St. Clement of Alexandria - The Theory of Knowledge

UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA
F A C U L T A D ECLESIÁSTICA DE FILOSOFÍA
BONIFACE N. OKAFOR
THE THEORY
OF KNOWLEDGE
IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
Extracto de la Tesis Doctoral presentada en la Facultad Eclesiástica

de Filosofía de la Universidad de Navarra
PAMPLONA
1993
Ad normam Statutorum Facultatis Philosphiae Universitatis
Navarrensis, perlegimus et adprobavimus
Dr. Marianus ARTIGAS Dr. Modestus SANTOS
Coram Tribunali, die 19 mensis septembris, anno 1990, hanc

dissertationem ad Lauream Candidatus palam defendit
Secretarius Facultatis
Dr. Ioseph Emmanuel ZUMAQUERO
Excerpta e Dissertationibus in Philosophia

Vol. III, n. 2
PROLOGUE
Many attempts have been made to present a biography of

Clement of Alexandria from the point of view of his life and
works. Suffice it to refer to some of such studies and to highlight
some fundamental aspects that pertain to the interest of the scope
of our study . Although Clement of Alexandria has been called
1
the father of speculative theology, later to be greatly developed by

St Augustine and St. Thomas, the aim of our research work has
been to elaborate the theory of knowledge that lies behind Cle-
ment's speculative thought. In a way, it could be said that we
have aimed at grasping Clement's conception of knowledge, the
asystematic or multisystematic nature of his writings not withstan-
ding .
2
From Clement's own account, there is no doubt that

Platonism was his main philosophical formation and that he went
in great quest for knowledge and studied under several Christian
thinkers . The most esteemed of these, by Clement; is Pantaenus
3
the founder of the Alexandrian school whom Clement later suc-

ceeded as the head of the school. About him Clement says:
«When I came upon the last (he was the first in power), having
traced him out concealed in Egypt, I found rest. He, the true, the
Sicilian bee, gathering the spoil of the flowers, of the prophetic
and apostolic meadow, engendered in the soul of his hearers a
deathless element of knowledge* . In this regard, W. Wilson
4
rightly affirms in his introductory note to the English translation

that: «Titus Flavius Clemens, the illustrious head of the Cate-
quetical School at Alexandria at the close of the second century,
was originally a pagan philosopher. On embracing Christianity, he
eagerly sought the instructions of its most eminent teachers; for
this purpose traveling extensively over Greece, Italy, Egypt,
Palestine and other regions of the East» . 5
Among Clement's extant writings, the three major ones are

the Protrepticus or The Exhortation to the Heathens, Paedagogus or
The Instructor and Stromata or The Miscellanies. Of these three, the
92 BONIFACE N. OKAFOR
Stromata is the most philosophical in content. Other works in-

clude Excerpt ex Theodoto, the Prophetic Eclogues, and Quis Dives
Salvetur as well as fragments from the Hypotyposeis. Many of his
others works have been lost. The issue of the relationship bet-
ween his three major works, often referred to as a trilogy, has at-
tracted a lot of attention and commentaries . Osborn has
6
highlighted some aspects of Clement's style and thought with par-

ticular reference to the Stromata. He rightly observes that to get
into Clement's thought is to get into a labyrinth of thought. His
works show an asystematic presentation of ideas expressed in sym-
bolic and enigmatic language.
Clement's thought is generaly accepted as asystematic in view
of the fact that he is not restricted to one previous philosophical
system nor school. His eclectic approach to knowledge leads him
to accept whatever has been well said by any philosophical
school . As a consequence of this approach to knowledge, Jewish,
7
Greek and Alexandrian speculative heritage are united and employed

by Clement for the exposition of the Christian wisdom. Hence Cle-
ment's unpreparedness to limit himself to only one system of
thought, reflects his recognition of the universal nature of truth.
It also shows his eclectic approach to knowledge, his appreciation
for the truth in each philosophical school and his conviction that
no single system could exclusively explain all he had to say. Fur-
thermore his use of symbolism, a persistent characteristic of Cle-
ment's thought, is an attempt to reflect the hidden complexity of
the relationships between things and therefore between the ideas
of our knowledge of them.
Although some studies have been carried out on Clement's
thought from philosophical, theological, and patristic points of
view, little has been done on the theory of knowledge behind
Clement's whole thought: his concept of Knowledge and the ap-
proach to knowledge. Our research work is therefore a contribu-
tion in this direction. Taking into account the eclectic nature of
Clement's thought, we have a special effort to marshal and
systematize the relevant textual evidence for what would con-
stitute Clement's gnoseological view and his theory of knowledge.
Hence as much as possible our author has been allowed to speak
for himself. Although Clement of Alexandria never produced a
systematic work on gnoseology, one can grasp what would con-
PROLOGUE 93
stitute his theory of knowledge from the apparently unconnected

parts and ideas of his works. To this end we have tried to give
abundant references in connection with the topics discussed. This
is clearly an advantage of this study.
In considering Clement's approach to the problem of
knowledge it would be a wrong impression to think that Clement
was actually concerned with the elaboration of a theory of
knowledge for its own sake or as a philosophical method. Cle-
ment never sat down to develop systematically a theory of
knowledge as many of the modern and contemporary
philosophers have tended to do thus giving rise to the different
epistemology-centered philosophical systems. In these philosophical
systems the theory of knowledge is the foundation for further
development as is manifested by the different critiques of the
human understanding as the starting point of any philosophical
speculation.
The core of Clement's originality and merit is intimately
connected with his use of the Hellenic philosophical ideas to con-
vey a harmonious synthesis of a true philosophy. This has been
rightly expressed by E.F. Osborn when he affirms that, «to be in-
troduced to Clement of Alexandria is to be asked a riddle. Here
is a man whose thought is scattered and eclectic but whose
answers to philosophical questions are illuminating and to the
point. The answer to the riddle is that Clement is at once break-
ing up old systems and creating a new synthesis» . Consequently
8
in whatever may constitute Clement's theory of knowledge it is

no surprise that he employs notions and terminologies belonging
to the philosophical schools before him. Hence many ideas taken
from Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and neo-Platonists are frequently
to be found in Clement's notion of knowledge as we are to see
from the many references that Clement makes to these different
philosophical systems.
At the core of Clement's thought as a philosopher, as a
Christian or as a gnostic, lies an authentic and original view of
knowledge which is reflected in the expression of his ideas. As
would be expected, references to his works would reflect both
philosophical and theological aspects as well as aspects deriving
from the cultural milieu in which Clement developed his thought.
This fact is nothing rather than a consequence of the nature of
Clement's thought. Hence the christian truth is an essential ele-

ment in his conception of knowledge, as expressed by his works.
In view of the aspects that we have highlighted so far in
this prologue, our research work has involved the search for
related ideas in reference to the theory of knowledge behind our
author's thought. This is better appreciated when it is borne in
mind that Clement puts down in writing the ideas that come to
his mind when they do and consequently related ideas are to be
found scattered in different parts of his writings.
From the vast range of topics dealt with by Clement, we
have focused on the most fundamental themes of his thought
which most readily reflect his theory of knowledge and his ap-
proach to knowledge. These themes include: 1) Clement's theory
of the Logos as a metaphysical and a gnoseological principle. 2)
The acts of the intellect in the process of knowledge. 3) The role
of belief in the act of knowledge. 4) Contemplation. 5) Clement's
conception of wisdom.
Through the discussion of these topics we tried to present
the constitutive ideas of Clement's gnoseology with the aim of
providing a better understanding of his theory of knowledge. We
have also strived to see to what extent the fundamental aspects of
the theory of knowledge of the main Greek thinkers later to be
found in such great christain thinkers as St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas are already present in Clement of Alexandria.
The first chapter of our study deals with Clement's idea of
the Logos. According to Clement the Logos is a metaphysical and
a gnoseological principle. The divine Logos is considered as the
model of the human spiritual intellect possessed by all men as the
ordinary faculty of knowledge. Clement also maintains that man
counts with an additional principle of knowledge - the divine in-
spiration through the Logos. Thus natural intellectual apprehension
as well as supernatural inspiration and revelation are indispensable
elements in Clement's theory of knowledge
Furthermore chapter II will also deal with some essential
aspects of Clement's logic and his evaluation of the language-
concepts-reality relationship. In this context Clement emphasizes
the need for rigorous definition and distinguishes between
demonstration, syllogism, analysis and rhetoric. He criticizes
suspension of judgement and philosophical scepticism while he
PROLOGUE 95
upholds the utility of true dialectics. Clement's theory of symbolism

will also be considered in this chapter. This would enable us to
appreciate why he is of the view that reality is complex and so
is our knowledge of it. Consequently the most sublime truths are
not immediately apprehended by the intellect but being hidden
they are grasped through symbols.
Clement attributes very important roles to the will and in-
tellect in his conception of knowledge. Clement's conception of
the voluntary nature of knowledge is seen in his theory of pistis
in which he intends to develop a doctrine of belief. The general
thesis is that (from the point of view of its cause) knowledge is
a voluntary act and consequently one would not know if one
does not will to know or if one is sceptical about all truth.
Chapter III, titled Belief, deals with Clement's theory of
pistis. The aim is to see what role Clement attributes to the will
in human knowledge and the corresponding priorities of the in-
tellect and the will in this regard. Clement's theory of belief
which is of Stoic origin has many incorporated Aristotelican and
Christian elements of knowledge and truth. He considers
knowledge as a voluntary act and the question has been put for-
ward as to whether Clement could be accused of intellectual
voluntarism.
In chapter IV Clement's notion of contemplation as intellec-
tual vision and the object of contemplation are dealt with. He
stresses the fact that intellectual and moral separation from matter
are necessary for perfect contemplation. The idea of perfect
knowledge as contemplation is treated by Clement in knowledge
of God. The imperfect knowledge of God through the contempla-
tion of the universe when perfected culminates in the direct con-
templation of God, the most sublime object of knowledge.
One of the fundamental ideas that runs through Clement's
conception of knowledge is that of analogy. This is very much
linked with his notion of contemplation. Mirror imagery and the
idea of reflection in contemplation form part of Clement's
paradigm of knowledge.
Clement's notion of wisdom transcends mere natural human
wisdom or practical knowledge. His concept of wisdom comprises
philosophical, theological and the Christian gnosis. Wisdom ought
to lead to the possession of the eternal and unchangeable habit of

contemplation which is at the same time operative on to complete
perfection.
The last chapter deals with Clement's conception of wisdom
which comprises the knowledge of things both human and divine.
Philosophical and Christian truths, gnosis and the ultimate direct
contemplation of God are considered by Clement as a continuous
and related gradation of wisdom. Among other topics, the discus-
sion in this chapter will center on Clement's notion of
philosophy as a gnoseological instrument of divine Providence in
history. As regards philosophical wisdom, Clement conception of
philosophy as a divine gnoseological instrument in history is quite
original. Clement's concept of the true philosophy is unques-
tionably eclectic. At the core of Clement's eclecticism is his view
that truth is one and universal.
Style of Quotations
J.J. Sanguineti has already presented some aspects on the

manuscripts, editions and translations of Clement's works . We 9
therefore only wish to give some additional information on the

translations and editions of Clement's works from the books con-
sulted. (See the Appendix of the present study).
For quotations from the writings of Clement the texts used
include:
W. Wilson, Clement of Alexandria (Prot., Paed., Str., and
Fragments) English transl., in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, American
Reprint of the Edinburgh Edition, Vol. II, Eerdmans, Michigan
1983.
Alieto Pieri, Clemente Alessandrino, Protreptico ai Greci, Edi-
zione Paoline, Ancona 1966.
Giovanni Pini, Clemente Alessandrino, Stromati, Note di Vera
Filosofia, Introd., trad, e note, Edizione Paoline, Milano 1985.
The numbering in the Stahlin-Friichtel text has been used to
correlate the numbering in the quotations. The quotations from Stro-
mata Bk. VIII are mainly from the English translation mentioned
above owing to the impossibility of obtaining other editions.
PROLOGUE 97
Before going further to consider the topics that we have

outlined above, we should mention the way in which the
references to Clement's works have been made.
Prot. VI, 67: refers to the Protrepticus, Chapter VI, paragraph
67 (Edizione Paoline).
References to the Paedagogus and to the Stromata comprise
of four numbers. The first two roman numerals refer to the book
and the corresponding chapter respectively.
Paed. I.VI, 36.6: refers to the Paedagogus., Book I, Chapter
VI, paragraph 36.6 (Stahlin-Friichtel divisions as presented in the
Italian Translations mentioned above by Edizione Paoline)
Str. VII.XII, 71.3: refers to the Stromata, Book VII, Chapter
XII, paragraph 71.3 (Cfr. the reference to the Paedagogus)
In the present excerptum we have limited ourselves to
highlighting the main constitutive aspects of Clement's theory of
knowledge to be found especially in chapters II and III of the
thesis, viz. the roles of the intellect and the will in our author's
theory of knowledge. Becasuse of the limited scope of the present
work we have therefore left out some parts of the above two
chapters as well as prescinded completely of the contents of
chapters I, IV and V of the main study. The aspects that have
been left out are nevertheless necessary for a complete understan-
ding of the theory of knowledge in Clement's thought.
I wish to use this opportunity to thank all those who in
one way or another have contributed to the accomplishment of
this work. My special thanks to D. Juan José Sanguineti for his
timely suggestions and advice during the elaboration of the thesis,
as well as for his taking pains to read and correct the typescripts.
My gratitude to D. José Angel Garcia Cuadrado, Josemaria
Pastor and José Maria Valero for their technical assistance without
which it would have been more arduous to complete this work.
NOTES
1. For some ideas on Clement's biography cfr. Eusebio, Hist. Eccl. VI, 11.6
and 14.9 who presents quite a good amount of information on Clement;
Giovanni Pini, Clemente Alessandrino Stromati Note di Vera Filosofia, In-
trod. trad, e note, Edizione Paoline Milano 1985, pp. 9-10; R. B. Tollinton,
Clement of Alexandria, London 1914; G Lazzati, Introduzione allo Studio
di Clemente Alessandrino, Milano 1939; J . Patrick, Clement of Alexandria
(Edinburgh, 1914) pp. 65 and 106-7; R.P. Casey, Clement of Alexandria and
the Beginning of Christian Platonism; «Harvard Theological Review» 18,
1925, pp. 139-41, who rightly stresses the role which Philo played in the
formation of Christian Platonism (p. 45).
2. Clement's thought represents an effort to give a philosophical vision of
Christianity using the philosophical systems of his time.
3. Cfr.Str. I.I, 11.1; II.II, 8.
4. Str. I.I, 11.2-3. The above passage hints at Pantaenus' eclectic approach to
knowledge which no doubt must have influenced Clement.
5. W . Wilson, Clement of Alexandria English transí., in The Ante-Nicene
Fathers, American Reprint of the Edinburgh Edition, Vol. II, EERDMANS
Michigan 1983, p. 166.
6. Cfr. for instance, G. Lazzati, Introduzione allo Studio di Clemente Alessan-
drino, Milano 1939, pp. 1-35; C. Mondésert, in his introduction to the
Stronzata Bk. I, «Source Chrét», Paris 1951 pp. Uff.; E. Osborn, The
Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge 1957, pp. l-12ff.
7. It is important to point out here that this good eclectic attitude found in
Clement, is also characteristic of the great Christian thinkers as exemplified
by St. Thomas Aquinas' synthesis. Hence one of the motives for studying
Clement's gnoseological aspects.
8. E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge, 1957, p.
13.
9. Cfr. J . J . Sanguined, La Paideia Cristiana de Clemente de Alejandría, Diss.,
Rome 1968, pp. 5-25.
THESIS INDEX
Pag
ABBREVIATIONS
INTRODUCTION 1
A. Clement's Love and Search for Knowledge 3

B. Thought and Works 4
C. The Present Study 9
D. Style of Quotations 3
CHAPTER I: C L E M E N T S T H E O R Y O F T H E L O G O S , G N O S E O L O G I C A L A S P E C T S 16
A. The Nature and Origin of Clement's Notion of the Logos 18

B. The Logos, a Metaphysical Principle 26
C. The Logos, an Ontological Gnoseological Principle 35
D. The Logos and the Human Intellect 40
E. The Human Logos and Inspired Knowledge 45
CHAPTER II: T H E A C T S O F T H E I N T E L L E C T A N D ITS O B J E C T S 53
A. Cognitive Powers 55
1. Anthropological Aspects 55
2. The Intellect 63
3. The Role of Sense Perception 69
4. Abstraction and Object of the Intellect 74
B. Clement's Notion of Logic 80
1. Language-Concepts-Reality 82
2. Demonstration 86
3. Rigorous Definition 92
4. Judgement and Philosophical Scepticism 99
5. Dialectic 105
C. Symbolic Knowledge HI
1. The Theory of Symbolism 112
2. Universal Domain of Symbolism 116
3. Origin of Clement's Symbolism 118
4. Examples and Justification of Symbolism 122
CHAPTER III: T H E T H E O R Y O F BELIEF 129
A. The Doctrine of Assent 132
B. Clement's Theory of Pistis 136

1. Pistis as assent to evident knowledge and to first principles 138
2. Preconception or Intellectual Anticipation 145
3. Pistis as the firm conviction of the human mind 149
4. Pistis and Religious Knowledge 153
5. Ordinary and Perfect Pistis 161
C. Knowledge Through Perfection of Pistis 164
D. The Will and the Act of Knowledge 172

1. Knowledge a Voluntary Act: a Rational Choice 173
2. Priority of the Will and of the Intellect 175
E. Believe in Order to Understand 178
CHAPTER IV: CONTEMPLATION 184
A. Concept of Contemplation: Intellectual Vision and Speculation . 186

1. The Object of Contemplation 190
2. Clement's Use of Contemplation 193
3. Contemplation and Separation from Matter 195
B. Mirror Imagery and Contemplation 198

1. The Idea of Reflection 200
2. Origin and Clement's Use of Mirror Imagery 203
3. Mirroring and Gnoseological Mirrors 204
C. Knowledge of God through Contemplation 207

1. Through Natural Contemplation 210
2. Supernatural Contemplation (Mainly of Christian Origin) .... 220
D. Intellectual Mysticism 226
CHAPTER V: KNOWLEDGE AS W I S D O M 231
A. Philosophical Wisdom 233

1. Philosophy in History 233
2. Origin of Greek Philosophy 236
3. Evaluation of Greek Philosophy 241
4. Eclecticism 250
B. Reason and Faith 256

1. Clement's Conception of the True Philosophy 262
2. Concept of Christian Philosophy 268
3. Utility of Philosophy 272
4. Limitations of Philosophy and Supremacy of Faith 275
THESIS INDEX 101
C. Gnosis 281
1. The Nature of Clement's Gnosis 282
2. Gnosis: Wisdom per se (Perfect knowledge of things human
and divine) 290
3. The Perfect Gnostic 292
CONCLUSIONS 297
APPENDIX 310
BIBLIOGRAPHY , 314
A. References to Classical and Patristic Texts 315

B. Principal Reference works 316
C. Articles Consulted 320
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CLEMENT'S W O R K S A N D SOME TRANSLATIONS
STÄHLIN, O , Clemens Alexandrinus (Dei Griechischen Christlichen Schrift-

steller, Leipzig, 4 vol., 1905-1936.
— Vol. I. Protrepticus und Paedagogus (1st. Ed. 1905; 2nd. Ed. 1936).
— Vol. II. Stromata I-VI (1st. Ed. 1906; 2nd. Ed. 1936; rev. Ed. by L.
Friichtel, Berlin 1960).
— Vol. III. Stromata VII-VIII; Expcerpta ex Theodoto; Eclogae Propheticae;
Quis divies salvetur; Fragments; 1909.
— Vol. IV, Register, 1936.
Editions and Translations
STÄHLIN, O., Clemens von Alexanreia, Ausgewählte Schriften (Protr., Ped.,

Q.D.S., Strom., trad, intro). Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, Vols. 7, 8, 17, 19,
20; Munich, 1934-1938.
STÄHLIN-FRÜCHTEL text, «Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei
Jahrhunderte, Berlin»,):.
— Vol. I, Protrepticus and Paedagogus (2nd. Ed. 1960).
— Vol. II, Stromata Bks. I-VI rev. ed. by Friichtel, Berlin 1960.
— Vol. III, Stromata Bk. VII-VIII; Excerpta ex Theodoto; and other fragments.
English Translations
WILSON, W., Clement of Alexandria (Protr., Ped, Strom., Eclog. and Fragments) in
Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Edinburgh, 4 Vols.; 4, 12, 22, 24, 1867-1872;
London 3 Vols. 4, 12, 24 and reprinted in Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. II in
New York 1887, 1909.
BUTTERWORTH, G. W., Clement of Alexandria Exhortation to the Greeks. The
rich man's salvation. To the newly baptized. Loeb Classical Library Edn., Lon-
don 1919.
OULTON, J.E.L., and Chadwick, H , Alexandrian Christianity in (Library of
Christian Classics, Vol. 2, 1954) contains Stromata Bks. Ill and IV.
HORT, F.J.A. and Mayor, J.B., Clement of Alexandria's Miscellanies, Bk. VII,
(text, and com.) London 1902.
CASEY, R.P., The Excerpta of Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (with intr. and
notes), London 1934.
ROBERTS, A., D.D., and Donaldson J . , LL.D., Editors, Clement of Alexandria

(entire) in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, American Reprint of the Edinburgh Edi-
tion, Vol. II. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1983.
French Translations
MONDÉSERT, C , et Plassart, A., Le Protreptique (texte, intr. notes) Ed. Sources

chrétiennes, 2, 2e éd. Paris 1949.
M A R R O U , H.I., et Harl, M., Le Pédagogue I (texte, trad. intr. notes) Ed. Sources
chrétiennes, 70, Paris 1960.
MONDESERT, C , et MARROU, H.I., Le Pédagogue II, Ed. S.C., 108, Paris 1965.
MONDESERT, C, MATRAY, C, MARROU, H.I., Le Pédagogue III, Ed. S.C., 158,
Paris 1970.
MONDESERT, C., et Caster, M., Stromata I, Ed. S.C., 30, Paris 1951.
MONDÉSERT, C , et Camelot, P., Stromata II, Ed. S.C., 38, Paris 1954.
BARDY, G., Clément d'Alexandrie (intr. extrait trad., notes), Paris 126.
LE BOULLUEC, Stromata V (texte and trad. Vol. 1., corn. Vol. 2.).
Italian Translations
PlNI, G., Clemente Alessandrino, Stromati, Note di Vera Filosofia, (intr. trad.
note), Edizione Paoline, Milano 1985.
PIERI, A., Clemente Alessandrino, Protreptico ai Greci, (intr., trad., note a cura
del Prof. Alieto PIERI), Edizioni Paoline, Alba 1967.
PIERI, A., C'è salvezza per il ricco?, a cura di A . PIERI.
PIERI, A., Stornata, a cura di A. PIERI.
P I E R I , A., Pedagogo, a cura di A. P I E R I .

Neri, E., Clemente Alessandrino, Il Pedagogo, Siena Cantagalli 1928.
BOATTI, A., Clemente Alexandrinus, Il Pedagogo, (trad. ital. del Sac. Prof. Boat-
ti Abele), Soc. Ed. Internazionale, Torino 1912, 1937, 1953.
Bianco, Maria Grazia, Clemente Alessandrino, Il Protrettico; Il Pedagogo, (a cura di
M.G., Bianco), Unione Tipografico —editrice torinese, Torino 1971.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. REFERENCES T O CLASSICAL A N D PATRISTIC TEXTS
ALBINUS, Didaskalikos.
ARISTOTLE, Works. Edited by W . D . Ross, Oxford.
ARISTOTLE, De Mundo.
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics..
ARISTOTLE, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analalytics.
ARISTOTLE, Topics.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 105
ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, ed. by F. Susemihl, Lipsiae 1882.

EUSEBIUS, Historia Ecclesiastica. V . l l , 3-4; VI.6, 1.
JUSTIN, Dialogue.
JUSTIN, Apologia I. and II.
PHILO, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit., 48; 230-231.
PLATO, Works: Epinomis.
PLATO, Episteme. VII.
PLATO, Laws.
PLATO, Meno.
PLATO, Phaedo.
PLATO, Phaedrus.
PLATO, Protagoras..
PLATO, Sophist.
PLATO, Symposium.
PLATO, The Republic.
PLATO, The Statesman.
PLATO, Theaetetus.
PLATO, Timaeus.
PLOTINUS, Ennéades.
PLUTARCH, Moralia, English transi, by F.C. Babbitt and H.N. Fowler, London
1927.
PORPHRY, Alcibiades .
SEXTUS EMPIRUCUS., Adversus Physicos.
SEXTUS EMPIRUCUS., Adversus Mathematicos. BK. VII. ed. by H. Mutschmann,
Lipsiae 1914.
B. PRINCIPAL REFERENCE W O R K S
ARMIN, von I., De Octavo dementis Stromateorum libro, Rostock Progr., 1894.
ATONELLI, M.T., Encicliopedia Filosofica, Edipem, Roma, 1979, p. 508.
BAILEY, Epicurus. The Extant Remains, Oxford, 1926, p. 415.
B A U R , F . C , Die Christliche Gnosis oder die Christliche Religionsphilosophie in
ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Tübingen, 1835.
BERTHELOT, translation of Syriac text of Zosimus, La Chimie au moyen âge,
Paris 1893 p. 262.
BlGG, C , The Christian Platonist of Alexandria, 2nd. ed., Oxford, 1913.
BOLL, F., Vita Contemplativa, 1922.
CAMELOT, P.Th., Foi et Gnose. Introduction à l'étude de la connaissance mystique
chez Clément d'Alexandrie, Paris, 1945.
C H A D W I C K , H., Early Christian Thought and the Clasical Tradition, Studies in
Justin, Clement and Origen, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1987.
C L E V E L C A . , D.D. The Ante-Nicene Fathers American edition, vol. II, Eerdmans,
Michigan, 1983.
COPLESTON, F., S.J. A History of Philosophy Vol. II. Mediaeval Philosophy

Augustine to Scotus, Newman, Westminster, Maryland, 1952, p. 26.
DANIÉLOU, J . , Hist, des Doctrines Chrét. avant Nicée: I. Theologie du Judeo-Christ.
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Tournai 1958-1961; Trad, hai., Bologna, 1975.
D E F A Y E , E., Clément d'Alexandrie, Paris 1898.
D E F A Y E , E., Clément d'Alexandrie, Etudes sur les rapports du Christianisme et de
la philosophie grecque au II. siècle, Paris, 1898, 2nd ed. 1906.
DODS, M., Clement of Alexandria, Prophets of the Christian Faith, London,
1897.
DUPONT, J . , Gnosis. La Connaissance Religieuse dans les Epitres de Saint Paul,
Louvain/Paris, 1957.
Dr. GEMOLL, G., Vocabolario Greco-Italian, ed. Remo Sandron, Firenze 1922 p.
355.
ERNST, W., De Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum libro octavo qui fertur, Diss.
Gröttingen, 1910.
FERGUSON, J . , Clement of Alexandria, New York, Twanyne Publishers, 1974.
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a
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Dr. C. J . De Voget, et al., Assen, 1973.
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«Vigil. Christ.», 9, 1955, pp. 148-158.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 109
ABBREVIATIONS
Ed. Edition.
Paed. Paedagogus.
Prot. Proptrepticus.
Str. Stronzata.
PCA. Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria.
CQ. Classical Quartrely.
CSCG. Clement of Alexandria; A Study in Christian Platonism and
Gnosticism.
Clem. Clement.
Com. Commentaries.
S.C. Sources Chrétiennes.
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
An approach to understanding the theory of knowledge

embedded in Clement's thought is a general consideration of his
approach to the problem of human knowledge. To this end a search
in Clement's thought for his ideas on man's capacity to acquire
true knowledge of the reality, the roles of a sense perception, the
intellect and the will in the act of knowledge would no doubt throw
much light on his theory of knowledge. This would also show Cle-
ment as a realist philosopher, his platonic philosophical inclination
notwithstanding.
I. T H E A C T S O F T H E I N T E L L E C T A N D ITS O B J E C T S
In this section we wish to deal with some general considera-

tions connected with Clement's theory of knowledge. What is
really Clement's approach to the problem of knowledge? Accor-
ding to Clement can man acquire true knowledge of reality and
how is this possible? What are the roles of sense perception, the
intellect and the will in the act of knowledge? Answers to the
above and other related questions will no doubt throw light on
Clement's theory of knowledge as well as show Clement as a
realist philosopher, his platonic philosophical inclination not-
withstanding. There are many Aristotelican elements of knowledge
in our author's gnoseological theory although Stoic influence is
not lacking. In fact, it has been said that «Clement's approach to
the problem of knowledge is rather Aristotelican than Stoic» . 1
This is quite understandable when it is taken into account that

Clement considers sensation as one of the pillars of truth , and 2
regards sense perception as prior to intellectual apprehension.

As we let Clement speak for himself, his theory of

knowledge would gradually unfold, in answering the questions put
forth above. It would be convenient first of all, to examine what
notion of man Clement has and to see what roles he gives to the
human cognitive faculties.
A. Cognitive Powers
1. Anthropological Aspects
According to Clement the study of gnosis is to be preceded

by the study of nature. This idea is evidently expressed by Cle-
ment when he affirms in the opening chapter of Stromata Bk. IV
that «The science of nature, then, or rather observation, as con-
tained in the gnostic tradition according to the rule of the truth,
depends on the discussion concerning cosmogony, ascending
thence to the department of theology» . 3
Similarly Clement says that in accordance with the deepest

contemplation of the knowledge which proceeds from the creation
of the world, to the renowned and venerable canon of tradition,
the study of nature has to come first . Thus by «setting before
4
us what according to natural contemplation necessarily has to be

treated beforehand clearing off what stands in the way of this ar-
r a n g e m e n t , we are better prepared for the reception of the
5
tradition of perfect knowledge . 6
This way of proceeding as expressed in the above paragraph

is transposed by Clement to his consideration of the nature of
man and his rational faculties considering that the expression
know thyself, for instance, «may be an injunction to the pursuit of
knowledge* , and affirming that «it is not possible to know the
7
parts without the essence of the whole* ; he explains that «one

8
must study the genesis of the universe, that thereby we may be

able to learn the nature of man» . 9
Consequently Clement's view of man is very much inspired

in the Christian notion of man. «Is not man, then rightly said «to
have been made in the image of God?» —not in form of his [cor-
poreal] structure; (but inasmuch as God creates all things by the
Word, ...) and the Gnostic performs good actions by the in-
THE THEORY O F K N O W L E D G E IN CLEMENT O F A L E X A N D R I A 113
tellect» . Clement sees this likeness to God in man's spiritual

10
faculty. «For conformity with the image and likeness is not meant
of the body (for it were wrong for what is mortal to be made
like what is immortal), but in mind and reason on which fittingly
the Lord impressed the seal of likeness, both in respect of doing
good and of exercising r u l e » . However a strong Platonic in-
n
fluence that hints at a certain dualism in Clement's view of man,

is not lacking. The effect of the latter is nevertheless mitigated by
Clement's fidelity to the contents of Scripture, to which he
always has recourse when in doubt.
Hence in Clement's view the possessor of perfect knowledge
is «compelled to become like his Teacher, the divine Logos... For
the Word of God is intellectual, according as the image of mind
is seen in man alone» . Clement sees a certain similitude bet-
12
ween divine nature and human nature.

In Clement's view of man what has he to say about the soul?
It is true that Clement, speaking about the soul, considers it as
a more precious thing than the body . On this subject Clement
13
has recourse to Platonic psychology as well as to Scripture. Hence

his affirmations that «souls, themselves are equal. Souls are neither
male nor female, when they no longer marry nor are given in mar-
riage» . This same idea leads Clement to affirm that the essence
14
of the soul, being colourless, formless, and intangible, is visible only

to God . Clement considers God the soul's guide. That man has
15
a resemblance to God is an idea that is at the core of Clement's

confidence in man's capability to know the created reality and the
supernatural truths. With references to revelation and other Greek
philosophers Clement clearly maintains this idea. «Far from destitute
of a divine idea is man, who, it is written in Genesis, partook of
inspiration, being endowed with a purer essence than the other
animate creatures. Hence the Pythagoreans say that intellect comes
to man by divine providence, as Plato and Aristotle avow» . J . 16
Danielou has also pointed out this view among some of the Greek
philosophers who considered that the soul was constituted by the
ether of God . 17
Clement seems to commend the Platonic doctrine of the soul

in saying that «the Platonists hold that intellect is an effluence of
divine dispensation in the soul, and they place the soul in the
body» .
18
As can be inferred from what has been said so far, Cle-

ment's anthropogical view is very much inspired in the Christian
doctrine of the divine element in man, the spiritual soul. Hence
the sense of the supernatural is a recurrent aspect of Clement's
theory of knowledge. From Platonism he is influenced by the
doctrine of the world of immaterial forms and from Christianity
by the indispensible role of the divine Logos in human knowledge.
There are however passages in Clement's reference to man
which are not very clear. In Chapter sixteen of Stromata Bk. VI
Clement presents a «Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue» . In 19
this allegoric exposition, Clement makes a symbolic interpretation

of numbers, relating the number ten to man's faculties. «And
there is a ten in man himself: the five senses, and the power of
speech, and that of reproduction; and the eighth is the spiritual
principle communicated at his creation, and the ninth the ruling
faculty of the soul; and the tenth, there is the distinctive
characteristic of the Holy Spirit, which comes to him through
faith» . Similarly Clement considers that in addition to these ten
20
human parts, «the law appears to give its injunctions to sight, and
hearing, and smell, and touch, and taste, and to the organs subser-
vient to these, which are double — the hands and the feet. For
such is the formation of man» . However, ambiguity is not
21
lacking in this view of man's faculties and this is seen specifically

when Clement goes on to add, «And the soul is introduced, and
previous to it the ruling faculty, by which we reason, not produced
in procreation, so that without it there is made up the number
ten, of the faculties by which all the activity of man is carried
out» .22
A similar ambiguity is seen in Clement's dichotomy or

trichotomy of the soul and its functions. Among the distinctions
made by Clement are to be found carnal or corporeal spirit, the
ruling faculty and the faculty of reason.
Clement is of the opinion that the rational and ruling
power is the cause of the constitution of the living creature and
the irrational part is also part of it. Hence, «the vital force, in
which is comprehended the power of nutrition and growth, and
generally of motion, is assigned to the carnal spirit, which has
great susceptibility of motion, and passes in all directions through
the senses and the rest of the body, and through the body is the
THE THEORY O F KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT O F ALEXANDRIA 115
primary subject of sensation* . This Platonic-Stoic anthropological

23
doctrine of the trichotomy of the soul and its functions has also
been pointed out by M. Spanneut . 24
It is not clear if Clement's ruling faculty is the will or the

intellect because he goes on to add: «But the power of choice, in
which investigation, and study, and knowledge, reside, belongs to
the ruling faculty: it is through it that man lives, and lives in a
certain w a y » . There are good reasons to say that by ruling
25
faculty Clement means the will. Nevertheless be it as it may, the

important thing is that in Clement's view the will and the in-
tellect play an indispensable and mutual role in the act of
knowledge.
In pointing out that man's resemblance to God corresponds
to the spiritual aspect of man and not to the material part, Cle-
ment distinguishes between man's corporeal structure and the in-
tellectual structure. For some, not so clear, reason in his gnostic
Exposition of the Decalogue, he relates symbolically these two
aspects of man to the two tablets of the Decalogue. «Properly
therefore the two tablets are also said to mean the commandments
that were given to the twofold spirits — those communicated
before the law to that which was created, and to the ruling facul-
ty; and the movements of the senses are both copied in the mind,
and manifested in the activity which proceeds from the body» . 26
In conclusion it can be that Clement's anthropological stand,

in view of his theory of knowledge, takes into account all the
essential elements in human nature: the soul and its rational
faculties as well as the senses. According to Clement, therefore
knowledge is possible thanks to man's possession of the spirit in-
fused at creation, the soul, the ruling faculty and the senses. «For
apprehension results from both combined. Again, as sensation is
related to the world of sense, so is thought to that of in-
tellect* .
27
2. The Intellect
Clement attaches a special role to the intellect in his theory

of knowledge. We would be considering this point in the present
section and later the role of the will in the act of knowledge. At
the same time it would be interesting to know to which of the

the two faculties Clement attributes priority in the act of
knowledge.
Clement is quite clear on the point that among the living
corporeal creatures only man possesses a spiritual soul with ra-
tional faculties and an intrinsic self-determination towards their
objects. As regards the movement of beings towards their objects,
he also affirms that some are moved by impulse and appearance,
as animals; and some by transposition, as inanimate objects . 28
«But the intellectual faculty being peculiar to the human soul

ought not to be impelled similarly with the irrational animals, but
ought to discriminate appearances, and not to be carried away by
them» . 29
The intellect or spiritual faculty is thus a guiding faculty of

the soul thanks to its power of judging the truth of the apprehen-
sion acquired by the other faculties. This idea is evidently implied
by Clement, as for instance when he says: «Reason the governing
principle, remaining unmoved and guiding the soul, is called its
pilot» . 30
However knowledge belongs properly speaking to the ruling

faculty and not to the senses although they both play an impor-
tant role. In this regard, «through the corporeal spirit, then, man
perceives, desires, rejoices, is angry, is nourished, grows. It is by
it, too, that thoughts and conceptions advance to actions. And
when it masters the desires, the ruling faculty reigns» . 31
Although Clement attributes a certain kind of knowledge to

sense perception, he nevertheless is of the view that knowledge
properly speaking belongs to the spiritual faculties of man. Not
all reality is the direct object of the senses and consequently the
human intellectual faculty can apprehend realities which are
beyond the reach of the senses. This last aspect is clearer when
Clement speaks of knowledge of revealed truth and the knowledge
of God. Knowledge understood as the contemplation of reality
and of truth is a recurrent idea in Clement's treatment of the
gnosis .
32
The fundamental role of the intellect is therefore the
contemplation of reality .
33
Admitting that the senses contribute to the acquisition of

knowledge, «...since also sight, and hearing, and the voice con-
tribute to truth» , Clement firmly agrees with the Platonic doc-
34
THE THEORY O F K N O W L E D G E IN C L E M E N T O F A L E X A N D R I A 117
trine that real knowledge is of the immutable and intelligible reali-

ty. Consequently, as regards truth, «it is the intellect which is the
appropriate faculty for knowing it» . 35
In keeping with the Platonic doctrine it is impossible that

the immutable should assume firmness and consistency in the
mutable. In view of this Clement considers that he who is
perpetually changed by external occurrences and accidents, can
never possess habit and disposition, and consequently cannot
possess the grasp of scientific knowledge . Similarly if the ruling
36
faculty were to be perpetually changing, and therefore mutable,

the force of habit would not be maintained and consequently it
would not possess true and unchanging knowledge . 37
By identifying the intellect as the proper faculty of

knowledge, Clement makes quite an interesting and firm criticism
of Empiricism. «For bound in this earthly body, we apprehend
the objects of sense by means of the body; but we grasp intellec-
tual objects by means of the logical faculty itself. But if one expects
to apprehend all things by the senses, he has fallen far from the
truth» .
iB
Here we have another crucial point of Clement's theory
of knowledge: the senses contribute to the apprehension of the truth
but not all truth is subject to sense perception. This idea is frequent-
ly applied by Clement when speaking about the knowledge of
supernatural truth and the knowledge of God. «Spiritually,
therefore, the apostle writes respecting the knowledge of God,
«for now we see as through a glass, but then face to face» . 39
According to Clement and in agreement with Plato, the ob-

jects of sense are not the only things that exist. «For great is the
crowd that keep to the things of sense as if they were the only things
in existence. «Cast your eyes round and see,» says Plato, «that
none of the uninitiated listen.» Such are they who think that
nothing else exists but what they can hold tight with their hands;
but do not admit as in the department of existence, actions and
processes of generation, and the whole of the unseen. For such
are those who keep by the five senses. But the knowledge of God
is a thing inaccessible to the ears and like organs of this kind of
people» . 40
As can be inferred from the above passage, Clement's ap-

proach to knowledge is neither empiricist nor materialistic. It is
quite likely that Clement is under the influence of the Platonic
doctrine of the world of ideas. On one hand, he uses it to justify-

why all principles of knowledge are not subject to the senses and
on the other hand, to reaffirm the immaterial nature of the act of
knowledge. This is certainly the case with his idea of belief as a
principle of knowledge.
Accordingly Clement affirms: «But those who believe not as
is to be expected, drag all down from heaven, and the region of
the invisible, to earth, «absolutely grasping with their hands rocks
and oaks,» according to Plato. For, clinging to all such things,
they asseverate that, that alone exist which can be touched and
handled, defining body and essence to be identical» . 41
Clement is evidently opposed to Stoic materialism as can be

inferred from many passages . This42
criticism by Clement has
also been pointed out by C a s e y . However the gift of
43
understanding leads us from things of sense to intellectual objects

and in fact to holy things . 44
As we can see so far, Clement maintains the classical scheme

of knowledge whereby from sense perception, followed by abstrac-
tion, we attain intellectual apprehension. This idea is closely link-
ed to Clement's view of knowledge as contemplation and par-
ticularly so when he speaks of the knowledge of immaterial
beings and of God . 45
Hence Clement's affirmation that «Through reasoning, it is

possible to attain an intuition of God, if one attempts without
any of the senses, by reason, to reach that which each being is
in itself; and does not quit the sphere of being», till, rising up to
the things which transcend it, «he apprehends by the intellect
itself that which is the good in itself, moving in the very confines
of the world of thought, according to Plato» . Thus according
46
to Clement the proper object of the intellect is not material.

Consequently Clement proposes that we ought to direct the
visual faculty of the soul aright to discover, and to clear away
obstacles to knowledge and gnostic perfection* . Now this direc-
7
tion of the cognitive faculty implies intellecual abstraction, logical

processes such as demonstration, dialectics and other related
speculative operations. Before discussing these, attention should
first of all be given to the aspect of sense experience in Clement's
theory of knowledge.
3. The Role of Sense Perception
What is really Clement's evaluation of sense perception in

his notion of knowledge? Can Clement be regarded as an idealist
owing to his strong Platonic inclination or is he an empiricist?
The present study calls for a determination of our author's posi-
tion as regards one of the central ideas of a realist gnoseology,
viz. that intellectual knowledge proceeds from sense experience.
Clement no doubt attributes quite an important role to
sense perception in his notion of knowledge in view of his con-
fidence in the human capacity to know the truth about reality.
That the first data of knowledge is sense perception is pointed out
by Clement in several passages. The following passage from Cle-
ment may serve as an orientation to enable us to hear it from
Clement himself. «For in order, straightaway on man's entering
existence his life begins with sensations» , and furthermore, «as
48
sensation is related to the world of sense, so is thought to that

of intellect» . However Clement explains that «apprehension
49
results from both combined* . 50
The indispensible nature of sense data in human knowledge

is clearly expressed by our authour when he says, for instance:
«Now, inasmuch as there are four things in which truth resides
— sensation, understanding, knowledge, opinion — intellectual ap-
prehension is first in the order of nature; but in our case, and in
relation to ourselves, sensation is first, and from sensation and
understanding the essence of knowledge is constituted; and
evidence is common to understanding and sensation.» In Cle-
ment's view evidence, this is a clear although not the only
criterion of truth .
51
Hence the character of trustworthiness that Clement at-

tributes to the truth of sense knowledge despite his agreement
with Platonism in that true knowledge can only be of the im-
mutable reality. In fact Clement does affirm that «...sensation is
the ladder to knowledge* , since sense perception is of evident
52
sensible reality. Consequently, Clement's realistic approach to

knowledge leads him to shun sensism and empiricism as well as
any materialist approach to knowledge. He does not consider the
truth of sense perception as absolute.
However Clement explains that the primary data of revealed

truth is not attained through sense perception but through faith.
Hence, «faith, advancing over the pathway of the objects of sense,
leaves opinion behind, and speeds to things free of deception, and
reposes in the truth» .53
He is quite aware of the unstable and deceptive possibilities

of sense knowledge. Thus Clement goes on to say that
«knowledge is otherwise spoken of in a twofold sense: that, com-
monly so called, which appears in all men (similarly also com-
prehension and apprehension) universally, in the act of knowledge
of individual objects; in which not only the rational powers, but
equally the irrational, share, which I would never term
knowledge, inasmuch as the apprehension of things through the
senses comes naturally» . 54
The definition of knowledge in the above passage is among

the three general definitions of knowledge given by Clement in
the first chapter of Stromata Bk.VI. As it has rightly been observ-
ed, this particular definition is rejected by Clement on the basis
that it is not completely an intellectual a c t . According to
55
Osborn, Clement rejects it because it deals with sense-perceived

objects and not solely with intellectual objects . 56
The other two definitions are Platonic and peculiarly

57
Christian respectively. According to the first of the two defini-

58
tions, «that which per excellence is termed knowledge is

characterized by the intellect and reason, in the exercise of which
we become real rational beings, applying purely to objects of
thought, and resulting from the pure activity of the soul» . 59
The question remains as to whether Clement has only a

negative view of sense perception or not. This does not seem to
be the case for he does admit that «some questions demand the
evidence of the senses, as if one were to ask whether fire be
warm or snow white and some admonition and rebuke, as Aristo-
tle says: as the question if you ought to honour your parents* . 60
This idea is similarly expressed by Aristotle , Xenon and is

61 62
also to be found in Scripture (Cfr. Ex.20,12) in which Clement

constantly seeks justification of the highest authority for his ideas.
As if seeking more support Clement goes on to point out that
«Theophrastus says that sensation is the root of faith for from
it the rudimentary principles tend to the reason that is in us, and

the understanding* . 63
Thus for Clement «sensation for objects of sense, reason for

speech... and the mind for intellectual objects» , constitute three 64
fundamental elements of truth and therefore criteria for the judge-

ment of knowledge. . 65
According to Clement, therefore, the senses are to be developed

by exercising them in order to aid the act of knowledge just as
those who are occupied in instruction train the sensibility. Prac-
tice consequently will increase the sense appreciation which has
knowledge for its end . 66
Nevertheless since knowledge is properly said of the immutable

reality, «access to the immutable is obtained by a truly immutable
means» . Hence Clement's affirmation that we receive «a firm
67
persuasion of true perception, through the knowledge of things com-

prehended by the intellect» . Similarly in reference to the human
68
faculties and intellectual knowledge, Clement affirms that «there are

body and soul, the five senses, speech, the power of reproduction,
the intellect or the spiritual faculty or whatever you choose to call
it. And we must in a word, ascending above all the others, stop
at the intellect» . 69
In conclusion it must be said Clement attaches an indispen-

sable role to sense perception in human knowwledge. It provides
the first data of knowledge for the intellect thus serving as the
ladder to intellectual apprehension. All human knowledge starts
from some sense perception and advances by progressive abstrac-
tion from matter but always refers to reality.
4. Abstraction and Object of the Intellect
One of the central ideas that runs through Clement's

gnoseology, is that of the need for abstraction from matter and
from the passions in order to acquire perfect knowledge. In his
notion of abstraction there are mainly aspects of Stoic, Platonic,
and Aristotelican doctrines, synthesized under the guidance of his
Christian doctrine.
Moreover Clement's concept of knowledge implies practical
consequences in reference to the acquisition of a perfect moral
life. «For he who neither employs his eyes in the exercise of
thought, nor draws from his other senses, but with pure intellect
itself applies to the objects, practices the true philosophy. This is,
then, the import of the silence of five years prescribed by
Pythagoras, which he enjoined on his disciples; that abstracting
themselves from the objects of sense, they may with the mind
alone contemplate the Deity» . 70
Hence Clement's notion of abstraction extends not only to

the intellectual faculty but to the knowing subject (man). His idea
of abstraction therefore implies a general separation from matter in
order to facilitate intellectual knowledge. Just as in the great
mysteries, in which learning is abandoned for the contemplation
and the immediate apprehension of reality, so also is purification
and instruction necessary for perfect knowledge.
The most outstanding text, worth quoting in full, where Cle-
ment speaks about abstraction appears in Str. V.XI. «We shall unders-
tand the mode of purification by confession, and that of contempla-
tion by analysis, advancing by analysis to the first notion, beginning
with the properties that are underlying it; abstracting from the body
its physical properties, taking away the dimension of depth, then
that of breadth, and then that of length. For the point which re-
mains is a unit, so to speak, having a position; from which if we
abstract position, there is the conception of unity. If then, abstrac-
ting all that belongs to bodies and things called incorporeal...» . 71
From this notion of abstraction it is evident that according

to Clement just as for Aristotle the intellect through abstraction
apprehends the intelligible aspects of particular things. Clement's
reference to the point in the above text corresponds to the
Aristotelian definition of a point , and the description of
72
abstraction can be found in the Platonic tradition . 73
Clement's analysis begins with the unit of the sensible

phenomenon abstracting from it all the physical attributes peculiar
to its nature, including the dimensions. When position, the only
attribute of the resulting geometric point, is abstracted, the last
vestige of material content disappears. The result is an absolute
simple unity.
In this regard R. P. Casey has rightly observed that for Cle-
ment, «Such a unity is achieved by the gnostic when in con-
templation he has stripped his soul of all its material interests,
abandoning sensation and acquiring that impassibility...» . 74
Thus in Clement's notion of abstraction, both the intellec-

tual and moral aspects of knowledge are intimately linked. The
category of ethics and knowledge come together , with the in- 75
clusion of the Stoic ideal of impassivity in Clement's theory of

knowledge. Accordingly, to the extent that one is free from the
passions, to that extent is one apt to apprehend the higher forms
of reality and consequently a more perfect knowledge.
Reference has been made to the fact that Clement's notion
of abstraction is a manifestation of the general tendency of the
Alexandrian school to see the passions in a gnoseological context.
This tendency implies that indulging the flesh is a crime against
one's ability to know rather against some moral code» . Hence 76
Clement affirms that as regards the knowledge of the divine,

«many are the ditches of lust which impede us, and the pits of
wrath and anger which must be over-leaped, and all the machina-
tions we must avoid of those who plot against us, who would no
longer see the knowledge of God through a glass» . 77
It can be said that, unlike in Aristotle, Clement's notion of

abstraction has a greater extension and places greater emphasis on
separation from matter and from the passions in general. In
Aristotle's view, abstraction refers particularly to the intellectual
separation and possession of the forms from sensible reality. Con-
sequently in Clement's view, separation from the sensible things,
particularly from the body, is the only way to achieve the con-
templation of the intelligible world which is the object of the in-
tellect .
78
Hence the passage quoted by Clement in the opening

paragraph of Str. IV.XXV, «Happy he who possesses the culture
of knowledge... but contemplates the undecaying order of immor-
tal nature, how and in what way and manner it subsists. To such
the practice of base deeds attaches not» . The reason being that
79
«the gnostic soul must be consecrated to the light, stripped of the

integuments of matter, devoid of the frivolousness of the body
and of all the passions, which are acquired through vain and lying
opinions ...» . In this regard the divine Logos has a role to play.
80
According to Clement, this role is «to lead man, the foster-child

of this world, up to the objects of the intellect, and to the most
essential truths by knowledge, from one world to another» . 81
124 BONIFACE N. O K A F O R
Furthermore, quoting from Plato, Clement reaffirms the

moral and gnoseological implications of his concept of abstraction.
«Rightly then Plato says that the man who devotes himself to the
contemplation of ideas will live as a god among men; now the in-
tellect is the place of ideas, and God is intellect» . 82
In view of the infinity of the individual, particular things,

Clement like Aristotle maintains that the objects of the intellect
may be classed under the Aristotelian Categories. «For these are
capable of being contemplated by the intellect. (...) immaterial
things are capable of being apprehended by the intellect alone, by
primary application. And of those things that are classed under
the ten Categories, some are predicated by themselves (as the nine
categories), and others in relation to something* . 83
Primarily speaking, therefore, the object of the intellect, — the

thing apprehended by the intellect — is not matter, «for through the
knowledge of things comprehended by the intellect» , we receive 84
a firm persuasion of true perception. 85
The objects of the intellect are therefore the intelligible

realities of the things abstracted from the sensible reality to which
they are related as the concepts. The intellect therefore possesses
the forms of things and through these, it possesses the things im-
materialy. Similarly this idea of abstraction from sensible things is
also implied in what Clement has to say about perception. Accor-
dingly Clement says that perception is the knowledge of intellectual
objects which are what the mind deals with . To this end, by the
%b
gift of understanding, one is led from the things of sense to in-

tellectual objects and from these to holy things . 87
Consequently the most perfect object of the intellect is

therefore the knowledge of God. According to Clement, therefore,
all knowledge and true philosophy have as their ultimate goal the
contemplation of God by the sole pure and incorporeal applica-
tion of the intellect. .
88
It is interesting to note the Platonic influence in Clement's

notion of abstraction. There are numerous texts in which Clement
speaks about the objects of the intellect using such terminology
as: objects of thought, ideas, intellectual objects and world of
thought . Thus it is to be concluded that Clement's notion of
89
abstraction, although not very sofisticatedly developed, expresses

the essential idea that the objects of the intellect are the im-
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 125
material forms of the sensible realites. These forms are obtained

from the sensible things through intellectual abstraction and
through them the intellect knows the infinity of particular things.
Clement's operative notion of knowledge leads him to extend this
idea to the abstraction from the passions in order to acquire
perfect knowledge.
II. CLEMENT'S NOTION OF LOGIC
Clement's positive attitude to and appreciation for logic is

evidenced by many passages of the Stromata . 90
It must be
pointed out that Clement attributes to the notion of Platonic
dialectic the importance Aristotle attaches to logic. This would
become clearer through the course of the discussion in this sec-
tion. Thus Clement does not make drastic distinctions between
logic and dialectic. He considers logic as necessary for the sake of
rejecting the deceitful opinions of the Sophists . But, above all,
91
it is necessary because knowledge is directed towards intellectual

objects and results from the exercise of the rational powers.
Admitted Clement's appreciation of the importance of
logical inquiry in the approach to knowledge, the question arises
as to what is Clement's concept of logic. What essentially is logic
according to our author?
Clement's discussion of logical concepts is to be found main-
ly in the Stromata Bk. VIII. These ideas are used by Clement in
the rest of his works. He affirms that scientific knowledge is based
on general and defined principles and not on particulars which are
infinite' .
12
Hence like philosopical research which is occupied
with conceptions and real things, logic also brings every subject be-
ing investigated under some universal principles of knowledge. In
this way it determines or proves the truth of the point in question.
Such is the classification of names according to the Categories
which may apply to them in themselves or to their relationship
with one another . 93
Accordingly, logic is the art of reasoning being necessary for

the acquisition of both logical or speculative knowledge as well as
spiritual knowledge. This positive attitude towards logic is closely
linked with Clement's conviction that human knowledge is

necessary for the understanding of supernatural knowledge.
Before going on to discuss the logical terms expounded by
Clement, it is important to underline the fact that according to
Clement, for comprehensive scientific knowledge there must exist
the right relationship between language, concept and the reality
expressed by the language. Logic thus helps to identify what type
of relationship there is in a proposition and consequently to what
extent it is true.
A. Language-Concepts-Reality
It is generally agreed that the contents of Str. BK.VIII,

belong to the field of logic, notwithstanding the controversies as
to whether this book properly belongs to the Stromata or not . 94
The contents however are noted down by Clement. Osborn has

rightly pointed out that: «These extracts show that Clement was
interested in logic as an independent discipline. They also show
the problems which he considered important* . The contents of
95
this book are used by Clement in different parts throughout the

other books of the Stromata. Consequently the contents of
Stromata. BK. VIII «provide evidence of the kind of logic which
Clement practised* .96
Through highlighting the main points of Str. VIII, we in-

tend to shed some light on Clement's concept of logic. The main
ideas discussed are the following: the object of philosophical and
theological inquiry, the necessity of perspicuous definition, the no-
tions of demonstration and definition, suspense of judgement, as
well as the causes of doubt or assent, and language . 97
In the eighth chapter of the eighth book of the Stromata,

Clement deals with the distinction between names, concepts and
things. The use of Aristotelian terminology, the realist distinction
between the three elements of knowledge mentioned above
(names, concepts and things) and the discussion on the ten
categories shows the Aristotelian inclination of Clement's logic.
This will become even more evident in the following discussion.
The opening paragraphs of Str. VIII.VIII are very indicative
of Clement's notion of knowledge and truth, and of language as
an expression of knowledge and truth. For instance according to

Clement: «In language there are three things: Names which are
primarily the symbols of concepts and by consequence also of
subject. Second, concepts, which are the likeness and impressions
of the subjects. Hence in all the concepts are the same; in conse-
quence of the same impression being produced by the subjects in
all. But the names are not so, on account of the difference of
languages. And thirdly the subject-matters by which the concepts
are impessed in us» . 98
It is interesting to note the different classification of names

and things given by Clement in the second half of this
chapter . He considers for instance univocal terms, as for exam-
99
ple animal, applied to both man and ox, because of their posse-
sion of an animate essence. Different names applied to the same
thing are termed heteronyms whereas applied to different things
they are different. Whereas heteronyms relate to the same subject
under several names, as for example ascent and descent, names
that are considered different do not possess the same subject.
Some things have the same definition but different names
and such names are termed polynyms. Such is the case of the
names of the same object in different languages. Other things have
different definitions but the same name and such names are term-
ed paronyms. To these Clement also adds the equivocal term,
which is the name applied to things of differing definitions. Men-
tion is also made of analogical terms.
From the above consideration of Clement's analysis of the
possible classification of names and things an aspect of his logic
can be glimpsed at. It can be inferred that Clement strongly holds
the view that for there to be logical truth, the terms employed
must really express the reality they signify (Cfr. section below on
definition). Furthermore, since the names have their ultimate
foundation in the reality they are meant to refer to, Clement
points out that a logical truth is scientific in the measure in
which it corresponds to the reality signified by it.
As has been seen above, according to Clement, knowledge
is, properly speaking, proper of the rational powers and therefore
characterised by judgement and reason. These rational powers are
therefeore directed to mental objects or concepts which have their
foundation in reality. The adequate relationship between reality,
concept and language is thus necessary for them to be true

knowledge. Hence Clement's affirmation of the importance of the
logical inquiry in which the rational faculties act in a reasoning
process. In this way knowledge attains truth by logical procedure,
classifying things and concepts by reference to a system of
thought and its conformity to external reality.
Thus the truth of an expression or proposition depends on
the meaning of the concept and in the ultimate analysis on the
object it signifies. Normally the same reality produces the same
impression in all. But, as he rightly points out, the names to ex-
press the same concept are not the same on account of the diver-
sity of languages . 100
B. Demonstration
This aspect of logic is one of the most important terms dis-

cussed by Clement in Str. BK.VIII and, in fact, it appears at the
beginning of the book. For Clement the idea of demonstration is
at the core of his account of gnoseology. The similarity between
Clement's and Aristotle's accounts of demonstration as discourse
has also been pointed out by Osborn. According to him, Clement's
account, «is derived mainly from Aristotelian sources* . 101
What, is demonstration according to Clement? «Demonstra-

tion is discourse, agreeable to reason, producing belief in points
disputed, from points admitted* (5rr.VIII.III p. 559a). It is in-
teresting to note that according to Clement there must be some
points of agreement for a demonstrative discourse to be possible.
«In strict propriety, then, that is called demonstration which pro-
duces in the souls of learners scientific (knowledge) belief* . 102
Such scientific belief is in actual fact not mere opinion but cer-
tain, scientific, knowledge.
Clement's notion of demonstration has all the essential
elements of classical scientific demonstration. It is maintained that
for any scientific demonstration, the premises or initial assump-
tions must be true in order for there to be a conclusion and not
just a mere opinion. Hence, «in every trend of reasoning, the
point sought to be determined is the end, which is called the con-
clusion* . According to Clement, there is a distinction between
103
demonstration, syllogism and analysis. The distinguishing

characteristic being that true demonstration is only possible if the
premises correspond to, and truly express, the reality of the mat-
ter in question. Otherwise, one is dealing with mere syllogism.
«So that there is a compound advantage of demonstration:
from its assuming, for the proof of points in question, true
premises, and from its drawing the conclusion that follows from
them. If the first have no existence, but the second follow from
the first, one has not demonstrated, but syllogised. For, to draw
the proper conclusion from the premises, is merely to syllogise.
But to have also each of the premises true, is not merely to have
syllogised but also to have demonstrated» . Thus demonstration
m
implies syllogism but not vice versa since to draw the right in-
ference from the what is admitted is to syllogise, whereas to draw
the right conclusion from what is true is to demonstrate.
Clement distinguishes between primary and secondary
demonstrations. The first has to do with drawing conclusions
from what is evident. He therefore maintains that «in the case of
all conclusions alleged to be found out, demonstration is applied
in common, which is discourse, establishing one thing from
another^ , the starting point been known and admitted. «And
105
the foundation of all these is what is evident to sense and to the

intellect. Accordingly the primary demonstration is composed of
all these» . 106
Secondary demonstration refers to conclusions from truths

not immediately evident. In comparison to the first, Clement says:
«But the demonstration which, from the points already
demonstred thereby, concludes some other point, is no less
reliable than the former. It cannot be termed primary, because the
conclusion is not drawn from primary principles as premises* . 107
Clement rejects successive acts of demonstration ad in-

finitum. He rightly admits that not all things require demonstra-
tion. Certain things are evident and require no demonstration in
order to prove the knowledge of them. On the other hand if all
things required demonstration, then by demanding the demonstra-
tion of each demonstration, the process would go on ad infinitum
— leading to the subversion of scientific knowledge . 108
Clement has recourse to the philosophers in whom he finds

a reaffirmation of this view. This is clearly seen in the following
passage: «In point of fact, the philosophers admit that the first
principles of all things are indemonstrable. So that if there is
demonstration at all, there is an absolute necessity that there be
something that is self-evident, which is called primary and in-
demonstrable* . Three things are considered by Clement as fun-
109
damental grounds of demonstration. These are: things that are evi-

dent to the senses, those evident to the intellect, and Scripture.
These three are therefore primary, indemonstrable and are the
starting points of demonstration.
According to Clement, «the phenomena of sensation are sim-
ple and incapable of being decompounded; but those of understan-
ding are simple, rational and primary. But those produced from
them are compound but no less clear and reliable and having more
to do with the reasoning faculty than the first» °.
u
Hence the
phenomena produced from understanding have to do with the
reasoning faculty which deals with agreement or disagreement bet-
ween the points understood and the reality of the points in ques-
tion. The logical process therefore belongs, properly speaking, to
the reasoning faculty.
As a consequence of his view of the mutual relationship bet-
ween natural speculative knowledge and the supernatural revealed
knowledge, Clement also maintains that «all demonstration is trac-
ed up to indemonstrable faith* . Thus since demonstration
111
starts with axioms, Clement, with a certain ingenuity, equates

faith to axiomatic truth. In this way the content of Scripture is
regarded as one of the first indemonstrable principles of perfect
knowledge or gnosis. To this end, perfect knowledge also counts
with the help of the data of divine revelation.
Furthermore, it is of the very essence of questions subject to
demonstration that there must be a previously known truth,
«which being self-evident is believed without demonstration* . 112
This serves as the starting point in their investigation. According-

ly, Clement points out that if one starts from things that are evi-
dent to the senses or to the understanding and draws the proper
conclusion, one truly demonstrates. But starting with premises
which are only probable and are neither primary nor evident to
the senses and the understanding, one cannot demonstrate. Draw-
ing the proper inference in such cases would only mean to
syllogise .
113
Now, as regards Analysis, Clement says it is the reverse of

demonstration. Starting from the conclusion, it follows a trend of
reasoning that goes back to the points that are self-evident. But
demonstration is when the point in question reaches us through
all the intermediate steps . 114
Clement's realist view of the essence of knowledge can fur-

ther be inferred from his idea of the steps that should be taken
into account in a logical process. In the first place, there must be
a univesally admitted definition of the question. Secondly, the
premises must be true, different, relevant and related to the ques-
tion proposed. Thirdly, the right conclusion must be drawn from
the available data. Consequently, «the man, then who practices
demonstration, ought to give great attention to the truth, while
he regards the terms of the premises, whether you call them ax-
ioms, or premises, or assumptions* VIII.III (p.560a). From the
115
foregoing, it is obvious that Clement's notion of demonstration

contains the essential elements of the Aristotelian concept of
demonstration. For instance, Clement affirms the necessity of first
indemonstrable principles, the presence of at least two true and
different premises, logical syllogism and the right conclusion. In
expounding how Clement articulates these essential elements, it
has been possible to have another glimpse at our author's positive
and realist approach to knowledge.
Thus in Clement's gnoseological theory, the extramental
reality is always the touchstone of man's knowledge. This fact,
together with his positive attitude to knowledge, also shows that
his logic is not founded on pure mental constructions. This
becomes even more evident after discussing his concepts of defini-
tion and scepticism.
C. Rigorous Definition
In chapter II of Str. VIII, Clement outlines the need for a

perspicious definition in logical knowledge. «Every term therefore,
advanced for discussion, is to be converted to an expression that
is admitted by those that are parties in the discussion to form the
starting point for instruction, to lead the way to the discovery of
the points under investigation* . According to Clement, therefo-
116
re, a rigorous definition prevents ambiguity and consolidates pre-

existing knowledge which serves as the starting point of scientific
knowledge. In solving a problem by demonstration, a clear defini-
tion of the terms must be understood.
Clement points out that in order not to go on ad infinitum
in a demonstrative process or proof it is necessary for the parties
concerned to understand the same thing by the same concept.
«One, therefore, will give the definition of whatever he possesses
the knowledge of; as one can by no means be acquainted with
that which he cannot embrace and define in speech. And in con-
sequence of the ignorance of the definitions, the result is that
many disputes and deceptions arise» . To this end, the discourse
117
would have to be carried back to a more generally admitted fun-

damental principle or concept in case of dispute. This is the case,
for instance, of reducing the term in question to a concept that
is universally understood by all of the same nation and language.
Hence Clement's affirmation that «if the belief of a point
that is not admitted be carried back to one admitted by all, that
is to be made the commencement of instruction* . Such univer-
118
sal admission is based on the fact that the same concept is possess-
ed from the apprehension of the same reality.
Clement admits that man's expression of his knowledge
depends on the way he knows. His imperfect knowledge is also
reflected in the imperfect expression of such knowledge. Man's
knowledge of a thing does not exhaust the reality of the thing in
question. Definitions therefore serve to express the precise exten-
sion of the knowledge possessed about the object known.
Accordingly, Clement maintains that our «pre-existing
knowledge of each object of investigation is sometimes merely of
the essence, while its functions are unknown... or of the proper-
ties or powers, in other words of the qualities inherent in the ob-
jects. And some times we may know one or more of those
powers or properties —as for example the desires and affections of
the soul— and be ignorant of the essence* . Similarly even
119
when we know the essence and the operations we may be ig-

norant of the modifications . Hence the more reason for a
120
rigorous definition in the expression of scientific knowledge.

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT O F ALEXANDRIA 133
Clement points out that, in view of all these, it is necessary

to specify to which of the aspects of an object our propostions
refer, «for it is after forming conceptions of both —that is, both
of essence and operations— in our intellect, that we proceed to the
question* . It is our author's view that the form of expression
121
of a certain concept may deceive, confuse and disturb the mind,

making it difficult to discover to what category the thing belongs;
«as for example whether the foetus is an animal* . A clear
122
definition precisely prevents ambiguity. «For, having the concept

of an animal and a foetus, we inquire if it be the case that a
foetus be an animal* . 123
In view of all this Clement presents some practical aspects.

Therefore, a question must be stated in a clear and precise man-
ner; equivocal and synonymous terms being accurately defined ac-
cording to their significations. It is then to be determined if the
proposition belongs to those points, considered in themselves or
in relation to others, in view of what and why a thing is. A
rigorous definition no doubt serves to solve these questions. «And
to the consideration of these points, the knowldge of Particulars
and Universals, and the Antecedents and the Differences and their
divisions contribute* .
124
With references to Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics in Str.

VIII.IV, Clement goes on to illustrate the importance of
perspicuous definition using their definition of animal. «For Plato
calls plants animals, as partaking of the third species of life alone,
that of appetency. But Aristotle, while he thinks that plants are
possessed of a life of vegetation and nutrition, does not consider
it proper to call them animals; for that alone which possesses the
other life —that of sensation— he considers warrantable to be call-
ed an animal. The Stoics do not call the power of vegetation,
life* .
125
The right definition of an animal must therefore include the

fact that it is a being that is nourished and grows as well as
possesses sensation or movement by impulse. Consequently, he
who admits the Aristotelian definition of an animal as an animate
sentient being must also affirm that a foetus is an animal.
As regards the three elements of knowledge viz. the thing,
its concept, and the words that express it, although related, Cle-
ment does point out their difference in nature. This is quite evi-
dent from this rather humorous passage: «Now if you are shuffl-
ing about names, it is plain to everybody that the name, foetus is
neither an animal nor a plant, but a name, and a sound, and a
body, and a being and anything and every thing rather than an
animal. And if it is this that you have propounded, you are
answered* . The foetus is a material being in itself whereas the
126
concept and the word foetus, in themselves are incorporeal. But

as Clement rightfully points out, the real foundation of all these
is what is evident to the senses and to the intellect , which are
127
likewise the foundation of scientific demonstration.

The importance of definition is further inferred from the
sixth chapter of Str. BK. VIII. With reference to induction, divi-
sion and definition, Clement maintains that induction aims at
generalization and definition, whereas division aims at species, par-
ticular differences and demonstration. The result of the whole
leads to scientific knowledge and the truth. Hence, induction, ac-
cordingly shows not what a thing is but that it is, or is not. Divi-
sion shows what it is; and, like Division, definition expresses the
essence and what a thing is, but not if it is. Demonstration ex-
plains the three points, if it is, what it is and why it i s » . 128
Understood in this way demonstration is equivalent to complete

knowledge. It is pertinent to point out that all these points are
clearly Aristotelican.
Clement's account of definition and series of successive divi-
sions involved is impregnated with Aristotelian terminology and
influence. For instance, Clement explains that the definition of
man is reached by the successive division of the genus animal into
its component or compound species until the simple species which
consists of man is reached. This process of analysis is then follow-
ed by synthesis. Thus, «selecting from the species, apprehended by
division, those next to man, and combining them into one for-
mula, we state the definition of man, who is a an animal, mortal,
terrestral, walking, rational* .
129
In view of this concept of definition as expounded by Cle-

ment, only division of the genus into species is approved. Other
forms of divisions such as division into parts, magnitudes, ac-
cidents are rejected. Similarly, it is maintained that in the large
definitions of things the number of the species that are discovered
are the ten categories. Hence Clement's view that by taking the
THE THEORY O F KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 135
principal points of the simplest species, the essence and the nature
of the thing is defined. For each of the species is either an essence
(corporeal or incorporeal) or one of the other nine categories 130
VIII.VI (p.563b), where Clement says, «For each of the species is

either an essence; as when we say some substances are corporeal
and some incorporeal; or how much or what relation, or where,
or when, or doing, or suffering*. This is, no doubt, very similar
to the Aristotelian doctrine.
Futhermore Clement affirms that «in definition, difference is
assumed, which in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The
faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to the definition of
man, makes the whole — a rational, mortal terestrial walking,
laughing a n i m a l » . The genus is thus in the species and
131
whatever is predicated of the genus will be all predicated of the

species but not vice versa. In all definition therefore, the first
genus of the simplest species must assume the specific difference
as principal and fundamental Str.VIII.VI (p.563b).
132
From Clement's account of definition it must be concluded

that his account reflects a profound influence from Aristotelian
doctrine and terminology — directly derived or otherwise. A
definition therefore expounds the essence of a thing, for instance
man as: a rational, laughing animal. It is however incapable of ac-
curately comprehending the complete nature of the thing. For a
scientific definition it is necessary to divide the genus into at least
two essentially necessary species for the sake of brevity. By means
of uniting the principal species a definition exposes the essence of
a thing in the qualities expressed.
D. Judgement and Philosophical Scepticism
Clement's criticism of philosophical scepticism in the fifth

and seventh chapters of Stromata Bk.VIII is basically an applica-
tion of his notion of definition. The sceptical suspense refuted by
Clement is not the mere habit of unbelief that may arise from the
lack of knowledge or complete understanding. Clement's target is
the a priori methodical philosophical scepticism in which the first
principle assumed is that of the inknowability of truth. This is
evidently a critique of the Cartesian posture of knowledge which
proposes methodical doubt as a principle of knowledge. The

refutation affirmed and presented by Clement is from the Stoic
tradition in which the main thesis is that, if nothing is certain,
then it cannot be certain that nothing is certain.
In particular the scepticism in question is Pyrrhonian scep-
ticism. Accordingly, «Suppose the Pyrrhonian suspense of judge-
ment, as they say, [the idea] that nothing is certain: it is plain
that beginning with itself, it first invalidates itself» .133
As Clement points out, three things can be inferred from

the affirmation of such a thesis. In the first place, it is granted
that something is true. Secondly, such an affirmation already
means that judgement cannot be suspended on all things. Finally,
it is persistently affirmed that there is nothing true. There is
evidently a contradiction because it either affirms the truth or it
does not . 134
Now if the sceptical proposition that nothing is certain af-

firms the truth, then it must admit that something is true — at
least its thesis. If, on the other hand, it is false, then it leaves true
what it intended to demolish. «For, in so far as the scepticism
which demolishes is proved false,... the positions which are being
demolished are proved true; like the dream which says that all
dreams are false. For in confuting itself, it is confirmatory of the
others* . To this end it must be said that the philosophical
135
sceptical proposition is a self-defeating affirmation and can neither

be a philosophical principle nor a logical principle.
At the core of Clement's refutation of philosophical scep-
ticism is his defense of the knowability of truth and of extramen-
tal reality. Such truth is discovered by the rational faculties when
man applies himself to the loving search of truth in itself through
scientific investigation. In this regard, Clement points out that all
that is true in Greek philosophy and in true philosophy is a clear
manifestation of the fact that truth is knowable. It may be God
given or obtained through the efforts of human investigation.
Hence the mutual relationship that Clement mantains as existing
between the best Greek philosophy and Scripture as sources of
knowledge.
One clear point that can be inferred from the foregoing is
Clement's rejection of philosophical scepticism, his affirmation of
the knowability of truth and his proposition of philosophy and
Scripture as complementary sources of knowledge. This is quite

evident from the opening passage of the eighth book of the
Stromata where he points out that the object of philosophical and
theological inquiry is the discovery of truth . 136
According to Clement, the most ancient philosophers were

not carried away to disputing and doubting, much less are the
Christians, who are attached to the really true philosophy, and on
whom Scripture enjoins to seek and to investigate in order to
find. «Accordingly, by investigation, the point proposed for in-
quiry and the answer knocks at the door of truth according to
what appears. And, on an opening being made through the
obstacle in the process of investigation, there results scientific con-
templation. To those who thus knock, according to my view, the
subject under investigation is opened* . 137
On the other hand, it is the most recent of Hellenic

philosophers who, Clement says, quibble incessantly and argue to
no purpose except for self glorification. The barbarian philosophy,
on the contrary, rejects all useless babbling in refuting and
wrangling; expelling all contention. It affirms that if one seeks one
would find, it shall be opened and it shall be given to the one
who asks. Consequently, «when one knocks at the door of truth
by logical inquiry, the barrier to knowledge is removed* . This
138
indispensible role of intellectual effort in order to acquire

knowledge is very indicative of Clement's own practical ex-
perience and objectivity in the acquisition of knowledge.
Thus, in the same way as by searching, examining, analys-
ing, unfolding, questioning and clarifying we find what was hid-
den, so also do we, conscious of our ignorance, attain knowledge
when we inquire fully in a similar way.
Clement's approach to the problem of knowledge is a com-
pletely positive one and a far cry from philosophical scepticism.
It very much conforms to the normal human knowing experience.
In his optimistic view he maintains that it is impossible to have
gone through the whole investigation without receiving as a prize
the knowledge of the point in question.
Such is the irreconcilable position of philosophical scepticism
that Clement rightly maintains that, drawn by the desire to
discover the truth, we have to seek thoughtfully all the sources of
knowledge, be they human or divine: «for it is incumbent, in ap-
plying ourselves not only to the divine Scripures, but also to com-
mon notions, to institute investigations, the discovery ceasing at
some useful end» .139
Admitted the inacceptability of philosophical skepticism,

Clement's criticism does not intend to maintain the knowability
of all truth by the human intellect. Granted that the truth is
knowable, it is also granted that the human rational faculty is
limited, and consequently doubts, errors and corrections can and
do arise. Now by the very act of trying to correct erroneous
knowledge or to establish the doubt respecting it, it is granted
that the truth is knowable.
Hence according to Clement, in leaning towards logical con-
ceptions which have consistency with one another and with
phenomena, there may be a certain suspension of judgement. Con-
ception is here understood as a state of and an assent of the mind
to the apprehended truth VIII.V (p.562b).
140
Such a suspension of judgement, more than a principle of

knowledge, is actually a doubt on the adequacy of the coherence
between the elements of knowledge. These elements include the
phenomenona, the concepts thus obtained and the assent of the
mind to the coherence between them.
In this regard, «not merely sceptics, but everyone who
dogmatizes is accustomed in certain things to suspend his judge-
ment, either through want of strength of mind or want of
clearness in the things, or equal force in the reasons* . Clement
141
therefore identifies two causes of scepticism: the nature of the

human mind and the nature of the external world that confronts
it. The former refers to the instability of the human mind and
the latter refers to the mutability, the discrepancy and the com-
plexity of sensible reality.
He finds justification in the fact of the existence of the
many tribunals and councils as well as the libraries full of books
and compilations of treaties of differing dogmas, each claiming to
know the truth. All these he sees as signs of a mind in doubt and
not the evidence of philosophical scepticism.
Such a mind halts its judgement through feebleness, on ac-
count of conflicting matters, and not out of essence because the
mind is naturally open to all truth. «For being unable either to
believe in all views, on account of their conflicting nature; or to
disbelieve all, because that which says that all are untrustworthy
is included in the number of those that are so; or to believe some
and to disbelieve others on account of the equipoise, we are led
to scepticism* VIII.VII (p.564a).
142
Thus Clement rejects philosophical scepticism and the

suspension of judgement as principles of knowledge. He admits
the possibility of doubt on the basis of the incoherence between
propositions and the reality apprehended by the intellect. In Cle-
ment we can already find the idea that the truth is the coherence
between the human intellect and reality; an idea later to be
developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Nevertheless it is the limita-
tion of the human mind the Clement considers the cause of
logical sceptism, and not the nature of things.
E. Dialectic
It has been rightly pointed out that Clement's account of

dialectic shows how in his view logical procedure is not merely
a technique for the protection of truth but an important part of
knowledge . In fact it is speculative gymnastics as it is to be
143
found in the different philosophical schools. Now what is really

dialectics according to Clement and what is its role in the cognitive
act? Does Clement consider dialectics of any gnoseological value?
Among the definitions of dialectics given by Clement the
following can be regarded as summarizing the essential aspects
of his notion of dialectic. As in many other parts of his works
where references are made to Plato, the same occurs here in Cle-
ment's discussion of dialectics. This is the case when Clement
says for instance that «according to Plato in The Statesman, dialec-
tics is £ science devoted to the discovery and explanation of real
things* .
144
As has been pointed by G. Pini, for Clement dialectic is

something much more than what is expressed by the Platonic no-
tion. «He abandons the term lovgu* «with the human reason* and
thus Christianizes the resulting Platonic dialectic, from a method
of intellectual ascent towards the first reality, into the way leading
to God by gradation (physical world, celestial powers, etc.)* . 145
According to Clement, therefore: «The true dialectic, being

philosophy mixed with truth, by examining things, and testing
forces and powers, gradually ascends in relation to the most ex-
cellent essence of all and essays to go beyond to the God of the
universe, professing not the knowledge of mortal affairs, but the
science of things divine and heavenly; in accordance with which
follows a suitable course of practice with respect to words and
deeds, even in human affairs. Rightly, therefore, Scripture, in its
desire to make us such dialecticians, exhorts us: «Be ye skillful
money changers», «rejecting some things, but returning what is
good» .
146
Clement's dialectics is an act of the intellectual faculty that

by discerning the true and the false ascends to the most excellent
essence of all reality in accordance with the science of things
human and divine which is the true gnosis . Consequently true
147
dialectic is considered to be the science which analyses the objects

of thought, and shows abstractly and by itself the individual
substratum of beings, or the power of dividing things into genera,
which descends to their most special properties, and presents each
individual object to be contemplated simply such as it i s . 148
Similarly dialectics, which Clement considers as a function of the

intellect, is regarded as the logical discussion of intellectual sub-
jects, with selection and assent. This intellectual act establishes by
demonstration, allegations respecting truth, and demolishes the
doubts brought forward . 149
Clement as well as Plato upholds the immutable nature of

the object of truth and consequently considers the inconsistency
and inability of a definition to stand up to the objections brought
forward, sufficient to disqualify it. Hence the «examining» and
«testing» mentioned in the above definition are among the most
important elements of dialectics from a practical point of view.
Osborn has rightly pointed out that «this testing has sometimes
been regarded as the whole of dialectic. It is displayed elaborately
in the Parmenides and became very popular with middle and neo-
Platonists. It is linked with analysis in the Republio .
150
Nevertheless Clement's originality in this regard is that in

reference to the true dialectic and the true philosophy, consistency
is not enough. The truth with which Clement is concerned is
ultimate, essential, Christian truth. He was certainly aware of the
many systems of dialectics of his day leading to different first

principles. In his view, to determine a system, its first principle
must be fixed. This unshakeable first principle he found in the
Christian truth.
Furthermore, Clement's realist notion of dialectics is clearly
manifested in another definition he gives: «For this true dialectic
is the science which analyses the objects of thought, and shows
abstractly and by itself the individual substratum of existences, or
the power of dividing things into genera, which descends to their
most special properties, and presents each individual object to be
contemplated simply such as it is. Wherefore, the true dialectic,
«conducts to the true wisdom, which is the divine power which
deals with the knowledge of entities as entities, which grasps what
is perfect, and is freed from all passions; not without the Saviour,
who withdraws by the divine word, the gloom of ignorance aris-
ing from evil training, which has overspread the eye of the soul
and has given us the best faculty of all «that we may know well
whether we are dealing with man or God» . True dialectics is
151
therefore intimately linked to true wisdom . 152
Just as in Plato , dialectics is conceived by Clement as a

153
rational process that has nothing to do with sense perception or

experience. Rather, it concentrates on the hierarchical essences of
things. Thus for Clement, the «powers» play the role that forms
play for Plato. Through such dialectics the soul ascends to the
forms as well as discerns the right relationship of one form with
the others thus defining the essence of each particular thing. In
this way dialectics shows clearly the substance of each real
thing .
154
Clement's notion of dialectics is far removed from sophistry

which he strongly criticizes in many passages of the Stromata. To
this end, and in agreement with Plato in The Statesman he affirms
that dialectics is to be acquired by the wise man, not for the sake
of saying or doing what the dialecticians who occupy themselves
in sophistry do, but to be able to say and do, as far as possible,
what is pleasing to God . Once more we can appreciate the
155
very close relationship between knowledge and moral perfection

in Clement's theory of knowledge.
As has already been hinted above, Clement shows apprecia-
tion for dialectic. Of what use then is dialectics in Clement's
view? According to Clement dialectic develops argumentative skill

which prevents one from succumbing to falsehood and to heresies
as well as guard against sophism. Hence Clement maintains that
«The dialectic in vogue in the schools on the other hand, is the
exercise of a philosophy in matters of opinion, for the sake of the
faculty of disputation. But truth is not in these at all» . 156
Although Clement engages in polemics against the Sophists

(Cfr. Str. Lin, 22-24), his condemnation of their dialectic is not
total. The true dialectic is useful to the philosopher, to the Chris-
tian as well as to the gnostic. Hence Clement points out that it
serves to distinguish sophistry from philosophy, mere rhetoric
from dialectics, the other sects from the true philosophy, to
distinguish ambiguous expressions from synonymous ones and
above all to treat of intellectual objects by philosophising. To this
end, «Logical disscusion, then, of intellectual subjects, with selec-
tion and assent, is called Dialectic; which establishes by
demonstration allegations respecting the truth, and demolishes the
doubts brought forward* '.157
In the field of the Christian truth Clement affirms that true

dialectic helps in the correct explanation of the Scriptures. This is
quite evident from this passage: «For the whole Scripture is not
in its meaning a single Myconos, (...) but those who hunt after
the connection of the divine teaching, must approach it with the
utmost perfection of dialectic* . 158
Thus Clement's conception of dialectic is entirely Platonic

and not Aristotelican although Clement's syncretism leads him to
use Aristotelican philosophical method (logic) and Platonic dialec-
tic. Although he does not really separate logic and dialectic, he
nevertheless highlights dialectic to a greater extent.
III. SYMBOLIC KNOWLEDGE
Clement's account of symbolism to be considered in this

section is based on his view that the most profound realities and
the truth about them, are not immediately apprehended by the in-
tellect. Being hidden, they are expressed through symbols. Sym-
bolism and the veiling of truth are thus justified by Clement on
the basis of the complex nature of reality, the esoteric nature of

truth and the limitations of the human intellect. This is most evi-
dent in his treatment of supernatural and divine truths.
Here we wish to examine Clement's theory of symbolism
with particular reference to its characteristic aspects and founda-
tion, Clement's justification of symbolism and the role of the
mysteries and allegorism with the view of evaluating the role of
symbolism in his theory of knowledge.
A. The Theory of Symbolism
The bulk of Clement's account of Symbolism appears in Bk.

V of the Str. although his use of symbolism is manifested in
several parts of his writings. The foundation of Clement's account
of symbolism is his view of the esoteric nature of reality, and
knowledge of the truth, be it speculative or revealed. The founda-
tion of Clement's theory, therefore, has ontological, linguistic,
cultural and moral aspects. At the core of Clement's theory of
symbolism is his idea of the hidden things of truth and reality.
Symbolism is thus the way of expressing and transmitting
knowledge about these hidden aspects to others . 159
Clement's notion of symbolism is intimately linked to that

of mysterion. Mystery is associated to the symbolic and allegoric
methods of expression. Hence for instance in Str. I.I, 13.4 and in
Str. VI.XV, 124.5 mystery and symbolism are used synonymously.
Similarly in Str. V.IX, 58.6ff where Clement speaks about the
Pythagorian symbolism, veiling, allegorism and symbolism are all
put in relation with each other. The fundamental aspect of sym-
bolism, according to Clement, is that of the dissimulation of the
truth (Cfr. Str. V.IV, 21.4), where he considers this point as a
principle in the knowledge of the most sublime truths. Thus
knowledge expressed in a symbolic form always veils some aspect
of the whole truth . 160
According to Clement, the most important parts of truth

are hidden. Some are unwritten but reserved for the oral instruc-
tion of a few while others are written in an obscure and
enigmatic way and need interpretation . Clement sees this most
161
clearly manifested in the different philosophical schools and in

Scripture. The Lord revealed things to the few by word of mouth

and not in writing and what has been written about ultimate
things is expressed in a mysterious form in riddles and parables
and are veiled . He therefore points out that in Scripture, for
162
example, use is made of enigma, allegory and symbol.

However Clement affirms that nature itself bears a natural
symbolism, a kind of complicity between beings which links them
all together. Despite their diversity they are all comparable
because of a certain similarity between them. There is therefore
analogy between things and some symbolise others. Hence the use
of symbolism in the domain of sensation, objects, events, myths,
language, and philosophy to express the most sublime truths . 163
R. Mortley has rightly explained that this view of Clement

is due to the fact that, for Clement, «the answer is in the divine
economy: all that exists is invested with meaning. Man and his
world are signs because of their origin. God who is transcendent,
has left traces of his nature in his disposition of the universe. One
of these traces is the principle of analogy» . Hence the justifica-
164
tion for expressing the notion of an object in reality through a

symbol, or a spiritual truth through earthly symbolic elements.
Things are proportional and in some way resemble each
other. There is therefore a kind of paralellism between the
celestial plan and the terrestial plan as well as a paralellism bet-
ween the diverse elements of the terrestial plan — a kind of
horizontal paralellism whereby the inferior symbolises the
superior . All these relationships permit the human spiritual
165
soul to make a sort of synthesis embracing all the elements of

sensible experience. In this way the gnostic is «capable of perceiv-
ing the true and detecting the false, of discovering cor-
respondences and proportions, so as to hunt out for similarity in
things dissimilar...» .
166
In fact Osborn has pointed out that symbolic expression and

interpretation is perhaps the part of Clement's thought which is
most foreign to modern m i n d s . He has adduced two fun-
167
damental reasons for Clement's theory of symbolism. According

to him, one minor point was that, particularly in Alexandria,
Christian converts came from a background of which it was a
normal feature. But, «the main point which underlines all the ex-
THE THEORY O F KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 145
amples is that there are connections in the world other than those
normally seen. These connections take the form of likenesses, pro-
portions, harmonies. They all point out unities in apparent diver-
sity. They show that the world is a unity of far greater complexi-
ty than is normally seen. They give point to studies as astrono-
my* .168
B. Universal Domain of Symbolism
For Clement, the domain of symbolism is universal. He

regards the sensible realities accessible to our sense apprehension
as a sign of a deeper reality of which these are multiple reflec-
tions. Thus Clement considers words, objects and rites as all sub-
ject to interpretation in order to obtain the deeper truth underly-
ing them. His view of the sensible world as a reflection of truth
is clearly Platonic .169
The fundamental basis of the universality of symbolism, ac-

cording to Clement, is the fact that the whole of creation is filled
with indications of the existence of a divine being who is the ob-
ject of a variable avalanche of names. But according to Clement,
«... the God of the universe, who is above all speech, all concep-
tion, all thought, can never be committed to writing, being inex-
pressible even by his own power* . 170
It must be pointed out, however, that the extension of Cle-

ment's theory of symbolism, includes words, names and objects,
because they all have a revealing function. They are signs of the
reality to which they refer and which they represent as well as
reflect. In this sense everything in nature is meaningful, so that
even the simplest hide an immense richness of meaning, which re-
quires many symbols for its expression. Mortley has pointed out
that, in this regard, the study of etimology, presented by Cle-
ment, indicates that the reflections of reality are discovered
through all the languages . Similarly in the domain of myths,
171
philosophy, language, poetry, culture, theatre and theology Cle-

ment finds elements of symbolism. This is most evident in the at-
tempts to express the divine reality which the intellect cannot ful-
ly apprehend.
The universality of symbolism, according to Clement, also

extends to all forms of expression in which there is a gradation
of relationship between the symbol and the reality symbolized.
Hence not all symbols of a particular reality have the same im-
portance. In this regard speaking about the Egyptian hieroglyphic,
(Str.V.IV) Clement distinguishes two kinds: one literal and the
other symbolic. «Of the symbolic, one kind speaks literally by
imitation, and the other writes, as it were, figuratively, and
another is quite allegorical, using certain enigmas» . 172
Consequently, the domain of symbols and allegory extends

to all forms of expressions: these include imitation as in the case
of the circle to symbolize the sun, in which case the relationship
between the figure and what is symbolized is natural and evident.
In the case of a metaphor which represents an abstract idea by a
word, for instance, the relationship between the symbol and the
reality is less natural and evident. Finally, in the allegoric — enig-
matic form of expression, the connection between the sign and
what is signified is neither natural nor evident but arbitrary and
conventional. The truth expressed in this form will remain obscu-
re and incomprehensible to him who does not know the key to
the conventions.
C. Origin of Clement's Symbolism
The origin of Clement's symbolism comes from the oriental

influences in Greek thought, especially in Platonism and from the
mystery religions. To these must be added the influence of the
allegoric method of interpretation of Scripture developed and
employed in the Alexandrian school. Clement's symbolism is
therefore part of the tradition that goes back to the ancient Greek
mythical culture. Having destroyed the primacy of religious
myths, the poets and their disciples, the philosophers were left
with an abundance of mythical material that needed interpretation
and explanation.
Furthermore the origin of Clement's theory of symbolism
must be sort of in connection with the great emphasis he lays on
the esoteric nature of gnosis . To this end Clement quotes Pla-
173
to174
in order to reaffirm his view. Hence the presence of the
Platonic influence in Clement's symbolism.
Similarly S. Lilla has rightly pointed out that «Clement
glances at the most important Greek philosophical schools in
order to prove that what he has been saying so far is right: if the
Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the
Aristotelians agreed in keeping the most important of their doc-
trines hidden... is there not more reason to keep the true
philosophy out of the reach of common people?» . All these17S
philosophical doctrines in addition to Scripture play an important

role in the development of Clement's theory of Symbolism . 176
He has sufficiently shown that the origin of Clement's symbolism

is to be found in the practice of the above mentioned
philosophical schools, Scripture and the philosophical systems
177
of Clement's time . 178
The use of Symbolism already existed in the Jewish-

Alexandrian Philosophy, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and
even in the heretical Christian Gnosticism. Clement knew all
these and in some sense tended to imitate them. Above all it is
in Philo that the use of symbolism is particulary clear . In this
179
sense apart from Philo, the middle Platonic Plutarch and Albinus
in whom there is the same tendency to stress the hidden nature
of the highest doctrines must have influenced Clement's sym-
bolism .180
The theory of symbolism had its greatest success in the

Christian Platonism of which Clement is one of the greatest
figures. In Clement symbolism could not stay at the margin of his
gnoseology. The Christian Platonists were faced with the enor-
mous problem of Christian truth: the transcendental being has
manifested himself in a sensible form. Mortley thinks that this
problem, proper to Christianity, had stimulated Clement to
develop a theory of symbolism, «a theory of the relation between
the divine reality and the concepts which are presented to unders-
tand this reality» . 181
This idea is in fact extended by Clement to the knowledge

of reality in general. Hence Clement's gnoseology is also sym-
bolic. Consequently syncretism and Clement's Platonic formation
are some of the sources of Clement's theory of symbolism.
Among the causes of Clement's theory of symbolism Osborn has
identified two possible causes. First, the Christian converts, par-

ticularly in Alexandria, came from «a background of which sym-
bolism was an inevitable part of their mental machinery* . 182
However the main point is that according to Clement, there are

complex relationships which are not immediately evident in
reality.
The multiple relationships in reality, as the basis of Cle-
ment's foundation of the theory of symbolism has also been
pointed out by Mondesert. In view of this he observes that: «At
the basis of symbolism, as Clement understands it, there is a pro-
found idea which the very excesses of the method of interpreta-
tion emphasize... This idea is the relatedness of all things among
themselves, the intelligible bond which sets them in order, and
brings them together again, which makes them one beneath their
multiplicity, one by their cohesion and their unity» . 183
From the possibility of finding the same ideas implanted in

different gnoseological systems and situations, but expressed in dif-
ferent forms, Clement is led to compare and to equate as well as
to assimilate the mythical traditions in a theory of symbolism.
The truth is thus considered as residing in the community of
human thought which has several symbolic manifestations . Con-184
sequently, an affirmation of a symbolic nature may not be submit-

ted to the criterion of logical truth because its truth is of a dif-
ferent genus — the symbolic.
Thus it can be concluded that the origin of Clement's sym-
bolism derives from the influence of the mystery religions and
that of the esoteric philosophical systems. These include especially
Pythagorism, Platonism and Stoicism. However, the immediate
origin of Clement's symbolism can be attributed to his literary
dependence on Christian Platonism, in particular Philo, on Scrip-
ture and the gnostic literature. Together with all these Clement's
syncretic method must be taken into account.
D. Examples and Justification of Symbolism
Clement gives numerous examples of symbolism throughout

his writings and tries to justify the important role of symbolism
in knowledge. In fact the symbolic style is employed by Clement
especially in the Stromata as he is the first to admit. «Some things

I purposely omit, in the exercise of a wise selection ... Some
things my treaties will hint; on some it will linger; some it will
merely mention. It will try to speak imperceptibly, to exhibit
secretly, and to demonstrate silently* .185
According to Clement, he does not wish to artfully conceal

the truth by the body of varied erudition as contained by the
Stromata. On the contrary he intends to avoid divulging the
secrets of the true philosophy to those who discredit the
truth . Hence his affirmation that «The Stromata will contain
186
the truth mixed up in the dogmas of philosophy, or rather

covered over and hidden, as the edible part of the nut in the
shell. For, in my opinion, it is fitting that the seeds of truth be
kept for the husbandmen of faith, and no others* . 187
In Str. BK.V, Clement gives and explains many examples of

symbolism using them to justify his theory of symbolism. The
main types of symbolism include:
a.) Verbal symbolism as for instance the Greek maxims refer-
red to by Clement. «Also the maxims of those among the Greeks
called the wise men, in a few sayings indicate the unfolding of
matter of great importance* . Examples include the maxims,
188
«Know thyself* , the symbols attributed to Pythagoras such as,

189
«the Samian counsel not to have a swallow in the house* , and 190
Don't sail on land .

m
b.) Pictoral symbolism, such as the example of the exposition

in Str. V.VI, of the symbolic objects in the construction of the
Tabernacle. (Cfr. Srr.V.VI, 32. Iff)
c.) Symbolism of numbers, as for instance, the symbolism of
The number Ten, in Clement's Gnostic exposition of the
Decalogue. (C>.5tr.VI.XVI ,133.Iff). Similarly another Chapter is
given to Symbolism of numbers, geometrical ratios as well as
music. Cfr. Str. VI.XI, 84.Iff, where Clement illustrating
geometrical symbolism says, «For the expression wooden squares
indicates that the square form, producing right angles, pervades
all, and points out security* .192
d.) Clement also hints at other forms of symbolism as can

be inferred from the following passage: «All then, in a word, who
have spoken of divine things, both Barbarians and Greeks, have
veiled the first principles of things, and delivered the truth in
enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and metaphors, and such like
tropes» .
193
Clement goes to a great extent in justifying the important

role of symbolism in knowledge. The abundant reasons of
justification can be found in many parts of his works, especially
in the Stromata and in particular in Str. Bk.V. starting from
chapter nine.
The main reasons put forward can be summerized under the
following points:
i.) Symbolism dissimulates the truth rendering it more
valuable and noble. Thus it stimulates and motivates the search
for truth as well as encourages vigilance (Cfr.Str.l.ll, 21.2; VI.XV,
126.1.) In this sense Clement considers Greek philosophy as
dissimulating the truth. (Cfr.Str.ll.l, 3.5 ) . In Str.V.TV, Clement ac-
tually gives a long explanation of this concept of the dissimulation
of truth.
ii.) Symbolism, by veiling the truth, possesses a greater sug-
gestive power and consequently makes a more vivid impression on
the mind. «Besides all things that shine through a veil show the
truth grander and more imposing... in addition things unconcealed
are perceived in one w a y » .194
iii.) Clement also points out that symbolism serves for brevi-
ty of expression. «Very useful, then, is the mode of symbolic in-
terpretation for many purposes; and it is helpful to the right
theology, and to piety, and to the display of intelligence, and the
practice of brevity, and exhibition of wisdom» . 195
iv.) Apart from the fact that symbols are more impressive
than ordinary forms of expression of the truth, they also make
possible for a variety of interpretations. «Since, then, we may
draw several meanings, as we do from what is expressed in veiled
form, such being the case, the ignorant and unlearned man falls
into error. But the gnostic apprehends* . 196
v.) Symbolism also responds to the esoteric nature of

knowledge. Consequently Clement affirms that all forms of
philosophy have veiled certain knowledge in symbols and allegory.
«And the disciples of Aristotle say that some of their treaties are
esoteric and others common and exoteric* . The use of sym-
197
bolism therefore responds to the reservation and prudence that

must be practiced in the transmission of the most sublime truths.
vi.) The existence of tradition is another justifcation for
symbolism. Since mere verbal expressions veil a certain aspect of
the reality signified, Clement maintains that interpreters will be
needed. These will transmit the whole truth to others thus con-
stituting a tradition. «They also wish us to require an interpreter
and a guide. For so they consider that receiving truth from the
hands of those who knew it well, we would be more earnest and
less liable to deception, and those worthy of them would
profit* .
198
vii.) Clement considers truth to possess a certain sacredness

and because of its preciousness it must not be profaned by the
morally impure. This idea is symbolically expressed by Clement
in the following passage: «Wherefore, the method of concealment
is truly divine and most necessarey for us, because of the truly
sacred teaching deposited in the shrine of truth* . 199
In conclusion, Clement's theory of knowledge is to be con-

sidered in view of his Christian notion of man understood as en-
dowed with sense perception and intellectual apprehension. The
latter proceeds from the former by abstraction. Although the two
are indispensable for knowledge, only to the intellect is
knowledge attributed properly speaking. In Clement's notion of
knowledge the ethical and the speculative aspects are intimately
linked. Hence his notion of abstraction from matter extends not
only to the intellect but to the separation of the knowing subject
from the passions in order to acquire perfect knowledge.
Apart from abstraction, such logical acts as demonstration,
definition, and dialectic proceedings are all attributed by Clement
to the intellect because in them there can be pure application of
the intellect. To this end Clement regards them as acts of the in-
tellect that result in the acquisition of truth.
At the core of Clement's theory of knowledge is his em-
phasis on the esoteric nature of the most sublime realities and
consequently of the knowledge about them, since the intellect is
not perfect. This for Clement is the foundation of symbolic
knowledge and he firmly justifies the theory of symbolism. The
origin of his theory of symbolism can be traced back to the in-
fluence of the Greek mysteries, Scripture and Clement's

dependence on the philosophical tradition of his time.
It is worthwhile mentioning at this point that these elements
present in Clement's thought already contain substantially com-
plete the gnoseological doctrine later to be recieved by the
mediaeval Christian culture. These include Aristotelian
epistemological elements, aspects of the Platonic doctrine of on-
tological knowledge and the importance of symbolism that later
exercises a great influence in speculative theology. In a word it
could be said that in Clement the Agustinian and Thomistic pro-
gramme is already marked out. Clement is truly the first in Chris-
tian philosophical thought.
IV. T H E WILL AND THE VOLUNTARY DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE
At the core of many theories of knowledge, one can find the

doctrine of a voluntary rejection of aspects of spontaneous
knowledge or a perculiar view of the will in knowledge.
Having seen some fundamental aspects of the role of the
intellect in Clement's conception of knowledge, in the previous
section, our study now calls for a treatment of an aspect which
in Clement's theory of knowledge is fundamental. This is the vo-
luntary factor in the act of knowledge which is treated by Cle-
ment in his theory of muxml He very much appreciates the im-
portant role of the will in knowledge in view of its positive role
in inclining the rational faculties towards knowledge. How vo-
luntary is the act of knowledge according Clement? Does our author
attribute priority to the intellect or to the will in the act of
knowledge or does he rather see a simultaneous and mutual in-
fluence? As we strive to marshal out answers to these questions
from Clement's thought, the role of the will in his theory of
knowledge will become clearer.
Clement is quite outspoken as regards the voluntary opera-
tion of the soul. This is most evidently manifestated when Cle-
ment speaks about the authority of the will in moral actions and
in assent to the truth. In fact some passages give the impression
that he overvalues the will's capacity to selfdetermination.
A. The Doctrine of Assent
The importance of belief in the act of knowledge had been

pointed out by some philosophical schools before and during Cle-
ment's time, as for instance the Stoics. In general assent can be
considered as the act of interior adhesion to what the mind ap-
prehends as true or the personal participation in an idea or ac-
tion .
200
The Stoics consider assent as the intrinsic moment of

knowledge and recognize in it a certain role of the will, consider-
ing error as the consequence of a precipitated assent. Thus assent
is simply seen as the act by which that which is presented as evi-
dent, is recognized as such by the influence of the will. It can
therefore be said that the constitutive act of assent is presented as
a theoretical and a practical moment of knowledge . Later St.201
Thomas among others has however pointed out the complexity of

the act of assent . 202
Clement affirms the Stoic teaching on the important role of

belief in knowledge and that assent is an act of voluntary
choice . In view of Stoic philosophy, he affirms: «And not on-
203
ly the Platonists, but also the Stoics, say that assent is in our own
power. All opinion then, and judgment, and supposition, and
knowledge, by which we live and have perpetual intercourse with
the human race, is assent; which is nothing else than faith» . 204
Such is the context and extention of Clement's notion of belief.

The importance of belief in Clement's theory of knowledge
may be better appreciated if it is borne in mind that according to
ideas in Aristotle and the Stoics, pistis pertains to the judgement
of a syllogism or of a reasoning process — the faculty which ac-
cepts the result of reasoning . Thus Aristotle maintains a
205
similar idea Top. 1.1.100b. 18. It is in this context of pistis, as cer-

tain knowledge, a truth evident in itself, that Clement's notion of
assent has to be placed.
Similarly Epicurus already employed the notion of pistis,
understood as a voluntary preconception in his theory of
knowledge. Clement presents a long treatment of Epicurus' con-
ception in Str. II.IV, 16.3. He points out that it is a clear grasping
of the concept of a thing, which constitutes the precondition for
any argument, opinion or intellectual activity. In this sense belief
becomes the initial understanding which permits further

understanding of a truth. Through this preconception one
establishes general notions, as the basis, in anticipation of the con-
clusion of an intellectual discovery. Pistis can therefore be regard-
ed as a point of departure that helps to guide the progress of in-
tellectual knowledge.
As R. Mortley observes, Clement's treatment of the notion
of belief in knowledge shows a great originality. «He is the first,
known to us, to adapt the scriptural term to the notion of pistis
that is found in Aristotelian and stoic logic* . 206
According to Plato, belief, that is conjecture, comes under

the category of opinion . In this sense pistis is considered as
207
part of inferior knowledge whose object is the changeable reality

and therefore is not to be considered as real truth. However Cle-
ment attaches to belief the importance Aristotle attaches to the
knowledge of the first principles. It is this tradition of the notion
of belief which permits Clement to show the philosophical accep-
tability of faith as a fundamental aspect of knowledge . Thus 208
for Clement pistis is not just a mere acceptance of a vague and

irrational opinion but the foundation and part of knowledge . 209
Lilla has really observed that Clement obtains this doctrine from
Plato but that Clement uses it in addition some Aristotelican
ideas .210
According to Clement this assent of the will is of double

importance. On the one hand it is the foundation of knowledge
(epistemological pistis) and on the other hand it is necessary for
salvation (religious pistis). However there is a mutual and com-
plementary connection between the two as far as knowledge is
concerned.
B. Clement's Theory of Pistis
The idea of perfect knowledge represents one of the most

important aspects of Clement's philosophy and some of his most
instructive writing concerns the nature of pistis and gnosis.
Although the ideas on these topics can be found throughout his
works, the theory of pistis is discussed mainly in Stromata II and
Stromata V. The issue of gnoseological perfection is, in Clement's
thought, closely related to that of pistis . 211
Clement's doctrine of pistis can rightly be said to represent

a serious attempt to give a scientific explanation of the words
pistis (faith) and maxtucy (to believe) which occur so frequently in
the Scriptures. Clement's theory of pistis concerns the nature of
belief and may be described as the first Christian essay in aid of
a grammar of assent . He also seeks to relate the act of faith
212
to the epistemological debates of the philosophical schools about

the nature of proof and the ground of assent . In order to213
achieve his goal, Clement resorted to the school-philosophy of his

time as well as to some ideas characteristic of Philo.
Clement attaches several meanings to his conception of pistis.
Among other meanings it pertains to the intellectual acceptance of
evident truth. In the following section we intend to discuss some
of the meanings of Clement's conception of pistis with the view
obtaining a more global understanding of Clement's concept.
Clement's definitions of pistis are closely related to one
another and the study of each of them and their mutual relation-
ships would provide a better understanding of what Clement real-
ly means by pistis and the role it plays in his gnoseological doc-
trine.
The most characteristic aspect of Clement's notion of the
pistis is the stress on the idea of «a firm conviction^ that reflects
the truth. Presently the first meaning which refers to the
epistemological aspect of pistis will be examined followed by the
discussion of the religious pistis.
1. Pistis as assent to evident knowledge and to first principles
The indispensable role of pistis in the acquisition of

knowledge is expressed by Clement in some of his definitions of
demonstration , Pistis is presented as the intellectual act of
214
assenting to immediate, evident knowledge or to the first

undemonstrable principles of demonstration. This first meaning of
pistis occurs in such passages as: «What is subjected to criticism is
not believed till it is so subjected; so that what needs criticism
cannot be a first principle. Therefore, as is reasonable, grasping by
faith the undemonstrable first principle and receiving in abun-
dance, from the first principle itself, demonstrations in reference
to the first principle, we are by the voice of the Lord trained up

to the knowledge of the truth» . 215
The idea on which the above passage is based is expounded

by Clement in Str. VIII, which contains some material dealing
mainly with logic and epistemology (Cfr. chap. II. sect. 2). This
idea which is worth emphasizing expresses the metaphysical foun-
dation of Clement's theory of belief: «either everything needs a
demonstration, or something is itself trustworthy. In the first case
we, by requiring the demonstration of each demonstration, shall
be involved in an infinite regress, and in this way the demonstra-
tion itself will be overthrown. In the second case the things
which are themselves trustworthy will become the principles of
demonstrations. The philosophers then admit that the principles
of all things are undemonstrated. Consequently, if there is a
demonstration, there must necessarily be something prior to it,
which is trustworthy and which is called «primary» and
undemonstrated. Therefore every demonstration is traced back to
an undemonstrated belief' .
216
According to Clement, therefore, some demonstations must

be based on undemonstrated principles, which are themselves
trustworthy or evident. This explains why at the end of the
passage, he calls the first principle pistis, and maintains that by
means of pistis it is possible to assent to the existence of some
undemonstrable principles . Similary Clement points out that
217
knowledge is not founded on demonstration by a process of

reasoning because the first principles are incapable of demonstra-
tion; for they are known neither by art nor by theory. For the
latter is conversant about objects that are susceptible to change,
while the former is only practical and not theoretical . 218
«Hence it is thought that the first cause of the universe can

be apprehended by faith alone. Since all science is capable of be-
ing taught; what is capable of being taught is founded on what
is known before. But the first cause of the universe was not
previously known to the Greeks» . As regards the need for,
219
and the existence of an absolute and unconditioned principle in

the dialectic process, attention had been drawn by Plato and
Arisotle. The former in the Republic, VI, 511 b 6-7 . Aristotle
220
maintains that it is impossible to require a demonstration for

every demonstration, and that some demonstrations must start
from some absolute, undemonstrated, truths, and consequently also

trustworthy principles .
221
This Aristotelian doctrine is similar to
Clement's conception of assent. Clement's originality lies in at-
tributing to belief the quality of an undemonstrable principle of
knowledge.
Thus like many other Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines, the
Aristotelian doctrine of the absolute undemonstrable and trustwor-
thy principle of demonstration had become a constitutive element
of the syncretism characteristic of some Middle-Platonic Schools as
well as in Clement's conception of pistis.
Furthermore, Clement is inclined to consider as principles of
demonstration, not only the universal and trustworthy Aristotelian
principles, but also what appears evident both to sensation and to
the mind .
222
This idea is evidenced by Clement's affirmation Str.
Bk. II that: «Theophrastus says that sensation is the root of pistis.
For from it the rudimentary principles extend to the mind that
is in us, and the understanding* . Hence Clement's conception
223
of gnoseological belief is not a mere blind faith but has its foun-
dation in reality.
This consideration of what appears evident both to sensation
and to the mind as principles of demonstration, (i.e., of scientific
knowledge) is closely connected with the view according to which
scientific knowledge is based on both sensations and perception
and on the mind. This is clearly expressed in the following words:
«Now, inasmuch as there are four things in which the truth
resides —sensation, understanding, knowledge, opinion— intellec-
tual apprehension is first in the order of nature; but in our case,
and in relation to ourselves, sensation is first, and of sensation
and understanding the essence of knowledge is formed; and
evidence is common to understanding and sensation* . These 224
ideas are very similar to and indicative of Clement's dependence

on the epistemology of the Peripatetic School tradition . 225
It must be said that Clement surpasses the doctrine of pistis

in his predecessors. According to him, «sensation is the ladder to
knowledge; while Faith, advancing over the pathway of the ob-
jects of sense, leaves opinion behind, and speeds to things free of
deception, and reposes in the truth* . 226
Nevertheless what Clement says in Str. 23.11, 9.5; II.IV, 13.2;

VIII.Ill, 7.3-4 and 14.3 can be said to form a coherent
epistemological system and in agreement with the idea that the

self-evidence of sense-perceptions represents the first fundamental
stage for the growth of knowledge and has a direct influence on
intellectual apprehension . 227
From what we have seen so far about Clement's doctrine of

pistis, it is worthwhile mentioning that despite Philo's great in-
fluence on Clement in general, he does not possess such a com-
plicated doctrine of pistis as is to be found in Clement. However
his epistemological views have been shown to be the similar to
those of Antiochus. For instance, Philo maintains that knowledge
is the product of the activity of sense-perceptions or sensations
and the mind . Nevertheless Clement received not from the
228
Peripatetic school, but from the school-teaching going back to An-

tiochus, the doctrine of assent to what appears evident to sense-
perception as origin of immediate knowledge.
Now in the next section we will examine another meaning
of pistis as it is to be found in Clement's gnoseological views.
2. Preconception or Intellectual Anticipation
The idea of pistis as belief in those principles which appear

evident both to sensation and to mind is closely related to the
definition of pistis as assent, approval of, or consent to
which appears in such passages as: «But the faith
(ou^xaTaOecris)
which some Greeks disparage, deeming it futile and barbarous, is
a voluntary preconception or anticipation (npoknyic,); the assent of
piety» .
229
This same idea is expressed thus: «...and a hope which is the

future apprehension of a future event. And not only the Platonist,
but the Stoics, say that assent is in our own power. All opinion
then, and judgment, and supposition, and knowledge, by which we
live and have perpetual intercourse with the human race, is an as-
sent, which is nothing else than faith» . 230
Clement employs the Stoic terminology au£xaTa9eai<; (to ap-

prove of) used in the middle-platonic philosophy of his time as is
shown by the allusion made in Str. II.XII, 54.5 . The other ter-
231
minology, itpoknyic, (anticipation) and «preconception» is of

Epicurean origin and middle-platonic origins The Stoic term,
epecially as used by the Stoics, indicated the positive reaction or

assent of the mind to sense-perceptions. In this sense, assent and
faith are practically the same . However it is the mind that
232
must ultimately decide whether to believe or not the sense percep-

tions and this decision is expressed by an intellectual assent.
By using the Stoic and Epicurean terminologies, Clement ap-
proves of Epicurus' statement according to which pistis is a
preconception of the mind: «Epicurus, too, who very greatly
preferred pleasure to truth, supposes faith to be a preconception
of the mind; and defines preconception to be a grasping at
something evident, and as the clear understanding of the things; and
asserts that without preconception, no one can either inquire, or
doubt, or judge, or even argue» . Thus the 233
«preconception of
the mind» in this sense actually refers to the first principles of
knowledge without which it is not possible to inquire, know or
judge.
In fact Clement himself later goes on to define belief as a
preconception: «Faith is the voluntary supposition and anticipation
of pre-comprehension» . Thus it could be said that this mean-
234
ing of pistis really expresses the notion of a concept although us-

ing Stoic and Epicurean terminology. The Stoics also considered
sense-perceptions as the basis of all knowledge and as the first
cause of what they too calledrcpoX-f(|>ea<;.Similarly the Epicurean
doctrine of jtp6Xr|<|>t<; accepted by Clement, is in agreement with it.
Clement certainly found this doctrine in conformity with his own
epistemological view of sense perception as the starting point of
human knowledge.
However Clement's originality is seen in the fact that after
mentioning Epicurus' doctrine, he maintains, contrary to
Epicurus, for whom jtpoXTjclnc. is itself knowledge; that a
preconception is prior to knowledge, but not knowledge; as
already indicated in Str. II.VI, 28.1 above, and is transformed into
knowledge by instruction. This can be inferred from the following
passage: «How can one, without a preconception of what he is
aiming after, learn about that which is the subject of his investiga-
tion? He, again who has learned has already turned his preconcep-
tion into comprehension* . In this regard belief is understood
235
as a fundamental aspect of knowledge which serves and enhances

the development of further knowledge.
In conclusion, therefore, pistis in Clement, employed in a

gnoseological sense, refers to the assent to or the acceptance of the
first, undemonstrable principles of demonstration. It thus pertains
to whatever appears as evident to the rational faculties. Any kind
of immediate knowledge based on spontaneous apprehension can
therefore be said to fall within the scope of Clement's pistis,
sometimes expressed as preconception.
3. Pistis as the firm conviction of the human mind
In the previous section we examined Clement's use of the

term pistis to signify the attitude peculiar to the human mind
when it assents to the first principles of demonstration. These are
conceived as undemonstrable and trustworthy or evident. They
therefore merit an unshakable conviction from the knowing
faculty.
In the present section we wish to consider the notion of
pistis in Clement understood as the intellectual assent to a conclu-
sion. Pistis in this sense is considered as the firm conviction which
the human mind possesses after reaching the knowledge of
something by means of a scientific demonstration. Clement
understood quite well that a characteristic aspect of scientific
demonstration is the attainment of the truth. Consequently he
also uses pistis to designate the firm belief of the mind in the
truth of the conclusion of demonstration.
One of the most outstanding passages in this regard is the
following: «Knowledge, accordingly, is charactrerized by faith; and
faith by a kind of divine mutual and reciprocal correspondence,
becomes characterized by knowledge* . 236
The essential characteristic feature of pistis, which is the firm

conviction in the reality being considered, is evident in Clement's
definition of scientific knowledge. Thus he says, «But that
knowledge, which is the scientific demonstration of what is
delivered according to the true philosophy, is founded on faith.
Now, we may say that it is that process of reason which, from
what is admitted, procures faith in what is disputed* . 237
Clement considers the end of demonstration as the causing

of assent to what is not yet convincing. Hence Clement says,
THE THEORY O F KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT O F ALEXANDRIA 161
«The knowledge of the truth among us from what is already

believed, produces faith in what is not yet believed; which is, so
to speak, the essence of demonstration* . 238
Such passages as we have seen above explain why Clement

referring to Aristotle agrees with him in that the intellect natural-
ly assents to the truth. To this end he affirms that «Now Aristo-
tle says that the judgement which follows knowledge is in truth
faith. Accordingly, therefore, faith is something superior to
knowledge, and it is its criterion* . Faith is thus considered a
239
criterion of knowledge.
For Clement this faith-knowledge becomes gnosis as can be
seen in Str. II.II, 49.3; V.III, 18.3 and in Str. VII.X, 57.3. Clement
therefore maintains the Aristotelian ideas that the peculiar character
of scientific knowledge — knowledge attained through demonstra-
tion — is represented by the firm assent by the mind to the truth
attained. Clement also refers to this as pistis. Pistis can therefore
refer to the product of demonstration or it may also refer to im-
mediate knowledge, as when Clement says: «Pistis is the voluntary
supposition and anticipation of pre-comprehension» . 240
As regards the acceptance of or the assent to the premises

of demonstration, there is no doubt that according to Clement if
these premises are true, the conclusion thus attained will be scien-
tific knowledge; if they are only probable and based on opinion
the inference will be knowledge subject to opinion.
There is a similarity between the distinctions which Clement
makes between pistis and the Aristotelian distinction between
scientific demonstration, dialectical syllogism and rhetorical
syllogism . According to Aristotle scientific demonstration has
241
as its point of departure premises which are first and true prin-
ciples, whereas for the latter two types of syllogisms are based on
premises which belong to the sphere of opinion.
For Clement, therefore, just as for Aristotle, dialectical and
rhetorical syllogisms are based on merely probable premises; and
Clement's pistis strictly speaking does not refer to this type of
premises of demonstration. In fact, according to Clement, pistis is
identified with scientific knowledge since it is its direct product as
is expressed in some of the above passages. Since such scientific
knowledge or gnosis is only possible if the mind has a firm con-
viction of the truth in question, Clement considers such pistis as
superior to spontaneous knowledge, i7tia-tcp(XTi . He therefore

242
maintains a very close relationship between pistis, demonstration

and scientific knowledge, clearly distinguishing them from the
sphere of opinion.
C. The Will and the Act of Knowledge
According to Clement, «to will is the act of the soul, but

to do so is not without the body. Nor are actions estimated by
their issue alone; but they are judged also according to the ele-
ment of free choice in each» . Hence he would say that what
243
we do not, we do not either from, not being able, or not being

willing or both . Consequently in Clement's view, «what is
244
voluntary is either what is by desire, or what is by choice, or

what is of intention* . 245
Clement includes knowledge among those acts he considers

as voluntary acts. This is in view of the fact that the desire to
know aids in the acquisition of knowledge. This is the point to
be examined in the next few pages.
1. Knowledge as a Voluntary Act: a Rational Choice
Now since knowledge is subject to the voluntary operation

of the soul, Clement is also of the view that knowledge is a
voluntary act. Accordingly it is either of desire, choice or inten-
tion. The role of the will is so essential in the act of knowledge,
according to Clement, that it could be said that to know one has
to will it. «Therefore volition takes the precedence of all; for the
intellectual powers are ministers of the will. Will, it is said, and
thou shalt be able.» . 246
In view of such attributes by Clement to the will, there

seems to be some justification to think that in his approach to
knowledge there is a certain tendency to intellectual voluntarism
in Clement. However that this is not really the case would
become clearer in the course of our discussion.
In one of the opening paragraphs of Stromata BK. I, Cle-
ment says: «It is by one's own fault that he does not choose what
is best; God is free of blame» . This principle of freedom of

247
choice and human freedom is firmly maintained by the Christian

view of truth which no doubt greatly influenced Clement's con-
ception of knowledge . Clement affirms this fact as against the
248
implicit fatalism of certain gnostics . Clement, who holds in

249
very high esteem man's free, will cannot but find the celebrated
saying in Plato's Republic very appealing. «The blame is his who
chooses; Heaven is blameless» . 250
Clement's view of the independence of the will and its great

autonomy leads him to attribute to the human will an extensive
power of determining its actions . This is most clearly seen
251
when he is dealing with moral acts which in Clement are intimately

linked to cognitive acts because his notion of knowledge is operative
and leads to virtuous perfection. According to Clement, therefore,
it would seem that our voluntary acts depend almost exclusively
on us. Hence «to free ourselves from ignorance, and from evil and
voluptuous choice, and above all, to withhold our assent from those
delusive phantasies, depends on ourselves» . 252
Application to the training of ourselves and consequently

the acquisition of knowledge as well as subjection to the Com-
mandments, are among the acts Clement considers under our
power . Others include distraction and disobedience as weir as
253
obedience . 254
With this notion of the will, virtue is said to depend on

u s , and the requisition of gnosis or perfect knowledge is by a
255
free choice . Knowledge is therefore considered to be a volun-

256
tary act and the love for the contemplation of the truth is the
beginning of wisdom. Closely connected with this question of
knowledge as a rational choice is the question of the priority of
the will and the intellect.
2. Priority of the Will and of the Intellect
From what we have seen above, there is no doubt that for

Clement the role of the will in assenting to truth is really essen-
tial in the act of knowledge. A docile disposition and great desire
that leads to a practical application of the other faculties and
necessary means facilitate the acquisition of the truth. In view of
this Clement explains that «the preference and choice of truth is

voluntary* . To this end, he repeatedly maintains that belief
257
aids understanding. This is most clearly seen when Clement is

dealing with knowledge of the Christian truth as for instance
when he says that «intellectual apprehension depends on faith» . 258
Hence the conclusion: «For he who hopes, as he who believes

sees intellectual objects and future things with the mind» . 259
On the other hand some passages of Clement tend to point

to the fact that according to him the intellect has priority over
the will. Knowledge would therefore precede desire. This is
precisely the case with the knowledge of revealed truth as for in-
stance when Clement speaking about knowledge of the Christian
truth declares: «He, then, who imitates opinion shows also
preconception. When then one, having got an inkling of the sub-
ject, kindles it within his soul by desire and study, he sets
everything in motion afterwards in order to know it. For that
which one does not apprehend, neither does he desire it, nor does
he embrace the advantage flowing from it» . 260
It is an expressed view of Clement that the intellect and the

will being rational faculties are principles of knowledge, desire and
action. «For both are powers of the soul, both knowledge and im-
pulse. And impulse is found to be a movement after an assent.
For he who has an impulse towards an action, first receives the
knowledge of the action, and secondly the impulse* . 261
The intellect therefore seems to have priority over the will.

In fact Clement goes on to add that «since learning is older than
action (for naturally, he who does what he wishes to do learns
it first: and knowledge comes from learning, and impulse follows
knowledge; after which comes action) knowledge turns out to be
the beginning and author of all rational action* . 262
Consequently gnoseological faith is thus to be regarded as an

intellectual desire, since it is the assent of the mind to unseen ob-
jects. These ideas are clearly used by Clement to express the rela-
tionship between belief and knowledge; will and intellect. Accor-
dingly «If then faith be choice, being desirous of something, the
desire is in this instance intellectual. And since choice is the
beginning of action, faith is discovered to be the beginning of ac-
tion, being the foundation of rational choice in the case of anyone
who exhibits to himself the previous demonstration through
faith» . This syllogism employed by Clement in the above

263
passage is Aristotelican as so also is the definition of choice . 264
Hence Clement's affirmation that «voluntarily to follow what is

useful is the first principle of understanding* . First comes the
265
knowledge of the object through intellectual apprehension; then

the desire of the object thus apprehended
In Clement's view, therefore, first comes knowledge, then
volition and finally action. «So that rightly the peculiar nature of
the rational soul is characterized by this alone; for in reality im-
pulse, like knowledge, is excited by existing objects* , since
266
knowledge is the contemplation of beings that are.
D. Belief and Understanding
Despite such extensive attributes to the will as we have just

seen, Clement nevertheless is quite aware of the limitations of the
human rational capacity. According to Clement, therefore, the
human intellect alone cannot arrive to perfect knowledge and
truth, nor apprehend all the knowledge it could. Consequently
God in his divine providence has revealed some deeper truths by
the divine Logos. Hence Clement's insistence on faith in the
divine Logos and in His teaching, the Christian truth, in order to
acquire a more perfect knowledge. «For there is nothing like hear-
ing the Word Himself, who by means of Scripture inspires fuller
intelligence* . For him faith and trust in the divine authority
267
as the ultimate measure of truth is unquestionable. This is clearly

manifested by his theory of assent.
Clement saw a harmonious relationship between faith and
reason, between divine revelation and the effort of the human in-
tellect to reach the most profound truths. In fact this is one of
Clement's main tasks. «Animated by the attitude which was later
summed up in the formula, Credo, ut intelligam, he sought to
develop the systematic presentation of the Christian wisdom in a
true, as opposed to a false gnosis» . 2W
Accordingly, in our author's view to dispense of or

disbelieve Scriptures and Christian revelation inevitably implies
the impossibility of attaining the whole and real truth. «But
whoever chooses to banquet on faith, is steadfast for the reception
of the divine words, having acquired already faith as a power of

judging, according to reason*. Hence ensues to him persuasion in
abundance. And this was the meaning of that saying of prophecy,
«If ye believe not, neither shall ye understand* . Faith is
269
therefore indispensible for knowledge.

So much is faith an essential aspect in Clement's gnoseology
that he regards it as a way of attaining knowledge of the ultimate
cause, righteousness and wisdom. Clement therefore affirms that
«also Xenocrates, in his book on «Intelligence», says «that wisdom
is the knowledge of first causes and of intellectual essences* . 270
To this end Clement does not fail to point out that «it has been
shown that the knowledge of the first cause of the universe is of
faith, but it is not demonstration* . 271
Just as the voluntary acts of the will which are necessary for
human perfection do not depend exclusively on the faculties, so
also is knowledge not dependent exclusively o the human in-
tellect. «For neither is it possible to attain it (the perfect good)
without the exercise of the free choice; nor does the whole de-
pend on our own purpose; as for example, what is destined to
happen* .
272
In this respect Clement attributes an indispensible role to

the help of the divine Logos in human knowledge. «For since the
soul became too enfeebled for the apprehension of realities, we
need a divine teacher. The Saviour is sent down —a teacher and
leader in the acquisition of the good— the secret and sacred token
of the great providence* .273
Now the act of faith is an act of the will, according to Cle-

ment, and firm and true faith augments the momentum in the
direction of knowledge. Consequently, «the exercise of faith
directly becomes knowledge, reposing on a sure foundation* , 274
which is the divine authority itself. Such then is the natural

prerogative of him who has received faith or assented to the first
indemonstrable principles of knowledge to apprehend knowledge,
if he desires. Thus developing a perfect knowledge on «the foun-
dation* of faith .
275
In conclusion therefore Clement's theory of assent manifests

the importance he attributes to voluntary aspect of knowledge in
general. The intellectual assent to the first indemonstrable prin-
ciples of knowlege is considered as the foundation of knowledge.
From the discussion so far it can be seen that Clement attributes

a mutual relationship to the roles of the intellect and will in the
act of knowledge. He can therefore not be really accused of in-
tellectual voluntarism.
As can be inferred from Clement's theory of belief, he con-
siders knowledge and in particular wisdom as a whole. In this
sense, he emphasizes the voluntary psychological presupposition
whereby wisdom also includes possession of the virtues. He does
not assume an analytic or scholastic perspective in which the first
principles are objects of the will (Ockham, Descartes). Clement's
notion of belief, as that of the ancient Greek philosophers, is not
to be identified with the modern belief (of Hume for instance).
Clement, as a good Greek, is very intellectualistic. He is not
a voluntarist nor a fideist in the modern sense. He does not use
belief in order to solve critical problems nor to refute scepticism.
For Clement, belief means simply conviction, personal commit-
ment. It corresponds to the very common principle that one will
not know if one does not want to know.
In the case of the Christian truth, an essential part of Cle-
ment's notion of truth, he attributes the character of first prin-
ciples to the contents of revelation. Hence the need to assent to
them as the foundation for further knowledge. Clement's theory
of belief also reflects his view of the limitation of the speculative
faculty.
CONCLUSIONS
As can be inferred from the foregoing study, Clement's con-

ception of knowledge comprises the apprehension of all truth be
it natural or supernatural, speculative or practical, human or
divine, demonstrable or based on faith. He no doubt possesses and
proposes a comprehensive approach to knowledge.
Clement's theory of the Logos, his Christian conception of
human psychology as well as his theory of symbolism and his
theory of pistis constitute essential aspects of his theory of
knowledge. To these must be added Clement's conception of con-
templation and wisdom which reflect the intimate connection bet-
ween intellectual and moral perfection in his concept of

knowledge. Their fundamental role in Clement's gnoseological
doctrine is evidenced by his exposition of the Christian gnosis.
The latter is considered to be the knowledge of things human and
divine. According to Clement perfect knowledge must therefore
lead to the perfect contemplation of God, the most perfect object
of knowledge and the ultimate goal of real wisdom.
1. Clement's anthropological view is very much inspired in
the Christian doctrine of the divine element in man, the spiritual
soul. Hence the sense of the supernatural is a recurrent aspect of
Clement's theory of knowledge. From Platonism he is influenced
by the doctrine of the world of immaterial forms and from Chris-
tianity by the indispensable role of the divine Logos in human
knowledge.
A fact that stands out in Clement's theory of knowledge is
his optimistic conception about the human capacity to attain true
knowledge of reality. Hence his criticism of philosophical scep-
ticism. In the human acquisition of knowledge, Clement counts
with the following sources: a common natural apprehension of
reality, involving sense perception and intellectual abstraction; a
natural revelation as in the case of the philosophers, and a super-
natural revelation. All these are conceived as harmonious and
complementary towards the acquisition of the perfect knowledge
of things human and divine. As a consequence of Clement's
realistic and comprehensive conception of knowledge, the Logos is
considered as a metaphysical and a gnoseological principle. Cle-
ment envisages a close affinity between the human intellect and
the Logos, considering them as ontological principles of human
knowledge.
Clement's theory of knowledge is to be considered in view of
his Christian notion of man understood as endowed with sense per-
ception and intellectual apprehension. In his view the latter proceeds
from the former by abstraction. Although the two are indispensable
for knowledge, only to the intellect is knowledge attributed pro-
perly speaking. Clement's anthropological stand, in view of his
theory of knowledge, takes into account all the essential elements
in human nature: the spiritual soul infused at creation and its ra-
tional faculties as well as the senses. The acquisition of knowledge
is considered to result as combined roles of these faculties.
Although Clement does not expound a highly developed

psychology as is later to be found in St. Thomas' works, he
nevertheless takes the first steps in the right direction among the
Christian thinkers. He possesses a substantially Christian an-
thropology, the Platonic influences notwithstanding. He affirms
that the intellect is the proper faculty of knowledge and that
although knowledge is immaterial, it nevertheless starts with sense
perception. Hence Clement considers sense experience as one of
the pillars of truth and the ladder to knowledge.
It can be said that Clement's anthropological stand, in view
of his theory of knowledge, takes into account all the essential
elements in human nature: the soul and its rational faculties as
well as the senses. According to Clement, therefore, knowledge is
possible thanks to man's possession of the spirit infused at crea-
tion, the soul, the ruling faculty and the senses. Thus Clement re-
jects philosophical scepticism and the suspension of judgement as
principles of knowledge. He admits the possibility of doubt on
the basis of the incoherence between propositions and the reality
apprehended by the intellect. In Clement we can already find the
idea that the truth is the coherence between the human intellect
and reality; an idea later to be developed by St. Thomas Aquinas.
Nevertheless it is the limitation of the human mind that Clement
considers to be the cause of logical sceptism, and not the nature
of things.
Clement attaches an indispensable role to sense perception in
human knowledge. It provides the first data of knowledge for the
intellect thus serving as the ladder to intellectual apprehension. All
human knowledge starts from some sense perception and advances
by progressive abstraction from matter but always refers to reali-
ty. Clement's realistic approach to knowledge leads him to shun
sensism and empiricism as well as any materialist approach to
knowledge. He does not consider the truth of sense perception as
being absolute.
2. Apart from abstraction, such logical acts as demonstra-
tion, definition, and dialectic proceedings are all attributed by Cle-
ment to the intellect because only with them is there real applica-
tion of the intellect. To this end Clement regards them as acts of
the intellect that result in the acquisition of truth. Clement firmly
agrees with the Platonic doctrine that real knowledge is of the im-
mutable and intelligible reality. Consequently the intellect is the

appropriate faculty for knowledge. In this regard he makes quite
an interesting and firm criticism of Empiricism. He maintains that
bound in this earthly body, man apprehends the sensible objects
by means of the senses; but that he grasps intellectual objects by
means of the logical faculty itself. Accordingly he points out that
the object of knowledge is not only that which is subject to sense
experience.
In his conception of knowledge, the ethical and the
speculative aspects are intimately linked. Hence his notion of
abstraction from matter extends not only to the intellect but to
the separation of the knowing subject from the passions in or-
der to acquire perfect knowledge. In this regard Clement em-
phasizes the need for separation from matter and from the pas-
sions in order to possess perfect contemplation. It seems that
Clement's notion of abstraction is a manifestation of the general
tendency of the Alexandrian school to see the passions in a
gnoseological context. However he points out that the most pro-
fund contemplation starts with knowledge of created reality. He
affrms that if one expects to apprehend all things by the senses
alone, one has fallen far from the truth. According to him,
although the senses contribute to the apprehension of the truth,
not all truth is subject to sense perception. Consequently the
human intellectual faculty can apprehend realities which are above
the reach of the senses.
As we can see so far, Clement maintains the classical scheme
of knowledge whereby from sense perception, followed by abstrac-
tion, we attain intellectual apprehension. This idea is closely link-
ed to Clement's view of knowledge as contemplation and par-
ticularly so when he speaks of the knowledge of immaterial
beings and of God. As has been seen above, according to Cle-
ment, knowledge is, properly speaking, proper of the rational
powers and therefore characterised by judgement and reason.
These rational powers are therefore directed to mental objects or
concepts which have their foundation in reality. The adequate
relationship between reality, concept and language is thus
necessary for them to be true knowledge. Hence Clement's affir-
mation of the importance of the logical inquiry in which the ra-
tional faculties act in a reasoning process.
Consequently, in Clement's view, separation from the sensi-

ble things, particularly from the body, is the only way to achieve
the contemplation of the intelligible world which is the object of
the intellect. Thus it is to be concluded that Clement's notion of
abstraction, although not very sofisticatedly developed, expresses
the essential idea that the objects of the intellect are the im-
material forms of sensible realities. These forms are obtained from
sensible things through intellectual abstraction and through them
the intellect knows the infinity of particular things. Clement's
operative notion of knowledge leads him to extend this idea to
the abstraction from the passions in order to acquire perfect
knowledge.
3. In the gnoseological theory behind Clement's thought, the
extramental reality is always the touchstone of man's knowledge.
This fact, together with his positive attitude to knowledge, also
shows that his logic is not founded on pure mental constructions.
This becomes even more evident after discussing his concepts of
definition and scepticism. The fact that reality is the touch stone
of knowledge is reflected in Clement's view on the intellectual
processes in the acquisition of knowledge. This is reflected in his
ideas on logic in which he is strongly influenced by the
Aristotelian doctrine of scientific demonstration and by Platonic
dialectics.
Clement's notion of demonstration contains the essential
elements of the Aristotelian theory. For instance, Clement affirms
the necessity of first undemonstrable principles, the presence of at
least two true and different premises, logical syllogism and the
right conclusion. In expounding how Clement articulates these
essential elements, it has been possible to have another glimpse at
our author's positive and realistic approach to knowledge.
The use of Aristotelian terminology, the realistic distinction
between the three elements of knowledge mentioned above
(names, concepts and things) and the discussion on the ten
categories, shows the Aristotelian inclination of Clement's logic.
However Clement does not make a strict distinction between
Aristotelian logic and Platonic dialectics. Rather, he attributes to
the latter the importance Aristotle attributes to the former. It can
be inferred that Clement strongly holds the view that for there
to be logical truth, the terms employed must really express the
reality they signify (Cfr. section above on definition). Further-

more, since names have their ultimate foundation in the reality
they are meant to refer to, Clement points out that a logical truth
is scientific in the measure in which it corresponds to the reality
signified by it.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that Clement's notion of
demonstration contains the essential elements of the Aristotelian
concept of demonstration. For instance, Clement affirms the
necessity of first indemonstrable principles, the presence of at least
two true and different premises, logical syllogism and the right
conclusion. In expounding how Clement articulates these essential
elements, it has been possible to have another glimpse at our
author's positive and realistic approach to knowledge. Clement af-
firms that there is a distinction between demonstration, syllogism
and analysis. The distinguishing characteristic being that true
demonstration is only possible if the premises correspond to, and
truly express, the reality of the matter in question. Otherwise,
one is dealing with mere syllogism. Thus in Clement's
gnoseological theory, extramental reality is always the touchstone
of man's knowledge. This fact, together with his positive attitude
towards knowledge, also shows that his logic is not founded on
pure mental constructions. This becomes even more evident after
discussing his concepts of definition and scepticism.
From Clement's account of definition it must be concluded

that his account reflects a profound influence from Aristotelian
doctrine and terminology — directly derived or otherwise. Accor-
ding to him, a definition therefore expounds the essence of a
thing, for instance man as a rational, laughing animal. It is
however incapable of accurately comprehending the complete
nature of the thing. For a scientific definition it is necessary to
divide the genus into at least two essentially necessary species for
the sake of brevity. By means of uniting the principal species, a
definition exposes the essence of a thing in the qualities expressed.
Clement's dialectics is an act of the intellectual faculty that
by discerning the true and the false ascends to the most excellent
essence of all reality in accordance with the science of things
human and divine which is the true gnosis. Similarly, dialectics,
which Clement considers as a function of the intellect, is regarded
as the logical discussion of intellectual subjects, with selection and
assent. This intellectual act establishes by demonstration, allega-

tions respecting truth, and demolishes the doubts brought for-
ward. Thus Clement's conception of dialectic is entirely Platonic
and not Aristotelican although Clement's syncretism leads him to
use Aristotelican philosophical method (logic) and Platonic dialec-
tic. Although he does not really separate logic and dialectic, he
nevertheless highlights dialectic to a greater extent.
4. Nevertheless, Clement is of the view that not all
knowledge responds to logical analysis owing to the complexity of
reality and our knowledge of it. According to him, the most
sublime truths are not immediately apprehended by the intellect
but through symbols. Clement sees an appropriate need for some
use of symbolism in the understanding of revealed truth which he
considers to contain deeper meanings. The origin of Clement's
symbolism, derives from the influence of the mystery religions
and that of the esoteric philosophical systems. These include
especially Pythagorism, Platonism and Stoicism. However, the im-
mediate origin of Clement's symbolism can be attributed to his
literary dependence on Christian Platonism, in particular Philo,
on Scripture and the gnostic literature. Together with all these,
Clement's syncretic method must also be taken into account.
Clement emphasizes the esoteric nature of the most sublime
realities and consequently of the knowledge about them, since the
intellect is not perfect. This for Clement is the foundation of
symbolic knowledge. The origin of his theory of symbolism can
be traced back to the influence of the oriental mystery religions,
the Greek mysteries, Scripture and Clement's dependence on the
philosophical tradition of his time.
5. For Clement, knowledge is a voluntary act, in its cause,
compatible with being formally an intellectual act. Hence the very
important roles he attributes to the intellect and to the will in his
conception of knowledge. This also reflects another aspect of Cle-
ment's notion of knowledge. According to Clement, knowledge is
operative and leads to human perfection, contributing to man's at-
tainment of his ultimate goal. Hence the intellectual, spiritual,
logical and moral elements of knowledge are all brought into in-
timate connection in Clement's gnoseology.
Clement's conception of the voluntary nature of knowledge
is seen in his theory of pistis, in which he intends to develop a
doctrine of belief or assent to the truth. The general thesis is that

(from the point of view of its cause) knowledge is a voluntary act
and consequently one would not know if one does not will to
know. Clement finds a parallelism between the nature of the Aristo-
telian notion of the undemonstrable first principles of demonstration
and the objects of belief. To this end the first principles of dem-
onstration are to speculative knowledge what the data of revelation
are to religious knowledge. In this regard the revealed truths are
the first undemonstrable principles of religious knowledge.
The basis of Clement's theory of belief is that the demonstra-
tion of scientific knowledge cannot go on ad infinitum. There must
therefore be some starting principle which being an evident truth
or a conclusion is the object of belief. Thus Clement applies the
Aristotelian idea of the intellectual apprehension of the first prin-
ciples of demonstration to his doctrine of belief. To this end he
points out that the knowledge of the first cause of the universe,
the Creator, is not the subject of demonstration.
6. Clement's notion of knowledge as wisdom transcends mere
natural human wisdom or practical knowledge. His concept of
wisdom comprises philosophical, theological and the Christian gnosis.
Wisdom ought to lead to the possession of the eternal and un-
changeable habit of contemplation which is at the same time
operative on to complete perfection. The idea of contemplation in
Clement reflects unmistakable Platonic and Christian influences as
can be inferred from his conception of the objects of contempla-
tion. For him contemplation is undoubtedly something spiritual;
a purely intellectual act. It is an intellectual vision and speculation.
As regards philosophical wisdom, Clement's conception of
philosophy as a divine gnoseological instrument in history is quite
original. His thesis is that philosophy is of divine origin and had
been given to the Greeks as the Old Testament was given to the
Jews to prepare them for the reception of Christian wisdom. Thus
philosophy as well as revelation have a common origin and are
directed to the same end.
Clement's concept of true philosophy is unquestionably eclec-
tic. In his evaluation of Greek philosophy, he holds Plato
and Pythagorism in high regard and condemns Stoic materialism
and determinism. The Peripatetic doctrine which limits divine pro-
vidence is also criticized by Clement. His strongest criticisms are
reserved for the philosophy of Epicurus and the Sophists. Never-

theless, Clement admits that the best Greek philosophers who had
truly philosophized, had attained some aspects of the truth.
7. At the core of Clement's eclecticism is his view that truth
is truth and universal wherever it may be found. Hence there is
a harmonious relationship between true speculative knowledge and
Christian truth. All true knowledge is a participation in the Logos
who is Wisdom. The relationship between reason and faith is a
crucial problem in Clement's whole thought. There is no doubt
that the solution he provides sheds a lot of light on the theory
of knowledge behind his thought. For Clement, there is a har-
monious relationship between reason and faith. The mutual rela-
tionship between Philosophy and Revelation is based on their
common divine origin and goal. The relationship between them is
therefore considered as harmonious and complementary.
Clement's merit lies in his establishment of the fundamental
balanced principle in the reason-faith relationship. A more pro-
found and systematic theory of the relationship between faith and
reason will later be developed by St. Thomas. Clement is the first
to lay down in a firm way the principle that God, being the same
author of the natural and the supernatural, does not permit any
contradiction nor the devaluation of the truth attained by the in-
tellect. Nevertheless, the revealed truth is superior. In Clement we
can already find the germ of an essential aspect of Christian
philosophy. Hence he has been considered the precursor of Chris-
tian philosophy, later to be developed by St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas.
Finally it is worthwhile mentioning at this point that all
these elements present in Clement's thought already contain
substantially complete the gnoseological doctrine later to be receiv-
ed by the mediaeval Christian culture. These include Aristotelian
epistemological elements, aspects of the Platonic doctrine of on-
tological knowledge and the importance of symbolism that later
exercises a great influence in speculative theology. In a word it
could be said that in Clement the Agustinian and Thomistic pro-
gramme is already marked out. Clement is truly the first in Chris-
tian philosophical thought.
NOTES
1. Dr. H.B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy,
Assen, 1973, p. 73, footnote n. 6 (from the editor Prof. Dr. C. J . De
Voget, et al.)
2. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 13.2
3. Str. IV.I, 3.2. The rule of the truth referred to by Clement in this passage
is the scriptures and the Christian tradition which he considers the
touchstone of truth. The same idea is referred to by canon of tradition (Str.
LI, 11.3) or canon of faith (Str. V.XIV, 131.1; VII.XVI, 94.5) or rule of the
gnostic (Str. V.I, 1.4) as well as ecclesiastic tradition (Str. VI.XV, 125.2)
4. Cfr.Str. I.I, 15.2
5. Ibid.
6. Cfr. A. Cleveland Coxe, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers by The Rev. Alexander
Roberts, D.D., and James Donaldson, Vol. II, Eerdmans, Michigan, 1983 p.
344; See Elucidation V. Conformity with the Christian notion of truth and
therefore with reality and revelation is the essential criterion for Clement's
judgement of the truth of any knowledge. A. Cleveland Coxe, referring to
the passage above, has rightly affirmed that «This is a valuable passage for
the illustration of our author's view of the nature of tradition, as a canon
«from the creation of the world; a tradition preluding the tradition of true
knowledge*.
7. Str. I.XIV, 60.3
8. Str. I.XIV, 60.4
9. Ibid.
10. Str. VI.XVI, 136 etc. Cfr. John I, 26 and also Str. VI.XIV, 114.4 and Str.
II.XVI, 72.2 for man's likeness to God in a spiritual sense.
11. Str. II.XIX, 102. Also cfr. W . Volker, Der Wahre Gnostiker nach Clem.,
Berlin 1952.
12. Str. VI.IX, 72.1 and 72.2
13. Cfr. Str. I.XXVII, 171.1
14. Str. VI.XII, 100.3 Cfr. Luke 20, 35 and Gal 3,28 for parallel passages
15. Cfr. Str. VIII, 16.4. Also cfr. Plato, Phaedrus. 247c
16. Str. V.XIII, 87.4; 88.1. Clement understands the inspiration referred to in
Gen. 2, 7 as the human intellect. References to Plato and Aristotle include:
Plato, Meno. 99 and Protagoras.
e
322a; Aristotle Ethic. Nie. X 9 (10) 1179b
20-21.
17. J . Daniélou, Hist, des Doctrines Chrét. avant Nicée: I. Théologie du Judeo-
Christ. [cit. Théologie]; II Message évangélique et culture hellénistique [cit.
Message], Tournai 1958-1961; Trad, it., Bologna 1975. p. 155-162.
18. Str. V.XIII, 88.2. Cfr. Plat. Tim. 30b; 69c and 89e. The idea of effluence
is quite recurrent in the book of wisdom, for instance Wisd. 7, 25 and in
NOTES 177
Middle-Platonism as has been rightly pointed out by R. W i t t , The

Hellenism of Clem., «Class. Quarto. 25, 1931, pp. 195-204. Also to be seen
in cfr. Protr. VI, 68.2. Although Clement relates this idea of effluence of
divine dispensation to the pouring out of the Holy Spirit (Cfr. Str. VI.XVI,
134.2), he nevertheless makes it clear that «it is not as a portion of God
that the Spirit is in each of us». (Str. V.XIII, 88.3. cfr. Gal. 2, 28)
19. Str. VI.XVI. 133.1
20. Str. VI.XVI, 134.2
21. Str. VI.XVI, 134.3
22. Str. VI.XVI, 135.1
23. Str. VI.XVI, 135.3
24. Cfr. M. Spanneut, Le Stoicism des Peres etc. Paris, 1957, pp. 167-175,
224-226. Also cfr. Str. III.X, 68.5 Cfr. Clement's interpretation Gal. 5, 17
25. Str. VI.XVI, 135.4
26. Ibid., 136.4
27. Ibid., 136.5-137.1 This realist line of thought is later developed to a higher
level by such Christian philosophers as St. Thomas Aquinas.
28. Cfr. Str. II.XX, 110.4.
29. Str. II.XX, 111.1-3.
30. Str. II.XI, 51.6
31. Str. VI.XVI, 136.1
32. According to Clement «...gnosis, is essentially a contemplation of existences
on the part of the soul, either of a certain thing or of certain things, and
when perfected, of all together* (Str. VI.VIII, 69.3)
33. A more extensive treatment of contemplation is dealt with in Chapter IV
of this work.
34. Str. I.XX, 99.3
35. Ibid.
36. Cfr. VI.IX, 78.3
37. Cfr.Ibid. 78.2
38. Str. V.I, 7.4 cfr. Plato, Fedon 79 cd; 81e etc.
39. Ibid. 7.5 cfr. I Cor. 13,12. Also cfr. R. Mortley, The Mirror and I Cor. 13,12
in the Epistemology of Clement of Alexandria, «Vigilae Christianae», 30,
1976, pp. 109-120. He has rightly observed that Clement mitigates the idea
of the obscurity of the vision in a mirror. The idea of mirroring is c o n -
sidered as a legitimate and valid way of obtaining knowledge*. (Ibid. p. 120)
40. Str. V.VI, 33.4-6. cfr. Plato, Theaet, 155e
41. Str. II.IV, 15.1
42. Cfr. V.XIV, 89.2-5; VII.V, 29.2; VII, 37.1-2; Prot. V, 66-3. Other criticisms
of Stoic materialism also occur in Str. II.XXII, 135.3; VI.XIV, 114.5;
VII.XIV, 88.5.
43. Cfr. R. Casey, Clement and the Beginning of Christian Platonism, «Harv.
Theol. Review*, 18, 1925, pp. 39-101
44. Cfr. Str. VI.IX, 86.1 In many occasions Clement doesn't fail to use expres-
sions from Scripture if he thinks they express his idea better. «Thus Scrip-
ture says, that «the spirit of perception* was given to the artificers from
God. And this is nothing else than understanding, a faculty of the soul,
capable of studying existences, of distinguishing and comparing what suc-

ceeds as like and unlike...* (Str. VI.XVII, 154.4)
45. To this end he finds St. Paul's and Plato's words very convenient. «Thence
says the apostle: «now we see as through a glass, but then face to face*
by those sole pure and incorporeal applications of the intellect* (Str. V.XI,
74.1; I Cor. 13, 12.). Also cfr. Mehat, Etude sur des Stromates de Clement,
Paris 1966, p.203.
46. Str. V.XI, 74.1-3. Cfr. Plato, Rep. VII 53 2ab for the quotation from Plato.
47. Cfr. Str. V.I, 11.4
48. Str. VI.XVI, 135.1
49. Str. VI.XVI, 137.1
50. Str. VI.XVI, 136.5
51. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 13.2
52. Str. II.IV, 13.3
53. Ibid.
54. Str. VI.I, 3.1 cfr. Str. II.XI, 48.2
55. Cfr. E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge,
1957 pp. 146-167. Also cfr. Str. VI.I, 2.4ff. for the other two general defini-
tions of knowledge.
56. Cfr. Osborn, op. cit. p.147. It does not seem that Osborn is justified in
maintaining that «Clement did not regard sense-perception as a means of
discovering truth*. (Ibid.)
57. Cfr. Str. VI.I, 3.2
58. Cfr. Str. VI.I, 2.4ff
59. Str. VI.I, 3.2 In this definition there is a mixture of Stoic and Platonic doc-
trines.
60. Str. V.I, 6.1
61. Cfr. Aristotle, Topics, I 11 105a 3-9
62. Cfr. Xenon Mem IV 4, 19-20.
63. Str. II.II, 9.5
64. Str. II.XI, 50.1
65. Cfr. Ibid., 50.2
66. Cfr. Str. I.IV, 26.4-5
67. Str. II.XI, 57.6
68. Str. I.II, 20.3
69. Str. II.XI, 51.1
70. Str. V.XI, 67.2-3. Also see Str. V.XIV, 106.1 and VH.XII, 71.3 as well as
Plato, Phaedo, 6 5 —66a; 67d; and 80 — 81a for the notion of the true
e e
philosophy which is discussed in chapter V of the present study.

71. Str. V.XI, 71.2-3 Cfr.Str. VI.XI, 90.4
72. Cfr. De Anima, I 4 409a 6 as well as Post. Anal. I 27 87a 36. A similar
parallel can be seen in Sextus Empiricus, Adv. phys. II. 281
73. Cfr. Albinus, Did. 5, 4-5 p. 157 H
74. Cfr. Robert P. Casey, Clem, of Alex, and the Beginnings of Christian
Platonism, «Harv. Theo. Rev»., 18, 1925, p.76. This hints at Clement's in-
tellectual mysticism in which comprehension is so perfect that the distinc-
tion between subject and object becomes unreal.
NOTES 179
75. Cfr. Str. IV.VI, 40.1 for reference to the intimate connection between the
ethical and the theoretical aspects of perfect knowledge.
76. R. Mortley, 1 Cor. 13, 12. p. 112
77. Str. IV.III, 12,2
78. Cfr. Str. IV.XX, 139.5 - 140.1; V.XI, 67.3; VI.XI, 86.1 and VH.VII, 40.1-2
79. Str. IV.XXV, 155.1 Speaking negatively about the passions Clement points
out that, «those who abstain from these things give their thoughts to the
divine things, and partake of the gnostic food» (Str. V.IV, 26.2)
80. Str. V.XI, 67.4
81. Str. VI.XV, 126.3
82. Str. IV.XXV, 155.2 Cfr. Aristotle, De Anima, IE 429a 27, for this Platonic
view; Str. V.XI, 73.3. The identification of the intellect with God also ap-
pears in Str. II.XI, 51.1 and IV.XXV, 162.5. Cfr. E. Osborn, The Philosophy
of Clem., Cambridge 1957, pp. 38-44.
83. Str. VIII.VIH (P.564b)
84. Str. I.n, 20.3
85. Cfr. I.XX, 99.3
86. Cfr. Str. II.XVII,
87. Cfr. Str. VI.XI, (p.500a)
88. Cfr. Str.V.Xl, 74.2 Cfr. Plato, Resp. VII 532ab and A. Mehat, Etude sur les
Stromates de Clem., Paris 1944.
89. Str. IV.XXV, 155.1-2; V.IV, 26.6; V.XI, 73.3 and VI.XV, 126.3
90. Cfr. Str. I.I, 18.2; I.VI, 35.2 and I.IX, 43.1ff
91. Cfr. Str. I.VI, 35
92. Cfr. Str. VIII.VIII, 23ff.
93. Ibid. Osborn has pointed out that these Categories refer to Aristotle's ten
categories. Cfr. Osborn, op. cit. p. 151. See note n. 5
94. Some authors are of the view that the Eighth Book of the Stromata, is not
properly speaking part of the Stromata, but a note-book of extracts which
Clement had made, probably from different lectures or from written treaties
on logic. Cfr. Witt, Albinus and the history of Middle Platonism, Cambridge
1937, pp. 31-39; Lilla, op. cit. p.l20ff., note n. 3. Pohlenz, Klemens von
Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum, Gottingen Nachrichten, Phil.-
His. Klasse, 1943 p . l l l . The same idea also appears in J . von Arnim, De
Octavo Clementis Stromateorum libro, Rostock, 1894, p. 12.
95. Osborn, op. cit. p. 148
96. Ibid.
97. In the following sections we will discuss these points, except the first and
the last. The former will be discussed in the chapter on philosophy,
chapter V. The spirit of Clement's approach to the problem of knowledge
can be deduced from his following words: «But it is suitable for him, who
is at once a lover and disciple of the truth, to be pacific even in investiga-
tions, advancing by scientific demonstrations, without love of self, but with
love of truth, to comprehensive knowledge» (Str. VIII.III, Iff.)
98. Str. VIII.VIII, (p.564 of the English translation used)
99. Cfr. Str. Vni.VLH,
100. Cfr. Str. Vni.VIII, 23 ( p.564a )
101. Osborn, op. cit. p.150
102. Ibid.
103. Str. VIII.III.5 (p.559b)
104. Str. VIII.III (p.559b)
105. Str. VIII.IV, (P.562a)
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Cfr. Str. VIII.III, 6
109. Str. VIII.III.6 (p.559b)
110. Ibid.
111. 5fr. VIII.III, 6 (p.559b)
112. Str. VIII.III (p.560a)
113. Cfr. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Str.
116. Str. VIII.II (p.559a)
117. Str. VIII.VI, (p.563b)
118. Str. VIII.II, (p.559a)
119. Cfr. Str. VIII.IV (p.560b)
120. Ibid.
121. Srr. VIII.IV (p.560b)
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. 5fr. VIILIV
125. Ibid. Plato, Timaeus
126. / t ó .
127. Cfr. Str. VIII.IV
128. Str. VIII.VI (p.563a)
129. Ä « i
130. Cfr. Str.
131. / W .
132. Cfr. Ibid.
133. Str. Vili. V (p.562a)
134. Cfr.Str. Vili. V (Ibid.)
135. Str. VIII.V (Ibid.)
136. Cfr. VIII.I, (p.558a)
137. Str. VIII.I (p.558a)
138. Str. (p.558a)
139. / W .
140. Cfr. Str.
141. TW.
142. Str.
143. F. Osborn, op. cit. pp. 148-153
144. Str. I.XXVIII, 176.3. Also cfr. Plato, The Statesman 287a.
145. Giovanni Pini, demente Alessandrino, Stromati, Note di vera filosofìa, in-
troduzione, traduzione e note di Giovanni Pini, Edizioni Paoline, 1985, p. 219,
note 3. Cfr. Plat. Polit. 287a: ma Clem. tralascia il termine lovgu» «con la
ragione umana» e così cristianizza la dialettica Platonica che diviene, da
NOTES 181
metodo di ascesa intelletuale verso le realtà prime, la via conducente a Dio

per gradi (mondo fisico, potenza celesti, etc.).
146. Str. I.XXVIII, 177.1-2
147. Cfr. I. Pépin, La Vraie dialectique selon Clem., in «Epektasis», Mélanges
Danielou, Beauchesne 1972 pp. 380ff; Str. I.VIII, 39.4; V, 30.1; VI.X, 80.4.
Similar ideas have also been expressed by Nautin, Notes sur le Strom. I,
Rev. d'Hist. Eccl>». 47, 1952, p. 629ff.
148. Cfr. Str. I.XXVIII, 177.3
149. Cfr. Str. VI.XVII, 156.2; Str. I.I, 18.3-4 etc. This positive view of dialectics
in Clement is a far cry from sophism and from the dialectics in modern
and contemporary philosophy where the aim is not the attainment of truth
based on the reality of things.
150. Osborn, op. cit. p. 156. Cfr. Plato, Republic 534d
151. Str. I.XXVIII, 178.1 As in other places, the expression «eye of the soul»
is of Platonic origin. Cfr. Resp. VII 533d; Str. I.XXIV, 164.4; Protr. VI, 68.4
and XI, 114.1
152. Cfr. Str. VI.VII, 54; and also cfr. Osborn op. cit. pp. 153-157
153. Cfr. Plato, Republic, 532
154. Cfr. Plato, Sophist, 253
155. Cfr. Str. I.XXVIII, 176.3; I.III, 22 Plato, The Statesman, 287a. and Phaedrus
273e
156. Str. I.VIII, 39.5
157. Str. VI.XVII, 156.2 Cfr. Str. I.IX, 44.2-45.3; I.I, 18.2-4; 43.1
158. Str. I.XXVIII, 179.4 Also Cfr. I.VIII, 39.4; IX, 44.3; and VI.X, 80.4-82.3
159. Cfr. Str. VII.l, 4.2
160. Cfr. Str. W i l l , 45.1
161. Cfr. Paed. 111,97
162. Cfr. Str. I.I, 13
163. Cfr. Paed. II.2, 20.4; Str. VI.XI, 88.3 and Prot. XI.111.1; 1.10.1. The most
fundamental of such complicity is no doubt the fact that all beings par-
ticipate in being to varying degrees.
164. Cfr. Raoul Mortley, Connaissance Religieuse et Herméneutique chez Clément
D'Alexandrie, Leiden E. J . Brill, 1973, pp. 23, 95 and 222. «La réponse est
dans /'..... divine: tout ce qui existe est investi de signification. L'homme et son
monde sont significatifs à cause de leur ordine. Dans sa disposition de l'univers
Dieu a laissé des traces de sa nature: l'une des ces traces, comme nous l'avons
vu, est le principe de l'analogie» (p. 199).
165. Cfr. R. Mortley op. cit. p. 199
166. Str. VI.XI, 90.4
167. Cfr. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement ... p.171
168. Ibid. About astronomy Clement has this to say: «For treating of the
descriptions of the celestial objects, about the form of the universe, and the
revolution of the heavens, and the motion of the stars, leading the soul
nearer to the creative Power... This science makes the soul quick to
understand... It enables the soul to find agreements and relations so as to
hunt out likenesses in unlike things*. Cfr. Str. VI.XI, 90.3.
169. Cfr. Str. V.V, 29.4; I.XXII, 150.1-3; where Clement speaks about reflection
of truth in reference to Plato and Pythagoras. Also Cfr. Str. I.I, 10.2 and
Plato, Theaetetus 206d; Timaeus 46.a ff. as well as The Republic, 514.a ff.
and Laws VII 792d. The idea of the reflection will be treated in chapter
IV of the present study.
170. Str. V.X, 65.2 Cfr. Str. XI, 71.5; XII, 78.3 and 81.4-82.4; as well as E.
Marsh, The use of mysterion in the writings of Clem, etc., «Journ. of
Theol. Study»., 37, 1936, p. 64
171. Cfr. R. Mortley op. cit. p.196, «La pratique de l'étymologie, présente chez
Clement, indique que les reflets de la realité se retrouvent à travers tous
les languages*.
172. Str. V.X, 65.2.
173. Cfr. Str. V.IX, 56.3
174. Cfr. Rep.VlA94z; Theaet. 155e; Epinom. 973e. Also see Str. V.UI, 17.4; VI,
33.5; I, 7.6 respectively.
175. Lilla, op. cit. p. 145. Cfr. Str. V.IX, 58.1-5
176. Cfr. Str. V.III, 17.4-5 and Str. I.XLX, 92.3
177. Cfr. Str. VI.XV, 126.1-127.4 Also see Clement's interpretations of Matt.
10,26 (Str.I.I, 13.3).
178. Cfr. Lilla, ... p.147-158
179. Ibid.
180. See for instance how Albinus, Did. 179. 33-4, in reference to Plato's
Timaeus 28c approves of the use of esoterism and symbolism. This famous
passage of Plato is also quoted by Clement {Cfr. Prot. 68.1).
181. Raoul Mortley, Connaissance Religieuse et Herméneutique chez Clément
d'Alexandrie, Leiden E.J. Brill, 1973, p. 36. Ce problème, propre au chris-
tianisme, a stimulé Clément pour développer une théorie du symbolisme: c'est-
à-dire une théorie de la relation entre la Réalité divine et les concepts humains
qui prétendent saisir cette Réalité.
182. Osborn, op. cit. p.171.
183. C. Mondésert, Clément d'Alexandrie. Introd. à l'étude de sa pensée religieuse
à partir de l'Ecriture, Paris 1944, p. 151.
184. Cfr. Str. V.XLÏÏ, 87.3ff, I.XTV, 133 and Prot. VI. 68.2ff
185. Str. I.I, 14.3 and 15.1
186. Cfr. Str. I.II, 20.4ff
187. Str. I.I, 18.1. This is also Clement's aim as can be inferred from Str. I.XII,
56.3, VI.I, 2.1 and Vll.XVin, 110.4
188. Str. V.IV, 22
189. Str. V J V , 23.1
190. Str. V.V, 27.1
191. Str. V.V, 28.3 (Cfr. Osborn, op. cit. p.170 for an explanation of this
symbol).
192. Str. V.VI, 86.2
193. Str. V.IV, 21.4
194. Str. V.IX, 56.5. Also Cfr. Str. V.IV, 25.5; V.IX, 57.2 and V.VI, 32.1
195. Str. W i l l , 46.1
196. Str. V.IX, 57.1 Cfr. Str. I.I, 1.2; 13.1ff. as well as Str. VI.VII, 57.1 and
VII.XVI, 94.5ff. for references to such pholosophical and heretical errors.
197. Str. V.IX, 58.3. Cfr. Str. VI.XV, 127.3ff and V.IX, 58.5
198. Str. V.IX, 56.4
NOTES 183
199. Str. V.IV, 19.3. Cfr. Str. I.II, 20.4

200. Cfr. M. T. Antonelli, Encicliopedia Filosofica, EDIPEM, Roma 1979, p. 508
201. Cfr. Ibid.
202. Cfr. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3
203. Cfr. Str. V.XIII, 86.1; II.II, 8.4 and V.I, 3.2 Also Cfr. Plato, Laws 630 b,
c; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VI. 2. 4 for references to voluntary choice as the
basis of all intellectual enterprise.
204. Str. II.XII, 55
205. Cfr. Aristotle, Top. IV.5.126 b. 18; H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the
Church Fathers, p.H2ff.
206. R. Mortley, Connaissance... p. 108
207. Cfr. Plato, Theat. 200d ff.
208. Cfr. R. Mortley. op. cit. p. 110
209. Cfr. W . Volker, Der wahner Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, Berlin
1952, pp. 234-7 where he has studied the relationship between conjecture
and pistis in Clement.
210. Cfr. S. Lilla op. cit., p. 131,
211. Among those who have inquired at some length into Clement's doctrine
of pistis and its relationship with gnosis are E. de Faye, in his book Cle-
ment d'Alexandrie, 207 ff., P.T. Camelot, Foi et Gnose..., 28-14 and 43-50;
and H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Church Fathers 112 and 120-7. Also
see S. Lilla, op. cit., Chap. Ill; H. Chadwick, op. cit., Chap. II; and
Osborn, op. cit. Chap. 10.
212. Cfr. Henry Chadwick op. cit. p.
213. Cfr., for instance, Salvatore R.C. Lilla., Clement of Alexandria, A Study in
Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, Oxford University Press 1971, p. 118.
According to Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical
Tradition, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1987, pp. 51ff, the following questions,
among others, have been adduced as those to which Clement sought to res-
pond with his doctrine of pistis:
(i) the attack of some Greek philosophers, who strongly criticized the faith
as an unreasoning opinion formed without proper consideration nor
demonstration. (Cfr Str. II.II, 8.4.)
(ii) On the other hand, Clement had also to face the dangerous attitude of
those simple believers who insisted on the all-sufficiency of faith; rejecting
any attempt to give a scientific content to their Christian beliefs and to
develop their pistis into a higher form of knowledge. (Cfr. Str. I.LX, 43.1).
These are obviously the same Christians who are opposed to the study of
Greek philosophy.
214. Cfr. Str. VIH.III, 7.6 and 8.1
215. Str. VII.XVI, 95.5-6
215. Str. Vmill, 6.7-7.2
217. Cfr. Str. VII.XVI, 95.6
218. Cfr. Str. Il.rV, 13.4; Str. VII. XVI, 95.6 and VIH.III, 7.3-4. Similarly, Aristo-
tle, Eth. Nic. VI.3.1140b31-1141a3; Prior An. II.16.64b32-36 and Post. an.
I.2.71b20-23; 72a7-8. Also Cfr. Lilla, op. cit. pp.120-126).
219. Str. II.IV, 14.1-2. Thus for Clement the authority of the Logos surpasses the
rational demonstration (cfr. Str. V.I, 5.4; and Str. VII.XVI, 93.2 ff.) and this
is the unity between the faith and human knowledge of things natural and
supernatural. The idea of what is known before is an Aristotelican concept
that appears in Post. an. I.2.71b21; Metaphysics. 1.9. 992b 30; Ethic. Nic.
VI.3.1139b25-27.
220. It must be mentioned that Lilla has given some attention to the sources
of Clement's doctrine of Pistis. According to him and in agreement with
I. von Armin, De Octavo dementis Stromateorum libro (Rostock Progr.,
1894) p. 12 and with Ernst, W. De dementis Alexandrini Stromatum libro
octavo qui fertur (Diss. Grottingen, 1910), the underlying ideas of Clement's
doctrine of the Pistis and the material on logic in Str. BK. VIII are mainly
based on notes taken by Clement himself during his reading of some hand-
books of logic.
221. Cfr. Prior an. 64b32-6, Post. an. 71b20-3, 72a7-8, 84a30-3 as well as in Eth.
Nic. 1140b31-3.
222. Cfr. Str. VIILIII, 7.3-4.
223. Str. II.II, 9.5. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 13.4-14.1; VII.XVI, 95.6 and in VIILIII, 6.7-7.2;
Also cfr. Rep. VI.511b for similar ideas.
224. Str. II.IV, 13.2
225. Attention has been drawn by Lilla to Clement's possible dependence on a
work by Theophrastus or a Peripatetic school-handbook and on Antiochus
of Ascalon through the Adversus Mathematicos, VII.226 and 218. Cfr. Str.
II.II, 9.5; and Str. II.IV, 13.2; and VIILIII, 14.3, respectively.
226. Str. II.IV, 13.3
227. On the dependence of the passages of Str. II.IV, 13.2 and VIILIII, 7.3-4 on
Antiochus, also cfr. R.E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism,
Cambridge, 1937, p. 34.
228. Cfr. Lilla, op. cit. p.131-2 where attention has been drawn to these close
correspondences between Antiochus, Philo and Clement (ibid, footnote n. 2.)
229. Str. II.II, 8.4. For the definition of faith as assent Cfr. Str. II.II, 4.1; 9.1;
III, 11; VI, 27-28; V.I, 3.2; V.XIII, 86.1 and VILLI, 8.1.
230. Str. ILXII, 54.5-55.1. Clement is very much of the idea that the freedom
of assent is in man's power. Cfr. Str. I.I, 4.1 where he speaks of the volun-
tariness of faith. Also see Str. V.I, 3.2 and III, 11.1-2.
231. Cfr. Lilla, op. cit. 127-9
232. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 16.3 On the Stoic doctrine of assent, Cfr. R.E. Witt, Albinus
and the History of Middle-Platonism, Cambridge 1937, pp. 29-34, 50. Witt
has shown Antiochus' adoption of this Stoic doctrine of assent and connec-
ting it with pistis.
233. Str. II.II, 16.3. This is one of Clement's few positive references to the
atheistic Epicurus, whom he nevertheless does not miss the opportunity to
criticize in this passage (Cfr. Str. I.I, 1.2; I.XI, 50.6). On more about
preconception see Str. II.II, 8.4 and Str. II.VI, 28.1.
234. Str. II.VI, 28.1.
235. Str. II.IV, 17.1
236. Str. II.IV, 16.2
237. Str. II.XI, 48.1. Cfr. Str. VIILIII, 5.1-3 and 7.6. There is a Stoic influence
in this definition of demonstration as has been rightly noted by Witt, op.
cit. p. 33. See footnotes 5 and 7.
NOTES 185
238. Str. VII.XVI, 98.3.

239. Str. II.IV, 15.5. Cfr. R. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle-Platonism,
Cambridge 1957, p. 31; E. Osborn, The Philosohy of Clement of Alexandria,
Cambridge 1954, p. 132. Cfr. Anal. Pr. II.23.68bl2 etc. and Str. VII.X, 55.
240. Str. II.VI, 28.1.
241. Cfr. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 7 1 b l 8 ; Topics 100a27-30, and Posterior
Analytics, 46a9-10.
242. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 15.5.
243. Str. II.VI, 26.4-5
244. Cfr. Str. II.XVII, 77.2
245. Str. II.XV, 62.1
246. Str. II.XVII, 77.4. Cfr. Str. I.I, 1.1; V.XI, 71.5 and VII.X, 55.3.
247. Str. I.I, 4.1
248. Cfr. Str. I.XVII, 83.5-84.2; Str. II.XIV where Clement speaks about involun-
tary acts and Str. II.XV, where he deals with voluntarty acts.
249. Cfr. Str. II.III; XX.115-116.
250. Plato, Republic X 617 e. Cfr. II 379b, c. Tim. 42d; Laws. X 904c. cfr. Str.
II.XVI,75.2-3; IV.XXIII, 150.4; V.XIV.136.4; VII.IL12.1. This idea is similary
to be found in Paed. 1.8, 69.1
251. Cfr. Str. III.VII, 58.1; IX,65.1 for allusions to the independence of the will.
252. Str. I.XVII, 84.5
253. cfr. Str. II.XV,62.4, cfrStr. II.VI,26.3
254. cfr. Str. 11X111,59.6
255. Cfr. Str. IV.XIX,124.1-2, VI.XI.95.5
256. cfr. Str. VI.IX,78.4; VH.XVL101.6
257. Str. I.XVIII, 89.1
258. Str. VI.XVIII, 151.5
259. Str. V.III, 16.1
260. Str. VI.XVII, 150.1-2
261. Str. VI.VIII, 68.3-69.1 It is interesting to note Clement's use of the Stoic
definition of impulse in this passage. Cfr. Chrysippus., fr. moe 462 A m .
Also cfr. Str. II.XIII, 59.6 and Str. I.I, 4.1 for references to interior free
will.
262. Ibid., 69.2
263. Str. II.II, 9.2
264. Cfr. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VI 2, 4 1139 a 31, b 4
265. Str. II.II, 9.3
266. Str. VI.VIII, 69.3
267. Str. V V , 40.1
268. F. Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy Vol. II. Mediaeval Philosophy
Augustine to Scotus, Newman, Westminster, Maryland, 1952, p. 26
269. Str. II.II, 8.2.
270. Str. II.V, 24.1
271. Str. II.V, 24.2. Cfr. II.IV, 13.4-14.3 for Clement's demonstration that the
science of the first principle of the universe is reducible to faith and not
to demonstration.
272. Str. V . l , 7.1. This same idea is applied to salvation since according to him
our salvation depends on our free will but not without divine gift. To this
end Clement refers to Eph. 2.5: «For by grace we are saved», pointing out
that, «not, indeed, without good works».
273. Str. V.I, 7.8
274. Str. II.II, 9.4
275. Cfr. Str. VI.XVII, 152.1. Cfr. Str. V.IV, 26.3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag
PROLOGUE 91
THESIS TABLE OF CONTENTS 99
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THESIS 103
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
I. T H E ACTS OF THE INTELLECT A N D ITS OBJECTS Ill

A. Cognitive Powers 112
1. Anthropological Aspects 112
2. The Intellect 115
3. The Role of Sense Perception 119
4. Abstraction and Object of the Intellect 121
II. CLEMENTS NOTION OF LOGIC 125

A. Language-Concepts-Reality 126
B. Demonstration 128
C. Rigorous Definition 131
D. Judgement and Philosophical Scepticism 135
E. Dialectic 139
III. SYMBOLIC KNOWLEDGE 142

A. The Theory of Symbolism 143
B. Universal Domain of Symbolism 145
C. Origin of Clement's Symbolism 146
D. Examples and Justification of Symbolism 148
rv. T H E WILL A N D THE VOLUNTARY DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE 152

A. The Doctrine of Assent 153
B. Clement's Theory of Pistis 154
1. Pistis as assent to evident knowledge and to first principles 155
2. Preconception or Intellectual Anticipation 158
3. Pistis as the firm conviction of the human mind 160
C. The Will and the Act of Knowledge 162
1. Knowledge as a Voluntary Act: a Rational Choice 162
2. Priority of the Will and of the Intellect 163
D. Belief and Understanding 165
CONCLUSIONS 167
NOTES 176

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UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA

Extracto de la Tesis Doctoral presentada en la Facultad Eclesiástica

Dr. Marianus ARTIGAS Dr. Modestus SANTOS

Coram Tribunali, die 19 mensis septembris, anno 1990, hanc

Dr. Ioseph Emmanuel ZUMAQUERO

Excerpta e Dissertationibus in Philosophia

Many attempts have been made to present a biography of

the father of speculative theology, later to be greatly developed by

From Clement's own account, there is no doubt that

the founder of the Alexandrian school whom Clement later suc-

rightly affirms in his introductory note to the English translation

Among Clement's extant writings, the three major ones are

Stromata is the most philosophical in content. Other works in-

highlighted some aspects of Clement's style and thought with par-

Greek and Alexandrian speculative heritage are united and employed

stitute his theory of knowledge from the apparently unconnected

in whatever may constitute Clement's theory of knowledge it is

Clement's thought. Hence the christian truth is an essential ele-

upholds the utility of true dialectics. Clement's theory of symbolism

to lead to the possession of the eternal and unchangeable habit of

J.J. Sanguineti has already presented some aspects on the

therefore only wish to give some additional information on the

Before going further to consider the topics that we have

A. Clement's Love and Search for Knowledge 3

A. The Nature and Origin of Clement's Notion of the Logos 18

CHAPTER II: T H E A C T S O F T H E I N T E L L E C T A N D ITS O B J E C T S 53

CHAPTER III: T H E T H E O R Y O F BELIEF 129

A. The Doctrine of Assent 132

B. Clement's Theory of Pistis 136

C. Knowledge Through Perfection of Pistis 164

D. The Will and the Act of Knowledge 172

CHAPTER IV: CONTEMPLATION 184

A. Concept of Contemplation: Intellectual Vision and Speculation . 186

B. Mirror Imagery and Contemplation 198

C. Knowledge of God through Contemplation 207

D. Intellectual Mysticism 226

CHAPTER V: KNOWLEDGE AS W I S D O M 231

A. Philosophical Wisdom 233

B. Reason and Faith 256

A. References to Classical and Patristic Texts 315

CLEMENT'S W O R K S A N D SOME TRANSLATIONS

STÄHLIN, O , Clemens Alexandrinus (Dei Griechischen Christlichen Schrift-

Editions and Translations

STÄHLIN, O., Clemens von Alexanreia, Ausgewählte Schriften (Protr., Ped.,

ROBERTS, A., D.D., and Donaldson J . , LL.D., Editors, Clement of Alexandria

MONDÉSERT, C , et Plassart, A., Le Protreptique (texte, intr. notes) Ed. Sources

PIERI, A., Stornata, a cura di A. PIERI.

P I E R I , A., Pedagogo, a cura di A. P I E R I .

A. REFERENCES T O CLASSICAL A N D PATRISTIC TEXTS

ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, ed. by F. Susemihl, Lipsiae 1882.

COPLESTON, F., S.J. A History of Philosophy Vol. II. Mediaeval Philosophy

FESTUGIÈRE, A.J., La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste: II. Le Dieu cosmique,

ALLEVI, L., Ellenismo e Cristianesmo, «Vita e Pensiero», Milano 1934, p. 199.

of Plato, ^Classical Quarterly* 10, 1916, pp. 198-205.

«Rech. de Se. Rel.», 31, 1931, p.563.

Studies, 25, 1924, pp. 43-56.

^Classical Quartely» 22, 1928, pp. 129-42,.

FARINELLI, L., Filosofia e Rivelazione in Clemente Alessandrino, «Filosofia e

Basilides, «Harv. Theo. Rev.» 50, 1957, p. 145ff.

An approach to understanding the theory of knowledge