Chinese Studies in History

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The extreme secrecy of the Japanese army’s

“comfort women” system

Li Hongxi

To cite this article: Li Hongxi (2020) The extreme secrecy of the Japanese army’s “comfort
women” system, Chinese Studies in History, 53:1, 28-40, DOI: 10.1080/00094633.2019.1682376

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00094633.2019.1682376

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CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY
2020, VOL. 53, NO. 1, 28–40
https://doi.org/10.1080/00094633.2019.1682376

The extreme secrecy of the Japanese army’s “comfort

women” system
Li Hongxi

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
An extremely important characteristic of the modern Japanese military’s “Comfort women”; Japanese
“comfort women” 慰 安 婦 system was its extreme secrecy. It was realized military; Japanese
through a high degree of tacit “cooperation” between the Japanese military government; invasion
of China
and government. This “cooperation” was mainly manifested in “special
treatment” in various areas such as simplified exit procedures adopted by the
government for the recruiters and recruited “comfort women” during the
Japanese military’s recruitment of “comfort women.” Its extreme secrecy was
mainly manifested as documents on “comfort women” between the Japanese
military and government all having various levels of classification, and the
extreme secrecy of the management of “comfort women” affairs, and their
being cut off from the external world. “Comfort women” were even killed to
cover up the crimes. Owing to the extreme secrecy, many truths about the
Japanese military’s “comfort women” problem are still concealed today.

The problem of the Japanese army’s “comfort women” is a historical problem left over from
World War II that still has not yet been resolved. It not only touches on the issue of compensat-
ing the “comfort women” victims of different countries, but also necessarily involves the issue of
how to more deeply understand Japan’s responsibility for the war and the major issue of the
foundation on which Japan can build mutual relations with different countries of Asia.
There are currently many studies on this topic in the field of history in China and around the
world that have revealed from different perspectives the so-called “comfort stations” 慰 安 所
widely set up by the modern Japanese army while invading China and countries of Southeast
Asia in which women from places such as Korea, mainland China, Taiwan, Southeast Asian
countries, and Japan were forced to perform different inhuman barbaric atrocities. It is worth
noting that there have been many in-depth Chinese academic studies of “comfort women” from a
systemic level. These have mainly explored different aspects such as the causes of the “comfort
women” system, the course of its generation, the types of “comfort stations,” the quantities of
“comfort stations” and “comfort women,” the characteristics of their distribution, and the bar-
baric, cruel, and inhumane nature of the “comfort women” system. There has not been enough
in-depth exploration of the relationship between the Japanese government and military that ran
the “comfort women” system or analysis of the extreme secrecy of the implementation of this sys-
tem. It should be said that in-depth research of these questions would help to not only refute the
fallacy of right-wing Japanese forces denying the “comfort women” system (on the “comfort
women” issue, even though Japanese politicians as represented by Miyazawa Kiichi 宮 澤 喜 一 ,
Murayama Tomiichi 村 山 富 市 , and K
ono Y
ohei 河 野 洋 平 have admitted that the “comfort
women” system was carried out by the Japanese military and government at the time, there is a

Li Hongxi is an associate professor at the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Yanbian University.
Translation ß 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Chinese text “Riben congjun ‘wei’an fu’ zhidu de jiduan yinmixing,”
Riben yanjiu (Japan studies), 2 (2015), by Jeff Keller.
ß 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 29

considerable group of right-wing politicians who very stubbornly insist on denying the system
existed; for example, on June 11, 2005, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology Nakayama Nariaki 中山成彬 stressed at a meeting held in Shizuoka Prefecture that
the issue of military “comfort women” “did not exist at all”; on March 1, 2007, Prime Minister
Abe said, “There is no evidence that the Japanese army kidnaped and managed comfort women”),
but also further clarify the truth behind the “comfort women” system. Internal official Japanese
documents fully reflect the truth of the Japanese government and military involvement in the
“comfort women” system, and in the present article I also use these secret documents and diaries
and memoirs of those involved in an attempt to analyze the features of extreme secrecy in the
implementation of the “comfort women” system.

I. The tacit cooperation between the Japanese military and government in running
the “comfort women” system
From start to end, the characteristics of extreme secrecy of the “comfort women” system came
from the highly tacit cooperative relationship between the Japanese military and government that
was involved in its planning.
The Japanese military refers to the Army Ministry 陸軍省, Navy Ministry 海軍省, General
Staff Office 参謀本部, and the Kwantung Army 関東軍 that comprised the military, as well as
the various expeditionary armies and units. The Japanese government refers to the government in
a broad sense, including the central Japanese government, various local agencies and prefectural
governments, foreign consulates of the government, the Government-General of Korea 朝鮮總督
府 and its provincial governments, and the Government-General of Taiwan 臺灣總督府 and its
prefectural governments.
As for the implementation of the Japanese “comfort women” system, we must first investigate
the issues of how it began and how it later spread. The Japanese scholar Yoshimi Yoshiaki 吉見
義明 believes that the first “comfort station” of the Japanese military was established in Shanghai,
China. In 1931, when navy “comfort stations” were established, they only employed “drinking
girls” 酌婦 and operated three “restaurants” 料理店.1 By 1932, there were a total of 17 Japanese
navy “comfort stations” in Shanghai.2 Even though we still do not know how they were estab-
lished, these were undoubtedly jointly planned and operated by the top staff of the navy stationed
in Shanghai and the Japanese Navy Ministry.
Later, the Japanese military established army “comfort stations” in Shanghai. We should point
out that these were related to the navy “comfort stations.” According to the recollections of
Okabe Naosaburō 岡部直三郎, Senior Staff Officer of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army in 1932,
the Japanese army “comfort station” system was transplanted from the “comfort station” system
of the Japanese navy stationed in Shanghai. Based on the recollections of Okamura Yasuji 岡村寧
次, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army during the January 28, 1932 inci-
dent, the army “comfort stations” were established “because there was an incident in Shanghai in
which Japanese soldier raped a woman,” and “to prevent” such incidents, he requested that the
Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture send a “comfort delegation.”3 Army “comfort stations” were
thereby established in Shanghai. At the time, Okabe Naosaburō , Senior Staff Officer of the
Shanghai Expeditionary Army, believed, “Then we heard of many soldiers wandering around
looking for women and saying lewd things. In this situation it was difficult for the military to
return to its normal state. Therefore, they felt that it would be better to actively prepare some
facilities rather than restrict their behavior. Then they made all sorts of considerations of policies
to resolve sexual issues for soldiers and started to enact them. This task was mainly taken up by
Lieutenant Colonel Nagomi (Toshinori) 永見俊德”4 We can see that the expeditionary army staff
office planned and established the army “comfort stations” and this was directly related to the
government of Nagasaki Prefecture in Japan. The specific operations were carried out by the
30 LI HONGXI

frontline local Japanese military. Soon after this, these “comfort stations” were abolished with the
withdrawal of the Japanese military from Shanghai.
The Japanese military started establishing “comfort stations” widely around China and the
countries of Southeast Asia after the Japanese invasion of China fully broke out in 1937, starting
in Nanjing 南京. Based on the December 11, 1937, diary entry of Shanghai Expeditionary Army
Chief of Staff
Inuma Mamoru 飯沼守, in Nanjing “the comfort facilities were established based
on expeditionary army documents.” On December 19, after the Japanese army entered Nanjing,
“lieutenant colonel Ch
o was assigned to rapidly establish brothels.” This was under the direction
of the Central China Area Army (modern Japanese official documents referred to China as
“Shina” 支那, and the “Central Shina Area Army” referred to the Central China Area Army), and
Lieutenant Colonel Ch
o Isamu 長勇 of that army’s staff department second section was respon-
sible for its implementation.5 The December 8 diary entry of Uemura Toshimichi 上 村 利 道 ,
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, stated that “the army had more and
more illegal incidents,” so “they reviewed the plan of the staff department second section on set-
ting up comfort stations in Nanjing.”6 We can see that from the start, the establishment of
Japanese military “comfort stations” after the complete breakout of the Sino-Japanese was planned
and implemented by the expeditionary army’s staff department. However, there are no records
here of direct contacts between the Japanese military and government. This may be related to
Japanese people “not needing to bring passports to come and go” from China before
August 1937.7
The cooperation between the Japanese military and government in implementing the “comfort
station” system started after the Japanese army took Wuhan 武漢 and occurred during the actual
process of gathering the “comfort women.” The scope of the “comfort station” system increas-
ingly expanded as the invasion of China expanded, and this necessarily involved issues such as
those responsible for gathering the “comfort women” and the exit procedures of the “comfort
women” themselves. Therefore, the Japanese military had to have various contacts with the
Japanese government.
First, let us look at the recruitment of “comfort women” within Japan. On August 31, 1937,
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Horinouchi Kensuke 堀內謙介 issued an important document
to the officers of the National Police Agency, director of the Hokkaid
o 北海道 Agency, prefec-
tural governors, and director of the Kwantung Agency—“Procedures for Travel to Shina”—which
made clear stipulations of the procedures Japanese people had to undergo when traveling to
China. The first of these stipulated that “it is provisionally decided that the police chief with juris-
diction over the place of residence shall issue ID certificates for Japanese people (including
Koreans and Taiwan residents) traveling from mainland Japan and the colonies to Shina”; the
third stipulated that “police chiefs in the port of departure will not allow people to board ships
without ID certificates and passports issued by the local government.”8 This was the first legal
document issued by the Japanese government stipulating that those traveling to China must carry
ID certificates and passports. This was the end of the period of Japanese people being able to
travel to China without completing any procedures.
The first document that directly involved the issue of exit procedures for women for prostitu-
tion purposes was the secret document “Document Prohibiting Women Traveling to Shina,”
issued on February 23, 1938, by the Home Ministry Police Bureau director to the administration
directors and prefecture governors of Japan. It stated that “lately in all areas of Japan there has
been a frequent appearance of people recruiting these types of women,” and “women have left
the country due to their local circumstances or by being forced to.”9 It also stipulated, “I.
Women leaving the country for undesirable professions (prostitution) are women who are
21 years or older, have no sexually transmitted diseases or other diseases, and are prostitutes or
engage in prostitution in other professions,” and their exiting the country “is restricted to travel
to northern Shina (northern China) and central Shina (central China).” The Japanese government
 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 31

“temporarily decided to tolerate their leaving the country” and allowed “issuance of ID certificates
to them.” “III. Women leaving the country for undesirable professions must directly complete ID
certificate procedures with the police station.”10 This shows that the central Japanese government
clearly understood and supported the “comfort women” policy planned by the military, agreed
that they could complete the procedures to travel to China to become “comfort women,” and
required that all levels of government cooperate in enforcing these specific measures.
The first time a local Japanese government got involved in the exit procedures for these types
of women was in April 1938. On April 25, Awaya Senkichi 粟屋仙吉, Governor of Oita
大分
Prefecture, requested guidance from the director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs America
Bureau on the issue of “whether ID certificates could be issued to drinking girls holding certifi-
cates of residence in China or military certificates when recruiting drinking girls” for “comfort
stations” in Jinan 濟南 and other areas of the imperial military.11 The America Bureau Director
replied that “based on the Home Ministry police notice no. 5 from February 23 of this year on
handling travel to Shina, they can be issued ID certificates.”12 This shows that the Japanese gov-
ernment formally implemented these regulations on allowing these “drinking girls” engaged in
“undesirable professions” to travel to China.
Thereafter, the Japanese government’s procedures for giving “special treatment” to Japanese
“comfort women” traveling to China were increasingly simplified. On September 14, 1938, the
Hankou 漢 口 Expeditionary Army and Japanese Consulate General in Hankou held a “liaison
meeting” that passed an “Outline on the Emergency Handling of Japanese People in Hankou After
the Occupation of Hankou.” The third provision of the Outline stipulated that for Japanese people
headed to Hankou, “priority consideration should be given to those who can rapidly start work
after traveling to Hankou”; however, “those traveling to Hankou to open army “comfort stations”
are not subject to this provision.”13 With this kind of “special consideration,” the Japanese army
had established 20 “comfort stations” in Hankou by February 3, 1939. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
America Bureau Director Yoshizawa Seijir
o 吉沢清次郎 said, “these “comfort stations” were estab-
lished by the Japanese army depot and military police (憲兵隊 kenpeitai) with the consent of the
Consulate General.”14 This shows that the Japanese Hankou Expeditionary Army and Consulate
General in Hankou cooperated extremely closely in establishing the “comfort stations.”
Of course, in the course of actually implementing the “comfort women” system, it was difficult
to avoid certain conflicts from arising. On December 3 and December 27, 1939, the Amano 天野
forces in Hankou decided to send someone responsible for recruiting women to Japan to recruit
50 women to establish local “comfort stations.” That person soon recruited 50 women after trav-
eling to Japan and applied to the Kagawa 香 川 Prefecture government for them to travel to
China. In accordance with relevant procedures, for this recruitment the Amano forces should first
notify the Consulate General in Hankou, then the responsible person should obtain a certificate
issued by the Hankou Consulate General, and only then could they apply for the relevant proce-
dures with the Kagawa Prefecture government. This time, the Amano forces did not first notify
the Hankou Consulate General, and the Hankou Consulate General was never aware of this mat-
ter, so of course it could not issue the relevant certificate. This resulted in some conflicts arising
between both sides. Finally, the situation was resolved after the Home Ministry got involved. The
Home Minister felt that “The matter had reached this point, and we had to privately express con-
sent.”15 The Hankou Consul General also said, “As for the Amano forces recruiting comfort
women, even though we could not complete formal procedures with the military, given that these
forces have already performed the recruiting and planned on subsequently admitting to this, we
hope there will be an understanding.”16 This actually reflected some minute procedural conflicts
between the expeditionary army and consulate in China.
Some disputes arose on the Japanese side due to these conflicts. The 1940 “Matters of
Discussion on ‘Provisional Handling of Japanese People Traveling to China’” was such a case.
One important issue here was “What should places without Japanese consulates do if the military
32 LI HONGXI

wants to recruit special women?” The Home Ministry said, “Based on the army’s certificates, they
can obtain certificates at the consulate nearest to the army.”17 The Army Ministry also believed
that even though these “special women” could come to China using the certificates issued by their
local military police, they “hoped that such matters would be handled based on the certificates
issued by the designated consulates.”18 As there were many sides to this issue, it was once
brought up at a Japanese Cabinet meeting. On May 7, 1940, a Japanese Cabinet meeting discussed
this issue and finally decided on a concrete method for handling it, which was “based on the
aims decided at the Cabinet meeting, from now on for those with ID certificates for travel to
China issued by the chief of police,” “if it is for comfort purposes, they must first obtain the con-
sent of the Army and Navy Ministries.”19 This meant that those recruiting “comfort women” had
to first obtain certificates from the Army Ministry of Navy Ministry, and they also had to have a
“Certificate of Reason for Travel to China” and “ID Certificate” issued by the consulate. Clearly,
the close cooperation between the Japanese military and government on the recruitment of
Japanese “comfort women” was not just over a single issue, and already constituted a relatively
standardized operating mechanism that was even raised to the level of a high-level cab-
inet meeting.
Next, let us consider the issue of “comfort women” recruited in Taiwan. In August, 1940, the
Yantian Corps and Hayashi Yoshihide’s 林義秀 forces of the Southern Shina (Southern China)
Area Army planned on establishing “comfort stations” near Nanning 南 甯 in Guangxi 廣 西
Province. To “bring drinking girls” to Taiwan, this force decided to especially send the two peo-
ple responsible for running the unit’s “comfort station” (one was from Kaohsiung 高雄 City and
22 years old; the other information in documents available today about this person is concealed)
to Taiwan for recruiting. This recruiter first arrived in Taiwan for recruiting only carrying a
Certificate issued by Commander Hayashi Yoshihide, and on June 27 he obtained an “Exit
Certificate” issued by Qin County Military Police Detachment Leader Adachi Moichi 足立茂一
and “Drinking Girl Recruitment Certificates” for six women.20 However, in accordance with rele-
vant regulations from March of that year, they could only go to Nanning after receiving a
“Certificate of Reason for Travel to China” sent (mailed) by the Guangdong Consulate nearest to
Nanning. They also would have to wait a long time for this certificate, which would delay the
unit’s plan for establishing “comfort stations.” Therefore, on August 23 the Kaohsiung Governor
Akahori Tetsukichi 赤堀鐵吉 proposed a solution to the Government-General of Taiwan Foreign
Minister. On September 2, Government-General of Taiwan Foreign Minister Chiba Shinichi 千葉
蓁 一 replied, “I feel these personnel working in the comfort stations (comfort women) should
hurry to leave the country.” As this matter was a “special situation,” it “did not require waiting
for the certificate of reason for travel to China”; therefore, “based on the certificate issued by
Commander Hayashi,” the “relevant procedures can be completed.”21 To avoid this shortcoming,
simpler procedures were used after that. On January 14, 1942, Foreign Minister T
og
o Shigenori
東郷茂徳 sent a message to Government-General of Taiwan Foreign Minister Minetani 峰谷 that
said, “As it is very troublesome to issue passports for such people exiting the country, we hope
that consent can be given to their exit based on the military certificates.”22 From then on,
“comfort women” recruited from Taiwan to head to the countries of Southeast Asia did not need
certificates from the regional consulates, and could exit the country based only on military certifi-
cates. We can see the tacit cooperation among the South China Area Army, Government-General
of Taiwan, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Third, let us look at the issue of “comfort women” recruited from Korea. There are very few
sources for this in official Japanese archives. It is very likely that this was related to there being
no need for “ID certificates for travel to China” when going from Korea to Manchukuo 滿洲國
at that time.23 Basically all “comfort women” recruited from Korea at that time headed to north-
east China, and due to the so-called special relationship between Japan and Manchukuo, materials
on procedures completed for such people are not seen in official Japanese documents. There are
 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 33

only statistics on the number of “comfort women” from different locations. For example, after
July 1942, when the Japanese army mobilized 800,000 people to prepare for battle with the Soviet
Union (special drills of the Kwantung Army), Kwantung Army Staff Officer Hara Zenshir
o 原善
四郎 went to Korea to ask the Government-General of Korea to recruit 20,000 “comfort women.”
He recruited around 10,000 (or 8,000) Korean women from the Government-General who were
sent to northeast China (“Manchuria”) and set up and ran special facilities.24 This shows that
“comfort women” were recruited from Korea with the direct cooperation between the Kwantung
Army and Government-General of Korea.
Later, when these women were sent to inner China or southern China, they only needed their
ID certificates from the Government-General. For example, a March 19, 1942, notice from the
Government-General of Korea Police Bureau Chief to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs Korea
Department Director, local police department heads, and personnel stationed around China stated
that a total of 402 “ID certificates for travel to China” were issued to “geishas and prostitutes” (of
which 381 were Korean).25
Fourth, let us consider the issue of “comfort women” recruited from mainland China.
“comfort women” recruited from mainland China different from those recruited from Japan and
Taiwan because they mainly used pro-Japan groups to recruit Chinese people, so the Foreign
Ministry and Home Ministry were not involved. According to the recollection of Sugino Shigeru
杉野茂 of the Stretcher Team Third Unit of the Third Division Medical Corps, the unit battled
in Zhenjiang 鎮江 and Yangzhou 揚州, and on December 18, 1937, they entered Yangzhou city,
but not long thereafter they decided to establish a “comfort station.” Yamano 山野, one of the
founding committee members, together with other committee members and the Chinese
Yangzhou Self-Rule Committee (Public Order Maintenance Committee) recruited 47 Chinese
women and set up a “comfort station” in the fourth floor wooden structure of the L€ uyang Hotel
綠揚旅社.26 After the Japanese army occupied Hengyang 衡陽 in 1944, Military Police Warrant
Officer Yamada Sada 長山田定, who had come to the Baoqing 寶慶 City Detachment in Hunan
Province, was given a task by the Rear Chief Staff Officer of the 116th Division, and using the
excuse of “preventing rape by Japanese soldiers,” he began the task of recruiting “comfort wom-
en.” Later, he ordered a subordinate military police sergeant major to use spies to recruit dozens
of Chinese “comfort women.”27 In this way, the Japanese military “was very active in recruiting
Chinese comfort women behind the front lines of the war.”28
On the whole, the Japanese military (expeditionary army staff departments, Navy Ministry,
and Army Ministry) took the lead in planning and guiding the “comfort women” system, and
this system was implemented with the close cooperation of the Japanese government (Home
Ministry, local governments at all levels, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its overseas consulates,
the Government-General of Korea and its subordinate governments, and the Government-
General of Taiwan and its subordinate governments). This type of cooperation included not only
the problem of recruiting Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese “comfort women,” but also the char-
acteristics of its extreme secrecy. The Japanese military independently decided on the recruitment
of “comfort women” from China and Southeast Asian countries, and the Japanese government
approved of this early on.

II. The extreme secrecy of the entire process of implementing the “comfort
women” system
The extreme secrecy of the “comfort women” system permeated the entire course of its imple-
mentation. This arose from the intentions of the Japanese military and government to use all
available means to preserve its high degree of secrecy. This was mainly manifested in the follow-
ing three regards.
34 LI HONGXI

First, its secrecy was manifested in the handling of documents on “comfort women” that
passed between the Japanese military and government. Such documents all had headers that read
“secret,” “classified,” “top secret,” and “highly classified” to indicate their compulsory designation
as being strictly confidential between the Japanese military and government departments.
Specifically:
“Yonezou Confidential Joint No. 377”: “Document on Banning Undesirable Persons from Travel to Shina”
sent on August 31, 1937 by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Horinouchi Kensuke to the officers of the
National Police Agency, director of the Hokkaid
o Agency, prefectural governors, and director of the
Kwantung Agency.29

“Secret”: “Document on Banning Women from Travel to China (Home Ministry Police Notice No. 5) sent
on February 23, 1938 by the director of the Home Ministry Police Bureau to the administration directors
and prefecture governors (apart from the governor of Tokyo Prefecture).30

“Army Shina Confidential No. 745”: “Document on Recruiting Women to Work in Comfort Stations”
drafted on March 4, 1938 by the Army Ministry Military Affairs Bureau Military Affairs Section.31

“Secret Cable No. 34890”: “Document on Women Traveling to Shina for the Amano Force Comfort Station
of the Hankou Army” sent by Foreign Minister Nomura Kichisabur
o 野 村 吉 三 郎 to Consul-General of
Hankou Hanawa Yoshitaka 花輪義敬 on December 3 and December 27, 1939.32

“Kaohsiung Police Highly Confidential Foreign No. 5692”: August 23, 1940 “Document on Agreeing to
Handle Those Traveling to Regions Across the Strait when Certificates of Reason for Travel to Shina
Cannot Be Obtained” from the Kaohsiung Governor Akahori Tetsukichi to the local Foreign Minister.33

“Top Secret 15th Division Medical No. 28”: “Medical Affairs Bulletin” from December, 1942 to
February, 1943.34

“Personnel Top Secret”: July 15, 1943 “Precautionary Information” No. 6 from the Japanese Army in China
36th Division Headquarters.35

“Military Top Secret”: June, 1942 “Field Diary” of the Japanese Army in China Independent Reserve
Infantry 35th Brigade.36

“Top Secret No. 383”: March 10, 1941 report “Document on Handling Various Statistical Tables (August)
for Those Traveling to China” from the Japanese Consul-General in Guangdong Takao Tomio 高雄富雄 to
Foreign Minister Matsuoka Y
osuke 松岡洋右.37

“Army Asia Secret No. 2112”: “Communique to the Entire Army on STDs Among Officers and Men in the
Greater East Asia War” from Ministry of War Senior Adjutant Kawahara Naokazu 川原直一.38

“Korea Confidential No. 521”: August 29, 1942 “Document on Banning Japanese from Travel to China”
from the director of the Government-General in Korea Police Bureau to the director of the Ministry of
Colonial Affairs Korea Department, the police chiefs of all provinces, and personnel stationed in China.39

Many departments such as the Japanese Army Ministry, Navy Ministry, expeditionary army
forces, Foreign Ministry, overseas consulates, Colonial Affairs Ministry, Home Ministry, domestic
circuits and prefectures, the Police Administration, the Kwantung Administration, the
Government-General of Korea, all Korean provinces, and all Taiwan counties were involved in
such secret documents.
Next, their secrecy was reflected in the strict control of the Japanese military over recruiters of
“comfort women.” Initially, some unrestrained words and actions of these kidnappers of “comfort
women” brought increasing “trouble” to the Japanese military. On March 4, 1938, the
“Communique from the Senior Adjutant to the Chiefs of Staff of the North China Area Army
and Central China Expeditionary Army” by the Army Ministry Military Affairs Bureau Military
 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 35

Affairs Section states that as these recruiters “said things such as they had the understanding of
the military to harm the military’s prestige and lead to misunderstandings among ordinary peo-
ple. Or they wantonly recruited from military reporters and visitors, causing social problems, or
the recruiters used methods near to abduction, leading to investigations by the police.” Therefore,
the Army Ministry demanded that the expeditionary armies “enact true control over the people
they choose to be responsible for such recruiting in the future” and “closely work with the rele-
vant local military police and police to ensure the prestige of the military and avoid social prob-
lems.”40 The Japanese Home Ministry also adopted corresponding measures to strictly control
these recruiting activities. First, “those who said they had the military’s understanding or military
contacts and those whose statements harmed the military’s prestige should be strictly banned.”
Second, “When finding and recruiting women who will leave the country for prostitution pur-
poses, those who make advertisements and use fabricated facts or exaggerated promotions should
be strictly banned. Also, such people who do the finding and recruiting should be strictly investi-
gated, and if they do not have genuine permits and certificates issued by overseas consulates and
are of unknown identity, they should not be allowed to be issued certificates.”41
Third, their secrecy is also reflected in the extremely strict management system adopted by
the Japanese military to prevent external leaks on the internal state of the “comfort stations.”
For example, all “comfort stations” required that outsiders may not arbitrarily enter them,
and “comfort women” could not go out at will, and they also took the measures of regularly
giving physical exams to officers and men in the Japanese military and the “comfort women.”
In particular, as the war in the Pacific was coming to an end, the Japanese military used the
policy of killing “comfort women” to silence them, which further shows their extreme secrecy.
Some were sent into caves and machine gunned down, some were gassed to death in groups,
and some were thrown into wells or buried alive. For example, in the great Battle of Western
Yunnan in 1944, the Chinese military reporter Pan Shizheng wrote in a battlefield report
issued on September 18, “On the morning of September 14, when our forces overtook the
defenses of the last few enemies in Tengchong 騰 衝 , more than 10 women’s corpses were
found in a crack in a wall. Some were in military uniforms, some had on military pants, and
some had on pretty western outfits. The enemy had covered their eyes and gunned them
down in a pile. Some were already decomposing, some had just died, and some were still
moving their hands and feet. It was a cruel sight to behold.”42 There are countless of such
examples. Even after the Japanese Emperor issued the rescript on surrender, “comfort women”
were still being silenced by the Japanese military. On August 29 of the Sh
owa 昭和 20th year
(1945), Commander Ito 伊藤 of the Japanese Army 34th Division ordered in a cable to 18th
Squadron Commander Nokuchi Rokurou 野 口 六 郎 : “It is now verified that the Emperor’s
rescript was finally completed after consultations among the Emperor, War Minister Anami
阿南, Chief of General Staff Umezu 梅津, and Chief of Navy General Staff Toyoda 豊田, and
as military men we should carry out this rescript that we do not desire and surrender to the
military of the nearest local government. But as military men, for the historical image of
Great Japan and the image of its military, you must exterminate all of the comfort women in
comfort camp no. 44532 tomorrow and make sure you leave no trace. It is reported that the
US-led allies plan on setting up an international military tribunal in Tokyo, and the Chinese
government will also establish a military tribunal in China. If we are not careful, we may
bring unnecessary crimes upon the officers on trial.” In this way, to preserve the so-called
historical image of Japan and the image of its military and cover up the crimes of the officers
(class A war criminals), “comfort camp” no. 44532 was wiped out and three villages near the
“comfort camp” were also wiped out. Those who carried out the orders also brought in
flamethrowers and thoroughly burned the corpses of these Chinese “comfort women.”43
Owing to such extreme secrecy, it is very difficult to find documents involving the truth of the
“comfort women” in official Japanese sources today. The result is that we can only gradually clear
36 LI HONGXI

up the truth through the testimonies of the “comfort women” who were victims. The academic
world has considerable research results in this area that we need not recount here.

III. The causes of the extreme secrecy of the “comfort women” system
At the root, there are two causes behind such measures of extreme secrecy adopted by the
Japanese military and government:
The first is that the fact that “comfort women” were forced into service itself is an extremely
inglorious, immoral, inhumane crime. The Japanese army and government were well aware of
this, so they kept it as a dirty “secret” they would never reveal. This “secret” can be divided into
two parts: one is that the Japanese officers and men had no limit to satisfying the “enjoyment” of
their sexual needs, and the other is the “disastrous result” that is hard to express in words of the
Japanese officers and men contracting STDs.
Both the senior Japanese officers and ordinary troops similarly “enjoyed” their sexual needs to
no end. However, there was a distinction between “high and low” in the issue of the means of
their “enjoyment.” According to the regulations of the April 9, 1941, “Daily Orders” of the Third
Independent Mountain Artillery Company of the Japanese Army in China, the schedule of the
“comfort stations” was that ordinary soldiers used them from 9 a.m. to one hour before dinner;
corporals used them from 9 a.m. to one hour before evening roll call; and warrant officers and
above started at roll call and could use them all night. Of course, the fees (consumption) given to
the “comfort women” differed by military rank, and those of higher ranks paid greater fees.
Soldiers paid 1 Japanese yen for up to 30 minutes (plus 0.5 yen for each additional 30 minutes);
corporals paid 1.2 yen for up to 30 minutes (plus 1 yen for each additional 30 minutes); and
higher-ranked officers paid 3 yen for up to an hour (plus 2 yen for each additional hour; if they
stayed the night, they paid 8 more yen if it was after 10 p.m.).44 Use of other “comfort stations”
was mostly the same.
However, within the same “comfort station,” certain “comfort women” (naturally those of
exceptional beauty) would especially service certain high-ranking officers in the Japanese army,
and the other officers and men could not come near them. For example, in the “comfort station”
set up by the Kwantung Army in Dongning 東 甯 County, Heilongjiang Province, there were
around 40 Japanese and Korean “comfort women” in 1944, all of whom underwent training at
“prostitute schools.” The military officials often brought these “comfort women” with them to
banquets. The Korean Kim Sun Ok 金順玉 (22 years old), the prettiest of these “comfort women,”
became the “private property” of a nearly 60-year-old Japanese commander. She was only allowed
to service this officer, and was not allowed at all to come near any other officers.45 Later, as she
became pregnant and had to transfer to the Shimenzi 石門子 “comfort station,” where there were
about 50 Japanese and Korean “comfort women.” Owing to her beauty, she again became the
“private property” of a local senior official.46
There were even special “comfort stations” that only received Japanese officers, and ordinary
soldiers did not dare go near them. For example, the command of the Kwantung Army Fourth
Army 123rd Division established a “military meeting hall” in Sunwu 孫吳, Heilongjiang Province,
and the second floor was an elite “comfort station” that especially received high-ranking officers
and had around 20–30 Japanese and Korean “comfort women.” It was replete with health facili-
ties such as bathtubs, sinks, towels, and soap, and its other facilities were quite high grade at the
time.47 Ordinary soldiers could not come near this place.
As for the unspeakable “disastrous result” of Japanese officers and men contracting sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs), to the Japanese military, this was a very painful and embarrassing
“skeleton in the closet.” In particular, the problem of STDs among the Japanese officers and
men collectively appeared quite broadly and severely, which was embarrassing. How serious,
then, was the problem of STDs in the Japanese military? According to one survey of the Tada
 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 37

多 田 , Fuke 富 家 , and Fukushima 福 島 forces of the North China Area Army from January
1940, more than 7,963 members had been successfully treated, 5,418 were undergoing treatment
(including 26.34% who were infected by Japanese women, 45.31% who were infected by Korean
women, 28.37% who were infected by Chinese women, and 0.02% who were infected by
Westerners), and 2,563 who were infected because they did not wear condoms after drinking.48
The Japanese military doctors felt that as soon as someone contracted an STD, they had to
undergo weeks of hospitalized treatment, and that would impact the fighting force of the
Japanese army.49 Therefore, on June 18, 1942, an Army Ministry “Communique to the Entire
Army on STDs Among Officers and Men in the Greater East Asia War” said, “As officers and
men who participated in the Greater East Asia War return home, if they spread their STD
within Japan, this will not only be a problem for the families of the soldiers returning home, but
also be an enormous problem for Japan’s population policies. We must adopt strict emergency
countermeasures for this.”50 This shows that the STD problem for officers and men in the
Japanese military on the front lines was extremely serious and deep-rooted. Therefore, the
Japanese military adopted even stricter management measures. Due to the severity of the STD
problem, the Japanese military strictly required regular physical exams in the “comfort stations.”
“Comfort stations” in all locations followed these directions. Based on “state of clinical exams
for special “comfort women” in a “Report on Health Work” from December 1942 to February
1943, “comfort stations” in Nanjing, Wuhu 蕪湖, Jintan 金壇, Zhenjiang 鎮江, Chaoxian 巢縣,
and Piaoshui 漂水 were given 3–4 clinical exams. Each day, an average of 628 “comfort women”
were examined and a total of 2,230 people were examined, including 1,074 Japanese, 174
Koreans, and 982 Chinese, and 143 did not pass the exam.51 Furthermore, to strengthen military
discipline, the Japanese military also strictly disciplined those who contracted diseases.
According to July 15, 1943, “Prevention Information” from the Army’s 36th Division Command,
four people who contracted STDs from “Korean brothels” were punished, with one being placed
in light confinement and three being placed in heavy confinement.52
In the course of running the “comfort women” system, there were very many such “secrets” in
the Japanese military, some even more serious than this, but they are not reflected in official
Japanese documents. If these “secrets” were to be exposed to society, they would similarly ser-
iously impact the so-called image of the Japanese military and nation. Therefore, the Japanese
military and government did all they could to cover it up.
Second, they wanted to absolutely avoid mention and disclosure in Japanese and international
public opinion. Japan’s ruling group also was greatly concerned about these horrible deeds being
discovered by society in Japan and around the world. For example, on February 23, 1938, the dir-
ector of the Japanese Home Ministry Police Bureau said in a “Document on Banning Women
from Travel to Shina” to the heads of all Japanese administrations and prefectures that, “Lately
people finding and recruiting these kinds of women have frequently appeared in Japan and
improperly said things like they had the understanding of the military authorities.” Therefore,
“this not only harms the prestige of the empire and reputation of the imperial army, but also
affects all of the country’s people in the rear, and in particular has a negative impact on the sur-
viving families of soldiers in the war.” There also was “no way to guarantee they have not vio-
lated the aims of international treaties on the trafficking of women.”53
This shows that the Japanese Home Ministry and Army Ministry were extremely fearful of
ordinary Japanese people learning about the real situation and creating major “social problems,”
like the “leading to misunderstandings among ordinary people,” as this not only “harmed the
prestige of the Japanese military” and the “nation’s image,” but also would lose the hearts of the
Japanese citizens. It is well known that after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the Japanese mobi-
lized the entire country to “all be of one mind” for the all-out invasion of China. In this situation,
if such an inglorious “secret” were to be exposed in Japan, then it would disperse the domestic
38 LI HONGXI

social forces supporting the war and lead to a weakening of the highly concentrated ruling power
of the ruling group.
The Japanese ruling group was even more worried about international opinion because it
knew full well that this kind of kidnaping of “comfort women” seriously violated international
treaties banning the trafficking of women and children that it had signed itself. There were four
such international treaties: one was an international meeting held in Paris, France, on May 1,
1904, by the major countries of the world on women’s rights and prohibiting the trafficking of
women, which passed the “International Agreement on Banning the Trafficking of Women for
Undesirable Professions”; second, on May 5, 1910, the “International Agreement on Banning the
Trafficking of Women for Undesirable Professions” was passed on the basis of this agreement;
third, on September 30, 1921, various countries signed the “International Agreement on
Prohibiting the Trafficking of Adult Women and Children”; and fourth, on October 11, 1933,
this was further supplemented by the “International Agreement on Prohibiting the Trafficking of
Adult Women for Prostitution” (it did not pass the Japanese Diet). The first three treaties were
signed during the Kat
o Takaaki 加藤高明 cabinet.54 In particular, Article 1 of the 1910 treaty
stipulates, “those who persuade, lure, or abduct minor women (under the age of 21) for the
undesirable profession of meeting the sexual desires of others, even if the women gives her con-
sent, shall still commit a crime.”55
After the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan disregarded these international
treaties that it had entered into, planned and carried out the military “comfort women” system,
and specifically confirmed that Japanese women coming to China to serve as “comfort women”
were 21 years old. On February 23, 1938, the director of the Home Ministry Police Bureau send a
secret document to the heads of all agencies and prefectures stipulating: “Women exiting the
country for prostitution purposes shall be women 21 years or older with no STDs or other dis-
eases who currently are prostitutes or engage in other professions that are actually prostitution
within Japan.” As for where they could go, “at the time they can only go to north Shina (north
China) and central Shina (central China).”56 Even though the Japanese government clearly stipu-
lated the recruited “comfort women” had to be 21 years old, in actuality this provision was not
strictly implemented. On May 12, 1938, Deputy Consul in Shanhaiguan Sasaki Takayoshi 佐佐木
高義 sent a report to Foreign Minister Hirota K
oki 廣田弘毅 that stated: “Three of the four gei-
shas traveling on the 10th of this month from Shanhaiguan to the Beijing restaurant XX
(Asahikawa OO Street O District) were under the age of 21 (respectively aged 16, 17, and 17).”
Also, “Looking at the owner’s business, it is extremely clear that they left the country for prostitu-
tion purposes.” Nevertheless, “As they carried ID certificates issued by the Ashikawa Police Chief,
we had to let them through” and “there were two or three more situations similar to this.”57 Not
only was the situation like this for those recruited in Japan, but also for those recruited in
Taiwan and Korea. For example, the August 23, 1940 report from Kaohsiung Governor Akahori
Tetsukichi to the local Foreign Minister pointed out: six of the women recruited in Kaohsiung
for the “comfort stations” of the Shioda 塩田 forces and Hayashi 林 forces of the South China
Area Army stationed in Qin County, Guangdong Province were minors under 21 years old. In
terms of age, one was 15, two were 16, two were 17, and one was 18.58 Some were even younger
than this. For example, 10 of the “comfort women” in the “comfort station” set up in Chunhua
春化 Township, Hunchun 珲春 County, Jilin 吉林 Province, and the youngest of these was only
14 years old.59
From this, we can see that the modern recruiting of “comfort women” by the Japanese military
seriously violated the provisions of international treaties. If international society knew about the
situation, then the image of the Japanese military and government in international society would
greatly fall and further isolate Japan in international society. The Japanese military and govern-
ment knew this very well, so they adopted all sorts of measures of extreme secrecy in an attempt
to cover up their crimes.
 CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 39

Conclusion
On the whole, the “comfort women” system implemented in modern Japan was promoted and
implemented with highly tacit cooperation with the Japanese military.
In the entire course of implementing the “comfort women” system, the Japanese military
always took a leading and guiding role. The Japanese military first planned how to set up the
“comfort stations” and recruit “comfort women,” and the Japanese military similarly decided
when and where to establish them and when to remove them. However, the Japanese government
did not simply passively accept the “comfort women” system implemented by the Japanese mili-
tary, and actually actively cooperated in the process of implementation. Not only did it give
“special consideration” for exit procedures for recruiters and “comfort women,” but also adopted
strict prohibitive measures of all speech and action harmful to the Japanese military during the
implementation of the “comfort women” system. Therefore, the Japanese military’s “comfort
women” policy was all the more emboldened in its implementation, continually spreading and
universalizing the “comfort women” system. The result was a limitless indulgence and spread of
activities of collective sexual violence from Japanese militarism, and unimaginable ruin of the
respect, minds, and bodies of countless innocent women. To continue promoting and also cover
up this extremely immoral and inhumane crime of the “comfort women” system, there was close
tacit cooperation between the Japanese military and government in promoting the system and
throughout the entire course they adopted various measures to maintain its extreme secrecy. The
characteristic of the extreme secrecy of this system has made it difficult to discover in-depth evi-
dence of the “comfort women” system to this day, making it so the truth behind it has not been
fully revealed.

Funding
The writing of this article was funded by National Social Science Foundation Project “Studies on the Invasion
Activities of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police in China (1884–1949)” [approval no. 14BSS036].

Notes
1. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū (Collected Sources on Military “Comfort Women”) (Tō kyō ,
Japan: Ō tsuki Shoten, 2007): 27.
2. Ibid., 89–90.
3. Inaba Masao, Okamura yasuji taishō shiryō 1 (Sources on General Okamura Yasuji), battlefield meetings
chapter. See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 26.
4. Naosaburō , Okabe Naosaburō Taishō nikki (Diary of General Okabe Naosaburō ), March 14, 1932 entry.
See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 26.
5. See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 28.
6. Ibid., 28–29.
7. Ibid., 96.
8. Ibid., 95–99.
9. Ibid., 102–103.
10. Ibid., 103.
11. Ibid., 108.
12. Ibid., 109.
13. Ibid., 115–116.
14. Ibid., 118.
15. Ibid., 121.
16. Ibid., 122.
17. Ibid., 128.
18. Ibid., 129.
19. Ibid., 124.
20. Ibid., 133–136.
21. Ibid., 130–138.
40 LI HONGXI

22. Ibid., 142–143.

23. Ibid., 47.
24. Shimada Toshihiko, Kantō gun (The Kwantung Army), Senda Kakō , Jū gun ianfu (Military “comfort
women”) main text. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 47.
25. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 155.
26. Third Division Medical Corps Memoir Editorial Committee ed., Daisan shidan eiseitai kaikoroku
(Memoirs of the Third Division Medical Corps). See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 31.
27. Yamada Samadu, Kenpei nikki (Diary of the Military Police). Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 31.
28. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 95–99.
29. Ibid., 102.
30. Ibid., 105–106.
31. Ibid., 121.
32. Ibid., 132–133.
33. Ibid., 271–277.
34. Ibid., 280–282.
35. Ibid., 310–311.
36. Ibid., 158–159.
37. Ibid., 171–172.
38. Ibid., 156–157.
39. Ibid., 105–106.
40. Ibid., 104.
41. Ibid., 236–239.
42. Lu An, “Kangri zhanzheng zhong de Dianxi wei’anfu” (“Comfort Women” in Western Yunnan During
the War of Resistance Against Japan), Dang’an chunqiu (Memories and archives) 6 (2012): 25–28.
43. Wang Yanhua, “Guanyu rijun de ’wei’anfu zhidu’ “(On the Japanese Army’s “Comfort Women” System”),
Qiqihaer shifan xueyuan xuebao (Journal of Qiqihar Normal University) 5 (1995): 127–128.
44. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 256.
45. Jiang Longquan, Bei qiangzheng, bei duozou de renmen (People kidnaped and taken away) (Seoul: Riyue
tushu chuban, 1988): 184–186.
46. Ibid., 184–187.
47. Ibid., 259–260.
48. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jū gun ianfu shiryō shū , 237.
49. Ibid., 237.
50. Ibid., 171–172.
51. Ibid., 271–277.
52. Ibid., 280–282.
53. Ibid., 102–103.
54. Ibid., 34.
55. Ibid., 33–34.
56. Ibid., 103.
57. Ibid., 111.
58. Ibid., 135–136.
59. Jiang Longquan, Bei qiangzheng, bei duozou de renmen, 221.