the following
proportions: 5

Aurelio A. Roque 6/10 share

Severina M. Roque 1/10 share
Osmundo M. Roque 1/10 share
Feliciano M. Roque 1/10 share
Corazon M. Roque 1/10 share

On April 1, 1980, Aurelio A. Rogue sold his 6/10 share in T.C.T. No. 135671 to
spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan as evidenced by ."Deed of
Absolute Sale." 6

On July 21, 1980, Aurora Tuazon Repuyan caused the annotation of her affidavit
of adverse claim 7 on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135671, 8 to wit:

Entry No. 5627/T-135671 — NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM —

Filed by Aurora Tuazon Repuyan, married, claiming among others
that she bought 6/10 portion of the property herein described from
Aurelio Roque for the amount of P50,000.00 with a down payment of
P5,000.00 and the balance of P45,000.00 to be paid after the partition
and subdivision of the property herein described, other claims set
forth in Doc. No. 954, page 18, Book 94 of ________________ 64
_______ PEDRO DE CASTRO, Notary Public of Manila.
 Date of instrument — July 21, 1980
Date of inscription — July 21, 1980 at 3:35 p.m.

TERE
SITA
H.
NOB
LEJA
S
Actin
g
Regist
er of
Deeds

By:

RAM
ON
D.
MAC
ARIC
AN
Actin
g
Secon
d
Deput
y

On August 20, 1980, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for "Rescission of

Contract" docketed as Civil Case No. 134131 against spouses Aurora Tuazon-
Repuyan and Jose Repuyan before Branch IV of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila. The complaint is grounded on spouses Repuyan's failure to pay the balance
of P45,000.00 of the purchase price. 9 On September 5, 1980, spouses Repuyan
filed their answer with counterclaim. 10

In the meantime, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. 109032 (Partition
case) dated February 2, 1982, to wit: 11

In view of all the foregoing and finding that the amount of

P100,000.00 as purchase price for the sale of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 51330 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila
consisting of 84 square meters situated in Callejon Sulu, District of
Santa Cruz, Manila, to be reasonable and fair, and considering the
opportunities given defendants to sign the deed of absolute sale
voluntarily, the Court has no alternative but to order, as it hereby
orders, the Deputy Clerk of this Court to sign the deed of absolute sale
for and in behalf of defendants pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 39 of the
 Rules of Court, in order to effect the partition of the property involved
in this case.

SO ORDERED.

A deed of absolute sale was executed on February 4, 1982 between Aurelio

S. Roque, Corazon Roque, Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque and Osmundo
Roque and Clara Balatbat, married to Alejandro Balatbat. 12On April 14,
1982, Clara Balatbat filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
which was granted by the trial court on September 14, 1982 "subject,
however, to valid rights and interest of third persons over the same portion
thereof, other than vendor or any other person or persons privy to or
claiming any rights or interests under it." The corresponding writ of
possession was issued on September 20, 1982. 13

On May 20, 1982, petitioner Clara Balatbat filed a motion to intervene in Civil
Case No. 134131 14 which was granted as per court's resolution of October 21,
1982. 15 However, Clara Balatbat failed to file her complaint in intervention. 16 On
April 15, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, the
pertinent portion of which reads: 17

The rescission of contracts are provided for in the laws and nowhere
in the provision of the Civil Code under the title Rescissible Contracts
does the circumstances in the case at bar appear to have occurred,
hence, the prayer for rescission is outside the ambit for which
rescissible [sic] could be granted.

The Intervenor — Plaintiff, Clara Balatbat, although allowed to

intervene, did not file her complaint in intervention.

Consequently, the plaintiff having failed to prove with sufficient

preponderance his action, the relief prayed for had to be denied. The
contract of sale denominated as "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exh. 7 and
sub-markings) being valid and enforceable, the same pursuant to the
provisions of Art. 1159 of the Civil Code which says:

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law

between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith.

has the effect of being the law between the parties and should be
complied with. The obligation of the plaintiff under the contract being
to have the land covered by TCT No. 135671 partitioned and
subdivided, and title issued in the name of the defendant buyer (see
page 2 par. C of Exh. 7-A) plaintiff had to comply thereto to give
effect to the contract.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against the plaintiff, Aurelio A.

Roque, and the plaintiff in intervention, Clara Balatbat, and in favor of
the defendants, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, and
 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1980 as valid and
enforceable and the plaintiff is, as he is hereby ordered, to partition
and subdivide the land covered by T.C.T. No. 135671, and to
aggregate therefrom a portion equivalent to 6/10 thereof, and cause
the same to be titled in the name of the defendants, and after which,
the defendants, and after which, the defendants, and after which, the
defendants, and after which, the defendants to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P45,000.00. Considering further that the defendants suffered
damages since they were forced to litigate unnecessarily, by way of
their counterclaim, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendants the
sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00.

Costs against plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

On March 3, 1987, petitioner Balatbat filed a notice of lis pendens in Civil Case
No. 109032 before the Register of Deeds of Manila. 18

On December 9, 1988, petitioner Clara Balatbat and her husband, Alejandro

Balatbat filed the instant complaint for delivery of the owners duplicate copy of
T.C.T. No. 135671 docketed as Civil Case No. 88-47176 before Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against private respondents Jose Repuyan and
Aurora Repuyan.19

On January 27, 1989, private respondents filed their answer with affirmative
defenses and compulsory counterclaim. 20

On November 13, 1989, private respondents filed their memorandum 21 while

petitioners filed their memorandum on November 23, 1989. 22

On August 2, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads : 23

Considering all the foregoing, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have
not been able to establish their cause of action against the defendants
and have no right to the reliefs demanded in the complaint and the
complaint of the plaintiff against the defendants is hereby
DISMISSED. On the counterclaim, the plaintiff are ordered to pay
defendants the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos by way of attorney's
fees, Five Thousand Pesos as costs of litigation and further to pay the
costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, petitioner Balatbat filed an appeal before the respondent Court of

Appeals which rendered the assailed decision on August 12, 1992, to wit: 24
 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the
modification that the awards of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and
P5,000.00 as costs of litigation are deleted.

SO ORDERED.

On March 22, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 25

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner raised the following issues for this Court's resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED SALE TO THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS WAS MERELY EXECUTORY AND NOT A
CONSUMMATED TRANSACTION?

II

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DOUBLE SALE AS

CONTEMPLATED UNDER ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE?

III

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS A BUYER IN GOOD

FAITH AND FOR VALUE?

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

GIVING WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHICH WERE NOT
OFFERED?

Petitioner asseverates that the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the appealed
judgment considering (1) that the alleged sale in favor of the private respondents
Repuyan was merely executory; (2) that there is no double sale; (3) that petitioner
is a buyer in good faith and for value; and (4) that private respondents did not offer
their evidence during the trial.

Contrary to petitioner's contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in favor of
private respondents Repuyan was merely executory for the reason that there was
no delivery of the subject property and that consideration/price was not fully paid,
we find the sale as consummated, hence, valid and enforceable. In a decision dated
April 15, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch IV in Civil Case No.
134131, the Court dismissed vendor's Aurelio Roque complaint for rescission of
the deed of sale and declared that the Sale dated April 1, 1980, as valid and
enforceable. No appeal having been made, the decision became final and
executory. It must be noted that herein petitioner Balatbat filed a motion for
intervention in that case but did not file her complaint in intervention. In that case
wherein Aurelio Roque sought to rescind the April 1, 1980 deed of sale in favor of
the private respondents for non-payment of the P45,000.00 balance, the trial court
dismissed the complaint for rescission. Examining the terms and conditions of the
"Deed of Sale" dated April 1, 1980, the P45,000.00 balance is payable only "after
the property covered by T.C.T. No. 135671 has been partitioned and subdivided,
and title issued in the name of the BUYER" hence, vendor Roque cannot demand
payment of the balance unless and until the property has been subdivided and titled
in the name of private respondents. Devoid of any stipulation that "ownership in
the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price" 26,
ownership in thing shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been
fully paid. The failure of the buyer has not yet been fully paid. The failure of the
buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest to the
seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to
Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. 27 Non-payment only creates a right to
demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract.

With respect to the non-delivery of the possession of the subject property to the
private respondent, suffice it to say that ownership of the thing sold is acquired
only from the time of delivery thereof, either actual or constructive. 28 Article 1498
of the Civil Code provides that — when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot be inferred. 29 The execution of the public instrument, without actual
delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the vendor to the vendee, who
may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same. 30 In the instant case,
vendor Roque delivered the owner's certificate of title to herein private respondent.
It is not necessary that vendee be physically present at every square inch of the
land bought by him, possession of the public instrument of the land is sufficient to
accord him the rights of ownership. Thus, delivery of a parcel of land may be done
by placing the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying
the sale in a public instrument (constructive). The provision of Article 1358 on the
necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a
parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. 31

A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the

parties. 32 Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for
the perfection of the contract; and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the
execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for lack of
consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the
vendor may exercise his legal remedies. 33

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides:

 If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be movable property, the ownership shall belong to the

person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry
of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the

person who in good faith was first in the possession and in the
absence thereof, to the person who present the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an
immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default
thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. 34

In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share in TCT No.
135671 to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980. Subsequently, the same
lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque (6/10) and his children (4/10),
represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, on February 4, 1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale
contemplated under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

This is an instance of a double sale of an immovable property hence, the ownership

shall vests in the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property. Evidently, private respondents Repuyan's caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property denominated as
Entry No. 5627/T-135671 on July 21, 1980. 35 The annotation of the adverse claim
on TCT No. 135671 in the Registry of Property is sufficient compliance as
mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world.

On the other hand, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens only on February 2,

1982. Accordingly, private respondents who first caused the annotation of the
adverse claim in good faith shall have a better right over herein petitioner.
Moreover, the physical possession of herein petitioners by virtue of a writ of
possession issued by the trial court on September 20, 1982 is "subject to the valid
rights and interest of third persons over the same portion thereof, other than vendor
or any other person or persons privy to or claiming any rights to interest under
it." 36 As between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor,
has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title even if the latter
is in actual possession of the immovable property. 37 Further, even in default of the
first registrant or first in possession, private respondents have presented the oldest
title. 38 Thus, private respondents who acquired the subject property in good faith
and for valuable consideration established a superior right as against the petitioner.

Evidently, petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. In the

complaint for rescission filed by vendor Aurelio Roque on August 20, 1980, herein
petitioner filed a motion for intervention on May 20, 1982 but did not file her
complaint in intervention, hence, the decision was rendered adversely against her.
If petitioner did investigate before buying the land on February 4, 1982, she should
have known that there was a pending case and an annotation of adverse claim was
made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds and she could have
discovered that the subject property was already sold to the private respondents. It
is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to ask for the delivery of the owner's
duplicate copy of the title from the vendor. A purchaser of a valued piece of
property cannot just close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith and under the belief that
there were no defect in the title of the vendor. 39 One who purchases real estate
with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an
interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of
facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or
the want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a
state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens
or signs. 40

In fine, petitioner had nobody to blame but herself in dealing with the disputed
property for failure to inquire or discover a flaw in the title to the property, thus, it
is axiomatic that — culpa lata dolo aequiparatur — gross negligence is equivalent
to intentional wrong.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this petition for review is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.