Grid Disturbances Guidelines

European Network of
GUIDELINES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES ABOVE 100 kV Transmission System Operators
for Electricity
GUIDELINES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION

OF GRID DISTURBANCES ABOVE 100 kV
13.04.2017
ENTSO-E AISBL • Avenue Cortenbergh 100 • 1000 Brussels • Belgium • Tel +32 2 741 09 50 • info@entsoe.eu • www.entsoe.eu
European Network of
for Electricity
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 4
2 PURPOSE OF THE GUIDELINES........................................................................................ 4
3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STATISTICS ..................................................................... 5
4 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................ 6
4.1 GRID DISTURBANCE ...................................................................................................................................6
4.1.1 DURATION OF A DISTURBANCE .....................................................................................................................6
4.1.2 MULTIPLE FAULT SITUATION ........................................................................................................................6
4.2 FAULTS ...................................................................................................................................................6
4.2.1 PRIMARY FAULT ........................................................................................................................................7
4.2.2 SECONDARY FAULT ....................................................................................................................................7
4.2.3 LATENT FAULT ..........................................................................................................................................7
4.2.4 PERMANENT FAULT ...................................................................................................................................8
4.2.5 TEMPORARY FAULT....................................................................................................................................8
4.2.6 INTERMITTENT FAULT .................................................................................................................................8
4.2.7 FAULT IN COMPONENT ...............................................................................................................................8
4.2.8 SYSTEM DISTURBANCES ..............................................................................................................................9
4.2.9 CAUSE, PRIMARY CAUSE AND UNDERLYING CAUSE ............................................................................................9
4.3 OUTAGE AND SYSTEM UNITS ......................................................................................................................11
4.3.1 DURATION OF A GRID OUTAGE ..................................................................................................................13
4.4 OTHER DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................13
4.4.1 DELIVERY POINT .....................................................................................................................................13
4.4.2 END USER .............................................................................................................................................13
4.4.3 END-USER INTERRUPTION ........................................................................................................................13
4.4.4 DURATION OF END-USER INTERRUPTION .....................................................................................................14
4.4.5 INTERRUPTION........................................................................................................................................14
4.4.6 LONG-TERM INTERRUPTION ......................................................................................................................14
4.4.7 SHORT-TERM INTERRUPTION.....................................................................................................................14
4.4.8 ENERGY NOT SUPPLIED ............................................................................................................................14
4.4.9 UNIT ....................................................................................................................................................17
4.4.10 COMPONENT .........................................................................................................................................17
4.4.11 REPAIR TIME ..........................................................................................................................................21
5 CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES, FAULTS, OUTAGES AND INTERRUPTIONS................. 22

5.1 CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES .....................................................................................................22
5.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FAULTS .......................................................................................................................23
5.3 CLASSIFICATION OF OUTAGES ....................................................................................................................25
5.4 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERRUPTIONS ...........................................................................................................26
6 EXAMPLES OF CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES, OUTAGES, FAULTS AND INTERRUPTIONS27

6.1 FLASHOVER ON POWER TRANSFORMER BUSHING DUE TO SALT ........................................................................27
6.2 OUTAGE OF A LINE WHEN WORK IS PERFORMED ON A CONTROL UNIT ...............................................................29
6.3 TWO LINE FAULTS WITHIN A FEW SECONDS INTERVAL COMBINED WITH A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAULT RELATED TO THE
PREVIOUS FAULT .....................................................................................................................................30
6.4 INCORRECT CIRCUIT BREAKER OPERATION ....................................................................................................32
6.5 LINE FAULT AND A CIRCUIT BREAKER MALFUNCTION ......................................................................................33
6.6 SVC OUTAGE WITH AN UN RECOGNISED FAULT.............................................................................................35
6.7 MANUAL LINE DISCONNECTION DUE TO A FAULTY CURRENT TRANSFORMER .......................................................36
6.8 LINE DISCONNECTION CAUSED BY TEMPORARY EARTHING EQUIPMENT BEING LEFT ON LINE ...................................38
6.9 LINE FAULT AND A FAULT IN THE HIGH SPEED AUTOMATIC RECLOSING EQUIPMENT ..............................................39
6.10 FAULT IN A GENERATOR CONNECTED DIRECTLY TO THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK ................................................40
6.11 POWER OSCILLATION IN THE POWER SYSTEM................................................................................................41
6.12 NUCLEAR POWER STATION OUTAGE ...........................................................................................................41
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6.13 INTERRUPTION OF A PAPER MILL IN A DOWNSTREAM NETWORK .......................................................................41

6.14 OPERATION OF LOADED DISCONNECTORS ....................................................................................................41
6.15 UNSUCCESSFUL POWER TRANSFORMER ENERGISATION DUE TO SENSITIVE RELAY SETTING .....................................43
6.16 EXPLODED POWER TRANSFORMER BUSHING ................................................................................................44
6.17 LINE FAULT WITH SIMULTANEOUS FAULTS IN SURGE ARRESTERS AND CIRCUIT BREAKER .........................................46
6.18 EARTH FAULT IN A COMPENSATED NETWORK WITH A LATENT RELAY FAULT ........................................................48
6.19 FAULT IN A RADIAL NETWORK WITH A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILING TO TRIP ...........................................................49
6.20 LINE FAULT WITH UNEXPECTED RELAY TRIP...................................................................................................51
6.21 INTERMITTENT LINE FAULT DUE TO WIND.....................................................................................................53
6.22 FAULT IN OTHER STATISTIC AL A RE A CAUSING OUTAGE IN OWN STATISTICAL AREA ..........................................54
6.23 DOUBLE EARTH FAULT IN A COMPENSATED NETWORK ....................................................................................57
6.24 OUTAGE OF PARALLEL POWER TRANSFORMERS DUE TO A TAP CHANGER FAULT AND OVERLOAD .............................58
6.25 LINE FAULT WITH AN END-USER OUTAGE IN THE DOWNSTREAM NETWORK.........................................................60
6.26 OUTAGE OF A LINE WITH A SERIES CAPACITOR ..............................................................................................61
6.27 FAULT IN UNDER 100 KV NETWORK ............................................................................................................63
7 GUIDELINES FOR CALCULATING THE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS ......................................... 64
8 FUTURE WORK........................................................................................................ 65
10 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 66
11 CONTACT PERSONS .................................................................................................. 67
APPENDIX A: CROSS REFERENCE LIST FOR FAULT CAUSES ............................................................................ 69
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1 INTRODUCTION
These guidelines describe how HVAC transmission grid disturbances and faults are classified in the
ENTSO-E Disturbance and Fault Statistics (EDFS) guidelines.
The ENTSO-E Disturbance and Fault Statistics is published by ENTSO-E Regional Group Nordic (RGN)
while a subgroup to it, called Disturbance Statistics and Classification (DISTAC), collects the data,
prepares the report and maintains these guidelines.
The guidelines were originally prepared by Nordel in 1971 and updated in 2009. Nordel was an or-
ganization for co-operation between the transmission system operators in the Nordic countries,
whose objective was to create preconditions for a further development of an effective and harmo-
nised Nordic electricity market. Nordel was discontinued and all operational tasks were transferred
to ENTSO-E in July 2009.
These guidelines determine the definitions and instructions necessary to ensure uniform classifica-
tion and calculation of the number of grid disturbances and faults for the statistics published by
ENTSO-E Regional Group Nordic. Furthermore, instructions are included for the possible incorpora-
tion into national statistics with a view to facilitating the comparison of operating experience.
The guidelines are intended to form the basis of common grid disturbance statistics in the European
countries. Chapter 2 sets the purpose of grid disturbance statistics. Chapter 3 describes the scope of
the statistics and the limitations imposed. The necessary terms are defined in Chapter 4. Chapter 0
lists how and what to report about each grid disturbance. This is followed by several examples of
different types of grid disturbances in Chapter 6. Chapter 0 explains how the number of components
are calculated. The final Chapter 8 looks to the future and considers ideas for further developing the
grid disturbance statistics.
2 PURPOSE OF THE GUIDELINES

The purpose of the grid disturbance statistics is to compile data which can form the basis of:
 a correct assessment of the quality and function of the different components;

 a calculation or assessment of the reliability of the transmission system;
 an assessment of the quality of delivery points;
 studies of trends and comparisons of different parts of the transmission grid.
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3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STATISTICS

The statistics comprise:
 grid disturbances
 faults causing or aggravating a grid disturbance
 grid disturbances that disconnect end users from the network
 outage in parts of the electricity system in conjunction with grid disturbances.
The statistics do not comprise:
 faults in production units

 faults detected during maintenance
 planned operational interruptions in parts of the electricity system
 behaviour of circuit breakers and relay protection if they do not result in or extend a grid dis-
turbance.
The statistics are limited to transmission units in commercial operation with a voltage of at least
100 kV, including units for reactive compensation.
Figure 4.1.1 shows which components in the network are included in the statistics. Power trans-
formers for the transmission of energy to lower voltages are included in the statistics. On the other
hand, generator step-up transformers are not included. Power transformers for HVDC are not regis-
tered separately, but as components in an HVDC unit.
– kV 20 kV
1 –1 kV
Included Not included
HVDC SVC
Figure 4.1.1 The dashed-line rectangle shows the types of components which are included in the statistics
Units in trial operation whose warranty period have not yet commenced are also included in the
statistics after connection to the network.
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4 DEFINITIONS
This chapter defines the central concepts of these guidelines. The definitions are of a general nature
and do not in themselves indicate the scope of the statistics. The scope of the statistics is defined in
Chapter 3.
First, a grid disturbance and a multiple fault situation is defined. Second, the different kinds of faults
are defined. Third, an outage is defined. Finally, the other concepts are defined.
4.1 GRID DISTURBANCE

A grid disturbance is defined as:
Outages, forced or unintended disconnection or failed re-connection of breaker as a

result of faults in the power grid [1].
A grid disturbance starts with a primary fault and may also consist of one or more secondary faults
or latent faults.
A forced disconnection is not classified as a grid disturbance if preventive action can be taken before
disconnection, for example through the restructuring of operations. However, permanent earth
faults in compensated networks are reported as disturbances even though operations are restruc-
tured as the fault is sectioned off.
A failed manual connection is a grid disturbance if repairs are carried out before a possible new at-
tempt at connection. Signal acknowledgement is not considered repair work.
A grid disturbance can, for example, be:
 a tripping of breaker because of lightning striking a line;

 a failed line connection when repairs or adjustments need to be carried out before the line
can be connected to the network;
 an emergency disconnection due to fire;
 an undesired power transformer disconnection because of faults due to relay testing
 tripping with a successful high-speed automatic reclosing of a circuit breaker.
Each grid disturbance results in an outage affecting at least one system unit. See Section 4.3 about
outages and system units.
4.1.1 Duration of a disturbance

The duration of a disturbance is the time between the start of the first outage and the end of the last
outage.
4.1.2 Multiple fault situation

A multiple fault situation occurs when a grid disturbance has one or more secondary or latent faults.
The cause of the grid disturbance is the same as the one indicated for the primary fault.
4.2 FAULTS
A fault is defined as:
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The inability of a component to perform its required function [2] [3].
A fault is any defect or deviation resulting in a unit being incapable of fulfilling its intended function
in the power system. A fault is:
 a primary fault or a secondary/latent fault

 temporary or permanent
 intermittent or non-intermittent
 a system disturbance and fault in components.
Faults may be caused by inadequate power system units, system disturbances or flawed routines.
A fault which is intermittent and permanent is a fault which at first was intermittent, but subse-
quently became permanent. An example could be galloping lines which turn into phase failure.
There are also different kinds of faults, which are described below.
4.2.1 Primary fault

A primary fault is defined as:
A fault which initiates a grid disturbance [1].
The fault initiating a grid disturbance is called a primary fault. Any subsequent faults are called sec-
ondary faults or latent faults. A grid disturbance is always started by a primary fault. According to
Section 4.1, the cause of the primary fault is also considered as the cause of the grid disturbance.
4.2.2 Secondary fault

A secondary fault is defined as:
A fault which occurs as a consequence of a primary fault.
A secondary fault is a fault which is caused by a primary fault. An example of this is the breakdown
of a voltage transformer because of high voltages in conjunction with an earth fault in a compen-
sated network.
However, only secondary faults aggravating the grid disturbance should be included in the statistics.
By aggravation is meant that the secondary fault can cause additional outages in the system units
(see Section 4.3). Furthermore, the grid disturbance is considered as having been aggravated if faults
other than the primary fault result in the disconnection of system units for longer than would have
been the case if there had only been a primary fault. For example, a disconnection due to a line fault
may last longer in connection with a fault in a circuit breaker.
4.2.3 Latent fault

A latent fault is defined as:
A fault which was present before the primary fault, but was first detected in connec-
tion with the occurrence of the primary fault.
A latent fault is not directly related to the primary fault. An example would be a fault in the relay
protection system.
As is the case with secondary faults, only latent faults aggravating the grid disturbance must be in-
cluded in the statistics. See Section 4.2.2.
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It should be noted that a defective redundant protection is normally not included in the statistics as
this is often a latent fault which does not aggravate the grid disturbance.
In some cases, a grid disturbance may be caused by a latent fault, in which case the latent fault
should be included in the statistics. See the example in Section 6.14. Had it not been for the latent
fault, the grid disturbance would not have happened in this example.
As it can be very difficult to distinguish between latent faults and secondary faults, these fault types
are treated as equals in the statistics. In other words, they are simply summed up.
4.2.4 Permanent fault

A permanent fault is defined as:
A fault which means that the component or unit is damaged and cannot be restored
to service until repair or replacement is completed [1].
A permanent fault requires repair or adjustment before the unit is ready for operation. For example,
the resetting of computers is considered as repair work and a switch in the wrong position is consid-
ered as a permanent fault. Signal acknowledgement is not considered as repair work.
When determining if a fault is permanent or not, the duration of the disconnection is irrelevant.
4.2.5 Temporary fault

A temporary fault is defined as:
A fault which means that the unit or component is undamaged and is restored to
service through manual switching operations without repair being performed, but
possibly with on-site inspection [1].
Faults which do not require measures other than the reconnection of circuit breakers, replacement
of fuses or signal acknowledgement.
When determining if a fault is temporary or not, the duration of the disconnection is irrelevant. If,
for example, a fault results in long-term disconnection, and if an inspection is carried out without the
fault being pinpointed, such a fault is considered a temporary fault as no repairs are carried out.
4.2.6 Intermittent fault

An intermittent fault is defined as:
A recurring fault in the same unit and in the same place and for the same reason
which repeats itself before it becomes necessary to carry out any repairs or eliminate
the cause [1].
A fault which repeats itself after an inspection, which did not result in the fault being pinpointed or
repaired, is not considered an intermittent fault. A fault like this is considered as the beginning of a
grid disturbance every time the fault occurs.
One example of an intermittent fault is galloping lines.
4.2.7 Fault in component

A fault in a component is defined as:
A fault which affects a specific component.
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Unlike a system disturbance, a fault in a component is attributable to a specific component.
Incorrect operation is considered a fault in a component, or in other words, the incorrect operation
is attributed to the unit which has been operated incorrectly.
4.2.8 System disturbances

A system disturbance is defined as:
A forced outage which results from system effects or conditions and is not caused by
an event directly associated with the component or unit being reported on [1].
System disturbances have traditionally been termed system problems. Only system disturbances
resulting in grid disturbances or aggravating a grid disturbance are included in the statistics.
The examples below are termed system disturbances:
 overfrequency or underfrequency in a separate network

 power fluctuations
 overvoltage or undervoltage in parts of a network
 harmonics
 sub-synchronous resonance (SSR)
 geomagnetically induced currents (GIC).
4.2.9 Cause, primary cause and underlying cause

A cause of a fault is defined as:
Cause relating to design, production, installation, operation or maintenance which

results in a fault [1].
A primary cause of a fault is defined as:
Event or circumstance which leads to a fault [1].
An underlying cause of a fault is defined as:
Event or circumstance which is present before a fault occurs [1].
The cause of a fault must be indicated for each fault. All faults usually have a primary cause while
some faults also have underlying causes. The primary cause is the cause that has the most significant
impact on the fault.
If, for example, a tower collapses due to snow or strong winds and the weather conditions are above
designed parameters of tower, the primary cause will be snow or wind. However, if the weather
conditions were within the designed parameters of the tower, the primary cause could be lack of
maintenance, lack of tower design or metal fatigue due to aging. The underlying cause of the fault
can thus be a condition which was present long before the occurrence of the grid disturbance,
whereas the grid disturbance does not occur until other circumstances appear.
In the statistics, only one cause is reported. This is normally the primary cause, but if the primary
cause is unknown or unidentified, the underlying cause is used. If, for example, an isolator explodes
seemingly without any primary cause, the underlying cause is reported, which could be "technical
equipment".
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In the event of many faults occurring in the power system, it can be difficult to identify the exact
cause of the faults as there may be insufficient evidence. It is therefore recommended to report the
most likely cause as the cause instead of “unknown”.
All the countries or companies which provide data to the statistics have their own more detailed
categorisation of causes. Appendix A contains a cross-reference list showing how countries convert
the different causes into the categories used in the statistics.
Table 4.2.1 shows the categorisation of causes applied in the HVAC statistics. Furthermore,
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Appendix A shows how the Nordic countries convert their own fault causes to the format of the fault
categories in the HVAC statistics.
Table 4.2.1 Fault causes
Fault cause Explanation
Main regional envi- This category is named according to the main regional environmental cause.
ronmental cause For example, lightning is the main environmental cause for the Nordic coun-
tries.
Other environmental Moisture, ice, low temperatures, earthquakes, pollution, rain, salt, snow,
causes vegetation, wind, heat, forest fires etc.
External influences Fire due to a third party, animals and birds, aircraft, excavation, collision,
explosion, tree felling, vandalism.
Operation and mainte- Lack of monitoring, fault in settings, fault in connection plan, fault in relay
nance plan, incorrect operation, fault in documentation, human fault.
Technical equipment Dimensioning, fault in technical documentation (e.g., guidelines, manuals),

design, corrosion, materials, installation, production, vibration, ageing
Other Operating problems, faults at customers', faults in other networks, prob-

lems in conjunction with faults in other components, system causes, other
Unknown
4.3 OUTAGE AND SYSTEM UNITS

A system unit is defined as:
A group of components which are delimited by one or more circuit breakers [1].
An outage is defined as:
The component or unit is not in the "in service" state. In other words, it is partially or
fully isolated from the system [4].
The concepts of outages and system units have been introduced with the purpose of getting an idea
of how grid disturbances affect the availability of different component types. The registration is
based on an IEEE standard [4].
A system unit is often the same as a component. The system unit concept has been defined with a
view to facilitating the calculation of availability. A system unit is delimited by circuit breakers. Indi-
vidual components are not always delimited by circuit breakers, for which reason a system unit may
contain more components. The circuit breakers are not included in the system unit.
The type of the system unit is determined by its dominant component and the categories are follow-
ing:
 Power transformer
 Overhead line
 Cable
 Reactor
 Busbar
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 Series capacitor
 Shunt capacitor
 SVC.
When a system unit is no longer transporting or supplying electrical energy, the system unit is af-
fected by an outage. The system unit is unavailable after the outage has occurred.
A system unit may be unable to transport energy due to another system unit being disconnected
depending on the grid configuration the system unit is in. If, for example, the line in Figure 4.3.1 is
disconnected, the power transformer cannot transport energy. Both the line and the power trans-
former are then considered as having been affected by the outage.
The outage of a system unit may be caused by the failure of a component within the system unit, a
fault in a circuit breaker between two system units or a system disturbance.
The system units are divided into different types according to the main functions they fulfil. Figures
4.3.1–4.3.5 show different types of system units.
Figure 4.3.1 A system unit is delimited by circuit breakers as indicated by the dotted lines. Disconnectors do not delimit
system units. This system unit must be defined as being of the line type.
Figure 4.3.2 If there are no power transformer circuit breakers, the line and the power transformer are considered as one
system unit. Whether the unit is considered a transformer or a line is determined by its primary function.
Figure 4.3.3 The busbar has no circuit breakers and together with the line it forms a system unit which, as was the case in
Figure 4.3.2, is said to be defined as being of the line type.
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Figure 4.3.4 A series capacitor is not delimited by one or more circuit breakers according to the definition, but a series
capacitor bypasses a circuit breaker, which does not agree with the definition. The delimitation of a system unit of the
series capacitor type is selected in accordance with the above figure. If the line is affected by a grid disturbance, the
series capacitor is also affected by outage.
4.3.1 Duration of a grid outage

The duration of an outage is defined as:
The period from the onset of an outage occurrence until the component or unit is
returned to the "in service" state [1].
Administrative delays (voluntary waiting time) should not be included in the duration of the out-
age.
4.4 OTHER DEFINITIONS

4.4.1 Delivery point
A delivery point is defined as:
Point, power transformer or busbar in the grid where electricity is exchanged.
The definition is a general definition and can in practice comprise all points, power transformers
and busbars. In the statistics, the delivery point is on the boundary of the statistical area. Another
term for delivery point is supply point.
4.4.2 End user

An end user is defined as:
Buyers of electrical energy who do not resell all the energy [1].
A buyer who resells some of the power is considered an end user.
4.4.3 End-user interruption

An end-user interruption is defined as:
Situation characterised by the failure to deliver electricity to one or more end users
when the voltage constitutes less than 1 per cent of the contractually agreed volt-
age [5].
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End-user interruption concerns only end users. End-user interruption may or may not be notified.
End-user interruption is of either long or short duration.
4.4.4 Duration of end-user interruption

The duration of an end-user interruption is defined as:
The period from when the end-user interruption commences until voltage is sup-
plied to end users again [1].
4.4.5 Interruption
An interruption is defined as:
Situation characterised by the discontinuation of the delivery of electrical power to

one or more delivery points.
If an area has more than one delivery point from a transmission network, and an interruption occurs
in one of these delivery points, the magnitude of the interruption is the electrical energy which was
exchanged in the delivery point prior to the interruption.
The interruption must be included even if no end users are affected by the end-user interruption
due to delivery via another delivery point.
4.4.6 Long-term interruption

A long-term interruption is defined as:
End-user interruption or interruption lasting more than three minutes [5].
4.4.7 Short-term interruption

A short-term interruption is defined as:
End-user interruption or interruption lasting up to three minutes [5].
4.4.8 Energy not supplied

Energy not supplied (ENS) is defined as:
The estimated energy which would have been supplied to end users if no interrup-
tion and no transmission restrictions had occurred [1].
The estimated magnitude is based on the expected load curve throughout the duration of the in-
terruption. Load not reconnected, after supplies to end users have been resumed, should not be
included in ENS.
Statistical data does not include disturbances inside installations owned by the end-users, even if
they are over 100 kV. One example can be an aluminium smelting plant.
If an expected load curve is available, it is used to calculate ENS. If not, ENS is approximated as the
load before the interruption multiplied by the duration of the failure. If it is not possible to deter-
mine how much energy the end customer did not receive, and the only available information is the
measurement from the closest delivery point from the transmission grid, the term Energy Not Dis-
tributed (END) should be used instead of ENS.
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To calculate the ENS, the end-user interruption must have lasted for longer than normal state opera-
tion time for control equipment. This has been established as the minimum duration so that, for
example, automatic reclosing is not included.
In the calculation of ENS, the fact that some industries may experience a delay before production is
back to normal is not considered. Figure 4.4.1 shows how ENS is calculated in this case.
Figure 4.4.1 Grid disturbance with end-user interruption for industrial load.
However, if a grid disturbance affects different end users for different lengths of time, ENS is calcu-
lated as the shaded area in Figure 4.4.2.
Figure 4.4.2 Grid disturbance with end-user interruption affecting several end users.
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Per definition, energy not supplied also occurs when the energy output is limited due to transmis-
sion restrictions in the grid.
Figure 4.4.3 shows an example of this. One of the feeder lines to the transformer is disconnected
due to a failure. The remaining line cannot supply the required output and results therefore in ENS
because transmission must be restricted.
Figure 4.4.3 ENS due to transmission restrictions
In order for ENS to be registered, the interruption causing the ENS must affect a system unit within
the statistical area. See Figures 4.4.4–4.4.7.
Figure 4.4.4 A failure in the downstream network causes an outage in a system unit within the statistical area resulting in
ENS. As an outage causing ENS also occurs within the statistical area, this ENS must be included in the statistics with the
fault cause other statistical area.
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Figure 4.4.5 This scenario includes a breaker on the lower side of the transformer, in this case a breaker within the statistics
trips unnecessarily. The ENS values should be separated If possible. The first ENS (ENS2) is for the line where the feeder tripped
correctly(fault in another statistical area) and the other ENS (ENS1) is for the feeder where the breaker tripped unnecessarily.
Figure 4.4.6 ENS must be recorded when the transformer is affected by a fault that causes an outage.
Figure 4.4.7 Incorrect settings in the protection system causes faults in the downstream network. The resulting ENS should
not be registered because no system unit, that is transmitting to the downstream network, is affected by the outage.
4.4.9 Unit
A unit is defined as:
A group of components which fulfils a main function in the power system [1].
Main function means transmission, transformation, compensation, etc.
4.4.10 Component
A component is defined as:
Equipment which fulfils a main function in a unit [1].
See Section 4.3 for an explanation of the differences between system units and components.
A fault must be associated with one of the components listed in the table below. However, if the
fault is a system disturbance, it is not necessary to indicate the component. The table also shows
which sub-components are included in each component to support in choosing the right component
for a fault. It is important that faults are categorised identically in each country and company to
attain comparable results.
Table 5.3 Classification of components
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Component Sub-components included Sub-components

not included
Surge arresters and Active element Arresters and
spark gaps  Foundations spark gaps on
 Sensors series capacitor
 Isolators
 Counters
 Support structure
Circuit breakers  Breaking elements External com-
Disconnecting circuit break-  Foundations pressed-air system
ers (DCB) are considered
circuit breakers
 Isolators
 Control equipment integrated in the circuit
breaker
 Operating mechanism
Disconnectors and  Support structure
Disconnector contacts
earth connectors  Foundations Isolator(s)
 Control equipment integrated in the disconnector
 Operating mechanism
Common ancillary  Local power
equipment  Compressed-air system
 Buildings
 Fencing
 Direct-current rectifiers
 Direct-current system
 Diesel unit
 Distribution
 Other equipment which is not high-voltage
equipment and which cannot be attributed to any
of the components indicated
Control equipment  Alarm system Control equipment
 Automatics, such as synchronous and phasing de- integrated in other
vices, interlocking devices, sequential controls components is not
(DUBA), voltage controls included. In con-
 Remote control (SCADA) nection with faults
 Control cables in integrated con-
 Installation cabinets trol equipment,
 Local control the relevant com-
 Grid protection ponent is indicat-
 Optic cables ed.
 Signal transmission (data communication)
 Protection, including communication
 Control cables
 Reclosing
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not included
Power cables  Sensors
 Cables
 Cable boxes and joints
 Oil expansion tank
 End terminations
Power transformers  Foundations, including oil sumps
 Bushing
 Sensors, gas, temperature and pressure guards,
oil level sensors
 Cooling, including integrated automatics for cool-
ing
 Core
 Windings
 Tap changers and control equipment, including in-
tegrated automatics
 Instrument transformers if integrated in power
transformer
 Tank
Overhead lines  Foundations Control cables and
An overhead line terminates  Isolators optic cables are
at the first component in a
station
 Terminals included under
 Conductors, phase and earth control equipment
 Arc horn
 Joint
 Loop
 Guy wires
 Towers
 Vibration dampers
Instrument transform-  Foundations
ers  Isolators
 Core
 Winding
 Voltage diverters
 Breaker, if integrated in instrument transformer
Reactors inclusive of  Foundations, including oil sumps
neutral point reactors  Bushing
 Sensors, gas, temperature and pressure guards,
oil level sensors
 Cooling, including integrated cooling automatics
 Core
 Windings
 Tap changers, including control equipment
 Instrument transformers, if integrated in reactor
 Tank
 Reactor switch gear
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not included
Synchronous compen-  Ancillary equipment
sators  Integrated control equipment
 Excitation equipment
 Machinery including all electrical and mechanical
parts
 Starting equipment
Busbars  Density guard for GIS (gas insulated substations) Earth connectors
The busbar includes connec-  Foundations
tion to the first other com-
ponent connected to the
 Insulation medium for GIS
busbar.  Enclosure for GIS
No distinction is made be-  Bar
tween air and gas-insulated
 Loop
distribution plants or indoor
or outdoor distribution  Support structures
plants.  Support isolator
 Pressure guard for GIS
Series capacitors  Surge arresters and varistors
 Spark gap
 Capacitor
 Resistor
 Instrument transformer if integrated in shunt ca-
pacitor battery or filter
 Reactor
 Support isolator
Shunt capacitor bat-  Capacitor
teries and filters  Reactor
 Resistor
 Support isolator
 Power capacitor if power
transformer is designed
exclusively for shunt ca-
pacitor or filter
 Surge arresters if inte-
grated in shunt capacitor
battery or filter
 Instrument transformer if
integrated in shunt ca-
pacitor battery or filter.
SVC and statcom  Ancillary equipment
 Capacitor
 Integrated control equipment
 Cooling
 Reactor
 Power capacitor, if power capacitor is exclusively
designed for SVC or statcom
 Valves, i.e., semiconductors such as GTO and IGTB
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not included
Other high-voltage  Other high-voltage equipment which cannot be
components in sta- attributed to any of the components indicated
tions  Carrier frequency coils
 Foundations
 Connections between components in a station
 Bushings, though not integrated in other compo-
nents
 Loop
 Stand
 Support isolators which are not included under
other components
Unknown
4.4.11 Repair time

Repair time is defined as:
Time from when repair commences, including necessary trouble-shooting, until the
unit’s function(s) has (have) been resumed and the unit is ready for operation [1].
Repair time is reported only for permanent faults and does not include administrative delays (volun-
tary waiting time). However, any preparations necessary to carry out repairs, for example the collec-
tion or ordering of spare parts, waiting for spare parts or transport, are included in the repair time.
The repair time is also considered to be zero if a fault is determined to be left unrepaired.
As of 2015, repair time is not mandatory to report because they are not included in the report any-
more.
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5 CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES, FAULTS, OUTAGES AND

INTERRUPTIONS
This chapter outlines the information to be registered for grid disturbances and how the material
should be classified into different groups. The figure below describes the information to be regis-
tered for every grid disturbance.
Fault
Serial number
Reference to grid disturbance Outage
Component type System unit
Voltage level Fault causing the outage
System earth Type of system unit
Fault in own or other statistical area 1...n Energy not supplied (ENS)
Components fault or system disturbance Duration of end-user outage
Type of trip
Fault type Type of auto reclosing
1...n Primary fault or secondary/latent fault Outage time
Temporary or permanent fault
Disturbance Intermittent or non-intermittent fault
Identification
Date Fault cause
Time Repair time*
0...n
Interruption
Name of delivery point
Interruption (duration)
Figure 4.4.1 A grid disturbance is caused by faults and a fault can result in several outages. Grid disturbances can also
result in none, one or several supply interruptions. *Repair time is not mandatory to report but might be useful for internal
use.
Figure 4.4.1 shows that every grid disturbance has at least one fault. This also applies to outages;
one fault causes one or more outages. A grid disturbance can even cause none or several interrup-
tions.
5.1 CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES

In the grid disturbance statistics, the date, time and classification of every single grid disturbance are
registered. Identification could, for example, be in the form of a serial number counting from one
every new year.
When a grid disturbance is registered, the definitions given in Section 4.1 must be fulfilled. Further-
more, at least one component with a minimum voltage level of 100 kV or a component with reactive
compensation must have been disconnected in one’s own statistical area.
The table below describes the information to be registered for every grid disturbance.
Table 5.1.1 Information to be registered for every grid disturbance
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Category Data
Identification A serial number, for example, 2016-1, 2016-2.

Usually in the form of a serial number counting from one every year. Not
important for the statistical compilation.
Date Date of grid disturbance, e.g., 2016-01-17
Time Time of disturbance, e.g., 17:19:23.
5.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FAULTS

These statistics only consider faults resulting in or aggravating grid disturbances. In case of a grid
disturbance, faults can occur in several components. These faults are registered individually which in
turn leads to the possibility of a grid disturbance having several faults, as were shown in Figure 4.4.1.
However, only one fault is registered if the fault aggravates within the component. Moreover, a grid
disturbance is always caused by at least one fault.
If a fault occurs due to incorrect operation of circuit breakers and disconnectors, the fault must be
related to the component that has been incorrectly operated. Thus, the primary cause is reported as
operation and maintenance.
If an intermittent fault results in several faults in the same component and in the same place within
a short period due to the same cause, only one fault is reported.
The following table describes the information that must be reported for every single fault.
Table 5.2.1 Information to be registered for every fault
Category Data
Serial number 1, 2, 3, etc.

The serial number counts from one for every grid disturbance.
Reference to grid disturbance Identification of the disturbance, see Table 5.1.1
Component type See Section 4.4.10.

If the fault is a system disturbance, the component
type is optional.
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Category Data
Voltage level  100–150 kV

The voltage level for power transformers, SVCs, rotating phase  220–330 kV
compensators and common ancillary equipment is deter-
 380–420 kV
mined in the following manner:
 Power transformers: the rated voltage of the wind-
ing with the highest voltage.
 SVCs, shunt capacitors, shunt reactors and rotating
phase compensators: the voltage designed for reg-
ulation.
 Common ancillary equipment: the highest voltage
in the station.
System grounding  Directly earthed

Whether the power system is directly earthed or compen-  Compensated (resonant earthed)
sated. This information is optional for faults in units with
reactive compensation with voltages lower than 100 kV.
Fault in own or other statistical area  Own network

A component fault that occurs either in a component within  Other network
your own statistical area or within another area. If the fault
occurs in another statistical area, nothing more of the fault
needs to be reported. The information can be filled in but
must, however, be removed from the joint statistics.
Component fault or system disturbance  Component fault

Only system disturbances causing or aggravating a grid dis-  System disturbance
turbance needs to be registered. See sections 4.2.7 and 4.2.8.
Fault types  Single-phase earth fault
One fault can consist of several fault types. If a fault consists of  Two or three-phase with or without earth
several fault types, the most significant fault type is used.
fault
In case of developing faults, that is in faults changing from one  Function failing to occur
type to another, the final type is given.
 Undesired function; is only stated if the com-
ponent is a circuit breaker, disconnector or
control system
 Oscillation
 Overload
 Broken conductor without earth contact. (A
broken conductor with an earth fault is re-
ferred to as a single-phase earth fault or two
or three-phased faults with or without an
earth fault)
 Others, for example, geomagnetic currents,
SSR, capacitor bank imbalances, bad contact,
overheating
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Category Data
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault  Primary fault

The statistics do not distinguish between secondary and latent  Secondary/latent fault
faults. See sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 respectively for explana-
tions of secondary and latent faults.
Temporary or permanent fault  Permanent fault

See sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5.  Temporary fault
Intermittent or non-intermittent fault  Intermittent faults

See Section 4.2.6.  Non-intermittent fault
Fault cause See Section 4.2.9

The fault cause must always be reported. If the fault cause is a
combination of several fault causes, choose the most signifi-
cant one. See Section 5.2.9.
Repair time Not required but may be useful for internal use. Must
be given in hours and minutes. Voluntary waiting time
should not be included. See Section 4.4.11.
5.3 CLASSIFICATION OF OUTAGES

The following must be stated for every single outage.
Table 5.3.1 Information to be registered for every outage
Information Choices
System unit Identification of the system unit affected by out-

The name of the system unit is used to calculate how often the age.
same system unit is affected by outage. See Table 8.11.
Fault causing the outage Serial number of the fault which caused the out-
If two faults occur within the same system unit (for example, age according to Table 5.2.1.
wrecked surge arresters along with lightning faults) the fault
causing the outage of the longest duration will be chosen.
Type of system unit See Section 4.3.
Energy not supplied (ENS) See Section 4.4.8. To calculate ENS the end-user
outage must have lasted at least 2 seconds.
Duration of interruption See Section 4.4.4 .
Characterisation of the disconnection  Automatically

In case of a fault in the reclosing automatics resulting in lack of  Automatically with unsuccessful automatic
reclosing, automatically should be chosen as an alternative.
reclosing (fault current must have oc-
curred twice)
 Manually
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Information Choices
Characterisation of reclosing  Automatically after less than 2 seconds

If high speed automatic reclosing is successful at one end of a line, (successful high speed reclosing)
but the line needs to be reclosed manually at the other end,
choose manual reclosing.
 Automatically after more than 2 seconds
In this document, high speed automatic reclosing refers to auto- (delayed reclosing)
matic reclosing after less than 2 seconds.  Manually after restructuring of operation
 Manually after inspection
 Manually after repair
 Manually without either inspection, repair
or restructuring of operation
 Unknown
 Others
Duration of outage See Section 4.3.1 .
5.4 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERRUPTIONS

For every interruption, the data outlined in Table 5.4.1 must be reported.
Table 5.4.1 Information to be registered for every interruption
Category Data
Name of delivery point Name of the delivery point affected by outage.

Not relevant to the compilation of statistics.
Duration of interruption The time the interruption lasts.
However, it is only the delivery points in the own network that should be registered. Let us consid-
er the system in Figure 5.4.1. If one company owns equipment on the 400 kV side and another
company owns equipment on the 130 kV side and a fault occurs on the 400/130 kV transformer,
only the 130 kV system registers an interruption.
Figure 5.4.1 It is only the delivery points from the transmission network to low voltages that are registered
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6 EXAMPLES OF CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES, OUTAGES,

FAULTS AND INTERRUPTIONS
This chapter presents examples of different kinds of grid disturbances which are designed to cover
all possible kinds of disturbances. Most of the examples are constructed around the direct earthed
network in Figure 6.1. The network consists of the following system units: line X-Y, line Y-Z, busbar X,
busbar Y and power transformer Y. All the examples have the same date and time in order to make
them clearer.
Figure 6.1 The network used in most of the examples
6.1 FLASHOVER ON POWER TRANSFORMER BUSHING DUE TO SALT

Along with heavy onshore wind, a flashover (or in other words a short to earth) occurred on a 220 kV
isolator on the 220/60 kV power transformer Y. The transformer had been placed outdoors in a sta-
tion close to the coast and investigations after the incident concluded that the isolator was covered
with salt, which had dissipated completely along with the flashover. Furthermore, the transformer
bushings were not designed for outdoor use. The power transformer was loaded with 50 MW before
the fault occurred, and was operational again after half an hour. The downstream network was only
fed by this transformer and resulted therefore in 25 MWh of energy not supplied.
The cause of the fault depends on already known or investigated conditions. The correct primary
cause will be the one that is most significant. If the owner knew that the bushings were not designed
for outdoor and still made the decision to place the transformer there due to a small probability of
such weather conditions, the cause will be “other environmental causes”. If the transformer was
placed outdoors by a mistake in planning or maintenance, the primary cause will be “operations and
maintenance”.
The data that should be reported about the incident is shown in the tables below.
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Table 6.1.1 The grid disturbance data to be reported
Identification 2016-1
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Table 6.1.2 The fault data to be reported
Serial number 1
Reference to grid disturbance 2016-1
Component type Power transformer
Voltage level 220–330 kV
Fault in own or other statistical area Own
Component fault or system disturbance Component
System earth Direct earthed
Type of fault Single-phase earth fault
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault Primary
Temporary or permanent fault Temporary
Intermittent or non-intermittent fault Non-intermittent
Fault cause Other environmental
Repair time causes
0 min
Table 6.1.3 The outage data to be reported
System unit Power transformer Y

Fault causing the outage 1
Type of system unit Power transformer
Energy not supplied 25 MWh
Duration of end-user outage 30 min
Characterisation of disconnection Automatically
Characterisation of reclosing Manually after inspection
Duration of outage 30 min
Table 6.1.4The interruption data to be reported
Name of delivery point Transformer Y

Duration of interruption 30 min
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6.2 OUTAGE OF A LINE WHEN WORK IS PERFORMED ON A CONTROL UNIT

A current circuit was opened to the differential protective relay while working on the relay protec-
tion system of the 400 kV Y-Z line which tripped the line, as seen in Figure 6.2.1. It took five minutes
to solve the problem and reconnect the line. The power transformer load was 50 MW.
The fault is a permanent fault because the current circuit to the differential protective relay had to
be reconnected before the line could be reclosed manually.
Energy not supplied is 0 MWh as the power transformer was fed via the X-Y line. Interruptions
should not be registered since no delivery points in the network were affected by interruption.
Figure 6.2.1 The scenario of an outage of line when work is performed on a control unit.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Control equipment
Voltage level 400 kV
Fault within own or other statistical area Own
Component fault or system disturbance Component fault
Fault type Undesired function
Temporary or permanent fault Permanent
Fault cause Operation and maintenance
Repair time 5 minutes
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System unit Line Y-Z

Type of system unit Line
Characterisation of reclosing Manually after repair
Table 6.2.4 The interruption data to be reported
Name of delivery point -

Duration of interruption -
6.3 TWO LINE FAULTS WITHIN A FEW SECONDS INTERVAL COMBINED WITH A CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAULT RELATED TO THE PREVIOUS FAULT
A single-phase earth fault occurred on the X-Y line causing high speed automatic reclosing as a re-
sult of lightning. Four seconds later, the line tripped again due to lightning. This time, however, the
high speed automatic reclosing failed due to a fault in the circuit breaker in station Y. The faulty
circuit breaker was repaired after eight hours.
There are two disturbances to be reported. The first disturbance is reported below.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Line
Fault type Single-phase earth fault
Fault cause Lightning
Repair time 0 min
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System unit Line X-Y

Characterisation of discon- Automatically
nection
Characterisation of reclosing Automatically after less than 2
Duration of outage seconds
0
Table 6.3.4

Imagine that the other disturbance is given the serial number 2016-4. This grid disturbance is af-
fected by two faults. The first fault is lightning, and the second fault is in the circuit breaker. In this
case, the fault in the circuit breaker is included as the disturbance is aggravated over time. This
disturbance is reported as shown in the tables below.
Date 2016-01-
Time 10
10:01
Serial number 1 2
Reference to the grid disturbance 2016-4 2016-4
Component type Line Circuit breaker
Voltage level 400 kV 400 kV
Fault within own or other statistical area Own Own
Component fault or system disturbance Component fault Component fault
System earth Direct earthed Direct earthed
Fault type Single-phase earth fault Function failed to occur
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault Primary Secondary/latent fault
Temporary or permanent fault Temporary Permanent
Intermittent or non-intermittent fault Non-intermittent Non-intermittent
Fault cause Lightning Technical equipment
Repair time 0 min 8h

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Duration of outage 8h

6.4 INCORRECT CIRCUIT BREAKER OPERATION

Circuit breakers in station Y on the X-Y line were operated incorrectly while the other end of the
line remained connected to the network, as demonstrated in Figure 6.4.1. The circuit breaker was
manually reclosed after five minutes. No customers were affected by the outage because the net-
work was meshed.
Figure 6.4.1 Incorrect circuit breaker operation.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Circuit breakers
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault Primary fault
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Repair time 0 min

Characterisation of disconnection Manually
Characterisation of reclosing Manually without either inspection
Duration of outage repair
5 min or restructuring of operation

6.5 LINE FAULT AND A CIRCUIT BREAKER MALFUNCTION

The 220 kV X-Y line was struck by lightning which caused a single-phase earth fault. Furthermore,
the circuit breaker in station Y failed to trip. Therefore, the zone 2 protection in station Z tripped
the Y-Z line and the feeding to the 220/70 kV power transformer in station Y was interrupted caus-
ing an interruption of load. Station Y was inspected and 45 minutes later the load could be rerouted
via the Y-Z line. Energy not supplied increased to 7 MWh. High speed automatic reclosing took
place in X-Y line. The circuit breaker was repaired after two days. An overview of the incident can
be seen in Figure 6.5.1.
Figure 6.5.1 Line fault with a circuit breaker malfunctioning
The grid disturbance had two faults: a lightning fault and a circuit breaker fault. Four outages oc-
curred: one in each line, one in the power transformer and one in the gathering strip. Interruption
must be registered for the power transformer.
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Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2
Reference to grid disturbance 2000-5 2000-5
Component type Line Circuit breakers
Component fault or system disturbance Component Component
Fault type Single-phase earth fault Function failing to occur
Repair time 0 min 48 h 0 min
System unit Line X-Y Line Y-Z Busbar Y Power transformer Y

Fault causing the outage 1 2 2 2
Type of system unit Line Line Busbar Power transformer
Energy not supplied 0 MWh 0 MWh 0 MWh 7 MWh
Duration of end-user 0 min 0 min 0 min 45 min
outage
Characterisation of dis- Automatically Automatically Automatically Automatically
connection
Characterisation of re- Manually Manually after Manually after Manually after in-
closing after repair inspection inspection spection
Duration of outage 48 h 0 min 0 h 45 min 0 h 45 min 0 h 45 min
Name of delivery point Power transformer Y

Duration of outage 0 h 45 min
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6.6 SVC OUTAGE WITH AN UNRECOGNISED FAULT

An SVC, with the indication SVC-X, used for regulating the 130 kV voltage tripped. While inspecting
the SVC, no visible faults or indications of possible causes were discovered. The probable cause was
a fault in the program assets in the control equipment for operating the SVC. The control computer
was not restarted and thus no repair was carried out. The reclosing of the SVC was possible after
45 minutes.
For the report, check that the voltage level is set to 130 kV. Further instructions can be seen in Ta-
ble 5.2.1. Also, if the control equipment is integrated into the SVC, state the component type as
SVC and statcom, as in Table 6.6.2. If the control equipment is not integrated, the component type
is stated as control equipment.
Figure 6.6.1 SVC outage without a recognised fault.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type SVC and statcom or control equipment
Fault cause Unknown
Repair time 0 min
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System unit SVC-X

Type of system unit SVC

6.7 MANUAL LINE DISCONNECTION DUE TO A FAULTY CURRENT TRANSFORMER

A 400 kV current transformer was discovered to have an increased pressure level during scheduled
inspection of a station and was leaking oil, as shown in Figure 6.7.1. It was determined that there
was a high risk of the transformer exploding so the X-Y line with the current transformer was imme-
diately taken out of operation. The line and a replacement transformer was reconnected after 16
hours.
This is considered a grid disturbance as it is an emergency outage according to Section 4.1. If the
outage could have been postponed, it would not have been a grid disturbance and should not have
been registered.
Figure 6.7.1 Manual line disconnection due to a faulty current transformer.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
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Serial number 1
Component type Instrument transformer
Fault type Other
Fault cause Technical equipment
Repair time 16 h

Characterisation of disconnection Manually
Duration of outage 16 h

Duration of outage -
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6.8 LINE DISCONNECTION CAUSED BY TEMPORARY EARTHING EQUIPMENT BEING LEFT ON LINE
Temporary earthing equipment had been left on the X-Y line in station Y after maintenance had
been performed on the X-Y line, as shown in Figure 6.8.1. This caused the line to trip directly after
the line was energized. The temporary earthing equipment was removed 20 minutes later, and it
was possible to use the line again.
Figure 6.8.1 Line disconnection caused by temporary earthing equipment being left on the X-Y line in station Y.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Line
Repair time 20 min

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6.9 LINE FAULT AND A FAULT IN THE HIGH SPEED AUTOMATIC RECLOSING EQUIPMENT
A single-phase earth fault occurred on the 400 kV Y-Z line due to lightning, as shown in Figure 6.9.1.
High speed automatic reclosing was successful in station Y but failed to take place in station Z. In-
stead, the circuit breaker in station Z reclosed automatically after one minute. The high speed auto-
matic reclosing was repaired after three days; the repair time being three hours.
This incident should be registered as a fault because the fact that the high speed automatic reclos-
ing malfunctioned results in the grid disturbance being aggravated over time.
Figure 6.9.1 Line fault and fault in the high speed automatic reclosing equipment.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2
Component type Line Control system
Fault type Single-phase earth fault Function failing to occur
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6.10 FAULT IN A GENERATOR CONNECTED DIRECTLY TO THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK

A hydro-power unit connected directly to the 220 kV transmission network tripped, as shown in
Figure 6.10.1. The frequency of the network decreased causing an interruption of load. No system
unit above the voltage level 100 kV tripped.
Figure 6.10.1 Fault in a generator connected directly to the transmission network
Faults in production units, such as aggregate power transformers and generators, are not included in
the statistics. Neither is a network component with a voltage level lower than 100 kV. (See Chapter 3
for more information.) According to the definitions, this incident did not occur within the statistical
area since the load did not trip.
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6.11 POWER OSCILLATION IN THE POWER SYSTEM

A change in the production evoked power oscillation in the power system. According to Section 4.1,
a disconnection of a component is required in order for a situation to be considered a grid disturb-
ance, and therefore nothing should be registered in this case.
6.12 NUCLEAR POWER STATION OUTAGE

A nuclear power station tripped which caused the frequency of the grid to decrease and the net-
work load limits to be exceeded. The situation was resolved by starting gas turbines. This grid dis-
turbance does not need to be registered as neither the aggregate power transformers nor the gen-
erators are included in the statistics, as explained in Chapter 3.
6.13 INTERRUPTION OF A PAPER MILL IN A DOWNSTREAM NETWORK

A paper mill connected to a 40 kV network tripped when a capacity battery was energised in the
130 kV network. The interruption was caused by switching-over voltages, which are normal when
connecting capacitors.
This incident should not be reported as the grid disturbance took place in a network with a voltage
level of less than 100 kV.
6.14 OPERATION OF LOADED DISCONNECTORS

Before beginning to work on any line, its circuit breaker and disconnector should be opened in con-
secutive order. However, while doing this on line Y-Z, the circuit breaker had not opened and when
the line disconnector was opened the disconnector had a flashover, the line tripped and the high
speed automatic reclosing failed to occur. This incident is demonstrated in Figure 6.14.1. The circuit
breaker did not open because the fuse had been removed from the control equipment. Trip coil 2
tripped the circuit breaker after the short circuit without damaging the line disconnector. It took one
hour and five minutes to replace the fuse.
Figure 6.14.1 Operation of loaded disconnectors.
There are two options when registering this grid disturbance concerning the primary fault: it was
either caused by the flashover on the disconnector or by the fault in the control unit. If the flashover
on the disconnector was the primary fault, the fault in the control equipment should be registered
as a latent fault in the control equipment category. A latent fault not aggravating the grid disturb-
ance is normally not included in the statistics. However, the question now is whether the grid dis-
turbance would have taken place if the latent fault had not occurred. Therefore, fault number 2 is
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the fault in the control equipment. See Section 4.2.3 for more information. The duration of the out-
age is related to the repair time of the control equipment and not the work that was going to be
performed on the line, so outage duration should be reported as an hour and five minutes.
On the other hand, if the control unit fault is registered as the primary fault, the fault in the discon-
nector is registered as a secondary fault.
The tables below show how the incident should be reported if the flashover on the disconnector was
considered as the primary fault.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2
Component type Disconnector Control equipment
Fault within own or other statistical Own Own
area
Component fault or system disturb- Component fault Component fault
ance
Type of fault Two or three-phased fault with Function failing to occur
or without earth contact
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault Primary fault Secondary/latent fault

Fault cause Operation and maintenance Operation and mainte-

nance
Repair time 0 min 1 h 5 min

Characterisation of disconnection Automatically, unsuccessful automatic reclosing
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6.15 UNSUCCESSFUL POWER TRANSFORMER ENERGISATION DUE TO SENSITIVE RELAY SETTING

A 400/130 kV power transformer had to be energised but tripped immediately as the protective
relay settings of the transformer were too sensitive to the inrush current, as shown in Figure 6.15.1.
The second attempt after inspection and relay adjustment was successful.
The cause is stated as operation and maintenance as the relay was set to be too sensitive. No energy
not supplied arose in relation to the disturbance as the downstream 130 kV network was meshed.
The repair time was one hour and 30 minutes, and the outage lasted one hour and 40 minutes.
No interruption should be registered as no delivery points in the network were affected by interrup-
tions, see Section 5.4.
Figure 6.15.1 Unsuccessful power transformer energisation due to sensitive relay settings.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
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Repair time 1 h 30 min


6.16 EXPLODED POWER TRANSFORMER BUSHING

A bushing on the 400 kV side of a 400/130 kV power transformer exploded which in turn caused a
short circuit that tripped the power transformer, as shown in Figure 6.16.1. The power transformer
was replaced by a spare power transformer after seven days (or 168 hours). The downstream 130 kV
network was fed via the defective transformer before the fault occurred. Therefore, energy not sup-
plied increased to 25 MWh before the load could be supplied by means of spare feeders after 30
minutes. Station Y was being fed from stations X and Z.
Figure 6.16.1 Exploded power transformer bushing.
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The cause of the fault was determined to have been caused by moisture that had penetrated the
bushing or by a poor contact in the bushing connections that allowed the oil to heat. The fault was
attributed to ageing and the fault cause was thus reported as technical equipment, see Table 4.2.1.
Interruptions were registered for the delivery points Transformer A and Transformer B.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Power transformer
Fault type Two or three-phased fault with or without earth con-
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault tact
Primary
Fault cause Technical equipment
Repair time 168 h

Characterisation of reclosing Manually after restructuring of operation
Name of delivery point Transformer A Transformer B

Duration of interruption 30 min 30 min
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6.17 LINE FAULT WITH SIMULTANEOUS FAULTS IN SURGE ARRESTERS AND CIRCUIT BREAKER
Lightning struck a 400 kV line just outside an outdoor station causing a single-phase earth fault that
blew up the line’s valve surge arresters, as shown in Figure 6.17.1. The fragments from the explosion
also damaged an isolator in one of the phases in the circuit breaker which caused three-phase short
circuits on the circuit breaker. The fault was disconnected by the circuit breakers of the power trans-
former and by the circuit breaker of the X-Y line in station Y. The defective circuit breaker was isolat-
ed manually after 50 minutes after which station Y could be energised via line X-Y. The repair time
for the circuit breaker was eight hours and nine hours for the surge arrester. End users experienced
no energy supplied as station Y was fed from both station X and station Z before the fault.
Figure 6.17.1 Line fault with simultaneous faults in surge arresters and circuit breaker.
Three faults occurred in connection with this disturbance: the lightning, the fault in the surge ar-
rester and the fault in the circuit breaker. The fault in the circuit breaker and the surge arrester
should be registered as they expanded the disconnected part of the network, or in other words,
aggravated the disturbance. The fault cause for the surge arrester is set to be lightning.
If the surge arrester had broken down due to ageing or fault dimensioning, the fault cause would
have been technical equipment. The fault cause for the circuit breaker is stated as fault in conjunc-
tion with a fault in another component, that is, other fault causes, as seen in Table 4.2.1.
Interruption must be registered for power transformer Y.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2 3
Reference to grid disturb- 2016-18 2016-18 2016-18
ance
Component type Line Surge arrester Circuit breaker
Voltage level 400 kV 400 kV 400 kV
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Fault within own or other Own Own Own

statistical area
Component fault or system Component fault Component fault Component fault
disturbance
System earth Direct earthed Direct earthed Direct earthed
Fault type Single-phase Single-phase earth Two or three-phased fault
earth fault fault with or without earth contact
Primary fault or second- Primary fault Secondary/latent Secondary/latent fault
ary/latent fault fault
Temporary or permanent Temporary Permanent Permanent
fault
Intermittent or non- Non-intermittent Non-intermittent Non-intermittent
intermittent fault
Fault cause Lightning Lightning Other
Repair time 0 min 9h 8h
System unit Line Y-Z Busbar Y Power transformer Y Line X-Y

Fault causing the out- 1 3 3 3
age of power unit
Type Line Busbar Power transformer Line
Energy not supplied 0 MWh 0 MWh 0 MWh 0 MWh
Duration of end-user 0 min 0 min 0 min 0 min
outage
Characterisation of Automatically Automatically Automatically Automatically
disconnection
Characterisation of Manually Manually Manually after inspec- Manually after inspec-
reclosing after repair after inspection tion
Duration of outage 9h tion
50 min 50 min 50 min

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6.18 EARTH FAULT IN A COMPENSATED NETWORK WITH A LATENT RELAY FAULT

Lightning struck a 132 kV overhead line located in a compensated network and caused a single-phase
short circuit (earth fault). This also tripped the Y-Z line due to a relay fault. The line could be recon-
nected after 30 seconds and the relay fault was repaired after a week. The total repair time with
travel time was 4 hours. The scenario is shown in Figure 6.18.1.
A temporary single-phase earth fault in a compensated network is normally not registered. Howev-
er, in this case the earth fault tripped a circuit breaker and must thus be included.
Figure 6.18.1 Earth fault in a compensated network with latent relay fault.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2
Component type Line Control equipment
System earth Compensated Compensated
Fault type Single-phase earth fault Undesired function

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Characterisation of disconnec- Automatically
tion
Characterisation of reclosing Manually without either inspection, repair or restructuring of opera-
Duration of outage tionsecs
30

6.19 FAULT IN A RADIAL NETWORK WITH A CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILING TO TRIP

Station X fed a radial, direct earthed network through a 132 kV line. Furthermore, this line fed two
132/20 kV transformer stations: stations Y and Z, as seen in Figure 6.19.1. The line between stations
Y and Z sustained a three-phase earth fault due to a fallen tree during a severe storm. However, the
Y-Z line’s circuit breaker failed to trip because its tripping mechanism had frozen. Instead, the circuit
breaker in power station X tripped.
Figure 6.19.1 Fault on a radial feeder line with circuit breaker failing to trip.
The defective circuit breaker was isolated manually after 25 minutes, after which station Y could be
energised via the X-Y line. The circuit breaker was repaired after two hours and 35 minutes later the
tree was removed.
Energy not supplied amounted to 25 MWh in station Y and to 17 MWh in station Z. Interruptions for
the respective transformers must be registered.
Date 2000-01-10
Time 10:01
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Serial number 1 2
Component type Line Circuit breakers
Fault within own or other Own Own
statistical area
Fault type Two or three-phased fault with or Failed to occur
without earth contact
Temporary or permanent fault Permanent Permanent
Fault cause Other environmental causes Other environmental
Repair time 2 h 35 min causes
2h
System unit Line Y-Z Power transformer Line X-Y

Fault causing the outage 1 1 2
Type of system unit Line Power transformer Line
Energy not supplied 0 MWh 17 MWh 0 MWh
Duration of end-user outage 0 min 2 h 35 min 0 min
Characterisation of disconnection Automatically Automatically Automatically
Characterisation of reclosing Manually Manually Manually
Duration of outage 2 h 35 min 2 h 35 min 25 min
System unit Power transformer Busbar Y Busbar Z

Type of system unit Power transformer Busbar Busbar
Duration of end-user outage 25 min 0 min 0 min
Duration of outage 25 min 25 min 2 h 35 min
Name of delivery point Power transformer Z Power transformer Y

Duration of interruption 2 h 35 min 25 min
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6.20 LINE FAULT WITH UNEXPECTED RELAY TRIP

A station fed from two 400 kV lines was interrupted because of lightning that struck and short cir-
cuited the Y-Z line. Furthermore, the X-Y line tripped unexpectedly because it was equipped with an
old relay type that had a tendency to trip while transitioning from a single-phase earth fault to a
three-phased short circuit, as shown in Figure 6.20.1. Fortunately, the condition of the relay on the
X-Y line was known by the staff. Line Y-Z reclosed rapidly and automatically after less than two sec-
onds while line X-Y reconnected after five minutes.
Figure 6.20.1 Line fault with unselective relay trip.
For the reporting, no ENS needs to be calculated because the end-user outage lasted less than two
seconds, as explained in Section 4.4.8. Furthermore, the relay protection system fault is permanent.
There is also normally a repair time associated with a permanent fault, but since the relay protection
system was known to be flawed, it is evaluated as zero.
Interruption for the transformer must be registered. The duration of the interruption is set to 0
minutes.
Date 2016-01-
Time 10
10:01
Serial number 1 2
Component type Line Control equipment
Voltage level 400 400
Fault within own or other statistical Own Own
area
Fault type Two or three-phased fault with Undesired function
or without earth contact
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Primary or secondary/latent fault Primary Secondary/latent fault

Repair time 0 0
System unit Line Y-Z Line X-Y

Fault causing the outage 1 2
Type of system unit Line Line
Energy not supplied 0 MWh 0 MWh
Duration of end-user outage 0 min 0 min
Characterisation of disconnection Automatically Automatically
Characterisation of reclosing Automatically after less than 2 secs Manually
Duration of outage 0 min 5 min
System unit Busbar Y Power transformer Y

Type of system unit Busbar Power transformer
Characterisation of reclosing Automatically Automatically

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6.21 INTERMITTENT LINE FAULT DUE TO WIND

Wind caused the phase leads in the 132 kV X-Y line to gallop, which resulted in five successive trips
and a high speed automatic reclosing shortly after each one. This is an example of an intermittent
fault as short circuiting in the same place within a short period of time causes more trips without
the possibility to eliminate the cause, as explained in Section 4.2.6.
For the report, one fault per component should be registered. If the interval between the disconnec-
tions is longer, one fault per component and disconnection should be registered. Furthermore, five
outages must be registered.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Line
Voltage level 132
Fault type Two or three-phased fault with or without earth contact
Intermittent or non-intermittent fault Intermittent
Fault cause Other environmental causes
Repair time -
System unit Line X-Y Line X-Y Line X-Y

Type of system unit Line Line Line

Duration of end-user out- 0 min 0 min 0 min
age
Characterisation of discon- Automatically Automatically Automatically
nection
Characterisation of reclos- Automatically after Automatically after Automatically after less
ing less than 2 seconds less than 2 seconds than 2 seconds
Duration of outage 0 0 0
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System unit Line X-Y Line X-Y

Fault causing the outage 20016-9 2016-9
Type of system unit Line Line

Characterisation of reclosing Automatically after Automatically after
Duration of outage less
0 than 2 seconds less
0 than 2 seconds

Duration of delivery point -
6.22 FAULT IN OTHER STATISTICAL AREA CAUSING OUTAGE IN OWN STATISTICAL AREA
An unknown cause short-circuited the Y-Z line in company B’s grid. Furthermore, a relay fault in
station X caused the overhead line X-Y in company A’s grid to also trip. The lines were reconnected
manually after all affected stations had been inspected; the X-Y line was reconnected after 30
minutes and the Y-Z line after 45 minutes. This network, which is also shown in Figure 6.22.1, was
fed from both directions and the lines had no capabilities for automatic reclosing. It took four hours
and 45 minutes to repair the relay fault and energy not supplied for the transformer in station Y
amounted to 10 MWh.
Figure 6.22.1 A fault in one company's network causing outage in another company’s network.
Even if the line is reclosed, the relay fault is permanent until the relay has been repaired. Voluntary
waiting time should not be included in the repair time, as explained in Section 4.4.11. A possible
planned outage to repair the relay should not be included in the statistics as it is a planned outage.
Company A does not need to do any other classifications than the ones shown below for fault
number 1, which was the primary fault in company B’s area.
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Company A with the relay fault prepares the report according to the tables below.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2
Fault within own or other statistical area Other statistical area Own
Primary or secondary/latent fault Primary Secondary/latent fault
Fault cause Other Technical equipment
Repair time 4h 45min

Characterisation of reclosing Manually

Company B with the line fault prepares the report according to the tables below.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
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Serial number 1 2
Component type Line
Fault within own or other statistical area Own Other statistical area
Fault type Two or three-phased fault
Primary fault or secondary/latent fault with or without earth contact
Primary
Fault cause Unknown Technical equipment
Repair time 0 min 4h 45min
System unit Line Y-Z Power transformer Y Busbar Y

Type of system unit Line Power transformer Busbar
Duration of end-user outage 45 min 30 min 30 min
Duration of outage 45 min 30 min 30 min

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6.23 DOUBLE EARTH FAULT IN A COMPENSATED NETWORK

A falling tree caused an earth fault in the R phase of the Y-Z line which in turn caused high phase
voltages in the two other phases and damaged the S phase of a voltage transformer in station X, as
seen in Figure 6.23.1. Thus, a double earth fault had occurred and line X-Y had tripped correctly in
both ends. The earth fault in the Y-Z line disappeared automatically after the tree had been burned
down and the X-Y line could be reconnected after the voltage transformer had been replaced, which
took 24 hours.
Figure 6.23.1 Double earth fault in a compensated network.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1 2
Component type Line Voltage transformer
System earth Compensated Compensated
Fault type Single-phase earth fault Single-phase earth fault
Fault cause Other environmental Other
Repair time -causes 24 h

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6.24 OUTAGE OF PARALLEL POWER TRANSFORMERS DUE TO A TAP CHANGER FAULT AND
OVERLOAD
The 400/130 kV power transformer T1 tripped because the tap changer was in the middle posi-
tion. The main spring in the tap changer mechanism of one of the phases was broken. This over-
loaded the power transformer T2 and consecutively tripped it. The 130 kV level load was adjusted
and 10 minutes later the power transformer T2 was reinstated without inspection. An overview of
the scenario is presented in Figure 6.24.1.
Figure 6.24.1 Outage of parallel power transformers due to tap changer fault and overload.
The power transformer T1 was operational again after five days even though the repair only took
40 hours. The 130 kV network is meshed, and therefore no end-user outage occurred.
No interruption should be registered as no delivery points in the network were affected by the in-
terruption, as explained in Section 5.4.
Date 2016-01-
Time 10
10:01
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Serial number 1 2
Component type Power transformer Power transformer
System earth Direct Direct
Fault type Other Overload
Temporary or permanent fault Permanent Temporary
Fault cause Technical equipment Other
Repair time 40 h 0 min
System unit Power transformer Power transformer T2

Fault causing the outage T1
1 2
Type of system unit Power transformer Power transformer
Characterisation of discon- Automatically Automatically
nection
Characterisation of reclosing Manually after Manually without inspection, repair or restructuring
repair of operation

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6.25 LINE FAULT WITH AN END-USER OUTAGE IN THE DOWNSTREAM NETWORK

Lightning caused a single-phase earth fault on the 130 kV X-Y line which disconnected the 20 kV
downstream network. Furthermore, the 20 kV downstream network was only fed via the X-Y line
because the Y-Z line was under maintenance, as seen in Figure 6.25.1.
Figure 6.25.1 Line fault with an end-user outage in the downstream network.
The total load before the disturbance was 50 MW in the 20 kV network. Both the X-Y line and the
power transformer Y were inspected and 30 minutes after the disturbance they were also recon-
nected with a 20 MW load. The rest of the 50 MW load was reclosed 20 minutes later.
Energy not supplied is calculated as the energy that should have been delivered had the outage
not occurred, as explained in Section 4.4.8,. In this case, it is recommended to calculate the energy
30 20
not supplied as 60 ⋅ 50 𝑀𝑊ℎ + 60 ⋅ 30 𝑀𝑊ℎ = 35 𝑀𝑊ℎ, as shown in Figure 6.25.2. However, the
method for calculating the energy not supplied may differ for another company in practice.
Figure 6.25.2 A visual representation of how to calculate the energy not supplied in the example of Section 0.
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Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Line
Repair time 0 min
System unit Line X-Y Power transformer Y

Type of system unit Line Power transformer
Duration of end-user outage 50 min *) 50 min *)
Characterisation of reclosing Manually after inspection Manually after inspection
*) The end-user outage lasting the longest is stated.

6.26 OUTAGE OF A LINE WITH A SERIES CAPACITOR

A two-phased earth fault tripped the 400 kV X-Y line and its series capacitor X-Y, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.26.1. The high speed automatic reclosing of the line was successful and the series capacitor
was also bypassed automatically. The series capacitor was inspected and 1.5 hours after the incident
it was put back into operation.
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Figure 6.26.1 Outage of line with series capacitor.
Date 2016-01-10
Time 10:01
Serial number 1
Component type Line
Fault type Two or three-phased with or without earth contact
Repair time 0 min
System unit Line X-Y Series capacitor X-Y

Type of system unit Line Series capacitor
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Characterisation of reclosing Automatically after less than 2 secs Manually after inspec-
tion
Duration of outage 0 min 1 h 30 min


6.27 FAULT IN UNDER 100 KV NETWORK

A component on the lower side of the transformer’s bushing tripped and caused ENS on the down-
stream network, as shown in Figure 6.27.1. The fault is also situated on the lower side of the trans-
former. The transformer trips correctly on the 100 kV side. Therefore, no faults or ENS is to be re-
ported in the statistics.
In other hand, if the fault would have been on the transformer, a fault and ENS would have been
reported.
Figure 6.27.1 Fault on the lower side of a 100/20 kV transformer
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7 GUIDELINES FOR CALCULATING THE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS

To be able to calculate fault frequencies for components, it is imperative to know the number of
individual components. Table 8.12 shows how the number of the various components is calculated.
Table 6.27.1 How to calculate the number or length of various components
Component Calculation of number and kilometres

Surge arresters and Surge arresters and spark gaps are considered as one component per three-
spark gaps phased unit.
Circuit breakers Circuit breakers are considered as one component per three-phased unit. Dis-
connecting circuit breakers (DCB) are considered circuit breakers.
Disconnectors and Disconnectors and earth connectors are considered as one component per
earth connectors three-phased unit. Earth connectors and disconnectors are considered as two
components.
Common ancillary The number of common ancillary equipment should equal the number of sta-
equipment tions.
Cables Cable length is considered as the cable distension multiplied by the number of
parallel cable connections. Thus, if there are two parallel cable connections, the
cable length is twice the distance between the connection points of the cable.
Control equipment The number of control equipment should equal the number of circuit breakers
Power transformers A power transformer with a separate regulating transformer is considered as

one component. A power transformer consisting of three single-phase units is
considered as one component.
Overhead lines Is calculated as total length per kilometre and voltage level.
Instrument trans- An instrument transformer is considered as one component per three-phased
formers unit. If only a single-phase unit is installed, this is also considered as one com-
ponent.
Reactors inclusive of Reactors inclusive of neutral point reactors are considered as one component
neutral point reac- per three-phased connection organ.
tors
Synchronous com- Rotating phase compensators are considered as one component per unit.
pensators
Busbars The number of busbars is considered as one per voltage level and station. A, B
and C busbars are not considered as separate bars.
Series capacitors Series capacitors are considered as one component per three-phased connec-
tion
Shunt capacitor organ.
Shunt capacitor batteries and filters are considered as one component per
batteries and filters three-phased connection organ.
SVC and statcom SVCs and statcom are considered as one component per unit.
Other high voltage The number of other high voltage appliances should equal the number of sta-
appliances tions.
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8 FUTURE WORK
While these guidelines were prepared, suggestions were presented as to how to develop the HVAC
statistics. Also, common solutions must be found, and questions within certain areas need to be
answered.
One idea could be to introduce the concept energy not delivered (END). It could be defined as the
calculated amount of energy that should have been delivered by a delivery point if the outage had
not occurred. However, there is a degree of uncertainty attached to this definition. What applies to
a downstream network with several feeders? If the production in the downstream network releas-
es simultaneously with an outage occurring, and this leads to the transmitted effect in the down-
stream network being greater than before the outage, then how is END calculated?
It is difficult to find a model for calculating energy not supplied (ENS) that will always work. How do
you treat the cases in which the downstream generation is simultaneously connected to load? Can
end-user outage be calculated on the basis of the total load within the area or from the power
supplied to the area before the fault?
The reliability and the behaviour of the relay protection system during grid disturbances have great
influence on the development of grid disturbances. Here a comparison within the TSO’s would be
interesting.
It should be possible to develop the statistics report to also contain non-grid disturbance related
material, such as data on frequency quality, use of internal sections and international connections
and planned outages.
A further parameter being discussed in relation to the work on these guidelines is production loss.
It would be interesting to see statistics of this.
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10 REFERENCES
[1] The Energy Concern’s National League, The Norwegian Water Supply and Energy Department,
Statnett and Sintef Energy Research, “Definisjoner knyttet til feil og avbrudd i det elektriske
kraftsystemet – Versjon 2 (In English: Definitions in relation to faults and outages in the electrical
power system – Version ),” 1. [Online]. Available:
http://www.energy.sintef.no/Prosjekt/KILE/.
[2] IEC 50(191-05-01), International Electrotechnical Vocabulary, Dependability and Quality of Ser-
vice.
[3] EN 13306, Maintenance terminology.
[4] IEEE, Standard Terms for Reporting and Analyzing Outage Occurrence and Outage States of Elec-
trical Transmission Facilities.
[5] EN 50160, Voltage Characteristics of Electricity Supplied by Public Distribution Systems.
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11 CONTACT PERSONS
Denmark: Energinet.dk
Tonne Kjærsvej 65, DK-7000 Fredericia, Denmark
Anders Bratløv
Tel. +45 51 38 01 31
E-mail: anv@energinet.dk
Finland: Fingrid Oyj

Läkkisepäntie 21
P.O. Box 530, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Markku Piironen
Tel. +358 30 395 4172, Mobile +358 40 351 1718
E-mail: markku.piironen@fingrid.fi
Estonia: Elering AS
Kadaka tee 42, Tallinn
Irene Puusaar
Tel. +372 5084372
E-mail: irene.puusaar@elering.ee
Raul Uuring
Tel. +372 5296214
E-mail: raul.uuring@elering.ee
Iceland: Landsnet
Gylfaflöt 9, IS-112 Reykjavik
Ragnar Stefánsson
Tel. +354 863 7181 or +354 825 2395
E-mail: ragnars@landsnet.is
Latvia: AS "Augstsprieguma tīkls"

86 Darzciema Str., Riga, LV-1073, Latvia
Anrijs Maklakovs
Tel. +371 293 352 216
E-mail: anrijs.maklakovs@ast.lv
Lithuania: Litgrid AB
A.Juozapavičiaus g. 1 , LT-09311, Vilnius
Valdas Tarvydas
Tel. +370 5 278 2471
E-mail: valdas.tarvydas@litgrid.eu
Vytautas Šatinskis
Tel. +370 5 278 2258
E-mail: vytautas.satinskis@litgrid.eu
Romas Pangonis
Tel. +370 5 278 2245
E-mail: romas.pangonis@litgrid.eu
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Norway: Statnett SF
Postboks 4904 Nydalen, NO-0423 Oslo
Jørn Schaug-Pettersen
Tel. +47 23 90 35 55
E-mail: jsp@statnett.no
Christian Melaaen
Tel. +47 23 90 41 53, Mobile +47 91 31 40 58
E-mail: christian.melaaen@statnett.no
Sweden: Svenska kraftnät

Sturegatan 1, P.O. Box 1200, SE-172 24 Sundbyberg
Hampus Bergquist
Tel. +46 10 475 84 48, Mobile: +46 72 515 90 70
E-mail: hampus.bergquist@svk.se
Tarek Tallberg
Tel. +46 10 475 86 79, Mobile: +46 72 244 96 97
E-mail: tarek.tallberg@svk.se
Production Hillner Consulting

of report: Henrik Hillner
Tel. +358 41 505 7004
E-mail: henrik.hillner@hillner.fi
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APPENDIX A: CROSS REFERENCE LIST FOR FAULT CAUSES

The tables below state how different fault causes and subcauses for various countries and compa-
nies categorised according to the fault causes presented in Table 4.2.1.
Table A. 1 Fault causes in Denmark
Fault cause in Denmark Fault cause in the HVAC statistics

Lightning Lightning
Meteorological conditions Other environmental causes
Wind (storm) Other environmental causes
Ice and snow coverings Other environmental causes
Pollution, salt, etc. Other environmental causes
Low temperature Other environmental causes
Heat Other environmental causes
Rain and moisture Other environmental causes
Flood, storm surge Other environmental causes
Other external influences External influences
Vandalism External influences
Tree felling and rock blasting External influences
Flying objects External influences
Fire External influences
Birds or other animals External influences
Earthwork External influences
Collision External influences
Stray current External influences
Work on plant excl. staff External influences
Staff Operation and maintenance
Maloperation local control Operation and maintenance
Maloperation remote control Operation and maintenance
Influences during work or testing Operation and maintenance
Lack of monitoring Operation and maintenance
Other Other
Coupling overvoltages, induction etc. Other
Switching on of a fault during fault search Other
Switching off of component during fault search Other
No immediate cause Other
Influenced by another fault in another unit Other
Unknown Unknown
Table A. 2 Fault causes in Finland
Fault cause in Finland Fault cause in the HVAC statistics

Lightning Lightning
Natural phenomena in general Other environmental causes
Wind Other environmental causes
Rain or moisture Other environmental causes
Snow or ice Other environmental causes
Temperature (high or low) Other environmental causes
Pollution and salt Other environmental causes
Animals External influences
External influences in general External influences
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Fault cause in Finland Fault cause in the HVAC statistics

Tree felling External influences
Accidents, external External influences
Switching voltage or current Operation and maintenance
Maintenance in general Operation and maintenance
Power line maintenance Operation and maintenance
Protection maintenance Operation and maintenance
Equipment maintenance Operation and maintenance
Mistake in investments Operation and maintenance
Switching mistake Operation and maintenance
Device in general Technical equipment
Production Technical equipment
Ageing Technical equipment
Design Technical equipment
Operation in general Technical equipment
Other Other
Secondary fault Other
Fault in other network Other
System cause Other
Unknown Unknown
Table A. 3 Fault causes in Iceland
Fault cause in Iceland Fault cause in the HVAC statistics

Nature Other environmental causes
Felling External influences
Fault in material and production Technical equipment
Ageing Technical equipment
Installation Operation and maintenance
Lack of line passage Technical equipment
Fault in relay plan Operation and maintenance
Design/dimensioning Operation and maintenance
Lack of maintenance Operation and maintenance
Unknown Other
Other Other
Table A. 4 Fault causes in Norway
Fault cause in Norway Subcause in Norway Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Surroundings Lightning Lightning
Surroundings Wind Other environmental causes
Surroundings Snow/ice Other environmental causes
Surroundings Frost/frozen earth Other environmental causes
Surroundings Water/precipitation/moisture Other environmental causes
Surroundings Salt/pollution Other environmental causes
Surroundings Contaminant External influences
Surroundings Birds/animals External influences
Surroundings Vegetation Other environmental causes
Surroundings Displacements Other environmental causes
Surroundings Avalanche Other environmental causes
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Surroundings Fire/explosion External influences
Surroundings Other Other
Humans/staff Maloperation Operation and maintenance
Humans/staff Work/testing Operation and maintenance
Humans/staff Tree felling External influences
Humans/staff Excavation/explosion External influences
Humans/staff Component work Operation and maintenance
Humans/staff Traffic damage External influences
Humans/staff Vandalism/sabotage External influences
Humans/staff Other Operation and maintenance
Humans/external staff Maloperation Operation and maintenance
Humans/external staff Work/testing Operation and maintenance
Humans/external staff Tree felling External influences
Humans/external staff Excavation/explosion External influences
Humans/external staff Component work Operation and maintenance
Humans/external staff Traffic damage External influences
Humans/external staff Vandalism/sabotage External influences
Humans/external staff Other Operation and maintenance
Humans/others Maloperation External influences
Humans/others Work/testing External influences
Humans/others Tree felling External influences
Humans/others Excavation/explosion External influences
Humans/others Component work External influences
Humans/others Traffic damage External influences
Humans/others Vandalism/sabotage External influences
Humans/others Other External influences
Operational problems Overload Other
Operational problems High/low voltage Other
Operational problems High/low level Other
Operational problems High/low pressure Other
Operational problems Vibration Other
Operational problems Permanent load increase Other
Operational problems Other Other
Technical equipment Ageing Technical equipment
Technical equipment Abrasion Technical equipment
Technical equipment Corrosion Technical equipment
Technical equipment Cavitation Technical equipment
Technical equipment Erosion Technical equipment
Technical equipment Poor contact Technical equipment
Technical equipment Electrical discharges Technical equipment
Technical equipment Leak Technical equipment
Technical equipment Loose parts Technical equipment
Technical equipment Damaged/defective compo- Technical equipment
nent
Technical equipment Crack/break Technical equipment
Technical equipment Decay Technical equipment
Technical equipment Pollution/impurities Technical equipment
Technical equipment Blocking Technical equipment
Technical equipment Other Technical equipment
Design/installation Design/dimensioning fault Technical equipment
Design/installation Production fault Technical equipment
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Design/installation Installation Technical equipment
Design/installation Faulty settings/adjustment Operation and maintenance
Design/installation Lack of instructions/routines Technical equipment
Design/installation Lack of maintenance Operation and maintenance
Design/installation Defective relay Technical equipment
Design/installation Fault in relay plan Operation and maintenance
Design/installation Other Technical equipment
Former fault Other
No primary cause Other
Cause not defined Unknown
Table A. 5 Fault causes for Svenska Kraftnät
Fault cause for Svenska Kraftnät Subcause for Svenska kraftnät Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Lightning Lightning
Other nature Low temperature Other environmental causes
Frost Other environmental causes
Pollution/salt Other environmental causes
Rain/moisture/snow Other environmental causes
Vegetation Other environmental causes
Other Other environmental causes
Unknown Other environmental causes
External influences Fire External influences
Animals External influences
Flying objects incl. kites etc. External influences
Excavation/explosion External influences
Collision External Influences
Other External influences
Unknown External influences
Operation and maintenance Fault in documenta- Operation and maintenance
tion/foundation
Maloperation/connection plan Operation and maintenance
Fault in settings Operation and maintenance
Fault earthing Operation and maintenance
Erroneous work Operation and maintenance
Fault coupling/maloperation Operation and maintenance
Other staff fault Operation and maintenance
Unknown Operation and maintenance
High voltage equipment Poor contact Technical equipment
Fault in design/installation Technical equipment
Leak Technical equipment
Material break Technical equipment
Optic fault Technical equipment
Program fault Technical equipment
Abrasion Technical equipment
Other fault in high voltage Technical equipment
component
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Fault cause for Svenska Kraftnät Subcause for Svenska kraftnät Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Unknown Technical equipment
Control equipment Poor contact Technical equipment
Fault in design/installation Technical equipment
Fault in electronic component Technical equipment
Program fault Technical equipment
Optic fault Technical equipment
Abrasion Technical equipment
Lack of communication Technical equipment
Other Technical equipment
Unknown Technical equipment
Subsynchronous resonance Other
Other Overload Other
Power hunting Other
Fault in other network Other
Low transmission Other
Other Other
Unknown Other
Table A. 6 Fault causes for E.ON
Fault causes for E.ON Subcauses for E.ON Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Weather and envi- Lightning Lightning
ronment Wind Other environmental causes
Snow, ice bark, galloping lines Other environmental causes
Salt, pollution Other environmental causes
Low temperature Other environmental causes
Resetting of waterways Other environmental causes
Vandalism on sur- Digging, collision External influences
roundings Outrageous act External influences
Explosion, splintering External influences
Flying or buoyant objects External influences
Fire, explosion External influences
Animals, birds External influences
Foreign objects in turbine External influences
Staff Maloperation Operation and maintenance
Lack of monitoring and maintenance Operation and maintenance
Neglected or erroneous deregistration or Operation and maintenance
changing of protection and monitoring
equipment
Unsuitable setting of protection and Operation and maintenance
monitoring equipment, wrongly chosen
fuse
Fault in relation to testing and monitor- Operation and maintenance
ing
Other Operation and maintenance
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Fault causes for E.ON Subcauses for E.ON Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Equipment and mate- Faulty manufacture or material Technical equipment
rial Defective design or appliance Technical equipment
Insufficient dimensioning, aged plants Technical equipment
Exhaustion, abrasion, ageing, corrosion Technical equipment
Temporary Technical equipment
Defective installation Technical equipment
Insufficient line section passages. If the Technical equipment
line passage is tree proof, it should be
classified as ”Lack of monitoring and
maintenance” if lack of maintenance is
the case.
Other causes Influence in conjunction with fault in Other
another component during the same grid
disturbance
Decreased mechanical or electrical Other
strength due to earlier problems.
Known insufficiencies in the equipment Other
Coupling overload etc. Other
Other Other
Table A. 7 Fault causes for Vattenfall
Fault causes for Vattenfall Subcauses for Vattenfall Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Natural circumstances Lightning Lightning
Low temperature, snow and ice bark Other environmental causes
Salt cover Other environmental causes
Birds and other animals Other environmental causes
Resetting of waterways Other environmental causes
Vandalism Outrageous act External influences
Explosion and such causes External influences
Other personnel External influences
Aircraft etc. External influences
Fire External influences
Excavation, collision etc. External influences
Foreign objects External influences
Staff Maloperation Operation and maintenance
Lack of monitoring and maintenance Operation and maintenance
Erroneously reconnected protection Operation and maintenance
equipment
Erroneously set protection equip- Operation and maintenance
ment
Fault in relation to testing Operation and maintenance
Other Operation and maintenance
Equipment and material Defective material Technical equipment
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Fault causes for Vattenfall Subcauses for Vattenfall Fault cause in the HVAC statistics
Unsuitable design Technical equipment
Insufficient dimensioning Technical equipment
Unexpected problems Technical equipment
Temporary Technical equipment
Defective installation Technical equipment
Lack of line passage Technical equipment
Other causes Coverings on dampened surfaces Other
Coverings on surfaces in contact with Other
gas
Oil pollution etc. Other
Unsuitable fuel Other
Coupling over voltage etc. Other
Other Other
Own system disturbance Interruption of connection lines Other
Interruption due to local overload Other
Own system disturbance Other
Other Other
Not own system disturb- Fault in other company Other
ance Not own system disturbance Other
Deficient selectivity Other
Other Other
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Grid Disturbances Guidelines

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GUIDELINES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION

2 PURPOSE OF THE GUIDELINES........................................................................................ 4

3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STATISTICS ..................................................................... 5

5 CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES, FAULTS, OUTAGES AND INTERRUPTIONS................. 22

6 EXAMPLES OF CLASSIFICATION OF GRID DISTURBANCES, OUTAGES, FAULTS AND INTERRUPTIONS27

6.13 INTERRUPTION OF A PAPER MILL IN A DOWNSTREAM NETWORK .......................................................................41

7 GUIDELINES FOR CALCULATING THE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS ......................................... 64

11 CONTACT PERSONS .................................................................................................. 67

APPENDIX A: CROSS REFERENCE LIST FOR FAULT CAUSES ............................................................................ 69

2 PURPOSE OF THE GUIDELINES

 a correct assessment of the quality and function of the different components;

3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STATISTICS

The statistics do not comprise:

 faults in production units

Included Not included

4.1 GRID DISTURBANCE

Outages, forced or unintended disconnection or failed re-connection of breaker as a

A grid disturbance can, for example, be:

 a tripping of breaker because of lightning striking a line;

4.1.1 Duration of a disturbance

4.1.2 Multiple fault situation

The inability of a component to perform its required function [2] [3].

 a primary fault or a secondary/latent fault

4.2.1 Primary fault

A fault which initiates a grid disturbance [1].

4.2.2 Secondary fault

A fault which occurs as a consequence of a primary fault.

4.2.3 Latent fault

4.2.4 Permanent fault

4.2.5 Temporary fault

4.2.6 Intermittent fault

One example of an intermittent fault is galloping lines.

4.2.7 Fault in component

A fault which affects a specific component.

Unlike a system disturbance, a fault in a component is attributable to a specific component.

4.2.8 System disturbances

The examples below are termed system disturbances:

 overfrequency or underfrequency in a separate network

4.2.9 Cause, primary cause and underlying cause

Cause relating to design, production, installation, operation or maintenance which

A primary cause of a fault is defined as:

Event or circumstance which leads to a fault [1].

An underlying cause of a fault is defined as:

Event or circumstance which is present before a fault occurs [1].

Fault cause Explanation

Technical equipment Dimensioning, fault in technical documentation (e.g., guidelines, manuals),

Other Operating problems, faults at customers', faults in other networks, prob-

4.3 OUTAGE AND SYSTEM UNITS

An outage is defined as:

4.3.1 Duration of a grid outage

4.4 OTHER DEFINITIONS

Point, power transformer or busbar in the grid where electricity is exchanged.

4.4.2 End user

A buyer who resells some of the power is considered an end user.

4.4.3 End-user interruption

4.4.4 Duration of end-user interruption

Situation characterised by the discontinuation of the delivery of electrical power to

4.4.6 Long-term interruption

End-user interruption or interruption lasting more than three minutes [5].