University of Hong Kong

Faculty of Arts
Department of History

A Thesis
Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng:
A Comparative Study of Tripartite Loyalty
of Colonial Chinese Elite (1895-1912)

Submitted by
Chow Lo Sai, Pauline
In partial fulfillment for the
Degree of Master of Arts
in Comparative Asian Studies

December 1987
UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
LIBRARY

Thesis Collection
Deposited by the Author
ABSTRACT of thesis e n t i t l e d "Ho Kai and Lim Boon K e n g : A
Comparative Study of Tripartite Loyalty of Colonial Chinese
E l i t e (1895-1912)" s u b m i t t e d by Chow Lo Sai, P a u l i n e , for
the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Hong Kong
in December 1987.

The p e r i o d 1895-1912 was a f a s t changing era in China.

W h i l e the country was suffering humiliations of defeats,
occupation of the capital and other erosions of sovereignty,
China w a s s a l v a g i n g h e r s e l f . M a n y C h i n e s e , both a t home
a n d a b r o a d , became c o n c e r n e d w i t h C h i n a r s f u t u r e . Even
those Chinese, such as colonial Chinese elites, who appeared
to have severed all attachments from China also showed much
enthusiasm. These were Chinese who were s e r v i n g as
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l l o r s in their colonial governments and ai:
the same time, keen on promoting the well-being of their own
Chinese communities, sometimes even to the point of strongly
opposing government policies. Yet amidst their
commitments, they were e q u a l l y dedicated to improving
China's situation. They w r o t e t o p u b l i c i s e t h e i r r e f o r m
v i e w s and e v e n acted to i n t e r v e n e in d e v e l o p m e n t s in the
M a i n l a n d . W h i l e they w e r e s h i f t i n g o r d i s t r i b u t i n g their
allegiances and dedications with seeming ease and
confidence, they were in f a c t c a r e f u l l y c o m p r o m i s i n g and
b a l a n c i n g so as not t o - u p s e t their own status bases in the
colonial bulwarks. Such tripartite role-playing was only
p o s s i b l e when these Chinese w e r e i n r e l a t i v e l y l i b e r a l
colonial regimes and when they w e r e manipulating and
balancing conscientiously. Ho Kai in Hong Kong and Lim
Boon Keng in the Straits Settlements were two such Chinese
elites.
 CONTENTS

Chapter Page

ABSTRACT i

DECLARATION iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS V

PREFACE vii

BIOGRAPHIES xv

I THE SETTING (1895-1912) 1

II FORMATIVE YEARS 29

III EARLY YEARS OF TRIPARTITE LOYALTY 46

(PRE-1895 INVOLVEMENT)

IV YEARS OF INTENSE TRIPARTITE LOYALTY 79

(1895-1912 INVOLVEMENT)

V CONCLUSION 179

BIBLIOGRAPHY 181
 PREFACE

Born in Shanghai in 1947 and brought by parents to Hong

Kong in 1949, I have always loved Hong Kong as my homeland.
N e v e r for one m o m e n t h a v e I d o u b t e d the p o t e n t i a l of t h i s
l i t t l e city e s p e c i a l l y its people. I have witnessed it in
social t u r m o i l s in 1957 and 1967 and in economic u p h e a v a l s
in 1973, 1983 and r e c e n t l y in 1987. Yet in all these
crises, Hong Kong has survived though not without
casualties. I am now looking forward to seeing it crossing
the hurdles of 1997.
Hong Kong is w h a t it is t o d a y , a p r o s p e r o u s c o l o n y of
peace and s t a b i l i t y because of the interplay of many
o b j e c t i v e situations and subjective factors. But no one
can deny that one m a j o r contributing force b e h i n d this
remarkably peaceful and in many respects successful British
c o l o n i a l r u l e is the s e r v i c e r e n d e r e d by l o c a l C h i n e s e
elites to the colonial government. These a r e e s p e c i a l l y
those C h i n e s e who h a v e been a p p o i n t e d to the L e g i s l a t i v e
Council since 1880 and to the Executive Council since 1926
to r e p r e s e n t Chinese interests. A l t h o u g h they swear
a l l e g i a n c e to the B r i t i s h C r o w n , they do speak and act on
b e h a l f of l o c a l C h i n e s e i n t e r e s t s , if not a l w a y s for the
w h o l e of the c o m m u n i t y at least for s e c t i o n a l good. This
is the government expectation of their function - a bridge
between the a l i e n minority British r u l e r s and the vast
Chinese subjects so as to smooth away whatever
m i m m d e r s Landings o r m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s thai m a y e x i s t . Thono
Chinese c o u n c i l l o r s do not necessarily endorse all
government policies unreservedly. Scenes o f c o u n c i l l o r s '
open o p p o s i t i o n to government measures are not recent
phenomena. They often find t h e m s e l v e s caught in the
d i l e m m a of whether to a d v a n c e i n t e r e s t s of the c o l o n i a l
government which appoints them or those of the local Chinese
whom they represent.
To make t h i s l o y a l t y issue m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , some of
these Chinese c o u n c i l l o r s in Hong Kong are also enthusiasts
i n p r o m o t i n g t h e g e n e r a l good o f C h i n a , t h e i r c o u n t r y o f
origin. They may be local Chinese for s e v e r a l generations
and may even be baptized Christians. Nevertheless, their
sentiments for China are s o s t r o n g t h a t they n o t only
o b s e r v e d e v e l o p m e n t s in the M a i n l a n d , but a c t u a l l y initiate
or become i n v o l v e d in the events t h e m s e l v e s * Some e v e n
c l a i m i n f l u e n t i a l positions in the history of China. These
acts of i n t e r f e r e n c e in a f f a i r s of C h i n a are c e r t a i n l y a
d e v i a t i o n from their sworn a l l e g i a n c e to the British C r o w n ,
and sometimes more s e r i o u s l y in c o n t r a d i c t i o n with the
declared diplomatic principles of the British government.
By thus v a r i o u s l y a l l o c a t i n g their concerns, attention
and e f f o r t s , these C h i n e s e c o u n c i l l o r s i n Hong Kong a r e
p l a y i n g three a p p a r e n t l y contradictory r o l e s , namely,
supporters of the British c o l o n i a l government, caretakers of
local Chinese interests and o b s e r v e r s and promoters of
China's general w e l l - b e i n g . No doubt, situations arise that
c a l l forth decisions and choices. This tripartite

Vlll
 A
i n v o 1 v onion t of v n r y i n p ; clo/^roo nnrl n x i o n t i r> obr.o r v n b 1 o
t h r o u g h o u t the history of o v e r a c e n t u r y of C h i nose
appointment to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. Generally
speaking, when crisis situations occur in China, this
tripartite concern of Chinese elites is most o b v i o u s l y
manifested. Here is one case of a Hong Kong Chinese
councillor being so i n v o l v e d at the turn of the last
century. It was the period when intense activities were
taking place in the Mainland after China's defeat by Japan
and the signing of The Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895
to January 1912 when the Ch'ing Dynasty abdicated and the
Chinese Republic was established. The Chinese councillor
of Hong Kong involved in this tumultuous period was Ho Kai

(1859-1914).
Tripartite loyalty complex is not just found among
appointed Chinese councillors in Hong Kong. Similar
mentality and i n v o l v e m e n t was also evident among Chinese
councillors of Singapore of the Straits Settlements.
Singapore then r e s e m b l e d Hong Kong in its colonial
structure, and in its Chinese majority population with ties
attached to the Mainland.
Here is one concluding remark on a Chinese Legislative
Councillor in Singapore being so tripartitely committed.
"His whole life presents a picture of
great variety, revolving as it did around
different ties - ties to his sovereign
country, Britain, to the land of his
forefathers, China, and to the land of
his birth, Singapore.!!^

IX
Aside from the name of the place, Singapore, this
description can well be used to sum up any cases of Chinese
e l i t e s w h oh a v e t h e i r l o y a l t y s o c o n t r a d i c t o r i l y p l e d g e d .
The author of the above remark, Lee Guan Kin, is concluding
his study of Lim Boon Keng (1869-1957), one such Chinese
elite in Singapore.
I h e r e f c r e d i t occurs that the o b j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n s of
the times, that is, a Chinese society under British colonial
r u l e at a time when China is in change, may h a v e n u r t u r e d
this l o y a l t y c o m p l e x . To be a b l e to a r r i v e at such a
conclusion, a comparative study of two contemporary Chinese
e l i t e s in two d i f f e r e n t B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s is n e c e s s a r y .
This present study is a comparative review of the tripartite
l o y a l t y issue of Ho Kai in Hong Kong and Lim Boon Keng in
Singapore. They w e r e n o t exact c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . But
d u r i n g that t u r b u l e n t p e r i o d f r o m 1895 to 1912^ both had
their e m o t i o n s a r o u s e d a n d f r o m their c o l o n i a l b u l w a r k s
influenced developments in the Mainland. At the same time
Ho and Lim were also serving as appointed Chinese
representatives in the Legislative Councils of Hong Kong and
Singapore respectively.^
The choice of these two persons is not a matter of
convenience. Ho Kai in Hong Kong and Lim Boon Keng in
Singapore were unique in their own societies at that time to
be so a c t i v e l y and t r i p a r t i t e l y i n v o l v e d . Therefore
a l t h o u g h Lim o u t l i v e d Ho for a l m o s t h a l f a c e n t u r y , this
comparative study is still valid. For clarity of argument,
this work does not exhaust their biographies and only
focuses on their loyalty complex.
By s t u d y i n g the two cases of Ho Kai in Hong K o n g and
Lim Boon Keng in S i n g a p o r e in the p e r i o d 1895-1912, t h i s
work aims to a n a l y s e , compare and contrast the various
factors and situations l e a d i n g to the formation of
t r i p a r t i t e l o y a l t y , the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n v o l v e d an'd the
compromises reached. It is hoped that c o n c l u s i o n s can be
drawn from the findings.
This a u t h o r does not c l a i m to be o r i g i n a l both in the
conception of the terminology "tripartite" and to the use of
source m a t e r i a l . "Tripartite" i n v o l v e m e n t is the theme of
Lee Guan Kin's study of Lim Boon Keng in "The Thought of Lim
Boon Keng - C o n v e r g e n c y and C o n t r a d i c t i o n Between C h i n e s e
and W e s t e r n C u l t u r e " . As to m a t e r i a l s u t i l i z e d , m u c h is
r e l i e d upon p r e v i o u s w o r k s a l r e a d y done on Ho Kai and Lim
Boon Keng. When the writer first drafted this work, there
was the intention of claiming originality in the choice of
these two characters for the comparative study of tripartite
loyalty. And yet during the course of research, the writer
read t h e f o l l o w i n g f r o m H a r o l d Z. S c h i f f r i n ' s S u n Y a t - s e n
and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution,
"...Ho K a i , as w e l l as some of the
Anglicized Chinese like Dr. Lim Boon Keng
(Lin Wen~ch r ing) of Singapore, are worthy
of i n d i v i d u a l study. By background and
training these men were eminently fitted
f o r l e a d e r s h i p r o l e s i n this d i f f i c u l t
t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d i n Chinese h i s t o r y ,
yet their influence was limited by their
conflicting l o y a l t i e s . . . . " 4

XI
Schiffrin's mentioning of Ho Kai along with Lim Boon Keng
thus ends this writer's any claim to originality of the
topic.
fl
The present study though titled Ho Kai and Lim Boon
Keng: A Comparative Study of Tripartite Loyalty of Colonial
Chinese Elite (1895-1912)" lays particular stress on Ho Kai.
As this work is done in Hong Kong, literature on Ho Kai
rather than Lim Boon Keng is more available. Aside from
Lee Guan Kin's thesis already referred to, other works on
Lim tend to be either sketchy or repetitive and even
complimentary. The Straits Chinese Magazines co-founded by
Lim Boon Keng were not available in Hong Kong at the time of
writing this paper.
The following chapters do not only concentrate on the
period 1895 to 1912 for the examination of tripartite
loyalty. Chapter One provides a brief introduction for the
understanding of the topic by explaining the significance of
the period 1895 to 1912, overseas Chinese mentality as well
as situations in China, Hong Kong and Singapore. Chapter
Two examines Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng's family background
and education in Britain. Chapter Three sees Ho Kai and
Lim Boon Keng in their pre-1895 involvement showing that
tripartite orientations" were taking shape in Lim's case and
as for Ho Kai, tripartite moves were already launched.
Chapter Four details their activities during those turbulent
years of 1895 to 1912. Chapter Five tries to draw some
conclusions from the findings of the previous chapters.

Xll
 Transliteration of Chinese names follows the Wade-Giles
system or commonly accepted forms.

Hong Kong
December, 1987-

Xlll
 NOTES

1. / T r i p a r t i! t e n a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x 1 is the theme of Lee

"Guan K i n s study of Lim Boon Keng t i t l e d "The T h o u g h t
of Lim Boon Keng -- C o n v e r g e n c y and C o n t r a d i c t i o n
Between Chinese a n d W e s t e r n C u l t u r e . " (Singpaore,
1974). / T r i p l e! l o! y a l t y ' i s a l s o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n1 f o r
Lim Boon Keng s c o n f u s e d c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y in
T u r n b u l l , C.M., A History of Singapore 1819-1975 (Kuala
Lumpur, 1977), p. 106.
2. Lee Guan Kin, op« cit., English Abstract p.i.
3. Ho Kai was L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l l o r f r o m 1890 to 1914.
Lim Boon Keng only served from 1895 to 1903*
4. S c h i f f r i n , H . Z . , Sun Y a t - s e n and the O r i g i n s of the
Chinese Revolution (Berkeley and Los A n g e l e s , 1 9 6 8 ) , p T
212.

XXV
 BIOGRAPHIES

Ho Kai (1859-1914)
Born in Hong Kong in 1859, Ho Kai was a third
generation overseas Chinese. Being tied to foreign
missionaries, the Hos w e r e t h e m o s t u n o r t h o d o x C h i n e s e
family. Ho Kai was the f o u r t h son of R e v . Ho F u k - t o n g or
Ho Tsun-cheen of the London Missionary Society. Ho Kai was
e d u c a t e d at the G o v e r n m e n t C e n t r a l S c h o o l in Hong K o n g .
Then h e r e c e i v e d u n i v e r s i t y education in B r i t a i n , with
degrees in both medicine and law. After a decade-long stay
in B r i t a i n , and j u s t b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g to Hong Kong in 1882,
he took A l i c e W a l k d e n as wife. Back in Hong Kong, he found
Western medicine not yet accepted and therefore practised as
a barrister-at-law.
Soon Ho Kai became an a c t i v e f i g u r e . He was a p p o i n t e d
to various government bodies, f i r s t to the Sanitary Board,
then t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , t h e M e d i c a l B o a r d a n d
several others. It was in the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l that: ho
p e r f o r m e d l o n g - t e r m s e r v i c e s f r o m 1890 to 1914 u n d e r six
governors. As Chinese spokesman in the C o u n c i l , he did n o t
h e s i t a t e to oppose g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s . But at the same
time his a l l e g i a n c e to the c o l o n i a l r e g i m e s h o u l d not be
doubted, being most appreciative that the British
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b r o u g h t s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y to the
colony. G e n e r a l l y speaking, he was of the opinion that the
life of the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n s h o u l d be the least
disturbed.

xv
 Ho Kai was also a keen supporter of local welfare- He
was the first Chinese to pioneer the promotion of Western
medicine among the Chinese community. He donated to the
building of Alice Memorial Hospital and helped found the
Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese in 1887- These
two have both expanded since then. The former is today's
Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital and the latter is now
the University of Hong Kong. Ho r s efforts did not stop at
the founding of these institutions. He had always been
involved with the management and fund-raising of these two
institutions.
A l t h o u g h a Westernized Chinese, Ho Kai was most
concerned with the fate of his country of origin — China.
As early as 1887? he started writing and publishing his
reform ideas. His name was also involved with Sun Yat-sen.
Together with others, Ho and Sun plotted the 1895 Canton
coup. Then in 1900, Ho Kai even won Governor Blake of Hong
Kong into a plan of persuading Li Hung-chang to declare
southern independence. But after much consideration, Li
turned down the offer. On the whole, Ho Kai f s solutions
for Chinars problems were from his Western experiences. He
even urged Britain to impose reforms on China.
Ho Kai was awarded C.M.G. (Companion of the Order of
St. Michael and St. George) in 1902 and a Knighthood in
1912. He was the first local Chinese to be awarded both
these two honours. His English wife died in 1884* He
married again and had ten sons and seven daughters. He

xvi
d i P d o n J u l y 21, 1 9 1 4 , soon a f t e r h i s r e t i r e m e n t f r o m the
Legislative Council .

Lim Boon Keng (1889-1957)

Lim Boon Keng was born in Singapore in 1869- He was a

third generation overseas Chinese. T h e g r a n d f a t h e r came
f r o m Fukien p r o v i n c e . At an e a r l y age of ten, Lim began to
receive formal English education. Upon awarded Q u e e n r s
Scholarship, he went to Britain to study m e d i c i n e . A f t e r
f i v e y e a r s , he q u a l i f i e d as a medical doctor and returned to
Singapore in 1893- As a Westernized Christian Chinese, Lim
was r e a d y t o take u p t h e e l i t i s t r o l e a s s i g n e d t o h i m . It
was soon t h e post-1895 p e r i o d when t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p
c i r c l e in the Straits Settlements e s p e c i a l l y in Singapore
was competed for by several Chinese forces, n a m e l y , Ch ! ing,
r e f o r m and r e v o l u t i o n a r y e f f o r t s . Lim also found h i m s e l f
i n v o l v e d in this v o r t e x * Earlier experiences in Britain
made him r e a l i s e his inadequacy in his ownc u l t u r e . This
f i r s t awakened in him a consciousness of h i s Chinese
identity to which he responded most a c t i v e l y and soon found
himself tripartitely i n v o l v e d in loyalty and allegiance.
Lim performed zealously those government posts he had
been a p p o i n t e d to such as in the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , the
Raffles Library and Museum Committee, Singapore M u n i c i p a l
Commission and Chinese A d v i s o r y Board. He was appointed
unofficial L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l l o r in 1895, 1898, 1901 and
1915. Lim was most a r t i c u l a t e and i n s t r u m e n t a l in
expressing and organizing l o y a l t y of Straits Chinese to

xviz
British administration. Not o n l y did he speak and write to
g l o r i f y British c o l o n i a l administration but also founded the
Straits Chinese Magazine for the study of E n g l i s h among
local Chinese i n 1897, the Straits Chinese British
A s s o c i a t i o n in 1900 for the p r o m o t i o n of l o y a l t y to the
B r i t i s h and helped set up a Chinese Company in the Singapore
Volunteer Infantry. He also encouraged local Chinese to
support British w a r - e f f o r t s d u r i n g the First W o r l d War.
L i m Boon Keng e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y d e d i c a t e d h i m s e l f t o
i m p r o v i n g Straits Chinese society. He found it too
divided, ignorant and corrupt. He lamented that local
Chinese were so deprived of knowledge of their own c u l t u r e
l i k e he h i m s e l f once was. So e d u c a t i o n was his g r e a t e s t
concern. He promoted it alongside with e f f o r t s to
p u b l i c i z e M a n d a r i n which he hoped w o u l d unite the Chinese
society so seriously d i v i d e d along dialect lines. He a l s o
tried most painstakingly to reform the society by
campaigning to remove vices and more positively by promoting
Confucianism to the position of a r e l i g i o n .
Lim Boon Keng ! s self-consciousness as a Chinese despite
his W e s t e r n i z e d u p b r i n g i n g and c l o s e n e s s to the B r i t i s h
administration n u r t u r e d in him a strong concern for C h i n a f s
declining fate. He found himself supporting at different
times a n d sometimes simultaneously various causes he
b e l i e v e d could save China. At first, he supported K'ang
Yu-wei ! s reform ideas, but he also sympathised with Sun Yat-
sen ! s r e v o l u t i o n a r y c a u s e . L a t e r , when both r e f o r m a n d

XVlll
r e v o l u t i o n movements appeared spent forces, and the Ch r ing
government was vigorously launching reform programmes, he
also endorsed those measures.
With the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the Chinese R e p u b l i c , Lim
assumed important posts in Sun Yat-sen's government during
the transitional period. Once Yuan S h i h - k ' a i a s s u m e d
p o w e r , Lim r e t u r n e d to Singapore. D u r i n g the 1920s, he
became more i n v o l v e d with the promotion of education. He
was the f i r s t P r e s i d e n t of Tan Kah K e e ' s p e r s o n a l p r o j e c t ,
the Amoy University founded in 1921. The University aimed
t o p r o v i d e a n a l l - r o u n d higher e d u c a t i o n f o r a l l Chinese,
w h e t h e r o v e r s e a s or at home. But those w e r e y e a r s of mass
movements in China. So as President of the University, not
o n l y did Lim find himself i n v o l v e d in political and economic
difficulties, he h i m s e l f a l s o came to be a t t a c k e d by
students. Again he returned to Singapore. When Singapore
was occupied by the Japanese in the 1940s, Lim Boon Keng was
unfortunately p i c k e d out to s e r v e as the c h a i r m a n in
organizing Chinese contributions to the Japanese. Lim Boon
Keng died in Singapore on New Year T s Day in 1957-

xix
Sir Kai Ho Kai, Kt., C.M.G., M.B.f C.M.,
M.R.C.S., Barrister-at-law
 mm.
am;.: $pjk,

Dr. Lim Boon Keng

 Chapter One
THE SETTING (1895-1912)

The period started with China1s defeat by Japan and the

subsequent signing of The Treaty of Shimonoseki in April
1895 which ushered in a period of accelerated foreign
imperialism and ended with the abdication of the 268-year
old Ch T ing Dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese
Republic in January 1912.
"The decade and a half following the
Japanese War was a very turbulent era, in
which the old intellectual, social and
economic order passed away and the new
s t r u g g l e d toward birth. The rapid
transition presaged a major political
upheaval in the offing. The Manchu
dynasty, already two and a half centuries
o l d , stood at the critical point in
history. If it could not keep abreast of
the times and offer an alternative to
violent change, it would be doomed to
extinction„n
Those were turbulent years when China's impending demise
strongly provoked not only the Manchus but a growing number
of concerned Chinese whether at home or abroad into a
determination to search for effective prescriptions to
arrest her decline but most important of all to rejuvenate
her. Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng, though both third
generation overseas Chinese and colonial Legislative
Councillors, had their hearts so attached to China that
developments in the Mainland during these years never
escaped their attention. They both made various and at
times se1f-contradictory attempts out of a genuine
conviction that these were the timely and appropriate
measures to be adopted for China's s a l v a t i o n . Through an
a n a l y s i s of their a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g this period, it is hoped
that these two cases of tripartite loyalty can be
understood.

The f o l l o w i n g are brief explanations on topics

necessary for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the background c o v e r e d in
this study.

Foreign activities in China (1895-1912)

Although China h a d been subjected to defeats and
economic domination by the European Powers since the First
A n g l o - C h i n e s e War (1839-1842) or as the C h i n e s e p r e f e r to

n a m e it, the O p i u m W a r , the 1895 d e f e a t of China by J a p a n ,

the Asian neighbour of m u c h s m a l l e r size, was a great

humiliation. M o r e o v e r , the Treaty of Shimonosekl which was

T
h a r s h e r than a l l other p r e v i o u s u n e q u a l treaties 1 , further
eroded ChinaTs remaining sovereignty and aggravated her
a l r e a d y weakening economy. Besides the opening of treaty

p o r t s , this time Chungking, Soochow, Hangchow and Shashih,

and the payment of 200 m i l l i o n taels of s i l v e r as i n d e m n i t y ,
C h i n a a l s o h a d t o cede T a i w a n , Pescadores and Liaotung
P e n i n s u l a to Japan as w e l l as g i v i n g up her c l a i m s in Korea.
T h e r e was a new p r i v i l e g e g r a n t e d f i r s t to Japan and then
through the "most-favoured nation clause" also passed onto
all other Treaty Powers. This was the right to open
factories and engage in industry and manufacturing in China.

Goods produced were free from all custom duties. This was a
definite inhibition to the growth of China's native
industries.
China r s easy defeat by Japan after her over three-
decade long Self-strengthening Movement which heavily
emphasised military and technological modernization exposed
the shallowness of these reform efforts, thus revealing the
decadence of the ruling Manchus. This Manchu impotence was
to upset the originally rather settled state of Western
activities in China.
Up till 1895? while keen on expanding their economic
interests in China, the Treaty Powers had been acting more
or less as a joint front with neither of them seeking any
exclusive rights and privileges from China. But China's
obvious helplessness in front of Japanese attacks alarmed
them. They feared that the Manchu Dynasaty would soon
collapse. If that were to happen, then Japan and Russia,
because of their geographical proximity would be in
advantageous positions to grab more concessions from China.
Therefore, in order not to be left behind in this scramble
and to secure both the protection and expansion of decades
of vested interests, European Powers began to establish
footholds in various parts of China. They sliced the China
melon into leased territories and spheres of influence,
within which they were engaged in railway construction,
opening of mines, establishment of factories, operation of
banks and all other kinds of exploitative activities.
Therefore by the end of the century, China was virtually a
semi-colony although the Manchu rulers still held sway.
Frnnoo obtained m i n i n g and railway rights in Southwest
China, leased Kwangchow Bay and obtained the non-alienation
of Hainan Island. Britain a l s o had her share of r a i l w a y
rights in Y u n n a n , the n o n - a l i e n a t i o n of Yangtze V a l l e y and
the lease of the a r e a s to the north of the K o w l o o n
Peninsula. Russia extended her Trans-Siberian Railway
through Manchuria. Germany leased Kiaochow Bay in
Shantung. All these e n c r o a c h m e n t s of Chinese s o v e r e i g n
r i g h t s took p l a c e w i t h i n o n l y a span o f f o u r y e a r s 1895-
1898.
To c l i m a x all these was the A l l i e d occupation of Peking
in summer 1900 a f t e r widespread anti-foreign Boxer
activities in the north and the declaration of war against
Treaty Powers by the Empress Dowager, the head of the Manchu
regime. The Empress h e r s e l f and the Court had to f l e e the
capital for Sian. The A l l i e d troops only ended the
occupation when China agreed to v e r y h u m i l i a t i n g settlement
terms of the Boxer Protocol in 1901. Besides an indemnity
of 450 m i l l i o n t a e l s of s i l v e r , China was a l s o subjected to
m o r e e r o s i o n of her s o v e r e i g n t y such as the d e s t r u c t i o n of
her forts between Taku and Peking, the stationing of foreign
t r o o p s f r o m P e k i n g to the sea and the s u s p e n s i o n of C i v i l
Service Examination for 5 years in all those p r o - B o x e r
provinces. M o r e o v e r , China was not a l l o w e d to import arms

for 3 y e a r s .
China was not at all in control of foreign a c t i v i t i e s
within her boundaries. From 1904 to 1905, China had to see
a war waged b e t w e e n R u s s i a and Japan on her s o i l and for her
territories. Severe battles were fought in Mukden, ending
w i t h Japanese v i c t o r i e s and the signing of the T r e a t y of
P o r t s m o u t h in 1905- Former Russian m i n i n g and r a i l w a y
concessions in Liaotung Peninsula were transferred to Japan.
With this w a r , b i g power r i v a l r i e s o v e r Chinese soil w e r e
t e m p o r a r i l y settled. M e a n w h i l e , f o r e i g n e r s continued t o
e x e r c i s e a d o m i n a t i n g r o l e in C h i n a ' s economy. "Their
degree of control and scope of activities is seldom seen in
independent states; hence late C h ' i n g economy has been
appropriately dubbed 'semicolonialT."^ A t that t i m e ,
s i t u a t i o n s in E u r o p e were getting tense and t h e r e f o r e
deviated some of the Treaty Powers 1 attention.

China* s attempts to save herself

During this period, China as a nation showed
unprecedented awareness of the situation. The easy defeat
by Japan in 1895 demonstrated beyond doubt the f a i l u r e of
t h e S e l f - s t r e n g t h e n i n g R e f o r m Movement. C r i e s f o r more
r a d i c a l m e a s u r e s to save China came f r o m far and w i d e ,
constituting the two main currents of reform and revolution*
In the post-1895 y e a r s , r e f o r m was to mean m o r e e x t e n s i v e
institutional changes to modernize China in all aspects, and
revolution aimed to overthrow the ruling Manchus and later
to include the desire of setting up a republic.
Reform movement

Since the inadequacy of the ongoing reform measures was

r e v e a l e d by C h i n a ' s d e f e a t in 1895, the need for more
extensive reforms was recognized by all even the
conservatives including the Empress Dowager, the officials
and the s c h o l a r - g e n t r y . But reform advocates c o u l d not
a g r e e on the n a t u r e , scope and l e a d e r s h i p . The m o d e r a t e s
were still only for limited measures along Western lines
w i t h o u t u p s e t t i n g t h e basic C h i n e s e s t r u c t u r e s . Others
were a l r e a d y promoting drastic institutional changes. Chang
"76- * Z ^\
Chih-tung ^K -^ 'ty , the Wuhan governor-general and Weng
T'ung-ho ^| \lf) ^^ , the tutor of E m p e r o r
Kuang-hsti
\ /^ \s- i- i/
f
TLA v%\ headed the moderates. K a n g Yu-wei jj$-> 1(j Mp
was the leader of the radicals. Besides proposing revision
of existing systems and establishment of new bureaux, K'ang
was advocating such m e a s u r e s as the adoption of a
constitution and the creation of a national assembly. In
s h o r t , K ' a n g was d e s i g n i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h y to
replace the Confucian conception of dynastic Emperor.
After winning the E m p e r o r ' s f a v o u r in June 1898,
K ! ang in his position as the Secretary of the Tsungli Yamen,
began to forge bold programmes of reforms. About 40 to 50
reform decrees were issued during the 103 days from June 11
to September 20. D i f f e r e n t a r e a s such as a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
i n d u s t r y , e d u c a t i o n a n d d i p l o m a c y were c o v e r e d . Notable
measures included abolition of the eight-legged essay, the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the I m p e r i a l University at P e k i n g and
appointment of progressives to important posts.
 B u t s o o n t h i s 1898 r e f o r m m o v e m e n t t u r n e d i n t o
political strife. Empress Dowager was afraid that her son,
E m p e r o r Kuang-hsti was t r y i n g to rid her of p o w e r onoe and
for all. This court struggle culminated in the palace coup
on September 21 when the E m p e r o r was d e t h r o n e d and the
Empress returned to a d m i n i s t e r state a f f a i r s . K'ang
escaped a b r o a d in time to save his own head. Thus ended
the 1898 Hundred-Day Reform Movement. The Empress had yet
to l e a r n the hard way the u r g e n c y of such i n s t i t u t i o n a l
reforms. It took the traumatic experiences of the A l l i e d
o c c u p a t i o n of the c a p i t a l , her own h u m i l i a t i n g f l i g h t to
Sian and the exacting peace negotiation to convince her that
comprehensive and institutional not piecemeal and
s u p e r f i c i a l r e f o r m s had to be adopted to save her E m p i r e .
In the post-1900 years, the institutional reforms which she
initiated were not too different from those she had aborted
in 1898. Yet, by then, even these r e f o r m s were too late
and too i n e f f e c t i v e l y executed for a country which was
already so disintegrated that the central government did not
r e a l l y h o l d sway o v e r too l a r g e a t e r r i t o r y except the
immediate neighbourhood of the capital.
In 1905* a new d e v e l o p m e n t o c c u r r e d in the Ch ! ing
reform programmes. First of all, this year saw the victory
of Japan o v e r Russia in Russo-Japanese War. This was at
once interpreted as the triumph of constitutional monarchy
o v e r autocracy. A constitution was then the long sought
a f t e r p r e s c r i p t i o n for China's weakness. This began the
constitutional movement which at home and abroad among the
overseas Chinese community became a powerful force
counteracting the growing p o p u l a r i t y of the a n t i - M a n c h u
revolutionaries. K'ang in exile was n a t u r a l l y the
recognized leader of this m o v e m e n t and the dethroned Emperor
i t s deemed e n l i g h t e n e d m o n a r c h . F i n a l l y t h e Empress, o t t e r
w e i g h i n g the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n , decided to accept
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m to f o r e s t a l l revolution. In August 1908,
Hsien-fa t a - k a r i g , an O u t l i n e of C o n s t i t u t i o n , s c h e d u l i n g a
nine-year tutelage period was announced. At the same time,
steps t o r e s t o r e a n d c o n s o l i d a t e Manchu power o v e r Han
Chinese were also taken. With the death of the Dowager on
N o v e m b e r 15, 1908, a day a f t e r E m p e r o r K u a n g - h s t t ' s d e a t h ,
the regent, P r i n c e Chtin, accelerated those pro-Manchu
p o l i c i e s to the d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t of many C h i n e s e who had
pledged hope on the constitutional movement.

R e v o l u t i o n a r y movement
Besides this strong c u r r e n t of institutional r e f o r m
movement f i r s t led by K r a n g Yu»wei in 1898, then taken up by
the Empress in 1900 a n d f i n a l l y expanded into the
constitutional movement of 1900s, the other opposing force
was t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t c e n t r e d r o u n d S u n Y a t - s e n .
These t w o f o r c e s c l a s h e d c o m m a n d i n g d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s o f
support at different times of the period. Disappointment
with one u s u a l l y but not n e c e s s a r i l y led to p o p u l a r i t y of
the other.
Sun Yat-sen ^2^/W (1866-1925), a native of Kwangtung,
e d u c a t e d i n H o n o l u l u a n d Hong K o n g o r g a n i z e d h i s first

8
r e v o l u t i o n a r y society in H o n o l u l u . He staged the f i r s t of
a s e r i e s of a n t i - C h ' i n g u p r i s i n g s in O c t o b e r 1895 at the
same time w h i l e K ! ang Yu-wei was promoting his r e f o r m ideas
with the p u b l i c a t i o n of a d a i l y c a l l e d Wan-kuo kung-pao (The
Globe Magazine). But at that early year of Sun!s
r e v o l u t i o n a r y career, his leadership position was not yet
e s t a b l i s h e d and n e i t h e r was his revolutionary philosophy,
San flin Chu I (Three Principles of the People).3
Basically, Sun's revolutionary movement had its funds,
weapons, manpower, theoretical origin and,in a word, a l m o s t
all its aspects based overseas. With the f a i l u r e of the
1898 Hundred-Day Reform I l o v e m e n t and the leaders K T a n g and
his d i s c i p l e , Liang C h f i - c h f a o o v e r s e a s , Sun had to compete
with them for support among overseas Chinese societies and

foreign sympathisers. The outbreak of the Boxer a c t i v i t i e s

presented Sun with another opportunity for uprising but

u n f o r t u n a t e l y it again ended in f a i l u r e . O n l y i n 1905?

when S u n b e c a m e t h e r e c o g n i z e d l e a d e r o f a l l anti-Manchu
r e v o l u t i o n a r y activities with the formation of the Trung-
meng h u i , did the r e v o l u t i o n pick up momentum again. Then

uprisings f o l l o w e d one another in the years between 1906 and

1911 - six in K w a n g t u n g , one in K w a n g s i and one in Y u n n a n .
But continued f a i l u r e s e s p e c i a l l y the one in Canton in A p r i l
1911 f r u s t r a t e d m u c h s p i r i t a n d e x h a u s t e d both f u n d s a n d

manpower.
Both f o r c e s o f r e f o r m a n d r e v o l u t i o n h a d a t t r a c t e d
a t t e n t i o n and s u p p o r t . B u t o n t h e e v e o f t h e 1911
R e v o l u t i o n , they appeared to bo spent forces w h i l e the
Ch'ing government under Prince Chttn still pressed hard with
the pro-Manchu measures in a country which was a l r e a d y
1 errnon ti ng .

Pro-China mentality among overseas Chinese

During the post-1895 years w h i l e China was suffering
defeats, exploitative treaty terms, slicing up of her
territories and military occupation of her capital city,
while reforms were launched, aborted and re-launched or
while uprisings broke out in succession, the overseas
Chinese communities were not at all unaware. Those in Hong
Kong and the Straits Settlements, because of geographical
closeness to the Mainland and because of the large size of
the Chinese population, were specially attached. Overseas
Chinese of various backgrounds were watchful of developments
in the M a i n l a n d . These i n c l u d e d some who w e r e most
unexpected to be so perturbed by the fate of the very
country which they had seemingly forsaken. They m i g h t be
those who had just arrived to scrape a living, those who
were already several generations overseas and those who were
Western-educated or were even Christians. Ho Kai in Hong
Kong and Lim Boon Keng in Singapore were such Western-
educated Christian Chinese. They threw in w h a t e v e r
strength they had, be it in the form of donations or
expertise for the causes they b e l i e v e d to be able to save
China. At home in their own societies they laboured to

10
arouse the national consciousness of f e l l o w Chinese a n d t o
o r g a n i z e them into u s e f u l a s s e t s f o r t h e m o t h e r l a n d .

This overseas Chinese m e n t a l i t y seemed p u z z l i n g at

f i r s t sight. They w e r e C h i n e s e who had a l r e a d y s e t t l e d or

rooted in f o r e i g n soil under f o r e i g n r u l e . They appeared to

have no tangible interests i n v o l v e d in China. Yet they
were genuinely and deeply concerned over ChinaTs f u t u r e .
This Chinese n a t i o n a l i s m should n e v e r be interpreted as a
local Chinese movement for a separate Chinese p o l i t i c a l
e n t i t y i n t h e host c o u n t r i e s . Except for a very few
educated e l i t e s , Chinese were g e n e r a l l y not interested in
local politics. So whatever nationalism they might f e e l ,
it was limited to feelings for M a i n l a n d China. Moreover,
these pro-China sentiments were not necessarily p r o - C h T i n g
or pro-government. At d i f f e r e n t times of the period (1895-
1912), pro-China loyalty found itself two other causes,
namely reform and r e v o l u t i o n . In fact, loyalty to one
cause did not always remain constant, rather it fluctuated
a c c o r d i n g to both objective situations such as I fie
a c h i e v e m e n t s of the m o v e m e n t s , the fate of China and o t h e r
subjective considerations such as one's beliefs. Besides,
w h i l e overseas Chinese m e n t a l i t y is taken as a c o l l e c t i v e
term, not all Chinese responded so e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y . Some
might even be t o t a l l y unaware of or unaffected at all.

Factors causing pro-China mentality among overseas Chinese

Positively speaking, overseas Chinese had been exposed
to Western institutions, had experienced their e f f i c i e n c y

11
and had directly or indirectly benefited from
Vpstprnization. They m i g h t h i v e arnnssed immense f o r t u n e s ,
or been w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d in business or p r o f e s s i o n s or had
s i m p l y managed a decent, p e a c e f u l l i f e . They s i n c e r e l y
wished to see that these b e n e f i t s of the West be extended to
their f e l l o w Chinese on the M a i n l a n d .
N e g a t i v e l y speaking, l i f e of the Chinese in foreign
soil under foreign rule was not all that advantageous.
There were n a t u r a l l y discriminations and in some cases
a t r o c i t i e s such as w h a t happened in the P h i l i p p i n e s in lf>03
w h e n 25,000 C h i n e s e w e r e k i l l e d . ^ They h a d t o e n d u r e a l l
these w i t h o u t their mother country being e i t h e r strong
e n o u g h o r w i l l i n g e n o u g h t o back u p t h e i r cases o r r e d r e s s
their grievances. Besides, they were a l s o i n f o r m e d of
foreign i m p e r i a l i s t activities in China either through the
press or by word of mouth. This k n o w l e d g e f r u s t r a t e d their

confidence in the Christian f o r e i g n e r s who w h i l e preaching

j u s t i c e a n d r i g h t e o u s n e s s w e r e a t t h e same time c l a i m i n g
undue p r i v i l e g e s and enormous advantages from China through
u n f a i r treaty settlements. Thus overseas Chinese earnestly
wished to see China restored to her own feet, and be a b l e to
champion their local grievances or s i m p l y be the country
they could p r o u d l y claim as natives. And for those Chinese
l i v i n g in hostile foreign countries, a strong country c o u l d
u n d o u b t e d l y be used as a weapon to counter brutality.
M o r e o v e r , even when overseas Chinese did not a c t u a l l y
care about the fate of China as a c o u n t r y , they w e r e
c o n c e r n e d o v e r the w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e i r f a m i l i e s and

12
r e l a t i v e s in their home v i l l a g e s in C h i n a . Large sums of
money a r d u o u s l y saved had all t h e t i m e been r e m i t t e d . A
strong China w o u l d c e r t a i n l y mean better l i v i n g for t h e i r
l o v e d ones at home.
'Lhese p r o - C h i n a s e n t i m e n t s among o v e r s e a s Chinese w o r e
not e n t i r e l y spontaneous expressions. They were in p a r t
responses to the changed o v e r s e a s Chinese p o l i c y of the
C h T i n g government and p a r t l y reactions to those two strong
c u r r e n t s of r e f o r m and r e v o l u t i o n in the post-1895 years.
The Ch'ing Dynasty had inherited the long-held
p r e j u d i c e of regarding overseas Chinese as deserters or even
traitors, e s p e c i a l l y because overseas Chinese had been
i n v o l v e d or implicated in early anti-Manchu resistance
movement. The p o l i c y of M i n g D y n a s t y (1368-1644) of
p r o h i b i t i n g e m i g r a t i o n had been c o n t i n u e d . But 1860 saw
t h e change i n C h ! i n g a t t i t u d e . This was brought about by
Western m i l i t a r y victory. Westerners 1 need for regulated
Chinese emigrants made them force the Chinese government to
include l e g i s l a t i o n of emigration in the treaty settlement.
But t h e b a n o n e m i g r a t i o n w a s n o t f o r m a l l y l i f t e d u n t i l
1893. Yet a l r e a d y in the 1870s Chinese envoys began to be
sent f i r s t t o B r i t a i n a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s
such a s the U n i t e d States, Japan, Germany, France and

Russia. The protection of overseas Chinese was at the same

time paid attention to.

Since 1877, C h i n e s e c o n s u l a t e s began to be set up,

first in Singapore, and then s u b s e q u e n t l y in other

13
e s t a b l i s h e d o v e r s e a s Chinese c o m m u n i t i e s . These Ch ! ing
Consuls were skilful in cultivating loyalty and mobilizing
s u p p o r t by f i r s t enticing l o c a l community l e a d e r s . The
Consulate became a l m o s t a pseudo-Chinese government.5
Other activities aiming to cultivate Chinese consciousness
of their identity and c u l t u r e among the mass Chinese
population included the formation of literary societies for
the study of Chinese c l a s s i c s and o r g a n i z a t i o n of fund-
raising movements.
It was o n l y in 1893 that C h f i n g I m p e r i a l G o v e r n m e n t
f o r m a l l y repealed the emigration ban and gave wide publicity
to it. Consuls were also upgraded to Consul-General. "The
most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r in ending the age-old r u l e s in 1893
was a r e a l i s a t i o n of the economic p o t e n t i a l of o v e r s e a s
Chinese"^ 1 resulting from the two decades of contacts between
the C h r i n g c o n s u l s or v i s i t i n g d i p l o m a t s and the o v e r s e a s
Chinese communities. R e m i t t a n c e s sent home amounted to
about 14*400,000 taels, an e q u i v a l e n t to 65% of a n n u a l
customs collected in 1890s. These were net gains for China
in f o r e i g n exchange and even h e l p e d China to pay off huge
trade deficits and to stabilize China's currency.'
Knowledge of the immense w e a l t h of these Chinese was
gathered by Ch'ing o f f i c i a l s who envisaged this w e a l t h be
best u t i l i z e d for the funding of China ! s modernization
programmes. In the 1900s, Chinese Chambers of Commerce
began to be e s t a b l i s h e d , again f i r s t in Singapore in 1905-
These Chambers strove to unite local Chinese communities so
as to s e r v e the immediate needs of China ! s r e f o r m m o v e m e n t

14
by recruiting funds and technical know-how. Thus, pro-
ChTing feelings were purposely lostered and c h a n n e l l e d
towards the Manchu government.
These i n t e n s e overseas Chinese sentiments were not
s o l e l y brought into being by Ch!ing p o l i c i e s but a l s o by
e f f o r t s of both the r e f o r m i s t s and r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . At the
same t i m e when E m p e r o r K u a n g - h s t t w a s p u s h i n g f o r w a r d the
institutional reforms as advocated by Krang Yu-wei,
c o n c e r n e d o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e l i k e L i m Boon K e n g w e r e a l s o
attracted. They l a u n c h e d r e f o r m m o v e m e n t s a m o n g l o c a l
Chinese communities to f u r t h e r promote consciousness, unity
and strength. This w a s p a r t l y t h e a i m o f L i m ! s C o n f u c i a n
Revival Movement. With the f a i l u r e of the Hundred-Day
Reform Movement in 1898 a n d K ' a n g i n flight, overseas
Chinese communities became K T a n g ! s o n l y v a l u a b l e assets in
his attempt to r e t u r n to China and to restore the dethroned
Emperor. Extensive propaganda and fund-raising campaigns
were organized and launched* All these a g a i n n u r t u r e d
Chinese n a t i o n a l i s m though not towards the government in
power.
The r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , too, both benefited from and
helped to foster this pro-China m e n t a l i t y among the overseas
Chinese. As explained, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement around
Sun was c h i e f l y an overseas Chinese e n d e a v o u r to a v e r t the
i l l - f a t e of China. Of course, the nationalism c u l t i v a t e d
by these r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s w a s a n t i - M a n c h u . I n f a c t , they
were not the f i r s t ones to p r e a c h such. After a l l , anti-

15
M a n c h u i s m had been the d e c l a r e d aim of a l m o s t all secret
societies and anti-government uprisings. But it was Sun r s
revolutionary movement which f u l l y exploited and utilized
these anti-Manchu hostilities to their advantage. Whenever
the Manchus showed t h e m s e l v e s to be i n c a p a b l e of h a n d l i n g
foreign pressure and internal problems, they played into the
hands of the revolutionaries. Manchus being the
s u p p r e s s o r s of Han Chinese and t r a i t o r s in t r a d i n g off
China's s o v e r e i g n t y for Manchu r u l e of China to continue
w e r e images of the C h T i n g Dynasty as p r o p a g a t e d by the
revolutionaries.
A l t h o u g h the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s emerged as a f o r c e two
decades after Ch ! ing consular expansion and cultivation of
nationalist consciousness among overseas Chinese, they were
not able to capitalize on these already provoked nationalist
sentiments. After a l l , involvement in a revolution against
the government of China which had diplomatic relations with
the countries in which they sojourned would bring them into
t r o u b l e with the local g o v e r n m e n t . This might j e o p a r d i z e
whatever they had already established or wished to build up
locally. Besides, many overseas Chinese had left their
f a m i l i e s or r e l a t i v e s whom they cared at home. Once they
were i n v o l v e d or i m p l i c a t e d in r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t i e s ,
their l o v e d ones at home w o u l d be hunted down or punished.
"This fear of r e p r i s a l served as the main d e t e r r e n t to
overseas Chinese i n v o l v e m e n t in the modern Chinese
revolutions. f f ® Moreover with the increasing solicitation
of overseas Chinese coming from the Ch ! ing government since

16
1890s and then w i t h the d e c l a r a t i o n of I n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s
after 1900, the Ch!ing government appeared to be all
v i g o r o u s for a regeneration.
Yet, though the images of the M a n c h u s might h a v e been
improved, practical difficulties often rendered the C h ' i n g
g o v e r n m e n t i n c a p a b l e to l i v e up to its promised obligations
such as against the Exclusion Laws of A u s t r a l i a , New
Zealand, Canada and the United States. The d e c l i n i n g
a b i l i t y of the Ch'ing g o v e r n m e n t to protect its n a t i o n a l s
gave f u r t h e r opportunities for the Chinese revolutionaries
to e x p l o i t the a n t i - M a n c h u f e e l i n g s among the o v e r s e a s
Chinese. And as the Ch'ing constitutional movement in the
1900s u n v e i l e d i t s e l f t o b e h a l f - h e a r t e d w h i l e m e a s u r e s
strengthening Manchu rule o v e r t h e Hans w e r e e n f o r c e d ,
t h o s e w h o h a d once h a d h o p e s i n t h e C h T i n g g o v e r n m e n t g a v e
up their illusions. Of course, not all these former
g o v e r n m e n t supporters turned to endorse the revolutionary
m o v e m e n t , b u t n t least they became more r e c e p t i v e I n t h e

r e v o ] u t i o n a r y cause.
With all these o v e r t u r e s to the overseas Chinese coining
first from the r u l i n g Ch!ing g o v e r n m e n t , then f r o m the
exiled reformists and r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , the long neglected
overseas Chinese were responding v i g o r o u s l y . The s k i l f u l
and s y s t e m a t i c use of v a r i o u s p r o p a g a n d a m e a n s succeeded
f i r s t in stimulating then in sustaining pro-China attachment
and e n t h u s i a s m a n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f a l l in u t i l i z i n g and
organizing overseas Chinese wealth and expertise for China.

17
 Among these overseas Chinese who had c u l t i v a t e d such
pro-China mentality, the most interesting group were those
who had their loyalty variously and contradictorily pledged.
They could be serving as councillors in the host governments
and yet they were at the same time supporting China in
rejuvenating herself to meet the challenges of the foreign
powers which they happened to be serving and supporting in
their own communities. Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng v/ere two
such cases.
Here two questions arise. Firstly, the fact that Ho
Kai and Lim Boon Keng could have done what they did might
have been because of tolerant objective conditions of their
societies. Both lived under British rule which must have
somehow acquiesced or even nurtured and promoted this
m u l t i p l e commitment. Secondly, with loyalty so
contradictorily and ambivalently entangled, situations arose
when priorities had to be decided. Or in fact, there were
no set priorities at all, Ho and Lim were simply responding
to situations and doing what they thought right without
stopping for a moment to assess this loyalty complex of
theirs.

British handling of Chinese in Hong Kong

The island of Hong Kong, which also gave its name to
the colony itself, became a British Crown Colony by the
Treaty of Nanking on August 29, 1842. The small Kowloon
Peninsula opposite to it was acquired in 1860 while the
large stretch of land north to the Peninsula and named as

18
the New Territories was leased for 99 years in 1898 when
Britain scrambled with the other Powers for concessions in
China .

There is no intention to trace the development of Hong

Kong in all its various aspects. Only those issues of
relevance to the understanding of this study of tripartite
loyalty are given emphasis.9
From the beginning of British rule, the Chirieseness of
the society had been given special consideration. The
instructions to the governor on June 3, 1843 provided that
in Hong Kong the laws and customs of the Chinese should
supersede English law except where a Chinese law was
"repugnant to those immutable principles of morality which
Christians must regard as binding on themselves at all times
and in all places." 1 o In fact, the policy was as long as
the Chinese did not create trouble, the government was
content to keep interference at the lowest level and let the
Chinese community manage its own affairs. What existed was
actually two little worlds of their own, the Chinese one and
the British one with a "radical hiatus"^ 1 between them.
The proclaimed liberal principles were more an idealism than
a practice. Racial discrimination of all kinds though not
to a serious or inhuman extent was an everyday phenomenon.
The delayed appointment of Chinese to the Legislative

Council was one such illustration. Since June 1850,

unofficials had been brought into the Legislative Council.

But it was only in 1880 and upon the insistence of Governor

19
S i r J o h n Pope H e n n e s s y whose l i b e r a l tendency was w e l l
a h e a d of his t i m e s , was then a C h i n e s e , Ng C h o y ' ' 2 , b r o u g h t
into the Council but o n l y on t e m p o r a r y basis. It was in the
1884 r e f o r m e d Legislative Council when it became a
government policy that among thp three nominated
unoificials, one was to be a Chinese. The f i r s t Chinese to
be so n o m i n a t e d was Wong Shing^ who s e r v e d f r o m 1884 to
1890 when Ho Kai took up his p o s i t i o n . Ho s e r v e d u n t i l
1914- In 1896, one m o r e C h i n e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was a d d e d
to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. He was Wei Y u k ' ^ who served
t i l l 1917. To a g r e a t e x t e n t , by the t i m e of the p e r i o d
f
under r e v i e w , 1895 to 1912, the r a d i c a l hiatus 1 between the
British government and the Chinese subjects was much
modified with the emergence of these Chinese elites s e r v i n g
in their a d v i s o r y capacity to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council.
These Chinese f a v o u r e d by the c o l o n i a l government with
such e l i t i s t p o s i t i o n s had to be " B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s . . . a
native gentleman combining in his own person the p o p u l a r
social p o s i t i o n , independent means and education."'-* They
were u s u a l l y English-speaking and p r o f e s s i o n a l l y q u a l i f i e d
abroad. U t i l i z a t i o n of their b i - l i n g u a l s k i l l and knowledge
of b o t h c u l t u r e s f a c i l i t a t e d t h e a l i e n B r i t i s h r u l e r s w h o
were in absolute minority to r u l e the Chinese majority with
greater ease and efficiency* These Chinese were g e n e r a l l y
more a p p r e c i a t i v e and accommodating of Western v a l u e s and
practices. T h e c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t w a s most w i l l i n g t o
d e a l w i t h them b e c a u s e t h e i r s e r v i c e s w e r e a s s u r e d since
after a l l , they w e r e i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r p a r t arid p a r c e l

20
of the establishment being either products or beneficiary of
British colonial rule. In the eyes of the C h i n e s e
community, although these councillors were not elected, they
s t i l l commanded respect and co-operation because of their
intimate k n o w l e d g e of and association with the r u l i n g
foreigners. B e s i d e s being appointed to the L e g i s l a t i v e
Council and later to the Executive Council, they were also
appointed to various other government boards and committees
such as the Sanitary B o a r d where again their b i - l i n g u a l
a b i l i t i e s and k n o w l e d g e of both c u l t u r e s w e r e of d e f i n i t e
value in the decision-making process.
The g o v e r n m e n t a l s o sought a d v i c e f r o m other Chinese
leaders who might not be government nominees or appointees
to any official institutions, for example, the directors of
the Tung ¥ah H o s p i t a l , a c h a r i t a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n set up in
1870 which a l s o f u n c t i o n e d as a liaison s t r u c t u r e between
the government and the Chinese community.1I 0f\
During the period of great upheavals following the 1895
defeat of China by Japan, Hong Kong was also affected. The
geographical proximity of the colony to the Mainland and the
relatively liberal or acquiescent attitude of the British
g o v e r n m e n t t u r n e d Hong K o n g i n t o a n i d e a l p l a c e for
organization of anti-Ch ! ing a c t i v i t i e s * Besides, the
leaders of both the r e f o r m and r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t s ,
K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen were natives of Kwangtung, the
southern p r o v i n c e closest to Hong Kong. Most of the Hong
Kong Chinese were a l s o f r o m that p r o v i n c e . In fact when

21
their activities failed, both leaders attempted to take
sanctuary in Hong Kong, Sun in 1895 and KTang in 1900*
The colonial government usually ignored these Chinese
activities as long as they kept to a low profile and the
leaders paid cautious respect to local law and order. But
the British were careful that such activities did not offend
the Ch!ing government with which Britain had a formal
diplomatic relationship. After all, the British government
had no intention to see Hong Kong turn into the operational
base of such anti-Ch!ing movements. Therefore, in 1896 Sun
Yat-sen was banished from Hong Kong for five years for
conspiracy against the Canton government. But sometimes,
the governors in office did not concur with decisions of the
home government and took matters into their own hands. Sir
Henry Blake, Governor of Hong Kong from November 1898 to
November 1903 was one such example. He actually interfered
with development in China by trying to arrange a meeting
between Sun Yat-sen and Li hung-chang in 1900.
Generally speaking, Hong Kong Chinese were docile and
peaceful subjects and Hong Kong remained very stable while
the economy prospered.

British handling of Chinese In Singapore

The Straits Settlements, of which Singapore was the
capital, only became a British Crown Colony in 1867- But
actually for almost fifty years since 1819, Singapore had
been under the British administration of the East India
Company.^7 By 186? when the colonial status was formally

22
assumed, Singapore was already a prosperous commercial city
of r e l a t i v e peace and c a l m . Although the Straits
S e t t l e m e n t s c o m p r i s e d S i n g a p o r e , Penang and M a l a c c a with
m o r e d i s t r i c t s to be added to the list f r o m time to time,
the g o v e r n m e n t w a s S i n g a p o r e - o r i e n t e d a n d Singapore-
dominated.
The C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n i n S i n g a p o r e w a s n o t as
p r e d o m i n a n t as it was in Hong Kong. By 1900, it was about
75% of S i n g a p o r e T s p o p u l a t i o n , w h i l e in the case of Hong
Kong it was about 95$. In S i n g a p o r e , other s i z e a b l e
m i n o r i t i e s i n c l u d e d M a l a y s a n d Indians. M o r e o v e r , even
within the Chinese population 7 there were further divisions
into Straits-born or C h i n a - b o r n and m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y into
different dialect groups. So the British c o l o n i a l
g o v e r n m e n t was d e a l i n g w i t h a m o r e h e t e r o g e n e o u s society,
taking care that d i f f e r e n t sectional interests were all
g i v e n due c o n s i d e r a t i o n and i n t e g r a t e d into v a r i o u s
government policies* Again the B r i t i s h u t i l i z e d local
Chinese community leaders in the r u l e of the Chinese
population. In fact, the f i r s t Asian n o n - o f f i c i a l
appointed to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council in 1869* two y e a r s
after its f o r m a t i o n , was a rich Chinese merchant named Hoo
Ah Kay or as he was c o m m o n l y known to the W e s t e r n e r s ,
WhampoaJ® Wealth was the criterion of importance within
the Chinese society.
By the time of the period under review, 1895 to 1912, a
new generation of Western-educated Chinese e l i t e s was

23
emerging. One t y p i c a l e x a m p l e was Lim Boon K e n g , a
S t r a i t s - b o r n Chinese and a Queen ! s S c h o l a r s h i p recipient
educated in Britain. These Chinese were products of
decades of B r i t i s h r u l e and w e r e b e g i n n i n g to be p r e f e r r e d
as a p p o i n t e e s to p o s i t i o n s a s c r i b e d to Chinese w i t h i n the
colonial government.
Some of these Chinese elites were caught in the vortex
of late C h ' i n g d e v e l o p m e n t s . As d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r , the
w e a l t h and e x p e r t i s e of the Chinese c o m m u n i t y in the South
Seas had a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n and e f f o r t s of the C h T i n g
government, the reformists and the revolutionaries. Again,
the British colonial government kept a watchful eye on all
these involvements of the Chinese elites. As long as the
a c t i v i t i e s w e r e not a n t i - f o r e i g n or a n t i - B r i t i s h , the
government tolerated. But when a c t i v i t i e s became so open
and the local Chinese population was responding too
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y , t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t became a l a r m e d .
For e x a m p l e in 1894, when the Chinese C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in
_ju ,* *
Singapore, Huang Tsun-hsien ^ i3> -S/ started to issue
letters of Introduction to local Chinese returning to visit
in China, "the B r i t i s h i m m e d i a t e l y c a l l e d f o u l a n d
c o m p l a i n e d that the C o n s u l - G e n e r a l was r e a l l y issuing
!
passportsf thereby claiming Chinese citizenship for
subjects of the Crovn. r '°
Generally speaking, Singapore Chinese were more reform-
minded rather than being a t t r a c t e d by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y
movement, but again the number of Chinese i n v o l v e d in
whichever way was still very small. Like their

24
c o u n t e r p a r t s in Hong K o n g , the Chinese in Singapore w e r e
also easy subjects to rule.

25
 NOTES

1. H s u , I . C . Y . , T h e R i s e of M o d e r n C h i n a , (Hong Kong,
1 9 7 5 ) , p. 536.
2. I b i d . , p. 530.
3- Sun Yat-sen had these ideas d e v e l o p e d in the post-1897
years w h i l e in Europe. The Three P r i n c i p l e s of the
People became the r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h i l o s o p h y with the
establishment of the T T ung-meng hui (The R e v o l u t i o n a r y
A l l i a n c e ) in 1905. The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e , n a t i o n a l i s m ,
was both anti-Manchu and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t . The second
p r i n c i p l e was democracy which granted the people the
four rights of i n i t i a t i v e , referendum, election and
r e c a l l over the government with authority balanced
among e x e c u t i v e , l e g i s l a t i v e , j u d i c i a l , e x a m i n a t i o n and
control. The third p r i n c i p l e was socialism which
promised the regulation of capital and e q u a l i z a t i o n of
land. Thus, Sun hoped to s o l v e China T s p o l i t i c a l and
socio-economic p r o b l e m s all in one philosophy - The
Three Principles of the People.
For d e t a i l s on the e v o l u t i o n of these i d e a s , read
S c h i f f r i n , H . Z . , o p . cit..
4. P u r c e l l , V . , The C h i n e s e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , ( L o n d o n ,
1965), pp. 513-514.
5* At these consulates, solemn ceremonies during which the
Chinese rites of prostration were performed such as on
occasions of the Empress Dowager's birthdays. Consulate
notices urging the people to honour the monarchy w e r e
a l s o issued. Overseas Chinese even celebrated Emperor
Kuang-hsli's m a r r i a g e and his accession to the t h r o n e
with p u b l i c holidays and elaborate celebrations. See
Yen, C.H., Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of
Overseas Chinese During the Late C h T i n g Period (1851-
1911), (Singapore, 1985) •
6. I b i d . , p. 249-
7- I b i d , , p. 251*
8. Y e n , C.H., The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 R e v o l u t i o n
( K u a l a L u m p u r , 1976), p. xviii~
9. For a general picture of Hong Kong, see Endacott, G.B.,
A H i s t o r y of Hong K o n g , second e d i t i o n , ( H o n g K o n g ,
1983F.
10. I b i d . , p. 39-

26
11. Smith, C., "The E m e r g e n c e of a C h i n e s e E l i t e in Hong
K o n g , " J o u r n a l of the Hong Kong B r a n c h of the R o y a l
Asiatic Society, v o l . 11, 1971, pp. 74-115-
12. Ng Choy \L or Wu T'ing-fang f&^, ^ (1842-1922) was
b o r n in Singapore in 1842. He was educated in both
Canton and Hong Kong. In 1862, he became an
interpreter in the Supreme Court. In 1863, he married
Ho Miu L i n g , Ho K a i T s s i s t e r , who was o n l y s e v e n t e e n .
With the support of his wife ! s dowry, he went to London
to study law in 1874 and was a d m i t t e d into L i n c o l n f s
Inn. A f t e r t h r e e y e a r s , he was c a l l e d to the b a r .
In the same y e a r , he r e t u r n e d to Hong Kong and became
the first Chinese admitted as barrister in the Supreme
Court. In 1880, he became the first appointed Chinese
Legislative Councillor. In 1882, he l e f t Hong Kong
for China to start his diplomatic career. He assisted
Li H u n g - c h a n g in f o r e i g n a f f a i r s such as in the
n e g o t i a t i o n of the T r e a t y of Shimonoseki. L a t e r , he
acted as the Chinese M i n i s t e r to the U n i t e d States,
Spain and Peru. He continued to s e r v e in s e v e r a l
ministerial posts in Republican China.
13. Wong Shing $? $p was born in 1825 near Macao. He had
been educated at the Morrison Institution in Hong Kong,
and later entered Monson Academy at Monson,
Massachusetts, in the United States. He directed the
p r i n t i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t u n d e r Dr. James Legge for the
London M i s s i o n a r y Society. He had s e r v e d Li Hung-
chang in C h i n a , and had been a m e m b e r of the Chinese
legation staff in Washington. It was not known when he
died.
14. Wei Yuk 3 &. , l a t e r Sir B o s h a n Wei Yuk
(1849-1912) was the first Hong Kong Chinese to study in
Britain. In 1867, he went to L e i c e s t e r Stonygate
School. A year l a t e r , he proceeded to the D o l l a r
A c a d e m y in E d i n b u r g h . He was a p p o i n t e d to the
Legislative Council in 1896 and knighted in 1919*
15* Endacott, G . B . , op. cit. , p. 98.
16. The Tung Wah H o s p i t a l had even been c r i t i c i z e d as
" f o r m i n g aft o f f i c i a l Chinese Legislative Council
alongside the British administration." Smith, C., op.
cit. , p. 86.
17. For d e t a i l s on the d e v e l o p m e n t of Singapore, read
Turnbull, C . M . , op. cit..

27
18. Hoo Ah Kay i 5 f ^ £ ; was n i c k n a m e d Whampoa a f t e r the
place where he was born in 1815. He went to Singapore
at the age of 15 in 1830. He established a successful
s h i p f s c h a n d l i n g business. Then he i n v e s t e d in a
d e p a r t m e n t s t o r e , a b a k e r y , an icehouse and on land.
He became v e r y w e a l t h y and was the most w e l l - k n o w n
Chinese to the E u r o p e a n s . He became the f i r s t Asian
member of the Legislative Council in 1869* He died in
1880.
19. G o d l e y , M i c h a e l R., "The Late Ch ! ing C o u r t s h i p of the
Chinese in Southeast A s i a " , J o u r n a l of Asian S t u d i e s ,
Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, February 1975, pp. 369 "

28
 Chapter Two
FORMATIVE YEARS

This chapter traces first Ho Kai and then Lim Boon Keng
through their family, childhood and school days locally as
well as abroad in order to understand the kind of society
they grew up in. Since Ho and Lim were not exact
contemporaries, therefore the years covered were not
identical, 1859 to 1882 for Ho and 1869 to 1893 for Lim.
The chapter ends with Ho aged 23 in 1882 and Lim aged 24 in
1893 returning as Western-educated professionals to the
British colonies where they were born, ready to assume the
leadership role designated for them.

Ho Kai (1859-1882)
Ho Kai l«f%L as p r o n o u n c e d in Cantonese or Ho C h ' i in
T
M a n d a r i n , was b o r n in Hong Kong on M a r c h 21, 1859* HoT
was the f a m i l y name w h i l e his g i v e n name was o r i g i n a l l y
T
'Shan Kai* meaning God!s enlightenment1. But Ho Kai
p r e f e r r e d to d r o p the f i r s t character of his g i v e n name,
T
S h a n T and s i m p l y be known a s / K a i 1 . His other names were
f
Ti-chih l yfr *jL
JUta* ^^
and f
Yuk Sang
^
1
&~ & . After he was
knighted, he used the designation Sir Kai Ho Kai. Here in
this study, he will be referred to as Ho Kai or simply as Ho
whenever it does not cause ambiguity.

29
The grandfather
Ho K a i f s f a m i l y from the generation of his grandfather
e x e m p l i f i e d a v e r y s m a l l minority of Christian Chinese.
It was most unbecoming and even treasonous for a Chinese to
be baptized as Christian. After a l l , this would mean giving
up the m o s t i m p o r t a n t aspect of Confucianism-ancestor
V

worship. Moreover, C h r i s t i a n i t y was l a b e l l e d as a by-

product of foreign imperialism. Thus even among overseas
communities, Christian families were exceptional rather than
representative.
P
The grandfather whose name remained unknown^ came from
Sai Chiu v i l l a g e of Nam Hoi county in K w a n g t u n g . He
A- *MV
b r o u g h t his s o n , Fuk Tang or Fuk-tong ^§ j^ a l i a s Tsun-
cheen to w o r k w i t h him in M a l a c c a . ^ The old Ho w o r k e d as one
of the two b l o c k - c u t t e r s of the Chinese M o n t h l y M a g a z i n e
of the A n g l o - C h i n e s e C o l l e g e . 4
Not m u c h is known of him.

The father: Ho Fuk-tong

It was about Ho Fuk-tong that much more is known.
But here only a brief summary is given.
Ho Fuk-tong was born in the native v i l l a g e of Sai Chiu
in 1818. He went with his father to M a l a c c a . W h i l e old
Ho w o r k e d in the p r e s s , the s o n , Fuk-tong had the chance to
r e c e i v e an e d u c a t i o n i m m e n s e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of the
other Chinese youth. "He had gone off to Calcutta where he
l e a r n t English.... R e t u r n i n g to M a l a c c a , he entered the
Anglo-Chinese College as a student in 1840."5 Then he was

30
already a Christian, having been baptized in 1839- Also in
1840, James Legge , with whom Fuk-tong was to become great
friends, arrived. When the Principal of the College, John
Evans, died, Legge took his place. Legge had evidently
grown fond of the young Chinese student, Ho Fuk-tong, who
was three years his junior.
"Legge's daughter recalled years later
how her father had taken Ho under his
wing, educated him in Western knowledge,
especially in history, g e n e r a l and
ecclesiastical..., and also taught him
both Greek and Hebrew, b£ing astonished
at his progress in those languages."'
In 1843 when Hong Kong, the island closer to the heart
of China, was colonized by the British, James Legge was
instructed to dissolve the College at Malacca and transfer
it to Hong Kong. This he did and reached Hong Kong on
August 10. "A handful of students and others connected
with the College went with Legge to Hong Kong in 1843 or
v>
followed him there not long afterwards." Among the
students was Ho Fuk-tong.
Though a thoroughly Westernized Christian Chinese, Fuk-
tong agreed to an arranged marriage in the home village,
with a girl to whom he had been bethrothed as a child. But
he insisted that the wedding ceremony had to take place
according to church rites. And when he returned to find
out that it was not, he absconded to Hong Kong on his
wedding day. In the end, the ceremony did take place in a
church in Hong KongJ0 "With her,, he lived happily in Hong
Kong until his death, taking great pains in teaching

31
 In 1846, Ho Fuk-tong was ordained as the minister of
the London Missionary SocietyTs Chinese Congregation. He
had the reputation of being a very remarkable preacher.
"In preparing his sermons he only made some notes on a piece
of paper but when he started to speak, thoughts readily
flowed in his mind and words also came to him easily.11
"His fame soon spread from Hong Kong to the neighbouring
districts in Kwangtung Province.""12 He even had a follower
in Pok Lu who was not accepted by the locals and martyred.
Ho Fuk-tong wrote, too. He published a popular
monthly exhortation and wrote explanatory notes on St. Mark
and St. Matthew's Gospels. His busy missionary life kept
him from finishing the cycle.
Though a man of God since 1846, Ho Fuk-tong was also
engaged in the property market. With profits made in real
estate, he started a money-lending business charging 2Q% per
month. He died on April 2, 1871, aged 53-
A few obvious assumptions can be drawn from the above
about the kind of man Ho Fuk-tong was - the man whose
influence Ho Kai had been exposed to till the age of 13*
First of all, Ho Kai had an eloquent preacher as his father.
This same oratory skill was picked up by Ho Kai. Fuk-tong
did not have any formal Chinese education but instead he
learned English and even Hebrew and Greek under missionary
influences. Yet he still kept traces of his Chineseness,
such as illustrated by his going back to the native village
for a Chinese girl as wife. In fact, most respectable
overseas Chinese did so rather than marrying one of the

32
local Malay girls. He was a l s o a shrewd b u s i n e s s m e n ,
l e a v i n g his c h i l d r e n a r i c h estate e s t i m a t e d to be o v e r
HK$1QO,000. 1 3
In s h o r t , Ho Fuk-tong p r o v i d e d a r i c h , W e s t e r n i z e d
missionary family life for his children.

The son - Ho Kai

In Hong Kong 1859-1872
Ho Kai was the first generation of the family born
outside China. But by then the family had been living
abroad and associated with the Western missionaries for
forty years. It was a very unorthodox Chinese family,
belonging to none of the four classes of traditional Chinese
social stratification - scholar-gentry (shih) , farmer
(nun%), artisan (kung) and merchant (ghan%). Even in the
colonial situation of Hong Kong, this missionary family
background was very distinct from the rest of the Chinese
community.
Ho Kai was born on March 21, 1859. He was the fourth
son of a large family of eleven children, five sons and six
daughters. The family wealth enabled Ho Kai to receive the
best education. He first attended school in 1870 at the
age of eleven when he joined class 4 of Central School.
This was the most important government school in Hong Kong
with the students eagerly sought after by the commercial
firms.^4 The school was opened in 1862 largely due the
efforts of James Legge. 1 ^ Both Chinese and English

33
subjects were each taught four hours every day. There were
eight grades w i t h c l a s s 8 as the lowest. Ho was admitted
to class 4. After a year, he was in class 1, the top class,
with distinguished results. A f t e r C e n t r a l S c h o o l , Ho Kai
had the good f o r t u n e of p u r s u i n g his studies a b r o a d w h i l e
other students u s u a l l y left school and made use of their bi-
lingual e x p e r t i s e to become c l e r k s or i n t e r p r e t e r s in
commercial firms.

In Britain 1872-1882
In 1872, the same year when Ho Fuk-tong d i e d , Ho Kai
left for Britain. While he had only two years of education
in Hong K o n g , he was to stay in B r i t a i n for a decade f r o m
age 13 to 23- Thus, he had spent the most f o r m a t i v e y e a r s
in V i c t o r i a n E n g l a n d when the E m p i r e was at its h e i g h t of
power and prosperity. It was rare for a Hong Kong Chinese
to study in B r i t a i n , Ho Kai being the second. Wei Yuk who
went there in 1867 was the f i r s t . From 1872 to 1875, Ho
studied for three y e a r s in P a l m e r House School in M a r g a t e .
Then at the age of o n l y 14 in 1875, he r e g i s t e r e d in the
A b e r d e e n U n i v e r s i t y in Scotland to study m e d i c i n e , being
again the second Hong Kong Chinese to be so trained. The
f i r s t was Wong Foon.^ Ho Kai did his p r a c t i c a l w o r k at
St. Thomas 1 Hospital in London. D u r i n g these f o u r y e a r s ,
he scored very good results, getting certificates of honour
and a prize. In 1879, he graduated as Bachelor of Medicine
and Master of Surgery (M.B.C.M.) and was accepted as a
member of the Royal College of Surgeon of London.

34
 A l s o in 1879, Ho Kai met A l i c e V a l k d e n who was to be
his f u t u r e w i f e . She was the d a u g h t e r of John W a l k d e n , a
Member of Parliament. Alioe was born in 1852, being seven
y e a r s o l d e r than Ho Kai. Ho Kai did not r e t u r n to Hong
Kong after getting his medical degree. Instead, he took up
law and was a d m i t t e d into L i n c o l n ' s Inn. His r e a s o n s for
qualifying himself in two professions were not known. From
1879 to 1881, Ho was Senior Equity Scholar and Senior
S c h o l a r in R e a l and P e r s o n a l P r o p e r t y . In 1881, he was
c a l l e d to the bar with flying colours. Just before returning
to Hong Kong in 1882, he married Alice and brought her with
him to Hong Kong. W h i l e he was on his way home, he was
highly honoured by the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Pope
Hennessy, with a very complimentary speech.
"...This young gentleman who was expected
to a r r i v e in the C o l o n y had taken the
highest honours at Lincoln r s Inn. It was
something that a g e n t l e m a n b e l o n g i n g to
the C o l o n y s h o u l d h a v e gained such
honours. ! f ' '
T h e r e has not been any w r i t t e n r e c o r d of Ho K a i ' s
decade-long experiences in Britain. But when he returned to
Hong Kong in 1882, he was definitely different from the rest
of the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n in s e v e r a l aspects. He had
r e c e i v e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y f o r m a l W e s t e r n education and had
been professionally qualified in Britain first in medicine
and then in law* He had m a r r i e d an E n g l i s h lady o l d e r than
he was. He had witnessed the magnificence of the colonial
master and f e l t the atmosphere of l a i s s e z - f a i r e which was
then p r e d o m i n a n t in Britain. The G o v e r n o r s w e l c o m i n g

35
speech did signify that the government was ready and nnxious
lor this very Westernized Chinese young man of 23- Rut was
the Chinese community ready to accept him?

Lim Boon Keng (1869-1893)

a
Lim Boon K e n g -/|>^h >L//^> $ p r o n o u n c e d in H o k k i e n or
Lin Wen C h f i n g in Mandarin w a s , as Ho K a i , a third
generation overseas Chinese.

The g r a n d f a t h e r , Lim Hah Ping and the lather, Lim Thean Geow
The Lim f a m i l y like the Hos a l s o emigrated at the time
of the g r a n d f a t h e r , Lim Mah P i n g > ^ ^ % from the county of
H a i - c h e n g ''%} \^L in F u k i e n in 1839-
He f i r s t s e t t l e d in
Penang where he married a local Baba Chinese g i r l . 1 ft They
gave birth to only one boy named Thean Geow
W h e n Thean G e o w w a s o l d e n o u g h t o w o r k , L i m H a h P i n g
brought him to work for Cheang Hong Lim in Singapore. 11-*
Q

Mah Ping worked in his winery and Thean Geow in his opium

Inrm .

The son - Lim Boon Keng

In Singapore 1869-1887
Born in 1869, Lim Boon Keng was the second son of the
family which was quite poor. He grew up among more Chinese
influence as the family had been serving Chinese masters.
This was a very different family background from Ho!s.
Lim Boon Keng's first education was in Chinese. He
studied classical Chinese in one ol those classes attached

36
to the Hokkien association. He might probably just be
learning to recognize the Chinese characters as he was still
a very small child of less than ten years old. Then he
attended an English class at Cross Street before enrolling
himself in Raffles Institution in 1879. The Institution
could be regarded as a Singapore equivalent of Central
School in Hong Kong. It was an English-medium secondary
school but with vernacular languages taught in the lower
classes. . So both Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng had the best
formal English education then available. This was rare for
other children of their times.
Unlike Ho, whose father died rich leaving him a large
inheritance and thus enabling him to receive overseas
education in Britain, the death of his father in 1885 almost
ended Lim Boon Keng T s schooling. The grandparents asked
Lim to quit school and help with the family T s livelihood.
After all, among the common folks of the overseas Chinese
communities, education was regarded as a luxury both because
of the money spent on it but more importantly because of the
amount not earned when one was at school. In Lim T s case,
it was the family's employer, Cheang Hong Lim, who managed
to persuade the grandparents to change their mind. pn
u
Lim
must have been most impressive in his academic performance
to win this endorsement. Besides, he also.attracted the
attention and favour of the Principal of the Raffles
Institution, R.W. Hullett, who gave him special tutoring.
In 1886, Lim became the first Chinese recipient of a Queen's

37
Scholarship. This was to enable him to proceed to Britain
for university education.

In Britain 1887-1892
Lim Boon Keng went to Britain in 1887 at the age of 18.
So he started his school life on foreign soil at an age much
more mature than Ho Kai who was only 13 when he arrived in
Britain. Lim was to stay until 1892.
Lim Boon Keng took up his medical studies in Edinburgh
University in Scotland. He, too, achieved excellent
academic records, being awarded first class honours when he
graduated as M.B.C.M. in 1891. He stayed on for about half
a year more under Professor Roy at Cambridge University.
During this period, he published two papers which won him
much acclaim. The papers were "On the Cardiac Nerves of
the Dog" and "the Colemic Fluid of Lumbricus Terrestris in
Reference to a Protective Mechanism." In 1892, he set off
to return to Singapore.
Again as in Ho Kai f s case, not much is known of Lim
Boon Keng's life in Britain. It was known that he was
baptized there. Besides, there are two other anecdotes
often repeated in almost all academic or biographical works
on Lim. Here is one story. One day, he was talked to by
an Englishman in Mandarin, the standard spoken Chinese
language but usually only spoken in the northern provinces.
Lim could not reply* The second story is about how Lim
failed to translate an article into Chinese as requested by
his professor.

38
 The following inferences can be safely drawn from the
above accounts. The fact that Lim was baptized in Britain
at an adult age could have been due to one or more of the
following reasons. He could have been genuinely attracted
to Christianity or he might have been influenced by his peer
group or he might simply have been so practical-minded as to
get baptized so as to fit himself into the Christian Western
world he was in. But then to his great disillusionment,
though thoroughly Westernized in all aspects such as attire,
b e h a v i o u r , language, education, profession and even
religion, he was nevertheless not identified as one of their
own by the Englishmen surrounding him. He was still
expected to be familiar with the Chinese language and
culture. In 1893 Lim returned to Singapore as a Christian
Chinese and a Western-trained medical doctor. Then he was
aged 22.

Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng*s formative years in perspective

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it can be
said that basic differences between Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng
did cause them different experiences in Britian. First of
all, there was the age difference. While Ho Kai spent all
his teenage years and early twenties in Britain, Lim Boon
Keng was already 18 when he arrived in Britain. This could
have resulted in the sensitivity to and acceptance of the
English culture. Being younger, Ho could have been more
easily attracted to new ideas. As for Lim, at the age of

39
18, he s h o u l d have certain values formed such as a
c u l t i v a t e d sense of pride.
Then t h e r e w a s t h e d i f f e r e n c e in f a m i l y background.
Ho's f a m i l y wealth e n a b l e d him to enjoy an extended stay in
Britain. D u r i n g h Ls d e c a d e - 1 o n ^ r > l a y , ho had M V < M | hi
Margate, Aberdeen and London. His missionary iamily
background had also helped to a l l e v i a t e his Chineseness.
As for L i m Boon K e n g , he was in B r i t a i n as a s c h o l a r s h i p
recipient. He could not have been a b l e to a f f o r d t r a v e l s
or other e x t r a v a g a n t expenses. During most of those f i v e
years, he was in Scotland. The greatest difference was in
Ho K a i ! s m a r r y i n g an E n g l i s h l a d y as a w i f e b e f o r e his
r e t u r n to the C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y of Hong K o n g . E v e n his
father, Fuk-tong, a preacher, f o l l o w e d the traditional
practice of getting a n a t i v e Chinese v i l l a g e g i r l as w i f e *
T h e r e is no s u b s t a n t i a t i o n to s u p p o r t the r a r i t y of m i x e d
marriages. But judging from the present-day still critical
Chinese attitude to such marriage, it is not too far-fetched
to say that Ho Kai and his English wife made a v e r y u n u s u a l
couple when they a r r i v e d in Hong Kong in 1882.
Despite these differences, Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng did
show similarities in s e v e r a l aspects even at this f o r m a t i v e
period. Both were third generation overseas Chinese, l i v i n g
in Chinese communities under the r e l a t i v e l y liberal British
colonial administration. As such, they were more detached
than Mainland Chinese from traditional Chinese culture. But
of c o u r s e , this was e s p e c i a l l y the case of Ho Kai w i t h a
C h r i s t i a n preacher as father. S e c o n d l y , both Ho and Lim

40
belonged to the privileged class of their societies. Being
f o r m a l l y educated in English at home and then p r o f e s s i o n a l l y
q u a l i f i e d i n B r i t a i n , they w e r e c e r t a i n l y v e r y d i s t i n c t
among their f e l l o w Chinese. This closeness to the ruling
British was to q u a l i f y them in the taking up of the elitist
role. Lim Boon Keng was, in fact, a cultivated product of
the colonial regime. He was to usher in a new generation of
e l i t e s in Singapore when p r e v i o u s l y w e a l t h was the o n l y
a r b i t e r of e l i t i s t status. T h i r d l y , these two young men
had been brought up to a d m i r e W e s t e r n institutions
especially those of Britain, for example, the parliamentary
system and the laissez-faire economic policy. Their having
lived in Britain, the heart of the Empire, reinforced their
r e s p e c t for B r i t i s h w e a l t h and power. Lim Boon Keng was
in Britain in 1887 - the year celebrating the Golden Jubilee
of Queen V i c t o r i a ! s reign. So in the y e a r s to come, when
Ho and Lim l a m e n t e d o v e r C h i n a ' s w e a k e n i n g s i t u a t i o n , they
tended to prescribe Western institutions and British
assistance as the remedies. Y e t , at the same time, w h i l e
they admired and benefited from British administration, they
c o u l d not h a v e been u n a w a r e of the fact that B r i t a i n was the
very country that had led the exploitation of China with the
imposition of "unequal" t r e a t y terms. These a m b i v a l e n t
feelings towards the West should have brought along feelings
of frustration.
As e m p h a s i s e d , both Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng were
c l o s e r and m o r e intimate to the West than to their Chinese

41
origins. In fact, neither had ever been f o r m a l l y educated
in the traditional Chinese classics. Their knowledge and
acquaintance with the Chinese civilization should have been
acquired and c u l t i v a t e d in the later years when they
genuinely f e l t that urge for it. Lim Boon Keng even wrote
extensively in Chinese.
It was such W e s t e r n i z e d u p b r i n g i n g that q u a l i f i e d Ho
Kai in 1886 and Lim Boon Keng in 1893 to take up the e l i t i s t
status assigned to them.

42
 NOTES

1. T h e r e w e r e no c l e a r e s t i m a t e s of the n u m b e r of
Christian Chinese in this period of history. But here
is one evidence of the rarity of conversion.
"It has been e s t i m a t e d that M o r r i s o n T s
w o r k in Canton (1807-1813) r e s u l t e d
d i r e c t l y in no m o r e than 10 C h r i s t i a n
conversions. It took the A m e r i c a n
misionaries working later in Foochow nine
y e a r s (I !1 8 4 7 - 1 8 5 6 ) t o w i n a s i n g l e
convert.
H a r r i s o n , B., W a i t i n g f o r C h i n a , (Hong Kong, 1979), p.
159.
2. In H a r r i s o n , B., op. c i t » , A p p e n d i x I, " A n g l o - C h i n e s e
C o l l e g e , Malacca, Staff 1818-1843," the names of f i v e
printers were given. They w e r e Leung Ah F a h , Kew Ah
Gung a l i a s TV at N g o n g , Ah C h a o u , Ah Tsieh and Ah Sun or
Ho Ah Sun alias Ho Ye-tong. Also included is a brief
d e s c r i p t i o n on each. For the o n l y p r i n t e r surnamed
Ho, it is said that he a c c o m p a n i e d James Legge to Hong
Kong in 1843 and that he died in 1869. But t h e r e is
no mention of him having any relationship with Ho Fuk
- tong, Ho K a i ! s f a t h e r .
In the d e s c r i p t i o n of the students g o i n g to Hong Kong
with James Legge on pp. 130-131,
"A h a n d f u l o f s t u d e n t s a n d o t h e r s
connected with the C o l l e g e went with
Legge to Hong Kong in 1843 or f o l l o w e d
him there not long afterwards. Besides
the p r i n t e r s Leung Ah F a h , Kew Ah Gung
and Ho Ah S u n , at least f o u r students
seemed to have joined Legge in Hong Kong.
One, named Ho Tsun-chen, was the son of a
printer at the College Press."
There is no linkage between the p r i n t e r Ho Ah Sun and
the student, Ho Tsun-chen or Tsun-cheen.
Elsewhere in other works done on Ho Kai, for examples,
Chiu, L.Y., "The Life and Thought of Sir Kai Ho Kai",
(Sydney, Ph.D. thesis, 1968) and Choa, G.H., The Life
and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai (Hong Kong,! 1981), there is
also no mention of the name of Ho Kai s grandfather.

43
3- M a l a c c a had been an i m p o r t a n t c e n t r e of o v e r s e a s
Chinese settlement and commerce for centuries. Under
successive M a l a y , Portuguese, Dutch and English
regimes, the Chinese merchants ( m o s t l y Hokkien-
speaking, from the South China provinces of Fukien) had
always provided the essential elements of capital and
s k i l l i n M a l a c c a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l e x c h a n g e t r a d e . "In
1813 when Milne visited Malacca, he had been informed
that the p o p u l a t i o n of M a l a c c a town was about 17,000,
of w h i c h some nine or ten thousand w e r e C h i n e s e . "
H a r r i s o n , B., op. cit., pp. 16-17.
W i l l i a m Milne was Robert M o r r i s o n T s missionary partner.
Together they designed and b u i l t the A n g l o - C h i n e s e
C o l l e g e at Malacca. B u t M i l n e ' s name w a s v e r y much
overshadowed by that of Morrison.
4. The Anglo-Chinese College was the long-cherished dream
of an E n g l i s h P r o t e s t a n t m i s s i o n a r y b e l o n g i n g to the
London Missionary Society, Robert Morrison. In 1807>
he was sent out by the Society to preach the Christian
f a i t h to Asia. At f i r s t , M o r r i s o n went to M a c a u and
then China but as the Chinese d o o r s w e r e s t i l l c l o s e d
then, so he was not a b l e to a c h i e v e much. In 1813?
W i l l i a m M i l n e was sent to assist h i m . Then both went
to Malacca and founded the Anglo-Chinese College there.
The College was to serve as a Chinese language school
but most important of all to be the training centre of
missionaries for Asia.
"I wish that we had an i n s t i t u t i o n at M a l a c c a for the
t r a i n i n g of m i s s i o n a r i e s , E u r o p e a n and n a t i v e , and
designed for all the countries beyond the G a n g e s . . . . "
I b i d . , p. 21.
At the same time, the Chinese press, the ^hiJiej^e
Monthly Magazine was also produced. The objective was
to promote Christianity. It lasted from 1815 to 1822.
5. Ibid., p. 131-
6. James Legge was then a very well qualified young man
sent by the London Missionary Society to assist John
Evans, the Principal of the College and successor of
Robert Morrison who died in 1834* In less than a month
after Leggers arrival, Evans died.Legge then became the
Principal.
7- Ibid., pp. 130-131 .
8. Ibid., p. 110.
9. Ibid., p. 130.
10. Choa, G.H., op. cit., p. 10.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13- Ibid.
14- "By 1870, the students were beginning to take posts in
California, Japan and the Treaty Ports, as well as in
business houses in Hong Kong. The pressure to take
appointments was such that in 1870, 29 out of 36 in the
top class left before the end of the year and 134 out
of an average of 249 left during the year." Endacott,
G-B., op* cit., p. 231.
15. Ibid., Chapter XIII.
16. Wong Foon ^ %L± (1827-1879) was taken by the
missionary to the United States. He first attended
Monson Academy in Massachusetts and then he studied
medicine at the Edinburgh University, graduating in
1857- Later, he practised medicine both in Hong Kong
and Canton. He was at one time the medical adviser to
Li Hung-chang. He died in 1879-
17- Choa, G.B., op. cit., p. 17-
18. Baba Chinese are Chinese born of Chinese fathers and
local mothers, though not necessarily Malay. It is,
therefore, a community of mixed-blood, Straits-born
Chinese.
19. Cheang Hong Lim ^f" \) ^7 was a ri°h Chinese. He had
generously contributed to the defence funds of Fukien
and was therefore honoured with the title of tao yuan,
a senior assistant chief of staff of a division. This
practice of honouring contributing overseas Chinese was
part of late Ch'ing courtship of Chinese communities
for their wealth and expertise. Cheang was the first
Chinese to receive such title.
Mei Ching(ed.), Ma-hua ming-jen chuan (Biography of
famous Malayan Chinese), (Singapore, 1961), pp. 119-
131 .
20. Ibid.

45
 Chapter Three
EARLY YEARS OF TRIPARTITE LOYALTY (PRE-1895 INVOLVEMENT)

Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng did not suddenly become

concerned over China's fate in 1895. All their un-Chinese
traits did not, as might have been expected, diminish their
attachment to their mother country, China. Even at this
earlier period before China!s decline was unveiled by the
traumatic defeat of 1895, both Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng, but
especially Ho Kai who was ten years senior, were most aware
of their Chinese identity and were already each in his own
way doing what he thought was his obligation to his own
country, China.
The chapter below examines Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng
first as loyal British subjects, then as promoters of local
Chinese welfare and finally as nationalist overseas Chinese.
This sequence is for neatness of presentation and is not to
imply priority or clear compartmentalization. Details
irrelevant to this thematic study are not included. The
period covered in this chapter would be after their return
from Britain to 1894, that is 1882 to 1894 for Ho Kai and
only 1893 and 1894 for Lim Boon Keng.

Ho Kai 1882-1894
As loyal British subject
Ho Kai returned to Hong Kong in 1882. He was
immediately appointed as Justice of Peace, almost a

46
p r e l i m i n a r y step for any f u t u r e a p p o i n t m e n t s . But he did
not become a p u b l i c f i g u r e u n t i l f o u r y e a r s l a t e r when he
was a p p o i n t e d as the o n l y Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in the
reconstituted Sanitary Board. L i t t l e was known of his
activities during those four years from 1882 to 1886 except
that his wife died in 1884.
In 1890, Sir W i l l i a m Des V o e u x , G o v e r n o r of Hong Kong
from 1887 t o 1891, appointed Ho Kai as the Chinese
unofficial member in the Legislative Council.'' Ho was to
serve in such capacity until 1914 under six governors.^ He
was to represent Chinese interests to the government. Yet,
his W e s t e r n a t t i r e , education and o r i e n t a t i o n seemed to
render him in every aspect ineligible as the representative
of those Chinese so different from him. But this was also
his appeal to the Chinese community. His f l u e n c y in the
language and culture of the colonial administration and more
importantly his professional knowledge both in medicine and
law w e r e d e f i n i t e assets.
The following are some observations drawn from Ho Kai f s
speeches and voting behaviour in the Legislative Council in
the pre-1895 years. The intention is to d i s c o v e r w h e r e
Hofs priorities and orientations lay when he was
deliberating his public duties as Legislative Councillor.
G e n e r a l l y speaking, Ho Kai a p p e a r e d c o m f o r t a b l e with
the c o l o n i a l status of Hong Kong. This was a s u b t l e
expression of his confidence in the British Crown. And yet
in 1894, Ho Kai joined the other u n o f f i c i a l s , n a m e l y C.P.
Chater, T. Jackson and T.H* Whitehead, in a petition asking

47
for constitutional change. They demanded the free election
of representatives of British nationality in the Legislative
Council. I n f a c t w h a t w a s a d v o c a t e d i n 1894 w a s a n
o l i g a r c h y of B r i t i s h and n a t u r a l i z e d Chinese interests.
This was never intended to include the mass. Ho had always
b e l i e v e d that the r u l e of the e l i t e s c o u l d best ensure
security and prosperity.
Although an appointed member, Ho Kai insisted that his
representativeness in the Legislative Council be respected.
It was most frequent for him to introduce his speeches with
statements l i k e "...I h a v e v e r y much p l e a s u r e in r i s i n g as
the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Chinese in this C o u n c i l " ^ or
adding in the m i d d l e of a speech with much d i g n i t y that
"...I am doing so with the full c o n c u r r e n c e of my
constituents, the Chinese in this colony...."4
Ho K a i f s advice to the government in regard to policies
dealing with the Chinese population frequently stressed that
the Chinese were p e o p l e v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the E u r o p e a n
nationalities. He himself showed a profound knowledge of
local Chinese ways of l i f e . On N o v e m b e r 17, 1890, when
discussing an amendment aiming to make the adulteration of
food punishable, Ho pointed out,
"..*.there was sold in the c o l o n y a great
deal of food which in a European point of
view was tainted, such as preserved eggs
and eggs which had been hatched, and
which a great number of Chinese used as
food...."^
Since Ho Kai h e l d onto this p r i n c i p l e that Chinese p e o p l e
were d i f f e r e n t f r o m the E u r o p e a n s , he a d v i s e d that the

48
c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be the least i n t e r f e r i n g . He
showed himself a faithful adherent to the ideas of laissez-
faire. He was especially against imposing European notions
of health upon the Chinese. This was his rationalization
for opposing the Gaol Extension Bill in 1890 and 1893. In
v i e w of the fact that he had been t r a i n e d in W e s t e r n
medicine, his tolerance of overcrowdedness could hardly be
understood. He insisted that expenditure for gaol extension
was "unnecessary" and "as to o v e r c r o w d i n g and the f e a r of
epidemics, that is also without foundation."^
Of c o u r s e , H o r s e a r l i e r w r i t t e n p r o t e s t to the
Legislative Council on December 2, 1886 against the Public
H e a l t h B i l l was a l m o s t in i t s e l f an open m a n i f e s t o of all
his convictions. Then he was acting in the capacity of the
Chinese representative in the Sanitary Board. This protest
won him much l i m e l i g h t because it was his f i r s t year as a
public figure. He rejected "the leaving of a ten feet wide
backyard and the establishing of a 3/6 feet brick privy and
spacious kitchen."^ He argued articulately to support his
opposition. Some of these arguments were later very often
repeated in the Legislative Council deliberations.
"Some Sanitarians are constantly making
the mistake of treating Chinese as if
they were Europeans. They appear to
forget that there are wide constitutional
differences between a native of China and
one who h a i l s f r o m Europe. They do not
a l l o w for the d i f f e r e n c e s of habits,
usage, mode of l i v i n g and a host of other
things between the two."8

49
 Later in 1894 when the plague death toll was raging,
reaching 450 by May 28, Ho Kai still insisted that
overcrowded housing condition was not the cause but rather
"starvation and want". He claimed that any restrictions
imposed on housing would raise rent to the point that
"labourers would not be able to spare cash to buy enough
food for themselves"^ and thus worsened the situation.
Such inexplicable tolerance of overcrowdedness and
objection to government amendments to improve living
conditions could only be understood by accepting the then
contemporary view that Ho Kai was loyal to none but the
landowners. In this 1894 speech against the Public Health
Bill, he openly admitted this but defended that property
should be respected*
"....I feel it fair to those who have
acquired by industry, by success in
business, or otherwise large sums of
money which they have invested in this
colony, that they should receive due
consideration and not be treated ^ith
utter disregard to their interests."'^
He even went on to threaten
"....if you are to pass laws to interfere
too much with their domestic peace, to
allow their enjoyment of their properties
to be interfered with... they would
quietly leave the colony, and will leave
U o . . . * if 11
•no

But Ho Kai did on other issues defend the interests of

the w h o l e c o l o n y to the point of defying those of the Empire
to which he had pledged his allegiance. In 1891 * while he
was s t i l l y o u n g i n h i s o f f i c e , he joined the other
u n o f f i c i a l s in a p r o t e s t against the d o u b l i n g of m i l i t a r y

50
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to HK$233,572 w i t h o u t sending the p r o m i s e d
additional garrison. 1 2 In 1894, he again joined the other
u n o f f i c i a l c o u n c i l l o r s in a u n a n i m o u s p r o t e s t against the
same i s s u e . He was a l w a y s of the o p i n i o n t h a t the
g o v e r n m e n t p u r s e must be c a r e f u l l y g u a r d e d . In 1892, Ho
Kai spoke both p o w e r f u l l y a n d c y n i c a l l y against s a l a r y
increase and compensation of civil service owing to d o l l a r
depreciation.
"Instead of paying as it were $5 to the«£
we are now paying something over $10, and
for that and other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s it is
i m p o s s i b l e for us h e r e , as g u a r d i a n s of
the p u b l i c p u r s e , to consent - h o w e v e r
much i n c l i n e d we may be - to vote any
increase.... It seems v e r y u n g r a t e f u l
on our p a r t and p e r h a p s some of the
official members would think that we are
v e r y mean - ( l a u g h t e r ) - but s t i l l I
a s s u r e them that we are not mean at all -
(laughter) - and we f u l l y sympathise with
them. I would like to do the thing right
h a n d s o m e l y if we had the means.
(Renewed laughter.) ^
Ho Kai was w a r y that because the Chinese mass w e r e
unaware of their legal rights, t h e r e f o r e the a u t h o r i t y of
the police should be c a r e f u l l y monitored. His practice as
a barrister no doubt made him sensitive to this issue. In
a discussion over the Gambling Bill on December 8, 1890, he
claimed
"....one e f f e c t of it w i l l be that it
w i l l increase the power of the p o l i c e
enormously for good or for e v i l . " ' ^
Ho Kai was most ready to stand by Chinese institutions
such as Po Leung Kuk, the Chinese society for the protection
of g i r l s and women. He d e f e n d e d it most i n d i g n a n t l y
against charges made by T.H. W h i t e h e a d , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
of the Chamber of Commerce in the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. The
speech on June 2, 1893 was o v e r 3,000 w o r d s long.
11
s u c h a S o c i e t y as t h i s , I s u b m i t ,
deserves w e l l of the government. They
deserve, in fact, the support and
encouragement of e v e r y right-minded man
in this Colony. (Hear, hear) A n dw e
are now introducing this Ordinance to
g i v e to them a more d e f i n i t e legal status
and also to sympathise and encourage and
h e l p them in carrying on their good w o r k
by an e n d o w m e n t of $20,000...." ' J
Another example of Ho Kai defending p u b l i c interest as
a g a i n s t t h o s e o f t h e p r i v i l e g e d f e w d u r i n g t h i s 1890-1894
p e r i o d was his s u c c e e d i n g i n 1894 t o h a v e a n a m e n d m e n t
passed shortening the period of news m o n o p o l y of the Chamber
of Commerce from 48 h o u r s to 38 h o u r s a f t e r the first
p u b l i c a t i o n of the t e l e g r a m and f r o m 72 h o u r s to 48 h o u r s
after its receipt. During his speeh proposing the
a m e n d m e n t , Ho c o n c l u d e d that "I am sure the general p u b l i c
w o u l d be pleased to h a v e views of the outside w o r l d as soon

as possible."^
D u r i n g these f i r s t four years of his 24-year service as
Legislative Councillor, Ho Kai had a l r e a d y made his grounds
very clear. As a C h i n e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , he took his
duties s e r i o u s l y in reflecting as w e l l as defending Chinese
interests, although s e e m i n g l y more often for sectional
r a t h e r than g e n e r a l good. He was m o r e r e a d y to speak on

behalf of the i n t e r e s t s of the r a t e p a y e r s such as in

opposing unnecessary government expenditure and restrictions

on l a n d - d e v e l o p m e n t . It has yet to be discovered whether

his lonft-term service would later soften his pro-proporty

52
stand and bring him closer to the mass population. In this
period, it was outside the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l that his
l o y a l t y and d e d i c a t i o n to his f e l l o w Chinese was m o r e
evidently displayed.

As promoter of local Chinese w e l f a r e

Having been trained in Western medicine, Ho Kai surely
a p p r e c i a t e d its m e r i t s . T h e r e f o r e when he r e t u r n e d f r o m
B r i t a i n to find that the l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n was s t i l l not
r e a d y for it, he r e a l i s e d that the most urgent task was to
popularize it through the provision of free Western medicine
and by training local Chinese youth. So although he himself
did not actually go into the medical practice, his name has
long been r e m e m b e r e d for his c o n t r i b u t i o n f i r s t l y to the
b u i l d i n g and management of the now A l i c e Ho M i u Ling
N e t h e r s o l e H o s p i t a l a n d s e c o n d l y a l o n g with t h e H o s p i t a l ,
the founding of the Hong Kong C o l l e g e of M e d i c i n e for
Chinese which in 1912 was i n c o r p o r a t e d into the F a c u l t y of
Medicine of the now University of Hong Kong*
The idea of a Western medical hospital for the Chinese
was not c o n c e i v e d by Ho Kai. A l r e a d y since 1881 in Tai
Ping Shan d i s t r i c t s , that is, the d i s t r i c t s around the
present day Hollywood Road, where most Chinese lived, there
was a l r e a d y the N e t h e r s o l e Dispensary opened in 1881 This
was the j o i n t e f f o r t of two i n d i v i d u a l s , H.W. Davis of an
accountant f i r m and W i l l i a m Y o u n g , a medical doctor,
together with the London M i s s i o n a r y Society.1? The
Dispensary was named Nethersole in memory of Davis 1 s mother.
 It had been r a t h e r p o p u l a r in its t r e a t m e n t of out-
"i &
patients. ° Therefore the idea of improving and expanding
it into a hospital occurred. The Committee was enlarged to
include more members and Chinese representatives were also
invited. Ho Kai then became the only Chinese among the new
members added. He i m m e d i a t e l y o f f e r e d to donate the
b u i l d i n g costs of the p r o p o s e d h o s p i t a l in m e m o r y of his
deceased wife, Alice. F i n a l l y , this g e n e r o s i t y o f H o ' s
together with the concerted efforts of the London Missionary
Society and donations from E.R. Belilios, another
unofficial Legislative Councillor as well as public
s u b s c r i p t i o n s , t h e A l i c e M e m o r i a l H o s p i t a l w a s opened a t
H o l l y w o o d Road on F e b r u a r y 16, 1887- The H o s p i t a l was
managed by the London Missionary Society but with a Finance
C o m m i t t e e c h a i r e d by Ho K a i . This C o m m i t t e e was to be
responsible for fund-raising. The Hospital proved to be a
success, even more so than the Government Civil Hospital.
Because of such e n c o u r a g i n g r e s p o n s e , the idea of
founding a college to train local Chinese in W e s t e r n
m e d i c i n e was g i v e n a spur. S u p p o r t e r s of this p r o j e c t
included some illustrious figures in the history of Western
m e d i c i n e in Hong Kong. They w e r e P a t r i c k M a n s o n , James
Cantlie, G.P. Jordan, Francis Clark and Ho Kai, Ho being the
only Chinese at this meeting. They were all of the opinion
that only when Chinese youth were taught to practise Western
m e d i c i n e c o u l d it e v e r be p o p u l a r i z e d . But for the time
being, w h i l e the idea of the c o l l e g e was being put into
action, t h e r e was neither the intention nor the funds to

54
erect a college building. Finally half a year later on
October 1, 1887, the Hong Kong College of Medicine for
Chinese was formally inaugurated at the hospital building.19
As to Ho's role in the establishment and management of
the College, there was no mention of his donating any
subscription. But in the management, he was appointed as
the Honorary Secretary and the Rector's Assessor. Besides,
he was also among the teaching staff, lecturing on medical
jurisprudence or forensic medicine, that is the application
of medical knowledge to legal problems to third year
students. Since he had been trained first in medicine and
then in law in Britain, no other available candidate could
have been more qualified. He also taught physiology to
first and second year students.
The first class of 1887 started with twelve students.
Among them only two graduated at the end of five years in
July 1892. They were Sun Yat-sen 4&]!&<fjft and Kong Ying Wa
Ji. J| -8£ . The graduation ceremony was held on July 23?
1892 in the City Hall. Sir William Robinson, the Governor
of Hong Kong, officiated at the ceremony. Ho Kai was among
the distinguished guests gathered for the occasion.
If during these years Ho had not achieved much for the
Chinese he represented in the Legislative Council, he had
helped to take two important pioneering steps in the history
of Western medicine In Hong Kong - establishing a hospital
and founding a college of Western medicine.

55
As nationalist overseas Chinese
E v e n in this p e r i o d b e f o r e g r e a t u p h e a v a l s w e r e to be
brought about by China ! s 1895 defeat, Ho Kai had already had
his attention upon China ! s problems. It was then the 1880s
when China was engaged in the s e e m i n g l y o p t i m i s t i c S e l f -
strengthening Movement. In m o d e r n Chinese h i s t o r y , Ho
Kai ! s name has always been mentioned in association with his
reform essays and his relationship with Sun Yat-sen. Both
these two undertakings started in 1887.
Ho Kai ! s r e f o r m essays w e r e w r i t t e n in E n g l i s h and
sometimes p u b l i s h e d u n d e r the p s e u d o n y m "Sinensis" in the
20
Hong Kong China Mail. Hu Li-ylian $l -4J, £& translated
the essays into Chinese and p u b l i s h e d them in the l o c a l
Chinese n e w s p a p e r , The Chinese M a i l or Hua-tzu Jih-pao

However, there are two different versions to this Ho-Hu

collaboration.^ Chiu Ling-yeong is of the opinion that "Ho
Kai and Hu Li-ytian a p p e a r e d as j o i n t a u t h o r s of many
a r t i c l e s , even though Hu m e r e l y t r a n s l a t e d Ho's w o r k into
Chinese" 2 2 and that Hu c o u l d h a r d l y be c o n s i d e r e d as a
reformer, nor could he be ranked among the reformers of his
period. He could, at best, be described as a sympathizer
of the r e f o r m movement. 2 ^ But G.H. Choa thinks otherwise.
"Hu was very much a collaborator because in these essays he
had his own ideas f r e e l y besides expanding on Ho ! s." 2 4 j^
seems that this d i f f e r e n c e of opinion in regard to H u ' s
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the r e f o r m movement is because of Chiu and
Choa!s different concept of "contribution". Chiu is of the

56
opinion that Hu did not have any original ideas on reform.
Choa believes that what Hu added to Ho!s work as commentary
was already contribution to the reform movement. Both Chiu
and Choa are justified in their conclusions regarding this
joint reform effort of Ho and Hu.
During these pre-1895 years, Ho Kai published two
essays to express his views on China!s reform movement, one
in 188? and another in 1894- He showed that although he was
a Legislative Councillor of the Hong Kong colonial regime
with sworn allegiance to the British Crown, he still
earnestly "watched over conditions in China with much hope
and anxiety" and that he was ready "to put my shoulder to
the wheel along with those who are more gifted than I am."^
Ho Kai wrote his first reform essay on February 12,
1887* Then under the pseudonym "Sinensis", he had his
article published on February 16 in the Hong Kong China
Mail. The essay was a rejoinder to Tseng Chi-tsers "China
-- the Sleep and the Awakening" which first appeared in the
anc was
January issue of ^^jbj:£_Rjia:£jt£IlA-Z_.^£Zi£Z *
subsequently published in Hong Kong China Mail on February
Q/r
8. Ho Kai wrote his "a few humble words""10 which in fact
numbered over 4,500 four days after Tseng's article had
appeared in Hongkong newspapers. Ho Kai stressed that his
article was not intended to be a review and that he was only
offering his opinions which "are the results of years of
study."27

57
 There is no intention here to review either Tseng Chi-
PR
tse or Ho Kai's articles in length, but a brief summary of
both is necessary. Tseng wrote this certainly
controversial and almost sensational article before he left
London for China. His main argument was that China was not
yet o v e r and done with. Her seeming w e a k n e s s d u r i n g the
past y e a r s was because she was a s l e e p . But now it was time
for her to wake up because "she commenced to see that she
had been asleep whilst a l l the w o r l d was up and doing; that
she had been sleeping in the vacuous vortex of the storm of
forces w i l d l y whirling around her." He then assured that
"the awakening of 300 m i l l i o n to a consciousness of their
strength"^ would not be dangerous because China had always
been a p e a c e f u l p e o p l e . Then the a r t i c l e f o l l o w e d with
explanation of how China would maintain peaceful
relationship with the Treaty Powers. He also warned that
at the same t i m e , China w o u l d exercise a more e f f e c t i v e
supervision over her vassal states. Any hostile movements
against these c o u n t r i e s , or any i n t e r f e r e n c e with their
affairs, would be viewed at Peking "as a declaration, on the
part of the Power committing it, of a desire to discontinue
its friendly relations with the Chinese Government."^ The
article ended optimistically with "The world is not so near
its end that she (China) need h u r r y , nor the c i r c l e s of the
sun so n e a r l y done that she w i l l not h a v e time to p l a y the
r o l e assigned her in the w o r l d of nations."^ 1 On the
w h o l e , Tseng sounded most optimistic of China ! s f u t u r e to
the point that she s t i l l had an important r o l e to p l a y .

58
 Tseng!s article was widely reprinted, translated and
published. Certainly, it aroused much response. Chiu
Ling-yeong is of the opinion that "of all the comments and
criticisms, none were as constructive and concrete as Ho
Kaifs."32 HO!S rejoinder was in the form of an open letter
to the editor. When compared to Tseng T s article, Ho's was
not only longer but also more penetrating in problem-
detecting, candid in presentation and thorough in problem-
solving. After expressing his sincerity of purpose, Ho at
once refuted Tseng1 s argument that China was awake.
"The exertions and energy which are
alleged as being put forward and which
she (China) is now presumed to bring to
bear, are like the convulsive strugglings
of a s l e e p i n g man suffering from a
nightmare or delirium, utterly illogical
and without the shadow of guiding
principles."33
But this did not mean that Ho Kai was pessimistic. After
all, said Ho, "all the materials essential to the building
up of a mighty nation are there and in abundance."34 He
went on to reveal what went wrong with China and at the same
time he presented his solutions, pointing out all the
efforts so far were not enough to be of effect. His
prescription was simple. "It may be summed up in a
sentence, viz., equitable rule and right government."35 Ho
attacked ferociously China!s malpractices in the recruitment
and promotion of officers which had deprived China of many
good and faithful servants who otherwise would have served
her with loyalty and distinction."36 Such corruption in
the army and navy had led to disastrous military defeats.

59
But, the r e a l p r o b l e m of China lay in "her loose m o r a l i t y
and e v i l h a b i t s , both social and po l i t i c a l , !f37 Ho then
warned against Tseng Chi-tse ! s argument that China would be
taking up i n c r e a s e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o v e r her v a s s a l states
for Ho believed that this would mean trouble.
As to the funds needed for the reform programmes, China
!l
s h o u l d raise a n a t i o n a l debt in which her own p e o p l e can
also invest."^ 8 There was, of course, difficulty because
" p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e w i l l not be u n d e r t a k e n without much
encouragement from and confidence in the government."^ Ho
Kai concluded the essay by acknowledging Tseng!s
c o n t r i b u t i o n but not w i t h o u t once again c r i t i c i z i n g his
m i s t a k i n g "the e f f o r t for the cause".40 The v e r y last
p a r a g r a p h was in Chinese with a quotation f r o m M e n c i u s
echoing what Ho Kai had prescribed for China -- equitable
r u l e and right government.
Several deductions can be drawn f r o m this f i r s t
exposition of Ho Kai ! s reform views. Firstly, Ho's loyalty
and attachment to China was strong though he was p h y s i c a l y
and c u l t u r a l l y detached from it. After exposing the
problems, he offered the right solutions. He also showed
off his familiarity with the Chinese culture by quoting from
various Chinese texts most aptly five times throughout the
essay, thus adding stress, dignity but most important of all
Chinese f l a v o u r to his English essay. Yet, at the same
time, he was divulging very openly his Western-orientation.
Indeed, his e v a l u a t i o n of the Chinese situation and the
policies he advocated were all based on his experiences and

60
a d m i r a t i o n of the W e s t e r n i n s t i t u t i o n s . One v e r y c l e a r
example was his proposal to utilize private capital.
" N e a r l y e v e r y European nation has a
national debt in which her people f r e e l y
i n v e s t in spite of the low r a t e of
interest. Why s h o u l d China not h a v e a
n a t i o n a l d e b t a l s o i n4 w h i c h h e r o w n
people can also invest?" '
Ho's exaltation of the effectiveness of private enterprises
in rescuing China from economic difficulties was certainly
contrary to traditional Chinese contempt of merchants.
"Should the Government have much
d i f f i c u l t y i n securing s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s
to carry out all the contemplated
i m p r o v e m e n t s , they might be f o r c e d to
l e a v e much to be done by p r i v a t e
enterprise. This after all is the best
way, as has long ago been found out in
other countries. " 42
In this article, Ho K a i f s ambivalent love-and-hate feelings
t o w a r d s the West w e r e again d i s c l o s e d . At the same time
while he realized that Western institutions were effective
in r e m e d y i n g C h i n a ' s weaknesses, he was a l s o aware that
Western pressure of all forms was the one major cause. This
p a r a d o x i c a l e x p e r i e n c e was o b s e r v a b l e when Ho r e m a r k e d on
China's army. He r e c a l l e d n o s t a l g i c a l l y how Chinese
s o l d i e r s f o u g h t v e r y a d m i r a b l y "under t h e distinguished
leadership of that renowned chief, the late lamented General
C.G. Gordon" 4 3 of England. But this g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the
West was immediately followed by a lamentation on how China
as a nation had her s o v e r e i g n rights and dignity i n f r i n g e d
n
and her p e o p l e b r u t a l l y abused by f o r e i g n nations. l
d e e p l y sympathise with China in e v e r y wrong which she has

61
s u f f e r e d , and I long w i t h e v e r y t r u e - h e a r t e d Chinaman for
the time to oome when China s h a l l take her p l a c e among the
f o r e m o s t nations and her p e o p l e be w e l c o m e d and esteemed
everywhere."44 Ho Kai ! s l o v e for and hope in the mother
country could not have been given a more vivid expression.
H o T s 1887 essay was c l e a r l y r e f o r m i s t in tone and
motivation while still pledging faith in the Manchu regime.
About seven years were to e l a p s e b e f o r e he was to w r i t e
again on his reform views.
A l s o in 1887, Ho Kai and Sun Yat-sen met for the f i r s t
time. Since then their names had been i n t i m a t e l y
associated till 1900. It is indeed d i f f i c u l t to establish
whether Ho Kai as a teacher influenced the student, Sun Yat-
sen or vice v e r s a or the i n f l u e n c e was m u t u a l . H a r o l d Z.
Schiffrin, author of Sun Yat-sen and the O r i g i n s of the
Chinese R e v o l u t i o n , is of the opinion that Ho had a long-
lasting impact on Sun.4-^ The influence was in fact mutual
depending on the stage of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . D u r i n g the
f i v e y e a r s 1887-1892 when Sun was in the Hong Kong C o l l e g e
of Medicine, he had not yet developed revolutionary thoughts
a l t h o u g h he was a l r e a d y r e s e n t f u l of the c o r r u p t Manchu
practices and had loose connections with t r i a d societies.
Sun was enrolled in the College about half a year after the
publication of Ho's review article of Tseng Chi-tse ! s "China
— The Sleep and the Awakening". So Sun who shared H o f s
criticism of the Manchu government could not have failed to
notice, a d m i r e and respect this o n l y Chinese l e c t u r e r for
his professional status as w e l l as his outspoken behaviour

62
and s h o u l d f i n d his "sweeping c o n d e m n a t i o n of Chinese
traditional institutions most appealing."46 After all,
there were only twelve students in the College in 188?. It
was but n a t u r a l that Ho Kai and Sun Yat-sen, w i t h s i m i l a r
overseas and Christian background 47 should have the desire
and the chances to exchange their views of the Chinese
g o v e r n m e n t and thus g r a d u a l l y c u l t i v a t e a close
relationship. During this period, it was definitely Ho who
exerted much influence on Sun. Until then, Sun had not had
any Chinese f r i e n d s w i t h Ho K a i T s standing who shared his
d i s c o n t e n t against the r u l i n g Manchus. Ho was " p r o b a b l y
S u n f s f i r s t contact among those a t t e m p t i n g to m o d e r n i z e
China along western lines". 48 Ho certainly found in this
b r i g h t youth, s e v e n y e a r s his junior, much of his own
l i k e n e s s so as to become fond of him. O n l y a few y e a r s
l a t e r , the t e a c h e r , Ho K a i , was to take up the student ! s
idea of a coup to overthrow the Ch'ing government.
In fact as late as in 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War
was already waging in the north, both Ho Kai and Sun Yat-sen
still hoped that despite their overseas background and their
lack of the necessary s c h o l a r - g e n t r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , they
could, nevertheless, be enlisted as reformers and be given
the opportunities to launch those programmes that they had
designed to save China. In 1894, both Ho and Sun each
separately made an attempt to win the patronage or at least
attention of the Chinese reformist officials. Ho wrote his
second r e f o r m essay which was in the f o r m of a letter to Hu

63
Li-ytlan in Kobe, Japan. This was published in 1895 titled
"Discourse on the New G o v e r n m e n t " , Hsin-cheng l u n - i with
introductions added by both Ho Kai and Hu Li-ytian. 49 Also
in 1894, Sun Yat-sen s u d d e n l y gave up his drug-store
business in Canton to compose a lengthy petition to Li Hung-
chang. Afterwards, he utilized all his personal contacts
so as to h a v e an i n t e r v i e w with Li a r r a n g e d . But w h e t h e r
u n f o r t u n a t e l y for Ho and Sun or for China, both f a i l e d to
have their efforts accepted by Chinese officials.
For the purpose of this exercise, neither the f u l l text
nor detailed discussion of Ho Kai ! s essay and Sun Yat-sen's
petition are given here. The f o r m e r w i l l be examined for
its orientation while the latter w i l l only be considered in
the light of Ho Kai's influence.
Ho Kai ! s " D i s c o u r s e on the New G o v e r n m e n t " was of two
parts. The f i r s t part e l a b o r a t e d s e v e r a l p r o p o s a l s to
r e f o r m China's administration. They included appointment
of a r e f o r m - m i n d e d p r i m e - m i n i s t e r , better payment of all
officials, abolition of sale of government posts, training
of various talents while not neglecting literary studies and
establishment of elected councils at all levels including a
national assembly. The second part offered suggestions to
strengthen China in all aspects such as in transportation
with national r a i l w a y network, expansion of shipping,
n a t i o n a l e x p l o i t a t i o n of China's resources by e n c o u r a g i n g
private capital, registration for census purpose, setting up
of new ministries, reforms in the army and navy, drafting of
annual budget and publication of newspapers.50

64
 This "Discourse on the New Government" was in many ways
an expansion of H o ' s 1887 p r o p o s a l s , such as those r e l a t e d
to a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a r m y and n a v y . At the time of w r i t i n g ,
Ho was feeling most disheartened that the Chinese government
had not taken his 1887 warning that China should not meddle
in v a s s a l states 1 a f f a i r s b e f o r e she had r e c t i f i e d her own
internal problems because he saw Chinese intervention in the
Korean palace as the cause of Sino-Japanese conflict. He
f e l t sorry that his prediction had sadly come true. "What
I aimed to say in my p r e v i o u s a r t i c l e has all become a
fact."51 He exclaimed that "as the political situation (in
C h i n a ) is so c r i t i c a l that e v e r y o n e is bound to e x p r e s s
o n e ? s v i e w to share the n a t i o n a l burden." 5 ^ Ho K a i ! s
c r e d e n t i a l s w e r e his many years of e x p e r i e n c e "as a m e m b e r
of the Legislative Council (in British ruled Hong Kong).""
This was his open proclamation of his dual loyalty so that
although he swore allegiance to the British Crown, he could
still be genuinely worried about China 1 s fate.
Despite H o T s foreign identity, his r e v i s i o n of the
Chinese system was not t o t a l l y iconoclastic and his
acceptance of Western or even British practices was also not
wholesale. He saw "nothing wrong or evil with the K ! o-chll
examination system as long as it was not used for government
appointment purposes11-^ but for the preservation of Chinese
culture. Then when he was e l a b o r a t i n g on how a capable
prime minister should head the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t , he
insisted that the Emperor should be vested with the power of
selection. So Ho K a i ' s Chinese p r i m e minister was in fact

65
appointed and not elected as was practised in Britain. At
the local l e v e l , Ho advocated universal male suffrage. This
obviously showed that his c o n f i d e n c e in the mass was
limited. He had always held the same conviction of the Hong
Kong public. Ho was h i g h l y critical of ChinaTs
discriminatory policies towards her own nationals, such as
in the l e v y i n g of h e a v y taxes of all kinds on Chinese
products and Chinese ships while foreign ones enjoyed every
privilege. He e x p r e s s e d y e a r n i n g s for the p r o t e c t i o n of
o v e r s e a s Chinese by the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t . Ho K a i ' s
programmes for China were undoubtedly very comprehensive and
c o n s t r u c t i v e , being c a r e f u l l y designed to retain what was
t o l e r a b l e and include what was attainable.
A l s o in 1894? Sun Yat-sen made his last attempt to be
ranked as one of the Chinese reformers. His 1894 petition
to Li Hung-chang was an ensemble of reform ideas by earlier
as w e l l as c o n t e m p o r a r y s c h o l a r s , such as Feng K u e i - f e n
yj|4f-i3 , Wang T f a o 3L *%& , Cheng Kuan-ying 3q$^ *» and
of course Ho K a i . T h e r e was not much o r i g i n a l i t y in Sun's
essay.55 Briefly, he was advocating f u l l exploitation and
m a x i m i z a t i o n of f o u r things n a m e l y , talents, land and
resources and swift flow of commodities. He was
p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with p r o m o t i o n of education and
agriculture. All these r e f l e c t e d Ho Kai ! s influences
because already in 1887, Ho had made these recommendations
in his refutation of Tseng Chi-tse ! s "China — The Sleep and
the Awakening".

66
 Thus, both Ho Kai and Sun Yat-sen w e r e a r g u i n g f r o m
t h e i r w e s t e r n e x p e r i e n c e s , h o l d i n g onto their intimacy of
the foreign knowledge as their only credentials. Yet, t i l l
t h e n , China was not r e a d y to accept p e o p l e of j u s t this
calibre. If talents of Western knowledge were needed, the
Chinese government would rather resort to foreigners.
Moreover, Ho and Sun's open a d v o c a c y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l
reforms made them too aggressive to be utilized.^6
In a w o r d , Ho Kai was a l r e a d y a c t i v e l y engaged in a l l
three concerns before 1895- Being a Legislative Councillor
since 1890, he swore a l l e g i a n c e to the Crown and s e r v e d
d u t i f u l l y . He was also dedicated to promoting the well-being
of the Chinese community. He was the only Chinese
gentleman who joined the foreign medical men in publicizing
W e s t e r n m e d i c i n e among h i s f e l l o w Chinese. But while
engaged in p u b l i c duties in Hong Kong, his l o y a l t y to the
motherland never diminished. He was m o s t c o n c e r n e d with
China r s reform movement and responded almost instantaneously
to reform proposals by openly publishing his ideas. This
won him an a d m i r e r in Sun Yat-sen, the man who was to be
h o n o u r e d as "The Father of the Chinese R e p u b l i c " . So f a r ,
Ho was s t i l l r e f o r m i s t in a p p r o a c h and t h e r e f o r e found
h i m s e l f not too much r e j e c t e d by either the Chinese or the
colonial regime. But already, Ho Kai distinguished himself
among men of his background and status as unique in such
tripartite involvements.

67
Lim Boon Keng 1893-1894
As loyal British subject
In 1893, Lim Boon Keng, a medical doctor together with
Song Ong Siang %%£.*$, a lawyer, both Queen's Scholarship
recipients returned to Singapore heralding "a new breed" of
s o c i a l l e a d e r s among the S i n g a p o r e Chinese.57 They w e r e
not wealthy as earlier S t r a i t s Chinese l e a d e r s were.
I n s t e a d , they w e r e u n i v e r s i t y - e d u c a t e d u s u a l l y i n B r i t a i n
and were very often baptized Christians. Their asset lay
in their closeness to the ruling colonial regime. But such
Western-orientation did not necessarily sever all
attachments from their Chinese roots.
By 1893 when Lim Boon Keng r e t u r n e d to the city where
he was born, Singapore was already a settled colony. Since
the establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877, the
1889 banning of the Chinese secret societies which had been
responsible for various organized vices, and the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the Chinese A d v i s o r y B o a r d , the Chinese
m a j o r i t y in Singapore had become a much more o r d e r l y
community* In fact, a Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e had been in
the Legislative Council since 1869, the year Lim Boon Keng
was born and two years a f t e r the establishment of the
Council.
Not much of Lim Boon Keng f s tripartite involvement can
be d e d u c e d f r o m t h e s e f i r s t t w o y e a r s o f h i s l i f e as
Singapore's public figure. Still traces of such tendency
are detectable. Of course, Lim was not yet appointed to
any o f f i c i a l posts. But with his W e s t e r n i z e d , Christian

68
and professional background, he was already moving with ease
among the g r o u p of Chinese e l i t e s c l o s e to the r u l i n g
British. He was quick to express g r a t i t u t e to his
b e n e f a c t o r and G o v e r n o r of the Straits S e t t l e m e n t s , Sir
Cecil Clementi Smith, who had founded the Queen's
S c h o l a r s h i p in 1887 which e n a b l e d Lim to h a v e u n i v e r s i t y
e d u c a t i o n in B r i t a i n . On the occasion of the G o v e r n o r s
retirement in 1893, the Chinese elites gathered to discuss
setting up the Sir C.C. Smith S c h o l a r s h i p "as a vote of
thanks to H.E. the G o v e r n o r for his s e r v i c e s in p r o m o t i n g
h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n in the C o l o n y . " 5 Q Lim i m m e d i a t e l y g a v e
the p r o p o s a l his "hearty support."59 Again, in the
f a r e w e l l b a n q u e t , Lim Boon Keng was among the twenty-one
Chinese gentlemen present. ^ His attachment to the British
colonial regime was evident.

As promoter of local Chinese welfare

Lim Boon Keng's awareness of his Chinese identity while
a b r o a d became a strong i n c e n t i v e and s t i m u l a n t for his
zealous pursuit of the Chinese culture especially
Confucianism. A l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y after h i s r e t u r n f r o m
Singapore, he spent his daily spare hours upgrading himself
in his long-neglected Chinese.fi*i
01
W h i l e regretting and
making up his own deficiency in the Chinese c u l t u r e , he
discovered the same ignorance among the local Chinese
community. Thus in 1894, Lim started to preach
Confucianism among his f e l l o w Chinese in Singapore and the
w h o l e of the M a l a y Peninsula.° 2 This was Lim ! s d i l e m m a .

69
He himself had earlier embraced Christianity in Britain - a
deed c o n s i d e r e d by the C h i n e s e as a r e n u n c i a t i o n of o n e ' s
Chinese identity and a total acceptance of the West. When
back in S i n g a p o r e , Lim went to Sunday church. But at the
same time he was p r o m o t i n g C o n f u c i a n i s m and was a c t u a l l y
arousing and cultivating a separate consciousness among the
Chinese subjects of the colonial regime to which he himself
had sworn a l l e g i a n c e . At this e a r l y stage, Lim's
t r i p a r t i t e l o y a l t y was not yet c o n s p i c u o u s . But a l r e a d y
while Lim was moving with ease among his English friends in
the Sunday church, he was feeling the contradictions he was
in.

As nationalist overseas Chinese

In these two y e a r s 1893 and 1894> Lim was not yet
c r i t i c a l of the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t . C h i n a ' s weaknesses
were s t i l l not o b v i o u s to him* This was m a i n l y an e f f e c t
of the optimistic atmosphere towards the r u l i n g Manchus
among the Chinese community in Singapore. It was the high
time of C h T i n g e f f o r t s to s o l i c i t the rich South Seas
Chinese. This changed attitude of the Chinese government
was w e l l - r e c e i v e d by the i n f l u e n t i a l Chinese e l i t e s in
Singapore, not o n l y because such recognition by their own
government gave them much pride in front of aliens but also
when among their own p e o p l e . Lim Boon Keng was no
exception to this ethos.

70
 Go w h a l e H o K a i h a d a l r e a d y a t t r a c t o d a t t e n t i o n f o r - h i s

c r i t i c a l a n d W e s t e r n - o r i e n t e d r e f o r m e n n n y s , I,im w a s not. yn t
moving in this direction. And w h i l e Ho Kai noldom
betriended Ch'ing officials, Lirn war, a t this sta^e, like
other Singapore Chinese elites, quite close to the then

Chinese C o n s u l - G e n e r a l , Huang Tsun-hsien. Here is one

interesting anecdote. I n 1894, Lim cured Huang of his

serious t u b e r c u l o s i s by a d v i s i n g him to eat p l e n t y of dog

meat. Upon r e c o v e r y , Huang p e r s o n a l l y delivered a plaque

to L i m , with d e t a i l e d i n s c r i p t i o n s of his disease and c u r e ,

ending with lavish praises of Lim's remarkable healing

power. ^

Lim Boon Keng who wrote so a b u n d a n t l y especially at the

t u r n of the c e n t u r y , had not yet p r o d u c e d any a r t i c l e s in
the pre-1895 years.
Manifestations of Lim's t r i p a r t i t e i n v o l v e m e n t were not
yet e v i d e n t as in the case of Ho K a i . Several factors
e x p l a i n e d this d i f f e r e n c e . L i m w a s back i n S i n g a p o r e f o r
o n l y two y e a r s . He was e s t a b l i s h i n g h i m s e l f b o t h in his
c a r e e r and in his s o c i a l status. He was not h o l d i n g any
o f f i c i a l post which entailed contradictions between l o y a l t y
to the C r o w n and to the l o c a l C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n . He was
not yet p e r s o n a l l y meddling in the Chinese reform movement.
After all, h e w a s s t i l l s h a r i n g t h e same m e n t a l i t y o f t h e
local Chinese community, that of optimism towards the C h ' i n g
g o v e r n m e n t which was on a seemingly very energetic p a t h of
sol 1 - n t r o n g t h o n i n g . Yet Lira's on thur»iar>m for the C h i n o n o
c u l t u r e which was a clear diversion from his Westernized

71
b a c k g r o u n d , was a l r e a d y d i s c e r n i b l e . It is indeed too
c r u d e t o d r a w a n y c o n c l u s i o n f r o m this v e r y u n b a l a n c e d
comparison of Ho K a i f s decade-long engagements with Lim Boon
Keng ! s two-year activities.

72
 NOTES

1- Legislative Council Constitution during Ho Kai's

service (1890-1914)

Number of official Number of unofficial

Year members exclusive members
of the governor

1890 6 5

1896-1914 7 ; 6 (an addition of the

second Chinese
representative
Wei Yuk)

2. Governors of Hong Kong^ during Ho Kai f s service as

Legislative Councillor

Governor Term of Office

Sir George William Des Voeux 10.1887 - 5 .1891

Sir William Robinson 12.1891 - 1 .1898

Sir Henry Arthur Blake 11.1898 - 11 .1903

Sir Matthew Nathan 7.1904 - 4 .1907

Sir Frederick John Lugard 7.1907 - 3 .1912

Sir Francis Henry May 7.1912 - 2 .1919

73
3- Hansard, July 3, 1891, p. 197.
4* Hansard, January 11, 1893, p. 60.
5- Hansard, November 17, 1890, p. 53,
6- Hansard, December 6, 1890, p. 73.
I. "Dr. Ho Kai!s Protest Against the Public Health Bill",
No. 30, Hong Kong Sessional Papers, 1887, p. 2.
8. Ibid.
9. Hansard, December 22, 1894, p. 26.
10. Ibid., p. 24.
II. Ibid., p. 25.
12. Hansard, March 19, 1891, p. 145*
13« Hansard, November 25, 1892, p. 23.
14* Hansard, December 8, 1890, p. 80.
15. Hansard, June 2, 1893, P* 91.
16. Hansard, December 12, 1894, p. 12.
17. Here again Ho Kai got himself related to activities of
the London Missionary Society.
18. The f a c t that the N e t h e r s o l e D i s p e n s a r y was accepted
seemed to be c o n t r a d i c t o r y with the f a c t that Ho Kai
was not successful with his medical practice after his
r e t u r n to Hong K o n g in 1882. In f a c t , t h i s
contradiction could be resolved because the Dispensary
was o f f e r i n g l i m i t e d f r e e m e d i c a l treatment. This
Dispensary and the later Alice Memorial Hospital proved
to be greater successes than the G o v e r n m e n t C i v i l
H o s p i t a l o p e n e d in 1850. In the 1881 C o l o n i a l
Surgeon's Report, the Superintendent of the Government
C i v i l Hospital wrote that v e r y few Chinese p r i v a t e
p a t i e n t s sought a d m i s s i o n . This might h a v e been due
to the f e e s c h a r g e d , $1 per d a y . But as to the
Nethersole Dispensary and the Alice Memorial, they were
f r e e of charge. Besides, these were not g o v e r n m e n t
institutions, and therefore less austere. Moreover,
Chinese participation in the Hospital management might
have also drawn the people into accepting it. "...the
beds were at once f i l l e d and crowds of out-patients
came for treatment. Its success was established
within a month of its being opened." A l i c e Ho Miu
Ling Nethersole Hospital 1887-1967, (Hong Kong, 196717
p. 4-

74
19- The Hong Kong C o l l e g e of Medicine for Chinese offered a
f i v e - y e a r course taught in the medium of English. The
t u i t i o n f e e s w e r e $60 a y e a r . At the end of the
course, there were four p r o f e s s i o n a l examinations to be
passed. G r a d u a t e s w o u l d be a w a r d e d the d i p l o m a of
Licentiate of Medicine and Surgery C o l l e g e for Chinese
(L.M.S.C.C.). But at this i n i t i a l p e r i o d , the d i p l o m a
was not yet recognized by the General M e d i c a l Council
of the United Kingdom.
20. Hu Li-y!ian or Hu I-nam v was born in Hong Kong
in 1848. He had a t r a d i t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n in C h i n e s e .
V/hen h e f a i l e d i n h i s C i v i l S e r v i c e E x a m i n a t i o n , h e
e n r o l l e d h i m s e l f i n t h e Hong Kong C e n t r a l S c h o o l a n d
s t u d i e d t h e r e f r o m 1862 to 1872. Thus Hu and Ho Kai
came to be s c h o o l m a t e s . A f t e r Hu l e f t s c h o o l , he
became a shipping merchant but s t i l l kept his l i t e r a r y
interest. He was the e d i t o r of a C h i n e s e n e w s p a p e r
and a l s o c o m p i l e r of A C o m p r e h e n s i v e Book in English
Law J^-^ij ^^ • Between 1872 to 1881, he t u r n e d
down reouests f r o m Chinese diplomats such as Ch T en Lan-
pin j^m^^) anc* Cheng Tsao-Ju \J^X j^fc^f or his services
in c o u n s e l l i n g t h e m on f o r e i g n "affair s. In 1885, Hu
a c t e d as a d v i s e r to a g r o u p of B r i t i s h b u s i n e s s m e n in
the d e v e l o p m e n t of British N o r t h Borneo. He was even
f a v o u r e d by the S u l t a n of S u l u who w a n t e d to a b d i c a t e
in his f a v o u r . In 1894 when the S i n o - J a p a n e s e War
b r o k e o u t , he was in Japan and was h o n o u r e d by the
Chinese c o m m u n i t y in K o b e w i t h the t i t l e of h o n o r a r y
consul. In 1895, he r e t u r n e d to Hong Kong. For
t h r e e y e a r s , he a c t e d as the i n t e r p r e t e r of L i t e r a r y
Society. Since 1887 w h e n Ho Kai s t a r t e d his r e f o r m
e s s a y - w r i t i n g , Hu f
L i - y u f T a n had been e n g a g e d in the
translation of H o s essays. A f t e r editi^ng The_Tjroe
M e a n i n g of the N e w_Gk}^v jy? n me? rrt ^fjf {J^ J3 %£, TH sin -
c h e n g c h e n ~ c h T u a n ~ ] was p u b l i s h e d in S h a n g h a i in 1901*
L a t e r t h e s e essays t o g e t h e r w i t h some o f H u L i Y U a n T s
own a r t i c l e s and poems w e r e all included in
The Complete Works of Hu I-nam nm] JA nj vfi Z> \\
Hu d i e d in 1916, aged 68. ^ - ^
The a b o v e h a s been a d a p t e d f r o m C h i u , L . Y . * , op, c i t » ,
pp. 257-259-
21. Chiu, L . Y . and Choa , G . H . both did works on Ho K a i .
Chiu ! s was a Doctor of P h i l o s o p h y thesis on Ho Kai
t i t l e d "The L i f e a nf d T h o u g h t o f S i r K a i H o K a i " ,
(Sydney, 1968). Choa s was a book titled The Life and
Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai - A Prominent Figure in
Nineteenth Century Hong Kong, (Hong Kong7 1981 )*
22. Chiu, L . Y . , op. clt., p. 259*
23. I b i d . , p. 260.

75
24. Choa, G . H . , op. cit., p. 135.
25- Chiu, L . Y . , op. cit., p. 316.
26. For a f u l l text of Ho K a i ' s essay, see C h i u , L.Y.,
Appendix III, pp. 315-338.
27. Ibid., p. 315.
28. Tseng Chi-tse ^ *£ )J , was the son of Tseng Kuo-fan
1| lD '%& w h o ' was one o£ the l e a d e r s of the S e l f -
strengthening Movement. Tseng Chi-tse was Minister to
France and Great B r i t a i n f r o m 1878 to 1885. In 1881,
he sucessfully recovered for China the territory of Hi
in Sinkiang by concluding The Treaty of St. Petersburg
with R u s s i a . For a f u l l text of Tseng Chi-tse's
article, see Chiu, L . Y . , op. cit., pp. 297-313.
29. Chiu, L.Y., op. cit., p . 301.
30. Ibid., p. 311.
31. Ibid.. p. 313.
32. Ibid., p. 110.
33- Ibid., p. 318.
34. Ibid., p. 319.
35- Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 326.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 334.
39. Ibid., p. 335.
40. Ibid., p. 337.
41. Ibid., p. 334.
42. Ibid., p. 335-
43. Ibid., p. 330.
44. Ibid., pp. 330-331.
45. Schiffrin, H.Z., op. cit., p. 24.
46. Ibid., p. 26 n.

76
47- Sun Yat-sen was born in Hsiang-shan in K w a n g t u n g in
1866. H i s g i v e n n a m e w a s W e n . In 1879, h e K e n t t o
stay with his e l d e s t b r o t h e r , Sun f l e i , in H a w a i i . Sun
flei had successfully established himseli in H o n o l u l u .
Sun Yat-sen attended l o l a n i School, an A n g l i c a n
i n s t i t u t i o n . Then he entered Oahu C o l l e g e , the h i g h e s t
c e n t r e of l e a r n i n g in the I s l a n d s . I n 1883, S u n I l e i
sent Sun Yat-sen home for f e a r he w o u l d be b a p b i r e d .
But soon Sun Yat-sen was e x p e l l e d t r o m the v i l l a g e for
misbehaviour. S u n then w e n t t o H o n g K o n g , a t t e n d e d
f i r s t the Diocesan Home and l a t e r the G o v e r n m e n t
Central School. In 1884, he was b a p t i z e d and n a m e d
Yat-sen.
48. S c h i f f r i n , H . Z . , op. cit., p . 2 .
B u t t h e r e h a s n e v e r been a n y s u b s t a n t i a l w r i t t e n
records of the two men r e f e r r i n g to each other.
49. This second essay was p u b l i s h e d in 1895, but because it
was w r i t t e n in 1894 before China's defeat by Japan and
b e f o r e t h e T r e a t y o f S h i m o n o s e k i w a s c o n c l uTd e d , i t i s
t h e r e f o r e here considered as part of Ho K a i s pre-1895
involvement.
50. For d e t a i l s of Ho K a i ' s " D i s c o u r s e on the Hew
Government 1 1 , see C h i u , L . Y . , op. cit. , pp. 150-197-
51. I b i d . , p. 153-
52. Ibid.
53- I b i d . , p. 154-
54- I b i d . , p. 161.
55. For a c r i t i c a l r e v i e w of Sun Y a t - s e n f s p e t i t i o n to Li
Hung-chang, read S c h i f f r i n , H . Z . , op. cit., p p . , 34-40.
56. H a v i n g argued that their un-Chineseness rendered Ho Kai
and Sun Yat-sen ineligible to Chinese o f f i c i a l d o m , it
i m m e d i a t e l y o c c u r r e d that o t h e r p e r s o n s o f s i m i l a r
o v e r s e a s and W e s t e r n b a c k g r o u n d such as Ng C h o y , Ho
K a i T s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w , were h i g h l y r e l i e d upon by the
Chinese government. In f a c t , e v e n Ho Kai was a l s o
i n v i t e d to take up a post in Shanghai in 1897*
57. T u r n b u l l , C . M . , op. cit., p. 103-
58. Song, O.S., One Hundred Years 1 History of the Chinese
in Singapore (London, 1923, 1967 edition) p. 276.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.

77
61. Lee, G.K., op, cit., p. 27.
62. Ibid., p. 76 n.
63- Tan Yeok Seong, "How Lim Boon Keng cured Huang Tzuen
Shiann!s tuberculosis by dog's meat," Journal of South
Seas Society, Vol. XVII, Pt. 1, April 1962, pp. 29-30.

78
 Chapter Four
YEARS OF INTENSE TRIPARTITE LOYALTY

(1890-1912 I N V O L V E M E N T )

F o l l o w i n g the 1895 defeat of China by Japan, events in

t h e M a i n l a n d took u p s p e e d . There were the scramble for
concessions among the T r e a t y Powers to the extent of
v i r t u a l l y slicing up China, the anti-foreign Boxer
activities, the Ch'ing declaration of w a r , the A l l i e d
o c c u p a t i o n of P e k i n g and the s i g n i n g of Boxer P r o t o c o l ,
During all these upheavals, various reformist and
r e v o l u t i o n a r y attempts were launched F i n a l l y , in October
1911? t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y e f f o r t s f i r s t inspired and long
sustained by Sun Yat-sen f i n a l l y paid off* The Wuchang
U p r i s i n g on October 10 sparked off widespread p r o v i n c i a l
declaration of independence. This l e f t the Manchus with no
a l t e r n a t i v e but to abdicate in February 1912 ending 268-year
ChTing rule*
All these c h a n g e s t h a t took p l a c e i n China d i d n o t
escape the watchful eyes of those concerned overseas
Chinese. Sun Yat-sen was d e f i n i t e l y not the lone overseas
Chinese in possessing such China-oriented affections and in
i n t e r f e r i n g to i n f l u e n c e C h i n a T s c o u r s e . Ho Kai and Lim
Boon Keng w e r e two other who took it as t h e i r d u t i e s to
promulgate what they b e l i e v e d to be the right solutions of
China's problems. B e s i d e s being e s s a y i s t s , they also
supported promising candidates to bid for decision-making

79
and better s t i l l , if p o s s i b l e , s o v e r e i g n positions in China.

Rut though they were only two i n d i v i d u a l s amonR the

m u l t i t u d e of Chinese n a t i o n a l s who w e r e i n v o l v e d d i r e c t l y or
i n d i r e c t l y in t h i s one and a h a l f d e c a d e l o n g q u e s t of C h i n a

for self-salvation, their uniqueness was not to be drowned

in t h e i r c o m m o n a l i t y . They w e r e the one arid o n l y , each in
his own community at that time, being so t r i p a r t i t e l y
engaged.

D u r i n g the period 1895 to 1912 Ho Kai and Lim Boon

Keng ! s a l r e a d y aroused consciousness of Chinese i d e n t i t y was
g r o w i n g more acute. Yet this was o n l y one aspect of their
tripartite loyalty. They continued to be most vigorously
engaged in s e r v i c i n g their c o l o n i a l government and p r o m o t i n g
the w e l f a r e of their f e l l o w Chinese. They appeared to be
at perfect ease shifting allegiances or even being

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y engaged in all three i n v o l v e m e n t s . In fact,

they were c o n s t a n t l y making concessions and y i e l d i n g to
compromises. There was neither fair distribution nor
monopoly of these m e n f s a l l e g i a n c e s . But there were
definite bottom-1ines to this kind of contradictory
involvements. Both men were conscious that their bases in
the colonies were never to be j e o p a r d i z e d not to say
uprooted. Any a c t i o n s that m i g h t lead to such r e s u l t s
w o u l d surely not be pursued.
The f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s f i r s t d e a l w i t h H o K a i r s
tripartite i n v o l v e m e n t during the period 1895-1912 with an
aim to i n v e s t i g a t e the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s he f a c e d and the
c o m p r o m i s e s he m a d e . Then Lim Boon K e n g T s a c t i v i t i e s in

80
the same p e r i o d w i l l be c o m p a r e d to and c o n t r a s t e d with
Ho ? s. S i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s of the two cases w i l l be
analysed for conclusions to be drawn.

Ho Kai 1895-1912
As loyal B r i t i s h s u b j e c t

I n t h i s p e r i o d 1895-1912, H o K a i b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y
i n v o l v e d in his p u b l i c duties but none c o u l d match his long-
term s e r v i c e in the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . So this section
continues t o a s s e s s Ho ! s l o y a l t y t o t h e B r i t i s h C r o w n b y
examining his b e h a v i o u r in the C o u n c i l ,
Although from 1896 onward, one more Chinese
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Wei Y u k , was appointed to the C o u n c i l , Ho ! s
p o s i t i o n as the s p o k e s m a n of the C h i n e s e r e m a i n e d i n t a c t
b e c a u s e W e i s e l d o m spoke a n d d i d s o u s u a l l y t o c o n c u r w i t h

Ho!s a r g u m e n t . S e v e r a l of Ho K a i ! s pre-1895 a t t i t u d e s in

the Council were unchanged. His expressions of " l o y a l t y

and devotion" to the Crown remained only what were discreet.

"...Though we are c o m p a r a t i v e l y a s m a l l community l i v i n g in

a Far Eastern Colony, yet I may venture to say without fear

of c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t we are b e h i n d n o n e in l o y a l t y and
devotion to our Gracious King (King Edward V I I ) . . . . " ' was
almost the most enthusiastic of such speeches.
R e f e r e n c e has e a r l i e r been made to Ho Kai being

c o m f o r t a b l e with the c o l o n i a l status. In fact, except for

co-signing the petition demanding elected representatives in

the L e g i s l a t i v e and E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l s in 1894? n e v e r again

did he a d v o c a t e any s i m i l a r d e m a n d s . In f a c t on A p r i l 30,

81
1908 in a s s o c i a t i o n with the creation of a g o v e r n m e n t -
appointed administrative head and President of the Sanitary
Department, Ho a c t u a l l y said that he f a v o u r e d such an
arrangement rather than inadequate and wretched
representation in the Board. "Better the present
a r r a n g e m e n t than a q u a s i - m u n i c i p a 1 i t y " . 2 H i s 1894
involvement could be interpreted as an act of endorsing his
colleagues in the Legislative Council and not out of his own
initiatives. P e r h a p s then in 1894, as a r e l a t i v e l y new
member, he saw it p r u d e n t to be p a r t of the unanimous
unofficial voice rather than acting differently.
Yet, Ho was very insistent that the British government
had to b e h a v e p r o p e r l y to win his vote of c o n f i d e n c e and
support. S h o u l d any m i s d e m e a n o u r o c c u r , he was n e v e r
hesitant to expose it. His legal e x p e r t i s e w o u l d then
become most u s e f u l in f o c u s i n g the core of the p r o b l e m s .
One such incident was o v e r the issue of c l o s i n g down the
opium dens in Hong Kong. Having been trained in medicine
and having witnessed the miseries of drug-addiction, he was
d e f i n i t e l y not ignorant of the harm caused by opium. But
he was resentful that the British Home Government arrived at
such a decision u n i l a t e r a l l y without f i r s t confiding and
consulting the Hong Kong Legislative Council. On May 28,
1908, he demanded,
"...this Council s h o u l d be c o n s u l t e d on
all matters affecting the finances and
the welfare of this fair colony of ours,
and in maintaining also the right of the
public of Hongkong to have a consultative
v o i c e in a m a t t e r w h i c h a j f f e c t s its
prosperity and its revenues."^

82
Again o v e r the same o p i u m i s s u e , he c h a r g e d the B r i t i s h
government for not materializing its promise of grants to
the c o l o n y as c o m p e n s a t i o n for the loss of o p i u m r e v e n u e *
On June 17, 1909, he pointed out,
"...the Home g o v e r n m e n t have taken upon
themselves a very great responsibility
and t h e i r f a i l u r e t o r a t i f y t h e p r o m i s e
w o u l d d r a g t h e f a i r name o f G r e a t B r i t a i n
in the m i r e and w o u l d h a v e a bad e f f e c t
upon the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n of this
C o l o n y , w h o w i l l b e l e d t o b e l i e v e that
the promises of English statesmen are so
many meaningless w o r d s . " 4
Then in 1911 when the C o l o n i a l S e c r e t a r y wanted to r u s h an
a m e n d m e n t to the 1909 Opium O r d i n a n c e by suspension of the
Standing O r d e r s of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l so that the
amendment would go through all the three readings and become
an ordinance at once, Ho Kai could not have been more blunt.
"I hope that the Government w i l l not place us in a position
to simply echo their sentiments, and to give a decision upon
a B i l l of this n a t u r e w i t h o u t h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d it."5 So
Ho r s respect and admiration of British institutions was not
unquestioned or unconditional. To deserve his "loyalty and
devotion", the colonial master had to behave right. This
r a t i o n a l i t y of a l l e g i a n c e was d e f i n i t e l y a r e s u l t of H o r s
Western training. It could not have been anything Chinese
for the Chinese believed "when the monarch demands that the
minister is to die, the latter just cannot be alive."
As b e f o r e , Ho K a i ' s c r i t i c i s m of the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l
p o l i c i e s continued to be most a b r a s i v e o v e r the m i l i t a r y
c o n t r i b u t i o n of Hong Kong to the B r i t i s h E m p i r e . He had

83
been making speeches in opposition to u n r e a s o n a b l e
extractions for a decade. On June 1, 1911, he said,
"I had a l m o s t said that I was tired of
discussions on this s u b j e c t , but yet at
the same t i m e I d o n ' t see how we can
avoid bringing it forward periodically so
long as the m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n is
c a l c u l ab t e d a n d r a i s e d o n a n u n f a i r
basis.»
He again reminded the British government that promises made
had to be kept.
"On one hand I think we a l l agree that we
must as a B r i t i s h C o l o n y , as a l o y a l
C o l o n y , c o n t r i b u t e a j u s t share t o w a r d s
the m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e of the E m p i r e ,
and on the other hand it has been said by
no less a u t h o r i t y than Mr. Joseph
C h a m b e r l a i n that this m i l i t a r y
c o n t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d be c a l c u l a t e d in a
f a i r and j u s t w a y , and the o n l y f a i r and
just basis on which it can be calculated
is the ability of the inhabitants at any
p a r t i c u l a r time to pay that amount of
contribution ...."'
Therefore, when l o y a l t y to the B r i t i s h Crown came into
c o n f l i c t with the interests of the Chinese p e o p l e of Hong
Kong he had been appointed to represent, he took it upon his
obligation that he had to be accountable to them and not to
the government.
All these o b s e r v a t i o n s are not meant to i m p l y that Ho
Kai was an exceptionally critical unofficial member of the
Legislative Council. After a l l , the British government set
up such an institution of unofficial representation for the
v e r y p u r p o s e of hoping to be i n f o r m e d of responses and
reactions of her c o l o n i a l subjects towards her p o l i c i e s .
H o f s behaviour was within expectations and therefore
tolerated and even encouraged. Ho might have appeared to

84
have spoken more often than the others In the Council
because as a spokesman of the Chinese majority, his opinion
was much sought after. And, with the increase of his years
of service as Councillor, his respectability also increased.
He was well aware of this and made the most of it not for
the sake of attracting attention but because by being so
outspoken, he was serving both the Crown and his fellow
Chinese*
Ho!s speeches on loyalty to the Crown might have been
barely adequate, but his appreciation of the achievements of
governnors, the immediate representative of the British
government in Hong Kong was certainly infused with the
warmest sincerity and heartfelt gratitude. Ho had served
under six governors. To three of them, namely, Sir William
Robinson, Sir Henry Blake and Sir Frederick Lugard, Ho Kai
offered the most personalized votes of thanks on the
occasions of their departure from the colony. To Robinson
who had added the second Chinese representative in the
Legislative Council, he spoke on January 25, 1898,
"...Now, Sir, in bidding you farewell
today I wish to tender you my personal
thanks for unvarying kind assistance I
have received at your hands as the senior
representative of the Chinese community.
...I wish to thank you further for the
interest you have always taken in Chinese
affairs and most especially for the
increased representation which you have
given to them on this Council....lf°
To Blake with whom Ho Kai had conspired over developments in
South China in 1900, and whose office term he had petitioned

85
to e x t e n d , he was e v e n m o r e a f f e c t i o n a t e in his f a r e w e l l
speech on November 19, 1903.
" . . . . P e r s o n a l l y , I cannot bid you
f a r e w e l l today w i t h o u t thanking y o u f o r
your invariable kindness and
consideration to myself and my colleagues
in this C o u n c i l , Mr. Wei Y u k , in our
capacity as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the
Chinese .... "^
To L u g a r d whose a d m i n i s t r a t i o n saw the f o u n d i n g of the
University of Hong Kong, Ho Kai became very generous in his
compliments on the occasion of the f a r e w e l l speech on March
7, 1912.
"....Sir, it does not need a p r o p h e t to
predict that you w i l l be long remembered
by f u t u r e generations as the eminent
p r o m o t e r of education, and with the
University your name w i l l be handed down
and c h e r i s h e d with l o v i n g and g r a t e f u l
memories. I cannot c o n c l u d e , Sir,
without expressing my great admiration of
the a b l e and s u c c e s s f u l way you h a v e
p r e s e r v e d the good o r d e r and peace of
this C o l o n y when the n e i g h b o u r i n g
provinces were in a disturbed condition*
In my h u m b l e opinion no one c o u l d h a v e
succeeded so well and completely as your
E x c e l l e n c y , and this is due l a r g e l y to
your having won the respect and
c o n f i d e n c e of the Chinese and to your
great sympathy with them in all their
legitimate aspirations and
undertakings * . . . " ' °
Generally speaking, In the post-1895 period here under
r e v i e w , Ho Kai was becoming m o r e Hong Kong-oriented, that
is, he took the welfare of the whole colony as his priority.
Many aspects of his behaviour in the C o u n c i l can be more
e a s i l y understood when viewed f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e . He
was speaking less for any p a r t i c u l a r class of Chinese in
Hong Kong. He became most concerned with the preservation

86
and p r o m o t i o n of the s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y of this Crown
Colony, Thus, he m i g h t be v e r y c r i t i c a l and even b l u n t in
his speeches, but he was n e v e r r a d i c a l or d e s t r u c t i v e . On
his retirement from the Council a f t e r 24 years of service,
he said p r o u d l y ,
!t
T h e r e is one t h i n g , and one o n l y ,
that I can c l a i m for m y s e l f , and that is,
that I h a v e a l w a y s d u r i n g the past tried
to do my b e s t in the d i s c h a r g e of my
p u b l i c duties, and in no instance have I
permitted my personal inclination or
s e l f - i n t e r e s t to i n t e r f e r e in the
d i s c h a r g e of my d u t i e s both i n s i d e and
outside this C o u n c i l . " ' '
In f a c t , w h e n Ho Kai was d e f e n d i n g the w e l f a r e of the
c o l o n y as a w h o l e , Ho was at the same time p r o t e c t i n g the
Chinese community which after all constituted an absolute
m a j o r i t y if not a l m o s t the whole of Hong Kong. He was most
far-sighted when he came to c o n s i d e r the f u t u r e of Hong
K o n g , d e m o n s t r a t i n g that h e h a d t h e g r e a t e s t c o n f i d e n c e i n
the continuous growth and prosperity of the colony.
For e x a m p l e , on the occasion when Ho Kai asked for
the p r e s e r v a t i o n of "Sung W o n g Toi" 1 *2 as an open space at
Kowloon on August 15? 1898, he said,
!!
.*..My p r i n c i p a l m o t i v e i s t o p r e s e r v e
an a d d i t i o n a l open space for the c o l o n y
of H o n g k o n g and its d e p e n d e n c i e s . It
may seem to be l o o k i n g too far a h e a d , as
it w e r e , at this time of the day to
r e s e r v e an open space for British
K o w l o o n , where the population is not very
great, but taking into consideration that
rapid growth of Hongkong i t s e l f , from the
b a r r e n rock of 50 y e a r s ago to a m o s t
thickly-populated place - more thickly
p o p u l a t e d per square m i l e , I should say,
than any o t h e r c i t y in the w o r l d - I do
not t h i n k we are l o o k i n g so far ahead
a f t e r a l l i n p r e s e r v i n g t h i s piece o f

87
 g r o u n d for the b e n e f i t1 of the p u b l i c of
Hongkong and Kowloon." ^
When Ho Kai was c r i t i c i s i n g the b u d g e t for 1912, again his
o p t i m i s m in Hong Kong was most o b v i o u s * He attacked
government education policies as being short-sighted.
".... I d o n o t a d v o c a t e c o m p u l s o r y
e d u c a t i o n in this C o l o n y at the p r e s e n t
m o m e n t , but as the n u m b e r of c h i l d r e n
d e m a n d i n g e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s is so
v e r y g r e a t , ...it w i l l soon b e c o m e a
serious question for the government
whether they ought to a l l o w more than
half of the children in Hongkong to grow
up w i t h o u t e v e n an e l e m e n t a r y education
for want of such f a c i l i t i e s . ....I
r e g r e t a l s o to find that no a d d i t i o n a l
p r o v i s i o n is made for the education of
g i r l s whose t r a i n i n g a n d schooling a r e
p a r t i c u l a r l y l!f14
i a b l e to be n e g l e c t e d in
this Colony
He continued to explain the benefits of vernacular technical
education which
"will repay a thousandfold the money and
labour i n v o l v e d , and if Hongkong and the
New Territories were ever to become great
industrial and manufacturing centres, the
technical t r a i n i n g of its m e c h a n i c s ,
artisans and skilled labourers cannot any
longer be postponed or neglected. 11 -^
However Ho Kai T s preoccupation with the general w e l l -
being of the c o l o n y did not outweigh his attention on the
i n t e r e s t s of the v e r y Chinese p e o p l e he r e p r e s e n t e d . Ho
continued to see to it that the ignorance of his fellow
Chinese would not expose them to abuses. Such was the case
in 1899 when he demanded that the people of the n e w l y -
acquired New Territories would not be unreasonably summoned
before the Registrar-General for information. He emphasised
that this affected

88
 "the C h i n e s e a n d t h e C h i n e s e a l o n e ,
whether a British subject or otherwise -
and this makes the B i l l v e r y much m o r e
o b j e c t i o n a b l e - it may be c o n s i d e r e d as
class legislation, and as a general r u l e
the legislature regard such legislation
w i t h a g r el ba t d e a l o f d i s f a v o u r a n d
suspicion."
This was but one e x a m p l e of many other cases when Ho
was defending the Chinese as against claims to privileges by
the E u r o p e a n s . In 1907, he was against the i m p o s i t i o n of
stocks f o r Chinese c r i m i n a l s a l o n e . His biting remarks
were,
"If the i m p o s i t i o n of stocks w e r e made
u n i v e r s a l , to a p p l y not o n l y to Chinese
but o t h e r s as w e l l , it w o u l d take away a
g r e a t d e a l of the o p p o s i t i o n of the
m a j o r i t y of the Chinese to this mode of
punishment."''
Ho K a i c o n t i n u e d t o b e w a r y o f e x c e s s i v e p o l i c e
authority. When he was speaking in o p p o s i t i o n to the
penalising of spitting in 1908, he said
"Again if we are to leave the discretion
to common p o l i c e o f f i c e r s we are in
d a n g e r of p l a c i n g in t h e i r h a1n d s a
powerful instrument of oppression." °
Ho also saw to it that Hong Kong Chinese were to be
protected from any possible harassment by the Ch!ing
government which he distrusted. In 1897* an amendment was
to be passed to the Chinese E x t r a d i t i o n B i l l that "six
months immediately prior to the date of his so being brought
b e f o r e the Magistrate"^ s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e the period of
residence in the Colony. But Ho Kai argued that since the
Chinese population in Hong Kong then was most transient, an
accused person who had resided in the colony c o n t i n u o u s l y

89
d u r i n g the p r e c e d i n g t w e l v e m o n t h s was not to be d e p o r t e d
e v e n if he m i g h t h a v e l e f t the c o l o n y on and o f f .
Despite all these e x a m p l e s of Ho Kai d e f e n d i n g the
p u b l i c good and u p h o l d i n g the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e and
e q u a l i t y , t h e r e were at the same time other cases of his
yielding to class legislation which violated the sacredness
of those v a l u e s be c l a i m e d to c h e r i s h . No case can be m o r e
typical than Ho f s agreeing to the Peak Reservation B i l l of
1904. It was p r o p o s e d on A p r i l 19 that the Peak was to be
r e s e r v e d as a p l a c e of residence for persons other than
Chinese. He admitted that the B i l l "has a decided s a v o u r
of the nature of class legislation, and especially against
the Chinese", and that he was "quite c o n v i n c e d of the
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s and expediency of such a measure." 2 0 He
remedied himself from the awkward situation of subserviency
by a r g u i n g that y i e l d i n g to the B i l l meant p r o m o t i n g the
w e l f a r e of not j u s t the E u r o p e a n s but that of the w h o l e
colony. The European a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w o u l d then be kept
h e a l t h y and sound if they alone w e r e to l i v e in the c o o l e r
and less crowded Peak district. The only rationalization
of Ho ! s compromising attitude was that he genuinely believed
the interests of the colony were most important.
Ho K a i f s e a r l i e r advocation of the least government
i n t e r f e r e n c e in the l i v e s of the Chinese p e o p l e persisted
throughout his service as Legislative Councillor. Such was
still his attitude to the sanitary issue. On May 28, 1900,
there was the discussion over an amendment which empowered
search parties to commence visitations of houses at f i v e

90
o ? c ] o c k In the m o r n i n g . Those were years of p l a g u e h o r r o r .
The n u m b e r of d e a t h s had r i s e n f r o m 21 in 1897 to 1175 in
1898 a n d 1428 i n 1899- M o r t a l i t y r a t e f l u c t u a t e d f r o m as
h i g h as 100^ in 1897 to 89$ in 1898. 21 Search inspection
was p r o p o s e d t o b e m a d e e a r l i e r f r o m e i g h t o ! c l o c k t o f i v e
o ' c l o c k in the m o r n i n g so as to c a t c h the i n f e c t e d p e o p l e
b e f o r e t h e y w e n t out to w o r k and s p r e a d the d i s e a s e . Ho
Kai had the f o l l o w i n g argument to support his opposition.
!I
A v i s i t f r o m a s e a r c h p a r t y c o m p o s e d of
persons who are not p r o p e r l y qualified
medical m e n , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y h a v e
to e x a m i n e a p a t i e n t to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t
to find out whether there is anything the
m a t t e r w i t h him or n o t , are e n o u g h to
a l a r m anyone - not m e r e l y women and
c h i l d r e n , b u t e v e n g r o w n - u p men.... t h i s
w i l l cause t h e C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n o f
H o n g k o n g such i n c o n v e n i e n c e a n d a l a r m
t h a t they w o u l d b e f a r b e t t e r a w a y f r o m
here in a much better p l a c e than
Hongkong. It seems to me that the
p l a g u e w o u l d not make h a l f as much
mischief as the search parties under the
amended By-law. .. ."^
So, Ho ! s preference for stability to disturbance precluded
his concern for improved health conditions. Here h e e v e n
r e p e a t e d the same t h r e a t of 1894, t h a t the most v a l u a b l e
asset of Hong Kong - its people would leave the colony if
legislation was toughened.
Not o n l y d i d H o K a i a l l o w h i s priority for public
health be compromised, but also disapproved of penalising in
1908 minor offences such as spitting. He a r g u e d

persuasively,

91
 " H a b i t Is s e c o n d n a t u r e and b e c o m e s a
sort of i n v o l u n t a r y act, and a p r o v i s i o n
of this kind w o u l d , I am quite sure deter
a g r e a t n u m b e r of C h i n e s e f r o m v i s i t i n g
this C o l o n y or r e g a r d i n g it as a
desirable place in which to live. 1 ' 2 - 5
All these o b v i o u s contradictions can o n l y be e x p l a i n e d
by his generally j.aisse2~f a ire a t t i t u d e , his fear of
u p s e t t i n g the p e a c e and p r o s p e r i t y of the c o l o n y if the
f r u g a l people of Hong Kong began to leave and his p e r p e t u a l
m i s t r u s t of the law-enforcing machine — the p o l i c e . Ho's
awareness of the p u b l i c naivety of law must have cautioned
him to be t o l e r a n t even of bad habits such as spitting.
Ho T s dedication to the w e l f a r e of the Chinese mass was
not limited to protecting them from possible mal-treatment.
In the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, he p o s i t i v e l y promoted measures
that w o u l d improve standards of l i v i n g . When the Tramways
w e r e p r o p o s e d in 1901, Ho d e c l a r e d t h a t "he w o u l d s u p p o r t
the b i l l through thick and thin if the promoters could meet
him on the g r o u n d s he had i n d i c a t e d . " 2 ^ That is, one cent
per t r i p and the n u m b e r of c a r s run to be d e t e r m i n e d by the
governor. Ho wanted to make sure that the general p u b l i c
would be p r o v i d e d with cheap transportation. In this case,
he e v e n p r o p o s e d g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e in private
enterprises, a behaviour quite contrary to his laissez-faire
orientation. P e r h a p s , all these y e a r s of s e r v i c e in the
C o u n c i l had l u r e d him c l o s e r to the mass.
For the Chinese p u b l i c , Ho Kai fought against the Water
B i l l of 1902. G o v e r n m e n t c h a r g e d "the main w a s t e is in
C h i n e s e houses, and that Is the e v i l we h a v e to fight

92
 pR
with." ^ Therefore, the installation of a water-meter was
to be made compulsory with any amount of water "in excess of
a q u a r t e r l y allowance which, at 50 cents per 1,000 gallons,
w o u l d be e q u a l to o n e - t h i r d per centum on the rating
v a l u a t i o n of the said tenement." 2 6 Ho Kai r e b u t t e d that
not o n l y the a l l o w a n c e a l l o t t e d was too s m a l l to meet
s a n i t a r y d e m a n d , but the cost of the I n s t a l l a t i o n of the
meter would n a t u r a l l y f a l l upon the tenants. He strongly
attacked the g o v e r n m e n t for charging the Chinese as being
responsible.
"....in E u r o p e a n q u a r t e r s a large amount
of water is used for w a t e r i n g the g a r d e n
and w a t e r i n g the lawn - quite as much
perhaps as would suffice for the
r e q u i r e m e n t s of two or three tenement
houses. "^'
Though a Western-educated and government-appointed
Legislative Councillor, Ho Kai was definitely not b l i n d l y
pro-European.
And yet, Ho K a i f s e a r l i e r respect for p r o p e r t y was
still very conspicuous alongside with his sympathy towards
the general public. This could, perhaps, be explained by
assuming that he was working for all Chinese, regardless of
their c l a s s and w e a l t h . Against charges of his being
pro-property, he defended most convincingly,
"I say that it is an aspersion which I
take the f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y to p u b l i c l y
deny. So far as concerns m y s e l f , I am
not a l a r g e l a n d o w n e r , nor am I
interested l a r g e l y in landed p r o p e r t y ,
but those whom I have represented for the
last few years, as his E x c e l l e n c y the
G o v e r n o r has appointed me, have large
landed interests In the c o l o n y , and it is
my duty to look a f t e r their interests and

93
 w e i g h them in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h other
interests, but I e n t i r e l y repudiate the
charge that I have acted for p r i v a t e and
n28
interested motives.

It has been demonstrated that Ho K a i ' s speeches in the

Legislative Council revealed both compromises and
contradictions. His d u a l l o y a l t y to the British Crown and
to the Chinese p e o p l e was most o b v i o u s . W h i l e he was most
a p p r e c i a t i v e of British rule, he expected the British
g o v e r n m e n t to award the colony its due dignity and respect
so as to j u s t i f y his r e c i p r o c a t i n g it w i t h his a l l e g i a n c e .
As to his d e d i c a t i o n to the C h i n e s e , he took it t h a t as
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the C h i n e s e , he had to speak for the
interests of all Chinese, rich and poor, the generation then
and in future. Although he was in p r i n c i p l e against
E u r o p e a n s being p r i v i l e g e d as a d i f f e r e n t class, he was not
a die-hard to insist upon the p r i n c i p l e should it interfere
w i t h i n t e r e s t s of the c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e . He s t i l l
f a v o u r e d laissez-faire or the least government intervention

in the l i v e s of the Chinese. Yet he expected the

government to provide the general mass with expanded

w e l f a r e , such a s w a t e r , e d u c a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , open spaces

and cheap transportation.

As promoter of the welfare of the Chinese

If Ho Kai was becoming more a c t i v e in the Legislative

C o u n c i l p r o m o t i n g the w e l f a r e of the Hong Kong C h i n e s e , he

was e v e n m o r e so outside the Council. As for the

motivation of his being so engrossed, it c o u l d have been one

or all of the f o l l o w i n g not too far-fetched conjectures.

94
He could have been acting out of a missionary heart. Or
quite the contrary, he could have been painstakingly
building up himself honour and reputation. Or since he was
the Chinese representative in the Legislative Council, he
was therefore honoured with many public posts which he
could not turn down. But definitely he was not working for
any tangible personal good because when he died on July 21,
1914? he not only did not leave any wealth to his family of
ten sons and seven daughters born to him by his second wife,
Lai Yuk King % i $jl , but the family financial
conditions were so pathetic that the government of Hong Kong
had to undertake the cost of his sons1 education.^
Despite Ho T s concern over the fate of China, he was
never negligent of the needs of his fellow people in Hong
Kong. His most prized contribution to the community would
be the part he played in promoting and publicizing Western
medicine. His earlier efforts in helping to set up the
Alice Memorial Hospital and the Hong Kong College of
Medicine for Chinese were further pursued during this
period.
First of all, here is Ho Kai!s connections with the
Alice Memorial Hospital during the period 1895 to 1912.
Since his initial donation to the cost of building the
Hospital in 1887, there was not any other mention of him
again financially contributing to the Hospital. But
judging from the continuous expansion of the Hospital, he
was most successful in his office as the Chairman of the

95
F i n a n c e C o m m i t t e e . Soon a f t e r its o p e n i n g , beds" for in-
p a t i e n t s w e r e i n c r e a s e d f r o m 80 to 90. When the site in
H o l l y w o o d Road c o u l d n o t b e f u r t h e r e x p a n d e d , t h e London
Missionary Society gave the site on Bonham Road for a second
hospital. The cost of the b u i l d i n g was c o v e r e d by H.¥.
D a v i s who had a l s o n e v e r ceased in his concern for the
Hospital. In 1893, the new hospital named the Nethersole
H o s p i t a l to c o m m e m o r a t e D a v i s ! s m o t h e r was opened. This
very much relieved the pressure on the Alice M e m o r i a l
Hospital which at the same time had to provide lecture rooms
for the students of the Hong Kong College of Medicine. The
L o n d o n M i s s i o n a r y Society a l s o managed the Nethersole
Hospital which admitted only women and children in-patients.
Men i n - p a t i e n t s were to be accepted by A l i c e M e m o r i a l
Hospital.
As for m a t e r n i t y cases, o n l y one s m a l l w a r d in the
N e t h e r s o l e H o s p i t a l was used. Soon, the demand grew.
Again Ho Kai started fund-raising. Assisted by Chau Siu Ki
)^ •!/ ijfc , Ho was a b l e to raise the b u i l d i n g costs f r o m
among the Chinese community. Then on June 7> 1904, the
m a t e r n i t y hospital again named a f t e r Ho Kai ! s f i r s t w i f e ,
the Alice Memorial Maternity Hospital, built on land also
g r a n t e d by the London M i s s i o n a r y Society, was opened. It
was the first of its kind in the colony.
In 1906, the London M i s s i o n a r y Society had a f o u r t h
hospital added to its group of hospitals. But this time the
land in Breezy Path was p r o v i d e d by the Hong Kong
government. It was to be for male patients. The building

96
costs were donated by Ho Kai's sister, Ho Miu Ling or Pladam
Wu Ting Fang. The hospital was thus named the Ho Miu Ling
Hospital.
To manage all four missionary hospitals, large funds
were needed. The Finance Committee became increasingly
important in the operations of the hospital work. Just for
the year 1906, the budget was $13,732.17- About 35f* of
this, that is, $4,766.04, was for salaries and wages.3°
"His able Chairmanship of the Finance Committee had made
possible the steady development of the Hospitals work."-^
Ho Kai held this Chairmanship post for twenty-seven years
from his first donation in 1887 to his death in 1914-
Secondly, Ho Kai became even more i n v o l v e d in the
operation of the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese
which simultaneously opened with the Alice Memorial Hospital
in 1887- Here is a survey of Ho Kai!s efforts in promoting
the C o l l e g e and the subsequent U n i v e r s i t y of lion/* Konp,
d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1095 to 1912. In his c a p a c i t y as
Honorary Secretary and the Rector's Assessor, Ho was not
only engaged in fund-raising among the rich Chinese but also
in campaigning for the recognition of the professional
qualifications of the college graduates as well as in the
setting up of the University of Hong Kong. It should be
noticed that whereas in the earlier years, Ho Kai was the
only Chinese involved, since the turn of the century, more
and more Chinese efforts of various forms were put in*

97
 In 1896, Ho Kai f o r w a r d e d a d r a f t o r d i n a n c e to the
g o v e r n m e n t on b e h a l f of the C o l l e g e of Medicine. He
petitioned for government recognition of the professional
s t a t u s of g r a d u a t e s but he f a i l e d . O n l y in 1904 was the
professional status of the g r a d u a t e s f u l l y recognized.
As to the f u n d i n g of the C o l l e g e , Ho Kai h i m s e l f g a v e a
very detailed narration when he was showing the objects and
!!
reasons for the B i l l entitled An O r d i n a n c e f o r the
I n c o r p o r a t i o n of the H o n g k o n g C o l l e g e of M e d i c i n e " in the
L e g i s l a t i v e Council on May 16, 190?. He e x p l a i n e d how for
twenty y e a r s , the College had to r e l y a l m o s t e n t i r e l y on the
fees, twenty d o l l a r s a year per student, to meet its various
expenses. As to d o n a t i o n s , t h e r e was $1 000 g e n e r o u s l y
g r a n t e d by the T u n g Wah H o s p i t a l in 1887 w h e n Wei Yuk was
the Chairman. This t i m e l y donation started the C o l l e g e off
with the purchase of all the necessary books, models,
d i a g r a m s and specimens required. The C o l l e g e c o u l d s u r v i v e
o n l y because all the lecturers, recruited mostly from the
Civil Service, the Army and N a v y and from the professional
gentlemen practising the medical profession, had given their
services v o l u n t a r i l y and h o n o u r a b l y . I n 1900, the
Government began to come to its aid with an annual grant of
$2,500. In a b o u t 1905, Ng Li H i n g ^ $$- J?$ 9 a prominent
Chinese merchant offered to erect the College buildings on
grounds reserved by the government for such purposes. The

site was in the Tai Ping Shan d i s t r i c t f a m o u s for the

bubonic plague epidemic. Estimations for the b u i l d i n g costs

and f u n d - r a i s i n g plans were made. Ho Kai was requested by

98
the C o l l e g e to d r a f t a b i l l for i n t r o d u c t i o n in the
Legislative Council for the incorporation of the College and
changing the name to "The Hong Kong C o l l e g e of M e d i c i n e "
d r o p p i n g "for Chinese" so as to accept students of other
nationalities. In 1906, a r i c h C h i n e s e , Tang Chuk-hai
died. In his w i l l , he b e q u e a t h e d about $10,000 to the
College. In o r d e r to e n a b l e the C o l l e g e to a c q u i r e this
p r o p e r t y and manage the fund p l a c e d under its c o n t r o l , the
Incorporation Ordinance was therefore moved in May 1907.
But in 1907 j u s t when p l a n s for the C o l l e g e b u i l d i n g s
w e r e being drawn up and tenders c a l l e d f o r , the suggestion
of a university was very much in the air. The Governor, Sir
F r e d e r i c k L u g a r d , made the f i r s t p u b l i c suggestion of a
university at St. Stephen's College speech day. It was the
time when u n i v e r s i t y m o v e m e n t was strong t h r o u g h o u t the
British Empire. As to u n i v e r s i t y schemes in the East,
plans were to join forces with the religious groups already
working in China. But Lugard was of the opinion that
u n i v e r s i t y education was to be s e c u l a r , p r a c t i c a l and
utilitarian. And he pressed forward his scheme.
By 1908, p l a n s were going a h e a d , H*N. Mody, a w e a l t h y
local Parsee m e r c h a n t o f f e r e d $30,000 as an endowment.
Lugard formed a committee to promote the scheme. The first
meeting was on March 13, 1908. It was suggested that there
should be two faculties, medicine and engineering,
incorporating the already existing College of Medicine and
the Technical Institute, with a faculty of arts to be added

99
later. The Court of the College of Medicine decided that
it would join the university* A new site was proposed for
the university at the junction of Pokfulam Road and Bonham
Road. M o d y f a v o u r e d this site to the one at Tai Ping Shan
district for there would be more room for future expansion*
Ho Kai c o n s u l t e d the v i e w s of both the past and p r e s e n t
students of the College and found that they a l l concurred on
the new site p r o p o s e d * Then he p e r s u a d e d Ng Li King a l s o
to agree to this p r o p o s a l * At a meeting in w h i c h Ho Kai
was the o n l y Chinese p r e s e n t , the d e t a i l s w e r e worked o u t *
It was a m e e t i n g c a l l e d by the G o v e r n o r , L u g a r d * Those
p r e s e n t were M o d y ! s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , A*H. R e n n i e , F.H* M a y ,
C o l o n i a l S e c r e t a r y and Rector of the C o l l e g e , Drs. Ho Kai,
J.C. Thomson and R . M . Gibson and I.V. N o b l e . The decision
was for the C o l l e g e of M e d i c i n e to continue to issue
diplomas to qualified students until it was f u l l y
incorporated into the F a c u l t y of M e d i c i n e of the new
university.
And y e t , at this i n i t i a l stage, b e s i d e s the two
philanthropists mentioned, Mody and Ng, and the others
concerned, the general public including both the foreign and
Chinese merchants as w e l l as the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e were not
too enthusiastic* The situation became acute when M o d y ! s
offer of donation w o u l d e x p i r e by the end of 1909*
Therefore, public appeals for subscriptions had to be made
in o r d e r to m a k e up the b a l a n c e of the t o t a l cost,
o t h e r w i s e , Mody w o u l d not honour his p r o m i s e of donations*
The British G o v e r n m e n t announced that Britain w o u l d o n l y

100
h e l p if the Chinese Government also contributed. It was
then l e f t for Ho Kai as the only Chinese represented in the
p l a n n i n g committee to appeal for donations f r o m his f e l l o w
C h i n e s e i n Hong K o n g a n d t h e C h i n e s e G o v e r n m e n t . Through
his influence and advocacy, the local Chinese
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y r a i s e d funds in support of the scheme. In
J a n u a r y 1909, a Committee for such purpose was f o r m e d under
the c h a i r m a n s h i p of Ho Kai. The f i r s t meeting was h e l d on
F e b r u a r y 15. G o v e r n o r Lugard honoured the Committee by
addressing this f i r s t meeting. W e e k l y meetings were h e l d
regularly. And the most e f f e c t i v e fund-raising publicity
was the circulation of 10,000 copies of the Chinese version
of Lugard's appeal for donation. This stimulated the most
encouraging responses from Chinese everywhere. According
to the 1909 Hong Kong Annual Report, Chinese subscriptions
2
a l o n e a m o u n t e d to H K $ 5 2 8 , 4 3 4 * Ho Kai had i n d e e d p l a y e d
most s u c c e s s f u l l y his r o l e as the Chairman of the Committee.
In fact, donations were often successfully solicited due to
the personal e f f o r t s and i n f l u e n c e of Ho and his colleagues.
In one e x a m p l e , as r e c o r d e d in the d e s p a t c h by Chang Jen-
chlln or Cheung Yan-tsun, the Liang-kuang G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ,
to the chief o f f i c i a l s of the v a r i o u s g o v e r n m e n t b u r e a u x
under his jurisdiction r e q u e s t i n g them to meet for
discussion of fund-raising for the university, he wrote,
11
I have also received a joint
c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m c e r t a i n Hong Kong
C h i n e s e m e r c h a n t s , Ho K a i , Wei Yuk and
o t h e r s coiiched in e a r n e s t t e r m s for my
support. "

101
"And in o r d e r to s t r e n g t h e n the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n of the

proposed U n i v e r s i t y , Ho Kai again p e r s o n a l l y assured Llio

C o u n c i l of a further $27,000."34 E v e r y t h i n g tiion w e n t
smoothly. Thus by the e x p i r a t i o n d a t e , December 31, 1909,
of Mody's offer, "$1,279,16/1 had been s u b s c r i b e d as
!f
p r o m i s e d . ^J

T n f a c t i n 1908 w h e n f u n d - r a i s i n g w a s n o t y e t r u n n i n g
s m o o t h l y , Ho Kai s u b m i t t e d a l o n g m e m o r a n d u m to L u g a r d on
how the u n i v e r s i t y p r o j e c t c o u l d be made attractive to the
Chinese p u b l i c so as to s u c c e s s f u l l y solicit subscriptions.
A l t h o u g h Ho's p r o p o s a l s in the memorandum were in the end
r e j e c t e d by L u g a r d , they were s t i l l w o r t h noting. In the

main, Ho advocated the establishment of subsidiary courses

taught in the Chinese language. Students q u a l i f i e d in the
course were to be awarded licences or certificates.
Degrees w o u l d only be awarded to students q u a l i f i e d in the
courses taught in English. Ho had s t r o n g a r g u m e n t s to
support his proposal. First of a l l , if Chinese was the
m e d i u m of instruction, then Chinese communities e v e r y w h e r e
would be more w i l l i n g to subscribe. Moreover, the
convenient location of this institution which offered
professional and technical education in the Chinese medium
w o u l d attract Chinese students f r o m far and wide. The
prestige and i n f l u e n c e of the B r i t i s h Empire w o u l d be
g r e a t l y enhanced and extended in China and throughout Asia*

Thirdly, t h e c o l o n y i t s e l f w o u l d a l s o b e n e f i t when more

f a m i l i e s of w e a l t h and i n f l u e n c e w o u l d bring their sons and

relatives to Hong Kong to be educated and by the

102
a v a i l a b i l i t y of so m a n y men of v a r i o u s t a l e n t s . In t h i s
memorandum, Ho ! s tripartite l o y a l t y was c l e a r l y manifested*
His a d v o c a c y of c o u r s e s in C h i n e s e was no d o u b t to b e n e f i t
not o n l y the C h i n e s e of Hong K o n g but a l s o those from
Mainland China. It h a d a l w a y s been h i s belief that
Western-trained Chinese were the very talents China needed
to strengthen herself. Ho saw that a university
established in the British Crown Colony o f f e r i n g British-
style professional and technical courses would be the ideal
breeding-ground of talents for C h i n a f s reforms. Yet at the
same t i m e , he e n v i s a g e d the u n i v e r s i t y as an e x t e n s i o n of
the British I m p e r i a l i n f l u e n c e , H e also had the w e l f a r e of
his f e l l o w Chinese in Hong Kong or that of the whole colony
in mind. When more rich and i n f l u e n t i a l people came to Hong
Kong w h i l e b r i n g i n g i n their c h i l d r e n f o r e d u c a t i o n , t h e
commerce and i n d u s t r y w o u l d p r o s p e r w i t h the i n f l o w of
w e a l t h and p e o p l e . In d r a f t i n g this m e m o r a n d u m , Ho was
trying to satisfy all his three allegiances. He must have
been most disappointed when Lugard rejected his proposal.
E v e n though his m e m o r a n d u m was not a c c e p t e d by L u g a r d
in 1908, Ho Kai s t i l l continued to g i v e the u n i v e r s i t y his
greatest support. The Committee to raise funds from among
the Chinese communities was set up in January 1909, that is
a f t e r H o f s p r o p o s a l h a d a l r e a d y been r e j e c t e d . Although
his ideas had not been a c c e p t e d , he s t i l l a p p r e c i a t e d the
value of the university scheme. After a l l , courses taught
in E n g l i s h c o u l d s t i l l b e n e f i t C h i n a , Hong Kong and the

103
B r i t i s h E m p i r e if not so d i r e c t l y and i n s t a n t l y . The
f o u n d a t i o n stone of the u n i v e r s i t y was l a i d on M a r c h 16,
1910. About 1,300 persons attended the ceremony. Ho Kai
was among the guests of h o n o u r . G o v e r n o r Lugard g a v e a
speech, mentioning Ho Kai's name several times. Yet Ho Kai
was f u l l y aware of what f o r c e had c o n t r i b u t e d to his
s u c c e s s f u l f u n d - r a i s i n g - the enthusiasm of the Chinese
communities everywhere. In 1911, when Ho Kai endorsed "the
O r d i n a n c e for the Incorporation and R e g u l a t i o n of the
University of Hongkong" on M a r c h 9, he e x p r e s s e d these
sentiments.
"The total contributions from the Chinese
up to the p r e s e n t time are c l o s e upon
$700,000, and I v e n t u r e to say that it
w o u l d be hard to f i n d that such a v a s t
sum of money has ever been subscribed by
the Chinese towards one single
institution within such a short space of
time." 35
In this speech, Ho was e x h i l a r a t e d when he l o o k e d
forward to seeing how people educated by the University of
Hong Kong went to China to develop the motherland.
"When the U n i v e r s i t y has turned out a
number of e n g i n e e r s , for e x a m p l e , w h e r e
do you suppose they would go? Of course,
they w o u l d go to the interior of China
and open mines, build railways, establish
factories all over the Empire...."^'
So, as the f i r s t Chinese i n v o l v e d in the p r o m o t i o n of
Western medicine and higher education through the
establishment of hospitals, a college to train doctors and a
university, Ho Kai certainly commanded a place of respect.
This year w h i l e we are c e l e b r a t i n g the centenary of the
M e d i c a l F a c u l t y of the U n i v e r s i t y of Hong Kong, Ho Kai and

104
all those enthusiasts w h e t h e r Chinese or not s h o u l d be d u l y
remembered and appreciated for nil that they Find no
painstakingly put in for generations of this C h i n e s e
community to benefit. With the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the
University in 1912, Ho K a i ' s admiration of W e s t e r n
i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d l o y a l t y t o his i e l l o w C h i n e s e w a s g i v e n
physical embodiment. On the occasion of his r e t i r e m e n t
from the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , in F e b r u a r y 1914 the G o v e r n o r ,
Henry M a y , bid him a v e r y honoured f a r e w e l l .
l!
....he has devoted his i n t e l l e c t and his
energies to the a d v a n c e m e n t of the best
i n t e r e s t s of the C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y and
for the good of the C o l o n y as a w h o l e * . . .
This council desires to record its
h e a r t f e l t t h a n k s to Sir Kai Ho Kai for
the assistance which he has at all times
u n g r u d g i n g l y rendered in the work of the
Council, and its deep appreciation of the
v a l u a b l e services rendered by him to the
Colony throughout the twenty-four years
of his s e r v i c e as a m e m b e r of the
Legislature.n^®

As nationalist overseas Chinese

According to a v a i l a b l e records, even during this period
when Ho Kai was so z e a l o u s l y o b s e r v i n g and s c r u t i n i z i n g
w h a t e v e r was happening in China, he was r a r e l y away from
Hong Kong.^ But he was responding sometimes m i l d l y w h i l e
o t h e r t i m e s e v e n r a d i c a l l y to the f a s t changing f a t e of
China as it unfolded. On the w h o l e , he did not d e v i a t e
v e r y m u c h f r o m h i s pre-1895 a c t i v i t i e s , that i s , essay
w r i t i n g and s u p p o r t of Sun Yat-sen. But it w o u l d be
observed that Ho never steadfastly held on to any
principles. His tactics were most f l e x i b l e so long as they

105
could achieve a China reformed according to his plans. If
Ch'ing demonstrated willingness to reform, the Manchus could
stay. O t h e r w i s e , they w o u l d have to go. Even the
substitution of Manchus need not necessarily be Sun Yat-sen.
It could be Li Hung-chang. One constant factor in Ho Kai ! s
calculation was that the British should best be won over, or
at least her quiescence had to be a s s u r e d . Once he was
d o u b t f u l of B r i t i s h f a v o u r , he w i t h h e l d . In f a c t , he k e p t
his radical p r o f i l e very low while promoting his reformist
p r o g r a m m e s which were W e s t e r n - o r i e n t e d not o n l y in the
measures themselves but also in motivation. Thus, although
Ho Kai ! s connections with r e v o l u t i o n a r y Sun Yat-sen w e r e
open secrets, he could still move among British, Hong Kong
and e v e n at times C h T i n g d i g n i t a r i e s . But his t r i p a r t i t e
loyalty was not without costs. "During the governorship of
Sir W i l l i a m Robinson in 1895, there was some t a l k about
appointing a Chinese to the Executive Council and his name
was i n t h e m i n d o f t h e g o v e r n o r . H o w e v e r , he n e v e r
received this appointment."4° It was no coincidence that
it was in 1895 that Ho had the c l o s e s t r e l a t i o n s h i p with Sun
Yat-sen. The British government was not entirely unaware
of H o r s activities. Even behind the "vote of h e a r t f e l t
thanks" for his long s e r v i c e in the L e g i s l a t i v e Council
extended to him by the governor, Henry May, on the occasion
of his retirement, there was serious British dissatisfaction
with Ho's v a r i o u s i n v o l v e m e n t s . So what appeared as a
r e t i r e m e n t in 1914 was in fact a non-recommendation of Ho

106
K a i for f u r t h e r r e a p p o i n t m e n t. 41 So a f t e r a J ] , t r i p a r t i t e
loyalty did not pay.

Here is a brief chrono 1 ogica ] s u r v e y of Ho K n l ' s

involvemnt, paying p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the m o t i v a t i o n
and compromises behind his activities. Although his
responses showed o b v i o u s inconsistencies, they w o u l d appear
less so under c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

In e a r l y 1895 j u s t as Ho had his reformist essay,

" D i s c o u r s e o n t h e New G o v e r n m e n t " p u b l i s h e d , h e w a s a t t h e
same time d e e p l y i n v o l v e d in Sun Yat~sen ! s f i r s t of a series
of u p r i s i n g s w h i c h w e r e to erupt on and off until the
c o l l a p s e of the C h T i n g in 1911- 42 If the pre-1895 H o ~ S u n
relationship had n e v e r been too strongly substantiated and
o n l y i m p l i e d , then 1895 w o u l d be the b e g i n n i n g of a m u c h
closer and recorded connection. Ho Kai was never a member
of the H s i n g C h u n g Hui but his i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h the 1895
Canton seizure was definite. It seemed a coincidence that
Sun Y a t - s e n and Ho Kai had t u r n e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y or a n t i -
C h ' i n g a t t h e same t i m e * Both h a d e a r l i e r f a i l e d t o h a v e
their reformist ideas accepted by the Chinese authority at
a b o u t t h e same time when China w a s s u f f e r i n g humiliating
defeats at the hands of Japan. Both were then subsequently
in c o l l a b o r a t i o n for plots to o v e r t h r o w the Manchus. Thus
these t w o z e a l o u s o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e w h o h a d t h e i r r e f o r m
s o l u t i o n s to s a v e China r e a d y and yet w e r e d e p r i v e d of the
opportunities had f i n a l l y resorted to creating such

opportunities by t h e m s e l v e s .

107
 Tberpjfore in 1895 a t the nnrno i i m o when Ho K n i wnr,
attending Legislative Council meetings, he was also p r e s e n t
at Using Chung Hui meetings held at Chr ien-herigHnng
JLS"

7 at 1
-\ZJ 7 ^ J 3, S t a u n t o n S t r e e t . Ho was in f a c t p l e d g i n g
support to o v e r t h r o w the very Chinese g o v e r n m e n t which his
c o l o n i a l m a s t e r h a d d e c i d e d t o boost. Though a c t i v e l y
i n v o l v e d , he kept a v e r y low p r o f i l e , a f r a i d to upset his
other r o l e - p l a y i n g . It was precisely because of his many-
faceted l i f e that he was of c r u c i a l service to Hsing Chung
Hui First of a l l , Sunfs group was counting on foreign
passivity if not support for their anti-Ch'ing activities if
they w e r e t o s u c c e e d . Thus f o r e i g n m e r c h a n t s i n v a r i o u s
treaty-ports in China had to be assured that the Hsing Chung
Hui was not an anti-foreign group. And if these merchants
could be won o v e r , then the sympathies and better s t i l l the
endorsement of their home governments could be assured. No
other candidate c o u l d better p e r f o r m these r o l e s of
pacifying and soliciting the foreigners than Ho Kai. After
all, h e w a s t h e o n l y Hsing Chung H u i s y m p a t h i z e r w h o w a s
w e l l - v e r s e d in E n g l i s h and h e l d the r e s p e c t a b l e post of
g o v e r n m e n t - a p p o i n t e d Hong Kong L e g i s l a t i v e Councillor.
M o r e o v e r , his e a r l i e r essays on reforms had also cast him as
a moderate, not a r e v o l u t i o n a r y and t h e r e f o r e a less
threatening image. These assets of Ho T s could only be f u l l y
u t i l i z e d if he r e m a i n e d b e h i n d - t h e - s c e n e s . Once o p e n l y
connected with clearly subversive activities, his

r e s p e c table status w o u l d be tarnished and his service to the

Hsing Chung Hui w o u l d be m u c h w e a k e n e d . As to Ho Kai

108
 himself, this 'grey eminence'43 role also suited him.
Being spokesman of the Hong Kong Chinese, e s p e c i a l l y that of
the merchants, he was expected to be an u p h o l d e r of law and
order. Both his patron, the Hong Kong government, and his
clients, t h e Hong Kong C h i n e s e , w o u l d a t once t e r m i n a t e
their trust in him if he were e v e r openly i n v o l v e d inanti-
Ch!ing uprisings. T h e r e f o r e , since he h i m s e l f c o u l d not
l e a d s u c h a m o v e m e n t , he was most w i l l i n g to s u p p o r t any
other candidate who shared his desperate distrust of the
C h f i n g government. He found this person in Sun Yat-sen who
was m o s t e n t h u s i a s t i c in r a d i c a l a c t i o n s b e i n g t a k e n . So
i f t h e Ho-Sun r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s o f e x p l o i t a t i v e n a t u r e , it
was m u t u a l . Sun m a d e use of H o ' s s t a t u s w h i l e Ho of Sun as
the f r o n t man. There was still another reason for Ho Kai ! s
low p r o f i l e . If this u p r i s i n g were to f a i l , the very
inconspicuous role he played would facilitate him washing
his hands off any connections with an aborted s u b v e r s i o n .
In a word, w h i l e eagerly supporting a scheme he believed to
be able to save China, he was c a r e f u l not to jeopardize his
other engagements.
Ho Kai made two definite contributions to Sun Yat-sen 1 s
1895 coup attempt. Firstly, Ho succeeded to win p r o -
Hsing Chung Hui c o v e r a g e in the f o r e i g n press of Hong Kong.
Secondly, he helped draft the Hsing Chung Hui proclamation
which was to be publicized if the uprising were to succeed.
To a c h i e v e both o b j e c t i v e s , Ho made use of two a r e n a s , the
Hong Kong China M a i l and the Hongkong Telegraph, the editors

109
of w h i c h , Thomas A. Reid and Chesney Duncan were his
personal friends. H o ' s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e Hong Kong
China M a i l was p a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s e , h a v i n g had his very f i r s t
reformist essay, t h e r e v i e w a r t i c l e o f Tseng C h i ~ t s e l s
" C h i n a - the S l e e p and the A w a k e n i n g " p u b l i s h e d in it on
F e b r u a r y 12, 1887- Without Ho Kai ! s connections, the Using
Chung Hui w o u l d n e v e r h a v e such a c h a n c e of clarifying
t h e m s e l v e s to foreigners. Of course, whether such exposure
did indeed benefit Sun's e f f o r t s was hard to establish*
But endorsement by the foreign press definitely
distinguished Sun f s Canton uprising in 1895 from all other
p r e v i o u s anti-Ch ! ing secret society revolts. And this was
made possible all because of Ho Kai's influence. But what
was published in these foreign papers was a very different
v e r s i o n of the n a t u r e of the H s i n g Chung Hui and Canton
uprising - that which appealed to the interests and played
upon the fears of the foreign merchants.
For three days, March 12, March 16 and again March 18,
1895, the Hong Kong China M a i l reported on the possibility
of u p r i s i n g s in Canton w h i c h w o u l d r e s u l t in a r e f o r m e d
China much more receptive of Western influences and
therefore of g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s of the W e s t e r n e r s . The
r e b e l s were depicted as Westernized reformers and the group
as a m o d e r a t e r e f o r m i s t p a r t y . T h e r e was not o n l y no
mention of any anti-dynastic or republican intentions, but
also not even the name of the group, Hsing Chung Hui. These
three e d i t o r i a l s were in Thomas A. Reid ! s hands but c l e a r l y
under the i n f l u e n c e of Ho K a i r s r e f o r m ideas e a r l i e r

110
published. In fact, a l m o s t t h e same v i e w s b u t i n m o r e
e l a b o r a t e d i s c u s s i o n s and o p e n l y a u t h o r e d by Ho Kai w e r e
published in the same p a p e r on May 23. This was a
translated version of Ho's "Discourse on New Government 1 1 in
1894- He was o u t l i n i n g p o l i t i c a l reforms under the
l e a d e r s h i p of an e n l i g h t e n e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h . So
w h i l e S u n a n d H s i n g C h u n g H u i m i g h t s e c r e t l y c h e r i s h such
aims as 'ousting the Manchus and establishing the R e p u b l i c 1 ,
these w e r e d e f i n i t e l y not what Ho saw fit to support. It
would not be o v e r speculating to say that Ho was making use
of t h i s u p r i s i n g to impose his r e f o r m i s t p r o g r a m m e s on
China. If the uprising succeeded in sparking off
p r o v i n c i a l s e c e s s i o n , then Ho Kai as the o n l y supporter
around with a definite political programme and i n f l u e n c e
among f o r e i g n e r s e s p e c i a l l y the British, his v i e w s w o u l d
s u r e l y be a d o p t e d * And e v e n if the u p r i s i n g f a i l e d , Ho
m i g h t h a v e hoped that he w o u l d have attracted enough
attention as to be o f f e r e d posts by the Chinese government.
These c o u l d h a v e been Ho ! s w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g w h i l e h e w a s
i n v o l v i n g h i m s e l f with Sun's Canton Uprising.
A f t e r six months of p l o t t i n g , that is, from March to
October, 1895, the uprising f i n a l l y f e l l f l a t disastrously.
Not only l i v e s and funds were sacrificed, even the leaders
were also hunted down with prices on their heads. Sun Yat-
sen began his l i f e as a f u g i t i v e , n e v e r to r e t u r n to C h i n a
until the target for which he fought paid off - the collapse
of the M a n c h u s f o l l o w i n g the W u c h a n g U p r i s i n g of O c t o b e r ,

111
1911. N o n e t h e l e s s , the Canton U p r i s i n g started off SunTs
revolutionary career. But at the same time, Ho's
revolutionary activities ended. It seemed as though Ho had
enough of such experience and he was n e v e r again i n v o l v e d in
any of Sun ! s s u b s e q u e n t u p r i s i n g s . He r e v e r t e d to essay
writing.

It w o u l d seem that H o K a i w a s t r y i n g , s e a r c h i n g a n d
l e a r n i n g to f i n d a way of h a v i n g his reform programmes
executed. So when Sun f a i l e d h i m , he w o u l d not hesitate to
seek o t h e r m e a n s o r o t h e r candidates who w o u l d enable
himself to exert an i n f l u e n c e in r e f o r m i n g China. In

March, 1897? despite his Western education, his bitter

attack of Manchu g o v e r n m e n t practices and his dubious

l o y a l t y to the Ch ! ing dynasty, Ho Kai was given a chance to
participate in the Chinese government. He was to take up an

important appointment in Shanghai, handling matters in

connection with r a i l w a y and banking. H e l e f t Hong Kong

w i t h his b r o t h e r - i n - l a w , Ng Choy or Wu T ' i n g - f a n g who had

been n e w l y appointed as the Chinese Minister to the United
States, Spain and Peru. The Chinese community in Hong Kong
presented their h o n o u r a b l e spokesman, Ho Kai, w i t h a
v a l u a b l e p l a t e as a souvenir on the occasion of sending him
off to his new appointment in the Chinese government. But
Ho was in China for o n l y two m o n t h s , t h a t is, M a r c h to May
and was back again in Hong Kong. Hu Li-ytlan w r o t e that He

was not used to the w e a t h e r and had f a l len i l l . T h e r e f o r e he

returned so q u i c k l y . ^ 4 B u t m o r e c o u l d h a v e been d e d u c e d

f r o m t h i s b r i e f episode of Ho w i t h the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t .

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The 'weather' reason could h a v e been but a convenient
excuse. First of all, despite all his disqualifications, he
was finally recruited by the Manchu government. This could
mean that his talents and his views were appreciated and he
was therefore appointed. At the same time, Ho Kai should
have felt most excited that finally he had a chance to serve
his mother country which he had been so anxiously observing
and criticizing in the hope of h e l p i n g to check its
declining fate. The fact that this long-anticipated
appointment lasted only two months could have been caused by
more than the climatic factor. There was never any record
of Ho explaining the case, "Nevertheless, it was believed
that Ho Kai realised he could hardly manage external and
financial affairs, if he were not given freedom to carry out
his duties."^5 ^o ^ai must have high hopes of designing
reform programmes once he was in office. Finding that he
was not so empowered, he immediately withdrew himself and
returned to serve the Hong Kong government, which though not
his own native government, offered him more room for
expression and manipulation. Thus Ho fared a far less
fortunate fate than K'ang Yu~wei who in 1898 succeeded to
gain the favour of the Emperor himself and K'ang could
therefore influence policy-making.
By 1897, Ho Kai had had experiences of both for and
against the Manchu government. He attempted to overthrow it
in 1895 by supporting Sun Yat-sen T s Canton uprising. He
tried to assist it in 1897 by joining the government. He

113
was disappointed on both occasions. Yet his loyalty to the
m o t h e r l a n d was not the l e a s t f r u s t r a t e d and his efforts
pprninlort. M t o p r e t u r n i n g f r o m f i h n n / M i n i , ho ru> n i n
dedicated h i m s e l f to essay-writing. He was to produce two
e s s a y s in 1897. The f i r s t was " F o u n d a t i o n of the New
Government 1 1 dealing with national finance. The second was
" A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the New Government" on g o v e r n m e n t
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures.
In " F o u n d a t i o n of the New G o v e r n m e n t " , Ho Kai f i r s t
l i s t e d the p r o b l e m s of C h i n a , such as c o r r u p t i o n and the
misuse of talents. He c a r e f u l l y c a l c u l a t e d China's foreign
l o a n s and the i n t e r e s t s i n c u r r e d . To meet these huge
p a y m e n t s , Ho was of the o p i n i o n that C h i n a had to r e s o r t to
the d o u b l e measures of cutting expenditure and efficient
exploitation of new revenue resources such as opening mines,
banks, railways and industries. Foreign investors need not
be b a r r e d but put on c o m p e t i t i v e t e r m s . The t a x a t i o n
system w a s a l s o a t t a c k e d . With reference to people!s
livelihood in the W e s t , Ho l a m e n t e d how the p o o r C h i n e s e
w e r e e x t o r t e d to the b e n e f i t not of the nation as a w h o l e
but of the corrupt government officials. New taxes and new
sources of revenues were proposed. Social services were to
be p r o v i d e d . The F i n a n c e M i n i s t r y was to be r e o r g a n i z e d
with departments in all provinces. Foreign advisers were
to be employed at least until sufficient Chinese o f f i c i a l s
were trained. ^
In the second essay, " A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the New
G o v e r n m e n t " , Ho Kai was r e p e a t i n g m a n y of the ideas he had

114
exposed in the v e r y f i r s t of his r e f o r m essays - "Discourse
on the New G o v e r n m e n t 1 1 in 1894. But this t i m e , he put
s p e c i a l e m p h a s i s on the need of a b e n e v o l e n t g o v e r n m e n t
abiding by the p r i n c i p l e s of law, a p p l y i n g clemency, sharing
p u b l i c f e e l i n g and f a c i l i t a t i n g the course of justice. The
B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t was q u o t e d as a m o d e l to show t h a t it was
so omnipotent as to be able to r u l e even far-away colonies
most e f f i c i e n t l y . Besides, Ho again stressed the urgency
of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s such as in organization, staffing
and recruitment. He r e p e a t e d his a r g u m e n t on the
significance of u t i l i z i n g foreign or foreign-trained Chinese
professionals and specialists.47

I n these e s s a y s , H o K a i d i d n o t d e v i a t e f r o m b u t o n l y
d e t a i l e d his early reform proposals. He continued to
s c r u t i n i z e Chinese p r o b l e m s through his Westernized eyes.
The two-month Shanghai episode should have given him
personal experience of the corrupt and inefficient
administrative practices. And for all these i l l s , h e
prescribed Western physicians and medications. He strongly
objected to severing relationships with foreign powers. On
the contrary, he advised otherwise. With these r e f o r m
ideas p u b l i s h e d , Ho became p a r t of that l o u d cry in post-
1895 China demanding institutional reforms.
Besides being engaged in essay-writing, Ho continued to
m o n i t o r r e f o r m m o v e m e n t s a s they d e v e l o p e d i n C h i n a . In
A p r i l 1898, K!ang Yu-wei, the leader for institutional
r e f o r m s , m a d e a speech at a m e e t i n g of the Pao-kuo hui or

115
 the National Protection Society which he had just organized
among several hundred provincial graduates and government
officials in Peking. In this speech, K f a n g c r i t i c i s e d
c o m p r a d o r m e n t a l i t y of u r g i n g c o - o p e r a t i o n with f o r e i g n
p o w e r s to s t r e n g t h e n China. In f a c t , K ' a n g was attacking
what Ho Kai had been advocating for over ten years. K T ang
also made particular references to the Chinese in Hong Kong,
l a m e n t i n g that a l l they c o u l d become w e r e b u t c o m p r a d o r s .
A r e v i e w a r t i c l e of K ? a n g ! s speech a u t h o r e d by Hu Li-yflan
was soon p u b l i s h e d . A l t h o u g h it was not in H o ' s hands, Hu
o p e n l y a c k n o w l e d g e d that it i n c o r p o r a t e d Ho ! s ideas. It
was m a i n l y a d e f e n c e of what K ' a n g attacked. Foreign
i m p e r i a l i s m was not the cause of C h i n a r s d e c l i n i n g f a t e .
The British administration in Hong Kong was much supported
because it t r e a t e d the Chinese as e q u a l s . T h e r e f o r e , the
Chinese in Hong Kong w e r e not being s e r v i l e t o w a r d s the
British. What existed between the Chinese and the British
in Hong Kong was in f a c t m u t u a l respect. Hu c o n c l u d e d by
endorsing Confucian and Mencian principles which K'ang had
been promoting but he was of the opinion that
rationalization of reform efforts with these principles was
unnecessary and outdated/ 8 Ho Kai himself did not review
K T a n g f s speech but trusted it to the hands of Hu Li-yttan
p r o b a b l y to a v o i d d o w n g r a d i n g the p o l e m i c s into p e r s o n a l
attacks since he h i m s e l f had e a r l i e r been implicated by
Kfang.
The n e x t y e a r in 1898, a m a j o r r e f o r m w o r k was
published in China. It was Chang Chih-tung f s Ch'ttan-hstteh

116
P ' i e n or " E x h o r t a t i o n to Study". It was a c o l l e c t i o n of
twenty-four essays divided into "The Inner Section" dealing
with " r e c t i f i c a t i o n of the human m i n d " , and "the Outer
Section" on "the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new l e a r n i n g " . These
chapters could be summarized into what became known as Chang
Chi-tung f s "Chinese learning for substance, Western learning
for f u n c t i o n " t ^ %) £~, \$ It P} 1% . In other
w o r d s , Chang w a s s t i l l a d v o c a t i n g g r a d u a l a n d m o d e r a t e
reforms and opposing radical institutional changes of Kang
Y u - w e i ! s g r o u p a r o u n d the E m p e r o r . Chang debased the
p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e s for he b e l i e v e d that the o n l y one
way to s t r e n g t h e n China was to unite all Chinese under the
majestic spiritual power of the Imperial Court.^9
Ho Kai again reviewed Chang Chi-tung r s "Exhortation to
Study" as he did to Tseng Chi-tse's in 1887. There is
c o n t r o v e r s y as to whether Ho Kai or Hu Li-yttan was the
author of this review article.5° But whether it was out of
Ho's hands did not make much d i f f e r e n c e . The ideas were
definitely Ho Kairs. Ho d e f e n d e d those Western
i n s t i t u t i o n s attacked by Chang c l a i m i n g that he was much
more qualified than Chang to discuss them. After
condemning Chang for being sweet-tongued to win I m p e r i a l
f a v o u r for s e l f - p r o m o t i o n , Ho again listed those c o r r u p t
p r a c t i c e s w h i c h he had a l w a y s b e l i e v e d to be C h i n a ' s
problems. Then he r e f u t e d in detail Chang ! s attitudes
towards the Western doctrine of p e o p l e T s rights. What
Chang found as a source of d i s o r d e r , Ho recommended as a

117
panacea to rejuvenate China. Ho wrote that the parliament
could successfully harmonize relations between the
government and the p e o p l e , while at the same time enabling
the p e o p l e to s e r v e their country. He made it c l e a r that
though W e s t e r n - e d u c a t e d , he was not a n t i - C o n f u c i a n but he
saw that r e v i v a l of Confucianism could only worsen China r s
situation. This r e v i e w a r t i c l e was Ho K a i ' s last a d d r e s s
to the r u l i n g Manchus.
A year later in 1899, while the scramble for
concessions was at its peak and a n t i - f o r e i g n a c t i v i t i e s
which were secretly encouraged by the Chinese officials were
m o u n t i n g in C h i n a , Ho Kai began to address his reform
p r o g r a m m e s designed for China d i r e c t l y to B r i t a i n . This
was the joint address of Ho Kai and ¥ei Yuk to Rear-Admiral
L o r d B e r e s f o r d who was l e a d i n g a t r a d e mission to China.
On his way back to England after the mission, he arrived at
Hong Kong on D e c e m b e r 25, 1898, and was e n t e r t a i n e d by the
Chinese Chamber of C o m m e r c e . It was on the m e r c h a n t s 1
b e h a l f that Ho and Wei presented him the a d d r e s s a f t e r he
was back in E n g l a n d . It was dated January 20, 1899- The
j o i n t s i g n a t u r e was for no other o b v i o u s reason than the
fact that they were both serving as Chinese spokesmen in the
Legislative Council. Ho Kai was undoubtedly the master-mind
behind this address.
In this presentation, besides advocating his r e f o r m
m e a s u r e s , Ho Kai was making a strong p l e a for Britain to
i n t e r f e r e for the sake of her own c o m m e r c i a l interests and
for China. Statements amounting to treason f i l l e d the

118
 letter. He was i n v i t i n g B r i t a i n to r u l e or at least
dictate policies in China.
"It is q u i t e a p p a r e n t that i m m e d i a t e
reformation must be inaugurated. It is
a l s o c l e a r that w i t h o u t e x t e r n a l a i d o r
p r e s s u r e China is u n a b l e to effect her
own r e g e n e r a t i o n . In this p r e d i c a m e n t
we venture to think that England, having
the p r e d o m i n a n t i n t e r e s t in China and
being the c o u n t r y most l o o k e d up to and
trusted by the Chinese, should come
f o r w a r d and f u r n i s h the assistance and
a p p l y the r e q u i s i t e pressure.... We
recommend further that if China be unable
or u n w i l l i n g to undertake these
a b s o l u t e l y necessary reforms, Great
B r i t a i n , either s i n g l e - h a n d e d l y or in
conjunction with some other Power, should
render China substantial assistance, and,
if need be, a p p l y f i r m pressure on the
central authorities in Peking. 11 -^
The British commercial interests in China were enticed.
"...there would be such a ramification of
British commercial interests in the whole
Chinese Empire that China, in its
entirety, would become a complete sphere
of B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e , ...We are h o p e f u l
of seeing the day when Great Britain w i l l
emerge from this commercial and political
c o n f l i c t with u n t a r n i s h e d l u s t r e a n d
unsullied glory."-^
Loyalty of naturalized British-Chinese like Ho Kai and Wei
Yuk themselves were proudly proclaimed, while demanding the
B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t to award them their due respect,
p r o t e c t i o n and greater u t i l i z a t i o n of their " m i d d l e - m e n "
role.
"By a p r o p e r system of organisation and
greater empowerment to British subjects
of Chinese parentage, they can be made
an arm of s t r e n g t h of G r e a t B r i t a i n
c o m m e r c i a l l y , and that proud position
which she has held in China can yet be
maintained despite the r i v a l r y and
underhand schemes of her enemies. We
h u m b l y suggest that Britain ! s Chinese

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 s u b j e c t s be s e n t to the i n t e r i o r to
occupy every possible source of trade and
to act as c o m m e r c i a l scouts or l i v i n g
c h a n n e l s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n n to the
different Chambers of Commerce. "
Such i n v i t a t i o n of f o r e i g n interference can be
differently interpreted. Of course, there is the version
of Ho Kai and Wei Yuk being s h a m e l e s s and s e r v i l e r u n n i n g
dogs and henchmen of Western imperialism begging for foreign
a s s i s t a n c e to back up their own s e l f i s h m o t i v e s in China.
The patronage these Westernized Chinese could not get from
the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t was now s o u g h t a f t e r from the
foreigners. Or there can also be the v e r y opposite
explanation. H a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e d and b e n e f i t e d f r o m the
l i b e r a l , benevolent and prosperous British administration in
Hong Kong, they s i n c e r e l y w a n t e d to share such a d v a n t a g e s
w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w Chinese w h o were s u f f e r i n g u n d e r t h e
c o r r u p t C h ' i n g Dynasty. After all, t h e Manchus were n o w
s q u a n d e r i n g away Chinese r e s o u r c e s and t e r r i t o r i e s to the
foreign r u l e r s t o t r a d e o f f f o r their c o n t i n u e d r u l e .
T h e r e f o r e instead of g r a d u a l l y f a l l i n g into the hands of
various foreign powers, China might as well be handed over
to the British. Although profits might be scraped away by
the B r i t i s h , at least their r u l e w o u l d r e j u v e n a t e the
country. In fact, Ho Kai could have been motivated by both
rationalizations.
It was clear that by 1899 Ho Kai had failed in a l l his
v a r i o u s attempts to have his r e f o r m programmes adopted.
Firstly his reform essays did not attract Chinese attention.
Then his support of Sun Yat-sen had also been f r u s t r a t e d .

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Participation in the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t in 1897 only
d i s a p p o i n t e d him. It was out of d e s p e r a t i o n that Ho Kai
threw himself before the British whom he had the confidence
of t r u s t i n g China to. Of course, h a v i n g l i v e d under
B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n for d e c a d e s , he was not i g n o r a n t of
the existence of u n f a i r p r a c t i c e s on racial grounds. But
after all, these, too, c o u l d be found in China on an e v e n
larger scale. Moreover, if the British could r e a l l y reform
China, the loss of some concessions to the British were but
for efficient managerial performance.
In 1900, an o p p o r t u n i t y arose for Ho Kai to a c t u a l l y
execute his 1899 plan of inviting the British to determine
the Chinese c o u r s e . It was the time when a n t i - f o r e i g n
Boxer activities under Imperial patronage were rising high
in the N o r t h and s p r e a d i n g out. But anti-Boxer o f f i c i a l s
under the l e a d e r s h i p of Li Hung-chang, then the G o v e r n o r -
General of Liang-Kwang Provinces, had refused to comply to
I m p e r i a l c a l l for assistance. The South e v e n p r o c l a i m e d
neutrality and announced that all anti-foreign activities
within their j u r i s d i c t i o n w o u l d be suppressed. This
disguised open defiance of Peking r e k i n d l e d Ho Kai and Sun
Yat-sen T s hope in Li Hung-chang. At such moment of discord
with the Manchus, Li Hung-chang might be won over to declare
the independence of the South. "On June 18, 1900 - three
days b e f o r e the d e c l a r a t i o n of war (against the Treaty
Powers) - he received a court summons to come to Peking,
Initially disposed to respond affirmatively, Li changed his

121
mind, deciding instead to stall, and if necessary to go only
as far as Shanghai, there to await further de ve Iopment.!f54
But once the war was declared, the Court urged Li to m o v e
North with Imperial edicts issued on July 3, July 6 and July
8. On July 8, the Court announced that Li Hung-chang would
be restored to his former positions of Governor-General of
Chihli and the Superintendent of Trade for the northern
ports.55 Being thus appeased, Li decided to set out on the
journey north but still deliberately tardily scheduling to
arrive at Shanghai on July 21. It was this ambiguous
attitude of Li that attracted Ho Kai. An intrigue was to
go on in Hong Kong in the months of June and July before Li
was to arrive in Hong Kong on July 18, 1900.
Ho Kai carefully assessed the situation. Just the
year before, he had failed to attract the attention of the
British by his open address. But this time, he tried to
win over the immediate British representative in Hong Kong -
Governor Sir Henry A. Blake. The good office of Governor
Blake was to persuade Li Hung-chang personally to declare
the independence of the South with the support of Sun Yat-
sen!s forces and the patronage of the British. Once he had
clearly thought out his plan, Ho Kai moved fast. This
time, he instigated the whole drama. What he was
manipulating in 1900 was, when carefully examined, not much
different from his role in 1895- Only then in 1895 he
supported Sun as the candidate. This time, he was betting
China's fate on Li Hung-chang with Sun as Lils aide-de-camp.
The strategy and the end-product would still be the same.

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F i r s t an independent South was to be e s t a b l i s h e d , then a
chain reaction was to occur with other provinces declaring
similar independence. Finally the Manchus, finding
themselves no longer wielding any control, would abdicate.
Ho K a i f s f i r s t m o v e was to d r a f t a p r o c l a m a t i o n in
English which b r i e f l y explained the rationalization for
e s t a b l i s h i n g a new regime with its political programmes
listed. Then he submitted this draft to Governor Blake who
a p p r o v e d it. It was B l a k e who passed this to Li Hung-
chang, who at the time was s t i l l undecided w h e t h e r to set
off n o r t h or not. Li r e s p o n d e d to the d r a f t f a v o u r a b l y .
This e n d o r s e m e n t of Ho Kai ! s scheme by B l a k e and Li c o u l d
e a s i l y be u n d e r s t o o d . A f t e r a l l , the Hong Kong c o l o n i a l
government was r e a l l y alarmed by situations in China since
the New Territories neighbouring South China had only been
put under British administration a year ago. If a friendly
g o v e r n m e n t under B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n were to be set up in
South China, it w o u l d do no harm but good to the c o l o n y .
As to Li Hung-chang, he might be s e c r e t l y e n t e r t a i n i n g the
dream of becoming Emperor himself.^& if the plot paid o f f ,
he could not only avenge the shame of being removed from his
long-held post in 1895, but could also build his posterity a
dynasty. If he f a i l e d , with his great age of 77, he w o u l d
not l i v e long to suffer the shame. ~'
Ho Kai had impressed G o v e r n o r Blake so much that the
latter even began his telegraphic appeals to London on
behalf of Sun Yat-sen. Blake a l s o r e p o r t e d f a v o u r a b l y on

123
the possible development in South China disclosing Li Hung-
chang's concurrence and ambitions. With all the upheavals
going on in C h i n a , this scheme seemed the o n l y way out of
the confusion. Sun was therefore on the verge of regaining
the f a v o u r of the v e r y B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t which had in the
1880s educated him but had also banished him from Hong Kong
in 1895- But came J u l y 8 and the w h o l e s i t u a t i o n was
changed. Li was o f f e r e d his pre-1895 posts, at once his
e n t h u s i a s m for the Hong Kong o f f e r abated. Not even
British pressure from London could convince him to stay in
Canton. B l a k e was eager that the p l a n was to succeed.
He e v e n r e c o m m e n d e d to London that when Li a r r i v e d in Hong
Kong, he be p e r m i t t e d to use force to detain Li.
T e l e g r a p h i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n s f l a s h e d back a n d f o r t h between
L o n d o n , Hong Kong and C a n t o n , for a l m o s t a m o n t h f r o m late
June to m i d - J u l y . On the v e r y day b e f o r e Li ! s a r r i v a l ,
July 17, Blake informed London that he was ready to f o r c i b l y
detain Li once permission was granted. But that same day,
Joseph C h a m b e r l a i n , Secretary of State for C o l o n i e s , sent
Blake a telegram forbidding any interference of Li's moves.
Also on that day, Sun Yat-sen arrived in Hong Kong on board
the "Sado Maru 1 1 , ready for the meeting with Li Hung-chang
which he thought should have been arranged by then. And on
that day, Ho Kai and Wei Yuk c a l l e d upon B l a k e hoping to
persuade him into detaining Li despite London's decision.
On J u l y 18, the i n t e r v i e w between Li Hung-chang and
Blake took p l a c e . All B l a k e f s persuasion and all his
f!
argument could not keep Li from leaving for the North. Li

124
even urged the Governor to prevent subversive elements from
using Hong Kong as a base."57 Thus ended o v e r a m o n t h ' s
conspiracy of the southern independence movement. Sun Yat-
sen never met Li Hung-chang. Meantime, he stayed on board
and waited in vain only to leave for Japan in disappointment
on J u l y 20.
Ho K a i h a d p l a y e d a m u l t i p l e r o l e i n t h i s 1900
intrigue. His function did not stop at the drafting of the
proclamation. He was the v e r y f o r c e boosting B l a k e in
convincing London of the possibility and feasibility of the
plan. He was also the liaison between Blake and Sun. And
d u r i n g those days w h i l e Sun was on board the "Sado M a r u "
o u t s i d e Hong Kong f r o m J u l y 17 to J u l y 20, Ho c o u l d have
been meeting Sun Yat-sen and exchanging views. They could
have been "charting an approach to the governor in the hope
of e n s u r i n g a f r i e n d l y base at Hong Kong, and perhaps e v e n
more positive British support when the attack succeeded."^^
It can be safely assumed that even though this Ho-Sun-Blake
c o l l a b o r a t i o n f e l l f l a t , in the later days, Ho Kai c o u l d
still have called on Blake to discuss developments in China.
In fact, both had not given up the hope of south
independence m o v e m e n t . B l a k e continued his t e l e g r a m s to
London urging the Home Government to grant him permission to
negotiate with Chinese agitators be they r e f o r m i s t s like
K f a n g Yu-wei or r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s like Sun Yat-sen. On
September 24, Blake even sent the C o l o n i a l Secretary a
petition from anonymous Hong Kong Chinese demanding that the

125
A l l i e d powers s h o u l d force institutional r e f o r m s upon China.
A p o s s i b l e u p r i s i n g in the South was a l s o w a r n e d . 5 9
Besides working on Blake to keep up the latter's enthusiasm.
Ho Kai continued with his l i t e r a r y appeal to the foreigners
i n H j o n j g _ K o n g _ C h d . n a _ M a i . 1. It was in A u g u s t t h a t two
e d i t o r i a l s p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e d by Ho Kai and an open letter
signed in Ho's pen-name, "Sinensis", were published. It was
t h e v e r y m o n t h when t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s w e r e s t o r m i n g f r o m
Tientsin to Peking, f i n a l l y occupying the capital on August
14. The editorial on August 1 carried the same cry for the
need of foreign interference to impose reforms on China.
"An A d v i s o r y Board formed of the foreign
m i n i s t e r s o r some o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
f r o m each of the p o w e r s s h o u l d sit at the
c a p i t a l to c o n t r o l the g o v e r n m e n t . . . . 1 1
The supreme power w o u l d be vested in the
central governor with his foreign
dictators and their control would be
s o m e w h a t s i m i l a r to that h e l d by the
central authority of the United States at
nb
Washington °
A l m o s t the same m e s s a g e was again the e m p h a s i s of A u g u s t 4
editorial.
"....The o n l y chance for e m a n c i p a t i o n of
the c o m m o n h o r d e s of C h i n a is by the
r e f o r m of the system of government under
the direction of the f o r e i g n
powers. . * *"
Then on August 22 with the capital, Peking, under siege and
the Ch!ing c o u r t in flight, !r
An O p e n Letter on the
S i t u a t i o n " dated A u g u s t 21 a d d r e s s e d to Mr. John B u l l and
signed "Sinensis" was published in the Hong Kong China Mail.
Ho Kai was now writing in the strongest tone of indignation

126
that the Westerners were s t j 1 1 boosting the hopeless
Manchus.
fT
you did not know that your meekness
has been regarded by the Chinese
g o v e r n m e n t as weakness and that your
g e n e r o s i t y a n d f o r e b e a r a n c e as s i g n s o f
t i m i d i t y and cowardice. Hence of late
y e a r s you h a v e had a succession of
m i s h a pl sf b^2c u 1 m i n a t i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t
crisis.
Ho Kai was a c t u a l l y complaining that the Treaty Powers were
too l e n i e n t to the Manchu government. He was of the
opinion that the disasters ensuing from the rise of Boxers
should never have happened had the foreigners e s p e c i a l l y
Britain forced the Ch'ing government to carry out
institutional reforms. He c l a i m e d that the o u t b r e a k of
such anti-foreign atrocities was purposely instigated by the
high C h f i n g o f f i c i a l s to d r i v e out the missionaries. He
strongly urged the A l l i e s to make use of this opportunity.
!f
....to c a p t u r e n o t o n l y P e k i n g , b u t a l s o
the l a w l e s s band of m a n d a r i n s arid t h e i r
confederates the leading Boxers." ^
The one statement carrying nationalist favour would be
"....I take i t t h a t y o u a r e w e l l a g r e e d
upon the p r i n c i p l e s so f e a r l e s s l y
propounded by your Under-Secretary for
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s that C h i n a s h a l l b e f o r
the Chinese, and there w i l l be no
p a r t i t i o n of the M i d d l e K i n g d o m by the
Foreign Powers. Irfc> 4
After a l l , Ho Kai did have the integrity of China very much
at heart. But he was w i l l i n g to trade off the Manchus for
the f o r e i g n p o w e r s . He began to sound as a n t i - M a n c h u as
his s t u d e n t , Sun Y a t - s e n had been for s e v e r a l y e a r s . He
e m p h a s i s e d that those M a n c h u s w h o h a d p l u n g e d C h i n a into

127
such a p a t h e t i c state w e r e not Chinese at a l l . Therefore
the Vest should not a l l o w Manchus to continue their rule in
China m e r e l y to e n s u r e the s e l f i s h m o t i v e s of the West in
the further exploitation of Chinese resources.
"The Indianising of China you w i l l not
have, but then you must not go to the
other e x t r e m e to l e a v e China s e v e r e l y
a l o n e and p e r m i t her to get a l o n g as
before.,.. The present rotten and
corrupt system of government must go and
radical reforms should be introduced.
It w i l l not do a f t e r h a v i n g v i n d i c a t e d
y o u r honour to make a h o l l o w peace w i t h
the Chinese G o v e r n m e n t , exact an
i n d e m n i t y , sign a new t r e a t y , have some
m o r e p o r t s opened to t r a d e , get m o r e
c o n c e s s i o n s , and then let the Manchu
G o v e r n m e n t do as they like t h e r e a f t e r .
Pray remember that Manchus are not
Chinese and it w i l l only be fair to leave
China for the.b Chinese and M a n c h u r i a for
the Manchus." ^
With these w o r d s , Ho Kai was at the same time o p e n l y
i n d i c t i n g the W e s t e r n P o w e r s . But such charges w e r e not
against all Powers.
" A l l the e n l i g h t e n e d sons of China are
e a r n e s t l y l o o k i n g to and p r a y i n g Great
Britain and United States of America for
d e l i v e r a n c e f r o m the y o k e o.f a n
oppressive and corrupt government. I f b t >
He e n v i s a g e d that if these two Powers w o u l d take up the
assignment, then all oppositions whether from within China
or from the other Powers would melt away.
In this l e t t e r , Ho Kai did not even bother to repeat
his reform programmes. He simply concluded by saying,
"Lastly, as regards the sort of r e f o r m
you should introduce into China and the
form of government you might establish, I
r e g r e t that I have neither the time nor
space here to touch upon them but I may
r e f e r you to the two leading a r t i c l e s

128
 published in the China Mail on the 1st
and 4th of August 1900 respectively. In
them you will find many suggestions for
your consideration and adoption."°?
With this letter of 1900, Ho Kai was to stop his over a
decade long essay-writing and was almost to end all his
involvement in regard to the rChina Affair1. He stepped back
into an observers role at the time when his reform ideas
were beginning to attract greater attention since Ying
L i e n - c h i hf\0 R0 p u b l i s h e d H o K a i ! s i d e a s a s edited and
t r a n s l a t e d by Hu Li-yttan in the f o r m of a p a m p h l e t , The
True Meaning of the New Government -|ft $fL$z fiT . It was
a c o l l e c t i o n of seven essays, six of which were H o f s
works. ^ But as e x p l a i n e d e a r l i e r , there has not been
c o n s e n s u s as to w h e t h e r Ho Kai or Hu Li-ytian or both w e r e
the authors of these essays. By 1900, Ho Kai had exhausted
all c h a n n e l s w i t h i n his means to try and i n f l u e n c e the
c o u r s e of the r e f o r m m o v e m e n t in China. He had t r i e d
p r o p o s i n g r e f o r m ideas since 1887? s u p p o r t e d Sun Yat-sen ! s
Canton coup in 1895, p a r t i c i p a t e d in the C h r i n g g o v e r n m e n t
for two months in 1897, l u r e d the Hong Kong G o v e r n o r into
i n f l u e n c i n g Li Hung-chang to accept an i n d e p e n d e n t South
China g o v e r n m e n t though in v a i n in 1900, and a l s o in that
year openly pleaded with the Western Powers to abolish the
Manchu government. In all these attempts, his efforts did
not pay o f f . This c o u l d be one reason for his r e l a t i v e
passivity after 1900. But another reason could have been
because of promising developments in China. After the dust
stirred up by the Boxer activities had been settled and the

129
C o u r t back i n P e k i n g , t h e E m p r e s s D o w a g e r i n h e r s h a m e a n d
h u m i l i a t i o n a n n o u n c e d a s e r i e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s .
Some o f these r e f o r m m e a s u r e s w e r e v e r y s i m i l a r t o w h a t H o
Kai had been a d v o c a t i n g for o v e r a d e c a d e . So he m i g h t
have become once more h o p e f u l in the Manchus and decided to
adopt the attitude of "wait and see" w h i l e praying that this
time China had at last woken up. A l t h o u g h he was not a b l e
to p e r s o n a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e in this r e f o r m movement in the
M a i n l a n d , at least he could comfort himself that China was
f i n a l l y on the road to r e c o v e r y . As to his support of Sun
Y a t - s e n , that too s e e m e d to h a v e e n d e d . Sun was g e t t i n g
more radical e s p e c i a l l y after the forming of T ! ung Meng Hui
and the Proclamation of the Three P r i n c i p l e s of the People.
Ho w i t h d r e w his s u p p o r t . After all, Ho had n e v e r been a
proponent of r e p u b l i c a n ideas. The Western Powers
i n c l u d i n g B r i t a i n h a d a l s o f a i l e d h i m when they a l l o w e d
Manchus to continue r u l i n g China after they had been bribed
off with the terms of the Boxer Protocol.
Ho K a i T s various i n v o l v e m e n t in the !
China A f f a i r * was
not as unprincipled as it appeared to be. The means varied
but not the objective. He was determined in what he wanted
- a r e f o r m e d China a b l e t o r u l e e q u i t a b l y a n d e f f i c i e n t l y
and able to uphold Chinese sovereignty. And so whatever or
whenever the possibilities arose, he would u t i l i z e them at
once to a r r i v e at his o b j e c t i v e . The n a t u r e of the
c a n d i d a t u r e did not b o t h e r him as long as he c o u l d s e r v e his

purpose.

130
 For his tripartite endeavours, Ho Kai was not duly
rewarded at his times. The Chinese government turned a
deaf ear to his ideas. Contemporary Chinese reformers,
too, did not have too much regard for him although he is
today ranked among late Chring Chinese reformers. Even the
British colonial government found his loyalty ambiguous.
For this, Ho lost the chance to be appointed the first
Chinese to the Executive Council in 1895 and had to retire
from the Legislative Council in 1914 because he was not
considered for re-appointment. ¥hen he died in 1914, at
least Ho Kai could find consolation in the fact that the
Alice Memorial and Affiliated Hospitals managed by the
London Missionary Society had expanded to consist of four
hospitals and the University of Hong Kong offering courses
in Medicine, Engineering and Arts was attended by students
from China and the Straits Settlements. As to China where
his heart and soul lay, it had been most disappointing.
Even with the Manchus gone and the establishment of the
R e p u b l i c , there was not a new strong China but power
struggle and further decline. He could even have his heart
broken had he lived long enough to see how China was
subjected to greater erosion of sovereignty by Japan in
1915. So after all, tripartite loyalty did have more costs
than rewards.

Lim Boon Keng (1895-1912)

The following section looks at Lim Boon Keng's
tripartite loyalty as compared to and contrasted with Ho

131
K a i ' s i n t h e p e r i o d 1895-1912. All other materials
irrelevant to this thematic study are discarded. But the
o v e r a l l situation in the Straits Settlements w i l l be given
due emphasis.

As loyal British subject

D u r i n g this p e r i o d 1895-1912 under r e v i e w , Lim Boon
Keng was appointed Legislative Councillor in 1895* 1898 and
1901. U n l i k e Ho Kai who served throughout this period for
over two decades as Legislative Councillor, Lim served only
for eight years. M o r e o v e r , here in Hong Kong, the Hansard
of the S t r a i t s Settlements are not a v a i l a b l e . It is
t h e r e f o r e not p o s s i b l e j u s t to assess L i m ' s l o y a l t y to the
British Crown merely from his behaviour in the Legislative
C o u n c i l . Other m a n i f e s t i o n s of his p r o - B r i t i s h m e n t a l i t y
w i l l a l s o be considered in o r d e r to p r e s e n t a less
unbalanced comparative study.
In June 1895, Lim Boon Keng was a p p o i n t e d the Chinese
representative in the Legislative Council to replace Seah
Jb-* JSst Jk""
Liang Seah ft H%k .7° But while Ho Kai could claim that
he r e p r e s e n t e d an a l m o s t h o m o g e n e o u s Chinese community
except for differences in wealth, Lim Boon Keng was
representing a Chinese community much more heterogeneous
along dialect lines, namely Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese and
Hakka and also between China-born and Straits-born, not to
say differences in wealth and occupation. Therefore, there
would not be a Chinese Legislative Councillor in the Straits

132
 situation with such long term services as Ho Kai. Lim Boon
Keng was a Singapore-born Hokkien.
Lim Boon Keng was appointed as Legislative Councillor
at the high time of s e v e r a l y e a r s of s t r u g g l e between the
unofficial m e m b e r s of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l and the
S t r a i t s g o v e r n m e n t o v e r again the same issue as was in the
case of Hong Kong - m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n . In f a c t ,
"throughout the period 1891-4, the persistent
representations made by this Colony for substantial relief
owing to bad financial times were unheeded."7 1 In 1891 and
in 1895, meetings had been held in the Town H a l l to protest
a g a i n s t the l e v y i n g of such exactions. The 1895 m e e t i n g
was h e l d on J a n u a r y 11, a f t e r "the r e s i g n a t i o n of the
Singapore u n o f f i c i a l members of the Legislative Council, the
Justices of Peace and the Chinese Advisory Board from their
respective public offices.""^ Lim was not yet appointed to
his office. But he was a l r e a d y very active in the Chinese
community. At this meeting, he seconded the resolution
moved - "all those present heartily approved of the action
taken by the u n o f f i c i a l m e m b e r s in resigning f r o m their
posts."73
Like Ho K a i , Lim Boon Keng was a l s o v e r y a p p r e c i a t i v e
that B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the c o l o n y had b r o u g h t the
Chinese s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y . Lim even d e m o n s t r a t e d
greater enthusiasm in openly glorifying the fair and square
British r u l e which had p r o v i d e d opportunities for the
Chinese to d e v e l o p their talents.74 A f t e r a l l , Lim Boon
Keng h i m s e l f had p e r s o n a l l y e n j o y e d such benefit. It was a

133
g o v e r n m e n t s c h o l a r s h i p that had e n a b l e d him to become
p r o f e s s i o n a l l y q u a l i f i e d as a W e s t e r n m e d i c a l doctor.
E x p r e s s i o n s of l o y a l t y and g r a t i t u d e w e r e most f r e q u e n t .
One such occasion was the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria.
On June 22, 1897, the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l h e l d a special
meeting to pass a loyal resolution to Queen Victoria. Lim
Boon Keng assured the colonial government that the Chinese
in the Straits Settlements would render their loyalty s o l e l y
to the Queen and no other and c e r t a i n l y not to the Chinese
government.
"....I can assure Your Excellency that to
no o t h e r of Her M a j e s t y ' s s u b j e c t s w i l l
the Chinese of Singapore yield in loyalty
and adhesion to Her M a j e s t y . . . . " ' *
Then at the Town H a l l , a n o t h e r vote of g r a t i t u d e and
a l l e g i a n c e was e x p r e s s e d by Lim Boon Keng on b e h a l f of the
Chinese community.
fl
....For all these b l e s s i n g s we most
h u m b l y a n d h e a r t i l y thank y o u r M a j e s t y ,
while assuring Your Majesty of our
undying l o y a l t y , and p r a y i n g that Your
Majesty may be long spared to reign over
us in peace, happiness and g l o r y . n ' b
In fact, the Chinese community most energetically celebrated
this Diamond Jubilee of their alien rulers. The Stratis-
b o r n Chinese community initiated schemes that w o u l d
m a t e r i a l l y s y m b o l i z e their sentiments. Lim Boon Keng
together with other Chinese l e a d e r s proposed to set up an
i n s t i t u t i o n for the aged and the i n f i r m poor and a
s c h o l a r s h i p in the name of the Queen. But the g o v e r n m e n t
rejected both schemes. Besides, the Chinese a l s o held a

134
monster p r o c e s s i o n "which took an h o u r and a h a l f to pass a
g i v e n point and was two m i l e s in length."^

O n o t h e r s i m i l a r o c c a s i o n s o f c e l e b r a t i o n , L i m Boon
Keng as the Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was most z e a l o u s to

d r m n m t r n to h i n n l l o g i n n c o a n w o l l ar> t h a t o f t h e C h i n o r > o

community. In A p r i l 1901, Lim supported in the Legislative

C o u n c i l a m o t i o n for $20,000 f u n d for the w e l c o m i n g of the
D u k e and D u c h e s s of Y o r k . ? 8 In M a r c h 1902, Lim w e n t to
E n g l a n d to attend the C o r o n a t i o n ceremony of Edward VII.^9
Lim Boon K e n g ! s l o y a l t y a s a g r a t e f u l B r i t i s h s u b j e c t
c o u l d not have been more v i v i d l y and a r d e n t l y demonstrated
t h a n his e f f o r t s in h e l p i n g to set up the S t r a i t s C h i n e s e

Magazine in 1897, the Straits Chinese British Association in

1900 and the Chinese Company of the Volunteer Force in 1901.
!t
The S t r a i t s C h i n e s e M a g a z i n e p r o c l a i m e d itself as a
or\
Q u a r t e r l y Journal of Oriental and Occidental Culture.now
It operated for ten y e a r s from 1897 to 1907. It was
founded and edited by Lim Boon Keng and Song Ong Siang, both

Queenrs Scholarship winners educated in Britain. This

M a g a z i n e b e c a m e an a r e n a for the p r o m o t i o n of E n g l i s h to
other Chinese. T h i s was a f o r m a l e x p r e s s i o n of t h e i r
gratitude to and appreciation of the British colonial rule
in that they wished their f e l l o w Chinese could share these
b e n e f i t s w i t h them. It was a l s o an e f f o r t to assimilate
fellow C h i n e s e into t h e language and c u l t u r e of their

c o l o n i a l master and should therefore be regarded as the most

positive step of showing their support of the British Crown.

There was a special column in the Magazine which encouraged

135
"Chinese readers to study the E n g l i s h classics for t h e i r
educational, c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l values." 8 1 And in
1900 with the f o r m a t i o n of the Straits Chinese British
A s s o c i a t i o n , t h i s M a g a z i n e was to s e r v e as the v o i c e of
Chinese subjects loyat to the B r i t i s h Empire.
The S t r a i t s C h i n e s e B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n w a s f o r m e d i n
August 1900 by Tan Jiak Kim 8 2 , Seah Liang Seah and again Lim
Boon Keng and Song Ong Siang. It w a s , in f a c t , a f o r m a l
institutionalisation of Straits-born Chinese l o y a l t y to the
British. It was just the time when the British were
celebrating victories in South A f r i c a . The Straits Chinese
e n t h u s i a s m on this o c c a s i o n won the r e s p e c t of the l o c a l
English community.
" T h e S_t£a : 2._t - s_Tj : m < e_s s a y s T W e m u s t
legitimately applaud, in the name of the
E m p i r e , the z e a l andr r 8 e n t h u s i a s m of the
Straits-born C h i n e s e . ^
The A s s o c i a t i o n was e v e n n a m e d as the " i m m e d i a t e s e q u e l of
all this c e l e b r a t i o n o f B r i t i s h v i c t o r i e s . " 8 ^ But in
M a i n l a n d C h i n a , it was the h e a t of the a n t i - f o r e i g n B o x e r
activities. I n f a c t , t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s h a d j u s t charged
i n t o P e k i n g on A u g u s t 14* Yet the S t r a i t s C h i n e s e w e r e
openly and f o r m a l l y pledging allegiance to the British who
headed the very forces invading the capital of their
motherland.
The o b j e c t i v e s of the Association were for the
promotion of i n t e l l i g e n t interest in a f f a i r s of the British
E m p i r e , encouragement and maintenance of loyalty as subjects
of tho Queen and promotion of w e l f a r e of the Chinese in the

136
colony. The English community was looking at this Chinese
a s s o c i a t i o n o p e n l y p r o f e s s i n g l o y a l t y t o t h e B r i t i s h with
appreciative hopes saying that the association was "capable
of doing great things for the Chinese and the colony." 8 5
It was c l e a r l y an a s s o c i a t i o n f o r m e d by the v e r y "upper
crust" of the Straits-Chinese who were English-educated and
W e s t e r n i z e d in l i f e . "The vast m a j o r i t y of the Straits
Chinese w e r e no better e d u c a t e d , affluent or o r i e n t e d
towards Britain than their immigrant China-born
or
00
contemporaries." These Chinese, including Lim Boon Keng
were all conscious of their very paradoxical identity.
They c o u l d n e v e r rid t h e m s e l v e s of their Chinese ethnic
o r i g i n s and yet they had n e v e r been b r o u g h t up or l i v e d as
Chinese but as E n g l i s h . The p r o b l e m was that n e i t h e r the
E n g l i s h n o r t h e Chinese c o m m u n i t y f u l l y accepted them.
They w e r e a c l a s s a p a r t c r e a t e d by the very colonial
g o v e r n m e n t to whom they w e r e so eager to p l e d g e their
allegiance. But as d i f f e r e n t f r o m the other l e a d e r s ,
Lim T s identity problem was even more complicated.
The Straits Chinese British Association at once became
instrumental in e x p r e s s i o n s of p r o - B r i t i s h l o y a l t y . On
occasions of royal celebrations and visits of the British,
the A s s o c i a t i o n was most a r t i c u l a t e in voicing a l l e g i a n c e
and in proposing schemes. In April 1901, when the Duke and
Duchess of Y o r k v i s i t e d the colony, the n e w l y f o r m e d
association "conceived and carried out the idea of erecting
a Chinese pagoda surmounted by a figure of Britannia holding

137
a torch in her u p l i f t e d h a n d -- a n e m b l e m o f t h e C h i n e s e
social fabric i l l u m i n a t e d by the l i g h t of science and
w e s t e r n progress." 8 ^ Then about f i v e years later in 1906,
the v i s i t of Prince A r t h u r of C o n n a u g h t to Singapore en
r o u t e t o J a p a n p r o v i d e d these S t r a i t s - b o r n C h i n e s e w i t h
another o p p o r t u n i t y to express their gratitude, l o y a l t y and
glorification. L i m Boon Keng a s the P r e s i d e n t of the
Association extended the f o l l o w i n g address to the gathered
Chinese procession celebrating the occasion*
"We pray that Your Royal Highness w i l l be
pleased to convey an humble expression of
l o y a l t y t o H i s M a j e s t y t h e K i n g-
Emperor. ! | 6 b
One m a j o r e f f o r t of the Straits Chinese British
A s s o c i a t i o n was to s u p p o r t the claims of S t r a i t s - b o r n
Chinese in their wish to be e n r o l l e d as v o l u n t e e r s for local
defence. In f a c t , Lim Boon Keng had p e r s o n a l l y t r i e d to
convince the colonial government of the practicability of
such an organization since 1897. He c l e a r l y saw it as an
expression of the government trust in the Chinese community.
In A p r i l 1901, the m e m o r i a l of a n u m b e r of S t r a i t s - b o r n
Chinese endorsed by the Straits Chinese British Association
was f o r w a r d e d to the S e c r e t a r y of State for the C o l o n i e s
through the colonial government. The Chinese were making
use of the c h a n c e when the C o m m a n d a n t of the Singapore
Volunteer R i f l e s announced that the government intended to
i n c r e a s e the s t r e n g t h of the c o r p s by the a d d i t i o n of two
Eurasian companies.9° A y e a r l a t e r in N o v e m b e r 1901, the
Colonial Secretary's r e p l y came stating that

138
 "His M a j e s t y ' s g o v e r n m e n t h a s r e c e i v e d
with much gratification this evidence of
the patriotic and loyal spirit which
a n i m a t e s the S t r a i t s - b o r n Chinese and
hopes that it w i l l be possible to utilize
their services as volunteers,"91
A month e a r l i e r before this formal approval was to come, Lim
Boon Keng was a l r e a d y speaking e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y in the
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l on it, though he f i r s t e x p r e s s e d his
frustration at the delay.
"....after a good many v a i n a p p l i c a t i o n s
to g o v e r n m e n t the a p p e a l of the B r i t i s h
s u b j e c t s b o r n in this C o l o n y to become
Volunteers had received recognition and
reply."
He was confident that
"....the p r o p o s e d f o r m a t i o n of the
Singapore Volunteer Infantry w o u l d be
hailed with enthusiasm and gratitude by a
very large number of the intelligent and
p r o g r e s s i v e s u b j e c t s of His M a j e s t y who
h a v e had the good f o r t u n e to be born and
b r o u g h t up here.... they w o u l d p r o v e
w o r t h y of the i s l a n d and w o r t h y of the
e d u c a t i o n the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t had
given them."9 2
But to this w a r m v o t e of g r a t i t u d e , the g o v e r n o r only
r e p l i e d t h a t p e r s o n a l l y h e w o u l d a l w a y s hesitate t o enter
the f i e l d of prophesy.^3 C l e a r l y no matter how Westernized
and a r d e n t l y l o y a l these S t r a i t s - b o r n Chinese w e r e , t h e r e
T
w o u l d a l w a y s be a g u l f ! between them and the c o l o n i a l
master. Immediately after the formal approval came
through, 100 Straits Chinese British subjects were enrolled
and sworn in as volunteers. This company was then known as
No. 2 Company, Singapore V o l u n t e e r I n f a n t r y . Among those
f i r s t e n l i s t e d was Lim Boon Keng who was eager to g i v e the
rest of the community an e x a m p l e . He was to s e r v e u n t i l

139
1905. In M a r c h 1902, Lim as Sergeant and Song Ong Siang
as C o r p o r a l were r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of this Company among
a l t o g e t h e r 50 m e m b e r s s e l e c t e d f r o m the w h o l e of the
Volunteer Corps in the Colony "to proceed to represent the
Straits S e t t l e m e n t s at the C o r o n a t i o n of His M a j e s t y King
Edward VIP 1 . 94 j^y aiso attended the dinner on June 18 of
the Straits Settlements Association at the Hotel Metropole.
This was "the o n l y occasion in the c e n t u r y on which one
batch of Straits Chinese were present at an annual dinner of
the Straits Settlements Association in England," wrote Song
Ong Siang.95
W i t h the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l Proceedings unavailable
here in Hong K o n g , it is t h e r e f o r e d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h
how Lim Boon Keng d i s c h a r g e d his d u t i e s as an U n o f f i c i a l
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l l o r d u r i n g his eight y e a r s of o f f i c e .
Here is some more meagre information.
In September 1899? "a v e r y sweeping clause"^ was
introduced to the Banishment Ordinance (1888)* The
amendment said that "a banishment order should be conclusive
e v i d e n c e for all p u r p o s e s " and "that the p e r s o n to be
banished was not a B r i t i s h subject."97 Li m Boon Keng led
the opposition to the amendment on b e h a l f of the Straits-
born Chinese. He pointed out that "such an o r d e r might be
made against a British subject who would be deprived of his
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right of a p p e a l i n g to the Supreme Court to
d e t e r m i n e his nationality."9 8 In committee at the next
council meeting, the g o v e r n o r accepted L i m ' s amendment in

140
the f o r m of a p r o m i s e that "nothing h e r e i n contained s h a l l
p r e v e n t the person against whom the b a n i s h m e n t o r d e r has
been issued from submitting fresh evidence to the governor
in C o u n c i l to p r o v e his n a t i o n a l i t y : and if, a f t e r h e a r i n g
such e v i d e n c e , the g o v e r n o r in C o u n c i l is s a t i s f i e d that
such p e r s o n is a n a t u r a l - b o r n s u b j e c t of the Queen, the
g o v e r n o r in C o u n c i l s h a l l f o r t h w i t h cancel the o r d e r of
banishment."99 go, Li m jiacj ¥On a c a s e f o r ^s g r o u p of

Chinese - Straits-born Chinese.

At the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l meeting on A p r i l 24, 1900,
Lim Boon Keng s u p p o r t e d his col league ^ W a l t e r N a p i e r ^ in
moving a resolution to r e v o k e a g o v e r n m e n t n o t i f i c a t i o n
which c a n c e l l e d two s c h o l a r s h i p s of $200 each and instead
offered only one Queen!s Scholarship of $250 for
competition. Although the resolution was carried
unanimously, the g o v e r n m e n t s t i l l r e f u s e d to make any
pledge. 10 ° As a Queen's Scholarship recipient, he surely
appreciated the benefits it brought and would like to share
them with more young people.
In October 1901, Lim Boon Keng was again speaking on
behalf of education over the Supply Bill. He said that "he
hoped government w o u l d do something to help Raffles
I n s t i t u t i o n in its e n d e a v o u r to i m p r o v e education in that
institution." 101 He was worried that it would not be able
to s u r v i v e if the g o v e r n m e n t did not h e l p it. But to this,
the governor advised Lim to approach the wealthy Chinese for
donations so as to e s t a b l i s h some school or g i v e the
g o v e r n m e n t enough f u n d s to make " R a f f l e s Institution a

141
b e t t e r i n s t i t u t i o n than it had h i t h e r t o been." 1 0 2 So Lim
was given a l m o s t the same task as Ho Kai was in raising
funds for the university. The Chinese, as they always did,
responded most zealously and generously. By January 1902,
that is o n l y about three months after L i m r s p l e a in the
Council, $100,000 had been paid and $280,000 had been
promised by the Chinese*"'^
Judging f r o m the l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e , the
f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn in r e g a r d to Lim Boon
K e n g f s l o y a l t y to the B r i t i s h Crown and his r o l e as a
Legislative Councillor* When compared to Ho Kai, Lim
appeared much more appreciative of and grateful to British
r u l e and that he f e l t lucky to be a B r i t i s h subject. All
his deeds, speeches and w r i t i n g s f u l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d such
sentiments. He a l s o made extra e f f o r t s to c u l t i v a t e
s i m i l a r f e e l i n g s among his f e l l o w Chinese towards the
colonial regime. This enthusiastic m a n i f e s t a t i o n of
loyalty to the British rulers could have been caused by one
or more of the f o l l o w i n g reasons. F i r s t l y , it was the
British c o l o n i a l r u l e that had brought him all the
p r i v i l e g e s he was enjoying, n a m e l y , his education, career
and social status. T h e r e f o r e he f e l t obliged out of
genuine g r a t i t u d e or mere p r a c t i c a l - m i n d e d n e s s or both to
express his loyalty to his benefactor and sincerely wished
that m o r e Chinese w o u l d be brought under the patronage of
the B r i t i s h r u l e r s . Secondly, Lim Boon Keng was m o v i n g
around in Singapore - a society d i f f e r e n t f r o m Ho Kai ! s.

142
The Chinese p o p u l a t i o n were not the o n l y B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l
subjects. There were a l s o M a l a y s and Indians. Thus,
there was a need to convince the British of Chinese loyalty
so as to compete for f a v o u r f r o m the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s .
M o r e o v e r , increasing courtship of r i c h Chinese community
leaders by Ch ! ing g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s , Chinese r e f o r m i s t
and revolutionary leaders much more so in Singapore than in
Hong Kong had to a great extent a l a r m e d the B r i t i s h into
thinking that the Chinese subjects w e r e shifting their
allegiance, wealth and expertise to the Mainland. Lim Boon
Keng in his office as the Legislative Councillor or as the
President of the Straits Chinese British Association, that
is, as the spokesman of the Chinese, found it his duty to
reassure -the British that the Chinese community would always
remain the most loyal subjects of the British E m p i r e and
that whatever feelings the Chinese might have towards China,
their country of origin, would remain c u l t u r a l and
emotional. As to Lim Boon Keng himself, he was not unaware
that his promotion of Confucianism among his f e l l o w Chinese
was creating B r i t i s h d i s c o m f o r t s towards h i m s e l f , so he
found it extremely necessary to demonstrate by all means his
loyalty and support of the British and that whatever
involvement he was engaged in would never allay his strong
dedication to the colonial regime*
Like Ho Kai, Lim Boon Keng was also f l u e n t in his
English. In fact, Lim's "command of English was better
than his predecessors on the legislative council and argued
more outspokenly". 1 0 4 But he suffered more or less the

143
same f a t e " w i t h l i t t l e success a g a i n s t c e r t a i n g o v e r n m e n t
measures."105 Lim echoed the same complaint that
unofficial voices in the Council were very often discarded.
Lim also insisted, as Ho Kai did, that education especially
higher education should be subsidized to maintain standards,
that t h e c o l o n i a l m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d b e f a i r l y
extracted a n d that banishment order should take into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the l o c a l c o m m u n i t i e s . Had the L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i 1 P r o c e e d i n g s been a v a i l a b l e , m o r e p a r a l l e l s could
have been drawn.

As promoter of local Chinese w e l f a r e

U n l i k e Ho K a i , Lim Boon K e n g T s p r o m o t i o n of local
uninese wellare was much more diversified in motivations and
engagements. W h i l e Ho was c h i e f l y engaged in p r o m o t i n g
Western medicine among the local community and in defending
Chinese interests in the Legislative Council, Lim Boon Keng
had dedicated himself to much heavier commitments*
Geographically, his efforts were also not merely limited to
Singapore but beyond.
As a l r e a d y emphasised, Lim Boon Keng was in a v e r y
heterogeneous Chinese society. It was d i v i d e d a l o n g
dialect, wealth, r e l i g i o n , p l a c e of origin and whether
Straits-born. E v e n w i t h i n this g r o u p of S t r a i t s - b o r n
Chinese to w h i c h Lim Boon Keng b e l o n g e d , there was no
" e n t i r e l y homogeneous culture". 1 °° T h e r e w e r e again the
same divisions. But basically the Straits-born Chinese was
a group of local born Western-educated and sometimes

144
 n
A n g l i c i z e d Chinese. It had come into being because of the
existence of a colonial environment which provided status,
employment, security, prosperity and peace." 107 In a word,
they were closer to the British administration than to their
Chinese origins, Lim Boon Keng saw his own g r o u p as
s u f f e r i n g from an identity crisis. They w e r e i g n o r a n t o f
the Chinese c u l t u r e and thus were detached from their own
roots. Yet, they were not f u l l y accepted by the Westerners
no m a t t e r how a s s i m i l a t e d they w e r e . T h u s , he t r i e d to
c u l t i v a t e among his own g r o u p a ' s y n c r e t i c 1 n a t u r e of
i d e n t i t y 1I UOft
O
, smooth away t h e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n t h e g r o u p
i t s e l f and e r a d i c a t e their v i c e s . The S t r a i t s Chinese
founded in 1897 was to s e r v e as the a r e n a of
Straits-born Chinese culture and the Straits Chinese British
A s s o c i a t i o n in 1900 was to u n i f y the g r o u p . It is c l e a r
that Lim Boon Keng took this identity problem seriously and
t r i e d hard to s o l v e it for h i m s e l f and his own g r o u p . Ho
Kai did not a p p e a r to s u f f e r f r o m this same p r o b l e m . Ho
seemed perfectly at ease with his own identity of being the
spokesman of the Chinese and m o v i n g a r o u n d the W e s t e r n e r s
whom he b e f r i e n d e d and co-operated with in his p u b l i c and
private engagements.
L i m f s efforts to establish an identity for the Straits-
b o r n Chinese society was at the same time a c c o m p a n i e d by a
drive to unite the whole Chinese society. He believed that
"language was an important element of Chinese identity and a
means to Chinese unity. " 1 °9 M a n d a r i n was to do this Job.

145
It was the v e r y l a n g u a g e Lim Boon Keng was spoken to by a
foreigner in Britain and to which he could not reply. Lim
offered the first Mandarin class to Straits-born Chinese in
1898. This f i v e years 1 lapse a f t e r Lim ! s r e t u r n f r o m
B r i t a i n in 1893 c o u l d be e a s i l y e x p l a i n e d . Though his
Chinese consciousness was a r o u s e d in B r i t a i n , it took
c o n t a c t s w i t h his own society in S i n g a p o r e to make him
r e a l i s e that his ignorance of the Chinese l a n g u a g e and
culture was not exceptional but a norm. Moreover, coming
into acquaintance with Huang Nai~shang 1 1 0 , a Chinese scholar
and r e f o r m e r and m a r r y i n g H u a n g ' s d a u g h t e r , Tuan Chiung
&% $![,, gave Lim a d d e d spur to his quest for the Chinese
language and culture. The marriage with Huang Tuan Chiung
took p l a c e in 1896. "She was a r e f i n e d , e n l i g h t e n e d and
well-educated gentle-woman. The experiences which she had
gained t h r o u g h her v i s i t to E n g l a n d and A m e r i c a , p r i o r to
her m a r r i a g e , e n a b l e d her to take a sympathetic and a c t i v e
i n t e r e s t in all the r e f o r m m o v e m e n t s of this p e r i o d , in
which her husband p l a y e d the chief role." 1 1 1 In fact,
d u r i n g her v i s i t s to the United States, she met Li Hung-
chang who i n v i t e d her to r e p r e s e n t China and g i v e t a l k s at
the American Congress of Representative Women. 11 ^
A f t e r f i r s t o f f e r i n g M a n d a r i n classes to a l i m i t e d
number of Chinese at his own house in 1898, Lim extended
the facilities to a wider circle by holding bigger classes
at the Straits Chinese Recreation Club. Later when the
Ch'ing Consul endorsed his movement, classes were also held
at the Consulate. "This campaign to p o p u l a r i z e Mandarin

146
contributed directly to the break down of the dialect
barriers in education, because the use of Mandarin as the
medium of instruction made possible the enrolment of
children of different dialect groups." 1 1 3 But more
importantly, he was striving to break down the deep-rooted
prejudice which had always existed among the different
dialect groups and thus contributed to forging a more
harmonious Chinese society. But such effect was not
instant. In 1906, eight years after the first Mandarin
class started, Lim was still working hard. "He convened a
meeting of clan leaders and exhorted them to introduce
Mandarin as a subject in the temple schools."11^ Three
more years were to pass for Lim to witness some concrete
success of his efforts. In August 1909? the Fukien Tao Nan
School and the Cantonese Yang Cheng School in Singapore
dropped the requirement "children from our group" in
enrolment circulars. In 1910, the Hakka Ch!i Fa and the
Cantonese Bacon Girl School also did the same. ^
Promoting Mandarin as the common Chinese language was
only one aspect of his many-faceted reform movement to
correct the long-time problems of the Straits Chinese
society. It should be emphasised that Lim ! s reform
movement in the Straits Settlements was part and parcel of
that post-1895 vast reform current of China. If KTang Yu~
wei!s Confucian Revival Movement provided Lim the means and
the solutions, it was the social problems and vices Lim saw-
in his own Chinese society in Singapore that provided the

147
 lf
stimulus. He was certainly an enthusiast in all m o r a l ,
social and educational reforms among the Chinese in the
Colony." 116 First of a l l , he abhorred the wretched state
of education and then the degree and extent of various other
social vices. He was determined to rectify the situation.
Education was Lim Boon Keng's chief concern. He wrote
extensively and g a v e many speeches on his view points of
education. The StraitsChinese Magazine served as his
m outhpiece. 11 ? Basically, he believed that education
d e l i v e r e d man from his weaknesses and perfected him. He
lamented that education was neglected by both the Straits
government and Chinese society. The Chinese took the
education of their children most lightly. Even if they did
send their children to school, it would be to English
classes because a knowledge of English meant greater chances
of employment and more income* In these English classes,
there was never any attention given to the cultivation of
moral virtues* As to the state of Chinese education, it
was even more pathetic* Classes run by the government were
all closed down by 1894 , owing to poor attendance. Other
classes sponsored by the rich Chinese philanthropists were
poorly staffed and taught in dialects. Lim Boon Keng was
of the opinion that the whole educational system had to be
reformed in its orientation, curricula and organization.
Mandarin should be the one and only medium of Chinese
instruction. The objectives of education were for both
academic as well as moral enlightenment. Curricula should
be modernized to include new subjects and should be hi-

148
lingual that is, English and Mandarin. Women1 s education
should also be promoted for the benefit of not just the
females but the enrichment of the whole society.
Efforts to establish a school for girls went ahead.
In April 1899, a provisional committee was set up. The
circular inviting financial aid stated that "the object of
the school is to demonstrate the feasibility of reforming
Chinese conducting the education of their children on
improved and modern systems, distinctively in consonance
with Chinese principles as laid down in the classical works
of Confucius: but entirely at variance with existing
methods." $6,000 were raised. Half of this came from
Khoo Seok Wan jfjJ ^ g| ^118 ^^m ¥as among the nine-men
committee headed by the Singapore Chinese Consul who was
President. The curricula included Romanized Malay, Chinese,
English, Arithmetic, Geography, Music and Sewing. In June
1899, the school was opened. There were only seven girls
on the register but in two months1 time, thirty girls were
attending.119 Mrs. Lim Boon Keng gave lessons in Chinese
two times a week. The school soon ran into financial
difficulties because subscriptions came slow. The older
and more conservative Chinese refused to support the cause.
Writing in 1920, Song Ong Siang proudly remarks, "It is
worthy of note.... Dr. Lim Boon Keng (President), Mr. Song
Ong Siang (Vice President).... have for twenty years worked
1 PO
incessantly in the interests of the school."

149
 Lim Boon Keng also set up the Chinese Philomathic
Society to encourage both English and Chinese literary
studies. He utilized the Chinese press to supplement the
Straits Chinese Magazine as his arena in the promotion of
his various reform ideas. Here Lim worked closely with
Khoo Seok-wan who was the p r o p r i e t o r of the
Thien Nan Shin Pao ^ $} ^ "^ set up in 1898. Lim was
the adviser on European and foreign affairs. The next
year, Lim took over Sing Pao and renamed it Jit Shin Pau
BJ^*jfe * That became Lim's Chinese mouthpiece. "Not
only could he publish his translations of European
scientific and education treatises and his own original
articles, but he could also publicize the activities of the
"i p-i
Chinese Philomathic Society.''^
Education was a long-term solution to reforming the
Straits Chinese society, Lim Boon Keng aimed to see more
immediate successes. He toured and gave speeches to
campaign for his reform ideas. He was of the opinion that
obsolete traditional practices or beliefs should be
abolished. He was against such customs as the keeping of
the queue or the towchang for men,122 foot-binding for women
and elaborate funeral, marriage and ancestor-worship
rituals. Of course, he was also strongly against opium-
smoking. He believed that life of the Straits Chinese
should no longer conform to the traditional Chinese
practices. They should live much more simply by abolishing
all unnecessary customs.

150
 The most controversial of Lim f s activities was his 1898
queue-cutting campaign. Lim was criticized as trying to
totally Westernize the Straits Chinese by shedding them of
all their Chinese identity. The subject became so bitter
that two placards of scandalous nature were found posted
near Lim!s residence. Later in that year, when Lim!s term
of office was about to expire, his supporters and opponents
"crossed swords in the columns of the daily papers as to
whether the Governor should renominate him for a fresh term
of three years.»'^ After all, the British administration
would only appoint those Chinese who could command co-
operation from their own people. However, in the end, Lim
was re-appointed.
Another of Lim!s efforts in reforming the Chinese
society was his anti-opium campaign in the 1900s. In this
activity, he teamed up with another doctor, Yin Suat Chuan
a
9 China-born but American, Canadian and British-
educated medical doctor. Yin joined Lim in the practice of
his profession. Again in this campaign, Lim did not
receive too enthusiastic a support from his fellow Chinese
because many of them had vested interests in opium money.
In 1899, Lim Boon Keng who was a Christian became
i
conv'erted to Confucianism as re-interpreted by K'ang Yu-wei.
Lim was a typical product of the West, yet he embraced
China's most traditional beliefs - Confucianism. Since
then, Lim was to devote about five years to spreading
Confucianism among not only the Chinese in Singapore but
throughout Malaya. This was the Confucian R e v i v a l

151
Movement. But because the movement was heavily-related to
Lim's China-orientation, detailed discussion on the movement
would be done in the following section. Here, briefly
explained is how Lim attempted to utilize Confucianism to
reform the Straits Chinese society.
Lim Boon Keng wrote very extensively on Confucianism in
all his arenas, Straits Chinese Magazine, Jit Shin Pau and
Thien Nam Shin Pao but especially in English in the Straits
Chinese Magazine '^4 perhaps with an aim to convince those
Westernized Chinese to reconsider their beliefs. Briefly,
Lim believed that Confucianism should be the very motivating
force behind all reforms.12^ jt should be cultivated as a
code of moral ethics for good behaviour in schools, at home
and in society. Children should be so brought up from an
early age. He also utilized Confucian teaching to attack
such extravagant practices as ancestor worship, marriage
and funeral. For all these moral reasons as well as to
support K!ang Yu-wei, Lim Boon Keng was to push ahead
steadfastly with his Confucian Revival Movement.
As to Lim Boon KengTs other less spectacular though not
less significant activities in the promotion of local
Chinese welfare would be the role he played in settling
disputes and in promoting rubber economy among Chinese. In
November 1906, a serious riot broke out between the Hokkiens
and Teochews which lasted four days. Lim was among the
five-man conference held at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
Besides Lim, the other Chinese present was Tan Jiak Kim,

152
a p p a r e n t l y him and Tan w e r e to s e r v e as spokesmen of the two
contending dialect groups. Even soldiers were called for
to settle the dispute. F i n a l l y it ended after 300 rioters
were arrested. As to rubber plantation, Lim was the first
Chinese who believed in its feasibility and profitability in
the M a l a y P e n i n s u l a . The f i r s t big p l a n t a t i o n at M a l a c c a
o w n e d b y T a n K i H i e n Kl § fj
1 /i * *\j yi
was set up with L i m ' s
encouragement. 126 And rubber was to bring great wealth to
the Singapore Chinese community.
So whether in his capacity as a Legislative Councillor
or not, Lim Boon Keng had dedicated much of his attention to
his f e l l o w Chinese community in the Straits Settlements.
A l t h o u g h his p l a n s did not a l w a y s c a r r y off with great
a c h i e v e m e n t s , he had at least s t i r r e d up attentions to the
p r o b l e m s and thus g a v e c o n c e r n e d l e a d e r s of the later
g e n e r a t i o n s some o b j e c t i v e s to work f o r . Such were his
efforts in the promotion of Mandarin, education, and social
r e f o r m s such as anti-smoking and a n t i - e x t r a v a g a n t r i t u a l
campaigns. He had always envisaged a unified, upright and
s i m p l e Chinese society in Singapore. Thanks to his and
other Chinese of equal ambitions, the Chinese community in
Singapore is more or less so. And in trying to achieve his
targets, Lim had a l o n g the way j e o p a r d i z e d his own status
and even the c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t ' s t r u s t in him such as in
considering his re-appointment to the Legislative Council in
1898. W h i l e c u l t i v a t i n g unity and a sense of identity
among his f e l l o w Chinese, Lim was cautious to show that his
l o y a l t y to the British was always strong as e v e r . It was

153
at the heat of the C o n f u c i a n R e v i v a l M o v e m e n t at the t u r n of
the century that he h e l p e d set up the very pro-British
Straits Chinese British Association. In all his various
activities, L i m Boon Keng was teamed up with various
f r i e n d s , t h e p r o m o t i o n o f e d u c a t i o n l a r g e l y w i t h Song O n g
Siang and the Confucian R e v i v a l M o v e m e n t with Khoo Seok-wan.
T h a t is to say, Lim was u n i q u e as a man of his b a c k g r o u n d ,
and status to be so engaged in various and even
contradictory causes for his community.

As nationalist overseas Chinese

B e f o r e 1895* Lim Boon Keng was not yet a w a r e of the
deep-rooted weaknesses of his home country, China. It took
C h i n a ' s 1895 d e f e a t , the h u m i l i a t i n g treaty terms, the
subsequent scramble of the foreign powers in China together
w i t h the r e a c t i o n s of some Chinese at home and a b r o a d in
demanding reforms and in instigating revolutions to expose
the s e r i o u s n e s s of s i t u a t i o n s to h i m . O n l y then did he
b e g i n to f o c u s his a t t e n t i o n s on China. This was not to
mean that Lim was not patriotic or nationalist before 1895*
W i t h his acute c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a Chinese and his n e w l y -
a c q u i r e d i n t e r e s t in the C h i n e s e l a n g u a g e and c u l t u r e , he
could not be i n d i f f e r e n t to C h i n a ' s demise. But the
g e n e r a l l y optimistic i l l u s i o n in the Manchu government among
S t r a i t s Chinese m u s t h a v e b l i n d e d h i s s e n s i t i v i t y . Once
a w a k e n e d , he e x e r t e d t r e m e n d o u s e n e r g y for the cause - a
reformed m o t h e r l a n d . L i m f s name was largely associated with
the Confucian R e v i v a l Movements, his support of K'ang Yu-wei

154
and his vague r e l a t i o n s h i p with Sun Yat-sen. For neatness
of discussion, no f a c t u a l d e t a i l s are here given. O n l y the
bare m i n i m u m necessary for the discussion is i n c l u d e d . The
focus is on L i m f s l o y a l t y p r o b l e m and those contradictions
and compromises that arose. Lim's attitude and solutions
to post-1900 China w i l l a l s o be considered.
The name "Lim Boon Keng n was a l m o s t identical with the
Straits Confucian R e v i v a l Movement. There is this credit
a t t r i b u t e d to him. " M a i n l y through his lectures d e l i v e r e d
b e t w e e n 1894 and 1910, t h e r e has been a C o n f u c i a n r e v i v a l
movement throughout Malaya, with its r e f l e x action upon
China h e r s e l f . " ' ^ But t h i s is o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of a
m o v e m e n t v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d both in motivation and in
development. Lim Boon K e n g ' s i n v o l v e m e n t was not
consistant throughout the w h o l e course of the movement.
The Confucian R e v i v a l M o v e m e n t in Singapore and Malaya
was sparked off by the movement in Mainland China at a time
when o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d s e n t i m e n t s h a d
a l r e a d y been strongly aroused and sustained by both Ch ! ing
and local Chinese efforts. Of c o u r s e , the Confucian
R e v i v a l Movement had heavy p o l i t i c a l overtures. It could
be i n t e r p r e t e d as an e f f o r t of o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e to add
muscle to K ! ang Yu-wei ! s demands for institutional reforms.
And even after K'ang was a l r e a d y ousted, the movement could
still be explained as a force to restore the reform-minded
Emperor Kuang-hsu and K r ang. M o r e o v e r , The Thlen Nan Shin
Pao of which Lim was the political adviser and the Jit Shin

155
 °f which he was the p r o p r i e t o r both s t r o n g l y attacked
the Ch ! ing g o v e r n m e n t a l o n g l i n e s of K ! ang ! s c r i t i c i s m s *
To reach the i l l i t e r a t e mass, Lim toured to give talks* In
October 1899, he was in Kuala Lumpur preaching Confucianism.
And when K ! ang Yu-wei was in S i n g a p o r e upon the i n v i t a t i o n
and h o s p i t a l i t y of Lim and Khoo Seok-wan in 1900, the
p o l i t i c a l connotation of the m o v e m e n t was most v i v i d l y
demonstrated to a l l , including the Chfing and British
governments. A visiting Ch'ing degree-holder announced that
any s u p p o r t e r s of the movement w o u l d be i m p l i c a t e d as a
supporter of the escaped K'ang Yu-wei. In fact around 1901,
the C o n s u 1 - G e n e r a 1 in S i n g a p o r e was i n s t r u c t e d to
i n v e s t i g a t e both Khoo and Lim. Khoo had to pay l a r g e sums
of money to buy an h o n o u r a r y Ch ! ing o f f i c i a l t i t l e to show
his a l l e g i a n c e to Ch ! ing so as to h a v e his kinsmen in the
home v i l l a g e f r e e d f r o m confinement. As to Lim whose
i n v o l v e m e n t was less h e a v y than K h o o r s , he was let off
lightly.^^ At once, Lim made compromises and shed the
m o v e m e n t of all p o l i t i c a l m o t i v e s . After a l l , leading a
pro-China political movement while he was still Legislative
Councillor not only aroused British suspicion but also that
of his f e l l o w Chinese who were g e n e r a l l y apathetic to all
politics, be they Chinese or colonial. That ended the first
phase of the largely politically-oriented Confucian Revival
Movement (1899-1900).
Then a socially and c u l t u r a l l y laden Confucian Revival
M o v e m e n t was to begin. The objective was no longer to
support any political intentions or programmes in China but

156
to p r o m o t e a C o n f u c i a n i z e d way of l i f e among the C h i n e s e .
This immediately became the theme of the articles p u b l i s h e d
in the r e f o r m i s t press, namely, Straits Chinese Magazine,
Thien Nan Shin Pao and Jit Shin Pau. The Ch'ing government
was no l o n g e r u n d e r a t t a c k . The m o v e m e n t then b e c a m e a
combination of c u l t u r a l , r e l i g i o u s and social ferments.
This a l l a y e d the fears and suspicion of all parties
concerned, the Chinese community, the colonial
administration and the C h T i n g government. Lim became more
a c t i v e than b e f o r e for two m o r e y e a r s (1901-1902). On
O c t o b e r 9, 1901, a n n i v e r s a r y of C o n f u c i u s ! b i r t h d a y , Lim
Boon Keng and some other leaders held a p r e l i m i n a r y meeting
attended by a few hundred representatives of various dialect
groups including many rich merchants. The Ch ! ing Consul-
G e n e r a l was also present to show o f f i c i a l endorsement. The
p u r p o s e of the m e e t i n g was to a p p e a l to the p u b l i c for f u n d s
to build Confucian temples. Lim c a l l e d for two more
m e e t i n g s at the Thong Chai H o s p i t a l in F e b r u a r y and M a r c h
1902 to o r g a n i z e a c o m m i t t e e for the c o - o r d i n a t i o n of all
activities. "A c o m m i t t e e of 195 m e m b e r s was set up, a
p u b l i c notice appealing to all Chinese was p u b l i s h e d ; and
regulations for establishing Confucian temples and modern
schools were issued. 12 ^ Various tactics were utilized for
fund-raising. C h i n e s e a s p i r a t i o n s t o fame w e r e fully
manipulated. By the m i d d l e of 1902, m o r e than S$200,000
had been raised.130 But almost suddenly the whole
enthusiasm for the movement cooled off only to resurge again

157
in 1908 but by then it had become a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y a
Ch ! ing o f f i c i a l operation. In mid-1902, Lim Boon Keng l e f t
for L o n d o n to a t t e n d the c o r o n a t i o n of K i n g E d w a r d the
Seventh. This seemed to signify a very sarcastic
c o n c l u s i o n to the one m o v e m e n t he had put his heart and soul
to. But this w r i t e r is of the opinion that 1902 only ended
Lim Boon K e n g ' s a c t i v e r o l e in the movement. His
enthusiasm for Confucianism did not die with his journey to
London. One c l e a r evidence is that Lim continued writing
a r t i c l e s on C o n f u c i a n i s m in the p e r i o d 1904 to 190?. He
m i g h t h a v e q u i t t e d f u n d - r a i s i n g , c o m m i t t e e work a n d tour
talks, but his belief in Confucianism as the unifying force
of all Chinese did not subside. It o n l y grew stronger with
time.
LimTs initial objective in promoting the Confucian
R e v i v a l Movement among overseas Chines was to back up K ! ang
Yu~wei!s institutional reform efforts. This h a d f a l l e n
flat. Then whether out of genuine change of attitude or as
a c o m p r o m i s e to s i t u a t i o n s , he l o a d e d the m o v e m e n t w i t h
heavy social, c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s implications and worked
to spread it throughout the Straits Settlements. If he did
not p e r s o n a l l y succeed to get a t e m p l e erected for
Confucius, he had at least p r o v i d e d the otherwise divided
Chinese community with a cause to co-operate and thus helped
to b u i l d up a more u n i f i e d and n a t i o n a l i s t Chinese
community. Lim's involvement in the e a r l y leadership role
of the movement was most outstanding for there was no other

158
person of his Westernized and non-merchant background in the
leadership group. ^1

As to Lim Boon Keng!s attitude to the C h ' i ng

government, it was rather a m b i v a l e n t . He might have
appeared anti-Manchu. But he was not a l w a y s so. He was
no d i f f e r e n t from his other f e l l o w Chinese. He p r e f e r r e d
g r a d u a l changes to r e v o l u t i o n s . In fact, he b e f r i e n d e d
Ch ! ing o f f i c i a l s . But he also wrote to criticize the corrupt
practices of the Manchu g o v e r n m e n t in his newspapers so as
l,o oiulorno K'nn^'n roforrnn. And whon Lho 189B h'pfnrm
Movement was crushed by the Empress Dowager with the Emperor
dethroned, Lim solicited signatures to urge for the
Emperor!s restoration. He even eulogized the crushed
TI
r e f o r m movement with a poem A Voice Heard in Canton." But
when the Manchu regime was showing signs of optimism in the
post-1900 period, Lim acted very pro-Ch'ing such as going to
Peking in 1903 to pledge loyalty to the Regent, Prince Chun.
In 1907, he accompanied Yang Shih-ch'i, a vice president of
the n e w l y established Board of A g r i c u l t u r e , Industry and
C o m m e r c e , in a t o u r of the S o u t h Seas, i n c l u d i n g m u c h of
M a l a y a and J a v a to s o l i c i t o v e r s e a s Chinese i n v e s t m e n t in
China's modernization programmes. Chinese youth were also
r e c r u i t e d to the M a i n l a n d for the n a t i o n a l i s t cause. In
1911 when the a n t i - C h ' i n g r e v o l u t i o n was going on, Lim was
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of China at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l m e d i c a l
conference. Yet the m o m e n t when C h ' i n g a b d i c a t e d and the
P r o v i s i o n a l R e p u b l i c a n G o v e r n m e n t was set up, he acted as
Sun Yat-senrs confidential secretary and medical o f f i c e r .

159
He a l s o helped d r a f t the p r o c l a m a t i o n of the infant Chinese
R e p u b l i c to the foreign powers.

Lirn Boon Keng's association with Sun Yat-sen started in

1900. Sun was in S i n g a p o r e on J u l y 9, 1900 to s a v e his
J a p a n e s e f r i e n d s M i y a z a k i a n d K i y o f u j i w h o h a d been sent
there to arrange talks with Kfang Yu-wei. Instead K'ang
had them a r r e s t e d . It was with the h e l p of Lim that SunTs
f r i e n d s were released. The meeting with Sun had impressed
b o t h L i m Boon Keng a n d h i s f a t h e r - i n - l a w , H u a n g N a i - s h e n g .
Although Lim was never a member of Sun's Hsing Chung Hui or
the later Tung Meng H u i , his sympathies for the
r e v o l u t i o n a r y cause was there.
Therefore, Lim Boon Keng was again showing the same
kind of inconsistency as Ho Kai in his pro-China allegiance*
Lim h a d s u p p o r t e d K ! a n g Y u - w e i , d e s e r t e d h i m , r e s c u e d S u n
Yat-sen in d i s t r e s s and s u p p o r t e d M a n c h u c o u r t s h i p of
o v e r s e a s Chinese w e a l t h and talents. But in fact though
tactics changed, his objective never flickered - a reformed
China a b l e to stand on her own f e e t . After all, it was a
p e r i o d of u n c e r t a i n t y and p r o b a b i l i t y . Thus o n l y in his
e a r l i e s t i n v o l v e m e n t with the China a f f a i r , that is, in 1898
and 1899 was he s t e a d f a s t l y h o l d i n g onto his c a n d i d a t e ,
K ! ang Yu-wei. Since then, he had matured and learned to be
practical by keeping all doors open. Perhaps, it is not too
crude to say that he would pledge his allegiance to whatever
form of government capable of r u l i n g China efficiently.

160
 Having earlier shown that in the immediate post-Boxer
year Ho Kai's solution for the China case was foreign
imposition of reforms on China, it is interesting to see how
Lim Boon Keng reacted to the same conspicuous Manchu
impotency and national humiliations. The coincidence that
both wrote at about the same time to express their reactions
makes the comparison easier. In 1901, Lim Boon Keng r s
articles published in Singapore Free Press were collected,
edited 1 ^ 2 and published as Chinese Crisis from Within.
¥hat will be considered here is Lim's attitude towards the
foreign powers and the Manchu court, the solutions he
offered and where his loyalty lay.
The editor of Chinese Crisis from Within, Reith, G.M.,
remarked that the book was "a powerful indictment of Manchu
Court".'" He should have added "as well as of the foreign
imperialist powers". While Ho Kai felt sorry that the
Manchus had tolerated and boosted the Boxer anti-foreign
activities, Lim Boon Keng analysed painstakingly that such
anti-foreign emotions and activities were justified. His
argument with lavish examples and parallels drawn from the
West was clear. His tone was loaded with dignified anger.
He explained that the Chinese were only trying to address
their commercial, communal and religious grievances which
had been caused by the "utter disregard by the framers of
treaties for the interests of the natives - the real
possessors of the Chinese Empire."134 Lim even coined this
threat of the West to the Chinese as "White Peril" as

161
against the foreigners calling the Chinese as "Yellow
Peril".
" The dangers which the White Man's
presence involve are more terrible than
those of the Yellow Peril. The Chinese
have competed with the Christian nations
with their industry, their inborn
frugality, their dogged perseverance and
their simple habits and for these really
great v i r t u e s , begotten of the £££
angustal domi, the unfortunate Chinese
have been made the objects of calumny and
ridicule, and have been shut out from
places where they could seriously compete
with white laborers. On the other hand,
the Christian nations force upon the
unwilling Chinese the acceptance of the
Christian missionary and his promising
impudence (from the native view point),
impress upon the nation an unfair tariff,
compel the Imperial government to protect
foreign enterprise to the detriment of
native c o m m e r c e , and support the
tyranneous Manchus against the Chinese,
who are struggling to free themselves
from the intolerable yoke already borne
so long by them. The Chinese demand
their right to have their grievances
redressed by the Government, and failing
to obtain a hearing, they w i l l , in
accordance with the precepts of the
sages' rise against the powers that
be."135
Thus Lim Boon Keng had stated most clearly, bluntly and
directly China's half-a-decade long grievances. To him,
the foreigners who had suffered at the hands of the anti-
foreign rebels had themselves, in fact, asked for and
invited those humiliations and disasters.
Several times Lim referred cynically to the fact that
while claiming themselves as Christian nations, these
foreign powers had never acted with a Christian spirit.

162
 l?
The C h i n e s e h a v e not yet seen the
s u p e r i o r sense of j u s t i c e c l a i m e d by
m i s s i o n a r 13b
ies for all Christian
nations "
So what Ho Kai had s u b t l y i m p l i e d , Lim had put it f r a n k l y
that China was justified in her anti-foreign attitude. The
Westerners were themselves to blame. This is the
difference b e t w e e n Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng in t h e i r post-
1900 attitude to the Western Powers.
Lim Boon Keng shared Ho Kai and Sun Yat-sen!s
insistence that Manchus were not Chinese. Lim argued that
the Boxer episode was a Manchu-instigated conspiracy.
"The extensive anti-foreign propagandism
in N o r t h China is not a sudden m o m e n t a r y
o u t b r e a k of a band of f a n a t i c s , but the
outcome of a deliberate scheme elaborated
by the r e a c t i o n a r y Manchus for the
e x p u l s i o n of f o r e i g n e r s and the
v i n d i c a t i o n of the p r o w e s s of the Tsing
dynasty." 1 3 7
As to the Chinese administration, L i m , likewise, criticized
the i n a d e q u a c y of r e f o r m s so far a d o p t e d , saying that the
r e f o r m e r s w e r e but t r y i n g "to e n g r a f t the new b r a n c h e s of
l e a r n i n g on the decayed t r u n k of the old." 1 3 8 He made an
evaluation of Chinese reformers, sharing Ho Kai's
condemnation of Chang Chi-tung even complimenting Ho Kai for
his having "completely shown up the Hyde and Jekyll" 1 3 ^ of
C h a n g ' s "Exhortation to study". In fact L i m f s e v a l u a t i o n
of c u r r e n t Chinese r e f o r m e r s was to extol K ' a n g Yu-wei as
V o l t a i r e of China and K a n g f s Shi Wu Pao as the immortal
Ency c1 ope die. 1 4° This was one d i f f e r e n c e between Ho and
Lim. While Lim e l e v a t e d K'ang, Ho considered him
d i s q u a l i f i e d to t a l k of W e s t e r n institutions. But on the

163
whole, Ho and Lim were not too far away from their
assessment of Manchu administrative measures including the
disgust over "the unreasonable suspicion which the oliicials
of the Tsungli Yamen have a l w a y s entertained against those
Chinese who have become f r i e n d l y to loreigners and who have
a c q u i r e d a k n o w l e d g e of some f o r e i g n t o n g u e , " 1 4 1 t h a t is,
men like Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng.
But the striking similarity lies in Ho Kai and Lim Boon
Keng extending t h e same p l e a t o t h e f o r e i g n powers for
i n t e r v e n t i o n in C h i n a T s p o l i t i c s and in entrusting the
leadership r o l e to Britain.
"It w i l l be the o b v i o u s duty of the
A l l i e s to procure for the country such an
administration as w i l l save it from
further anti-foreign troubles." 1 4 ^
" P e k i n ought to be w e l l g a r r i s o n e d
with foreign troops until a settled
government has been inaugurated. If the
foreign powers are sincere in maintaining
the i n t e g r i t y of the old E m p i r e , now is
their chance of enforcing upon the r u l e r s
a new policy which, while giving f u l l
p r i v i l e g e s to f o r e i g n e r s , does not
o v e r l o1o4 k the r i g h t of the sons of the
soil." ^
So l i k e Ho K a i , Lim e n t e r t a i n e d the w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g t h a t
these foreign powers would act as "honest brokers" when they
administered China. In the c o n c l u d i n g paragraph, Lim
wrote emphatically,
"We m u s t now c o n c l u d e , the o n l y f u r t h e r
r e m a r k to be made is that the A l l i e s h a v e
at present a rare opportunity of setting
a f i r m basis the r e l a t i o n between
foreigners and Chinese. If independence
is to be granted to the C h i n e s e E m p i r e ,
then let one Power be d e p u t e d to p r o p it
up on sound p r i n c i p l e s . Preferably,

164
 E n g l a n d s h o u l d be that P o w e r , e l i g i b l e
a l i k e on a c c o u n t of her v a s t e x p e r i e n c e
and on account of the undisputed success
of her p o l i c y in E g y p t . O t h e r w i s e let
the A l l i e s f i g h t the M a n c h u s to the
bitter end. Let them r e m o v e the dynasty
and p r o c l a i m a new g o v e r n m e n t by the
people themselves, after consultation
with the f r i e n d l y v i c e r o y s , the literati
and the r e f o r m e r s and w i t h the aid of
foreign powers, a constitutional
oligarchy elected by the o f f i c i a l s and
the literati »144
At the time when China, the mother country, was
humiliated with foreign occupation, both Ho Kai and Lim Boon
Keng w e r e not in u p r o a r but instead c a l l i n g this a g o l d e n
opportunity, were pleading for more foreign intervention so
as to solve C h i n a ' s p r o b l e m once a n d a l l . They both
b e l i e v e d that China was i n c a p a b l e of r e f o r m i n g h e r s e l f
without foreign imposition or assistance. They w e r e , i n
fact, recommending Western medication and operations by
W e s t e r n s u r g e o n s f o r this sick C h i n a m a n w i t h f e e s to be
charged on W e s t e r n terms. There can be no c l e a r e r
e x p l a n a t i o n for this g r e a t c o n f i d e n c e in the W e s t but that
both Ho and Lim had been brought up under these and no other
ideologies or institutions.

Intense tripartite involvement of Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng

in perspective
The c h a p t e r has c o n s i d e r e d Ho Kai and Lim Boon K e n g ' s
tripartite role-playing during those turbulent years of 1895
to 1912. Here is a brief summary.
As a loyal British subject, Ho Kai served the Crown by
f a i t h f u l l y bringing the government closer to the Chinese

165
p o p u l a t i o n in his c a p a c i t y as the Chinese spokesman in the
Legislative Council. He was generally only critical of the
g o v e r n m e n t o v e r e x p e n d i t u r e issues and those p o l i c i e s he
considered as violating the sacredness of the Chinese ways
of l i f e . When c o n f l i c t s arose b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t s of the
Crown and those of the Chinese, he made c o m p r o m i s e s
depending on the issues i n v o l v e d but g e n e r a l l y he allowed
i n t e r e s t s of the w h o l e c o l o n y to come first. Outside the
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , Ho Kai dedicated much of his time,
energy and money to p r o m o t i n g W e s t e r n m e d i c i n e among his
f e l l o w Chinese. In f a c t , he had been thus engaged a l m o s t
immediately after his return to Hong Kong from England in
1882. So during this period while Ho was anxiously seeking
v a r i o u s means to s o l v e the p r o b l e m s of C h i n a ' s d e m i s e , his
a t t e n t i o n s to his p u b l i c d u t i e s w e r e not at all lessened.
As to his c o n c e r n for China, it a l s o s u r f a c e d v e r y e a r l y
starting from his review of Tseng Chi-tse's article in 188?.
Since then, he was in a p e r m a n e n t and persistent quest for
ways to have his mother country reformed. He tried writing
reform essays hoping to have his voice heard. Although he
was writing in English and proposing Western prescriptions,
he showed a genuine understanding of China ! s problems. He
also took other active measures in the years after 1895 when
China f s final collapse seemed imminent. He supported Sun
Yat-sen ! s v e r y f i r s t uprising In 1895* For that, Ho Kai
had always been branded as a revolutionary. But in fact he
was not because he did not support Sun for his r e p u b l i c a n

166
ideas. Not o n l y because at such an e a r l y stage, Sun had not
yet f o r m u l a t e d those ideas but because to Ho K a i , S u n f s coup
was but a means for Ho h i m s e l f to i m p o s e his r e f o r m ideas
which were not r e v o l u t i o n a r y at a l l . He even worked for
Ch T ing government for two months. With the outbreak of the
B o x e r s and the A l l i e d occupation of P e k i n g in 1900, Ho Kai
was f e e l i n g so d e s p e r a t e that he r e s o r t e d to his final
option - t h r o w i n g China's fate into the hands of the
foreigners. He succeeded to persuade the Governor of Hong
Kong to go into conspiracy with him for an independent South
China m o v e m e n t . He w r o t e to p l e a d for f o r e i g n i m p o s i t i o n
and d o m i n a t i o n of the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t . Then when all
had f a i l e d , Ho Kai quitted to see whether the Manchu reforms
announced after 1901 would r e a l l y save China. In all these
i n v o l v e m e n t s , Ho Kai seemed to be m o v i n g v e r y f r e e l y f r o m
one means to a n o t h e r . In a w o r d , Ho Kai had a r a t h e r
pathetic tripartite role-playing. Although he was bidden a
very honoured farewell in 1914» it was in fact a f o r c e d
retirement. He had been pleading for foreign assistance to
China's problems but this never came. The Manchus were not
a b a n d o n e d b y t h e f o r e i g n e r s i n 1900 a n d i n s t e a d w e r e
b o l s t e r e d up. Of c o u r s e , he c o u l d c o n g r a t u l a t e h i m s e l f
when he saw that the Chinese youth, Sun Yat-sen, whom he had
once inspired and supported became the President of the
Chinese R e p u b l i c but again Sun f a i l e d to d e l i v e r China in
1912 and had to y i e l d to Yuan S h i h - k r a i . The e m b o d i m e n t s
of his l i f e - l o n g career w o u l d be the A l i c e Ho M i u Ling
H o s p i t a l and the U n i v e r s i t y of Hong Kong. At least these

167
two institutions did not f a i l him.
As to Lim Boon Keng, who was exercising his tripartite
role-playing in a more heterogeneous society, the nature of
his loyalty complex was more complicated. Lim suffered
f r o m an i d e n t i t y p r o b l e m not f o u n d in Ho K a i . He a l s o
a p p e a r e d to be very conscious of his contradictory
a l l e g i a n c e s and t r i e d to h a r m o n i z e them. W h i l e he was
a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g the W e s t e r n c u l t u r e and c i v i l i z a t i o n
c l o s e r to the S t r a i t s C h i n e s e , he was a l s o a d v o c a t i n g a
Confucian R e v i v a l Movement. And when his dedication to the
promotion of a Chinese identity among his f e l l o w Chinese was
getting so c o n s p i c u o u s and e x t e n s i v e , he r e m e d i e d the
s i t u a t i o n by o p e n l y p l e d g i n g and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g his
l o y a l t y to the B r i t i s h t h r o u g h the f o r m a t i o n of Straits
Chinese B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n . W h i l e Ho Kai g e n e r a l l y
a d v o c a t e d l a i s s e z - f a i r e in r e g a r d to the l i f e of l o c a l
Chinese p o p u l a t i o n , Lim Boon Keng was t r y i n g to r e f o r m it
altogether. As to concern o v e r C h i n a , Lim Boon Keng was
g e n e r a l l y b r a n d e d as r e f o r m i s t because of his connection
w i t h K ! ang Yu-wei. But in the post-Boxer p e r i o d , he o f f e r e d
the same s o l u t i o n as Ho Kai to China ! s demise - f o r e i g n
d o m i n a t i o n of China. Lim had a much i n v o l v e d t r i p a r t i t e
r o l e - p l a y i n g than Ho Kai because he was m o r e c o n s c i o u s of
his paradoxical identity and because he was functioning in a
more complicated society. Besides, Lim started his various
a c t i v i t i e s a f t e r 1895, that is, he was t h r o w n into the
vortex of actions without too much preparation and

168
experience. Besides, Lim lived a much longer life, dying
at the great age of 88. He was both blessed and cursed in
the sense that he could witness how his life-long concerns
such as the Chinese society in Singapore, the British Empire
and China developed or degenerated before his very eyes.

169
 NOTES

I. Hansard, August 29, 1901, p. 46.

2
- Hansard. April 30, 1908, p. 38.
3- Hansard, May 28, 1908, p. 50.
4. Hansard, June 17, 1909, p. 47.
5. Hansard, August 24, 1911, p. 171.
6- Hansard, June 1, 1911, p. 106.
7. Ibid.
8. Hansard, January 25, 1898, pp. 24-25.
9. Hansard, September 17, 1903, p. 56.
10. Hansard, March 7, 1912, p. 18.
II. Hansard, February 26, 1914, p. 29.
12. "Sung Wong Toi" were the words inscribed on a rock by
an Emperor of the Sung Dynasty before he threw himself
into the water and killed himself to avoid his captors.
13. Hansard, August 15, 1898, p. 49-
14. Hansard, November 9, 1911, p. 218.
15- Ibid., p. 219-
16. Hansard, December 21, 1899, p. 40.
17. Hansard, October 19, 1907, p. 59.
18
- Hansard, December 10, 1908, p. 156.
19. Hansard, November 8, 1897, pp. 16-17-
20. Hansard, April 19, 1904, p. 18.
21. Choa, G.H., op. cit., p. 200.
22. Hansard, May 28, 1900, pp. 79-80.
23. Hansard, December 19, 1908, p. 157-

24. Hansard, July 29, 1901, p. 40.

25. Hansard, June 23, 1902, p. 28.

170
26. Ibid.,
27- Ibid.
28
« Hansard, December 3, 1896, p. 2.
29- C . O . 129 412/280, July 31, 1914.
This information has not been utilized by either Chiu,
L.Y. or C h o a , G . H . ,and has been b r o u g h t to this
w r i t e r ' s a t t e n t i o n by Dr. E l i z a b e t h Sinn of H i s t o r y
Department, University of Hong Kong.
30. Alioe Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital 1887-196?, p. 10.
31. Chiu, L . Y . , op. cit., p. 66.
32. Breakdown of Chinese donations:
Chinese Government $ 13,608
Liang-kuang Government $200,000
Weichow Residents $ 92,764
Hongkong Chinese $198,000
Canton Chinese $ 13,971
Saigon Chinese $ 10,000
$528,343
Annual Report 1909, pp. 27-28.
33. Chiu, L.Y., op. oit., p. 66.
34. Ibid., p. 60.
35. Endacott, G.B., op. cit., p. 283*
36- Hansard, March 9, 1911, p. 21.
37- Ibid., p. 22.
38- Hansard, February 26, 1914, pp. 28-29-
39. According to available records, Ho Kai was seldom away
from Hong Kong. During his 24 years in Legislative
Council, he was seldom absent from meetings: two times
in February 1891, once in September 1893, nine times in
1910 and once in April 1912. The frequent absence in
1901 was for health reasons. Recorded evidence of his
being in Mainland China was November 1897.
40. Choa, G.H., op. cit., p. 19-

171
41
* C O , 129 4 0 1 / C o n f i d i e n t l a l , J u n e 1 6 , 1913. This
m a t e r i a l has a g a i n be b r o u g h t to a t t e n t i o n by Dr. L.
Sinn.

42. A f t e r f a i l i n g to get Li H u n g - c h a n g f s a t t e n t i o n , Sun

b e g a n to o r g a n i z e his f o l l o w e r s . In 1894, he f o r m e d
Hsing Chung Hui or R e v i v e China Society in H a w a i i . At
this e a r l y stage, r e p u b l i c a n ideas were not yet c l e a r l y
thought out. Tn J a n u a r y 1895, Sun set out for H o n g
Kong to p l o t for the seizure of Canton. The strategy
was to s e i z e the two s o u t h e r n p r o v i n c e s of K w a n g t u n g
and Kwangsi so as to set up an independent g o v e r n m e n t .
Once s u c c e s s f u l , s i m i l a r p r o v i n c i a l secession w o u l d be
sparked off and the Ch'ing r u l e r s would have no choice
but to a b d i c a t e . Hong K o n g , w i t h its p r o x i m i t y to
South China and its immunity from Chinese j u r i s d i c t i o n
under the protection of the l i b e r a l British c o l o n i a l
g o v e r n m e n t , w o u l d be most ideal to serve as the
r a l l y i n g point for men, arms and funds. In fact it
was f o r this v e r y p u r p o s e o f p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e coup
t h a t the Hong Kong b r a n c h of the H s i n g Hung Hui was
f o r m e d in F e b r u a r y , 1895- The same a m b i g u i t y of
purposes as in Hawaii was pursued. No c l e a r p o l i t i c a l
programmes were made explicit. Thus, it appeared more
as "an ad hoc conspiracy geared for an immediate thrust
of r e g i o n a l d i m e n s i o n s r a t h e r than as a b r o a d l y based
p o l i t i c a l movement with a long-range program."
S c h i f f r i n , H . Z . , o p . c i t . , p. 5 4 *
For more details, see Chapter III.

43- Ibid.
44. Choa, G.H., op. cit., p. 142.

45- Chiu, L.Y., op. cit,, p. 35-

46. Summarized from Choa, G.H., op. cit., pp. 142-144-
47. Summarized from ibid., pp. 144-146.
48. Ibid., pp. 146-148.
49. For details, see Chiu, L . Y . , op. cit., Chapter V I I .
50. Choa, G.H. is of the opinion that Hu Li-yton wrote this
review article. Choa, G . H . , op. cit., p. 149 f f .
C h i u , L.Y. is of the o p i n i o n that Ho Kai w r o t e it.
Chiu, L . Y . , op. cit., p. 215 f f -

51. Choa, G . H . , op. cit.., p. 157-

52. I b i d . , p. 158.

172
53. Ibid.
54. Hsu, I., op. cit., p. 487.
55. Li Hung-chang held these posts from 1870 to 1895. But
for his failing to negotiate easier terms with Japan in
1895, he was removed from these posts.
56. Schiffrin, H.Z., op. cit., p. 204.
57. Ibid., p. 199.
58. Ibid., p. 202.
59. Ibid., p. 206.
60. Choa, G.H., pp. cit,, p. 159.
61. Ibid., p. 161 .
62. Ibid., p. 161.
63. Ibid., p. 162.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., pp. 162-163.
67. Ibid., p. 163.
68. Ying Lien-chih 3k ^ -Z- (1867-1926) was a Manohu
military man. He had no proper school training. He
was baptized in 1888. He was most impressed by Ho
Kai r s works especially after meeting Ho in 1900. He
honoured Ho as the man to lead the reform movement.
The next year, he established Ta Kung Pao in Shanghai.
It was then that he published The True Meaning of the
New Government.
69. Ho Kai r s six articles were
1. 1887 - A Review of Tseng Chi-tse's Article
2. 1894 - Discourse on the New Government
3. 1897 - Foundation of the New Government
4. 1897 -Administration of the New Government
5. 1898 - A Review of K'ang Yu-wei's Speech
6. 1898 - A Review of "Exhortation To Study"

173
70. Seah Liang Seah ?J» ]$, *& (1850-1925), was a rich
Teochew. He had inherited large inheritances from his
father. He served as Legislative Councillor and was
one of the founders of Straits Chinese British
Association.
71. Song, O.S., op. cit., p. 283.
72. Ibid.
73- Ibid., p. 284.
74. Lee, O.K., op. cit., p. 25.
75- Song, O.S., op. cit., p. 298.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.,p. 297.
78. Lee, G.K., op. cit., p. 96.
79. Ibid.
80. Clammer, J.R., op. cit., p. 63.
81. Ibid.
82. Tan Jiak Kim was a rich Chinese who helped found the
Straits Steamship Company. He had inherited large
fortune. He was also a Legislative Councillor.
83. Song, O.S., op. cit., p. 319.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Turnbull, C.M., op. cit., p. 105.
87. Song, O.S., op. cit., pp. 323-324-
88. Ibid., p. 387.
89. Lee, O.K., op. cit., p. 25.
90. Song, O.S., op. cit., p. 327.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 308.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid., p. 333.

174
95* I b i d , , p. 334.
96. I b i d . , p. 310.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99* Ibid.
100. Ib^d., p. 318.
101. I b i d . , p. 320.
102. Ibid.
103. I b i d . , pp. 330-331.
104- T u r n b u l l , C . M . , op. cit., p. 107.
105. I b i d .
106. Clammer, J . R . , op. cit., p. 5.
107. I b i d . , p. 127.
108. I b i d . , p. 5.
109- Y e n , C.H., The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 R e v o l u t i o n
(Kuala L u m p u r , 1976), p. 288.
110. Huang Nai-shang ~yti Jj *&is was born in 1848 in the Min-
ch T ing district of Fukien province. At the age of 18,
he was b a p t i z e d as C h r i s t i a n . In 1894* he passed the
provincial examination and obtained his chti-jen degree.
But then he was a l r e a d y 46. So, he did not pursue his
Chinese classics. He had all the time been concerned
with China's unrest. The same year saw Huang in
Singapore. He became the chief editor of Sing Po Jjj^
x$L/ * p r o m o t i n g K ' a n g Y u - w e i f s r e f o r m ideas. Since
his meeting with Sun Yat»sen in 1900, he was g r a d u a l l y
won o v e r by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y cause and became an
active supporter of Sun. Huang was also well-known for
recruiting his native people to d e v e l o p Sibu.
111. Song, O . S . , op. cit., p. 236.
112* L e e , G . K . , op. cit., p. 14.
113- Y e n , C . H . , op. cit., p. 289*
114- Ibid.

175
115- Ibid., p. 300, n. 101.
116. Song, O.S., op. cit., p. 235*
117- The Straits Chinese Magazines are unfortunately not
available in Hong Kong at the time of research and
writing of this thesis. To get a glimpse of Lim f s
writings, here are the titles of those articles on
education:
"Our Enemies", Straits Chinese Magazine, Vol. I,
No. 2, June 1897, p. 54-
"Straits Chinese Reform 3: The Education of
Children", Ibid., Vol. Ill, No. 11, September
1899, p. 102.
"Ethical Education for the Straits Chinese",
Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1904, pp. 25-30.
"Thinking and Observation in relation to National
Progress", Ibid., Vol. 8, No. 4, December 1904,
pp. 184-188.
Lee, G.K., op. cit., Appendix I.
118. Khoo Seok-wan was born in China in 1874. He was a
traditional Chinese scholar obtaining his chti-jen
degree at 21. He inherited rich fortune from his
father. He was among the reformist leaders of
Singapore. Later, he shifted to support Ch!ing
government.
119. Song, O.S., op. cit., pp. 305-306.
120. Ibid., p. 306.
121. Chen, M.H., The E a r l y Chinese Newspapers of Singapore
1881-1912, (Singapore, 1967), p. 76.
122. T h i s h a d b e e n t h e h a i r - s t y l e f o r m e n s i n c e the
establishment of the C h f i n g Dynasty in 1644-
123. Song, O . S . , op. cit., p. 303.
124. Some titles on Confucianism p u b l i s h e d on the Straits
Chinese Magazine were: -
"Confucian Cosmogony and Theism", V o l . V I I I , No,
2, June 1904-
"Confucian View of Human Nature", Vol. V I I , No. 3*
September 1904*

176
 "Basis of C o n f u c i a n Ethics", V o l . V I I I , No. 4,
December 1904.
"The Confucian Code of Filial Piety", V o l . IX, No.
1, March 1905.
"The Confucian Cult", Vo. IX, No. 2, June 1905-
"The Confucian Ideal", Vol. IX, No. 3, September
1905.
"The Confucian Doctrine of Brotherly Love", Vol.
IX, No. 4, December 1905.
"The Status of Chinese Women Under a Confucian
Regime", Vo. X, No. 4, December 1906.
"The Confucian Ethics of Friendship", Vo. XI, No.
2, June 1907-
Lim also wrote two books on Confucianism, The Great
War from the Confucian Point of View (1918) and The
Quintessence of Chinese Culture(1951).
Lee, O.K., op. cit., Appendix II.
125* F o r d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o n L i m B o o n K e n g ' s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C o n f u c i a n i s m , see Lee, O.K.,
op. cit., Chapter III.
126. Mei Ching, op. cit., p. 125.
127. Song, O . S . , op. cit., p. 235-
128. Yen, C.H., "The Confucian R e v i v a l Movement in Singapore
and Malaya, 1899-1911", p. 42.
129- I b i d . , p. 44.
130. I b i d . , p. 45-
131. I b i d . , pp. 51-52.
132. Reith, G.M.. was the editor. He highly recommended
the book as instructive, informative, peculiar and
unique.
133. Wen Ching, Chinese Crisis from Within, (Singapore,
1901), Preface.
134. Ibid., p. 307.
135. Ibid., pp. 326-327-
136. Ibid., p. 288.

177
137. Ibid., p. 49-
138. Ibid., p. 39.
139. Ibid., p. 22.
140. Ibid., Chapter III.
141. Ibid., p. 260.
142. Ibid., p. 287.
143. Ibid., p. 67.
144. Ibid., p. 260.

178
 Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

The tripartite loyalty phenomenon of Ho Kai and Lim

Boon Keng was both a product of the times and of their own
making. Tripartite loyalty is here to sum up their three
roles, as loyal British subjects, as promoters of local

Chinese welfare and as overseas Chinese concerned with

China!s fate.

Ho Kai in Hong Kong and Lim Boon Keng in Singapore were

able to become elites of the colonial regimes because they
themselves were products of colonialism. They received a
Western education and adopted the Western faith. They were
appointed to serve the colonial governments by bridging the

gap between the Chinese subjects and the British rulers.

In the eyes of their fellow Chinese, they were respected

because of their closeness with the governments. As social

leaders, they took it onto themselves to promote local

wo 1 f a r o . At tho namo t i m e , whon thoy naw C h i tin in

trouble, they immediately recommended what they were

enjoying - Western institutions as the remedies. They
carried on such contradictory role-playing of sometimes
defying their colonial masters by fighting for local
communal good and other times by interfering in the affairs
of a country they had given up their own nationality because
the British colonial masters tolerated. All these were
only possible because the British were lenient though wary

and they were cautious not to step overboard.

179
 Both Ho Kai and Lim Boon K e n g w e r e u n i q u e in that at
t h e i r own t i m e s and in t h e i r own s o c i e t i e s , t h e r e w e r e no
other Chinese of t h e i r s t a t u s and b a c k g r o u n d b e i n g so
tripartitely involved. There were men who were Legislative
C o u n c i l l o r s and enthusiasts in promoting local Chinese
welfare and might even be generous philanthropists in
donations to h e l p victims of natural disasters in China, but
there were no Chinese L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l l o r s like Ho Kai
and Lim Boon Keng who got themselves so h e a v i l y and
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y i n v o l v e d in the fate oi China*
Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng did demonstrate differences in
their tripartite i n v o l v e m e n t . Ho was less conscious of his
own p e c u l i a r i d e n t i t y - a W e s t e r n i z e d C h i n e s e e l i t e and
t h e r e f o r e did not h a v e to w o r k h a r d to r e s o l v e rt. But Lim
Boon Keng was a c u t e l y a w a r e of his own i d e n t i t y and s t r o v e
to r e m e d y his ignorance of the Chinese c u l t u r e . He
projected these sentiments onto his own f e l l o w Chinese and
sought to r e f o r m the w h o l e society by promoting the
Confucian R e v i v a l Movement. This could have resulted from
their d i f f e r e n t f a m i l y background and d i f f e r e n t experiences
in Britain.
Both Ho Kai and Lim Boon Keng w e r e men to be respected
because their t r i p a r t i t e i n v o l v e m e n t was not to serve any
tangible self interests of their own.

180
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