Democratization

ISSN: 1351-0347 (Print) 1743-890X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Against the Odds: Deviant Cases of

Democratization

Renske Doorenspleet & Petr Kopecký

To cite this article: Renske Doorenspleet & Petr Kopecký (2008) Against the Odds: Deviant Cases
of Democratization, Democratization, 15:4, 697-713, DOI: 10.1080/13510340802191045

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340802191045

Published online: 21 Jul 2008.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 3302

View related articles

Citing articles: 2 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fdem20
 Against the Odds: Deviant Cases
of Democratization

R E N S K E D O O R E N S P L E E T a n d P E T R K O P E C K Ý

Economic development and diffusion effects appear to exert substantial influence on the
success of democratization. However, large-N quantitative studies also show that there are
some ‘outliers’, or ‘deviant’ cases, which do not fit the general pattern and cannot be explained
by existing theories and models. It appears that deviant cases of democratization include Costa
Rica and India (since the 1940s), Botswana (since the 1960s) and Benin and Mongolia (since
the 1990s). This introduction focuses on important conceptual, theoretical, and methodological
problems involved when studying them. We first look at the highly contested concept of
democracy and place ‘deviant democracies’ in the framework of a minimal definition of
democracy and transition waves. We also provide a working definition for two other highly
contested concepts – democratic transition and democratic consolidation. We then go on to
briefly review existing general theories of democratization. By doing so, we lay the ground
for specifying more precisely the level of ‘deviancy’ of our cases, and offer potential expla-
nations for their unusually successful process of democratization. Finally, we outline the
nested mixed method, the logic of which we follow in this special issue.

Key words: economic development; diffusion; transition; consolidation; deviant cases; nested
mixed method

Introduction
Democracy has become the widely accepted norm within the international commu-
nity. States seeking international legitimacy are increasingly forced to embrace
democratic forms of governance, or else may face sanctions from the international
community, including exclusion from international negotiations. The diplomatic
row over the possible exclusion of Zimbabwe’s embattled President Robert
Mugabe from the European-African Union Summit in December 2007 is a good
example of the current international climate. Democracy also features prominently
on the foreign policy agenda of most western countries, including that of the
United States under George W. Bush’s two administrations. Yet, despite this
recent global democratic spirit, the idea that democracy can take root in every soil
is disputed: structural factors do matter.1 Human beings – political leaders, activists,
citizens, or foreign donors – act within a political, social and economic context that

Renske Doorenspleet is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the
University of Warwick, United Kingdom. She is also director of the Centre for Studies in Democratization.
Petr Kopecký is a Research Fellow of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), based
at Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Democratization, Vol.15, No.4, August 2008, pp.697– 713
ISSN 1351-0347 print/1743-890X online
DOI: 10.1080/13510340802191045 # 2008 Taylor & Francis
698 DEMOCRATIZATION

may be more or less favourable for democracy. There is strong evidence, for example,
which shows that economic factors and the presence of democratic neighbours have
substantially increased the probability of a regime becoming democratic.
However, there are important exceptions to this general pattern. These are what
we call ‘deviant democracies:’ countries that have seemingly beaten the odds and
democratized within an unfavourable structural setting. Within the so-called fourth
wave of democratization, from 1989 onwards, Benin and Mongolia represent
primary examples of deviant cases of democratization.2 Prior to this time, other
historical examples can be found: Costa Rica and India since the late 1940s, and
Botswana since the 1960s. These political systems meet the minimal criteria for
democracy3 in that they have competitive elections and inclusive suffrage. They
are ‘deviant democracies,’ however, because they lack the standard ‘requisites’ for
democracy mentioned by the modernization perspective4 and, at the same time,
they have become democratic while neighbouring countries remained undemocratic.
Deviant democracies have democratized against the odds. The collection of
articles in this special issue aims to provide a better understanding of the exceptional
and anomalous nature of democratization in these countries. It is the first time that
these special cases from different parts of the world and from different periods of
time have been brought together under a single analytical framework in order to
draw out similarities and differences in their unusual paths towards democratization.
Ultimately, the aim of the collection is to contribute to existing theories of democra-
tization by providing a more refined explanation for democratic regime change, one
which puts structural explanations alongside a systematic focus on the role of leader-
ship, civil society, and political institutions.
This paper aims to embed the five country case studies in a broader comparative
context by focusing on important conceptual, definitional, and theoretical problems
in the study of ‘deviant cases of democratization’. We first look at the highly contested
concept of democracy, and place ‘deviant democracies’ in the framework of a minimal
definition of democracy and transition waves. We provide a working definition for two
other highly contested concepts, democratic transition and democratic consolidation,
which are used as the starting point of the empirical analysis in all the country case
studies. We then go on briefly to examine existing theories of democratization.
This, in turn, will enable us both to specify more precisely the level of ‘deviancy’ of
our cases, and to offer potential explanations for their unusually successful processes
of democratization. Finally, we summarize the nested mixed method, the logic of
which we follow in this special issue. By outlining the generic theoretical, conceptual,
and methodological basis of this project on deviant democracies, we aim to provide a
general analytical framework for the subsequent articles on specific deviant cases.

Democracy, Transition, Consolidation, and the Waves of Democratization

Defining Democracy
Democracy is a highly contested concept. T. S. Eliot once wrote that ‘when a term has
become so universally sanctified as “democracy” now is, I begin to wonder whether it
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 699

means anything, in meaning too many things’.5 There is undoubtedly a lack of

consensus on the meaning of democracy. Illustrative of this conceptual chaos are
the results of a comprehensive literature review conducted by David Collier and
Steven Levitsky, in which they identify more than 550 subtypes of democracy in
about 150 different studies.6 In common with many other studies of democratization,
and as a starting point for classifying our deviant cases as democracies, we have opted
for a minimal definition of democracy in this collection, as originally outlined by
Joseph Schumpeter. According to this minimalist, procedural notion, democracy is
a system of government in which citizens choose their political leaders in periodic
elections, thereby giving their leaders the right to rule after the elections.7
Joseph Schumpeter’s procedural definition has significantly affected the concep-
tualizations of minimal democracy, especially in the field of quantitative research on
democracy and democratization. Robert Dahl developed one of the first cross-
national classifications of democratic regimes, relying heavily on Schumpeter’s
ideas. Dahl regarded government responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens,
who are considered as political equals, as a key characteristic of democracy. Such
responsiveness requires citizens to have opportunities to formulate their preferences,
to express these preferences to their fellow citizens and to the government by indi-
vidual and collective action, and to have them weighed equally in the conduct of
the government, that is to say, weighed with no discrimination because of content
or source of preference.8
Dahl presents a theoretical scale which allows for different political regimes to be
ranked. He contends that, upon closer examination, there are two main theoretical
dimensions of democracy: competition and inclusive suffrage. Focusing on the com-
petition dimension, Dahl explains that regimes have varied in the extent to which
various guarantees of competition are openly available, publicly employed, and
fully guaranteed to some members of the political system. Regimes may differ
according to the extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political
competition. Since a regime might permit opposition to a very small proportion of
the population, Dahl argues that a second dimension, reflecting the right to participate
in public contestation, or inclusive suffrage, is needed in order to classify a regime as
democratic. He emphasizes that there is no country in which these conditions are per-
fectly met; therefore, he prefers the term ‘polyarchies’ for political systems in which
the conditions are sufficiently met, and retains the term ‘democracy’ for the ideal
type.
Based on Dahl’s ideas, democracy is defined in this collection of essays as a type
of political regime in which there exists: 1) competition; i.e. institutions and pro-
cedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative
policies at the national level, as well as institutionalized constraints on the exercise
of power by the executive; 2) inclusive suffrage; i.e. the right to participate in the
selection of national leaders and policies. Conversely, non-democratic regimes are
defined as political regimes that fail to meet either the first requirement of compe-
tition and/or the second requirement of inclusiveness.9
Despite the recent global resurgence of ‘polyarchies’, we are of course far from
subscribing to the ‘end of history’, as suggested by Francis Fukuyama.10 Indeed,
700 DEMOCRATIZATION

many of the new democratic regimes, which emerged during the last two decades, can
be characterized by inclusive suffrage and competition but, at the same time, by
insufficient protection of civil and political liberties.11 In addition, as O’Donnell
pointed out in an influential essay, many of the long enduring polyarchies also
feature clientelism, particularism, and executive dominance, all of which severely
undermine both the horizontal accountability among the institutions and the adher-
ence to the formal rules of the democratic game.12 Consequently, Linz and Stepan
have argued that one of the more interesting subfields of contemporary democratiza-
tion studies is the focus on the rich variety of new polyarchies; i.e. regimes that fall
within the bounds of a minimal definition of democracy, but that differ in the level of
practical compliance with democratic rules.13
Clearly, minimal democracy or electoral democracy14 may be deepened into a
democratic regime which is not only competitive and inclusive, but also displays
no major violations of civil and political liberties, has little or no endemic corruption
that undermines state institutions, and ensures the rule of law for all citizens. Minimal
or electoral democracies can overcome some of the deficiencies that frequently
plague them, and may eventually develop into fully-fledged liberal democracies.
But it is, of course, equally possible that no progress from an electoral towards a
liberal democracy is made or, worse, that an electoral democracy sinks back into
some form of authoritarianism. The cases in this collection have all been minimal
democracies, although not all have necessarily developed into liberal democracies.
In other words, despite being located on different continents, having different
levels of economic and social development, and having different sizes of population,
all the countries in this collection share a successful transition to a minimal democ-
racy. Arguably, most have also succeeded in the process of democratic consolidation.

Transition and Consolidation

At this point it is necessary to introduce the distinction between transition to democ-
racy and consolidation of democracy, and clarify both terms for the purposes of
empirical analysis. This is all the more important given that we have included
three historical cases of democratization, namely Costa Rica, India, and Botswana,
in this collection of articles. None of these cases have been analysed, certainly not
at the time they democratized, with the use of the same two analytical concepts.
Indeed, it is the literature on the third wave of democratization (see below) that
sees the emergence and subsequent frequent usage of these two analytical concepts,
through the pioneering work of Rustow and, later, of O’Donnell and Schmitter.15 In
most of the contemporary democratization literature, the terms refer to different
phases of the process of democratization, though there is a huge debate about their
exact meaning and their empirical indicators and measures.16
In accordance with the original literature, we understand transition as the interval
between the dissolution of the old regime and the installation of a new regime.17
Transitions are processes involving often inconclusive and uncertain struggles
about the fundamental direction of regime change. These processes are delimited
on both ends by different (types of) regimes: if successful, this came to mean an
authoritarian regime on the one end, and a democratic regime on the other.18
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 701

Transition to democracy is considered to be completed when an agreement on

democratic rules is reached successfully.19 Empirically, this usually, but does not
necessarily always have to, includes the adoption of a new constitution and the
successful organization of the first free elections.
It is important to note that the study of transition, i.e. ‘transitology’ proper, is not
supposed to indicate exactly what kind of democracy is to emerge, or how deeply
rooted or stable it will be, even though some scholars will argue that a particular
mode of transition will have an effect on the subsequent process of consolidation.20
Transition studies are less concerned with the persistence or quality of democracy,
and more with the struggle over the fundamental direction of political change, where
the main fault lines lie between democracy and autocracy. Studies of transition thus
provide insights into the political dynamics in the initial stages of political change
and gauge the outcomes of this process in broad generic terms. Since we adopt a
minimal definition of democracy in this collection, it is then to this minimal or electoral
democracy that the notion of transition should analytically be linked.
In contrast to transition, the essence of consolidation is generally agreed to be
defining and fixing the core rules of democratic competition,21 in other words, trans-
forming the set of democratic rules and institutions agreed upon in the transition
phase into regular, acceptable, and predictable patterns.22 In terms of outcomes,
the process of democratic consolidation is delimited on both ends by different
types of democracies: non-institutionalized and unstable democracies versus institu-
tionalized and stable democracies. Studies of democratic consolidation are thus con-
cerned only with different (sub-)types of democracies, rather than with different types
of political regimes. Moreover, by definition, processes of democratic consolidation
can only start after transition to democracy has been successfully completed, even
though in practice these processes may be partly overlapping. This means that any
outcome of political change that is not a minimal democracy in the first place, i.e.
partial or derailed transitions, should fall under the bounds of transition studies and
not consolidation studies.
However, to judge when a country has achieved full democratic consolidation
remains a complex issue. Many authors working on Latin America and Southern
Europe used to speak of consolidated democracy when all politically significant
groups adhered to democratic rules of the game.23 Consolidated democracy was
thus understood primarily in terms of the political actors’ behavioural compliance
with the minimal procedural requirements of democracy. Others have later introduced
a more substantive definition of democratic consolidation, and of democracy, insist-
ing that not only must the main political actors comply with democratic rules of the
game, but these rules must also be seen as legitimate by the actors themselves and by a
large section of the public.24 Yet others have added specific rules and organizations
and their particular features, for example, a vibrant civil society or institutionalized
political parties and party systems, as a precondition of democratic consolidation,25
creating very complex definitions and corresponding empirical measurements.
Indeed, as Schedler has argued, many of the more recent notions of democratic
consolidation extend the definition to include the completing, deepening, and
organizing of democracy, rather than referring only to regime continuity, in other
702 DEMOCRATIZATION

words, avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic erosion, as in most

classical meanings.26 This has not only created a huge conceptual confusion, but has
also resulted in consolidation becoming a ‘garbage can’ concept lacking a core
meaning. We agree with Schedler that democratic consolidation should not be
defined with excessive expectations, by including everything that we might like to
see in a new democracy. Consolidation should not be linked to the deepening or orga-
nizing of democracy, but rather, should be restricted to avoiding democratic break-
down and erosion. Importantly, consolidation should be linked to the same
(minimal) definition of democracy that allowed the country to be classified as
having completed the transition phase successfully. Consequently, ‘consolidated
democracy’ in our understanding denotes a minimal or electoral democracy that
has already lasted for some period of time, and that can be expected to last into
the future.
This said, it is important to realize that consolidation does not guarantee that a
democracy will be immune to political crises, ethnic tensions, and other sorts of
potentially destabilizing events. It is equally important to realize, however, that a
crisis of the state is not necessarily the same as a crisis of democracy. Many estab-
lished democracies have come to face enormous difficulties in recent years, in the
form of ethnic tensions, civilian unrest, declining levels of political participation,
erosion of trust in the political class, or increasing levels of corruption. Because of
the use of (excessively) demanding definitions, countless similar tribulations of
democracy are collapsed under the problems of consolidation in the new democracies
or, even worse, are interpreted as signs of non-consolidation of these democracies.
But if we expect a new democracy to last into the future, these problems might as
well be interpreted as pressures for further change, and as signs of the major successes
in creating open democratic societies. In other words, these problems should be part
of the broader study of the functioning or quality of democracy, rather than the more
narrow study of the consolidation of democracy.

Waves of Transitions
The transitions among our ‘deviant cases of democratization’ took place during
several periods in history. Especially since the publication of Samuel Huntington’s
influential study of democratization, scholars have come to take for granted the
notion that the spread of democracy has come in waves, with bursts of progress
being succeeded by quite substantial reversals, and with the pattern of flow and
ebb marking a less than optimistic two-step forwards, one-step backwards pattern.27
It is clear that there has been a significant wave of democratization since 1974,
and an explosion of democratization since 1989. Previous study showed, however,
that, with the exception of the first wave of transition to democracy (until 1924),
Huntington’s other waves could not be distinguished clearly.28 The first reverse
wave, between 1924 and 1944, and the second wave of democratization, during
the mid-1940s and 1950s, are neither significant nor convincing. Moreover, there
is no clear second reverse wave of democratization which, according to Huntington,
should have been apparent between 1957 and 1973. In fact, this period is better
described as one of trendless fluctuation, in which there are waves of both
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 703

authoritarianism and democracy.29 In comparison with previous ‘waves,’ the third

wave of democratization, from 1974 until 1989, has been more global and more
impressive than earlier ones. Finally, the fourth wave, from 1989 onwards, has
been the most impressive. No earlier wave has contained such a large number of
democratic transitions.30
The five cases in the present collection are interesting because they represent tran-
sitions towards democracy during different periods in history. First, Costa Rica’s
change of regime occurred during the second wave of democratization, in the late
1940s. This short wave began with the Allied victory in World War II, and continued
until approximately 1960. Allied occupation promoted the installation of democratic
institutions in West Germany, Japan, and Finland. Second, India’s transition to
democracy also occurred at this time, specifically, in the late 1940s. Furthermore,
after an interruption and transition period, Austria and Italy became democratic.
The competitive systems of Belgium and France allowed women to vote after the
war, resulting in democracies; Turkey, too, became a democracy at this time.
Czechoslovakia was a democracy before the war, experienced an interruption
period during the war, and became a non-democracy following the coup orchestrated
under Soviet pressure in 1948.
Third, Botswana became a minimal democracy in the early 1960s. Huntington
insisted that this period be best described as the second reverse wave in which
many democracies became authoritarian: ‘The global swing away from democracy
in the 1960s and early 1970s was impressive’, he states. There is, however, no solid
evidence of a second reverse wave.31 There is no clear group of transitions from
democratic to non-democratic regimes that significantly outnumber transitions in
the opposite direction. It can better be described as an intermezzo, in which transitions
to both non-democratic regimes and democracy occurred. In this period, Colombia
and Venezuela became democracies, for example. The polarized Chilean democracy
was overthrown by a military coup in 1973 led by General Augusto Pinochet, and 17
years of repressive rule by a rightist military regime followed. Another military coup
ended democracy in Uruguay. And although the electoral victory of Peronism over the
Radical Party in 1973 paved the way for a transition to civilian rule in Argentina, a
military coup followed and toppled the government headed by Peron’s widow. In
Pakistan, in 1958, President Iskander Mirza dissolved the assemblies, abrogated the
constitution, and declared martial law in the country, inviting General Ayub Khan
to assist him as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Turkey’s second attempt at democ-
racy started in 1961, and was again interrupted by military intervention from 1971
until 1973. In short, the period in which Botswana democratized was very volatile,
without a clear wave of democracy or non-democracy.
Finally, Benin and Mongolia democratized during the fourth wave, which started
in the late 1980s. While many countries had already made a transition to democracy
during the third wave, from the mid 1970s till the late 1980s, the fourth wave has been
an even more impressive period of democratization. The movement towards demo-
cracy since 1989 was overwhelming and global. At the end of the 1980s, a wave
swept through Eastern Europe and the first democratic elections in Hungary and
Poland led to non-communist governments. Russia began to liberalize at the same
704 DEMOCRATIZATION

time, and the communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania
collapsed. The 1990s also saw a widespread and rapid collapse of non-democratic
regimes in Africa, where more than a dozen democracies emerged. The end of the
Cold War seems to have provided a ‘window of opportunity’ to democratize, not
only in Europe, but also in Africa and Asia. Benin and Mongolia were among the
numerous regimes that democratized during this period, with the former country at
the forefront of democratization efforts on the African continent.

Theoretical Explanations of Democratization

We have established working definitions of democracy, and of transition and conso-
lidation of democracy. We also know in which historical contexts our country cases
have made the transition to democracy. But what do we exactly mean by ‘deviant
democracies’? Before answering this question, we must briefly pay attention to
some established theoretical explanations of why some countries make the transition
to democracy, while others do not, and why some countries succeed in sustaining and
developing their democracy, and others do not.

Economic Development
The initial impetus for the empirical quantitative studies of democratization was
Lipset’s 1959 article, which later turned out to be of crucial importance for the rise
of studies on the relationship between economic development and democracy.
Lipset argued that when the people of a country enjoy a higher level of economic
development, they will be more inclined to believe in democratic values and will
support a democratic system. Only in a relatively wealthy society can a situation
exist in which
the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could
develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irre-
sponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished mass
and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy . . . or in tyranny.32
This hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between economic develop-
ment and democracy has been replicated many times,33 and a positive correlation
between economic development and democracy has been a persistent finding in
such empirical quantitative studies. Indeed, even scholars belonging to the qualitative
research tradition have acknowledged that:
the main finding of cross-national statistical work – a positive, though not
perfect, correlation between capitalist development and democracy – must
stand as an accepted result. There is no way of explaining this robust finding,
replicated in many studies of different designs, as spurious effect of flawed
methods. Any theory of democracy must come to terms with it.34
Consequently, taking the positive relationship between economic development and
democracy as a base line, many scholars, such as Inglehart, tend to conclude that
the level of economic development also ‘helps predict which countries are most
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 705

likely to become democratic’.35 In a similar vein, Diamond argues that ‘the more
well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favour,
achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country’.36
While such scholars are generally regarded as operating within the moderniz-
ation paradigm, it is also important to point out that many have not made the dis-
tinction between transitions to democracy, on the one hand, and consolidation of
democracy, on the other, as outlined above. For example, Inglehart has implied
that economic development predicts transitions, while Diamond has positively
linked economic development to both transition and consolidation.37 It is arguable,
however, that many factors, including the level of economic development, which
might help in maintaining democracy (i.e. consolidation), are not necessarily the
same as the factors that brought democracy into existence in the first place (i.e.
transition).
Huntington was one of the first scholars working in the quantitative research
tradition to deal with the impact of economic development specifically on democratic
transitions. He argued that transitions to democracy are unlikely in poor countries,
and that they had typically occurred in rich countries. The empirical results
showed that during the so-called third wave of democratization, from 1974 till
1990, countries in the middle-income zone were most likely to make a transition to
democracy: ‘[A]s countries develop economically and move into this zone, they
become prospects for democratization’.38 Gasiorowski made a similar claim, his find-
ings supporting Lipset’s argument that economic development increases the likeli-
hood of democratic transitions from 1950 till 1990.39
These findings have not gone unchallenged, however. For example, a study
by Przeworski and others has suggested that there is no significant relationship
between economic development and transition to democracy at all, and that democ-
racies are likely to emerge at any level of economic development.40 The conventional
wisdom about a straightforward relationship between economic development and
political change has also been tested by the experiences of Eastern European
countries, which began their transition from communist regimes to democracy
amidst economic crisis and generally declining levels of economic development.41
Boix and Stokes, in turn, have reassessed Przeworski and Limongi’s findings that
economic development does not play a significant role in transitions away from
autocracy.42 Their study has convincingly challenged and criticized Przeworski
and Limongi’s results, and argues that economic development does substantially
increase the probability that a country will make a transition to democracy. They
also argue that development has a much bigger positive effect on the likelihood of
maintaining a democratic regime. All in all, therefore, it is fair to accept on the
basis of the abovementioned studies that economic development has a positive
impact both on transitions to democracy and on democratic consolidation.

Democratic Region
The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe since 1989 seem to show that countries are
both dependent on each other and influence one another during the process of
democratization. Once the non-communists came to power in Poland in August
706 DEMOCRATIZATION

1989, the breakdown of non-democratic communist regimes swept through Eastern

Europe, reaching first Hungary in September 1989, then East Germany in October,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in November, and Romania in December. The
‘disease’ of democracy seemed to spread contagiously. As one citizen of the
former East Germany remarked: ‘We saw what Poland and Hungary were doing.
We heard Gorbachev. Everyone felt, why are we being left behind?’43
Why not us? Everyone knew from his or her neighbour’s experience that tran-
sition to democracy was a possibility. Not only in Eastern Europe, but also in parts
of Africa and Asia, a diffusion or demonstration effect seemed operative. These pro-
cesses of diffusion and demonstration encouraged elites and civil society groups to
press for change towards democracy. Hence, democratization occurs not only in
temporal, but also in spatial clusters. Countries seem to affect each other; living in
a democratic region in particular has a positive impact on the chance that your
regime will make a transition to democracy.
Indeed, ever since the transitions during the third wave of democratization took
place, many theorists have sought to include the influence of democratic clustering
in their research.44 Linz and Stepan, for example, emphasized this influence during
democratization processes, positing that ‘the more tightly coupled a group of
countries are, the more a successful transition in any country in the group will tend
to transform the range of perceived political alternatives for the rest of the group’.
Indeed, they continued, ‘international diffusion effects can change political expec-
tations, crowd behaviour, and relations of power within the regime almost over-
night’.45 Lipset concluded that a ‘diffusion, a contagion, or demonstration effect
seems operative, as many have noted, one that encourages democracies to press for
change and authoritarian rulers to give in’.46
Based on these theoretical ideas, cross-national empirical studies show indeed
that there is a clear clustering of democratization around the world.47 In his quanti-
tative large-N study on the impact of economic crises on democracy, Gasiorowski
also paid attention to the possible ‘demonstration effects’ of democratic neigh-
bours.48 He was one of the first political scientists who incorporated this variable
in a multivariate model, and discovered that it was significant and strong; not only
during the transition phase, but also for the consolidation of the new democracy.
The findings that democratic neighbours facilitated both transition to and consoli-
dation of democracy were quite novel, but unfortunately not many studies have
followed to study this topic and to replicate this result.
The few that have, however, tell the same story. The study by O’Loughlin and
his co-authors provides strong and consistent evidence that there is a spatial cluster-
ing of regime types.49 Democracies are likely to be found in regions with other
democracies, while non-democratic regimes also form a strong spatial constellation.
In addition, Kopstein and Reilly have shown that democratic diffusion mattered,
and especially that the geographical distance from the west seemed to have played
a role in the diffusion and transformation of the post-communist world.50 They
claimed that their statistical analyses even showed that ‘location matters more than
domestic politics itself’51 in determining outcomes such as establishing or consolidat-
ing a democratic regime. Finally, Doorenspleet has shown that democratic
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 707

neighbours do indeed have a strong and positive influence on the likelihood that
a country undertakes a democratic transition, especially during the fourth wave
since 1989.52
However, while the evidence of this correlation is convincing, the mechanisms
are not so clear. Not much has been written yet about why clustering of types of
political regimes might occur. Elkins and Simmons suggest three explanations.53
First, countries respond similarly, though independently, to similar domestic con-
ditions. This explanation is dominant in comparative politics and international politi-
cal economy, and states that countries democratize because of political and economic
pressures within their countries, and that these pressures exist simultaneously for
leaders in other countries. A second explanation for the clustering is that regime
change and consolidation are coordinated by a group of nations, a hegemonic
power, or an international organization.54 Examples of this type might include volun-
tary international cooperation, or coercion by donor countries or international finan-
cial organizations. A third explanation of the clustering of regime types is that there is
uncoordinated interdependence between the countries, what Elkins and Simmons
explicitly call ‘diffusion’.55 The actions and choices of one country affect another,
but not through direct cooperation or imposition. Instead, the kind of interdependence
is uncoordinated. Examples of this type are not only adaptation to altered conditions,
but also diffusion via the exchange of information or learning.
More research needs to be done in order to find out whether these three expla-
nations of clustering can be supported by empirical evidence, and whether we can
get more insights into the specific mechanisms that lie behind the strong finding
that there is spatial clustering of democratic regimes. It seems widely accepted,
though, that a non-democratic regime that is surrounded by democratic neighbours
will be more likely to collapse and make a transition to democracy and vice versa.
Whether the presence or absence of democratic neighbours also encourages or
hinders the process of democratic consolidation remains underinvestigated, although
preliminary research does indicate a strong impact on democratic consolidation as
well.56 In other words, empirical evidence shows that there is a clear spatial clustering
of democratization around the world. Non-democratic countries that are surrounded
by democracies are much more likely to make a transition and to consolidate than
non-democratic countries in a non-democratic region.

Other Explanations of Democratization

Both modernization theory and ideas concerning the diffusion of democracy belong
to the group of structural accounts of democratization. Modernization theory in par-
ticular came under sustained attack during the 1970s and 1980s with the emergence of
a new agency-based theoretical school which focused on the role of political elites in
triggering the downfall of non-democratic regimes. Although Rustow is considered to
be the pioneer of this theoretical school, it was not until the book by O’Donnell and
Schmitter in 1986, portraying transitions to democracy as a range of contingencies
within a setting of regime uncertainty,57 that this school of thought has become
more salient. In contrast to the overly deterministic accounts of modernization
theory, therefore, actor-based perspectives emphasize the role of agents (principally
708 DEMOCRATIZATION

of political elites), relatively unconstrained by the structural environment in which

they operate.
Many other accounts in this theoretical tradition have subsequently refined and
tested numerous propositions, specifically concerning the role of different political
actors (e.g. regime elites and opposition counter-elites) in both the transition to
and the consolidation of democracy.58 This theorizing also includes propositions
linking the mode of transitions (e.g. pacts, reforms and ruptures) with the subsequent
problems of democratic consolidation.59 Finally, the agency-based school also inspired
influential thinking relating the type of non-democratic regime (e.g. the distinction
between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes) to the mode transition,60 opening up
a whole new field of so-called ‘path dependent’ explanations of democratization.61
Although it is clear that ‘path dependencies’ are no longer strictly non-structural
theories of political change, the role of political agency still features much more pro-
minently in these accounts than in either modernization theory or the theory of value
(democratic) diffusion. One partial exception to these trends of emphasizing the role
of agency are the writings on institutional design, most notably the debates about the
relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems and of different electoral
systems, which are quite prominent within the consolidation literature.62 Institutions
are structures by definition and they often evolve in piecemeal, ‘path dependent’
fashion. However, it is interesting to note that much of the literature on institutional
choices in new democracies is as much concerned with the constraining and distribu-
tive effects of institutions as it is with the role, perceptions and expectations of those
who design these institutions. In this latter respect, the role of agents again becomes
crucial in understanding the process of democratization.
All in all, therefore, it should be clear from this cursory overview that the
democratization literature generally tends to gravitate between the relative expla-
natory weight assigned to structures (socio-economic, cultural or institutional)
and agents (elites, parties, counter-elites, civil society etc.), often resulting in
problems of causal inference. This is true for both the transition literature and
the consolidation literature, though arguably, and in sharp contrast to the original
democratization literature, it is now the literature on consolidation that tends to
emphasize the role of structural factors in determining outcomes. In any case, if
we are right about the nature of ‘deviant cases of democratization’, then logically
non-structural explanations should carry more weight in shedding light on these
successful cases of transition to and consolidation of democracy. However, like
most contemporary scholars of democratization, we are sceptical about singular
explanations. Indeed, if nothing else, we hope that our collection helps to achieve
a better integration of structure- and agency-based explanations into a single
explanatory framework.63

Methodological Path: The Mixing of Methods

It is our view that an important strength of this special issue is the methodological
approach that has been employed. We follow the logic of one of the most promising
recent methodological developments in comparative politics and international
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 709

studies, that is, mixed methods in research designs.64 Indeed, there is a specific type
of mixed methods that is particularly interesting for political science, namely the
nested design as advocated by Lieberman and by Brady, Collier, and Seawright.65
The research process of nested analysis, which is defined by Lieberman as a
research design that involves the structured combination of statistical and case
study methods, involves two crucial steps.66 The first step of nested analysis is,
formally, a quantitative analysis or a large-N analysis. The preliminary quantitative
analyses provide insights into various plausible factors that might explain the
phenomenon of interest, and guides the further execution of the small-N analysis.
The second step involves the intensive analysis of one or more cases, the small-N
analysis. One of the possibilities is thus to study outliers (or deviant cases) in order
to discover new explanatory variables. So, if the results of the large-N studies are
not entirely satisfactory, then the goal of the case study approach is to build a
better explanatory model. The purpose of case studies is, hence, to increase the expla-
natory power and the robustness of the results of large-N quantitative studies.
An important advantage of the nested mixed method is that it may contribute to
theory development. Lieberman argues that small-N analysis can strengthen statisti-
cal analysis in two ways: by a stronger test of the statistical model and by contributing
to model-building. The promise of the nested research design is that small-N and
large-N analyses can inform each other in such a way that ‘the analytic payoff is
greater than the sum of the parts’.67
Although this method shows a lot of potential to increase our understanding of
core topics in political science, unfortunately there is a lack of studies that have
applied this method.68 This special issue follows an innovative path by mixing find-
ings from both quantitative and qualitative research in a way similar to the approach
employed by Rueschemeyer et al. in their influential book on democratization.69
First, although we do not perform our own large-N analysis, we rely on various
pre-existing quantitative studies and identify the general pattern, as has been done
in this introductory article. On the basis of such quantitative research, it appears
that both economic development and democratic diffusion play a role during the
phases of transition and consolidation. Although it is important to point out that
other factors such as class structure, economic dependency, and political culture
explain processes of democratization to some extent as well, the factors of economic
development and diffusion clearly are the most powerful ones.70 However, these
large-N studies also show that there are some ‘outliers’ or deviant cases, which do
not fit into the general pattern, and cannot be explained by the general theories and
models. The case studies in this issue – Costa Rica, Botswana, India, Mongolia,
and Benin – are examples of such deviant cases.
Therefore, second, we perform a small-N qualitative analysis, as will be done in
each of the following country articles. The goal of each individual case study is to
specify in what ways the country is an ‘outlier’, using data on economic development,
together with a short analysis of ‘democracy’ in the country’s regional context.
Importantly, each case analysis is geared towards detecting important variables
that can explain the unexpected transition to and consolidation of democracy. It is
then the goal of the concluding chapter to provide a synthesis and outline how
710 DEMOCRATIZATION

these individual explanations will increase the explanatory power and the robustness
of the results of large-N quantitative studies, and contribute in turn to theory building.

Conclusion
Numerous studies have convincingly shown that structural factors matter in the process
of democratization. Among these structural factors, it is above all the level of economic
development and the presence or absence of democratic neighbours that have had most
impact on a country’s prospects for democratization. However, there are countries that
have experienced, in various historical periods, a successful transition to democracy in
a structural context that may be considered to be unfavourable for both the launching
and the sustaining of this process of political change. Their level of economic develop-
ment was low and they were surrounded by non-democratic neighbours at the time
their own non-democratic regimes began to crumble. Yet, after transitions of different
lengths, they successfully constructed a new competitive and inclusive political
regime – i.e. a minimal or electoral democracy. Moreover, most of these countries
have also succeeded in consolidating their new democratic order; i.e. they have
sustained their minimal or electoral democracies well beyond the initial period of
transition and the first free democratic elections. They may not be perfect democracies
by western liberal democratic standards, but they represent a success story that is or
was quite unusual given the context in which their transitions took place.
As we have specified in this introduction, such deviant cases of democratization
include Costa Rica and India, which made their transition to democracy during the
second wave of democratization following the end of World War II; Botswana,
which experienced successful transition in the 1960s; and Benin and Mongolia,
which managed to make the transition to democracy in the early 1990s during the
more recent fourth wave of democratization. All these countries can be considered
as ‘democracies against the odds’. In other words, they do not fit the expectations of
modernization and diffusion theories. In the light of the exceptional and anomalous
nature of democratization in these countries, the articles that follow this introductory
article aim to bring a better understanding of political change in those deviant cases.
The collection also represents an opportunity to refine existing accounts of democra-
tization by integrating non-structural factors into explanations of political change.
Indeed, the theoretical outlook of this collection, as well as the employment of
generic concepts and working definitions that we outlined in this introduction,
should help to overcome the usual problems involved in comparing such vastly differ-
ent countries across time and space, as well as the different time periods in which these
deviant cases occurred.

NOTES

1. Cf. Renske Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources During the
Fourth Wave (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).
2. Renske Doorenspleet, ‘Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization’, World Politics, Vol. 52, No.
3 (2000), pp. 384–406. On the exact meaning of the Fourth Wave see below.
3. Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1), Chapter 2.
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 711

4. See Seymour M. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959), pp. 69– 105; Robert A. Dahl,
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971). For an over-
view of modernization approach and studies of democratization done in this tradition see Doorenspleet,
Democratic Transitions (note 1), Chapters 4 and 5.
5. Thomas S. Eliot, The Idea of a Christian Society (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), pp. 11–12.
6. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Compara-
tive Research’, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1997), pp. 403– 51.
7. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Unwin, 1943).
8. Dahl (note 4), pp. 2, 4.
9. See Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1), for a classification of minimal democracies and a
list with countries who have met this criteria since 1800.
10. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
11. E.g. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (1997),
pp. 22– 43; Andreas Schedler, ‘What is Democratic Consolidation?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9,
No. 2 (1998), pp. 91–107; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
12. Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Illusions about Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1996),
pp. 34– 51.
13. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996).
14. E.g. Diamond, Developing Democracy (note 11).
15. Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics,
Vol. 2, No. 3 (1970), pp. 337–65; Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: The John
Hopkins University, 1986).
16. E.g. Gerardo L. Munck, ‘Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Politics,
Vol. 26, No. 3, (1994), pp. 355–75; Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram, and Harald Waldrauch, Democratic
Consolidation in East-Central Europe (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1998); Schedler.
17. O’Donnell and Schmitter (note 15).
18. E.g. Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes’, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo
O’Donnell, and Julio Valenzuela (eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American
Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),
pp. 17– 56; Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch (note 16).
19. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1990).
20. Gerardo Munck and Carol S. Leff, ‘Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and
Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1997), pp. 343–62.
21. Di Palma (note 19).
22. E.g. Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5 (1994),
pp. 57–74; Juan J. Linz, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1990),
pp. 143–64; Julio Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion,
Process, and Facilitating Conditions’, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Julio Valenzuela
(eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative
Perspective (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 57–104; Richard Gunther,
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation:
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
23. For example Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (note 22).
24. Diamond, Developing Democracy (note 11).
25. See Linz and Stepan (note 13).
26. Schedler (note 11).
27. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Doorenspleet, ‘Reassessing’ (note 2).
28. See Doorenspleet, ‘Reassessing’ (note 2).
29. See Doorenspleet, ‘Reassessing’ (note 2), and Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1).
30. See Doorenspleet, ‘Reassessing’ (note 2); Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1); Diamond,
Developing Democracy (note 11); Adrian Karatnycky, ‘The Decline of Illiberal Democracy’,
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 1, (1999), pp. 112–25.
712 DEMOCRATIZATION

31. See Doorenspleet, ‘Reassessing’ (note 2).

32. Lipset (note 4).
33. See Chapter 5 in Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1), for a long list of replication studies
since 1959.
34. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and
Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
35. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Culture, Economic, and Political Change in
43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Our italics.
36. Larry Diamond, ‘Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered’, in Gary Marks and Larry
Diamond (eds), Reexamining Democracy. Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset (Sage Publi-
cations: London, 1992), pp. 93– 140. Our italics.
37. Inglehart (note 35); Diamond, ‘Economic Development’ (note 36).
38. Huntington (note 27), p. 60.
39. Mark J. Gasiorowski, ‘Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis’,
American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, (1995), pp. 882–97.
40. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Modernization: Theories and Facts’, World Politics,
Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), pp. 155– 83; Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and
Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the
World 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
41. E.g. Bronislaw A. Misztal, ‘Must Eastern Europe Follow the Latin American Way?’, Archives
Européenes de Sociologie, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1992), pp. 151–79; Paul G. Lewis, ‘Theories of Democra-
tization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Communist Studies and
Transition Politics, Vol. 13 (1997), pp. 4 –26; Michael D. Kennedy, ‘Contingencies and the Alterna-
tives of 1989: Toward a Theory and Practice of Negotiating Revolution’, East European Politics and
Societies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1999), pp. 293– 302.
42. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, ‘Endogenous Democratization’, World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 4
(2003), pp. 517– 49.
43. Huntington (note 27), p. 104.
44. Cf. Huntington (note 27); Seymour M. Lipset, ‘The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, Amer-
ican Sociological Review, Vol. 59 (1994), pp. 1 –22; Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (eds),
Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspective (London: Routledge,
1994); Linz and Stepan (note 13).
45. Linz and Stepan (note 13), p. 76.
46. Lipset, ‘Social Requisites Revisited’ (note 44), p. 16.
47. Harvey Starr, ‘Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the Inter-
national System’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2. (1991), pp. 356–81; Gasiorowski (note
39); John O’Loughlin, Michael D. Ward, Corey L. Lofdahl, Jordin S. Cohen, David S. Brown, David
Reilly, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Michael Shin, ‘The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946–1994’, Annals of
the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 88, No. 4 (1998), pp. 545–74; Kristian S. Gleditsch, All
International Politics is Local; The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor,
MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002); Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1).
48. Gasiorowski (note 39).
49. O’Loughlin et al. (note 47).
50. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, ‘Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Post-
communist World’, World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 1, (2000), pp. 1 –37.
51. Ibid., p. 24.
52. Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1), chapter 8.
53. Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, ‘On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework’,
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 598, No. 1, (2005),
pp. 33– 51.
54. Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the
Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
55. Elkins and Simmons (note 53), p. 35.
56. See e.g. Gasiorowski (note 39).
57. Rustow (note 15); O’Donnell and Schmitter (note 15).
58. For an example of the former, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Political and Econ-
omic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
an example of the latter is John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolida-
tion in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
DEVIANT CASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 713

59. O’Donnell and Schmitter (note 15); Munck and Leff (note 20).
60. E.g. Linz and Stepan (note 13).
61. E.g. David C. Stark and László Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in
East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Belinda Crawford and Arend
Lijphart (eds), Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Tran-
sitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).
62. E.g. Arend Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz, ‘Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?’, in
Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Per-
spectives, Volume 1 (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 3 –90; Adam
Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, ‘What Makes Democracies
Endure?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1996), pp. 39–55.
63. See e.g. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuss, Frank Bönker, Ulrike Götting, Friedbert W. Rueb,
Institutional Design in Post-Communist Democracies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
64. For an overview of this methodological developments, and for description of strengths and weaknesses
of applying mixed methods, see Ellen Mastenbroek and Renske Doorenspleet, ‘Mind the Gap! On the
Possibilities and Pitfalls of Mixed Methods Research’, Paper presented at the 4th ECPR General Con-
ference, Pisa, Italy, 6–8 September 2007.
65. Evan S. Lieberman, ‘Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research’,
American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, (2005), pp. 435 –52; Henry E. Brady, David
Collier, and Jason Seawright, ‘Toward a Pluralistic Vision of Methodology’, Political Analysis,
Vol. 14, No. 4, (2006), pp. 353– 68.
66. Lieberman (note 65).
67. Ibid., p. 436.
68. See for exceptions the description of studies in Lieberman (note 65); Mastenbroek and Doorenspleet
(note 64).
69. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (note 34).
70. See for overview of other factors and theories: Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1), chapter
4; see also Mark J. Gasiorowski and Tomothy J. Power, ‘Institutional Design and Democratic Conso-
lidation in the Third World’, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (1997), pp. 123– 55;
Gasiorowski (note 39); See for strength of development and diffusion effects on democracy: Doorens-
pleet, Democratic Transitions (note 1), chapter 5, 8, and 9; Boix and Stokes (note 42), and O’Loughlin
et al. (note 47).

Manuscript accepted for publication February 2008

Address for correspondence: Renske Doorenspleet, Department of Politics and International Studies,
University of Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. E-mail: renske.
doorenspleet@warwick.ac.uk; Petr Kopecký, Department of Political Science, Wassenaarseweg, 52
2300, RB Leiden, the Netherlands. E-mail: kopecky@fsw.leidenuniv.nl