Shreya Singhal V Union of India (2015)
Shreya Singhal V Union of India (2015)
Shreya Singhal V Union of India (2015)
LAW
RAILMAJRA
Information Technology law
PROJECT REPORT ON
At the same time, cases regarding hatred, false information and Sensational
reporting of critical issues in order to obtain viewership is also increasing.
Therefore, in order to maintain sovereignty and integrity of country the
Government also imposes some reasonable restrictions, because the right to
freedom of speech and expression under the constitution of India is not
absolute.
Shreya Singhal vs Union of India is a landmark case which has created
significant impact in the history of Indian legal system. This case revolves
around the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
in Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
In this case under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, Ten criminal and
civil writ petitions were filed in the Honourable Supreme Court of India.
These writ petitions raised concerns mainly about the provisions of Sections
66 A, 69 A, 79 of the Information Technology Act of 2000 and Section 118
(d) of the Kerala Police Act, with respect to the freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under the provisions of Article 19 (1) (a) of the
Constitution of India.
After that, in the year 2013, the Union Government recommended a proviso to
the arrest of a person made under Section 66A of the IT Act. The Central
government stated in its advisory that no individual shall be apprehended by
the police without prior authorization of the superior officer, who is not below
the rank of Inspector General of Police. Henceforth, there were numerous
petitions filed by the people across the country to strike down the
unconstitutional provisions of the IT Act. The Apex Court of India clubbed
those petitions into a single PIL and the case came to be known as Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India.
On 5th July 2012, the Human Rights Council of United Nations unanimously
pronounced to safeguard the right to free speech and expression of each and
every individual on the internet. It was the first declaration made by the United
Nations asserting the Human Rights of the netizens must be safeguarded to an
equal extent as it does in the corporeal world.
Facts in Issue
The petitioner filed a writ petition in the public interest under Article 32 of the
Indian Constitution, seeking the Supreme Court of India to declare Section
66A, 69A and 79 of the IT Act ultra-vires to the Constitution of India. It was
asserted in the petition that the wordings of these provisions are wide and
ambiguous. The petitioner further affirmed that the objective of these
provisions are inclined towards its reckless exploitation and thus falls out of
the purview of Article 14, 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Indian Constitution. There are
terminologies like menacing, offensive, annoyance, inconvenience,
obstruction, danger, and insult which are not explained in any act. Thus, it
makes it more prone to unwanted abuse. Apart from it, the classification made
between the citizens and netizens of the country was also termed as arbitrary
and contrary to the provision of free speech inscribed under Article 19(1) (a)
of the Indian Constitution. It was asserted that the distinction gives an authority
to the police officers to apprehend netizens for their remarks which can also be
made by the general citizens of the country. Thus, such classification violates
the fundamental right to equality penned down under Article 14 of the Indian
Constitution.
1. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 waives off the
right to free speech and expression prescribed under Article 19(1) (a)
of the Indian Constitution and doesn’t come under the purview of
reasonable classification prescribed in Article 19(2).
2. It was also affirmed by the petitioner that the acts of causing
displeasure, exasperations and vexation are out of the ambit of Article
19(2) of the Indian Constitution.
3. Section 66A was also contended to be ambiguous as it doesn’t
describe various terms in it. The terms can be interpreted in a very
broad manner and are subjected to be abused by the executive
authorities.
4. There is no intelligible differentia in the classification of charging
only netizens under Section 66A of the IT Act. Hence, the entire
provision is arbitrary, vague and discriminatory in nature.
Any legislation enacted to restrict the freedom of speech and expression can
cause public turmoil and affects the autonomy & integrity of the country. But,
there are certain situations in which it is necessary to curtail the freedom of
speech and expression in order to prevail public harmony in the society.
However, such an imposition of restriction on the fundamental right of speech
and expression has to be rational and intra-vires. Hence, in order to determine
this; article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution has been included to give eight
essential conditions for the reasonable classification of any restriction imposed
upon the ‘right to speech’, which has not been satisfied by the section 66A of
the IT Act.
Doctrine of Severability
There are certain cases in which the court of law is unpleased with the
constitutionality of a law. In such cases, the doctrine of severability comes into
a play. The raison d’être given by the respondent is ambiguous and irrational
as it doesn’t assert which fraction or proportion of the Section 66A can be
spared. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is legislated in
a language which is prone to be misused by the authorities, and it contains an
arbitrary restriction on the ‘freedom of speech and expression’ which is
inconsistent with the Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. As stated
under Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution, any existing law inconsistent
with Part III of the Constitution is only null and void to the fraction of its
discrepancy and not further.
Infringement of Article 14
In the Shreya Singhal’s case, the petitioner had affirmed that those offences
which are ambiguous, irrational and discriminatory in nature tend to violate the
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution and results in the prejudiced application
of the law. In addition to it, it was asserted by the petitioner that section 66A
of the IT Act doesn’t conform to the essentialities of twin test. There is no
intelligible differentia present between the public transmission of messages
through live speech and the internet. Therefore, it is arbitrary to form a new
class of offenders on the basis of it. It was also affirmed that Section 66A of
the IT Act sanctions people with maximum 3 years of imprisonment, which is
contrary to the offence of defamation having 2 years of maximum sentence
prescribed in it. Along with this, the offence of defamation falls under the
purview of non-cognizable offence whereas an offence under Section 66 is
cognizable.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the submission of the petitioner and
affirmed that there is an intelligible differentia present between the public
transmission of messages through live speech and the internet. It was stated by
the court of law that the transmission of obnoxious texts through the internet is
cost-effective and less time consuming as compared to live speech. Therefore,
such messages get available to the wider public during a short of span of time
and create a chance of expediting public disorder. Hence, the petitioner
challenges to Article 14 got failed before the Apex Court of law.
Abrogation of Section 79
As per Section 69A of the IT Act, a website can be blocked only after
following numerous procedural rules and regulations including listening to the
originator and intermediary. After that, the website can be taken down either
by the Designated Officer while abiding with the 2009 Rules or when the
Hon’ble Court of law authorizes the Designated officer to do so. However,
there is nowhere mentioned under Section 69A read with 2009 Rules that the
intermediary has a liability to block particular information from the digital
realm. The sole ground for that to happen is when the intermediary doesn’t
block an explicit content expeditiously upon a prompt order of the court. This
is the only ground mentioned under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT act, otherwise,
it will be very difficult for the intermediaries like Instagram, Yahoo etc. to
comply with the orders when millions of requests are awaiting, and the
intermediary is then obligated to authenticate as to which requests are rational
and which are not.
It should be noted that the direction or order given by the court of law should
be in compliance with the subject matter penned down under Article 19(2) of
the Indian Constitution. Therefore, bearing this in mind, the Apex Court of
India in the instant case proclaimed that the illegal acts or omissions prescribed
beyond Article 19(2) don’t come under the purview of Section 79 and
consequently rejected the plea of the petitioner to strike down Section 79 of
the IT Act.
The Supreme Court of India has relied on the technical, convoluted and dicey
process of state to understand the potential and competence of parties involved.
For example, the rules enacted in 2009 have been enforced with an inference
that firstly, the laws pertaining to the website blocking provides a rational
chance of being contacted and notified to the alleged offender and secondly, it
gives a presumption that the intermediary will justify and defend the online
content from being taken down by the executive body. These deductions are
practically inept and extraneous.
The offences committed through the Internet are more critical in nature due to
its geographic spread and anonymity. It provides a virtual shield to the content-
originator making it highly unlikely for him/her to get caught. Apart from it,
the intermediaries will also never spend their resources in safeguarding the
content of third parties and are going refuse to mingle with any kind of dispute.
Hence, the content available on the internet will be available to the larger
audience throughout the world despite the proclamation from the executive
authorities to ban it.
The rule of blocking has been prescribed to be executed in secrecy
under Rule 16 of the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for
Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009. It
affirms that the confidentiality of blocking order should be maintained while
pronouncing such an order. Although, this rule was argued in the Shreya
Singhal case but it was left untouched by the Supreme Court in its judgment.
Therefore, in order to uphold the doctrine of transparency, a notice should be
published on the hosting page proclaiming blocking orders of the government
for the specified content. This will not only aware the content-creators and
viewers about the content ordered to be put down by the executive authority
but will also promote lucidity in the digital realm.
Conclusion:
Because of numerous reasons, Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (U.O.I) is
one of the landmark and significant judgment with regards to the freedom of
speech and expression in the history of Indian Legal System. In this case,
Honorable supreme court effectively protected the rights of people as well as
safeguarded the interest of society.
But even though, Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 has been struck down by
Supreme Court's Order dated 24th March, 2015 numerous cases has been
filed against the innocent people under Section 66A. Police officers and even
subordinate court judges were not aware of this supreme court's order.